1.

G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his
capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

The promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" was concieved by Caltex in 1960 to
drum up patronage for its oil products. It calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period. Employees of the Caltex, its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate
families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. A three-staged winner selection
system is envisioned. The first-prize winner in each station called the “Dealer contest” will then
be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions and the regional first-
prize winners will then be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest".
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. A Petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be
rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of
the public".
RTC:
Contest is not a violation of Postal Law (on appeal)
Issue: WON the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law
Held:
No. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other. Construction,
verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely
non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the issue posed in
this appeal.
As to “lottery”, the term extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: 1. consideration; 2. prize; and 3. chance.
The elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of
contention. Consequently, as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed
down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. The law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly
from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. Reverting
to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the
invitation to participate therein is couched: “No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers,
labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter
the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from — to —,
and win valuable prizes ." Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing
of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution
of property by chance. The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit
derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, is whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of
the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor.
A scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in
which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest —
wanting in consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio( in silence). As to a “gift enterprise”, while an all-embracing concept of
the term is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice
of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is
given a chance to win a prize. As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at
bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of
whether or not they buy the appellee's products. The pertinent jurisprudence is that every case
must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. Taking
this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” is used in association with the
word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of
legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis (the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word as in a statute
or contract should be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the
context) Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term
"gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of
any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to
the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud
orders, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed
matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. Since in gambling it is
inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind
the law can hardly be said to obtain. Decision: Petition herein states a sufficient cause of action
for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
EXTRA INFO:
As to sufficient cause for Declaratory Relief: declaratory relief is available to any person "whose
rights are affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules
of Court) In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter,
laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefore, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

In this case, The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has
the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to
advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the
authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty
to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under
Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable
schemes.

2.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
An appeal for Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, said taxes collected under THE Republic Act No. 590
Under the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil.,
552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes
The Legislature in its in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income
tax is not a diminution of his compensation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, is unconstitutional
[STATCON Question: May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after
the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise?]
Held:
Yes. It is unconstitutional.
Sec 9, Article VIII of our Constitution provides:
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
Construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that
judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in
the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590 to authorize and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act
No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to
be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on
public policy. In the case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court (US) declared
"that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
In this case, when a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office, provided
and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
We reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and
of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided
in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.

STATCON QUESTION/MORE
The fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power
to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends
to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will
have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion
of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there
is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot
shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must
so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the
courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as
used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it
so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as
not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even
annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the
Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative
of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those
governing the separation of powers.
3.
G.R. No. L-21707 March 18, 1967
FELIPE ACAR, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, respondent
The present case involves the alleged violation of Subsection. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free access
to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
Facts:
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten
persons for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar
cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compañia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon
Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged
participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar,
molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions of Republic Act 809.
Plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the aforementioned court authorize
them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that
they had no means, to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on their
daily wages for livehood and possessed of no properties. And in support of the foregoing, the ten
named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of their places of residence
stating that they have no real property declared in their names in said municipalities.
Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an order on
May 27, 1963, denying the same upon the ground that the plaintiffs have regular employment
and sources of income and, thus, cannot be classified as poor or paupers. In denying petitioners'
motion to litigate as paupers, respondent Judge adopted the definition at "pauper" in Black's Law
Dictionary (at p. 1284) as "a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense". And,
as afore-stated, he ruled that petitioners are not that poor.
Issue:
WoN the CFI (RTC) erred in dismissing the petition to litigate in forma pauperis by the
petitioner.
Ruling:
Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suits in forma
pauperis and the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: "Free access to the
courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." As applied to statutes or
provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been
recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact
that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he
has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs" (14 Am. Jur. 31). It
suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the difference between
"paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the latter are "persons who have no property or source of
income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able
to work and in employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, "Indigent", citing People vs.
Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of being indigent that
"pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis.
Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as mentioned earlier, We find this course the most
sensible, logical and practical construction demanded by the free access clause of the
Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not make said provision the living reality that it
is designed to be.
the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named plaintiffs,
suffice it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to bring all the other
9,000 laborers before the court. This Court finds the supporting evidence of indigence adequate,
showing in petitioners' favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent Judge, the right not to be
denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty
Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before
respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate in forma
pauperis. No costs. So ordered.
In re: Class suit
SEC. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court
shall make sure that the parties actually before it is sufficiently numerous and representative so
that all interest concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene
in protection of his individual interest.
Eventhough it was stated that the 10 petitioners were representative of the other 9000 farmers,
the amount of litigation will be handled by the 10 person and not the other 9000. And even if the
14500 docket fee will be handled by the other 9000, the amount of 1.60/each is still burdensome
as the petitioners are only seasonal farm laborers earning barely subsistent wages. And as
pointed out, this is only the initial fee; subsequent fees and charges would have to be paid.
4.
G.R. No. L-21064 February 18, 1970
J.M. TUASON and CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents-appellants.
Petition:
Special civil action for prohibition to nullify a legislative act directing the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate, Quezon City this Court and inquiry into how far Legislative Power under the
constitution to authorize payment of just compensation, expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals may extend.
The Facts:
A legislative act was enacted by the Congress which was Republic Act No. 2616 or "The
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and
Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor."
This statute authorized the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots. The Estate is
usually called the Veterans Subdivision. The Congress enacted this act to solve socio-economic
problems existing within the area as these lot owners have actually paid for the the lots in the
Estate and developed it into a residential area which homes and roads have already been built.
The owners were led to believe that the lots they had purchased from petitioners, as
representatives of the owners of the Veterans Subdivision were purchased in good faith from the
actual owners and petitioners only started this claim against the land upon seeing the
improvements the new owners had introduced to the disputed estate.
Petitioners contend the validity of a statute specifically made applicable to a particular piece of
land, owned by petitioner J. M. Tuason & Co and that the above statute is unconstitutional.
Petitoners also states that their right to due process and equal protection of laws have been
violated by the legislative act which is contrary to the Constitution.
Thus, petitioners had sought the above stated act be declared unconstitutional and preliminary
injunction released against respondents.

