The Philosophy of Sex Contemporary Readings Seventh Edition Raja Halwani, Alan Soble, Sarah Hoffman, and Jacob M. Held ROWMAN & LITTLERIELD Lanham * Boulder « New York * Londoni | | TWELVE Is “Loving More” Better? The Values of Polyamory _\ Elizabeth Brake Elizabeth Brake begins by ofering a roush definition ofthe practice of polyam- ‘ory —that i includes multiple sexual or romantic partners, and that some sort of tent to polyamorous ideals must be held by the partners to the relation- sitp. She then turns her attention to moral objections to polyamory —fromt the Kantian one that sex should be confined to a tvo-party monogamous marriage, to the objection that polyamorous relationships have less value than monoga- ‘mous ones (because they lack—or have less of something crucial, suc as int macy, lov, or speciatness), 10 the objection that it has harmful effects. Brake argues that they all fail to be convincing. In addition, she argues that polyamory ‘can be show to be superior to monogamy (in some respects, atleast) its pract- tioners espouse ideals such as radical honesty, non-possessiveness, and a rejec- tion of jealousy. These aspects might make polyamory a morally better practice than monogamy. Moreover, in a society in which polyamory is widespread, people might be happier and lead less psychologically troubled lives, nat £0 men- fion the existence of communal Benefits, Brake ends with some remarks on poly- ‘amory and legal marriage. oat ak assoc prlese of pilceophy a zo Stato Univrsy. er esearch rian nice en poic shop. Ste th aber of Minn Mariage Marg, ray, are La, Fuld a thepy eto Flowsip at Tar, a Cazdan SSHRC Ga and an ASU rots Humans Fellowtip. Se cent wring on apc he at's le in deaster epone. © 2017, Etat ‘rt, we kn gave permis ah ne esay tbe nice nD ame. ‘Most people think that love and sex are good. And having more of a good ‘thing is usually better than having less. So why isn’t polyamory, which, 201202 lizabeth Brake its practitioners claim involves having more love and sex than monoge- my, more wiiely accepted and practiced? (Loving Mores in fact the name of the major polyamory support organization and magazine.!) Indeed, ‘why isn't polyamory the rational choice for someone who values love and ex because it~reportedly —inereases those goods? ‘One common response is that polyamory is iznmoral, according to an objective standard of morality. Others have argued that polyamory does not truly involve love at all-as romantic or sexual love is necessarily exclusive, for only one person at a time—or that the love it involves is in. some way less valuable than exclusive love. Others suggest that, given the prevalence of responses such as jealousy oF rsks of unfairness, poly- amory is likely tobe less satisfying than monogamy. (On the other hand, polyamory incorporates ethical values ofits own— indeed, a case could be made that i isthe superar approach to relation- ships. Some polyamorists claim to value love and sex more than exclusiv- ity and possessiveness—indeed, in other areas of life, exchsivity and possessiveness are not usually good things. It could even be argued that {ve should all aspire to polyamory. This prompts the deeper question of ‘whether one approach to relationships is better for everyone ox whether there are simply different preferences. This chapter explores the nature, ethics, and, to some extent, the poli tics of polyamory. I begin with a short discussion ofits definition. T then explore arguments that it is impertnissible or less valuable than monoga- sy, before turning to polyamory as an ideal. Finally, I briefly address its status under lav. WHATISPOLYAMORY? The etymology of “polyamory” is “many loves.” This distinguishes it from “polygamy,” which means “many marriages,” and its two subsets polyandry (many husbands) and polygyny (many wives). Unlike polyga- my, polyamorous relationships are not predicated on a traditional form ‘of marriage (legal or substantive) or spousal roles—thus, they need not involve the gendered spousal roles often associated with polygamy, in which husbands and wives take on very different sets of responsibilities and powers. Polyamory, in the simplest definition, involves multiple love and sex zelationships. Polyamorous relationships can be same-sex or different- sex, and polyamorists can be straight, gay, bisexual, or, more generally, queer. Polyamory is not defined by a particular form of relationship (as the monogamous dyad is). For example, it could involve an individual pursuing more than one simultaneous sexual relationship, in an open and forthright way, with varying degrees of love or commitment. Poly- amory can also be practiced by a dyadic couple in an open relationship, Is "Loving More” Beter? 208 {in which partners agree to pursue independent romantic and sexual rela~ tionships. Some such different-séx dyads adopt a “one-penis” or “one- vagina” policy, meaning that partners’ independent relationships are only same-sex. Polyamory can also take the form of a group relationship ‘of more than two people. Group relationships also take multiple forms, A group of three is referred to as a triad, and four as a quad. If group members only have sexual relationships within the group, it is “polyiidelity” (polyfidelity could in fact be seen as multiple monogamy, a8 opposed to an open and fluid relationship). A group could consist of three or more people who all have sex with each otter, but each member in a polyamorous group need not have sex with every other member. For example, Elizabeth Emens describes “the woman with two husbands” who cohabited with and had sexual relationships with two men, who did not have sexual relationships with each other Because polyamory is not defined by its formal structure, polyamor- ous units can evolve into different formations. For example, a network of people can grow out ofa polyamorous marriage as partners enter longer- term, more inéimate relationships with people who in tu have other connections. Emens describes such a case, in which the bisexual male partner of a male-female couple entered a relationship with another man; the three formed a close relationship (of over fifteen years) and eventual- ly included in their “family” a third man. In this way, an open relation- ship transitioned to a group relationship, in which not all the parties interact with one another sexually, but all consider themselves part of a family.? Polyamory is not defined by the fortnal structure ofits relationships, nor is it best defined as a sexual orientation.