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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2020

BEFORE

THE HON' BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA

WRIT PETITION No.20627/2016(KLR-RR/SUR)

BETWEEN:

1. SRI M. MARIYAPPA
S/O SRI. GOVINDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

2. SRI. K.D CHANGAPPA

S/O SRI. K.P. DEVAIAH
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS

3. SRI. GANGAPPA
S/O SRI. KUPPAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS

PETITIONERS 1 TO 3 ARE
R/AT DODDATOGURU VILLAGE,
BEGUR HOBLI,
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT-560068.
...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI R. B. SADASIVAPPA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
M. S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE-560001.

2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT
KANDAYA BHAVAN,
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2ND FLOOR, K.G. ROAD,

BANGALORE-560009

3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,

BANGALROE URBAN DISTRICT
KANDAYA BHAVAN, K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560001.

4. THE TAHSILDAR
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK
KANDAYA BHAVAN,
K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560001.
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI Y.D. HARSHA, AGA)

****
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 06.02.2016 PASSED BY THE
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU SOUTH SUB-
DIVISION, BENGALURU THAT IS RESPONDENT-3 HEREIN IN
CASE AT ANNEXURE-K ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY

HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:

ORDER

The petitioners have filed the present writ petition

for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order

dated 6.2.2016 passed by the 3rd respondent-Assistant

Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division,

Bengaluru as per Annexure-K and direct the 4th

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respondent to continue the name of the petitioners in

the relevant columns of the computerized RTC extracts

as before.

2. It is the case of petitioners that the land

bearing Sy.No.105 of Doddatoguru village, Begur Hobli,

Bengaluru South Taluk, petitioner No.1 is the owner of

4 acres of land; petitioner No.2 is the owner of 1 acre 2

guntas of land and petitioner No.3 is the owner of 2

acres and they are in physical possession and

enjoyment of their respective lands as absolute owners.

3. The Tahsildar, Bengaluru South Taluk, who is

the 4th respondent granted the above respective lands to

the petitioners by the order dated 19.3.1978 about 38

years ago and saguvali chits dated 21.6.1978 were

issued to the petitioners as per the grant orders and

subsequently, the mutation was effected in the names of

the petitioners in respect of their extent of lands that

were granted to each one of them and the same was

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reflected in the RTC of the new revenue records as per

Annexures-A, B, C and D respectively and inspite of the

same, in the year 2000, when the Revenue Department

introduced computerization of RTC, their names were

left out for no reason. However, the petitioners came to

know that their names were not continued in the RTC

upto the year 2000, though they were in possession and

enjoyment of the lands. Therefore, they made

representation dated 17.1.2010 to enter their names in

the RTC as it stood before.

4. Since the representations were not

considered, the petitioners filed Writ Petition

No.59428/2014 seeking a writ of mandamus directing

the authorities to consider their representations and the

same came to be allowed by the order dated 18.2.2015

and a direction was issued to the 3rd respondent to

consider their representations which were treated as

appeals. The Assistant Commissioner by the order dated

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11.8.2015 allowed the appeals and directed the

Tahsildar to verify the genuineness or otherwise of the

Grant Certificate and also physical possession of the

parties. In pursuance of the order passed by the

Assistant Commissioner, the Tahsildar after holding an

enquiry found that the grant orders are genuine and the

petitioners are in physical possession and enjoyment of

their respective lands and therefore, directed the

Revenue Authorities to delete the name of BDA from

column No.9 of the RTC in respect of Sy.No.105 and to

make necessary correction by entering the names of the

petitioners in pursuance of the order dated 20.10.2015

as per Annexure-H.

5. It is the further case of the petitioners that the

order of the Tahsildar was also implemented in the RTC

for the year 2015-16 as per Annexure-J. When the

things stood thus, the Assistant Commissioner,

Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru on suo-moto

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directed the Tahsildar to show the name of the

Government in the relevant column by cancelling the

mutation order made in favour of the petitioners as per

Annexure-K dated 21.10.2015. Therefore, the

petitioners are before this Court for the relief sought for.

6. The respondents-State has filed objections

justifying the impugned order passed by the Assistant

Commissioner contending that during the pendency of

the appeal, the Tahsildar had mutated the names of the

petitioners in the RTC at Column No.9 and on knowing

that the interim order was operating in Appeal

No.954/2015, the Tahsildar proposed to the Assistant

Commissioner to cancel the names of the petitioners by

letter dated 3.2.2006, Annexure-R1. Accordingly, the

Assistant Commissioner by the order dated 6.2.2006,

initiated action as per Annexure-K in exercise of the

power under the provisions of Section 136(2) of the

Karnataka Land Revenue Act (for short, hereinafter

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referred to as ‘the Act’). It is further contended that if

the petitioners are so aggrieved, they can approach the

Deputy Commissioner, who is the competent authority

to revise the order passed by the Assistant

Commissioner, under the provisions of Section 136(3) of

the Act which is a revisable order, but the petitioner has

approached this Court. Therefore, the petitioners are

not entitled for any relief and sought to dismiss the writ

petition.

