Making Net Zero Aviation Possible

MAKING NET-ZERO
AVIATION POSSIBLE
An industry-backed, 1.5°C-aligned
transition strategy
AVIATION TRANSITION STRATEGY / JULY 2022
Sponsored by
Supported
by knowledge
partner
McKinsey
& Company
Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 1

PREFACE
The Mission Possible Partnership

At current emissions levels, staying within the global carbon budget for 1.5°C might slip out of reach in this
decade. Yet efforts to slow climate change by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions run into a central
challenge: some of the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere — transportation sectors like
aviation, shipping and trucking, and heavy industries like steel, aluminium, cement/concrete, and chemicals
manufacturing — are the hardest to abate. Transitioning these industries to climate-neutral energy sources
requires complex, costly, and sometimes immature technologies, as well as direct collaboration across the
whole value chain, including companies, suppliers, customers, banks, institutional investors, and governments.
Catalysing these changes is the goal of the Mission Possible

Partnership (MPP), an alliance of climate leaders focused on
supercharging efforts to decarbonise these industries. Our
objective is to propel a committed community of CEOs from
A Sector Transition Strategy
carbon-intensive industries, together with their financiers,
customers, and suppliers, to agree and, more importantly,
is a suite of user-friendly tools
to act on the essential decisions required for decarbonising (including a report, an online
heavy industry and transport. Led by the Energy Transitions
Commission, the Rocky Mountain Institute, the We Mean explorer, and an open-source model)
Business Coalition, and the World Economic Forum, MPP will
orchestrate high-ambition disruption through net-zero industry aiming to inform decision makers
platforms for seven of the world’s most hard-to-abate sectors:
aviation, shipping, trucking, steel, aluminium, cement/concrete, from the public and private sectors
and chemicals.
about the nature, timing, cost, and
The foundation of MPP’s approach: scale of actions necessary to deliver
7 Sector Transition Strategies
net zero within the sector by 2050
Transitioning heavy industry and transport to net-zero
GHG emissions by 2050 — while complying with a target of and to comply with a 1.5°C target.
limiting global warming to 1.5°C from preindustrial levels —
will require significant changes in how those sectors operate.
MPP facilitates this process by developing Sector Transition
Strategies for all seven hard-to-abate sectors.

In line with industry-specific replacement cycles of existing Goals of the MPP
assets (like steel plants or aircraft) and the projected increase Aviation Transition Strategy
in demand, the market penetration of viable decarbonisation
measures each sector can draw on is modelled. This publication builds on the work of other aviation
organizations that have announced initiatives to reduce
The objectives of the MPP Sector Transition Strategies are: emissions. In particular, we acknowledge and appreciate the
following important building blocks to shape the aviation
1. To demonstrate industry-backed, 1.5°C-compliant sector’s decarbonisation path:
pathways to net zero, focusing on in-sector decarbonisation
and galvanising industry buy-in across the value chain. • Waypoint 2050 by the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) and
its accompanying ICF report, Fueling Net Zero”1
2. To be action-oriented with clear 2030 milestones: By
quantifying critical milestones for each sector in terms • Report on the Feasibility of a Long-Term Aspirational Goal
of its required final energy demand, upstream feedstock (LTAG) for International Civil Aviation CO2 Emission Reductions
resources, and capital investments, MPP wants to lay the by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)2
foundation for tangible, quantitative recommendations
of ways to reach these milestones through collaboration • Decarbonising Air Transport by the International Transport
among industry, policymakers, investors, and customers. Forum (ITF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)3
3. To be transparent and open: MPP’s long-term goal is to
fully lay open the internal machinery of the Sector Transition • Horizon 2050: A Flight Plan for the Future of Sustainable
Strategies, that is, to make its Python models open source Aviation by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and
and all data inputs open access. In addition, MPP is Accenture4
developing online explorers that bring the Sector Transition
Strategy reports to life: individual users will be able to • Destination 2050 by European aviation industry
explore the results of the reports and to customize model associations5
input assumptions, study the impact of individual levers, and
dive deeper into regional insights. • 2021 Aviation Climate Action Plan by the US Federal Aviation
Administration6
4. To break free from siloed thinking: The transition of a
sector to net zero cannot be planned in isolation since • PtL Roadmap by the government of Germany7
it involves interactions with the broader energy system,
for instance, via competing demands for resources from • Decarbonisation Road-Map by Sustainable Aviation for the
multiple sectors. All MPP Sector Transition Strategies United Kingdom8
are based on similar assumptions about the availability
and costs of technologies and resources like electricity, • Roadmap to Climate Neutral Aviation in Europe by Transport &
hydrogen, or sustainable biomass. By providing a Environment 9
harmonized, cross-sectoral perspective, we intend to inform
decision makers with a fair, comparable assessment of Through the support of industry stakeholders from the Clean
transition strategies for all seven sectors. Skies for Tomorrow (CST) and Target True Zero (TTZ) initiatives,i
MPP has considered the different perspectives of the roadmaps
On the basis of its Sector Transition Strategies, MPP intends to above and has developed an industry-backed Sector
develop practical resources and toolkits to help operationalize Transition Strategy that outlines how the global aviation
industry commitments in line with a 1.5°C target. Among sector can reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 while
others, the quantitative results of the Sector Transition also complying with a 1.5°C target. Beyond that, it takes the
Strategies will inform the creation of standards, investment next step from strategic thinking to near-term milestones
principles, policy recommendations, industry collaboration and provides recommendations for action for industry,
blueprints, and the monitoring of commitments. These will be policymakers, and financial institutions on ways to unlock
developed to expedite innovation, investments, and policies to the transition in this decade.
support the transition.
i The Clean Skies for Tomorrow (CST) and the Target True Zero (TTZ) initiatives of the World Economic Forum convene top executives and public leaders, across and
beyond the aviation value chain, to accelerate the uptake of Sustainable Aviation Fuels and novel propulsion aircraft.

Industry support for MPP’s Aviation Transition Strategy
This report constitutes a collective view of participating the transition can be achieved. The fact that this agreement is
organizations in the Aviation Transition Strategy, foremost possible among the industry leaders listed below should give
the CST and TTZ community. Participants have validated the decision makers across the world confidence that it is possible
model inputs and architecture, and endorse the general thrust to meet simultaneously rising air travel demand, reduce
of the arguments made in this report, but their endorsement emissions from the sector to net zero by 2050, and comply
should not be taken as agreeing with every finding or with a 1.5°C target. It should also provide assurance that the
recommendation. These companies agree on the importance critical actions required in the 2020s to set the sector on the
of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and the importance of right path are clear and can be pursued without delay, and
reaching net-zero GHG emissions in heavy industry and that the industry is ready to collaborate with its value chain to
transport by mid-century, and they share a broad vision of how achieve those goals.
1. ACI 35. IAG

2. Aena 36. Japan Airlines
3. AeroMéxico 37. KLM
4. Aeroporto di Roma 38. LanzaJet
5. Air France–KLM Group 39. LanzaTech
6. Air France 40. Loganair
7. Air New Zealand 41. Lydian
8. Airbus 42. Maeve Aerospace B.V.
9. Alaska Airlines 43. McKinsey & Company
10. Amelia International 44. Menzies
11. American Airlines 45. Microsoft
12. American Express Global Business Travel 46. Neste
13. ASL Aviation 47. Norsk e-Fuel
14. Boeing 48. Novo Nordisk
15. Boom Supersonic 49. Occidental Petroleum
16. bp 50. Oneworld Alliance
17. Brisbane Airport Corporation 51. Praj
18. Caphenia 52. Prometheus
19. Carbon Engineering 53. Qatar Airways
20. Cargolux 54. Repsol
21. Cathay Pacific 55. Royal Schiphol Group
22. Chooose 56. SAF+ Consortium
23. Dubai Airports 57. Shell
24. EasyJet 58. SkyNRG
25. EDL Anlagenbau Gesellschaft mbH 59. Sounds Air
26. Embraer Commercial Aviation 60. Sunfire
27. Eve Air Mobility 61. SYSTEMIQ
28. Faradair Aerospace Limited 62. Twelve
29. Fly Victor 63. Vancouver Airport Authority
30. Fraport 64. Varo Energy
31. GenZero 65. Velocys
32. Gol Linhas Aéreas 66. Virgin Atlantic
33. Heathrow Airport 67. VoltAero
34. Honeywell 68. Widerøe Zero
69. Wright Electric

AUTHORS & Acknowledgements
This report was prepared by the Mission Possible Partnership

aviation team, led by a steering committee of:
Lauren Uppink (World Economic Forum, MPP Aviation Sector Lead)

Manosij Ganguli (Energy Transitions Commission, ETC)
Robin Riedel (McKinsey & Company)
The coordination of the report, analysis,

and stakeholder engagement was led by:
Maximilian Held (ETC)

Laia Barbarà (World Economic Forum)
and supported by:
Elena Gerasimova (McKinsey)

Kritika Rastogi (McKinsey)
David Hyde (World Economic Forum)
The model and analytics effort was led

by Maximilian Held (ETC) and driven by:
Andrea Bath (ETC)

Charlotte Bricheux (McKinsey)
Jason Martins (ETC)
Morgan Matranga (McKinsey)
Timon Rückel (ETC)
Austin Welch (McKinsey)
Steering and guidance were provided

by MPP leadership who oversee the development
of all the MPP Sector Transition Strategies:
Faustine Delasalle (Executive Director, MPP)

Eveline Speelman (ETC)
We thank Carlos Agnes, Kash Burchett, Henry Gilks, Alasdair

Graham, Andrew Isabirye, Ita Kettleborough, Aparajit Pandey, Lloyd
Pinnell, Manuel Schrenk, Trishla Shah, Adair Turner, Marco van
Veen, Laëtitia de Villepin, Maaike Witteveen (all from ETC), Peter
Cooper, Axel Esque, Guenter Fuchs, Julian Hölzen, Nathan Lash,
Agata Mucha, Jesse Noffsinger, Daniel Riefer, Brandon Stackhouse
(all from McKinsey), the McKinsey Energy Insights and Hydrogen
Insights teams, and other collaborators for providing valuable
contributions to this project. The report was edited and designed
by M. Harris & Company.

PREPARED BY
Mission Possible Partnership (MPP) Clean Skies for Tomorrow (CST)

Led by the ETC, RMI, the We Mean Business Coalition, and the The Clean Skies for Tomorrow (CST) Coalition provides a
World Economic Forum, the Mission Possible Partnership (MPP) crucial global mechanism for top executives and public
is an alliance of climate leaders focused on supercharging the leaders, across and beyond the aviation value chain, to
decarbonisation of seven global industries representing 30% align on a transition to sustainable aviation fuels as part of a
of emissions: aviation, shipping, trucking, steel, aluminium, meaningful and proactive pathway for the industry to achieve
cement/concrete, and chemicals. Without immediate action, carbon-neutral flying. The Clean Skies for Tomorrow Coalition
these sectors alone are projected to exceed the world’s is led by the World Economic Forum in collaboration with RMI
remaining 1.5°C carbon budget by 2030 in a Business-as-Usual and the Energy Transitions Commission. Learn more at
scenario. MPP brings together the world’s most influential www.weforum.org/cleanskies.
leaders across finance, policy, industry, and business. MPP is
focused on activating the entire ecosystem of stakeholders
across the entire value chain required to move global industries
to net-zero. www.missionpossiblepartnership.org
World Economic Forum

The World Economic Forum is the international organization for
public–private cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost
political, business, cultural, and other leaders of society to
Energy Transitions Commission (ETC) shape global, regional, and industry agendas. Learn more at
ETC is a global coalition of leaders from across the energy www.weforum.org.
landscape committed to achieving net-zero emissions by
mid-century, in line with the Paris climate objective of limiting
global warming to well below 2°C and ideally to 1.5°C. Our
commissioners come from a range of organizations — energy
producers, energy-intensive industries, technology providers, Supported BY
finance players, and environmental NGOs — which operate
across developed and developing countries and play different
roles in the energy transition. This diversity of viewpoints
informs our work: our analyses are developed with a systems
perspective through extensive exchanges with experts and
practitioners. www.energy-transitions.org
Target True Zero Coalition
The Target True Zero Coalition, led by the World
McKinsey & Company Economic Forum, brings together leaders from across
McKinsey & Company is a global management consulting firm the aviation sector to understand the role that new
committed to helping organizations create Change that Matters. technologies such as electric and hydrogen aircraft
In more than 130 cities and 65 countries, their teams help can play in delivering flying with a true zero climate
clients across the private, public, and social sectors shape bold impact. The coalition works to establish consensus
strategies and transform the way we work, embed technology on the key issues that will be required to realize the
where it unlocks value, and build capabilities to sustain the benefits of alternative propulsion in aviation and
change. Not just any change, but Change that Matters — for their identify unlocks to accelerate the development
organizations, their people, and in turn society at large. McKinsey and deployment of technologies with reduced
& Company is a knowledge partner for the Mission Possible climate impact. Learn more at www.weforum.org/
Partnership and provided fact-based analysis for this report. agenda/2021/07/targeting-true-net-zero-aviation/.
Learn more at www.mckinsey.com.

CONTENTS
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Main report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Decarbonising aviation: Challenges and solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1.1 Global aviation and its decarbonisation challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 Decarbonisation solution portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2.1 Demand-side measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2.2 Efficiency improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2.3 Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.2.4 Novel propulsion aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.2.5 Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2. Achieving net zero: Possible trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2.1 Scenario definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 What it will take to achieve net-zero aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.1 CO2-neutral growth until 2030, halving emissions by 2040, net zero by 2050 . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.2 Compatibility with 1.5°C carbon budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.3 The role of SAFs and fuel efficiency measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.4 2020s milestones to kick off the transition to net zero in aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.5 Cost of the switch to low-carbon solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.6 Investment needs for the transition to net zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2.7 Energy prerequisites and requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3. Conclusion: From strategic thinking to action in this decade . . . . . . . . . 60

3.1 Key milestones until 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Policy, industry, and finance action to achieve 2030 milestones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.1 Key policy actions in this decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.2 Key industry actions in this decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.3 Key finance actions in this decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ELEVEN critical insights

on the path to a NET-ZERO
AVIATION sector

1. Bringing aviation on a path to net-zero emissions
by 2050 requires a doubling of historical fuel
efficiency gains of aircraft, a rapid roll-out of
Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAFs), and the market
entry of novel propulsion aircraft in the mid-2030s.
In 2019, global aviation was responsible for GHG emissions of the Optimistic Renewable Electricity (ORE) scenario is that the
1.2 Gt CO2eii — about 2% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions latter assumes a faster cost decline of renewable electricity
and 3.5% of the anthropogenic climate impact (measured in net and hence, more favorable economic conditions for electricity-
effective radiative forcing). In contrast to a Business-as-Usual based technologies. As a result, SAFs produced from electricity
(BAU) scenario, two net-zero scenarios combine a different set of (Power-to-Liquids, PtL) as well as hydrogen and battery-
decarbonisation measures to reach net zero by 2050 (Exhibit A). electric aircraft enter the market earlier and at a larger scale —
The main difference between the Prudent (PRU) scenario and in contrast to the PRU scenario in which biofuels prevail.
ii Global aviation includes commercial passenger, commercial cargo, public sector, and general aviation. In 2019, the total emissions of global aviation
of 1.24 gigatonnes (Gt) CO2-equivalent (CO2e) consisted of 1.02 Gt CO2 tank-to-wake and 0.22 Gt CO2e upstream (well-to-tank) emissions.

EXHIBIT A
A combination of GHG reduction levers can make
net-zero aviation a reality
Continued historical Additional Hydrogen Battery- Power- Other HEFA Unabated Carbon
fuel efficiency fuel efficiency electric to-Liquids biofuels dioxide
improvements improvements removal
(CDR)
Business-as-Usual scenario
GHG emissions reduction, Gt CO₂e (billion tonnes) Cumulative GHG emissions between
2022 and 2050, Gt CO₂e
3.0
57
2.5 26%
47
<1%
2.0 10 0.1 0 0 0
Impact of
COVID-19
1.5
Contribution
in 2050
1.0 73%
0.5
No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
action GHG
Prudent scenario
3.0
57
2030: 9% GHG emissions reduction from SAFs 24%
2.5
(of which 81% are from biofuels, 19% from PtL)
2.0 16%
2% 16
1.5
1.5 9% 5
19% 22
1.0
12
0.8
21%
0.5
5%
5%
-5% No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 action GHG
Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario

3.0
19% 57
2030: 11% GHG emissions reduction from SAFs
2.5
13%
2.0
2%
14
1.5 25% 5
9
1.0 21
7 0.6
28%
0.5
6%
3%
4%
-4% No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 action GHG
Note: Sums in contributions to 2050 GHG emissions may not total 100 due to rounding. Source: MPP analysis

For both net-zero scenarios, fuel efficiency improvements of by a shift of short-haul flights to high-speed rail and behaviour
aircraft and SAFs play the largest role in reducing emissions. changes (e.g., reduced business travel due to videoconferencing)
Doubling the annual fuel efficiency gains compared with could save an additional 5 megatonnes (Mt) CO2e in 2030 if the
historical developments could avoid about 14–16 Gt CO2e required high-speed rail network were available.
between 2022 and 2050 compared with a future without
any climate action. SAFs can further reduce emissions by Net-zero emissions by 2050 are feasible (Exhibit C)
16–17 Gt CO2e. if yearly fuel efficiency gains can be doubled compared with
average historical gains; SAF production capacity can be
Common ground between scaled up by a factor of 35–45 compared with existing or
two net-zero scenarios planned plants; hydrogen, battery-electric, and hybrid-electric
aircraft enter the market in the mid-2030s; and carbon dioxide
Carbon-neutral growth until 2030 is feasible (Exhibit B) if yearly removals (CDR) counterbalance the residual emissions of
fuel efficiency gains can be doubled compared with historical renewable fuels by 2050, which can reduce GHG emissions
gains and if the production capacity of Sustainable Aviation compared with fossil jet fuel by about 75%–95% but not 100%.
Fuels (SAF) can be ramped up by a factor of 5–6 compared Demand reduction could cut the amount of SAF needed in
with existing and planned plants. Demand reduction triggered 2050 by about 10%–15%.
EXHIBIT B
How carbon-neutral growth until 2030 could be achieved
GHG emissions in 2030, Gt CO₂e
Negative abatement costs of -US$300–$0/t CO₂ High abatement costs of $200–$600/t CO₂
Additional reduction ICAO’s CORSIA

1.60
of 0.04 Gt CO₂e if target is to achieve
Power-to-Liquids carbon-neutral
scale early growth from 2019 on
0.17
0.11 2019 level
1.13 1.12
0.14–0.18 <0.01
0.11 Gt CO₂e emissions
reduction from additional
technological and operational
improvements
Unconstrained Historical Additional Sustainable Remaining Behaviour Remaining

growth, efficiency efficiency gains Aviation Fuels emissions change emissions
no action gains of of another (SAFs) (without (video- (with demand
1% per year 1% per year demand conferencing, reduction)
reduction) mode shift, etc.)
Note: Totals may not equal sums due to rounding.
Source: MPP analysis

EXHIBIT C
How net zero by 2050 could be achieved
GHG emissions in 2050, Gt CO₂e (billion tonnes)
Negative abatement costs Medium abatement costs High abatement costs of
of -$300–$0/t CO₂ of $50–$200/t CO₂ $100–$300/t CO₂
2.9
SAF demand could be reduced by about
40–55 Mt (corresponding to about
0.15–0.20 Gt CO₂e emissions reduction) due
to demand reduction
0.6–0.7
0.4–0.5
0.4–0.5 Gt CO₂e emissions reduction CDR is

from additional technological and 1.6–1.8 necessary to
operational improvements (60%–80% neutralise
thereof residual
from SAFs) emissions
0.1
Unconstrained Historical Additional efficiency SAFs, hydrogen, Carbon

growth, efficiency gains gains of another and battery- dioxide
no action of 1% per year 1% per year electric aircraft removals
Note: Totals may not equal sums due to rounding.

