STATCON CASES

A. Definition of Statutory Construction

CALTEX INC. v. ENRICO PALOMAR, GR No. L-19650, 1966-09-29

Facts:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived
and laid the ground-work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its
oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for... participants therein
to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations
were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for...
mailing

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored
to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of... the
Postal Law.

Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance

. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the...

foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration on the part of any
contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery.

Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case

seven... years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his
view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960
not... only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well
threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it
(Caltex) and all its representatives".

Issues:

whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the

Postal Law.

Ruling:

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are
too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently, as the
appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the...
element of consideration therein.

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to

1
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry
form... which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing
of the winner

Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.

The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is
whether the participant pays a valuable consideration... for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of
the prize.

"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be
administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.

In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only... if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may
not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Principles:

The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-
mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny... the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are
too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently, as the
appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the...
element of consideration therein

2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and
laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by
the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the
next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle
and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with
batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the
qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-
prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the
national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second;
Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the

following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the

3
 Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining
to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company
is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that
any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining
money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any
postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing
the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the
outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such
person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person
or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of
any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent
of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a
firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the
return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn
in favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was
not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion
rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217,
Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned
by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for
purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a
fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After
issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules
marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent
has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

4
The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether
the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the
proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in
seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to
any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now
section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to
wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs.
The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R.
No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein
states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases
thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some
consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to
avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In
contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law,
admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid
out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties
in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found
expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue
of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the
appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request.
A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were
exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only
by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by
the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud
order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge
thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned
a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a
real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests
are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the
issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant,
the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to
uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by
the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled
and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is
long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if
any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was

5
translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz.,
251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given
set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory
relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the
circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the
matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is
the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the
scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.
To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand
can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to
a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed.
Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has
taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate
resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety — nay, the
necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the
language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in
22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has
been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a
final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law
apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and
uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with
the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the
appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed
censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is
constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit
of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object
(section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see
in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down
in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory
judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than
this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect,
judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty
bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution
of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held

6
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis
vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc.
vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-
mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue
posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc.
vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do
with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends
to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
(Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194
U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction
Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in
the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms —

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from
the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in
which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus —

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to
buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the
hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from — to —, and win valuable
prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A
prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction,
"look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra,

7
p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege
to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the
use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly
needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value. 1awphîl.nèt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would
naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged
to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The
required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.)
788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the
prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that
of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive,
some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not
supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App.,
98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law.

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally
prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of
consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve
its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the
appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the
Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the
determination of whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have
found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit
words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the
term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850;
34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs.
Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs.
State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot
embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed
within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think
that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings
there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of
the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs.
States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114
Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a

8
lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite
elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113
Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.,
2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S.,
1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration
or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs.
State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson
that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with
the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle
of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature
of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to
the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud
orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As
applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals
(Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that
something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that
where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or
indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded
to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore
examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if,
like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in
question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.

9
B. Purpose of Construction
City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969

Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the
reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The
land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961,
Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On
the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening
on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in
RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land,
they have standing on the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain
Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public
Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the
Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account
of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public
domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding
the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which
should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be
followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the
petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be
omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J.
BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

10
1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O
for petitioners.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged
contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year
period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published; and
(3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under
Republic Act 931. The facts follow:

On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No.
1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court
of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan Psu-
186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case
on November 13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in actual,
open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate
Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file
their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr.,
and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm
lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square
meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square
meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to
intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962
in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that
such tree farm leases were null and void.

On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory
relief judgment did not bind them, for they were not parties to that action.

On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed
petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent Lutes.

On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his
reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening.
A motion to reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.

On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition
to reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They
maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those
not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private
petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.

11
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6,
1964 motion to dismiss made by private petitioners.

On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral court's
jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private
petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P500-
bond.

Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that
petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the
appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of
the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.

Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the
petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due
course.

1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?

First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads —

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN

CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE
FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides —

SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper
court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 2 after the date on which
this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-
two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent
Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after
hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes,
interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day when
the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels. 3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case
where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that
although Section 34, Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind
of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... nevertheless ... the opposition
must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all
subordinate to, the rights of the Government."5 The opposition, according to the Leyva decision,
"must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public
domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives
of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon
it."

But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of
ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute

12
R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"
or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right,
however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right is
thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from
the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reopen
has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper.

This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening
petition there filed was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land
holding revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the petition in that Case
because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by the government
to private persons.

Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but
through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of
R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the
reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the
mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that
may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening petition?
R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is that, with the fact
of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this
standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.

The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent
when we take stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the land
affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the
purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they are
persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees,
then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is
leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a
petition for reopening. 10

In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the
cadastral court should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on the
merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as
lessees to be threshed out in that court.

We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the
necessary personality to intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.

2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have
been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act.

To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro
vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there
held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition
for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia — was already embraced in the
cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court
already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be
published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.

Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision
in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved
was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of fact.

13
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over
petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.

3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to
reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes?

The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April
12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen
on July 25, 1961.

