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The Expression Theory Again

Article  in  Theoria · February 2008

DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1986.tb00107.x

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Stephen Davies, Philosophy, University of Auckland

Important note: This is a final draft and differs from the definitive version, which is published
in Theoria, 52 (1986): 146-167. I have been assured by the University of Auckland's research
office that if they have made this publicly available then it does not violate the publisher's
copyright rules.

"The Expression Theory Again"

In this paper I discuss a version of the Expression Theory of art. My aim is not to dwell
upon the objections faced by this version of the theory, although the criticisms which it invites
are both obvious and fatal. Rather, my concern is to explain the theory's attractiveness. Or
perhaps I should say that my aim is to explain away the prima facie attractiveness of the
theory, for my approach is not a sympathetic one. The initial plausibility of the theory, rather
than hinting at a novel but important truth lying at the theory's heart, arises instead from a
natural but mistaken characterisation of the relationship between artists' feelings and the
expressive properties or powers of the works of art they create.
* * * * * * *
Many views have gone under the name "Expression Theory". Three types of so-called
Expression Theory are not relevant to my discussion. I am not here concerned with attempts to
define the meaning of "art" in terms of the expression of emotions (see Tolstoy, [1898] 1962).
Nor am I concerned with views the point of which is to insist that expressive properties,
qualities, features or powers can be predicated truly of works of art (see Sircello, 1965 & 1972).
Nor am I interested in views the point of which is to claim that there need be nothing odd nor
anything aesthetically illegitmate in a person's respon- ding emotionally to works of art (see
Elliot, 1966-67). Views of the last two types do not deserve the title of "theory" since they testify
to the facts which stand in need of explanation without attempting to provide that explanation.
(The facts mentioned are these - that art is expressive of emotion in some way which typically
gives rise to an emotional response. Not that aesthetic theory does not face obvious problems
in accounting for the rationality of such responses - see Davies, 1983 A.)
The version of the Expression Theory with which I am concerned is one which explains
art's expressiveness as arising from artists' expressing their concurrent emotions or feelings in
the production of art. The emotions read off from works of art are recognised and responded
to as those of their creators; that is, they are recognised as emotions felt by artists and given
expression through the act of creation. On this view, one can read off an artist's feelings from
his or her art just as one can read off a person's sadness from his or her tears. The audience's
emotional response to the expressiveness of an artwork is a response to that work as
expressing emotions felt by its creator at the time of creation. That is, in its expressiveness an
artwork reveals its creator's feelings and is responded to as doing so. The emotions expressed
in an artwork, rather than being consciously and coolly designed into the artwork by its artist
at a time of calm concentration, are somehow poured or discharged into the artwork during its
creation.I1_ On this view artists express in their works emotions, feelings, moods or attitudes,
rather than expressing ideas, suppositions or beliefs.I2_ That is to say, in the theory here under
consideration, the expression of emotion in art is thought not to be compared usefully to the
expression of thought in words, although some theorists might talk loosely of art as a
'language' with which artists 'communicate' with their audiences.
It might be objected that the version of the Expression Theory which I have chosen to
discuss is an unacceptably crude example of the theory. More sophisticated versions of the
theory appreciate and attempt to avoid the power- ful difficulties faced by the theory I have
characterised. To this objection I reply as follows: The version of the theory I discuss is its
AUr_-form; other versions are sophistications upon this proto-theory in that they attempt to
preserve its spirit whilst modifying it in a way which attempts to meet the difficulties which
threaten it. It is not unfair of me to concentrate on the Ur-theory because my concern does not
lie with the objections which it faces and, so, does not lie with the success or otherwise of
attempts to meet these objections. Rather, I am interested in the undoubted appeal of the
proto- theory. My aim is to show that appeal to be spurious. Indirectly then, I hope also to
show that the desire to preserve the spirit of the Ur-theory - the desire which motivates the
quest for replies to the objections which the Ur- theory faces - is misguided.
*******
Very briefly, the obvious objections to the Expression Theory here under discussion
amount to this: It is not common for most artists to work creatively under the duress of
emotion. So, as a general account of the creative process, the Expression Theory is mistaken.
And nor does it fare any better as an account of the process involved in the production of
artworks which are expressive of emotion. Artists are no more likely to feel emotion in the
creation of expressive works than in the creation of non-expressive works. Moreover, when
they are emotionally moved and see themselves as pouring their emotions into their creations,
artists may fail to create artworks which are expressive.