2. Aviation can comply with a sectoral 1.5°C
carbon budget if all levers are pulled.
Achieving net zero by mid-century avoids
cumulative GHG emissions of 25–26 Gt CO2e.
In a BAU scenario, cumulative GHG emissions between 2022 roughly in line with a 1.5°C carbon budget, being responsible
and 2050 sum to 47 Gt CO2e, of which roughly 39 Gt are from for cumulative GHG emissions of only 21–22 Gt CO2e, of which
in-flight CO2 emissions (Exhibit D) — an overshoot of more about 18 Gt CO2 are in-flight CO2 emissions and life-cycle CO2
than 100% against a 1.5°C carbon budget for global aviation of emissions of renewable fuels.
about 18 Gt CO2.iii In contrast, the two net-zero scenarios are
EXHIBIT D
Both net-zero scenarios halve the cumulative GHG emissions
of the BAU scenario
Annual GHG emissions, Gt CO₂e per year Cumulative CO2 emissions between 2022 and 2050,
Gt CO₂ per year
2.4
Business-as-Usual 39.1
scenario
1.8 1.5°C carbon

+117%
budget (50%
probability)
Cumulative GHG of about
1.2
emissions reduction 18.0 17.5 18 Gt CO₂e
of 25–26 Gt CO₂e
Prudent and
Optimistic Renewable
0.6 Electricity scenarios
Cumulative GHG emissions

of 21–22 Gt CO₂e
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Business-as Prudent Optimistic Renewable
Usual scenario scenario Electricity scenario
Note: For the carbon budget comparison, only CO₂ emissions are compared (not GHG emissions) since the 1.5°C carbon budget is defined for CO₂ only, while it assumes a
similar emissions reduction trajectory for non-CO₂ emissions. Similarly, we assume here that non-CO₂ emissions from aviation are reduced in a similar trajectory as CO₂
emissions. For the cumulative emissions, we have accounted for tank-to-wake CO₂ emissions of fossil jet fuel and life-cycle CO₂ emissions (incl. Scope 1 and Scope 3) for
renewable fuels. Based on industry expertise and Chipindula et al. (2018), we have assumed that 95% of the assumed life-cycle GHG emissions are CO₂, the rest from
non-CO₂ species. Only for waste-based fuels (e.g., used in G/FT or AtJ processes), we have assumed that 90% of the life-cycle GHG emissions are CO₂. The cumulative
emission figures include emissions reductions from CDR.
Source: MPP analysis, Jesuina Chipindula et al., “Life Cycle Environmental Impact of Onshore and Offshore Wind Farms in Texas”, Sustainability 10, no. 6 (June 2018)
Source: MPP analysis; Jesuina Chipindula et al., “Life Cycle Environmental Impact of Onshore and Offshore Wind Farms in Texas”, Sustainability 10, no. 6 (June 2018)
iii The sectoral 1.5°C carbon budget is calculated as of the beginning of 2022 at a 50% probability of achieving a 1.5°C target. It has been broken down from a global car-
bon budget from the IPCC to individual sectors following an average of the sectoral allocations of BNEF NEO and IEA NZE reports. The methodology is documented in
Box 1 (main text) and the Technical Appendix. See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”, in Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming
of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change,
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, eds. Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. (2018); BloombergNEF, New Energy Outlook 2021 Executive Summary, July
2021; and IEA, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, May 2021. NZE refers to the “Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario” of the IEA.

3. Average annual investments between 2022 and 2050
to get global aviation to net zero are estimated at about
US$175 billion, about 95% of which would be required
for fuel production and upstream assets.
Achieving carbon-neutral growth till 2030 (that is, maintaining new renewable electricity generation capacity, and the rest for
the same levels of emissions as in 2019) would need average CO2 capture plants and electrolysers.
annual investments of about $40 billion to $50 billion in this
decade. Until mid-century, a total annual capital investment The remaining 4%–8% of the total investment requirement
of about $175 billion would be required (Exhibit E). This flows into the development of battery-electric, hybrid-electric,
compares with aviation’s yearly contribution to global GDP and hydrogen aircraft. The total annual capital investments
of roughly $2 trillion. do not include the capital cost of new conventional jet aircraft
that would also be required for a regular fleet substitution/
Of these investments, 92%–96% are required for the production expansion without decarbonising. Since SAFs can simply be
of renewable fuels — including not only the final fuel production blended to fossil jet fuel as drop-in fuels, their impact on aircraft
but also all upstream assets: about 30%–50% of that capital is capital costs is negligible compared with investments required
required for new SAF production plants, about 35%–50% for in the fuel production chain.
EXHIBIT E
Investments to bring global aviation to net zero
Annual investments across the whole value chain, Breakdown of capital requirements across value chain,
billion $ per year, required for net zero by 2050 Percentage ranges dependent on modelled scenario
~175
4%–8%: Hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft
(additional costs compared with jet aircraft)
Uncertainty range
(dependent on
modelled scenario) 28%–52%: SAF plants (final fuel production
step, including ethanol production for
alcohol-to-jet production)
x4 92%–96%:
Fuel
4%–8%: Low-temperature electrolysers
production
(including 4%–6%: CO₂ capture (from point sources and
upstream direct air capture)
assets)
40–50
36%–49%: Renewable electricity generation
2022–29: Smaller 2022–50: Larger annual

annual investments to investments for large-
kick off the transition scale adoption of SAFs

4. Current project pipelines for SAF production
are insufficient and need to be scaled up
by a factor of 5–6 until 2030.
Sustainable bio-jet fuel and electricity-based (PtL) fuels need
EXHIBIT F
to be brought to market by 2030 to enable the massive scale-
up in the 2030s that will be required to achieve net zero by
How SAF project pipeline
2050. To achieve SAF production levels of 40–50 Mt by 2030, needs to be scaled
investments into about 300–400 new fuel production plants and
SAF production volumes in net-zero scenarios, Mt
associated upstream infrastructure need to be made (Exhibit F).
In particular, this 2030 target will be a challenge considering that
300–370
it takes at least five years to build a new SAF plant and get it to Uncertainty range
full operation. With eight years left until 2030, new SAF plants (dependent on
need to be planned within the next two to three years if they are modelled scenario)
meant to meet 2030 targets.
x6–9
Since the availability of sustainable biomass resources is limited,
policies should incentivise priority use of biomass for sectors
like aviation that have few other alternatives to decarbonise.
To accelerate the scale-up of bio-jet fuel production, ethanol 40–50
production volumes currently supplying the road transport sector 8 x5–6
could be redirected to the aviation sector. The electrification of
Current project 2030 2050
cars will most likely free up certain ethanol volumes that can be
pipeline
transformed into bio-jet fuel via the alcohol-to-jet process. In 300–400 1,600–3,400
addition, HEFA (hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids) plants plants plants
could decrease their diesel outputs in favour of jet fuel. Both
measures combined could unlock additional SAF supply Assumed plant sizes: SAF output capacities of 0.3 Mt/y for PtL and HEFA,
of 14–22 Mt by 2030, about 25%–50% of the SAF demand 0.065 Mt SAF/y for other biofuels.
in that year. Source: MPP analysis
5. The faster the cost decline in renewable electricity

generation, the higher the expected market share
of PtL. In contrast, if electricity costs do not drop as
rapidly, biofuels are likely to dominate the market.
To decarbonise aviation, a combination of different renewable in our ORE scenario, in which PtL constitutes the main SAF
fuels will be required, foremost biofuels, PtL, and hydrogen. In type from around 2040 onwards. However, if the cost decline of
particular, there is a trade-off between the use of sustainable renewable electricity generation is slower, biofuels are expected
biomass on one hand and renewable electricity and green to dominate the market in 2050 if (and only if) sufficient
hydrogen on the other. While biofuels are the only SAF option volumes of sustainable biomass — which is subject to global
today, PtL is projected to enter the market on a large scale in resource constraints — can be directed to the aviation sector.
the late 2020s and become cheaper in the mid-2030s. The PtL This is reflected in the PRU scenario. Although the future might
market share by 2050 depends on how fast the levelised cost lie between those two scenarios, the high demand volumes of
of electricity will fall in the next 15 years. Low electricity costs SAF will in any case require both fuel production pathways to
will lead to low green hydrogen production costs and finally low deliver SAF.
PtL costs that outcompete biofuels. Such a situation is reflected

6. Hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft can
make global aviation more efficient starting
in the late 2030s and supply up to a third
of the final energy demand in 2050.
Hydrogen aircraft could enter the market in the 2030s will be lower and rank at about 13% of the final energy
and scale up through 2050 to reach as much as roughly a demand by 2050.
third of aviation’s final energy demand by then (Exhibit G).
With current aircraft designs, hydrogen aircraft could be Assuming breakthroughs in battery chemistries, battery-
range limited to about 2,500 km because storing hydrogen electric aircraft could potentially power regional aircraft on
compared with jet fuel currently requires at least five flights up to about 1,000 km by mid-century. Although they
times more volume to carry the same amount of energy. could replace more than 15% of the global jet aircraft fleet
A redesign of airframes and storage technology innovation through 2050, they would contribute to only about 2% GHG
could, however, unlock longer ranges without reducing the emissions reduction because of their range limitation.
number of available seats. If hydrogen aircraft were to enter
the market around 2035 and achieve high ranges, they “Green corridors” could kick off the introduction of hydrogen
could gain a market share of about 32% by 2050 in terms and battery-electric aircraft, providing the necessary refuelling/
of aviation’s final energy demand. If they enter the market recharging infrastructure at two dedicated airports with regular
only at around 2040 and achieve lower ranges, their impact operations between them.
EXHIBIT G
The technological potential of renewable fuels
Best Medium Worst
Battery-electric Hydrogen SAFs
Efficiency of fuel production ~60% ~25% ~15%

and propulsion system Hydrogen and
battery-electric aircraft
are more efficient than
Few 100s km 2,500 km up to
Maximum range in 2050 up to 1,000 km no limitation
No limitation jet fuel-powered aircraft,
but can only perform
short- to mid-haul
flights.
Expected large-scale
market entry Around 2035–40 <2030
Share of cumulative GHG

emissions reduction from 2%–3% 8%–22% 75%–91% SAFs enter the market
renewable fuels (2022–50) earlier and therefore
have a larger impact on
GHG emissions
Share of final energy reduction.
demand in 2050 ~2% 13%–32% 65%–85%
Note: The GHG reduction potential of renewable fuels (SAFs and hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft) is defined by a trade-off between maximum aircraft range, expected
market entry, and well-to-wake efficiency.

7. By 2050, net-zero aviation could require an additional
5,850 terawatt-hours (TWh) of renewable electricity
(5% of the expected global demand), 95 million tonnes
of hydrogen (10%–20% of the expected global demand),
and 12 exajoules (EJ) of sustainable biomass (10%–25%
of the expected global sustainable biomass availability)
per year in the PRU scenario — or about double the
electricity and hydrogen but only one-third of the
biomass in the ORE scenario.
Decarbonising air transport has massive implications for waste (MSW), agricultural/forestry residues, or nonfood
global energy system resources (Exhibit H) — in particular energy crops, or (3) about 24–31 megawatt-hours (MWh) of
for sustainable biomass (for biofuel production) as well as renewable electricity (to yield about 0.5 tonne of hydrogen
renewable electricity and green hydrogen (for PtL production and to capture about 3.3 tonnes of CO2). CO2 can be sourced
and the direct use of hydrogen in hydrogen aircraft). One from point source capture (PSC) in the near term to scale up
tonne of jet fuel can be produced by (1) about 1.1–1.2 tonnes PtL production, but needs to come from direct air capture
of used cooking oil, (2) about 5–8 tonnes of municipal solid (DAC) in the long term.

EXHIBIT H
Resource demand of global aviation in 2030 and 2050
PRUDENT SCENARIO
A key challenge of a biofuel-dominated scenario is the sufficient supply of sustainable biomass, in light of the competition for this
limited resource from other sectors. However, such a scenario will require only about half the electricity, H₂, and captured CO₂ of a
PtL-dominated one by 2050.
Biomass demand ending up Renewable electricity Hydrogen demand, Captured CO2 demand, from
in jet fuel, EJ/y demand, TWh/y Mt/y PSC and DAC, Mt CO2/y
12 100% of the captured
CO₂ needs to come
from DAC by 2050.
5,850 95 490
x6
2 x23 x20 x20

250 5 25
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Share of maximum Share of global Share of global

global supply by 2050 demand demand
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
1%
2%–4% ~5% 5%
10%–20%
10%–25%
OPTIMISTIC RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY SCENARIO
A key challenge of a PtL-dominated scenario will be the sufficient supply of renewable electricity, H₂, and captured CO₂, in light of
growing global demand also from other sectors. However, such a scenario will require only one-third of the sustainable biomass of a
biofuel-dominated one by 2050.
Biomass demand ending up Renewable electricity Hydrogen demand, Captured CO2 demand, from
in jet fuel, EJ/y demand, TWh/y Mt/y PSC and DAC, Mt CO2/y
9,300 730
160
x20 x15
4 x18
1.5 x3
450 9 50
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Share of maximum Share of global Share of global

global supply by 2050 demand demand
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
1%–3% 1%
5%–10% ~10% 10%
20%–30%

In 2030, aviation could demand 5 million–9 million tonnes of
hydrogen, suggesting a share of 5%–10% of indicative global
demand projections of the Energy Transitions Commission of
90 Mt. It could require 250–450 TWh of additional renewable
electricity, suggesting a share of about 1% of indicative global
demand projections of the Energy Transitions Commission of
35,000 TWh, depending on how fast PtL enters the market.
In a scenario where PtL and hydrogen dominate the energy

mix in 2050 (ORE), up to 9,300 TWh in additional renewable
electricity production capacity would be required. Supplied by
up to 4 TW of renewable electricity generation capacity, aviation
could thereby demand up to 10% (9,300 TWh) of the indicative
expected global electricity production of 90,000–130,000 TWh
in 2050, suggested by the Energy Transitions Commission.
In addition, the production of about 160 Mt hydrogen would
require an installed electrolyser capacity of up to about 2 TW.
In a scenario more reliant on biofuels (PRU), 12 EJ of biomass

could be required for the aviation sector, demanding 10%–25%
of the indicative global availability of sustainable biomass by
2050. The conversion of 12 EJ sustainable biomass to biofuels
will simultaneously entail the production of by-products like
diesel/gasoline or naphtha, which will demand an additional 8
EJ.iv Therefore, 20%–40% of the indicative globally available
sustainable biomass would be used in biofuel production
facilities, to primarily serve the aviation sector.
In the face of competing demand for these resources, also from

other sectors, ramping up sufficient capacity will be critical
in order to decarbonise aviation and our global economy.
Sustainable biomass should be redirected from current sectoral
use cases where alternative decarbonisation solutions exist
(e.g., in road transport or shipping) to the aviation sector.
iv These by-products can decarbonise other sectors, wherefore the additional 8 EJ should not be attributed to aviation per se.

8. Aircraft fuel efficiency gains and operational measures
could avoid over 15 Gt CO2e of cumulative GHG
emissions at zero or even negative abatement costs.
Sustainable biofuels and PtL will most likely enter the market could abate about 15 Gt CO2e at far lower costs than other
at large scales only around 2030, and hydrogen and battery- measures — often even at negative marginal abatement costs
electric aircraft even later in the 2030s. However, other compared with current abatement costs of more than $200 per
measures can reduce emissions more quickly. The industry tonne of CO2e for SAFs.
should keep investing in fuel efficiency gains for conventional
engines, along with improved airframe design, ground Historically, average efficiency gains of 1% per year have
operations, air traffic management, and route planning. These been recorded. However, in two periods in the 1980s and
measures could improve fuel efficiency by 2% per year (see the 2010s, surging aviation fuel costs led to increased fuel
Technical Appendix for more detail), or about 40% by 2050 efficiency measures of 1.5%–2.8% per year to save on fuel
compared with 2019. Replacing the current commercial aircraft costs (Exhibit I). The prospect of future fuel cost increases
fleet with the most fuel-efficient aircraft that are in service due to the switch to SAFs could again be a key driver for
today would already reduce fuel consumption by about 20%. increased fuel efficiency efforts.
Cumulatively between 2022 and 2050, efficiency measures
EXHIBIT I
Historically, aircraft fuel efficiency gains followed high oil prices
Oil price, $/barrel Fuel economy,* fuel/tonne-km
120 120
… have been
followed by an
increase in fuel
100 Historically, 100
efficiency
increases in oil improvements
prices …
80 80
60 60
40 40
20 20
0 0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
* Relative to 1970 (1970 = 100%)

Source: MPP analysis, based on World Bank and ICCT¹⁰
ICCT

9. Although average fuel costs are increasing in the
net-zero scenarios, the cost of flying could remain
stable, being counterbalanced by efficiency gains.
SAFs are currently 2–5 times more expensive than fossil By 2050, average fuel costs for a fully decarbonised aviation
jet fuel, and even in the long run, SAFs are likely to come at sector could increase by about 90%–190% compared with
a premium, even though high oil prices could reduce this projected fossil jet fuel costs (before considering any carbon
premium considerably. pricing on top of fossil jet fuel costs). Average costs per RPK
could, however, rise by only about 5%. Further technology
The average energy cost for global aviation will depend on (1) improvements, economies of scale, and the introduction of
the market share of renewable fuels, which will increase over more efficient hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft could even
time, (2) their production costs, which will decline over time lead to a decrease of about 5% (Exhibit J) in the costs per RPK.
(because of technology innovation, economies of scale, and/or Although these values are only indicative and it is unclear how
carbon pricing schemes), and (3) the fuel efficiency of aircraft, individual segments of the value chain will react to increased
which will increase over time. As a result of (1) and (2), a share fuel costs, efficiency gains could enable airlines to compensate
of 13%–15% of SAFs by 2030 could increase the average cost for large parts of the economic impact of increased fuel costs.
of fuel by about 15%–20%. However, considering fuel efficiency
gains of aircraft, the average cost increase per revenue
passenger kilometre (RPK) could be negligible.
EXHIBIT J
Increasing fuel costs could be balanced with fuel efficiency gains
Average aviation fuel cost increase compared Indicative cost increase per RPK,
with fossil jet fuel costs, % percentage, compared with 2019 baseline From 2035, SAFs are
phasing out fossil jet
fuel rapidly, potentially
200 8 leading to higher costs
90%–190% per RPK compared
Uncertainty range with 2019 levels.
(dependent on 6 Until 2035,
modelled scenario) additional costs
from SAFs are
150 4 counterbalanced
by efficiency
measures.
2
75%–120%
100 0
-2
A more rapid cost
decline of SAFs coupled
50 -4 with continued fuel
efficiency gains can
mitigate cost increases
15%–20% -6 per RPK. This is the case
in the ORE scenario.
0%
0 -8
2020 2030 2040 2050 2019–35 2036–45 2046–50

10. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) solutions are needed
to remove residual emissions from renewable fuels
but are not a replacement for deep and rapid
in-sector decarbonisation.
CDR solutions are necessary in addition to, and not instead of, Still, renewable fuels rarely reduce GHG emissions by 100%,
deep and rapid in-sector decarbonisation. and unabated residual emissions of about 120–140 Mt CO2e
will remain in 2050. Those will need to be mitigated by CDR
Renewable fuels reduce GHG emissions by about 75%–95% solutions, including, for example: natural climate solutions (NCS);
compared with fossil jet fuel. The GHG emissions reduction hybrid solutions like biochar or bioenergy with carbon capture
of biofuels can vary considerably depending on the biomass and storage (BECCS); and engineered solutions like direct air
feedstock. For PtL, hydrogen, and battery-electric aircraft, the carbon capture and storage (DACCS). Counterbalancing the
GHG emissions reduction potential depends on the embedded residual emissions would cost an additional $15 billion–$18 billion
emissions in renewable electricity generation assets and is in 2050 alone at an average abatement cost of $125 per tonne of
therefore expected to increase in parallel to the decarbonisation CO2. Investments in CDR should start immediately to be able to
of the manufacturing industry. sequester 120–140 Mt CO2e by 2050.

