The Productivity of The Public Sector A
The Productivity of The Public Sector A
The Productivity of The Public Sector A
Abstract
We define public administrations (PAs) as productive units and analyze the recent trends in PAs’
productivity. We apply Sylos Labini’s productivity function, i.e. a Classical-type model of the
determinants of growth at both micro and macro levels. Such a framework is useful as a reference
growth model that does not rely upon “marginalist” hypotheses (especially concerning the aggregate
production function), and it is specifically well suited to capture the relevance of innovation processes.
We present a preliminary application of the model to the estimation of the impact on productivity of
the development of e-Government processes in a number of OECD countries. At the microeconomic
level, we propose a model of government action and of the production of public goods. At the
macroeconomic level, we set out to underline the relevance of distinguishing the public and the private
sectors in growth accounting exercises, and to highlight a significant relationship between e-
Government and economic growth.
1. Introduction
Public intervention in the economy is usually seen either with suspect, by libertarians and
neo-liberals, or as a way to fill in market’s gaps, by the relatively more progressive thinkers.
In the face of the current financial and economic crisis, in several (mostly European) countries
austerity measures are dramatically cutting on public expenditure, as if it was a deadweight
burden upon society, or a luxury that we can afford only in good times.1 Indeed, in particular
the role of the public sector as a producer of public goods and services is under attack, as
evidenced by the large role of public sector wage and employment reductions as a share of the
total expenditure cuts within the current fiscal retrenchment plans in Europe and elsewhere.2
In this paper we claim that the production of public goods is instead a constituent component
of any well-functioning capitalist economy and that it carries economic worth despite this can
only inadequately be measured by the market value of its output.
We do so by defining public administrations (PAs) as productive units, and by analyzing the
recent trends in PAs’ productivity. To carry on such an analysis, we apply Sylos Labini’s
productivity function, i.e. a Classical-type model of the determinants of growth at both micro
∗
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Statistics, Viale Regina Elena, 295/E, 00161 Rome, Italy. E-mail:
marcella.corsi@uniroma1.it, carlo.dippoliti@uniroma1.it.
1
Cf. Kregel (2011); D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia (2011).
2
See Glassner (2010) for a review of the recent employment and wage reductions in European countries.
and macro levels.3 Such a framework is useful as a reference growth model that does not rely
upon “marginalist” hypotheses (especially concerning the notion of aggregate capital and the
neoclassical production function), and it is specifically well suited to capture the relevance of
innovation processes.
In the applied part of the paper, we present a preliminary application of the model to the
estimation of the impact on productivity of the development of e-Government processes in a
number of OECD countries.4 We employ a unique dataset developed for the European
Commission, estimating the value and structure of public expenditure for ICT-led
reorganization of PAs.5
The aim of the paper is thus twofold: at the microeconomic level, we propose a model of
government action and of the production of public goods; at the macroeconomic level, we set
out to underline the relevance of distinguishing the public and the private sectors in growth
accounting exercises, and to highlight a significant relationship between e-Government and
economic growth.
Such an analysis, however, incurs in the major limitation that the mainstream definition of
economic growth currently only takes the variation in GDP as an indicator, thus limiting itself
to the changes in sum total of the exchange value of the goods and services exchanged in the
market. Such a narrow view of economic worth has been repeatedly criticized.6 What is
fundamental from the perspective of valuing the public sector’s output is that publicly
produced goods and services are not exchanged in the market, they frequently cannot be given
an exchange value, and when they can such value if often an underestimation of the real worth
of such output for society. Thus, in the next section of the paper we consider what limitations
are inevitably occurred into, given the current state of the statistical practice, when applying
the concepts of efficiency and efficacy to the public sector.
The following section 3 illustrates the theoretical model we propose, i.e. an adaptation of
Sylos Labini’s “productivity function” model. In section 4, we highlight the potential of ICT-
enabled reorganisation of the public sector as a driver of productivity growth. In section 5 we
estimate the theoretical model and the specific role of e-Government processes in a number of
OECD countries; section 6 concludes by highlighting a few implications of our analysis for
public policy.
