Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners - 197 SCRA 853

7/19/22, 9:06 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 197
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 853

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa
*
G.R. Nos. 95122-23. May 31, 1991.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC
Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,
respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T.
GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN,
KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T.
GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN,
respondents.
________________
* EN BANC.
854
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018216908dc3ce8f398d000d00d40059004a/p/APH694/?username=Guest 1/81
G.R. Nos. 95612-13. May 31, 1991.*
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
Courts; Appeals; Administrative Law; Bureau of Immigration;

The Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, hence,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a
special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.—B.P. Blg. 129 did
not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or
rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the
law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal
rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21 (1), BP 129).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Bureau of Immigration has
the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship.—True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 756 [1989]. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate
to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in
deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1954]).
Political Law; Citizenship; Bureau of Immigration;
Jurisdiction; The primary jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Immigration over deportation proceedings, admits of exception i.e.
judicial intervention may be resorted to in cases where the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct.—However, the rule enunciated in
the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as
deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to
citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the
deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the
question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this
Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
“When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or author-
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VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 855
ity, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the

unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection,
either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal
ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in
allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the
remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability. “x x x. And if the right (to peace) is precious and
valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of illmeaning or misinformed
administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to
peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation
Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen’s
name before the bar of public opinion?” (Italics supplied) The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of
Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not
without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo
vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however,
should be granted only in cases where the “claim of citizenship is
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed
only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the
records that respondent’s claim of citizenship is substantial, as
We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.—Neither can it
be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision (dated July
6, 1962) finding respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not
satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said
decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Elections ( supra ); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA
561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478
[1983]) In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41
SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
supra), this Court declared that: “(e)verytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.”
856
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata may be

applied in cases of citizenship only if the following requisites are
present; 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue
in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor
General took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the
finding of citizenship is affirmed by this Court.—An exception to
the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51
SCRA 248 [1973]), viz: “We declare it to be a sound rule that
where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitively resolved
by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in
the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active
participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is
affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute
conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any other case or
proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision
on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless
obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.” Thus,
in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship, the following must be present: (1) a person’s
citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in
Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by
petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even
a party in said cases.
Same; Same; Immigration Laws; Bureau of Immigration;
Arrests; A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.—Coming now to
the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows
as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion
issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases
(Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit. Sec. 37
(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known
as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: “Sec. 37. (a) The following
aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien.” (Italics supplied) From a perusal of the above provision,
it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act
insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner
of Immigration
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VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 857
may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the

Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to
be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong
vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62
SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa; 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs.
Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9
SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also
Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deportation; Deportation
shall not be effected unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises.—Furthermore, petitioners’ position is not
enhanced by the fact that respondent’s arrest came twenty-eight
(28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37
(b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation “shall not be
effected x x x unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises.”
In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the
consequences of such inaction, thus: “There is however an
important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of
the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the
mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained entrance
into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese
resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that
is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had
elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture
of sincerity, made an spontaneous admission before the
immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection
with the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not
through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother
was found to be married to another Chinese resident merchant,
now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued
at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the
immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity
not serious enough when, inspite of that finding, they decided to
land said minor “as a properly documented preference quota
immigrant” (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two
years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude
and would take steps to institute deportation
858
proceedings against the minor. “Under the circumstances

obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the
mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper
means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say
unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother
to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by
inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to
elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour
would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother
through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity
resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This
inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials has
created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity,
should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved.” (Italics
supplied) In the case at bar, petitioners’ alleged cause of action
and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990—28 long years
after. It is clear that petitioners’ cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced
by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.

Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was
already recalled and the identification certificate of respondent,
among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then
Acting Commissioner Nituda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; No prosecution
and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses
enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the
eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act, being a special
legislation.—It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No.
3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances), “violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: xxx; (c) after
eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; xxx.” Consequently, no prosecution
and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses
enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the
eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a
special legislation. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not
imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the
rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
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VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 859
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the

final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal
Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to deport
an alien is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good
and domestic tranquility of the people.—"The power to deport an
alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority
of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to
the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.” (Lao Gi
vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the
economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000
people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported

when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign
investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at
least US $50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that
respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is
unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled
government policy.
Conflicts of Law; Foreign Laws; Marriages; There being no
proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.—
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien.
In support of their position, petitioners point out that Santiago
Gatchalian’s marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the
marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu
Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other
than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing
what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country,
it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of
China wherein the same were contracted. There being none,
petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be
considered valid. Hence, Santiago’s children, including Francisco,
followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside
of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco’s
marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson
followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. After
a careful consideration of petitioners’ argument, We find that it
cannot be sustained. In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924];
Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
860
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those

of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption
that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of
Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who
was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board
to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been

content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation
of China.
Same; Same; Same; Political Law; Citizenship; William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a
Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.—Having declared the
assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian
follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a
legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a
Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who
(the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an
order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William
Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated
under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
“Section 1. the following are citizens of the Philippines: “(1) Those
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution. xxx” This forecloses any further question about
the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
FELICIANO, J., Dissenting:
Political Law; Citizenship; In upholding the validity and legal

effect of the July 6, 1962 BOC decision that the Gatchalian
applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine
Citizenship, the Supreme Court, in effect, ruled that the
Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens.—In its
Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC
and the Warrant of Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian,
the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by
immigration authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro’s co-
applicants, which include respondent William Gatchalian. The
validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro
Gatchalian, as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian,
allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly
placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and
the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and
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VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 861
Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the

validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the
Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to
Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the
Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their
true nationality might be.
Same; Same; Deportation; Exclusion of persons found not to
be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be
distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having
been initially, lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed
acts which rendered them liable to deportation.—What was
involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren
of Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was
the right of a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen to enter
for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the
Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the
country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such
claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not
acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple
passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to
admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the
deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully
admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered
them liable to deportation. Normally, aliens excluded are
immediately sent back to their country of origin. This is so in
cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the
country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when
the alien had already physically gained entry but such entry is
later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully
admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the alien in this
case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be
made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his
exclusion is discovered only after he had gained physical entry.
Same; Same; Same; Immigration Laws; The Immigration Act
e x pressly authorizes deportation “at any time after entry,” of “any
alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of said act,
who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.—My
distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act No. 3326, and
on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the arrest
for purpose of deportation is made more than five (5) years after
the cause for deportation arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8)
years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took effect on 4
December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of
criminal prosecutions for violations penalized not
862
by the Revised Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not
otherwise establish a period of prescription. In other words, Act
No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the institution of
criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite settled that deportation
proceedings cannot be assimilated to criminal prosecutions for
violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of special statutes.
Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the
special act itself has not established an applicable statute of
limitations for criminal proceedings. It cannot, however, be said
that Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has not
established an applicable statute of limitations. For, precisely,
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation may
be effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) “at any time
after entry.” One of those instances is, precisely, deportation upon
the ground specified in Clause (2) of 37 (a) which relates to “any
alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act,
who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.” Thus, the
Immigration Act, far from failing to specify a prescriptive period
for deportation under Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes
deportation under such ground “at any time after entry.” It is,
thus, very difficult to see how Act No. 3326 could apply at all to
the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent William Gatchalian’s
claim to Philippine citizenship rests upon a fragile web
constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of
official documentation, of negative facts and of invocation of
presumptions without proof of essential factual premises.—I turn
to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the
basis of the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship.
The most striking feature of this claim to Philippine citizenship is
that it rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral
testimony, a total lack of official documentation whether
Philippine or foreign, of negative facts and of invocation of
presumptions without proof of ess ential factual premises. Put in
summary terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine
citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to wit: a. that Santiago
Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen; b. the supposed filiation of
Francisco Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian,
which leads to the intermediate conclusion that Francisco was a
Philippine citizen; and c. the supposed filiation of William
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to

the final conclusion that William Gatchalian is a Philippine
citizen. I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the
facts made of record will show that the correctness and factual
nature of each of these layered premises are open to very serious
doubt, doubts which can only lead to the same conclusion which
the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the
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VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 863
BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove the Philippine
citizenship of William Gatchalian and of his eight (8) alleged
uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when they first arrived in the
Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The administrative determination
by the Bureau of Immigration as of July 20, 1960 does not
constitute res judicata that forecloses the Supreme Court from
examining the supposed Philippine Citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian upon which private respondent William Gatchalian
seeks to rely.—It is suggested in the majority opinion that the
question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter
which cannot be reviewed by this Court; that per the records of
the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960, Santiago
Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this
forecloses re-opening of that question thirty (30) years later. I
must, with respect, disagree with this suggestion. The
administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as of
20 July 1960 certainly does not constitute res judicata that
forecloses this Court from examining the supposed Philippine
citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private respondent
William Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid
examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago
Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by William
Gatchalian, considering that one of the central issues here is the
tenability or untenability of the claim of William Gatchalian to
Philippine citizenship and hence to entry or admission to the
Philippines as such citizen.
Conflicts of Law; Marriages; The rule that a foreign marriage
valid in accordance with the law of the place where it was
performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to
operate until after the marriage performed abroad and its
compliance with the requirements for validity under the marriage
law of the place where performed are first shown as factual

matters.—It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who
asserts and relies upon the existence of a valid foreign marriage
must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the fact of
compliance with the requisites of such law, but also the fact o f
the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, the issue before
the Court was whether the marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the
deceased Sy Kiat in accordance with Chinese law and custom had
been adequately proven. In rendering a negative answer, this
Court, speaking through Cortez, J. , said: “These evidence may
very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said
marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. Custom is
defined as ‘a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
864
rule, legally binding and obligatory.’ The law requires that ‘a

custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence’ [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had
occasion to state that ‘a local custom as a source of right can not
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact’ [Patriarca
vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same evidence, if not one
of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. The
law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that: Art. 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine Law. Construing this
provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid
foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)]. (Italics supplied) In the
instant case, there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago’s
bare assertion that a marriage ceremony between Santiago and
Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China in accordance with
Chinese law. The contents of the relevant Chinese law on
marriage at the time of the supposed marriage, was similarly not
shown. Should it be assumed simply that the requirements of the
1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the

requirements of the Philippine law on marriage, it must be
pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian
submitted proof that any of the requirements of a valid marriage
under Philippine law had been complied with. I respectfully urge,
therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our
conflicts rule on marriage embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code
(now Article 26 of the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No.
3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage valid in
accordance with the law of the place where it was performed shall
be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to operate until after
the marriage performed abroad and its compliance with the
requirements for validity under the marriage law of the place
where performed, are first shown as factual matters. There is, in
other words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful
marriage under Chinese law had taken place in 1926 in China
between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.
Same; Same; Same; No presumption of a lawful marriage
between Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese wife can be
invoked by William Gatchalian, consequently, the latter cannot
invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his own favor.—Francisco
Gatchalian stated
865
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 865
that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in

1947 according to Chinese custom. Once again, we must note that
there was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony satisfying
the requirements of “Chinese custom” had ever taken place in
China between Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was there
any proof that a marriage “according to Chinese custom” was
valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947 and of factual
compliance with the requirements of the law and custom in China
concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok was alleged to have died in
Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then follow,
once again, that no presumption of a lawful marriage between
Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked
by William Gatchalian. It follows still further that William
Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his
own favor. As in the case of his putative father Francisco, William
could as well have followed the nationality of his concededly
Chinese mother.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring-Dissenting Opinion:
Jurisdiction; Immigration Laws; The case of William

Gatchalian should not be treated as an exception to the rule that
the primary jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged
aliens rests in the Bureau of Immigration.—I can easily agree
with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established
doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged
aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and
that “a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings.” I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners
in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of
Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-
judicial bodies. However, I cannot go along with the view that the
case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the
Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards.
Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court
should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian
instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To
grant him these benefits would do violence to the law, liberally
stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary
rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or
circumstances exists to justify the application of the exceptions for
the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts
exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law
and the doctrine.
866
Same; Courts; Appeals; The Gatchalians should have invoked

the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for
appropriate redress instead of filing petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila and the RTC
of Valenzuela.—Cone-quently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resoltuions of 15
September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.) and
G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March
1989, 22 December 1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578
(Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals,

et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617,
and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate
redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil
Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial
courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned
orders, respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; A party should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums.—As to
why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court
and his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint before
the latter has not been explained. It is to be noted that he is a
registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long
resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-
Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor children
are not parties to the case before the Comm i ssion on
Immigration and Deportation. Their causes of action are based
mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against William
tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium and connubium and
the plaintiffs minors protection and support. At once, the viability
of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have
valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs
in the case filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a
separate complaint before another court was part of a strategy to
frustrate the proceedings before the Board. As correctly
maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case
of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact that on
September 4, 1990, or two days before the filing of the case before
the Valenzuela court the government filed a
867
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 867
motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-

shopping has long been condemned and proscribed. In People vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28
November 1980, this Court held that a party “should not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different

forums.”
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the

resolution/temporary restraining order of the Regional
Trial Court, of Manila, Branch 29. Dela Rosa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent
William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D.
Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the

Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September
7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to
the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of
respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in
Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined
petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit
respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil
cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his
Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person
with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the
alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment
to respondent Gatchalian’s counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as
answer to the petition and petitioners’ comment as answer
to the counter-
868

petition and gives due course to the petitions.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex “1”, counter-petition). Before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he
has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely:
Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian,
Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex “2”,
counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-
year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together
with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and
Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex
“C”, petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135
by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex
“D”, petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after
a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and
ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex “E”, petition). A warrant of exclusion
also dated July 6, 1962
869
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 869

was issued alleging that “the decision of the Board of

Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 xxx has now become
final and executory (Annex “F”, petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the
Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July
20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967
case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of
Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the
others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of
arrest issued therein (Annex “5”, counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued
an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of
arrest issued against him (Annex “6”, counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National
Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the
other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1
and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as
the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex “G”, petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action
(Annex “20”, counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo
**
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued
a mission
________________
** Renamed Bureau of Immigration as per Executive Order No. 292.
870

order commanding the arrest of respondent William

Gatchalian (Annex “18”, counter-petition). The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20,
1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by
respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent
judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners
and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless,
respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated
September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent
Gatchalian’s wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172,
presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No.
3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William. On
the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned
temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from
continuing with the deportation proceedings against
William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1)
respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of
the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with
the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have
jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in
preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case
against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process
determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela
Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues
raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby
disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca
(supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of

the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is
a Chinese citizen; and 4)
871
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 871

respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil

Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges
among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record
is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen,
petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved
the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer
judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent’s
citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias,
pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground
for which he is sought to be deported has already
prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be
referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is
the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-
judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that
petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in
equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue “writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
their respective regions, x x x.” Thus, the RTCs are vested
with the power to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the Court of Appeals is vested with—
“(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
board or commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance

with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-
paragraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.”
872

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-
judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions
are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their
enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs.
Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under
Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the
Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention
Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals. In the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this
Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
“Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:

“x x x. The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
“The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as
follows:
“SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies.—Any provision
of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of
Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and
two, also known as the ‘Minimum Wage Law’; the Department of
Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred
seventy-five, also known as the ‘Indust rial Peace Act’; the Land
Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the
Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural
Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals,
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law,

or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final
judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved
party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.’
873
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 873

“Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of

various special courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has
to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory
statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the
National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory,
but, nevertheless, ‘reviewable by this Court through a petition for
certiorari and not by way of appeal.
“Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the
Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are appealable to
the Court of Appeals.
“The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are
likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of
the Social Security Commission.
“As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals,
it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial
Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the
control of the latter. (Italics supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor

Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as
Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies
or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land
Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions
or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in
terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control
of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not
among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to
the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to
judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book
VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as
follows:
“SEC. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject

to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable
laws.
“x x x
“(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified
in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of
874

Court.”
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is

subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the
latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the
Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the
court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is
subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of
Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial
bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As
the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed
through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration
has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. And a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531
[1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits
of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings
are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the
alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question
of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955],
this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and

We quote:
“When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his

citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed
by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to
resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas
corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evi dence thereof is satisfactory,
there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deporta-
875
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 875

tion proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after

the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.
“ x x x. And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at
all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent undue
harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed
administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to
peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation
Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen’s
name before the bar of public opinion?” (Italics supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of

Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore,
not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413
[1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial
intervention, however, should be granted only in cases
where the “claim of citizenship is so substantial that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.
In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on
sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co.
vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]. It appearing
from the records that respondent’s claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention
should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could
properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional
Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21
(1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over
actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the

pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.
Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the
parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to
decide the controversy right at this instance. And this
course of action is not without precedent for “it is a
cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive
to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is
remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised
again to the Court of
876

Appeals and from there to this Court” (Marquez vs.

Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs.
Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 1974]; Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos
(67 SCRA 146 [1975]). In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
“Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of

evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing
vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et
al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al.,
19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety &
Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]),

We said:
“Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids

waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the
government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf.
Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic
of our judicial setup is that where the dictates of justice so

demand xxx xxx xxx the Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing
Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.)”
(Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See
also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only

before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the
other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298,
counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in
support of the deportation charges
877
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 877

against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that

this Court’s decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (
supra ), has already settled respondent’s alienage. Hence,
the need for a judicial determination of respondent’s
citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking
admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past
thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board, supra ).
According to petitioners, respondent’s alienage has been
conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo
cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the
sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of rendition
of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of
Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on
July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the
figure (date) “20” was erased and over it was superimposed
the figure “6” thereby making the decision fall within the
one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within
which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not
squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less
that of respondent’s who was not a party in the aforesaid
cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in
behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a
person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision
rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of

Commissioners’ decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not
satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing,
said decision did not make any categorical statement that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine
of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship
(Labo vs. Commission on Elections ( supra); citing Soria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia
Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41
SCRA 292 [1971] and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra ), this Court declared that:
“(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or

indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizen-
878

ship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to

be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in

Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
“We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a

party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court,
the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of
such party’s citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is
made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of
citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in
any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with
the procedure herein stated.”
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be

applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof;

and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set
forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William
Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the
arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence
based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962,
coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the
Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
“Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the
ground for deportation as
879
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 879

charged against the alien.” (Italics supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in

matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the
case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok
Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24
SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan
vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, 10 SCRA 411); see also Santos vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board
(supra), “(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings.
And if one suspected of having committed a crime is

entitled to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of
an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?” It is not
indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2,
Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated
August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that
the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of
the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1
and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:
“xxx
“1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal

Pro-
880

cedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration

Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xx x
“3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and
immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent
and a right to counsel; x x x”
Hence, petitioners’ argument that the arrest of respondent

was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission
order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same
was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or
warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against
petitioners’ cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or
comment to the counterpetition of respondent, respondent
Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the
1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing

before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after
giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda (Annex “5”, counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2)
the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the “very basis
of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram
by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, xxx, which was
dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong
authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.”
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that “(i)f at all, the
cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of
Identity which took the place of a passport for their
authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that
they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain
in the country.”
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda
issued an Order (Annex “6”, counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated
July 6, 1961 admitting
881
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 881

respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens;

recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino
citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis
of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor
of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian,
grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As
a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6,
1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The
opening paragraph of said order states:
“The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is

based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960.” (Annex “37”,
Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants

therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The
status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to
the “applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino.” (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before
the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex “1” to
the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in
Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine
Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960
by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his
affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex “5”, counterpetition),
Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a
consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien
registry which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B.
No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized
by the
882

Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued

Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens,
Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to reopen the question of citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even
put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the
records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July
20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a
Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even
question Santiago Gatchalian’s Philippine citizenship. It is
the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in
issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this

case.
Furthermore, petitioners’ position is not enhanced by
the fact that respondent’s arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section
37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation “shall
not be effected xxx unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises.” In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil.
1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:
“ There is however an important circumstance which places this

case beyond the reach of the resultant consequence of the
fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she
admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making
use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of
her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be
the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that
more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission.
Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the mother
herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation
conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on
September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the
immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission,
plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to another
Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a
restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a
net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must
have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspite
of that finding, they decided to land said minor “as a properly
documented preference
883
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 883

quota immigrant” (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder

why two years later the immigration officials would reverse their
attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings
against the minor.
“ Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe
that much as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for
having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the
Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too
late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having
allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of

validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his
deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him to live
separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving
him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and
protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which,
for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor
herein involved.” (Italics supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners’ alleged cause of action and

deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990—28 long
years after. It is clear that petitioners’ cause of action has
already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be
validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William
Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on
March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs.
Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was
found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a
party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b)
of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is
applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7,
8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable
in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration
Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings
should be insti-
884

tuted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act

provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses
therein enumerated with a fine of “not more than
P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2)
years and deportation if he is an alien.” Thus:
“Penal Provisions
“Sec. 45. Any individual who—
“(a) When applying for an immigration document personates

another individual, or falsely appears in the name of
deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by
appearing under an assumed name; fictitious name; or
“(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document,
to any person not authorized by law to receive such
document; or
“(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document,
knowing it to be false; or
“(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection
and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains
entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading
representation or wilful concealment of a material fact; or
“(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent
himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any
requirement of the immigration laws; or
“(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under
oath any false statement or representations; or
“(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without
first securing an immigration clearance certificates
required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
“(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the
foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one
thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two
years, and deported if he is an alien.” (Italics supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe

in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional
penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal
Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No.
3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances)
“violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: xxx; (c) after
885
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 885

eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two

years or more, but less than six years; xxx.”
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent
deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year
prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting
deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion
based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not
imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of
the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the
lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to
execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
“Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of
the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it
is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should
not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceed-ings.” (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra ). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse
of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date
it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of
limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action
based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from
the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the
rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be

initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when effected under
any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the
Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec.
37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or
exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
886

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the

BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against
respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners’ cause of action has already prescribed. Neither
may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated
July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144
[3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961,
respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in
the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973
(Annex “8”, counter-petition) with whom he has four (4)
minor children. The marriage contract shows that said
respondent is a Filipino (Annex “8”). He holds passports
and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes “9”, “10” &
“11”, counter-petition). He is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition).
He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is
the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and
Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, “13”
& “14”, counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent
claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a
controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He
continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and
discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners
initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
“The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is
an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people” (Lao Gi
vs. Court of Appeals, supra ). How could one who has
helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered
undesirable and be summarily deported when the
government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign
investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who
invest at least US $50,000.00 in the country? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair,
if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners
887
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 887

in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled

government policy.Petitioners,
on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In
support of their position, petitioners point out that
Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the
laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There
being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago’s
children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage.
Similarly, the validity of the Francisco’s marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed
the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner’s argument,
We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no
proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be
blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor.
The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed
by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of
China relating to marriage, having been content with the
testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was
lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian’s testimony subjected to
the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philipin the case at bar is
diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
888

pine consular and immigration authorities regarding their

marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-
serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in
matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this
salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law.
Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document,

final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.” (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago

Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are
not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art.
172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
the Family Code) provides that “(a)ll marriages performed
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . .” And
any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and
the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may
be extended to the consequences of the coverture is
answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: “In
case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over
their children, and the validity of defense for any member
of the family in case of unlawful aggression.” (Italics
supplied). Bearing in mind the “processual presumption”
enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that
the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of
proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father Fran-
889
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 889

cisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.

Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the
class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article
IV of the Constitution, which provides:
“Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution. xxx”
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine

citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13
SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling
arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar
for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to
have been married in China by a village leader, which
undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art.
7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to
resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino
citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as
DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-
54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are
likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-

Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), I concur in the result.
Narvasa, J., I concur in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I concur in the dissent of Mr.
Justice
890

Feliciano.
Cruz, J., I join Justice Feliciano in his dissent.
Paras, J., I join J. Feliciano in his dissent.
Feliciano, J., See separate dissenting opinion.
Padilla, J., I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
dissent.
Regalado, J., I join Feliciano, J. in his dissent.
Davide, Jr., J., with separate concurring and
dissenting opinion.
FELICIANO, J.: Dissenting:
I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my

distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice A.A. Bidin,
and I, therefore, undertake to submit this separate opinion.
For convenience, the following is a precis of the matters
discussed in detail below.
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August

1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding
facts, however, make quite clear that an amended
warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one
correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration
Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying
out an existing and valid Warrant of Exclusion
covering respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of
Commissioners (“BOC”) and Warrant of Exclusion
remain valid and effective and enforceable against
respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-
applicants for that matter. That Decision reversed a
6 July 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
(“BSI”) and held that respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants failed to
subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippine
citizenship in 1961. Respondent William Gatchalian
does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode
of entitlement subsequent to his application for
entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by
any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the
Philippines.
1
1
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6
July 1962 Decision
________________
1 21 SCRA 532 (1967); 128 Phil. 566 (1967).
891
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 891

of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only

against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular
Gatchalian who was taken into custody by
immigration authorities in 1965, but also against
Pedro’s co-applicants, which include respondent
William Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to
Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a
supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian,
allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962
proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by
the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in
Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity
and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision
that the Gatchalian applicants had not
substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship,
this Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian
applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever
their true nationality might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once
more the claim to Philippine citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed
examination of the facts, including the supposed
status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born
Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to
Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven by
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian
does not claim to have been naturalized as a
Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be
not a Philippine citizen.
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to
some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not
with this Court which is charged with the

application of the law as it is in fact written, but
with the political branches of the Government. It is
those departments of Government which must
consider the desirability and wisdom of enacting
legislation providing for the legalization of the
entry and stay of aliens who may be in the same
situation as respondent William Gatchalian and his
co-applicants.
1. Petitioner argues that respondent William

Gatchalian’s arrest follows as a matter of
“consequence” of the Warrant of Exclusion issued
by the BOC on 6 July 1962. This is opposed by
892

respondent Gatchalian upon the ground that the Mission

Orderor Warrant of Arrest does not mention that it is
issued pursuantto a final order of deportation or Warrant
of Exclusion.
The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August
1990 issued by petitioner Commissioner Domingo, CID,
reads in part as follows:
“Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams
Team No.
Subject William, Juan, Francisco, Jose, Benjamin, Jonathan,
Pedro, Gloria, Elena, all surnamed Gatchalian
Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.
x x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-xx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal

Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Section 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
2. Make a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest under Rule 125, Section 12.
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and
immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent

and a right to counsel;
4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with the Special
Prosecutor’s Office and, in case of a search, prepare and
file an inventory of the properties seized, verified under
oath following Office Memorandum Order No. 45
x x x x x x x x x”
The above Mission Order merely referred to Section 37 (a)

of the Immigration Act, as amended, and to Sections 45
and 46 of the Administrative Code (should be Immigration
Law), and that its wording suggests that the arrest is
sought to be carried out for the purpose of carrying out a
preliminary investigation or custodial interrogation rather
than for the purpose of enforcing a final order of
deportation or warrant of exclusion. More specifically, the
Mission Order failed to mention the 6 July 1962 BOC
Decision and Warrant of Exclusion. At the same time, there
is no gainsaying the fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision
and Warrant of Exclusion do exist and became final and, as
discussed in detail below, remain valid and effective.
It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990,
Special
893
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 893

Prosecutor Mabolo had filed a Manifestation or Motion

before the Bureau of Immigration explicitly referring to the
Warrant of Exclusion issued against respondent William
Gatchalian and his original co-applicants for admission in
1961, which had been passed upon in Arocha vs. Vivo
(supra), and argued that there was, therefore, no longer
any need to adduce evidence in support of the charges
against respondent William Gatchalian.
Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or
Mission Order dated 15 August 1990, ineptly worded as it
is, may be amended so as to refer explicitly to the
mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a new warrant of
arrest or mission order issued similarly explicitly referring
to the Warrant of Exclusion.
2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the

Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July 1962 which read as
follows:
“WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the proceedings had on

the application for admission as Philippine citizens of JOSE
GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN, BENJAMIN
GATCHALIAN, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN,
GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN,
WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the
Board of Commissioners found them not entitled to admission as
Filipinos in a Decision, dated July 6, 1962, and ordered their
exclusion as persons not properly documented;
AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners,
dated 6 July 1962, ordering the exclusion of above-named
applicants, has now become final and executory.
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the
undersigned by law, you are hereby ordered to exclude the
aforenamed individuals and cause their removal from this country
to the port where they came or to the port of the country of which
they are nationals, on the first available transportation, in
accordance with law.” (Italics supplied)
It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian was

a party to the 1961-1962 proceedings before the Bureau of
Immigration which proceedings culminated in the 6 July
1962 Decision of the BOC and the aforequoted Warrant of
Exclusion.
It is, however, insisted by respondent William
Gatchalian that the Warrant of Exclusion may no longer be
executed or implemented as against him in view of the
passage of approxi-
894

mately twenty-eight (28) years since the issuance of such

Warrant. Respondent Gatchalian here relies upon Section
37 (b) of the Immigration Act which states that:
“Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 3, 7, 8,

11 and 12 of the Par. (a) of this Section at any time after entry, but
shall not be effected under any other clauses unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
cause for deportation arises x x x.” (Italics supplied)
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that

the five (5) year-limitation is applicable only where
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section
37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where
deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under
clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and 12 of Section 37 (a), no period of

limitation is applicable; and that, to the contrary,
deportation or exclusion may be effected “at any time after
entry.”
Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that the
Government has sought to effect the exclusion and
deportation of respondent William Gatchalian upon the
ground that he had entered the country as a citizen of the
Philippines when he was not lawfully admissible as such at
the time of entry under Section 37 (a) (2), since the BOC
had held him and the other Gatchalians there involved as
not properly documented for admission, under Section 29
(a) (17) of the Immigration Act, as amended. On 7 July
1990, the Acting Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (“NBI”) initiated the proceedings immediately
before us by writing to the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent William Gatchalian, and
his co-applicants covered by the Warrant of Exclusion
dated 6 July 1962, be charged with: “Violation of Section 37
(a), paragraphs 1 and 2, in relation to Section 45 (c), (d) and
(e) of Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as
the Immigration Act of 1940.” The Secretary of Justice
endorsed this recommendation to Immigration
Commissioner Domingo for investigation and immediate
action. On 20 August 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo filed
a charge sheet against respondent William Gatchalian
which specified the following charges:
895
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 895

“The respondent is an alien national who unlawfully gained entry

into the Philippines without valid travel document in violation of
the Immigration Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub pars. (1) and (2);
That respondent being an alien misrepresented himself as
Philippine Citizen by false statements and fraudulent documents
in violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 45, par. (c), (d) and (e).
That respondent being an alien national is an undocumented
person classified as excludable under the Immigration Act, Sec. 29
(a) sub par. (17).
x x x x x x x x x” (Italics supplied)
Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as

amended, provides as follows:
“Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be arrested upon the

warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the
Immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry; (As
amended by Republic Act No. 503).
(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of
entry.

x x x x x x x x x”
(Italics supplied)
Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to Section 29

(a) of the Immigration Act, as amended, which lists the
classes of alien excluded from entry in the Philippines, as
follows:
“Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
entry into the Philippines;
x x x x x x x x x
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be
required under the provisions of this act.” (Italics supplied)
Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time

limitation is applicable in respect of the carrying out of the
Warrant of
896

Exclusion issued in 1962.

A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so.
What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children
and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first descended
upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to
be a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside
in the Philippines. On the part of the Government, what
was at stake was the right to exclude from the country
persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such

claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do
not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the
simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to
be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be
distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after
having been initially lawfully admitted into the
Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to
deportation.
Normally, aliens excluded
2
are immediately sent back to
their country of origin. This is so in cases where the alien
has not yet gained a foothold into the country and is still
seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had
already physically gained entry but such entry is later
found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully
admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the alien in
this case is being excluded; however, the rules on
deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact
that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he
had gained physical entry.
It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. Vivo
(supra), this Court upheld the 6 July 1962 Order of the
BOC and the application of the Warrant of Exclusion, in
respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even though more than five (5)
years had elapsed by the time the Court’s Decision was
promulgated on 26 October 1967.
Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically
inside the country, it is the government’s basic position
that he was never lawfully admitted into the country,
having failed to prove his claim of Philippine citizenship,
and hence the Warrant of
_______________
2 Section 36, Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended, or Immigration

Law.
897
VOL.197, MAY 31, 1991 897

Exclusion of 6 July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for

that matter, may be executed “at any time” under Section
37 (b). It is the correctness of that basic position which
must be ascertained and in that ascertainment, the mere
passage of time is quite peripheral in relevance considering

the express language of Section 37 (b).
My distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act
No. 3326, and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold
that where the arrest for purpose of deportation is made
more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be
applied. Act No. 3326 which took effect on 4 December
1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of criminal
prosecutions for violations penalized not by the Revised
Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not
otherwise establish a period of prescription. In other words,
Act No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the
institution of criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite
settled that deportation proceedings cannot be assimilated
to criminal prosecutions for violation
3
either of the Revised
Penal Code or of special statutes. Moreover, Act No. 3326
purports to be applicable only where the special act itself
has not established an applicable statute of limitations for
criminal proceedings. It cannot, however, be said that
Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has
not established an applicable statute of limitations. For,
precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation may be effected under certain clauses of
Section 37 (a) “at any time after entry.” One of those
instances is, precisely, deportation upon the ground
specified in Clause (2) of 37 (a) which relates to “any alien
who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.”
Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to specify a
prescriptive period for deportation under Section 37 (a) (2),
expressly authorizes deportation under such ground “at
any time after entry.” It is, thus, very difficult to see how
Act No. 3326 could apply at all to the instant case.
________________
3 Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commission of Immigration and the
Director of National Bureau of Investigation, 104 Phil. 949 (1958); La
Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 683 (1948).
898

Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually

involved in the case at bar is exclusion, not deportation.
3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs. Vivo

(supra) has already resolved the claim to Philippine
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian adversely to
him and that such ruling constitutes res judicata. Upon the
other hand, respondent William Gatchalian vehemently
argues that neither the 6 July 1962 BOC’s Decision nor
Arocha definitely settled the question of his citizenship.
My respectful submission is that respondent William
Gatchalian’s argument constitutes a highly selective
reading of both the BOC Decision and the Decision in
Arocha written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for a unanimous court.
The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC, in its dispositive
portion, reads as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this

Board finds and hereby holds that the applicants [Jose
Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian, Benjamin Gatchalian, Juan
Gatchalian, Pedro Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco
Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and Johnson Gatchalian] herein
have not satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine citizenship
and therefore the Decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, dated
July 6, 1961 admitting them as Filipinos is hereby reversed, and
said applicants should be, as they are hereby ordered excluded as
persons not properly documented. SO ORDERED.” (Italics
supplied)
Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants

in 1961 claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine
citizens, determination of their right to enter the
Philippines thus indispensably involved the resolution of
their claim to Philippine citizenship. In other words, the
determination of that citizenship in the instant case was
not a mere incident of the case; it was rather the central
and indeed the only issue that had to be resolved by the
BOC. Review of the 1961 proceedings before the BSI shows
that the sole issue before it was the supposed Philippine
citizenship of the applicants. Thus, the very same issue of
claimed Philippine citizenship was resolved by the BOC
when it reversed the 6 July 1961 decision of the BSI. This
case may be distinguished from other types of cases, e.g.,
applications for public utility franchises, petitions for
change of name, applications for registration as voter, filing
of certifi-
899
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 899

cates of candidacy for an elective position, etc., where the

central issue is not citizenship although resolution of that
issue requires a determination of the citizenship of the
applicant, candidate or petitioner.
The ruling of the BOC that respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission as
Philippine citizens had not satisfactorily proved their claim
to Philippine citizenship, can only be reasonably read as a
holding that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true
nationality or nationalities might be. Thus, it appears to be
merely semantic play to argue, as respondent William
Gatchalian argues, that the 1962 BOC Decision did not
categorically hold him to be an “alien” and that the BOC
had merely held him and his co-applicants as “not properly
documented.” The phrase “not properly documented” was
strictly and technically correct. For William Gatchalian
and his co-applicants had presented themselves as
Philippine citizens and as such entitled to admission into
the country. Since the BOC rejected their claims to
Philippine citizenship, William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants were non-Filipinos “not properly documented for
admission” under Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as
amended.
4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had

before it the following items:
1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which allowed

the entry of respondent Gatchalian and his co-
applicants as citizens of the Philippines;
2 . A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July 1961
BSI decision, which had been “noted” by two (2)
Commissioners but rejected by Commissioner
Galang on 14 and 26 July 1961 and 21 August
1961, respectively;
3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in which the
BOC had reviewed motu proprio the Gatchalian
proceedings before the BSI and reversed the BSI
decision of 6 July 1961;
4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962 issued
pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC;
and
5. A decision of the Manila Court of First Instance
dated 31 July 1965, rendered in a habeas corpus
proceeding brought to effect the release of Pedro
Gatchalian who had been taken into custody by
immigration officials pursuant to the 6 July 1962

