Labor Case 19
Labor Case 19
Labor Case 19
CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 37689-R and C.A.-
G.R. No. 37690-R modifying that of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR cases 1185 and
1186.
The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is the owner of a 200-hectare coconut plantation located in
Calauan, Laguna. In 1958 his overseer ("katiwala") therein was Gonzalo Belarmino, who took
into the land the 17 respondents under an agreement that the latter were to receive 1/7 portion of
every coconut harvest. Sometime in October, 1962, the petitioner dismissed Belarmino, upon the
suspicion that the latter had been deceiving him, in connivance with the respondents.
On March 2, 1963 Ruperto Alcantara, et al., and Gregorio Espineli (respondents here) filed
separate petitions (subsequently amended) against De los Reyes in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, seeking the delivery to them of the difference between the 1/7 share which the
petitioner had been giving them and the 30% share to which they, as share tenants, were
allegedly entitled. Upon the finding that the respondents were mere agricultural workers of the
petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to retain them as such and to pay them the sum of
P4,559.07 "which is the total of their unpaid share of 1/7 of the net coconut harvests for the
period from September 13 to December 23, 1962 and February 25 to May 28, 1963," plus P500
as attorney's fees. Upon respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
CAR, by declaring the respondents tenants of the petitioner and ordering the latter to pay them
"the difference between the one-seventh (1/7) share of the crops and the thirty (30%) per cent
provided for in the Tenancy Law from the year 1958 up to the filing of the petitions and so on;
the resulting amount for this purpose to be arrived at in a liquidation to be submitted, if and when
this judgment shall have become final and the record remanded to the lower court."
Basically, the petitioner contends that (1) there existed no contractual relationship between him
and the respondents; (2) the respondents were not his tenants; and (3) the decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives him of his property without due process of law.
The respondents attempted to have the present appeal dismissed on the ground that it involves
questions of fact. If indeed the issues posed by the petitioner necessarily invite calibration of the
entire evidence,1 then the appeal should be dismissed since issues only of law may be raised in
an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court.2 It seems to us clear, however, that the
petitioner accepts the findings of fact made by the appellate court, but takes exception to the
conclusions drawn therefrom. Such being the case, the questions here tendered for resolution are
purely of law.3
At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a contract, the petitioner alleging, as
he does, that his consent, express or implied, had never been given. His position, simply stated, is
that at the time the respondents were taken into his land by Belarmino, the latter was a mere
laborer and therefore without the requisite authority to contract in his behalf, and it was only
later that he was promoted to the position of overseer. However, in his "Amended Complaint" of
April 22, 1968,4 the petitioner prayed that "judgment be rendered ... finding the defendants guilty
of a breach of their contractual obligation with the plaintiff," and in the body thereof he
incorporated statements from which it can plainly be seen that a contractual relationship existed
between the parties.
Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the
respondents. In our view the pith of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that of
agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the respondents) or that of farm employer and
agricultural laborer (as asserted by the petitioner). On a determination of this question depends
the respective rights of the parties, more particularly the proper assessment of the share of the
respondents under the law.
It is to be readily deduced from the foregoing definitions that aside from the usual essential
requisites of a contract,8 the characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a
landholder, who is a natural or juridical person and is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of agricultural land,9 and a tenant who, himself and with the aid available from within
his immediate farm household, cultivates the land which is the subject-matter of the tenancy; (2)
the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract is agricultural production;
and (4) the cause or consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide the
agricultural produce between themselves in proportion to their respective contributions.
While the Agricultural Tenancy Act did not define the term "agricultural laborer" or "agricultural
worker," the Agricultural Land Reform Code does. A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage,
salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless
this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and
who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The term includes
"farm laborer and/or farm employees."10 An "agricultural worker" is not a whit different from a
"farm worker."
From the definition of a "farm worker" thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should be an
employer-employee relationship between the "farm employer"11 and the farm worker. In
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally
considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment
of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of
relationship.12
This is not to say that agricultural workers or farm laborers are industrial workers. Not by any
means, although they may both appear in the same establishment. The difference lies in the kind
of work they do. Those whose labor is devoted to purely agricultural work are agricultural
laborers. All others are industrial workers.13 Nonetheless, they belong to the same class. Both are
workers. Both are employees.
We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm employer-farm worker
relationship and an agricultural sharehold tenancy relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but
there the similarity ends. In the former, the lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as
the lessor of his services, and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. 14 In the latter, it is the
landowner who is the lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of agricultural land. As lessee
he has possession of the leased premises.15 But the relationship is more than a mere lease. It is a
special kind of lease, the law referring to it as a "joint undertaking."16 For this reason, not only
the tenancy laws are applicable, but also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of
the place and the civil code provisions on partnership. 17 The share tenant works for that joint
venture. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a
salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.18 On the other hand, the share
tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount
of the harvest.
Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and
employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other
hand, the landholder has the "right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices
which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use
fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements
of the land." This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by
an employer. If landholder and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss
the latter. It is the court that shall settle the conflict according to the best interests of both
parties.19
The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers.
They do not observe set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which
they are supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it
does not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner or his agent.