‘ While it may be that some people find monogamy more onerous than others, and so could perhaps be said to have a polyamorous orientation, this does not seem essential €o being polyamorous. Rather, polyamory is best characterized as adopting, and consequently practicing, a certain set of attitudes toward monogamy, exclusivity, love, and sex. In my view. 2 core constituent of being poly- amorous, Orin a polyamorous relationship, is commitment to some of the values of polyamory. Being poly or identifying aa poly, or having a poly- amorous relationship, is not just a set of behaviors: it also requires adopt- ing a core set of polyamorous beliefs or attitudes, as articulated in texts such as Dossie Easton and Catherine Liszt's The Ethical Slut and Deborah -Anapol's Polyamory in the 21st Century.$ ‘Thus, someone openly having multiple sexual relationships is not nec- essarily polyamorous. Polyamorous dating can be distinguished from simply dating multiple partners in that polyamorists are not aiming at eventually “settling down” in a monogamous relationship; polyamory typically involves intentionally living without exclusive, monogamous commitment. Likewise, polyamorous open relationships can be distin-208 Elizabeth Brake ‘guished from “swinging,” in which couples swap partners or seek out ‘extra partners for sexual excitement and variety; by contrast, polyamory focuses on emotional relationships as well as sex (there is some dispute ‘over this classification) 6 Polyamorous values center on non-possessiveness, communication, honesty, and critical reflection on the norms of monogamy, as well as love and sex. Polyamory is typically a choice made against marriage, possessiveness, and gendered spousal rojes.” Polyamorists claim that, ‘unlike many married couples, they are deeply honest with their partners regarding their sexual desires and experiences outside the marriage. Such honesty is part of the consciously adopted ethical rules of polyamorists. ‘While they can cheat on one another, polyamorists typically agree on rules of engagement, such as whether they will tell their partner(s) about ‘every lover, what means of contraception and protection against STDs they will take, whether one partner has priority, and what that priority entaiis, Cheating within polyamory would consist of breaking. these rales, Pelyamory is not an organized and monolithic movement, and hence there are disputes among polyamorists about the core tenets of polyam- orous practice. One issue is whether polyamory primarily involves sex, love, or both. Tt seems that polyamory must involve sex, a5 otherwise polyamorous relationships would simply be affectionate relationships like frieriships. (But complications arise, such as when group relation- ships involve sexual relationships between some, but not ll, group mem- ‘bers, and when the parties to the relationships are romantic asexuals.) ‘They must also involve romantic love, otherwise polyamory would sim- ply be promiscuous or “swinging” relationships. In general, then, poly- amorous relationships involve sex and romantic love or affection, Before turning to ethical issues, itis worthwhile addressing one objec- tion to the claim that polyamory involves multiple romantic love rela- tionships, Numerous philosophers of love have argued against the very possibility of polyamorous love, arguing that we cannot love more than ‘one person at a time, at least in the sense of romantic or sexual love (for clearly we can love more than one parent, sibling, child, or friend at a time). If we cannot love more than one person at atime, then polyamory cannot involve multiple love relationships. Carrie Jenkins has called the view that itis conceptually impossibie to love more than one person at a time “modal monogamy." ‘As Jenkins points out, many philosophers of love have defended mo- dal monogamy, taking exclusivity to be a defining feature of romantic love relationships. That is, they assume that romantic love necessarily focuses exclusively on one other person.? But Jenkins offers reasons against modal monogamy. First, many people report loving more than cone person at a time—not only polyamorists but also people who are torn between two lovers. Jenkins writes, “Unless all such people are either 4s “Loving More” Better? 205 confused or lying, Modal Monogamy is false. And Iknow of no reason to suppose that all such people are either confused or lying.” Second, other forms of love, such as love for friends or children, are not exclusive; why should romantic love be uniquely exclusive? ‘Additionally, Jenkins warns that conceptual analysis of the nature of ove may conflate culturally dominant norms with what is true by defini- ‘tor of the concept under examination. Given that monogamous romantic love is indeed a dominant cultural conception, there is reason to think that cultural paradigms have shaped the intuitions of philosophers undertaking conceptual analysis of love. In other words, while it may seem as if exclusivity is essential to romantic love, this may simply reflect the cultural practice of our society—and it might be mentioned here that ‘many societies have practiced polygamy or some form of institutional- sized extramarital sex.!? But precisely because of these cultural paradigms, it might be psycho- Logically (as opposed to conceptually) impossible to love more than one person at a time. Just as our philosophical intuitions have been shaped calturally, our psychology has also been shaped culturally. Indeed, many ‘people report that when in love with someone, they cannot be in love ‘with someone else, at least during the initial passionate stages of love. ‘The early stages of romantic fove can bring an overwhelming and narrow {focus on the love object which Sigmund Freud compared to “a neurotic compulsion”!!! However, itis dearly possible to love multiple people at ‘one time in diferent ways: so while one might be in a state of limerence (early love) with one person, they might also love another person in a companionate way—just a8 we do not cease loving friends and family when we fall into romantic love. An underlying assumption of modal ‘monogamy is that romantic love involves being in love in the same way at the same time with one’s love objects, but even within monogamy, the nature of romantic love for a single object can change over time—from limerence to companionate pair bonding. ‘THEETHICS While honesty and non-possessiveness are central tothe “ethics” of poly- amory, is polyamory really ethical? To those who see monogamy as the only permissible form of sexual relationships, it cannot be ethical. But ‘what isthe reason for such judgments? ‘Perhaps itis best to start with the following question: What is the ethical status of polyamorous relationships? We can distinguish worries about wrongs, harms, or deficiencies intrinsic to the practice (those which cannot be separated from it) &om concerns about side effects likely to accompany polyamory. To take a parallel example, some people argue that assisted suicide is inherently wrong, because it violates human dig-206 Elizabeth Brake nity; itis wrong in itself, Others argue that it is not inherently wrong, but ‘hat permitting it would likely have bad side effects, such as leading hospitals or families to pressure elderly members to agree to be eutha- nized. If such side effects are sufficiently serious and widespread, they provide reason against a practice. But if such side effects are contingent Jn the social context, this would allow the practice to be ethical in some contexts or societies but notin others. T will fst look at the concerns that polyamory is inherently wrong. ‘Then T will look at anguments that the practice of polyamory risks harm- fal side effects. I conclude by looking at the ethical values of polyamory and asking whether polyamory may be ethically preferable to monogamy. 1. Is Polyamory Inkerently Wrong? [A first set of possible concerns about the nature of polyamory should be set aside. This is the assumption that polyamory —like many instances of extramarital sex—involves deception and promise-breaking, Extra- marital sex (Or sex outside committed relationships) may involve lies about the sex itself as well as smaller lies concerning where spouses or pariners have been, with whom, and so on. When spouses (or partners) fave promised sexual exclusivity, sex outside the relationship also in- volves promise breaking, However, such promise-breaking can be found inal types of relationships, not just in polyamorous ones (indeed, they right be less frequent in polyamorous than in monogamous relation- Ships given that each partner has access fo more than one sexual partner). Moreover, as we have seen, polyamorists aspire to avoid dishonesty and promise breaking by engaging in radical honesty and only promising to bey rules which they believe they can keep. ‘More subtly, it might be suggested that because many people expect and want romantic love to be monogamous, offering non-monogamous Tove disappoints their expectations." This, however, could be guarded fgeinst tuough honest disclosure. People can have many expectations bout their romantic partners (that they be employed, ot healthy, etc); {generally, disappointing such expectations is wrong only when there is sir intention to deceive or when the expectations involve reasonable as- sumptions. "Thus, although polyamorists can be dishonest or break their promises, ‘monogatnists can do s0 also. The point is that these moral wrongs are not intrinsic to polyamory. They aze moral failures by many polyamorist town lights. We can then set aside concems about cheating, deception, and promise-breaking because they are no more inherent to polyamory than to monogamy. "This cautions against idealizing or demonizing either monogamy or polyamory. Such overgeneralizations make fair comparisons impossible. Claims euch as “monogamy is stable, loyal, and loving." “polyamory Is "Loving More” Better? 207 involves radical honesty and openness,” or “monogamy leads to decep- tive extramarital sex” all involve overgeneralizations, to the extent that they are not true in all cases, To assess either practice, we should keep in ‘mind both the ideals to which it aspires and the reality of human beings imperfectly practicing such ideals. The fact that some polyamorists do rot live up to their ideals of honesty and openness does not show that polyamory is inherently flawed, just as the fact that some monogamists do not live up to their ideals of exclusivity and loyalty does not show that ‘monogamy is inherently flawed. Some sexual ethicists, though, argue that even in its ideal form poly- mory is inherently wrong, because sex outside a monogamous relation- ship (even stronger: outside marriage) is immoral. The philosopher Imaa- ruel Kant, for example, held that sex involved giving oneself up to an- other, to be used for their pleasure, and this could be avoided only when the sex is between a couple who are in a monogamous (legal) marriage. (On Kant’s View, respect for humanity requires always treating others as valuable in themselves, and not as a mere means for one’s own pur- ‘Poses. Treating someone as a mere means to one's purposes is thus a grave wrong, violating their moral rights." Kant found many moral problems with sex. Indeed, ie thought that in sex or masturbation we use ‘our own bodies as mere means for pleasure. But he focused on the con- cer that sexual use of another treats them as a mere means for the Pu pose of sexual pleasure. Kant thought that our bodies are an essential part of our personhood, which morally demands respect as “beyond all. price.” Hence, respect for our personhood must extend to any use of our bodies. Even selling our hair or teeth, according to Kant, contravenes the respect we owe ourselves. When we offer up our bodies to another per- son for their pleasure, it is not like allowing them to use a tool that we own but rather allowing them to use asa mere means what must always bbe treated with respect. Kant’s solution to this involved both parties re- ciprocally giving themselves up to each other in marriage: when both givethemelves up wholly to each ther eachinesence gets themasves ba Kant’s view involves some mysterious metaphysics, but we can at- tempt a sympathetic reconstruction of his views on polygamy. Kant ex- plained what is wrong with multiple sexual relationships as follows (he focused on polygamy, but his reasoning would also extend to