RULING
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Held RA NO 2616 as unconstitutional and issued preliminary injunction.
SUPREME COURT
REVERSED the decision of the lower court and writ of prohibition suit is DENIED and
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court SET ASIDE. With costs against petitioner
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT R.A. NO. 2616 UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
(2) WHETHER OR NOT LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT EXCEEDED THE
POWER GRANTED UNTO IT BY THE CONSTITUTION? (STATCON Question)
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WERE VIOLATED?
HELD:
(1) No. R.A. No. 2616 is not unconstitutional.
In the case of Guido v. Rural Progress, the power of the President conferred by statute "to
acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide
the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions
as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants" had occasion to delineate the contours of
the above constitutional provision, reconciling the undoubtedly broad grant of constitutional
authority to Congress with the right of property that might be adversely affected by its exercise.
 Therefore, RA No 2616 is the exercise of State’s power of eminent domain and not
unconstitutional for it is a valid exercise of legislative’s power.

(2) No. Legislative Department acted within its granted power as per stated in the
Constitution. The enacted act is in line with the functions of the Legislative to create laws which
are beneficial for the public.
A prerequisite for the valid exercise of such a congressional power that the taking be for
the public use. This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the expropriation of
land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that finds expression in our fundamental law and so
is the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution.
The greater awareness exhibited by the framers of our Constitution of the social forces at
work when they drafted the fundamental law. To be more specific, they were seriously
concerned with the grave problems of inequality of wealth, with its highly divisive tendency,
resulting in the generous scope accorded the police power and eminent domain prerogatives of
the state, even if the exercise thereof would cover terrain previously thought of as beyond state
control, to promote social justice and the general welfare.
"The Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to be so important to the
maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress and the general welfare that it
not only provided for the expropriation and subdivision of lands but also opened the way for the
limitation of private landholdings (Art. XIII, section 3). It is not for this Court to judge the worth
of these and other social and economic policies expressed by the Constitution; our duty is to
conform to such policies and not to block their realization."
Thus a constitution, to quote from Justice Cardozo, "state or ought to state not rules for
the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future." The words employed by it are not to be
construed to yield fixed and rigid answers but as impressed with the necessary attributes of
flexibility and accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the future
has in store. It is not, in brief, a printed finality but a dynamic process.
The broad grant of congressional power so apparent from the text of the constitutional
provision, the historical background as made clear during the deliberation for the Constitutional
Convention, and the cardinal postulate underlying constitutional construction that its provisions
are not to be interpreted to preclude their being responsive to future needs, the fundamental law
being intended to govern the life of a nation as it unfolds through the ages, the challenged statute
can survive the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary may lend itself susceptible
to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures with social and economic
implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding insistence on the primacy
of property rights, contrary to what the Constitution ordains.
 In no other sphere of judicial activity are judges called upon to transcend personal
predilections and private notions of policy, lest legislation intended to bring to fruition the hope
of a better life for the great masses of our people, as embodied in the social justice principle of
which this constitutional provision under scrutiny is a manifestation, be unjustifiably stricken
down.
Therefore, the Congress acting on behalf of the people with power granted unto it by both
the State and its Constitution did not exceed in its exercise of power upon enactment of RA No.
2616 for its served a public purpose of social and economic problem.
(3) No. Their right to due process and equal protection of laws was not violated for upon
expropriation of the estate as per the eminent domain powers of the State they shall receive just
compensation. As for their property rights, State has enacted its power of eminent domain and
not unless Government will not pay them can they say that their rights have been violated. In
view of equity, their fraudulent act of misleading the public in the purchase of the subdivided
lots have been considered as this act of them if allowed shall cause major social and economic
problems. The Constitution is enacted for the benefit of the public not just for one person. As
such allowance would cause oppression and encourage economic enslavement by the public be
tolerated, the Government voted for the expropriation of the lands to the owners who had in good
faith purchased the subdivided lots from petitioners.
In the course of the expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a judicial
determination as to the party entitled to the just compensation. As of now then, such a question
would appear at the very least to be premature. Reference is likewise made as to the effect of the
authorized expropriation on those purchasers of lots located in the Tatalon Estate. Again, on the
occasion of the expropriation, whatever contractual rights might he possessed by vendors and
vendees could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional protection.
It could thus determine what lands would first be the subject of expropriation. This it did
under the challenged legislative act. As already noted, Congress was moved to act in view of
what it considered a serious social and economic problem. The solution which for it was the
most acceptable was the authorization of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. So it provided
under the statute in question. It was confronted with a situation that called for correction, and the
legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it
stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize
its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying
the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that "the
legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of "all or none". Thus, to
reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of equal protection clause is not attended with success
 Therefore, since Government will observe to exercise its power within the limits
provided by the Constitution and as rights alleged violated have no sufficient evidence nor proof
of violation, no right therefore has been compromised by the enactment of RA No. 2616.

5.
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Facts:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer
Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws.
When the deed of sale was presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the
petitioner was required, as corporation sole to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of
the members thereof were Filipino citizens. The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954,
expressed willingness to submit an affidavit and the totality of the Catholic population of Davao
would become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the
document, proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after the
petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September 21,
1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the
absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizen. Therefore, ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale
in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition. There being no question that the
present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was
instituted with this Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law as
well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in
favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to
acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship,
and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside the resolution of the Land
Registration Commissioner in question.

Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship

of its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. Canon Law
also specified that church temporalities are owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or
by the diocess as minor "moral persons" with the ordinary or bishop as administrator. Petitioner
presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of
that year, Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was,
therefore, allowed that the constitutional requirement was fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is
not the owner of the land purchased, yet he has control over the same, exercising all rights of
ownership over the properties. The respondents instead tried to prove that in reality, the
beneficiary of ecclesiastical properties are not members or faithful of the church but someone
else.
Corporation sole - of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities
and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have
had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their
several chapters.
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and
sustain the stand of petitioner. That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as
the case may be, as corporation's sole are merely administrators of the church properties that
come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for the church. Church properties acquired
by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not his personal
heirs but to his successor in office. ownership of these temporalities logically fall and develop
upon the church, diocese or congregation acquiring the same.
To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the
citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding
the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become members of that religious
society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. every Roman Catholic Church in different
countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of
the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges
granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the
personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines,
or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to
the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution or whether or not the petitioner in this
case can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain.

Held:
Yes. We find that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a
corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally to administer its temporalities and manage its
properties. Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of incorporation were
reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948.
Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549 provides that a corporation sole is organized and
composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church, for the
ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of such society or church. And Section 159 provides,
any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal; property for its church,
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of such
purposes. That the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the power
exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes
is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned represented by
said corporation sole. As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes may be
subject of registration, and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to register
lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its name.
Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every
corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the necessary
power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it
exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of the nationality
of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the bishop of the dioceses. The Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations sole
when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
Corporations sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all.
Corporations sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Philippines.
Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and hold real
as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion of the objects for which said
corporation sole is created. It could be distilled from the foregoing that the framers of the
Constitution intended said provisions as barrier for foreigners or corporations financed by such
foreigners to acquire, exploit and develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth
for our people to clear and enrich when they are already prepared and capable of doing so. No
mention nor allusion whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the
liability of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands.

