TEAM CODE -

LATE KUSUMTAI CHAVAN 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020.

IN THE MATTER BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

IN THE MATTER OF

M. BANERJEE ND ORS. …PETITONER

V.

UNION OF INDICA …RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETETIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... 4

STATEMENTS OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 6

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................... 7

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 8

ISSUE: 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 8

ISSUE: 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 8

ISSUE: 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 8

ISSUE: 4 ...................................................................................................................................... 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................... 9

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ...................................................................................................... 10

I. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 14. ............................................................................................................................ 10

II. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 19. ............................................................................................................................ 13

III. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 21 ............................................................................................................................. 16

IV. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION. ............ 18

PRAYER ....................................................................................................................................... 21

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S. NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

1. AIR ALL INDIA REPORT
2. ANR. ANOTHER
3. U/S. UNDER SECTION
4. ITA INDIAN TELEGRAPH ACT
5. HON’BLE HONOURABLE
6. GOVT. GOVERNMENT
7. INDLAW INDIA LAW

8. SEC. SECTION
9. LNIND LEXIS NEXIS INDIA

10. GUD. GUDIGUDI

11. BOM BOMBAY
12. IT ACT. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT.
13. ORS. OTHERS
14. P. PAGE
15. PIL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

16. SC SUPREME COURT

17. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

18. ART. ARTICLE

19. U.T. UNION TERRITORIES

20. S.C.R. SUPRERME COURT RECORDS

21. NY. NEWYORK

22. v. VERSUS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 ........................................................................... 14
Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI, 2020 1 MLJ 574. ................................................................................. 21
AnuradhaBhasin and Ors. Vs. Union of India .............................................................................. 17
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34 ............................................................. 11
BabulalParate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884. .......................................................... 19
Bachansingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336.................................................................... 14
BudhanChoudhry v. State of BiharAIR 1955 SC 191. ................................................................. 11
Chintamanrao v. state of Madhya Pradesh , AIR 1951 SC 118. ................................................... 15
District register and collector v. Canara bank, AIR 2005 SC 186 ............................................... 12
District register and collector v. Canara bank, AIR 2005 SC 186 ................................................ 14
EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 .............................................................. 14
Fedco (P) Ltd. Bilgrami,S.N., AIR 1960 SC 415. ........................................................................ 20
Gaurav Sureshbhai Vyas v. State of Gujarat, C/WPPIL/191/2015............................................... 19
Indian Express v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641. ............................................................ 18, 21
Jan Md., Noor Mohammad Begam v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 385. ................................. 20
Julian J Robinson v.The Attorney General of Jamaica; Justice K.S Puttaswamy and Ors. V.
Union of India and Ors. AIR 2017 SC 4161 ............................................................................. 22
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. v. UOI and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 4161 ..................................... 21
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 ..................................................................... 20
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 ................................................................... 14
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal,
(1995) 2 SCC 161; ..................................................................................................................... 19
Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh. (1969) 1 SCC 853. ............................................ 16
Municipal Corporation v. Jan. Md. Usmanbhai, AIR 1986 SC 1205. ......................................... 20
Nar Pal Singh v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 1401 ................................................................................... 21
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430. ............................................................... 20
Natural resource allocation, Re Special Reference Number 1 Of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 (77 .... 11
P.P Enterprises v. UOI, (1982) 2 SCC 33. .................................................................................... 13
PUCL v. UOI, (2003) 4 SCC 399. ................................................................................................ 16
Ramdhandas v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1559. ................................................................... 20
ShreyaSingal v. UOI (2015) 5 SCC 1. .......................................................................................... 19

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Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC .......................................................................... 18

State of Karnataka v. associated management of (Govt. Recognized – Unaided – English
Medium) Primary and Secondary Schools, (2014) 9 SCC 485. ................................................ 14
State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157. ................................ 20
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh,(1999) 7 SCC 89. ........................................ 13
Thommen J, in Indira Sawhney v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477. ........................................................ 11

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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STATEMENTS OF FACTS

-: FACTUAL BACKGROUND :-

❖ The Union of Indica comprises of 29 states and 9 Union territories in which each territory
enjoys certain degree of autonomy and control over the affairs within its jurisdiction. The
Union Territory of Gudigudi is a dominion falling under the control of Union of Indica. The
outbreak of communal violence and anti-national activities are quite frequent in the
territory because of its social structure. On one occasion, a WhatsOn message disparaged a
particular religion causing severe unrest among the locals. Flowing of the said message
through different social media sites and applications ultimately caused protests and
subsequently some incidences of unrest in the territory.