polyamo- zy): when aman ie involved with two women (say), each woman gives all of herself, but she receives only half of the man in return. Not only is this unfair and lopsided, but since the solution to the moral problem of sex requires that partners give themselves up to each other wholly and recip- rocally, the man in this scenario is using each woman asa mere means to hhis sexual pleasure (and they are allowing themselves to be used). ‘There are problems with this account. Firs, it is difficult to see how Kant’s view precludes three people giving themselves to each other208 licbeth Brake wholly and reciprocally in polyfidelity. Members of a small group can give themselves up to the group, and thus get themselves back, ust as ‘members of a couple can. Second, it is difficult to see why consensual polyamory would inevitably treat the person as a mere means. In most cases, informed consent is sufficient to render treatment of others respect- ful; Kant’s view that, in sex, both consent and reciprocal exchange of exclusive rights over each other are needed adds an unusual require- ‘ment, one found only in the context of sex. But we can use one another's bodies for pleasure in other ways—mastage, partner yoga, dancing, cud- dling—where consent does seem sufficient for the interaction to be per- missible. ‘The difficulty for Kant’s account isto explain why special moral re- quirements apply to sex." On a less stringent standard of sexual ethics— ‘one requiring only respect, consent, honesty, and affection and concer. {for the other—it is hard to see how polyamory could be judged inherent- ly wrong. After all, polyamory can involve respect, consent, honesty, affection, and concer for the others. But it might be thought that although polyamory is not inherently wrong, polyamorous relationships inherently have less value than ‘monogamous relationships—less intimacy or emotional depth, less of whatever makes romantic relationships valuable. For example, Chris Bennett has argued that being the “only one" for someone else confirms a sense of specialness. On his view, exclusive (although not necessarily sexually exclusive) dyadic love relationships uniquely support our autonomy by providing “reassurance about our own value.” Bennett writes: Tn conjugal love another person chooses ty assume responsibility for you asa whole, because they value the detail of your life. They choose sou. Furthermore, they chosse you and ot anyone else. The evaluation Of you that is expressed in the choice, and in the very form of the relationship and its structures of responsibility, singles you out. You Ihave been chosen over everyone ese. Tis should not make you think that you are zare special than everyone else But it does quite rightly ‘back up your sense that you are special in your own right. Being special for someone else affirms and recognises your sense thatthe things that rake you a particular individual ae valuable, because someone has chosen you for those things.!* Being special for someone else does likely bolster our sense of our own value, But our specialness is not only confirmed in monogamous love relationships, Imagine, for example, a triad in which members pledge mutual fidelity. A member of this triad may feel that the others have chosen her for just who she is and feel confirmed in her specialness by their regard. And polyamorist couples can also commit to one another 1s "Loving More” Beter? 209 above everyone else—for example, they might draw a distinction be- tween partners, who take priority, and companions. ‘A related objection might be that in polyamory, each partner shares, their partner with another who competes for attention and s0 receives less love, affection, intimacy, or even sex than they would in a monoga- ‘mous relationship. But this assumes that relations of love, affection, inti- macy and sex are a zero-sum game—that is, a situation in which there _must be winners and losers, as opposed to a situation in which everyone can achieve more by cooperating than they could on their own. The argu- ‘ment assumes that if one’s partner loves someone else, one therefore must receive less love. But we don’t think this way in relation to parental love or love for friends. There may well be a point at which someone simply lacks the time and psychological capacity to love and care for ‘more children, friends, or partners equally, so each additional person will, detract from what the others receive. But there is no reason to think that this point is reached at “more than one,” and it plausibly differs from person to person. ‘Another problem with arguing that polyamorous relationships have Jess value than monogamous relationships—that they have “second-rate” love and sex—is that not everyone seeks the same qualities in a relation- ship. Some prize stability over spontaneity, closeness over independence, while others do not. So even if polyamory falls short of some monoga- ‘mous ideal of priority or intimacy, polyamorists might respond, “Yes, but Js more important to me to have love and sex with more people than ‘more exclusive or intimate love and sex if ‘exclusivity’ and ‘intimacy’ ‘mean ‘between only two people.”” At this point ¢0 respond to the poly- ‘amorist’s claim that relationships might involve multiple values requis. ing trade-offs and that such trade-offs are a matter of subjective prefer- ‘ence, the critic must show that polyamory lacks something of objective value, such as something crucial to human flourishing or Welfare. That i, the argument must show that polyamary falls short of an objective stan dard of value that the polyamorist cannot or should not opt out of. But thisis a high argumentative standard to meet, especially given the diver- sity of people’s emotional needs and capacities. Indeed, even if most people do prefer monogamy, the polyamorist can .g0 on the offensive and claim that polyamory is the ideal that most of us are unable to meet, After all, “one and only,” “exclusive.” and other language surrounding romantic love suggests selfishness and possessive- ness. Before examining this point, Ill consider harms which are “side effects” of the practice, not inherent to it 2.18 it Harmful? ‘The foregoing concems are about the alleged inherent wrongness of polyamory. But many objections to polyamory aze about its likely side210 Eizabeth Brake