544.lopez v. CA - 34 SCRA 116

3/18/22, 6:12 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 34
No. L-26549. July 31, 1970.
EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the “MANILA

CHRONICLE”and JUAN T. GATBONTON, petitioners, vs.
THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ,
respondents.
Libel; Damages; Publication of plaintiff’s photograph is

actionable; Case at bar.—An action for libel would lie arising from
a publication in a weekly magazine of the plaintiff’s photograph
as being responsible for the hoax of the year, even though the
publisher made a correction of their mistake immediately upon
discovery thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Pressure of deadline not a defense in

libelous publication in a weekly magazine.—While a newspaper
should not be held to account for honest mistakes owing to
pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet,
and no occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine.
Same; Same; Same; Retraction mitigates amount of damages.

—A retraction published to correct the mistake does not wipe out
the responsibility arising from the publication of the libelous
photograph or article, although it may and should mitigate it.
Dizon, Dissenting:
Libel; Damages; Actual malice must be proved.—For liability

in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication, without
offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the
publication was made with actual malice—that is, with the
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

117
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 117

https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f9c84a541df5860e3000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/17
Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari

from a decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This Week
Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of eleven thousand
pesos arising from the publication of a picture of
respondent, Fidel G. Cruz, as being responsible for the
hoax of the year. The absence of any connection either
fanciful or remote with such event is admitted. The view is
pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal construction of
the implications of press freedom, owning up to the
mistake, unfortunately not discovered until it was too late,
and publishing a correction as an earnest of its good faith,
that they should not be made to pay at all. This Court,
without discounting the elements of plausibility of their
contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the injury
inflicted on respondent and indulge them in such a plea. It
is not disposed though to affirm respondent Court’s
decision in its entirety. Considering all the circumstances,
the damages awarded to private respondent appear to be
far too generous. A reduction is in order. The sum of one
thousand pesos would be enough. So we decide.
The antecedents of the case follow: In the early part of
January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The
Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was
the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a
sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel
Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing
United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the
message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army
plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-
sustenance kit containing, among other things, a twoway
radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that
the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series
of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing no
time, the Philippines defense establish-
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by

Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported
killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major
Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged
killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted
transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding,
Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a “hoax,” to use his
own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was
the term employed by the other newspapers when referring
to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then
edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial
article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was
made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false, if
brought to light the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able
to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in
the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the
“January News Quiz” included an item on the central
figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who
nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the
government’s attention to that forsaken and desolate
corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz
appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was
made to a health inspector who suddenly felt “lonely” in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running
loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried
back to civilization. He was given the appellation of “Hoax
of the Year.”
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of
the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published on both occasions were that of
private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessmancontractor
from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz,
sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila
Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure
observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news
quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in-
119
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 119

advertently switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought
to file attention of petitioners, the following correction was
iinmediately published in This Week Magazine on January

27, 1957: “While we were rushing to meet the deadline for
January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently
published the picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in ‘Our Own
Who’s Who feature in the Year End Quiz’ of This Week in
lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected
with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan
Island. We here express our profound regrets that such an
error occurred.” Together with the foregoing correction,
petitioners published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the
photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by
four lines, the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the
item was placed in a conspicuous place m order to call 1
the
attention of the readers to such amends being made.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages
alleging the defamatory character of the above publication
of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded five
thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand
pesos as moral damages, and one thousand pesos for
attorney’s fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to
respondent Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari with
the result, as already announced at the opening of this
opinion, that while respondent Cruz is entitled to prevail,
the damages awarded him should be reduced.
1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would
stake their case to demonstrate that no action for libel
would lie arising from the publication of the picture of
respondent Cruz identified as responsible for the hoax of
the year, when such was not the case at all. It is easily
understandable why. No liability would be incurred
_______________
1 The above statement of facts appearing in the Petition pp 1-5 was

accepted in the decision now on appeal by respondent Court. Vide
Appendix. Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 52-61.
120

if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the

wellnigh all-embracing scope of freedom of the press.
Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what
items should see the light of day so long as they are
relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the

requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable
inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other
publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no
such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the
commission of such2
quasi-delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing
v. Lu Tiong Gui, that “the repeal of the old Libel Law 3
(Act
No. 277) did not abolish the civil action for iibel.” A libel
was defined in that Act as a “malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, x x x, tending to blacken the memory
of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one
who is alive, and thereby4
expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule,” There was an express provision in
such legislation
5
for a tort or a quasidelict action arising
from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the
new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral6 damages
for libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
_______________
2 76 Phil. 669 (1956).

