EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO

AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Froilan V. Siobal for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 106 of Quezon City for raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The
conviction was based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, the victim and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi,
and one of the evidence presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim.
However, it was retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal
evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign
it.

Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the

testimony of the victim in view of her execution of the affidavit of desistance.
The Court ruled that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of
recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since
they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply
because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. cIHCST

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF

REGULAR PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL DUTY; TRIAL COURT PRESUMED TO HAVE
COMPLIED WITH ITS DUTY TO INFORM ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. —
The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel
were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since
appellant miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has
been regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court; namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the
right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such
information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so
desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable
time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ
one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE RECORD TO DISCLOSE
AFFIRMATIVELY THAT TRIAL JUDGE ADVISED ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL, NOT SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE CONVICTION. — It is settled that the
failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with
the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that
such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of
his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the
court of such right.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; RIGHT TO
QUESTION FAILURE OF TRIAL COURT TO INFORM ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL DEEMED WAIVED BY HIS CONSENT TO BE ASSISTED BY TWO (2)
COUNSEL DE OFICIO. — In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de
oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom
extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante
Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the
failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he
previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His
consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver
of his right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his
right to counsel.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; TRIAL COURTS' COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR

PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES MUST APPEAR ON RECORD. — We take this
opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with their
pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to counsel to ask him
if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend
himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel will be
appointed for him, must appear on record.
5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TWO (2) DAYS TIME TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL
MUST BE EXPRESSLY DEMANDED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED. —
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to
prepare for trial Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 9. Time
to prepare for trial — After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2)
days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further
time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground
for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the
instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he
effectively waived such right.

6. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; THIS COURT WILL NOT GENERALLY

INTERFERE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN PASSING UPON
CREDIBILITY OF OPPOSING WITNESSES. — The second assigned error is equally
unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of
the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some facts
or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and, if
considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and empirical
considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question
of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. He had before him the essential aids to
determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not
always stalk boldly forth naked, she often hides in nooks and crannies visible
only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien. On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold
record, which generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and
prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or guilt
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE OF 14-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER IN CHARGING HER
OWN FATHER OF RAPE. —If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences
and even allowed the examination of her private parts, she did so inspired by
no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and
emotional burdens the painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then
improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her
own father with a heinous crime.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; MAY BE COMMITTED WHERE PEOPLE
CONGREGATE. — What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony
of EDEN are more apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in the small
room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man
has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it
drives him to commit rape anywhere — even in places where people
congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and
inside a house where there are other occupants. In People v. Opeña , rape was
committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case,
EDEN's other companions in the room when she was molested by appellant
were young girls who were all asleep. DHSaCA

9. ID.; ID.; FORCE OR INTIMIDATION; SUBSTITUTED BY MORAL

ASCENDANCY OR INFLUENCE BY THE FATHER OVER HIS DAUGHTER. — That
EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of no
moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such
moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking
for help. In any event, in a rape committed, by a father against his own
daughter, as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the
latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. Likewise, it must not be forgotten
that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel or to act like a mature and
experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to
have courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. Even in cases of rape of
mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable
reactions. Some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion.

10. ID.; ID.; INTIMIDATION; SUFFICIENT IF IT PRODUCED FEAR FOR

VICTIM'S LIFE; RESISTANCE, UNNECESSARY. — Intimidation in rape cases is not
calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the
victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is
enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if the victim did not
yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would happen
to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was
cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile,
it would be the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all
her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of
intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the assault so
as to make the victim' s submission to the sexual act voluntary.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF; DESISTANCE; CONSIDERED
INFERIOR TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN IN OPEN COURT. — Nor is there merit in
the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily
contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this
affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her previous
testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN
withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she was
pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken
ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court;
and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly
unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of
justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for
one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and
place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; P50,000.00 INDEMNITY FOR RAPE. — To take
appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting
coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest
in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the
full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of
"P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in
accordance with current case law.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:

Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all
decent persons who recognize that a woman's cherished chastity is
hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will
descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly
repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on one's own flesh and
blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The
latter yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by social
inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but the man who rapes his
own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the
mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his
animal greed on her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he
forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not
least of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever
stained with his shameful and shameless lechery. 1

At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden
Agbayani who charged her own father with rape committed in the sanctity of
their rented room on 19 July 1994, this Court finds itself repeating this
declaration. 2
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in view of the death penalty imposed by
it for the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. 4

On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division

of the National Capital Regional Command, Philippine National Police (PNP),
endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of
Eden Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein accused-
appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza. 5

After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint 6 for rape signed

by EDEN, assisted by her sister Fedelina Agbayani, and subscribed and sworn to
before Asst. City Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was filed against appellant
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 27 October 1994. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial
and trial on 22 December 1994. 7
At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys.
Samuel Baldado and Edwin de la Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 not guilty. 8 Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits immediately
followed, with the prosecution presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, a Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, 9 who was cross-
examined by Atty. Baldado. 10 On the succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution
presented EDEN 11 and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. 12 During these hearings,
however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public
Attorney's Office. 13
On its part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina
Agbayani, as well as EDEN who identified her and Fedelina's affidavit of
desistance, 14 which was subscribed and sworn to before notary public Eranio
Cedillo on 6 February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:
We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina
Agbayani, 19 years old, sister of Eden Agbayani, and presently residing
at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta, Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose
and states [sic ]: dctai

That we are the complainant [sic ] against our father, Eduardo

Agbayani pending before this honorable Court docketed as Criminal
Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic ] to the filing
of the instant case I formally realize that the incident between us and
my father is purely family problem that arise from the disciplinarian
attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided
to formally forego this case and withdraw the same:
That I am executing this affidavit for purposes of finally
withdrawing the instant case and therefrom requesting this Honorable
Court to dismiss the case against our father.
That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.

As EDEN declared in open court that what she said in her previous
testimony and sworn statement were not true, the trial court held her in direct
contempt of court, reasoning that her "intentional falsehood" was "offensive to
its dignity and a blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading [to] the
administration of justice." Accordingly, the trial court ordered her "committed to
incarceration and imprisonment within the period provided by law," 15 which
penalty, however, was modified to a fine of P200.00 upon EDEN's motion for
reconsideration. 1 6
On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She
retracted her affidavit of desistance and claimed that she had signed it under
coercion by her mother and elder sister.
The trial court's summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the
references to the pages of the stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as
follows:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in
September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was charged by
his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime
of rape which case was raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo Manalastas of
Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was, however,
provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted
from pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus
consequently released from jail on July 13, 1994. Three (3) days
thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters,
Fedelina, Eden, Diana and Edima, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan
St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the
testimonies of Complainant Eden Agbayani, Medico Legal Officer, Dr.
Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows that at the
above-mentioned address, the complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the
evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her
father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima,
while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed. At the time,
complainant's mother was outside the country, working in Saudi
Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant Eden Agbayani was
awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina.
She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting
her. Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito,
gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill her
[sic ]. The accused then proceeded to undress her. Thereafter he
undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter
felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.

The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her
elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been done to her by her father. She
was told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the
incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled
the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were
made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it
was only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him.
Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the complaint to Judge Danilo
Manalastas who reopened tile previously provisionally dismissed case
and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID
in Quezon City, the accused was arrested on the same day at his
residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City and was
later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently detained. After
the accused's arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where
they made individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje
narrating the events leading to and occurring after the incident of July
19, 1994.