7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the

parties to the lis.

8. Sri R.B. Sadasivappa, learned Counsel for the

petitioners contended that the impugned order passed

by the Assistant Commissioner vesting the land with the

State Government is totally without jurisdiction. When

once the Tahsildar has held a detailed enquiry and has

come to the conclusion that the land was granted to the

petitioners, by the order dated 20.10.2015 has directed

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the revenue authorities to delete the name of BDA and

enter the names of the petitioners at Column No.9 in

the RTC in respect of their lands in question, which has

attained finality. Therefore, he contended that the

Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction under the

Act to initiate suo-motu proceedings, and to cancel the

mutation entries which are in the names of the

petitioners and to enter the name of the Government.

He would further contend that when the grant was

made in the year 1978 and proceedings are initiated on

6.2.2016 by the Assistant Commissioner, even

assuming that the Assistant Commissioner has got

power to initiate suo-motu proceedings, is totally

unreasonable and cannot be sustained. Therefore, he

sought to allow the writ petition.

9. Per contra, Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Counsel

for the respondents-State while justifying the impugned

order contended that based on the material on record,

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the Assistant Commissioner has come to the conclusion

that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief.

Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition.

10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the

parties, it is not in dispute that the properties in

question were granted in favour of the petitioners on

19.3.1978; on the basis of the grant, the names of the

petitioners were entered in the revenue records from the

year 1978 upto 2020 and after a lapse of 38 years, the

proceedings are initiated. It is also not in dispute that

on the basis of the direction dated 11.8.2020 issued by

the Assistant Commissioner, the Special Tahsildar

considering the entire material on record issued an

Official Memorandum dated 20.10.2015 to the effect

that after a lapse of 37 years, the grant made in favour

of the petitioners cannot be canceled and cannot be

considered as the Government land, in view of the

dictum of this Court in the case of Shri Anna Rao and

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Others –vs- Gundareddy and Others reported in ILR

1997 Kar. 1998 and therefore, issued a direction to

enter the names of the original grantees in the Khatha

by removing the name of the BDA in column No.9 in the

RTC and revenue records in respect of land bearing

Sy.No.105. The said order passed by the Special

Tahsildar has reached finality in the year 2015. When

the things stood thus, the Assistant Commissioner

initiating suo-motu proceedings on 6.2.2016 and

directing to cancel the mutation in the name of the

petitioners and to enter the name of Government is

totally without jurisdiction. If any such suo-moto

proceedings has to be initiated, it is only the Deputy

Commissioner under the provisions of Section 136(3) of

the Act and not the Assistant Commissioner.

11. The respondents though have filed the

statement of objections, have not produced any material

authorizing the Assistant Commissioner to initiate suo-

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moto proceedings and restore the lands granted in

favour of the petitioners as long back as on 19.3.1978

after a lapse of 38 years. Even assuming for the sake of

argument that the Assistant Commissioner has power

to initiate proceedings should be within a reasonable

period, in the absence of any limitation period

prescribed under the provisions of the Act, the

respondents-State Government has not produced any

material delegating the power to the Assistant

Commissioner to initiate suo-motu proceedings. Even

otherwise, the initiation of proceedings after a lapse of

38 years, cannot be sustained.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in identical

circumstances in the case of Joint Collector Ranga

Reddy District and Another –vs- D. Narsing Rao and

Others reported in (2015)3 SCC 695 relying upon the

dictum in the case of State of Gujarat –vs- Patil Raghav

Natha reported in (1969) 2 SCC 187 while considering

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the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land

Revenue Code, 1879, has held that:-

“Though there is no period of limitation

prescribed under Section 211 to revise
an order made under Section 65 of the
Act, the said power must be exercised in
reasonable time and on the facts of the
case in which the decision arose, the
power came to be exercised more than
one year after the order and that was
held to be too late.”