11. Policymakers must create a level playing field
between fossil jet fuel and SAFs. Industry collaboration
across the value chain can ramp up SAF demand and
supply, as well as trigger technological innovation.
Financial institutions must direct capital to SAF plants.
A tailored and robust set of policies will be needed to
overcome the technological and economic challenges that EXHIBIT K
have been preventing SAFs from scaling (Exhibit K).v In this Key policy
decade, policymakers should (1) de-risk private investments
for new SAF production pathways, (2) bridge their cost
milestones in this decade
differential compared with fossil jet fuel, and (3) direct Global milestones
sustainable feedstock to the aviation sector. Simultaneously,
Create demand for decarbonisation measures: ICAO
the way for hydrogen/battery-electric aircraft can be paved by
commits to net zero by 2050 and adopts a long-term
supporting R&D and ensuring future accessibility to renewable global aspirational goal (LTAG), e.g., in form of GHG
electricity and green hydrogen at scale. emissions intensity reduction targets in line with
this report.
Create enabling conditions: A functional, global
book-and-claim system is established by 2025.
National/regional supply incentives

Change incentive schemes for renewable fuel
production to redirect biomass use from road
transport (biodiesel) to aviation (bio-jet fuel).
Support R&D of new SAF pathways and hydrogen/
battery-electric aircraft.
De-risk projects, e.g., via blended finance,

capital grants, concessional/low-interest loans,
or long-term guarantees.
National/regional demand incentives

Impose 5%–7% blending mandates for SAFs by 2025
and 10%–15% by 2030, and reduce the cost differential
between SAFs and fossil jet fuel, e.g., by direct
or indirect subsidies (like a blender’s tax credit).
Use green public procurement to supply 20% of
public-sector air travel with SAF by 2030.
Tighten emissions trading schemes.
Note: List is not mutually exclusive, nor collectively exhaustive; national

policy packages should be tailored to the specific country and region.
v See overview of policy options to support the market entry and scaling of SAFs developed by the Clean Skies for Tomorrow Initiative, the Mission Possible Part-
nership, and the Energy Transitions Commission, Clean Skies for Tomorrow: Sustainable Aviation Fuel Policy Toolkit, November 2021, www.energy-transitions.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Clean_Skies_for_Tomorrow_Sustainable_Aviation_Fuel_Policy_Toolkit_2021.pdf.

From an industry perspective, the market entry and scale-up
of SAFs require radical collaboration across the value chain in
Key finance
EXHIBIT M
this critical decade to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem
between demand and supply of SAFs and to bridge their initially
high cost differential compared with fossil jet fuel (Exhibit L). milestones in this decade
Banks, institutional investors, and public-sector banks can Climate-aligned investment principles
collectively make commitments to invest in SAF plants and By 2030, banks, institutional investors, and
upstream energy infrastructure to unlock the annual capital public-sector banks commit 100% of their invest-
requirements of $40 billion–$50 billion in this decade. Financial ments to infrastructure assets and companies that
institutions should signal capital flow commitments early comply with 1.5°C targets (similar to Poseidon
Principles in shipping).
on to de-risk projects (Exhibit M). Besides SAF plants, novel
propulsion aircraft should also receive investment support to In collaboration with the financial sector, investment
increase their technology readiness level (TRL). principles are established until 2023 to define sustainability
criteria for infrastructure assets, companies’ and financial
institutions’ aviation- and fuel-related portfolios. Investment
principles should:
EXHIBIT L Encourage an engagement of investors and industry

Key industry corporations
milestones in this decade •To incentivise and facilitate 1.5°C-aligned

target-setting;
Demand creation via offtake agreements •To develop best practices of new financing
instruments tailored to make projects related to
Current offtake agreement volumes — a cumulative 21 Mt SAFs, efficiency measures, and novel propulsion
SAF for varying offtake durations of 0.5–20 years — aircraft investable, and
between SAF producers and customers (airlines,
corporations, governments, etc.) are doubled by 2025 •To develop quantitative analyses on ways to
and increased by a factor of 5 until 2030 to overcome the de-risk such projects for financial institutions.
chicken-and-egg problem between demand and supply.
Mandate beneficiaries of any form of climate-aligned
Offtake agreements focus on this decade to scale up finance to disclose annual metrics to track their
near-term supply of SAFs and meet the yearly demand progress on decarbonisation targets.
for about 40–50 Mt SAFs by 2030. Advanced market
commitments and initiatives like the First Movers Include exclusion criteria to trigger divestments from
Coalition provide similar powerful demand signals. non-1.5°C-aligned assets and companies, e.g., banks
do not provide loans to aviation companies that do
Supply changes in reaction to policy revisions not meet minimum 1.5°C-aligned criteria by 2030.
Triggered by revised biofuel policies, existing HEFA plants
Include inclusion criteria (e.g., existing target to
reduce their diesel output in favour of jet fuel: doubling
reduce GHG intensity per RPK by 20%–25% until
the jet fuel share to 36% unlocks additional 7 Mt jet fuel
2030 for airlines, or a commitment to use 10%–15%
by 2030. Increasing the jet fuel share to a maximum of
SAF by 2030 for airlines and corporate customers, or
55% would unlock an additional 8 Mt.
the target of min. 85% GHG reduction compared with
Triggered by revised biofuel policies, 10% of global fossil jet fuel for a new SAF plant) to trigger new
bioethanol supply (9 Mt) is redirected from road investments in 1.5°C-aligned assets and companies.
transport to aviation to produce 6–7 Mt of SAF by 2030.
Public–private partnerships can
Industry consortia de-risk technology projects of low maturity
Cross-value chain consortia have de-risked currently
Consortium of capital providers to share risk.
low-TRL PtL production pathways and brought
first-of-a-kind (FOAK) PtL plants to the market by
2025 and larger-scale second-of-a-kind (SOAK) PtL
plants by 2030.
Public-sector banks to de-risk projects, e.g., via
Cross-value chain consortia have de-risked the blended finance, concessional loans, capital grants, or
development of hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft, long-term guarantees.
which enter the real-world test phase by 2030.
Note: List is not mutually exclusive, nor collectively exhaustive; finance
Note: List is not mutually exclusive, nor collectively exhaustive; industry
action should be tailored to type of financial institution, their portfolios,
action should be tailored to the national policy environment and region. the size of the companies that require capital for low-carbon technolo-
gies, and the technologies’ maturity.

Conclusion
Bringing global aviation on a 1.5°C-aligned path to net zero
is possible. It will require substantial annual investments in the
order of $175 billion, of which about 95% would be in renewable
fuel production, and entail large-scale implications for the
energy system. Aviation demand could represent up to 10% of
the expected global electricity demand and up to 30% of the
expected global green hydrogen demand by 2050.
Policymakers, financial institutions, and industry leaders

need to collaborate to set the course towards 1.5°C and
net zero. Early action in this decade is required to unlock
technological innovation and economies of scale and to enable
large-scale GHG emissions reductions in the 2030s and 2040s.
In a joint effort by actors across the value chain, we can

make this mission possible.

MAIN REPORT
Making Net-Zero
Aviation Possible
An industry-backed,
1.5°C-aligned
transition strategy

PART 1
Decarbonising Aviation:
Challenges and Solutions
1.1 Global aviation and its decarbonisation challenge

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, global aviation was responsible about one-third of the total climate impact of aviation. In-flight
for about 1 Gt of CO2 emissions per year, 12% of global transport nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and the formation of contrails
emissions, and 2.8% of total global, anthropogenic CO2 and cirrus clouds — subsumed under the term aviation-induced
emissions.10 Aviation emissions rose by over a third between cloudiness — could be responsible for the other two-thirds of
2010 and 2019 alone, from 760 Mt CO2 to 1,020 Mt.11 If aviation the climate impact (Exhibit 1.1), but are beyond the scope of
were unmitigated, it could be responsible for 22% of global this study because scientific uncertainties around the actual
emissions by 2050.12 magnitude of these climate impacts are high. The formation and
mitigation of contrails and cirrus clouds are discussed in more
Within the scope of this project, we include upstream GHG detail in the Technical Appendix.
emissions and in-flight CO2 emissions, which are responsible for

EXHIBIT 1.1
Climate impact of global aviation, based on the current
state of science
IN-FLIGHT UPSTREAM GHG AND TOTAL CLIMATE

CO₂ EMISSIONS IN-FLIGHT CO₂ EMISSIONS IMPACT
2.8% + Upstream
2.5% + Short-lived
3.5%–4%
of global CO₂ emissions GHG
of global GHG emissions climate
of global warming impact
(based on direct emissions (based on well-to-wake GHG forcers (based on net anthropogenic
tank-to-wake emissions of emissions of 1.24 Gt CO₂ out in-flight effective radiative forcing of
1.02 Gt CO₂ out of roughly of roughly 50 Gt CO₂ 80.4 mWm/m2 from in-flight
36.7 Gt CO₂ globally in globally in 2019) emissions, out of
2019) 2,290 mW/m2 globally in 2011)
Breakdown of the total climate impact, measured in effective radiative forcing, 2018 data
Uncertainty range
HIGH Upstream GHG

CERTAINTY emissions ~7% LEGEND
In scope of Low Medium High
this report
Uncertainty range
In-flight CO2
emissions ~31%
Uncertainty range Aircraft produce contrails which can

form cirrus clouds. The impact of
these two effects is subsumed under
aviation-induced cloudiness.
In-flight NO2
~16%
emissions
Uncertainty range
LOW In-flight aviation- ~53%

CERTAINTY induced cloudiness
Beyond scope
of this report
Uncertainty range
Other effects
(from sulfates, soot,
and H₂O)
Total climate impact 100%
Note: mW/m² = milliwatts per square metre

The climate impact of upstream GHG emissions has been calculated using a multiplier of 1.2 on top of in-flight CO₂ emissions (3.16 tank-to-wake vs. 3.83 t CO₂e/t jet fuel
well-to-wake). More research is needed to narrow the large uncertainty bandwidths for the non-CO₂ impact of flights. However, even the lower end of the uncertainty
ranges suggests a significant impact of these so-called short-lived climate forcers (in particular NOₓ and aviation-induced cloudiness).
Source:
Source: MPP
MPPillustration,
illustration,based
basedon
onLee
Leeetetal.;
al.;Our
OurWorld
Worldinin
Data13
Data ¹⁴

The climate impact of aviation stands in contrast to its benefits:14 • Short-lived climate forcers: According to the current
scientific knowledge, about two-thirds of aviation’s climate
• The aviation sector supports 11.3 million in-sector jobs impact could stem from non-CO2 effects, primarily
worldwide and 18.1 million jobs in the aviation industry supply contrails and cirrus clouds.21 The good news: reducing CO2
chain. emissions always needs to be priority number one (because
CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere whereas short-lived
• Aviation’s economic contribution amounted to $961.3 billion in climate forcers don’t) and many CO2 reduction technologies
the sector and an additional $816.4 billion in the supply chain. also reduce non-CO2 effects. Recent insights point towards
a considerable reduction of aviation-induced cloudiness
• In 2019, 4.5 billion passengers were carried by air, for leisure through the use of certain Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF)
and business purposes, connecting people around the world. types, so-called synthetic paraffinic kerosenes (SPKs), or
hydrogen (see Technical Appendix).
To serve the industry, airlines spent $188 billion on fuel in 2019,
and aerospace companies are spending $15 billion each year on Why is it particularly a challenge to kick off the
research for aircraft technology efficiency.15 transition to net zero in this decade?
Why is aviation hard to abate? • Low TRLs: Many SAF production pathways still have an
insufficient technology readiness level (TRLs of 5–8vi) to
• Limited decarbonisation options: Compared with ground ramp up immediately. Hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft
transport, aircraft rely on energy-dense liquid fuels, and most rank at even lower TRLs of 1–5.
transport activity (measured in passenger-kilometres) takes
place on long distances: flights longer than 1,000 nautical • Taking action takes time: Building new SAF production
miles (1,852 km) are responsible for two-thirds of emissions in plants (and associated resource supply chains, such as for
the aviation sector while representing only about 25% of all biomass delivery) usually takes about five to six years until
departures.16 The more an energy carrier weighs and/or the they go fully operational. We have eight years until 2030.
more volume it needs, the lower the range of the aircraft will New SAF plants and the associated upstream infrastructure
be. This trade-off limits the applicability of direct electrification (renewable electricity generation, hydrogen production, CO2
of aircraft, which is a major decarbonisation lever for ground capture, supply of sustainable biomass) need to be planned
transport but not a large-scale solution for aviation. within the next two or three years if they are meant to
meet 2030 targets.
• High costs: There are few renewable alternatives to fossil jet fuel,
and all of them come at a high additional cost. The only market- • International nature of aviation: 60% of the emissions
ready technology to propel close-to-zero-emissions flights in this from passenger aviation stem from international flights.
decade are SAFs, which are currently 2–5 times as expensive as Therefore, it is hard to get national model projects off the
fossil jet fuel (before considering any policy incentives). ground for international flights because they are at risk
of certain market distortion effects and carbon leakage,
• High demand growth: Although COVID-19 has delayed the meaning that, for example, stopover flights could be rerouted
growth of air traffic by a few years, demand is expected to from intermediate airports in countries with carbon pricing
rebound to pre-pandemic levels by around 2024.17 After this schemes to countries that don’t have such regulations. This
normalization, aviation will be back on a strong growth path could put the national aviation industry at a certain economic
with growth rates of about 3.0% per year. In 2018, 62% of disadvantage compared with other markets that do not have
the CO2 emissions from global commercial passenger aviation any cost-adding sustainability measures in place.22 However,
were emitted from flights departing from high-income such competitive market distortion effects could be alleviated
countries representing only 16% of the global population.18 by countermeasures from policymakers (as discussed for
On average, humans spend about the same time per day example in the European Commission’s ReFuelEU Aviation
in transit (approximately 1–1.5 hours per person per day), policy proposal).
irrespective of their wealth (measured in GDP per capita of
the country they live in).19 However, with rising GDP, travellers • Competitive market: Airlines operate on tight profit
switch to faster modes of transport. With a direct correlation margins and under high capital expenditures. Additionally,
between GDP and demand for air travel, the GDP growth in competition is high, in particular from and among low-cost
developing countries will unlock a huge additional demand carriers. This weakens incentives for long-term sustainable
for air travel.20 And since the aviation industry reinforces investments from airlines.
GDP growth, decarbonising aviation becomes even more
challenging and at the same time even more important.
vi TRL 1–3 represents the research stage, TRL 4–6 the development phase, and TRL 7–9 the deployment phase. TRL 9 means a technology has been proven in its ex-
pected operational environment.

1.2 Decarbonisation solution portfolio
This section provides a high-level overview of the available 2050, while complying with a 1.5°C carbon budget, based on the
decarbonisation levers to get to net-zero GHG emissions by following definitions of a “1.5°C carbon budget” and “net zero”.
BOX 1
What is the 1.5°C carbon budget for aviation?

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates the global carbon budget to limit global warming to 1.5°C
above preindustrial levels with a probability of 50% to about 500 Gt CO2 from the beginning of 2020.
From that, about 50 Gt CO2 of net anthropogenic emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) are sub-
tracted. That leaves roughly 450 Gt CO2 for all energy sectors, which needs to be allocated to individual sectors according
to their decarbonisation complexity. Hard-to-abate sectors are limited in their decarbonisation speed, whereas other sectors
like the power or automotive sector could switch to low-carbon technologies more quickly.
In a preliminary assessment by MPP, roughly 50% of the 450 Gt CO2 has been allocated to the seven MPP sectors (alumini-
um, chemicals such as ammonia and petrochemicals, concrete/cement, steel, aviation, shipping, and trucking). The sectoral
allocation is based on the cumulative sectoral emissions from the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 report and the BloombergNEF New
Energy Outlook 2021 report (and for some sectors the One Earth Climate Model) between 2020 and 2050, which serve as a
proxy of how hard to abate each individual sector is.
Following this methodology, global aviation has a 1.5°C carbon budget of about 20 Gt CO2 from the beginning of 2020. Sub-
tracting the emissions from global aviation in 2020 and 2021 leaves a carbon budget of about 18 Gt CO2 for global aviation
from 2022 onwards. Given the variety of other potential sectoral allocation methods, this value should not be taken as the
absolute truth but rather as an indicative figure for a 1.5°C carbon budget for global aviation.
Definition of “1.5°C carbon budget”

BOX 1
Global carbon budget 2020–50, Gt CO₂

Carbon budget for global aviation, Gt CO₂
500 50
450 19.5 0.6
0.8 18.1
Carbon CO₂ CO₂ Carbon

19.5 budget from emissions emissions budget from
beginning of in 2020 in 2021 beginning of
1.5°C AFOLU Total energy 2020 2022
(50% probability) emissions emissions
carbon budget
from IPCC
Note: Detailed assumptions are documented in the Technical Appendix.
Source: MPP analysis based on IPCC, IEA, and BloombergNEF²⁴

Source: MPP analysis, based on IPCC, IEA, and BloombergNEF23

BOX 2
What is “net zero”?

The world needs to get to net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 to avoid the most harmful effects of climate change. Thereby, “net zero”
means priority in-sector decarbonisation, complemented by carbon dioxide removals (CDR).
• About 90%–95% of current emissions in each sector need to be reduced by in-sector measures. This is in line with the Science
Based Targets initiative, which prescribes “long-term deep decarbonization of 90%–95% across all scopes before 2050” as the
single most important target for a net-zero world.
• The remaining 5%–10% of residual emissions that cannot be reduced by in-sector decarbonisation need to be neutralised by CDR, the
potential of which is described in a recent report from the Energy Transitions Commission.
Note: Details on CDR can be found in Mind the Gap: How Carbon Dioxide Removals Must Complement Deep Decarbonisation to Keep 1.5°C Alive, a recent report of the Energy
Transitions Commission, https://www.energy-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ETC-CDR-Report-Mind-the-Gap.pdf
The aviation industry has five major levers that can propel Exhibit 1.2 shows a breakdown of the causes of emissions from
it toward net-zero emissions: (1) reduction in air travel aviation and how each decarbonisation solution can contribute
demand, (2) efficiency improvements, (3) SAFs, (4) novel to reducing individual parts of the equation.
propulsion (hydrogen, battery-electric and hybrid) aircraft,
and (5) CDR solutions.
EXHIBIT 1.2
Decomposition of the roots of aviation’s emissions
and corresponding decarbonisation levers
Required energy CO₂ emissions

TOTAL EMISSIONS = Flight kilometres x x
Flight kilometres Energy
5. Carbon dioxide 1. Demand reduction 3. SAFs

2. Efficiency gains
removal 2. Efficiency gains 4. Novel propulsion aircraft
Required to Can reduce the overall Can reduce the overall Only measure to eliminate
counterbalance energy demand and thereby energy demand and thereby GHG emissions to close to
residual emissions avoid GHG emissions and avoid GHG emissions and zero
but must not replace reduce the cost of the reduce the cost of the
in-sector GHG transition transition
reduction measures
PORTFOLIO OF DECARBONISATION SOLUTIONS
Note: The numbers in the exhibit correspond to the following sections (on pp. 35–38) on each decarbonisation lever.
Source: MPP schematic

What is the contribution of each lever
to decarbonise aviation?
• Although efficiency improvements and reduction in air

travel demand often come at zero or even negative costs,
they cannot bring down emissions to zero. Increasing the
annual fuel efficiency gains to 2% can reduce the global
final energy demand of aviation in 2050 by around 40%.
• SAFs and novel propulsion aircraft are the only levers to

bring GHG emissions down to close to zero, but they come at
high fuel production or aircraft development costs.vii
◦ Different energy carriers and their propulsion systems

face a trade-off between production efficiency (i.e.,
energy demand for producing the energy carrier), on-
board energy conversion efficiency (i.e., energy demand
to create thrust during flight), the resource availability
(electricity, hydrogen, biomass, captured CO2), energy
costs, the GHG emissions reduction and the aircraft’s
maximum ranges (see overview in Exhibit 1.3).
◦ SAFs (renewable jet fuel, e.g., produced from biomass or

renewable electricity) have the broadest use case because
they can replace fossil jet fuel one-to-one as drop-in fuels
and can cover all flight distances. Without factoring in
the value of the environmental benefit of SAFs, they are
currently 2–5 times as expensive as the historical average
fossil jet fuel price over the past two decades. However,
strong cost reductions can be expected as the result of
technology innovation, economies of scale, and policy
incentives. Additionally, this cost differential narrows in
times of high fossil fuel prices.
◦ Hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft potentially offer

lower costs and a greater reduction of aviation’s climate
impact. However, they are not expected to enter the
market on large scales until the late 2030s or 2040s,
and likely for short- and medium-haul flights only. In
the long run (towards and after mid-century), however,
particularly hydrogen aircraft could have an increasing
market share.viii
• Lastly, CDR solutions do not reduce emissions within the

sector. However, they are required in order to permanently
neutralise residual emissions from SAFs and hydrogen or
battery-electric aircraft, which reduce GHG emissions only
by about 75%–95%.
Exhibits 1.3–1.5 show a high-level comparison of the five main

decarbonisation levers.
vii SAFs, green hydrogen, and renewable electricity are subsumed under “renewable fuels/energy carriers”.
viii Retrofitting existing regional turboprops with hydrogen fuel cell propulsion systems could bring their market entry forward to as early as 2025.