-: PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:-
❖ Following this, the Union of Indica imposed certain restrictions in the territory of Gudigudi to
maintain law and order. The government not only suspended the freedom of movement but
also imposed a complete ban on the Internet services along with certain other rights throughout
the territory. This decision of the Government adversely affected communication, net banking,
voice calls, SMS, tourism, day-to-day business activities etc. Banking services were also
disrupted. Online traders suffered loss of business profit. The universities had to postpone their
exams due to non-availability of internet facility. Students were unable to submit various
exams forms within scheduled time limit. The needy were unable to withdraw money from
ATMs in time. Due to all these issues many people faced irreparable losses.

-:CURRENT SCENARIO:-
❖ Being aggrieved by this decision of the Government and the hardships faced the common
people, various petitions were filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article
32 of the Constitution of Indica seeking issuance of appropriate writs, to compensate for losses
suffered, for setting aside or quashing the order of suspension of internet service in the UT and
to restore all modes of communication. Looking into the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
clubbed all the petitions as the present one. In addition to this the Hon’ble Supreme Court
issued a show cause notice to the Union of Indica. In reply to which, the Union of Indica
opposed the writ petition and justified their actions.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 32
of the constitution of Indica.1

11
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

 LATE KUSUMTAI CHAVAN 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE: 1

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 14?

ISSUE: 2

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 19?

ISSUE: 3

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 21?

ISSUE: 4

WHETHER PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED FOR COMPENSATION?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE: 1

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 14.
The counsel for the petitioners humbly submits before this Hon’ble Supreme court that, in
the instant matter of M. Banerjee and Ors. V. Union of Indica the internet suspension
imposed in the territory of Gudigudi is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indica
as it does not discriminate the people of Gudigudi from carrying out their day to day
activities in which internet plays a very vital role.

ISSUE: 2

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 19.
The counsel for the respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Supreme court that, in
the instant matter of M. Banerjee and Ors. V. Union of Indica. It is contended that the
impugned restrictions of the freedom of movement, freedom of speech and expression and
right to free trade are justified in order to protect and safeguard the interest of the people
of Gudigudi.

ISSUE: 3

WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 21.
The counsel for the respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Supreme court that, in
the instant matter of M. Banerjee and Ors. V. Union of Indica the government deprived the
people of web connectivity which was to curb the arising unrest in the state and for public
safety as in whole.

ISSUE: 4

WHETHER PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED FOR COMPENSATION.

The counsel for the respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Supreme court that, in
the instant matter of M. Banerjee and Ors. V. Union of Indica that the restrictions imposed

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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were not arbitrary but reasonable in nature which was solely for the welfare of the people
of Gudigudi.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 14.

It is humbly submitted by the Respondent that the suspension of internet ban in Gudigudi is not
violative of Article 14 of Constitution of Indica.
2.1. Suspension of internet ban is not violative of Article 14 of Indican Constitution.
1. Article 14 - Equality before law :-
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica provides that the state shall not deny to any
person Equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws in the Territory of
Indica.2
2. Equality is one of the magnificent corner-stones of the Indian democracy. Article 14
embodies the idea of equality expressed in the preamble. It lays down the general
principles of equality before law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination between the –
persons.

A.TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION:

3. It is humbly submitted that Article 14 provides for equality before the law and equal
protection of the law. Two tests have been provided by the Supreme Court overtime, in
which any law passed by the government is required to satisfy, in order to fulfill the
requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution, and the Acts in question are unable to
satisfy the requirements so laid down.

4. For upholding the classification under Article 14 these two tests must be satisfied. In the
case of BudhanChoudhry vs. State of Bihar 3, the Constitution Bench of seven Judges of
this Court explained the true meaning and scope of Article 14 as follows: “It is now well
established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of

2The Constitution of India, 1950

3BudhanChoudhry vs. State of BiharAIR 1955 SC 191

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permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) That the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) That the
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.”