They do not work in shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the
respondents were and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of
control and supervision evincive of an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the
respondents are guards, then they are not agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions
of a guard are not agricultural in nature.20 It is the Industrial Court that has jurisdiction over any
dispute that might arise between employer and employee. Yet, the petitioner filed his complaint
against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.
We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient characteristics of an
agricultural share tenancy contract. The subject-matter is coconut land, which is considered
agricultural land under both the Agricultural Land Tenancy ACT 21 and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.22 The purpose of the contract is the production of coconuts; the respondents would
receive 1/7 of the harvest. The petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.
The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose
of production23 and he must personally cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land
personally he cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement
of the parties.24
"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various
phrases of farm labor described and provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of
dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of
the growing plants.25 Where the parties agreed that they would "operate a citrus nursery upon the
condition that they would divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of respondents
and 2/3 as share of petitioner," and that the "petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings
and seeds, as well as the technical know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the
budded citrus, while respondents would furnish the land necessary for the nursery, the farm labor
that may be needed to plant and cultivate, and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that
may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the tenancy agreement entered into between the
parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted to the production of
agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties, and as such comes within the purview of
the term 'agricultural tenancy' as defined in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended."26
In one instance,27 the landholder claimed that his caretaker was not an agricultural tenant because
he "does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are
already full grown," and "he does not even do the actual gathering of the fruits" but "merely
supervises the gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to
plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land." This Court's answer was to the point:
Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with the above description of the
relationship. He knows the caretaker, must water the trees, even fertilize them for better
production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests,
etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems
that defendant planted other crops, [i.e., cultivated the lot] giving the landowner his
corresponding share.
The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact. The respondents were called
"kasama." They have plowing implements. The respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a
carabao which he subsequently exchanged for a horse. Almost all of the respondents have
banana plantations on the land. They live in the landholding. They are charge with the obligation
to clean their respective landholdings. Certain portions of the land are planted to palay.
These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 28 Furthermore, the said facts
are supported by the testimony of the petitioner himself, who admitted that the respondents are
his "kasama," although he tried to minimize the effect of this admission by alleging that although
called "kasama," the respondents "do not perform the work of a "kasama," and that in Quezon
the "kasama" plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not do anything." The
appellate court was correct in concluding that "kasama" means "tenant,"29 not worker or laborer,
which is translated into our national language as "manggagawa."30 Respecting farm implements,
the petitioner admitted that "they have the implements," but again he tried to minimize the
significance of his statement by adding that "they have not used it in the farm." However, the
report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his ocular inspection, pertinently states that he found
"certain portions planted with palay."
The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the landholding and that "all of
them have banana plantation, small or big, "though he averred," not one single banana was given
to me as my share."
We now come to the all-important question of whether the respondents have the duty to cultivate
the land in order that the trees would bear more coconuts. The petitioner's answers on cross-
examination are quite revealing. Thus:
A. These laborers clean the land from where . . . They are getting their food and
subsistence.
COURT: The question is that, are they duty bound to clean the landholding in
question?
Undeniably, the petitioner considers it one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the
land. Additionally, in his complaint the petitioner claimed that "the defendants have abandoned
their posts at the plaintiff's plantation and have likewise failed and refused to comply with their
contractual obligation with the plaintiff to keep the areas respectively assigned to them clean
and clear of undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with the result that it is now
impossible for the plaintiff to harvest the mature coconuts as these would only be lost amid the
undergrowth and cogonal which have now grown to unreasonable heights, thereby causing
further damage and prejudice to the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a tenant, especially, to
maintain the land clean and clear "at all times," which not only would facilitate harvesting but,
more importantly, would necessarily result in greater production. As found by the CAR clerk of
court during the ocular inspection,
the planting of palay has a direct effect on the growing of the coconuts because in the
places he found planted with palay, the coconut trees displayed white leaves gray in color
with plenty of nuts or fruits, compared to the portion in the hacienda where we
encountered cogon grasses, under brushes and ipil-ipil tress, there is a need for thorough
cleaning, especially the ipil-ipil trees which are growing high for years already in-
between the rows of coconut trees.32
Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were
to "cultivate" the land. Whether the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual
obligations, does not affect the nature of the contract which the appellate court analyzed and
found to be that of share tenancy. It is the principal features and stipulations which determine the
true essence of a contract.33 Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate
their respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the harvest, the
Court of Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts that the
respondents raise secondary crops and have their homes in their respective holdings.
The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly
cannot be seriously claimed that the relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being
imposed on him without due process of law. It was the petitioner himself who voluntarily entered
the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof, one of which is that
the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce. 34
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject workers are agricultural laborers and therefore employees of the owne
r of the land they work on.
HELD:
On a determination of this question depends the respective rights of the parties, more particularly
the proper assessment of the share of the respondents under the law.
The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers.
They do not observe set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which
they are supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it d
oes not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They
do not work in shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the respondents we
re and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of control and super
vision evincive of an employer-
employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then they are not agricultural l
aborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature. It is the Industr
ial Court that has jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and employee.
Yet, the petitioner filed his complaint against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.