Fortune Corp v.

CA

Facts:
 An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation against
respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City
 After respondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with written
interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.
 The interrogatories were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman,
Juanito A. Teope.
 On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination dated March 26, 1992, notifying the latter that on April 7,
1992, at San Pablo City, herein petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A.
Teope, in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24.
 Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to
Plaintiff's Notice To Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, dated March 27, 1992,
alleging inter alia that:
o (a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the
written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and
defenses in the case;
o (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the
oral deposition;
o (c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the
prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope;
o (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and
o (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the
trial on the merits.
 The trial court thereafter issued an order that the requested deposition shall not be taken for
the following reasons:
o the Court opines that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope, appears unwarranted since
the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories of the
plaintiff and
o that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court
o to allow the deposition will deprive the Court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory
questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness.
 Its MR having been denied, petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC.
However, the SC referred the case to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the
merits.
 Respondent CA, dismissed the petition and held that Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court imply that the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not
absolute.
o “sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, (which) are precisely designed to protect parties and
their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their
depositions under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy,
embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions expressly authorize
the court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop one that is already being
taken. “

Issue: W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the deposition? – YES
Ruling:

 Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown
that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is
to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a
substantial reason — one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons
exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining the
question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown."
 In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good
cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken, for several
reasons.
 We agree with petitioner's submission that the fact that petitioner had previously availed of
the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims,
counterclaims and defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause", because: (a)
the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by answers to
interrogatories does not bar an examination before trial, and is not a valid objection to the
taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the examining party is not acting in
bad faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed
deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.
 As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the
litigants with information essential to the expeditious and proper litigation of each of the facts
in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as
provided for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or
mutually exclusive.
 It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party
has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other
discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court,
or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to
resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. Additional lines
of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been taken, as to which written
interrogatories probably would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party
should not be entitled to obtain all the relevant information he desires if no substantial
prejudice is done to the party from whom discovery is sought. On the other hand,
interrogatories may well be used as a preliminary to the taking of depositions, in order to
ascertain what individuals have the information sought. And, of course, if the answers to
interrogatories are evasive and unsatisfactory, the interrogating party should be able to
utilize the more effective method of oral examination rather than have to reframe
interrogatories. Ordinarily, however, there will be no occasion for a party to use both
methods at the same time, at least to obtain the same information.
 The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause"
to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to
attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court
during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of
his deposition.
 We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere fact that the court could
not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify the denial of the right to
take deposition. As we have already explained:
o The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition
were taken, the court could not observe the behavior of the deponents. The
insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of the
 deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could
ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In
other words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying
the right to take depositions, and therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of
Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the
framers of section 16 of the same rule.
 Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy,
harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice
to take deposition.
 Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may
be issued if the following requirements are complied with: 
o (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; 
o (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
o (c) that there is good cause shown; and
o (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. 
 Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party objecting to show that the
discovery requested is not relevant to the issues,  and to establish the existence of any
claimed privilege.  These, private respondent has failed to do so. Consequently, its objection
to the taking of the deposition cannot be sustained.
 Furthermore, the fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City, whereas the
proposed deponent lives in Manila, is not sufficient to establish private respondent's theory
that the requested deposition was intended to annoy and harass the proposed deponent.
 Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the
taking of his deposition.  No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to be
examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to
examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.  The
mere fact that an officer of private respondent would be required to attend the examination
and thereby absent himself from some of his usual business affairs during the taking of the
deposition is utterly insufficient to justify the court in ruling that he is being annoyed,
embarrassed or oppressed, within the meaning of this language. Something far beyond this
is required in this connection to grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has signified its
willingness to select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the deposition in order to
accommodate the proposed deponent. 
 On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be
taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of