3
See Corsi and Guarini (2007) for a full description of Sylos Labini’s productivity function.
4
In accordance with the economic and organisational literature, by e-Government we mean a set of processes of
reorganisation and modernisation of the public administrations led by the adoption of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT).
5
See Corsi et al. (2006). Carried out under the European Commission’s “Modinis Programme,” and managed by
the e-Government unit of the DG Information Society and Media, the e-Government Economics Project (eGEP)
focused on producing a measurement framework for the evaluation of e-Government impacts and outcomes. Full
documentation is available under request.
6
Lastly by the so-called Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission’s Report: cf. Stiglitz et al. (2011).
2
nature - are neither constant over time nor necessarily uniform between countries, which sets
limits to the interpretation of international comparisons as in the case of the present work.
However, the most serious limitations to any quantitative evaluation of the economic role of
the public sector lie in the statistical practice related to the measurement of the public sector’s
inputs and output. Yet, it is an aim of the present work to show that at least some of these
limitations can be overcome, while others do indeed imply a high risk of underestimating the
real value of the public sector’s output but still they cannot impede us from analysing it
altogether.
For example, in the specific case of e-Government, it is to be pointed out that a series of
further effects stemming from its implementation are not taken into account in the estimates
presented below, although they have significant impact on the entire social fabric. Among
them, we may distinguish: increases in the level of responsibility and transparency within the
public administrations, improvements in the diffusion and circulation of information deriving
from public sources, greater participation in the performance of democratic processes,
enhanced efficacy for public policies. Yet, if we were to abstain from any quantitative
analysis only because it is to be expected that its results would be underestimated, we would
seriously incur in the more dangerous risk of implying that what cannot be measured does not
count.
For this reason, in this section we expose the major limitations of any quantitative analysis of
the public sector, in order to be then able to proceed keeping such limits in mind.
Most existing analyses of public sector productivity are defined at the microeconomic level,
in relation to an individual organisational unit within the PA. Occasionally, analyses of the
outcomes of the public sector production are defined or estimated at the aggregate level, as
are most of the feasible measures of efficacy (based, for example, on social-economic
development indicators as “social inclusion” or “health” levels)7. Although the aggregate
measures derive ex-post from the sum of microeconomic variables, this distinction takes on a
certain significance since ex-ante the macro magnitudes can differ considerably from a simple
sum. In fact, all the economic activities are connected, and a change within one organisational
unit cannot occur without producing effects within other, associated units (e.g., if a public
administration shows increased levels of efficiency, the benefits deriving from it are very
likely to be absorbed to some extent by the administrations interacting with it).
Furthermore, the operation to aggregate diverse magnitudes – in our case a miscellany of
goods and services – implies the need to adopt a common unit of measurement. For the
private sector the national accounting standards take market prices as a reference, aggregating
their value. However, the public sector has no market to sell its products and services, which
makes measurement problematic, and above all many public goods and services have no
market value: the conceptual implications are indeed considerable.
With regard to the former type of problem, it is to be noted that many public administrations
do not engage in the supply of services to final users, interacting solely with other
administrations (government-to-government activities): thus their place in the capitalist
economy is only on the side of input acquisition; many charge no price for the services
supplied, or charge only minimal amounts, in order to ration demand (thereby selecting
among a great number of consumers those who really need the services in question) rather
than covering, even partially, the costs borne. As concerns the second type of problem, it
should be noted that a number of public administrations have the precise aim not to supply a
certain service (for example, the PAs operating at the level of prevention – of certain
7
For a recent review see Giordano and Tommasino (2011).
3
behaviours and actions on the part of the citizens, for instance, or natural events, or even
threats from without). Furthermore, we are all well acquainted with the issue of “public
goods” – goods distinguished by collective and/or non-rival consumption, consumption of
which cannot be excluded for any individual user (as in the case of infrastructures): such
goods are generally provided without any charge.