effects given contingent facts about society or facts of human psychology and biology. These concerns hnld that even if polyamory is permissible in principle, itis likely to be harmful, and this generates reasons to refrain fromit. One concem often voiced regarding polyamory is the side effects on children of polyamorous parents. Critics worry that children will be con- fused, or, in the case of the judge cited by Emens, that polyamorous ‘will serve as poor moral role models.”” There is litle research on such children to make a strong empirical case either way. Literature con- cerning polygamous families (such as that cited in Thom Brooks's “The Problem with Polygamy”) is unlikely to be representative due to demo- ‘graphic differences between typical polygamists and typical polyamor- ists. While polygamy in the United States and Canada tends to be prac- ticed in small, isolated religious communities where access to education ig restricted, polyamorists tend to be well-educated urban profession- als. in fact, there may be little research on polyamorous families because they tend to be closeted. Polyamorists have no legal protections egainst ‘employment and housing discrimination and, in the case cited by Emens, a child was removed from the custody of otherwise fit parents simply because those patents were polyamorous. Polyamorists fearing loss of jobs, homes, or children have reason to be claseted. jpeth Sheff has recently published the first study on polyamorous families, “a fifteen-year longitudinal, ethnographic study of polyamorous people and their children,” which includes interviews with twenty-two children. Sheff’s analysis of the data focuses on two themes: first, hav- {ng multiple biologically unrelated parties in parental roles isnot distine- tive of polyamory. Both serial monogamy and some assisted reproduc- tive technologies (involving gamete donation or contract pregnancy) ‘create families with more than two parents, not all of whom are biologi- cally related to the child. So the challenges of polyamorous families—in particular, identifying the adults responsible for a child—are already posed by other family forms, Second, polyamorists argue that “multiple parenting” benefits chil- dren, and Sheff’s data appear to suggest that benefits, as well as disad- vantages, exist for children of polyamorous parents. The benefits include practical benefits such as more rides and more money, as well as the love and supervision of more parents, and a greater variety of parenting styles (due to the multiplicity of adults involved in a parental way with the child). While these benefits might also accrae to children in steptamilies, some benefits are unique to polyamory: an emphasis on honesty and choice regarding sexual experience, and on maintaining friendly relations among former partners when sexual relationships end, These must be balanced with disadvantages such as the loss of parents’ partners when relationships end (again, also found in monogamous divorce) and over. 1s “Loving More” Better? am crowding in the home. Other disadvantages arise from social stigma and the unfamiliarity of such family forms. ‘A different objection concerns the gender politics of polyamory. Thus, Brooks suggests that polyamory, while potentially egalitarian, mainly takes the form of gender-structured polygyny-like relationships—one male and multiple females.” Given significant gender inequality in in- come, wealth, and social power, itis reasonable to worry that women ‘who are financially dependent on their male partners may be pressured into polyamory. OF course, the concern that structural inequality between ‘men and women may result in unequal decision-making power, even subtle coercion, also applies to monogamy.” But critics could suggest that, within polyamory, competition between women might increase the opportunity for exploitation. On the other hand, some polyamorists are explicitly feminist, rejecting monogamous norms that they see as Patriar- chal, and advocates of polyamory argue that it allows the division of household work and childcare between more people—benefiting wom- en, who typically take on a greater share of such work It might also be objected that the practical challenges of polyamory introduce risks and potential unfaimess. One set of risks is sexual: pos- sible transmission of STDs or unplanned pregnancy. These risks suggest the importance for polyamorists of creating, explicit agreements regard- ing their practices, such as using protection and regularly taking STD tests (as, in fact, monogamists might be less likely to do). But polyamor- ists might point out that because their relationships are more open and involve access to multiple sexual partners, there is less temptation to cheat (by breaking the rules) and partners are aware of the risks, as they are not in a monogamous relationship in which one partner secretly cheats, Another risk is that of unfair treatment. Polyamorists may experience sexual or romantic jealousy, and while partners may agree on prioritizing 4 primary relationship, with the expectation that secondary companions respect the primary relationship, this might not work in practice. One of the biggest reported challenges for polyamorists is simply making time for multiple relationships, The potential conflict between different part- ners, particularly in time spent together, might lead to forms of unequal treatment, Polyamorists, however, might respond that because communi- cation isa core tenet of polyamorist practice, discussions of fairness and priority will be central to polyamorist practice—and monogamists might also benefit from embracing such discussions. While polyamorists might create hierarchies—between, for instance, a primary partner and a secon- dary companion —these hierarchies are both acknowledged and, to some extent, dynamic. Explicit attention to the hierarchies in relationships and openness to their fluidity could be better conditions for identifying and changing unfair hierarchies than the static hierarchies which emerge without discussion in some monogamous relationships. Finally, unfaira2 Elizabeth Brake treatment and jealousy are possible in monogamous relationships in which a partner might devote time or attention to non-romantic passions such as work, hobbies, friendships, or