Warrant of Exclusion.
900

The Court of First Instance (“CFI”) decision ordered Pedro

Gatchalian’s release upon the ground that the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision had been issued beyond the one (1) year
period for review of the BSI decision of 6 July 1961. The
CFI decision was reversed and nullified by the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6
July 1962 had not been antedated and that it was valid and
effective to reverse and nullify the BSI order granting
admission to the Gatchalians as citizens of the Philippines.
The Court also held that the split BOC decision of July-
August 1961 did not operate to confirm and render final the
BSI decision of 6 July 1961, the split decision being null
and void because it had not been rendered by the BOC as a
body.
The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian’s argument
that he was not bound by the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision:
“It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. 5-A refer
only to the cases of Gloria, Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian.
But the designation of the case is ‘Gloria Gatchalian, et al.’ No
reason is shown why the case of these three should be considered
and voted upon separately, considering that the claims to
citizenship and entry of all were based on the same
circumstances, applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino and that all their applications for entry
were in fact jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry
4
in one single
decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844).”
I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling in

Arocha disposes of the contention here being made by
respondent William Gatchalian that he is not bound by the
Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that the 1962
BOC Decision was valid and effective and William was
certainly one of the applicants for admission in the
proceedings which began in 1961 before the BSI.
Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the Court
in Arocha did not find him nor any of his co-applicants to
be aliens and that all the Court did was to hold that the 6
July 1962 Board of Commissioners decision had not been
antedated. This contention cannot be taken seriously. As

has already been
________________
4 21 SCRA at 539.
901
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 901

pointed out several times, the 1962 Board of

Commissioners decision held that William Gatchalian and
his eight (8) other co-applicants for admission had not
proved their claim to Philippine citizenship; not being
Filipinos, they must have been aliens, to be excluded as
persons not properly documented. Moreover, a review of
the Rollo in Arocha vs. Vivo shows that the parties there
had expressly raised the issue of the citizenship of Pedro
Gatchalian in their pleadings. The Solicitor General, in his
fifth assignment of error, argued that the Court of First
Instance had erred in declaring Pedro Gatchalian a
Filipino, and simultaneously urged that the 6 July 1962
decision of the Board of Commissioners was quite correct.
Pedro Gatchalian, upon the other hand, contended that
precisely because he was a Filipino, the 5 Bureau of
Immigration had no jurisdiction to exclude him.
The Court also said in Arocha:
“Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not traverse the

allegation of appellant Commissioners in their return to the writ
of Habeas Corpus that appellee Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on
the strength of a forged cablegram, purportedly signed by the
former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, and
apparently authorizing appellee’s documentation as a Filipino
(par. 3[a] of Return, C.F.I., Rec., pp. 15-16). Such failure to deny
imports admission of its truth by the appellee, establishes that his
entry was irregular. Neither has he appealed the decision 6
of the
Commissioners of Immigration to the Department Head.”
Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was effected

simultaneously with that of Francisco and William
Gatchalian, on exactly the same basis and on the strength
of the same forged cablegram allegedly from then Secretary
of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, it must follow that
the entry of Francisco and William Gatchalian was
similarly irregular. The applications for admission of the
nine (9) Gatchalians were all jointly resolved by the BSI on

6 July 1961 on the identical basis
________________
5 Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 32 (Brief for the Respondents-Appellants,

p. 28); Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 41 (Brief for the Petitioner-Appellee, p.
8).
6 21 SCRA at 541.
902

that they were all descendants of Santiago Gatchalian, a

supposed natural born Philippine citizen.
5 . The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision

by Commissioner Nituda in 1973, cannot be given
any effect. A close examination of the same reveals
that such purported reversal was highly irregular.
Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr. Nituda,

being in 1973 Acting Commissioner of Immigration, had
the authority to reverse the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962,
since he (Nituda) had immediate control, direction and
supervision of all officers, clerks and employees of the
Bureau of Immigration. Control means, respondent
Gatchalian continues, the power to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to 7substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Respondent Gatchalian’s view is obviously flawed. The
Commissioner’s power of control over the officers and
employees of the Bureau of Immigration cannot be
compared to the power of control and supervision vested by
the Constitution in the President of the Philippines (which
was what Ham was all about), for the Commissioner’s
general power of control cannot be said to include the
power to review and set aside the prior final decision
reached by the BOC. The Commissioner of Immigration,
acting alone, cannot be regarded as an authority higher
than the BOC itself (constituted by the Commissioner and
the two [2] Associate Commissioners), in respect of matters
vested by the governing statute in such Board itself. One of
these matters is precisely the hearing and deciding of
appeals from decisions of the BSI, and the motu proprio
review of the entire proceedings of a case within 8one (1)

year from the promulgation of a decision by the BSI.
Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the
Immigration Act as amended, as empowering Nituda to
reverse the 1962 BOC Decision. Section 29 (b) reads as
follows:
“Section 29. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
________________
7 Citing Ham vs. Bachrach, 109 Phil. 949 (1968).

8 Section 27 (d), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended.
903
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 903

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the

Commissioner of Immigration, in his discretion, may
permit to enter (sic) any alien properly documented, who
is subject to exclusion under this section, but who is—
(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who is

returning from a temporary visit abroad;
(2) an alien applying for temporary admission.”
It is difficult to understand respondent’s argument. For one

thing, Section 29 (b) relates to an “alien properly
documented” while respondent Gatchalian precisely claims
to be a citizen of the Philippines rather than a resident
alien returning from a temporary visit abroad or an alien
applying for temporary admission.
It should be recalled that Nituda’s 1973 Decision
approved a ruling rendered by a Board of Special Inquiry in
1973 that respondent Gatchalian was properly
documented, a ruling which was precipitated by a “Petition
for Rehearing” filed by respondent Gatchalian and his co-
applicants in 8 March 1972 before the BSI. There are a
number of obvious defects in the action of the BSI. Firstly,
the motion for rehearing was filed way out of time. Rule 3,
B 22 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations of 1
January 1941 provides as follows:
“At any time before the alien is deported, but not later than seven
days from the date he receives notice of the decision on appeal of
the Board of Commissioners, the applicant or his attorney or
counsel may file a petition for rehearing only on the ground of

newly discovered evidence. Such petition shall be in writing and
shall set forth the nature of the evidence discovered and the
reason or reasons why it was not produced before. x x x” (Italics
supplied)
Respondent Gatchalian’s and his co-applicants’ motion for

re-hearing was filed, not seven (7) days but rather ten (10)
years after notice of the 1962 BOC Decision had been
received by them. Secondly, Rule 3, B 25 of the Immigration
Rules and Regulations prescribed that any motion for
rehearing shall be filed only with the Board of
Commissioners; the Gatchalians’ motion for rehearing was
filed with the BSI which then purported to reopen the case
“without first securing the consent in writing of the
Commissioner of Immigration” as required by Rule 2, D 20.
904

Furthermore, the purported reversal of the 1962 BOC

Decision was made not by the duly constituted BOC in
1973, but only by its Chairman, then Acting Commissioner
Nituda. Mr. Nituda’s action flew in the face of Rule 3, B 22
of the Immigration Rules and Regulation, which mandates
that the decision of any two (2) members of the BOC shall
prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda purported to act as
if he were the entire BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in
1973 could not have lawfully reversed 9
a final decision
rendered by the BOC ten (10) years ago.
We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha
vs. Vivo (supra) where the Supreme Court expressly
outlined the procedure to be followed by the BOC in
resolving cases before them. This court was very explicit in
holding that individual actions of members of the BOC are
legally ineffective:
“x x x [T]he former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have

acted individually in this particular instance and not as a Board.
It is shown by the different dates affixed to their signatures that
they did not actually meet to discuss and vote on the case. This
was officially made to record by the Secretary of Justice in his
Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he
stated.
‘that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of

Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate in the
cases coming before it.’ [Citation omitted]
Individual action by members of a board plainly renders

nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The
Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in
order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that
their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before
reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs. Humphrise, LRA 1915F
1047). This process is of the essence of a board’s action, save where
otherwise provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule
would be lost were the members to act individually, without
benefit of discussion.
‘The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised
by the individual members separately. Their acts are official only when
done by the members convened in sessions,
________________
9 See Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. Fernandez, et al., 120 Phil. 178
(1964).
905
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 905

upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum

present. [Citation omitted]
Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board
but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their
official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the
board. [Citation omitted]
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals,
that board can act officially only as such, in convened sessions, with the
10
members, or a quorum thereof, present.’ [Citation omitted]” (Italics

supplied)
The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 Decision of the

BOC could not hence be considered as the act of the BOC
itself.
The pretended act of reversal of Mr. Nituda must,
therefore, be stricken down and disregarded for having
been made in excess of his lawful authority. The 1973 order
of Nituda was ineffective to vest any right upon respondent
Gatchalian who, it is worth nothing, did not pretend to
submit any newly discovered evidence to support their
claim to Philippine citizenship already rejected by the 1962
BOC. In essence, Mr. Nituda purported not merely to set
aside the 1962 BOC Decision but also the 1967 Decision of
this Court in Arocha vs. Vivo.
II
I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which

make up the basis of the claim of William Gatchalian to
Philippine citizenship. The most striking feature of this
claim to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a fragile
web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total
lack of official documentation whether Philippine or
foreign, of negative facts and of invocation of presumptions
without proof of essential factual premises. Put in
summary terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to
Philippine citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to wit:
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen;

b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as a
legitimate
________________
10 21 SCRA at 540.
906

son of Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the

intermediate conclusion that Francisco was a
Philippine citizen; and
c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to
the final conclusion that William Gatchalian is a
Philippine citizen.
I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the facts

made of record will show that the correctness and factual
nature of each of these layered premises are open to very
serious doubt, doubts which can only lead to the same
conclusion which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it
reversed the BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove
the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of his
eight (8) alleged uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when
they first arrived in the Philippines.
1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian must be considered first. Santiago was
allegedly born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905 to Pablo

Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. The records do not
disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco but everyone,
including William Gatchalian, assumes that Pablo Pacheco
was a Chinese subject and never became a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. The basic claim of Santiago was that
his mother Marciana Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen
and that Marciana was not lawfully married to Pablo
Pacheco and that consequently, he (Santiago) was an
illegitimate son of Marciana Gatchalian.
The first point that should be made in respect of
Santiago’s claim was that he had always regarded himself
as a Chinese citizen until around 1958 or 1960, that is,
when he reached the age of 53 or 55 years. Santiago, by his
own testimony, lived the bulk of his adult life in China
where he went in 1924 at age 19 and where he stayed for
about 13 years returning to the Philippines for the first
time in 1937. He returned in the same year to China,
stayed there for another nine (9) years, and then came back
to the Philippines again in 1946. He once more left the
Philippines for China on 14 April 1947 and returned on 14
June 1947. Upon his second return to the Philippines in
1946, he documented himself as a Chinese national: he was
holder of ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He continued to
be documented as such, the record showing that he was
also holder of
907
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 907

an ACR No. A-219003 dated 13 January 1951. Santiago,

again by his own statement, married in China a Chinese
woman. This Chinese wife, however, Santiago never
brought or attempted to bring to the Philippines and she
allegedly died in China in 1951, or four (4) years after
Santiago had permanently returned to the Philippines.
In 1958, when he was 53 years of age, Santiago obtained
a residence certificate where for the first time he described
himself as a Filipino. It was also only in 1960, that is, when
Santiago was 55 years of age, that he filed a petition for
cancellation of his ACR obviously upon the theory that he
had always been a Philippine citizen. It was at the hearing
of his petition for cancellation of his ACR that Santiago
made his oral statements concerning the supposed
circumstances of his birth, parentage and marriage.
Santiago’s petition to cancel his ACR was apparently made
in preparation for efforts to bring in, the succeeding year, a

whole group of persons as his supposed descendants.
The second point that needs to be made in respect of
Santiago’s claim of citizenship resting on his supposed
status as an illegitimate son of a Filipina woman, is that no
birth certificate bearing the name of Santiago Gatchalian
was ever presented.
Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the name
Santiago Gatchalian was presented showing the name of
Marciana Gatchalian, Filipina, as mother, with the name of
the father unknown. There was also presented a marriage
certificate dated 1936 of Joaquin Pacheco, alleged brother
of Santiago Gatchalian, also showing Marciana Gatchalian
as mother with the name of the father similarly left blank.
These two (2) pieces of paper, together with Santiago’s own
statements to the Citizenship Evaluation Board as well as
the statements of Joaquin Pacheco to the same Board,
constituted the sum total of the evidence supporting
Santiago’s claim to Philippine citizenship and on the basis
of which an Order dated 12 July 1960, signed by Felix S.
Talabis, Associate Commissioner, granted the petition to
cancel Santiago’s alien registry.
In so issuing his Order granting cancellation of
Santiago’s ACR, Commissioner Talabis disregarded
Santiago’s failure to present a birth certificate, in obvious
violation of rules of the Bureau of Immigration which
expressly require the submission
908

of a birth certificate, or a certified true copy thereof, in

proceedings brought for cancellation of an ACR upon the
ground that the11 petitioner is an illegitimate son of a
Filipina mother. It is well-settled that a baptismal
certificate is proof only of the administration of baptism to
the person named therein, and that such certificate is not
proof of anything else and certainly not proof12 of parentage
nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy.
That Order also casually disregarded a number of other
things, one of which was a document dated 1902 signed by
Maxima Gatchalian, the mother of Marciana Gatchalian,
stating that Maxima—
“x x x residing in the City of Manila, mother of Marciana

Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of age, her father being dead,
do hereby freely consent to her marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of

Manila, and that I know of no legal impediment to such
marriage.” (Italics supplied)
Such parental consent indicated that a marriage ceremony

would have taken place shortly thereafter as a matter of
course; otherwise, the consent would have been totally
pointless. Even more importantly, Commissioner Talabis’
Order disregarded the testimony of Santiago Gatchalian
himself in the same cancellation proceedings that he
(Santiago) believed that his parents had been
13
married by
the Justice of the Peace of Pasig, Rizal. In his Order,
Commissioner Talabis referred to the fact
________________
11 Memorandum Circular, Department of Justice, dated 28 August

1958; Administrative Memorandum, Bureau of Immigration, dated 17
March 1952, cited in E.F. Hernandez and O.A. Domingo, Philippine
Immigration Law and Procedure, (1970 ed.,) p. 437.
12 See, e.g., People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); Macadangdang vs.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980); Fortus vs. Novero, 23 SCRA 1331
(1968); Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 (1968); Vidaurraza vs. Court of
Appeals, 91 Phil. 492 (1952); and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135
(1907).
13 The transcript of the investigation conducted on 12 February 1960 in
CEB No. 3860-R, In Re Petition to Cancel Alien Registry, Santiago
Gatchalian, petitioner,” Annex “2” of private respondent Gatchalian’s
“Comment with Counter-Petition” in G.R. Nos. 95612-13
909
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 909

that Santiago Gatchalian had been “interchangeably using

his parental and maternal surnames. In school, he was
known as Santiago Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921,
Meisic, Manila; Certificates of Completion of Third and
Fourth Grades, Meisic, Primary School). But in his Special
Cedula Certificate No. 676812 dated 17 September 1937,
and in tax clearance certificate issued on 2 October 1937,
he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a
Communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to as
Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office.” At the very least, such use of both paternal and
maternal surnames indicated that Santiago was uncertain
as to his supposed illegitimacy. In our case law, moreover,
the use of a paternal surname may be regarded as an

indication
________________
states:
“[Immigration Investigator]
Q It says here, ‘this is to certify that I, the undersigned, residing in the
City of Manila, mother of Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years
of age, her father being dead, do hereby freely consent to her marriage
with Pablo C Pacheco, of Manila, and that I know of no legal
impediment to such marriage.’ Was your father, Pablo C. Pacheco, and
mother, Marciana Gatchalian, ultimately or eventally married because
of this consent of your grandmother?
[Santiago Gatchalian]
A Yes, I was informed by my brother Joaquin Pacheco that our parents
were married by the justice of the peace of Pasig, Rizal.” (Italics
supplied)
In his subsequent testimony in the same proceedings, Joaquin Pacheco,

and a singularly accommodating immigration investigator who posed
obviously leading questions, sought to soften the impact of Santiago’s
admission that his parents were married:
“[Immigration Investigator]
Q Or is it because [Santiago] was ashamed to admit that he was a
legitimate child and that is the reason why he said your parents were
married?
[Joaquin Gatchalian]
A It may be also that he is ashamed to make it be known that he is a
legitimate child that is why he said our parents are married.” (Annex
“B-9” of private respondent Gatchalian’s“Comment with Counter-
Petition” in G.R. Nos. 95612-13)
910

of possession 14of the status of a legitimate or acknowledged

natural child.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Commissioner
Talabis Order granting cancellation of Santiago’s ACR, is
that such Order failed to give any weight to the
presumption in law in favor of marriage, a presumption
significantly reinforced by the parental consent given by
Maxima Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter
Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C. Pacheco. A related
presumption is that in favor of the legitimacy of offspring
born of a man and woman comporting themselves as
15
15
husband and wife. I respectfully submit that these
presumptions cannot be successfully overthrown by the
simple self-serving testimony of Santiago and of his alleged
brother Joaquin Pacheco and by the two (2) pieces of paper
(the baptismal certificate of Santiago and the marriage
certificate of Joaquin Pacheco). It seems relevant to point
out that Joaquin Pacheco, too, was unable to present any
birth certificate to prove his supposed common parentage
with Santiago Gatchalian; Joaquin was allegedly born in
1902, the same year that Maxima Gatchalian gave her
consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian and Pablo
C. Pacheco.
The third point that needs to be underscored is that
Santiago Gatchalian did nothing to try to bring into the
Philippines his supposed sons and daughters and
grandchildren since 1947, when he returned permanently
to the Philippines, and until 1960. The story given by the
nine (9) supposed descendants of Santiago when they first
arrived in the Philippines was that they had left the
People’s Republic of China and had gone to Macao in 1952
and there they stayed until they moved to Hongkong in
1958. It should also be noted that the youngest supposed
child of Santiago, Benjamin Gatchalian, was said to have
been born in China in 1942 and was consequently only five
(5) years old when Santiago returned permanently to the
Philippines in 1947. In other words, Santiago Gatchalian
behaved as if the nine (9) supposed descendants did not
exist until 1960
________________
14 E.g., In Re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974); and Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23