Beyond objections on empirical grounds such as those mentioned above, the main line of
critique makes a conceptual point against the Expression Theory. It notes that the theory
supposes that the expressiveness of a process is transmitted to the product which has its
genesis in that process; the theory assumes that the expressiveness of an action will be
apparent in traces left by that action. Such suppositions are neither true in general nor true in
the particular case of an artist's creating a work of art. The Expression Theory wrongly claims
that the expressiveness perceived in artworks stands to their artists' feelings as the
expressiveness of those artists' tears stands to their feelings of sadness. But it is not the case
that artists' feelings can be read off their artworks just as they might be read off their tears; it is
not the case that the expressiveness of works of art is appropriately to be seen as a direct and
visible sign of their artists' feelings (see Bouwsma, 1950; Hospers, 1954-55; Khatchadourian,
1965; Tormey, 1971, Ch.4 and Appendix).
(I mention in passing a further objection which seems to me to be unwarranted. This
objection notes that, as it stands, the Expression Theory does not explain why artists'
expressing their feelings in their art would be valued as the expressiveness of art is valued [see
Todd, 1972, esp p.479]. This objection is unfair in attacking the theory for not considering a
matter which lies, anyway, beyond its immediate remit. The theory purports to explain what it
is for art to be expressive and there is no reason to expect that that explanation must also make
obvious why it is that we attach value to the expressiveness of art as we do. And as a matter of
fact, it is not difficult to see how the theory might be developed to meet the objection - perhaps
the creation of art is especially suited to the expression of important and/or highly specific
feelings which are not easily amenable to description or to other forms of communication.)
*******
As a prelude to considering the appeal of the Expression Theory it is necessary that I
distinguish between different types of emotional expressiveness which I will shall call
"primary", "secondary" and "tertiary". Subsequently I will argue that the appeal of the
Expression Theory comes from its recognising that we respond to art as if art were like a
primary expression of emotion, in conjunction with its failing to appreciate that art can be only
a secondary or tertiary expression of artists' feelings.
Some emotions have characteristic forms of expression which I shall call "primary".
Sobbing, for example, is a primary expression of sadness and like emotional states. Primary
expressions occur unintentionally and unreflect- ively. Indeed, these forms of expression may
not be easy to mimic consciously and, where it is known that they are deliberately adopted,
they are seen usually to be merely pretended and not to be expressive of genuine emotions.
Because they are not consciously contrived or adopted, these are forms of expression into
which one falls or to which one gives way. Sad people need not weep and need not always feel
like weeping when they are sad - but Asometimes_ they must feel like weeping when they are
sad, and if they do not then weep it is because they control the impulse to weep which goes
with and is partly constitutive of sadness. The control and suppression of primary expressions
of emotion may be intentional, although their occurrence or tendency to occur is not. Where
one's sadness is extreme a sob may be wrung from one by the force of one's feelings and in
spite of an intention not to show one's feelings. So primary expressions are not expressive in
virtue of their being intended as such. Rather, they are expressive in themselves of the
emotions to which they stand as primary
expressions.
Primary expressions of emotion might reasonably be characterised as "natural". But this
would not be to deny that they are shaped by learning or conditioning. "Ouch" or "ow",
uttered unthinkingly under circumstances in which the utterer had been caused sudden and
unexpected pain, are primary expressions of that pain. But speakers of French under the same
circumstances give primary expression to their pain by saying "ouf" and speakers of other
languages use other vocables for the primary expression of sudden pain. Even the ways in
which we smile or weep might be shaped subtly by cultural practices which differ from group
to group.
Because they are not adopted intentionally and because they betray "inner" states, there
are respects in which primary expressions of emotion are like symptoms (the spots of measles)
or natural signs (the smoke which indicates the presence of fire). In pursuing this comparison
one might come to doubt that Aexpressiveness_ is a notion which applies appropriately to
what I have called "primary expressions". Spots signify or symptomise or betray the presence
of measles, but they do not Aexpress_ measles. So is it wrong to regard tears as expressing
sadness? Some proponents of sophisticated versions of the Expression Theory have argued
that the answer to this question is "yes" because they wished to move away from the idea that
art is expressive as tears are, and in doing so they demoted tears from their apparent status as
expressions of feeling. These writers distinguished between the mere venting of emotion and
the expressing of emotion and they dismissed what I have called "primary expressions" as
mere ventings.I3_
But to pursue the analogy with symptoms and natural signs as far as this conclusion
seems to be absurd - as Wollheim recognises (1966-67, esp pp.231-3; see also Tormey, 1971,
pp.98-102) only philosophers (and only a few of them) would feel uncomfortable in regarding
tears as expressive of grief under the appropriate circumstances. The analogy might be broken
by arguing that tears are constitutive of, and not merely concomitant with, sadness, whereas
symptoms and natural signs are no more than concomitants (see Wollheim, 1964, esp pp.275-7;
1966-67, esp pp.233-8 & 241-4; Tormey, 1971, pp.29-32 & 47-50). (Of course the analogy must
fail somewhere, otherwise it would become a statement of type-identity rather than of
analogy.) Emotions are the sorts of things which are expressed, and diseases or fires are not.