3 Ibid, p. 676.
4 Section 1, Act No. 277 (1901).
5 According to Section 11 of the Act: “In addition to the criminal action
hereby prescribed, a right of civil action is also hereby given to any person
libeled as hereinbefore set forth against the person libeling him for
damages sustained by such libel, and the person so libeled shall be
entitled to recover in such civil action not only the actual pecuniary
damages sustained by him but also damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think
will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others. Suit
may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the
parties. The presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses herein
provided for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil
actions under this section.“
6 Art. 2219 (8).
121
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 121

There has been no time then in our judicial history when

civil actions for libel did not form
7
a staple part of litigations
which had reached this Court. Such is the case in a far
greater measure in the United States. According to the

standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel:
“Publication of a person’s photograph in connection with an
article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person
whose picture is published, where the8 acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person.” In support of the9
above statement, he made reference to several cases.
Other decisions to the same effect have been promulgated
since the fourth edition of Newell pub-
_______________
7 Causin v. Ricamora, 5 Phil. 31 (1905); Causin v. Jakosalem, 5 Phil.

155 (1905); Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912) ; Jimenez v. Reyes, 27
Phil. 52 (1914); Sotelo Matti v. Bulletin Publishing Co., 37 Phil. 562
(1918); Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); Phee v. La
Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211 (1923); Oliver v. La Vanguardia, 48 Phil. 429
(1925) ; Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919 (1926) ; El Hogar Filipino v.
Prautch and Poblete, 49 Phil. 171 (1926) ; Guevara v. Almario, 56 Phil.
476 (1932); Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946); Quisumbing
v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1955); Sison v. David, L-11268, Jan. 28, 1961, 1
SCRA 60; Tolentino v. Baylosis, L-15742, Jan. 31, 1961, 1 SCRA 396;
Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co., L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 148;
Duque v. Santiago, L-16916, Nov. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 661; Dizon v.
Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714; Deaño v. Godinez, L-
19518, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 483; Corpus v. Cuaderno, L-16969, April
30, 1966, 16 SCRA 807; Jimenez v. Cabangbang, L-15905, Aug. 3, 1966, 17
SCRA 876; Imperial v. Ziga, L-19726, April 13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726;
Ubarra v. Biscom Employees Coop. Asso., L-25332, Oct. 14, 1968, 25
SCRA 498; Deles v. Aragona, Adm. Case No. 598, March 28, 1969,, 27
SCRA 633.
8 Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., 259-260 (1924). Cf. Gatley on Libel
and Slander, 5th ed., 19-20 (1960).
9 Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Wandt v. Hearst’s Chicago
American, 109 N. W. 70 (1906); James v. Ft. Worth Telegram Co., 117
S.W. 1028 (1909); De Sando v. New York Herald Co., 85 N.Y.S. 1903;
Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 87 S.W. 565 (1905).
122

10
lished in 1924. Why libel law has both a criminal and a
civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press
thus: “On the one hand, libeling a person results in
depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a
thing of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches,
an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this

personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured
person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory
statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by
the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the
state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this
angle, libel is a crime, and
11
as such subjects the offender to
a fine or imprisonment.”
The first decision cited by Newell is a decision
12
of Justice
Holmes. The case is Peck v. Tribune Co. Plaintiff there
complained of her picture being published in an
advertisement in defendant’s newspaper. The Chicago
Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a
brand of liquor attributed to her when in fact she did not
make such a statement at all and could not have made it,
as she was a total abstainer. The defendant was held liable,
for as Justice Holmes pointed out: “There was some
suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by
mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff’s
portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if
it was one, was no excuse. If the publication was libelous,
the defendant took the risk. As was
______________
10 Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505 (1931); Riley v. Askin and Marine Co.,
132 S.E. 584 (1926); Becker v. Brinkop, 78 S.W. 2d 538 (1935); Knapp v.
Post Printing and Publishing Co., 144 P. 2d 981 (1944); Corbett v. Am.
Newspapers, 5 A. 2d 245 (1939); Myers v. Afro-American Pub. Co., 5
N.Y.S. 2d 223 (1938); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.W. 55 (1938);
Petransky v. Repository Printing Co., 200 N.E. 647 (1936); Lanka v. Park
Entertainments, 1 N. E. 2d 42 (1936); Jackson v. Consumer Publications,
11 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1939); Smith v The Journal Co., 73 N.W. 2d 429 (1955);
Dahl v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 166 N.Y.S. 2d 708 (1957); Greer v.
Skyway Broadcasting Co., 124 S.E. 2d 98 (1962).
11 Hale, Law of the Press, 3rd ed. 6 (1948)
12 214 US 185 (1909).
123
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 123

