Borja vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA,

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and
HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu
(Branch I), respondents.
Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela,
Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
The jurisdictional infirmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R.

Senining of the City Court of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent
Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this
certiorari proceeding was the absence of an arraignment of petitioner
Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This
notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in
absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976,
found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
for a period of twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was
duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent
Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner
and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 affirming the judgment
of the City Court. It is the contention of petitioner that the failure to arraign
him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more
specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4
There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor
General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of
such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the
Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as answer, with the
case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively
construed by this Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor
General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the
criminal case against him finds support in the procedural due process
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mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense
he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in
accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking
through Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme
Court, identified due process with the accused having "been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with
the authority of a constitutional law, . . . ." 8 An arraignment thus becomes
indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and
notifying him of the cause he is required to meet . . ." 9 Its importance was
stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case of United
States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned,
"there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to
inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain
others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion,
must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he added:
"No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the
accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are
rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself
must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its
own volition, . . . ." 12 In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General:
"Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution."
13 Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused
being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and
manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then,
he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is
no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be
worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though
if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With
his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full
knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.
It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not
useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent
Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence
of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement
due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date
came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being present, although his
bondsmen were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of
the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present its evidence
invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the offended
party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the
prosecution rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the
promulgation of the decision on December 28, 1973." 14 It could then
conclude: "Verily, the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned
at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings
in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that there was a
denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel.
As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading case
of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added
further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that
it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or
implied. It suffices to refer to another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19
where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically took note of the importance
of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish his innocence." 20 With the violation of the
constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest,
it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner
that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held
in absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge
Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory.
Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor
General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should
come "after arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution
of the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural
scheme to accord an accused due process. Without the accused having been
arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this exception
to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself
and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from
the comment of the Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance . .
. considered the appeal taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in
the proceedings in the respondent City Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is
tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in
support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner
at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to
bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be
invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a
fair and impartial trial." 22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of
respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set
aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is
nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for
the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect
and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the
arraignment of petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Petition, pars. 4-8.
2. Ibid, 9.
3. According to Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution: "No person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law."
4. According to Article IV, Section 19: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified."
5. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by Assistant Solicitor

General Jose E. Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega.
6. Cf. Vera v. People, L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711.

7. 76 Phil. 72 (1946).
8. Ibid, 87. Reference was made to Rogers v. Peck, 199 US 425 (1905) and
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US 78 (1908).
9. Ibid.
10. 35 Phil. 23.
11. Ibid, 27.
12. Ibid.
13. Comment of the Solicitor General, 4.
14. Ibid, 2.
15. Ibid, 8.
16. 84 Phil. 525 (1949).

17. Ibid, 529.
18. Ibid, 534.

19. 85 Phil. 752 (1950).
20. Ibid, 756.
21. Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution.

22. Comment of the Solicitor General, 9.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]

MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA,

Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.

The jurisdictional inﬁrmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

5. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by Assistant Solicitor

6. Cf. Vera v. People, L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711.

16. 84 Phil. 525 (1949).

18. Ibid, 534.

21. Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution.

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