No less significant, finally, is the lack of a clear and commonly accepted definition of the
public sector output, and of a value attributable to it. It is, indeed, precisely the many
conceptual difficulties and problems of definition that make measurement such a formidable
task. The solution most often adopted involves classifying as “market” activities, and so
aggregated on the basis of the payment (“price”) made for the individual transactions, that
part of the supply of goods and services to final users, which is acquired at a price amounting
to at least 50% of the unit production cost. Conversely, they are considered “non-market”, and
thus valued at the cost of production, all the remaining activities, namely those that do not
imply individual transactions, imply transactions only between PAs, or for which the charge
effectively paid is less than 50% of the average cost.
Such practice proves quite in contrast with the main aim of the empirical analysis here to be
performed, in that imposing a condition of equality between costs borne and value of output
produced is tantamount to implicitly assuming constant average productivity.8
The so-called Atkinson Report (NSO, 2005) has impressed on national statistical institutes
worldwide the need to address the definition of common public sector output measurement
criteria with all due commitment. The aim is to estimate this magnitude through direct output
measures, or in other words direct measurements of variations in the volume of output,
proxied by variations in the volume of activities and tasks pursued. With regard to progress
towards this goal, the Atkinson Report points up the pioneering position of the United
Kingdom within the EU, with estimation of about two thirds of the total economic activities in
the public sector applying direct output measures, while many OECD countries are lagging in
the implementation of this methodology with all the consequent problems when it comes to
comparing results.
In the last decades, several economists have attempted to assess the performance of the public
sector trough productivity indices that compare aggregate output to aggregate input use
(O’Mahony and Stevens, 2003; Dawson et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2006). The use of direct
output measures is naturally easier in some industries, among which the health-care sector.
Beyond the cited Dawson et al. (2005), reviews of the economic studies focussing on this
sector are to be found in Cutler and McClellan (2001) and Cutler and Berndt (2001). Finally,
concerning the USA, particular attention to measurement issues in examining trends on ICT
usage and their effect on public sector productivity is given by Lehr and Lichtenberg (1996)
and Lichenberg (1996). In these papers the authors use data from the Bureau of Labour
Statistics’ (BLS) Federal Productivity Measurement Program on productivity growth and
computer assets. However, due to a lack of relevant aggregate data, our study will not
consider the USA.
8
For example, a pay rise in certain PAs of the public sector is evaluated sic et simpliciter as a proportional
increase in the respective production.
4
economic growth in the private sector (revised and estimated on Italian data by Sylos Labini,
2004), which is also the source for denomination of the individual effects.9
Let YPS denote the value of production in the public sector – the sum of the goods and
services supplied – calculated in monetary terms, which by definition represents a portion of
the Gross Domestic Product (YPS = GDP). Thus the productivity of labour in the public
sector can be defined as the overall value of production in the public sector divided by the
number of employees in that sector.
Since this is an average productivity – the value of the goods and services produced on
average by every public employee – πPS constitutes a synthetic measure of the productivity of
the public sector as a whole, and not only of the labour factor, as in the case of marginal
productivity,10 being in combination with other production inputs. Variations in productivity
per employee can be generated by variations in price or average value of product per
employee, given the physical quantities supplied of each good or service (in which case,
within the framework of the model it will be a matter of variations in the efficacy of the
public administration), or by an increase in the physical quantities per employee, given their
prices and values (variations in efficiency), or by both quantities.
We assume that e-Government processes contribute to GDP growth along three channels:
1. Direct variations of the efficiency and efficacy of the public administration, leading to
increases in labour productivity in the public sector (πPS). Given the number of employees in
the Public Sector (LPS), the consequent increase in value of the public output (YPS) will
translate as growth in GDP (or, it is hypothesised that increases in productivity will be
followed by less than proportional reductions of staff).