EXHIBIT 1.3
Comparison of SAFs and hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft
Indicative energy cost in 2020 ... ... and in 2050
$/MWh and as multiple of historical average
of fossil jet fuel price
Battery- Battery-
SAFs Hydrogen electric SAFs Hydrogen electric
500 3–9x 500
450 LCOH at about LCOE at about 450 LCOH at LCOE at about
400 $3.5–$6.5/kg today $50–$150/MWh 400 $1.8–$3.5/kg in 2050 $20–$120/MWh
350 (incl. liquefaction) today 350 (incl. liquefaction) in 2050
300 300
250 3–4.5x 2–4x 250 2–3.5x
200 Fossil 200 Fossil
1–2x 1–2x
150 2–3x jet fuel 150 jet fuel
~2x 1–2.5x 0.5–2.5x
($600– ($600–
100 $650 100 $650
50 per 50 per
0 tonne) 0 tonne)
HEFA Other PtL Green H₂ Battery-electric HEFA Other PtL Green H₂ Battery-electric
biofuels biofuels
GHG abatement potential ... ... and total climate impact abatement potential
Upstream GHG + in-flight CO₂ emissions only; In addition to the GHG abatement potential, this includes
compared with fossil jet fuel non-CO₂ in-flight effects; compared with fossil jet fuel
SAFs Hydrogen Battery-electric SAFs Hydrogen Battery-electric
Certain SAF types are H₂ combustion aircraft could increase

expected to reduce or reduce AIC. H₂ fuel cell aircraft could
aviation-induced eliminate AIC entirely.
cloudiness (AIC)
95%–100% 95%–100%
75%–95% 90%–100% 50%–90%
30%–60%
Well-to-wake efficiency ... ... and maximum range, km

SAFs Hydrogen Battery-electric SAFs Hydrogen Battery-electric
Potentially drastically
higher ranges after
aircraft redesign
15,000
~60% Few 100s km today,
up to 1,000 km for
next-gen batteries
~25%
~15% 2,500
Technology readiness level (TRL) ... ... and large-scale market entry
Battery-
SAFs Hydrogen electric
9 6–8 5–6 pre-2025 ~2025 ~2030s
1–5 1–5
HEFA Other PtL H₂ aircraft Battery-electric HEFA Other PtL H₂ aircraft Battery-electric
biofuels aircraft biofuels aircraft
Note: The cost of fossil jet fuel is taken as the average market price of the past 20 years. It has, however, fluctuated substantially
during that period, ranging from $135 to $1,590 per tonne. LCOE = levelised cost of electricity; LCOH = levelised cost of hydrogen.
Source:
Source: MPP
MPP analysis,
analysis, based
based on European Commission;
on European Commission; ICAO;
ICAO; McKinsey,
McKinsey, Clean
Clean Sky
Sky 22 JU,
JU, and
andFCH
FCH22JU;
JU;Stolz
Stolzet
etal.;
al.;industry
industryexpertise
expertisefrom
fromCST
CSTcommunity²⁵
community24

EXHIBIT 1.4
Indicative GHG abatement costs of all
decarbonisation measures for aviation
GHG abatement costs, $/tonne of CO2e
0–1,400
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
Today
800 200–700
600
400 150–350
0–250 50–200
200
0 -300–0 In 2050
0
-200
-400
Demand Efficiency HEFA Other biofuels PtL Novel Carbon dioxide
reduction improvements (highly dependent on the propulsion aircraft removal solutions
GHG reduction — here
displayed for 85%)
HEFA Other biofuels Power-to-Liquids
SAF production costs, $/tonne Multiple of historical GHG abatement costs of SAFs
average jet fuel price $/tonne of CO₂e
6,000
1,600
9
1,400 Historical
5,000 8
fossil jet
1,200 fuel price
7
4,000 1,000
ranges
6
over the
5 800 past two
3,000
decades
4 600
Fluctuations
2,000 3 400
2 200
1,000
1 0
0 0
2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 Average
Note: The cost of fossil jet fuel is taken as the average market price of the past 20 years. It has, however, fluctuated substantially during that period, from $135 to $1,590
per tonne. GHG abatement costs are based on the historical average fossil jet fuel price of $600–$650/tonne; however, high oil prices could reduce the GHG abatement
costs of renewable fuels substantially and bring them earlier to market. This report’s SAF cost assessment is built on insights into more than 30 feedstock types. However,
given the broad variety of existing feedstocks and SAF production processes, the cost ranges do not necessarily reflect the full range of potential future SAF costs — in
particular given regional differences and recent impacts of global supply chain disruptions. The GHG abatement costs are based on a higher GHG reduction of up to 95%
for PtL, and a large range of 55%–100% for biofuels based on the ICAO CORSIA Eligible Fuels methodology.
Source: MPP analysis, based on CST;

CST; ICAO;
ICAO; Schäfer
Schäfer et
et al.
al. (2016);
(2016); McKinsey
McKinsey25

EXHIBIT 1.5
Comparison of decarbonisation solution portfolio for aviation

Technology Market
Applicability at scale readiness availability
(i.e., potential impact) level (TRL) at scale Main barriers
1) Air travel demand reduction High demand growth,

• Modal shift of short-haul flights to Strong dependence on low development of
high-speed rail future behaviour, regional high-speed rail
• Behaviour change (e.g., reduced market developments, – – network, trade-off
business travel caused by and elasticity towards with co-benefits of
videoconferencing) increased ticket prices flying (connecting
• Elasticity on increased ticket prices people and cultures)
2) Efficiency improvements Aircraft efficiency:

8–9 upfront
• Turbine efficiency (more
High impact from a development costs
• Aircraft aerodynamics advanced
maximum 2%/y High Operational
• Air traffic management efficiency
efficiency improvement efficiency:
measures
• Flight operations efficiency international
rank lower)
• Ground operations efficiency coordination
High limitation of sustainable

HEFA biomass feedstock to supply about 9 High Feedstock constraints
50 Mt SAF/y
Limitation of sustainable
3) Sustainable Other
feedstock to supply about 6–8 Medium
Aviation Fuels biofuels Market entry at scale
250 Mt SAF/y
(SAFs) and currently
considerably higher
Theoretically unlimited cost than fossil jet fuel
feedstock (but potential (2–5x historical fossil
PtL supply constraints of 5–6 Low jet fuel prices)
renewable electricity,
hydrogen, and captured CO2)
Hybrid Applicable to almost

aircraft all flight ranges
4) Novel Applicable to short- and Up-front technology

Hydrogen Not yet
propulsion mid-haul (+ maybe 1–5 development costs
aircraft at market
technologies long-haul) flights and certification
Battery- Applicable to
electric aircraft short-haul flights
5) Carbon dioxide removal

(CDR) solutions Monitoring and
• Natural climate solutions (NCS): measurement of
restoration of natural ecosystems long-term carbon
3–9
(e.g., forests, peatlands) and better Only supporting measure, sequestration,
(NCS: 8–9;
management of current use of land not replacing switch to Medium ramp-up limits, large
DAC: 3–6;
• Hybrid solutions (biochar and renewable fuels investment require-
BECCS: 6–9)
bio-energy with carbon capture and ments, in particular
storage [BECCS]) for hybrid and
engineered solutions
• Engineered solutions: direct air
carbon capture and storage (DACCS)
Source:MPP,
Source: MPP,based
basedononEuropean
EuropeanCommission;
Commission;Prussi
Prussietetal.;
al;ETC
ETC26

1.2.1 Demand-side measures EXHIBIT 1.6
Although IATA expects a rebound to pre-pandemic air travel Flights longer than 1,800 km are
demand by 2024,27 there are signs that future demand could be
reduced by certain effects: responsible for two-thirds of GHG
emissions from commercial
• Videoconferencing: In business, video calls have proven
to be excellent substitutes for in-person encounters while passenger aviation
cutting corporate travel expenses.
Cumulative share of departures, revenue passenger
kilometres (RPK), and fuel burn dependent on flight
• Modal shift: Short-haul flights could be shifted to high- distance, 1 nautical mile = 1.852 km
speed rail, which can reduce CO2 emissions by up to 90%
Departures RPK Fuel
compared with today’s aircraft.28 Flights shorter than 650
nautical miles (1,200 km), which would be roughly equal to 1.0
Proportion of global total
a four-hour train ride, are responsible for 18% of emissions

of commercial aviation, while representing about 57% of 0.8
all departures (Exhibit 1.6). Therefore, mode shift could at
0.6
maximum reduce the CO2 emissions of global commercial
aviation by 15%. This maximum potential is reduced by
0.4
the availability of high-speed rail infrastructure. The IEA
estimates that future high‐speed rail lines could absorb
0.2
around 17% of all regional flights.29 That would yield a
maximum CO2 reduction potential of 2% of all emissions
from commercial aviation. To achieve this, substantial 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
expansions in high-speed rail infrastructure (e.g., to enable Distance, nautical miles
the envisioned tripling of high-speed rail traffic in the EU by
Source: Schäfer et
et al.
al. (2019)
(2019)34
205030) would be required.31
• Shifting consumer choice: Transparent information on 1.2.2 Efficiency improvements

the impact of travel could lead to more sustainable travel
choices by consumers. Google Flights, for instance, lets its Over the past decades, the aviation industry has made huge
users sort their flights not only by price or duration, but also progress in making its aircraft and flight procedures more
by CO2 emissions.32 efficient. Within normal fleet turnover cycles, the replacement
of retired aircraft with new, more efficient aircraft leads to
• Response to increasing costs per passenger kilometre: regular efficiency improvements at negative CO2 abatement
Increasing costs per passenger kilometre due to the use costs of $70–$250 per tonne of CO2.35 That means per every
of expensive SAFs could result in a demand reduction. The abated tonne of CO2, $70–$250 can be saved. Other aircraft
elasticity of demand is about 1; that is, an increase in ticket technology improvements — like reducing cabin weight,
prices of 5% could result in a demand reduction of 5%.33 retrofitting aircraft with blended winglets, or switching to electric

taxiing — have similar negative abatement costs. Individual
EXHIBIT 1.7
operational strategies from airlines and air traffic management
(ATM) improvements can have similar effects — at negative CO2
The most efficient aircraft
abatement costs of $250–$300 per tonne of CO2.36 in service are 15%–20% more
Increasing the efficiency of flying reduces fuel costs. As a result,
efficient than the global fleet average
the industry achieved average yearly efficiency improvements CO₂ intensity (as proxy for fuel efficiency) for
of 1.0% between 1970 and 2019, and it reached 1.5%/y between widebody aircraft, g C0₂/RPK
2010 and 2019.37 Beyond those continued historical trends, 1990 typical
110
we assume that overall efficiency improvements could be aircraft
increased to 2.0%/y by 2030 through additional efficiency Global airline
89
gains from: fleet average
-16%
2010s frontier
• Operational improvements and ATM (e.g., optimized
38
aircraft
75
approach/departure procedures, vertical speed inefficiency
reductions during cruise from improved aerodynamics, CO₂ intensity (as proxy for fuel efficiency) for
improved congestion management, single-engine taxiing, narrowbody aircraft, g C0₂/RPK
engine washes) 1990 typical
160
aircraft
• Other efforts like retrofits or new engine and aircraft Global airline
86
designs39 fleet average
-21%
2010s frontier
If these efficiency targets are achieved, the global aircraft aircraft 68
fleet could be about 40% more fuel efficient in 2050 than in
Note: Average fuel economy for wide- and narrowbody aircraft (which are
2019. Replacing the average aircraft with the most efficient responsible for about 80% of the CO₂ emissions of commercial aviation) in 2019
aircraft currently in service would save about 16%–21% of fuel and indicative values for the older aircraft and the newest aircraft in the fleet.
(Exhibit 1.7), without introducing any new technologies to the Source: MPP analysis, based on International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)42
Source: MPP analysis, based on International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
market. Further efficiency improvements can be achieved
through novel turbine technologies (like open rotor engines) or
airframe or operational improvements, such as those recently
outlined in a study from the Aerospace Industries Association
and Accenture40 and in Europe’s decarbonisation roadmap for
aviation, Destination 2050.41

Policy incentives are needed to support bridging the gap gains (Exhibit 1.8). Similarly, the prospect of future fuel price
between the historical 1%–1.5%/y efficiency gains and increases will serve as a key driver for increased fuel efficiency
the aspired 2%/y, which will require massive research, measures. Therefore, policies need to create certainty about
development, and demonstration (RD&D) efforts from original the switch from fossil jet fuel to SAFs in the future (through
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and engine/parts suppliers. blending mandates, carbon pricing, emissions trading schemes,
There is evidence from historical data that times of high oil etc.) and corresponding increases in average fuel costs.
prices have been followed by a stronger focus on fuel efficiency
EXHIBIT 1.8
Historically, high oil prices have been followed by increased
fuel efficiency improvements
Oil price, $/barrel Fuel economy (in fuel/tonne-km), relative to 1970
(1970 = 100%)
$110 120
… have been
100 110 followed by an
Historically, increase in fuel
90
increases in oil 100 efficiency
prices … improvements
90
80
80
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10 10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Source:MPP
Source: MPPanalysis,
analysis,based
basedon
onWorld
WorldBank
Bankand
andICCT
ICCT43
1.2.3 Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAFs) of esters and fatty acids are known as HEFA, which is
the only biofuel that is commercially available today. Its
SAFs are the most important lever to decarbonise aviation. production costs are in the range of 2–3x the cost of the
Until hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft enter the market average historical fossil jet fuel price (average over the past
in the 2030s, SAFs will be the only viable option to decrease two decades). Its scale-up is limited by the availability of
emissions to close to zero, and they will remain the only lever sustainable biomass feedstock. Additionally, HEFA feedstock
for long-haul flights in the future. They are chemically almost (like used cooking oil) is also in demand from other sectors,
identical to conventional jet fuel, and therefore compatible with and only minor cost reductions are expected from scale
current airport infrastructure and aircraft engines. Currently, effects: by 2050, HEFA is still expected to cost around 2x the
most certified SAFs can be blended with conventional fossil jet cost of the historical fossil jet fuel price.
fuel up to 50 vol%,44 but OEMs and engine manufacturers have
announced plans to target certification of 100% unblended SAF • Other biofuels: Agricultural and forestry residues, municipal
by 2023–30.45 In this report, SAFs from sustainable biomass solid waste (MSW), as well as cellulosic (non-food) energy
(HEFA and other biofuels like gasification/Fischer-Tropsch and crops can be converted to jet fuel via gasification and a
alcohol-to-jet) and electricity (Power-to-Liquids) are modelled: subsequent Fischer-Tropsch synthesis (G/FT) or to alcohols
and then to jet fuel via an alcohol-to-jet synthesis (AtJ).
• HEFA: SAFs made from waste and residue fats, oils, and Feedstock for these biofuels is significantly less limited
greases that are produced through so-called hydroprocessing than HEFA feedstock, but many sectors are competing for

sustainable biomass. Such biofuels currently cost about also reduce aviation-induced cloudiness and improve local air
3.0–4.5x the historical average jet fuel price, but as these quality. However, three major barriers limit their contribution to
technologies mature, this cost surplus is expected to drop to achieving net zero by 2050:
2.5–4.0x by 2030 and to 2.0–3.5x through 2050.
• Range limitation: Hydrogen aircraft are limited to ranges
• PtL: Water and captured CO2 (from point sources or from up to 2,500 km, battery-electric aircraft to a few hundred
airix) can be converted into liquid fuels using renewable km. Redesigns of conventional airframes could potentially
electricity, electrolysers, and a Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. unlock much larger distances for hydrogen aircraft — and
This process is known as Power-to-Liquids (PtL), which new battery chemistries could potentially enable flights
currently has the lowest TRL (5–6) among all SAFs. There up to 1,000 km for battery-electric aircraft, should they be
are theoretically no feedstock constraints for PtL. Supply able to quadruple current battery pack energy densities of
potentials for global renewable electricity generation exceed 200 Wh/kg. However, even then, their energy density would
projected demand, and CO2 can be captured from ambient still be 10x lower compared with jet fuel. Hybrid aircraft can
air basically without limitation.x The production cost of PtL serve as bridging technologies until full-electric aircraft
currently ranks at 3–9x the average historical jet fuel price reach commercial readiness.
but is expected to drop massively to 2.0–4.5x by 2030
and 1.0–2.5x by 2050. Currently, 85% of the cost of PtL • Technology development risk: Historically, the
production stems from hydrogen production and the related development of new aircraft has required large investments
renewable electricity generation.46 The expected cost from OEMs and has been a high-risk endeavour in a more
decline of renewable electricity and hydrogen also drives a or less duopoly market between Airbus and Boeing. Not
rapid reduction of PtL costs, whereas biofuels have a smaller until 2020 did Airbus announce its plans for hydrogen
cost reduction potential due to capital-intensive plant aircraft,47 with Embraer following the year after with its
equipment or biomass feedstock prices that show a smaller announcements of electric and hydrogen aircraft concepts,
cost decline. Because of these expected cost reductions, PtL and only over the past few years have smaller companies
could reach close-to-cost parity with the average historical or startups entered the race to bring hydrogen, battery-
jet fuel price by 2050, if it is produced at locations with electric, and hybrid-electric aircraft to the market.48
extremely low levelised costs of renewable electricity. Currently, novel propulsion aircraft have TRLs of 1–5.
A variety of other SAF production pathways could potentially • Market introduction lead time: Airworthiness certifications
match the characteristics of the highlighted SAF pathways for new aircraft can take about 5–9 years.49 Also on the
(HEFA, G/FT, AtJ, PtL) in terms of sustainability, GHG ground, new transportation, logistics, and refuelling
reduction potential, costs, and other factors. Pyrolysis and infrastructure will be required — however, the feasibility
catalytic hydrothermolysis could for example be subsumed of hydrogen infrastructure at airports has already been
under “other biofuels”, and recycled carbon fuels based on demonstrated in Heathrow, Berlin, and Los Angeles.50
carbon monoxide off-gases from steel or ferroalloy plants
would be subsumed under PtL, given that they are based on Hybrid-electric aircraft offer the potential for earlier carbon
non-biomass feedstocks. Because of the high uncertainties reductions by enabling efficient electric aircraft configurations
about future technology and cost developments of new to be combined with SAF.
SAF production pathways, they are implicitly included in
this analysis: under the prerequisite that they match the 1.2.5 Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) solutions
sustainability, costs, and GHG emission reduction impact of
G/FT, AtJ, or PtL, they would be included in those categories. CDR solutions are needed in addition to, not instead of, deep
An extended list of existing SAF production pathways is and rapid in-sector decarbonisation, in line with the Science
provided in the Technical Appendix. Based Targets initiative.51 For aviation, CDR solutions are
necessary in order to neutralise the residual emissions from SAFs,
1.2.4 Novel propulsion aircraft hydrogen, and electricity as these renewable fuels typically do
not reduce GHG emissions by 100% but by only about 75%–95%.
Hydrogen, battery-electric, and hybrid-electric aircraft can CDR solutions are also needed to neutralise the residual warming
reduce CO2 emissions by about 95%. They could potentially effect of aviation-induced cloudiness that cannot be mitigated
ix CO2 can be sourced from point source capture in the near term to scale up PtL production, but needs to come from direct air capture in the long term.
Double-counting of the emissions reduction credit between the emitting industry that captures the CO2 and the PtL producer using the CO2 in fuel production needs
to be avoided at all times.
x The abundant availability of these two resources will be critical in order to avoid any harmful side effects (like delayed phase-out of coal because scarce renewable
electricity is used for PtL production rather than for replacing coal power). There could be a risk of near-term supply constraints because aviation competes with
other sectors for renewable electricity and green hydrogen, and supply might lag behind demand. However, supply pipelines for both green electricity and hydrogen
are accumulating rapidly.