addictions. Polyamorists, whether in open or in group relationships, can define their own rules, and doing so is essential given the risks and logistical challenges of polyamory. For example, an open couple might limit their contact with third parties to anonymous sexual encounters, or they might permit the formation of independent emotional relationships. A triad might agree to polyfidelity or agree to practice only safe sex with non- group members. Partners may find it important to establish rules setting, ut the priority of their relationship. For example, a couple in an open zelationship might agree that partners have veto power over each other's, lovers, or that partners will limit the time spent with secondary compan- ions. Once again, polyamory does not mean that anything goes—infidel- ity can exist in an open relationship as much as in a closed one, if one partner breaks the agreed-upon rules.2> 3. The Values of Polyamory ‘As Luke Branning writes in a recent essay, some polyamorists have tended to defend polyamory by comparing it to monogamy, focusing on similarities between the practices. But Brunning suggests a full under- standing of the value of polyamory lies in its distinctiveness. Because of the potential for conflict it involves, it requires partners to practice com- munication, self- and other-awareness, and emotional work, thus making, it, he argues, more emotionally challenging but also more emotionally zich than monogamy. Indeed, critical reflection on the norms of monog- amy is partly constitutive of polyamory, suggesting a crucial distance between the practices. Polyamorists have articulated a range of values according to which polyamory could be seen as an improvement on monogamy. Honest communication is a foundational rule for polyamorous relationships.” ‘The ideal of “radical honesty,” or openness about sexual desires, feelings, and encounters that manogamists typically conceal from their partners, could create greater intimacy and prompt partners to confront and work through negative feelings of jealousy. Not all polyamorists espouse the ‘extreme of radical honesty; they may prefer a “don’t ask, don’t tell” poli- 6, for example. But such a choice is still based on honest communication, rather than deception, ‘The ideal of non-possessiveness rejects relationship norms that treat partners as possessions who can be controlled. Monogamist norms 1e- semble property norms (particularly when we examine the historical law of coverture in marriage} partners exclude all others from their holdings. The critic of capitalism John McMurtry, for instance, saw monogamy as an ideological tool of capitalism, disposing individuals to see the world — 1s “Loving More” Better? 213 including their sexual partners—in terms of cwnership and exclusion.2* ‘And of course such possessiveness has, historically, been gendered: thus the rejection of possessiveness is sometimes an explicitly feminist repudi- ation of traditional marsiage norms which treated wives as tantamount to their husbands’ property and limited women’s value to their status as wives and mothers. Dossie Easton, the self-described “ethical slut,” be- came a principled polyamorist after escaping an abusive relationship with a sexually possessive man. In part, she rejected monogamy so that she would gain self-knowledge, as opposed to losing her identity and independence in a relationship: “I resented those cultural values that said that my sense of security and self-worth were contingent on the status of ‘whatever man [managed to attract to me, as if Thad no status of my own. So I vowed to discover a security in myself, the stable ground of my very own being, something to do... . with self-respect and self-acceptance.” But polyamorists also aspire to a positive emotional ideal of non- possessiveness, taking delight in their partner's sexual and remantic ex- periences. Deborah Anapol describes the emotion of “compersion.” which is “the opposite of jealousy,” as feeling “joy and delight when ‘one's beloved loves or is being loved by another.”® This expands empa- thy to one’s sexual partner, against cultural norms and feelings of sexual jealousy. From a polyamorous standpoint, such jealousy is irrational (hough challenging): love and sex are good, and we should wish for our loved ones to have good things. For similar reasons, new partners are generally expected to respect the autonomy of existing relationships. We can consider polyamory as an ideal by asking what it would be like if we lived in a society where polyamory (with its ideals of honesty, communication, and non-possessiveness) was the norm. We ean imagine, as Easton suggests, that marital status would no longer be a marker to determine one’s value or a symbol of adulthood. Marriage or being “cou- pled” is one of the primary means we now use to categorize ourselves and others socially. But in a polyamorous world these markers would be less clear-cut. Relationships would be more fluid, so the distinction be- ‘ween being in and out of a relationship would no longer be so impor- fant. This would allow romantic asexuals and friendships to flourish without being marginalized by cultural norms of coupledom; if being in a relationship of a certain form became less culturally important, it could become more acceptable to choose to opt out of roraantic or sexual rela- tionships altogether. A polyamorous society would be a post-monoga- ‘mous society, in a way parallel to ideals of post-racial or post-gender societies: different sexual identities would not carry arbitrary penalties, and sexual identity itself might become more fiuid.®* ‘A polyamorous hegemony might also have wider social, economic, and environmental effects, Communal living might become more com- mon, with environmental benefits, and all the time spent on communica- tion and pursuing relationships might lead toward a less consumerist4 Blizabeth Brake society where people were more entranced by relationships—and con- vversations about how to conduct them—than the latest consumer items or celebrity gossip. It might even be a more fun society, in which flirtation and sexual possibility were more widespread, without the threat of dis- rupting existing relationships or requiring messy deceptions. At the same time, because sexuality was more open and polyamorous desires allowed open expression, popular rulture might become less sexualized. People might come to better knowledge of themselves and others through the “emotional work” of polyamory. And as sex wouldn’t carry the burden of uniting oneself with one monogamous partner, people who are cur- rently disadvantaged on “mating markets” —pethaps those with less in- come, worse social skills, or unconventional looks—might have more ‘access to sexual and romantic relationships, ‘There is also the tempting, albeit somewhat controversial, thought — ‘which I will not pursue here that polyamory is more suited to human nature (lets set aside doubts about the existence of such a thing as human, nature): at least as far as sex is concerned, we might not be sexually monogamous by nature, and human sexual desire might target multiple sexual partners, (In a society that values monogamy, this could be one important reason why cheating is rampant and why polyamorists value honesty.) If so, polyamory might be truer to who we are than sexual monogamy. For ail these reasons, people might be more sexually and romantically fulélied ina polyamorous world, LAW AND POLITICS ‘While some forms of plural marriage or bigamy are illegal, polyamory as such is not criminalized in Western countries Ina liberal society, sexual freedom protects one's right to have sex with multiple partners (and freeriom of association grants a right to interact with those whom one ‘chooses, so long as they consent). But (atleast in the United States) poly- “amorists have no protections against discrimination in housing and em- ployment. In fact, a survey of polyamorists found that “employment non- discrimination was one oftheir three highest priority legal issues."32 Polyamorists have not—yet—sought marriage equality. This may be because many reject the possessiveness and gender norms associated with traditional marriage. Moreover, legislating group marriage poses challenges not associated with recognizing same-sex marriage: How will ‘marital rights and responsibilities be divided among three people, for example? And whose legal consent would be required to add another party to the relationship? But some form of legal recognition for groups ‘or network relationships might be possible—and perhaps required for ‘equal treatment.5¢ Is "Loving More" Better? a5 Some iegaf theorists have considered whether being polyamorous should be construed as a minority sexual orientation such as being gay or lesbian, and hence arguably eligible for legal protection against discrimi- nation. One concern with such a strategy is that almost everyone who is rot asexual can be considered polyamorous in orientation, if that simply _means desiring more than one person sexually. But it might be argued ‘that polyamory is sulficiently embedded —deeply entwined with identity and pursued in the face of significant risks—to be legally classified as an orientation.*® Perhaps one minority can claim a more profound polyam- corous orientation: bisexuals, For bisexuals, Kayley Vernallis argues. ex- pressing their sexual identity fully might require polyamory, thus giving ise to a claim, perhaps even a right, to what she calls “bi-macriage,” a ‘group of (at least) four individuals all of whom are bisexuals and two of ‘whom are men and two women.5 In a tolerant, liberal society, the state has no reason to discriminate among its citizens’ different approaches to love, sex, and intimacy, as Jong as their choices do not harm unconsenting or incompetent others. Tre vibrant coexistence of polyamory alongside monogamy could benefit monogamists too, by encouraging the adoption of values such as radical honesty, communication, and more attention to needs for love and sex.*? NOTES 1. This canbe found online at wor lovemore com sosessed December 28 2016, 2 ElzabethF, mens, “Menogamy’s Law: Compulsory and Paiyan- corous Fotence,”" New York Unioerty Resi of Las and Sot Change 292 (2008), 2r7Sre see especially 310-12 2 Bera, “Monogamy/sLaw." 312-14 4 See te easy "What Is Seal Orientation by Robin Demboftin this volume, ‘were the account of sexual erento defended implies that polyamory Is not 8 Sewoalonentation 5 Seo Desie Easton and Catherine List, Te Eiki Slt A Guide fo yin Sera Posts (Beryl Calf: Greenery Pres 1997), snd Deborah Anapol, Paienory inv the 2ist Century Love and intimacy oth Many Prinrs(Lanbast, Ma: Rownan ieee, 2020) 6. See AnapolFlyamory in te 2st Contry 13-14, Anapol suggests that the clear est diference shat whereas center around couples polyamory does not 7, But se Kayley Vermallis,Biseralty and Bisewsal Mertiage” (in this volume) and “Bisemsal Marriage” (in The Ploy of Sex: Contonprary Ratings th eition, eb las Prey je Halwan at Aan Ste Yaar, ME Rowan ‘ea, noa) 2150), here she space thatthe opal om of ecu mange ‘would have tobe polyamorous. 8, Ca Mole Monaguny” B 28 QD Ontine apd) 10.3998jeng.12405914.9002008; accessed December 28,2016, 9. She ces S Matthew Lio, "The Ie of Duty to Love" Jounal of Valu Ingiry 404 (2006, 1-22 at 16 Ale Sobe, "The Unity of ‘Love in Philosphy and ‘Thevogy 1:4 0987), 37497, at 389; and Robert Solomon, Abou Love: Rinses Ro- ‘Gur Times (New York Simon fe Schuster, 1960, 197 “0. Stephanie Coont, Manage: Histary (London: Penguin, 2006), 20-1,216 Elizabeth Brake 11, Sigmund Preud, On Nareissiom: An Dtnodutio, in The Philosophy of Erti) Love, “evel by Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins (Lawrence, Kans: University Press of ‘Kansas, 1991) 166. 1, Richard Wassersttom, "Is Adultery Immoral” Philosophical Forum 5: (1974), 513-28. Wasserstrom critically discusses Such expectations as well as promise-break ing in the context of extramarital sex 43. Inmnanuel Kant Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphyeis of Moras, in Practial Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge (Cambridge University Pros, 1996) 57-108 and 353-603, sp. 426-29, and 546-00. “4, But see the essays “Sexual Use” by Alan Sable and “Dark Desites" by Serial Mangan ints volume. 15. Christopher Bennett, “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Conjugal Love,” Res Publiaa 93 (3003), 285-201, at 201. 16, Bennet, “Liberalisw, Autonomy, and Conjugal Love," 297-88, 7. Emens, "Monogamy Law,” 3 18. Thom Brooks, “The Problem with Polygamy,” Phosophical Topics 37:2 (2008), 109-2, See also British Columbia Supreme Court, Reference re: Section 258 ofthe Crimi: nal Cade of Canade, 2011 BCSC 1588, Retrieved fora hitpd vw cours gov becajab- ‘be/SC)I1/15/2011CSC1S88,htmy accessed December 28,2016. 