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court considering the

provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, in

the case of Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil –vs-

Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale reported in (2009)9 SCC

352 at para-11 has held that:-

“It seems to be fairly settled that if a

statute does not prescribe the time-limit
for exercise of revisional power, it does
not mean that such power can be
exercised at any time; rather it should
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be exercised within a reasonable time. It

is so because the law does not expect a
settled thing to be unsettled after a
lapse of long time. Where the legislature
does not provide for any length of time
within which the power of revision is to
be exercised by the authority, suo motu
or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of
such power within reasonable time is
inherent therein. In the said case, the
reasonable period within which the
power of revision would be exercised
was three years under Section 257 of
the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code
subject, of course, to the exceptional
circumstances in a given case, but
surely exercise of revisional power after
a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable
time. Invocation of revisional power by
the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section
257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code is plainly an abuse of process in
the facts and circumstances of the case
assuming that the order of the Tahsildar
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passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and

legally not correct.”

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, reported in

(2018) 12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be

taken within reasonable time, where no period of

limitation specified – even while dealing with beneficial

legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be

ignored lightly where no period of limitation prescribed

and actions initiated after delay and at paragraphs-9,

10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, it has been held as under:

“9. The learned counsel appearing for

the appellants vehemently submitted
that the delay must be overlooked
because the Act is a beneficial piece of
legislation intended to bring relief to
farmers who had been dispossessed
during the proscribed period. The
reliance was placed on a judgment of
this Court in New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance
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Co. Ltd. v.C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 :

2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court
held that in a motor accident which took
place on 18-12-1989, a claim petition
barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995,
after limitation itself was removed from
the statute was maintainable. This
Court held that there could be no resort
to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
even though no period of limitation was
prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held
that the claim petition could not be
rejected at the threshold on the ground
of limitation, after the deletion of sub-
section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided
a period of six months. This view was
taken having regard to the purpose of
the statute. We, however, find that the
judgment relied on has no application to
the present case. It is a settled law
where the statute does not provide for a
period of limitation, the provisions of the
statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time.
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10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P.

Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn.,
“reasonable time” is explained as
follows:
“That is a reasonable time that
preserves to each party the rights
and advantages he possesses
and protects each party from
losses that he ought not to suffer.”
Thus, time must be reckoned
reasonably, not only in order to
preserve rights and advantages a party
possesses, but equally to protect each
party from the losses he ought not to
suffer. Thus, whether an action has
been taken within a reasonable time,
must also be viewed from the point of
view of the party who might suffer
losses.

11. In the instant case, we find that the

High Court had observed as follows:

“The auction-sale took place in

1942, the application for
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restoration of the lands was first

made in 1975 and the appeal
from it was dismissed for default
in 1983. In the meanwhile, the
disputed lands changed hands
twice and were in the possession
of the appellant-writ petitioners
from 1962 and 1986. Such a long-
settled position could only be
upset for some very compelling
reasons and on making out an
extremely strong case for
restoration of the appeal. There is
nothing on record to suggest
anything remotely like that.
Secondly, the action of the
Additional Collector in restoring
the appeal even without any
notice to the appellant-writ
petitioners was clearly illegal and
in contravention of Sections 4 and
5 of the Act.”

The High Court was clearly right in the

view it had taken.
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12. It is argued on behalf of the

appellants that power of the Additional
Collector for restoration of lands could
have been exercised suo motu and since
no limitation was prescribed for exercise
of such power, the delay in this case
may be overlooked. This submission
presupposes that where the power can
be exercised suo motu, such exercise
may be undertaken at any time. The
submission is directly contrary to a
decision of this Court in Collector v. D.
Narsing Rao[Collector v. D. Narsing Rao,
(2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ)
396] where this Court affirmed the view
[Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC
Online AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para
‘17’ of the judgment reads as follows:
(D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D.
Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015)
2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17)
“17. … that the suo motu revision
undertaken after a long lapse of time,
even in the absence of any period of
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limitation was arbitrary and opposed

to the concept of rule of law.”

Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting

this contention.

13. In our view, where no period of

limitation is prescribed, the action must
be taken, whether suo motu or on the
application of the parties, within a
reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is
reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the
purpose of the statute. In the case
before us, we are clear that the action is
grossly delayed and taken beyond
reasonable time, particularly, in view of
the fact that the land was transferred
several times during this period,
obviously, in the faith that it is not
encumbered by any rights.

14. We are of the view that merely

because the legislation is beneficial and
no limitation is prescribed, the rights
acquired by persons cannot be ignored
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lightly and proceedings cannot be

initiated after unreasonable delay as
observed by this Court in Situ
Sahu v. State of Jharkhand[Situ
Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8
SCC 340] .

15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, writ petition

is allowed. The impugned order dated 6.2.2016 passed

by the 3rd respondent-Assistant Commissioner,

Bengaluru South Sub-Division Bengaluru is without

jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed and accordingly,

it is quashed.

Rule is made absolute.

Sd/-
Judge

Nsu/-