said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, ‘Whenever a man

publishes, he publishes at his peril.’ x x x The reason is
plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to
publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an
individual, without other justification than exists for an
advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of

tort will make him liable if13 the statements are false, or are
true only of someone else.”
Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would
lie arising from a publication in an advertisement of
plaintiff’s photograph yielding a “grotesque, monstrous and
obscene impression” and that he was “substantially enough
ridiculed” to complain reached the conclusion “that because
the picture taken with the legends was calculated to expose
the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima facie
actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a
fact or an opinion is irrelevant;
14
and that in consequence the
publication is actionable.” It is likewise an accepted fact
that such publications do occasion greater injury to
reputation than would mere words alone. Cardozo so aptly
put the matter thus: “‘It has its genesis in evils which the
years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory
may be said with impunity through the medium of speech.
Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and
transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing
is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but
the written one abide and ‘perpetuates the scandal.’ xxx
When one speaks of a writing in this connection, one does
not limit oneself to writings in manuscripts or books. Any
symbol suffices—pictures, hieroglyphics, shorthand notes— 15
if only what is written is intelligible to him who reads.”
2. That is only one side of the picture, however. There is
an impressive recognition in our decisions of the
curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if
an
_______________
13 Ibid, p. 189.
14 Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F. 2d 154, 156 (1936).
15 Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1981).
124

action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove

doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of
that constitutional right.16 Thus, in the first leading case,
United States v. Bustos, Justice Malcolm could correctly
stress: “The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men

is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not to be too thin-
skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize
defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the
State, 17so must expected criticism be born for the common
good.” On this aspect of the question which, as answered
by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should
not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he
categorically declared: “Public policy, the welfare of society,
and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the 18
development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege.”
In another civil action for libel, such a thought is
expressed differently in this wise: “So long as it is done in
good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and
express opinions on legal questions. To deny them19 that
right would infringe upon the freedom of the press.” The
last word on the subject,
20
up to now at least, came from
Quisumbing v. Lopez. In the language of the then Chief
Justice Paras, who penned the opinion: “The Court
_______________
16 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

17 Ibid, pp. 740-741.
18 Ibid, p. 742. Cf. Another decision of Justice Malcolm is United States
v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 225 (1922).
19 El Hogar Filipino v. Prautch, 49 Phil. 171, 176 (1926).
20 96 Phil. 510 (1955).
125
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 125

of Appeals found as a fact that ‘there is no evidence in the

record to prove that the publication of the news item under
consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or
that there was intention to do harm,’ and that on the other
hand there was ‘an honest and high sense of duty to serve
the best, interests of the public, without self-seeking motive
and with malice towards none.’ Every citizen of course has

the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do
not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances
of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom
of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy.
In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition
usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently
with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, 21for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.”
It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme
Court had occasion to speak its mind on the subject.
22
In the
leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, the nature
of the question presented was set forth by Justice Brennan
for the Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion: “We
are required in this case to determine for the first time the
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech
and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel
action brought by 23
a public official against critics of his
official conduct.” This is the Court’s approach to such an
issue: “In deciding the question now, we are compelled by
neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the
epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state
law. xxx Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression
of expression
______________
21 Ibid, pp. 514-515.