The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer

and Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a colonel,
who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report. 17

Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 could not have raped his daughter EDEN, because on 19 July 1994, he was in
Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter. 18 He
declared that EDEN charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt
after he caught her lying about her whereabouts one night. Then on 24 July
1994, she left their rented apartment and did not return anymore. 19

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July

1994, appellant requested her to take care of his children because he was
going to Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July
1994. 20
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who
"appeared, during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995,
coherent, candid and responsive;" further, it commended her "for her courage
and her unwavering strength in the midst of the emotional and psychological
strain and humiliation, not to mention the pressure and lack of moral support of
her family, brought on by the filing of this case." It also ruled that EDEN did not
voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance as it was procured "at the behest
of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and the family's
good name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever
injury the complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused."
Besides, even assuming arguendo that no such pressure was exerted by her
mother and sister, the trial court declared that it understood EDEN's moral
predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was difficult to charge her own father
with rape; insist on his punishment; and thereby inflict emotional stress and
financial strain upon the members of her family, particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit "E")
of Fedelina Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly
self-serving, and characterized the testimony of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of
belief. As to appellant's claim that EDEN filed the complaint because of a
grudge against him, the trial court found this "incredible, if not totally absurd,"
for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is
unlikely to possess such vindictiveness and dearth of conscience as to
concoct such a malicious and damaging story. The complainant
appeared, during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4,
1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on March 16
was sufficiently explained to this Court (tsn, 5-4 95, testimony of Eden
Agbayani, pp. 2-3). She has shown to this Court the seriousness of the
injury upon her person and dignity inflicted upon by the accused . . .
Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would indeed
lodge a complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation
with him, it is highly unlikely that the complainant would concoct a
charge which would damage her and wreck havoc on her family's
reputation, destroy the household peace and subject her father, the
accused, to a grave punishment which by dent of express of law, can
obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the
defense's proposition would be stretching the imagination too far, if not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 to the extreme.

The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or
intimidation by virtue of his moral ascendancy over her and his threat that
he would kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which
imposes the penalty of death when the victim is under eighteen years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim, rendered judgment against appellant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused, EDUARDO AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against complainant,
Eden Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court, as a consequence
thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH,
conformably with the provisions of the death penalty law, R.A. 7659.
Further, Accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden
Agbayani, the sum of P75,000.00 as damages, with all the necessary
penalties provided for by law without subsidiary imprisonment,
however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme
Court on automatic review.
SO ORDERED.

On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys

Froilan V. Siobal and Domingo Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial 21 on the
ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were
committed during the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a)
present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero, Quezon City, who
would have testified, on the basis of his certification attached to the motion,
that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his barangay, but
that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which
was the address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruz's
testimony; (c) present private complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-
rebuttal to testify as to the circumstances which brought about he execution of
the affidavit of desistance; and (d) cross-examine complainant and the police
investigator exhaustively. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was
never prepared during all the scheduled hearings, worse, even waived the
presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented.
He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt to
intimidate private complainant.
In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Trial, 22 the public
and private prosecutors alleged that there were no such irregularities; neither
was there new and material evidence to be presented that appellant could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and which
if introduced and admitted at trial would probably change the judgment of the
court.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 In its Order 23 of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial for being devoid of merit and for not being within the purview of Sections 1
and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.

In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the
trial court erred in: (a) denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime
charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in
his motion for new trial, and adds two others, namely, (1) the lower court failed
to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower
court did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated
period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is
not sufficient to convict, since it is unclear and not free from serious
contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her
sisters or any one of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was
allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet and allowed
him to abuse her; neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that would
have awakened her sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters allowed him to live
and sleep with them again in their rented room even after the alleged rape.

Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her

affidavit of desistance must have necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her
"subsequent turn-around . . . that she was pressured and influenced to execute
and sign the affidavit of desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and,
in effect, demolished whatsoever faith left on her charge against the accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error
as devoid of merit. When appellant appeared without counsel at the
arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel
for him if he so desired, to which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period
to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and
does not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial after arraignment,
especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It would have been
entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court would
have no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all
the hearings, appellant never questioned the way his defense was being
handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's request for a continuance because
he had not yet conferred with appellant was not evidence of counsel's lack of
sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's awareness of his duty to confer
with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for
the prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of appellant's presence during the hearing
of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him, because on that date, the defense
presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina to
corroborate the statements of EDEN — which testimonies were in appellant's
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 favor. As to the manner appellant's counsel de oficio cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record shows that said
counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of
merit." EDEN's positive identification of appellant as the author of the crime
rendered appellant's defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated
clearly and vividly what transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in
view of EDEN's candid and categorical manner of testifying the OSG concluded
that she was a credible witness. 24