The population of the Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In the
practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in need of more temples where to
pray, more schools where the children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of
their religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more hallow or consecrated
grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually existing
at the time of the enactment of our Constitution.
The court has reason to believe that when the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
drafted and approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind the corporation
sole.
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September
21, 1954 is hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent Register of Deeds of the City of
Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present litigation.

Statutory Issue.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem we are confronted with in this appeal,
hinges around the necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution. Let us then be guided by the principles of statutory construction laid
down by the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom
the constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words employed are to be
taken in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given their technical
meaning. Among the more important of these are consideration of the history of the times when
the provision was adopted and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of
constitutional convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the
legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve,
but not to create, ambiguities. The interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing
conceptions of political and social values.
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistent
with the general objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statute
the courts rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usually
applied where the effect of literal interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the
words of one court, the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'.
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from
the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great length
of time, and it is progressive and not static.
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language
used and that construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or
purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted. It is quite generally
held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be broad or liberal or
equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that intent, rather than technical.
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in
mind the corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said
Article XIII when they passed and approved the same.

6.
G.R. No. 126280 March 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ROGER GULPE and RICARDO VIGAS, appellants.
Appellants Roger Gulpe (Gulpe) and Ricardo Vigas (Vigas) were convicted of the crime of Rape
with Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City (RTC).1 Appellants do not assail their
conviction, but have filed the present petition to reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals’
ruling which increased the penalty imposed upon them.
Based on eyewitness accounts,2 in the afternoon of June 30, 1990, in Sitio Iraya, San Pedro,
Iriga City, at about 4:00 o’clock, Gulpe was seen having sexual intercourse with the seven-year-
old victim Lenly Ranola (Lenly). While this was happening, Vigas was holding down Lenly’s
right shoulder with his right hand, pinning her left shoulder on the ground with his left elbow and
covering her mouth with his left hand. Thereafter, Gulpe exchanged positions with Vigas and the
latter was then seen having sexual intercourse with Lenly while the other appellant was holding
her down. When Vigas finished having sex with Lenly, they called for Villaruel, Jr., a co-
accused who was acquitted. Villaruel, Jr., however, left. Vigas then got a piece of bamboo and
stabbed the victim with it, causing her death.
The crime of Rape with Homicide carried with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.3 However, considering that at the time the crime was
committed, on June 30, 1992, the death penalty had been reduced to reclusion perpetua by
Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution and that Gulpe and Vigas were then 17 years old
and 16 years old, respectively, the RTC appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority in their favor and reduced appellants’ penalty by one degree lower from reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, appellants were sentenced each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed. It opined that, even before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659,4 the penalty prescribed for the special complex crime of
Rape with Homicide was already death but death could not be imposed only because the
Constitution had proscribed its imposition. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not consider the
death penalty abolished but as, in a sense, "in a state of hibernation."5
Since the death penalty was not abolished, the Court of Appeals concluded that in offenses where
the death penalty is prescribed, it must still be reckoned with in determining the imposable
penalty. In the present case, since the penalty for Rape with Homicide is death, the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should reduce the penalty by one degree
lower from death. Consequently, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the RTC and
imposed upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals is correct.

The issue in this case has already been discussed and resolved in People v. Quintori,6 to wit:
…[W]hile the trial court was correct in ruling that the prescribed penalty for rape was death, but
that it could not, however, be imposed in view of the prohibition in Section 19(1) of Article III of
the Constitution, the RTC nevertheless erred in reasoning that the prescribed penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua, hence, the penalty next lower in degree was reclusion temporal.
In People v. Munoz, [170 SCRA 107 (1989)] we ruled that the constitutional prohibition did not
alter the periods for the penalty for murder for purposes of determining the proper imposable
penalty, i.e., the intent of the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death
penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. The same thing may be said as regards rape
with homicide. The penalty of death provided under the governing law then was deemed reduced
to reclusion perpetua; however, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be reckoned
with… (underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly increased appellants’ penalty to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.