Diseases and fires can be Arepresented_ as can their symptoms and signs; Athoughts_ about
diseases or fires can be Aexpressed_, as can thoughts about their symptoms and signs. But
diseases and fires differ from emotions in not being directly expressible, and tears differ from
symptoms or signs in being direct expressions (under appropriate circumstances) of that
which they betray.
By the "secondary" expression of emotion I mean behaviour which issues from the
emotions felt, but which could not be seen as expressive by someone lacking (independent)
knowledge of the agent's intentions and/or circumstances. Secondary expressions of emotion
may be intentional, though they need not be. They are distinguished from primary expressions
not (always) by virtue of their intentionality but, rather because they are forms of expression
which are not constitutive of the emotions to which they give expression. It is because they are
non-constitutive of the emotions to which they give expression that independent knowledge of
the intentions and/or circumstances is required by those who appreciate those actions as
expressive.
 An example of a secondary expression of a person's emotion would be that of a man who
throws himself into the activity of designing and building a house at a time of grieving for a
dead wife and in response to that grief. Knowing his intentions and circumstances one might
describe the act of building the house as an expression of his grief - as his coming to terms with
his grief, or his burying or turning his back on his grief, or his dissipating the force of his grief
in acion, or his creating a private memento of his loss, or his giving his grief time to subside,
and so on. These are, admittedly, attentuated uses of the notion of expression, but it is not
inappropriate to talk of such activities as expressing the man's grief. But notice that, whilst the
actions and the house itself are expressions of grief to those who understand their motivation,
we would not usually say that the actions or the house are expressive in themselves of grief.
We would say that grief is expressed Athrough_ rather than Ain_ them. This locution
acknowledges the fact that their expressiveness depends upon their being seen as resulting
from certain intentions and/or circumstances.
(Of course, although the secondary expression of emotion is free expression in being
largely unconstrained by conventions and rules, it is not so free that just any behaviour might
become a secondary expression of grief, say, merely as a result of the agent's intending that it
be such. If the man mentioned above hit the high spots with a blonde on his knee intending
(as we happen to know) that this be a secondary expression of his grief, we would not judge
his actions to be such an expression unless there were something special about the
circumstances. We would deny that his actions are at all expressive of grief and would
dismiss his "intention" as no more than a pious hope. Indeed, we might be inclined to doubt
that he feels any grief.)
Tertiary expressions of emotion differ from secondary expressions in that, through their
use of conventions and rituals, they permit the audience to become aware of the agent's
intentions through its experience of the work, rather than via independent sources. That is, the
conventional nature of the actions or of their product is such as to make the intentions of the
agent clear as regards the expressiveness of his or her actions or their products. Of course it is
a condition for tertiary expressiveness that the use of those conventions be both intentional
and sincere. So, if the man mentioned above built, instead of a house, a mausoleum dedicated
to the memory of his dead wife, that mausoleum would be a tertiary expression of his grief
provided that he was sincere about his feelings in expressing them this way. The
commissioning of mausoleums is a conventional expression of grief. And note that, in virtue
of the conventional nature of this form of expression, the man mentioned need not design and
build the mausoleum for himself as a condition of its being a tertiary expression of his grief.
He may commission the design and its execution, taking interest neither in the progress of the
design nor in its execution, without this undermining the status of the mausoleum as an
expression of his grief. He cannot in the same way commission others to cry his tears (as a
primary expression of his grief) for him. (Though he might employ professional mourners,
their tears are a tertiary and not a primary expression of his grief.) Nor, under most
circumstances, can he commission others to give secondary expression to his emotions.
Indifference is evidence of insincerity where a claim to secondary expression is concerned, but
need not be in the case of tertiary expressions. The expressiveness is carried forward by the
conventions in the case of tertiary expressions in a way which obviously is not possible for
secondary expressions.
Of course, once the conventions are established, they can be misused to present the
appearance of an expression of grief where none is felt. Thus, a cynic who has loathed his wife
and rejoices in her death might, as an expensive and private joke, commission a grand
mausoleum dedicated to her memory. Because the established conventions may be used
insincerely as well as sincerely, they can be employed to lie, to stretch the truth, for ironic
effect, and so on.
_ * * * * * * *
 How does the version of the Expression Theory which is under discussion categorise the
expressiveness of art? In maintaining that the expressiveness of art stands to the artists'
feelings as their tears stand to their felt-sadness, the Expression Theory analyses the
expressiveness of art as primary. And the appeal of such a view is obvious. Emotions are
expressed Ain_ primary expressions, whereas (usually) they are expressed only Athrough_
secondary or tertiary expressions, and our experience of the expressiveness of art locates the
feeling in it.I4_ Moreover, the expressiveness of art moves its audience in a way in which
primary, but not secondary or tertiary, expressions of emotions do. Secondary and tertiary
expressions of emotion are indirect, mediated, often formalised types of expression and, as
such, they distance the audience from the emotions which are expressed through them.