Phil. 350 (1912).
15 See, in this connection, Rule 131, Section 5 (cc) and (dd) of the Rules
of Court.
911
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 911

when Commissioner Talabis’ Order cancelling Santiago’s

ACR was issued.
It may also be noted that Santiago’s 1951 ACR
application mentioned only two (2) children of Santiago:
Jose and Elena. In 1961, however, Santiago stated before
the immigration investigator that he had a total of five (5)
children: Jose, Elena, Francisco, Gloria and Benjamin.
Santiago’s explanation strongly echoes a common lawyer’s

excuse for failure to seasonably file some pleading, and, it
is respectfully submitted, is equally contrived and
unpersuasive; that he had his clerk fill up the ACR; that he
gave his clerk four (4) names (not five [5]); that the clerk
had simply failed to fill up the ACR correctly. In its 6 July
1962 Decision, the BOC noted that “while the two (2)
names listed in [Santiago’s] [ACR application] Jose and
Elena, bear the same names as two of the [9] applicants,
the difference in the ages of said persons compared to 16
the
said applicants, casts serious doubts on their identity.”
It is suggested in the majority opinion that the question
of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter
which cannot be reviewed by this Court; that per the
records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960,
Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino
citizen and that this forecloses re-opening of that question
thirty (30) years later. I must, with respect, disagree with
this suggestion. The administrative determination by the
Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does
not constitute res adjudicata that forecloses this Court
from examining the supposed Philippine citizenship of
Santiago Gatchalian upon which private respondent
William Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid
examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago
Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by
William Gatchalian, considering that one of the central
issues here is the tanability or untenability of the claim of
William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and hence to
entry or admission to the Philippines as such citizen.
2. The second of the three (3) premises noted in the
beginning of this section is: that Francisco Gatchalian was
the legiti-
________________
16 Annex “37” of Comment with Counter-Petition, G.R. Nos. 95612-13.
912

mate son of Santiago Gatchalian and therefore followed the

supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago. This premise
has in fact two (2) parts: (a) the physical filiation of
Francisco Gatchalian as the son of Santiago Gatchalian;
and (b) that Santiago Gatchalian was lawfully married to
the Chinese mother of Francisco Gatchalian. This premise

is remarkable for the total absence of documentary support
for either of its two (2) parts. Francisco was born in Amoy,
China in 1931, according to Santiago. The sum total of the
evidence on this premise consists of Francisco Gatchalian’s
own statement and that of Santiago. No birth certificate or
certified true copy thereof, or comparable documentation
under Chinese law, was submitted by either Santiago or by
Francisco. No secondary evidence of any kind was
submitted. No testimony of a disinterested person was
offered.
Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been married in
China in 1926 to a Chinese woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of
which marriage Francisco was allegedly born. No
documentary proof of such marriage in China, whether
primary or secondary, was ever submitted. Neither was
there ever presented any proof of the contents of the
Chinese law on marriage in 1926 and of compliance with
its requirements.
It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts
and relies upon the existence of a valid foreign marriage
must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the
fact of compliance with the requisites of such law, but also 17
the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales,
the issue before the Court was whether the marriage of
petitioner Yao Kee to the deceased Sy Kiat in accordance
with Chinese law and custom had been adequately proven.
In rendering a negative answer, this Court, speaking
through Cortes, J., said:
“These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to
establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese
law and custom.
Custom is defined as ‘a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory.’ The law requires that ‘a custom must be
proved as a
________________
17 167 SCRA 736 (1988).
913
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 913

fact, according to the rules of evidence’ [Article 12, Civil Code]. On

this score the Court had occasion to state that ‘a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless
such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact’ [Patriarca vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The
same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of
a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the
Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to

establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing 18evidence
[Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).” (Italics
supplied)
In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof other

than Santiago’s bare assertion that a marriage ceremony
between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in
China in accordance with Chinese law. The contents of the
relevant Chinese law on marriage at the time of the
supposed marriage, was similarly not shown. Should it be
assumed simply that the requirements of the 1926 Chinese
law on marriage are identical with the requirements of the
Philippine law on marriage, it must be pointed out that
neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under
Philippine law had been complied with.
I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the
majority opinion upon our conflicts rule on marriage
embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of
the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is
unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage valid in
accordance with the law of the place where it was
performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot
begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad
and its compliance with the requirements for validity
________________
18 167 SCRA at 743-744.
914

under the marriage law of the place where performed, are

first shown as factual matters. There is, in other words, no
factual basis for a presumption that a lawful marriage
under Chinese law had taken place in 1926 in China
between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.
It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot
simply rely upon a presumption of legitimacy of offspring of
a valid marriage. As far as the record here is concerned,
there could well have been no marriage at all in China
between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as
Santiago had insisted that his father and mother had never
married each other) and that consequently Francisco
Gatchalian could just as well have followed the nationality
of his admittedly Chinese mother.
3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed
filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of
Francisco which resulted in William’s following the
supposed Philippine citizenship of Francisco Gatchalian.
William was, according to Santiago Gatchalian, born in
Amoy, China in 1949. Here again, just in the case of
Francisco Gatchalian, there is a complete absence of
contemporaneous documentary evidence of the supposed
filiation of William 19Gatchalian as a legitimate son of
Francisco Gatchalian. The only support ever presented for
such alleged filiation consisted of the oral statements of
Santiago Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian and William
Gatchalian. It is difficult to resist the impression that there
took place here a pyramiding of oral statements, each
resting upon another oral statement and all going back to
the supposed bastardy of Santiago, a status suddenly
discovered or asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in life.
No birth certificate, or comparable documentation under
Chinese law, exhibiting the name of William Gatchalian
was submitted.
Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a
Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according
to Chinese custom. Once again, we must note that there
was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony
satisfying the require-
________________
19 William Gatchalian presented his own marriage contract executed in

1973, which showed as his parents Francisco Gatchalian and Ong Siu
Kiok. This, of course, has no probative value for present purposes.
915
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 915

ments of “Chinese custom” had ever taken place in China

between Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was there
any proof that a marriage “according to Chinese custom”
was valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947 and of
factual compliance with the requirements 20
of the law and
custom in China concerning marriage. Ong Siu Kiok was
alleged to have died in Macau and never came to the
Philippines. It must then follow, once again, that no
presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco
Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by
William Gatchalian. It follows still further that William
Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of legitimacy in
his own favor. As in the case of his putative father
Francisco, William could as well have followed the
nationality of his concededly Chinese mother.
One final note: it might be thought that the result I have
reached is unduly harsh considering the prolonged physical
stay of William Gatchalian in the country. But this Court
must apply the law as it is in fact written. I respectfully
submit that the appropriate recourse of respondent
William Gatchalian, should he feel that he has some
humanitarian claim to a right to stay in the Philippines, is
to the political departments of Government. Those
departments of Government may then consider the wisdom
and desirability, in the light of the interests of the country,
of legislation permitting the legalization of the entry and
stay in the Philippines of respondent William Gatchalian
and those similarly situated. Unless and until such
legislation is enacted, this Court really has no choice save
to apply and enforce our immigration law and regulations
and our law on citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE
the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7
September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in
Civil Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of respondent
Judge Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No.
3431-V-90; and to REAFFIRM that respondent William
Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.
________________
20 Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, supra.
916

CONCURRING-DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in

the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration
therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the
process, determine also their citizenship, and that “a mere
claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings.” I also agree with the conclusion that the
petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of
Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter
referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case
of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon
the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion
that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the
citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case
to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits
would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of
the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to
unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance
exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the
benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial
facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application
of the law and the doctrine.
To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were
done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions.
Therefore, the rule laid down in Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals (160 SCRA 848) does not apply.
Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resolutions of 15
September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.)

and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our
decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December
917
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 917

1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential

AntiDollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609,
617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for
appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial courts should have
dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders,
respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before
the former court and his wife and minor children filed a
separate complaint before the latter has not been
explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-
Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor
children are not parties to the case before the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation. Their causes of action are
based mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards
against William tend to deprive plaintiff mother
consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors
protection and support. At once, the viability of their
causes of action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have
valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-
plaintiffs in the case filed by William. It appears then that
their filing of a separate complaint before another court
was part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before
the Boards. As correctly maintained by the petitioning
Boards, we have here a clear case of forum-shopping,
especially considering the fact that on September 4, 1990,
or two days before the filing of the case before the
Valenzuela court the government filed a motion to dismiss

the case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has long
been condemned and proscribed. In People vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28
November 1980,
918

this Court held that a party “should not be allowed to

pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums.” In
the Resolution of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs.
Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, this Court
held:
“The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping,

an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling
with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice.” (See
also Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corp. vs. PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of Natural
Resources, et al. vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566;
Limpin vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA
639; Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877; Danville
Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175 SCRA 717; Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179
SCRA 154; Adlawan vs. Tomol, 179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs.
Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73).
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in

the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-
petition, he is now before this Court in an active offensive
role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bring
directly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to
divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He
could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He
and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead,
to separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the
proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished
when the two judges separately issued orders restraining
said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the
proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William
Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding
with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian
(Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in
the ponencia as another authority which allows William
Gatchalian to enjoy the protective mantle of the

exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation to try and
hear cases against aliens and in the process also determine
their citizenship is either not applicable or is mis-applied.
This case laid down the principle that “when the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recog-
919
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 919

nized and the courts should promptly enjoin the

deportation proceedings. x x x If he is a citizen and evidence
thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in
allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting
him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability. x x x” (italics supplied).
The word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or
to include the regional trial courts because, as stated
above, said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction
over the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the
Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years
before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized
judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by a
respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or as stated in
Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are no reasonable
grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even
show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William
Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very
serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning.
His initial entry into the Philippines was made possible
through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino) which was
issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then
new Board of Commissioners promulgated a written
decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C
inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine citizens
of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco,
William and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July
1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian and
the others as aliens not properly documented. Accordingly,

a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued
by the Commissioners commanding the deportation officer
to exclude William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause
their removal from the country on the first available
transportation in accordance with law to the port of the
country of which they were nationals. The pertinent
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
920