5. The power to make classification can be exercised not only by the legislature but also by
the administrative bodies acting under an Act4. The equality under Article 14 is not
discriminatory. Paradoxical as it may seem, the concept of equality permits rational or
discriminating discrimination.

i. The Principle of Intelligible Differentia:

6. The expression intelligible differentia means difference capable of being understood and
should be reasonable and not arbitrary. 5
7. Equal treatment means equal treatment in similar circumstances,6both in privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. Implicit in the concept of equality is the concept that
persons who are in fact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on par 7 and equals
cannot be treated as unequals8.

8. Equality is the basic feature of the constitution. The content of article 14 was originally
interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as a concept of equality confined to the
aspects of discrimination and classification. The content of Article 14 got expaneded
conceptually so as to comprehend the doctrine of promissory estopple, non-arbitrariness,
compliance with the rule of natural justice, eschewing irrationality, etc. 9
Article 14 in its ambit and sweep involves tow facets, viz it permits reasonable
classification which is founded on on intelligible diffrentia and accommodates the
practical needs of the society and the differential must have the rational relation to the

4 K.R. Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2001) 1 SCC 442.

5
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 876 (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur,
2016).
6 Shikhar singh v. state of rajasthan, AIR 1995 SC 795; T.M.A. Pai foundation v. state of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC

481; Soma chakravarty v. state, AIR 2007 SC 2149.

7 T.M.A. Pai foundation v. state of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481.
8 State of Punjab v. balkaran singh, AIR 2007 SC 641.
9 M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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object sought to be achieved . further, it does not allow any kind of arbitrariness and
ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It the ‘ fon juris’ of our constitution, the
fountain head of justice10.

9. Thus suspension of internet facilities is a justified action of Union of Indica as it is not

only providing an aid for the prevention of communal violence and anti-national
activities but also safe guarding the interest of the people of Gudigudi. As we all know
that internet these days has become a major source of communication than any other
form of media, hence this action of govt. becomes the need of the hour.
Therefore, there has been no arbitrary classification and discrimination by govt.

ii. Rational Nexus between Classification and the Object Sought:

10. It is necessary that there must be a substantial basis for making the classification
and that there should be a rational nexus between the basis of classification and
the object of the statute under consideration. In other words, there must be some
rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be
achieved. Therefore mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se
amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To
attract Article 14, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is
unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard
to the object which the legislature has in view in making the law in question 11.
But in this case the actions of the govt. are totally reasonable and unarbitrary as all
the restrictions imposed were absolutely on a rational basis the achieve the object
of peace and security in the territory.

10 Sunita bagga v. director of education, 2010 (5) SLR 535 (Del-DB).

11 Jaila Singh v. State of Rjasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1436.

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II. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 19.

The restrictions which may be imposed be any of the authorities who are included in the
definition of ‘State’ in Article 12, who are competent to make a ‘law’ 12as it is understood in the
wider sense referred in Article 13(3)(a), will have to be tested by the permissive limits
prescribed in clause (2) to (6) of Article 19 e.g. restrictions imposed upon the right to use public
highways, including the right to run vehicles over them. 13
There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly free from restraint for
that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject
to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed to the governing authority of the country to be
essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and moral of the community. What the
Constitution, therefore, attempts to do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance
between individual liberty and social control. 14
Article 19 of the Constitution gives a list of liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the
restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not conflict with public welfare
or general morality.15
It has been said that these rights are great and basic rights which are recognized and guaranteed
as the natural rights, inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country but not absolute in nature
and uncontrolled in operation.
However, freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) are not absolute as no right can be. Each of
these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by
Parliament or the State Legislatures, Accordingly, clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 lay down the
grounds and the purposes for which a legislature can impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ on the
rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) to (g). It has been held that the State cannot travel beyond
the contours of clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution in curbing the fundamental
rights guaranteed by clause (1). The court is not concerned with the necessity of the impugned

12 Oudh Singh Millsv. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1070

13 Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., AIR 1957 SC 118
14 Collector of Customs, Madras v. Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316
15 Gopalan A.K. v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27