Accordingly, secondary and tertiary expressions of emotions seem not to call for an emotional
response from others. By contrast, primary expressions of emotion confront others directly
with the force of the person's feeling and emotional indifference in the face of primary
expressions of emotion is difficult to maintain and, anyway, not appropriate usually. Such
indifference might rightly be seen as callous, for example. Similarly, the expressiveness of
works of art seems to present emotions directly to their audiences and that expressiveness is
highly evocative of emotional responses from members of the audiences. Emotional
indifference to art's expressiveness might properly be seen as evidence of a lack of
appreciation and understanding.
Nevertheless, art seems clearly not to be a primary expression of emotion. The
expressiveness of works of art usually is consciously contrived by their artists which suggests
that, as expressions of artists' feelings, artworks are secondary or tertiary. But even in those
(comparatively rare) cases in which the artist creates an expressive artwork in an unreflective
creative frenzy brought on by his or her emotional feelings, still there are obvious grounds for
hesitating to consider the work as a primary expression of his or her feelings. Primary
expressions are partly constitutive of, and not merely concomitant with, the emotions they
express (see Wollheim, 1964, esp pp.275-7; 1966-67, esp pp.233-8 & 241-4; Tormey, 1971, esp
pp.29-32 & 47-50). Which is why one must teach children the meaning of emotion-words in
connection with the occurrence (or depiction or description) of their primary expressions. But
the expressiveness of works of art seems to be no more than concomitant with the artist's
feeling, even where the emotion expressed in the artwork is the same emotion as that felt by
the artist. Unlike expressiveness which is primary, the expressiveness of the artwork would
not be destroyed were we to learn that the artist had felt nothing during the work's creation, or
that the artist had deliberately contrived the work's expressiveness. That the expressiveness of
art lacks the intimate link with emotion felt by a person which characterises primary
expression is evident in the fact that one could not teach the meaning of emotion-terms to a
child if one's examples all were examples of art in which emotions are expressed (as opposed
to examples of art in which persons are represented or described as giving expression to their
feelings).
A further respect in which the expressiveness of art differs importantly from the primary
expression of emotion deserves comment. As the Expression Theory rightly observes, both the
expressiveness of art and the primary expression of emotion are highly evocative of emotional
responses. But the Expression Theory fails to note a crucial difference in the emotions evoked.
The emotional response called forth by a primary expression of emotion (or by a
representation of such) rarely Amirrors_ the expressed emotion - rather, the response is suited
to the character of the emotion expressed. Thus, sadness invites a compassionate response,
wretchedness invites pity, anger invites fear, and so on. (This remains essentially true where it
is not possible for the response to be acted upon, nor for the response to affect the emotional
context. So, films of the suffering of victims of the concentration camps call forth
compassionate and pitying responses although the responders know perefectly well that the
people filmed are now long past suffering anything.) Whereas the emotions expressed in art
(as opposed to the emotions depicted or described in art) often call forth mirroring responses
(see Hospers, 1954-55, esp p.337; Davies, 1980 & 1983 A; Osborne, 1983). Sad music tends to
evoke sadness; happy music tends to make people feel happy. This suggests clearly, I think,
that we do not respond emotionally to art as a primary expression of artists' feelings.
No doubt it is objections such as these which have led to revisions of the proto-theory
which I have been discussing. Two ways of defending the theory recommend themselves.
Each defence tries to preserve the aim of explaining the expressiveness of art in terms of the
connection between that expressiveness and artists' feelings. And both defences hope to avoid
the problems mentioned above by denying that this connection is like that which holds
between an emotion and its primary expression. According to the one view art is a secondary
or tertiary expression of the artist's feeling and the feeling which is experienced by the
audience as in the artwork is the one felt by the artist. According to the other view art is a
secondary or tertiary expression of the artist's feeling and the feeling which is experienced by
the members of the audience as in the work of art is a projection of their own emotional
response to the work of art as an expression of the artist's feeling.I5_ In either case the
departure from the Ur-theory is likely to be accompanied by "reminders" that emotions cannot
be Ain_ art (except metaphorically), and that "real" expression (such as is found in art) is to be
contrasted with the mere venting of emotion.