19, For discussion of the demographics of polygamist, see British Cohumbia Su- [preme Cut, Reference re: Sctin 288 ofthe Criminal Cade of Canada. On potyamorits, Sse Mark Goldfeder and Hisabeth Sheff, “Children of Polyamorows Families A First Empirical Look” Journal of Lato and Socal Deoiance 5 (2013), 150-243, at 19, 20. Goldfeder and Sheff, “Children of Pelyamorous Families,” 189, 172-6. 21. Goldfeder and Sheff, “Children of Polyamorous Pamilies,” 186, 208-36, 22. Brooks, "The Problem with Polygamy” 117 23, Laurie Shrage, “Polygamy, Privacy, and Equality” in After Marriage: Rethinking ‘Marital Relationships, edited by Hizabeth Brake (New York: Ondord University Press, 2016, 160-79. 24, Goldfeder and Shelf, “Children of Polyamorous Families,” 165; Emens, “Monogamy Lav,” 34-17 25, See Anapol, Polyamory in the 21st Contry, ch. 11, and Easton and Liszt, The Ethical Sh onthe logistical and emotional complexities of uch ar 26, Luke Brunning, “The Distinctiveness of Polyamory,” Journal of Applied Philo hy Online First 2016): DOI 10,1111/fapp 12240; accessed December 28,2016. 27, See Anapol, Polymmory in the Dist Contry, 62-63; Emens, “Monogamy’s Law," 322-24 28, John MeMurty, “Monogamy: A Critique," The Monit 56: (1972), 587-99. 29, Haston and Liset, The Ethic Slut, 1-12, cited at Emens, “Monogamy’s Lav" 318, 30. Anapol, Polyamory inthe 1st Cnetury, 22, 21 BL. Here, one might object thar just ae strong sodial norms with « social exclusions develop under monogamy, so too a plyamarous society oul stig smatize oF mang mists However, cause polyamory involves neyota- tion and fluidity, it might be more difficult for stark discriminations of this Kind to 92. Emens, “Manogamy’s Law,” $8, fr. 816; and see Ann Tweedy, “Polyamory asa Sexual Orientation,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 79:4 (2011), 1461-1515, at 1189-90, 133, Brooks “The Problem with Polygamy"? ralses such questions regarding polyga- ‘my; for responses, see Lautie Shrage and Gregg Strauss, "Is Polygamy Inkerenly ‘Unequal? Ethie 12233 2012) 516-44 ‘34 See Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Mariage: Mariage, Morality, and The Law (New ‘ork: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156-8, and "Recognizing Care: The Case or Friendship and Polyamory,” Syracuse Le and Cioic Engagemen! fourtal? (2023). One Js “Laing More” Better? ay Tine at htpd/siae syreduyfiseue-1-2013-14-on-equalty recognizing carethe-case-for~ ftiendship-and-polyamory/; acessed December 28, 2016. 35, Tweedy, “Polyamory asa Sexual Orientation,” 1452-88. 36, Vernallis, “Bisexual Marsiage,” passin. See also Vernallis, “Bisexuality and Bi- ‘sexyal Marviage;” inthis volume. ‘37, Thanks to Raja Halwani for extensive comments, some of which have been fed into the current essay, and to Jason Buteo Sams and Cynthia Stack fOr discussion STUDY QUESTIONS 1. Brake states, “Polyamory, in the simplest definition, involves ‘multiple love and sex relationships.” Can you provide a more ro- bust or substantive definition of “polyamory,” one that involves individually necessary conditions and jointly sufficient ones? In undgamising this task, think carefully about whether above quest any adequate think of counter ‘more members do mind)? Suppose you ‘counter-examples, why rect? Robin Dembroff’s essay in 2") as to whether being other types of lave (e.g, friendship, par SWF), « person can love more than one other pe taneously? And is the following common (though perhaps false) ‘psychological belief relevant to this issue~“To be able to love someone, you must love yourself first"? That is, does loving one- self count as an additional person inthis discussion? 5. As Brake explains, one objection to polyamory is that because ‘many people expect and want romantic love to be monogamous, offering, non-monogamous ove disappoints their expectations Brake replies, “People can have many expectations about their ro- ‘mantic partners (that they be employed, or healthy, etc); generally,218 Elizabeth Brake disappointing such expectations is wrong only when there is an intention to deceive or when the expectations involve reasonable assumptions.” Give an example in which an honest polyamorist ‘wrongly disappoints their potential partner when the latter's ex- pectations involve “reasonable assumptions.” Think of analogous cases not related to love or sex. 6. In replying to Kant’s proposal that only in a two-party monoga- -moggparriage is sex permissible. Brake claims that “magalgers of a ‘can give themselves up to the group.” 2 Is Brake suggesting that in such a g; gives And wl Poolyamory against the’ fe and Y marry each other, lf to X. Because reiving Y's self to X, have rights over the ehow, be non-owned by in, say, a group of three or X gets back X's st other [by “owning” & the other. How would four people?) 7. Is being special to so value? Is the mere value—even if X. bolster our own sense of to bolster Y's sense of person Joving ‘enough? Would being in a poy sone can say to oneself, “ ve some Val- Pother type of love? (Do you get value ‘your parents love you?) (reprinted in The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 6th ed, edited by Nicholas Power, Raja Halwani, and Alan Soble [Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012}, 777-93), in which she argues that (legal) marriage—gay, staight, or any other form—should be opposed because divorce can be hell to ge through. Trace the im- plications of Card’s argument to polyamorous groupings, especial- ly with the last section of Brake’s essay in mind, 9. Think about the ideal of “radical honesty,” whereby one is ex: pected to be radically honest about one’s sexual desires and r0- mantic feelings, especially in the context of polyamory but also perhaps outside it. Is it a good ideal? Should we be honest always about these things? Can you think of cases in which such honesty would be unethical? Or would such cases not be cases of genuine honesty? 10. Do you think that polyamory is more suited to human nature than monogamy? Why or why not? In answering this question, keep in Is “Loving More” Better? 219 mind that polyamory might involve both sexual desire and roman- ticlove.