by renewable fuels. Net zero can be achieved only through a CDR (like the permanence of CO2 removal), the potential CDR
combination of renewable fuels and CDR. volumes per specific measures, and the required investments
over the next decade to scale CDR solutions.
CDR solutions include (1) natural climate solutions like
land use management, (2) hybrid solutions like biochar or The continued use of fossil jet fuel combined with CDR neither
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), and represents an in-sector decarbonisation measure nor is
(3) engineered solutions like direct air carbon capture and economically preferrable if oil prices are high. Capturing CO2
storage (DACCS).52 and converting it into PtL jet fuel is likely going to be a cost-
competitive alternative to using fossil jet fuel and neutralising
Natural climate solutions come at a cost of $0–$100/t CO2. all associated emissions via CDR. Factoring in aviation-induced
Meanwhile, hybrid and engineered solutions cost between $300 cloudiness, the non-CO2 climate impact of aviation, creates cost
and $600/t CO2 today but with more cumulative deployed parity between fossil jet fuel/DACCS and e-jet fuel produced via
capacity could reach a cost level of $100–$300/t CO2 by 2050.53 PtL with CO2 from DAC (Exhibit 1.9). In the long run, PtL is most
Background information on the role of CDR solutions, based likely going to outcompete fossil jet fuel/DACCS in terms of
on a recent in-depth analysis from the Energy Transitions fuel costs, if PtL proves to significantly reduce non-CO2 climate
Commission on the role of CDR to complement deep forcing (which is currently estimated to be the case but subject
decarbonisation,54 can be found in the Technical Appendix. The to high uncertainties).55 Therefore, the continued use of fossil jet
ETC’s CDR report provides further details on quality criteria for fuel combined with CDR is not considered in this report.
EXHIBIT 1.9
The use of PtL could be more cost competitive compared with
the use of fossil jet fuel when factoring in non-CO₂ climate effects
Jet fuel costs, $/t
Fossil jet fuel + CDR PtL + CDR
3500
3000 2030
2030
2500
2030 2030
2000
2050 2050
1500
2050 2050
1000
500
Baseline assumptions + Increased jet fuel price + Non-CO₂ climate effects + Increased jet fuel price (x1.5)
(x1.5) Non-CO₂ climate effects and non-CO₂ climate effects
assumed to be 2x the CO₂ effect,
i.e., total climate impact is
calculated with a multiplier of 3
Note: Fossil jet fuel price at $600–$650/t. Emissions of 3.83 tonnes CO₂e/tonne of fossil jet fuel. Lower bound of fossil jet fuel: CDR via mix of NCS, BECCS, and DACCS at
$125/t CO₂. Upper bound of fossil jet fuel: CDR via DACCS at $200/t CO₂. PtL is assumed to reduce CO₂e emissions by 90% and the total climate impact (incl. aviation-in-
duced cloudiness) by 60%. Lower bound of PtL: Estimated fuel production cost in 2050 is 1.5x fossil jet fuel price, residual emissions neutralised by CDR assuming a mix of
NCS, BECCS, and DACCS at $125/t CO₂. Upper bound of PtL: Estimated fuel production cost in 2030 is 3.5x fossil fuel price, residual emissions neutralised by CDR assuming
DACCS at $200/t CO₂. Residual climate impacts (CO₂/non-CO₂ effects) of fossil jet fuel and PtL are neutralised by CDR. Comparison is similar for other SAF types and would
be different for different fossil jet fuel cost assumptions. In general, a higher oil price will make the case for PtL more compelling.
Source:
Source: MPP
MPP analysis,
analysis, based
basedon
onETC
ETCCDR
CDRreport
report56

1.2.6 Summary
Considering the current state of all decarbonisation measures unlock the massive scale-up of decarbonisation technologies
above, the role of action in this decade is not to achieve large in the 2030s (see Exhibit 1.10).
emission reductions by 2030 compared with 2019 levels, but to
EXHIBIT 1.10
The role of each decade to achieve carbon-neutral growth until
2030, halve emissions by 2040, and get to net zero by mid-century
2020–30 2030–40 2040–50
Seed phase Harvest phase Consolidation phase
• Scale high-TRL SAF production pathways • Ramp up SAF production and upstream • Ensure long-term SAF supply
• Bring low-TRL SAF production pathways infrastructure (biomass, electricity, •Scale hydrogen and battery-electric
to market hydrogen, and CO₂ supply) at large scales aircraft
• Develop hydrogen and battery-electric • Bring hydrogen and battery-electric
aircraft aircraft to market
S-shaped market penetration of new technologies
Source: MPP schematic

Early progress is already under way (see overview in Exhibit 1.11).
Early progress towards
EXHIBIT 1.11
Around 0.05–0.10 Mt SAF are currently produced annually,57
all from HEFA plants that make not only jet fuel, but also diesel/
gasoline and light ends like naphtha. However, HEFA plants have
net-zero aviation
a total product output capacity of 9 Mt and could produce more Targets from international bodies
jet fuel (up to 55% instead of the current 18%), but existing
Industry-wide goal ICAO: Carbon-neutral growth
regulations disincentivise the production of jet fuel in favour
of net zero by 2050 ICAO member states have committed
of road transport fuels. Because of increasing political and
IATA/ATAG have to CORSIA, the carbon offsetting and
industrial pushes to use significant volumes of SAF in the future,
committed to achieve reduction scheme for international
fuel producers are meanwhile investing in new SAF production net-zero carbon aviation, i.e., to achieve carbon-
plants. The current project pipeline of planned SAF plants would emissions by 2050 neutral growth from 2019 on
ramp up SAF production to 8.4 Mt by 2030. About 90% of these
announced volumes are coming from HEFA. Targets from (supra-)national policy
5% SAF by 2030 10%–15% SAF by 2030
Blending mandate SAF use target of 9 million tonnes by 2030
within the for the commercial aviation fuel market in
European Union the United States (range of 10%–15%
dependent on demand projection)
Industry action
>35 airlines: Carbon 100 companies: 10%
neutral by 2050 SAF by 2030
>35 airlines have 100 companies have signed
announced plans to target CST’s ambition statement to use
carbon neutrality by 10% SAF by 2030, orchestrated
2050 or earlier by the World Economic Forum
and supported by MPP
First Movers Coalition

Committed to using
80+ industry leaders
cutting-edge SAFs and 80+ aviation companies across
propulsion technologies for the whole value chain engaged in
air travel by 2030 the Mission Possible Partnership
SAF supply starting to take off

• A SAF volume equal to
3% of current jet fuel 300–370
demand is in the project
pipeline until 2030 323
• A SAF volume equal to
7% of current jet fuel
demand is under offtake
agreements
SAF volume and jet fuel

demand, Mt
21
0.05–0.1 8.4
2019 SAF Project pipeline Under offtake 2019 jet fuel 2050 jet fuel
supply until 2030 agreements demand demand
Source: MPP overview, based on IATA; ICAO; ATAG; European Commission;

Source:
the MPP
White overview,
House; based on
First Movers IATA; ICAO;
Coalition; ATAG; analysis;
McKinsey EuropeanCST
Commission; the
White House; First Movers Coalition; McKinsey analysis; CST58

PART 2
Achieving net zero:

Possible trajectories
There is a range of possible scenarios how to achieve net-zero up constraints, (B) biomass feedstock constraints, (C) aircraft
GHG emissions in aviation. Different combinations of the whole range constraints, and (D) regulations that incentivize the use
portfolio of decarbonisation measures can lead to the same of SAFs.
target. By modelling two potential trajectories to net zero by
2050, we aim to illustrate the potential pace of change under To gauge real-world impacts, the two net-zero scenarios are
different circumstances and highlight the prerequisites for both compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Exhibit 2.1).
scenarios in terms of required investments, resource demand,
and 2030 milestones to kick off the transition. • Business as Usual (BAU): In the BAU scenario, the aviation
industry seeks the lowest total cost of ownership for aircraft,
The two scenarios paint two pictures of how the transition to implementing new technologies only if they offer an
net zero can be mastered by mid-century; the reality might economic advantage.
lie in between. However, these two scenarios will allow for a
discussion of no-regret moves — that is, action that needs to be • Prudent (PRU): The PRU scenario describes a trajectory to
taken no matter which set of decarbonisation measures is used net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 that relies on technologies
— and key trade-offs between certain types of decarbonisation that either are already available or will enter the market
measures, e.g., the demand for sustainable biomass for biofuel over the coming decades, according to industry consensus.
production versus the demand for renewable electricity for PtL Based on prudent technology improvement assumptions,
production. We also identify the key drivers for these trade-offs this scenario posits the deployment of a diversified mix of
and conclude under which circumstances certain technologies technologies.
would have more or less market penetration.
• Optimistic Renewable Electricity (ORE): The ORE scenario
2.1 Scenario definition describes a trajectory to net-zero GHG emissions by 2050
in which abundant and cheap clean electricity spurs rapid
The two net-zero scenarios aim to minimize the total costs R&D and faster than anticipated cost declines for electricity-
of ownership for the aviation sector within a given set of based technologies. As a result, PtL and hydrogen aircraft
constraints, including (A) technology market entry and ramp- enter the market earlier and at a larger scale.

All three scenarios include a compound annual growth rate For PRU and ORE, we also model the EU’s proposed SAF
(CAGR) of the global air travel demand of 3.0%/y between blending mandate covered in the ReFuelEU Aviation policy
2024 and 2050, while demand is projected to recover to proposal.59 For the United States, we implement its SAF Grand
pre-pandemic levels by 2024. Between 2019 and 2050, that Challenge to supply at least 3 billion gallons of SAF a year by
yields an overall demand growth rate of roughly 2.5%/y. This 2030 (about 15% of pre-pandemic US jet fuel demand from
is a crucial assumption. Demand needs to be kept below or airlines60 ) and to meet 100% of the projected aviation fuel
at this global average demand growth rate, while at the same demand with SAFs by 2050.61
time considering a just transition with regionally differing
growth rates, in particular allowing for higher growth rates in In both PRU and ORE, the aviation industry is modelled to
developing countries. If demand for air travel were to rise at a accept a certain green premium on top of BAU in order to get to
faster pace, reaching net zero would require larger volumes of net zero. The maximum accepted green premium is measured
renewable fuels than highlighted in the PRU and ORE scenario as the difference in airlines’ total costs of ownership when using
in the next section. SAFs, hydrogen, or battery-electric aircraft compared with
using fossil jet fuel. This concept of a green premium does not
The BAU scenario assumes a continuation of historical annual suggest that it will be paid by a single entity; it can be shared
fuel efficiency improvements of 1%/y, while PRU and ORE across the value chain. For PRU and ORE, the model selects
assume annual efficiency gains of 1.5% in 2019, linearly the technology with the lowest GHG abatement costs within all
increasing to 2% until 2030 and constant at 2% afterwards solutions that are in reach within a certain green premium on
through 2050. top of the total costs of ownership.
EXHIBIT 2.1
Scenario overview
Business-as-Usual Prudent scenario Optimistic Renewable Energy
scenario (BAU) (PRU) scenario (ORE)
Fuel efficiency Moderate: 1%/y High: 1.5%/y in 2019, ramping up to 2%/y in 2030, then constant
improvements at 2% until 2050
Renewable electricity costs Moderate: $50–$200/MWh today, $50–$120/MWh by 2050 Low: $30–$150/MWh today,
$20–$80/MWh by 2050
Power-to-Liquids Medium cost: Driven by medium hydrogen cost reductions Low cost: Driven by high hydrogen cost
technology ($3.5–$6.5/kg H₂ today, $2.25–$3.75/kg H₂ by 2050) reductions ($2–$4/kg H₂ today,
$0.7–$1.3/kg H₂ by 2050)
Sustainable biomass High: Up to about 14 EJ of sustainable biomass feedstock available Medium: Up to about 6 EJ of sustainable
availability for aviation biomass feedstock available for aviation
Market entry of hydrogen

Late: Around 2040 Early: Around 2035
and battery-electric aircraft
Maximum range of hydrogen fuel

Max. 1,000 km for battery-electric and 2000–2,500 km for hydrogen fuel cell aircraft (100–200 km in the near term)
cell and battery-electric aircraft
Maximum range of hydrogen Moderate: ~2,500 km for hydrogen combustion aircraft in High: No range limitation for hydrogen
combustion aircraft the long term combustion aircraft in the long term
Maximum green premium

0% 37.5% 25%
before efficiency gains*
Selects technology with lowest GHG abatement costs among the options that lie within the maximum green
Model logic
premium range, considering a set of constraints
*The maximum accepted green premium is measured as the difference in airlines’ total costs of ownership when using SAFs, hydrogen, or battery-electric aircraft compared
with using fossil jet fuel on individual routes. This concept of a green premium does not suggest that it will be paid by a single entity; it can be shared across the value chain.
Source: MPP modelling; see more details on modelling assumptions in the Technical Appendix.

2.2 What it will take to achieve
net-zero aviation
2.2.1 CO2-neutral growth until 2030, halving

emissions by 2040, net zero by 2050
EXHIBIT 2.2
Both net-zero scenarios
halve emissions by around 2040
and get to net zero by 2050
Annual emissions, Gt CO₂e
2.4
2.0
BAU
1.6 • By 2050, the aviation sector could reduce its GHG emissions
by about 95% through in-sector decarbonisation measures
1.2
PRU compared with 2019 emissions levels, despite high demand
ORE growth rates. Both net-zero scenarios halve the cumulative
GHG emissions between 2022 and 2050 compared with the
0.8 BAU scenario. In both net-zero scenarios, residual value chain
-50% emissions of 0.12–0.14 Gt CO2e (mainly from biofuels and
Approximately 2040 PtL) need to be counterbalanced by CDR to reach net zero.
0.4
The CDR solutions must be ramped up well before 2050 to
attain the required volumes towards mid-century and beyond,
starting with investments in this decade.xii
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

2.2.2 Compatibility with 1.5°C carbon budget
• Until 2030, achieving carbon-neutral growth based on 2019
levels — and thereby complying with ICAO’s CORSIA goalxi — is Both net-zero scenarios comply with the 1.5°C
critical (Exhibit 2.2). This alone will require the industry to carbon budget.
bring new SAF production pathways to market and scale them
up rapidly. The net-zero scenarios manage to stay below 2019 The carbon budget of about 18 Gt CO2 (defined in Box 1)
emission levels at all times, and the share of SAFs on total jet compares with cumulative emissions of about 18 Gt CO2 in
fuel consumption by 2030 amounts to 13% for the Prudent the two net-zero scenarios (Exhibit 2.3). Hereby, the Prudent
scenario and 15% for the Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario shows slightly higher CO2 emissions than the
scenario. In both cases, half of the SAF volumes are from Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario. However, both net-
HEFA, the other half from other biofuels and PtL. Because of a zero scenarios are 1.5°C-compliant.
more ambitious cost reduction path for PtL, the ORE scenario
already has a PtL share of 30% on total SAF volumes by 2030. By contrast, in the Business-as-Usual scenario, the 1.5°C
carbon budget for aviation is exceeded by 117%. Emitting 39 Gt
• By 2040, a critical milestone will be to halve 2019 emission CO2 between 2022 and 2050, aviation would emit 10% of the
levels. In both net-zero scenarios, renewable energy carriers global carbon budget still available from the beginning of 2022
(i.e., SAFs, hydrogen, and electricity) reach 50% market (roughly 380 Gt CO2), compared with an emissions share of only
share of the final energy demand shortly before 2040. about 3% today.
xi ICAO's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) aspires carbon-neutral growth of international aviation from 2019, that is,
keeping global CO2 emissions of international aviation below/at 2019 levels.
xii In this report, a constant growth rate of 20%–25% is assumed for CDR to reach the required levels in 2050 to counterbalance residual emissions from renewable
fuels, starting with a CO2 removal capacity of 1 Mt/y in 2025.

EXHIBIT 2.3
Both net-zero scenarios are
1.5°C-compliant, halving cumulative
emissions of a BAU scenario
Cumulative CO₂ emissions between 2022 and 2050, Gt CO₂
39.1
+117%
18.0 17.5 1.5°C carbon

budget (50%
probability)
of about
18 Gt CO₂e
Business-as Prudent Optimistic

Usual scenario scenario Renewable
Electricity scenario
Note: For cumulative emissions, we have accounted for tank-to-wake CO₂

emissions of fossil jet fuel and life-cycle CO₂ emissions (incl. Scope 1 and Scope 3)
for renewable fuels. Based on industry expertise and Chipindula et al. (2018), we
have assumed that 95% of the assumed life-cycle GHG emissions are CO₂, the rest
from non-CO₂ species. Only for waste-based fuels (e.g., used in G/FT or AtJ
processes), we have assumed that 90% of the life-cycle GHG emissions are CO₂.
The cumulative emission figures include emissions reductions from CDR.

EXHIBIT 2.4
A combination of GHG reduction levers can make
net-zero aviation a reality
Continued historical Additional Hydrogen Battery- Power- Other HEFA Unabated Carbon
fuel efficiency fuel efficiency electric to-Liquids biofuels dioxide
improvements improvements removal
(CDR)
Business-as-Usual scenario
GHG emissions reduction, Gt CO₂e (billion tonnes) Cumulative GHG emissions between
2022 and 2050, Gt CO₂e
3.0
57
2.5 26%
47
<1%
2.0 10 0.1 0 0 0
Impact of
COVID-19
1.5
Contribution
in 2050
1.0 73%
0.5
No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
action GHG
Prudent scenario
3.0
57
2030: 9% GHG emissions reduction from SAFs 24%
2.5
2.0 16%
2% 16
1.5
1.5 9% 5
19% 22
1.0
12
0.8
21%
0.5
5%
5%
-5% No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 action GHG
Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario

3.0
19% 57
2030: 11% GHG emissions reduction from SAFs
2.5
13%
2.0
2%
14
1.5 25% 5
9
1.0 21
7 0.6
28%
0.5
6%
3%
4%
-4% No Total
2019 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 action GHG
Note: Sums in contributions to 2050 GHG emissions may not total 100 due to rounding. Source: MPP analysis

2.2.3 The role of SAFs and fuel efficiency
EXHIBIT 2.5
measures 300–400 SAF plants
The two main GHG emissions reduction levers in the two net- could be needed to produce
zero scenarios are fuel efficiency improvements and the use
of SAFs (Exhibit 2.4): 40–50 Mt SAF by 2030
• PRU: 95% of the cumulative GHG emissions reduction from PtL Other biofuels HEFA
in-sector decarbonisation measures between 2022 and 2050
stems in equal parts from the use of SAFs (of which 30% is
PRU scenario ORE scenario
from PtL, 70% from biofuels) and fuel efficiency gains. SAF production volumes, Mt 51
• ORE: 85% of the cumulative GHG emissions reduction be- 42

15
tween 2022 and 2050 stems in equal parts from the use of 7
SAFs (of which 60% is from PtL, 40% from biofuels) and fuel
efficiency gains. 12
20 22
The main difference between PRU and ORE is the underlying 17 6
assumption around the development of PtL and hydrogen 2
aircraft. Two prerequisites are decisive for a large-scale market 6 24
9
penetration of those two: 15
10
6
• Low-cost and abundant renewable electricity and hydro- 2025 2030 2025 2030
gen production: The major cost driver for PtL is the cost of
electricity and hydrogen.
Number of SAF plants
386
• Rapid technological advancements: If PtL can be intro-
25
duced to the market at significant scale by 2030, economies
312
of scale could unlock higher cost reductions in the 2030s
and 2040s compared with biofuels. Technological advance- 49
ments in the energy density of hydrogen storage systems
could unlock longer ranges for hydrogen aircraft. Coupled 312
with an early market entry, they could take a significant mar- 160 149 182
ket share by 2050. 7
18
The ORE scenario incorporates those prerequisites. Although 134 98

market introduction for PtL is modelled to be 2025 for both 81
19 49 33
net-zero scenarios, only in the ORE scenario does PtL scale
early as a result of high cost reductions and technology 2025 2030 2025 2030
innovation. As a consequence, PtL dominates the SAF market
Note: Assumed plant sizes: SAF output capacities of 0.3 Mt/y for PtL and HEFA,
and makes up 50% of the final energy demand of global 0.065 Mt SAF/y for other biofuels.
aviation by 2050. Similarly, hydrogen aircraft benefit from Source: MPP analysis
ambitious range assumptions and low-cost green hydrogen.
They could be responsible for up to roughly a third of the final
energy demand by 2050. aircraft against SAFs will be three important factors that
determine whether hydrogen aircraft could replace a certain
In contrast, the PRU scenario relies on more biofuel volumes share of SAFs beyond 2050.
since PtL becomes competitive only in the 2040s.
2.2.4 2020s milestones to kick off the
Beyond 2050, hydrogen aircraft could replace a certain share transition to net zero in aviation
of SAFs. Future total costs of ownership, technology innovation
to increase the maximum aircraft range (in particular By 2030, about 42–51 Mt of SAFs — 13%–15% of total jet fuel
lightweight liquefied hydrogen tanks and novel airframes), and demand — are required to achieve credible 1.5°C pathways
increasing certainty around the total climate impact reduction in the Prudent and Optimistic Renewable Electricity
(GHG emissions and aviation-induced cloudiness) of hydrogen scenarios. SAF production needs to increase by a factor of

5–6 from currently planned SAF projects by then. If new SAF increase in biojet volume “at a moderate investment cost”.64
projects receive appropriate kickoff support, their production A doubling of the average jet fuel share from 18% to 36%
cost could drop by about 10%–20% within this decade, could make an additional 7.2 Mt of jet fuel available by 2030.
thanks to economies of scale. The ORE scenario relies on Increasing the jet fuel share to the maximum 55% would
larger (and therefore fewer) PtL plants, and the PRU scenario unlock 14.8 Mt in total.
requires the construction of smaller (and therefore more) non-
HEFA biofuel plants. 2. Ethanol production facilities, currently used to supply the
road transport sector, could be repurposed to serve the
Given project lead times of about five to six years, project aviation sector.65 The electrification of cars could accelerate
planning for the 310–390 SAF plants required to supply the that process as large ethanol volumes could be freed up
2030 SAF demand levels (Exhibit 2.5) is feasible but needs because of declining demand for conventional vehicles. In
to start now. The initial scale-up to a 13%–15% SAF share by 2019, 115 billion litres (91 Mt) of bio-ethanol were produced
2030 can be accomplished if the following levers are pulled globally.66 If the replacement of conventional vehicles by
simultaneously: bringing PtL to the market and accelerating battery-electric vehicles freed up 10% of that demand by
the scale-up of bio-jet fuel production. Three low-hanging fruits 2030, an additional 6.5 Mt of jet fuel could be produced.xiii
that can help to achieve this target are (Exhibit 2.6):
3. Bringing PtL to the market and accelerating the scale-up
1. Today, HEFA plants produce only about 18% jet fuel because of new bio-jet fuel production from non-HEFA routes can tap
certain policies incentivise the production of other fuel new SAF supply. The supply of low-cost green hydrogen,
types like diesel.62 New HEFA plants can be optimized to produced from renewable electricity, and captured CO2
achieve a 55 weight% jet fuel share on the total product (from PSC or DAC) will be key enablers for a near-term PtL
output.63 Similarly, retrofitting HEFA plants could unlock an market entry.
EXHIBIT 2.6
Indicative SAF supply scenario for 2030
SAF project pipeline until 2030, SAF demand in 2030 vs. potential supply scenario, Mt
Mt Illustrative scenario 9.0 51.0
As of December 2021
8.4 Without
PtL 7.8 building any
new ethanol 11.5 42.0
G/FT
production
AtJ facilities e.g., about
HEFA 30 new PtL
6.5–7.3 plants
e.g., about
7.2–14.8
100–200 new
biofuel plants
8.4
0.1
2020 2025 2030 Current Potential Potential New plants Demand in New plants Demand in
project retrofitting redirecting required PRU scenario required ORE scenario
pipeline of HEFA of ethanol to meet to meet
plants to production demand in demand in
increase jet to new PRU scenario ORE scenario
fuel product AtJ plants
slate
xiii A conversion efficiency from ethanol to jet fuel of around 90% and a jet fuel selectivity on the total product output of 77% is assumed. In Brazil, the ethanol demand
could be reduced by up to 40% by 2035 because of the electrification of cars. The 10% ethanol demand reduction is estimated as a more moderate global average
decrease in demand. In the long term, the 91 Mt of bio-ethanol could cover about 20% of the global jet fuel demand in 2050. See Clean Skies for Tomorrow Initiative
(CST), World Economic Forum, and McKinsey & Company, Clean Skies for Tomorrow: Sustainable Aviation Fuels as a Pathway to Net-Zero Aviation, November 2020,
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Clean_Skies_Tomorrow_SAF_Analytics_2020.pdf; Guolin Yao et al., “Stochastic Techno-Economic Analysis of Alcohol-to-Jet Fuel
Production”, Biotechnology for Biofuels 10, no. 18 (2017); and Fabiana Batista, Leonardo Lara, and Isis Almeida, “Get Ready for a Flood of Sugar as Brazilians Buy
Electric Cars”, Bloomberg, June 15, 2021, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-15/get-ready-for-a-flood-of-sugar-as-brazilians-buy-electric-cars.

Although the required SAF production volumes for 2030 related learnings like the standardisation of processes,
represent only about 10%–15% of the demand in 2050, they increased operational efficiencies, greater specialisation in
are key to bringing the technologies to market and unlocking manufacturing, and lower prices due to the purchase of larger
the ramp-up to about 300–370 Mt SAF by 2050 (Exhibit 2.7). quantities of resources.67 Additionally, it can be based on (2)
financial learnings: the technological learnings “can lower
New SAF plant projects are expected to be subject to drastically the risk perceptions held by project developers and financial
lower risk from 2030 onwards. By deploying first- and second- institutions ensuring more favourable financing conditions”,68
of-a-kind commercial plants by 2030 and thereby gaining state investment banks can “build investor confidence in new
experience in these maturing technologies, the TRL of novel technologies”,69 and a growing group of investors can create
SAF production technologies can be brought to a higher level, competition that drives down the financing cost of new projects.
inducing a reduction of investment risks. The deployment of an
increasing number of SAF production facilities after 2030 will For some components like electrolysers, learning rates are
then unlock cost declines from economies of scale. expected to be 13%–18%70 with the potential to increase to
rates similar to that of solar photovoltaic (PV),71 which has
This learning-by-doing, that is, the cost decline per doubling experienced learning rates of about 30%, that is, a cost decline
of cumulative installed capacity, is based on (1) technology- of 30% per doubling of cumulative installed capacity.72
EXHIBIT 2.7
1,600–3,400 SAF plants could be necessary to
produce 300–370 Mt SAF by 2050
PtL Other biofuels HEFA
PRU scenario ORE scenario

SAF demand, Mt 372 369
327
118 302
149
229
215
49 222
222
203 101
176 111
101 129
19 39 64
51 62
42 50 27 52
17 22
32 51 51 44 45 50 43 28
2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Number of SAF plants 3,692

394 3,358
496
2,317
1,836
1,635
3,128 1,495
2,715
740
335 739
943 1,986
700
386 993 954
774 312 802
160 149 421
2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Assumed plant sizes: SAF output capacities of 0.3 Mt/y for PtL and HEFA, 0.065 Mt/y SAF for other biofuels. Totals may not equal sums due to rounding.

2.2.5 Cost of the switch to low-carbon solutions abatement cost for all renewable fuels (weighted by the volume
of each fuel type) decreases to about $200 per tonne of CO2e by
Replacing fossil jet fuel with low-carbon alternatives comes at 2050, and in the Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario the
an additional cost. As the share of those alternatives increases, cost drops even more to about $100 per tonne of CO2e because
economies of scale will reduce their cost. Currently, GHG of more ambitious assumptions about future reductions of PtL
abatement costs for SAFs show a high range of $200–$1,400 production costs. This difference of $100 per tonne of CO2e
per tonne of CO2e. In the Prudent scenario, the average GHG exemplifies the value of higher technology learning rates.
EXHIBIT 2.8
The aviation industry could avoid an increase of the cost of flying
through counterbalancing increasing fuel costs with fuel efficiency gains
PRU ORE Fossil jet fuel only
1 SAF blending rate, % of final 2 SAF cost, $/tonne of SAF 3 Average fuel cost, $/tonne jet
jet fuel demand (weighted by SAF volumes of fuel equivalent (weighted average
each SAF type) of all energy carriers)
100 2,000 1,500
2025: 2030:
80
5%–7% 13%–15% 1,500
2040: 1,000
60
62% 1,000
40
2035: 500 500
20 28%–32%
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
4 Billion RPK, for commercial 5 Cost increase or decrease per 6 GHG emissions per revenue
passenger aviation (without RPK, % (compared with 2019 passenger kilometre, g CO₂e/
impact of COVID-19) baseline) RPK for commercial passenger
20,000 9 aviation
6 120
15,000 3 100
+116%
80
10,000 -3
60
-6
40
5,000 -9
-12 20
-15
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Additional assumptions
• Fuel costs are •Non-fuel-related •Fuel efficiency gains of 2%/y
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + Additional
assumptions = 5 25% of total airline costs stay constant from 2030 onwards (linearly
costs in 2019 at 2019 levels increased from 1.5%/y in 2019)
Note: SAF costs, SAF blending rate, and the resulting average aviation fuel costs for commercial passenger aviation — and an indication of how that impacts the average
costs per revenue passenger kilometre (RPK). The average fuel cost and the cost increase per RPK in the net-zero scenarios do not include the additional cost to neutralise
residual emissions. Including these would raise the cost increase per RPK by 1–2 percentage points in 2050. The cost of the transition to net zero (5th graph) is juxtaposed
with its benefit in terms of GHG emissions per RPK (6th graph).
Source:MPP
Source: MPPanalysis;
analysis,share
shareof
offuel
fuelcosts
costson
onticket
ticketprices
pricesbased
basedon
onWassermann
Wassermannetetal.
al73

The transition towards SAFs could be cost-neutral (on a 2.2.6 Investment needs for the
cost-per-RPK basis) if renewable electricity and green transition to net zero
hydrogen costs decline rapidly and fuel efficiency gains of
2%/y are achieved (Exhibit 2.8). Bringing global aviation to net zero by 2050 will require an
additional investment of about $175 billion in upfront capital
Projected fossil jet fuel costs (before considering any carbon annually over the next three decades.xiv Of these investments:
pricing schemes) are modelled to be declining towards
mid-century in line with the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 report,74 • 28%–52% will be required from fuel producers for SAF pro-
assuming an oversupply of oil in a decarbonising global duction plants (including reverse-water-gas-shift reactors to
economy. Compared with these projected fossil jet fuel costs, produce syngas, and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis units for PtL,
the average fuel cost in the net-zero scenarios increases by ethanol production and AtJ plants, G/FT, and HEFA plants).
90%–190% by 2050. Compared with the historical average
fossil jet fuel costs of $600–$650/tonne, however, the • 44%–64% will be required from energy providers for assets
increase in average fuel costs is only about 70% in the PRU further upstream. These upstream assets include renew-
scenario and 10% in the ORE scenario. These cost increases able electricity generation (e.g., wind power plants or solar
are counterbalanced by fuel efficiency improvements, leading PV parks), low-temperature electrolysers (for hydrogen
to an increase of costs per RPK of only about 5% in the PRU production), and CO2 capture plants for SAF-, hydrogen- and
scenario by 2050. In the ORE scenario, costs per RPK could electricity-powered aircraft.
even decrease by up to 5% because of the assumed rapid cost
decline of renewable electricity and green hydrogen. • 4%–8% will be required from airlines for hydrogen and
battery-electric aircraft (additional capital costs for new
Where airlines purchased aviation fuel for $188 billion in engines and airframes entering the market, compared with
2019,75 these expenses will rise to about $250 billion to $400 optimised conventional jet engines and airframes).xv
billion in 2050 while increasing air travel (in RPK) by more
than a factor of 2. Overall, $5.1 trillion of capital investments could be required
between 2022 and 2050 to bring global aviation to net
Crucially, costs per RPK could stay constant until 2035 zero. However, for the same capital investments, the
despite the ramp-up of SAFs if: Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario offers larger fuel
cost reductions and a cost-neutral transition (in $/RPK)
• The assumed annual efficiency improvements of 2% are compared with the Prudent scenario (as highlighted in the
achieved (if only the historical efficiency gains of 1%/y were previous section), mainly driven by more progressive underlying
to be continued, costs per RPK could increase by 10%–15%) assumptions for renewable electricity costs. This highlights
the economic opportunity of investing in renewable electricity
• Suitable policy measures are introduced to overcome mar- generation assets and green hydrogen production (thereby
ket entry barriers, in particular for SAFs making them cheaper and/or more efficient).
• Sufficient investments are made now in new technologies The $175 billion would not be distributed equally across the
with low TRLs decades to come. In the 2020s, 6%–8% of the cumulative
investments required between 2022 and 2050 need to happen.
At the same time, global commercial air travel could reduce its This $38 billion–$49 billion of average annual investments
GHG intensity per RPK by about 40% by 2035. would be sufficient to kick off the transition (Exhibit 2.9)
and compares with the spending of aerospace companies for
research in aircraft technology efficiency on the order of $15
billion per year.76
xiv All investment numbers are in real 2019 US dollars of capital required in the specific years and do not represent a net present value.
xv The capital investments in new conventional jet aircraft are excluded in these investment requirements because they would also be required for a regular fleet substi-
tution/expansion without decarbonisation. Since SAFs are drop-in fuels, their impact on aircraft capital costs is negligible compared with investments required in the
fuel production chain.

EXHIBIT 2.9
Average annual investments to get global aviation to net zero
are estimated at about $175 billion
Hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft (additional costs compared with jet aircraft)
Upstream inputs to fuel production (renewable electricity, hydrogen, CO₂ capture)
Fuel production (final fuel production step, e.g., reverse-water-gas-shift reactors + Fischer-Tropsch plants for PtL,
and AtJ plants incl. ethanol production)
Prudent scenario Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario
Annual capital investment, billion $
398
383
276
Average annual 262 Average annual
investment: $174 billion investment: $176 billion
175
155
117
103
44 49 52
36
2022–25 2026–30 2031–35 2036–40 2041–45 2046–50 2022–25 2026–30 2031–35 2036–40 2041–45 2046–50
Note: Annual investments are on top of a BAU scenario and do not include the investments in regular fleet replacements. Investments for CDR are not included here since
they could come from different sources (NCS, BECCS, DACCS, etc.).

In the PRU scenario (Exhibit 2.10), an average $174 billion/y ($5.1 propulsion aircraft (8%). Nineteen per cent of all investments
trillion cumulatively between 2022 and 2050) would be required flow into biofuels, 59% into PtL, and 22% into hydrogen and
for the production of renewable fuels (52%), corresponding battery-electric aircraft (and their fuel). Since about half of the
upstream investments (44%), and novel propulsion aircraft (4%). final energy mix in 2050 is supplied by PtL in this scenario, it is
Fifty per cent of all investments flow into biofuels, 41% into PtL, also responsible for the largest share of investments.
and 9% into hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft (and their
fuel). While the capital for biofuels is largely allocated to the final Behavioural change could reduce the total SAF demand
fuel production plant, about 84% of PtL costs are required for by about 40–55 Mt by 2050, assuming (1) a modal shift of
upstream assets (67% for renewable electricity generation, 17% short-haul flights to high-speed rail in line with the IEA’s Net
for electrolysers and CO2 capture plants). Zero by 2050 report77 and (2) an additional overall reduction
of air travel demand of 10% (e.g., triggered by reduced
In the ORE scenario (Exhibit 2.11), an average $176 billion/y business travel). This could reduce investments in the whole
($5.1 trillion cumulatively between 2022 and 2050) would value chain (SAF plants and upstream infrastructure like
be required for the production of renewable fuels (28%), renewable electricity generation) by $500 billion–$700 billion,
corresponding upstream investments (64%), and novel cumulatively, between 2022 and 2050.
EXHIBIT 2.10
In the Prudent scenario, 52% of capital investments are required
for fuel production, 36% upstream for renewable electricity generation
Breakdown of capital investment requirements in the PRU scenario, cumulatively between 2022 and 2050, trillion $
Electricity for battery-electric aircraft 1.8

0.2 5.1
(36% of total) <0.01 <1%
Hydrogen for hydrogen aircraft
5%
Power-to-Liquids
Other biofuels
41%
HEFA
2.6 0.2
0.2
(52% of total)
48%
2%
4%
Fuel production Hydrogen CO₂ capture Renewable Airport H₂ Additional Total
production (via (from PSC electricity infrastructure costs of H₂
low-temperature and DAC) (PPA from mix of and battery-
electrolysis) offshore & onshore electric aircraft
wind, solar PV, (compared with
and hydro power) jet aircraft)
Typical entity
for investments Fuel Energy providers Airports Airlines
producers (+ CO₂ capture companies)
Share of total
52% ($2.6 tn) 44% ($2.2 tn) <0.1% 4% (0.2 tn)
investments
they could come from different sources (NCS, BECCS, DACCS, etc.). PPA = power purchase agreements. Totals may not equal sums due to rounding.

EXHIBIT 2.11
In the Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario, 28% of capital
investments are required for fuel production, 49% upstream for
renewable electricity generation
Breakdown of capital investment requirements in the ORE scenario, cumulatively between 2022 and 2050, trillion $
Electricity for battery-electric aircraft 2.5 0.4 5.1

<1%
Hydrogen for hydrogen aircraft (49% of total) <0.01
14%
Power-to-Liquids
Other biofuels
HEFA
59%
0.3
1.4 0.4
(28% of total)
17%
2%
8%
Fuel production Hydrogen CO₂ capture Renewable Airport H₂ Additional Total
production (via (from PSC electricity infrastructure costs of H₂
low-temperature and DAC) (mix of PPA and and battery-
electrolysis) dedicated VRE [mix of electric aircraft
offshore and onshore (compared with
wind and solar PV]) jet aircraft)
Typical entity
for investments Fuel Energy providers Airports Airlines
producers (+ CO₂ capture companies)
Share of total
28% ($1.4 tn) 64% ($3.3 tn) <0.1% 8% (0.4 tn)
investments
they could come from different sources (NCS, BECCS, DACCS, etc.). Totals may not equal sums due to rounding. PPA = Power Purchase Agreement.
2.2.7 Energy prerequisites and requirements
To limit global warming to 1.5°C, the entire energy sector

needs to transition to net-zero GHG emissions in less than
three decades. Renewable electricity, green hydrogen
(based on electrolysis powered by renewable electricity),
and sustainable biomass are three key resources that can
enable this transition (Exhibit 2.12).

EXHIBIT 2.12
Indicative global demand/supply of electricity and hydrogen,
and availability of sustainable biomass
Global electrical supply, TWh Global hydrogen supply, Mt
2020 26,000 7,500 TWh from renewable generation 2020 50
Majority grey hydrogen
2030 35,000 2030 90
2040 70,000 2040 450
2050 90,000–130,000 2050 500–800
Global sustainable biomass constraint, EJ

2050 50–110
Note: Projected indicative global demand/supply of electricity and the current share of renewable electricity. Projected indicative global hydrogen demand
(including grey hydrogen to be replaced with clean sources) and global sustainable biomass availability.
Sources:ETC;
Source: ETC;Our
OurWorld
WorldininData
Data
78
From a global energy systems perspective, the supply of Similar to renewable electricity, current hydrogen production
renewable electricity needs to increase by a factor of 15 by needs to scale by a factor of 10–15 by 2050 and to switch
2050. Besides the replacement of fossil fuel power plants by from grey to clean hydrogen production pathways. First signs
clean electricity, the electrification of road transport, shipping, of a scale-up of electrolyser capacity are emerging. A total
steel, aviation, and other sectors poses an additional demand electrolyser capacity of 150 GW has been announced to get
on top of current levels — either via the direct use of electricity online through 2030,85 and the announced project pipeline
or via hydrogen or hydrogen-derived fuels. The projected is increasing massively in a short time: the pipeline for all
indicative demand for renewable electricity in 2050 (90,000– electrolyser capacity to go online prior to 2040 went up 36%
130,000 TWh) is well below the estimated theoretical maximum between April and November 2021 alone.86 Policymakers
potential for solar and wind electricity alone, which ranks at need to support the sufficient production of clean hydrogen
200,000–1,000,000 TWh, depending on how much land is in the short term to avoid supply constraints. In particular,
made available for electricity generation.79 The corresponding the initially high cost of producing hydrogen via electrolysis
global installed capacity from wind and solar PV ranks at needs to be overcome in this decade, but as with renewable
40–50 TW required to fulfil global demands.80 electricity, there is no theoretical upper limit that would
constrain the use of hydrogen.
Although global installed capacities of solar PV and wind
power ranked at just above 0.7 TW each at the end of 2020, the In contrast, the maximum amount of globally available
annual capacity additions gain in momentum: within the past sustainable biomass is constrained. The exact limits are
decade (2011–20), the installed capacity of solar PV increased debated — a “cautious” scenario estimates a global constraint
by almost a factor of 10.81 This equals a CAGR of 26%, about of about 50 EJ of sustainable biomass (primary energy); the
double the pace that is needed to achieve the 2050 targets.82 maximum potential could be about 110 EJ but is tied to very
In the same period, wind energy increased by a factor of more ambitious assumptions about unlocking additional sustainable
than 3.83 This equals a CAGR of 13%, about the pace needed biomass compared with the cautious scenario (see detailed
to achieve 2050 targets.84 Continuing this trend, the global discussion in the Technical Appendix).87 Many sectors will
installed capacity of solar PV is set to double every two to three demand sustainable biomass in the future — from traditional
years, wind energy every five or six. The supply of sufficient use cases in pulp and paper or wood products to new demands,
renewable electricity generation is a key enabler for the energy such as from the production of chemicals. Although many
transition of many sectors, and short-term supply constraints sectors, like automotive, have alternative technology options,
must be avoided through orchestrated action from energy others, like aviation, do not, particularly in the near term.
providers, investors, and policymakers. However, its supply is Therefore, the use of sustainable biomass should be prioritized
theoretically not constrained. for such sectors.

Fulfilling the energy demand of aviation needs to be planned
EXHIBIT 2.13 in the context of all sectors’ energy and resource demand.
By 2050, aviation could Aviation will be a major competitor for renewable electricity,
demand up to 25% of globally green hydrogen, and sustainable biomass (Exhibit 2.13).
The more biomass the aviation sector can access, the less
available sustainable biomass renewable electricity and hydrogen production capacity it will
require, and vice versa. However, in both net-zero scenarios
BAU PRU ORE
(PRU and ORE), no single feedstock will be sufficient to supply
Renewable electricity generation, TWh/y the total energy demand of the aviation sector in 2050. It will
10,000 need a combination of all.
About 10% of the
8,000 projected global
A. Renewable electricity: 5%–10% of the global demand
electricity demand
6,000 for renewable electricity, i.e., 5,850–9,300 TWh, could
be required to decarbonise aviation. The PtL- and H2-
4,000 dominated ORE scenario thereby ranks on the upper end
of the demand, whereas the PRU scenario has a lower
2,000
electricity but higher biomass demand. Aviation’s demand
for renewable electricity would require an additional
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
installed capacity of about 2.5–4.0 TW of solar PV, onshore,
Hydrogen production, Mt/y and/or offshore wind power — about 5%–10% of the
200 About 20%–30% of projected global installed capacity of solar and wind power.
the projected global
hydrogen demand B. Hydrogen: Aviation will become one of the largest
150
hydrogen-demanding sectors. The PRU scenario will
100 demand 95 Mt of hydrogen by 2050 — a 10%–20% share of
global demand — and the ORE scenario has a higher demand
50 of about 160 Mt of hydrogen, or a 20%–30% share of global
demand, to supply hydrogen- and PtL-powered aircraft.
This demand translates to a required installed electrolyser
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 capacity of about 1.5–2.0 TW.
Captured CO, Mt CO₂/y
C. Biomass: Aviation should be given priority to use
1000
Solid lines sustainable biomass feedstocks. Given the few technological
800 CO₂ demand for alternatives to decarbonise aviation and the comparatively
PtL (PSC and DAC) higher cost of abatement compared with other industries,
600 Dashed lines aviation should be treated as a priority sector for biomass
Include CDR
400 consumption. In the PRU scenario, about 12 EJ primary
volumes on top
biomass energy would be required in 2050 for the production
200 of 220 Mt bio-jet fuel (20 EJ in total when accounting for by-
products). In the ORE scenario, 4 EJ primary biomass energy
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 would be required to produce about 80 Mt bio-jet fuel (7 EJ in
total when accounting for by-products).
Biomass feedstock use, EJ/y
15 About 10%–25% of the In the PRU scenario, 10%–25% of the global sustainable
projected globally available
12 sustainable biomass
biomass feedstock could supply up to 50% of the aviation
sector’s final energy demand in 2050, with the rest being
9 supplied by PtL, hydrogen, or electricity. Decarbonising
aviation without the use of biofuels is hardly imaginable.
6
In any scenario, biofuels will dominate the decarbonisation
3 story of aviation in this decade, and policymakers should
redirect sustainable biomass flows to the sectors most in
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 need. Giving aviation priority over the road transport sector
could be an important first step.
Note: All resources displayed here are only the volumes that end up in jet fuel.
However, SAF plants will produce unavoidable by-products (Exhibit 2.15); therefore
the overall resource inputs to SAF plants will be higher. Finally, the use of waste materials as biomass feedstocks can
Source: MPP analysis have positive side effects. For instance, using municipal solid
waste as a biofuel feedstock could improve local air quality.

D. Aviation will become one of the largest applications for
direct air capture of CO2. The more the aviation sector
relies on PtL, the more CO2 capture technologies will be
required — up to a capacity of 490–730 Mt/y by 2050 (for
jet fuel only — for all product outputs of PtL plants, 800–
1,200 Mt CO2 need to be captured by then). A rapid ramp-up
of CO2 supply for PtL production will require a cross-border
CO2 transport network and/or a marketplace for long-term
CO2 offtake agreements that can decouple CO2 capture
plants from PtL plants.
The required CO2 volumes could stem from direct air capture
(DAC) or point source capture (PSC) of CO2 from natural gas
processing, cement, steel, coal power plants, and others.88
PSC will be required as a bridging technology to kick off PtL
production in the next few years, before DAC is available at
large scales to power PtL production in the future. However,
in the long run, only DAC is an acceptable solution to supply
CO2 for PtL production. EXHIBIT 2.14
A fast ramp-up of DAC
PtL based on PSC should be counted as in-sector
decarbonisation only if the CO2 reduction credit can be
is required to cater to the
claimed 100% by the aviation sector and if no double- CO₂ demand of PtL
claiming (from the fuel producer and the CO2-emitting
Captured CO₂ in ORE scenario (including for by-products
industry) occurs. CO2 reduction credits can be claimed of PtL production), Mt CO₂
by only one party, not both, which has caused reluctance
2,500
from policymakers to allow PtL from PSC-CO2 in the future
Ramp-up of DAC with CAGR
as a potential SAF production pathway. In addition, PSC of 25%, starting with a
2,000
relies on excessive emissions from industrial sources that capacity of 10 Mt/y in 2025
will reduce their emissions over time in a decarbonising
global economy. Therefore, PSC investments should be 1,500
CDR (from NCS,
made in sectors where CO2 emissions will be unavoidable, BECCS, DACCS, etc.)
as in the cement sector, where CO2 is formed not from the 1,000
combustion of fossil fuels but from the manufacture of Point source

capture
cement. In these cases, the PSC appliances will not become 500
Direct air
“stranded assets” if the aviation sector moves 100% to DAC capture
because they will still be needed in the respective sector to
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
get to net zero there.
Note: Indicative PSC/DAC mix of CO2 supply for PtL production plants in the ORE
scenario. CO2 volumes contain the total CO2 demand, including for by-products,
Capturing CO2 from air is projected to be about three times not only what ends up in jet fuel. If the large-scale market entry, and significant
more expensive in the long run (and even more in the near cost decline, of DAC can be achieved earlier than expected, it could take larger
shares of the total CO2 supply in this decade and the next.
term), with $100–$300 per tonne of DAC-CO2 compared
Source: MPP analysis, based on Hanna et al
with $50–$100 per tonne of PSC-CO2.89 Source: MPP analysis, based on Hanna et al.90
Exhibit 2.14 shows the CO2 supply mix (DAC versus E. By-products of SAF production plants can be used to
PSC) in the PtL-dominated ORE scenario. To cater to decarbonise other sectors. New SAF production facilities
the CO2 demand for PtL production within aviation, DAC should maximize the product slate of jet fuel, that is, the
technologies need to be ramped up at a CAGR of roughly share of jet fuel being produced in contrast to other by-
25% to meet the full demand by 2050. In the near term, products, such as diesel/gasoline or light ends (liquefied
lower-cost PSC can kick-start the market entry of PtL. petroleum gas, naphtha). By-products will not always be
Because of these early investments in PSC facilities, they completely avoidable, but they can help decarbonise other
remain in the CO2 supply mix until 2050 but will be replaced sectors (Exhibit 2.15). Off-takers for diesel/gasoline could
by 2050 at the latest to get to real net zero within the include trucking. Off-takers for light ends could include
aviation sector. If DAC scales faster, it could phase out PSC the chemical industry — to produce olefins, which are the
already in the 2040s. precursor monomers for plastics.

EXHIBIT 2.15
By-products of SAF production could find potential off-takers
in the trucking and chemicals sectors
By-products of SAF plants, Mt of yearly production volumes (average of PRU and ORE scenarios)
579
Light ends (e.g., naphtha) 554
Diesel/gasoline 93
91
Jet fuel
376 136 128
56
98
188 350
336
85 57 222
34 106
47
2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Projected energy demand in trucking vs. diesel by-product Projected demand of light ends in the chemicals
volumes from SAF production in 2050, Mt diesel-equivalent sector vs. by-product volumes from
SAF production in 2050, Mt naphtha-eq.
Trucking Aviation Chemicals sector Aviation
580–660
Possible Possible
525–600
situation 1 situation 2
170–280
175–200
~130
~90
0
Total energy ... of which ... of which expected Diesel by-product Total ... of which Light end
demand expected diesel demand for volumes from light ends expected by-product
diesel demand a 100% phaseout SAF production demand demand from volumes from
of ICEVs fossil sources SAF production
Possible situation 1 Possible situation 2 By 2050, the chemicals sector could have a demand for light
ends (naphtha, propane [LPG], and ethane) of up to 600 Mt.
By 2050, the diesel by- In a scenario where the whole trucking
product volumes from SAF sector switches to electricity/hydrogen, the Thereof, about 175–200 Mt could still be derived from
production could fulfill diesel by-product from SAF production fossil fuels.
45%–75% of the expected would have no demand. SAF producers By-products from SAF production could
diesel demand from trucking. could, however, tailor their fuel synthesis decarbonise roughly 45%–50% of this demand.
In such a scenario, diesel processes to avoid diesel as by-products.
would still be used in mining In this scenario, a higher specificity of fuel
vehicles and long-distance, production processes towards jet fuel as Note: ICEV = internal combustion engine vehicle. Totals may not equal
heavy-duty trucks by 2050. product would be beneficial. sums due to rounding.
Source: MPP
Source: MPP analysis,
analysis, based
based on
on IEA;
IEA; MPP
MPP Trucking
TruckingTransition
TransitionStrategy;
Strategy;SYSTEMIQ
SYSTEMIQanalysis
analysis
91
F. CDR solutions are necessary to neutralise residual be required to achieve net zero. At an average cost of about
emissions. In both net-zero scenarios, residual emissions $125/t CO2,92 CDR solutions will incur additional annual
from SAFs, hydrogen, and battery-electric aircraft (75%– costs of about $15 billion–$18 billion in 2050 and after. To
95% GHG reduction potential compared with fossil jet fuel achieve these required CDR volumes and the project price
use) of about 0.12–0.14 Gt CO2e will remain by 2050. Annual points by 2050, increased investments into high-quality
removals of these residual emissions even beyond 2050 will CDR solutions are needed already in this decade.
xvii The additional capital investments for CDR are not included in the investment figures shown in this report.

PART 3
CONCLUSION: From strategic

thinking to action in this decade
In the Glasgow CIimate Pact, agreed in 2021, the parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) recognize “that limiting global warming to
1.5°C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global
greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon
dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010
level”.93 They add that this will require accelerated action this
decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge.
Although the aviation sector is not expected to contribute

to this goal as much as easier-to-abate sectors, the aviation
value chain, policymakers, and financial institutions should
start on the path towards a net-zero aviation sector now. The
following two sections highlight (1) key milestones that should
be achieved until 2030, and (2) what key policy, industry, and
finance actions can bring about these milestones.
3.1 Key milestones until 2030

The commercialisation of SAFs until 2030 is the decisive
task to achieve carbon-neutral growth by 2030 and to lay
the foundation for net-zero aviation by 2050 (Exhibit 3.1).
SAF production volumes need to be increased by a factor of
5–6 compared with the current project pipeline until 2030.
Given this lead time, decisions need to be made now.
In this decade, $40 billion–$50 billion of annual investments

(foremost in SAF production plants and corresponding
upstream infrastructure) would be sufficient to meet the
estimated demand of about 40–50 Mt by 2030. Of these
investments, $20 billion–$25 billion would be required for SAF
plants, and $10–$20 billion upstream for renewable electricity
generation, hydrogen production, and CO2 capture. Even if the
demand for hydrogen and PtL will accelerate to scale only after
2030, policymakers need to set ambitious renewable expansion
targets now to meet the future clean electricity demand in
the 2030s and ’40s. Investments into SAFs and hydrogen,
hybrid, or battery-electric aircraft should be accompanied
by infrastructure investments at airports and in the upstream
supply chain and need to be planned within the next few years.

EXHIBIT 3.1
Key milestones for 2025 and 2030: Kicking off the transition
to net zero within this decade is crucial
Key milestones by 2025 Key milestones by 2030
17–22 Mt SAF production volumes 42–51 Mt SAF production volumes (EU blending
(EU blending mandate: ~2 Mt) mandate and US SAF Grand Challenge: ~14 Mt)
SAF ramp-up 150–160 SAF plants or repurposing of existing 310–390 SAF plants, or repurposing of existing
HEFA/ethanol plants HEFA/ethanol plants
$35 billion–$50 billion of annual investments $45 billion–$50 billion of annual investments
in SAF plants and upstream assets in SAF plants and upstream assets
20–40 GW of dedicated electrolyser capacity 50–100 GW of dedicated electrolyser capacity
35–75 GW of dedicated installed capacity 100–200 GW of dedicated installed capacity

for renewable electricity generation for renewable electricity generation
Upstream energy
infrastructure
0.7–0.8 EJ/y of sustainable biomass directed 1.6–1.8 EJ/y of sustainable biomass directed
to the aviation sector to the aviation sector
10–20 Mt of annual CO2 capture capacity 25–50 Mt of annual CO2 capture capacity
for PtL production for PtL production
Battery-electric and hydrogen aircraft

First commercial scale PtL plant online
enter test phase
TRLs
Novel SAF production pathways certified
3.2 Policy, industry, and finance action

to achieve 2030 milestones
Policymakers, industry leaders, and financial institutions can
make the transition of global aviation to net zero a success
story by addressing three major challenges in this decade:xviii
1. A lack of demand for SAFs due to their high cost differential

compared with fossil jet fuel
2. The first-mover risk of investing into first- and second-of-

a-kind (FOAK and SOAK) SAF production plants because of
their low TRL
3. The sufficient availability of sustainable resources to

produce SAFs
To overcome these challenges, policymakers, industry leaders,

financial institutions, and customers need to act hand in glove
(see high-level overview in Exhibit 3.2).
xviii This section focuses primarily on SAFs since they are responsible for about 75%–90% of cumulative GHG emission reductions from all renewable fuels between 2022
and 2050. However, similar challenges as well as policy, industry, and finance actions are required to spur innovation and the market entry for novel propulsion air-
craft. Additionally, fuel efficiency improvements, demand reduction measures, and the promotion of CDR solutions are essential in order to complement the portfolio
of decarbonisation solutions. All levers need to be pulled to master the transition of global aviation to net zero.

EXHIBIT 3.2
The three key challenges that need to be overcome to kick off the
transition to net zero: Lack of demand for SAFs, high investment risk,
and availability of sustainable feedstock
s
er
Fi ry
Cu e
om
nc
st
y
lic
st
du
na
Po
In
Problem statement High-potential solutions Examples
DEMAND
High cost Make SAFs cheaper (subsidies to •SAF blender’s tax credits by
differential support R&D and scale-up) United States
between SAFs and
•Public–private partnership
fossil jet fuel Make fossil jet fuel more
“Clean Aviation” to promote
expensive (carbon price)
energy efficiency (initiated
by European Commission)
Promote efficiency measures
to reduce energy demand
Lack of demand Create voluntary demand signals •Offtake agreements among airlines,
for SAFs via offtake agreements large corporations, and SAF producers
•First Movers Coalition (led by United
Mandate blending rates for SAFs or GHG intensity
States)
reduction pathway via legal emission limits (in GHG/RPK)
•Proposed SAF blending mandate by
Establish green public European Commission (ReFuelEU
procurement Aviation policy proposal)
SUPPLY
Low TRL, high Support R&D •PtL FOAK plant funding in

uncertainty, little Germany
experience • PtL development via SAF+
Create industry
consortium
consortia to share risk
High investment Encourage climate-aligned •Capital grants for FOAK SAF plants in
risk for FOAK and investments United States
SOAK SAF plants •Climate-aligned investment
De-risk FOAK projects via
principles similar to Poseidon
public–private partnerships
Principles for shipping
De-risk SAF plants via cross-sectoral diversification (e.g.,
joint production of jet fuel, diesel, and naphtha for
aviation, trucking, and chemicals sectors in SAF plants)
FEEDSTOCK AVAILABILITY
Limited availabili- Prioritise feedstock for aviation (e.g., via triggering shift •Plans within UK’s Decarbonisation
ty of sustainable of biodiesel production for road transport to bio-jet fuel Road-Map for aviation
biomass production)
High demand for Bring down costs of renewable electricity, hydrogen, •“Hydrogen Shot” by U.S. Department
renewable and captured CO2 (foremost DAC) of Energy (to reduce H₂ costs to
electricity, $1/kg by 2030)
hydrogen, and Enable cross-value chain partnerships
•Partnership between ArcelorMittal
carbon capture (e.g., via power purchase agreements)
and LanzaTech (CO captured at steel
plants used for SAF production)
Note: Lists of potential solutions and examples are non-exhaustive.
Source:
Source: MPP
MPP schematic,
schematic, based
based on
on Sustainable
Sustainable Aviation;
Aviation; European
European Commission;
Commission; First
First Movers
Movers Coalition;
Coalition; 117th
117thUS
USCongress;
Congress;Clean
CleanAviation
AviationJoint
JointUndertaking;
Undertaking;Federal
Federal
Ministry
Ministry for
for Digital
Digital and
and Transport
Transport of
of Germany
Germany (BMVI);
(BMVI); Brandt
Brandt et
et al.;
al.; Poseidon
Poseidon Principles;
Principles; US
US Department
Department of of Energy;
Energy;ArcelorMittal
94
ArcelorMittal

Additional costs from this transition should always be measured Chicago Convention.95,xix For decades, this created unfavourable
against the value they create — in terms of climate change conditions for the introduction of low-carbon technologies.
mitigation, local air quality improvements, noise reduction,
national/regional energy security, and job creation. SAFs can currently only be produced at 2–5x the cost of the
average historical fossil jet fuel price, but policymakers could
3.2.1 Key policy actions in this decade trigger a reduction of this cost by about 10%–20% in this decade
through a combination of supply and demand measures as
Decisive policy action will be needed to create a level playing well as by ensuring feedstock sustainability and through other
field between fossil jet fuel and SAFs, ideally on a global level enabling measures. A tailored and robust set of policies will be
to avoid regional market distortions. Fossil jet fuel has been required to support the market entry of SAFs (Exhibit 3.3).
tax exempt since 1944, triggered by Article 24 of the ICAO’s
xix Per se, the Chicago Convention does not allow the taxation of “fuel […] on board an aircraft […] on arrival in the territory of a contracting State” — it does not prohibit
countries from taxing jet fuel sold to aircraft operators in a country.