2. Direct impact on the private production of goods and services, thanks to multiplier and
accelerator mechanisms connected with the public demand for investment goods and services
(full employment is assumed not to obtain) and the creation of public capital in the form of
material and immaterial infrastructures, assumed at least partially to constitute positive inputs
also for production in the private sector.
3. Direct impact on growth in the private sector generated by the stimulation to innovate, and
by the contribution to the competitiveness of the economic system stemming from the
changed composition of public demand, oriented (in the case of e-Government processes)
towards markedly innovative, high value added goods and services.
The theoretical model we look to refers to the first of these three channels, distinguishing five
mechanisms by means of which variations in efficiency and efficacy lead to variations in
9
See the documents produced within the eGEP Project, for extensive illustration of the model and discussion of
the problems involved in transposing it to the public sector. Cf. Corsi et al. (2006).
10
See Sylos Labini (1995) for a clear exposition of the reasons for this choice and for a theoretical critique of the
neoclassical production function and related empirical applications. Most Sylos Labini’s works are available on-
line at http://dspace.unitus.it/handle/2067/163.
5
productivity – three originally identified by Sylos Labini (1984) – the Smith Effect, the
Ricardo Effect and the Investments Effect (here renamed Schumpeter Effect) – and two more
effects with specific reference to innovation processes in the public administration – the
Back-Office Effect and the Take-Up Effect.
The Smith Effect. At the private level, the Smith Effect connects labour productivity with the
market size of an individual firm (thus an effect defined at the microeconomic level): in
particular, it summarizes the impact of dynamic economies of scale on labour productivity. In
fact, with variations in firm size the efficiency with which the endowment of fixed and
circulating capital is used also varies: generally there will be increasing economies of scale, or
in other words the Smith Effect is expected to exhibit a positive sign, at least through the
possibility of amortising the fixed costs over a larger set of goods and services.
Adapting this concept to the public sector proves far from simple or direct. In fact, in their
activity of supplying services to the community the public administrations have no market (in
the sense of traditional microeconomics) for their products. In many cases there is no
“demand” for public goods, in the sense of evident readiness to pay for them, and production
decisions are guided, rather, by the supply side. At the same time, effectively achieving
improvements in efficiency means launching reorganisation processes that cannot be
considered automatic, given the lack of competitive stimulus of an objective of monetary
gain.
Finally, the reverse relationship, from increases in productivity to increases in scale, which
can be hypothesised in the private sector, thanks to the possibility of setting lower prices at
larger scales on the strength of higher productivity, but it cannot be considered automatic in
the case of the PAs. In fact, the need is for the greater potential supply of public goods and
services to be effectively matched by demand of users and citizens; otherwise, the technically
feasible increases in productivity will remain unfulfilled, unless through staff reduction. At
the aggregate level this reverse effect implies efficacious planning of the broad mix of public
goods and services supplied, meaning by efficacious that it effectively answers to the needs of
the citizens, which may be considered a sort of demand for public services and goods.
In relation to the public sector, the Smith Effect can be broken down into two effect
typologies: microeconomic and macroeconomic. The former applies to the benefits strictly
achieved by the individual public administrations, many of which take the form of gains in
financial terms. In particular, e-Government is able to produce the following intermediate
results: savings in terms of reduction of the cost of services as a whole and/or of single
transactions; reallocation of human and financial resources in favour of those services that are
of the greatest utility to users (increase in efficacy);11 greater integration, customisation and
speed in the supply of goods and services; services supply of new design, and potentially
corresponding new revenues.
At the macroeconomic level, over and above aggregation of the micro-effects, which does not
correspond to their sum it is at least worth noting the increased speed and coverage capacity
of tax revenues.
Indicating with a circumflex accent the rate of variations of the individual variables in period
t, the Smith effect can be indicated in symbols as
11
See Danziger and Viborg Andersen (2002), Grönroos and Ojasalo (2004), Berman and Vasudeva (2005), for
examples of in-depth examination of the efficacy and quality of public services provision.