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legislation or the wisdom of the policy underlying it, but only whether the restriction is in excess
of the requirement, and whether the law has overstepped the Constitutional limitations. 16
The Supreme Court has given a broad dimension to Article 19(1)(a) by laying down the
proposition that freedom of speech involves not only communication, but also receipt, of
information. Communication and receipt of information are the two sides of the same coin.
The Supreme Court has now declared the reason why bandh should be banned. In the name of
hartal or bandh or strike no person has any right to cause inconvenience to any other person or to
cause in any manner a threat or apprehension of risk to life, liberty and property of any citizen or
destruction of life and property, and the least to any government or public property. The
Supreme Court pointed out that it was high time that the authorities concerned took serious note
of this requirement while dealing with those who destroy public property in the name of strike,
hartal or bandh. Any soft or lenient approach for such offenders would be an affront to the rule
of law and challenged to public order and peace. 17
While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a democracy,
so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintainence of social order.
No freedom can be absolute or unrestricted. 18

The standard of reasonableness is to be judged with due reference to the subject-matter of the
legislation in question, economic and social conditions in India and the surrounding
circumstances. The Supreme Court has emphasized in Pathumma 19 that in interpreting the
constitutional provision, the Court should keep in mind the social setting of the country so as to
show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements of the society,
the increasing needs of the nation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing
the people which the legislature in its wisdom through beneficial legislation seeks to solve.

The learned Magistrate, however, observed that since Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India
gave unfettered right of freedom of speech and expression to every citizen of India except for
restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution which did not cover a contingency of
the present nature, Section 144, Criminal P. C., must be held to be ultra vires. It appears that the
learned Magistrate did not take into consideration the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,

16 Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. UOI, AIR 2012 SC 3445
17 James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203
18 Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI, (2012) 2 MJL (32) SC
19 Pathumma v State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771

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which came into force on 18-6-1951, by which Article 19, as it originally stood, had been
amended.20

By the amendment the following clause was substituted for Clause (2) of Article 19:

"(2) Nothing in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, or in relation to contempt
of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

Freedom of speech does not mean that a person is at liberty to say what he pleases at all times and
under all circumstances, for it has been held repeatedly that the right of freedom of speech cannot
have been and obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.
This right may sometimes be-come a wrong if, for example, a person were to indulge in the use
of language which is so defamatory, insulting, inciting or provocative as to be reasonably likely
to cause disorder and violence. 21

"There are certain well-denned and narrowly limited classes of speech" observed Murphy J, in an
American case "the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, and the
insulting or fighting words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace". 22

All the freedoms and rights mentioned under Article 19 are no doubt the basic human rights vested
with every individual but these are also subjected or can be made subjected to certain restrictions
as and when needed. As in this case a temporary ban internet facilities and other certain day-to-
day activities have been imposed due to certain undesirable circumstances arising in the territory
which demanded few strict actions for the safety of the people.

20 State v. Deadly Misra, AIR 1954 ALL 738

21 Patterson v. Colorado (1907) 205 US 454 (A)
22 Virendra v. State opf Punjab, AIR 1957 SCR 896

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III. WHETHER SUSPENSION OF INTERNET FACILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 21

Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his or her life or personal liberty
except according to ‘procedure established by law’ Immediately after the Constitution
became effective, the question of interpretation of these words arose in the famous
Gopalan Case.23
The expression ‘personal liberty’ used in Article 21 has also been given a liberal
interpretation. It does not mean merely the liberty of the body, i.e. freedom from physical
restraints or freedom from confinement within the bounds of a prison. In other words, it
means not only freedom from arrest or detention, from false imprisonment or wrongful
confinement, but ,means much more than that. The term ‘personal liberty’ is not used in a
narrow sense but has been used in Article 21 as a compendious term to include within it
all those variety of rights of a person which go to make up the personal liberty of a man.
Liberty of an individual has to be balanced with his duties and obligations towards his
fellow citizens.24
Does the word ‘law’ in Article 21 include an ‘ordinance’? Can an ordinance lay down
procedure to deprive a person of his personal liberty? The question was raised in AK Roy v UOI25,
in the context of the National Security Ordinance, 1980, promulgated by the President “to provide
for preventive detention in certain cases and for matters connected therewith.” 26
The power of the Government to declare any area as ‘disturbed area’ was held not to be arbitrary.
Such an area is one where disorder of such type prevails so as to be regarded as a public order
problem. Guidelines in this respect are available from the preamble and the log title of the
concerned Act. The term ‘disturbed area’ has been used in a number of laws and so the term is
well understood. The term ‘public order’ is not vague.27