“The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named applicants is

based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an Order, dated July 12, 1960. It is alleged that
applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN,
ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the
legitimate children of Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim
Tee. Except for the self-serving testimonies of Santiago
Gatchalian and his alleged children, there has not been submitted
any evidence of Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage to Chiu Gim Tee
and the birth of the alleged children of the couple. The personal
records of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this office do not
reflect the names of applicants as his children, and while two
names listed in his Form 1 (ACR application), Jose and Elena,
bear the same name as two of herein applicants, the difference in
the ages of said applicants, casts serious doubt on their identity.
Apropos, the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, GLORIA
GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHA-LIAN, ELENA
GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not having
satisfactorily proved as the children of Santiago Gatchalian,
determination of the citizenship of the other applicants, JUAN
GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON
GATCHA-LIAN, whose right to Filipino citizenship are merely
drawn from their fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian, is unnecessary.” (Decision, Annex “E” of Petition).
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William’s alleged

grandfather, I cannot find sufficient credible evidence to
support his claim of Filipino citizenship. For a long time
before 20 July 1960 he considered himself a Chinese
citizen. The “conclusion” of the Bureau of Immigration that
Santiago is a Filipino citizen is based on totally
questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot inspire
belief. The Order itself, signed by Associate Commissioner
Felix Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as

follows:
“This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of

SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese and holder of
ACR No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 February 1951 and
ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He is alleged to be the son of
Filipino parents who were not lawfully married.
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo, Manila,
on 25 July 1905, to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. It is
noted that in his application for alien registration filed with this
Office on 13 January 1951, Santiago Gatchalian stated that his
deceased parents
921
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 921

were Pablo Pacheco and Marciana. He was identified by his only

brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who insisted that he and petitioner are
illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there is a certificate signed
on 26 October 1902 by Maxima Gatchalian, their maternal
grandmother, giving consent to the marriage of Marciana
Gatchalian to Pablo Pacheco (Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his
parents did not actually get married. In proof of this, the
baptismal record of the petitioner expressly states that Santiago
Gatchalian was born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6 October
1905, being the son of Marciana Gatchalian, “filipina”, and an
unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907, Parish Priest
of Binondo, Manila).
The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his
civil status, has been interchangeably using his paternal and
maternal surnames. In school he was known as Santiago Pacheco
(Class card for 1920-21, Meisic, Manila; Certificates of completion
of third and fourth grades, Meisic Primary School); but in his
residence certificate dated 17 September 1937, and in Tax
Clearance Certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is referred to
as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a communication dated 6 June
1941, he was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes office.
Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder
brother who is better informed about their origin, the
incontestable entry in his baptismal record that he is illegitimate
and the entry in the marriage contract of his elder brother
wherein the father’s name is omitted and the mother, Marciana
Gatchalian, is described as Filipina (marriage contract dated 29
November 1936) there is sufficient evidence to establish that
Santiago Gatchalian is really Filipino at birth, being the

legitimate child of a Filipino woman.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien
registration is granted, petitioner shall henceforth be shown in
the records of this office as a citizen of the Philippines and the
issuance to him of the appropriate identification certificate
showing his correct status is hereby authorized.” (Order of 12 July
1960, Annex “1” of Comment with Counter-Petition).
As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five

children, we only have his self-serving oral testimony, thus:
“Q What is the name of your wife?

A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.
Q Is she still alive?
A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.
Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their
names,
922

ages and sexes?

A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are
as follows:
Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria
Gatchalian, born February 20, 1929 in Amoy; Francisco
Gatchalian, born on March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena
Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy; Benjamin
Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.
Q Where are they living now?
A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-
law by the name of Chu Lam Tee.” (p. 4, Transcript of
the proceedings before the Citizen Evaluation Board on
12 February 1960, Annex “2” of Comment with Counter
Petition).
If indeed Santiago’s parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana

Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for
insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an
illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo
Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would
follow the citizenship of Marciana, a “filipina.” But to give
full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is

to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the
legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are
among the presumptions which the ponencia precisely
applied when it rejected the petitioners’ claim that
Santiago failed to establish his claimed marriage to Chu
Gim Tee and Francisco’s (father of William) claimed
marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly
celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why
these presumptions should be liberally applied in favor of
claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied
to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco
during such proceedings and when he testified, he gave his
name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This is an
incontrovertible proof that he recognized the legitimate
union of his father and mother. On 18 February 1960,
Santiago was recalled to be confronted re his claim as to
the number of his children; he testified thus:
“Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you

named as your children the following: Jose, Gloria,
Francisco, Elena
923
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 923

and Benjamin, all born in Amoy, arranged according to

the order of their ages. However, in your Form 1 when
you secured your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose
Gatchalian and Elena Gatchalian. Why, what is the
reason why in this form that you filled up in 1951, you
mentioned only Jose and Elena?
A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is
not my handwriting. It is the handwriting of my broker
or the clerk of my broker. However, when they prepared
that I mentioned my children named Jose, Gloria,
Francisco, Elena in a piece of paper which I gave to him,
except Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?
A Because he was not yet baptized then.” (Transcript, p. 7,
Annex “2” of Comment with Counter-Petition).
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the

respect of a passing glance.
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any
immediate definite positive step against the 6 July 1962
decision and the warrant of exclusion.
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that
he and others covered by the warrant of expulsion filed a
motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry.
There has been no explaination for the unreasonable delay
in the filing of the motion. It may be surmised that it was
due to his minority, considering that he was allegedly only
twelve years old when he arrived in Manila from Hongkong
on 27 June 1961. But, such minority was no obstacle to the
filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the
Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then
Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the
July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were
not only highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was
done without any semblance of authority. The Board of
Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or
reverse a Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered
about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the
power or authority to approve the recommendation of said
Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of
the
924

Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the

Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and
to order the admission of William Gatchalian as a Filipino
citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of C.A. No. 613, as amended
(The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of
Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at all it
was legally and validly done. The Board of Commissioners
is composed of the Commissioner of Immigration and the
two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of any member
of the Board, the Department Head shall designate an
officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve
as member thereof. In any case coming before it, the
decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8, C.A. No.
613 as amended). The Department Head referred to is the
Secretary of Justice since the Commission is, for
administrative purposes, under the supervision and control

of the Department of Justice.
The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was
void and invalid ab initio. In view thereof, the
rationalization in the ponencia that the issue could be re-
opened since the decision of the Board of Commissioners of
6 July 1962 did not constitute res judicata is irrelevant.
But even if it is to be conceded that the 6 July 1962
decision did not constitute res judicata, I find it both
strange and illogical to give full faith and credit to the
unilateral action of Mr. Nituda and to use it to bar the
Boards from exercising its power and jurisdiction over
William Gatchalian.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of
Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not
mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven
years old. It is logical to presume that the proceeding
initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his
alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent
events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their
entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven
months after he obtained a favorable decision from the
Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged children
and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961
his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged
grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On
27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son
Francisco with
925
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 925

his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from

Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines
since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973,
and his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino
citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a
Filipino; he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of
suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines since
1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer
Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and
that the companies he runs and in which he has a
controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a

taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the status of
Filipino citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such
until petitioning Boards initiated the deportation
proceedings against him, are not of any help to William
Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor strengthen his
claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the
illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void
and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts.
Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by
salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by
the void decision.
In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant
of exclusion issued against William Gatchalian pursuant to
and by virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of
Commissioners subsists and remains valid and enforceable.
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that
the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion
because it is already barred by prescription considering
that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation “shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises.”
Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:
“(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12

paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not
be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause
of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not
be effected if the
926

court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall

recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported.” (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis
supplied).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other

than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In
respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not
apply. These clauses read as follows:
“(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
xxx
“(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of

any limitation or condition under which he was admitted
as a non-immigrant;
“(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches
the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of
the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or
who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government,
or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or
assassination of public officials because of their office, or
who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful
destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever
lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the
dissemination of such doctrines;
xxx
“(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-

marketing, independent of any criminal action which may
be brought against him;
“(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred and
Seventy-Three, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law
relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
x x x”
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the

warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five
years following his entry.
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to
Mr. Gatchalian. In issue in that case was the deportation of
a minor whose mother fraudulently entered the Philippines
by using the name of a resident Chinese merchant who is
not her lawful
927
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 927

husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was

initiated within five years following her entry. Said mother
did in fact acquire permanent residence status.

Furthermore, the minor’s mother never claimed to be a
Filipino citizen.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT
the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the
questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa
and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued
beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil
Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the
COUNTER-PETITION.
Petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23 dismissed; while petition
in G.R. Nos. 95612-13 granted.
Note.—An alien who misrepresented himself as a

Filipino citizen is undesirable and can be deported. (Reyes
vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478.)
——o0o——
928
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7/19/22, 9:06 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 197

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 853

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON

854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

G.R. Nos. 95612-13. May 31, 1991.*

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF

Courts; Appeals; Administrative Law; Bureau of Immigration;

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 855

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

ity, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the

person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata may be

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 857

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the

858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

proceedings against the minor. “Under the circumstances

by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 859

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the

people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported

860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those

to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been

FELICIANO, J., Dissenting:

Political Law; Citizenship; In upholding the validity and legal

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 861

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the

862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 863

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

law of the place where performed are first shown as factual

864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

rule, legally binding and obligatory.’ The law requires that ‘a

1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 865

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in

DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring-Dissenting Opinion:

Jurisdiction; Immigration Laws; The case of William

866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

Same; Courts; Appeals; The Gatchalians should have invoked

(Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals,

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991 867

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-

allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different