6
∧
π =bYˆSP
∧ ∧
π =bYˆSP +c w ∧
P I ,PS
Before variations in the relative prices lead to the adoption of different technologies there is a
certain time lag, just as the impact of these innovations on productivity will not be immediate:
the effective temporal dimension of the lag is a matter of empirical nature, and we have
therefore omitted time indexes in our general formulation of the model.
The Schumpeter Effect (or effect of investments in innovation). In the last decade, many
studies have been conducted to identify the benefits of ICT investments in terms of
productivity, especially in the private sector.12 Basically, there are two reasons why
investments increase not only the potential output, but also efficiency and/or efficacy in the
supply of goods and services. Firstly, they are sometimes made for this precise purpose; on
the other hand – even if they are made simply to increase the volume of production, thus with
a proportional increase of employees, productivity being equal, or when the aim is to replace
capital either obsolete or old – the introduction of new machinery generally leads to
improvement in operations, thanks to the “embodied” technical progress.
Obviously, not only the mere acquisition of physical goods can be considered investment: in
relation to reorganisation processes and the introduction of forms of e-Government, there are
12
For a review of the economic literature see Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998); Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999);
Triplett (1999); Dewan and Kraemer (2000); van Ark (2000); Pohjola (2001); Inklaar et al. (2003); van Ark and
Piatkowski (2004).
7
four items to be distinguished: spending on hardware (generally greater in the initial stages of
e-Government processes), spending on software (also greater at the stage of introduction, but
fairly steady in the subsequent stages), spending on external consulting and on staff training
plans (greater at the more advanced stages of the innovation process).13
Indicating with I expenditures on investment in the public sector, and again adopting the
convention of ignoring the temporal dimension of the individual effects, we obtain the
following productivity function:
∧ ∧
π =bYˆSP +c w ∧ +d I ,
P I ,PS
13
Although - strictly speaking - expenditure borne indirectly on the reorganisation of processes and services
should also be calculated among the investment in innovation cost items, rating them is empirically far harder,
and they will therefore be omitted from the following analysis.
14
Cf. Bertschek and Kaiser (2004).
8
Broadly speaking, the social environment influences the efficacy of e-Government
programmes – or in other words their impact on the productivity of the public sector – on both
the demand side, with greater receptivity of the potential users, and on the supply side, with
better-prepared staff in the public offices.
Indicating with ϕ the set of context variables affecting the efficiency of the effects considered,
and with ψ the capacity of the policy-makers to reorganise the public sector as a whole in
response to the incentives considered, thus we may sum up the productivity function:
∧ ∧
π =(ϕ,ψ ) bYˆSP +c w ∧ +d I
P I , PS
15
Capgemini (2006).
16
The documents produced in the course of the project are available on the website www.understand-eu.net. For
a summary of the results see Mancini (2006).
9
negative relationship there is between PA dimension and the development of e-Government
initiatives.
With regard to evaluation of the efficiency and efficacy of public services, it is worth citing a
work published in 2004 by Cisco Systems,17 containing interviews with over 1400 people
responsible for investment choices in relation to the supply of electronic public services (at
both the technological and organisational level) working in the central, regional and local
public administrations of eight European countries. The study determines a series of factors of
critical importance in achieving increases in the efficiency of e-services supply (for example,
the average time taken to complete a procedure, average cost of a procedure, total number of
procedures concluded within a given span of time, etc.), so as to identify, on the basis of these
key aspects a series of best practices to imitate.
It hardly needs pointing out that much of the literature on efficiency and efficacy in the public
administrations is of the organisational-management type and based on sample surveys of best
practices, often characterised by considerable use of methodologies of the benchmarking type.
The eGEP Economic Model (Corsi et al., 2006) marks a break in the line of the literature, in
that it addresses the complexity of the subject systematically (i.e. analysing the entire public
sector) while strictly grounded on economic theory.