It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper
court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been
declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of
land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus
appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.

It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No
charge has been made hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional
injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched in
constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts
unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot
be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.

This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away
from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office
of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the
words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the,
purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the
law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention
of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not
"correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17

It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in
the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative
intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason
therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to
legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific
constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by
the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative
intention." 22

With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take
another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE
PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO
PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL
OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. 23 It
expresses in language clear the very substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that
Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.

14
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid — from
which surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body — attended
Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same
language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the
legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a
chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility the
wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more
thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional
regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in
the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." 25 Reliance,
therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in
some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all the more
valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the House
from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it
authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." That
title is written "in capital letters" — by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be
classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature
speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from
R.A. 931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted from the
body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In
line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as
part of the rules or provisions expressed in the body. 30 At the very least, the words "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in
Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."

Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must
give to the statute does not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this,
because of the principle long accepted that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of
liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of
remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act,
had no legal means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note
thereof, which reads:

This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest
in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for
failure of said person or claimant to present his claim within the time prescribed by law.

There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not
had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in
the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons
and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or
claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.

This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or
claimants with meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and
protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court.
Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to
hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal
technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation.

15
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be
filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on
which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period. lawphi1.nêt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's
orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null
and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed
accordingly. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part..

Footnotes

City of Baguio, et al., Petitioners, versus Hon. Pio R. Marcos, et al., Respondents, CA-
1

G.R. No. 34909-R.

2
Extended until December 31, 1968 by Republic Act 2061, effective June 13, 1958.

3
Emphasis supplied.

4
The text of Section 34, Act No. 496, as ammended reads: "Any person claiming an
interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before
the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer
shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by
the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and
sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf."

5
See also: Aduan vs. Alba, L-17046, April 25, 1961.

6
Emphasis supplied.

On the Director of Lands is primarily lodged the power of executive control,

7

administration, management, distribution and disposition of public lands, Director of

Lands vs. Lim, 91 Phil. 912; Mari vs. Secretary, 92 Phil. 410, 414; Kiamko vs. Maceren,
92 Phil. 1057, 1060; Lubugan vs. Castrillo, 101 Phil. 1229, 1230; Municipality of San
Carlos vs. Morfe, L-17990, July 24, 1962; Jamisola vs. Ballesteros, L-17466, September
18, 1965; Ganitano vs. Secretary, L-21167, March 31, 1966.

8
Rule 143, Rules of Court, provides: "These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient." Emphasis supplied.

9
Section 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court.
10
See: De Castro vs. Marcos, L-26093, January 27, 1969.
11
I Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, 1961 ed., P. 412, citing Santiago
vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil. 438 and Phil. Ass'n. of Col & Univ. vs. Secretary of Education,
51 O.G. 6230.
12
Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2nd ed., p. 11.
13
82 C.J.S., p. 526.
14
Sedalia vs. Smith, 104 S.W. 15, 19.
15
Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, February 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 613.
16
Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
17
Id.

16
 18
C.J.S., p. 731. See: Commissioner of Customs vs. Relunia, L- 11960. May 29, 1959.
19
Bell vs. New York, 11 N.E. 495, 497, citing Smith vs. People, 47 N.Y. 330: People vs.
Davenport 91 N.Y., 574.
20
82 C.J.S., p. 734, See: Pruitt vs. Sebastian Country Cole and Mining Co., 222 S.W. 2d.
50, 57, citing Reynaldo vs. Holland. 35 Ark. 56.
21
Section 21(1), Article VI, Constitution; emphasis supplied.
22
37 A.L.R., p. 952, citing Joyce vs. Woods, 78 Ky. 386. See also p. 937, referring
to O'Connor vs. Nova Scotia Teleph. Co. 22 Can. S.C. 276, reversing 23 N.S. 509.
23
Cf . People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499, 504, which in substance held that "mere
catchwords" cannot control the body of the statute, which is otherwise unambiguous.
24
Sedalia vs. Smith, supra, at pp. 19-20.
25
Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28089, October 25, 1967.
26
Sedalia vs. Smith, supra, at p. 20.
27
See: Congressional Record (House of Representatives), vol. II, Second Congress,
Second Regular Session, pp. 1921-1922.
28
See: Congressional Record (Senate), vol. IV; Second Congress, Fourth Session, pp.
1108-1109.
29
Berger vs. Jackson, 23 So. 2d. 265, 267.
30
See: People vs. Lamphier, 172 N.Y.S. 247, 248-249; Newman vs. Newman, 91 N.Y.S.
2d. 330, 331.
31
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 530; Rodrigo vs. Cantor
(unreported), L-4398, May 28, 1952, 91 Phil. 918; Maniego vs. Castelo, 101 Phil. 293,
296, citing Sibulo vs. Altar, 83 Phil. 513.

C. When construction is resorted to:

Garcia v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007

D. Characteristics of Construction
Alonzo v. IAC, G.R. No. 728723, May 28, 1987

E. Limitations of judicial construction

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

F. Related Legal Principles

a. Separation of Powers
b. Checks and Balances
c. Hierarchy of Laws
Civil Code, Article 7
d. Stare Decisis
Civil Code, Article 8
Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288, August 1, 2018

17