The first of these views clearly faces difficulties. Since the audience does not usually
require knowledge, beyond that which is provided by the artwork, of the artist's intentions
before being able to appreciate the work's expressiveness, artworks presumably are tertiary
rather than secondary expressions of their artists' feelings.I6_ But in cases where the work
undeniably is a tertiary expression of the artist's feelings, this fact seems to be irrelevant to an
aesthetic appreciation of the work. Faure wrote his ARequiem_ on his father's death and
(given that his sincerity is not in doubt) it is a tertiary expression of his grief. But it is co-
incidental that it his feelings which are given tertiary expression in the writing of the
ARequiem_. The feelings given tertiary expression might as well have been those of another
person who had commissioned Faure to write a requiem. And, because we would regard the
feelings of the person who commissioned an artwork to be irrelevant to its appreciation, so
Faure's giving tertiary expression to his grief in writing the ARequiem_ is a matter of aesthetic
irrelevance. So, even in those cases where it is at its most plausible, the first theory "explains"
the expressiveness of art at the cost of making that expressiveness aesthetically irrelevant.
Artists may (sometimes) give tertiary expression to their emotions in creating artworks, but
this fact seems not to explain (as the Expression Theory is supposed to do) how artworks are
expressive in themselves, nor how expressiveness in art is aesthetically relevant.
The expressiveness of art which is aesthetically relevant seems not to be conventional as
are tertiary expressions of emotions. I concede readily that there is an element of convention
which plays a part in determining the expressive properties of any work of art. That is, I accept
that the expressive- ness of a property is in part dependent upon the categorisation of the
artwork in which it is instantiated (see Walton, 1970). And I accept (what may not be a
different point) that the expressiveness of a property may depend upon the range of properties
chosen by the artist for his or her use (see Gombrich, 1969 esp ch.12 & 1963, esp pp.257-69;
Tomas [1952] 1962).I7_ But the conventions involved here seem not to be of a quasi-linguistic
variety which have as their point the revelation of a meaning intended by the utterer. Rather,
they seem more like the conventions which operate with respect to primary expressions of
emotion in that they map the ranges of tolerance within which and against which individual
elements are naturally expressive. (So, across a range in which red is naturally brighter and
jollier than violet, green is bright in the context of a range the scope of which extends from
violet to green, and is dull in the context of a range the scope of which extends from red to
green.) To the extent that the expressiveness of primary expressions is taught, being dependent
upon a range of alternatives which is determined, at least in part, by cultural factors, then (to
that extent) primary expressions of emotion are conventional. But that kind of conventionality
is unlike the ordinary, Aarbitrary_ kind of conventionality which characterises tertiary
expressions of emotion.I8_ The conventions of primary expressions serve merely to structure
elements in a way which reveals the potential for expressiveness which is natural to them,
whereas the conventions of tertiary expression are arbitrary in that they can be neither
apposite nor inapposite. And it is the very arbitrariness of tertiary expressions which
encourages the audience to look through and beyond them to the intentions and emotions to
which they give expression. Whereas, and by contrast, the aesthetically relevant conventions of
art focus the audience's attention on the intrinsic properties of the artwork, rather than
directing their attention beyond the artwork to other matters (see Davies, 1983 B). The
conventions of art which are aesthetically relevant are, when appreciated, such as to direct the
audience's attention to qualities of the artwork and not (as are the conventions which make
apparent tertiary expressions of emotion) such as to render the work of art transparent so as to
reveal that which lies behind it. In summary: Art may be no less conventional than is the use of
language which has communication as its aim. But the conventions of art, unlike those which
regulate communication, serve to reveal the contextual significance of elements and not to
reveal the intentions which motivated their arrangement (whether or not such intentions
might be inferred in the appreciation of the arrangement).
The second of the views mentioned above, according to which the expressiveness of art
is a projection of the audience's response to the artist's secondary or tertiary expression of
emotion, also is subject to objections. The notion of projection seems to be implausible, both
because it fails to accommodate the possible (and common) mismatch between what is felt and
what is expressed, and also because it provides no (obvious) way of distinguishing between
appropriate and inappropriate responses occasioned by the artwork.
More to the point, this second view of artistic expressiveness fails in much the way that
the first view fails. The second view explains the expressiveness of art as a projection of the
audience's response to a secondary or tertiary act of expression performed by the artist. Now,
unless this approach can describe the artist's act of expression as aesthetically relevant then
neither can it explain the audience's emotional response as aesthetically relevant. So, this
second revision of the proto-theory must deal with the difficulties which face the first revision,
as well as with those which apply specifically to it.
Thus, the two most obvious ways of attempting to defend the Ur-theory seem to fail. If
they are at all successful in explaining the expressiveness of art, they are successful in
explaining one respect in which art might be expressive, but not in explaining the
expressiveness of art in a way which accounts for the aesthetic relevance and importance of
that expressiveness. Neither the Ur-theory nor its improvements proves to be adequate. The
attractiveness of the Ur-theory lies, I have suggested, in its recognising that we respond to the
expressiveness of artworks as if that expressiveness were primary, and in its recognising that it
is artists who are responsible (if anyone is) for the expressiveness of works of art. The
attempts at revising the theory which I have considered fail both in the attempt to clear
objections from the theory's path and in the attempt to preserve the aesthetic relevance of
audiences' responses to works of art as responses to those works as expressing their artists'
feelings.
The following summary recapitulates the main points of the argument so far. The
Expression Theory is right in seeing the expressiveness of art as aesthetically important but
wrong in seeing the expressiveness as a primary expression of artists' feelings. It is right in
recognising than at audience's response to the expressiveness of art is more like a response to a
primary than to a secondary or tertiary expression of feelings. And it is right in recognising
that the artist is responsible, if anyone is, for the expressiveness of the artwork. Its failure lies
in its attempt to marry these observations. Of course art can be used by artists to express their
feelings, although evidence suggests that this is not common. Where art is so used by artists,
usually the artworks created must be understood as secondary or tertiary expressions of their
artists' feelings. Art which is expressive in this way need not be expressive in itself; a concern
with art as a secondary or tertiary expression of feelings is a concern which leads one away
from, rather than towards, the expressiveness Ain_ the work. So, revisions of the Ur-theory,
which are more convincing in explaining how artworks express their artists' emotions, fail
because they cannot justify the aesthetic relevance of the type of expression which they
characterise.
* * * * * * *
I have suggested that our knowledge of the creative process indicates that artists intend
their artworks to express that which their works do express, that they deliberately design the
expressiveness into their artworks. The techniques by which this is achieved might be applied
automatically, their use having been mastered in the past, or they might be applied with
painstaking calculation. (Mozart often worked in the former way, Beethoven often in the latter,
and Berg sometimes in the one way and sometimes in the other.) How, in non-technical terms,
might works of art be designed to be expressive?
First, the artist might describe or represent a person in a situation which standardly
would lead that person to feel an emotion, and/or to act in a way which can be understood as
their giving expression to their feeling. So, for example, the artist might depict a weeping
woman cradling in her arms a dead, younger man, perhaps her son. Secondly, the artist might
describe, represent or present material which is likely to be associated in the minds of the
audience with the occurrence of some emotion. So, for example, the picture of the woman
holding the dead man might be presented as a Pieta.
Now, although the attribution of properties or states to fictional people or events raises
interesting issues and although it is not perhaps immediately obvious how one would justify
the rationality of emotional responses to the represented emotions of fictional persons (see
Davies, 1983 A), the types of expressiveness mentioned above are not difficult to recognise and
understand. The depicted emotions (or beliefs, or attitudes, or whatever) belong to the fictional
persons who experience and may give expression to them.
Rightly, the Expression Theory notes that cases of these two types of expressiveness in
art fail to exhaust all instances of expressiveness in art.I9_ As well as describing, representing
and indicating by association the presence of emotion, works of art express within themselves
emotions, feelings and attitudes which cannot be attributed to any fictional (or actual) person
described or represented within the work. An emotion or attitude may be expressed
Atowards_ the propositional or representational content of the work. For example, the self-
satisfied smugness of a pictured person may be depicted as contemptible. Furthermore,
emotions may be expressed in works with neither propositional nor representational content,
nor any emotional associations. For example, the last movement of Beethoven's ASeventh
Symphony_ is, simply, joyous. And rightly, the Expression Theory recognises that, in lacking
an "owner", instances of this type of expressiveness stand in need of explanation. The
Expression Theory hopes to provide the required explanation in arguing that the attitude or
emotions thus expressed are the artist's. But such an approach faces problems which already
have been mentioned. So, this (third) type of expressiveness cannot be explained as a primary
form of emotional expression, and neither can it be explained as a secondary or tertiary form
of expression (since the expressiveness is aesthetically relevant and is located in rather than
through the work of art), even if the work does happen to be a secondary or tertiary expression
of the artist's corresponding attitude or emotion.
How, without appealing to the feelings of artists, might one account for this type of
expressiveness? One possible answer to this question quickly may be dismissed. It will not do
to suggest that art expresses Aaesthetic_ emotions which are neither felt nor shown and, so,
are quite unlike "real", non- aesthetic emotions. It will not do because this approach makes the
expressive- ness of art of dubious concern as a result of its depriving the notion of expression
of its usual meaning. In severing the connection between emotions in art and emotions in life,
this approach makes artistic expressiveness no more like the human expression of emotions
than river banks are like savings and trading banks. And, without that likeness, the power of
artistic expression to interest and move us as it does becomes a matter of impenetrable
mystery (see Hospers, 1954-55, esp pp.326-7; Scruton, 1974, esp pp.38-43).
A more promising line of explanation argues that art is expressive in the way in which
faces, carriages and gaits are - that is, in virtue of its physiognomic presentation of the
Aappearance_ of an emotion (see Urmson, 1973; Davies, 1980; Kivy, 1980). I noted before that,
where what would otherwise be seen as the primary expression of an emotion is seen to be
consciously contrived, it is no longer seen as expressive. More correctly I should say that it is
no longer seen as a Aprimary_ expression of an emotion which is felt by a person. Such
behaviour may retain an expressive character in its Aappearance_, even where it is consciously
adopted and, hence, is not a primary expression of felt-emotion. On this view, works of art are
not expressive in that they reveal anyone's occurent emotions. rather, they are expressive in
that they present appearances of emotion.
This brief outline of an account is far from adequate as it stands. Even if it is true that we
experience artworks as no less expressive than we do human faces, something needs to be said
about this for it is not at all obvious how music, for example, could present expressive aspects
as faces do. It will be unconvincing to argue that dynamic and structural similarities between
human actions and music account for the expressiveness of music. That is to say, it is hard to
see how the expressiveness of music could be generated merely by the mimicry of the
dynamics and structure of human actions or physiognomy. More- over, it will be necessary
also to explain how Aappearances_ of emotions are evocative of emotional responses, given
that those appearances are not taken as evidence of occurent emotions. But these are not
matters which here can be pursued.I10_ For the present purpose it is sufficient that there is a
plausible alternative to the account offered by the Expression Theory.I11_
According to the alternative theory, artists deliberately create art with a physiognomy
which is expressive in that it presents characteristic appearances of emotion. In this way they
achieve the type of expressiveness which the Expression Theory is concerned to explain -
expressiveness which is aesthetically interesting and valuable because it is experienced as
residing in artworks, by contrast with expressiveness which stands at a remove from artworks
and their immediate properties and which focusses instead on emotions felt by people. But, of
course, the theory need not deny that artists sometimes are concerned to express their own (or
their employers') feelings. A woman artist grieving for her dead son might choose to express
her grief by painting a Pieta, or by painting a work which expresses (rather than represents)
sadness. This mode of expression is like that of a person who, on actually feeling sad,
deliberately adopts a sad expression with the aim of appearing sad. The physiognomic
expression adopted is, in such a case, a secondary or tertiary expression of the person's feeling,
although the same behaviour or physiognomy would be a primary expression of the person's
feeling were it to occur unthink- ingly rather than deliberately. As a secondary or tertiary
expression of an occurent emotion, it exploits the prior expressive character which that
physiognomy or behaviour possesses in virtue of its relation to (actual) primary expressions of
(actual) felt-emotions.
The point, though, is this: As a secondary or tertiary expression of someone's (actual)
emotion or (actual) attitude, the expressiveness of the work of art is not (in any usual or
obvious way) aesthetically relevant. Rather, it is the form of expression which is
Aappropriated_ by the artist (to the end of creating secondary or tertiary expressions of
[actual] emotions or [actual] attitudes) which has aesthetic relevance. That is to say, the
expressiveness which is aesthetically relevant is the expressiveness which the work has by
virtue of its presenting in its appearance emotion-characteristics integrally associated with
primary expressions of emotions or attitudes. What is aesthetically relevant is the expressive
character present in the artwork, and not the fact (if it Ais_ a fact, which usually it is not) that
this expressive character has been used because it matches the mood to which it gives
secondary or tertiary expression.
_ * * * * * * *
 By now it should be clear where the error of the Expression Theory lies. That theory
assumes that all expressions of emotion must be expressions of felt-emotions and is concerned,
therefore, to locate an "owner" of the emotions expressed in art. Where those emotions or
attitudes cannot be attributed to some person depicted, they are attributed to the artist who,
after all, is responsible, if anyone is, for the appearance of expressiveness is his or her artworks.
But the Expression theory founders, either because it mistakenly sees art as a primary
expression of artists' feelings or because, in revised form, it wrongly supposes that there is
aesthetic relevance in artists' giving secondary or tertiary expressions to their feelings in their
creative acts. The Expression Theory rightly acknowledges that we respond to the
expressiveness of art as presenting the appearance of primary expressions of emotion and
rightly acknowledges that it is just such expressions which are both aesthetically important
and in need of explanation. But, because it assumes wrongly that all Aappearances_ of
primary expressions of emotion must Abe_ primary expressions of occurent emotion if they
are not to be deprived totally of expressive character, the Expression Theory misconstrues the
relation between artistic expression and the expression of actual emotions in behaviour. (And
it is because sophisticated versions of the theory are keen to preserve the connection with the
artist's feelings that they attempt to force the analysis by equating the type of expressiveness
which is aesthetically relevant with artists' giving secondary or tertiary expression to their
emotions or attitudes.) The Expression Theory need not be wrong in holding that artists feel
emotions which (sometimes, at least) they intend to be expressed in their artworks. And it
need not be wrong in holding that such intentions may be realised success- fully. But it is
wrong in holding that the expressiveness of art can be explained solely and simply as artists'
expressing their feelings. The artist's intention that some emotion be expressed in his or her
artwork is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for that work's expressing that
emotion. And in those cases where the artist's intention is realised, that fact is irrelevant in that
the expressiveness of the artwork can be apparent to someone who is aware neither of the
artist's feelings, nor of the artist's successfully realised intention. Ultimately the expressiveness
of art is independent of artists' feelings and of artists' intentions to express their feelings in
their creations.