The points developed there also underlie the model presented here, the subject of which – as
we have seen – is evaluation of the efficiency shown by the public administrations in the
supply of goods and services, which are assumed to be comparable on the basis of market or
estimated value. It will also emerge from the analysis that this approach affords some general
indications for a preliminary evaluation of the efficacy of the PAs. The reason for researching
aspects associated with efficiency lies mainly in the lesser complexity of an empirical survey,
thanks to the (relatively) greater measurability of the variables involved.
A final point to note is the new viewpoint taken – pre-analytic, in the terminology of
Schumpeter (1954) – which makes comparison of the model here proposed with the economic
and organisational literature on PA somewhat difficult, in that the main assumption adopted
sees increasing efficiency in the PA as precondition for the supply of more and better
products and services, rather than intermediate objective on the way to downsizing the role of
the public sector in the economy. Actually, the model presented here also takes account of the
issue of reducing the bureaucracy weighing on firms and citizens, but it goes further, seeking
to determine how the public sector can, on the strength of innovations guided by ICT
implementation, actively enhance its own capacity and generate a positive impact on
economic growth. Here the key assumption is that the objective of arriving at public
administrations able to supply services conceived in terms of the users’ needs, can in the first
place be achieved by boosting productivity through reorganisation, professional training and
ICT, or in other words through e-Government.
17
Cisco Systems-Momentum (2004).
10
directly or through some indirect measures that do not exclusively or mechanically rely on the
value of inputs. Thus, especially the data concerning the most recent years may in a first
approximation be employed to highlight the potential for improved productivity in the public
sector.
The database considered includes 24 OECD countries18 observed from 1998 to 2005: we do
not consider the most recent years at this stage because of lack of updated data on ICT-related
expenditure and in order to avoid the strong perturbation effects due to the financial and
economic crisis and the following public austerity programs.
Public sector output is proxied with the value of the production of the Central, Regional and
Local Administrations (since institutional differences do not affect the estimates); the same
productive units are considered for the dynamics of the average wages and the number of full-
time equivalent employees in the public sector (i.e. adjusted for the hours worked).
Investments are expressed in the form of gross fixed capital, that is before accrued
depreciation. Direct ICT expenditure, i.e. excluding the expense incurred in reorganising
production, is provided by the WITSA database.19
The formulation adopted considers rates of change, with regard to both labour productivity
and the Smith and Ricardo effects, for the sake of better international comparability of the
data, as compared to e.g. first differences, given the partially different accounting standards
across countries. The variation of public output (Smith Effect) is taken with a one-year time
lag to avoid possible spurious correlations with the productivity dynamics, given the possible
rigidity of employment. The Ricardo Effect is also considered with a lag for theoretical
reasons. Public investments are expressed as percentages of public output, and e-Government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP: the former with one lag, the latter with two. The model
is firstly estimated in its basic form, then including e-Government. Productivity growth is
considered on both a yearly and a long-period basis. Pooled estimates are conducting jointly
considering variation across all countries and all years at the same time, with proper
corrections of the standard errors considering correlation across observations regarding each
country and heteroskedacity of errors across countries.
Considering the model in the simplest form (Table 1, columns denoted as OLS), it emerges
that the productivity function accounts for 52% of productivity growth on an annual basis,
and for an eve greater proportion of variance in the case of long-run growth, up to 83% on a
triennial basis. The significance of the Ricardo Effect and of investments increases with the
increase in the time span considered, although the sample size is correspondingly reduced
(implying a reduction in the width of the confidence intervals). Both observations clearly
indicate that the model is better equipped to capture productivity growth determinants in the
medium-to-long run than in the short run.
18
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey.
19
WITSA (2006).
11
Smith 0.239 0.262 0.034 -0.047 -0.169 -0.047 -0.222 -0.159
(0.164) (0.112)* (0.084) (0.134) (0.197) (0.228) (0.340) (0.346)
With more prolonged time spans, the coefficients of the two variables (Ricardo and
Investments) increase, showing a positive role for public investments in the medium run – not
observed in the short run – and an efficient response to market signals, despite the lack of
competition in the public supply of many goods and services. It is to be noted that all the
coefficients show marked variance, indicative of a certain heterogeneity at the national and, in
some cases, temporal level. In particular, the high variance causes the Smith Effect to be not
significant at the traditional confidence levels. Furthermore, the respective coefficient
decreases on average, and in the minimum and maximum, as longer time spans are
considered. The conclusion this brings us to, is that the public administrations are unable to
achieve economies of scale when they grow in size. Behind this incapacity there may lie a
technological impossibility (associated with the technical conditions of goods and services
supply), or inability to reorganise the overall organisation with due efficiency, or it may
depend on the typology of the goods and services supplied efficiently (i.e. effectively
demanded by the citizens). It is also to be pointed out, however, that the Smith Effect has a
substantially variable influence on productivity over time, as it emerges from the separate
estimation of cross-sections for the various years (shown in the Appendix): in the sample of
countries considered a positive trend emerges – albeit more notably in short-period growth
than over the medium-long term – thanks to which the Smith Effect proves significantly
positive in most of the formulations referring to years 2004 and 2005.
Introduction of e-Government expenditure in the model considered, appears empirically
problematic given the high correlation between e-Government expenditure and public
spending on investments, despite the different normalisation of the two magnitudes. Thus
estimations were made, pooled and individually for each year, with the instrumental variable
method (IV columns in Table 1). In fact, the database considered offers details of the
distribution of ICT expenditure in the four categories of software, hardware, services and
consultation, and communication. These variables, expressed as percentages of national ICT
expenditure, together with the quota of public expenditure for ICT over the total national ICT
expenditure, are closely correlated with e-Government spending, but not with productivity
dynamics, nor with public investments as a whole (see Table A2 in the Appendix): they thus
prove excellent instruments to estimate the impact of e-Government on productivity.
12
In all the specifications, estimation of e-Government expenditure in relation to the five
instruments described accounts for 88% to 98% of the variance; on the other hand, R2 does
not prove a significant measure in relation to the second stage of estimation. Explicit
consideration of e-Government implies certain modifications to the preceding results. While
the Smith Effect becomes significantly positive in estimation of the annual variation in
productivity, the Ricardo Effect shows greater relevance over the medium-to-long run,
growing in magnitude and significance. At the same time, the Investments coefficient
diminishes as the period under consideration is prolonged, without a corresponding reduction
in variance (which, moreover, increases in some cases). This tends to downsize the role of
public investments in the increase of public sector productivity, in favour of expenditure
specifically going into e-Government programmes, which likewise loom gradually larger.
This finding is hardly surprising when we consider that, unlike e-Government programmes,
public investments are not necessarily channelled into enhancing the productivity of public
employment (as in the case of building infrastructures, for example, or when directed to an
increase in productive capacity and not in productivity). Nevertheless, the fact that their
contribution to the growth of productivity in the public sector appears not only modest but
statistically insignificant, signals the need for further research in analysing the efficacy of
public investments.
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APPENDIX
Obs 24 24 24 24 24 24 20 20
R-sq 0.52 0.75 0.80 0.28
Biennial Variation
Obs 22 22 24 24 24 24 20 20
R-sq 0.47 0.82 0.75 0.70
Triennial Variation
16
(0.483) (0.439) (0.414) (0.351) (0.336) (0.337)
Obs 17 17 22 22 20 20
R-sq 0.82 0.89 0.81
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedacity in brackets. * significance 5%; ** significance 1%
Table A2. Simple correlations: e-Government, public investments, productivity of the public
sector, instruments adopted
17
(0.008) (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0203)
Observations 93 91 65 25
R2 96,75% 96,94% 96,88% 97,13%
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroskedacity and self-correlation in brackets. The estimate includes
annual dummies as control variables.
18