Right to life, enshrined in Article 21 means something more than survival or animal existence. 28 It
would include the right to live with human dignity;29 a right to minimum subsistence allowance

23 AK Gopalan v State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27

24 MC Mehta v UOI, AIR 2003 SC 3469
25 AK Roy v UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710
26 Ghulam Ahmad v State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1954 J&K 59
27 ……………………………………..
28 State of Maharshtra v. Chandrabadan, AIR 1983 SC 803
29 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory Delhi, Administrator, AIR 1981 SC 746

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during suspension.30 It would include all those aspects of life which go to make a man’s life
meaningful, complete and worth living. 31 That which alone can make it possible to live must be
declared to be an integral component of the right to live. 32

The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution embraces within its sweep not
only physical existence but the quality of life. Therefore in our case the restrictions and limitations
imposed by the Government on the people of Gudigudi are to safeguard the interest of the Territory
along with preserving the quality of life of the people living there.

Presumption of innocence is a human right, Article 21 of the Constitution, in view of its expensive
meaning, not only protects life and liberty but also envisages a fair procedure. Liberty of a person
should not ordinarily be inferred with unless there co-exist cogent grounds thereof. 33 The cogent
grounds in this particular case were the unrest and the communal violence arising which were
directly hampering the peaceful co-existence of the people of Gudigudi.

Procedure established by law in Article 21 means the law prescribed by the Parliament at any
given point of time. It is a valid law if it is enacted by a competent Legislature and if it does not
violate any of the other fundamental rights declared by the Constitution. Also whether the
procedure prescribed by the Legislature is ‘just, fair and reasonable’ would depend upon the
circumstances of each case. 34

Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution require that any action of the State must demonstrate five
essential features:
(a) backing of a law,
(b) legitimacy of purpose,
(c) rational connection of the act and object,
(d) necessity of the action, and
(e) when the above four are established, then the test of proportionality.
All these five essential features are very well being answered by the Government as contexted
several times above.
30 State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabadan, AIR 1983 SC 803
31 Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
32 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180
33 Ranjitsingh Bhrahmajeetsingh Sharma v. State of Maharshtra, AIR 2005 SC 2277
34 Charan Lal Sahu v. UOI, AIR 1990 SC 1480

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Modern terrorism heavily relies on the internet. Operations on the internet do not require
substantial expenditure and are not traceable easily. The internet is being used to support
fallacious proxy wars by raising money, recruiting and spreading propaganda/ideologies. The
prevalence of the internet provides an easy inroad to young impressionable minds. In this regard,
Gregory S. McNeal, 35Professor of Law and Public Policy, Pepperdine University, states in his
Article about propaganda and the use of internet in the following manner:
“Terrorist organisations have also begun to employ websites as a form of information warfare.
Their websites can disperse inaccurate information that has far-reaching consequences. Because
internet postings are not regulated sources of news, they can reflect any viewpoint, truthful or
not. Thus, readers tend to consider internet items to be fact, and stories can go unchecked for
some time. Furthermore, streaming video and pictures of frightening scenes can support and
magnify these news stories. As a result, the internet is a powerful and effective tool for spreading
propaganda.”

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we may summarize the requirements of the doctrine of
proportionality which must be followed by the authorities before passing any order intending on
restricting fundamental rights of individuals. In the first stage itself, the possible goal of such a
measure intended at imposing restrictions must be determined. It ought to be noted that such
goal must be legitimate. However, before settling on the aforesaid measure, the authorities must
assess the existence of any alternative mechanism in furtherance of the aforesaid goal. The
appropriateness of such a measure depends on its implication upon the fundamental rights and
the necessity of such measure. It is undeniable from the aforesaid holding that only the least
restrictive measure can be resorted to by the State, taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances. Lastly, since the order has serious implications on the fundamental rights of the
affected parties, the same should be supported by sufficient material and should be amenable to
judicial review.36

IV. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION.

