IDEAOFPH
IDEAOFPH
This second translation into English of Die Idee der Phänomenologie, lectures of 1907,
corrects the inaccuracies of the previous translation and adds three of Husserl's addenda that
were omitted from the 1964 version. The translator, Lee Hardy, has a previous familiarity with
phenomenology through translating the work of Elisabeth Ströker, a Director of the Husserl
Archives at the University of Cologne.
Husserl's five lectures and the informative "train of thought in the lectures" span 55
pages. The text is a clear introduction to many of the constant themes of Husserl's work. There
are some difficulties in understanding Husserl's emphasis during the five lectures but these
difficulties are overcome in the "train of thought". The Idea of Phenomenology is interesting
because it is a clear statement of Husserl's aims and method of Leitfaden for intentional
analysis. It is insightful to read this text alongside Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and the
papers in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time of 1911 and after.
Cartesian Meditations becomes understandable as a restatement of the themes of the 1907 text
but with a new focus very explicitly on intersubjective intentionality and the presence of the
other. Accordingly, a familiarity with this 1907 presentation of the transcendental reduction, as
the suspension of the assumption of existence, shines a good deal of light on the mature work
of Husserl in 1929 and thereafter. I will make a brief statement of the stance and argument
presented in the work as a whole.
Husserl claimed to be able to reject the natural attitude influence and understanding of
consciousness as immanent - and the world and its material objects as transcendent. He
redefined "real immanence" as containing within itself, the sought after "real transcendence" of
trustworthy understanding. His deployments of these terms refer to the alleged ability to
consider objectivity afresh and to be cognisant of human consciousness's relation to an object
of a specific sort, that appears in a specific way. In 1913, this is the central focus on the
correlations between noeses and their noemata. But in The Idea of Phenomenology, it is clear
that Husserl also presented his method of intentional analysis. The method of Leitfaden is
expressed in Ideas I (§§130-2, 149-50) and Cartesian Meditations (§§17-21).
The focus of the transcendental phenomenology of consciousness is on a number of
objects and the manner that they can be present to consciousness in several ways. In 1913, the
same phenomena is called the "intentional modifications" of one type of givenness into
another, giving rise to "intentional implications" of different sorts. For instance, remembering
one has read a book about the social behaviour of cats involves a number of acts of
consciousness and a number of interrelated objects of awareness. The method of Leitfaden
requires focusing on regions of objects alone; or on the constituting processes that present an
object of a specific type in a specific way. For instance, a cat could be looked at, read about,
discussed, touched, remembered or imagined. Each cat that becomes present to consciousness
does so through a mixture of perception and presentiation. Presentiation can be comprised of
prior presentiations, or perceptions, or mixtures of the two. The understanding of a cat arises
through the accumulation of many instances of consciousness constituting its experiences in
various ways. The study of feline behaviour, of cats in general, follows a similar path. Thus,
objectivity, an intersubjectively accessible understanding, is one that "constitutes itself in a
continuum... its essence requires just such a gradated continuum", (p. 69). Intentional analysis
about any object of reflection is to consider "all correlations and forms of givenness, and to
elucidate them through analysis", (p. 68). The radical epistemology being proposed has
ontological overtones yet its focus is on disinterested experience of "real transcendence," as it
appears through "real immanence". Thus, Husserl's stance is empirico-ideal. The ultimate focus
is on generalities, possibilities and conditions for universal essence that appear through one's
own experience.
Finally, "self-givenness" for Husserl is a clue to determining the processes of
consciousness, through scrutinizing the interrelations between perceptual appearances and all
other types of the presentiation of quasi-presence: in speech, writing, film, recollection,
imagination, anticipation. "All distinctions lie in the things, which are for themselves and have
their distinctions by themselves ... "simply being there" is matter of certain experiences of a
specific and changing structure", (p. 68). For something to be present in consciousness is not at
all like something being in a box. Consciousness does work for things to appear in the way
they do. The text of The Idea of Phenomenology is most informative for understanding
Husserl's phenomenology.
Ian Owen
University of Wolverhampton