As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other

persons, the OSG maintains that such was not at all improbable. 25 There was,
as well, nothing unusual in EDEN's silence; as she could only attempt to shout
because appellant had succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and
exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over EDEN, his daughter. 26 Hence
the OSG invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father against his
own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. 27

As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts

look with disfavor on retraction of testimonies previously given in court, for
such can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a
monetary consideration, 28 as well as the probability that it may later be
repudiated.

In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the

appointment of counsel de oficio at his arraignment did not relieve the court of
its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his
right to counsel and that it would be grievous error to deny an accused such
right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:
This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73
Phil. 426 and People vs. Domenden, 73 Phil. 349, cited in R.J.
Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p. 323 it was held,
that:

"The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would

be a grievous error to proceed by sentencing the accused
without due process of law and this is not complete, when the
accused is denied the right recognized by said rule. The records
must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced
his right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the
interest of justice and remove all doubts that if the accused had
waived said right, he was fully informed before giving his plea of
its consequences. Omission by courts whether voluntary should
not truly be censured but also condemned."

Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the
appellant contends that said right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a
reversible error and a ground for new trial. (R.J. Francisco's Criminal
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing People vs. Mijares, et al., 47
OG 4606; Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be so ". . . to
prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the
means of properly facing the charges presented against him." LibLex

The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994
and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings
only state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the
said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed
appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean
that the trial court failed to inform appellant of such right. The precise time the
two counsel de oficio were appointed is not disclosed in the record either. At
the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22
December 1994, the two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT:

Call the case.

(Interpreter calls the case).

FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:

For the prosecution, Your Honor.

ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:

Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the

control and direct supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor,
we are ready to present our first witness.

ATTY. BALDADO:

For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.

ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:

For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel

de oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The
trial court's order 30 of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel
were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since
appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has
been regularly performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial
court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 32
of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has
the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such
information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so
desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable
time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ
one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. 33

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the
trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to
have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of
cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative
showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears
in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform
the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right. 34

In U .S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:

Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question
to be determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their
right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of
conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we
are all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the
court below did in fact fail to advise the accused of their rights under
the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought
here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is
not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the
court below must be presumed in matters of this kind to have complied
with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in
the trial had before him.

While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:

However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record
is silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the
trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney,
under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27
Phil. 87, 88), in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the
records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the
court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on finding every
fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense
against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled
license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for
it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them
correctly." (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was
reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs.
Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.

In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who
assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-
examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides,
it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial
court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it
in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of
Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the
alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38

The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by

appellant are inapplicable. In both cases the trial courts there clearly failed to
inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during
the arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial
courts to ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to
inform the accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one,
and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he
has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must
appear on record.

Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to

prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial . — After a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court
for good cause grants him further time.

It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only
when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a
ground for new trial. 42 Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. 43 In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for
trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.

During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty.

Temanil of the Public Attorney's Office in Quezon City, who entered his
appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that
Atty. Temanil's services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). 44
There is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and skill to
defend appellant. The latter's contention that his counsel was not ready at all
times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a continuation
as he has "not yet interviewed [his] client," 45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil made
that statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that
it was almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and both of them were already
hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:

I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of
trial the witness appears to be fluent and suffers no difficulty in
answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the
Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.

COURT:
Put that on record.

That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the

afternoon and we are both hungry now.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 ATTY. TEMANIL.