22 376 US 254 (1964).
23 Ibid, p. 256.
126

that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no

talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured
24
by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment.” Continuing the same trend, the opinion
stressed further: “Thus we consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well

include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials, xxx The
present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and
protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would
25
seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.”
For liability to arise then without offending press
freedom, there is this test to meet: “The constitutional
guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with
26
reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.” The United States
Supreme27
Court went further in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, where such immunity was held as covering
statements concerning public figures regardless of whether
or not they are government officials. Why there should be
such an extension is understandable in the light of the
broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which certainly
allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can
be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an
expansion of the principle. As noted by a commentator:
“Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful
without reference to the men involved on both sides of such
issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public
officials, one cannot but agree that the Court
______________
24 Ibid, p. 269.
25 Ibid, pp. 270-271.
26 Ibid, pp. 279-280.
27 388 US 130 (1967).
127
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 127

was right28
in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public
figures.”
The significance of the foregoing line of decisions
impressive for their consistency is quite obvious. No
inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of
punitive action visited on what otherwise could be
characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words
or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication
of respondent’s picture with the offensive caption as in the

case here complained of. This is not to deny that the party
responsible invites the institution either of a criminal
prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what
was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering
the value the law justly places on a man’s reputation. This
is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the
press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal
values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to
emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the
utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in
safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a
realistic account of the obligation of a news media to
disseminate information of a public character and to
comment thereon as well as the conditions attendant on
the business of publishing cannot be ignored. To single out
one decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones loud
and clear.
3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly
sympathetic ruling to press freedom that petitioners would
seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in the
Quisumbing case appeared in the headline. It was without
basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself.
Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with vigor and
clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no liability was
deemed incurred by the then publisher of the Manila
Chronicle. A newspaper, it is stressed, “should not be held
to account to a point of suppression for honest mis-
_______________
28 Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time, 56 California Law

Rev.. 935, 954 (1968).
128

takes or imperfection in the choice of words.” The above

ruling, coupled with the requirement in the New York
Times decision of the United States Supreme Court, would
for the writer of this opinion, furnish a sufficient basis for
the success of this appeal. The Court, however, is not
inclined to view matters thus. Obviously Quisumbing v.
Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure
of a daily deadline to meet, no occasion to act with haste as
the picture of respondent was published in a weekly
magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of

reasonable care imposed by such decision which from the
facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be
concluded then that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently
persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not ignored,
but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive
of the basic issue. By itself, it does not have a controlling
significance. So we hold.
4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their
correction, which has all the force of a retraction, as a basis
from being absolved from any pecuniary responsibility. The 29
present Chief Justice in Policarpio v. Manila Times
restated the controlling principle: “We note that the news
item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that
neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the
aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal’s office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved
in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification
does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the
publication of the first article, although it may
30
and should
mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52).”
The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus
call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be
noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss
arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile
_______________
29 L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5. SCRA 143.

30 Ibid, p. 156.
129
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 129

to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant

attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the
usual practice being “more31likely to reduce damages for
libel than to increase them.”
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming the lower court
decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners
Eugenio Lopez and Juan T. Gatbonton being ordered to pay
jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 as moral damages
and the additional amount of P500.00 for attorney’s fees.
Costs against petitioners.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and

Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur in the result.
DIZON, J., Dissenting:
Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the

scholarly opinion penned for the majority by Mr. Justice
Enrique Fernando.
I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on
pp. 2-3 of the majority opinion and, precisely on the basis
thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed from
should be reversed.
The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the light
of New York Times Company vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), as the ruling therein laid down was amplified in
Curtis Publishing Company vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967).
After considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid
down in said cases, the majority opinion says that for
liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous
publication, without offending press freedom, there is need
to prove that the publication was made with actual malice
—that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
_______________
31 Guevarra v. Almario. 56 Phil. 476 (1932).
130

Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no

criminal liability for libel. As far as liability in damages is
concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that there is
no evidence of actual malice—that is, there is no evidence
showing that petitioners or their subordinates knew that
the imputation made to respondent Cruz was false or that,
in publishing that imputation, they had recklessly
disregarded the question of whether it was false or true.
On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part
of petitioners, on the basis of tort would seem to be equally
untenable. In the first place, the alleged “hoax” to which
respondent Cruz’ person was related as a result of the
publication in question—if considered without passion and
in the right perspective—ascribes to him nothing immoral

or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the case, whatever
negligence there might have been on the part of petitioners
or their subordinates would amount only to what might be
legitimately considered as “excusable negligence”—thus
eliminating any idea of malice or intention to cause injury,
on their part.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the
decision appealed from.
Decision modified.
Notes.—(a) Basis of liability for libel.—The enjoyment of

a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as
the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of those
rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole
scheme of civilization. The law recognizes the value of such
reputation and imposes upon him who attacks it, by
slanderous words or libelous publication, the liability to
make full compensation for the damages done (Worcester
vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).
(b) Effect of honest mistake in identity on liability for
damages arising from libelous publication.—In Phee vs. La
Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211, the defendant, who was
131
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 131

sued for libel, contended that the publication was an honest

mistake in identity. Ruling on this contention, the Supreme
Court held that that circumstance “would be considered
only in mitigation of damages. Under all authorities, where
the publication of an article is libelous per se, an honest
mistake is not a complete defense.”
(c) Effect of apology or retraction.—Under the earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court, an apology or retraction
seemed to be considered as a defense or at least a ground
for mitigation of liability. To have either of these effects,
however, the retraction should contain an admission of the
incorrectness of the libelous publication and evince a desire
to repair the wrong occasioned thereby (Sotelo Matti vs.
Bulletin Publishing Co., 37 Phil. 562, 565). And failure to
retract will not be condoned simply because the plaintiff
did not make a formal demand for retraction, especially if
he gave notice, by going to the office of the defendant, that
there was a mistake in identity (Phee vs. La Vanguardia,

supra).
(d) Damages recoverable.—The amount of damages in a
libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case
and the sound discretion of the court (Guevarra vs.
Almario, 56 Phil. 476).
Actual damages need not be proved, at least where the
publication is libelous per se (Phee vs. La Vanguardia,
supra; Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52; Quemuel vs. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44) or when the amount of the award is
more or less nominal (U.S. vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828; Freeman
vs. U.S., 40 Phil. 1039; Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals,
supra). The reason is that, by its nature, libel causes
dishonor, disrepute and discredit, and injury to the
reputation of the offended party is its natural and probable
consequence (Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals, supra). The
liability for damages on account of injury to feelings and
reputation in a civil action for libel is an obligation ex
delicto, and the damages are compensatory and recoverable
under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code (Lu Shu Sing
vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669).
132

Quimiguing vs. Icao
Although moral damages may undoubtedly also be

recovered under Article 2219 of the new Civil Code, there is
a holding enunciated before said Code went into effect, that
the right to recover punitive and exemplary damages had
been abolished by the Revised Penal Code which repealed
Act No. 277, Section 11 of which granted such right (See Lu
Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, supra). It would seem,
however, that if the action is one based on quasi-delict (as
in the Lopez case, supra), exemplary or corrective damages
may also be awarded under Article 2231 of the new Civil
Code.
________________
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3/18/22, 6:12 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 34

No. L-26549. July 31, 1970.

EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the “MANILA

Libel; Damages; Publication of plaintiff’s photograph is

Same; Same; Same; Pressure of deadline not a defense in

Same; Same; Same; Retraction mitigates amount of damages.

Libel; Damages; Actual malice must be proved.—For liability

APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 117

Lopez vs. Court of Appeals

Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 119

iinmediately published in This Week Magazine on January

1 The above statement of facts appearing in the Petition pp 1-5 was

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the

relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the

2 76 Phil. 669 (1956).

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 121

There has been no time then in our judicial history when

greater measure in the United States. According to the

7 Causin v. Ricamora, 5 Phil. 31 (1905); Causin v. Jakosalem, 5 Phil.

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 123

said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, ‘Whenever a man

advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove

Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men

16 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 125

of Appeals found as a fact that ‘there is no evidence in the

and with malice towards none.’ Every citizen of course has

21 Ibid, pp. 514-515.

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no

uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 127

of respondent’s picture with the offensive caption as in the

28 Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time, 56 California Law

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

takes or imperfection in the choice of words.” The above

magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of

29 L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5. SCRA 143.

VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 129

to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant

Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and

DIZON, J., Dissenting:

Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the

31 Guevarra v. Almario. 56 Phil. 476 (1932).

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no

in the right perspective—ascribes to him nothing immoral

Notes.—(a) Basis of liability for libel.—The enjoyment of