EXHIBIT 3.3
Key policy measures to reduce Key aspects of policies

Reduces cost Reduces
the first-mover risk and the cost differential between first-mover risk
of renewable fuels SAF and fossil jet fuel
Ensure Create minimum GHG

feedstock reduction standards for SAFs
sustainability
Stimulate sustainable feedstock

Increase production and processing
sustainable
feedstock
availability Prioritize feedstock for SAF and
optimize fuel plant production slates
Grow SAF
supply
Support SAF Support the scale-up of
capacity higher TRL SAF pathways
Increase SAF scale-up
production
capacity Fund and promote RD&D
Bring new SAF
pathways to
market
De-risk first-of-a-kind
SAF production plants
Establish Mandate use of SAF or

mandatory reduction of GHG intensity
mechanisms
Reduce SAF
price for users Set up direct subsidies
Stimulate
for SAFs
SAF demand Establish
market-based
mechanisms Increase price Set up indirect subsidies
of SAF for SAFs
alternatives
Increase cost of fossil jet
Establish
fuel
voluntary
mechanisms
Include SAF in public
procurement
Create a marketplace
for SAF
Stimulate
Enable SAF SAF trade
supply and Ease SAF-related trade
demand
connection
Harmonise SAF
certification
Others, e.g., capacity

building
Note: Policy measures to reduce the cost differential of SAFs against fossil jet fuel and the first-mover risk of financial institutions investing in and airlines purchasing SAFs.
Most policy measures are also applicable to hydrogen and battery-electric aircraft.
Source: Detailed policy overview of CST/ETC, Clean Skies for Tomorrow

Source: Detailed policy overview of CST/ETC, Clean Skies for Tomorrow96

Based on the generic overview of potential SAF-related policies
in Exhibit 3.3, a few key milestones in this decade are derived in
more detail:
A. The ICAO should set global CO2 standards.
The ICAO has already demonstrated the feasibility of a

long-term aspirational goal (LTAG) to reduce emissions in
international aviation.97 Governments should now act upon
this assessment and adopt an LTAG, e.g., in the form of a
GHG intensity reduction pathway (like the GHG-per-RPK
pathway shown in Exhibit 2.8) or SAF usage targets. The
adoption of an LTAG could strengthen CORSIA and provide
the long-term planning security that is currently lacking for
hesitant investors.
B. Policymakers should reduce the first-mover risk by:
• Stimulating demand via blending mandates (like that

proposed by the European Commission98,xx) — ideally
with at least 5%–7% SAF share on aviation’s final energy
demand by 2025, 10%–15% by 2030, about 30%
by 2035, 60%–65% by 2040, and 95%–100% from
2045 on. Such blending mandate levels could cover • Redirecting existing SAF supply capacities from road
the full required SAF supply indicated in the two net- transport to the aviation sector by revising policies that
zero scenarios of this report. In general, SAF blending favour the production of ground transportation fuels like
mandates can be based on SAF volumes or carbon biodiesel, and unlocking additional sustainable biomass
intensity reductions for uplifted fuel. volumes for the production of SAF.
• Stimulating demand via direct or indirect subsidies for • Ensuring the recognition of SAFs under regional and
SAFs, e.g., tax incentives for SAF offtakers, producers, or global GHG reduction schemes (e.g., EU ETS, CORSIA)
blenders. while ensuring that double counting is avoided.
• Stimulating demand via green public procurement (such C. Policymakers can bridge the cost differential of SAFs and
as the US government using its scale to achieve certain fossil jet fuel by:
climate targets, e.g., 100% clean road transport for its
own fleet in advance of nationwide timelines99). • Establishing market mechanisms that appropriately price
in the cost of GHG emissions from the use of fossil jet fuel
• De-risking private investments to scale SAF production at about $100–$200 per tonne of CO2e (e.g., by taxing
through public–private partnerships (like the Jet Zero fossil jet fuel, as discussed by the European Commission
Council, convened by the UK government to scale in its ReFuelEU Aviation policy proposal,104 while avoiding
sustainable aviation solutions100) and blended finance competitive market distortions)
(like the Catalyst Program by Breakthrough Energy101 ).
• Reinvesting the revenues from carbon pricing
• Supporting RD&D and providing long-term planning mechanisms into SAF projects
security for new SAF production pathways for at least 10
years to enter the market (like the German PtL funding • Providing direct subsidies for FOAK and SOAK SAF
for 10 years102) and for novel propulsion technologies plants, e.g., via fiscal incentives (like tax credits in the
(like the FlyZero program by the Aerospace Technology United States105) or capital grants,106 while ensuring
Institute103). technology neutrality
xx Individual EU countries like Sweden and Finland are discussing even higher targets (30% SAF by 2030) than proposed in the ReFuelEU Aviation proposal. See Airlines
for Europe (A4E), Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), European Regions Airline Association (ERA), Airports Council International-Europe (ACI), and
Aerospace & Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), Destination 2050: A Route to Net Zero European Aviation, February 2021.

3.2.2 Key industry actions in this decade
To achieve a fast scale-up of SAFs, initiatives of individual value

chain actors need to be actioned in concert. Therefore, industry
leaders should combine demand and supply measures.
A. Demand for SAFs can be spurred by offtake agreements

between:
• Airlines and large corporations (e.g., among Microsoft,

KLM, and Delta Air Lines107)
• Fuel suppliers and large corporations (e.g., the Board

Now program by SkyNRG108).
• Fuel suppliers and airlines (see list by Commercial Avia-

tion Alternative Fuels Initiative109)
• Aircraft manufacturers and corporations (like offtake

agreements between DHL and Eviation or UPS, Amazon,
and Beta Technologies for battery-electric aircraft110)
Twenty-one Mt of SAF are currently under offtake agreements,

spanning durations between six months and 20 years.111 From
that volume, almost 40% (9 Mt) were announced in 2021 and
30% (6 Mt) in the first half of 2022 — showing the momentum
of this kind of demand–supply cooperation — and initiatives like
the First Movers Coalition are pooling voluntary demand for
decarbonisation solutions across multiple sectors.112
Furthermore, CST is developing an industry-backed SAF

certificate system to accelerate the scale-up of SAF and enable
a book-and-claim system for global SAF trade. In November
2021, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) • Additionally, the electrification of cars could free up 10%
launched a book-and-claim pilot with Air bp, United Airlines, of global bioethanol supply (9 Mt). If it were redirected
and Microsoft.113 A separate CST report on that topic will be from road transport to aviation, an additional 7 Mt of SAF
published later this year. A global book-and-claim system would could be produced by 2030.
need to be coordinated with national regulations, e.g., if different
participating countries have different taxation schemes. National Industry consortia can expedite the supply of SAFs.
book-and-claim systems could kick off this kind of system and
provide important insights into how a global book-and-claim • Industry stakeholders including airlines, airports, manu-
system could work. facturers, fuel producers, and other entities can share the
risk of the supply ramp-up of technologies that are not
B. Supply of SAFs can be increased via a variety of actions yet proven at scale. Such industry collaboration can ben-
efit from standardisation, pooling of expertise, and econ-
Sustainable biomass should be redirected to the aviation omies of scale in order to de-risk sustainable aviation
sector. projects. The SAF+ Consortium, for instance, consisting
of an OEM, an airline, an airport, a chemical company,
• Triggered by revised biofuel policies, existing HEFA academic institutions, and others, aims to bring PtL to
plants could reduce their diesel output in favour of jet the North American market by 2026.114 Similar initiatives
fuel. A doubling of their jet fuel share to 36% of the could de-risk other low-TRL technologies.
total product output could unlock an additional 7 Mt of
jet fuel by 2030. Increasing the jet fuel fraction to the • Collaboration between certification authorities and SAF
technical maximum of 55% would unlock about 15 Mt in producers could expedite the certification time of new
total by 2030. fuel types, which has historically been about four years.115

3.2.3 Key finance actions in this
decade
Essential elements
EXHIBIT 3.4
The enormous market opportunities of SAFs, with a global
volume of up to $400 billion by 2050, have started to raise of climate-aligned
attention from capital providers. A variety of interventions
by financial institutions can accelerate the capital flow to investment principles
SAF production at the scale needed to achieve the 2030 100% 1.5°C-alignment until 2030
milestones (Exhibit 3.1) — of which two essential actions are By 2030, banks, institutional investors, and public-sector
highlighted ahead. banks commit 100% of their investments to infrastructure
assets and companies that comply with 1.5°C targets (similar
A. Climate-aligned investment principles are required to to Poseidon Principles in shipping).
unlock the race to the top. Investment principle requirements
In collaboration with the financial sector, investment
Capital providers (banks, institutional investors, public- principles are established until 2023 to define sustainability
sector banks) should invest only in the 50% most ambitious (and in particular decarbonisation) criteria for infrastructure
companies and infrastructure projects. Climate-aligned assets, companies, and financial institutions’ aviation- and
investment principles similar to the Poseidon Principles in fuel-related portfolios.
the shipping sector116 can create clarity and transparency on
what companies and projects are investable and what are Encourage an engagement of investors and industry
corporations
not in line with net-zero and 1.5°C targets (Exhibit 3.4).
•To incentivize and facilitate 1.5°C-aligned
target-setting
•To develop best practices of new financing
instruments tailored to make projects related to
SAFs, efficiency measures, and novel propulsion
aircraft investable
• To develop quantitative analyses on ways to
de-risk such projects for financial institutions.
Mandate beneficiaries of any form of climate-aligned

finance to disclose annual metrics to track their
progress on decarbonisation targets.
Include exclusion criteria to trigger divestments

from non-1.5°C-aligned assets and companies, e.g.,
banks do not provide loans to aviation companies
that do not meet minimum 1.5°C-aligned criteria by
2030.
Include inclusion criteria (e.g., existing target to

reduce GHG intensity per RPK by 20%–25% until
2030 for airlines, or a commitment to use 10%–15%
SAF by 2030 for airlines and corporate customers,
or the target of min. 85% GHG reduction compared
with fossil jet fuel for a new SAF plant) to trigger new
investments in 1.5°C-aligned assets and companies.

B. Novel technologies need to be de-risked via public– • Breakthrough Energy has identified SAFs as one of four
private partnerships. focus areas of its Catalyst Program.117 More initiatives
like that are required in order to de-risk investments and
Depending on the maturity of the technology and the size guarantee the capital flows needed for more than 300
of a company, different sources of capital and different new SAF production plants by 2030.
financing instruments are best suited to enable new
investments into low-carbon technologies like FOAK and • In the same manner, a partnership between the Euro-
SOAK SAF plants (Exhibit 3.5). pean Commission and industry intends to spur innova-
tion for hydrogen and hybrid-electric aircraft as well as
Two examples of public–private partnerships to scale SAFs efficient propulsion systems via supporting R&D with
and novel propulsion aircraft are: €4.1 billion over the next decade (€1.7 billion covered by
Horizon Europe, €2.4 billion by industry).118
EXHIBIT 3.5
Financing mechanisms for low-carbon technologies differ for
individual decarbonisation levers
Large Accelerate current efforts
enterprises Hydrogen OEMs and engine
combustion manufacturers (to • Institutional investors to
aircraft produce more efficient provide green bonds
manufacturers jet aircraft) •Banks to provide green
loans for projects
HEFA
Innovate alongside Accelerate producers
existing portfolio current efforts
Mature technology and

reduce costs and risks
•Consortium of capital
providers to share risk
•Public-sector banks to
de-risk projects, e.g., via
Advanced biofuel anchored blended finance,
Mature technology and producers concessional loans,
reduce costs and risks low-interest loans, capital
grants, or long-term
guarantees
Power-to-Liquids Grow
business • Insurers to insure the risk
producers
of uncertain technological
development, e.g., the risk
of SAF producers not being
able to produce at a certain
Hydrogen fuel cell and
SAF price point by 2030 to
battery-electric aircraft
Small and de-risk offtake agreements
manufacturers
medium-sized
enterprises
Low technological High technological

maturity maturity
Note: Ideal financing mechanisms depend on technology maturity and company size. Over time, growing corporations deploying maturing technologies will demand
different financing instruments.

The way FORWARD
The aviation industry has laid out its ambition to get to their partners aim to develop quantitative tools (1) to reduce
net zero by 2050, and has buy-in from a broad range uncertainties around the capital requirements for FOAK and
of stakeholders. Now, the onus is on decision makers to SOAK SAF plants, and (2) to better understand how to kick off
navigate the green transition in the context of their own real-world projects, for instance by identifying mismatches
circumstances. The global scenarios presented in this report between the perceived and real risk for investors, and by
need to be broken down by region. Transition strategies need to quantifying the impact of individual policies and investment
be drafted and brought to action, tailored to regional resource decisions on the cost differential of low-carbon technologies
availabilities, local technological innovation, and national vis-à-vis fossil jet fuel. Furthermore, CST is already developing a
policy options. Securing a just transition and an equitable book-and-claim system and a SAF registry to enable the large-
distribution of the green premium of sustainable flights will scale coupling of SAF supply and demand in the future.
be key. Public–private partnerships are one of many solutions
to ensure an economically, ecologically, and socially viable, The MPP Aviation Transition Strategy demonstrates that
just, and successful transition to climate neutrality by 2050. SAF costs are likely to decline rapidly if the right incentives
CST and MPP can drive the transition through their convening are put in place now. Together with efficiency gains and
power across the whole aviation value chain and including the deployment of new propulsion technologies, the cost
policymakers and financial institutions. Building upon the of flying could remain at 2019 levels and not increase. New
2030 milestones in the last section of this report, CST and MPP technologies will additionally offer new market opportunities:
will connect the dots among industry, policy, and finance via for example, regional battery-electric aircraft can unlock
workshops, quantitative analyses, and other formats. new routes and enable higher connectivity between cities.
By working together, the aviation industry can master this
The first-mover risk needs to be transformed to a first-mover transition. Already, it brings together people from around the
advantage so that success stories can empower hesitant actors globe, connects families, and enables the sharing of cultures,
to follow pioneers. De-risking investments in clean technologies perspectives, and ideas. Flight is arguably one of the great
and providing real-world proof points that their initially high technological achievements of humankind, and the industry
costs can be reduced rapidly in only a few years will be critical has the creative and technical resources to reinvent itself.
ingredients of a successful takeoff of this transition to make To get there, it needs decisive leadership from companies,
climate-neutral aviation the new normal. By working hand in governments, and financial institutions, and dedication to
glove with their broad stakeholder community, CST, MPP, and delivering a sustainable future for the industry and the planet.

GLOSSARY
AFOLU Agriculture, forestry, and other land use LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
AIC Aviation-induced cloudiness LTAG Long-term aspirational goal
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials LTO Landing and takeoff
ATAG Air Transport Action Group MPP Mission Possible Partnership
AtJ Alcohol-to-Jet MSW Municipal solid waste
ATM Air traffic management Mt Megatonne
ATS Aviation Transition Strategy MWh Megawatt-hour
BAU Business as Usual mW/m2 Milliwatts per square metre
BECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage NCS Natural climate solutions
CAGR Compound annual growth rate NOx Nitrogen oxides
CCUS Carbon capture, utilisation, and storage OEM Original equipment manufacturer
CDR Carbon dioxide removals ORE Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario
CO2 Carbon dioxide PPA Power purchase agreement
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent PRU Prudent scenario
CORSIA Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme PSC Point source capture
for International Aviation PtL Power-to-Liquids
CST Clean Skies for Tomorrow initiative PV Photovoltaic
DAC Direct air capture R&D Research and development
DACCS Direct air carbon capture and storage RD&D Research, development, and demonstration
EJ Exajoule RPK Revenue passenger kilometre
ETC Energy Transitions Commission RSB Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials
eVTOL  Electric vertical takeoff and landing SAF Sustainable Aviation Fuel
FOGs Fats, oils, and greases SBTi Science Based Targets initiative
FOAK First of a kind SOAK Second of a kind
GDP Gross domestic product SPK Synthetic paraffinic kerosene
G/FT Gasification/Fischer-Tropsch TCO Total cost of ownership
GHG Greenhouse gas, expressed in CO2e t CO2 Tonne carbon dioxide
(carbon dioxide equivalent) TRL Technology readiness level
Gt Gigatonne TTW Tank-to-wake, covers Scope 1 emissions from jet fuel 
HEFA Hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids TTZ Target True Zero initiative
IATA International Air Transport Association TW Terawatt
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization TWh Terawatt-hour
ICEV Internal combustion engine vehicle UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention
IEA International Energy Agency on Climate Change
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WTT Well-to-tank, covers Scope 3 emissions from jet fuel 
ICCT International Council on Clean Transportation WTW Well-to-wake, covers full value chain
LCOE Levelised cost of renewable electricity of jet fuel emissions

ENDNOTES
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https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/Avia-
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MAKING NET-ZERO

AVIATION TRANSITION STRATEGY / JULY 2022

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 1

The Mission Possible Partnership

Catalysing these changes is the goal of the Mission Possible

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 2

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 3

1. ACI 35. IAG

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 4

This report was prepared by the Mission Possible Partnership

Lauren Uppink (World Economic Forum, MPP Aviation Sector Lead)

The coordination of the report, analysis,

Maximilian Held (ETC)

and supported by:

Elena Gerasimova (McKinsey)

The model and analytics effort was led

Andrea Bath (ETC)

Steering and guidance were provided

Faustine Delasalle (Executive Director, MPP)

We thank Carlos Agnes, Kash Burchett, Henry Gilks, Alasdair

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 5

Mission Possible Partnership (MPP) Clean Skies for Tomorrow (CST)

World Economic Forum

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 6

1. Decarbonising aviation: Challenges and solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2. Achieving net zero: Possible trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3. Conclusion: From strategic thinking to action in this decade . . . . . . . . . 60

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 7

ELEVEN critical insights

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Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 9

Optimistic Renewable Electricity scenario

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 10

Additional reduction ICAO’s CORSIA

Unconstrained Historical Additional Sustainable Remaining Behaviour Remaining

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 11

0.4–0.5 Gt CO₂e emissions reduction CDR is

Unconstrained Historical Additional efficiency SAFs, hydrogen, Carbon

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 12

1.8 1.5°C carbon

Cumulative GHG emissions

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 13

36%–49%: Renewable electricity generation

2022–29: Smaller 2022–50: Larger annual

Source: MPP analysis

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 14

in that year. Source: MPP analysis

5. The faster the cost decline in renewable electricity

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 15

Battery-electric Hydrogen SAFs

Efficiency of fuel production ~60% ~25% ~15%

Share of cumulative GHG

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 16

Making Net-Zero Aviation Possible PAGE 17

2 x23 x20 x20

Share of maximum Share of global Share of global

OPTIMISTIC RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY SCENARIO

2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050

Share of maximum Share of global Share of global

Source: MPP analysis

milestones in this decade •To incentivise and facilitate 1.5°C-aligned