I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not
yet interviewed my client, Your Honor. 46

Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed

irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion
Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the
defense, and EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not
cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was
in the province and not in their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the
other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that
rape was committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his
barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did not occupy a house numbered
30-A nor denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room.
Besides, he and his children were not renting the entire house, but merely a
room, which could probably be the unit numbered "30-A" referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-
rebuttal witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN that they coerced her into
signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to
show that they were in fact willing to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the
transcripts of the stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil
sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his cross-
examination, it could have been due to the futility of any further cross-
examination which might only prove favorable to the prosecution, as it might
have opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her
testimony.

The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of

the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine
jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility or opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which have been overlooked and if considered, would
affect the result. This is founded on practical and empirical considerations, i.e.,
the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since
he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying. 47 He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a
witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth
naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of
the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the
heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 48 On the other
hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does not
reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 innocence or guilt. 49

At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme
penalty of death imposed, this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous
care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of
the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by
her father, herein appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay
Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity
and candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an
innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral shock and anguish. She must
have been torn between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation
of her ordeal might mean the imposition of capital punishment on her father.
By testifying in court, she made public a painful and humiliating secret, which
others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She
thereby jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man
may be reluctant to marry her because her traumatic experience may be a
psychological and emotional impediment to a blissful union. Moreover, such a
revelation divided her family and brought it shame and humiliation.

If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed

the examination of her private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive
than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional
burdens the painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable
that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her own father
with a heinous crime.

What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are

more apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in the small room did not
at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no
conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him
to commit rape anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where
there are other occupants. 50 I n People v. Opeña , 51 rape was committed in a
room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other
companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young girls
who were all asleep.

That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained
by the fact that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed
was of no moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who
wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of
resisting or asking for help.

Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast
rules. Since it is addressed to the victim's and is therefore subjective, it must
be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear —
fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such
intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into submission as a result
thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of
unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength.
If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering
none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim's
submission to the sexual act voluntary. 52

In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter,

as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. 53 Likewise, it must not be forgotten
that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act like a mature and
experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to
have courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 54 Even in cases of rape
of mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable
reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into
insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 55
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the
same rented room disprove the rape. While she was hurt physically,
psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have been irresistible
and compelling that her assailant was her own father, who was both a father
and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who provided her
with the daily wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside
was uncertain. Instances are not few when daughters raped by their fathers
stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the evil
deed even if the memory thereof haunted them forever. LibLex

Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance
"must have necessarily contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier
quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she
retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any
case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she
was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being
taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court; 56 and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as
exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn
trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. 57

This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty
therefor is death under the first circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as
follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict
of death for a sin or crime is God's exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental
law of the land allows Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital
punishment in cases of heinous crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659.
Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be
exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply
it in this case.

To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a

disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest
and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest
animal, the full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves
no place in society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of
"P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in
accordance with current case law.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-
59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above
modification as to the amount of indemnity.

Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of

reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as
the records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. People v. Ramos , 165 SCRA 400, 408 [1988].

2. See also People v. Matrimonio , 215 SCRA 613, 633 [1992].
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 3. Original Record (OR), 121-133; Rollo , 76-88. Per Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo.

4. Entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,

Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other
Special laws, and for Other Purposes. It took effect on 31 December 1993
(People v. Simon , 234 SCRA 555 [1994]).

5. OR, 11-12.
6. Id., 1-2.

7. OR, 19.

8. Id., 32; TSN, 22 December 1994, 26.

9. Ibid., id ., 3.

10. TSN, 22 December 1994, 15.

11. TSN, 20 January 1995.

12. TSN, 9 February 1995.

13. TSN, 20 January 1995, 1; TSN, 9 February 1995, 1; TSN, 16 March 1995, 1; TSN,
24 March 1995, 1; TSN, 20 April 1995, 1.

14. Exhibit "1," OR, 95.

15. Order of 16 March 1995, Id., 72.

16. Order of 17 March 1995, Id., 82.

17. OR, 122-123; Rollo , 77-75.

18. TSN, 24 March 1995, 4, 12-13.

19. Id., 6-8.

20. TSN, 20 April 1995, 4-5.

21. OR, 148-154.

22. Id., 160-165.

23. Id., 176-179.

24. Citing People v. Palicte, 27 January 1996.

25. Citing People v. Manuel, 236 SCRA 545 [1994].

26. Citing People v. Dusohan , 227 SCRA 87 [1993].

27. Citing People v. Matrimonio , 215 SCRA 613 [1992].

28. Citing People v. Mangulabnan , 200 SCRA 611 [1991].

29. TSN, 22 December 1994, 2.

30. Id., 26.

31. Sections 3(ff) and (m), respectively, Rule 151, Rules of Court.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 32. The section provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. —

Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to
counsel and shall ask him is he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person, or he has employed counsel of his
choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.

33. People v. Holgado , 85 Phil. 752, 756 [1950]. VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 559 (2d, 1969)

34. U.S. v. Labial , 27 Phil. 82, 84 [1914]; U.S. v. Escalante , 36 Phil. 743, 746
[1917]; People v. Abuyen , 52 Phil. 722, 724 [1929]; People v. Ocbina , 63 Phil.
528, 529 [1936]; People v. Javier , 64 Phil. 413, 416-417 [1937]; People v.
Miranda, 78 Phil. 418 [1947]; People v. Nang Kay , 88 Phil. 515, 517-518
[951].

35. Supra note 34, at 84.

36. Supra note 34, at 419.

37. TSN, 22 December 1994, 15-25.

38. U.S. v. Escalante , supra note 34 at 746-747.

39. 73 Phil. 349 [1941].

40. 73 Phil. 426 [1941].

41. People v. Kagui Malasugui , 63 Phil. 221, 229 [1936].

42. People v. Mejares , 85 Phil. 727, 729 [1950]; Montilla v. Arellano , 89 Phil. 434,
437 [1951]; People v. Nabaluna, 101 Phil. 402, 404-405 [1957].
43. People v. Moreno , 77 Phil. 548, 553-554 [1946], citing People v. Cruz , 54 Phil.
24, 28 [1929].

44. Integrated Reorganization Plan which was decreed into law by P.D. No. 1, dated
24 September 1972, and by Letter of Implementation No. 4 dated 23 October
1972. The CLAO was renamed PAO by Sec. 14, Chapter 5, Title III of Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code.

45. TSN, 20 January 1994, 31.

46. Id., 31.

47. People v. Conde , 322 Phil. 757,766 [1996].

48. People v. Delovino, 317 Phil. 741, 753 [1995), citin g Creamer v. Bivert , 214 MO
473, 474 [1908] as cited in M. FRANCES McNAMARA, 2000 FAMOUS LEGAL
QUOTATIONS 548 [1967).

49. People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407, 410 [1990]; People v. De Leon , 245 SCRA
538, 546 [1995].

50. People v. Aragona , 138 SCRA 569, 580 [1985]; People v. Viray , 164 SCRA 135,
143 [1988]; People v. De los Reyes , 203 SCRA 707, 723 [1991].

51. 102 SCRA 755 [1981].

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 52. People v. Grefiel , 215 SCRA 596, 608, 609 [1992]; People v. Matrimonio , supra
note 2, at 630; People v. Pamor, 237 SCRA 462, 472 [1994].
53. People v. Erardo , 127 SCRA 250 [1984]; People v. Lucas , 181 SCRA 316 [1990];
People v. Caballes , 199 SCRA 152 [1991]; People v. Matrimonio , supra note
2.

54. People v. Matrimonio , supra note 2.

55. People v. Cabradilla , 133 SCRA 413, 418-419 [1984]; People v. Grefiel , supra
note 54.

56. People v. Marcelo , 223 SCRA 24, 37 [1993]; People v. Enciso , 223 SCRA 675,
686 [1993].
57. People v. Mangulabnan , 200 SCRA 611, 623 [1991].

58. Section 29 (1), Article III, Constitution.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com