Stephen Davies, Department of Philosophy, Private Bag, Auckland,E NEW ZEALAND_.

_UANOTES_
1. Obviously such an account accords with a common view of artistic inspiration (see
Osborne, 1977).
2. This distinction does not rest on a denial that emotions inevitably have a cognitive
content. Post-Wittgensteinian writers have discussed the cognitive content of emotions at
length - for example, see Bedford (1956-57), Kenny (1963) and Tormey (1971).
3. See Dewey (1934, esp pp.60-1), Collingwood ([1938] 1963, esp pp.60-1), and Ducasse
(1964 & 1966) - Hare (1972) gives a good summary of Ducasse's views. Some who are not
expression theorists have also distinguished between venting and expressing - see Alston
(1965) and Tomas ([1952] 1962, esp p.31).
4. Casey (1971) offers a phenomenological description of this experience as if such a
description might replace a conceptual analysis of artistic expressiveness.
5. Of course, one need not be a defender of the Expression Theory in order to suggest that
the expressiveness of art is to be analysed in terms of the way in which artworks evoke (or
tend to evoke) emotional responses in their audiences. In general, such an analysis is
dismissed as unworthy of much attention - see Hospers (1954-55). Defenders of
"emotionalism" have included Hepburn (1963) and Nolt (1981) - for a critique of Nolt's view
see Stecker (1983).
6. Tormey (1971, esp pp.117-20) makes the point against the view that art may be analysed
as (in my terms) a secondary expression of artists' emotions, but he has little to say about the
possibility of artworks' being (in my terms) tertiary expressions of emotion. Sircello (1972, esp
ch.2) argues that art is best to be understood (in my terms) as a tertiary, rather than a
secondary, expression of emotions, moods and attitudes.
7. Wollheim has discussed Gombrich's views - see 1966-67 (esp pp.239-41), 1964 (esp
pp.275-7) and 1968 (esp sects 28-31).
8. Lewis (1969) provides an analysis of the ordinary notion of convention. The view that
the contents of a work of art might be explained entirely by reference to artists' conventional
uses of materials and media has been attacked by Baxter (1983). (And whether or not the social
place of art may be defined in terms of conventions also is a matter of debate - see Lord [1980]
and Peggy Zeglin Brand [1982].)
9. Sircello (1972, esp chs.1 & 2) has argued that there is a further type of expression to be
understood as involving "artistic acts". I have argued against such implicit appeals to artists'
intentions (see Davies, 1982) but I do not wish to deny the importance of the type of
expressiveness to which Sircello alludes. Some critics of the Expression Theory (eg Todd,
1972) miss the point in failing to appreciate that the Expression Theory aims to analyse only
this problematic (and most important) type of expressiveness.
10. Scruton (1983, esp p.61) seems to have such worries in mind when he suggests that
faces can be expressive in themselves, without regard to occurent emotions, only because
Asometimes_ their expressiveness does indicate the presence of occurent emotions; his point
being that art cannot supply the same (in my terms, primary) connection with occurent
emotions. Elsewhere I have suggested some answers to this particular difficulty and to the
other problems raised in this paragraph - see Davies, 1980.
11. Tilghman (1984, esp pp.175-8) has rejected such a view as implausible. On his view, the
exerience of art as expressive is Airreducibly_ analogous to the experience of human
expressions (of occurent emotions); that is, artistic expressiveness is not grounded in any
similarities between human physiognomy and the "physiognomy" of art. An analysis such as I
have recommended leaves the philosophical problem untouched, he says, because the
similarity must be described by means of the very language (in terms of action, rather than
mere movement) which the resemblance is supposed to underwrite (see esp p.177).
Despite these criticisms, I am not sure that the recommended theory is so different from
the view which Tilghman defends. It may be true, ultimately, that the experience of
expressiveness is grounded in irreducible experiences of similarity between, for example,
spatial and musical movement, or musical movement and intentional human action. But, for
all that, there is philo- sophically interesting territory to be explored between the experience of
artistic expressiveness and the irreducible experiences of similarity in which, finally, it is
grounded. And it is just that territory with which the recommended theory is concerned.
Tilghman himself allows that, to take analogous case, the experience of seeing a duck in the
duck-rabbit figure is not irreducible as is the experience of seeing a dot in the picture as the
duck's eye is irreducible (see esp p.184). And, anyway, there is something very odd in the
complaint that a view leaves the philosophical problem untouched when it comes from
someone whose aim is to show that there is no such problem (see esp p.169).

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