The underlying purpose of Art. 14 is to treat all persons circumstanced alike, both in privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. Classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational,
keeping in mind the national interest and internal security, the state shall make all endeavors to
ensure that normal life is restored in Gudigudi;

35 Gregory S. McNeal, Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad, 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 789 (2007).
36 Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI, (2020) 1 MLJ 574

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

 LATE KUSUMTAI CHAVAN 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020

Equality before law and equal protection of laws is the quintessence of Right to Equality, a
Fundamental Right guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica. Right to such equality cannot be
arbitrarily denied to the equals in the absence of a valid classification 37. Every action of the state
must be informed by the reasons and guided by the public interest.
Since the actions of internet ban was to of the sole motive to safeguard the interest of people
which was reasonable and within the ambit of Art. 14.
If a statutory or public authority/functionary does not record the reason, its decisions would be
rendered arbitrary, unjust and violative of Art. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 38 Considering the
facts of this case the reasons were clearly stated by the authority that the main purpose for the
suspension of internet ban was to stop the communal unrest among the people of Gudigudi.
It is now well settled that every state action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the
vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Art.14 of the Constitution and the basic rule of law, the
system which governs us, arbitrariness is the negation of the rule of law.

Hence all the acts of the Government were absolutely unarbitrary and reasonable on the grounds
that all these steps were for the safety of the people as well as the safety of the territory of
Gudigudi.

Art. 19
The rights guaranteed to a citizen by Art. 19 do not confer any absolute or unconditional right.
Each Right is subject to reasonable restriction which the legislature may impose in public
interest. It is therefore necessary to examine whether such restriction is meant to protect social
welfare satisfying the need of prevailing social values.39 According to, under Art. 19(2), the state
may make a law imposing ‘reasonable restriction’ on the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech and expression ‘in the interest of’ the security of the state, friendly relations with the
foreign states, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and integrity of Indica.
A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the
restriction and the public order is proximate and direct. 40

Hence the freedom of speech and expression has not been permanently disabled from the people
of Gudigudi but only certain restrictions have been imposed for the welfare of the people inorder
to curb the growing unrest in the territory.

ART 21
Any law interfering with personal liberty of the citizen must satisfy a triple test (i) it must
prescribe a procedure;(ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the
Fundamental Rights conferred under Art. 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and
(iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14.41
Considering the ‘due process of law’ denotes that the law should be ‘just’ but what is ‘just and
reasonable’ is not a static or rigid concept; it varies from situation to situation, and what may be
regarded as reasonable in one situation may not necessarily be so in another situation. 42

37 Virendra Krishna Mishra v. UOI, (2015) 2 SCC 712.

38 Bhagat Ram v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454.
39 Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd. AIR 1995 SC 2200.
40 OK. Ghosh v. EX. Joseph, AIR 1962 SC 814.
41 District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186.
42 Cowin, The Constitution of USA, 1084-8 (1953).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

 LATE KUSUMTAI CHAVAN 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020

The Government is hence not liable to pay any kind of compensation because the acts of the
Government were justified in all respects.

As it is rightly stated by Mr. Vinton G. Cerf, one of the ‘fathers of the internet’ he argued while
the internet is very important, however, it cannot be elevated of the status of a Human Right 43. In
his view, technology is an enabler of rights and not a right in itself. Thus the suspension of
internet in Gudigudi is no ever an action of deprivation of any persons life.

43 Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Access is not a Human Right, The New York Times (January 04, 2012).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

 LATE KUSUMTAI CHAVAN 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020

PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is humbly prayed by the Respondent that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare:
1. To declare, the order passed by the government is not arbitrary but reasonable in nature
which is acting for the benefit of general public.

2. To declare, that any loss incurred was unintended but for maintaining peaceful conditions and for
maintaining proper law and order along with safeguarding the interest of the people of Gudigudi.

AND/OR
And pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of justice,
equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the respondent shall duty bound forever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENTS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS