FINAL REPORT

Select Committee to Investigate the

January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol

December 00, 2022

117th Congress Second Session
House Report 117-000
 Union Calendar No. XXX
117th Congress Report
2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117-000

FINAL REPORT
OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH
ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

49-937
 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ii JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL
BENNIE G. THOMPSON Mississippi, Chairman

LIZ CHENEY Wyoming, Vice Chair

ZOE LOFGREN California

ADAM B. SCHIFF California

PETE AGUILAR California

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY Florida

JAMIE RASKIN Maryland

ELAINE G. LURIA Virginia

ADAM KINZINGER Illinois

 COMMITTEE STAFF iii

DAVID B. BUCKLEY Staff Director

KRISTIN L. AMERLING Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
HOPE GOINS Senior Counsel to the Chairman
JOSEPH B. MAHER Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair
TIMOTHY J. HEAPHY Chief Investigative Counsel
JAMIE FLEET Senior Advisor
TIMOTHY R. MULVEY Communications Director
CANDYCE PHOENIX Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor
JOHN F. WOOD Senior Investigative Counsel and
Of Counsel to the Vice Chair
KATHERINE B. ABRAMS, Staff Associate THOMAS E. JOSCELYN, Senior Professional
TEMIDAYO AGANGA-WILLIAMS, Senior Staff Member
Investigative Counsel REBECCA L. KNOOIHUIZEN, Financial
ALEJANDRA APECECHEA, Investigative Counsel Investigator
LISA A. BIANCO, Director of Member Services CASEY E. LUCIER, Investigative Counsel
and Security Manager DAMON M. MARX, Professional Staff Member
JEROME P. BJELOPERA, Investigator EVAN B. MAULDIN, Chief Clerk
BRYAN BONNER, Investigative Counsel YONATAN L. MOSKOWITZ, Senior Counsel
RICHARD R. BRUNO, Senior Administrative HANNAH G. MULDAVIN, Deputy
Assistant Communications Director
MARCUS CHILDRESS, Investigative Counsel JONATHAN D. MURRAY, Professional Staff
JOHN MARCUS CLARK, Security Director Member
JACQUELINE N. COLVETT, Digital Director JACOB A. NELSON, Professional Staff Member
HEATHER I. CONNELLY, Professional Staff ELIZABETH OBRAND, Staff Associate
Member RAYMOND O’MARA, Director of External
MEGHAN E. CONROY, Investigator Affairs
HEATHER L. CROWELL, Printer Proofreader ELYES OUECHTATI, Technology Partner
WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Senior Researcher ROBIN M. PEGUERO, Investigative Counsel
SOUMYALATHA O. DAYANANDA, Senior SANDEEP A. PRASANNA, Investigative Counsel
Investigative Counsel BARRY PUMP, Parliamentarian
STEPHEN W. DEVINE, Senior Counsel SEAN M. QUINN, Investigative Counsel
LAWRENCE J. EAGLEBURGER, Professional BRITTANY M. J. RECORD, Senior Counsel
Staff Member DENVER RIGGLEMAN, Senior Technical Advisor
KEVIN S. ELLIKER, Investigative Counsel JOSHUA D. ROSELMAN, Investigative Counsel
MARGARET E. EMAMZADEH, Staff Associate JAMES N. SASSO, Senior Investigative Counsel
SADALLAH A. FARAH, Professional Staff GRANT H. SAUNDERS, Professional Staff
Member Member
DANIEL GEORGE, Senior Investigative Counsel SAMANTHA O. STILES, Chief Administrative
JACOB H. GLICK, Investigative Counsel Officer
AARON S. GREENE, Clerk SEAN P. TONOLLI, Senior Investigative Counsel
MARC S. HARRIS, Senior Investigative Counsel DAVID A. WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff
ALICE K. HAYES, Clerk Member
QUINCY T. HENDERSON, Staff Assistant AMANDA S. WICK, Senior Investigative
JENNA HOPKINS, Professional Staff Member Counsel
CAMISHA L. JOHNSON, Professional Staff DARRIN L. WILLIAMS, JR., Staff Assistant
Member ZACHARY S. WOOD, Clerk
iv CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS
RAWAA ALOBAIDI
MELINDA ARONS
STEVE BAKER
ELIZABETH BISBEE
DAVID CANADY
JOHN COUGHLIN
AARON DIETZEN
GINA FERRISE
ANGEL GOLDSBOROUGH
JAMES GOLDSTON
POLLY GRUBE
L. CHRISTINE HEALEY
DANNY HOLLADAY
PERCY HOWARD
DEAN JACKSON
STEPHANIE J. JONES
HYATT MAMOUN
MARY MARSH
TODD MASON
RYAN MAYERS
JEFF MCBRIDE
FRED MURAM
ALEX NEWHOUSE
JOHN NORTON
ORLANDO PINDER
OWEN PRATT
DAN PRYZGODA
BRIAN SASSER
WILLIAM SCHERER
DRISS SEKKAT
CHRIS STUART
PRESTON SULLIVAN
BRIAN YOUNG

INNOVATIVE DRIVEN
 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL v

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL,
Washington, DC,
December 00, 2022.

Hon. CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MS. JOHNSON: By direction of the Select

Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, I hereby transmit its final report
pursuant to section 4(a) of House Resolution 503, 117th
Congress.
Sincerely,

BENNIE G. THOMPSON,
Chairman.
 FOREWORD: SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE vii

“THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH”

“I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter: So help me God.”

All Members of the United States Congress take this sacred oath. On January
6, 2021, Democrats and Republicans agreed that we would fulfill this oath—
and that we had an obligation to signal to the world that American Democ-
racy would prevail.
In furtherance of fulfilling this duty, the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol was charged with
investigating the facts, circumstances and causes that led to this domestic
terror attack on the Capitol, the Congress and the Constitution.
We owe a debt of gratitude to Chairman Bennie Thompson, Vice Chair
Liz Cheney, the patriotic Members of Congress and dedicated staff—who
devoted themselves to this investigation, to uncovering the truth and to
writing a report that is a “Roadmap for Justice.”
The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack has suc-
ceeded in bringing clarity and demonstrating with painstaking detail the
fragility of our Democracy. Above all, the work of the Select Committee
underscores that our democratic institutions are only as strong as the com-
mitment of those who are entrusted with their care.
As the Select Committee concludes its work, their words must be a
clarion call to all Americans: to vigilantly
guard our Democracy and to give our vote
only to those dutiful in their defense of our
Constitution.
Let us always honor our oath to, as
Abraham Lincoln said, “nobly save, or
meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”
So help us God.

NANCY PELOSI
Speaker of the House
viii FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN

We were told to remove our lapel pins. At the start of every new Congress,
House Members are presented with lapel pins. They are about the size of a
quarter and carry a seal of a bald eagle.
On a routine day in the Capitol, there are thousands of tourists, advo-
cates, and workers. Typically, the pins are an easy way to spot House Mem-
bers.
However, on January 6, 2021, the pin that once was a badge of honor
and distinction turned into a bullseye.
On that day, tear gas fogged the air as gunfire rang out, and a violent
mob crashed against the sealed doors. Concerned for our safety, Capitol
Police officers told us that our lapel pins would make us a target for rioters.
As the Capitol Police rushed Members of Congress and staff to safety,
that simple and, in context, sensible warning stuck with me. On January 6,
2021, my colleagues and I came to work with the intent of fulfilling our
oaths of office and constitutional duty to carry out the peaceful transfer of
power. We were the people’s representatives in the people’s House doing
the people’s business. Sadly, on that day, the danger was too great for our
work to continue and for us to remain in the Capitol. It was too dangerous
to be identified as a representative of the American people.
I’ve been a Member of the House for nearly 30 years. In that time,
there’s not a day that goes by that I don’t feel a profound sense of duty and
responsibility to the men and women who sent me to Congress to be their
voice. After all, I’m from a part of the country where, in my lifetime, Black
people were excluded entirely from political processes. Jim Crow laws pre-
vented my father from registering to vote, and tragically during his life, he
never cast a vote.
For generations, the people in communities I represent have struggled
to have their voices heard by their government. Therefore, I take my duties
and responsibilities seriously, advocating for greater economic opportunity,
robust infrastructure, better schools, and safer housing for my constitu-
ents.
However, that long struggle to overcome oppression and secure basic
civil and human rights continues to be my highest priority. I am always
mindful of the journey that brought me to Washington as a member of
Congress to be the voice of the women and men of Mississippi. As a violent
mob stormed the Capitol trying to take away people’s votes, rioters carried
the battle flag from a failed rebellion of confederate states. This moment
resonated deeply with me because of my personal history. Additionally, I
continually think about the ongoing struggle to ensure justice and equality
for all Americans.
 FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN ix

The Capitol building itself is a fixture in our country’s history, of both

good and bad. After all, this structure is among the most recognizable sym-
bols of American democracy. The Capitol’s shining dome, topped with the
statue of goddess Freedom, was built partially by the labor of enslaved
people in the 18th and 19th centuries. Dark chapters of America’s history
are written into the building’s marble, sandstone, and mortar. And yet in
the halls and chambers of this building, leaders of courage passed amend-
ments to our Constitution and enacted the laws that banned slavery, guar-
anteed equal rights under the law, expanded the vote, promoted equality,
and moved our country, and her people, forward. The Capitol Building itself
is a symbol of our journey toward a more perfect union. It is a temple to our
democracy.
Those great moments in our history have come when men and women
put loyalty to our country and Constitution ahead of politics and party.
They did the right thing. The work of the Select Committee certainly origi-
nates from the same tradition. Our bipartisan membership has moved poli-
tics to the side and focused on the facts, circumstances, and causes of
January 6th.
When I think back to January 6th, after nearly a year and a half of
investigation, I am frightened about the peril our democracy faced. Specifi-
cally, I think about what that mob was there to do: to block the peaceful
transfer of power from one president to another based on a lie that the
election was rigged and tainted with widespread fraud.
I also think about why the rioters were there, besieging the legislative
branch of our government. The rioters were inside the halls of Congress
because the head of the executive branch of our government, the then-
President of the United States, told them to attack. Donald Trump sum-
moned that mob to Washington, DC. Afterward, he sent them to the Capitol
to try to prevent my colleagues and me from doing our Constitutional duty
to certify the election. They put our very democracy to the test.
Trump’s mob came dangerously close to succeeding. Courageous law
enforcement officers put their lives on the line for hours while Trump sat in
the White House, refusing to tell the rioters to go home, while watching the
assault on our republic unfold live on television.
When it was clear the insurrection would fail, Trump finally called off
the mob, telling them, “We love you.” Afterward, Congress was able to
return to this Capitol Building and finish the job of counting the Electoral
College votes and certifying the election.
This is the key conclusion of the Select Committee, all nine of us,
Republicans and Democrats alike.
x FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN
But who knows what would have happened if Trump’s mob had suc-
ceeded in stopping us from doing our job? Who knows what sort of consti-
tutional grey zone our country would have slid into? Who would have been
left to correct that wrong?
As required by House Resolution 503, which established the Select
Committee, we’ve explored in great detail the facts, circumstances, and
causes of the attack. This report will provide new details that supplement
those findings the committee already presented during our hearings.
But there are some questions for which there are still no clear answers,
even if all the facts, circumstances, and causes are brought to bear. The
“What If?” questions. For the good of American democracy, those questions
must never again be put to the test. So, while it’s important that this report
lays out what happened, it’s just as important to focus on how to make sure
that January 6th was a one-time event—to identify the ongoing threats
that could lead us down that dangerous path again—with hopes and
humble prayers that the committee’s work is carried on through corrective
action.
This report will provide greater detail about the multistep effort devised
and driven by Donald Trump to overturn the 2020 election and block the
transfer of power. Building on the information presented in our hearings
earlier this year, we will present new findings about Trump’s pressure
campaign on officials from the local level all the way up to his Vice Presi-
dent, orchestrated and designed solely to throw out the will of the voters
and keep him in office past the end of his elected term.
As we’ve shown previously, this plan faltered at several points because
of the courage of officials (nearly all of them Republicans) who refused to
go along with it. Donald Trump appeared to believe that anyone who shared
his partisan affiliation would also share the same callous disregard for his
or her oath to uphold the rule of law. Fortunately, he was wrong.
The failure of Trump’s plan was not assured. To the contrary, Trump’s
plan was successful at several turns. When his scheme to stay in power
through political pressure hit roadblocks, he relentlessly pushed ahead with
a parallel plan: summoning a mob to gather in Washington, DC on January
6th, promising things “will be wild!”
That mob showed up. They were armed. They were angry. They believed
the “Big Lie” that the election had been stolen. And when Donald Trump
pointed them toward the Capitol and told them to “fight like hell,” that’s
exactly what they did.
Donald Trump lit that fire. But in the weeks beforehand, the kindling he
ultimately ignited was amassed in plain sight.
 FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN xi

That’s why as part of the Select Committee’s investigation, we took a

hard look at whether enough was done to mitigate that risk. Our investiga-
tive teams focused on the way intelligence was gathered, shared, and
assessed. We probed preparations by law enforcement agencies and security
responses on the day of the attack. We followed the money, to determine
who paid for a number of events in the run-up to the attack and to gain a
clearer understanding of the way the former President’s campaign appara-
tus cashed in on the big lie. And we pulled back the curtain at certain major
social media companies to determine if their policies and protocols were up
to the challenge when the President spread a message of violence and his
supporters began to plan and coordinate their descent on Washington.
The Select Committee’s conclusion on these matters—particularly
dealing with intelligence and law enforcement—is consistent with our
broader findings about the causes of January 6th. Were agencies perfect in
their preparations for January 6th and their responses as the violence
unfolded? Of course not. Relevant oversight committees and watchdogs
should continue to find efficiencies and improvements, some of which are
laid out in Committee’s recommendations.
But the shortfall of communications, intelligence and law enforcement
around January 6th was much less about what they did or did not know. It
was more about what they could not know. The President of the United
States inciting a mob to march on the Capitol and impede the work of Con-
gress is not a scenario our intelligence and law enforcement communities
envisioned for this country. Prior to January 6th, it was unimaginable.
Whatever weaknesses existed in the policies, procedures, or institutions,
they were not to blame for what happened on that day.
And so, when I think about the ongoing threats—when I think about
how to avoid having to confront those “What-Ifs?” in the future—my con-
cerns are less with the mechanics of intelligence gathering and security
posture, as important as those questions are. My concerns remain first and
foremost with those who continue to seek power at the expense of Ameri-
can democracy.
What if those election officials had given in to Donald Trump’s pres-
sure? What if the Justice Department had gone along with Trump’s scheme
to declare the 2020 election fraudulent? What if the Vice President had tried
to throw out electoral votes? What if the rioters bent on stopping the
peaceful transfer of power hadn’t been repelled?
To cast a vote in the United States of America is an act of both hope and
faith. When you drop that ballot in the ballot box, you do so with the confi-
dence that every person named on that ballot will hold up their end of the
bargain. The person who wins must swear an oath and live up to it. The
xii FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN
people who come up short must accept the ultimate results and abide by the
will of the voters and the rule of law. This faith in our institutions and laws
is what upholds our democracy.
If that faith is broken—if those who seek power accept only the results
of elections that they win—then American democracy, only a few centuries
old, comes tumbling down.
That’s the danger.
What’s the solution?
The Committee believes a good starting point is the set of recommen-
dations we set forth in our report, pursuant to House Resolution 503.
Driven by our investigative findings, these recommendations will help
strengthen the guardrails of our democracy.
Beyond what we recommend, in my view and as I said during our hear-
ings, the best way to prevent another January 6th is to ensure accountabil-
ity for January 6th. Accountability at all levels.
I have confidence in our Department of Justice and institutions at the
state and local level to ensure accountability under the law. As this report is
released, we see those processes moving forward.
But preventing another January 6th will require a broader sort of
accountability. Ultimately, the American people chart the course for our
country’s future. The American people decide whom to give the reins of
power. If this Select Committee has accomplished one thing, I hope it has
shed light on how dangerous it would be to empower anyone whose desire
for authority comes before their commitment to American democracy and
the Constitution.
I believe most Americans will turn their backs on those enemies of
democracy.
But some will rally to the side of the election deniers, and when I think
about who some of those people are, it troubles me deep inside. White
supremacists. Violent extremists. Groups that subscribe to racism, anti-
Semitism, and violent conspiracy theories; those who would march through
the halls of the Capitol waving the Confederate battle flag.
These are people who want to take America backward, not toward some
imagined prior greatness, but toward repression. These are people who
want to roll back what we’ve accomplished. I believe that those who aligned
with the scheme to overturn the election heeded Donald Trump’s call to
march on the Capitol because they thought taking up Donald Trump’s cause
was a way to advance their vile ambitions.
That is why I did not remove my lapel pin on January 6th.
Our country has come too far to allow a defeated President to turn him-
self into a successful tyrant by upending our democratic institutions,
 FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN xiii

fomenting violence, and, as I saw it, opening the door to those in our coun-
try whose hatred and bigotry threaten equality and justice for all Ameri-
cans.
We can never surrender to democracy’s enemies. We can never allow
America to be defined by forces of division and hatred. We can never go
backward in the progress we have made through the sacrifice and dedica-
tion of true patriots. We can never and will never relent in our pursuit of a
more perfect union, with liberty and justice for all Americans.
I pray that God continues to bless the United States of America.

BENNIE G. THOMPSON
Chairman
xiv FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR

In April 1861, when Abraham Lincoln issued the first call for volunteers for
the Union Army, my great-great grandfather, Samuel Fletcher Cheney,
joined the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He fought through all four years of
the Civil War, from Chickamauga to Stones River to Atlanta. He marched
with his unit in the Grand Review of Troops up Pennsylvania Avenue in May
1865, past a reviewing stand where President Johnson and General Grant
were seated.
Silas Canfield, the regimental historian of the 21st OVI, described the
men in the unit this way:

Industry had taught them perseverance, and they had learned to turn
aside for no obstacle. Their intelligence gave them a just appreciation of
the value and advantage of free government, and the necessity of
defending and maintaining it, and they enlisted prepared to accept all
the necessary labors, fatigues, exposures, dangers, and even death for
the unity of our Nation, and the perpetuity of our institutions.1
I have found myself thinking often, especially since January 6th, of my
great-great grandfather, and all those in every generation who have sacri-
ficed so much for “the unity of our Nation and the perpetuity of our insti-
tutions.”
At the heart of our Republic is the guarantee of the peaceful transfer of
power. Members of Congress are reminded of this every day as we pass
through the Capitol Rotunda. There, eight magnificent paintings detail the
earliest days of our Republic. Four were painted by John Trumbull, includ-
ing one depicting the moment in 1793 when George Washington resigned
his commission, handing control of the Continental Army back to Congress.
Trumbull called this, “one of the highest moral lessons ever given the
world.” With this noble act, George Washington established the indispens-
able example of the peaceful transfer of power in our nation.
Standing on the West Front of the Capitol in 1981, President Ronald
Reagan described it this way:
To a few of us here today, this is a solemn and most momentous occa-
sion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence.
The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution rou-
tinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop
to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this
every-4-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a
miracle.
 FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR xv

Every President in our history has defended this orderly transfer of

authority, except one. January 6, 2021 was the first time one American
President refused his Constitutional duty to transfer power peacefully to the
next.
In our work over the last 18 months, the Select Committee has recog-
nized our obligation to do everything we can to ensure this never happens
again. At the outset of our investigation, we recognized that tens of millions
of Americans had been persuaded by President Trump that the 2020 Presi-
dential election was stolen by overwhelming fraud. We also knew this was
flatly false, and that dozens of state and federal judges had addressed and
resolved all manner of allegations about the election. Our legal system
functioned as it should, but our President would not accept the outcome.
What most of the public did not know before our investigation is this:
Donald Trump’s own campaign officials told him early on that his claims of
fraud were false. Donald Trump’s senior Justice Department officials—each
appointed by Donald Trump himself—investigated the allegations and told
him repeatedly that his fraud claims were false. Donald Trump’s White
House lawyers also told him his fraud claims were false. From the begin-
ning, Donald Trump’s fraud allegations were concocted nonsense, designed
to prey upon the patriotism of millions of men and women who love our
country.
Most Americans also did not know exactly how Donald Trump, along
with a handful of others, planned to defeat the transfer of Presidential
power on January 6th. This was not a simple plan, but it was a corrupt one.
This report lays that plan out in detail—a plan that ultimately had seven
parts, anticipating that Vice President Pence, serving in his role as Presi-
dent of the Senate, would refuse to count official Biden electoral slates from
multiple states. We understood from the beginning that explaining all the
planning and machinations would be complex and would require many
hours of public presentations and testimony. We also understood that our
presentations needed to be organized into a series of hearings that pre-
sented the key evidence for the American public to watch live or streamed
over a reasonable time period, rather than rely on second-hand accounts as
reported by media organizations with their own editorial biases. We orga-
nized our hearings in segments to meet that goal. Tens of millions of
Americans watched.
Among the most shameful findings from our hearings was this: Presi-
dent Trump sat in the dining room off the Oval Office watching the violent
riot at the Capitol on television. For hours, he would not issue a public
statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol,
despite urgent pleas from his White House staff and dozens of others to do
so. Members of his family, his White House lawyers, virtually all those
around him knew that this simple act was critical. For hours, he would not
xvi FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR
do it. During this time, law enforcement agents were attacked and seriously
injured, the Capitol was invaded, the electoral count was halted and the
lives of those in the Capitol were put at risk. In addition to being unlawful,
as described in this report, this was an utter moral failure—and a clear der-
eliction of duty. Evidence of this can be seen in the testimony of his White
House Counsel and several other White House witnesses. No man who
would behave that way at that moment in time can ever serve in any posi-
tion of authority in our nation again. He is unfit for any office.
* * * * *
In presenting all of the information in our hearings, we decided that the
vast majority of our witnesses needed to be Republicans. They were. We
presented evidence from two former Trump Administration Attorneys Gen-
eral, a former White House Counsel, many former Trump-appointed White
House, Justice Department, and Trump Campaign staff, a respected former
conservative judge, the former Secretary of Labor, and many others.
Like our hearings, this report is designed to deliver our findings in
detail in a format that is accessible for all Americans. We do so in an execu-
tive summary, while also providing immense detail for historians and oth-
ers. We are also releasing transcripts and evidence for the public to review,
consistent with a small number of security and privacy concerns. A section
of this report also explains the legal conclusions we draw from the evi-
dence, and our concerns about efforts to obstruct our investigation.
The Committee recognizes that this investigation is just a beginning; it
is only an initial step in addressing President Trump’s effort to remain in
office illegally. Prosecutors are considering the implications of the conduct
we describe in this report. As are voters. John Adams wrote in 1761, “The
very ground of our liberties is the freedom of elections.” Faith in our elec-
tions and the rule of law are paramount to our Republic. Election-deniers—
those who refuse to accept lawful election results—purposely attack the
rule of law and the foundation of our country.
As you read this report, please consider this: Vice President Pence,
along with many of the appointed officials who surrounded Donald Trump,
worked to defeat many of the worst parts of Trump’s plan to overturn the
election. This was not a certainty. It is comforting to assume that the insti-
tutions of our Republic will always withstand those who try to defeat our
Constitution from within. But our institutions are only strong when those
who hold office are faithful to our Constitution. We do not know what
would have happened if the leadership of the Department of Justice
declared, as Donald Trump requested, that the election was “corrupt,” if
Jeff Clark’s letters to State Legislatures had been sent, if Pat Cipollone, Jeff
Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Steve Engel and others were not serving as
guardrails on Donald Trump’s abuses.
 FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR xvii

Part of the tragedy of January 6th is the conduct of those who knew that
what happened was profoundly wrong, but nevertheless tried to downplay
it, minimize it or defend those responsible. That effort continues every day.
Today, I am perhaps most disappointed in many of my fellow conservatives
who know better, those who stood against the threats of communism and
Islamic terrorism but concluded that it was easier to appease Donald
Trump, or keep their heads down. I had hoped for more from them.
The late Charles Krauthammer wrote, “The lesson of our history is that
the task of merely maintaining strong and sturdy the structures of a consti-
tutional order is unending, the continuing and ceaseless work of every gen-
eration.” This task is unending because democracy can be fragile and our
institutions do not defend themselves.
The history of our time will show that the bravery of a handful of
Americans, doing their duty, saved us from an even more grave Constitu-
tional crisis. Elected officials, election workers, and public servants stood
against Donald Trump’s corrupt pressure. Many of our witnesses showed
selfless patriotism and their words and courage will be remembered.
The brave men and women of the Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police
and all the other law enforcement officers who fought to defend us that day
undoubtedly saved lives and our democracy.
Finally, I wish to thank all who honorably contributed to the work of
the Committee and to this Report. We accomplished much over a relatively
short period of time, and many of you sacrificed for the good of your
nation. You have helped make history and, I hope, helped right the ship.

LIZ CHENEY
Vice Chair

ENDNOTE
1. Silas S. Canfield, History of the 21st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War of the
Rebellion (Vrooman, Anderson & Bateman, printers, 1893), p. 10.
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

PRELIMINARIES

Foreword: Speaker of the House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Foreword: Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Foreword: Vice Chair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Executive Summary: Overview of the Evidence

Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel
and House Ethics Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Efforts to Avoid Testifying, Evidence of Obstruction, and
Assessments of Witness Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Summary: Creation of the Select Committee; Purposes . . . . . . 128
Select Committee Witnesses Were Almost Entirely
Republican . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

NARRATIVE

Chapter 1 THE BIG LIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

1.1 The Big Lie Reflected Deliberate Exploitation of the
“Red Mirage” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
1.2 Trump’s Pre-Election Plans to Declare Victory . . . . . . . . . . . 199
1.3 Trump’s Pre-Election Efforts to Delegitimize the
Election Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
1.4 President Trump’s Launch of the Big Lie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
1.5 Post-Election: President Trump Replaces His Campaign
Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
1.6 President Trump’s Campaign Team Told Him He Lost
the Election and There Was No Significant Fraud . . . . . . . 204
1.7 President Trump Had His Day in Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
1.8 President Trump Repeatedly Promoted Conspiracy
Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
1.9 President Trump’s January 6th Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xix

Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

Chapter 2 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

2.1 The Electoral College, and President Trump’s Attempt
to Subvert It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
2.2 The Plan Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
2.3 Outreach and Implementation of the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
2.4 An Outright Request for Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
2.5 Some Officials Eagerly Assisted President Trump With
His Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
2.6 The Final Outreach to State Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
2.7 The Harm Caused by Demonizing Public Servants . . . . . . . 300
Chapter 3 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
STRATEGY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
3.1 Laying the Groundwork for the Fake Elector Plan: The
Chesebro Memos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
3.2 President Trump and the Campaign Adopt the Fake
Elector Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
3.3 The Campaign Legal Team Bows Out, and Giuliani Steps
In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
3.4 Some of the Proposed Fake Electors Express Concerns
About the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
3.5 On December 14th, The Fake Electors Meet and Vote . . . 352
3.6 The Fallout from the Fake Elector Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Chapter 4 ‘‘JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME’’ . . . . . . . . . 373
4.1 The DOJ Found No Significant Evidence of Fraud . . . . . . . . 373
4.2 November 23, 2020: Barr Challenges President Trump’s
Election Lies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
4.3 December 1, 2020: President Trump is Irate After Barr
Says There is No Significant Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
4.4 December 14, 2020: Barr Submits His Resignation . . . . . . 379
xx TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

4.5 Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and Acting

Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue Hold the
Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
4.6 President Trump is Introduced to Jeffrey Clark . . . . . . . . 382
4.7 December 27th Phone Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
4.8 Congressman Scott Perry Calls Donoghue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
4.9 December 28, 2020: The Clark Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
4.10 December 29th Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
4.11 Rosen’s December 30th Call with President Trump . . . . . 395
4.12 December 31st Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
4.13 January 2, 2021: Rosen and Donoghue Confront Clark
Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
4.14 January 3, 2021: Clark Informs DOJ Leadership that He
Will Accept President Trump’s Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
4.15 President Trump’s Unprecedented Attempt to Subvert
the DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
Chapter 5 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
5.1 President Trump and His Allies Embark on a Desperate
Gambit to Block Certification of the 2020 Presidential
Election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
5.2 President Trump and his Allies Exert Intense Public and
Private Pressure on the Vice President in Advance of
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . 441
5.3 President Trump and his Allies Continue to Pressure
the Vice President on January 6th, Threatening His Life
and Our Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
5.4 President Trump Endangers Pence’s Life, Causing the
Vice President, His Family, and Staff to Narrowly
Miss the Rioters as They Flee the Mob Attacking the
Capitol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
5.5 Aftermath of the Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi

Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

Chapter 6 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499

6.1 How Far-Right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists
Planned for January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
6.2 The Proud Boys: “[Y]ou Want to Storm the Capitol” . . . . 507
6.3 The Oath Keepers: “He Called Us All to the Capitol
and Wants Us to Make it Wild!!!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
6.4 “Trump Said It’s Gonna be Wild!!!!!!! It’s Gonna be
Wild!!!!!!!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
6.5 “Ready to Step in And Do What Is Needed” . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
6.6 “Friends of Stone” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
6.7 White Nationalists: “The Capitol Siege was Fucking
Awesome…” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: “#OccupyCongress” . . . . . . . 521
6.9 QAnon: “Operation Occupy the Capitol” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
6.10 TheDonald.win: “Occupy the Capitol” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared
for January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
6.12 “He’s Calling on You, He Needs Your Help” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
6.13 “Trump is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitol” . . . . . . . 532
6.14 “Well, I Should Walk With the People.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
6.15 “POTUS…Likes the Crazies.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
6.16 January 5, 2021: “Fort Trump” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
6.17 “Together, We Will STOP THE STEAL.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
Chapter 7 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
7.1 “Reinsert the Mike Pence Lines” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
7.2 “I’ll Be There With You” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
7.3 The President’s Anger When He Could Not March to
the Capitol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

7.4 “We’re Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a

Statement” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
7.5 “He Doesn’t Want to Do Anything” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
7.6 “He Thinks Mike Deserves It” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
7.7 “I Guess They’re Just More Upset About the Election
Theft Than You Are” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
7.8 “Stay Peaceful!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
7.9 “The President Needs to Stop This ASAP” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
7.10 “We Love You. You’re Very Special” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
7.11 “Remember This Day Forever!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
7.13 He “Just Didn’t Want to Talk About It Anymore” . . . . . . . . 610
7.14 President Trump’s “Rhetoric Killed Someone” . . . . . . . . . . 611
Chapter 8 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
8.2 March of the Proud Boys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
8.3 The Initial Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
8.4 President Trump’s Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol . . . 647
8.5 The Mob Surges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
8.6 The United States Capitol is Breached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
8.8 The Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted
Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii

Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO

JANUARY 6TH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
APPENDIX 2: DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
JANUARY 6TH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
APPENDIX 3: THE BIG RIP-OFF: FOLLOW THE MONEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 770
APPENDIX 4: MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

On October 31, 2022, in a Federal courthouse in Washington, DC, Graydon

Young testified against Stewart Rhodes and other members of the Oath
Keepers militia group. The defendants had been charged with seditious
conspiracy against the United States and other crimes related to the January
6, 2021, attack on Congress.1
In his testimony that day, Young explained to the jury how he and other
Oath Keepers were provoked to travel to Washington by President Donald
Trump’s tweets and by Trump’s false claims that the 2020 Presidential
election was “stolen” from him.2 And, in emotional testimony, Young
acknowledged what he and others believed they were doing on January 6th:
attacking Congress in the manner the French had attacked the Bastille at
the outset of the French Revolution.3 Reflecting on that day more than a
year and half later, Young testified:
Prosecutor: And so how do you feel about the fact that you were
pushing towards a line of police officers?
Young: Today I feel extremely ashamed and embarrassed. . . .
Prosecutor: How did you feel at the time?
Young: I felt like, again, we were continuing in some kind of his-
torical event to achieve a goal.

* * *
Prosecutor: Looking back now almost two years later, what would
that make you as someone who was coming to D.C. to fight against
the government?
Young: I guess I was [acting] like a traitor, somebody against my
own government.4
Young’s testimony was dramatic, but not unique. Many participants in
the attack on the Capitol acknowledged that they had betrayed their own
country:
• Reimler: “And I’m sorry to the people of this country for threatening
the democracy that makes this country so great . . . My participation in
the events that day were part of an attack on the rule of law.” 5
• Pert: “I know that the peaceful transition of power is to ensure the
common good for our nation and that it is critical in protecting our
country’s security needs. I am truly sorry for my part and accept full
responsibility for my actions.” 6
• Markofski: “My actions put me on the other side of the line from my
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Protestors gather at the Capitol.

(Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)

brothers in the Army. The wrong side. Had I lived in the area, I would
have been called up to defend the Capitol and restore order . . . My
actions brought dishonor to my beloved U.S. Army National Guard.” 7
• Witcher: “Every member—every male member of my family has served
in the military, in the Marine Corps, and most have saw combat. And I
cast a shadow and cast embarrassment upon my family name and that
legacy.” 8
• Edwards: “I am ashamed to be for the first time in my 68 years,
standing before a judge, having pleaded guilty to committing a crime,
ashamed to be associated with an attack on the United States Capitol, a
symbol of American democracy and greatness that means a great deal
to me.” 9

Hundreds of other participants in the January 6th attack have pleaded

guilty, been convicted, or await trial for crimes related to their actions that
day. And, like Young, hundreds of others have acknowledged exactly what
provoked them to travel to Washington, and to engage in violence. For
example:

• Ronald Sandlin, who threatened police officers in the Capitol saying,

“[y]ou’re going to die,” posted on December 23, 2020: “I’m going to be
there to show support for our president and to do my part to stop the
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

steal and stand behind Trump when he decides to cross the rubicon. If
you are a patriot I believe it’s your duty to be there. I see it as my civic
responsibility.” 10
• Garret Miller, who brought a gun to the Capitol on January 6th,
explained: “I was in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, because I
believed I was following the instructions of former President Trump
and he was my president and the commander-in-chief. His statements
also had me believing the election was stolen from him.” 11
• John Douglas Wright explained that he brought busloads of people to
Washington, DC, on January 6th “because [Trump] called me there, and
he laid out what is happening in our government.” 12
• Lewis Cantwell testified: If “the President of the United States . . . [is]
out on TV telling the world that it was stolen, what else would I believe,
as a patriotic American who voted for him and wants to continue to see
the country thrive as I thought it was?” 13
• Likewise, Stephen Ayres testified that “with everything the President
was putting out” ahead of January 6th that “the election was rigged . . .
the votes were wrong and stuff . . . it just got into my head.” “The
President [was] calling on us to come” to Washington, DC. 14 Ayres
“was hanging on every word he [President Trump] was saying” 15 Ayres
posted that “Civil War will ensue” if President Trump did not stay in
power after January 6th.16

The Committee has compiled hundreds of similar statements from par-

ticipants in the January 6th attack.17
House Resolution 503 instructed the Select Committee to “investigate
and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the January
6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex”
and to “issue a final report” containing “findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations for corrective measures.” The Select Committee has conducted
nine public hearings, presenting testimony from more than 70 witnesses.
In structuring our investigation and hearings, we began with President
Trump’s contentions that the election was stolen and took testimony from
nearly all of the President’s principal advisors on this topic. We focused on
the rulings of more than 60 Federal and State courts rejecting President
Trump’s and his supporters’ efforts to reverse the electoral outcome.
Despite the rulings of these courts, we understood that millions of
Americans still lack the information necessary to understand and evaluate
what President Trump has told them about the election. For that reason,
our hearings featured a number of members of President Trump’s inner
circle refuting his fraud claims and testifying that the election was not in
fact stolen. In all, the Committee displayed the testimony of more than four
4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
dozen Republicans—by far the majority of witnesses in our hearings—
including two of President Trump’s former Attorneys General, his former
White House Counsel, numerous members of his White House staff, and the
highest-ranking members of his 2020 election campaign, including his
campaign manager and his campaign general counsel. Even key individuals
who worked closely with President Trump to try to overturn the 2020 elec-
tion on January 6th ultimately admitted that they lacked actual evidence
sufficient to change the election result, and they admitted that what they
were attempting was unlawful.18
This Report supplies an immense volume of information and testimony
assembled through the Select Committee’s investigation, including informa-
tion obtained following litigation in Federal district and appellate courts, as
well as in the U.S. Supreme Court. Based upon this assembled evidence, the
Committee has reached a series of specific findings,19 including the follow-
ing:
1. Beginning election night and continuing through January 6th and
thereafter, Donald Trump purposely disseminated false allegations of
fraud related to the 2020 Presidential election in order to aid his effort
to overturn the election and for purposes of soliciting contributions.
These false claims provoked his supporters to violence on January 6th.
2. Knowing that he and his supporters had lost dozens of election law-
suits, and despite his own senior advisors refuting his election fraud
claims and urging him to concede his election loss, Donald Trump
refused to accept the lawful result of the 2020 election. Rather than
honor his constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” President Trump instead plotted to overturn the
election outcome.
3. Despite knowing that such an action would be illegal, and that no
State had or would submit an altered electoral slate, Donald Trump
corruptly pressured Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to count
electoral votes during Congress’s joint session on January 6th.
4. Donald Trump sought to corrupt the U.S. Department of Justice by
attempting to enlist Department officials to make purposely false
statements and thereby aid his effort to overturn the Presidential
election. After that effort failed, Donald Trump offered the position of
Acting Attorney General to Jeff Clark knowing that Clark intended to
disseminate false information aimed at overturning the election.
5. Without any evidentiary basis and contrary to State and Federal law,
Donald Trump unlawfully pressured State officials and legislators to
change the results of the election in their States.
6. Donald Trump oversaw an effort to obtain and transmit false electoral
certificates to Congress and the National Archives.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

7. Donald Trump pressured Members of Congress to object to valid

slates of electors from several States.
8. Donald Trump purposely verified false information filed in Federal
court.
9. Based on false allegations that the election was stolen, Donald Trump
summoned tens of thousands of supporters to Washington for Janu-
ary 6th. Although these supporters were angry and some were armed,
Donald Trump instructed them to march to the Capitol on January 6th
to “take back” their country.
10. Knowing that a violent attack on the Capitol was underway and
knowing that his words would incite further violence, Donald Trump
purposely sent a social media message publicly condemning Vice
President Pence at 2:24 p.m. on January 6th.
11. Knowing that violence was underway at the Capitol, and despite his
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, Donald Trump
refused repeated requests over a multiple hour period that he instruct
his violent supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol, and instead
watched the violent attack unfold on television. This failure to act
perpetuated the violence at the Capitol and obstructed Congress’s
proceeding to count electoral votes.
12. Each of these actions by Donald Trump was taken in support of a
multi-part conspiracy to overturn the lawful results of the 2020
Presidential election.
13. The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies did suc-
cessfully detect the planning for potential violence on January 6th,
including planning specifically by the Proud Boys and Oath Keeper
militia groups who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. As January
6th approached, the intelligence specifically identified the potential
for violence at the U.S. Capitol. This intelligence was shared within the
executive branch, including with the Secret Service and the Presi-
dent’s National Security Council.
14. Intelligence gathered in advance of January 6th did not support a
conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage
in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack Trump supporters on
January 6th. Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that
some left-wing groups were instructing their members to “stay at
home” and not attend on January 6th.20 Ultimately, none of these
groups was involved to any material extent with the attack on the
Capitol on January 6th.
6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15. Neither the intelligence community nor law enforcement obtained
intelligence in advance of January 6th on the full extent of the ongo-
ing planning by President Trump, John Eastman, Rudolph Giuliani
and their associates to overturn the certified election results. Such
agencies apparently did not (and potentially could not) anticipate the
provocation President Trump would offer the crowd in his Ellipse
speech, that President Trump would “spontaneously” instruct the
crowd to march to the Capitol, that President Trump would exacerbate
the violent riot by sending his 2:24 p.m. tweet condemning Vice
President Pence, or the full scale of the violence and lawlessness that
would ensue. Nor did law enforcement anticipate that President
Trump would refuse to direct his supporters to leave the Capitol once
violence began. No intelligence community advance analysis pre-
dicted exactly how President Trump would behave; no such analysis
recognized the full scale and extent of the threat to the Capitol on
January 6th.
16. Hundreds of Capitol and DC Metropolitan police officers performed
their duties bravely on January 6th, and America owes those individu-
als immense gratitude for their courage in the defense of Congress
and our Constitution. Without their bravery, January 6th would have
been far worse. Although certain members of the Capitol Police lead-
ership regarded their approach to January 6th as “all hands on deck,”
the Capitol Police leadership did not have sufficient assets in place to
address the violent and lawless crowd.21 Capitol Police leadership did
not anticipate the scale of the violence that would ensue after Presi-
dent Trump instructed tens of thousands of his supporters in the
Ellipse crowd to march to the Capitol, and then tweeted at 2:24 p.m.
Although Chief Steven Sund raised the idea of National Guard support,
the Capitol Police Board did not request Guard assistance prior to
January 6th. The Metropolitan Police took an even more proactive
approach to January 6th, and deployed roughly 800 officers, including
responding to the emergency calls for help at the Capitol. Rioters still
managed to break their line in certain locations, when the crowd
surged forward in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2:24
p.m. tweet. The Department of Justice readied a group of Federal
agents at Quantico and in the District of Columbia, anticipating that
January 6th could become violent, and then deployed those agents
once it became clear that police at the Capitol were overwhelmed.
Agents from the Department of Homeland Security were also
deployed to assist.
17. President Trump had authority and responsibility to direct deploy-
ment of the National Guard in the District of Columbia, but never gave
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

any order to deploy the National Guard on January 6th or on any other
day. Nor did he instruct any Federal law enforcement agency to assist.
Because the authority to deploy the National Guard had been del-
egated to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense could,
and ultimately did deploy the Guard. Although evidence identifies a
likely miscommunication between members of the civilian leadership
in the Department of Defense impacting the timing of deployment,
the Committee has found no evidence that the Department of Defense
intentionally delayed deployment of the National Guard. The Select
Committee recognizes that some at the Department had genuine
concerns, counseling caution, that President Trump might give an
illegal order to use the military in support of his efforts to overturn
the election.
* * *

This Report begins with a factual overview framing each of these con-
clusions and summarizing what our investigation found. That overview is
in turn supported by eight chapters identifying the very specific evidence of
each of the principal elements of President Trump’s multi-part plan to
overturn the election, along with evidence regarding intelligence gathered
before January 6th and security shortfalls that day.
Although the Committee’s hearings were viewed live by tens of millions
of Americans and widely publicized in nearly every major news source,22
the Committee also recognizes that other news outlets and commentators
have actively discouraged viewers from watching, and that millions of other
Americans have not yet seen the actual evidence addressed by this Report.
Accordingly, the Committee is also releasing video summaries of relevant
evidence on each major topic investigated.
This Report also examines the legal implications of Donald Trump and
his co-conspirators’ conduct and includes criminal referrals to the Depart-
ment of Justice regarding President Trump and certain other individuals.
The criminal referrals build upon three relevant rulings issued by a Federal
district court and explain in detail how the facts found support further
evaluation by the Department of Justice of specific criminal charges. To
assist the public in understanding the nature and importance of this mate-
rial, this Report also contains sections identifying how the Committee has
evaluated the credibility of its witnesses and suggests that the Department
of Justice further examine possible efforts to obstruct our investigation. We
also note that more than 30 witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, others invoked Executive Privilege or
categorically refused to appear (including Steve Bannon, who has since
been convicted of contempt of Congress).
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Finally, this report identifies a series of legislative recommendations,
including the Presidential Election Reform Act, which has already passed
the House of Representatives.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED

In the Committee’s hearings, we presented evidence of what ultimately

became a multi-part plan to overturn the 2020 Presidential election. That
evidence has led to an overriding and straight forward conclusion: the cen-
tral cause of January 6th was one man, former President Donald Trump,
whom many others followed. None of the events of January 6th would have
happened without him.

THE BIG LIE

In the weeks before election day 2020, Donald Trump’s campaign experts,
including his campaign manager Bill Stepien, advised him that the election
results would not be fully known on election night.23 This was because cer-
tain States would not begin to count absentee and other mail-in votes until
election day or after election-day polls had closed.24 Because Republican
voters tend to vote in greater numbers on election day and Democratic vot-
ers tend to vote in greater numbers in advance of election day, it was widely
anticipated that Donald Trump could initially appear to have a lead, but that
the continued counting of mail-in, absentee and other votes beginning
election night would erode and could overcome that perceived lead.25 Thus,
as President Trump’s campaign manager cautioned, understanding the
results of the 2020 election would be a lengthy “process,” and an initial
appearance of a Trump lead could be a “red mirage.” 26 This was not unique
to the 2020 election; similar scenarios had played out in prior elections as
well.27
Prior to the 2020 election, Donald Trump’s campaign manager Bill
Stepien, along with House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, urged Presi-
dent Trump to embrace mail-in voting as potentially beneficial to the
Trump Campaign.28 Presidential advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner
recounted others giving Donald Trump the same advice: “[M]ail in ballots
could be a good thing for us if we looked at it correctly.” 29 Multiple States,
including Florida, had successfully utilized mail-in voting in prior elec-
tions, and in 2020.30 Trump White House Counselor Hope Hicks testified: “I
think he [President Trump] understood that a lot of people vote via absen-
tee ballot in places like Florida and have for a long time and that it’s worked
fine.” 31 Donald Trump won in numerous States that allowed no-excuse
absentee voting in 2020, including Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wyoming.32
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9

On election night 2020, the election returns were reported in almost

exactly the way that Stepien and other Trump Campaign experts predicted,
with the counting of mail-in and absentee ballots gradually diminishing
President Trump’s perceived lead. As the evening progressed, President
Trump called in his campaign team to discuss the results. Stepien and other
campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would not be
known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare victory.33 “It
was far too early to be making any calls like that. Ballots—ballots were still
being counted. Ballots were still going to be counted for days.” 34
Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Select Committee that he
argued against declaring victory at that time as well, because “it was too
early to say one way [or] the other” who had won.35 Stepien advised Trump
to say that “votes were still being counted. It’s too early to tell, too early to
call the race but, you know, we are proud of the race we run—we ran and
we, you know, think we’re—think we’re in a good position” and would say
more in the coming days.36
President Trump refused, and instead said this in his public remarks
that evening: “This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embar-
rassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election.
Frankly, we did win this election. We did win this election . . . . We want all
voting to stop.” 37 And on the morning of November 5th, he tweeted “STOP
THE COUNT!” 38 Halting the counting of votes at that point would have vio-
lated both State and Federal laws.39
According to testimony received by the Select Committee, the only
advisor present who supported President Trump’s inclination to declare
victory was Rudolph Giuliani, who appeared to be inebriated.40 President
Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr, who had earlier left the election
night gathering, perceived the President’s statement this way:
[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that
there was major fraud underway. I mean, this happened, as far as I
could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evi-
dence. He claimed there was major fraud. And it seemed to be based
on the dynamic that, at the end of the evening, a lot of Democratic
votes came in which changed the vote counts in certain States, and
that seemed to be the basis for this broad claim that there was
major fraud. And I didn’t think much of that, because people had
been talking for weeks and everyone understood for weeks that that
was going to be what happened on election night . . . . 41
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on election night
and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous
decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Trump declares victory in a speech at an election night party.

(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false declaration of vic-

tory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31 and
November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom
Fitton.42 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that President Trump would falsely
declare victory on election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evi-
dence also includes an audio recording of President Trump’s advisor Steve
Bannon, who said this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates
from China:
And what Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory, right? He’s
gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s a winner. He’s
just gonna say he’s a winner . . . The Democrats—more of our
people vote early that count. Theirs vote in mail. And so they’re
gonna have a natural disadvantage, and Trump’s going to take
advantage of it—that’s our strategy. He’s gonna declare himself a
winner. So when you wake up Wednesday morning, it’s going to be
a firestorm . . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by 10 or 11
o’clock at night, it’s going to be even crazier. No, because he’s
gonna sit right there and say “They stole it. I’m directing the Attor-
ney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states.” It’s
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11

going to be, no, he’s not going out easy. If Trump—if Biden’s win-
ning, Trump is going to do some crazy shit.43
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to
President Trump, made this statement:
I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens,
the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is nine-tenths of
the law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.44
On election day, Vice President Pence’s staff, including his Chief of Staff
and Counsel, became concerned that President Trump might falsely claim
victory that evening. The Vice President’s Counsel, Greg Jacob, testified
about their concern that the Vice President might be asked improperly to
echo such a false statement.45 Jacob drafted a memorandum with this spe-
cific recommendation: “[I]t is essential that the Vice President not be per-
ceived by the public as having decided questions concerning disputed
electoral votes prior to the full development of all relevant facts.” 46
Millions of Americans believed that President Trump was telling the
truth on election night—that President Trump actually had proof the elec-
tion was stolen and that the ongoing counting of votes was an act of fraud.
As votes were being counted in the days after the election, President
Trump’s senior campaign advisors informed him that his chances of suc-
cess were almost zero.
Former Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien testified that he had
come to this conclusion by November 7th, and told President Trump:

Committee Staff: What was your view on the state of the election at
that point?
Stepien: You know, very, very, very bleak. You know, I—we told
him—the group that went over there outlined, you know, my belief
and chances for success at this point. And then we pegged that at,
you know, 5, maybe 10 percent based on recounts that were—that,
you know, either were automatically initiated or could be—could be
initiated based on, you know, realistic legal challenges, not all the
legal challenges that eventually were pursued. But, you know, it
was—you know, my belief is that it was a very, very—5 to 10 per-
cent is not a very good optimistic outlook.47
12 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller testified to the Committee
about this exchange:
Miller: I was in the Oval Office. And at some point in the conversa-
tion Matt Oczkowski, who was the lead data person, was brought
on, and I remember he delivered to the President in pretty blunt
terms that he was going to lose.
Committee Staff: And that was based, Mr. Miller, on Matt and the
data team’s assessment of this sort of county-by-county, State-by-
State results as reported?

Miller: Correct.48
In one of the Select Committee’s hearings, former Fox News political
editor Chris Stirewalt was asked what the chance President Trump had of
winning the election after November 7th, when the votes were tallied and
every news organization had called the race for now-President Biden. His
response: “None.” 49
As the Committee’s hearings demonstrated, President Trump made a
series of statements to White House staff and others during this time
period indicating his understanding that he had lost.50 President Trump
also took consequential actions reflecting his understanding that he would
be leaving office on January 20th. For example, President Trump personally
signed a Memorandum and Order instructing his Department of Defense to
withdraw all military forces from Somalia by December 31, 2020, and from
Afghanistan by January 15, 2021.51 General Keith Kellogg (ret.), who had
been appointed by President Trump as Chief of Staff for the National Secu-
rity Council and was Vice President Pence’s National Security Advisor on
January 6th, told the Select Committee that “[a]n immediate departure that
that memo said would have been catastrophic. It’s the same thing what
President Biden went through. It would have been a debacle.” 52
In the weeks that followed the election, President Trump’s campaign
experts and his senior Justice Department officials were informing him and
others in the White House that there was no genuine evidence of fraud suf-
ficient to change the results of the election. For example, former Attorney
General Barr testified:
And I repeatedly told the President in no uncertain terms that I did
not see evidence of fraud, you know, that would have affected the
outcome of the election. And, frankly, a year and a half later, I
haven’t seen anything to change my mind on that.53
Former Trump Campaign lawyer Alex Cannon, who was asked to over-
see incoming information about voter fraud and set up a voter fraud tip
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13

line, told the Select Committee about a pertinent call with White House
Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in November 2020:
Cannon: So I remember a call with Mr. Meadows where Mr. Mead-
ows was asking me what I was finding and if I was finding anything.
And I remember sharing with him that we weren’t finding anything
that would be sufficient to change the results in any of the key
States.
Committee Staff: When was that conversation?
Cannon: Probably in November. Mid- to late November . . . .
Committee Staff: And what was Mr. Meadows’s reaction to that
information?
Cannon: I believe the words he used were: “So there is no there
there?” 54
President Trump’s Campaign Manager Bill Stepien recalled that Presi-
dent Trump was being told “wild allegations” and that it was the Cam-
paign’s job to “track [the allegations] down”:
Committee Staff: You said that you were very confident that you
were telling the President the truth in your dealings with [him]. And
had your team been able to verify any of these allegations of fraud,
would you have reported those to the President?
Stepien: Sure.
Committee Staff: Did you ever have to report that—
Stepien: One of my frustrations would be that, you know, people
would throw out, you know, these reports, these allegations, these
things that they heard or saw in a State, and they’d tell President
Trump. And, you know, it would be the campaign’s job to track
down the information, the facts. And, you know, President Trump,
you know—if someone’s saying, hey, you know, all these votes
aren’t counted or were miscounted, you know, if you’re down in a
State like Arizona, you liked hearing that. It would be our job to
track it down and come up dry because the allegation didn’t prove
to be true. And we’d have to, you know, relay the news that, yeah,
that tip that someone told you about those votes or that fraud or,
you know, nothing came of it.
That would be our job as, you know, the truth telling squad and, you
know, not—not a fun job to be, you know, much—it’s an easier job to
14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
be telling the President about, you know, wild allegations. It’s a harder
job to be telling him on the back end that, yeah, that wasn’t true.
Committee Staff: How did he react to those types of conversations
where you [told] him that an allegation or another wasn’t true?
Stepien: He was—he had—usually he had pretty clear eyes. Like, he
understood, you know—you know, we told him where we thought
the race was, and I think he was pretty realistic with our viewpoint,
in agreement with our viewpoint of kind of the forecast and the
uphill climb we thought he had.55

Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Committee that
he informed President Trump “several” times that “specific to election day
fraud and irregularities, there were not enough to overturn the election.” 56
Vice President Pence has also said publicly that he told President Trump
there was no basis to allege that the election was stolen. When a reporter
recently asked “Did you ever point blank say to the President [that] we lost
this election?,” Pence responded that “I did . . . Many times.” 57 Pence has
also explained:
There was never evidence of widespread fraud. I don’t believe fraud
changed the outcome of the election. But the President and the
Campaign had every right to have those examined in court. But I
told the President that, once those legal challenges played out, he
should simply accept the outcome of the election and move on.58

The General Counsel of President Trump’s campaign, Matthew Morgan,

informed members of the White House staff, and likely many others, of the
Campaign’s conclusion that none of the allegations of fraud and irregulari-
ties could be sufficient to change the outcome of the election:
What was generally discussed on that topic was whether the fraud,
maladministration, abuse, or irregularities, if aggregated and read
most favorably to the campaign, would that be outcome determina-
tive. And I think everyone’s assessment in the room, at least
amongst the staff, Marc Short, myself, and Greg Jacob, was that it
was not sufficient to be outcome determinative.59
In a meeting on November 23rd, Barr told President Trump that the
Justice Department was doing its duty by investigating every fraud allega-
tion “if it’s specific, credible, and could’ve affected the outcome,” but that
“they’re just not meritorious. They’re not panning out.” 60
Barr then told the Associated Press on December 1st that the Depart-
ment had “not seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15

outcome in the election.” 61 Next, he reiterated this point in private meet-

ings with the President both that afternoon and on December 14th, as well
as in his final press conference as Attorney General later that month.62 The
Department of Homeland Security had reached a similar determination two
weeks earlier: “There is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost
votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.” 63
In addition, multiple other high ranking Justice Department personnel
appointed by President Trump also informed him repeatedly that the alle-
gations were false. As January 6th drew closer, Acting Attorney General
Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue had calls with Presi-
dent Trump on almost a daily basis explaining in detail what the Depart-
ment’s investigations showed.64 Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard
Donoghue told the Select Committee that he and Acting Attorney General
Rosen tried “to put it in very clear terms to the President. And I said some-
thing to the effect of ‘Sir, we’ve done dozens of investigations, hundreds of
interviews. The major allegations are not supported by the evidence devel-
oped. We’ve looked in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada. We’re
doing our job.’” 65 On December 31st, Donoghue recalls telling the President
that “people keep telling you these things and they turn out not to be
true.” 66 And then on January 3rd, Donoghue reiterated this point with the
President:
[A]s in previous conservations, we would say to him, you know,
“We checked that out, and there’s nothing to it.” 67

Acting Attorney General Rosen testified before the Select Committee

that “the common element” of all of his communications with President
Trump was President Trump urging the Department to find widespread
fraud that did not actually exist. None of the Department’s investigations
identified any genuine fraud sufficient to impact the election outcome:
During my tenure as the Acting Attorney General, which began on
December 24 of [2020], the Department of Justice maintained the
position, publicly announced by former Attorney General William
Barr, that the Department had been presented with no evidence of
widespread voter fraud in a scale sufficient to change the outcome
of the 2020 election.68
As President Trump was hearing from his campaign and his Justice
Department that the allegations of widespread fraud were not supported by
the evidence, his White House legal staff also reached the same conclu-
sions, and agreed specifically with what Barr told President Trump. Both
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric
Herschmann reinforced to President Trump that the Justice Department
was doing its duty to investigate allegations of supposed voter fraud.69
16 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cipollone told the Select Committee that he “had seen no evidence of
massive fraud in the election” and that he “forcefully” made this point “over
and over again.” For example, during a late-night group meeting with Presi-
dent Trump on December 18th, at which he and Herschmann urged Trump
not to heed the advice of several election conspiracists at the meeting:
Cipollone: They didn’t think that we were, you know—they didn’t
think we believed this, you know, that there had been massive fraud
in the election, and the reason they didn’t think we believed it is
because we didn’t.
Committee Staff: And you articulated that forcefully to them during
the meeting?
Cipollone: I did, yeah. I had seen no evidence of massive fraud in the
election. . . . At some point, you have to deliver with the evidence.
And I—again, I just to go back to what [Barr] said, he had not seen
and I was not aware of any evidence of fraud to the extent that it
would change the results of the election. That was made clear to
them, okay, over and over again.70
Similarly, White House Attorney Eric Herschmann was also very clear
about his views:

[T]hey never proved the allegations that they were making, and
they were trying to develop.71
In short, President Trump was informed over and over again, by his
senior appointees, campaign experts and those who had served him for
years, that his election fraud allegations were nonsense.
How did President Trump continue to make false allegations despite all
of this unequivocal information? President Trump sought out those who
were not scrupulous with the facts, and were willing to be dishonest. He
found a new legal team to assert claims that his existing advisors and the
Justice Department had specifically informed him were false. President
Trump’s new legal team, headed by Rudolph Giuliani, and their allies ulti-
mately lost dozens of election lawsuits in Federal and State courts.
The testimony of Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien helps to put
this series of events in perspective. Stepien described his interaction with
Giuliani as an intentional “self-demotion,” with Stepien stepping aside
once it became clear that President Trump intended to spread falsehoods.
Stepien knew the President’s new team was relying on unsupportable
accusations, and he refused to be associated with their approach:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17

There were two groups of family. We called them kind of my team

and Rudy’s team. I didn’t mind being characterized as being part of
“team normal,” as reporters, you know, kind of started to do
around that point in time. 72
Having worked for Republican campaigns for over two decades, Stepien
said, “I think along the way I’ve built up a pretty good -- I hope a good
reputation for being honest and professional, and I didn’t think what was
happening was necessarily honest or professional at that point in time.” 73
As Giuliani visited Campaign headquarters to discuss election litigation,
the Trump Campaign’s professional staff began to view him as unhinged.74
In addition, multiple law firms previously engaged to work for the Trump
Campaign decided that they could not participate in the strategy being
instituted by Giuliani. They quit. Campaign General Counsel Matthew Mor-
gan explained that he had conversations with “probably all of our counsel
who [we]re signed up to assist on election day as they disengaged with the
campaign.” 75 The “general consensus was that the law firms were not
comfortable making the arguments that Rudy Giuliani was making pub-
licly.” 76 When asked how many outside firms expressed this concern, Mor-
gan recalled having “a similar conversation with most all of them.” 77
Stepien grew so wary of the new team that he locked Giuliani out of
his office:
Committee Staff: Yeah. I’m getting the sense from listening to you
here for a few hours that you sort of chose to pull back, that you
were uncomfortable with what Mr. Giuliani and others were saying
and doing and, therefore, you were purposefully stepping back from
a day-to-day role as the leader of the campaign. Is that—I don’t
want to put words in your mouth. Is that accurate?
Stepien: That’s accurate. That’s accurate. You know, I had my assis-
tant -- it was a big glass kind of wall office in our headquarters, and
I had my assistant lock my door. I told her, don’t let anyone in. You
know, I’ll be around when I need to be around. You know, tell me
what I need to know. Tell me what’s going on here, but, you know,
you’re going to see less of me.
And, you know, sure enough, you know, Mayor Giuliani tried to, you
know, get in my office and ordered her to unlock the door, and she
didn’t do that, you know. She’s, you know, smart about that. But
your words are ones I agree with.78
Over the weeks that followed, dozens of judges across the country spe-
cifically rejected the allegations of fraud and irregularities being advanced
18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
by the Trump team and their allies. For example, courts described the argu-
ments as “an amalgamation of theories, conjecture, and speculation,”
“allegations … sorely wanting of relevant or reliable evidence,” “strained
legal arguments without merit,” assertions that “did not prove by any
standard of proof that any illegal votes were cast and counted,” and even a
“fundamental and obvious misreading of the Constitution.” 79
Reflecting back on this period, Trump Campaign Communications
Director Tim Murtaugh texted colleagues in January 2021 about a news
report that the New York State Bar was considering expelling Rudolph Giu-
liani over the Ellipse rally: “Why wouldn’t they expel him based solely on
the outrageous lies he told for 2 1/2 months?” 80
This is exactly what ultimately came to pass. When suspending his
license, a New York court said that Giuliani “communicated demonstrably
false and misleading statements to courts, lawmakers and the public at
large in his capacity as lawyer for former President Donald J. Trump and the
Trump campaign in connection with Trump’s failed effort at reelection in
2020.” 81 The court added that “[t]he seriousness of [Giuliani’s] uncontro-
verted misconduct cannot be overstated.” 82
Other Trump lawyers were sanctioned for making outlandish claims of
election fraud without the evidence to back them up, including Sidney Pow-
ell, Lin Wood and seven other pro-Trump lawyers in a case that a Federal
judge described as “a historic and profound abuse of the judicial process”:
It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights associated
with an allegedly fraudulent election. It is another to take on the
charge of deceiving a federal court and the American people into
believing that rights were infringed, without regard to whether any
laws or rights were in fact violated. This is what happened here.83
A group of prominent Republicans have more recently issued a report—
titled Lost, Not Stolen—examining “every count of every case brought in
these six battleground states” by President Trump and his allies. The report
concludes “that Donald Trump and his supporters had their day in court
and failed to produce substantive evidence to make their case.” 84 President
Trump and his legal allies “failed because of a lack of evidence and not
because of erroneous rulings or unfair judges . . . . In many cases, after
making extravagant claims of wrongdoing, Trump’s legal representatives
showed up in court or state proceedings empty-handed, and then returned
to their rallies and media campaigns to repeat the same unsupported
claims.” 85
There is no reasonable basis for the allegation that these dozens of rul-
ings by State and Federal courts were somehow politically motivated.86 The
outcome of these suits was uniform regardless of who appointed the judges.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19

One of the authors of Lost, Not Stolen, longtime Republican election lawyer
Benjamin Ginsberg, testified before the Select Committee that “in no
instance did a court find that the charges of fraud were real,” without
variation based on the judges involved.87 Indeed, eleven of the judges who
ruled against Donald Trump and his supporters were appointed by Donald
Trump himself.
One of those Trump nominees, Judge Stephanos Bibas of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rejected an appeal by the Trump Campaign
claiming that Pennsylvania officials “did not undertake any meaningful
effort” to fight illegal absentee ballots and uneven treatment of voters
across counties.88 Judge Bibas wrote in his decision that “calling an election
unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations and then
proof. We have neither here.” 89 Another Trump nominee, Judge Brett Lud-
wig of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, ruled against President Trump’s
lawsuit alleging that the result was skewed by illegal procedures that gov-
erned drop boxes, ballot address information, and individuals who claimed
“indefinitely confined” status to vote from home.90 Judge Ludwig wrote in
his decision, that “[t]his Court has allowed plaintiff the chance to make his
case and he has lost on the merits” because the procedures used “do not
remotely rise to the level” of breaking Wisconsin’s election rules.91
Nor is it true that these rulings focused solely on standing, or proce-
dural issues. As Ginsberg confirmed in his testimony to the Select Commit-
tee, President Trump’s team “did have their day in court.” 92 Indeed, he and
his co-authors determined in their report that 30 of these post-election
cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary hearing had been held,
and many of these judges explicitly indicated in their decisions that the evi-
dence presented by the plaintiffs was wholly insufficient on the merits.93
Ultimately, even Rudolph Giuliani and his legal team acknowledged that
they had no definitive evidence of election fraud sufficient to change the
election outcome. For example, although Giuliani repeatedly had claimed in
public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, he admitted during
his Select Committee deposition that “I do not think the machines stole the
election.” 94 An attorney representing his lead investigator, Bernard Kerik,
declared in a letter to the Select Committee that “it was impossible for
Kerik and his team to determine conclusively whether there was widespread
fraud or whether that widespread fraud would have altered the outcome of
the election.” 95 Kerik also emailed President Trump’s chief of staff on
December 28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the investigations we want
later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators that have to
be moved and this will do just that.” 96 Other Trump lawyers and support-
ers, Jenna Ellis, John Eastman, Phil Waldron, and Michael Flynn, all
invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
20 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Rudolph Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, and other hold a press conference at Four Seasons Total
Landscaping on November 7, 2020 falsely claiming Donald Trump had won the state of
Pennsylvania.
(Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images)

asked by the Select Committee what supposed proof they uncovered that
the election was stolen.97 Not a single witness--nor any combination of
witnesses--provided the Select Committee with evidence demonstrating
that fraud occurred on a scale even remotely close to changing the outcome
in any State.98
By mid-December 2020, Donald Trump had come to what most of his
staff believed was the end of the line. The Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit
he supported filed by the State of Texas in the Supreme Court, and Donald
Trump had this exchange, according to Special Assistant to the President
Cassidy Hutchinson:
The President was fired up about the Supreme Court decision. And so
I was standing next to [Chief of Staff Mark] Meadows, but I had
stepped back . . . The President [was] just raging about the decision
and how it’s wrong, and why didn’t we make more calls, and just this
typical anger outburst at this decision . . . And the President said I
think—so he had said something to the effect of, “I don’t want
people to know we lost, Mark. This is embarrassing. Figure it out. We
need to figure it out. I don’t want people to know that we lost.” 99
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21

On December 14, 2020, the Electoral College met to cast and certify each
State’s electoral votes. By this time, many of President Trump’s senior staff,
and certain members of his family, were urging him to concede that he had lost.
Labor Secretary Gene Scalia told the Committee that he called President
Trump around this time and gave him such feedback quite directly:
[S]o, I had put a call in to the President—I might have called on the
13th; we spoke, I believe, on the 14th—in which I conveyed to him that
I thought that it was time for him to acknowledge that President
Biden had prevailed in the election . . . . But I communicated to the
President that when that legal process is exhausted and when the
electors have voted, that that’s the point at which that outcome needs
to be expected . . . . And I told him that I did believe, yes, that once
those legal processes were run, if fraud had not been established that
had affected the outcome of the election, that, unfortunately, I
believed that what had to be done was concede the outcome.100
Deputy White House Press Secretary Judd Deere also told President
Trump that he should concede. He recalled other staffers advising President
Trump at some point to concede and that he “encouraged him to do it at
least once after the electoral college met in mid-December.” 101 White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone also believed that President Trump should
concede: “[I]f your question is did I believe he should concede the election
at a point in time, yes, I did.” 102
Attorney General Barr told the Select Committee this: “And in my view,
that [the December 14 electoral college vote] was the end of the matter. I
didn’t see—you know, I thought that this would lead inexorably to a new
administration. I was not aware at that time of any theory, you know, why
this could be reversed. And so I felt that the die was cast . . . .” 103
Barr also told the Committee that he suggested several weeks earlier
that the President’s efforts in this regard needed to come to an end soon, in
conversation with several White House officials after his meeting with
Trump on November 23rd:
[A]s I walked out of the Oval Office, Jared was there with Dan
Scavino, who ran the President’s social media and who I thought
was a reasonable guy and believe is a reasonable guy. And I said,
how long is he going to carry on with this ‘stolen election’ stuff?
Where is this going to go?
And by that time, Meadows had caught up with me and—leaving the
office, and caught up to me and said that—he said, look, I think that
he’s becoming more realistic and knows that there’s a limit to how
far he can take this. And then Jared said, you know, yeah, we’re
working on this, we’re working on it.104
22 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite all that Donald Trump was being told, he continued to purposely
and maliciously make false claims. To understand the very stark differences
between what he was being told and what he said publicly and in fundraising
solicitations, the Committee has assembled the following examples.

Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey President Trump one week later

Rosen (12/15/20): (12/22/20):
“And so he said, ‘Well, what about “There is even security cam-
this? I saw it on the videotape, some- era footage from Georgia that
body delivering a suitcase of ballots.’ shows officials telling poll
And we said, ‘It wasn’t a suitcase. It watchers to leave the room
was a bin. That’s what they use when before pulling suitcases of
they’re counting ballots. It’s ballots out from under the
benign.’” 105 tables and continuing to count
for hours.” 106

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump later that

Donoghue (12/27 & 12/31/20): week (1/2/21):
“I told the President myself that several “[S]he stuffed the machine.
times, in several conversations, that She stuffed the ballot. Each
these allegations about ballots being ballot went three times, they
smuggled in in a suitcase and run were showing: Here’s ballot
through the machine several times, it number one. Here it is a sec-
was not true, that we looked at it, we ond time, third time, next
looked at the video, we interviewed the ballot.” 108
witnesses, that it was not true . . . . I
believe it was in the phone call on
December 27th. It was also in a meeting
in the Oval Office on December 31st.” 107

GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump one day later

(1/2/21): (1/3/21):
“You’re talking about the State Farm “I spoke to Secretary of State
video. And I think it’s extremely unfor- Brad Raffensperger yesterday
tunate that Rudy Giuliani or his people, about Fulton County and voter
they sliced and diced that video and fraud in Georgia. He was
took it out of context.” . . . “[W]e did an unwilling, or unable, to answer
audit of that and we proved conclu- questions such as the ‘ballots
sively that they were not scanned three under table’ scam, ballot
times. . . . Yes, Mr. President, we’ll send destruction, out of state ‘vot-
you the link from WSB.” ers’, dead voters, and more. He
[Trump]: “I don’t care about a link. I has no clue!” 110
don’t need it.” 109
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23

Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): President Trump one day later

“Then he raised the ‘big vote dump,’ as (12/2/20):
he called it, in Detroit. And, you know, “I’ll tell you what’s wrong,
he said, people saw boxes coming into voter fraud. Here’s an example.
the counting station at all hours of the This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the
morning and so forth…. I said, ‘Mr. morning, a vote dump of
President, there are 630 precincts in 149,772 votes came in unex-
Detroit, and unlike elsewhere in the pectedly. We were winning by a
State, they centralize the counting pro- lot. That batch was received in
cess, so they’re not counted in each horror. . . . In Detroit everybody
precinct, they’re moved to counting saw the tremendous conflict . . .
stations, and so the normal process there were more votes than
would involve boxes coming in at all there were voters.” 112
different hours.’ And I said, ‘Did any-
one point out to you—did all the people
complaining about it point out to you,
you actually did better in Detroit than
you did last time? I mean, there’s no
indication of fraud in Detroit.’” 111

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump ten days later
Donoghue (12/27/20): (1/6/21):
“The President then continued, there “More votes than they had
are ‘more votes than voters…’. But I voters. And many other States
was aware of that allegation, and I said, also.” 114
you know, that was just a matter of
them ‘comparing the 2020 votes cast to
2016 registration numbers.’ That is ‘not
a valid complaint.’” 113

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump three days

Donoghue (1/3/21): later (1/6/21):
“[W]e would say to him, you know, “In Pennsylvania, you had
‘We checked that out, and there’s 205,000 more votes than you
nothing to it. . . . And we would cite to had voters. And the number is
certain allegations. And so—like such actually much greater than
as Pennsylvania, right. ‘No, there were that now. That was as of a
not 250,000 more votes reported than week ago. And this is a math-
were actually cast. That’s not true.’ So ematical impossibility unless
we would say things like that.” 115 you want to say it’s a total
fraud.” 116
24 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump two days later

(1/2/21): (1/4/21):
[Trump]: “[I]t’s 4,502 who voted, but “4,502 illegal ballots were
they weren’t on the voter registration cast by individuals who do not
roll, which they had to be. You had appear on the state’s voter
18,325 vacant address voters. The ad- rolls. Well, that’s sort of
dress was vacant, and they’re not strange. 18,325 illegal ballots
allowed to be counted. That’s were cast by individuals who
18,325.” . . . registered to vote using an
[Raffensperger]: “Well, Mr. President, address listed as vacant
the challenge that you have is the data according to the postal ser-
you have is wrong.” 117 vice.” 118

GA Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger President Trump four days later

(1/2/21): (1/6/21):
[Trump]: “So dead people voted, and I “[T]he number of fraudulent
think the number is close to 5,000 ballots that we've identified
people. And they went to obituaries. across the state is staggering.
They went to all sorts of methods to Over 10,300 ballots in Georgia
come up with an accurate number, and were cast by individuals
a minimum is close to about 5,000 whose names and dates of
voters.” . . . birth match Georgia residents
[Raffensperger]: “The actual number who died in 2020 and prior to
were two. Two. Two people that were the election.” 120
dead that voted. So that’s wrong.” 119

GA Sec. State General Counsel Ryan President Trump four days later
Germany (1/2/21): (1/6/21):
[Trump]: “You had out-of-state voters. “And at least 15,000 ballots
They voted in Georgia, but they were were cast by individuals who
from out of state, of 4,925.” . . . [Ger- moved out of the state prior to
many]: “Every one we’ve been through November 3rd election. They
are people that lived in Georgia, moved say they moved right
to a different state, but then moved back.” 122
back to Georgia legitimately.” . . . “They
moved back in years ago. This was not
like something just before the election.
So there’s something about that data
that, it’s just not accurate.” 121
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25

White House Press Secretary Kayleigh President Trump:

McEnany (n.d.): Between mid-November and
“[T]he one specific I remember refer- January 5, 2021, President
encing was I don’t agree with the Trump tweeted or retweeted
Dominion track.” . . . “I specifically conspiracy theories about
referenced waving him off of the Domin- Dominion nearly three dozen
ion theory earlier in my testimony.” . . . times.124
[Q] “Are you saying you think he still
continued to tweet that after you
waved him off of it?”
[A] “Yeah . . .” 123
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason President Trump:
Miller: “You have Dominion, which is
“…the international allegations for very, very suspect to start off
Dominion were not valid.” with. Nobody knows the own-
[Q] “Okay. Did anybody communicate ership. People say the votes
that to the President?” are counted in foreign coun-
[A]: “I know that that was—I know tries and much worse…” 126
that was communicated. I know I
communicated it” 125

Attorney General Barr (11/23/20): President Trump three days

“I specifically raised the Dominion vot- later (11/26/20):
ing machines, which I found to be one “[T]hose machines are fixed,
of the most disturbing allegations— they’re rigged. You can press
‘disturbing’ in the sense that I saw Trump and the vote goes to
absolutely zero basis for the allegations Biden. . . . All you have to do is
. . . I told him that it was crazy stuff and play with a chip, and they
they were wasting their time on that played with a chip, especially
and it was doing great, great disservice in Wayne County and
to the country.” 127 Detroit.” 128

Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): President Trump one day later

“I explained, I said, look, if you have a (12/2/20):
machine and it counts 500 votes for “In one Michigan County, as
Biden and 500 votes for Trump, and an example, that used Domin-
then you go back later and you have ion systems, they found that
a—you will have the 1,000 pieces of nearly 6,000 votes had been
paper put through that machine, and wrongly switched from Trump
you can see if there’s any discrep- to Biden, and this is just the
ancy . . . there has been no discrep- tip of the iceberg. This is what
ancy.” 129 we caught. How many didn’t
we catch?” 130
26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Attorney General Barr (12/14/20): “‘I President Trump one day later
will, Mr. President. But there are a (12/15/20):
couple of things,’ I responded. ‘My “This is BIG NEWS. Dominion
understanding is that our experts have Voting Machines are a disaster
looked at the Antrim situation and are all over the Country. Changed
sure it was a human error that did not the results of a landslide
occur anywhere else. And, in any election. Can’t let this
event, Antrim is doing a hand recount happen. . . .” 132
of the paper ballots, so we should
know in a couple of days whether
there is any real problem with the
machines.’ ” 131

Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey President Trump one day later

Rosen (12/15/20): (12/16/20):
“[O]ther people were telling him there “ ‘Study: Dominion Machines
was fraud, you know, corruption in shifted 2-3% of Trump Votes
the election. The voting machines to Biden. Far more votes than
were no good. And we were telling him needed to sway election.’
that is inconsistent, by ‘we,’ I mean Florida, Ohio, Texas and many
Richard Donoghue and myself, that other states were won by even
that was not what we were seeing.” . . . greater margins than pro-
“There was this open issue as to the jected. Did just as well with
Michigan report. And—I think it was Swing States, but bad things
Mr. Cuccinelli, not certain, but had happened. @OANN” 134
indicated that there was a hand
recount. And I think he said, ‘That's
the gold standard.’ ” 133

National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien President Trump one day later
(12/18/20): (12/19/20):
“I got a call from, I think, Molly “. . . There could also have
Michael in outer oval, the President’s been a hit on our ridiculous
assistant, and she said, ‘I’m connect- voting machines during the
ing you to the Oval’ . . . somebody election, which is now obvious
asked me, was there—did I have any that I won big, making it an
evidence of election fraud in the vot- even more corrupted embar-
ing machines or foreign interference rassment for the USA. @DNI-
in our voting machines. And I said, no, _Ratcliffe @SecPompeo”136
we’ve looked into that and there’s no
evidence of it.” 135
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 27

Acting Deputy AG Richard Donoghue President Trump two days later

(12/31/20): (1/2/21):
“We definitely talked about Antrim “Well, Brad. Not that there’s
County again. That was sort of done at not an issue, because we have
that point, because the hand recount a big issue with Dominion in
had been done and all of that. But we other states and perhaps in
cited back to that to say, you know, yours. . . . in other states, we
this is an example of what people are think we found tremendous
telling you and what’s being filed in corruption with Dominion
some of these court filings that are machines, but we’ll have to
just not supported by the evi- see.” . . . “I won’t give
dence.” 137 Dominion a pass because we
found too many bad
things.” 138
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump four days later
(1/2/21): (1/6/21):
“I don’t believe that you’re really “In addition, there is the
questioning the Dominion machines. highly troubling matter of
Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 Dominion Voting Systems. In
percent re-tally of all the ballots, and one Michigan county alone,
compared them to what the machines 6,000 votes were switched
said and came up with virtually the from Trump to Biden and the
same result. Then we did the recount, same systems are used in the
and we got virtually the same majority of states in our coun-
result.” 139 try.” . . . “There is clear evi-
dence that tens of thousands
of votes were switched from
President Trump to former
Vice President Biden in several
counties in Georgia.” 140

Evidence gathered by the Committee indicates that President Trump

raised roughly one quarter of a billion dollars in fundraising efforts
between the election and January 6th.141 Those solicitations persistently
claimed and referred to election fraud that did not exist. For example, the
Trump Campaign, along with the Republican National Committee, sent
millions of emails to their supporters, with messaging claiming that the
election was “rigged,” that their donations could stop Democrats from
28 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Taped footage of William Barr speaking to the January 6th Select Committee is shown at
one of its hearings.
(Photo by Mandel Ngan-Pool/Getty Images)

“trying to steal the election,” and that Vice President Biden would be an
“illegitimate president” if he took office.
Ultimately, Attorney General Barr suggested that the Department of
Justice’s investigations disproving President Trump’s fraud claims may
have prevented an even more serious series of events:
[F]rankly, I think the fact that I put myself in the position that I
could say that we had looked at this and didn’t think there was
fraud was really important to moving things forward. And I sort of
shudder to think what the situation would have been if the position
of the Department was, “We’re not even looking at this until after
Biden’s in office.” I’m not sure we would’ve had a transition at
all.142

RATHER THAN CONCEDE, DONALD TRUMP CHOOSES TO OBSTRUCT THE JANUARY 6TH
PROCEEDING
President Trump disregarded the rulings of the courts and rejected the
findings and conclusions and advice from his Justice Department, his cam-
paign experts, and his White House and Cabinet advisors. He chose instead
to try to overturn the election on January 6th and took a series of very spe-
cific steps to attempt to achieve that result.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 29

A central element of Donald Trump’s plan to overturn the election

relied upon Vice President Mike Pence. As Vice President, Pence served as
the President of the Senate, the presiding officer for the joint session of
Congress on January 6th. Beginning in December, and with greater fre-
quency as January 6th approached, Trump repeatedly and unlawfully pres-
sured Pence in private and public to prevent Congress from counting lawful
electoral votes from several States.
To understand the plan President Trump devised with attorney and law
professor John Eastman, it is necessary to understand the constitutional
structure for selecting our President.
At the Constitutional Convention 233 years ago, the framers considered
but rejected multiple proposals that Congress itself vote to select the Presi-
dent of the United States.143 Indeed the Framers voiced very specific con-
cerns with Congress selecting the President. They viewed it as important
that the electors, chosen for the specific purpose of selecting the President,
should make the determination rather than Congress:
It was desireable, that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be con-
fided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making
it, not to any pre-established body, but to men, chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.144
The Framers understood that a thoughtful structure for the appoint-
ment of the President was necessary to avoid certain evils: “Nothing was
more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed
to cabal, intrigue and corruption.” 145 They were careful to ensure that
“those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the
president in office” “were not among those that chose the president.” 146
For that reason, “[n]o senator, representative, or other person holding a
place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the number of the
electors.” 147
Article II of our Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth Amendment,
governs election of the President. Article II created the electoral college,
providing that the States would select electors in the manner provided by
State legislatures, and those electors would in turn vote for the President.
Today, every State selects Presidential electors by popular vote, and each
State’s laws provide for procedures to resolve election disputes, including
through lawsuits if necessary. After any election issues are resolved in State
or Federal court, each State’s government transmits a certificate of the
ascertainment of the appointed electors to Congress and the National
Archives.
30 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The electoral college meets in mid-December to cast their votes, and
all of these electoral votes are then ultimately counted by Congress on
January 6th. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, presides over
the joint session of Congress to count votes. The Twelfth Amendment
provides this straight forward instruction: “The president of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; The person having the
greatest number of votes for President shall be the President…” The Vice
President has only a ministerial role, opening the envelopes and ensuring
that the votes are counted. Likewise, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 pro-
vides no substantive role for the Vice President in counting votes, rein-
forcing that he or she can only act in a ministerial fashion—the Vice
President may not choose, for example, to decline to count particular
votes. In most cases (e.g., when one candidate has a majority of votes sub-
mitted by the States) Congress has only a ministerial role, as well. It simply
counts electoral college votes provided by each State’s governor. Congress
is not a court and cannot overrule State and Federal court rulings in elec-
tion challenges.
As January 6th approached, John Eastman and others devised a plan
whereby Vice President Pence would, as the presiding officer, declare that
certain electoral votes from certain States could not be counted at the
joint session.148 John Eastman knew before proposing this plan that it
was not legal. Indeed, in a pre-election document discussing Congress’s
counting of electoral votes, Dr. Eastman specifically disagreed with a col-
league’s proposed argument that the Vice President had the power to
choose which envelopes to “open” and which votes to “count.” Dr. East-
man wrote:

I don’t agree with this. The 12th Amendment only says that the
President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint session then,
in the passive voice, that the votes shall then be counted. 3 USC § 12
[of the Electoral Count Act] says merely that he is the presiding
officer, and then it spells out specific procedures, presumptions,
and default rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it
suggest that the president of the Senate gets to make the determi-
nation on his own. § 15 [of the Electoral Count Act] doesn’t
either.149
Despite recognizing prior to the 2020 election that the Vice President
had no power to refuse to count certain electoral votes, Eastman neverthe-
less drafted memoranda two months later proposing that Pence could do
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 31

exactly that on January 6th—refuse to count certified electoral votes from

Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wis-
consin.150
Eastman’s theory was related to other efforts overseen by President
Trump (described in detail below, see infra) to create and transmit fake
electoral slates to Congress and the National Archives, and to pressure
States to change the election outcome and issue new electoral slates.
Eastman supported these ideas despite writing two months earlier that:

Article II [of the Constitution] says the electors are appointed “in
such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” but I don’t
think that entitles the Legislature to change the rules after the elec-
tion and appoint a different slate of electors in a manner different
than what was in place on election day. And 3 U.S.C. §15 [of the
Electoral Count Act] gives dispositive weight to the slate of electors
that was certified by the Governor in accord with 3 U.S.C. §5.151
Even after Eastman proposed the theories in his December and January
memoranda, he acknowledged in conversations with Vice President Pence’s
counsel Greg Jacob that Pence could not lawfully do what his own memo-
randa proposed.152 Eastman admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court would
unanimously reject his legal theory. “He [Eastman] had acknowledged that
he would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.” 153 Moreover, Eastman acknowl-
edged to Jacob that he didn’t think Vice President Al Gore had that power in
2001, nor did he think Vice President Kamala Harris should have that power
in 2025.154
In testimony before the Select Committee, Jacob described in detail why
the Trump plan for Pence was illegal:
[T]he Vice President’s first instinct, when he heard this theory, was
that there was no way that our Framers, who abhorred concentrated
power, who had broken away from the tyranny of George III, would
ever have put one person—particularly not a person who had a
direct interest in the outcome because they were on the ticket for
the election—in a role to have decisive impact on the outcome of
the election. And our review of text, history, and, frankly, just com-
mon sense, all confirmed the Vice President’s first instinct on that
point. There is no justifiable basis to conclude that the Vice Presi-
dent has that kind of authority.155
This is how the Vice President later described his views in a public
speech:
I had no right to overturn the election. The Presidency belongs to
the American people, and the American people alone. And frankly,
32 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
there is no idea more un-American than the notion that any one
person could choose the American President. Under the Constitu-
tion, I had no right to change the outcome of our election.156
But as January 6th approached, President Trump nevertheless embraced
the new Eastman theories, and attempted to implement them. In a series of
meetings and calls, President Trump attempted to pressure Pence to inter-
vene on January 6th to prevent Congress from counting multiple States’
electoral votes for Joe Biden. At several points in the days before January
6th, President Trump was told directly that Vice President Pence could not
legally do what Trump was asking. For example, at a January 4th meeting in
the Oval Office, Eastman acknowledged that any variation of his proposal—
whether rejecting electoral votes outright or delaying certification to send
them back to the States—would violate several provisions of the Electoral
Count Act. According to Greg Jacob:

In the conversation in the Oval Office on the 4th, I had raised the
fact that . . . [Eastman’s] preferred course had issues with the Elec-
toral Count Act, which he had acknowledged was the case, that
there would be an inconsistency with the Electoral Count Act[ ]157

Jacob recorded Eastman’s admission in an internal memo he drafted for

Vice President Pence on the evening of January 4th: “Professor Eastman
acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory
law.” 158 And, during a phone call with President Trump and Eastman on the
evening of January 5, 2021, Eastman again acknowledged that his proposal
also would violate several provisions of the Electoral Count Act.

[W]e did have an in-depth discussion about [the Electoral Count

Act] in the subsequent phone calls as I walked him through provi-
sion after provision on the recess and on the fact that . . . Congress-
men and Senators are supposed to get to object and debate. And he
acknowledged, one after another, that those provisions would—in
order for us to send it back to the States, we couldn’t do those
things as well. We can’t do a 10-day, send it back to the States, and
honor an Electoral Count Act provision that says you can’t recess for
more than one day and, once you get to the 5th, you have to stay
continuously in session.159

As Pence’s Chief of Staff, Marc Short, testified that the Vice President
also repeatedly informed President Trump that the Vice President’s role on
January 6th was only ministerial.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 33

Committee Staff: But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it your
impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his posi-
tion on these issues to the President, not just to the world through a
Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to President Trump?
Marc Short: Many times.
Committee Staff: And had been consistent in conveying his position
to the President?
Short: Very consistent. 160
As the situation grew increasingly acrimonious, Vice President Pence’s
private counsel Richard Cullen contacted former Fourth Circuit Judge
Michael Luttig, a renowned conservative judge for whom Eastman had pre-
viously clerked, and asked Luttig to make a public statement. On January
5th, Luttig wrote the following on Twitter: “The only responsibility and
power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the
electoral college votes as they have been cast.” 161 As Judge Luttig testified
in the Committee’s hearings, “there was no basis in the Constitution or
laws of the United States at all for the theory espoused by Eastman—at all.
None.” 162 Judge Luttig completely rejected Eastman’s “blueprint to over-
turn the 2020 election” as “constitutional mischief” and ‘the most reck-
less, insidious, and calamitous failure[ ] in both legal and political
judgment in American history.” 163
Contemporaneous written correspondence also confirms both that: (1)
Eastman himself recognized Pence could not lawfully refuse to count elec-
toral votes, and (2) President Trump also knew this. While sheltering in a
loading dock with the Vice President during the violent January 6th attack,
Greg Jacob asked Eastman in an email, “Did you advise the President that in
your professional judgment the Vice President DOES NOT have the power to
decide things unilaterally?” Eastman’s response stated that the President
had “been so advised,” but then indicated that President Trump continued
to pressure the Vice President to act illegally: “But you know him—once he
gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to change course.” 164
To be absolutely clear, no White House lawyer believed Pence could
lawfully refuse to count electoral votes. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone
told the Select Committee this:
I thought that the Vice President did not have the authority to do
what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law. I con-
veyed that, ok? I think I actually told somebody, you know, in the
Vice President’s—“Just blame me.” You know this is—I’m not a
politician, you know . . . but, you know, I just said, “I’m a lawyer.
This is my legal opinion.” 165
34 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Greg Jacob and Judge Michael Luttig testify at January 6th Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by House Creative Services)

Cipollone also testified that he was “sure [he] conveyed” his views.166
Indeed, other testimony from Cipollone indicates that Trump knew of
Cipollone’s view and suggests that Trump purposely excluded Cipollone
from the meeting with Pence and Pence’s General Counsel on January
4th.167 Indeed, at one point, Cipollone confronted Eastman in the hallway
outside the Oval Office and expressed his disapproval of and anger with
Eastman’s position. According to Jason Miller, “Pat Cipollone thought the
idea was nutty and had at one point confronted Eastman basically with the
same sentiment” outside the Oval Office.168 Pat Cipollone did not deny hav-
ing an angry confrontation with Eastman outside of the Oval Office—
though he said he didn’t have a specific recollection, he had no reason to
contradict what Jason Miller said and, moreover, said that Eastman was
aware of his views.169
Likewise, Eric Herschmann, another White House lawyer, expressed the
same understanding that Eastman’s plan “obviously made no sense” and
“had no practical ability to work.” 170 Herschmann also recounted telling
Eastman directly that his plan was “completely crazy”:
And I said to [Eastman], hold on a second, I want to understand
what you’re saying. You’re saying you believe the Vice President,
acting as President of the Senate, can be the sole decisionmaker as
to, under your theory, who becomes the next President of the
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 35

United States? And he said, yes. And I said, are you out of your F’ing
mind, right. And that was pretty blunt. I said, you’re completely
crazy. 171
Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin also had the same understand-
ing.172 Indeed, as Herschmann testified, even Rudolph Giuliani doubted that
Vice President Mike Pence had any legal ability to do what Eastman had
proposed.173
Despite all this opposition from all White House lawyers, Trump never-
theless continued to exert immense pressure on Pence to refuse to count
electoral votes.
The pressure began before the January 4th Oval Office meeting with
Pence, Eastman, Jacob, Short and Trump, but became even more intense
thereafter. On the evening of January 5, 2021, the New York Times pub-
lished an article reporting that “Vice President Mike Pence told President
Trump on Tuesday that he did not believe he had the power to block con-
gressional certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s victory in the Presidential
election despite President Trump’s baseless insistence that he did.” 174 This
reporting was correct—both as to the Vice President’s power and as to Vice
President Pence having informed President Trump that he did not have the
authority to change the outcome of the election. But in response to that
story, late in the evening before the January 6th joint session, President
Trump dictated to Jason Miller a statement falsely asserting, “The Vice
President and I are in total agreement that the Vice President has the power
to act.” 175 This statement was released at President Trump’s direction and
was false.176
Thereafter, Trump continued to apply public pressure in a series of
tweets. At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, “[i]f Vice President @Mike_Pence
comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to
decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent
numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it
must be). Mike can send it back!” 177 At 8:17 a.m. on January 6th, he tweeted
again: “States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based
on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative
approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE
WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!” 178
President Trump tried to reach the Vice President early in the morning
of January 6th, but the Vice President did not take the call. The President
finally reached the Vice President later that morning, shouting from the
Oval Office to his assistants to “get the Vice President on the phone.” 179
After again telling the Vice President that he had “the legal authority to
send [electoral votes] back to the respective states,” President Trump grew
very heated.180 Witnesses in the Oval Office during this call told the Select
36 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Trump speaks with Vice President Pence over the phone in the Oval Office on the
morning of January 6th.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

Committee that the President called Vice President Pence a “wimp,” 181 told
him it would be “a political career killer” to certify the lawful electoral
votes electing President Biden,182 and accused him of “not [being] tough
enough to make the call.” 183 As Ivanka Trump would recount to her chief of
staff moments later, her father called the Vice President “the p-word” for
refusing to overturn the election.184
In response, Vice President Pence again refused to take any action other
than counting the lawfully certified electoral votes of the States. But Presi-
dent Trump was angry and undeterred. After the conclusion of this call, he
edited his speech for the Ellipse to insert language to which his lawyers
objected—targeting Vice President Pence directly.185
Earlier that morning, Eric Herschmann had tried to remove the refer-
ence to Vice President Pence from the speech. As he told speechwriter Ste-
phen Miller, he “didn’t concur with the legal analysis” that John Eastman
had advanced and believed it “wouldn’t advance the ball” to discuss it pub-
licly.186 But after the call with Vice President Pence, speechwriters were
instructed to reinsert the line. Although the final written draft of his speech
referred to Pence just once—a line President Trump didn’t end up
reading187—the President went off-script five different times to pressure
the Vice President:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 37

“I hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so. Because if Mike
Pence does the right thing, we win the election,” Trump first told the
crowd.188
“Mike Pence is going to have to come through for us,” Trump later
said, “and if he doesn’t, that will be a, a sad day for our country because
you’re sworn to uphold our Constitution.” 189
Addressing Pence directly, Trump told the assembled crowd: “Mike
Pence, I hope you’re going to stand up for the good of our Constitution and
for the good of our country.” Trump said at another point, “And if you’re
not, I’m going to be very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now. I’m
not hearing good stories.” 190
“So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he
doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s listening to,”
Trump said.191
These statements to the assembled crowd at the Ellipse had Trump’s
intended effect—they produced substantial anger against Pence. When
Pence released a statement confirming that he would not act to prevent
Congress from counting electoral votes, the crowd’s reaction was harshly
negative.
“I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence—hearing the Pence
just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m hear — I’m hearing
reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m telling you, if Pence caved,
we’re going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking
politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.” 192
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: “Ok. And that’s when all
this started?”] Yup. That’s when we marched on the Capitol. 193
“We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent
electoral votes. [Other speaker: “Boo. You’re a traitor!”] That's
right. You’ve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United
States of America. [Other speaker: “Fuck you, Mike Pence!”] Mike
Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of
the United States and we will never, ever forget.” [Cheers]194
“This woman cames [sic] up to the side of us and she says Pence
folded. So it was kind of, like, Ok, well — in my mind I was think-
ing, well that’s it. You know. Well, my son-in-law looks at me and
he says I want to go in.” 195
“[Q] “What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol?” [A]
[Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: “One hundred percent. It has, it has
spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybody’s
marching on the Capitol. All million of us. it’s insane.” 196
38 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence.
Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence.” 197
“Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike
Pence. Hang Mike Pence.” 198
Once Trump returned to the White House, he was informed almost
immediately that violence and lawlessness had broken out at the Capitol
among his supporters.199 At 2:24 p.m., President Trump applied yet further
pressure to Pence (see infra), posting a tweet accusing Vice President Mike
Pence of cowardice for not using his role as President of the Senate to
change the outcome of the election: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to
do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitu-
tion, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify.
USA demands the truth!” 200 Almost immediately thereafter, the crowd
around the Capitol surged, and more individuals joined the effort to con-
front police and break further into the building.
The sentiment expressed in President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet, already
present in the crowd, only grew more powerful as the President’s words
spread. Timothy Hale-Cusanelli—a white supremacist who expressed Nazi
sympathies—heard about the tweet while in the Crypt around 2:25 p.m.,
and he, according to the Department of Justice, “knew what that meant.”
Vice President Pence had decided not to keep President Trump in power.201
Other rioters described what happened next as follows:
Once we found out Pence turned on us and that they had stolen the
election, like officially, the crowd went crazy. I mean, it became a
mob. We crossed the gate.202
Then we heard the news on [P]ence . . . And lost it . . . So we
stormed.203

They’re making an announcement right now saying if Pence betrays us

you better get your mind right because we’re storming that building.204
Minutes after the tweet—at 2:35 p.m.—rioters continued their surge
and broke a security line of the DC Metropolitan Police Department, result-
ing in the first fighting withdrawal in the history of that force.205
President Trump issued this tweet after he had falsely claimed to the
angry crowd that Vice President Mike Pence could “do the right thing” and
ensure a second Trump term, after that angry crowd had turned into a vio-
lent mob assaulting the Capitol while chanting, “Hang Mike Pence!” 206 and
after the U.S. Secret Service had evacuated the Vice President from the Sen-
ate floor.207 One minute after the President’s tweet, at 2:25 p.m., the Secret
Service determined they could no longer protect the Vice President in his
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 39

ceremonial office near the Senate Chamber, and evacuated the Vice Presi-
dent and his family to a secure location, missing the violent mob by a mere
40 feet.208
Further evidence presented at our hearing shows the violent reaction
following President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet and the efforts to protect Vice
President Pence in the time that followed.209
The day after the attack on the Capitol, Eastman called Eric Her-
schmann to talk about continuing litigation on behalf of the Trump Presi-
dential Campaign in Georgia. Herschmann described his reaction to
Eastman this way:
And I said to him, are you out of your F'ing mind? Right? I said,
because I only want to hear two words coming out of your mouth
from now on: Orderly transition. I said, I don't want to hear any
other F'ing words coming out of your mouth, no matter what, other
than orderly transition. Repeat those words to me.” 210
Herschmann concluded the call by telling Eastman: “Now I’m going to
give you the best free legal advice you’re ever getting in your life. Get a
great F’ing criminal defense lawyer, you’re going to need it,” and hanging
up the phone.211
In the course of investigating this series of facts, the Select Committee
subpoenaed Eastman’s emails from his employer, Chapman University.212
Eastman sued to prevent Chapman from producing the emails, arguing that
the emails were attorney-client privileged. Federal District Court Judge
David Carter reviewed Eastman’s emails in camera to determine, among
other things, whether the emails had to be produced because they likely
furthered a crime committed by one of Eastman’s clients or by Eastman
himself. In addition to reviewing the emails themselves, Judge Carter
reviewed substantial additional evidence presented by the Select Committee
and by Eastman.
After reciting a series of factual findings regarding President Trump’s
multi-part plan to overturn the election, Judge Carter concluded that Presi-
dent Trump likely violated two criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (cor-
ruptly obstructing, impeding or influencing Congress’s official proceeding
to count electoral votes); and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiring to defraud the
United States). The Court also concluded that John Eastman likely violated
at least one of these criminal laws. As to §1512(c), Judge Carter explained:
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that President Trump
likely knew the electoral count plan had no factual justification.
The plan not only lacked factual basis but also legal justification. . . .
40 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The illegality of the plan was obvious. Our nation was founded on
the peaceful transition of power, epitomized by George Washington
laying down his sword to make way for democratic elections. Ignor-
ing this history, President Trump vigorously campaigned for the
Vice President to single-handedly determine the results of the 2020
election. . . . Every American—and certainly the President of the
United States—knows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not
installed. With a plan this “BOLD,” President Trump knowingly
tried to subvert this fundamental principle. Based on the evidence,
the Court finds it more likely than not that President Trump cor-
ruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on Janu-
ary 6, 2021.213
As to 18 U.S.C. § 371, Judge Carter identified evidence demonstrating
that both President Trump and John Eastman knew their electoral count
plan was illegal, and knew it could not “survive judicial scrutiny” in any of
its iterations:
Dr. Eastman himself repeatedly recognized that his plan had no
legal support. . . . Dr. Eastman likely acted deceitfully and dishon-
estly each time he pushed an outcome-driven plan that he knew
was unsupported by the law.214
Finally, Judge Carter concluded:
Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to overturn
a democratic election, an action unprecedented in American history.
Their campaign was not confined to the ivory tower—it was a coup
in search of a legal theory. The plan spurred violent attacks on the
seat of our nation’s government, led to the deaths of several law
enforcement officers, and deepened public distrust in our political
process.215

Judge Luttig reached similar conclusions during his live hearing testi-
mony: “I have written, as you said, Chairman Thompson, that, today,
almost two years after that fateful day in January 2021, that, still, Donald
Trump and his allies and supporters are a clear and present danger to
American democracy.” 216
During the hearing, Judge Luttig took issue with certain of Greg Jacob’s
characterizations of the 12th Amendment’s text, explaining that the appli-
cable text was not ambiguous in any way. The Committee agrees with Judge
Luttig: the application of the Twelfth Amendment’s text is plain in this
context; it does not authorize Congress to second-guess State and Federal
courts and refuse to count State electoral votes based on concerns about
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 41

fraud. See infra. Although Jacob did not discuss his position in great detail
during the hearing, his private testimony gives more insight on his actual
views:
In my view, a lot has been said about the fact that the role of the
Vice President in the electoral count on January 6th is purely minis-
terial, and that is a correct conclusion. But if you look at the consti-
tutional text, the role of Congress is purely ministerial as well. You
open the certificates and you count them. Those are the only things
provided for in the Constitution.217

EFFORTS TO PRESSURE STATES TO CHANGE THE ELECTION OUTCOME, AND TO

CREATE AND TRANSMIT FAKE ELECTION CERTIFICATES
Anticipating that the Eastman strategy for January 6th would be imple-
mented, President Trump worked with a handful of others to prepare a
series of false Trump electoral slates for seven States Biden actually won.
President Trump personally conducted a teleconference with Eastman and
Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel “a few days before
December 14” and solicited the RNC’s assistance with the scheme.218
McDaniel agreed to provide that assistance.219
A series of contemporaneous documents demonstrate what President
Trump and his allies, including attorney Kenneth Chesebro, were attempt-
ing to accomplish: they anticipated that the President of the Senate (which,
under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could rely upon these false
slates of electors on January 6th to justify refusing to count genuine elec-
toral votes.220
The false slates were created by fake Republican electors on December
14th, at the same time the actual, certified electors in those States were
meeting to cast their States’ Electoral College votes for President Biden. By
that point in time, election-related litigation was over in all or nearly all of
the subject States, and Trump Campaign election lawyers realized that the
fake slates could not be lawful or justifiable on any grounds. Justin Clark,
the Trump Campaign Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel told
the Select Committee that he “had real problems with the process.” 221
Clark warned his colleagues, “unless we have litigation pending like in
these States, like, I don’t think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn’t
the right thing to do. I don’t remember how I phrased it, but I got into a
little bit of a back and forth and I think it was with Ken Chesebro, where I
said, ‘Alright, you know, you just get after it, like, I’m out.’ ” 222
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign General Counsel, told the Select
Committee that without an official State certificate of ascertainment,223
“the [fake] electors were, for lack of a better way of saying it, no good or
not—not valid.” 224
42 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Graphic depicting the difference between the real and the fake elector certificates.

The Office of White House Counsel also appears to have expressed con-
cerns with this fake elector plan. In his interview by the Select Committee,
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-
December, the process was “done” and that his deputy, Pat Philbin, may
have advised against the fake elector strategy.225 In an informal Committee
interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the “bad
theories” that were like “Whac-A-Mole” in the White House during this
period.226 Cipollone agreed with this characterization.227
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least
one member of the White House Counsel’s Office say that the plan was not
legal:
Committee Staff: [T]o be clear, did you hear the White House Coun-
sel’s Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and
cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not
legally sound?
Hutchinson: Yes, sir.228
Multiple Republicans who were persuaded to sign the fake certificates
also testified that they felt misled or betrayed, and would not have done so
had they known that the fake votes would be used on January 6th without
an intervening court ruling. One elector told the Select Committee that he
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43

thought his vote would be strictly contingent: “[I]t was a very consistent
message that we were told throughout all of that, is this is the only reason
why we’re doing this, is to preserve the integrity of being able to have a
challenge.” 229
The “Chairperson” of the Wisconsin fake electors, who was also at the
time Chairman of the Wisconsin Republican Party, insisted in testimony to
the Select Committee that he “was told that these would only count if a
court ruled in our favor” and that he wouldn’t have supported anyone using
the Trump electors’ votes without a court ruling.230
Despite the fact that all major election lawsuits thus far had failed,
President Trump and his co-conspirators in this effort, including John
Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro, pressed forward with the fake elector
scheme. Ultimately, these false electoral slates, five of which purported to
represent the “duly elected” electoral college votes of their States, were
transmitted to Executive Branch officials at the National Archives, and to
the Legislative Branch, including to the Office of the President of the Sen-
ate, Vice President Mike Pence.231
The fake electors followed Chesebro’s step-by-step instructions for
completing and mailing the fake certificates to multiple officials in the U.S.
Government,232 complete with registered mail stickers and return address
labels identifying senders like the “Arizona Republican Party” and the
“Georgia Republican Party.” 233 The Wisconsin Republican Party’s fake cer-
tificates apparently weren’t properly delivered, however, so the Trump
Campaign arranged to fly them to Washington just before the joint session
on January 6th, and try to deliver them to the Vice President via Senator
Ron Johnson and Representative Mike Kelly’s offices.234 Both Johnson and
Kelly’s offices attempted to do so, but Vice President Pence’s aide refused
the delivery.235
Despite pressure from President Trump, Vice President Pence and the
Senate parliamentarian refused to recognize or count the unofficial fake
electoral votes. Greg Jacob testified that he advised Vice President Pence on
January 2nd that “none of the slates that had been sent in would qualify as
an alternate slate” under the law and that the Senate Parliamentarian “was
in agreement” with this conclusion.236

* * *

In addition to this plan to create and transmit fake electoral slates,

Donald Trump was also personally and substantially involved in multiple
efforts to pressure State election officials and State legislatures to alter
official lawful election results. As U.S. District Judge Carter stated in his
June 7, 2022, opinion:
44 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dr. Eastman’s actions in these few weeks [in December 2020] indi-
cate that his and President Trump’s pressure campaign to stop the
electoral count did not end with Vice President Pence—it targeted
every tier of federal and state elected officials. Convincing state leg-
islatures to certify competing electors was essential to stop the
count and ensure President Trump’s reelection.237
Judge Carter also explained that “Dr. Eastman and President Trump’s
plan to disrupt the Joint Session was fully formed and actionable as early as
December 7, 2020.” 238
Chapter 2 of this report provides substantial detail on many of Presi-
dent Trump’s specific efforts to apply pressure to State officials and legis-
lators. We provide a few examples here:
During a January 2, 2021, call, President Trump pressured Georgia’s
Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find 11,780 votes.”
During that call, President Trump asserted conspiracy theories about the
election that Department of Justice officials had already debunked. Presi-
dent Trump also made a thinly veiled threat to Raffensperger and his attor-
ney about his failure to respond to President Trump’s demands: “That’s a
criminal, that’s a criminal offense . . . That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan,
your lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that you’re letting it happen.” 239

Judge Carter drew these conclusions:

Mr. Raffensperger debunked the President’s allegations “point by
point” and explained that “the data you have is wrong;” however,
President Trump still told him, “I just want to find 11,780 votes.” 240
***

President Trump’s repeated pleas for Georgia Secretary of State

Raffensperger clearly demonstrate that his justification was not to
investigate fraud, but to win the election. . . . Taken together, this
evidence demonstrates that President Trump likely knew the elec-
toral count plan had no factual justification. The plan not only
lacked factual basis but also legal justification.241
That call to Raffensperger came on the heels of President Trump’s
repeated attacks on Raffensperger, election workers, and other public ser-
vants about President Trump’s loss in the election. A month earlier, the
Georgia Secretary of State’s Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, had
given this explicit public warning to President Trump and his team, a
warning that the Select Committee has determined President Trump appar-
ently saw and disregarded:242
[I]t has all gone too far. All of it. . . .
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 45

A 20-something tech in Gwinnett County today has death threats

and a noose put out, saying he should be hung for treason because
he was transferring a report on batches from an EMS to a county
computer so he could read it.
It has to stop.
Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this lan-
guage. Senators, you have not condemned this language or these
actions. This has to stop. We need you to step up. And if you’re
going to take a position of leadership, show some.

My boss, Secretary Raffensperger—his address is out there. They

have people doing caravans in front of their house, they’ve had
people come onto their property. Tricia, his wife of 40 years, is get-
ting sexualized threats through her cellphone.
It has to stop.
This is elections, this is the backbone of democracy, and all of you
who have not said a damn word are complicit in this. It’s too
much. . . .

What you don’t have the ability to do—and you need to step up and
say this—is stop inspiring people to commit potential acts of vio-
lence. Someone’s going to get hurt. Someone’s going to get shot.
Someone’s going to get killed.243
The stark warning was entirely appropriate, and prescient. In addition
to the examples Sterling identified, President Trump and his team were also
fixated on Georgia election workers Ruby Freeman and Wandrea “Shaye”
Moss. He and Giuliani mentioned Freeman repeatedly in meetings with
State legislators, at public rallies, and in the January 2nd call with Raffens-
perger. Referring to a video clip, Giuliani even accused Freeman and Moss
of trading USB drives to affect votes “as if they [were] vials of heroin or
cocaine.” 244 This was completely bogus: it was not a USB drive; it was a
ginger mint.245
After their contact information was published, Trump supporters sent
hundreds of threats to the women and even showed up at Freeman’s
home.246 As Freeman testified to the Select Committee, Trump and his fol-
lowers’ conduct had a profound impact on her life. She left her home based
on advice from the FBI, and wouldn’t move back for months.247 And she
explained, “I’ve lost my sense of security—all because a group of people,
starting with Number 45 [Donald Trump] and his ally Rudy Giuliani,
decided to scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies
46 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Gabriel Sterling at a press conference on November 6, 2020 in Atlanta, Georgia.

(Photo by Jessica McGowan/Getty Images)

about how the Presidential election was stolen.” 248 The treatment of Free-
man and Moss was callous, inhumane, and inexcusable. Rudolph Giuliani
and others with responsibility should be held accountable.
In Arizona, a primary target of President Trump’s pressure, and ire, was
House Speaker Russell “Rusty” Bowers, a longtime Republican who had
served 17 years in the State legislature. Throughout November and Decem-
ber, Bowers spoke to President Trump, Giuliani, and members of Giuliani’s
legal team, in person or on the phone. During these calls, President Trump
and others alleged that the results in Arizona were affected by fraud and
asked that Bowers consider replacing Presidential electors for Biden with
electors for President Trump.249 Bowers demanded proof for the claims of
fraud, but never got it. At one point, after Bowers pressed Giuliani on the
claims of fraud, Giuliani responded, “we’ve got lots of theories, we just
don’t have the evidence.” 250 Bowers explained to Giuliani: “You are asking
me do something against my oath, and I will not break my oath.” 251
President Trump and his supporters’ intimidation tactics affected Bow-
ers, too. Bowers’s personal cell phone and home address were doxed,252
leading demonstrators to show up at his home and shout insults until
police arrived. One protestor who showed up at his home was armed and
believed to be a member of an extremist militia.253 Another hired a truck
with a defamatory and profane allegation that Bowers, a deeply religious
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 47

man, was a pedophile, and drove it through Bowers’s neighborhood.254

This, again, is the conduct of thugs and criminals, each of whom should be
held accountable.
In Michigan, President Trump focused on Republican Senate Majority
Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker Lee Chatfield. He
invited them to the White House for a November 20, 2020, meeting during
which President Trump and Giuliani, who joined by phone, went through a
“litany” of false allegations about supposed fraud in Michigan’s election.255
Chatfield recalled President Trump’s more generic directive for the group to
“have some backbone and do the right thing,” which he understood to
mean overturning the election by naming Michigan’s Electoral College
electors for President Trump.256 Shirkey told President Trump that he
wouldn’t do anything that would violate Michigan law,257 and after the
meeting ended, issued a joint statement with Chatfield: “We have not yet
been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the
election in Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will follow the law and
follow the normal process regarding Michigan’s electors, just as we have
said throughout this election.” 258
When President Trump couldn’t convince Shirkey and Chatfield to
change the outcome of the election in Michigan during that meeting or in
calls after, he or his team maliciously tweeted out Shirkey’s personal cell
phone number and a number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong.259
Shirkey received nearly 4,000 text messages after that, and another private
citizen reported being inundated with calls and texts intended for Chat-
field.260
None of Donald Trump’s efforts ultimately succeeded in changing the
official results in any State. That these efforts had failed was apparent to
Donald Trump and his co-conspirators well before January 6th. By January
6th, there was no evidence at all that a majority of any State legislature
would even attempt to change its electoral votes.261
This past October, U.S. District Court Judge David Carter issued a further
ruling relating to one of President Trump’s lawsuits in Georgia. Judge
Carter applied the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege again,
and identified potential criminal activity related to a knowingly false repre-
sentation by Donald Trump to a Federal court. He wrote:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific num-
bers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those num-
bers, both in court and in public.262
48 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Steven Engel, Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue at a Select Committee hearing on June
23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)

As John Eastman wrote in an email on December 31, 2020, President

Trump was “made aware that some of the allegations (and evidence prof-
fered by the experts)” in a verified State court complaint was “inaccu-
rate.” 263 Dr. Eastman noted that “with that knowledge” President Trump
could not accurately verify a Federal court complaint that incorporated by
reference the “inaccurate” State court complaint: “I have no doubt that an
aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President and his
lawyers once all the dust settles on this.” 264 Despite this specific warning,
“President Trump and his attorneys ultimately filed the complaint with the
same inaccurate numbers without rectifying, clarifying, or otherwise
changing them.” 265 And President Trump personally “signed a verification
swearing under oath that the incorporated, inaccurate numbers ‘are true
and correct’ or ‘believed to be true and correct’ to the best of his knowledge
and belief.” 266 The numbers were not correct, and President Trump and his
legal team knew it.

EFFORTS TO CORRUPT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

In the weeks after the 2020 election, Attorney General Barr advised Presi-
dent Trump that the Department of Justice had not seen any evidence to
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 49

support Trump’s theory that the election was stolen by fraud. Acting Attor-
ney General Jeffrey Rosen and his Deputy repeatedly reinforced to President
Trump that his claims of election fraud were false when they took over in
mid-December. Also in mid-December 2020, Attorney General Barr
announced his plans to resign. Between that time and January 6th, Trump
spoke with Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen and Acting Deputy Richard
Donoghue repeatedly, attempting to persuade them and the Department of
Justice to find factual support for his stolen election claims and thereby to
assist his efforts to reverse election results.
As Rosen publicly testified, “. . . between December 23rd and January
3rd, the President either called me or met with me virtually every day, with
one or two exceptions, like Christmas Day.” 267 As discussed earlier, Justice
Department investigations had demonstrated that the stolen election
claims were false; both Rosen and Donoghue told President Trump this
comprehensively and repeatedly.
One of those conversations occurred on December 27th, when President
Trump called Rosen to go through a “stream of allegations” about the elec-
tion.268 Donoghue described that call as an “escalation of the earlier con-
versations” they had.269 Initially, President Trump called Rosen directly.
When Donoghue joined the call, he sought to “make it clear to the President
[that] these allegations were simply not true.” 270
So [the President] went through [the allegations]—in what for me
was a 90-minute conversation or so, and what for the former Acting
AG was a 2-hour conversation—as the President went through
them I went piece by piece to say “no, that’s false, that is not true,”
and to correct him really in a serial fashion as he moved from one
theory to another.271
The President raised, among others, debunked claims about voting
machines in Michigan, a truck driver who allegedly moved ballots from
New York to Pennsylvania, and a purported election fraud at the State Farm
Arena in Georgia.272 None of the allegations were credible, and Rosen and
Donoghue said so to the President.273
At one point during the December 27th call in which Donoghue refuted
President Trump’s fraud allegations, Donoghue recorded in handwritten
notes a request President Trump made specifically to him and Acting Attor-
ney General Rosen: “Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to
me and the Republican Congressmen.” 274 Donoghue explained: “[T]he
Department had zero involvement in anyone’s political strategy,” and “he
wanted us to say that it was corrupt.” 275 “We told him we were not going to
do that.” 276 At the time, neither Rosen nor Donoghue knew the full extent
50 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
to which Republican Congressmen, including Representative Scott Perry,
were attempting to assist President Trump to overturn the election results.
The Committee’s investigation has shown that Congressman Perry was
working with one Department of Justice official, Jeffrey Clark, regarding the
stolen election claims. Perry was working with Clark and with President
Trump and Chief of Staff Mark Meadows with this goal: to enlist Clark to
reverse the Department of Justice’s findings regarding the election and help
overturn the election outcome.277
After introducing Clark to the President, Perry sent multiple text mes-
sages to Meadows between December 26th and December 28th, pressing
that Clark be elevated within the Department. Perry reminded Meadows
that there are only “11 days to 1/6 . . . We gotta get going!,” and, as the days
went on, one asking, “Did you call Jeff Clark?” 278
Acting Attorney General Rosen first learned about Clark’s contact with
President Trump in a call on Christmas Eve. On that call, President Trump
mentioned Clark to Rosen, who was surprised to learn that Trump knew
Clark and had met with him. Rosen later confronted Clark about the con-
tact: “Jeff, anything going on that you think I should know about?” 279
Clark didn’t “immediately volunteer” the fact that he had met with the
President, but ultimately “acknowledged that he had been at a meeting
with the President in the Oval Office, not alone, with other people.” 280
Clark was “kind of defensive” and “somewhat apologetic,” “casting it as
that he had had a meeting with Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania and
that, to his surprise, or, you know, he hadn’t anticipated it, that they some-
how wound up at a meeting in the Oval Office.” 281 Clark’s contact with
President Trump violated both Justice Department and White House poli-
cies designed to prevent political pressure on the Department.282
While Clark initially appeared apologetic and assured Rosen that “[i]t
won’t happen again,” 283 he nevertheless continued to work and meet
secretly with President Trump and Congressman Perry. Less than five days
after assuring Rosen that he would comply with the Department’s White
House contacts policy, Clark told Rosen and Donoghue that he had again
violated that policy. Donoghue confronted him: “I reminded him that I was
his boss and that I had directed him to do otherwise.” 284
Around the same time, Representative Perry called Acting Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue, criticized the FBI, and suggested that the
Department hadn’t been doing its job. Perry told Donoghue that Clark
“would do something about this.” 285
On December 28th, Clark worked with a Department employee named
Kenneth Klukowski—a political appointee who had earlier worked with
John Eastman—to produce a draft letter from the Justice Department to the
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 51

State legislature of Georgia.286 That letter mirrored a number of the posi-

tions President Trump and Eastman were taking at the time.287 (Although
both Clark and Eastman refused to answer questions by asserting their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, evidence shows that Clark
and Eastman were in communication in this period leading up to January
6th.288 The draft letter to Georgia was intended to be one of several Depart-
ment letters to State legislatures in swing States that had voted for
Biden.289
The letter read: “The Department of Justice is investigating various
irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the United States.” 290
Clark continued: “The Department will update you as we are able on inves-
tigatory progress, but at this time we have identified significant concerns
that may have impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States,
including the State of Georgia.” 291 This was affirmatively untrue. The
Department had conducted many investigations of election fraud allega-
tions by that point, but it absolutely did not have “significant concerns”
that fraud “may have impacted the outcome of the election” in any State.
Jeff Clark knew this; Donoghue confirmed it again in an email responding
to Clark’s letter: “[W]e simply do not currently have a basis to make such a
statement. Despite dramatic claims to the contrary, we have not seen the
type of fraud that calls into question the reported (and certified) results of
the election.” 292
The letter also explicitly recommended that Georgia’s State legislature
should call a special session to evaluate potential election fraud. “In light of
these developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia General
Assembly should convene in special session so that its legislators are in a
special position to take additional testimony, receive new evidence, and
deliberate on the matter consistent with its duties under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.” 293
Clark’s draft letter also referenced the fake electors that President
Trump and his campaign organized—arguing falsely that there were cur-
rently two competing slates of legitimate Presidential electors in Geor-
gia:294
The Department believes that in Georgia and several other States,
both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a sepa-
rate slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on
[December 14, 2020] at the proper location to cast their ballots, and
that both sets of those ballots have been transmitted to Washing-
ton, D.C., to be opened by Vice President Pence.295
This, of course, was part of Donald Trump and John Eastman’s plan for
January 6th. This letter reflects an effort to use the Department of Justice to
52 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
help overturn the election outcome in Georgia and elsewhere. Rosen and
Donoghue reacted immediately to this draft letter:
“[T]here’s no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely
like this,” Donoghue wrote.296 The plan set forth by Clark was “not even
within the realm of possibility,” 297 and Donoghue warned that if they sent
Clark’s letter, it “would be a grave step for the Department to take and it
could have tremendous Constitutional, political and social ramifications for
the country.” 298
As Richard Donoghue testified when describing his response to Clark’s
proposed letter:
Well, I had to read both the email and the attached letter twice to
make sure I really understood what he was proposing because it was
so extreme to me I had a hard time getting my head around it ini-
tially.

But I read it, and I did understand it for what he intended, and I had
to sit down and sort of compose what I thought was an appropriate
response . . . .
In my response I explained a number of reasons this is not the
Department’s role to suggest or dictate to State legislatures how
they should select their electors. But more importantly, this was not
based on fact. This was actually contrary to the facts as developed
by Department investigations over the last several weeks and
months.
So, I respond to that. And for the department to insert itself into the
political process this way I think would have had grave conse-
quences for the country. It may very well have spiraled us into a
constitutional crisis.299
Rosen and Donoghue also met with Clark about the letter. Their conver-
sation “was a very difficult and contentious” one, according to Dono-
ghue.300 “What you’re proposing is nothing less than the United States
Justice Department meddling in the outcome of a Presidential election,”
Donoghue admonished Clark, to which Clark indignantly responded, “I
think a lot of people have meddled in this election.” 301
Both Rosen and Donoghue refused to sign the letter, and confronted
Clark with the actual results of the Department’s investigations.302 They
also permitted Clark access to a classified briefing from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) showing Clark that allegations
he made to Rosen and Donoghue about foreign interference with voting
machines were not true. According to Rosen, the decision to give Clark the
briefing at that point “was a difficult question because, if he’s going to brief
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 53

the President, I reluctantly think it’s probably better that he’s heard from
Director Ratcliffe than that he not, even if—I don’t think he should brief
the President. But, at this point, he’s telling me that this is happening
whether I agree with it or not. So, so I let him have that briefing.” 303
After Clark received the ODNI briefing, “he acknowledged [to Dono-
ghue] that there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his
earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.” 304 While Clark then dropped
his claims about foreign interference, he continued to press to send the let-
ter to Georgia and other States, despite being told that the Department of
Justice investigations had found no fraud sufficient to overturn the election
outcome in Georgia or any other States. This was an intentional choice by
Jeff Clark to contradict specific Department findings on election fraud, and
purposely insert the Department into the Presidential election on President
Trump’s behalf and risk creating or exacerbating a constitutional crisis.
By this point, President Trump recognized that neither Rosen nor
Donoghue would sign the letter or support his false election claims. Presi-
dent Trump and his team then communicated further with Clark and
offered him the job of Acting Attorney General. On January 2nd, Clark told
Rosen that he “would turn down the President’s offer if [Rosen] reversed
[his] position and signed the letter” that he and Klukowski had drafted.305
The next day, Clark decided to accept and informed Rosen, who then called
White House Counsel to seek a meeting directly with President Trump. As
Rosen put it, “I wasn’t going to accept being fired by my subordinate, so I
wanted to talk to the President directly.” 306
On January 3rd, that meeting was convened. Although contemporane-
ous White House documents suggest that Clark had already been appointed
as the Acting Attorney General,307 all the participants in the meeting other
than Clark and President Trump aggressively opposed Clark’s appointment.
At that point, Rosen decided to “broaden the circle” and ask that his
subordinates inform all the other Assistant Attorneys General (AAGs) what
was afoot.308 Rosen wanted to know how the AAGs would respond if Jeff
Clark was installed as the Acting Attorney General. Pat Hovakimian, who
worked for Rosen, then set up a conference call. The AAGs almost immedi-
ately agreed that they would resign if Rosen was removed from office.309
Rosen, Donoghue, and Steve Engel, the Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel, attended the meeting. White House lawyers Pat
Cipollone, Eric Herschmann and Pat Philbin joined as well.
When the meeting started, Clark attempted to defend his appointment.
Clark declared that this was the “last opportunity to sort of set things
straight with this defective election,” and he had the “intelligence,” the
“will,” and “desire” to “pursue these matters in the way that the President
54 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
thought most appropriate.” 310 Everyone else present disagreed that Clark
could conceivably accomplish these things.
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as well,
describing Clark’s letter as a “murder-suicide pact.” 311 Cipollone warned
that the letter would “damage everyone who touches it” and no one should
have anything to do with it.312
President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do if
Clark took office. Both confirmed they would resign.313 Steve Engel recalled
that the President next asked if he would resign:
At some point, [] I believe Rich Donoghue said that senior Depart-
ment officials would all resign if Mr. Clark were put in, and the
President turned to me and said, “Steve, you wouldn’t resign, would
you?” I said, “Well, Mr. President, I’ve been with you through four
Attorneys General, including two Acting Attorneys General, and I
just couldn’t be part of this if Mr. Clark were here.” And I said, “And
I believe that the other senior Department officials would resign as
well. And Mr. Clark would be here by himself with a hostile building,
those folks who remained, and nothing would get done.”314
Donoghue added that they would not be the only ones to resign. “You
should understand that your entire Department leadership will resign,”
Donoghue recalled saying. This included every Assistant Attorney General.
“Mr. President, these aren’t bureaucratic leftovers from another adminis-
tration,” Donoghue reminded Trump, “You picked them. This is your lead-
ership team.” Donoghue added, “And what happens if, within 48 hours, we
have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department because of
your actions? What does that say about your leadership?” 315 Steve Engel
then reinforced Donoghue’s point, saying that Clark would be leading a
“graveyard.”
Faced with mass resignations and recognizing that the “breakage”
could be too severe, Donald Trump decided to rescind his offer to Clark and
drop his plans to use the Justice Department to aid in his efforts to overturn
the election outcome.316 The President looked at Clark and said, “I appreci-
ate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you being willing to suffer the
abuse. But the reality is, you’re not going to get anything done. These guys
are going to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. It’s going to be a disas-
ter. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no matter how much you want
to get things done in the next few weeks, you won’t be able to get it done,
and it’s not going to be worth the breakage.” 317
***

Evidence gathered by the Committee also suggests that President

Trump offered Sidney Powell the position of Special Counsel for election
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 55

related matters during a highly charged White House meeting on December

18, 2020.318 White House lawyers vehemently opposed Powell’s appoint-
ment, and it also was not ultimately made formal.

SUMMONING A MOB TO WASHINGTON, AND KNOWING THEY WERE ANGRY AND

ARMED, INSTRUCTING THEM TO MARCH TO THE CAPITOL
In the early morning hours of December 19th, shortly after the contentious
December 18th White House meeting with Sidney Powell and others, Donald
Trump sent a tweet urging his supporters to travel to Washington for Janu-
ary 6th. In that tweet, President Trump attached false allegations that the
election was stolen and promised a “wild” time on January 6th.319 This
Twitter invitation was followed by over a dozen other instances in which he
used Twitter to encourage supporters to rally for him in Washington, DC on
January 6th.320
The Committee has assembled detailed material demonstrating the
effects of these communications on members of far-right extremist groups,
like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and others, and on
individuals looking to respond to their president’s call to action. President
Trump’s supporters believed the election was stolen because they listened
to his words,321 and they knew what he had called them to do; stop the cer-
tification of the electoral count.322
For example, one supporter, Charles Bradford Smith, noted on Decem-
ber 22, 2020, that “Trump is asking everyone to go” to Washington, DC on
56 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
January 6th “to fill the streets” on the “day Pence counts up the votes.” 323
Derek Sulenta posted to Facebook on December 23, 2020, that “I’ll be there
Jan 6th to support the president no matter what happens” because “That’s
the day he called for patriots to show up.” 324 By December 31, 2020, Robert
Morss believed January 6th stood for the moment when “1776 Will Com-
mence Again” because President Trump asked them to “Be there, Will be
Wild.” 325 Kenneth Grayson predicted what would eventually happen on
January 6th, when on December 23, 2020, he wrote on Facebook that Presi-
dent Trump called people to Washington, DC through his December 19th
tweet and then added “IF TRUMP TELLS US TO STORM THE FUKIN CAPI-
TAL IMA DO THAT THEN!” 326 Some demonstrated their inspiration for
January 6th by circulating flyers, which proclaimed “#OccupyCongress”
over images of the United States Capitol.327 Robert Gieswein, a Coloradan
affiliated with Three Percenters who was among the first to breach the
Capitol, said that he came to Washington, DC “to keep President Trump
in.” 328
Chapter 8 of this report documents how the Proud Boys led the attack,
penetrated the Capitol, and led hundreds of others inside. Multiple Proud
Boys reacted immediately to President Trump’s December 19th tweet and
began their planning. Immediately, Proud Boys leaders reorganized their
hierarchy, with Enrique Tarrio, Joseph Biggs, and Ethan Nordean messag-
ing groups of Proud Boys about what to expect on January 6th.329 Tarrio
created a group chat known as the Ministry of Self-Defense for hand-
selected Proud Boys whom he wanted to “organize and direct” plans for
January 6th.330 On social media, Tarrio referenced “revolt” and “[r]evolu-
tion,” and conspicuously asked “What if we invade it?” on Telegram.331 As
of December 29, 2020, Tarrio told the group the events on January 6th
would be “centered around the Capitol.” 332
At the time of publication of this report, prosecutions of certain Proud
Boys are ongoing. To date, one Proud Boy has pled guilty to seditious con-
spiracy and other Proud Boys have pled guilty to other crimes, including
conspiracy to obstruct Congress.333 Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boy who pled
guilty to seditious conspiracy, admitted that he:
understood from internal discussions among the Proud Boys that in
the leadup to January 6, the willingness to resort to unlawful con-
duct increasingly included a willingness to use and promote vio-
lence to achieve political objectives.334
Moreover,
Bertino believed that the 2020 election had been “stolen” and, as
January 6, 2021, approached, believed that drastic measures,
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 57

including violence, were necessary to prevent Congress from certi-

fying the Electoral College Vote on January 6, 2021. Bertino made
his views in this regard known publicly, as well as in private discus-
sions with MOSD leadership. Bertino understood from his discus-
sions with MOSD leadership that they agreed that the election had
been stolen, that the purpose of traveling to Washington, D.C., on
January 6, 2021, was to stop the certification of the Electoral College
Vote, and that the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it
would take, including using force against police and others, to
achieve that objective.335
As set out in Bertino’s plea agreement, members of MOSD:
openly discussed plans for potential violence at the Capitol [. . . and]
members of MOSD leadership were discussing the possibility of
storming the Capitol. Bertino believed that storming the Capitol
would achieve the group's goal of stopping Congress from certifying
the Electoral College Vote. Bertino understood that storming the
Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and would require using force
against police or other government officials.336
Another Proud Boy who has pled guilty to conspiracy and assault
charges, Charles Donohoe, understood that the Proud Boys planned to
storm the Capitol. Donohoe, a Proud Boys local chapter leader from North
Carolina:
was aware [as early as January 4, 2021] that members of MOSD
leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol.
Donohoe believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the
group’s goal of stopping the government from carrying out the
transfer of presidential power.337
The Department of Justice has charged a number of Oath Keepers with
seditious conspiracy. Specifically, the government alleges that “[a]fter the
Presidential Election, Elmer Stewart Rhodes III conspired with his
co-defendants, introduced below, and other co-conspirators, known and
unknown to the Grand Jury, to oppose by force the lawful transfer of presi-
dential power.” 338 A jury agreed, convicting Stewart Rhodes and Kelly
Meggs—the leader of the Florida Oath Keepers chapter—of seditious con-
spiracy. The jury also convicted Rhodes and Meggs, as well as fellow Oath
Keepers Jessica Watkins, Kenneth Harrelson, and Thomas Caldwell,339 of
other serious felonies for their actions on January 6th.340
Meggs celebrated the December 19th tweet, sending an encrypted Signal
message to Florida Oath Keepers that President Trump “wants us to make it
WILD that’s what he’s saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to
58 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
make it wild!!! . . . Gentlemen we are heading to DC pack your shit!!” 341
Similarly, Oath Keeper Joshua James—who pleaded guilty to seditious
conspiracy—told Oath Keepers that there was now a “NATIONAL CALL TO
ACTION FOR DC JAN 6TH” following President Trump’s words.342
Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepers’ founder, felt that “the time for
peaceful protest is over” after December 19th and, according to the govern-
ment, “urged President Trump to use military force to stop the lawful
transfer of presidential power, describing January 6, 2021, as “a hard con-
stitutional deadline” to do so.343 Rhodes created a “an invitation-only Sig-
nal group chat titled, ‘DC OP: Jan 6 21’” on December 30, 2020, which he
and other Oath Keepers, like Meggs and James, used to plan for January
6th, including by creating a “quick reaction force” of firearms to be stashed
in Virginia.344
Multiple members of the Oath Keepers have pleaded guilty to seditious
conspiracy. Brian Ulrich started planning for January 6th right after Presi-
dent Trump sent out his December 19th tweet. The Department of Justice
summarized Ulrich’s communications, as follows:
Ulrich messaged the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal group chat,
“Trump acts now maybe a few hundred radicals die trying to burn
down cities . . . Trump sits on his hands Biden wins . . . millions die
resisting the death of the 1st and 2nd amendment.” On December
20, 2020, an individual in the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal
group chat, who later traveled with Ulrich to Washington, D.C., and
breached the Capitol grounds with Ulrich on January 6, 2021, mes-
saged, “January 6th. The great reset. America or not.” 345
The Justice Department’s Statement of Offense for Oath Keeper Joshua
James provided these details:
In advance of and on January 6, 2021, James and others agreed to
take part in the plan developed by Rhodes to use any means neces-
sary, up to and including the use of force, to stop the lawful transfer
of presidential power. In the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021,
Rhodes instructed James and other coconspirators to be prepared, if
called upon, to report to the White House grounds to secure the
perimeter and use lethal force if necessary against anyone who tried
to remove President Trump from the White House, including the
National Guard or other government actors who might be sent to
remove President Trump as a result of the Presidential Election.346
The former President’s call also galvanized Three Percenters to act. A
group known as The Three Percenters Original sent a message to its mem-
bers on December 16, 2020, noting they “stand ready and are standing by to
answer the call from our President should the need arise” to combat the
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 59

“pure evil that is conspiring to steal our country away from the american
people” through the “2020 presidential election.” 347 After President
Trump’s tweet, the group put out another letter instructing “any member
who can attend . . . to participate” on January 6th because “[t]he President
of the United States has put out a general call for the patriots of this Nation
to gather” in Washington, DC.348
Other Three Percenter groups also responded. Alan Hostetter and Rus-
sell Taylor led a group of Three Percenters calling themselves the California
Patriots–DC Brigade, who have been charged with conspiracy to obstruct
Congress because they organized to fight to keep President Trump in power
on January 6th after President Trump’s December 19th tweet inspired them
to come to Washington, DC.349 On December 19th, Hostetter posted on Ins-
tagram:
President Trump tweeted that all patriots should descend on Wash-
ington DC on Wednesday l/6/2021. This is the date of the Joint Ses-
sion of Congress in which they will either accept or reject the fake/
phony/stolen electoral college votes.350

Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor, and other
members of the California Patriots–DC Brigade exchanged messages and
posted to social media about bringing gear, including “weaponry,” like
“hatchet[s],” “bat[s],” or “[l]arge metal flashlights,” and possibly “fire-
arms,” and, about being “ready and willing to fight” like it was “1776.”
Taylor even spoke in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021,
explaining that “[p]atriots” would “not return to our peaceful way of life
until this election is made right . . . .” 351 On December 29, 2020, Taylor
exclaimed “I personally want to be on the front steps and be one of the first
ones to breach the doors!” 352
Similarly, members of the Florida Guardians of Freedom, Three Percent
sent around a flyer on December 24, 2020, saying they were “responding to
the call from President Donald J. Trump to assist in the security, protection,
and support of the people as we all protest the fraudulent election and
re-establish liberty for our nation.” 353 Their leader, Jeremy Liggett, posted
a meme to Facebook stating that “3% Will Show In Record Numbers In
DC” 354 and put out a “safety video” instructing people that they could
bring “an expandable metal baton, a walking cane and a folding knife” 355
to Washington, DC on January 6th. Several have been arrested for partici-
pating in the violence around the tunnel on January 6th.356
When interviewed by the FBI on March 31, 2021, Danny Rodriguez—a
Three Percenter from California who tased Officer Michael Fanone in the
neck as rioters tried to break through a door on the west side of the
Capitol—reflected on his decision to go to Washington, DC357:
60 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump called us to D.C. . . . and he’s calling for help—I thought he
was calling for help. I thought he was—I thought we were doing the
right thing. . . . [W]e thought we were going to hit it like a civil war.
There was going to be a big battle. . . . I thought that the main fight,
the main battle, was going to be in D.C. because Trump called
everyone there.358
These groups were not operating in silos. Meggs bragged on Facebook
that following President Trump’s December 19th tweet he had formed an
alliance between the Oath Keepers, the Florida Three Percenters, and the
Proud Boys “to work together to shut this shit down.” 359 On December
19th, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio and they spoke for more than three min-
utes.360 Three days later, Meggs messaged Liggett, echoing his excitement
about the December 19th tweet and specifically referencing the seat of Con-
gress: “He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!!” 361
Liggett said “I will have a ton of men with me” and Meggs replied that “we
have made Contact [sic] with PB [Proud Boys] and they always have a big
group. Force multiplier. . . . I figure we could splinter off the main group of
PB and come up behind them. Fucking crush them for good.” 362 Aside from
Meggs, Stewart Rhodes brought in at least one local militia leader363 and
Three Percenters into the Oath Keepers January 6th planning chats that
came about following President Trump’s tweet.364
Even on January 6th, rioters referenced the tweet. An unknown rioter
was caught on video as they ascended the Capitol steps saying “He said it
was gonna be wild. He didn’t lie.” 365 MPD body-worn cameras captured
Cale Clayton around 3:15 p.m. as he taunted officers from under the scaf-
folding: “Your fucking president told us to be here. You should be on this
side, right here, going with us. You are an American citizen. Your fucking
President told you to do that. You too. You too. You. All of you guys. That
Tweet was for you guys. For us. For you.” 366
As January 6th neared, intelligence emerged indicating that January 6th
was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol was a target. On
January 3rd, an intelligence summary informed Department of Justice offi-
cials of plans to “occupy the Capitol” and “invade” the Capitol on January
6th. This summarized a “SITE Intelligence Group” report about the “online
rhetoric focused on the 6 Jan event.” Some of the reporting includes: “Calls
to occupy federal buildings.” “intimidating Congress and invading the
capitol building.” The email also quoted WUSA9 local reporting: “one of the
websites used for organizing the event was encouraging attendees to bring
guns.”
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue testified:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 61

And we knew that if you have tens of thousands of very upset people
showing up in Washington, DC, that there was potential for vio-
lence.368
At the same time, a Defense Department official predicted on a White
House National Security Council call that violence could be targeted at the
Capitol on January 6th. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Mark Milley:
So during these calls, I—I only remember in hindsight because he
was almost like clairvoyant. [Deputy Secretary of Defense David]
Norquist says during one of these calls, the greatest threat is a
direct assault on the Capitol. I’ll never forget it.369
Likewise, documentation received by the Committee from the Secret
Service demonstrates a growing number of warnings both that January 6th
was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol would likely be the
target, including intelligence directly regarding the Proud Boys and Oath
Keepers militia groups.
Even two weeks ahead of January 6th, the intelligence started to show
what could happen. On December 22, 2020, the FBI received a screenshot of
an online chat among Oath Keepers, seemingly referring to the State capi-
tols besieged by protesters across the country earlier that year: “if they
were going to go in, then they should have went all the way.” 370 “There is
only one way. It is not signs. It’s not rallies. It’s fucking bullets,” one user
replied.371
A public source emailed the Secret Service a document titled “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President,” on December 24th, which summarized online
comments responding to President Trump’s December 19th tweet.372 Pro-
testors should “start marching into the chambers,” one user wrote.373
Trump “can’t exactly openly tell you to revolt,” another replied. “This is
the closest he’ll ever get.” 374 “I read [the President’s tweet] as armed,”
someone said.375 “[T]here is not enough cops in DC to stop what is com-
ing,” replied yet another.376 “[B]e already in place when Congress tries to
get to their meeting,” the comments continued, and “make sure they know
who to fear.’” 377 “[W]aiting for Trump to say the word,” a person said, and
“this is what Trump expects,” exclaimed another.378 Capitol Police’s head
of intelligence, Jack Donohue, got the same compilation from a former col-
league at the New York Police Department on December 28, 2020.379
On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud
Boys detailing plans to have “a large enough group to march into DC armed
[that] will outnumber the police so they can’t be stopped.” 380 “Their plan
is to literally kill people,” the informant stated. “Please please take this tip
seriously . . . ” 381 On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related
62 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged
to “occupy federal building[s],” including “march[ing] into the capital
building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 382
Civilians also tipped off Capitol Police about people bringing weapons to
besiege the Capitol. One tipster, who had “track[ed] online far right
extremism for years,” emailed Capitol Police warning “I’ve seen countless
tweets from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,” and “I[’]ve also
seen tweets from people organizing to ‘storm the Capitol’ on January
6th.” 383
On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to
Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy
federal building,” including “march[ing] into the capital building and mak-
[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 384 Indeed, a Secret
Service intelligence briefing on December 30th entitled “March for
Trump,” highlighted the President’s “Will be wild!” tweet alongside hash-
tags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, writing “Presi-
dent Trump supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol
Hill.” 385
On January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch at DC Police
forwarded a civilian tip about “a website planning terroristic behavior on
Jan 6th, during the rally” to Capitol Police intelligence.386 “There are
detailed plans to storm federal buildings,” including “the capitol in DC on
Jan 6th,” the tipster reported, linking to thedonald.win.387
On January 2, 2021, the FBI discovered a social media posting that read,
“This is not a rally and it’s no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . .
many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And don’t be surprised if we
take the #capital building.” 388
On January 3, 2021, a Parler user’s post—under the name 1776(2.0)
Minuteman— noting “after weds we are going to need a new congress” and
“Jan 6 may actually be their [Members of Congress] last day in office”
reached the FBI and Capitol Police.389
The FBI field office in Norfolk, Virginia issued an alert to law enforce-
ment agencies on January 5th tiled “Potential for Violence in Washington,
D.C. Area in Connection with Planned ‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6 January
2021,” which noted:
An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to include
stating, “Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking,
doors being kicked in, and blood . . . being spilled. Get violent . . .
stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for
war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this
goal.”390
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 63

In addition, the alert copied “perimeter maps [of the Capitol] and cara-
van pictures [that] were posted” on thedonald.win, particularly worrying
that the “caravans . . . had the same colors as the sections of the perimeter”
of the Capitol.391 Secret Service also knew about caravans planning to come
to DC to “Occupy the Capitol.” 392
That same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, DC’s Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Agency, Secret Service, DC Police, and Capitol
Police shared a website, Red State Secession, which had a post titled “Why
the Second American Revolution Starts Jan 6.” A user asked visitors to post
where they could find the home addresses of Democratic congressmen and
“political enemies” and asked if “any of our enemies [will] be working in
offices in DC that afternoon.” 393 “What are their routes to and from the
event?” the post continued.394 “[T]he crowd will be looking for
enemies.” 395
A Secret Service open-source unit flagged an account on thedonald.win
that threatened to bring a sniper rifle to a rally on January 6th. The user
also posted a picture of a handgun and rifle with the caption, “Sunday Gun
Day Providing Overwatch January 6th Will be Wild.” 396
The Secret Service learned from the FBI on January 5th about right-
wing groups establishing armed quick reaction forces in Virginia, where
they could amass firearms illegal in DC397 Trump supporters staged there
waiting across the river “to respond to ‘calls for help.’” 398 The Oath Keep-
ers were such a group.399
President Trump’s closest aides knew about the political power of sites
like thedonald.win, which is where much of this violent rhetoric and plan-
ning happened. On December 30, 2020, Jason Miller—a Senior Adviser to
and former spokesman for the former President—texted Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows a link to the thedonald.win, adding “I got the base FIRED UP.” 400
The link connected to a page with comments like “Gallows don’t require
electricity,” “if the filthy commie maggots try to push their fraud through,
there will be hell to pay,” and Congress can certify Trump the winner or
leave “in a bodybag.” 401 Symbolic gallows were constructed on January 6th
at the foot of the Capitol.402
After President Trump’s signal, his supporters did not hide their plans
for violence at the Capitol, and those threats made their way to national and
local law enforcement agencies. As described in this report, the intelligence
agencies did detect this planning, and they shared it with the White House
and with the U.S. Secret Service.
64 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6th.

Testimony from White House staff also suggests real concerns about
the risk of violence as January 6th approached. Cassidy Hutchinson, for
example, testified about a conversation she had with her boss, Mark Mead-
ows, on January 2nd:
I went into Mark’s office, and he was still on his phone . . . . I said to
Mark, “Rudy [Giuliani] said these things to me. What’s going on
here? Anything I should know about?”
This was—he was, like, looking at his phone. He was like, “Oh, it’s
all about the rally on Wednesday. Isn’t that what he was talking to
you about?”
I said, “Yeah. Yeah, sounds like we’re going to the Capitol.”
He said, “Yeah. Are you talking with Tony?”
“I’m having a conversation, sir.”

He said—still looking at his phone. I remember he was scrolling. He

was like, “Yeah. You know, things might get real, real bad on the
6th.”
And I remember saying to him, “What do you mean?”
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 65

Mark Meadows walks along the South Lawn on October 30, 2020.
(Photo by Sarah Silbiger/Getty Images)

He was like, “I don’t know. There’s just going to be a lot of people

here, and there’s a lot of different ideas right now. I’m not really
sure of everything that’s going on. Let's just make sure we keep tabs
on it.” 403

Hutchinson also testified about a conversation she had with Director of

National Intelligence, Ratcliffe:
He had expressed to me that he was concerned that it could spiral
out of control and potentially be dangerous, either for our democ-
racy or the way that things were going for the 6th.404
Hope Hicks texted Trump Campaign spokesperson Hogan Gidley in the
midst of the January 6th violence, explaining that she had “suggested . . .
several times” on the preceding days (January 4th and January 5th) that
President Trump publicly state that January 6th must remain peaceful and
that he had refused her advice to do so.405 Her recollection was that Her-
schmann earlier advised President Trump to make a preemptive public
statement in advance of January 6th calling for no violence that day.406 No
such statement was made.
The District of Columbia Homeland Security office explicitly warned
that groups were planning to “occupy the [Capitol] to halt the vote.” 407
66 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[W]e got derogatory information from OSINT suggesting that some
very, very violent individuals were organizing to come to DC, and
not only were they organized to come to DC, but they were—these
groups, these nonaligned groups were aligning. And so all the red
flags went up at that point, you know, when you have armed militia,
you know, collaborating with White supremacy groups, collaborat-
ing with conspiracy theory groups online all toward a common goal,
you start seeing what we call in, you know, terrorism, a blended
ideology, and that’s a very, very bad sign. . . . [T]hen when they
were clearly across—not just across one platform but across mul-
tiple platforms of these groups coordinating, not just like chatting,
“Hey, how’s it going, what’s the weather like where you’re at,” but
like, “what are you bringing, what are you wearing, you know,
where do we meet up, do you have plans for the Capitol.” That’s
operational—that’s like preoperational intelligence, right, and that
is something that's clearly alarming.408
Again, this type of intelligence was shared, including obvious warnings
about potential violence prior to January 6th.409 What was not shared, and
was not fully understood by intelligence and law enforcement entities, is
what role President Trump would play on January 6th in exacerbating the
violence, and later refusing for multiple hours to instruct his supporters to
stand down and leave the Capitol. No intelligence collection was apparently
performed on President Trump’s plans for January 6th, nor was there any
analysis performed on what he might do to exacerbate potential violence.
Certain Republican members of Congress who were working with Trump
and the Giuliani team may have had insight on this particular risk, but none
appear to have alerted the Capitol Police or any other law enforcement
authority.
On January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson wrote in an email to fellow rally
organizers, “POTUS expectations are to have something intimate at the
[E]llipse, and call on everyone to march to the Capitol.” 410 And, on January
4, 2021, another rally organizer texted Mike Lindell, the MyPillow CEO, that
President Trump would “unexpectedly” call on his supporters to march to
the Capitol:
This stays only between us . . . . It can also not get out about the
march because I will be in trouble with the national park service and
all the agencies but POTUS is going to just call for it “unexpect-
edly.” 411
Testimony obtained by the Committee also indicates that President
Trump was specifically aware that the crowd he had called to Washington
was fired up and angry on the evening of January 5th. Judd Deere, a deputy
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 67

White House press secretary recalled a conversation with President Trump

in the Oval Office on the evening of January 5th:
Judd Deere: I said he should focus on policy accomplishments. I
didn’t mention the 2020 election.
Committee Staff: Okay. What was his response?
Deere: He acknowledged that and said, “We’ve had a lot,” some-
thing along those lines, but didn’t—he fairly quickly moved to how
fired up the crowd is, or was going to be.
Committee Staff: Okay. What did he say about it?
Deere: Just that they were—they were fired up. They were angry.
They feel like the election’s been stolen, that the election was
rigged, that—he went on and on about that for a little bit. 412
Testimony indicated that President Trump was briefed on the risk of
violence on the morning of the 6th before he left the White House. Cassidy
Hutchinson provided this testimony:
Vice Chair Cheney: So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding
that Mr. Ornato told the President about weapons at the rally on the
morning of January 6th?
Hutchinson: That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.413

The head of President Trump’s security detail, Bobby Engel, told the
Select Committee that when he shared critical information with White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Anthony Ornato, it was a means of conveying
that information with the Oval Office: “So, when it came to passing infor-
mation to Mr. Ornato, I—my assumption was that it would get to the chief
[of staff, Mark Meadows], or that he was sharing the information with the
chief. I don’t—and the filtering process, or if the chief thinks it needs to get
to the President, then he would share it with the President.” 414 Also, Engel
confirmed that if “information would come to my attention, whether it was
a protective intelligence issue or a concern or—primarily, I would—I would
make sure that the information got filtered up through the appropriate
chain usually through Mr. Ornato. So if I received a report on something
that was happening in the DC area, I’d either forward that information to
Mr. Ornato, or call him about that information or communicate in some
way.” 415
The Select Committee also queried Deputy Chief of Staff Ornato this
November about what he generally would have done in this sort of situa-
tion, asking him the following: “Generally you receive information about
things like the groups that are coming, the stuff that we talked earlier. You
68 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
would bring that to Mr. Meadows and likely did here, although you don’t
have a specific recollection?” 416 Ornato responded: “That is correct, sir.” 417
Ornato also explained to the Committee that “… in my normal daily func-
tions, in my general functions as my job, I would’ve had a conversation
with him about all the groups coming in and what was expected from the
secret service.” 418 As for the morning of January 6th itself, he had the fol-
lowing answer:
Committee Staff: Do you remember talking to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows about any of your concerns about the threat landscape
going into January 6th?
Ornato: I don’t recall; however, in my position I would’ve made sure
he was tracking the demos, which he received a daily brief, Presi-
dential briefing. So he most likely was getting all this in his daily
brief as well. I wouldn’t know what was in his intelligence brief that
day, but I would’ve made sure that he was tracking these things and
just mentioned, “Hey, are you tracking the demos?” If he gave me a
“yeah”, I don’t recall it today, but I’m sure that was something that
took place.419
Ornato had access to intelligence that suggested violence at the Capitol
on January 6th, and it was his job to inform Meadows and President Trump
of that. Although Ornato told us that he did not recall doing so, the Select
Committee found multiple parts of Ornato’s testimony questionable. The
Select Committee finds it difficult to believe that neither Meadows nor
Ornato told President Trump, as was their job, about the intelligence that
was emerging as the January 6th rally approached.
Hours before the Ellipse rally on January 6th, the fact that the
assembled crowd was prepared for potential violence was widely known. In
addition to intelligence reports indicating potential violence at the Capitol,
weapons and other prohibited items were being seized by police on the
streets and by Secret Service at the magnetometers for the Ellipse speech.
Secret Service confiscated a haul of weapons from the 28,000 spectators
who did pass through the magnetometers: 242 cannisters of pepper spray,
269 knives or blades, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3
gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like
scissors, needles, or screwdrivers.420 And thousands of others purposely
remained outside the magnetometers, or left their packs outside.421
Others brought firearms. Three men in fatigues from Broward County,
Florida brandished AR-15s in front of Metropolitan police officers on 14th
Street and Independence Avenue on the morning of January 6th.422 MPD
advised over the radio that one individual was possibly armed with a
“Glock” at 14th and Constitution Avenue, and another was possibly armed
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 69

President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the Ellipse.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

with a “rifle” at 15th and Constitution Avenue around 11:23 a.m.423 The
National Park Service detained an individual with a rifle between 12 and 1
p.m.424 Almost all of this was known before Donald Trump took the stage at
the Ellipse.
By the time President Trump was preparing to give his speech, he and
his advisors knew enough to cancel the rally. And he certainly knew enough
to cancel any plans for a march to the Capitol. According to testimony
obtained by the Select Committee, President Trump knew that elements of
the crowd were armed, and had prohibited items, and that many thousands
would not pass through the magnetometers for that reason. Testimony
indicates that the President had received an earlier security briefing, and
testimony indicates that the Secret Service mentioned the prohibited items
again as they drove President Trump to the Ellipse.
Cassidy Hutchinson was with the President backstage. Her contempora-
neous text messages indicate that President Trump was “effing furious”
about the fact that a large number of his supporters would not go through
the magnetometers:
Cassidy Hutchinson: But the crowd looks good from this vanish [sic]
point. As long as we get the shot. He was fucking furious
70 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tony Ornato: He doesn’t get it that the people on the monument
side don’t want to come in. They can see from there and don’t want
to come in. They can see from there and don’t have to go through
mags. With 30k magged inside.
Cassidy Hutchinson: That’s what was relayed several times and in
different iterations
Cassidy Hutchinson: Poor max got chewed out
Cassidy Hutchinson: He also kept mentioning [an off the record
trip] to Capitol before he took the stage
Tony Ornato: Bobby will tell him no. It’s not safe to do. No assets
available to safely do it.425
And Hutchinson described what President Trump said as he prepared to
take the stage:
When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the stage,
he was very concerned about the shot. Meaning the photograph that
we would get because the rally space wasn’t full. One of the reasons,
which I’ve previously stated, was because he wanted it to be full and
for people to not feel excluded because they had come far to watch
him at the rally. And he felt the mags were at fault for not letting
everybody in, but another leading reason and likely the primary
reasons is because he wanted it full and he was angry that we
weren’t letting people through the mags with weapons—what the
Secret Service deemed as weapons, and are, are weapons. But when
we were in the off-stage announce tent, I was a part of a conversa-
tion, I was in the vicinity of a conversation where I overheard the
President say something to the effect of, “I don’t F’ing care that
they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. Take the F’ing
mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from
here. Let the people in. Take the F’ing mags away.” 426
The Secret Service special agent who drove the President after his
speech told the Select Committee that Trump made a similar remark in the
vehicle when his demand to go to the Capitol was refused—essentially that
Trump did not believe his supporters posed a security risk to him person-
ally.427
Minutes after the exchange that Hutchinson described—when President
Trump took the stage—he pointedly expressed his concern about the thou-
sands of attendees who would not enter the rally area and instructed Secret
Service to allow that part of the crowd to enter anyway:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 71

. . . I’d love to have if those tens of thousands of people would be

allowed. The military, the secret service. And we want to thank you
and the police law enforcement. Great. You’re doing a great job. But
I’d love it if they could be allowed to come up here with us. Is that
possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?428
Although President Trump and his advisors knew of the risk of violence,
and knew specifically that elements of the crowd were angry and some were
armed, from intelligence and law enforcement reports that morning, Presi-
dent Trump nevertheless went forward with the rally, and then specifically
instructed the crowd to march to the Capitol: “Because you’ll never take
back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to
be strong. We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and
only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.” 429
Much of President Trump’s speech was improvised. Even before his impro-
visation, during the review of President Trump’s prepared remarks, White
House lawyer Eric Herschmann specifically requested that “if there were
any factual allegations, someone needed to independently validate or verify
the statements.” 430 And in the days just before January 6th, Herschmann
“chewed out” John Eastman and told him he was “out of [his] F’ing mind”
to argue that the Vice President could be the sole decision-maker as to who
becomes the next President.431 Herschmann told us, “I so berated him that
I believed that theory would not go forward.” 432 But President Trump made
that very argument during his speech at the Ellipse and made many false
statements. Herschmann attended that speech, but walked out during the
middle of it.433
President Trump’s speech to the crowd that day lasted more than an
hour. The speech walked through dozens of known falsehoods about pur-
ported election fraud. And Trump again made false and malicious claims
about Dominion voting systems.434 As discussed earlier, he again pressured
Mike Pence to refuse to count lawful electoral votes, going off script
repeatedly, leading the crowd to believe falsely that Pence could and would
alter the election outcome:

And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: “Mike, that doesn’t take
courage. What takes courage is to do nothing. That takes courage.”
And then we’re stuck with a president who lost the election by a lot
and we have to live with that for four more years. We’re just not
going to let that happen . . . .
When you catch somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very
different rules.
72 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope
he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s lis-
tening to.” 435
This characterization of Vice President Pence’s decision had a direct
impact on those who marched to and approached the Capitol, as illustrated
by this testimony from a person convicted of crimes committed on January
6th:
So this woman came up to the side of us, and she, says, Pence
folded. So it was kind of, like, okay. Well, in my mind I was think-
ing, ”Well, that’s it, you know.” Well, my son-in-law looks at me,
and he says, ”I want to go in.”436
Trump used the word “peacefully,” written by speech writers, one time.
But he delivered many other scripted and unscripted comments that con-
veyed a very different message:
Because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have
to show strength and you have to be strong. We have come to
demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors
who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated. . . .
And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell,
you’re not going to have a country anymore . . . .437
Trump also was not the only rally speaker to do these things. Giuliani,
for instance, also said, “Let’s have trial by combat.” 438 Likewise, Eastman
used his two minutes on the Ellipse stage to make a claim already known to
be false—that corrupted voted machines stole the election.439
The best indication of the impact of President Trump’s words, both
during the Ellipse speech and beforehand, are the comments from those
supporters who attended the Ellipse rally and their conduct immediately
thereafter. Videoclips show several of the attendees on their way to the
Capitol or shortly after they arrived:
I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence—hearing the Pence
just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m hear—I’m hearing
reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m telling you, if Pence caved,
we’re going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking
politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.440
Yes. I guess the hope is that there’s such a show of force here that
Pence will decide do the right thing, according to Trump.441
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: Ok. And that’s when all
this started?] Yup. That’s when we marched on the Capitol.442
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 73

We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent
electoral votes. [Other speaker: Boo. You're a traitor! Boo!] That’s
right. You’ve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United
States of America. [Other speaker: Boo! Fuck you, Mike Pence!] Mike
Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of
the United States and we will never, ever forget. [Cheers]443
[Q] What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol? [A] [Oath
Keeper Jessica Watkins]: One hundred percent. It has, it has spread
like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybody’s marching
on the Capitol. All million of us. It’s insane. 444
Another criminal defendant—charged with assaulting an officer with a
flagpole and other crimes—explained in an interview why he went to the
Capitol and fought:
Dale Huttle: We were not there illegally, we were invited there by
the President himself. . . . Trump’s backers had been told that the
election had been stolen. . . .
Reporter Megan Hickey: But do you think he encouraged violence?
Dale Huttle: Well, I sat there, or stood there, with half a million
people listening to his speech. And in that speech, both Giuliani and
[Trump] said we were going to have to fight like hell to save our
country. Now, whether it was a figure of speech or not—it wasn’t
taken that way.
Reporter Megan Hickey: You didn’t take it as a figure of speech?
Dale Huttle: No.445

President Trump concluded his speech at 1:10 p.m.

Among other statements from the Ellipse podium, President Trump
informed the crowd that he would be marching to the Capitol with them:
Now, it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault on our
democracy. And after this, we’re going to walk down, and I’ll be
there with you, we’re going to walk down, we’re going to walk
down. Anyone you want, but I think right here, we’re going to walk
down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators
and congressmen and women, and we’re probably not going to be
cheering so much for some of them.446
Hutchinson testified that she first became aware of President Trump’s
plans to attend Congress’s session to count votes on or about January 2nd.
She learned this from a conversation with Giuliani: “It’s going to be great.
74 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The President’s going to be there. He’s going to look powerful. He’s—he’s
going to be with the members. He’s going to be with the Senators.” 447 Evi-
dence also indicates that multiple members of the White House staff,
including White House lawyers, were concerned about the President’s
apparent intentions to go to the Capitol.448
After he exited the stage, President Trump entered the Presidential SUV
and forcefully expressed his intention that Bobby Engel, the head of his
Secret Service detail, direct the motorcade to the Capitol. The Committee
has now obtained evidence from several sources about a “furious interac-
tion” in the SUV. The vast majority of witnesses who have testified before
the Select Committee about this topic, including multiple members of the
Secret Service, a member of the Metropolitan police, and national security
and military officials in the White House, described President Trump’s
behavior as “irate,” “furious,” “insistent,” “profane” and “heated.”
Hutchinson heard about the exchange second-hand and related what she
heard in our June 28, 2022, hearing from Ornato (as did another witness, a
White House employee with national security responsibilities, who shared
that Ornato also recounted to him President Trump’s “irate” behavior in
the Presidential vehicle). Other members of the White House staff and
Secret Service also heard about the exchange after the fact. The White
House employee with national security responsibilities gave this testimony:
Committee Staff: But it sounds like you recall some rumor or some
discussion around the West Wing about the President’s anger about
being told that he couldn’t go to the Capitol. Is that right?
Employee: So Mr. Ornato said that he was angry that he couldn’t go
right away. In the days following that, I do remember, you know,
again, hearing again how angry the President was when, you know,
they were in the limo. But beyond specifics of that, that's pretty
much the extent of the cooler talk.449
The Committee has regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating
testimony by the White House employee with national security responsi-
bilities as earnest and has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to
invent their accounts. A Secret Service agent who worked on one of the
details in the White House and was present in the Ellipse motorcade had
this comment:
Committee Staff: Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the committee
that you sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her
account. Is that accurate?
Special Agent: I have no—yeah, that’s accurate. I have no reason—I
mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked every day
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 75

with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a
good working relationship. I have no reason—she’s never done me
wrong. She’s never lied that I know of.450
The Committee’s principal concern was that the President actually
intended to participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol,
leading the attempt to overturn the election either from inside the House
Chamber, from a stage outside the Capitol, or otherwise. The Committee
regarded those facts as important because they are relevant to President
Trump’s intent on January 6th. There is no question from all the evidence
assembled that President Trump did have that intent.451
As it became clear that Donald Trump desired to travel to the Capitol on
January 6th, a White House Security Official in the White House complex
became very concerned about his intentions:
To be completely honest, we were all in a state of shock. . . . it just—
one, I think the actual physical feasibility of doing it, and then also
we all knew what that implicated and what that meant, that this
was no longer a rally, that this was going to move to something else
if he physically walked to the Capitol. I—I don’t know if you want to
use the word “insurrection,” “coup,” whatever. We all knew that
this would move from a normal, democratic, you know, public event
into something else.452
President Trump continued to push to travel to the Capitol even after
his return to the White House, despite knowing that a riot was underway.
Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press secretary, spoke with President
Trump about his desire to go to the Capitol after he returned to the White
House from the Ellipse. “So to the best of my recollection, I recall him
being—wanting to—saying that he wanted to physically walk and be a part
of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed to,
ride in the Presidential limo.” 453
Later in the afternoon, Mark Meadows relayed to Cassidy Hutchinson
that President Trump was still upset that he would not be able to go to the
Capitol that day. As he told Hutchinson, “the President wasn’t happy that
Bobby [Engel] didn’t pull it off for him and that Mark didn’t work hard
enough to get the movement on the books.” 454

187 MINUTES: TRUMP’S DERELICTION OF DUTY

Just after 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence, serving as President of the Senate
under Article I of the Constitution, gaveled the Congress into its Joint Ses-
sion. President Trump was giving a speech at the Ellipse, which he con-
cluded at 1:10 pm. For the next few hours, an attack on our Capitol occurred,
perpetrated by Trump supporters many of whom were present at the Ellipse
76 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
for President Trump’s speech. More than 140 Capitol and Metropolitan
police were injured, some very seriously.455 A perimeter security line of
Metropolitan Police intended to secure the Capitol against intrusion broke
in the face of thousands of armed rioters—more than 2,000 of whom
gained access to the interior of the Capitol building.456 A woman who
attempted to forcibly enter the Chamber of the House of Representatives
through a broken window while the House was in session was shot and
killed by police guarding the chamber. Vice President Pence and his family
were at risk, as were those Secret Service professionals protecting him.
Congressional proceedings were halted, and legislators were rushed to
secure locations.
From the outset of the violence and for several hours that followed,
people at the Capitol, people inside President Trump’s Administration,
elected officials of both parties, members of President Trump’s family, and
Fox News commentators sympathetic to President Trump all tried to con-
tact him to urge him to do one singular thing—one thing that all of these
people immediately understood was required: Instruct his supporters to
stand down and disperse—to leave the Capitol.
As the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates, President Trump spe-
cifically and repeatedly refused to do so—for multiple hours—while the
mayhem ensued. Chapter 8 of this report explains in meticulous detail the
horrific nature of the violence taking place, that was directed at law
enforcement officers at the Capitol and that put the lives of American law-
makers at risk. Yet in spite of this, President Trump watched the violence
on television from a dining room adjacent to the Oval Office, calling Sena-
tors to urge them to help him delay the electoral count, but refusing to sup-
ply the specific help that everyone knew was unequivocally required. As this
report shows, when Trump finally did make such a statement at 4:17 p.m.—
after hours of violence—the statement immediately had the expected
effect; the rioters began to disperse immediately and leave the Capitol.457
To fully understand the President’s behavior during those hours—now
commonly known as the “187 minutes”—it is important to understand the
context in which it occurred. As outlined in this report, by the afternoon of
January 6th, virtually all of President Trump’s efforts to overturn the out-
come of the 2020 election had failed. Virtually all the lawsuits had already
been lost. Vice President Mike Pence had refused Trump’s pressure to stop
the count of certain electoral votes. State officials and legislators had
refused to reverse the election outcomes in every State where Trump and
his team applied pressure. The Justice Department’s investigations of
alleged election fraud had all contradicted Trump’s allegations.
The only factor working in Trump’s favor that might succeed in materi-
ally delaying the counting of electoral votes for President-elect Biden was
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 77

the violent crowd at the Capitol. And for much of the afternoon of January
6th, it appeared that the crowd had accomplished that purpose. Congres-
sional leaders were advised by Capitol Police at one or more points during
the attack that it would likely take several days before the Capitol could
safely be reopened.458
By the time the President’s speech concluded, the lawlessness at the
United States Capitol had already begun, but the situation was about to get
much worse.
By 1:25 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under
attack.
Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a
member of the White House staff and asked if they had watched his speech
on television. “Sir, they cut it off because they’re rioting down at the Capi-
tol,” the employee said. The President asked what they meant by that.
“[T]hey’re rioting down there at the Capitol,” the employee repeated. “Oh
really?” the President asked. “All right, let’s go see.” 459 A photograph
taken by the White House photographer—the last one permitted until later
in the day—captures the moment the President was made aware of the vio-
lent uprising at the Capitol.460
Not long thereafter, as thousands of Trump supporters from the Ellipse
speech continued to arrive at the Capitol, the DC Metropolitan Police
Department declared a riot at the Capitol at 1:49 p.m., the same time Capitol
Police Chief Steven Sund informed the DC National Guard “that there was a
dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate assistance” of
as many national guard troops as possible.461
No photographs exist of the President for the remainder of the after-
noon until after 4 p.m. President Trump appears to have instructed that the
White House photographer was not to take any photographs.462 The Select
Committee also was unable to locate any official records of President
Trump’s telephone calls that afternoon.463 And the President’s official Daily
Diary contains no information for this afternoon between the hours of 1:19
p.m. and 4:03 p.m., at the height of the worst attack on the seat of the
United States Congress in over two centuries.464
The Select Committee did, however, obtain records from non-official
sources that contained data of some phone calls President Trump made that
afternoon. Even though “he was placing lots of calls” that afternoon,
according to his personal assistant,465 the Select Committee was given no
records of any calls from the President to security or law enforcement offi-
cials that afternoon, and that absence of data is consistent with testimony
of witnesses who would have knowledge of any such calls, who said that he
did not do so.466 Based on testimony from President Trump’s close aides,
78 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
we know that President Trump remained in the Dining Room adjacent to
the Oval Office for the rest of the afternoon until after 4:03 p.m.467
In fact, from cellular telephone records, it appears that at 1:39 p.m. and
2:03 p.m., after being informed of the riot at the Capitol, President Trump
called his lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani. These calls lasted approximately four
minutes and eight minutes, respectively.468 And Press Secretary Kayleigh
McEnany testified that President Trump also called a number of Sena-
tors.469 The number or names of all such Members of Congress is unknown,
although Senator Mike Lee (R–UT) received one such outgoing call from
the President within the hour that followed.470
At 1:49 p.m., just as the DC Metropolitan Police officially declared a riot
and the Capitol Police were calling for help from the National Guard to
address the crisis, President Trump sent a tweet with a link to a recording
of his speech at the Ellipse.471
At about that point, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone became aware
of the Capitol riot. The Committee collected sworn testimony from several
White House officials, each with similar accounts. The President’s White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone testified that he raced downstairs, and went to
the Oval Office Dining Room as soon as he learned about the violence at the
Capitol—likely just around or just after 2 p.m. Cipollone knew immediately
that the President had to deliver a message to the rioters—asking them to
leave the Capitol.
Here is how he described this series of events:
. . . the first time I remember going downstairs was when people had
breached the Capitol… But I went down with [Deputy White House
Counsel] Pat [Philbin], and I remember we were both very upset
about what was happening. And we both wanted, you know, action
to be taken related to that . . . But we went down to the Oval Office,
we went through the Oval office, and we went to the back where the
President was. . . . I think he was already in the dining room . . . I
can’t talk about conversations [with the President]. I think I was
pretty clear there needed to be an immediate and forceful response,
statement, public statement, that people need to leave the Capitol
now.472
Cipollone also left little doubt that virtually everyone among senior
White House staff had the same view:
There were a lot of people in the White House that day . . . Senior
people who, you know, felt the same way that I did and who were
working very hard to achieve that result. There were—I think
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 79

Ivanka was one of them. And Eric Herschmann was there, Pat Phil-
bin was there, and a number of other people . . . . many people sug-
gested it. . . . Many people felt the same way. I’m sure I had
conversations with Mark [Meadows] about this during the course of
the day and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to
be done.473
Likewise, senior staff cooperated to produce a message for the Presi-
dent on a notecard, which read:
ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT
PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. 474
The President declined to make the statement. Cipollone also made it
clear that the advice they were giving to the President never changed
throughout this three-hour period. Trump refused to do what was neces-
sary.
Committee Staff: [I]t sounds like you from the very onset of vio-
lence at the Capitol right around 2 o’clock were pushing for a strong
statement that people should leave the Capitol. Is that right?
Cipollone: I was, and others were as well. 475
Cassidy Hutchinson, who worked closely with Mark Meadows and sat
directly outside his office, confirmed this account and described several
additional details:
I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway towards our office.
And he rushed right in, looked at me, said, “Is Mark in his office?”
And I said, “Yes.” And on a normal day he would’ve said, “Can I pop
in,” or, “Is he talking to anyone,” or, “Is it an appropriate time for
me to go chat with him,” and myself or Eliza would go let him in or
tell him no. But after I had said yes, he just looked at me and started
shaking his head and went over, opened Mark’s office door, stood
there with the door propped open, and said something to the—Mark
was still sitting on his phone. I remember, like, glancing in. He was
still sitting on his phone.
And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, “The
rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and
see the President now.” And Mark looked up at him and said, “He
doesn't want to do anything, Pat.” And Pat said something to the
effect of—and very clearly said this to Mark—something to the
effect of, “Mark, something needs to be done, or people are going to
die and the blood’s gonna be on your F’ing hands. This is getting
out of control. I’m going down there. 476
80 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Select Committee believes that the entire White House senior staff
was in favor of a Presidential statement specifically instructing the violent
rioters to leave. But President Trump refused. White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone answered certain questions from the Select Committee on this
subject as follows:
Vice Chair Cheney: And when you talk about others on the staff
thinking more should be done, or thinking that the President
needed to tell people to go home, who would you put in that cat-
egory?
Cipollone: Well, I would put . . . Pat Philbin, Eric Herschmann. Over-
all, Mark Meadows, Ivanka. Once Jared got there, Jared. General
Kellogg. I’m probably missing some, but those are—Kayleigh I
think was there. But I don’t—Dan Scavino.
Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to
leave the Capitol?”
Cipollone: On the staff?
Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House?

Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who didn’t want

people to get out of the Capitol once the—particularly once the vio-
lence started. No. I mean—
Mr. Schiff: What about the President?

Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.

...
[Consultation between Mr. Cipollone and his counsel.]
Cipollone: Yeah. I can’t reveal communications. But obviously I
think, you know—yeah.477
The testimony of a White House employee with national security
responsibilities also corroborated these facts. This employee testified about
a conversation between Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann in which Her-
schmann indicated that the President did not want to do anything to halt
the violence. That employee told the Select Committee that he overheard
Herschmann saying something to the effect of “the President didn’t want
anything done.” 478
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere also testified to the Select Committee
that as soon as it was clear that the Capitol’s outer perimeter had been
breached, he urged that the President make a statement telling the rioters
to go home:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 81

Committee Staff: And so what did you do at that point?

Judd Deere: If I recall, I went back up to [Press Secretary] Kayleigh
[McEnany]’s office and indicated that we now likely needed to say
something.
Committee Staff: Okay. And why did you think it was necessary to
say something?

Deere: Well, I mean, it appears that individuals are storming the

U.S. Capitol building. They also appear to be supporters of Donald
Trump, who may have been in attendance at the rally. We’re going
to need to say something.
Committee Staff: And did you have a view as to what should be said
by the White House?
Deere: If I recall, I told Kayleigh that I thought that we needed to
encourage individuals to stop, to respect law enforcement, and to go
home. . . . And it was—it was incumbent upon us to encourage those
individuals, should they be supporters of ours, to stop.479
Testimony from both Deputy Press Secretary Matthews and White
House Counsel Cipollone indicated that it would have been easy, and nearly
instantaneous, for Trump to make a public statement insisting that the
crowd disperse. As Matthews explained, he could have done so in under a
minute:
. . . it would take probably less than 60 seconds from the Oval Office
dining room over to the Press Briefing Room. And, for folks that
might not know, the Briefing Room is the room that you see the
White House Press Secretary do briefings from with the podium and
the blue backdrop. And there is a camera that is on in there at all
times. And so, if the President had wanted to make a statement and
address the American people, he could have been on camera almost
instantly.480
Cipollone also shared that assessment:
Committee Staff: Would it have been possible at any moment for the
President to walk down to the podium in the briefing room and talk
to the nation at any time between when you first gave him that
advice at 2 o’clock and 4:17 when the video statement went out?
Would that have been possible?
Cipollone: Would it have been possible?”
Committee Staff: Yes.
82 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cipollone: Yes, it would have been possible.481
At 2:13 p.m., rioters broke into the Capitol and flooded the building.482
As the violence began to escalate, many Trump supporters and others
outside the White House began urgently seeking his intervention. Mark
Meadows’s phone was flooded with text messages. These are just some of
them:

2:32 p.m. from Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham: “Hey Mark, The
president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.” 483
2:35 p.m. from Mick Mulvaney: “Mark: he needs to stop this, now.
Can I do anything to help?” 484
2:46 p.m. from Rep. William Timmons (R–SC): “The president
needs to stop this ASAP” 485
2:53 p.m. from Donald Trump, Jr.: “He’s got to condem [sic] this
shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.” 486
3:04 p.m. from Rep. Jeff Duncan (R–SC): “POTUS needs to calm this
shit down” 487
3:09 p.m. from former White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus:
“TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!” 488
3:13 p.m. from Alyssa Farah Griffin: “Potus has to come out firmly
and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed.” 489
3:15 p.m. from Rep. Chip Roy (R–TX): “Fix this now.” 490
3:31 p.m. from Fox News anchor Sean Hannity: “Can he make a
statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital
[sic]” 491

3:58 p.m. from Fox News anchor Brian Kilmeade: “Please get him
on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished” 492
Others on Capitol Hill appeared in the media, or otherwise appeared via
internet. Representative Mike Gallagher (R–WI) issued a video appealing
directly to the President:
Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are the only person
who can call this off. Call it off. The election is over. Call it off!493
Some Members of Congress sent texts to President Trump’s immediate
staff or took to Twitter, where they knew the President spent time:
Sen. Bill Cassidy (R–LA) issued a tweet: @realDonaldTrump please
appear on TV, condemn the violence and tell people to disband.494
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 83

Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA) sent a text to Mark Meadows:

We need to hear from the president. On TV. I hate that Biden jumped
him on it.495
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy tried repeatedly to reach President
Trump, and did at least once. He also reached out for help to multiple
members of President Trump’s family, including Ivanka Trump and Jared
Kushner.496 Kushner characterized Leader McCarthy’s demeanor on the call
as “scared”:
Kushner: I could hear in his voice that he really was nervous, and
so, obviously, I took that seriously. And, you know, I didn’t know if
I’d be able to have any impact, but I said, you know, it’s better to at
least try. And so I—like I said, I turned the shower off, threw on a
suit, and, you know, and rushed into the White House as quickly as I
could.
Committee Staff: Yeah. What did he ask you to do? When you say
have an impact, what is it specifically that he needed your help
with?
Kushner: I don't recall a specific ask, just anything you could do.
Again, I got the sense that, you know, they were—they were—you
know, they were scared.
Committee Staff: “They” meaning Leader McCarthy and people on
the Hill because of the violence?
Kushner: That he was scared, yes.497
Kevin McCarthy told Fox News at 3:09 p.m. about his call with the
President498 and elaborated about its contents in a conversation with CBS
News’s Norah O’Donnell at around 3:30 p.m.:
O’Donnell: Have you spoken with the President and asked him to
perhaps come to the Capitol and tell his supporters it’s time to
leave?
Leader McCarthy: I have spoken to the President. I asked him to talk
to the nation and tell them to stop this. . . .
* * *

O’Donnell: The President invited tens of thousands of people to

quote unquote stop the steal. I don’t know if you heard his more-
than-hour-long remarks or the remarks of his son, who was the
wind-up. It was some heated stuff, Leader McCarthy. I just wonder
whether someone is going to accurately call a spade a spade, and I
84 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
am giving you the opportunity right now that your precious and
beloved United States Capitol and our democracy is witnessing this.
Call a spade a spade.
Leader McCarthy: I was very clear with the President when I called
him. This has to stop. And he has to, he’s gotta go to the American
public and tell them to stop this.
* * *
O’Donnell: Leader McCarthy, the President of the United States has
a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It is, the cameras are hot
24/7, as you know. Why hasn’t he walked down and said that, now?
Leader McCarthy: I conveyed to the President what I think is best to
do, and I’m hopeful the President will do it.499
The Committee has evidence from multiple sources regarding the con-
tent of Kevin McCarthy’s direct conversation with Donald Trump during the
violence.
Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA), to whom McCarthy spoke soon
after, relayed more of the conversation between McCarthy and President
Trump:
And he said [to President Trump], “You have got to get on TV.
You’ve got to get on Twitter. You’ve got to call these people off.”
You know what the President said to him? This is as it’s happening.
He said, “Well Kevin, these aren’t my people. You know, these are
Antifa. And Kevin responded and said, “No, they’re your people.
They literally just came through my office windows and my staff are
running for cover. I mean they’re running for their lives. You need
to call them off.” And the President’s response to Kevin to me was
chilling. He said, “Well Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about
the election, you know, theft than you are”.500
Rep. Herrera Beutler’s account of the incident was also corroborated by
former Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, who testified that
Leader McCarthy told him several days later that President Trump had said
during their call: “Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this
than you are. Maybe they’re more upset.” 501
Mulvaney was also trying to reach administration officials to urge
President Trump to instruct his supporters to leave the Capitol.502 As were
many elected officials in both parties, including Nancy Pelosi and Chuck
Schumer, and several Republican Members of Congress.503
As already noted, Cipollone and others in the White House repeatedly
urged President Trump to tell his supporters to leave the Capitol. Cipollone
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 85

described his conversations with Meadows after they failed to convince

President Trump to deliver the necessary message:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion with Mark
Meadows with respect to his view that the President didn’t want to
do anything or was somehow resistant to wanting to say something
along the lines that you suggested.
Pat Cipollone: Not just—just to be clear, many people suggested it.
Committee Staff: Yeah.
Cipollone: Not just me. Many people felt the same way. I’m sure I
had conversations with Mark about this during the course of the day
and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to be
done.504
***
Committee Staff: So your advice was tell people to leave the Capitol,
and that took over 2 hours when there were subsequent statements
made, tweets put forth, that in your view were insufficient. Did you
continue, Mr. Cipollone, throughout the period of time up until 4:17,
continue, you and others, to push for a stronger statement?
Cipollone: Yes.505
***
Committee Staff: . . . at the onset of the violence when you first
notice on television or wherever that rioters have actually breached
the Capitol, did you have a conversation with Mark Meadows in
which Meadows indicated he doesn’t want to do anything, “he”
meaning the President?
Cipollone: I don’t—I had a conversation I’m sure with Mark Mead-
ows, I’m sure with other people, of what I thought should be done.
Did Mark say that to me? I don’t have a recollection of him saying
that to me, but he may have said something along the lines.506

At 2:16 p.m., security records indicate that the Vice President was
“being pulled” to a safer location.507
In an interview with the Select Committee, a White House Security Offi-
cial on duty at the White House explained his observations as he listened to
Secret Service communications and made contemporaneous entries into a
security log. In particular, he explained an entry he made at 2:24 p.m.:
Committee Staff: Ok. That last entry on this page is: “Service at the
Capitol does not sound good right now.”
86 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Official: Correct.
Committee Staff: What does that mean?
Official: The members of the VP detail at this time were starting to
fear for their own lives. There were a lot of—there was a lot of yell-
ing, a lot of—I don’t know—a lot [of] very personal calls over the
radio. So—it was disturbing. I don’t like talking about it, but there
were calls to say good-bye to family members, so on and so forth. It
was getting—for whatever the reason was on the ground, the VP
detail thought that this was about to get very ugly.

Committee Staff: And did you hear that over the radio?
Official: Correct.
...
Committee Staff: … obviously, you’ve conveyed that’s disturbing,
but what prompted you to put it into an entry as it states there,
“Service at the Capitol—”
Official: That they’re running out of options, and they’re getting
nervous. It sounds like that we came very close to either Service
having to use lethal options or worse. At that point, I don’t know. Is
the VP compromised? Is the detail—like, I don’t know. Like, we
didn’t have visibility, but it doesn’t—if they’re screaming and say-
ing things, like, say good-bye to the family, like, the floor needs to
know this is going to a whole another level soon.508
Also at 2:24 p.m., knowing the riot was underway and that Vice Presi-
dent Pence was at the Capitol, President Trump sent this tweet:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been
done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a
chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inac-
curate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA
demands the truth! 509
Evidence shows that the 2:24 p.m. tweet immediately precipitated fur-
ther violence at the Capitol. Immediately after this tweet, the crowds both
inside and outside of the Capitol building violently surged forward.510 Out-
side the building, within ten minutes thousands of rioters overran the line
on the west side of the Capitol that was being held by the Metropolitan
Police Force’s Civil Disturbance Unit, the first time in history of the DC
Metro Police that such a security line had ever been broken.511
Virtually everyone on the White House staff the Select Committee inter-
viewed condemned the 2:24 p.m. tweet in the strongest terms.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 87

Police officers attempt to clear rioters inside the Capitol building.

(Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images)

Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger told the Select

Committee that the 2:24 p.m. tweet was so destructive that it convinced
him to resign as soon as possible:
One of my aides handed me a sheet of paper that contained the
tweet that you just read. I read it and was quite disturbed by it. I was
disturbed and worried to see that the President was attacking Vice
President Pence for doing his constitutional duty.
So the tweet looked to me like the opposite of what we really needed
at that moment, which was a de-escalation. And that is why I had
said earlier that it looked like fuel being poured on the fire.
So that was the moment that I decided that I was going to resign,
that that would be my last day at the White House. I simply didn’t
want to be associated with the events with the events that were
unfolding at the Capitol.512
Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews had a similar reaction:
So it was obvious that the situation at the Capitol was violent and
escalating quickly. And so I thought that the tweet about the Vice
President was the last thing that was needed in that moment.
88 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
And I remember thinking that this was going to be bad for him to
tweet this, because it was essentially him giving the green light to
these people, telling them that what they were doing at the steps of
the Capitol and entering the Capitol was okay, that they were justi-
fied in their anger.
And he shouldn’t have been doing that. He should have been telling
these people to go home and to leave and to condemn the violence
that we were seeing.
And I am someone who has worked with him, you know, I worked
on the campaign, traveled all around the country, going to countless
rallies with him, and I have seen the impact that his words have on
his supporters. They truly latch onto every word and every tweet
that he says.
And so, I think that in that moment for him to tweet out the mes-
sage about Mike Pence, it was him pouring gasoline on the fire and
making it much worse.513
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere stated the following:
Committee Staff: What was your reaction when you saw that tweet?
Deere: Extremely unhelpful.
Committee Staff: Why?
Deere: It wasn’t the message that we needed at that time. It wasn’t
going to—the scenes at the U.S. Capitol were only getting worse at
that point. This was not going to help that.514
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee, “I don’t
remember when exactly I heard about that tweet, but my reaction to it is
that’s a terrible tweet, and I disagreed with the sentiment. And I thought it
was wrong.” 515
Likewise, Counselor to the President Hope Hicks texted a colleague that
evening: “Attacking the VP? Wtf is wrong with him.”516
At 2:26 p.m., Vice President Pence was again moved to a different loca-
tion.517
President Trump had the TV on in the dining room.518 At 2:38 p.m., Fox
News was showing video of the chaos and attack, with tear gas filling the
air in the Capitol Rotunda. And a newscaster reported, “[T]his is a very
dangerous situation.” 519 This is the context in which Trump sent the tweet.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 89

Testimony obtained by the Committee indicates that President Trump

knew about the rioters’ anger at Vice President Pence and indicated some-
thing to the effect that the Vice President “deserves it.” 520 As Cassidy
Hutchinson explained:
I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, “Mark, we need
to do something more. They’re literally calling for the Vice Presi-
dent to be f’ing hung.” And Mark had responded something to the
effect of, “You heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He
doesn’t think they're doing anything wrong.” To which Pat said
something, “[t]his is f’ing crazy, we need to be doing something
more,” briefly stepped into Mark’s office, and when Mark had said
something—when Mark had said something to the effect of, “He
doesn’t think they’re doing anything wrong,” knowing what I had
heard briefly in the dining room coupled with Pat discussing the
hanging Mike Pence chants in the lobby of our office and then
Mark’s response, I understood “they’re” to be the rioters in the
Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.521

Although White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was limited in what he

would discuss because of privilege concerns, he stated the following:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion at any point dur-
ing the day about rioters at the Capitol chanting ‘hang Mike Pence?’
Cipollone: Yes. I remember—I remember hearing that—about that.
Yes.
Committee Staff: Yeah. And—
Cipollone: I don’t know if I observed that myself on TV. I don’t
remember.
Committee Staff: I'm just curious, I understand the privilege line
you’ve drawn, but do you remember what you can share with us
about the discussion about those chants, the ‘hang Mike Pence’
chants?

Cipollone: I could tell you my view of that.

Committee Staff: Yeah. Please.
Cipollone: My view of that is that is outrageous.
Committee Staff: Uh-huh.
Cipollone: And for anyone to suggest such a thing as the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States, for people in that crowd to be chanting
90 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
that I thought was terrible. I thought it was outrageous and wrong.
And I expressed that very clearly to people. 522
Almost immediately after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, Eric Herschmann went
upstairs in the West Wing to try to enlist Ivanka Trump’s assistance to per-
suade her father to do the right thing.523 Ivanka rushed down to the Oval
Office dining room. Although no one could convince President Trump to call
for the violent rioters to leave the Capitol, Ivanka persuaded President
Trump that a tweet could be issued to discourage violence against the
police.
At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet:
“Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are
truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” 524

While some in the meeting invoked executive privilege, or failed to

recall the specifics, others told us what happened at that point. Sarah Mat-
thews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, had urged her boss, Kay-
leigh McEnany, to have the President make a stronger statement. But she
informed us that President Trump resisted using the word “peaceful” in his
message:
Committee Staff: Ms. Matthews, Ms. McEnany told us she came
right back to the press office after meeting with the President about
this particular tweet. What did she tell you about what happened in
that dining room?

Sarah Matthews: When she got back, she told me that a tweet had
been sent out. And I told her that I thought the tweet did not go far
enough, that I thought there needed to be a call to action and he
needed to condemn the violence. And we were in a room full of
people, but people weren’t paying attention. And so, she looked
directly at me and in a hushed tone shared with me that the Presi-
dent did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that
tweet and that it took some convincing on their part, those who
were in the room. And she said that there was a back and forth
going over different phrases to find something that he was com-
fortable with. And it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the
phrase ‘stay peaceful’ that he finally agreed to include it.525
At 3:13 p.m., President Trump sent another tweet, but again declined to
tell people to go home:
“I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No
violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the
Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” 526
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 91

Almost everyone, including staff in the White House also found the
President’s 2:38 p.m. and 3:13 p.m. tweets to be insufficient because they
did not instruct the rioters to leave the Capitol. As mentioned, President
Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., texted Meadows:
He’s got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police
tweet is not enough. 527
Sean Hannity also texted Mark Meadows:
Can he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully
leave the capital [sic].528
None of these efforts resulted in President Trump immediately issuing
the message that was needed. White House staff had these comments:
Pottinger: Yeah. It was insufficient. I think what—you could count
me among those who was hoping to see an unequivocal strong
statement clearing out the Capitol, telling people to stand down,
leave, go home. I think that’s what we were hoping for. 529
...
Matthews: Yeah. So a conversation started in the press office after
the President sent out those two tweets that I deemed were insuffi-
cient. . . . I thought that we should condemn the violence and con-
demn it unequivocally. And I thought that he needed to include a
call to action and to tell these people to go home. 530

And they were right. Evidence showed that neither of these tweets had
any appreciable impact on the violent rioters. Unlike the video-message
tweet that did not come until 4:17 finally instructing rioters to leave, nei-
ther the 2:38 nor the 3:13 tweets made any difference.
At some point after 3:05 p.m. that afternoon, President Trump’s Chief
of Staff—and President Trump himself—were informed that someone had
been shot.531 That person was Ashli Babbitt, who was fatally shot at 2:44
p.m. as she and other rioters tried to gain access to the House chamber.532
There is no indication that this affected the President’s state of mind that
day, and we found no evidence that the President expressed any remorse
that day.
Meanwhile, leaders in Congress—including Speaker Pelosi, Senator
Schumer, Senator McConnell—and the Vice President, were taking action.
They called the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, governors and
officials in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, begging for
assistance.533
President-elect Biden also broadcast a video calling on President Trump
to take action:
92 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I call on President Trump to go on national television now to fulfill
his oath and defend the Constitution and demand an end to this
siege.534
President Trump could have done this, of course, anytime after he
learned of the violence at the Capitol. At 4:17 p.m., 187 minutes after finish-
ing his speech (and even longer after the attack began), President Trump
finally broadcast a video message in which he asked those attacking the
Capitol to leave:
I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was
stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it,
especially the other side, but you have to go home now. We have to
have peace. 535

President Trump’s Deputy Press Secretary, Sarah Matthews testified

about her reaction to this video message:
[H]e told the people who we had just watched storm our nation’s
Capitol with the intent on overthrowing our democracy, violently
attack police officers, and chant heinous things like, “Hang Mike
Pence,” “We love you. You’re very special.” As a spokesperson for
him, I knew that I would be asked to defend that. And to me, his
refusal to act and call off the mob that day and his refusal to con-
demn the violence was indefensible. And so, I knew that I would be
resigning that evening. 536

By this time, the National Guard and other additional law enforcement
had begun to arrive in force and started to turn the tide of the violence.
Many of those attackers in the Capitol saw or received word of President
Trump’s 4:17 p.m. message, and they understood this message as an
instruction to leave:537
• Stephen Ayres testified in front of the Select Committee that: “Well, we
were there. As soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it,
and it seemed like it started to disperse, you know, some of the crowd.
Obviously, you know, once we got back to the hotel room, we seen that
it was still going on, but it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd.” 538
• Jacob Chansley, also known as the QAnon-Shaman answered President
Trump’s directive: “I’m here delivering the President’s message. Don-
ald Trump has asked everybody to go home.” Another responded to
Chansley: “That’s our order.” 539
• Other unknown individuals also listened to President Trump’s message
while outside the Capitol, and responded: “He says, go home. He says,
go home.” And “Yeah. Here. He said to go home.” 540
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 93

At 6:01 p.m., President Trump sent his last tweet of the day, not con-
demning the violence, but instead attempting to justify it:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred election
landslide victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away
from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so
long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!541
Staff in President Trump’s own White House and campaign had a
strong reaction to this message:
Sarah Matthews: At that point I had already made the decision to
resign and this tweet just further cemented my decision. I thought
that January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days in our Nation’s
history and President Trump was treating it as a celebratory occa-
sion with that tweet. And so, it just further cemented my decision to
resign.542
Tim Murtaugh: I don’t think it’s a patriotic act to attack the Capitol.
But I have no idea how to characterize the people other than they
trespassed, destroyed property, and assaulted the U.S. Capitol. I
think calling them patriots is a, let’s say, a stretch, to say the least. .
. . I don’t think it’s a patriotic act to attack the U.S. Capitol.543

Pat Cipollone: [W]hat happened at the Capitol cannot be justified in

any form or fashion. It was wrong, and it was tragic. And a lot—and
it was a terrible day. It was a terrible day for this country.544
Greg Jacob: I thought it was inappropriate. . . . To my mind, it was a
day that should live in infamy.545
At 6:27 p.m., President Trump retired to his residence for the night. As
he did, he had one final comment to an employee who accompanied him to
the residence. The one takeaway that the President expressed in that
moment, following a horrific afternoon of violence and the worst attack
against the U.S. Capitol building in over two centuries, was this: “Mike
Pence let me down.” 546
President Trump’s inner circle was still trying to delay the counting of
electoral votes into the evening, even after the violence had been quelled.
Rudolph Giuliani tried calling numerous Members of Congress in the hour
before the joint session resumed, including Rep. Jim Jordan (R–OH) and
Senators Marsha Blackburn (R–TN), Tommy Tuberville (R–AL), Bill
Hagerty (R–TN), Lindsey Graham (R–SC), Josh Hawley (R–MO), and Ted
Cruz (R–TX).547 His voicemail intended for Senator Tuberville at 7:02 p.m.
that evening eventually was made public:
94 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Trump sign with Vice President Mike Pence’s name removed.

(Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images)

Guiliani: Sen. Tuberville? Or I should say Coach Tuberville. This is

Rudy Guiliani, the President’s lawyer. I’m calling you because I
want to discuss with you how they’re trying to rush this hearing and
how we need you, our Republican friends, to try to just slow it down
so we can get these legislatures to get more information to you.548
Reflecting on President Trump’s conduct that day, Vice President Pence
noted that President Trump “had made no effort to contact me in the midst
of the rioting or any point afterward.” 549 He wrote that President Trump’s
“reckless words had endangered my family and all those serving at the
Capitol.” 550
President Trump did not contact a single top national security official
during the day. Not at the Pentagon, nor at the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Depart-
ment, or the D.C. Mayor’s office.551 As Vice President Pence has confirmed,
President Trump didn’t even try to reach his own Vice President to make
sure that Pence was safe.552 President Trump did not order any of his staff
to facilitate a law enforcement response of any sort.553 His Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—who is by statute the primary military advisor to the
President—had this reaction:
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 95

General Milley: You know, you’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve

got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of
America. And there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?554
General Milley did, however, receive a call from President Trump’s
Chief of Staff Mark Meadows that day. Here is how he described that call:
He said, “We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is
making all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative, you
know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady
or stable,” or words to that effect. I immediately interpreted that as
politics, politics, politics. Red flag for me, personally. No action. But
I remember it distinctly. And I don’t do political narratives.555
Some have suggested that President Trump gave an order to have
10,000 troops ready for January 6th.556 The Select Committee found no evi-
dence of this. In fact, President Trump’s Acting Secretary of Defense Chris-
topher Miller directly refuted this when he testified under oath:
Committee Staff: To be crystal clear, there was no direct order from
President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January
6th, correct?
Miller: No. Yeah. That’s correct. There was no direct—there was no
order from the President.557
Later, on the evening of January 6th, President Trump’s former cam-
paign manager, Brad Parscale, texted Katrina Pierson, one of President
Trump’s rally organizers, that the events of the day were the result of a
“sitting president asking for civil war” and that “This week I feel guilty for
helping him win” now that “. . . a woman is dead.” Pierson answered: “You
do realize this was going to happen.” Parscale replied: “Yeah. If I was
Trump and knew my rhetoric killed someone.” “It wasn’t the rhetoric,”
Pierson suggested. But Parscale insisted: “Yes it was.” 558

THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF JANUARY 6TH

In days following January 6th, President Trump’s family and staff
attempted repeatedly to persuade him not to repeat his election fraud alle-
gations, to concede defeat, and to allow the transition to President Biden to
proceed. Trump did make two video recordings, which initially appeared
contrite. But evidence suggests that these statements were designed at least
in part to ward off other potential consequences of January 6th, such as
invocation of the 25th Amendment or impeachment.
In fact, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy indicated after the attack, in a
discussion with House Republican leaders, that he would ask President
Trump to resign:
96 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Rep. Cheney: I guess there’s a question when we were talking about
the 25th Amendment resolution, and you asked what would happen
after he’s gone? Is there any chance? Are you hearing that he might
resign? Is there any reason to think that might happen?
Leader McCarthy: I’ve had a few discussions. My gut tells me no.
I’m seriously thinking of having that discussion with him tonight. I
haven’t talked to him in a couple of days. From what I know of him,
I mean, you guys all know him too, do you think he’d ever back
away? But what I think I’m going to do is I’m going to call him. This
is what I think. We know [the 25th Amendment resolution] will pass
the House. I think there’s a chance it will pass the Senate, even
when he’s gone. And I think there’s a lot of different ramifications
for that. . . . Again, the only discussion I would have with him is that
I think this will pass, and it would be my recommendation you
should resign.559
Before January 6th, Fox News personality Sean Hannity warned that
January 6th could be disastrous:
Dec. 31, 2020 text from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows: “We can’t
lose the entire WH counsels office. I do NOT see January 6 happen-
ing the way he is being told. After the 6 th [sic]. He should announce
will lead the nationwide effort to reform voting integrity. Go to Fl
and watch Joe mess up daily. Stay engaged. When he speaks people
will listen.” 560
January 5, 2021 texts from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows:
“Im very worried about the next 48 hours”
“Pence pressure. WH counsel will leave.”
“Sorry, I can’t talk right now.”

“On with boss”561

A member of the Republican Freedom caucus also warned, on December
31, 2020, and on January 1, 2021:
The President should call everyone off. It’s the only path. If we sub-
stitute the will of states through electors with a vote by Congress
every 4 years . . . we have destroyed the electoral college . . .
Respectfully.562 If POTUS allows this to occur . . . we’re driving a
stake in the heart of the federal republic . . . 563
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 97

After January 6th, Hannity worked to persuade President Trump to stop

talking about election fraud, proposed that Trump pardon Hunter Biden,
and discussed attending the Inauguration:
1. No more stolen election talk.
2. Yes, impeachment and 25th amendment are real, and many people
will quit.
3. He was intrigued by the Pardon idea!! (Hunter)
4. Resistant but listened to Pence thoughts, to make it right.
5. Seemed to like attending Inauguration talk.564

Ultimately, President Trump took little of the advice from Hannity and his
White House staff. A few days later, Hannity wrote again to Meadows and
Jim Jordan:
Guys, we have a clear path to land the plane in 9 days. He can’t
mention the election again. Ever. I did not have a good call with him
today. And worse, I’m not sure what is left to do or say, and I don t
like not knowing if it’s truly understood. Ideas?565
Likewise, despite her many contrary public statements, Republican
Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene privately texted her concerns on
January 6th about a continuing and real threat of violence.
Mark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor of
the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people This isn’t the
way to solve anything 566
Donald Trump was impeached on January 13th. In a speech that day,
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy made this statement from the House
floor, but voted against impeachment:
The President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Con-
gress by mob rioters. He should have immediately denounced the
mob when he saw what was unfolding. These facts require immedi-
ate action by President Trump, accept his share of responsibility,
quell the brewing unrest and ensure President-elect Biden is able to
successfully begin his term. The President’s immediate action also
deserves congressional action, which is why I think a fact-finding
commission and a censure resolution would be prudent.567
Later, McCarthy told members of the House Republican conference that
Trump had acknowledged that he was at least partially responsible for the
January 6th attack.
98 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kevin McCarthy speaks at a press conference at the Capitol building on August 27, 2021.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

I asked him personally today, does he hold responsibility for what

happened? Does he feel bad about what happened? He told me he
does have some responsibility for what happened. And he need to
acknowledge that.568
Since January 6th, President Trump has continued to claim falsely that
the 2020 Presidential election was stolen. Not only that, he has urged other
politicians to push this argument as well. Representative Mo Brooks has
issued a public statement appearing to represent Trump’s private views and
intentions:
President Trump asked me to rescind the 2020 elections, immedi-
ately remove Joe Biden from the White House, immediately put
President Trump back in the White House, and hold a new special
election for the presidency.569

REFERRALS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL COUNSEL AND HOUSE

ETHICS COMMITTEE

The Committee’s work has produced a substantial body of new information.

We know far more about the President’s plans and actions to overturn the
election than almost all Members of Congress did when President Trump
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 99

was impeached on January 13, 2021, or when he was tried by the Senate in
February of that year. Fifty-seven of 100 Senators voted to convict Presi-
dent Trump at that time, and more than 20 others condemned the Presi-
dent’s conduct and said they were voting against conviction because the
President’s term had already expired.570 At the time, the Republican Leader
of the U.S. Senate said this about Donald Trump: “A mob was assaulting the
Capitol in his name. These criminals were carrying his banners, hanging his
flags, and screaming their loyalty to him. It was obvious that only President
Trump could end this. He was the only one who could.” 571 House Republi-
can Leader Kevin McCarthy, who spoke directly with President Trump dur-
ing the violence of January 6th, expressed similar views both in private and
in public. Privately, Leader McCarthy stated: “But let me be very clear to
you and I have been very clear to the President. He bears responsibility for
his words and actions. No if, ands or buts.” 572 In public, Leader McCarthy
concluded: “The President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on
Congress by mob rioters.” 573
Today we know that the planning to overturn the election on January
6th was substantially more extensive, and involved many other players, and
many other efforts over a longer time period. Indeed, the violent attack and
invasion of the Capitol, and what provoked it, are only a part of the story.
From the outset of its hearings, the Committee has explained that
President Trump and a number of other individuals made a series of very
specific plans, ultimately with multiple separate elements, but all with one
overriding objective: to corruptly obstruct, impede, or influence the count-
ing of electoral votes on January 6th, and thereby overturn the lawful
results of the election. The underlying and fundamental feature of that
planning was the effort to get one man, Vice President Mike Pence, to
assert and then exercise unprecedented and lawless powers to unilaterally
alter the actual election outcome on January 6th. Evidence obtained by the
Committee demonstrates that John Eastman, who worked with President
Trump to put that and other elements of the plan in place, knew even
before the 2020 Presidential election that Vice President Pence could not
lawfully refuse to count official, certified electoral slates submitted by the
Governors of the States.574 Testimony and contemporaneous documentary
evidence also indicate that President Trump knew that the plan was unlaw-
ful before January 6th.575 When the Vice President’s counsel wrote to East-
man on January 6th to ask whether the latter had informed the President
that the Vice President did not have authority to decide the election unilat-
erally, Eastman responded: “He’s been so advised,” and added, “[b]ut you
know him—once he gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to
change course.” 576
100 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Many of the other elements of President Trump’s plans were specifi-
cally designed to create a set of circumstances on January 6th to assist
President Trump in overturning the lawful election outcome during Con-
gress’s joint session that day. For example, President Trump pressured
State legislatures to adopt new electoral slates that Vice President Pence
could, unlawfully, count. Trump solicited State officials to “find” a suffi-
cient number of votes to alter the final count, and instructed the Depart-
ment of Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave
the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.” 577 President Trump
offered the job of Acting Attorney General to Jeffrey Clark. As our evidence
has unequivocally demonstrated, Clark intended to use that position to send
a series of letters from the Department of Justice to multiple States falsely
asserting that the Department had found fraud and urging those States to
convene their legislatures to alter their official electoral slates.578 And
President Trump, with the help of the Republican National Committee and
others, oversaw an effort to create and transmit to Government officials a
series of intentionally false electoral slates for Vice President Pence to uti-
lize on January 6th to alter or delay the count of lawful votes.579
Of course, other elements of the plan complemented these efforts too.
As this Report documents, President Trump was advised by his own experts
and the Justice Department that his election fraud allegations were false,
and he knew he had lost virtually all the legal challenges to the election, but
he nevertheless engaged in a successful but fraudulent effort to persuade
tens of millions of Americans that the election was stolen from him. This
effort was designed to convince Americans that President Trump’s actions
to overturn the election were justified. President Trump then urged his
supporters to travel to Washington on January 6th to apply pressure to
Congress to halt the count and change the election outcome, explaining to
those who were coming to Washington that they needed to “take back”
their country and “stop the steal.” 580
It is helpful in understanding these facts to focus on specific moments
in time when President Trump made corrupt, dishonest, and unlawful
choices to pursue his plans. For example, by December 14th when the elec-
toral college met and certified Joe Biden’s victory, President Trump knew
that he had failed in all the relevant litigation; he had been advised by his
own experts and the Justice Department that his election fraud claims were
false; and he had been told by numerous advisors that he had lost and
should concede. But despite his duty as President to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, he chose instead to ignore all of the judicial rulings
and the facts before him and push forward to overturn the election. Like-
wise, in the days and hours before the violence of January 6th, President
Trump knew that no State had issued any changed electoral slate. Indeed,
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 101

neither President Trump nor his co-conspirators had any evidence that any
majority of any State legislature was willing to do so. President Trump also
knew that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count legitimate
votes. Despite all of these facts, President Trump nevertheless proceeded to
instruct Vice President Pence to execute a plan he already knew was illegal.
And then knowing that a violent riot was underway, President Trump
breached his oath of office; our Commander in Chief refused for hours to
take the one simple step that his advisors were begging him to take—to
instruct his supporters to disperse, stand down, and leave the Capitol.
Instead, fully understanding what had unfolded at the Capitol, President
Trump exacerbated the violence with a tweet attacking Vice President
Pence.581 Any rational person who had watched the events that day knew
that President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet would lead to further violence. It
did. And, at almost exactly the same time, President Trump continued to
lobby Congress to delay the electoral count.
As the evidence demonstrates, the rioters at the Capitol had invaded the
building and halted the electoral count. They did not begin to relent until
President Trump finally issued a video statement instructing his supporters
to leave the Capitol at 4:17 p.m., which had an immediate and helpful effect:
rioters began to disperse582—but not before the Capitol was invaded, the
election count was halted, feces were smeared in the Capitol, the Vice
President and his family and many others were put in danger, and more
than 140 law enforcement officers were attacked and seriously injured by
mob rioters. Even if it were true that President Trump genuinely believed
the election was stolen, this is no defense. No President can ignore the courts
and purposely violate the law no matter what supposed “justification” he
or she presents.
These conclusions are not the Committee’s alone. In the course of its
investigation, the Committee had occasion to present evidence to Federal
District Court Judge David Carter, who weighed that evidence against sub-
missions from President Trump’s lawyer, John Eastman. Judge Carter con-
sidered this evidence in the context of a discovery dispute—specifically
whether the Committee could obtain certain of Eastman’s documents pur-
suant to the “crime-fraud” exception to the attorney-client privilege. That
exception provides that otherwise privileged documents may lose their
privilege if they were part of an effort to commit a crime or a fraud, in this
case by President Trump. Judge Carter set out his factual findings, discuss-
ing multiple elements of President Trump’s multi-part plan to overturn the
election,583 and then addressed whether the evidence, including Eastman’s
email communications, demonstrated that Trump and Eastman committed
crimes. “Based on the evidence,” Judge Carter explained, “the Court finds it
more likely than not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct
102 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021,” and “more likely than
not that President Trump and Dr. Eastman dishonestly conspired to
obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th.” 584 Judge Carter also
concluded that President Trump’s and Eastman’s “pressure campaign to
stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President Pence—it targeted
every tier of federal and state elected officials” 585 and was “a coup in
search of a legal theory.” 586 “The plan spurred violent attacks on the seat
of our nation’s government,” Judge Carter wrote, and it threatened to
“permanently end[] the peaceful transition of power. . . .” 587
The U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating and prosecuting
persons who invaded the Capitol, engaged in violence, and planned violence
on that day. The Department has charged more than 900 individuals, and
nearly 500 have already been convicted or pleaded guilty as we write.588 As
the Committee’s investigation progressed through its hearings, public
reporting emerged suggesting that the Department of Justice had also
begun to investigate several others specifically involved in the events being
examined by the Committee. Such reports indicated that search warrants
had been issued, based on findings of probable cause, for the cell phones of
John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, and Representative Scott Perry.589 Other
reports suggested that the Department had empaneled one or more grand
juries and was pursuing a ruling compelling several of this Committee’s
witnesses, including Pat Cipollone and Greg Jacob, to give testimony on
topics for which President Trump had apparently asserted executive privi-
lege. Recent reporting suggests that a Federal district court judge has now
rejected President Trump’s executive privilege claims in that context.590
Criminal referrals from a congressional committee are often made in
circumstances where prosecutors are not yet known to be pursuing some of
the same facts and evidence. That is not the case here. During the course of
our investigation, both the U.S. Department of Justice and at least one local
prosecutor’s office (Fulton County, Georgia) have been actively conducting
criminal investigations concurrently with this congressional investiga-
tion.591 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has recently taken the
extraordinary step of appointing a Special Counsel to investigate the former
President’s conduct.592
The Committee recognizes that the Department of Justice and other
prosecutorial authorities may be in a position to utilize investigative tools,
including search warrants and grand juries, superior to the means the
Committee has for obtaining relevant information and testimony. Indeed,
both the Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney may
now have access to witness testimony and records that have been unavail-
able to the Committee, including testimony from President Trump’s Chief
of Staff Mark Meadows, and others who either asserted privileges or
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 103

invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.593 The Department may also be able
to access, via grand jury subpoena or otherwise, the testimony of Republi-
can Leader Kevin McCarthy, Representative Scott Perry, Representative Jim
Jordan and others, each of whom appears to have had materially relevant
communications with Donald Trump or others in the White House but who
failed to comply with the Select Committee’s subpoenas.
Taking all of these facts into account, and based on the breadth of the
evidence it has accumulated, the Committee makes the following criminal
referrals to the Department of Justice’s Special Counsel.

I. Obstruction of an Official Proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c))

Section 1512(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime to
“corruptly” “obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding, or
attempt[] to do so.” 594 Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential
violations of this statute for a criminal referral of President Trump and
others.595
First, there should be no question that Congress’s joint session to count
electoral votes on January 6th was an “official proceeding” under section
1512(c). Many Federal judges have already reached that specific conclu-
sion.596
Second, there should be no doubt that President Trump knew that his
actions were likely to “obstruct, influence or impede” that proceeding.
Based on the evidence developed, President Trump was attempting to pre-
vent or delay the counting of lawful certified electoral college votes from
multiple States.597 President Trump was directly and personally involved in
this effort, personally pressuring Vice President Pence relentlessly as the
joint session on January 6th approached.598
Third, President Trump acted with a “corrupt” purpose. Vice President
Pence, Greg Jacob, and others repeatedly told the President that the Vice
President had no unilateral authority to prevent certification of the elec-
tion.599 Indeed, in an email exchange during the violence of January 6th,
Eastman admitted that President Trump had been “advised” that Vice
President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count votes under the Electoral
Count Act, but “once he gets something in his head, it’s hard to get him to
change course.” 600 In addition, President Trump knew that he had lost
dozens of State and Federal lawsuits, and that the Justice Department, his
campaign and his other advisors concluded that there was insufficient fraud
to alter the outcome. President Trump also knew that no majority of any
State legislature had taken or manifested any intention to take any official
action that could change a State’s electoral college votes.601 But President
Trump pushed forward anyway. As Judge Carter explained, “[b]ecause
104 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Trump likely knew that the plan to disrupt the electoral count
was wrongful, his mindset exceeds the threshold for acting ‘corruptly’
under § 1512(c).” 602
Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c) for a criminal referral of President Trump based solely on his plan
to get Vice President Pence to prevent certification of the election at the
joint session of Congress. Those facts standing alone are sufficient. But
such a charge under that statute can also be based on the plan to create and
transmit to the executive and legislative branches fraudulent electoral
slates, which were ultimately intended to facilitate an unlawful action by
Vice President Pence, to refuse to count legitimate, certified electoral votes
during Congress’s official January 6th proceeding.603 Additionally, evidence
developed about the many other elements of President Trump’s plans to
overturn the election, including soliciting State legislatures, State officials,
and others to alter official electoral outcomes, provides further evidence
that President Trump was attempting through multiple means to corruptly
obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of electoral votes on January
6th. This is also true of President Trump’s personal directive to the Depart-
ment of Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave
the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.” 604
We also stress in particular the draft letter to the Georgia legislature
authored by Jeffrey Clark and another Trump political appointee at the
Department of Justice. The draft letter embraces many of the same theories
that John Eastman and others were asserting in President Trump’s effort to
lobby State legislatures. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone described that
letter as “a murder-suicide pact,” and other White House and Justice
Department officials offered similar descriptions.605 As described herein,
that draft letter was intended to help persuade a State legislature to change
its certified slate of electoral college electors based on false allegations of
fraud, so Vice President Pence could unilaterally and unlawfully decide to
count a different slate on January 6th.606 The letter was transparently false,
improper, and illegal. President Trump had multiple communications with
Clark in the days before January 6th, and there is no basis to doubt that
President Trump offered Clark the position of Acting Attorney General
knowing that Clark would send the letter and others like it.607
Of course, President Trump is also responsible for recruiting tens of
thousands of his supporters to Washington for January 6th, and knowing
they were angry and some were armed, instructing them to march to the
Capitol and “fight like hell.” 608 And then, while knowing a violent riot was
underway, he refused for multiple hours to take the single step his advisors
and supporters were begging him to take to halt the violence: to make a
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 105

public statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capi-
tol.609 Through action and inaction, President Trump corruptly obstructed,
delayed, and impeded the vote count.
In addition, the Committee believes sufficient evidence exists for a
criminal referral of John Eastman and certain other Trump associates under
18 U.S.C. §1512(c). The evidence shows that Eastman knew in advance of the
2020 election that Vice President Pence could not refuse to count electoral
votes on January 6th.610 In the days before January 6th, Eastman was
warned repeatedly that his plan was illegal and “completely crazy,” and
would “cause riots in the streets.” 611 Nonetheless, Eastman continued to
assist President Trump’s pressure campaign in public and in private,
including in meetings with the Vice President and in his own speech at the
Ellipse on January 6th. And even as the violence was playing out at the
Capitol, Eastman admitted in writing that his plan violated the law but
pressed for Pence to do it anyway.612 In the immediate aftermath of January
6th, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann told Eastman that he should
“[g]et a great F'ing criminal defense lawyer, you’re going to need it.” 613
Others working with Eastman likely share in Eastman’s culpability. For
example, Kenneth Chesebro was a central player in the scheme to submit
fake electors to the Congress and the National Archives.
The Committee notes that multiple Republican Members of Congress,
including Representative Scott Perry, likely have material facts regarding
President Trump’s plans to overturn the election. For example, many Mem-
bers of Congress attended a White House meeting on December 21, 2020, in
which the plan to have the Vice President affect the outcome of the election
was disclosed and discussed. Evidence indicates that certain of those Mem-
bers unsuccessfully sought Presidential pardons from President Trump
after January 6th,614 as did Eastman,615 revealing their own clear con-
sciousness of guilt.

II. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371)

Section 371 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides that “[i]f two or more per-
sons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.” The Committee believes sufficient evidence exists
for a criminal referral of President Trump and others under this statute.616
First, President Trump entered into an agreement with individuals to
obstruct a lawful function of the government (the certification of the elec-
tion). The evidence of this element overlaps greatly with the evidence of the
section 1512(c)(2) violations, so we will not repeat it at length here. Presi-
dent Trump engaged in a multi-part plan described in this Report to
106 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
obstruct a lawful certification of the election. Judge Carter focused his opin-
ions largely on John Eastman’s role, as Eastman’s documents were at issue
in that case, concluding that “the evidence shows that an agreement to
enact the electoral count plan likely existed between President Trump and
Eastman.” 617 But President Trump entered into agreements—whether for-
mal or informal618—with several other individuals who assisted with the
multi-part plan. With regard to the Department of Justice, Jeffrey Clark
stands out as a participant in the conspiracy, as the evidence suggests that
Clark entered into an agreement with President Trump that if appointed
Acting Attorney General, he would send a letter to State officials falsely
stating that the Department of Justice believed that State legislatures had a
sufficient factual basis to convene to select new electors. This was false—
the Department of Justice had reached the conclusion that there was no
factual basis to contend that the election was stolen. Again, as with section
1512(c), the conspiracy under section 371 appears to have also included
other individuals such as Chesebro, Rudolph Giuliani, and Mark Meadows,
but this Committee does not attempt to determine all of the participants of
the conspiracy, many of whom refused to answer this Committee’s ques-
tions.
Second, there are several bases for finding that the conspirators used
“deceitful or dishonest means.” For example, President Trump repeatedly
lied about the election, after he had been told by his advisors that there was
no evidence of fraud sufficient to change the results of the election.619 In
addition, the plot to get the Vice President to unilaterally prevent certifica-
tion of the election was manifestly (and admittedly) illegal, as discussed
above. Eastman and others told President Trump that it would violate the
Electoral Count Act if the Vice President unilaterally rejected electors. Thus
Judge Carter once again had little trouble finding that the intent require-
ment (“deceitful or dishonest means”) was met, stating that “President
Trump continuing to push that plan despite being aware of its illegality
constituted obstruction by ‘dishonest’ means under § 371.” 620 Judge Carter
rejected the notion that Eastman’s plan—which the President adopted and
actualized—was a “good faith interpretation” of the law, finding instead
that it was “a partisan distortion of the democratic process.” 621 Similarly,
both President Trump and Clark had been told repeatedly that the Depart-
ment of Justice had found no evidence of significant fraud in any of its
investigations, but they nonetheless pushed the Department of Justice to
send a letter to State officials stating that the Department had found such
fraud. And Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and others made
clear to President Trump that they had no authority to “find” him 11,780
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 107

votes, but the President relentlessly insisted that they do exactly that, even
to the point of suggesting there could be criminal consequences if they
refused.622
Third, there were numerous overt acts in furtherance of the agreement,
including each of the parts of the President’s effort to overturn the election.
As Judge Carter concluded, President Trump and Eastman participated in
“numerous overt acts in furtherance of their shared plan.” 623 These
included, but certainly were not limited to, direct pleas to the Vice President
to reject electors or delay certification, including in Oval Office meetings
and the President’s vulgar comments to the Vice President on the morning
of January 6th. Judge Carter also addressed evidence that President Trump
knowingly made false representations to a court. Judge Carter concluded
that Eastman’s emails showed “that President Trump knew that the spe-
cific numbers of voter fraud” cited in a complaint on behalf of President
Trump “were wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both in court
and to the public.” Judge Carter found that the emails in question were
related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United
States.624
In finding that President Trump, Eastman, and others engaged in con-
spiracy to defraud the United States under section 371, Judge Carter relied
on the documents at issue (largely consisting of Eastman’s own emails) and
evidence presented to the court by this Committee. This Committee’s
investigation has progressed significantly since Judge Carter issued his first
crime-fraud ruling in March 2022. The evidence found by this Committee
and discussed in detail in this Report further documents that the conspiracy
to defraud the United States under section 371 extended far beyond the
effort to pressure the Vice President to prevent certification of the election.
The Committee believes there is sufficient evidence for a criminal referral
of the multi-part plan described in this Report under section 371, as the
very purpose of the plan was to prevent the lawful certification of Joe
Biden’s election as President.

III. Conspiracy to Make a False Statement (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001)

President Trump, through others acting at his behest, submitted slates of
fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Section 1001 of Title 18
of the United States Code applies, in relevant part, to “whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
108 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.”
According to the Department of Justice, whether a false statement is
criminal under section 1001 “depends on whether there is an affirmative
response to each of the following questions:
1. Was the act or statement material?
2. Was the act within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the
United States?
3. Was the act done knowingly and willfully?” 625

In addition, and as explained above, 18 U.S.C. § 371 makes it a crime to con-

spire to “commit any offense against the United States.” 626
The evidence suggests President Trump conspired with others to submit
slates of fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Sufficient evi-
dence exists of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001 for a criminal referral
of President Trump and others.
As explained earlier and in Chapter 3 of this Report, the certifications
signed by Trump electors in multiple States were patently false. Vice Presi-
dent Biden won each of those States, and the relevant State authorities had
so certified. It can hardly be disputed that the false slates of electors were
material, as nothing can be more material to the joint session of Congress
to certify the election than the question of which candidate won which
States. Indeed, evidence obtained by the Committee suggests that those
attempting to submit certain of the electoral votes regarded the need to
provide that material to Vice President Pence as urgent.627
There should be no question that section 1001 applies here. The false
electoral slates were provided both to the executive branch (the National
Archives) and the legislative branch.628 The statute applies to “any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States.” 629 It is well established that false state-
ments to Congress can constitute violations of section 1001.630
Finally, the false statement was made knowingly and willfully. There is
some evidence suggesting that some signatories of the fake certificates
believed that the certificates were contingent, to be used only in the event
that President Trump prevailed in litigation challenging the election results
in their States. That may be relevant to the question whether those electors
knowingly and willfully signed a false statement at the time they signed the
certificates. But it is of no moment to President Trump’s conduct, as Presi-
dent Trump (including acting through co-conspirators such as John East-
man and Kenneth Chesebro) relied on the existence of those fake electors as
a basis for asserting that the Vice President could reject or delay certifica-
tion of the Biden electors. In fact, as explained earlier and in Chapter 5 of
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 109

this Report, Eastman’s memorandum setting out a six-step plan for over-
turning the election on January 6th begins by stating that “7 states have
transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of the Senate.”
The remaining question is who engaged in this conspiracy to make the
false statement to Congress under section 1001. The evidence is clear that
President Trump personally participated in a scheme to have the Trump
electors meet, cast votes, and send their votes to the joint session of Con-
gress in several States that Vice President Biden won, and then his support-
ers relied on the existence of these fake electors as part of their effort to
obstruct the joint session. Republican National Committee (RNC) Chair-
woman Ronna McDaniel testified before this Committee that President
Trump and Eastman directly requested that the RNC organize the effort to
have these fake (i.e., Trump) electors meet and cast their votes.631 Thus, the
Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of
President Trump for illegally engaging in a conspiracy to violate section
1001; the evidence indicates that he entered into an agreement with East-
man and others to make the false statement (the fake electoral certificates),
by deceitful or dishonest means, and at least one member of the conspiracy
engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (e.g.,
President Trump and Eastman’s call to Ronna McDaniel).

IV. “Incite,” “Assist” or “Aid and Comfort” an Insurrection (18 U.S.C. § 2383)
Section 2383 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies to anyone who
“incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection
against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or
comfort thereto.” 632 The Committee recognizes that section 2383 does not
require evidence of an “agreement” between President Trump and the vio-
lent rioters to establish a violation of that provision; instead, the President
need only have incited, assisted, or aided and comforted those engaged in
violence or other lawless activity in an effort to prevent the peaceful transi-
tion of the Presidency under our Constitution. A Federal court has already
concluded that President Trump’s statements during his Ellipse speech
were “plausibly words of incitement not protected by the First Amend-
ment.” 633 Moreover, President Trump was impeached for “Incitement of
Insurrection,” and a majority of the Senate voted to convict, with many
more suggesting they might have voted to convict had President Trump still
been in office at the time.634
As explained throughout this Report and in this Committee’s hearings,
President Trump was directly responsible for summoning what became a
violent mob to Washington, DC, urging them to march to the Capitol, and
then further provoking the already violent and lawless crowd with his 2:24
p.m. tweet about the Vice President. Even though President Trump had
repeatedly been told that Vice President Pence had no legal authority to
110 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
stop the certification of the election, he asserted in his speech on January
6th that if the Vice President “comes through for us” that he could deliver
victory to Trump: “[I]f Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the elec-
tion.” This created a desperate and false expectation in President Trump’s
mob that ended up putting the Vice President and his entourage and many
others at the Capitol in physical danger. When President Trump tweeted at
2:24 p.m., he knew violence was underway. His tweet exacerbated that vio-
lence.635
During the ensuing riot, the President refused to condemn the violence
or encourage the crowd to disperse despite repeated pleas from his staff
and family that he do so. The Committee has evidence from multiple
sources establishing these facts, including testimony from former White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone. Although Cipollone’s testimony did not dis-
close a number of direct communications with President Trump in light of
concerns about executive privilege, the Department now appears to have
obtained a ruling that Cipollone can testify before a grand jury about these
communications. Based on the information it has obtained, the Committee
believes that Cipollone and others can provide direct testimony establishing
that President Trump refused repeatedly, for multiple hours, to make a
public statement directing his violent and lawless supporters to leave the
Capitol. President Trump did not want his supporters (who had effectively
halted the vote counting) to disperse. Evidence obtained by the Committee
also indicates that President Trump did not want to provide security assis-
tance to the Capitol during that violent period.636 This appalling behavior
by our Commander in Chief occurred despite his affirmative constitutional
duty to act to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.637
The Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal
referral of President Trump for “assist[ing]” or “ai[ding] and comfort-
[ing]” those at the Capitol who engaged in a violent attack on the United
States. The Committee has developed significant evidence that President
Trump intended to disrupt the peaceful transition of power and believes
that the Department of Justice can likely elicit testimony relevant to an
investigation under section 2383.
For example, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told White House Counsel
Pat Cipollone that the President “doesn’t want to do anything” to stop the
violence.638 Worse, at 2:24 p.m., the President inflamed and exacerbated the
mob violence by sending a tweet stating that the Vice President “didn’t
have the courage to do what should have been done.” 639 The President
threw gasoline on the fire despite knowing that there was a violent riot
underway at the Capitol. Indeed, video and audio footage from the attack
shows that many of the rioters specifically mentioned Vice President
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 111

Pence.640 And immediately after President Trump sent his tweet, the vio-
lence escalated. Between 2:25 p.m. and 2:28 p.m., rioters breached the East
Rotunda doors, other rioters breached the police line in the Capitol Crypt,
Vice President Pence had to be evacuated from his Senate office, and Leader
McCarthy was evacuated from his Capitol office.641
Evidence developed in the Committee’s investigation showed that the
President, when told that the crowd was chanting “Hang Mike Pence,”
responded that perhaps the Vice President deserved to be hanged.642 And
President Trump rebuffed pleas from Leader McCarthy to ask that his sup-
porters leave the Capitol stating, “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are
more upset about the election than you are.” After hours of deadly riot,
President Trump eventually released a videotaped statement encouraging
the crowd to disperse, though openly professing his “love” for the mem-
bers of the mob and empathizing with their frustration at the “stolen”
election. President Trump has since expressed a desire to pardon those
involved in the attack.643
Both the purpose and the effect of the President’s actions were to
mobilize a large crowd to descend on the Capitol. Several defendants in
pending criminal cases identified the President's allegations about the
“stolen election” as the key motivation for their activities at the Capitol.
Many of them specifically cited the President’s tweets asking his supporters
to come to Washington, DC, on January 6th. For example, one defendant
who later pleaded guilty to threatening House Speaker Nancy Pelosi texted
a family member on January 6th to say: “[Trump] wants heads and I'm
going to deliver.” 644 Another defendant released a statement through his
attorney stating: “I was in Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, because I
believed I was following the instructions of former President Trump and he
was my President and the commander-in-chief. His statements also had
me believing the election was stolen from him.” 645
As the violence began to subside and law enforcement continued to
secure the Capitol, President Trump tweeted again, at 6:01 pm to justify the
actions of the rioters: “These are the things and events that happen,” he
wrote, when his so-called victory was “so unceremoniously & viciously
stripped away. . . .” 646 When he wrote those words, he knew exactly what
he was doing. Before President Trump issued the tweet, a White House
staffer cautioned him that the statement would imply that he “had some-
thing to do with the events that happened at the Capitol”—but he tweeted
it anyway.647 The final words of that tweet leave little doubt about President
Trump’s sentiments toward those who invaded the Capitol: “Remember
this day forever!” 648
112 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
V. Other Conspiracy Statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 372 and 2384)
Depending on evidence developed by the Department of Justice, the Presi-
dent’s actions with the knowledge of the risk of violence could also consti-
tute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 372 and § 2384, both of which require proof of
a conspiracy. Section 372 prohibits a conspiracy between two or more per-
sons “to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accept-
ing or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United
States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means
any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an
officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in the discharge of his
official duties.” 649 Oath Keepers Kelly Meggs, Kenneth Harrelson, and Jes-
sica Watkins were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 372 in connection with
the January 6th attack on the Capitol.650 The Committee believes that for-
mer Chief of Staff Mark Meadows (who refused to testify and was held in
contempt of Congress) could have specific evidence relevant to such
charges, as may witnesses who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination before this Committee.
Section 2384, the seditious conspiracy statute, prohibits “conspir[acy]
to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the
United States . . . or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force
to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United
States . . . .” 651 A jury has already determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
a conspiracy existed under section 2384, as the leader of the Oath Keepers
and at least one other individual were convicted of seditious conspiracy
under section 2384 for their actions related to the attack on the Capitol.652
A trial regarding a series of other “Proud Boy” defendants may also address
similar issues.653
The Department of Justice, through its investigative tools that exceed
those of this Committee, may have evidence sufficient to prosecute Presi-
dent Trump under sections 372 and 2384. Accordingly, we believe sufficient
evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump under these two
statutes.

VI. The Committee’s Concerns Regarding Possible Obstruction of its Investigation

The Committee has substantial concerns regarding potential efforts to
obstruct its investigation, including by certain counsel (some paid by
groups connected to the former President) who may have advised clients to
provide false or misleading testimony to the Committee.654 Such actions
could violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512. The Committee is aware that both the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office
have already obtained information relevant to these matters, including
from the Committee directly. We urge the Department of Justice to examine
the facts to discern whether prosecution is warranted. The Committee’s
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 113

broad concerns regarding obstruction and witness credibility are addressed

in the Executive Summary to this Report.

VII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THOSE WHO PLOTTED UNLAWFULLY TO OVERTURN THE

ELECTION IS CRITICAL.
To date, the Justice Department has pursued prosecution of hundreds of
individuals who planned and participated in the January 6th invasion of and
attack on our Capitol. But the Department has not yet charged individuals
who engaged in the broader plan to overturn the election through the
means discussed in this Report. The Committee has concluded that it is
critical to hold those individuals accountable as well, including those who
worked with President Trump to create and effectuate these plans.
In his speech from the Ellipse on January 6th, President Trump recited
a host of election fraud allegations he knew to be false, and then told tens
of thousands of his angry supporters this:
And fraud breaks up everything, doesn’t it? When you catch some-
body in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very different rules. So I
hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he
doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s listening
to. 655
The meaning of President Trump’s comments was sufficiently clear
then, but he recently gave America an even more detailed understanding of
his state of mind. Trump wrote that allegations of “massive fraud” related
to the 2020 election “allow[] for the termination of all rules, regulations
and articles, even those found in the Constitution.” 656 And President
Trump considered pardoning those involved in the attack and has since
expressed a desire to pardon them—and even give them an apology—if he
returns to the Oval Office.657
In the Committee’s judgment, based on all the evidence developed,
President Trump believed then, and continues to believe now, that he is
above the law, not bound by our Constitution and its explicit checks on
Presidential authority. This recent Trump statement only heightens our
concern about accountability. If President Trump and the associates who
assisted him in an effort to overturn the lawful outcome of the 2020 elec-
tion are not ultimately held accountable under the law, their behavior may
become a precedent, and invitation to danger, for future elections. A failure
to hold them accountable now may ultimately lead to future unlawful
efforts to overturn our elections, thereby threatening the security and
viability of our Republic.
114 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VIII. REFERRAL OF MEMBERS TO THE HOUSE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS
During the course of the Select Committee’s investigation of President
Trump’s efforts to subvert the election, the Committee learned that various
Members of Congress had information relevant to the investigation.
Accordingly, the Committee wrote letters to a number of Members involved
in that activity inviting them to participate voluntarily in the Select Com-
mittee’s investigation. None of the members was willing to provide infor-
mation, which forced the Select Committee to consider alternative means of
securing evidence about the conduct of these Members and the information
they might have. On May 12, 2022, the Select Committee subpoenaed sev-
eral members of Congress—including House Minority Leader Kevin McCa-
rthy, Representative Jim Jordan, Representative Scott Perry, and
Representative Andy Biggs—to obtain information related to the Commit-
tee’s investigation.
This was a significant step, but it was one that was warranted by the
certain volume of information these Members possessed that was relevant
to the Select Committee’s investigation, as well as the centrality of their
efforts to President Trump’s multi-part plan to remain in power.
Representative McCarthy, among other things, had multiple communi-
cations with President Trump, Vice President Pence, and others on and
related to January 6th. For example, during the attack on the Capitol, Rep-
resentative McCarthy urgently requested that the former President issue a
statement calling off the rioters, to which President Trump responded by
“push[ing] back” and said: “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are more
upset about the election than you are.” 658 And, after the attack, Represen-
tative McCarthy spoke on the House floor and said that, “[t]here is abso-
lutely no evidence” that Antifa caused the attack on the Capitol and instead
called on President Trump to “accept his share of responsibility” for the
violence.659 As noted above, Representative McCarthy privately confided in
colleagues that President Trump accepted some responsibility for the attack
on the Capitol.660
Representative Jordan was a significant player in President Trump’s
efforts. He participated in numerous post-election meetings in which
senior White House officials, Rudolph Giuliani, and others, discussed strat-
egies for challenging the election, chief among them claims that the elec-
tion had been tainted by fraud. On January 2, 2021, Representative Jordan
led a conference call in which he, President Trump, and other Members of
Congress discussed strategies for delaying the January 6th joint session.
During that call, the group also discussed issuing social media posts
encouraging President Trump’s supporters to “march to the Capitol” on
the 6th.661 An hour and a half later, President Trump and Representative
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 115

Jordan spoke by phone for 18 minutes.662 The day before January 6th, Rep-
resentative Jordan texted Mark Meadows, passing along advice that Vice
President Pence should “call out all the electoral votes that he believes are
unconstitutional as no electoral votes at all.” 663 He spoke with President
Trump by phone at least twice on January 6th, though he has provided
inconsistent public statements about how many times they spoke and what
they discussed.664 He also received five calls from Rudolph Giuliani that
evening, and the two connected at least twice, at 7:33 p.m. and 7:49 p.m.665
During that time, Giuliani has testified, he was attempting to reach Mem-
bers of Congress after the joint session resumed to encourage them to con-
tinue objecting to Joe Biden’s electoral votes.666 And, in the days following
January 6th, Representative Jordan spoke with White House staff about the
prospect of Presidential pardons for Members of Congress.667
Like Representative Jordan, Representative Perry was also involved in
early post-election messaging strategy. Both Representative Jordan and
Representative Perry were involved in discussions with White House offi-
cials about Vice President Pence’s role on January 6th as early as November
2020.668 Representative Perry was present for conversations in which the
White House Counsel’s Office informed him and others that President
Trump’s efforts to submit fake electoral votes were not legally sound.669
But perhaps most pivotally, he was involved in President Trump’s efforts to
install Jeffrey Clark as the Acting Attorney General in December 2020 and
January 2021. Beginning in early December 2020, Representative Perry sug-
gested Clark as a candidate to Mark Meadows,670 then introduced Clark to
President Trump.671 In the days before January 6th, Representative Perry
advocated for President Trump to speak at the Capitol during the joint ses-
sion, speaking to Mark Meadows on at least one occasion about it.672 He
was also a participant in the January 2, 2021, call in which Representative
Jordan, President Trump, and others discussed issuing social media posts to
encourage Trump supporters to march to the Capitol on January 6th.673
After January 6th, Representative Perry reached out to White House staff
asking to receive a Presidential pardon.674
Representative Biggs was involved in numerous elements of President
Trump’s efforts to contest the election results. As early as November 6,
2020, Representative Biggs texted Mark Meadows, urging him to “encour-
age the state legislatures to appoint [electors].” 675 In the following days,
Representative Biggs told Meadows not to let President Trump concede his
loss.676 Between then and January 6th, Representative Biggs coordinated
with Arizona State Representative Mark Finchem to gather signatures from
Arizona lawmakers endorsing fake Trump electors.677 He also contacted
fake Trump electors in at least one State seeking evidence related to voter
fraud.678
116 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To date, none of the subpoenaed Members has complied with either
voluntary or compulsory requests for participation.
Representative McCarthy initially responded to the Select Committee’s
subpoena in two letters on May 27 and May 30, 2022, in which he objected
to the Select Committee’s composition and validity of the subpoena and
offered to submit written interrogatories in lieu of deposition testimony.
Although the Select Committee did not release Representative McCarthy
from his subpoena obligations, Representative McCarthy failed to appear
for his scheduled deposition on May 31, 2022. The Select Committee
responded to Representative McCarthy’s letters this same day, rejecting his
proposal to participate via written interrogatories and compelling his
appearance for deposition testimony no later than June 11, 2022. Although
Representative McCarthy again responded via letter on June 9, 2022, he did
not appear for deposition testimony on or before the specified June 11,
2022, deadline.
Representative Jordan also responded to the Select Committee’s sub-
poena just before his scheduled deposition in a letter on May 25, 2022, con-
taining a variety of objections. Representative Jordan also requested
material from the Select Committee, including all materials referencing
him in the Select Committee’s possession and all internal legal analysis
related to the constitutionality of Member subpoenas. Although the Select
Committee did not release Representative Jordan from his subpoena obliga-
tions, Representative Jordan failed to appear for his scheduled deposition
on May 27, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the
substance of Representative Jordan’s May 25th letter and indicated that
Representative Jordan should appear for deposition testimony no later than
June 11, 2022. On June 9, 2022, Representative Jordan again wrote to reiter-
ate the points from his May 25th letter. That same day, Representative Jor-
dan sent out a fundraising email with the subject line: “I’VE BEEN
SUBPOENED.” 679 Representative Jordan did not appear before the Select
Committee on or before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Perry likewise responded to the Select Committee’s sub-
poena on May 24, 2022, in a letter, “declin[ing] to appear for deposition”
and requesting that the subpoena be “immediately withdrawn.” 680
Although the Select Committee did not release Representative Perry from
his subpoena obligations, Representative Perry failed to appear on May 26,
2022, for his scheduled deposition. Representative Perry sent a second let-
ter to the Select Committee on May 31, 2022, with additional objections.
That same day, the Select Committee responded to Representative Perry’s
letters and stated that he should appear before the Select Committee no
later than June 11, 2022, for deposition testimony. Representative Perry
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 117

responded via letter on June 10, 2022, maintaining his objections. He did
not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Biggs issued a press release on the day the Select Com-
mittee issued its subpoena, calling the subpoena “illegitimate” and “pure
political theater.” The day before his scheduled deposition, Representative
Biggs sent a letter to the Select Committee with a series of objections and
an invocation of Speech or Debate immunity. Although the Select Commit-
tee did not release Representative Biggs from his subpoena obligations,
Representative Biggs did not appear for his scheduled deposition on May
26, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the sub-
stance of Representative Biggs’ May 25th letter and indicated that Repre-
sentative Biggs should appear for deposition testimony no later than June
11, 2022. Although Representative Biggs responded with another letter on
June 9th, he did not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Despite the Select Committee’s repeated attempts to obtain information
from these Members and the issuance of subpoenas, each has refused to
cooperate and failed to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena. Accord-
ingly, the Select Committee is referring their failure to comply with the
subpoenas issued to them to the Ethics Committee for further action. To be
clear, this referral is only for failure to comply with lawfully issued subpoe-
nas.
The Rules of the House of Representatives make clear that their willful
noncompliance violates multiple standards of conduct and subjects them to
discipline. Willful non-compliance with compulsory congressional commit-
tee subpoenas by House Members violates the spirit and letter of House rule
XXIII, clause 1, which requires House Members to conduct themselves “at
all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the House.” As a previ-
ous version of the House Ethics Manual explained, this catchall provision
encompasses “‘flagrant’ violations of the law that reflect on ‘Congress as a
whole,’ and that might otherwise go unpunished.” 681 The subpoenaed
House Members’ refusal to comply with their subpoena obligations satisfies
these criteria. A House Member’s willful failure to comply with a congres-
sional subpoena also reflects discredit on Congress. If left unpunished, such
behavior undermines Congress’s longstanding power to investigate in sup-
port of its lawmaking authority and suggests that Members of Congress
may disregard legal obligations that apply to ordinary citizens.
For these reasons, the Select Committee refers Leader McCarthy and
Representatives Jordan, Perry, and Biggs for sanction by the House Ethics
Committee for failure to comply with subpoenas. The Committee also
believes that each of these individuals, along with other Members who
attended the December 21st planning meeting with President Trump at the
118 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
White House,682 should be questioned in a public forum about their advance
knowledge of and role in President Trump’s plan to prevent the peaceful
transition of power.

EFFORTS TO AVOID TESTIFYING, EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTION, AND ASSESSMENTS OF

WITNESS CREDIBILITY

More than 30 witnesses before the Select Committee exercised their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused on that basis
to provide testimony. They included individuals central to the investigation,
such as John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, Roger Stone, Michael Flynn, Kenneth
Chesebro, and others.683 The law allows a civil litigant to rely upon an
“adverse inference” when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he
Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions . . ..” 684 The Committee has not chosen to rely on any such infer-
ence in this Report or in its hearings.
We do note that certain witness assertions of the Fifth Amendment
were particularly troubling, including this:
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe the violence on
January 6th was justified?
Counsel for the Witness: Can I get clarification, is that a moral
question or are you asking a legal question?
Vice Chair Cheney: I'm asking both.
General Flynn: The Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was
justified morally?
General Flynn: Take the Fifth.

Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was
justified legally?
General Flynn: Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe in the peaceful
transition of power in the United States of America?

General Flynn: The Fifth.685

President Trump refused to comply with the Committee’s subpoena,
and also filed suit to block the National Archives from supplying the Com-
mittee with White House records. The Committee litigated the National
Archives case in Federal District Court, in the Federal Appellate Court for
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 119

the District of Columbia, and before the Supreme Court. The Select Com-
mittee was successful in this litigation. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit
explained:
On January 6, 2021, a mob professing support for then-President
Trump violently attacked the United States Capitol in an effort to
prevent a Joint Session of Congress from certifying the electoral
college votes designating Joseph R. Biden the 46th President of the
United States. The rampage left multiple people dead, injured more
than 140 people, and inflicted millions of dollars in damage to the
Capitol. Then-Vice President Pence, Senators, and Representatives
were all forced to halt their constitutional duties and flee the House
and Senate chambers for safety.686
Benjamin Franklin said, at the founding, that we have “[a]
Republic”—“if [we] can keep it.” The events of January 6th exposed
the fragility of those democratic institutions and traditions that we
had perhaps come to take for granted. In response, the President of
the United States and Congress have each made the judgment that
access to this subset of presidential communication records is nec-
essary to address a matter of great constitutional moment for the
Republic. Former President Trump has given this court no legal rea-
son to cast aside President Biden’s assessment of the Executive
Branch interests at stake, or to create a separation of powers con-
flict that the Political Branches have avoided.687
Several other witnesses have also avoided testifying in whole or in part
by asserting Executive Privilege or Absolute Immunity from any obligation
to appear before Congress. For example, the President’s Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows invoked both, and categorically refused to testify, even about text
messages he provided to the Committee. The House of Representatives
voted to hold him in criminal contempt.688 Although the Justice Department
has taken the position in litigation that a former high level White House
staffer for a former President is not entitled to absolute immunity,689 and
that any interests in the confidentiality of his communications with Presi-
dent Trump and others are overcome in this case, the Justice Department
declined to prosecute Meadows for criminal contempt. The reasons for Jus-
tice’s refusal to do so are not apparent to the Committee.690 Commentators
have speculated that Meadows may be cooperating in the Justice Depart-
ment’s January 6th investigation.691 The same may be true for Daniel
Scavino, President Trump’s White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Commu-
nications and Director of Social Media, whom the House also voted to hold
in contempt.692
120 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Steve Bannon also chose not to cooperate with the Committee, and the
Justice Department prosecuted him for contempt of Congress.693 Bannon
has been sentenced and is currently appealing his conviction. Peter
Navarro, another White House Staffer who refused to testify, is currently
awaiting his criminal trial.694
Although the Committee issued letters and subpoenas to seven Republi-
can members of Congress who have unique knowledge of certain develop-
ments on or in relation to January 6th, none agreed to participate in the
investigation; none considered themselves obligated to comply with the
subpoenas. A number of these same individuals were aware well in advance
of January 6th of the plotting by Donald Trump, John Eastman, and others
to overturn the election, and certain of them had an active role in that
activity.695 None seem to have alerted law enforcement of this activity, or of
the known risk of violence. On January 5th, after promoting unfounded
objections to election results, Rep. Debbie Lesko appears to have recognized
the danger in a call with her colleagues:
I also ask leadership to come up with a safety plan for Members [of
Congress]. . . . We also have, quite honestly, Trump supporters who
actually believe that we are going to overturn the election, and when
that doesn’t happen—most likely will not happen—they are going
to go nuts.696
During our hearings, the Committee presented the testimony of numer-
ous White House witnesses who testified about efforts by certain Republi-
can Members of Congress to obtain Presidential pardons for their conduct
in connection with January 6th.697 Cassidy Hutchinson provided extensive
detail in this regard:
Vice Chair Cheney: And are you aware of any members of Congress
seeking pardons?
Hutchinson: I guess Mr. Gaetz and Mr. Brooks, I know, have both
advocated for there'd be a blanket pardon for members involved in
that meeting, and a — a handful of other members that weren't at
the December 21st meeting as the presumptive pardons. Mr. Gaetz
was personally pushing for a pardon, and he was doing so since
early December.

I’m not sure why Mr. Gaetz would reach out to me to ask if he could
have a meeting with Mr. Meadows about receiving a presidential
pardon.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did they all contact you?
Hutchinson: Not all of them, but several of them did.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 121

Vice Chair Cheney: So, you mentioned Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Brooks.
Hutchinson: Mr. Biggs did. Mr. Jordan talked about Congressional
pardons, but he never asked me for one. It was more for an update
on whether the White House was going to pardon members of Con-
gress. Mr. Gohmert asked for one as well. Mr. Perry asked for a par-
don, too. I’m sorry.
Vice Chair Cheney: Mr. Perry? Did he talk to you directly?
Hutchinson: Yes, he did.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did Marjorie Taylor Greene contact you?
Hutchinson: No, she didn't contact me about it. I heard that she had
asked White House Counsel’s Office for a pardon from Mr. Philbin,
but I didn't frequently communicate with Ms. Greene.698
Many of these details were also corroborated by other sources. Presi-
dent Personnel Director Johnny McEntee confirmed that he was personally
asked for a pardon by Representative Matt Gaetz (R-FL).699 Eric Her-
schmann recalled that Representative Gaetz “. . . asked for a very, very
broad pardon. . . . And I said Nixon’s pardon was never nearly that
broad.” 700 When asked about reporting that Representatives Mo Brooks
and Andy Biggs also requested pardons, Herschmann did not reject either
possibility out of hand, instead answering: “It’s possible that Representa-
tive Brooks or Biggs, but I don’t remember.” 701 The National Archives pro-
duced to the Select Committee an email from Representative Mo Brooks to
the President’s executive assistant stating that “President Trump asked me
to send you this letter” and “… pursuant to a request from Matt Gaetz” that
recommended blanket Presidential pardons to every Member of Congress
who objected to the electoral college votes on January 6th.702
These requests for pardons suggest that the Members identified above
were conscious of the potential legal jeopardy arising from their conduct.
As noted infra 136, the Committee has referred a number of these individu-
als to the House Ethics Committee for their failure to comply with subpoe-
nas, and believes that they each owe the American people their direct and
unvarnished testimony.
The Select Committee has also received a range of evidence suggesting
specific efforts to obstruct the Committee’s investigation. Much of this evi-
dence is already known by the Department of Justice and by other prosecu-
torial authorities. For example:
1. The Committee received testimony from a witness about her decision to
terminate a lawyer who was receiving payments for the representation
from a group allied with President Trump. Among other concerns
expressed by the witness:
122 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The lawyer had advised the witness that the witness could, in certain
circumstances, tell the Committee that she did not recall facts when
she actually did recall them.
• During a break in the Select Committee’s interview, the witness
expressed concerns to her lawyer that an aspect of her testimony
was not truthful. The lawyer did not advise her to clarify the specific
testimony that the witness believed was not complete and accurate,
and instead conveyed that, “They don’t know what you know, [wit-
ness]. They don’t know that you can recall some of these things. So
you saying ‘I don't recall’ is an entirely acceptable response to this.”
• The lawyer instructed the client about a particular issue that would
cast a bad light on President Trump: “No, no, no, no, no. We don’t
want to go there. We don’t want to talk about that.”
• The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share her testi-
mony before the Committee with other lawyers representing other
witnesses. The lawyer shared such information over the client’s
objection.
• The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share informa-
tion regarding her testimony with at least one and possibly more
than one member of the press. The lawyer shared the information
with the press over her objection.
• The lawyer did not disclose who was paying for the lawyers’ repre-
sentation of the client, despite questions from the client seeking
that information, and told her, “we’re not telling people where
funding is coming from right now.”
• The client was offered potential employment that would make her
“financially very comfortable” as the date of her testimony
approached by entities apparently linked to Donald Trump and his
associates. Such offers were withdrawn or did not materialize as
reports of the content of her testimony circulated. The client
believed this was an effort to impact her testimony.

Further details regarding these instances will be available to the public

when transcripts are released.
2. Similarly, the witness testified that multiple persons affiliated with
President Trump contacted her in advance of the witness’s testimony
and made the following statements:
What they said to me is, as long as I continue to be a team player,
they know that I am on the right team. I am doing the right thing. I
am protecting who I need to protect. You know, I will continue to
stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 123

couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just keep that
in mind as I proceed through my interviews with the committee.
Here is another sample in a different context. This is a call received by
one of our witnesses:
[A person] let me know you have your deposition tomorrow. He
wants me to let you know he’s thinking about you. He knows you’re
a team player, you’re loyal, and you’re going do the right thing
when you go in for your deposition.703
3. The Select Committee is aware of multiple efforts by President Trump to
contact Select Committee witnesses. The Department of Justice is aware
of at least one of those circumstances.
4. Rather than relying on representation by Secret Service lawyers at no
cost, a small number of Secret Service agents engaged private counsel for
their interviews before the Committee. 704 During one such witness’s tran-
scribed interview, a retained private counsel was observed writing notes to
the witness regarding the content of the witness’s testimony while the ques-
tioning was underway. The witness’s counsel admitted on the record that he
had done so.705

Recently, published accounts of the Justice Department’s Mar-a-Lago

investigation suggest that the Department is investigating the conduct of
counsel for certain witnesses whose fees are being paid by President
Trump’s Save America Political Action Committee.706 The public report
implies the Department is concerned that such individuals are seeking to
influence the testimony of the witnesses they represent.707 This Committee
also has these concerns, including that lawyers who are receiving such pay-
ments have specific incentives to defend President Trump rather than zeal-
ously represent their own clients. The Department of Justice and the Fulton
County District Attorney have been provided with certain information
related to this topic.
The Select Committee recognizes of course that most of the testimony
we have gathered was given more than a year after January 6th. Recollec-
tions are not perfect, and the Committee expects that different accounts of
the same events will naturally vary. Indeed, the lack of any inconsistencies
in witness accounts would itself be suspicious. And many witnesses may
simply recall different things than others.
Many of the witnesses before this Committee had nothing at all to gain
from their testimony, gave straightforward responses to the questions
posted, and made no effort to downplay, deflect, or rationalize. Trump
Administration Justice Department officials such as Attorney General Barr,
124 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Acting Attorney General Rosen, and Acting Deputy Attorney General Dono-
ghue are good examples. Multiple members of President Trump’s White
House staff were also suitably forthcoming, including Sarah Matthews,
Matthew Pottinger, Greg Jacob, and Pat Philbin, as were multiple career
White House, military and agency personnel whose names the Committee
agreed not to disclose publicly; as were former Secretary of Labor Eugene
Scalia, Bill Stepien, and certain other members of the Trump Campaign.
The Committee very much appreciates the earnestness and bravery of
Cassidy Hutchinson, Rusty Bowers, Shaye Moss, Ruby Freeman, Brad
Raffensperger, Gabriel Sterling, Al Schmidt, and many others who provided
important live testimony during the Committees hearings.708
The Committee, along with our nation, offers particular thanks to Offi-
cers Caroline Edwards, Michael Fanone, Harry Dunn, Aquilino Gonell, and
Daniel Hodges, along with hundreds of other members of law enforcement
who defended the Capitol on that fateful day, all of whom should be com-
mended for their bravery and sacrifice. We especially thank the families of
Officer Brian Sicknick, Howard Liebengood and Jeffrey Smith, whose loss
can never be repaid.
The Committee very much appreciates the invaluable testimony of Gen-
eral Milley and other members of our military, Judge J. Michael Luttig, and
the important contributions of Benjamin Ginsberg and Chris Stirewalt.
This, of course is only a partial list, and the Committee is indebted to many
others, as well.
The Committee believes that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone gave a
particularly important account of the events of January 6th, as did White
House lawyer, Eric Herschmann. For multiple months, Cipollone resisted
giving any testimony at all, asserting concerns about executive privilege
and other issues, until after the Committee’s hearing with Hutchinson.
When he did testify, Cipollone corroborated key elements of testimony
given by several White House staff, including Hutchinson—most impor-
tantly, regarding what happened in the White House during the violence of
January 6th—but also frankly recognized the limits on what he could say
due to privilege: “Again, I’m not going to get into either my legal advice on
matters, and the other thing I don’t want to do is, again, other witnesses
have their own recollections of things.” Cipollone also told the Committee
that, to the extent that other witnesses recall communications attributable
to White House counsel that he does not, the communications might have
been with his deputy Pat Philbin, or with Eric Herschmann, who had strong
feelings and was particularly animated about certain issues.709
Of course, that is not to say that all witnesses were entirely frank or
forthcoming. Other witnesses, including certain witnesses from the Trump
White House, displayed a lack of full recollection of certain issues, or were
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 125

not otherwise as frank or direct as Cipollone. We cite two examples here,

both relating to testimony played during the hearings.
Kayleigh McEnany was President Trump’s Press Secretary on January
6th. Her deposition was taken early in the investigation. McEnany seemed
to acknowledge that President Trump: (1) should have instructed his violent
supporters to leave the Capitol earlier than he ultimately did on January
6th;710 (2) should have respected the rulings of the courts;711 and (3) was
wrong to publicly allege that Dominion voting machines stole the elec-
tion.712 But a segment of McEnany’s testimony seemed evasive, as if she
was testifying from pre-prepared talking points. In multiple instances,
McEnany’s testimony did not seem nearly as forthright as that of her press
office staff, who testified about what McEnany said.
For example, McEnany disputed suggestions that President Trump was
resistant to condemning the violence and urging the crowd at the Capitol to
act peacefully when they crafted his tweet at 2:38 p.m. on January 6th.713
Yet one of her deputies, Sarah Matthews, told the Select Committee that
McEnany informed her otherwise: that McEnany and other advisors in the
dining room with President Trump persuaded him to send the tweet, but
that “. . . she said that he did not want to put that in and that they went
through different phrasing of that, of the mention of peace, in order to get
him to agree to include it, and that it was Ivanka Trump who came up with
‘stay peaceful’ and that he agreed to that phrasing to include in the tweet,
but he was initially resistant to mentioning peace of any sort.” 714 When the
Select Committee asked “Did Ms. McEnany describe in any way how resis-
tant the President was to including something about being peaceful,” Mat-
thews answered: “Just that he didn’t want to include it, but they got him to
agree on the phrasing ‘stay peaceful.’” 715
The Committee invites the public to compare McEnany’s testimony
with the testimony of Pat Cipollone, Sarah Matthews, Judd Deere, and oth-
ers.
Ivanka Trump is another example. Among other things, Ivanka Trump
acknowledged to the Committee that: (1) she agreed with Attorney General
Barr’s statements that there was no evidence of sufficient fraud to overturn
the election; (2) the President and others are bound by the rulings of the
courts and the rule of law; (3) President Trump pressured Vice President
Pence on the morning of January 6th regarding his authorities at the joint
session of Congress that day to count electoral votes; and (4) President
Trump watched the violence on television as it was occurring.716 But again,
Ivanka Trump was not as forthcoming as Cipollone and others about Presi-
dent Trump’s conduct.
Indeed, Ivanka Trump’s Chief of Staff Julie Radford had a more specific
recollection of Ivanka Trump’s actions and statements. For example, Ivanka
126 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump had the following exchange with the Committee about her atten-
dance at her father’s speech on January 6th that was at odds with what the
Committee learned from Radford:
Committee Staff: It’s been reported that you ultimately decided to
attend the rally because you hoped that you would calm the Presi-
dent and keep the event on an even keel. Is that accurate?
Ivanka Trump: No. I don’t know who said that or where that came
from.717
However, this is what Radford said about her boss’s decision:
Committee Staff: What did she share with you about why it was
concerning that her father was upset or agitated after that call with
Vice President Pence in relation to the Ellipse rally? Why did that
matter? Why did he have to be calmed down, I should say.
Radford: Well, she shared that he had called the Vice President a
not—an expletive word. I think that bothered her. And I think she
could tell based on the conversations and what was going on in the
office that he was angry and upset and people were providing mis-
information. And she felt like she might be able to help calm the
situation down, at least before he went on stage.
Committee Staff: And the word that she relayed to you that the
President called the Vice President—apologize for being impolite—
but do you remember what she said her father called him?
Radford: The “P” word.718
When the Committee asked Ivanka Trump whether there were “[a]ny
particular words that you recall your father using during the conversation”
that morning with Vice President Pence, she answered simply: “No.” 719
In several circumstances, the Committee has found that less senior
White House aides had significantly better recollection of events than
senior staff purported to have.
The Select Committee also has concerns regarding certain other wit-
nesses, including those who still rely for their income or employment on
organizations linked to President Trump, such as the America First Policy
Institute. Certain witnesses and lawyers were unnecessarily combative,
answered hundreds of questions with variants of “I do not recall” in cir-
cumstances where that answer seemed unbelievable, appeared to testify
from lawyer-written talking points rather than their own recollections,
provided highly questionable rationalizations or otherwise resisted telling
the truth. The public can ultimately make its own assessment of these
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 127

issues when it reviews the Committee transcripts and can compare the
accounts of different witnesses and the conduct of counsel.
One particular concern arose from what the Committee realized early on
were a number of intentional falsehoods in former White House Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows’s December 7, 2021 book, The Chief’s Chief. 720 Here is
one of several examples: Meadows wrote, “When he got offstage, President
Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically about going
to the Capitol.” 721 Meadows goes on in his book to claim that it “was clear
the whole time” President Trump didn’t intend to go to the Capitol.722 This
appeared to be an intentional effort to conceal the facts. Multiple witnesses
directly contradicted Meadows’s account about President Trump’s desire to
travel to the Capitol, including Kayleigh McEnany, Cassidy Hutchinson,
multiple Secret Service agents, a White House employee with national secu-
rity responsibilities and other staff in the White House, a member of the
Metropolitan Police and others. This and several other statements in the
Meadows book were false, and the Select Committee was concerned that
multiple witnesses might attempt to repeat elements of these false
accounts, as if they were the party line. Most witnesses did not, but a few
did.
President Trump’s desire to travel to the Capitol was particularly
important for the Committee to evaluate because it bears on President
Trump’s intent on January 6th. One witness account suggests that Presi-
dent Trump even wished to participate in the electoral vote count from the
House floor, standing with Republican Congressmen, perhaps in an effort
to apply further pressure to Vice President Mike Pence and others.723
Mark Meadows’s former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Anthony
Ornato gave testimony consistent with the false account in Meadows book.
In particular, Ornato told the Committee that he was not aware of a genuine
push by the President to go to the Capitol, suggesting instead that “it was
one of those hypotheticals from the good idea fairy . . . [b]ecause it’s ridicu-
lous to think that a President of the United States can travel especially with,
you know, people around just on the street up to the Capitol and peacefully
protest outside the Capitol. . . .” 724 He told the Select Committee that the
only conversation he had about the possibility of the President traveling to
the Capitol was in a single meeting officials from the President’s advance
team,725 and his understanding is that this idea “wasn’t from the Presi-
dent.” 726 Two witnesses before the Committee, including a White House
employee with national security responsibilities and Hutchinson, testified
that Ornato related an account of President Trump’s “irate” behavior when
he was told in the Presidential SUV on January 6th that he would not be
driven to the Capitol.727 Both accounts recall Ornato doing so from his
128 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
office in the White House, with another member of the Secret Service pres-
ent.728 Multiple other witness accounts indicate that the President genu-
inely was “irate,” “heated,” “angry,” and “insistent” in the Presidential
vehicle.729 But Ornato professed that he did not recall either communica-
tion, and that he had no knowledge at all about the President’s anger.730
Likewise, despite a significant and increasing volume of intelligence
information in the days before January 6th showing that violence at the
Capitol was indeed possible or likely, and despite other intelligence and law
enforcement agencies similar conclusions,731 Ornato claimed never to have
reviewed or had any knowledge of that specific information732 He testified
that he was only aware of warnings that opposing groups might “clash on
the Washington Monument” and that is what he “would have briefed to
[Chief of Staff] Meadows.” 733 The Committee has significant concerns
about the credibility of this testimony, including because it was Ornato’s
responsibility to be aware of this information and convey it to decision-
makers.734 The Committee will release Ornato’s November Transcript so the
public can review his testimony on these topics.

SUMMARY: CREATION OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE; PURPOSES.

In the week after January 6th, House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy
initially supported legislation to create a bipartisan commission to investi-
gate the January 6th attack on the United States Capitol, stating that “the
President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Congress by mob
rioters” and calling for creation of a “fact-finding commission.” 735 Leader
McCarthy repeated his support for a bipartisan commission during a press
conference on January 21st: “The only way you will be able to answer these
questions is through a bipartisan commission.” 736
On February 15th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced in a letter to
the House Democratic Caucus her intent to establish the type of indepen-
dent commission McCarthy had supported, to “investigate and report on
the facts and causes relating to the January 6, 2021 domestic terrorist attack
upon the United States Capitol Complex.” 737 A few days thereafter, Leader
McCarthy provided the Speaker a wish list that mirrored “suggestions from
the Co-Chairs of the 9/11 Commission” that he and House Republicans
hoped would be included in the House’s legislation to establish the Com-
mission.738
In particular, Leader McCarthy requested an equal ratio of Democratic
and Republican nominations, equal subpoena power for the Democratic
Chair and Republican Vice Chair of the Commission, and the exclusion of
predetermined findings or outcomes that the Commission itself would pro-
duce. Closing his letter, Leader McCarthy quoted the 9/11 Commission
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 129

Co-Chairs, writing that a “bipartisan independent investigation will earn

credibility with the American public.” 739 He again repeated his confidence
in achieving that goal.740 In April 2021, Speaker Pelosi agreed to make the
number of Republican and Democratic Members of the Commission equal,
and to provide both parties with an equal say in subpoenas, as McCarthy
had requested.741
In May 2021, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie G.
Thompson began to negotiate more of the details for the Commission with
his Republican counterpart, Ranking Member John Katko.742 On May 14th,
Chairman Thompson announced that he and Ranking Member Katko had
reached an agreement on legislation to “form a bipartisan, independent
Commission to investigate the January 6th domestic terrorism attack on
the United States Capitol and recommend changes to further protect the
Capitol, the citadel of our democracy.” 743
On May 18th, the day before the House’s consideration of the
Thompson-Katko agreement, Leader McCarthy released a statement in
opposition to the legislation.744 Speaker Pelosi responded to that statement,
saying: “Leader McCarthy won’t take yes for an answer.” 745 The Speaker
referred to Leader McCarthy’s February 22nd letter where “he made three
requests to be addressed in Democrats’ discussion draft.” 746 She noted that
“every single one was granted by Democrats, yet he still says no.” 747
In the days that followed, Republican Ranking Member Katko defended
the bipartisan nature of the bill to create the Commission:
As I have called for since the days just after the attack, an independent,
9/11-style review is critical for removing the politics around January 6
and focusing solely on the facts and circumstances of the security breach
at the Capitol, as well as other instances of violence relevant to such a
review. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Thompson and I know this is
about facts. It’s not partisan politics. We would have never gotten to this
point if it was about partisan politics.748
That evening, the House passed the legislation to establish a National
Commission to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol Complex in a bipartisan fashion, with 35 Republicans joining 217
Democrats voting in favor and 175 Republicans voting against.749 In the
days thereafter, however, only six Senate Republicans joined Senate Demo-
crats in supporting the legislation, killing the bill in the Senate.750
On June 24th, Speaker Pelosi announced her intent to create a House
select committee to investigate the attack.751 On June 25th, Leader McCa-
rthy met with DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone, who was
130 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
seriously injured on January 6th.752 Officer Fanone pressed Leader McCa-
rthy “for a commitment not to put obstructionists and the wrong people in
that position.” 753
On June 30th, the House voted on H. Res. 503 to establish a 13-Member
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol by a vote of 222 Yeas and 190 Nays with just two Republicans sup-
porting the measure: Representative Liz Cheney and Representative Adam
Kinzinger.754 On July 1st, Speaker Pelosi named eight initial Members to the
Select Committee, including one Republican: Representative Cheney.755
On July 17th, Leader McCarthy proposed his selection of five members:
Representative Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of the House Judiciary
Committee;
Representative Kelly Armstrong of North Dakota; House Energy and
Commerce Committee;
Representative Troy Nehls, House Transportation & Infrastructure and
Veterans’ Affairs Committees.
Representative Jim Banks, Armed Services, Veterans’ Affairs and Educa-
tion and Labor Committees;
Representative Rodney Davis, Ranking Member of the Committee on
House Administration.756
Jordan was personally involved in the acts and circumstances of January
6th, and would be one of the targets of the investigation. By that point,
Banks had made public statements indicating that he had already reached
his own conclusions and had no intention of cooperating in any objective
investigation of January 6th, proclaiming, for example, that the Select
Committee was created “. . . solely to malign conservatives and to justify
the Left’s authoritarian agenda.” 757
On July 21st, Speaker Nancy Pelosi exercised her power under H. Res.
503 not to approve the appointments of Representatives Jordan or Banks,
expressing “concern about statements made and actions taken by these
Members” and “the impact their appointments may have on the integrity
of the investigation.” 758 However, she also stated that she had informed
Leader McCarthy “. . . that I was prepared to appoint Representatives
Rodney Davis, Kelly Armstrong and Troy Nehls, and requested that he rec-
ommend two other Members.” 759
In response, Leader McCarthy elected to remove all five of his Republi-
can appointments, refusing to allow Representatives Armstrong, Davis and
Nehls to participate on the Select Committee.760 On July 26, 2021, Speaker
Pelosi then appointed Republican Representative Adam Kinzinger.761 In
resisting the Committee’s subpoenas, certain litigants attempted to argue
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 131

that the Commission’s Select Committee’s composition violated House

Rules or H. Res. 503, but those arguments failed in court.762

SELECT COMMITTEE WITNESSES WERE ALMOST ENTIRELY REPUBLICAN

In its ten hearings or business meetings, the Select Committee called live
testimony or played video for several dozen witnesses, the vast majority of
whom were Republicans. A full list is set forth below.
Republicans:

• John McEntee (served as Director of the White House Presidential

Personnel Office in Trump Administration)
• Judd Deere (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and White
House Deputy Press Secretary in the Trump Administration)
• Jared Kushner (served as a Senior Advisor to President Donald Trump)
• Pat Cipollone (served as White House Counsel for President Donald
Trump)
• Eric Herschmann (served as a Senior Advisor to President Donald
Trump)
• Kayleigh McEnany (served as White House Press Secretary in Trump
Administration)
• Derek Lyons (served as White House Staff Secretary and Counselor to
the President in the Trump Administration)
• Cassidy Hutchinson (served as Assistant to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows in the Trump Administration)
• Matt Pottinger (served as Deputy National Security Advisor in the
Trump Administration)
• Ben Williamson (served as Senior Advisor to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows)
• Sarah Matthews (served as Deputy Press Secretary in the Trump
Administration)
• William Barr (served as Attorney General in the Trump Administration)
• Mike Pompeo (served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Secretary of State in the Trump Administration)
• Ivanka Trump (served as a Senior Advisor and Director of the Office of
Economic Initiatives and Entrepreneurship in the Trump Administra-
tion)
• Donald Trump Jr. (eldest child of Donald Trump)
• Molly Michael (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Execu-
tive Assistant to the President)
• Tim Murtaugh (served as Director of Communications for the Trump
2020 Presidential campaign)
132 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Richard Donoghue (served as Acting Deputy Attorney General in the
Trump Administration)
• Jeffrey Rosen (served as Acting Attorney General in the Trump Admin-
istration)
• Steven Engel (served as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Trump Administration)
• Marc Short (served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Greg Jacob (served as Counsel to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Keith Kellogg (served as National Security Advisor to Vice President
Mike Pence)
• Chris Hodgson (served as Director of Legislative Affairs for Vice Presi-
dent Mike Pence)
• Douglas Macgregor (served as advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the
Trump Administration)
• Jason Miller (served as spokesman for the Donald Trump 2016 Presi-
dential Campaign and was a Senior Adviser to the Trump 2020 Presi-
dential Campaign)
• Alex Cannon (Counsel for the Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
• Bill Stepien (served as the Campaign Manager for the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign and was the White House Director of Political
Affairs in the Trump Administration from 2017 to 2018)
• Rudolph Giuliani (an attorney for Donald Trump)
• John Eastman (an attorney for Donald Trump)
• Michael Flynn (served as National Security Advisor in the Trump
Administration)
• Eugene Scalia (served as the Secretary of Labor in the Trump Adminis-
tration)
• Matthew Morgan (General Counsel for the Trump 2020 Presidential
Campaign)
• Sidney Powell (an attorney and advisor to Donald Trump)
• Jeffrey Clark (served as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division in the Trump Administration)
• Cleta Mitchell (an attorney working with the Trump 2020 Presidential
Campaign)
• Ronna Romney McDaniel (Chair of the Republican National Commit-
tee)
• Justin Clark (served as Deputy Campaign Manager for the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign)
• Robert Sinners (Georgia State Director of Election Day Operations for
the Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
• Andrew Hitt (Wisconsin Republican Party Chair)
• Laura Cox (Michigan Republican Party Chair)
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 133

• Mike Shirkey (Majority Leader, Michigan State Senate)

• Bryan Cutler (Speaker, Pennsylvania House of Representatives)
• Rusty Bowers (Speaker, Arizona House of Representatives)
• Brad Raffensperger (Georgia Secretary of State)
• Gabriel Sterling (Georgia Secretary of State, Chief Operating Officer)
• BJay Pak (served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Georgia in the Trump Administration)
• Al Schmidt (City Commissioner of Philadelphia)
• Chris Stirewalt (Fox News Political Editor)
• Benjamin Ginsberg (Election Attorney)
• J. Michael Luttig (Retired judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and informal advisor to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Katrina Pierson (served as a liaison for the White House and organizers
at Donald Trump’s “Save America” rally on January 6)
• Nicholas Luna (served as Personal Aide to President Trump)
• Stephen Miller (served as Senior Advisor to President Trump)
• Vincent Haley (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Advisor
for Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting in the Trump Administration)
• Julie Radford (Chief of Staff to Ivanka Trump in the Trump Administra-
tion)
• Mick Mulvaney (former Acting Chief of Staff and Special Envoy for
Northern Ireland in the Trump Administration)
• Elaine Chao (Secretary of Transportation in the Trump Administration)
• Roger Stone (Trump associate)

Democrats:
• Jocelyn Benson (Michigan Secretary of State)

Other:
• U.S. Capitol Police Officer Harry Dunn
• DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone
• U.S. Capitol Police Sgt. Aquilino Gonell
• DC Metropolitan Police Officer Daniel Hodges
• General Mark Milley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
• U.S. Capitol Police Officer Caroline Edwards
• Nick Quested (award-winning British filmmaker)
• Robert Schornack (sentenced to 36 months’ probation)
• Eric Barber (charged with theft and unlawful demonstration in the
Capitol)
• John Wright (awaiting trial for felony civil disorder and other charges)
• George Meza (Proud Boy)
134 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Daniel Herendeen (sentenced to 36 months’ probation for role in Capi-
tol attack)
• Matthew Walter (Proud Boy)
• Wandrea ArShaye “Shaye” Moss (Georgia election worker)
• Ruby Freeman (Georgia election worker)
• Anika Collier Navaroli (former Twitter employee)
• White House Security Official
• Jim Watkins (Founder and owner, 8kun)
• Jody Williams (former owner of TheDonald.win)
• Dr. Donell Harvin (Chief of Homeland Security and Intelligence for the
government of the District of Columbia)
• Kellye SoRelle (attorney for Oath Keepers)
• Shealah Craighead (White House Photographer)
• Jason Van Tatenhove (former Oath Keepers spokesperson)
• Stephen Ayres (plead guilty to disorderly and disruptive conduct related
to Capitol attack)
• Sgt. Mark Robinson (Ret.) (Metropolitan Police Department)
• Janet Buhler (plead guilty to charges related to the Capitol attack)

ENDNOTES
1. A few weeks later, Rhodes and his associate Kelly Meggs were found guilty of seditious
conspiracy, and other Oath Keepers were found guilty on numerous charges for obstruct-
ing the electoral count. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, “Oath Keepers Leader Con-
victed of Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6 Case,” New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.
2. Trial Transcript at 5698, 5759, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,
2022).
3. Trial Transcript at 5775, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022)
(“for me at the time, it meant I felt it was like a Bastille type moment in history where in
the French Revolution it was that big turning point moment where the population made
their presence felt. I thought it was going to be a similar type of event for us”).
4. Trial Transcript at 5783, 5866, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,
2022).
5. Sentencing Transcript at 15-17, United States v. Reimler, No. 1:21-cr-239 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022),
ECF No. 37.
6. Sentencing Transcript at 33, United States v. Pert, No. 1:21-cr-139 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2022), ECF
No. 64.
7. Sentencing Memorandum by Abram Markofski, Exhibit B, United States v. Markofski, No.
1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2021), ECF No. 44-2.
8. Sentencing Transcript at 49, United States v. Witcher, No. 1:21-cr-235 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2022),
ECF No. 53.
9. Sentencing Transcript at 19–20, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:21-cr-366 (D.D.C. Jan. 21,
2022), ECF No. 33. See also, Sentencing Memorandum by Brandon Nelson, Exhibit B, United
States v. Nelson, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021), ECF No. 51-2; Sentencing Transcript at
65–66, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021), ECF No. 137; Sentencing
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 135

Transcript at 45, United States v. Schornak, 1:21-cr-278 (D.D.C. May 11, 2022), ECF No. 90;
Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Wilkerson, No. 1:21-cr-302 (D.D.C. Nov. 22,
2021), ECF No. 31; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), pp. 50–51.
10. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Sandlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter Oct. 1, 2022 3:33 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576295667412017157; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter, Oct.
1, 2022 3:40 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/
1576296016512692225; Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 16, United States v. San-
dlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2022), ECF No. 92.
11. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge’s Detention
Order at 4, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No 16; Dan Man-
gan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trump’s Orders, Apologizes to AOC
for Threat,” CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-
riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John Douglas Wright, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 22, 63.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Lewis Cantwell, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 54.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Stephen Ayres, (June 22, 2022), p. 8.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
16. Affidavit at 8, United States v. Ayres, No. 1:21-cr-156 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2021), ECF No. 5-1.
17. See infra, Chapter 6. See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling
Defendant Statements). The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements iden-
tifies hundreds of examples of such testimony. Select Committee staff tracked cases filed
by the Department of Justice against defendants who committed crimes related to the
attack on the United States Capitol. Through Department of Justice criminal filings, through
public reporting, through social media research, and through court hearings, staff col-
lected a range of statements by these defendants about why they came to Washington, DC,
on January 6th. Almost always, it was because President Trump had called upon them to
support his big lie. Those defendants also discussed plans for violence at the Capitol,
against law enforcement, against other American citizens, and against elected officials in
the days leading up to January 6th. In the days immediately following the attack, defen-
dants also bragged about their conduct. Some defendants later reflected on their actions
at sentencing. The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements is not meant
to be comprehensive or polished; it is a small sampling of the tremendous work the
Department of Justice has done tracking down and prosecuting criminal activity during the
attempted insurrection.
Moreover, the trial of multiple members of the Proud Boys on seditious conspiracy and
other charges is set to begin on December 19, 2022, and may provide additional informa-
tion directly relevant to this topic. See Court Calendar: December 9, 2022–December 31,
2022, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at https://
media.dcd.uscourts.gov/datepicker/index.html (last accessed Dec. 9, 2022); Alan Feuer,
“Outcome in Oath Keepers Trial Could Hold Lessons for Coming Jan. 6 Cases,” New York
Times, (Nov. 30, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/us/politics/oath-
keepers-stewart-rhodes.html.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001890_00001 (December
28, 2020, email from Bernard Kerik to Mark Meadows explaining that “[w]e can do all the
investigations we want later”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
136 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000005090_0001 (January. 6, 2021, email from John Eastman to Gregory Jacob acknowl-
edging that President Trump had “been so advised” that Vice President Pence “DOES NOT
have the power to decide things unilaterally”); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th (Russell “Rusty” Bowers testimony recalling Rudolph Giuliani stating that
“[w]e've got lots of theories; we just don't have the evidence”); see also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 128 (“Whether Rudy was at this stage of his life in the
same abilities to manage things at this level or not, I mean, obviously, I think Bernie Kerik
publicly said it, they never proved the allegations that they were making, and they were
trying to develop.”) Note: Some documents cited in this report show timestamps based on
a time zone other than Eastern Time—such as Greenwich Mean Time—because that is how
they were produced to the Committee.
19. The Committee notes that a number of these findings are similar to those Federal Judge
David Carter reached after reviewing the evidence presented by the Committee. Order Re
Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 31-40, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F.
Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM); Order Re Privilege of 599
Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 23-24, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356; Order Re Privilege of Remaining
Documents at 13-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF
No. 372.
20. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United States
Secret Service: Protective Intelligence Division communication noting left wing groups tell-
ing members to “stay at home” on January 6th).
21. Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and
Preparations for and Response to the Attack of January 6th: Part I, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,
(Apr. 21, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-
united-states-capitol-police-and-preparations-and-response; Committee on House Admin-
istration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and Response
to the Attack of January 6th: Part II, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,, (May 10, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-
states-capitol-police-threat; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January
6th Attack: Review of the Architect of the Capitol’s Emergency Preparedness, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., (May 12, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
oversight-january-6th-attack-review-architect-capitol-s-emergency; Committee on House
Administration, Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving Accountability for the Capitol
Police Board, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 19, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/
committee-activity/hearings/reforming-capitol-police-and-improving-accountability-
capitol-police; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Attack:
United States Capitol Police Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders
Unit, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (June 15, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-
activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-containment;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing
Review of the United States Capitol Police Inspector General Flash Reports, 117th Cong., 2d
sess., (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
oversight-january-6th-capitol-attack-ongoing-review-united-states.
22. John Koblin, “At Least 20 Million Watched Jan. 6 Hearing,” New York Times, (June 10, 2022),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/business/media/jan-6-hearing-
ratings.html. Their findings were also widely noted by major media outlets, including con-
servative ones. “Editorial: What the Jan. 6 Hearings Accomplished,” Wall Street Journal,
(Oct. 14, 2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-jan-6-inquiry-
accomplished-donald-trump-liz-cheney-subpoena-congress-11665699321; “Editorial: The
Jan. 6 Hearings are Over. Time to Vote.,” Washington Post, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 137

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/13/jan-6-hearings-are-over-time-
vote/; “Editorial: The President Who Stood Still on Jan. 6,” Wall Street Journal, (July 22,
2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-president-who-stood-still-donald-
trump-jan-6-committee-mike-pence-capitol-riot-11658528548; "Editorial: ‘We All have a
Duty to Ensure that What Happened on Jan. 6 Never Happens Again’,” New York Times,
(June 10, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/opinion/january-6-
hearing-trump.html; “Editorial: Trump’s Silence on Jan. 6 is Damning,” New York Post, (July
22, 2022), available at https://nypost.com/2022/07/22/trumps-jan-6-silence-renders-him-
unworthy-for-2024-reelection/
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45 (“And I told him it was going to
be a process. It was going to be, you know–you know, we're going to have to wait and see
how this turned out. So I, just like I did in 2016, I did the same thing in 2020.”).
24. “When States Can Begin Processing and Counting Absentee/Mail-In Ballots, 2020,” Ballot-
pedia (accessed on Dec. 5, 2022), available at https://ballotpedia.org/
When_states_can_begin_processing_and_counting_absentee/mail-in_ballots,_2020.
25. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investiga-
tion, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/
house-january6th.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 21.
30. John J. Martin, Mail-in Ballots and Constraints on Federal Power under the Electors Clause,
107 Va. L. Rev. Online 84, 86 (Apr. 2021) (noting that 45 States and DC permitted voters to
request a mail-in ballot or automatically receive one in the 2020 election); Nathanial Rak-
ich and Jasmine Mithani, “What Absentee Voting Looked Like In All 50 States,” FiveThir-
tyEight, (Feb. 9, 2021), available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-absentee-
voting-looked-like-in-all-50-states/; Lisa Danetz, “Mail Ballot Security Features: A Primer,”
Brennan Center for Justice, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), p. 24.
32. He also won in Utah, which mailed absentee ballots to all active voters, and won one or
more electoral votes in both Maine and Nebraska, which allowed no-excuse absentee vot-
ing and assign their electoral votes proportionally. See “Table 1: States with No-Excuse
Absentee Voting,” National Conference of State Legislatures, (July 12, 2022), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201004185006/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/vopp-table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting.aspx (archived); “Vot-
ing Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options,”
National Conference of State Legislatures, (Sep. 24, 2020), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201103175057/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx (archived); Federal Election Commission,
“Federal Elections 2020 – Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives,” (Oct. 2022), p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
138 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
33. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 66; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 75-76.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 66.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-77.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 60-61.
37. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
38. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 5, 2020 9:12 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105170250/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1324353932022480896 (archived). Note: Citations in this report that refer to an archived
tweet may list a timestamp that is several hours earlier or later than the one shown on
the suggested webpage because tweets are archived from various time zones.
39. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10307; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1010.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 77-78.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (November 3,
2020, email exchange between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael copying proposed election
day victory statement).
43. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory. We
note that Mr. Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a
jury of his peers. “Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two counts
of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-
counts-contempt-congress.
44. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in
response to over 70 questions, including questions regarding his direct communications
with Donald Trump and his role in January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone (Dec. 17, 2021). See
also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201101_1
(November 1, 2020, footage of Roger Stone speaking to associates).
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 12-13.
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 79VP-R000011578_0001, 079VP-
R000011579_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, email and memorandum
from Gregory Jacob to Marc Short regarding electoral vote count).
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 117-18.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 139

48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
50. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 121; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Alyssa Farah Griffin, (Apr. 15, 2022), p. 62; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (Sep. 14, 2022), p. 113; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kellyanne Conway, (Nov. 28, 2022), pp.
79-84.
51. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 212-21; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark
A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 108-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 44, 46, 48-51;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Douglas Macgregor, (June 7, 2022), pp. 27-41.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 215.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 6.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 22, 33-34.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111-12.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
57. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,” YouTube, at 2:13, Nov. 14,
2022, available at https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=133.
58. “CNN Townhall: Former Vice President Mike Pence,” CNN, (Nov. 16, 2022), available at
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-11-16/segment/01.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 118.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
61. Michael Balsamo, “Disputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud,” Associated
Press, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated June 28, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/barr-
no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24-30; “Bill Barr Press Conference
Transcript: No Special Counsels Needed to Investigate Election or Hunter Biden,” Rev, (Dec.
21, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/bill-barr-press-conference-
transcript-no-special-counsels-needed-to-investigate-election-or-hunter-biden.
63. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the
Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news/
2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-
election (emphasis in original).
140 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 59-60.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 108-09.
67. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6,
2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 18-19.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 50, 123; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 168-69, 184, 187.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 50.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (April 6, 2022), p. 128.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 172-73.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 63-70; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Mor-
gan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 57-62; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), pp,
66-68; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 19, 2022), pp. 37-38; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim
Murtaugh production), XXM-0021349 (text chain with Giuliani, Ellis, Epshteyn, Ryan, Bobb,
and Herschmann).
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 173.
79. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020), also available athttps://
electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/King-v-Whitmer-Doc62.pdf; Bowyer v.
Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706 (D. Ariz. 2020), also available at https://
storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923/
gov.uscourts.azd.1255923.84.0_2.pdf; Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp.
3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020), also available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/
gov.uscourts.pamd.127057/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057.202.0_1.pdf; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC
00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020),
available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 141

court decision), also available at https://election.conservative.org/files/2020/12/20-OC-

00163-Order-Granting-Motion-to-Dismiss-Statement-of-Contest.pdf; Wisconsin Voters Alli-
ance v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2021), also available at https://
electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WVA-v-Pence-Doc10.pdf.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0620 (text message between
Tim Murtaugh, Zach Parkinson, and “Matt”).
81. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
82. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
83. Opinion and Order at 1, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2020) (No.
20-13134), ECF No. 172.
84. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost,
Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
85. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost,
Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election, (July 2022), pp. 3-4, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/. We also
note this: The authors of Lost, Not Stolen also conclude that one of the pieces of supposed
evidence that President Trump and his allies have pointed to since January 6, 2021, to try
to bolster their allegations that the 2020 election was stolen shows nothing of the sort.
Lost, Not Stolen explains that Dinesh D’Souza’s “2000 Mules” tries to establish widespread
voter fraud in the 2020 election using phone-tracking data. “Yet the film, heartily endorsed
by Trump at its Mar-a-Lago premiere, has subsequently been thoroughly debunked in
analysis. What the film claims to portray is simply not supported by the evidence invoked
by the film.” Id., at 6. Likewise, former Attorney General Bill Barr told the Select Commit-
tee: “. . . I haven’t seen anything since the election that changes my mind [that fraud deter-
mined the outcome] including, the 2000 Mules movie.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr,
(June 2, 2022), p. 37. He called its cell phone tracking data “singularly unimpressive”
because “. . . in a big city like Atlanta or wherever, just by definition you’re going to find
many hundreds of them have passed by and spent time in the vicinity of these boxes” for
submitting ballots, and to argue that those people must be “mules” delivering fraudulent
ballots was “just indefensible.” Id., at 37–38.
86. White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann told the Committee that when he disputed
allegations of election fraud in a December 18th Oval Office meeting, Sidney Powell fired
back that “the judges are corrupt. And I was like, every one? Every single case that you’ve
done in the country you guys lost every one of them is corrupt, even the ones we
appointed?” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 171.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:53:10-1:53:20,
available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-
committee-hearing.
88. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 46-47, Donald J. Trump for Presi-
dent, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 4:20-cv-02078 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://
cdn.donaldjtrump.com/public-files/press_assets/2020-11-09-complaint-as-filed.pdf.
89. Opinion at 2, 3, 16, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 20-3371 (3d Cir. Nov.
27, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Donald-
J.-Trump-for-President-v-Boockvar-3rd-Cir-Doc91.pdf.
142 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
90. Complaint for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Article II of the
United States Constitution, Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2:20-cv-01785
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc1.pdf.
91. Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 21, 22 (E.D. Wis. 2020), avail-
able at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-
Doc134.pdf.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:52:45 to
1:53:20, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-
committee-hearing.
93. The authors determined that thirty cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary
hearing had been held, compared to twenty cases that were dismissed by a judge before-
hand, while the remaining fourteen were withdrawn voluntarily by plaintiffs. See Senator
John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al, Lost, Not Sto-
len: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election,
(July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
95. Letter from Timothy C. Parlatore to Chairman Bennie G. Thompson on “Re: Subpoena to
Bernard B. Kerik,” (Dec. 31, 2021).
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004125_0001 (December 28,
2020, email from Kerik to Meadows).
97. When our courts weigh evidence to determine facts, they often infer that disputed facts do
not favor a witness who refuses to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment right against
incriminating himself. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (the Fifth Amend-
ment allows for “adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to
testify to probative evidence offered against them”).
98. Nor was there such evidence of widespread fraud in any of the documents produced in
response to Select Committee subpoenas issued to the proponents of the claims, includ-
ing Rudy Giuliani and his team members and investigators Bernard Kerik and Christina
Bobb, or other proponents of election fraud claims such as Pennsylvania Senator Doug
Mastriano, Arizona legislator Mark Finchem, disbarred attorney Phill Kline, and attorneys
Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell, and John Eastman. Not one of them provided evidence rais-
ing genuine questions about the election outcome. In short, it was a big scam.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 19, 2022), at 56:30
to 58:10, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/101322-select-
committee-hearing.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eugene Scalia (June 30, 2022), pp. 11-13. Then-Secretary Scalia also
sent a memorandum to President Trump on January 8, 2021. In that memorandum, he
requested that the President “convene an immediate meeting of the Cabinet.” He told the
President that he was “concerned by certain statements you made since the election . . .
of further actions you may be considering,” and he “concluded that [his] responsibilities
as a Cabinet Secretary obligate[d] [him] to take further steps to address those concerns.”
The Select Committee will make this memorandum available to the public. Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Labor Production), CTRL0000087637, (January 8, 2021, Memorandum
for The President of the United States from Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia, regarding
Request for Cabinet Meeting).
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 143

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 12.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), p. 62.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), pp. 19-20.
105. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021),
pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 14-15 (in
which Rosen confirms the general accuracy of the transcription of his Senate testimony
and then is asked and agrees to the following question: [Committee staff]: “And we are
going to – the select committee is going to essentially incorporate those transcripts as
part of our record and rely upon your testimony there for our purposes going forward, as
long as you’re comfortable with that?” [Rosen]: “Yes.”)
106. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results – December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, at 9:11-
9:25 (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 43.
108. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
109. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
110. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103135742/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1345731043861659650 (archived).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
112. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 15:12-
15:44, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64.
114. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:42:58-1:43:02, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=6178.
115. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156,
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
116. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:15:19-1:15:39, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=4519.
144 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
117. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
118. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, at
51:38-52:01, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-
trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
119. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
120. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:32:25-1:32:43, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5545.
121. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
122. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:33:35-1:33:44, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5615.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 290-91.
124. Search results for “dominion”, Trump Twitter Archive v2, (accessed Sep. 20, 2022), https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22&results=1.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
126. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Con-
ceding Election,” Rev, at 23:35-23:46, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-
possibility-of-conceding-election.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
128. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Con-
ceding Election,” Rev, at 24:16-24:35 (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-
possibility-of-conceding-election.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 27.
130. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 10:46-
11:06, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
131. William P. Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York:
HarperCollins, 2022), at p. 554.
132. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 12:21 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1338715842931023873.jpg (archived).
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 145

133. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021),
pp. 25, 31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
134. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 16, 2020 1:09 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1339090279429775363.jpg (archived).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert O’Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 164-65.
136. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 11:30 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1340333619299147781.jpg (archived).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
138. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
139. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
140. PBS NewsHour, "WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win," YouTube, at 1:39:09 to 1:39:27 and 1:40:51 to 1:41:01, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5949.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 15.
143. The framers specifically considered and rejected two constitutional plans that would have
given Congress the power to select the Executive. Under both the Virginia and New Jersey
Plans, the national executive would have been chosen by the national legislature. See Cur-
tis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 592, 595 (2004); see also 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 21, 244 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (introducing Virginia and New Jersey Plans), available at
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-
vol-1; James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Sep. 4, 1787) (Gov. Morris
warning of “the danger of intrigue & faction” if Congress selected the President), available
at https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-
convention-1787-9-4/.
144. The Federalist No. 68, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
145. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
146. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector”).
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (Eastman Jan 6
scenario dual slates of electors memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Pro-
duction), CTRL0000923171 (Eastman Jan. 6 scenario conduct by elected officials memo).
146 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo
to President Trump).
150. See Eastman v. Thompson et al. at 6-8, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No.
8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo
to President Trump).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 118.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 110, 117.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
156. “Former Vice President Pence Remarks at Federalist Society Conference,” C-SPAN (Feb. 4,
2022), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?517647-2/vice-president-pence-remarks-
federalist-society-conference.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 122.
158. Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107
(January 5, 2021, Greg Jacob memo to Vice President); see also Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), pp. 127-28 (discussing memorandum).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27.
161. Judge Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53 a.m. ET available at https://
twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee, (Chapman University Production), Chap-
man005442 (Eastman emails with Greg Jacob).
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 88.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85-86.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 147

168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86-87.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 34.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40.
174. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to
Change Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
175. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p.
174-76; Greg Jacob testified that the President’s statement was “categorically untrue.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Marc Short testified that the state-
ment was “incorrect” and “false.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Chris Hodg-
son testified that it was not an accurate statement. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30,
2022), pp. 184-85.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 175-77 (acknowledging that Miller normally would
have called the Vice President’s office before issuing a public statement describing the
Vice President’s views but stating “I don’t think that ultimately -- don’t know if it ulti-
mately would have changed anything as the President was very adamant that this is where
they both were” and acknowledging that “the way this [statement] came out was the way
that [Trump] wanted [it] to.”).
177. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346698217304584192 (archived).
178. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210106175200/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346808075626426371 (archived).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21,
2022), p. 126.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; See also, Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donald John Trump Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), p. 49; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 21-22. The
Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of
retaliation.
148 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee (June 10, 2022), p. 20. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19. See also Peter Baker, Maggie Hab-
erman, and Annie Karni, “Pence Reached His Limit with Trump. It Wasn’t Pretty,” New York
Times, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-
pence-trump.html; Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York:
Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273-74.
185. At 11:33 a.m., Stephen Miller’s assistant, Robert Gabriel, emailed the speechwriting team
with the line: “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES.” Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000007531_0001 (January 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel email to Trump
speechwriting team at 11:33 a.m.).
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Stephen Miller (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 153.
187. Document on file with the Select Committee (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341-
2351 (S. Miller Jan. 6 Speech Edits Native File), pp. 2-3.
188. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Wor-
thington Production), CTRL0000924249, (changes in speech between draft and as deliv-
ered), pp. 2, 5, 12, 16, 22.
189. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
190. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
191. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:14:29,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:46-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:01:13-1:01:26,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 149

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:37-0:14:46,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:47-0:14:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 26-27 (establishing time as
1:21 p.m. based on time stamp of a photograph recognized and described).
200. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346900434540240897 (archived).
201. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 32-33, United States v. Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022), ECF No. 110.
202. See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 5, United States v.
Black, No. 1:21-cr-127 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/
opa/page/file/1354806/download.
203. Indictment at 9, United States v. Neefe, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1, avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1432686/download.
204. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 8, United States v. Evans,
No. 1:21-cr-337 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
dc/press-release/file/1351946/download.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at
2:26:06-2:26:26, available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript
at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying
for a victim impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: "At approximately 1435 hours,
with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended,
the defending officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the
United States Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history
of the Metropolitan Police Department").
206. See Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan.
13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
207. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:16.
208. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:25; see also Spencer S. Hsu,
“Pence Spent Jan. 6 at Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,” Wash-
ington Post, (Mar. 21, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/
03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44.
212. Complaint, Exhibit 2 (Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol subpoena to Chapman University, dated Jan. 21, 2022), Eastman v. Thompson
et al. et al., No. 8:22-cv-99, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022) ECF No. 1-2.
150 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
213. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 51-52, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
214. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 56-57, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
215. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63-64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 223.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7-8.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9-11.
220. On December 13th, Chesebro memorialized the strategy in an email he sent Rudy Giuliani
with the subject line: “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Brief notes on ‘President of the
Senate strategy.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman UniversityProduction), Chapman004708
(Dec. 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to Rudy Giuliani). Chesebro argued that the Trump
team could use the fake slates of electors to complicate the joint session on January 6th if
the President of the Senate “firmly t[ook] the position that he, and he alone, is charged
with the constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes, but to count them—
including making judgments about what to do if thereare conflicting votes.” Id. In the
weeks that followed, Chesebro and John Eastman would build upon that framework and
write two memos asserting that Joe Biden’s certification could be derailed on January 6th
if Vice President Pence acted as the “ultimate arbiter” when opening the real and fake
Electoral College votes during the joint session of Congress. Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chap-
man University Production), Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, Eastman memo titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docx”); see also Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021,
Chesebro email to Eastman).
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116.
223. The “certificate of ascertainment” is a State executive’s official documentation announcing
the official electors appointed pursuant to State law. See 3 U.S.C. § 6.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), pp. 70-72.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Inter-
view of Patrick Philbin (Apr. 13, 2022).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 75.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 151

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Shawn Still, (Feb. 25, 2022), p. 24.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50–51.
231. The National Archives produced copies of the seven slates of electoral votes they received
from Trump electors in States that President Trump lost. See Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945,
CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020,
memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Produc-
tion), VP-R0000323_0001 (Senate Parliamentarian office tracking receipt and attaching cop-
ies of the seven slates); See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Produc-
tion), CTRL0000083893 (Trump campaign staffers emailing regarding submission); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS 00096 – WS 00097 (Trump campaign
staffers emailing regarding submission).
232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004 (December 10, 2020,
Kenneth Chesebro email to David Shafer).
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037944 (December 14, 2020,
certificate and mailing envelope from Georgia); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), CTRL0000037941 (December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from
Arizona), Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945
(December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from Michigan).
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000080 (January 4, 2021, Hitt text mes-
sage with Mark Jefferson); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCal-
lum_01_001576 - McCallum_01_001577 (January 5, 2021, McCallum text messages with G.
Michael Brown); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) CTRL0000056548_00007
(January 6, 2021, Hodgson text messages with Matt Stroia); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator
Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 206–07; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson
Production) CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kelly’s Chief
of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson at 8:41 a.m.), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6,
2021, text messages from Senator Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson
around 12:37 p.m.); Jason Lennon, “Johnson Says Involvement with 1/6 Fake Electors Plan
Only 'Lasted Seconds',” Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at https://
www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-
seconds-1735486.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 52–54.
152 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
237. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 6, East-
man v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
238. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 20,
Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
239. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
240. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 5, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-
7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf. .
241. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 35, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-
7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.
242. After a journalist tweeted a video clip of key remarks from Gabriel Sterling’s warning
addressed to President Trump, President Trump responded by quote-tweeting that post,
along with a comment that doubled down on demonizing Georgia election workers in spite
of Sterling’s stark and detailed warning. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/
https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (archived)
(“Rigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes. Expose the massive voter fraud in Geor-
gia. What is Secretary of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what we’ll find!!!
[linking to] twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633”); Brendan Keefe
(@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633 (“"It. Has. All. Gone. Too. Far," says @Gabriel-
Sterling with Georgia Sec of State after a Dominion tech's life was threatened with a
noose. "Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this language....all of you
who have not said a damn word are complicit in this."” with embedded video of Gabriel
Sterling’s remarks); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21,
2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
243. Stephen Fowler, “‘Someone’s Going to Get Killed’: Election Official Blasts GOP Silence on
Threats,” GPB News, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.gpb.org/
news/2020/12/01/someones-going-get-killed-election-official-blasts-gop-silence-on-
threats.
244. House Governmental Affairs Committee, Georgia House of Representatives, Public Hearing
(Dec. 10, 2020), YouTube, at 1:55:10-1:59:10, available at https://youtu.be/9EfgETUKfsI?t=
6910.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:25:45 to
2:26:00, available at https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.
246. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two
Georgia Election Workers – and Death Threats Followed,” Reuters (Dec. 1, 2021), available at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
247. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10,
2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/
freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 153

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-
allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do Something Huge’: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s
Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-
rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
252. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:23 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336526978640302080 (retweeting people who were post-
ing Bowers's personal information); Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020
11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336528029791604737.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Russel “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, “Arizona GOP Civil
War Somehow Keeps Getting Weirder,” Daily Beast, (Dec. 11, 2020), available at https://
www.thedailybeast.com/arizona-republican-party-civil-war-somehow-keeps-getting-
weirder; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do Something Huge’: An
Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021,
updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/
elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/
6349795001/.
254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-22.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.
258. “Legislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,” State Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20,
2020), available at https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-
president-trump/.
259. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/
status/1345776940196659201 (archived); Beth LeBlanc, “Trump Campaign Lists Lawmakers’
Cells, Misdirects Calls for Chatfield to Former Petoskey Resident,” Detroit News, (Jan. 4,
2021), available at https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/04/trump-
campaign-lists-michigan-lawmakers-cell-numbers-misdirects-private-citizen/4130279001/;
Jaclyn Peiser, “Trump Shared the Wrong Number for a Michigan Lawmaker: A 28-Year-Old
Has Gotten Thousands of Angry Calls,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/05/michigan-trump-wrong-number-chatfield/.
154 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian, “Former Michi-
gan Resident Slammed with Calls After Trump Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on
Social Media,” Fox 17 West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-
trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.
261. Nor would any State legislature have had such authority.
262. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 16-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-
cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31,
2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert)
264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31,
2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert).
265. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-
cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf..
266. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-
099 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 53.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th .
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 155

274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCOR-
Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from
Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
277. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26, 2020, message
from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: “Mark, just checking in as time continues to
count down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta get going!”), MM014100
(December 26, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: “Mark, you
should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he explained to me why the principal
deputy won’t work especially with the FBI. They will view it as as [sic] not having the
authority to enforce what needs to be done.”), MM014101 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from
Meadows to Rep. Perry stating: “I got it. I think I understand. Let me work on the deputy
position”), MM014102 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: “Roger.
Just sent you something on Signal”), MM014162 (December 27, 2020, message from Rep.
Perry to Meadows stating: “Can you call me when you get a chance? I just want to talk to
you for a few moments before I return the presidents [sic] call as requested.”), MM014178
(December 28, 2020, message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: “Did you call Jeff
Clark?”), MM014208 (December 29, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows
stating: “Mark, I sent you a note on signal”), MM014586 (January 2, 2021, message from Rep-
resentative Perry to Meadows stating: “Please call me the instant you get off the phone
with Jeff.”). President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Representative Perry refused to testify
before the Select Committee, and Jeffrey Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in
refusing to answer questions from the Select Committee. “Thompson & Cheney Statement
on Donald Trump’s Defiance of Select Committee Subpoena,” Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nov. 14, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-donald-
trump-s-defiance-select-committee-subpoena; Luke Broadwater, “Trump Sues to Block
Subpoena from Jan. 6 Committee,” New York Times, (Nov. 11, 2022), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/us/politics/trump-subpoena-jan-6-committee.html; H. Rept.
117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall
Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-
117hrpt216.pdf; Letter from John P. Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, re:
Subpoena to Representative Scott Perry, May 24, 2022, available at https://
keystonenewsroom.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/05/575876667-Rep-perry-Ltr-
SelectComm.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Nov. 5, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Jeffrey Clark,
(Feb. 2, 2022). See also Jonathan Tamari and Chris Brennan, “Pa. Congressman Scott Perry
Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center of Election Plot,” Philadelphia
Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-
perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html .
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099-014103, MM014178.
156 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 54-55.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 55.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681
(Department of Justice policy), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White
House policy).
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698,
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with Congress-
man Perry).
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 15-17, 64-80, 179-191; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to Decem-
ber 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 184-88; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department
of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697, HCOR-Pre-
CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to Dec. 28 email from
Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue). As further discussed in Chapter 4 of
this report, Klukowski, a lawyer, joined DOJ’s Civil Division with just weeks remaining in
President Trump’s term and helped Clark on issues related to the 2020 election, despite
the fact that “election-related matters are not part of the Civil portfolio.” Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ken-
neth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 66-67. Although Klukowski told the Select Committee that
the Trump Campaign was his client before joining DOJ, id. at p. 190, and despite the fact
that he had sent John Eastman draft talking points titled “TRUMP RE-ELECTION” that
encouraged Republican State legislatures to “summon” new Electoral College electors for
the 2020 election less than a week before starting at DOJ, Klukowski nevertheless helped
Clark draft the December 28th letter described in this Report that, if sent, would have
encouraged one or more State legislatures to take actions that could have changed the
outcome of the 2020 election. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman028219, Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to Eastman
with attached memo). The Select Committee has concerns about whether Klukowski’s
actions at DOJ, and his continued contacts with those working for, or to benefit, the Trump
Campaign, may have presented a conflict of interest to the detriment of DOJ’s mission. In
addition, the Select Committee has concerns about many of the “privilege” claims Klu-
kowski used to withhold information responsive to his subpoena, as well as concerns
about some of his testimony, including his testimony about contacts with, among others,
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 157

John Eastman. The Committee has learned that their communications included at least
four known calls between December 22, 2020, and January 2, 2021. Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:38
a.m. EST for 22.8 min, that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:09 p.m. EST for 6.4 min,
that Eastman called Klukowski on 12/30 at 9:11 p.m. EST for 31.9 min, and that Klukowski
called Eastman on 1/02 at 6:59 p.m. EST for 6.4 min).
288. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061893 (Jan. 1, 2021,
emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Pro-
duction, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from
January 1, 2021, through January 8, 2021).
289. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (Dec. 28 email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue
titled “Two Urgent Action Items”) (“The concept is to send it to the Governor, Speaker, and
President pro temp of each relevant state…”); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021),
pp. 68-69, 79.
290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
291. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000703.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
158 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Produc-
tion), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020, email from
Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in
which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything
remotely like this.”).
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department
of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020,
email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action
Items in which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign this letter or any-
thing remotely like this.”); Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Dono-
ghue, (August 6, 2021), at p. 99, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
307. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000083040 (January 3, 2021,
White House Presidential Call Log).
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119-20. (“And so it was
unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen was removed from the seat.” The
only exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security
Division. Donoghue encouraged Demers to stay on because he didn’t want to further jeop-
ardize national security.)
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 159

311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126-28; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 120.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven A. Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 64.
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-132.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-32.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 75, 84.
319. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1340185773220515840 (archived).
320. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1344359312878149634; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
12:52 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (archived) (retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020
3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/
1340399063875895296)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m.
ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418; Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22 (archived)
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730)); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (archived) (retweet-
ing Jennifer Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21)), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (archived)
(retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/
1345599512560078849 (archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3,
160 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22 (archived) (retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan.
2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://
twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twit-
ter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (archived) (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2,
2021 2:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/
1345459488107749386); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346588064026685443.
321. See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum of Daniel Johnson at 5, United States v. Johnson, No.
1:21-cr-407 (D.D.C. May 25, 2022), ECF No. 56 (“Mr. Johnson believed what he read on the
internet and heard from the President himself - that the election had been stolen.”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Zac Martin, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 20 (answering that he believed President
Trump wanted “patriots to show up in Washington, DC on January 6th” because “we felt
like our rights were being taken away from us” given the election results).
322. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
Oct. 18, 2022) (Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified that the Oath Keepers came to Washing-
ton, DC “to stop the certification of the election. … [b]y any means necessary. That’s why
we brought our firearms.”); Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v.
Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (“Trump called us. Trump
called us to DC ... and he's calling for help -- I thought he was calling for help. I thought he
was -- I thought we were doing the right thing.”); Statement of Facts at 2, United States v.
Martin, No. 1:21-cr-394 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2021) (“MARTIN reported that he decided to travel to
Washington, D.C. after reading then-President Donald Trump’s tweets regarding the elec-
tion being stolen and a protest on January 6, 2021, flying to D.C. on January 5, 2021, and
attending the rallies on January 6, 2021, and then heading to the U.S. Capitol where he
entered along with a crowd of other individuals.”); Statement of Facts at 9-10, United
States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (“So Trump has called this himself. For
everyone to come. It’s the day the electoral college is suppose [sic] to be certified by con-
gress to officially elect Biden.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thth Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson (Nov. 16, 2022), pp.
34, 44, 70-71 (noting that he went to the Capitol at President Trump’s direction and that he
“figured [stopping the certification of the vote] was [President Trump’s] plan”; see also,
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements).
323. Indictment at 6, United States v. Smith, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
324. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Sulenta, No. 1:22-mj-00129-ZMF (D.D.C. June 6,
2022), ECF No. 1-1.
325. Stipulated Statement of Facts at 7, United States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. August 23,
2022), ECF No. 430.
326. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Grayson, No. 1:21-cr-224 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1.
327. Statement of Facts at 11, United States v. Denney, No. 1:21-mj-00686-RMM-ZMF (D.D.C. Dec.
7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 161

328. Gieswein denies that he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though he affili-
ated with an apparent Three Percenter group at previous times. See Gieswein’s Motion for
Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2-3, 18-19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No.
1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal
complaint noted that he “appears to be affiliated with the radical militia group known as
the Three Percenters.” Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24
(D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/
download. See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315 (highlighting photos of
Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter symbol).
329. Second Superseding Indictment at 9-10, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. March 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
330. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5; Third Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Donohoe, No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.
331. Third Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “Proud Boys,
Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal,
(Jan.17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-
to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
332. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000070865, (December 29, 2020, Tele-
gram chat at 11:09 a.m. from Enrique Tarrio under the name “HEIKA NOBLELEAD.”).
333. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop
Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-
guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power; “Leader of North Carolina Chapter
of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy and Assault Charges in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Apr. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-
north-carolina-chapter-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-and-assault-charges-jan-6.
334. Statement of Offense at 2, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5.
335. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5.
336. Statement of Offense at 4-5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022),
ECF No. 5.
337. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022),
ECF No. 336. Indeed, Proud Boys leaders Biggs and Nordean told MOSD on January 5th
about a plan they had discussed with Tarrio for January 6th. Although Biggs and Nordean
did not share the plan’s precise details, Proud Boys like Bertino and Donohoe nonetheless
understood the “objective in Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, was to obstruct, impede,
or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College vote, including by force if neces-
sary,” and that the Proud Boys “would accomplish this through the use of force and vio-
lence, which could include storming the Capitol through police lines and barricades if
necessary.” Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct.
6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.
338. Superseding Indictment at 2-3, United States v. Rhodes et al, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No. 167.
339. Caldwell testified that he was not an Oath Keeper. See Trial Transcript at 8778-79, United
States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2022); Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes
Lybrand, “Capitol Riot Defendant Calls Himself a ‘Little Bit of a Goof’ Regarding Pelosi and
Pence Comments,” CNN, (Nov. 15, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/
162 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
politics/thomas-caldwell-testifies-oath-keeper-trial. Because the government tried
Caldwell in a conspiracy case with known Oath Keepers, the Select Committee has referred
to him as an Oath Keeper.
340. See Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov.
29, 2022).
341. Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9328 - 9396), United States v. Rhodes, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
13, 2022).
342. Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Rhodes, III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No 167.
343. Superseding Indictment at 13-14, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
344. Superseding Indictment at 15-17, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No 167.
345. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Ulrich, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2022), ECF
No. 117.
346. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. James, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF
No. 60.
347. "TTPO Stance on Election Fraud," The Three Percenters - Original, available at https://
archive.ph/YemCC#selection-289.0-289.29 (archived).
348. Statement of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1; Post: “Oath Keepers claim to stand for the constitution yet will not call up its 30k
membership to attend the 6th. I thought you guys stood for the constitution? It's your only
job as an organization...now or never boys,” Patriots.win, Dec. 29, 2020, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s.
349. Indictment at 1, 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
350. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
351. Indictment at 8-13, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
352. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
353. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
354. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1. When the Select Committee asked about this post to the leader of the Florida
Guardians of Freedom, Liggett downplayed any significance or any knowledge about other
Three Percenter groups that might “show in record numbers.” Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 51-52.
355. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
356. Statement of Facts at 15-17, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29,
2022), ECF No. 5-1. The "tunnel" is actually a flight of stairs leading to a doorway from
which the President emerges on Inauguration Day to take the oath of office. When the
inauguration stage is present, the stairs leading to the doorway are converted into a "10-
foot-wide, slightly sloped, short tunnel that was approximately 15 feet long." Government's
Sentencing Memorandum at 5-6, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 13,
2022), ECF No. 140. For other examples of how extremist groups responded to President
Trump’s call to action, see Chapter 6.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 163

357. Indictment at 11, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF
No. 65; Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 70, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246
(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
358. Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246
(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
359. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Request for Pretrial Release at 7, United
States v. Meggs, No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 98.
360. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol ( Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
361. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2022).
362. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2022).
363. Trial Exhibit 9221, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2022).
364. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 125-26, United States v. Vallejo, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 18,
2022), ECF No. 102-1 (Collection of redacted text messages, labeled as Exhibit 8, showing
Rhodes adding “a CA Oath Keeper who is in with a four man team, followed by that person
announcing his identifiable radio frequency) Ryan J. Reilly, “New Evidence Reveals Coordi-
nation Between Oath Keepers, Three Percenters on Jan. 6,” NBC News, (May 28, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/new-evidence-reveals-
coordination-oath-keepers-three-percenters-jan-6-rcna30355 (noting how public source
investigators linked the identifiable radio frequency to Derek Kinnison, who is one of the
California Three Percenters indicted on conspiracy charges for their conduct on January
6th. See Indictment, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021),
ECF No. 1).
365. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), CTRL 0000010471, at 7:01 (January
6, 2021, video footage recorded by Samuel Montoya at the U.S. Capitol).
366. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3 X6039BKH5 13.53.47
20210106-FELONYRIOT-FIRSTSTSE, at 15:28:13 (MPD body camera footage); Statement of
Facts at 3, United States v. Cale, No. 1:22-cr-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.
367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000603.
368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 143.
369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199.
370. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020,
email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats),
371. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020,
email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats).
372. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
164 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
375. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
376. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
377. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
378. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
379. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000080 (December 28, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: (LES) Armed and Ready SITE.pdf.); Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jack
Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 8; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Donohue, (Jan. 7, 2022).
380. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020,
email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
381. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020,
email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls
on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.).
383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020,
email re: 1/6 warning.).
384. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY@USSS.DHS.GOV to THREATS@uscp.gov titled “FW: [EXTERNAL
EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.”).
385. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001, pp. 1, 3 (December
30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled “Wild Protest”).
386. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled “Fwd:
MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
387. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled “Fwd:
MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Parler Production) PARLER_00000013 (January 2, 2021, email from
Parler to the FBI re: Another to check out, attaching Parler posts).
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 165

389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001487 (January 2, 2021, email
to Capitol Police and Department of Justice with screenshots of Parler posts); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000116, CTRL0000000116.0001 (January
4, 2021, email from U.S. Capitol Police re: Comments of concern for Jan 6 rally, collecting
Parler posts).
390. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5,
2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
391. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5,
2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
392. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000293417 (December 30, 2020,
email to OSU-ALL titled “Discovery of Event Website- MAGA Drag the Interstate & Occupy
the Capitol”).
393. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email al re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
395. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email Deleted for privacy concerns. et. al re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post
of Concern.).
396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000066986, USSS0000066986.0001
(January 5, 2021, Secret Service email noting social media user threatening to bring a fire-
arm to Washington, D.C. on January 6th).
397. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238,
DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned
'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021.”).
398. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238,
DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned
'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021.”).
399. Trial Exhibit 6923 (1.S.159.817, 955), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
14, 2022) ( Rhodes sent an encrypted message to Oath Keeper leadership on January 5,
2021, stating: “We will have several well equipped QRFs outside DC. And there are many,
many others, from other groups, who will be watching and waiting on the outside in case
of worst case scenarios.”).
400. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441-MM01442 (December 30, 2020,
6:05 p.m. ET text from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows).
401. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. Miller claimed he had no idea
about the comments and would have “flag[ged]” them for “Secret Service” had he seen
166 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
them. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 210-12.
402. On his way to the Capitol, Proud Boy David Nicholas Dempsey stopped on the National
Mall in front of an erected gallows, fitted with a noose, to tell the world what he hoped
would happen: “Them worthless shitholes like Jerry Nadler, fuckin Pelosi … They don’t
need a jail cell. They need to hang from these motherfuckers [pointing to gallows]. They
need to get the point across that the time for peace is over. … For four, or five years
really, they’ve been fucking demonizing us, belittling us, … doing everything they can to
stop what this is, and people are sick of that shit …. Hopefully one day soon we really
have someone hanging from one of these motherfuckers … .” Statement of Facts at 2-3,
United States v. Dempsey, No. 1:21-cr-566 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2021); #SeditionHunters (@Sedi-
tionHunters), Twitter, Mar. 11, 2021 8:12 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
SeditionHunters/status/1370180789770588163.
403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
404. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 92.
405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_035, SC_HH_036 (January 6, 2021,
text messages with Hogan Gidley).
406. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 109-10.
407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, DC Produc-
tion), CTRL0000926794 (Talking points put together by Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director
of HSEMA, for a briefing with Mayor Muriel Bowers on December 30, 2020).
408. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Har-
vin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.
409. Given the timing of receipt of much of this intelligence immediately in advance of January
6th, it is unclear that any comprehensive intelligence community analytical product could
have been reasonably expected. But it is clear that the information itself was communi-
cated.
410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000181 (January 2, 2021, email from
Katrina Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich re: 1/6 Speaker Schedule).
411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5449; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
412. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 83, 86.
413. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
414. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert “Bobby” Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 64.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 167

415. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 21.
416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
417. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
418. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
419. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 16.
420. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000086772, p. 4 (November 18, 2021,
document titled: United States Secret Service - Coordinated Response to a Request for
Information from the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol).
421. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS7-
GC_1935.mov; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Summary
of updates from January 6, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson, (Nov. 16, 2022),
pp. 30-31 ("I was seeing these, like, piles of backpacks and flagpoles [outside the magne-
tometers]. And some people were watching that for other people. And I just -- there were
lots of piles all over the place of stuff like that.").
422. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu, “Evidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd
Grows as Arrests and Trials Mount,” Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.
423. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (summary of radio traf-
fic on January 6, 2021).
424. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73-78 (District of Columbia,
Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of Columbia,
Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of radio traffic from January 6, 2021, from 12:00
- 13:00).
425. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-CTRL0000000069.
426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
427. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77 ("The
most--the thing that sticks out most was he kept asking why we couldn't go, why we
couldn't go, and that he wasn't concerned about the people that were there or referenced
them being Trump people or Trump supporters.").
428. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
429. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
168 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 20-21.
431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24, 26.
432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26.
433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 23.
434. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), at
1:00:00 – 1:02:31, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-
save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).
435. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Janet West
Buhler, (Feb. 28, 2022), p. 40.
437. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
438. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
439. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:15:00,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions
of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43 - 8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
2021).
441. Unframe of Mind, “Unframe of Mind in DC #stopthesteal Rally,” YouTube, at 9:40 – 9:47, Jan.
6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 0:14:11-0:15:00, avail-
able at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
442. Walter Masterson, “Live from the Trump Rally in Washington, D.C.,” YouTube, at 17:32 –
17:50, Jan. 11, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 2:07:02-
2:07:07, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
443. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022) at, at 2:07:13-
2:07:47, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on
‘Stop the Steal J6’ Zello Channel (Unedited),” Soundcloud, at 4:00-4:18, available at https://
soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-
unedited .
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 169

445. For a video of the interview, see “Crown Point, Indiana Man Charged in Jan. 6 Capitol Riot
Says He Has ‘No Regrets’,” CBS Chicago, Nov. 29, 2022, available at https://
www.cbsnews.com/chicago/video/crown-point-indiana-man-charged-in-jan-6-capitol-riot-
says-he-has-no-regrets/#x.
446. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27 (emphasis added).
447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 131 (“I just didn’t
think it would be, you know, a good idea for the President to go up to the Capitol.”). While
Cipollone did not specifically recall talking with Cassidy Hutchinson about this topic, he
informed the Select Committee that he was sure that he did express his view to some
people. Id. Hutchinson believes it was Pat Cipollone, but also testified that it may have
been a different lawyer. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 113-
16.
449. For security reasons, the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this employee.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022) at p. 73. See also Chapter 7, which discusses this topic in greater detail.
450. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Agent, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 22-23. The
Select Committee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their
sensitive national security responsibilities.
451. A book written by Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in December 2021 made the categorical
claim that the President never intended to travel to the Capitol that day. See Mark Mead-
ows, The Chief’s Chief (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 250. The Committee’s
evidence demonstrates that Meadows’s claim is categorically false. Because the Meadows
book conflicted sharply with information that was being received by the Select Committee,
the Committee became increasingly wary that other witnesses might intentionally conceal
what happened. That appeared to be the case with Ornato. Ornato does not recall that he
conveyed the information to Cassidy Hutchinson regarding the SUV, and also does not
recall that he conveyed similar information to a White House employee with national
security responsibilities who testified that Ornato recalled a similar account to him. The
Committee is skeptical of Ornato’s account.
452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45. The Select Commit-
tee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their sensitive
national security responsibilities.
453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
454. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
455. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2-9, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291
(D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140; 167 Cong. Rec. S619 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Michael
S. Schmidt and Luke Broadwater, "Officers' Injuries, Including Concussions, Show Scope of
Violence at Capitol Riot," New York Times, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/capitol-riot-police-officer-injuries.html.
170 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
456. See Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30,
2021), ECF No. 137; Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein, "Where Jan. 6 Prosecutions Stand, 18
Months after the Attack," Politico, (July 7, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/
news/2022/07/07/jan-6-prosecutions-months-later-00044354.
457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30,
2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as
that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the
crowd. . . . We left.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21,
2022), at 1:58:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo (“I’m here
delivering the President’s message. Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home. ...
That’s our order.”).
458. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:50:59-1:52:19,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=6659; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 2:15:45-2:17:12, available at https://
youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8145; CBS News, “Former Vice President Mike Pence on 'Face the
Nation with Margaret Brennan' | Full Interview,” YouTube, at 16:23-19:01, Nov. 21, 2022,
available at https://youtu.be/U9GbkPhG1Lo?t=983; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew
Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 173.
459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation; See “Don-
ald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).
460. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8_hi_j0087_0bea; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 34:18, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2058.
461. Washington Post, “D.C. Police requested backup at least 17 times in 78 minutes during
Capitol riot | Visual Forensics,” YouTube, at 7:58 to 8:45, Apr. 15, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/rsQTY9083r8?t=478; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Public Hearing, (Mar. 3, 2021),
Written Testimony of William J. Walker, Commanding General District of Columbia National
Guard, p. 3, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Walker-
2021-03-03.pdf.
462. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 42, 46.
463. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th
464. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 171

465. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 138.
466. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith
Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-90.
467. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 127, 129, 131-32, 137, 141, 143-44, 148-49, 159.
468. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
469. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 163-64; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation,
117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/
house-january6th.
470. Senator Lee wrote to a reporter that he received a call from the President moments after
the Senate halted its proceedings and that the President claimed he had dialed Sen.
Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), so Lee let Tuberville talk to the President on his phone for 5 or
10 minutes until they were ordered to evacuate. Bryan Schott, “What Sen. Mike Lee Told Me
about Trump’s Call the Day of the Capitol Riot,” Salt Lake Tribune, (Feb. 10, 2021, updated
Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2021/02/11/what-sen-
mike-lee-told-me/; see also Kyle Cheney, “Tuberville Says He Informed Trump of Pence’s
Evacuation before Rioters Reached Senate,” Politico, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://
www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/tuberville-pences-evacuation-trump-impeachment-
468572.
471. 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/
crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210107235835/
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346891760174329859 (archived).
472. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 149-50.
473. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 150-51.
474. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:39:03-1:40:42,
available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5943. Two witnesses recall writing this note:
Cassidy Hutchinson and Eric Herschmann, although Hutchinson recalls that Herschmann
was responsible for the revision made to the note. The Committee’s review of Hutchinson’s
handwriting was consistent with the script of the note. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 67-68.
Who wrote the note is not material to the Select Committee—the important point is that it
was prepared for the President.
172 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
475. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:27:52-1:28:53,
available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5272; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (June 20, 2022), pp. 25-26.
477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:30 - 1:31:51, available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
478. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 12-15, 98-99; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July
21, 2022), at 38:02-38:44, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2283.
479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 108-09.
480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
482. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield … to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the
Capitol through this broken window.”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
483. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907.
484. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
485. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
486. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014933.
488. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935.
489. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.
490. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
491. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
492. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 173

493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
494. U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (@SenBillCassidy), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:03 p.m. ET, available
at https://twitter.com/SenBillCassidy/status/1346925444189327361.
495. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014971.
496. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 149-50; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Radford, (May 25, 2022), p. 37.
497. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 145, 150.
498. Leader McCarthy spoke on the air to Fox News starting at 3:05 p.m. ET and told the net-
work that “I’ve already talked to the President. I called him. I think we need to make a
statement, make sure that we can calm individuals down.” Fox News (FoxNews), “LISTEN:
Rep. Kevin McCarthy on protesters storming Capitol,” Facebook, at 3:27-3:40, Jan. 6, 2021
(uploaded to Facebook at 3:35 p.m. ET), available at https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/
videos/listen-rep-kevin-mccarthy-on-protesters-storming-capitol/232725075039919/.
499. CBS News, “Live coverage: Protesters Swarm Capitol, Abruptly Halting Electoral Vote
Count,” YouTube, at 3:29:02-3:29:15, 3:29:43-3:30:03, 3:31:28-3:32:07, 3:33:52-3:34:12, Jan. 6,
2021, available at https://youtu.be/3Fsf4aWudJk?t=12542.
500. Rep. Herrera Beutler Describes Efforts to Get Trump to Intervene in Stopping Jan. 6 riot,”
WTHR (Feb. 13, 2021), at 1:20 - 1:50, available at https://www.wthr.com/video/news/nation-
world/capitol-riot-herrera-beutler-trump-mccarthy-call/507-477fa84f-1277-444a-aad6-
716c5ec9f66f.
501. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43. CNN’s Jamie Gan-
gel related that she also confirmed the account with multiple other sources, reporting that
“I’ve spoken to multiple Republican Members of the House who have knowledge of that
call, who tell us that after Trump tried to say to Kevin, ‘these are not my people, it’s
Antifa,’ Kevin McCarthy said to Trump, ‘no, it’s not Antifa. These are your people’…. We’re
also told by several other Republican Members that Kevin McCarthy wasn’t shy about this
heated exchange with Trump, that he wanted his Members to know about it.” CNN, “New
Details Emerge in McCarthy's Call with Trump on January 6,” YouTube, at 0:25 - 1:50, Feb. 12,
2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy1FPNluoOE.
502. Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of John Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), pp. 10-12 (describing calls and
text messages to Dan Scavino and Mark Meadows).
503. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (HBO Productions), Video file Reel_204I - All Clips Com-
pilation.mp4 at 5:32–5:55 (January 6, 2021 footage from HBO of Nancy Pelosi and Chuck
Schumer on phone call with Jeffrey Rosen); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Produc-
tion), MM014906 (January 6, 2021 text message from Marjorie Taylor Greene to Mark Mead-
ows), MM014919 (January 6, 2021 text message from William Timmons to Mark Meadows),
MM014939 (January 6, 2021 text message from Chip Roy to Mark Meadows).
504. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 151.
505. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
506. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 152.
174 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
507. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 0:57:48 -
0:58:19, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3468.
508. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), pp. 81-83; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. The Select Committee is not revealing the
identity of this witness because of national security concerns as well as to guard against
the risk of retaliation.
509. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346900434540240897.jpg (archived).
510. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
511. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:26:06-2:26:26,
available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript at 19, United
States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim
impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: “At approximately 1435 hours, with rapidly
mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defend-
ing officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the United States
Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the Metro-
politan Police Department.”).
512. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
513. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
514. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 113.
515. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 160.
516. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_043-044 (January 6, 2021, text mes-
sage from Hope Hicks to Julie Radford at 7:18 p.m.).
517. 167 Cong. Rec. S635 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/
crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Spencer S. Hsu, “Pence Spent Jan. 6 at
Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,” Washington Post, (Mar. 21,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-
cowboys-trump-jan6/.
518. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 137.
519. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
520. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
521. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:31:25 –
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 175

1:32:22, available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5359; Select Committee to Investi-

gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 27-28.
522. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 182.
523. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68-69, 71.
524. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg (archived).
525. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
526. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg (archived).
527. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
528. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
529. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
530. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th].
531. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004112_0001 (January 6,
2021 email at 3:05 p.m. notifying Beau Harrison of Ashli Babbitt shooting); Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Inter-
view of William Beau Harrison (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 73–76 (describing writing note and
passing it to Mark Meadows or Tony Ornato); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Pro-
duction), P-R000241 (January 6, 2021 pocket card written by Beau Harrison with the mes-
sage, “1x CIVILIAN GUNSHOT WOUND TO CHEST @ DOOR OF HOUSE CHABER [sic]”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47 (“I remember seeing that
[note] in front of [President Trump], yeah.”). The Select Committee is not revealing the
identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation. See also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Anthony Ornato, (January 28, 2022), p. 115; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), p. 87 (recalling announcing during the afternoon that a Trump supporter had been
killed).
532. “Department of Justice Closes Investigation into the Death of Ashli Babbitt,” Department of
Justice, (Apr. 14, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/department-
justice-closes-investigation-death-ashli-babbitt.
533. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th; ABC News, “Mike Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6:
Exclusive,” YouTube, at 9:27-10:00, Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://youtu.be/-
AAyKAoPFQs?t=567; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
176 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-81;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-25; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 172-73, 182-84; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Dono-
ghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 186.
534. NBC News, "Biden Condemns Chaos at the Capitol as 'Insurrection,'" YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBCWTqJT7M4; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
535. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
536. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
537. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
538. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30,
2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as
that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the
crowd. . . . We left.”).
539. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
540. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
541. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 at 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210106232133/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1346954970910707712 (archived).
542. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
543. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 175; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
544. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 194; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
545. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 192.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 177

546. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.
547. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
548. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205-07; Sunlen Serfaty, Devan Cole, and Alex
Rogers, “As Riot Raged at Capitol, Trump Tried to Call Senators to Overturn Election,” CNN,
(Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/mike-lee-tommy-
tuberville-trump-misdialed-capitol-riot; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Produc-
tion, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
549. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 475.
550. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 474.
551. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14,
2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A.
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021),
pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.
552. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,” YouTube, at 10:45-11:02,
Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AAyKAoPFQs.
553. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14,
2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A.
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021),
pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.
554. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 17, 268.
555. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
178 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
556. Glenn Kessler, “Trump Falsely Claims He ‘Requested’ 10,000 Troops Rejected by Pelosi,”
Washington Post, (Mar. 2, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2021/03/02/trump-falsely-claims-he-requested-10000-troops-rejected-by-pelosi/; “Mark
Meadows: Biden Administration Policies Put 'America Last',” Fox News, (Feb. 7, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/mark-meadows-biden-administration-
policies-put-america-last.
557. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01. On January 4,
2021, Max Miller and Katrina Pierson exchanged text messages discussing their planning
activities for the 6th. In those messages, Max Miller stated: “Just glad we killed the
national guard and a procession” and that “… chief [Mark Meadows] already had said no
for days!”. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Max Miller Production), Miller Production 0001 (Janu-
ary 4, 2021, text messages between Max Miller and Katrina Pierson).
558. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:22:45-2:23:22,
available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo?t=8565; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0717-719.
559. "House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy on Asking President Trump for his Resignation,"
ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at
https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.
560. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014456.
561. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014858 - MM014861.
562. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014467 (December 31, 2020, text mes-
sage from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark
Meadows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
563. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014503 (January 1, 2021, text message
from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Mead-
ows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
564. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), CTRL0000925383, p. 3 (January 7, 2021,
text message from Sean Hannity to Kayleigh McEnany)
565. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM015209 (January 10, 2021, text mes-
sage Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows and Jim Jordan).
566. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906.
567. "U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197," C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 -
4:15:31, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-
impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=.
568. "Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsi-
bility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol," ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Mar-
tin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/
bookresources.
569. "Statement by Mo Brooks," Mo Brooks for U.S. Senate, available at https://mobrooks.com/
statement-by-mo-brooks/; Joe Walsh, "GOP Rep. Mo Brooks Claims Trump Asked Him to
Reinstate Trump Presidency," Forbes, (Mar. 23, 2022), available at https://www.forbes.com/
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 179

sites/joewalsh/2022/03/23/gop-rep-mo-brooks-claims-trump-asked-him-to-reinstate-
trump-presidency/?sh=7264e1d91edd (noting that Rep. Mo Brooks issued this statement on
Wednesday, March 23, 2022).
570. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words: The 43 Republicans’ Explana-
tions of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb. 15,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-
republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
571. C-SPAN, “Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell Remarks Following Senate Impeachment
Vote,” YouTube, at 5:10 – 5:46, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yxRMoqNnfvw.
572. “Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy Says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsi-
bility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,” Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin,
eds., ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/
bookresources; Melanie Zanona, “New Audio Reveals McCarthy said Trump Admitted Bear-
ing Some Responsibility for Capitol Attack,” CNN, (April 22, 2022), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2022/04/22/politics/trump-january-6-responsibility-book/index.html.
Leader McCarthy also relayed this conversation with President Trump to his Republican
colleagues: “I asked him [Trump] personally today, does he hold responsibility for what
happened. And he needs to acknowledge that.” Id. The Committee believes that House
Republican Leader McCarthy’s testimony would be material to any criminal investigation of
Donald Trump, not just to probe this apparent Trump acknowledgement of culpability, but
also because Leader McCarthy spoke directly to Donald Trump and others who were in the
White House on January 6th and unsuccessfully pleaded for the President’s immediate
assistance to halt the violence. Leader McCarthy did not comply with the Select Commit-
tee’s subpoena.
573. "U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197," C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 -
4:15:31, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-
impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=; 167 Cong. Rec. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/01/13/CREC-2021-01-13-pt1-
PgH165.pdf.
574. See supra, Executive Summary.
575. See supra, Executive Summary.
576. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
577. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-
Certification-Events-07282021-000738—HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
578. See supra, Executive Summary. The State legislatures lacked authority to change the lawful
outcome of the State elections at that point. Nevertheless Eastman, Trump, and others
nevertheless pushed for such action.
579. See supra, Executive Summary.
580. See Supra, Executive Summary; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020
1:42 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840 (archived); see also, e.g., Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twit-
ter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06
p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 12:52 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (retweet-
ing @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
180 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345095714687377418; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m.
ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/
?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (retweeting Jennifer
Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (retweeting Ron
Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849
(archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, avail-
able at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22
(retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan. 2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/
1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021 2:58
p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386); Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346588064026685443.
581. Donald J. Trump (@realDonldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22mike+pence+%22&results=1 (archived) (“Mike
Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country
and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands
the truth!”); USA Today Graphics (@usatgraphics), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 9:56 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/usatgraphics/status/1347376642956603392 (screenshotting the
since-deleted tweet).
582. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30 and 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen President Trump put his tweet out, we
literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as that come out, everybody started
talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.”).
583. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 3−16, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 181

584. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53−53, 58, Eastman v. Thomp-
son et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (refer-
ring to two Federal criminal statutes).
585. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 – January 20, 2021 at 24,
Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 24.
586. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63−64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
587. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
588. See “23 Months Since the January 6th Attack on the Capitol,” Department of Justice, (Dec. 8,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/23-months-january-6-attack-capitol.
589. Kyle Cheney, “Rep. Scott Perry Suing to Block DOJ Access to His Cell Phone,” Politico, (Aug.
24, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/24/rep-scott-perry-suing-
to-block-doj-access-to-his-cell-phone-00053486; Betsy Woodruff Swan, Josh Gerstein, and
Kyle Cheney, “DOJ Searches Home of Former Official Who Aided Alleged Pro-Trump ‘Coup’,”
Politico, (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/23/law-
enforcement-trump-official-coup-00041767.
590. See, e.g., Sarah Murray, Evan Perez, and Katelyn Polantz, “Federal Judge Orders Former Top
Lawyers in Trump’s White House to Testify in Criminal Grand Jury Probe,” CNN, (Dec. 1,
2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/01/politics/cipollone-philbin-trump-
lawyers-testify.
591. Sara Murray and Jason Morris, “Fulton County Prosecutor Investigating Trump Aims for
Indictments as Soon as December,” CNN, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/
2022/10/06/politics/fani-willis-georgia-prosecutor-trump-indictments-december/
index.html.
592. The Special Counsel is to oversee the Department’s ongoing investigation “into whether
any person or entity unlawfully interfered with the transfer of power following the 2020
Presidential election or the certification of the Electoral College vote held on or about
January 6, 2021.” “Appointment of a Special Counsel,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 18,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel-0. In
addition, the Special Counsel is to oversee the Department’s “ongoing investigation involv-
ing classified documents and other Presidential records, as well as the possible obstruc-
tion of that investigation. . . .” Id.
593. The House of Representatives held Meadows in contempt for refusing to testify before the
Committee, 167 Cong. Rec. H7814-7815 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2021), but DOJ declined to pros-
ecute him. See Josh Gerstein, Kyle Cheny, and Nicholas Wu, “DOJ Declines to Charge Mead-
ows, Scavino with Contempt of Congress for Defying Jan. 6 Committee,” Politico, (June 3,
2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/03/doj-declines-to-charge-
meadows-scavino-with-contempt-of-congress-for-defying-jan-6-committee-00037230.
594. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
595. According to DOJ, “[a] conviction under Section 1512(c)(2) requires proof that”: (1) “the
natural and probable effect of the defendant’s actions were to obstruct [influence or
impede] the official proceeding;” (2) “that [defendant] knew that his actions were likely to
obstruct [influence or impede] that proceeding;” and (3) “that he acted with the wrongful
or improper purpose of delaying or stopping the official proceeding.” United States v.
Andries, No. 21-93 (RC), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44794 at *37 n.8 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Second Supplemental Brief at 6); see United States
v. Aguilar; 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describ-
ing the “longstanding and well-accepted meaning” of “corruptly” as denoting “an act done
with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of oth-
ers” (quoting United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979))).
596. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, No. 22-CR-60 (BAH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214833, at *7-8
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-cr-287 (TNM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
182 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
196980, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2022); United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 67 (D.D.C.
2022), reconsideration denied, No. 1:21-CR-119 (CJN), 589 F. Supp. 3d 60 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022);
United States v. Puma, No. 1:21-CR-454 (PLF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48875, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar.
19, 2022); United States v. McHugh, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2022). See also T. Kan-
efield, “January 6 Defendants Are Raising a Creative Defense. It Isn’t Working,” Washington
Post, (Feb. 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/15/
jan-6-official-proceeding/.
597. See supra, Executive Summary.
598. See supra, Executive Summary.
599. See supra, Executive Summary.
600. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter). One judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in
the course of concluding that section 1512(c) is not void for vagueness, interpreted the
“corruptly” element as meaning “contrary to law, statute, or established rule.” United
States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d. 15−16, (D.D.C. 2021). As explained above, President Trump
attempted to cause the Vice President to violate the Electoral Count Act, and even Dr.
Eastman advised President Trump that the proposed course of action would violate the
Act. We believe this satisfies the “corruptly” element of the offense under the Sandlin
opinion.
601. Indeed, it would not have been legally possible for a State to have done so in the days
before January 6th.
602. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 49-50, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
603. See supra, Executive Summary.
604. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-
Certification-Events-07282021-000738 - COR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
605. See supra, Executive Summary.
606. See supra, Executive Summary.
607. See supra, Executive Summary. Jeffrey Clark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in response to questions regarding this letter. As already noted, the
political appointee who assisted in drafting the letter was hired at the Justice Department
on December 15, 2020, but had worked on behalf of President Trump on election chal-
lenges in the weeks beforehand (including, apparently, while simultaneously serving as
Special Counsel for the White House Office of Management and Budget).
608. See supra, Executive Summary.
609. See supra, Executive Summary.
610. See supra, Executive Summary.
611. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
612. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
613. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44. Although Eastman invoked his
Fifth Amendment rights as a reason not to answer any of this Committee’s substantive
questions during his deposition, he has recently suggested in public that he only wished
to delay the count of votes by multiple days. As the evidence developed by this Committee
demonstrates, Eastman knew that such an effort to delay the count would also be illegal.
See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 183

Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 1:32:00-
1:35:13, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“[D]id Dr. Eastman
seem to admit that both of these theories suffered from similar legal flaws? [T]his new
theory, as I was pointing out to him, or the procedural theory, still violates several provi-
sions of the Electoral Count Act, as he acknowledged.... So, he acknowledged in those con-
versations that the underlying legal theory was the same....”). In addition, neither Eastman
nor any other co-conspirator had information establishing that any delay in counting
votes would or could have changed the outcome of the election in any State.
614. See supra, Executive Summary. We also note that these Republican Members of Congress,
who had more knowledge of Trump’s planning for January 6th than any other Members of
Congress, were also likely in a far superior position than any other Members to warn the
Capitol Police of the risks of violence at the Capitol on January 6th.
615. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:29:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“I’ve decided that I should be on the
pardon list, if that is still in the works.”).
616. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States are: (1) at least two
people entered into an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government, (2) by
deceitful or dishonest means, and (3) a member of the conspiracy engaged in at least one
overt act in furtherance of the agreement. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January
4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022)
(No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). Put similarly, to prove a violation section 371’s “defraud” provi-
sion, the Government must prove that the defendant: (1) agreed with at least one other
person to defraud the United States, (2) knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the
intent to defraud the United States, and (3) that at least one overt act was taken in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Mel-
len, 158, 393 F.3d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2004). An individual “defrauds” the Government for pur-
poses of section 371 if he “interfere[s] with or obstruct[s] one of its lawful governmental
functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.” Hammer-
schmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 122 n.255 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding jury verdict on instruction defining “defrauding
the United States” as: “depriv[ing] the Government of its right to have the officials of its
departments and agencies transact their official business honestly and impartially, free
from corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty and obstruction”).
617. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 54-55, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
618. See Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson
et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). (“An ‘agree-
ment’ between co-conspirators need not be express and can be inferred from the con-
spirators’ conduct.”).
619. See infra, Chapter 1.
620. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 55, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
621. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
622. See infra, Chapter 2. President Trump’s call with Secretary Raffensperger may have violated
several provisions of both Federal and Georgia law. We do not attempt to catalogue all the
possible violations here.
623. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
624. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 59, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
184 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
625. “908. ELEMENTS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1001,” Department of Justice, (last accessed on Dec. 13, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-908-elements-
18-usc-1001.
626. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy are discussed above.
627. As explained in Chapter 5, staffers for Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI)
reached out to Vice President Pence’s director of legislative affairs, apparently seeking to
deliver fake certificates on January 6. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production),
00012 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kelly’s Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris
Hodgson on January at 8:41 a.m.), 00058 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator John-
son’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
628. See infra, Chapter 3.
629. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added).
630. See, e.g., United States v. Bowser, 964 F.3d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1390
(2021) (“[T]he False Statements Act applies to ‘any investigation or review, conducted pur-
suant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Con-
gress.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(2) (emphasis added).”); United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1,
10 (D.D.C. 2019).
631. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at
1:14:59-1:15:22 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0 (“[President
Trump] turned the call over to Mr. Eastman, who then proceeded to talk about the impor-
tance of the RNC helping the campaign gather these contingent electors, in case any of the
legal challenges that were ongoing changed the result of any of the states.”).
632. 18 U.S.C. § 2383.
633. Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 115 (D.D.C. 2022), appeal pending, No. 22-5069 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 18, 2022).
634. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words: The 43 Republicans’ Explana-
tions of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb. 15,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-
republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
635. See supra, Executive Summary.
636. See supra, Executive Summary. The evidence suggests that the Vice President and certain
members of President Trump’s staff urged DOD to deploy the National Guard notwith-
standing the President’s wishes.
637. A prominent U.S. professor of criminal law has opined that President Trump can be held
criminally responsible under section 2383 for his failure to act, when he had a duty to act
given his constitutional obligation under Article II section 3 of the Constitution to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” See Albert W. Alschuler, “Trump and the Insur-
rection Act: The Legal Framework,” Just Security, (Aug. 16, 2022), available at https://
www.justsecurity.org/82696/trump-and-the-insurrection-act-the-true-legal-framework/.
Professor Albert Alschuler, the Julius Kreeger Professor Emeritus at the University of Chi-
cago Law School, taught criminal law for over 50 years at many of our Nation’s leading law
schools. He has published a number of analytical pieces applying the “assists” and “aid
and comfort” clauses of that provisions (which he analogizes to “aiding and abetting”
accomplice liability) to the evidence presented at the Committee’s hearings. In any event,
as described above, President Trump did act, including through his 2:24 p.m. tweet about
the Vice President that inflamed the crowd attacking the Capitol.
638. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022) p. 26.
639. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:02:53, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo; Donald J. Trump
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 185

(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://

www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
"didn’t+have+the+courage+to+do+what+should+have+been+done" (archived).
640. See infra, Chapter 8.
641. See supra, Executive Summary
642. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
643. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if
Elected,” Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
644. Jordan Fischer, Eric Flack, and Stephanie Wilson, “Georgia Man Who Wanted to ‘Remove
Some Craniums’ on January 6 Sentenced to More than 2 Years in Prison,” WUSA9, (Dec. 14,
2021), available at https://perma.cc/RSY2-J3RU.
645. Dan Mangan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trump’s Orders, Apolo-
gizes to AOC for Threat,” CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/
25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-
aoc.html.
646. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
647. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 166–67.
648. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
649. 18 U.S.C. § 372.
650. See “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Con-
spiracy and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 29,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-
keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
651. 18 U.S.C. § 2384. To establish a violation of section 2384, the government must establish (1)
a conspiracy, (2) to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United
States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by
force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force
to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority
thereof. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2006).
652. “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy
and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 29, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-
member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
653. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-
other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
654. See supra, Executive Summary.
655. Brian Naylor, "Read Trump's Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial," NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
656. Kristen Holmes, “Trump Calls for the Termination of the Constitution in Truth Social Post,”
CNN, (Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/politics/trump-
constitution-truth-social/index.html.
186 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
657. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if
Elected,” Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
658. See infra, Chapter 7.
659. 167 Cong. Rec. H171-72 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).
660. See supra, Executive Summary.
661. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 84−87.
662. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008962_0009 (January 2,
2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
663. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014864 (January 5, 2021, text message
from Rep. Jim Jordan to Mark Meadows describing the Vice President’s actions on January
6th).
664. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255-259 (January 6, 2021,
Presidential Daily Diary); Felicia Somnez, “Rep. Jim Jordan Tells House Panel He Can’t Recall
How Many Times He Spoke with Trump on Jan. 6,” Washington Post, (Oct. 20, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jordan-trump-calls-capitol-attack/2021/
10/20/1a570d0e-31c7-11ec-9241-aad8e48f01ff_story.html.
665. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
666. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205−07.
667. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 106.
668. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 72−73.
669. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 66−67.
670. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 62–64.
671. See Sarah Lynch and David Shepardson, “Watchdog to Probe if Justice Dept. Officials
Improperly Tried to Alter 2020 Election,” Reuters, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-justice/watchdog-to-probe-if-justice-dept-
officials-improperly-tried-to-alter-2020-election-idUSKBN29U21E (“‘Throughout the past
four years, I worked with Assistant Attorney General Clark on various legislative matters.
When President Trump asked if I would make an introduction, I obliged,’ Perry said in a
statement.”).
672. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 48.
673. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 45.
674. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 106–07.
675. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449.
676. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011506, (November 2020 text mes-
sages from Rep. Andy Biggs to Mark Meadows).
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 187

677. Josh Kelety, “Congressman Andy Biggs Coordinated Efforts with Mark Finchem before Capi-
tol Riot,” Phoenix New Times, (Feb. 18, 2021), available at https://
www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/congressman-andy-biggs-coordinated-with-mark-
finchem-before-capitol-riot-11532527.
678. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jim DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000554 (December
18, 2020, text messages between James DeGraffenreid, a Nevada fake elector for Trump,
and another remarking that “Andy Biggs ... has reached out to NV to ask about our evi-
dence”).
679. Audrey Fahlberg, “January 6 Hearings Become Fundraising Fodder,” The Dispatch, (July 7,
2022), available at https://thedispatch.com/p/january-6-hearings-become-fundraising;
Archive of Political Emails, Jim Jordan, “The January 6th Committee Is After Me,” June 9,
2022 12:41 p.m., available at https://politicalemails.org/messages/686023.
680. John Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson re: “Subpoena to Representative
Scott Perry,” (May 24, 2022), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
22061774-scott-perry-j6-response.
681. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, House Ethics Manual, p. 13 (2008).
682. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (December 21, 2020,
WAVES records showing Representatives Babin, Biggs, Brooks, Gaetz, Gohmert, Gosar, Tay-
lor Greene, Harris, Hice, Jordan, and Perry entering the White House).
683. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of John Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022).
684. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 328 (1999)). Justice Scalia not only agreed with this principle, but he also reasoned
that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent an adverse inference in even criminal cases.
This is because the text of that Amendment does not require such a rule and applying an
adverse inference to a refusal to testify is exactly in keeping with “normal evidentiary
inferences.” See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with
Justice Scalia. See id. at 341-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
685. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 82.
686. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022).
687. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct.
1350 (2022). Former President Trump also asked the United State Supreme Court to block
the Select Committee from accessing his documents. The Supreme Court denied that
request stating, “Because the Court of Appeals concluded that President Trump’s claims
would have failed even if he were the incumbent, his status as a former President neces-
sarily made no difference to the court’s decision.” Trump v. Thompson, 142 S.Ct. 680, 680
(2022) (citation omitted).
688. H. Res. 851, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to
Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf.
689. Statement of Interest of the United States at 9-10, Meadows v. Pelosi et al., No. 1:21-cv-
03217 (CJN) (D.D.C. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 42.
690. “Thompson & Cheney Statement on Justice Department Decisions on Contempt Referrals,”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (June
188 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-
cheney-statement-justice-department-decisions-contempt-referrals.
691. Dennis Aftergut, “Why the DOJ Did Not Indict Mark Meadows (and What It Should Do Next),”
NBC News, (June 7, 2022), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-
lackey-mark-meadows-escaped-january-6-prosecution-peter-navarro-rcna32319.
692. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress
for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available
at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf. In particular, Scavino
may have further information on President Trump’s advance knowledge from social media
posts of the rioters’ plans to invade the Capitol. See supra __.
693. H. Res. 730, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply
with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf.
694. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); “Peter Navarro Indicted for Contempt of Congress,”
Department of Justice, (June 3, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
peter-navarro-indicted-contempt-congress; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending
that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Con-
tempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
695. See infra 136.
696. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2;14:00-2:14:50,
available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo.
697. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann,
(Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), pp. 176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 104-06.
698. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:22:05-2:23:41,
available at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8525.
699. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation,
117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:23:41-2:24:42, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4535-VW-bY&t=8620s.
700. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35, esp. pp. 130-131; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:21:26-2:22:04, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8486.
701. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 133.
702. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005854_0001 (January 11,
2021, email from Molly Michael to Rep. Mo Brooks, confirming receipt of email from Brooks
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 189

recommending pardons, including for “Every Congressman and Senator who voted to
reject the electoral college vote submissions of Arizona and Pennsylvania”); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:20:52-2:21:12, available
at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8452.
703. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
704. The Committee has enormous respect for the U.S. Secret Service and recognized that the
testimony regarding their work is sensitive for law enforcement, protectee security, and
national security reasons. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee “Driver”, (Nov. 7,
2022), p. 4 (the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this individual); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Inter-
view of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 28, 2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 21,
2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 18, 2022), p. 4 Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 4.
705. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 4, 86-87.
706. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Jacqueline Alemany, Josh Dawsey, and Rosalind S. Heldeman, “The
Justice Dept.’s Jan. 6 Investigation Is Looking at … Everything,” Washington Post, (Sept. 16,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/trump-
january-6-subpoenas-meadows/; Josh Dawsey and Isaac Arnsdorf, “Prosecutors Seek
Details from Trump’s PAC in Expanding Jan. 6 Probe,” Washington Post, (Sept. 8, 2022),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/08/trump-
subpoenas-pac-jan-6/.
707. See Devlin Barrett, Josh Dawsey, and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Trump’s Committee Paying for
Lawyers of Key Mar-a-Lago Witnesses,” Washington Post, (Dec. 5, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/05/trump-witnesses-legal-
bills-pac/.
708. The Committee sat for dozens of hours with Hutchinson and concluded that she is brave
and earnest, and understood the intense backlash that would inevitably result from those
who were enlisted to defend President Trump’s behavior. [See infra, Chapter 7]. The thug-
gish behavior from President Trump’s team, including efforts to intimidate described else-
where in this report (see e.g. Chapter 3), gave rise to many concerns about Hutchinson’s
security, both in advance of and since her public testimony. (We note that multiple mem-
bers of the Committee were regularly receiving threats of violence during this period.)
Accordingly, the Committee attempted to take appropriate measures to help ensure her
safety in advance of her testimony, including measures designed to minimize the risk of
leaks that might put her safety at risk.
709. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 71-72
(noting that another witness reference may have been to Pat Philbin).
710. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 264-65.
711. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 52-57, 70-74, 282-88.
712. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 142-45, 288-92. See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 12-15.
190 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
713. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 183-86.
714. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39-41.
715. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 41.
716. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 38-39, 120, 205, 210, 213-14.
717. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 27.
718. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19.
719. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 40.
720. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021).
721. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
722. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
723. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 47-49.
724. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Jan.y 28, 2022), pp. 76-77.
725. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 46-47. Ornato was interviewed at
length by the Select Committee in November 2022, after the Secret Service produced
nearly a million new internal documents in August and September of this year.
726. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 92; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 45-46 (stating that he had not heard about President
Trump’s instruction to others to ask Ornato about going to the Capitol).
727. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Inter-
view of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp.
69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
728. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Inter-
view of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp.
69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
729. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-7; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of USSS Employee “Driver”, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 77-80, 92-93; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 17-18.
730. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 104-105, 131-32, 135-36. See also
Chapter 7.
731. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199 (describing
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 191

another senior intelligence official worrying, ahead of January 6th, about violence at the
Capitol); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23 (former Chief of
Homeland Security and Intelligence for the District of Columbia describing the threat
scene ahead of January 6th); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production),
CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
732. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 54-56.
733. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 55-56.
734. See supra pp. 81-83. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 13
(Ornato confirming that one of his responsibilities was briefing the chief of staff and,
through the chief of staff at times, the President on security-related issues).
735. “U.S. House of Representatives Debate on Impeachment of President Trump,” C-SPAN, at
1:03:53 - 1:13:42, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-4/debate-
impeachment-president-trump; Tyler Moyer, “McCarthy: "President Bears Responsibility for
Wednesday's Attack”,” Bakersfield Now, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://
bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/mccarthy-president-bears-responsibility-for-wednesdays-
attack.
736. “House Minority Leader Weekly Briefing.” C-SPAN, at 7:30 - 8:44, Jan. 21, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?508185-1/minority-leader-mccarthy-backs-gop-conference-
chair-liz-cheney; Rudy Talaka, “GOP Leader McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Members Helping Rioters,” Mediaite, (Jan. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/gop-leader-mccarthy-calls-for-bipartisan-commission-to-
investigate-allegations-of-members-helping-rioters/; “Rep. McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan
Commission to Probe Capitol Riot,” Newsmax, (Jan. 22, 2021), available at https://
www.newsmax.com/politics/kevin-mccarthy-capitol-riot-boebert-probe/2021/01/21/id/
1006648/.
737. Clare Foran, Ryan Nobles, and Annie Grayer, ‘‘Pelosi Announces Plans for ‘9/11-Type Com-
mission’ to Investigate Capitol Attack,” CNN, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/02/15/politics/pelosi-capitol-attack-commission/index.html.
738. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
739. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
740. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCa-
rthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
741. Ryan Nobles, Annie Grayer, and Jeremy Herb, “Pelosi Concedes to Even Partisan Split on
1/6 Commission in Effort to Jumpstart Talks,” CNN, (Apr. 20, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/politics/nancy-pelosi-january-6-commission-talks/index.html;
Ryan Nobles and Daniella Diaz, “Pelosi Makes Concession on Subpoenas for 9/11 Style
Commission to Investigate Insurrection,” CNN, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/22/politics/nancy-pelosi-911-style-commission-insurrection-
subpoenas/index.html.
742. John Bresnahan, Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman, “Pelosi Taps Top Dem to Negotiate on
Jan. 6 Commission,” Punchbowl News, (May 11, 2021), available at https://punchbowl.news/
archive/punchbowl-news-am-5-11/.
192 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
743. “Chairman Thompson Announces Bipartisan Agreement with Ranking Member Katko to
Create Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the Capitol,” House Committee
on Homeland Security, (May 14, 2021), available at https://homeland.house.gov/news/
press-releases/chairman-thompson-announces-bipartisan-agreement-with-ranking-
member-katko-to-create-commission-to-investigate-the-january-6-attack-on-the-capitol.
744. “McCarthy Statement on January 6 Commission Legislation,” House Republican Leader
Kevin McCarthy, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-
statement-on-january-6-commission-legislation/.
745. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
746. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821;
“Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
747. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
748. “U.S. House of Representatives House Session,” C-SPAN, at 4:12:23-4:12:55, May 19, 2021,
available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?511820-2/houses-passes-bill-create-january-6-
commission-252-175.
749. “Roll Call 154 | Bill Number: H. R. 3233,” Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (May
19, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021154?Page=1&Date=
05%2F19%2F2021.
750. “Roll Call Vote 117th Congress - 1st Session,” Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to
Invoke Cloture Re: Motion to Proceed to H.R. 3233), H.R. 3233 - 117th Congress (2021):
National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Com-
plex Act, H.R.3233, 117th Cong. (2021), available at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00218.htm.
751. “House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Announces Select Committee on the January 6th Insurrec-
tion,” C-SPAN, at 4:44-5:26, June 24, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
guCcy9tUfn8.
752. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP
January 6 Conspiracies,” CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/
25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
753. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP
January 6 Conspiracies,” CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/
25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
754. “Roll Call 197 | Bill Number: H. Res. 503,” Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (June
30, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021197.
755. “Pelosi Names Members to Select Committee to Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S.
Capitol,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July 1, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/7121-0.
756. “McCarthy Names House Republicans to Serve on Select Committees,” House Republican
Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 19, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/
mccarthy-names-house-republicans-to-serve-on-select-committees/.
757. “McCarthy Taps Banks to Lead Republicans on Jan 6 Committee,” Congressman Jim Banks,
(Jul. 19, 2021), available at https://banks.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1921.
758. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
(Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 193

759. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to

Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
(Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
760. “McCarthy Statement about Pelosi’s Abuse of Power on January 6th Select Committee,”
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 21, 2021), available at https://
republicanleader.house.gov/mccarthy-statement-about-pelosis-abuse-of-power-on-
january-6th-select-committee/; “McCarthy Pulls Republicans from Jan. 6 Select Committee
after Pelosi Rejects Picks,” Axios, (July 21, 2021), available at https://www.axios.com/2021/
07/21/pelosi-jim-jordan-banks-select-committee.
761. “Pelosi Announces Appointment of Congressman Adam Kinzinger to Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July
25, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72521; 167 Cong. Rec. H3885
(daily ed. July 26, 2021).
762. See, e.g., Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25546,
at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022); Memorandum Opinion, Republican National Committee v.
Nancy Pelosi et al.. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102/
gov.uscourts.dcd.241102.33.0.pdf.
Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
 1

THE BIG LIE

Late on election night 2020, President Donald J. Trump addressed the

nation from the East Room of the White House. When Trump spoke, at 2:21
a.m. on November 4th, the President’s re-election was very much in doubt.
Fox News, a conservative media outlet, had correctly called Arizona for for-
mer Vice President Joseph R. Biden. Every Republican presidential candidate
since 1996 had won Arizona. If the President lost the State, and in the days
ahead it became clear that he had, then his campaign was in trouble. But as
the votes continued to be counted, President Trump’s apparent early lead in
other key States—States he needed to win—steadily shrank. Soon, he would
not be in the lead at all—he’d be losing.
So, the President of the United States did something he had planned to
do long before election day: he lied.
“This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to
our country,” President Trump said. “We were getting ready to win this
election,” the President continued. “Frankly, we did win this election. We
did win this election.” Trump claimed, without offering any evidence, that a
“major fraud” was occurring “in our nation.” 1
Neither of President Trump’s claims were true. He had no basis for
claiming victory or that fraud was taking place. Millions of votes still had
not been counted. The States were simply tabulating the ballots cast by the
American people. Trump’s own campaign advisors told him to wait—that it
was far too early to declare victory.
As the evening progressed, President Trump called in his campaign
team to discuss the results. Trump Campaign Manager William Stepien and
other campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would
not be known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare vic-
tory. Stepien was of the view that, because ballots were going to be counted
for days, “it was far too early to be making any proclamation [about having

195
196 CHAPTER 1

won the election].” Stepien told President Trump that his recommendation
was to say, “votes are still being counted. It's . . . too early to call the
race.” 2
Jason Miller, another senior Trump Campaign advisor, told the Select
Committee that he argued in conversations with Stepien and others that
night against declaring victory at the time as well, because “it was too early
to say one way [or] the other” who had won. Miller recalled recommending
that “we should not go and declare victory until we had a better sense of
the numbers.” 3
According to testimony received by the Committee, the only advisor
present who supported President Trump’s inclination to declare victory was
Rudy Giuliani, who, according to Miller, was “definitely intoxicated” that
evening.4
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on election night
and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous
decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false declaration of vic-
tory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31st and
November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom
Fitton.5 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that he would falsely declare victory on
election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evidence also includes
an audio recording of President Trump’s advisor Steve Bannon, who said
this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates from China:
And what Trump’s going to do is just declare victory, right? He’s
gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s the winner. He’s
just gonna say he’s a winner. . . . The Democrats, more of our people
vote early that count. Their vote in mail. And so they’re gonna
have a natural disadvantage, and Trump’s going to take advantage
of it. That’s our strategy. He’s gonna declare himself a winner.
So when you wake up Wednesday morning, it’s going to be a
firestorm. . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by ten or eleven
o’clock at night, it’s going to be even crazier. No, because he’s
gonna sit right there and say ‘They stole it. I’m directing the Attor-
ney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states. It’s going
to be, no, he’s not going out easy. If Trump—if Biden’s winning,
Trump is going to do some crazy shit.6
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to
President Trump, made this statement:
 THE BIG LIE 197

I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens,

the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is 9/10s of the
law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.7
In the days after the election, the President’s own campaign team told
him he had lost and there was no evidence of significant fraud. When his
campaign staff wouldn’t tell him what he wanted to hear, President Trump
replaced them with what Attorney General William Barr described as a
“clown car” of individuals willing to promote various conspiracy theories.8
But Donald Trump was no passive consumer of these lies. He actively
propagated them. Time and again President Trump was informed that his
election fraud claims were not true. He chose to spread them anyway. He
did so even after they were legally tested and rejected in dozens of lawsuits.
Not even the electoral college’s certification of former Vice President
Biden’s victory on December 14, 2020, stopped the President from lying.
Throughout, the Big Lie remained central to President Trump’s efforts to
block the peaceful transfer of power on January 6, 2021.

1.1 THE BIG LIE REFLECTED DELIBERATE EXPLOITATION OF THE “RED MIRAGE”

President Trump’s “Big Lie” on election night was based on simple differ-
ences in how Americans vote. In 2020, it was well-known that Democrats
were much more likely to vote via mail-in ballots than in person in 2020.
On the other hand, Republicans generally preferred to vote in person on
election day.9 In key swing States with tight margins between the candi-
dates, the election day votes would favor President Trump and dispropor-
tionately be counted first. Mail-in ballots, which would favor former Vice
President Biden, would disproportionately be counted later. In some States
it would take days to process the remaining mail-in ballots.
The timing of how votes are counted created the potential for what is
known as a “Red Mirage”—or an illusion of a Republican (Red) victory in
the early stages of vote counting. President Trump would appear to be in
the lead on election night, but this was not the whole picture. Many mail-in
votes for former Vice President Biden would not be counted on election day.
Therefore, the actual winner would likely not be known on election night.
The “Red Mirage” phenomenon was widely known prior to the 2020
presidential election. Chris Stirewalt was the head of the Fox News elections
desk that correctly called Arizona for Biden. Stirewalt and his team tried to
warn viewers of the Red Mirage. He testified that over the past 40 or 50
years, “Americans have increasingly chosen to vote by mail or early or
absentee,” and that “Democrats prefer that method of voting more than
198 CHAPTER 1

Photo by House Creative Services

Republicans do.” 10 In nearly “every election,” Stirewalt elaborated,

“Republicans win Election Day and Democrats win the early vote, and then
you wait and start counting.” It “[h]appens every time.” 11
President Trump’s campaign team made sure the President was briefed
on the timing of vote tallying. Stepien, his campaign manager, told the
Select Committee that President Trump was reminded on election day that
large numbers of mail-in ballots would still remain to be counted over the
coming days.12 Stepien added that he personally reminded the President
that while early returns may be favorable, the counting would continue: “I
recounted back to 2016 when I had a very similar conversation with him on
election day . . . I recounted back to that conversation with him in which I
said, just like I said in 2016 was going to be a long night, I told him in 2020
that, you know, it was going to be a process again, as, you know, the early
returns are going to be positive. Then we’re going to, you know, be watch-
ing the returns of ballots as, you know, they rolled in thereafter.” 13
Ordinarily, the “Red Mirage” anomaly does not create problems in the
election process because candidates wait for the votes to be tallied before
declaring victory or conceding. As Stirewalt emphasized, prior to President
Trump, “no candidate had ever tried to avail themselves of this quirk in the
election counting system.” 14
 THE BIG LIE 199

President Trump, however, made a different choice. In an extraordinary

breach of the American democratic process, he decided to exploit the
potential for confusion about the staggered timing of vote counting to
deceive the American public about the election results. He and his allies
foreshadowed this decision in their statements in the months leading up to
the November 2020 election.

1.2 TRUMP’S PRE-ELECTION PLANS TO DECLARE VICTORY

On Halloween, advisor Steve Bannon, who had served four years earlier as
Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign manager, laid out the election night plan.
“What Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory. Right? He’s gonna declare
victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s a winner,” Bannon told a private audi-
ence. “He’s just gonna say he’s a winner.” 15
Bannon explained that the Democrats “[would] have a natural disad-
vantage” on election night, because more Democrats would vote by mail
than Republicans and it would take time to count the mail-in ballots. This
would give President Trump the illusion of a lead. “And Trump’s going to
take advantage of it,” Bannon said. “That’s our strategy. He’s gonna
declare himself a winner.” 16
In an interview on Fox News the morning of the election, Bannon
insisted that President Trump needed to address the nation that night, to
“provide the narrative engine for how we go forward.” 17 During an episode
of his podcast later that same day, Bannon clarified what he meant: Presi-
dent Trump is “going to claim victory. Right? He’s going to claim
victory.” 18
Tom Fitton drafted a victory statement for the President to read on
election night.19 On October 31st, he emailed the statement to President
Trump’s assistant, Molly Michael, and social media guru, Dan Scavino. Fit-
ton wrote that election day, November 3rd, was the “deadline by which
voters in states across the country must choose a president.” Fitton argued
that counting ballots that arrived after election day would be part of an
effort by “partisans” to “overturn” the election results.20
Of course, that claim wasn’t true—mail-in ballots are regularly pro-
cessed after election day. Regardless, Fitton encouraged the President to
pre-emptively declare victory. “We had an election today—and I won,” Fit-
ton wrote for President Trump.21 Early in the evening on election day, Fit-
ton emailed Michael again to say he had “[j]ust talked to him [President
Trump] about the draft [statement].” 22 Later that evening, before President
Trump made his election night remarks, Michael replied that she
was “ . . . redelivering to him [President Trump] now.” 23
200 CHAPTER 1

Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images

Roger Stone, President Trump’s longtime political confidante, told sev-

eral associates just prior to the election that Trump needed to declare
victory—especially if the race wasn’t called on election day. “Let’s just
hope we are celebrating” on election night, Stone said. “I really do suspect
it will still be up in the air. When that happens, the key thing to do is claim
victory.” Stone elaborated with colorful language. “Possession is nine-
tenths of the law. No, we won. Fuck you. Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.” 24
Indeed, published reports echoed these warnings about President
Trump’s election strategy. Two days before the election, Jonathan Swan of
Axios reported that President Trump “has told confidants he'll declare vic-
tory on Tuesday night if it looks like he's ‘ahead.’” 25 Swan added that
“Trump's team is preparing to falsely claim that mail-in ballots counted
after Nov. 3—a legitimate count expected to favor Democrats—are evidence
of election fraud.” 26 If the vote tally swung against Trump after election
night in States such as Pennsylvania, then the Trump team would claim the
Democrats had “stolen” the election.27 Fox News election analysis Chris
Stirewalt testified that he and his team “had gone to pains” to inform
viewers that early votes would favor Republicans but the lead would be illu-
sory “because the Trump campaign and the President had made it clear that
 THE BIG LIE 201

they were going to try to exploit this anomaly.” 28 Others warned that
President Trump could exploit the Red Mirage as well.29

1.3 TRUMP’S PRE-ELECTION EFFORTS TO DELEGITIMIZE THE ELECTION PROCESS

President Trump also paved the way for his false election-night declaration
of victory by blanketing voters with a blizzard of lies and statements dele-
gitimizing mail-in voting in the middle of a deadly pandemic and consis-
tently questioning the security of ballots. President Trump used the
president’s bully pulpit, including his heavily-trafficked Twitter feed, to tell
one lie after another.
The Select Committee found dozens of instances in which President
Trump claimed that mail-in voting would produce a “rigged” election.
Trump repeatedly denounced mail-in voting on Twitter, during interviews,
and even during the presidential debate. Here is a small sample of President
Trump’s attempts to delegitimize mail-in balloting.
On April 7, 2020, President Trump claimed:
Mail ballots are a very dangerous thing for this country, because they’re
cheaters. They go and collect them. They’re fraudulent in many
cases. . . . These mailed ballots come in. The mailed ballots are corrupt, in
my opinion. And they collect them, and they get people to go in and sign
them. And then they—they’re forgeries in many cases. It’s a horrible
thing.30

The following day, April 8, President Trump tweeted:

Republicans should fight very hard when it comes to statewide mail-in
voting. Democrats are clamoring for it. Tremendous potential for voter
fraud, and for whatever reason, doesn’t work out well for Republicans.
@foxandfriends31

On May 24, President Trump tweeted:

The United States cannot have all Mail In Ballots. It will be the greatest
Rigged Election in history. People grab them from mailboxes, print
thousands of forgeries and “force” people to sign. Also, forge names.
Some absentee OK, when necessary. Trying to use Covid for this Scam!32
On September 17, President Trump falsely alleged that mail-in ballots
were ripe for foreign interference:
@TrueTheVote There is a group of people (largely Radical Left Demo-
crats) that want ELECTION MAYHEM. States must end this CRAZY mass
202 CHAPTER 1

sending of Ballots. Also, a GIFT to foreign interference into our elec-

tion!!! Stop it now, before it is too late.33
Before the election, as President Trump campaigned against mail-in
voting, Bill Stepien sought an intercession. Along with House Minority
Leader Kevin McCarthy, Stepien attempted to convince the President that
mail-in voting was “not . . . a bad thing for his campaign.” 34 They argued
that President Trump’s decision to discourage mail-in voting, while “urg-
ing [his] voters to vote only on election day leaves a lot to chance” and
would fail to take advantage of a superior grassroots operation that could
encourage Trump voters to return their ballots.35 President Trump did not
heed their warning. He continued to demonize mail-in voting. The Red
Mirage was a key part of his “Big Lie.”
Ominously, President Trump consistently refused to commit to accept-
ing the outcome of the election. During an interview on Fox News in July,
Chris Wallace asked: “Can you give a direct answer [if] you will accept the
election?” President Trump responded: “I have to see. Look, you—I have to
see. No, I’m not going to just say yes. I’m not going to say no, and I didn’t
last time either.” 36
On September 23, 2020, a reporter asked President Trump if he would
commit to a “peaceful transferal of power after the election.” The President
refused, saying, “we’re going to have to see what happens.” 37 The Presi-
dent claimed, “the ballots are disaster,” adding that if he could “get rid of
the ballots . . . we’ll have a very peaceful—there won’t be a transfer, frankly;
there’ll be a continuation.” 38 That is, according to President Trump, there
would be a “continuation” of his presidency.
The following day, September 24, another reporter followed up by ask-
ing if the election would be legitimate only if President Trump won. The
President again suggested there was something suspect about mail-in bal-
lots, adding that he was “not sure” the election could be an honest one.39

1.4 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S LAUNCH OF THE BIG LIE

Consistent with the pre-election narrative planted by President Trump,

within hours of polls closing, President Trump began pushing the claim
that late-reported vote tallies were illegitimate.40 Even though he had been
reminded by his Campaign Manager that very day that a large number of
mail-in ballots would not be counted for several hours or days,41 President
Trump claimed that Democrats were going to “find . . . ballots at four o’clock
in the morning and add them to the list.” 42 He also suggested that Demo-
crats were continuing to vote after the polls had closed.43
 THE BIG LIE 203

Indeed, this is exactly what Steve Bannon described when he said Presi-
dent Trump would “take advantage” of the Democrats’ “natural disadvan-
tage” on election night.44
In the ensuing days and weeks, President Trump often referred to
“dumps” of votes that were injected into the counting process.45 His sup-
porters latched onto these false claims.46 There were no “dumps” of
votes—just tallies of absentee ballots as they were reported by jurisdictions
throughout the country in a fully transparent process.47 These batches of
ballots included votes for both Trump and Biden. The late-reported votes
favored the former Vice President, just as President Trump’s campaign
advisors said they would, particularly in primarily Democratic cities.48
Attorney General Bill Barr recognized immediately that the “Red
Mirage” was the basis for President Trump’s erroneous claim of fraud.
“[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that there
was major fraud underway,” Barr said. “I mean, this happened, as far as I
could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evidence.” 49
President Trump’s claim “seemed to be based on the dynamic that, at the
end of the evening, a lot of Democratic votes came in which changed the
vote counts in certain states, and that seemed to be the basis for this broad
claim that there was major fraud.” 50
President Trump knew about the Red Mirage. He chose to lie about it
repeatedly—even after being directly informed that his claims were false.
This was often the case in the post-election period. The President con-
sciously disregarded facts that did not support his Big Lie.

1.5 POST-ELECTION: PRESIDENT TRUMP REPLACES HIS CAMPAIGN TEAM

President Trump’s campaign leadership, including Bill Stepien (the cam-

paign’s manager) and Justin Clark (the campaign’s deputy manager), sup-
ported President Trump, and were willing to pursue recounts and other
standard post-election litigation, but they were not willing to promote
baseless conspiracy theories.51 Stepien and others characterized this group
as “Team Normal.” 52
Less than two weeks after the election, President Trump pushed “Team
Normal” aside because its members didn’t tell him what he wanted to hear.
In their place, Trump promoted Rudy Giuliani and his associates, men and
women who spread baseless and extreme claims of election fraud. Giuliani,
the former mayor of New York City, recruited several investigators and
lawyers to assist him.53 Giuliani’s team included Jenna Ellis, Bernard Kerik,
Boris Epshteyn, Katherine Friess, and Christina Bobb.54 Ellis functioned as
204 CHAPTER 1

Giuliani’s deputy on the new Trump Campaign legal team.55 Kerik, the for-
mer commissioner of the New York Police Department and a pardoned
felon, served as Giuliani’s chief investigator.56 Other attorneys who col-
laborated with Giuliani’s legal team included Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell,
and John Eastman. As discussed elsewhere in this report, Eastman became a
key player in President Trump’s efforts to overturn the election.

1.6 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN TEAM TOLD HIM HE LOST THE ELECTION AND
THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT FRAUD

President Trump’s campaign team quickly realized that none of the signifi-
cant fraud claims were real. Bill Stepien testified that, as of November 5th,
the Trump Campaign had not found any proof of fraudulent activity. There
were “allegations and reports,” but “nothing hard [and] fast” that drew the
results of the election into question.57
The Trump Campaign continued to investigate claims of fraud into the
second week after the election. According to Stepien, as people shared “wild
allegations” with the President, the campaign team was forced to review
the facts and then serve as a “truth telling squad” to the President regard-
ing why the claims “didn’t prove to be true.” 58 For example, Stepien
recalled someone alleging that thousands of illegal votes had been cast in
Arizona. That wasn’t true. The votes had been submitted by overseas voters
(such as military deployed or stationed abroad) who were obviously eligible
to participate in the election.59
Alex Cannon was a lawyer for the Trump Campaign and previously
worked for the Trump Organization. After the election, Cannon was tasked
with looking into allegations of voter fraud in the 2020 election—including
the claim that thousands of ineligible votes had been cast in Arizona.60
Cannon recalled that Vice President Pence asked him what he was finding.
“And I said that I didn't believe we were finding it, or I was not personally
finding anything sufficient to alter the results of the election,” Cannon
responded. Vice President Pence thanked him.61
Cannon reported his assessment to Mark Meadows, the White House
Chief of Staff, as well. In mid to late-November 2020, Meadows asked Can-
non what his investigation had turned up. “And I remember sharing with
him that we weren't finding anything that would be sufficient to change the
results in any of the key states,” Cannon told Meadows. “So there is no
there, there?” Meadows replied.62
 THE BIG LIE 205

Jason Miller, a senior advisor to the Trump Campaign, pushed claims of

election fraud in public. In private, however, Miller says that he told Presi-
dent Trump a different story, informing him numerous times that there
was not enough election fraud to have changed the election:
Miller: My understanding is that I think there are still very valid
questions and concerns with the rules that were changed under the
guise of COVID, but, specific to election day fraud and irregularities,
there were not enough to overturn the election.
Committee Staff: And did you give your opinion on that to the
President?
Miller: Yes.
Committee Staff: What was his reaction when you told him that?
Miller: “You haven't seen or heard”—I’m paraphrasing, but—“you
haven't seen or heard all the different concerns and questions that
have been raised.”
Committee Staff: How many times did you have this conversation
with the President?
Miller: Several. I couldn't put a specific number on it, though.
Committee Staff: But more than one?

Miller: Correct.63
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign’s top lawyer, came to a similar
conclusion. Nearly two months after the election, on January 2nd, Morgan
met with the Vice President’s staff. According to Morgan, the consensus in
the room was that even if all the claims of fraud and irregularities were
“aggregated and read most favorably to the campaign . . . it was not suffi-
cient to be outcome determinative.” 64
As far as the Trump Campaign’s professional leadership was concerned,
there was no evidence that the election had been “stolen” from President
Trump. To the contrary, they had seen ample evidence that President
Trump simply lost—and told the President so.
On November 6th, Jared Kushner arranged for the senior campaign staff
to brief President Trump in the Oval Office on the state of the race.65 Since
election day, Matt Oczkowski, the Campaign’s leading data expert, had
tracked voting returns in the swing States to analyze the campaign’s odds
of success.66 Miller texted such updates on data from key States to Mead-
ows.67 The Trump Campaign’s data did not add up to victory. Oczkowski
“delivered to the President in pretty blunt terms that he was going to lose”
206 CHAPTER 1

Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images

the election.68 There were not enough outstanding votes in the battle-
ground States for President Trump to overcome Biden’s lead. President
Trump disagreed and insisted that he would still prevail through legal chal-
lenges.69

But the data did not lie.

On November 7th, the Associated Press called Pennsylvania and the
overall presidential election for former Vice President Biden.70 At that
point, a small team of the President’s campaign advisors including Stepien
met with the President and told him that his path to victory was virtually
non-existent.71 The campaign team conveyed to the President that his
chance of success was only “5, maybe 10 percent,” which Stepien explained
to the Committee was a “very, very, very bleak” assessment.72
In retrospect, the campaign’s estimate of a 5 to 10 percent chance of
winning, as of November 7th, was far too optimistic. In one of the most
favorable possible scenarios, for example, President Trump and his team
would need to win recounts in Arizona and Georgia, while also prevailing in
litigation challenging absentee or vote by mail ballots in Wisconsin, or pos-
sibly Michigan or Pennsylvania.73 But the election wasn’t even close enough
to trigger automatic recounts in Arizona or Georgia.
 THE BIG LIE 207

The narrowest margin of total votes between the two candidates was in
Arizona, where former Vice President Biden won by more than 10,000 votes.
This may seem like a small number of votes, but it was more than enough
to avoid an automatic recount. As Benjamin Ginsberg, a longtime Republi-
can elections lawyer, explained to the Select Committee, “the 2020 election
was not close.” 74 Previous campaigns had successfully challenged vote dif-
ferentials in the hundreds—not thousands—of votes.75 Ginsberg explained,
“you just don't make up those sorts of numbers in recounts.” 76 Georgia
performed a hand recount of all the ballots anyway, confirming within
weeks of the election that Biden had won the State.77 Also, by January 6th,
Arizona and New Mexico had conducted statutory post-election audits of
voting machines or randomly-selected, representative samples of ballots at
the State- or county-level that affirmed the accuracy of their election
results.78
Chris Stirewalt, who led the elections desk at Fox News at the time,
concurred with Ginsberg’s analysis. Asked what President Trump’s odds of
victory were as of November 7th, Stirewalt replied: “None.” 79
Meanwhile, the Trump Campaign continued to crunch the numbers. On
the morning of November 12th, Oczkowski circulated among top campaign
advisors a presentation describing what happened in each of the battle-
ground States the campaign was monitoring.80 This analysis by the data
team examined the turnout and margins on a county-by-county basis in a
dozen States while also analyzing demographic changes that impacted the
results.81 Among the States were Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Nevada, and Wisconsin.82 Oczkowski’s team determined that President
Trump lost each of those six States because Biden had performed better
than President Trump in certain areas like population centers or suburbs.83
Yet, in the weeks that followed, President Trump and his new legal team—
the “clown car”—went to great lengths to challenge the results of the elec-
tion in these six states, spreading multiple conspiracy theories.
The voting data told a clear story: President Trump lost. But, regardless
of the facts, the President had no intention of conceding defeat.
On election night, President Trump and Rudy Giuliani agreed that the
President should just declare victory—even though he had no basis for
doing so. Giuliani also told the Select Committee that President Trump
asked him on November 4th to take over his campaign’s legal operation.84
Giuliani thought the only way that it would work would be for the President
to call the existing campaign team to announce Giuliani’s takeover because,
in Giuliani’s words, “they are going to be extraordinarily resentful, because
they don’t like me already, and I don’t trust them.” 85 He said that the
President agreed.86
208 CHAPTER 1

Although Giuliani wouldn’t assume leadership of the Campaign’s legal

operations until mid-November, the former New York City mayor quickly
began to butt heads with “Team Normal.”
On November 6th, Giuliani and his team met with the Trump Cam-
paign’s leadership at its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.87
“Team Normal” was not impressed. Stepien told the Select Committee
the campaign team was concerned that Giuliani would be a distraction to
them and to President Trump.88 When Giuliani suggested traveling to
Pennsylvania to assist in the campaign’s efforts, the campaign team
“didn’t dissuade him from doing so.” 89 After just 10 to 15 minutes in the
conference room, Stepien and other staffers left the meeting.90
That same day, President Trump discussed the Campaign’s legal strat-
egy in the Oval Office with Giuliani, Clark, and Matt Morgan, the Trump
Campaign’s General Counsel.91 Prior to the election, Morgan was respon-
sible for the Campaign’s litigation strategy.92 Morgan and his team filed
lawsuits challenging the changes States made to voting practices during the
coronavirus pandemic.93 Morgan also studied previous elections to deter-
mine the types of cases that were likely to succeed.94 Clark described how
the Campaign’s original legal strategy was based on his general theory for
election cases: “to look at what do you think, what do you know, and what
can you prove” and then determine which cases to file from there.95
Giuliani had other ideas and advocated to President Trump that he be
put in charge of the Campaign’s legal operation so that he could pursue his
preferred strategy.96 “Mr. Giuliani didn’t seem bound by those cases or by
those precedents. He felt he could press forward on anything that he
thought was wrong with the election and bring a strategy around that,”
Morgan explained.97 “Rudy was just chasing ghosts,” Clark said.98 Morgan
and Clark excused themselves from the meeting because it “was going
nowhere.” 99
The next day, November 7th, Giuliani held a press conference at Four
Seasons Total Landscaping in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He immediately
began making outlandish claims, arguing that the Democrats had conspired
to steal the election. “As you know from the very beginning, mail-in ballots
were a source of some degree of skepticism, if not a lot of skepticism, as
being innately prone to fraud,” Giuliani said. “Those mail-in ballots could
have been written the day before by the Democratic Party hacks that were
all over the Convention Center.” 100 Giuliani offered no evidence to support
his shocking and baseless allegation. Echoes of President Trump’s relent-
less campaign against mail-in balloting, and his decision to exploit the Red
Mirage, were easy to hear.
 THE BIG LIE 209

Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images

On November 10th, Giuliani and Kerik met with President Trump in the
Oval Office to discuss their investigation into voter fraud. White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann
were also in attendance. After Giuliani’s presentation, President Trump
asked Cipollone whether he had spoken to Attorney General Barr about the
allegations of fraud.101 One day before, Barr had issued a memorandum out-
lining a shift in DOJ policy that allowed Federal prosecutors to investigate
claims of voting irregularities without waiting for the results to be certi-
fied.102 President Trump’s question was an early indication that he was
going to pressure the DOJ to endorse his phony fraud claims.
Days later, Giuliani and Justin Clark engaged in a screaming match dur-
ing a meeting in the Oval Office.103 Giuliani was urging President Trump to
file a lawsuit in Georgia, but Clark pointed out that a hand recount was
already being conducted and argued it was better to wait.104 Giuliani told
President Trump that Clark was lying to him.105 A formal changing of the
guard would follow.
On November 14th, President Trump announced on Twitter that Giu-
liani was now the head of his campaign’s legal team.106 “Team Normal”
saw drastic changes to their roles on the newly-structured campaign
210 CHAPTER 1

team—some self-imposed—and many outside law firms that had signed up

to support the campaign’s legal efforts disengaged completely.107
“I didn’t think what was happening was necessarily honest or profes-
sional at that point in time,” Stepien explained. “This wasn’t a fight that I
was comfortable with,” he added.108
On the day the leadership change was announced, Giuliani participated
in a “surrogate” briefing to coordinate messaging by Trump loyalists dur-
ing their media appearances.109 Giuliani announced that the messaging
strategy should be “to go hard on Dominion/Smartmatic, bringing up
Chavez and Maduro.” 110 Giuliani claimed that additional lawsuits would
soon be filed “to invalidate upwards of 1M ballots.” 111
Consistent with the messaging advanced by the new campaign team,
President Trump in mid-November remained dug-in, still refusing to con-
cede defeat. President Trump continued to insist that he was cheated out of
victory, endorsing one wild conspiracy theory after another to deny the
simple fact that he lost.

1.7 PRESIDENT TRUMP HAD HIS DAY IN COURT

“We’ve proven” the election was stolen, but “no judge, including the
Supreme Court of the United States, has had the courage to allow it to be
heard.” 112 That was how President Trump described efforts to overturn the
election in court one day before the electoral college met on December 14,
2020. That was false.
Judges across the nation did evaluate President Trump’s claims that the
election was stolen. As longtime Republican election attorney Benjamin
Ginsberg testified before the Select Committee, the President’s camp “did
have their day in court,” it’s just that “in no instance did a court find that
the charges of fraud were real.” 113 In total, the Trump Campaign and allies
of President Trump filed 62 separate lawsuits between November 4, 2020,
and January 6, 2021, calling into question or seeking to overturn the elec-
tion results.114 Out of 62 cases, only one case resulted in a victory for the
President Trump or his allies, which affected relatively few votes, did not
vindicate any underlying claims of fraud, and would not have changed the
outcome in Pennsylvania.115 Thirty of the cases were dismissed by a judge
after a hearing on the merits.116
In every State in which claims were brought, one or more judges spe-
cifically explained as part of their dismissal orders that they had evaluated
the plaintiffs’ allegations or supposed proof of widespread election fraud or
other irregularities, and found the claims to be entirely unconvincing. In
 THE BIG LIE 211

Arizona, for example, the plaintiffs in Bowyer v. Ducey alleged that the elec-
tion was tainted by the introduction of “hundreds of thousands of illegal,
ineligible, duplicate or purely fictitious ballots.” 117 A Federal judge dis-
missed their suit, finding it “void of plausible allegations” and “sorely
wanting of relevant or reliable evidence.” 118 Likewise, in Ward v. Jackson, an
Arizona State-court judge dismissed a lawsuit by the State GOP chair fol-
lowing a two-day trial, finding no evidence of misconduct, fraud, or illegal
votes.119 This ruling was unanimously upheld by the State supreme court,
where all seven justices were appointed by GOP governors.120
In Georgia, a State court dismissed Boland v. Raffensperger, which
alleged that tens of thousands of illegal ballots were cast by out-of-State
voters or with invalid signature matches.121 The judge found that “the Com-
plaint’s factual allegations . . . rest on speculation rather than duly pled
facts” and “do not support . . . a conclusion that sufficient illegal votes were
cast to change or place in doubt the result of the election.” 122 The judge
who issued this decision had been appointed by a Republican governor, as
had seven of the eight justices of the State supreme court who upheld her
ruling.123 Likewise, a Federal judge denied relief to the plaintiff in Wood v.
Raffensperger, which alleged that new procedures for checking absentee
ballot signatures spoiled the result by making it harder to reject illegal bal-
lots, finding “no basis in fact or law to grant him the relief he seeks.” 124
212 CHAPTER 1

The judge wrote that “[t]his argument is belied by the record” because
absentee ballots were actually rejected for signature issues at the same rate
as in 2018.125
In Michigan, a Federal judge found in King v. Whitmer that the plaintiffs’
claims of “massive election fraud” were based on “nothing but speculation
and conjecture that votes for President Trump were destroyed, discarded or
switched to votes for Vice President Biden. . . .” 126 Similarly, a State-court
judge rejected plaintiffs’ claims in two cases brought against Detroit and
the surrounding county that accused them of systematic fraud in how
absentee ballots were counted; the judge found that one group of plaintiffs
“. . . offered no evidence to support their assertions,” 127 and that the other
group’s “interpretation of events is incorrect” and “decidedly contra-
dicted” by “highly-respected” election experts.128
In Nevada, a State-court judge rejected a litany of claims of systematic
election fraud in Law v. Whitmer, ruling that plaintiffs “did not prove under
any standard of proof that illegal votes were cast and counted, or legal
votes were not counted at all, due to voter fraud” or “for any other
improper or illegal reason.” 129 The ruling was unanimously upheld by the
Nevada Supreme Court.130
In Pennsylvania, a Federal judge dismissed Donald Trump for President v.
Boockvar, finding that the Trump Campaign had presented nothing but
“strained legal arguments without merit and speculative accusations
unpled in the operative complaint and unsupported by evidence.” 131 The
dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which held: “[C]alling an election unfair does not make it so.
Charges require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither
here.” 132 That opinion was authored by another Trump appointee.133
Lastly, in Wisconsin, another judge dismissed a lawsuit accusing the
Wisconsin Elections Commission of “constitutional violations” that “likely
tainted more than 50,000 ballots.” 134 The judge ruled: “This Court has
allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has lost on the mer-
its,” failing to show that the outcome was affected by Commission rules
about drop boxes, ballot addresses, or individuals who claimed “indefinitely
confined” status to vote from home.135 The ruling was upheld by a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, all
of whom were Republican appointees, including one appointed by President
Trump himself.136
In all, the judges who heard these post-election cases included 22 Fed-
eral judges appointed by Republican presidents.137
President Trump and his lawyers were well-aware that courts were
consistently rejecting his claims. During a December 18th meeting in the
 THE BIG LIE 213

Oval Office with President Trump, Sidney Powell and others, White House
Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann pointed out that President Trump’s law-
yers had their opportunity to prove their case in court, and failed. Powell
fired back that “the judges are corrupt.” Herschmann responded: “Every
one? Every single case that you’ve done in the country you guys lost, every
one of them is corrupt, even the ones we appointed?” 138
President Trump was faced with another choice after having his day in
court. He could accept that there was no real evidence of voter fraud, or he
could continue to amplify conspiracy theories and lies. He chose the latter.

1.8 PRESIDENT TRUMP REPEATEDLY PROMOTED CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Instead of accepting his defeat, President Trump attempted to justify his

Big Lie with a series of increasingly preposterous claims. The President was
not simply led astray by those around him. The opposite was true. He
actively promoted conspiracy theories and false election fraud claims even
after being informed they were baseless. Millions of President Trump’s
supporters believed the election was stolen from him. Many of them still
do, but President Trump knew the truth and chose to lie about it.
The power of the President’s bully pulpit should not be underestimated,
especially in the digital age.139 President Trump’s relentless lying sowed
seeds of distrust in America’s election system. Researchers who studied this
election-denial phenomenon have noted: “President Trump didn’t just
prime his audience to be receptive to false narratives of election fraud—he
inspired them to produce those narratives and then echoed those false
claims back to them.” 140 Social media played a prominent role in amplify-
ing erroneous claims of election fraud. Shortly after election day, the “Stop
the Steal” campaign, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, went viral. “Stop
the Steal” influencers echoed President Trump’s premature declaration of
victory, asserting that he won the election, the Democrats stole it from him,
and it was the responsibility of American “patriots” to combat this sup-
posed injustice.141
This resulted in what Attorney General Barr has described as an “ava-
lanche” of false claims, as President Trump’s supporters attempted to jus-
tify his “Big Lie.” 142 The post-election allegations of fraud or other
malfeasance were “completely bogus,” “silly” and “usually based on com-
plete misinformation,” Barr explained.143 Nonetheless, many of President
Trump’s supporters wanted to believe them. The stolen election narrative
has proven to be remarkably durable precisely because it is a matter of
belief—not evidence, or reason. Each time a claim was debunked, more
214 CHAPTER 1

Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images

claims emerged in its place. Barr later complained that this dynamic forced
him and others to play “whack-a-mole.” 144
The United States Department of Justice, under Barr’s leadership and
then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, was forced to knock down one
lie after another. As discussed in Chapter 4, Barr took unprecedented steps
to investigate the “avalanche” of lies. Claims of election fraud were referred
to United States Attorney’s offices and the FBI for investigation. Deputy
Attorney General Richard Donoghue tracked dozens of investigations. None
of them were found to have merit.145 The top officials in President Trump’s
Justice Department personally told the President that the claims he was
promoting were false. But that did not matter to the President. As Barr told
the Select Committee, President Trump never showed any “indication of
interest in what the actual facts were.” 146
For example, on December 27th, Rosen and Donoghue spent approxi-
mately two hours on the phone with President Trump. They debunked a
litany of claims regarding the election, explaining that each had been
investigated and found to be baseless.147 According to Donoghue, President
Trump “had this arsenal of allegations that he wanted to rely on.” Dono-
ghue thought it was necessary to explain to the President “based on actual
investigations, actual witness interviews, actual reviews of documents, that
 THE BIG LIE 215

these allegations simply had no merit.” Donoghue wanted “to cut through
the noise” and be “very blunt” with the President, making it clear “these
allegations were simply not true.” 148
During their December 27th conversation with President Trump, Rosen
and Donoghue rebutted false claims regarding: suitcases of ballots in Geor-
gia, Dominion’s voting machines in Antrim County, a truckload of ballots in
Pennsylvania, ballots being scanned multiple times, people voting more
than once, dead people voting, Native Americans being paid to vote, and
more votes than voters in particular jurisdictions.149 As the officials
debunked each claim, President Trump “would just roll on to another
one.” 150 Donoghue told President Trump that Federal law enforcement
officials had conducted dozens of investigations and hundreds of inter-
views, and they had concluded that the major allegations were not sup-
ported by the evidence developed.151 Donoghue and Rosen told President
Trump “flat out” that “much of the information he [was] getting [was]
false and/or just not supported by the evidence.” 152 President Trump
responded: “You guys may not be following the internet the way I do.” 153
The Department of Justice was not alone in trying to contain the Presi-
dent’s conspiracy-mongering. President Trump’s lies were often debunked
in real-time by State authorities, judges, experts, journalists, Federal offi-
cials, and even members of his own legal team. As discussed above, the
President’s campaign team found that there was no significant fraud in the
election. So, the President pushed them aside. The courts rejected nearly
every claim brought by the President’s legal team. Even though courts
rejected the claims as speculative, unsupported and meritless, President
Trump, Rudy Giuliani, and others continued to assert them as truth to
Trump’s followers in speeches, tweets, and podcasts.154
The burden of refuting the false claims made by President Trump and
his surrogates often fell on State and local officials. For example, in Michi-
gan, the Secretary of State’s office posted thorough and prompt responses
to the claims of election fraud on a “Fact Check” page on its website.155 In
Georgia, the Secretary of State’s office issued news releases and held fre-
quent press conferences in the weeks following the election to respond to
claims of fraud.156 County clerks in the contested States also spoke out pub-
licly to refute allegations. Even as the President undermined the public’s
confidence in how votes are cast and counted, these clerks assured voters
that their elections were secure and they could have confidence in the
results.157 Outside experts also publicly denounced and dismantled the
claims being raised and amplified by President Trump. This was done in the
216 CHAPTER 1

context of litigation, congressional hearings, and press releases.158 Presi-

dent Trump simply ignored these authoritative sources and continued to
promote false claims that had been soundly discredited.
Below, the Select Committee presents two case studies demonstrating
how President Trump and his surrogates lied in the face of overwhelming
evidence. The first case study deals with Dominion Voting Systems. Presi-
dent Trump repeatedly claimed that Dominion’s software “switched votes”
and “rigged” the election well after the leaders of campaign and Justice
Department officials told him that these claims were baseless. The Presi-
dent’s smear of Dominion was central to his “Big Lie.”
The second case study examines video footage recorded in Fulton
County on election night. President Trump and his representatives con-
cocted a fictional narrative based on a deceptively edited version of the
footage. After these two case studies, the Select Committee examines a
variety of other claims the President repeatedly made. Once again, these
claims had no basis in truth.

DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS

Between election day and January 6th, President Trump repeatedly spread
conspiracy theories about Dominion voting machines. The President
tweeted or retweeted false claims about Dominion more than 30 times.159
He also repeatedly lied about the company’s software during his post-
election speeches and interviews.160 President Trump’s own campaign staff,
administration officials, and State officials, all told him the claims had no
merit. Hand recounts confirmed the fidelity of the machines. But none of
this overwhelming evidence mattered. President Trump demonstrated a
conscious disregard for the facts and continued to maliciously smear
Dominion.
President Trump’s allies began spreading false claims regarding
Dominion within days of the election. On November 8th, the day after net-
works called the election for Joe Biden, Sidney Powell claimed on Fox News
that Dominion machines “were flipping votes in the computer system or
adding votes that did not exist.” 161 On November 12th, Rudy Giuliani
appeared on Fox News to claim that Dominion was connected to Venezuelan
dictator Hugo Chavez and its software was created “in order to fix elec-
tions.” 162 The same day, President Trump retweeted a “REPORT” claiming
that Dominion had “DELETED 2.7 MILLION TRUMP VOTES NATIONWIDE”
and switched hundreds of thousands of votes in key swing states.163
By that time, the Trump Campaign team had looked into allegations
regarding Dominion and its software and concluded that the claims were
false. An internal campaign memo, dated November 12, said that Domin-
ion’s software “did not lead to improper vote counts” and cited reports
 THE BIG LIE 217

concluding that, among other things, Dominion machines “Did Not Affect
The Final Vote Count.” 164 The memo also addressed various claims of for-
eign influence regarding Dominion.165 Jason Miller told the Select Commit-
tee that by November 12th he had told President Trump the results of the
analysis of the Dominion claims by the campaign’s internal research team,
specifically telling him “that the international allegations for Dominion
were not valid.” 166 Emails and text messages show that this same analysis
was shared with Mark Meadows, President Trump’s chief of staff.167 White
House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany told the Select Committee that
she found herself “waving [President Trump] off of the Dominion theory,”
encouraging him to use more “fact-driven” arguments.168 But it was to no
avail.
Even though members of the Trump Campaign team reported that the
result of the election was not compromised by any problems with Dominion
machines, the President continued to assail Dominion on Twitter in the
days that followed, for example retweeting a false claim that Dominion’s
machines were “engineered by China, Venezuela, [and] Cuba” and claiming
that Dominion had “[r]igged” the election.169
Officials in the Trump administration also worked to debunk the false
rumors about vote manipulation. The United States Department of Home-
land Security’s Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
released a joint statement of election security officials on November 12,
reassuring voters that the election was “the most secure in American his-
tory.” CISA emphasized: “There is no evidence that any voting system
deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.” 170
This was another decision point for the President. He could choose to
endorse the findings of his administration’s own cyber security experts, or
he could continue to promote baseless fictions about Dominion. President
Trump chose the lies. The President and his supporters never did produce
any evidence showing that Dominion’s machines affected the results of the
election. But President Trump was undeterred by the facts. Indeed, the
President and his supporters seized upon a simple human error in a small
Michigan county as their initial pretense for these allegations as well as to
keep the Dominion conspiracy theory alive.
During the early-morning hours of November 4th, Sheryl Guy, a clerk
in Antrim County, Michigan, reported the unofficial results of the vote
count.171 Guy’s online report was odd. It showed that former Vice President
Biden had somehow won Antrim, a county that is majority-Republican and
President Trump was expected to easily win. Trump’s supporters quickly
pointed to Biden’s improbable win as evidence that Dominion had tampered
with the votes.172 That wasn’t true. Guy had made a mistake in updating the
218 CHAPTER 1

election counting software after a late addition of a local candidate to the

ballot in some of the county’s precincts, which caused her unofficial counts
to be off when she tallied the votes reported by the various precincts.173
Guy, a Republican, was informed of the odd result and began to investigate
immediately. The result was corrected, and President Trump won Antrim
just as was expected.174
Within days, local and State officials in Michigan explained to the public
what had happened. On November 7th, the Michigan Secretary of State’s
office issued a detailed description of Guy’s error and assured the public
that the official results were not impacted.175 The Michigan Senate’s Com-
mittee on Oversight, led by Republican Senator Ed McBroom, conducted its
own comprehensive review of the claims related to Antrim County and con-
firmed that the initial reporting error was entirely attributable to an honest
mistake by the county clerk.176
The mix-up in Antrim County was quickly corrected. A human erred—
not the voting machines. But President Trump used it as a pretext to con-
tinue lying about Dominion.
On November 12th, the same day CISA released its statement on election
security, President Trump asked Tim Walberg, a Republican Congressman
from Michigan, to “check with key leadership in Michigan’s Legislature as
to how supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election
irregularities and potential fraud.” 177 That night, President Trump asked
his Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, to look into allega-
tions of election irregularities in Michigan.178 The next day, President
Trump’s assistant sent Wolf a letter from Michigan State legislators raising
claims about the election, including an incorrect claim that flawed Domin-
ion software had caused votes to be counted for the wrong candidate.179
Administration officials quickly knocked down the Dominion claim.
Wolf forwarded the allegations to the leadership of CISA, including CISA
Director Christopher Krebs.180 Krebs provided Wolf with a press release
from the Michigan Secretary of State that debunked the false claim about
Antrim County and Dominion’s software in detail.181 Wolf shared an update
about the information he received from Krebs with White House Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows.182
On November 17th, Krebs tweeted out a statement issued by the
nation’s leading election scientists that dismissed claims that election sys-
tems had been manipulated as either “unsubstantiated” or “technically
incoherent.” 183 President Trump fired Krebs that same day.184 President
Trump claimed the statement released by Krebs was “highly inaccurate, in
that there were massive improprieties and fraud.” 185 The President had no
evidence for his claim.
 THE BIG LIE 219

On November 19th, Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and Jenna Ellis held a
press conference at the Republican National Committee (RNC) headquarters
in Washington, DC. Powell asserted that there was “massive influence of
communist money through Venezuela, Cuba, and likely China in the inter-
ference with our elections here in the United States.” 186 She pointed a fin-
ger at Dominion, claiming its software was “created in Venezuela at the
direction of Hugo Chavez to make sure he never lost an election,” and Giu-
liani echoed her claims.187
Hope Hicks told the Select Committee how that press conference was
received in the White House. The day after the press conference, President
Trump spoke by phone with Sidney Powell from the Oval Office. During the
call, Powell repeated the same claims of foreign interference in the election
she had made at the press conference. While she was speaking, the Presi-
dent muted his speakerphone and laughed at Powell, telling the others in
the room, “This does sound crazy, doesn’t it?” 188
A few days later, the Trump Campaign issued a statement claiming
Powell was not part of the Trump Campaign’s legal team.189 But Powell’s
outlandish claims were no different from those President Trump was mak-
ing himself. On November 19th, the same day as Powell’s appearance at the
RNC, President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on One
America News Network (OAN) that was captioned, “Dominion-izing the
Vote.” 190 The segment claimed that Dominion had switched votes from
Trump to Biden. OAN featured a supposed cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key
figure in the QAnon conspiracy movement.191 On his own Twitter account,
Watkins celebrated and thanked his supporters just minutes after President
Trump tweeted the clip, and President Trump went on to share the clip
again several times in the days that followed.192
Officials inside the Trump administration continued to debunk the
Dominion conspiracy theory, including during in-person meetings with
President Trump. Attorney General Bill Barr met with President Trump
face-to-face on three occasions after the election.193 Barr told the Select
Committee, “every time I was with the President, I raised the machines as
sort of Exhibit A of how irresponsible this was.” 194 During the first of these
meetings, on November 23rd, Barr explained to the President that the con-
spiracy theory about Dominion’s voting machines had “zero basis,” and
was “one of the most disturbing allegations.” Barr stressed that this was
“crazy stuff” and was poisoning Americans’ confidence in the voting sys-
tem for no reason. This “complete nonsense” was “doing [a] great, great
disservice to the country,” Barr said.195
President Trump ignored Barr’s grave concerns. On November 29th,
President Trump was interviewed by Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo. It was the
220 CHAPTER 1

President’s first interview since he lost his bid for reelection. He claimed
the election was “rigged” and rife with “theft” and “a total fraud.” 196 He
repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim that Domin-
ion’s voting machines had “glitches,” which he alleged moved “thousands
of votes from my account to Biden’s account.” 197 He claimed that there had
been “big, massive dumps” of votes—a reference to the Red Mirage.198 He
rambled off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead people
voted in significant numbers.199 None of it was true.
On December 1st, Attorney General Barr met again with President
Trump and told him that “the stuff his people were shoveling out to the
public was bullshit.” 200 Attorney General Barr specifically told President
Trump that the claims about Dominion voting machines were “idiotic
claims.” 201 President Trump was still not dissuaded from continuing the
lie. The day after his meeting with the Attorney General, President Trump
released a video in which he repeated several claims of election fraud,
including a claim that “votes had been wrongly switched from Trump to
Biden” using Dominion voting machines.202
By early-December, courts had assessed and rejected claims that
Dominion machines were manipulated to affect the outcome of the 2020
election. In Michigan, a Federal judge found that claims, including those
related to fraud due to the use of Dominion voting machines, were based on
“nothing but speculation and conjecture that votes were destroyed, dis-
carded or switched. . . .” 203 In Arizona, a Federal judge dismissed claims that
Dominion machines had deleted, switched, or changed votes.204 But Presi-
dent Trump and his supporters refused to accept denunciations of the fab-
ricated Dominion claims.
Through December, President Trump and his legal team tried to echo
the Dominion conspiracy theory by claiming to have found evidence that
votes were switched in Antrim County. The clerk’s unintentional error was
fixed weeks earlier and there was no evidence showing that Dominion had
altered the vote tally in Antrim, or anywhere else.205 But President Trump’s
legal team used a case challenging a local marijuana ordinance that had
passed by one vote to gain access to Dominion’s voting machines. An
Antrim County judge issued an order granting the plaintiff’s experts access
to the county’s computer, Dominion voting machines, thumb drives and
memory cards.206 Although the purpose of the order was to allow the plain-
tiff to seek evidence related to his ordinance challenge, it soon became clear
that President Trump’s legal team was behind the effort.207
An organization named Allied Security Operations Group (“ASOG”), led
by Russell Ramsland, conducted an analysis of Antrim County’s voting
machines and related systems. On December 13th, ASOG released a report
 THE BIG LIE 221

on its findings. The inspection yielded no evidence of vote manipulation.

Still, the report included an unsubstantiated assertion that the Dominion
voting machines used in Antrim County and throughout Michigan were
“purposefully designed with inherent error to create systemic fraud and
influence election results” and that a malicious algorithm was used to
manipulate the results of the 2020 election.208 Documents obtained by the
Select Committee show that President Trump and Vice President Mike
Pence were briefed on ASOG’s findings by Giuliani’s team.209 On December
14th, President Trump widely disseminated the ASOG report and accompa-
nying talking points prepared by Giuliani’s team.210 He also trumpeted the
report on Twitter, writing on December 14th: “WOW. This report shows
massive fraud. Election changing result!” 211
During a meeting with Attorney General Bill Barr that day, President
Trump claimed the ASOG report was “absolute proof that the Dominion
machines were rigged” and meant he was “going to have a second
term.” 212 Barr told the Select Committee that he believed the ASOG report
was “very amateurish,” its authors lacked “any real qualifications,” and it
failed to provide any supporting information for its sweeping conclusions
about Dominion.213 Barr told President Trump he would look into the
report, but that the DOJ already had a good idea of what happened in
Antrim County and it was human error, not a problem with the machines.214
In any event, Barr promised President Trump they would have a definitive
answer within a couple of days because a hand recount was being con-
ducted.215
In the ensuing days, as Barr predicted, the ASOG report was swiftly and
soundly criticized by experts within and outside the Trump Administration,
including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security.216 The initial analysis of election security experts at the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security was that the ASOG report was “false and mis-
leading” and “demonstrates a callous misunderstanding of the actual
current voting certification process.” 217 Subsequent analyses of the ASOG
report and the underlying data from Antrim County were even more criti-
cal.218 These thorough assessments of the Antrim County data and the ASOG
report demonstrate that virtually every one of the claims that President
Trump and his surrogates made about the report was false.219 ASOG’s
inspection did not reveal any malicious software or algorithms or any other
evidence that the voting machines had been compromised.220
Most importantly, as Attorney General Barr had promised President
Trump, within days of the release of the ASOG report, a full hand recount of
every ballot cast in Antrim County confirmed the results reported by the
Dominion machines and refuted ASOG’s assertion that an algorithm has
222 CHAPTER 1

manipulated the vote count.221 Giuliani’s chief investigator, Bernie Kerik,

acknowledged that his team was not able to find any proof that a Dominion
voting machine improperly switched, deleted, or injected votes during the
2020 election.222
President Trump was not swayed by these basic facts. The President
continued to promote the ASOG report, hounding DOJ to investigate the
matter further. He returned to ASOG’s claims during a December 27th call
with Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue, citing the report’s claimed error rate of 68 percent in Antrim
County. Donoghue pointed out to the President that the difference between
the computer and hand count was only one vote and that he “cannot and
should not be relying on” ASOG’s fraudulent claim, because it was simply
“not true.” 223
President Trump’s fixation on Dominion’s voting machines and the
baseless theory that the machines had manipulated votes led to a concerted
effort to gain access to voting machines in States where President Trump
was claiming election fraud. On the evening of December 18th, Powell, Lt.
Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.) and Patrick Byrne met with the President at the
White House. Over several hours, they argued that President Trump had the
authority, under a 2018 executive order, to seize voting machines. Several
administration officials joined the meeting and forcefully rejected this
extreme proposal.224 Multiple lawyers in the White House, including Eric
Herschmann, Derek Lyons, and White House Counsel Pat Cipollone “pushed
back strongly” against the idea of seizing voting machines. Cipollone told
the Select Committee it was a “horrible idea,” which had “no legal
basis,” 225 and he emphasized that he had “seen no evidence of massive
fraud in the election.” 226 White House advisor Eric Herschmann similarly
told the Select Committee that he “never saw any evidence whatsoever” to
sustain the allegations against Dominion.227 National Security Adviser Rob-
ert O’Brien phoned into the December 18th meeting and was asked if he had
seen “any evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or foreign
interference in our voting machines.” O’Brien responded that his team had
“looked into that, and there’s no evidence of it.” 228
Around the same time, President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Rudy
Giuliani were repeatedly asking the leadership of DHS whether the agency
had authority to seize voting machines, and they were repeatedly told that
DHS has no such unilateral authority.229 Giuliani and Powell were also
engaged in efforts to access voting machines in multiple States with the
assistance of sympathetic local election officials.230 Those efforts turned up
no evidence of any vote manipulation by any Dominion machine, but Presi-
dent Trump continued to press this bogus claim.
 THE BIG LIE 223

On January 2, 2021, President Trump had a lengthy phone call with

Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. The President repeatedly
brought up Dominion’s voting machines, alleging that they were at the
heart of a conspiracy against him.231 Raffensperger was incredulous. “I
don’t believe that you’re really questioning the Dominion machines,”
Raffensperger said. “Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally
of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came
up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got vir-
tually the same result.” 232 In other words, the story in Georgia was the
same as the story in Antrim County, Michigan: Officials performed a hand
recount to put to rest any allegations that Dominion’s machines had
manipulated the vote. But once again, President Trump consciously disre-
garded these basic facts and persisted with his lies.
During a January 4, 2021, speech in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump
chose to ignore Secretary Raffensperger’s straightforward observations.
The President rhetorically attacked Dominion once again, claiming that a
“crime” had been “committed in this state” and it was “immeasurable.” 233
The President called for an “immediate forensic audit of an appropriate
sampling of Dominion’s voting machines and related equipment.” 234 His
allegations were both false and nonsensical. Georgia had already performed
a statewide hand recount of all ballots.
President Trump and his allies have never provided any evidence show-
ing that Dominion’s voting software altered votes in the 2020 presidential
election. In fact, some of the most vocal proponents of the Dominion claims
harbored their own misgivings about the claims they were making in public.
For example, Rudy Giuliani repeatedly claimed in public that Dominion vot-
ing machines stole the election, and that foreign countries had interfered in
the election, but the evidence uncovered by the Select Committee reveals
that he did not believe either of those things to be true. Giuliani testified
that he did not believe that voting machines stole the election.235 He also
acknowledged that he had seen no evidence that foreign countries had
interfered in the election or manipulated votes.236
This testimony is consistent with his lead investigator Bernie Kerik’s
acknowledgment that he had not come across proof that voting machines
were used to switch, delete, or inject votes improperly.237 Christina Bobb,
an attorney who worked with Giuliani, similarly could not point to any evi-
dence of wrongdoing by Dominion.238 Even Sidney Powell, perhaps the
most committed proponent of the Dominion falsehoods, was unable to pro-
vide the Select Committee with any evidence or expert report that demon-
strated that the 2020 election outcome in any State had been altered
through manipulation of voting machines.239 And Powell defended herself
224 CHAPTER 1

in a defamation suit brought by Dominion by claiming that “no reasonable

person would conclude that her statements were truly statements of
fact.” 240
By January 6, 2021, President Trump’s claims regarding Dominion had
been debunked time and again. The President knew, or should have known,
that he had no basis for alleging that Dominion’s voting machines had cost
him the election.

THE STATE FARM ARENA VIDEO

President Trump also recklessly promoted allegations that video footage
from a ballot counting center in Fulton County, Georgia, was proof of major
election fraud. He was repeatedly informed that these allegations were
false, but he pressed them anyway.
On December 3rd, Rudy Giuliani presented State legislators with selec-
tively edited footage of ballots being counted on Election Night at Fulton
County’s State Farm Arena.241 Giuliani misrepresented the video as “a
smoking gun” proving election fraud.242 The President repeatedly claimed
that he would have won Georgia, if not for a supposed conspiracy that
unfolded on election night. President Trump and some of his supporters
alleged that political operatives faked a water main rupture to expel Repub-
lican poll watchers.243 These same operatives then supposedly took illegal
ballots from suitcases hidden under tables and added those ballots to the
official count multiple times over by scanning them more than once.244 Not
one of these allegations was true.
In a speech on December 5th, President Trump made the false claim
about the State Farm Arena and claimed that “if you just take the crime of
what those Democrat workers were doing . . . [t]hat’s 10 times more than I
need to win this state.” 245 During a December 22nd speech, he played the
same deceptive footage presented by Giuliani several weeks earlier.246
President Trump also repeatedly scapegoated one of these Fulton County
election workers during his January 2nd phone call with Georgia’s Secretary
of State, repeatedly referencing her by name and calling her “a professional
vote scammer and hustler.” 247 It was a malicious smear.
President Trump was directly notified at least four different times that
the allegations he was making were false. On December 15th, then-Deputy
Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen told him: “It wasn’t a suitcase. It was a bin.
That’s what they use when they’re counting ballots. It’s benign.” 248
Rosen’s deputy, Richard Donoghue, also debunked this claim, including on
a phone call on December 27th and in a meeting in the Oval Office on
December 31st: “I told the President myself . . . several times, in several con-
versations, that these allegations about ballots being smuggled in in a
 THE BIG LIE 225

suitcase and run through the machines several times, it was not true, that
we had looked at it, we looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses,
and it was not true.” 249
Likewise, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger told President
Trump that his allegations about the video were false. During his January
2nd call with the President, Raffensperger explained that Giuliani’s team
“sliced and diced that video and took it out of context” and that “the events
that transpired are nowhere near what was projected” once one looks at
more complete footage.250 Raffensperger also explained to the President
that his team “did an audit of that, and we proved conclusively that they
were not scanned three times.” 251 Yet, when Raffensperger said he would
send President Trump a link to the television segment, the President
refused: “I don’t care about the link. I don’t need it.” 252
The actual evidence contradicted all of President Trump’s claims about
what the Fulton County video depicted. For example, the chief investigator
for Raffensperger’s office explained in a December 6th court filing that
“there were no mystery ballots that were brought in from an unknown
location and hidden under tables. . . .” 253 As the investigator noted, the
security footage showed there was nothing under the table when it was
brought into the room. Hours later, with reporters and observers present,
the “video shows ballots that had already been opened but not counted
placed in the boxes, sealed up, [and] stored under the table.” 254 This find-
ing was affirmed by the FBI, DOJ, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation,
which interviewed witnesses and reviewed the full video footage and
machine data from the site.255
The ballots in question were not double counted. This was confirmed by
a full hand recount in November, as well as a subsequent review by investi-
gators.256 They found that although one of the workers was shown in the
video scanning certain batches multiple times, this was for a valid reason:
her scanner kept jamming. The investigators confirmed from scanner logs,
as well as the footage, that she only hit the “accept” button once per
batch.257 Investigators also found that staff likely did not tell the observers
to leave, let alone forcefully eject them from the facility.258
Despite this conclusive evidence and testimony, President Trump con-
tinued to point to the Fulton County video as evidence of a grand con-
spiracy. On January 5th, for instance, President Trump’s executive assistant
emailed a document “from POTUS” to Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Sena-
tor Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) that cited
“Suitcase Gate” among the “worst fraud incidents” in Georgia.259
226 CHAPTER 1

During his January 6th speech, President Trump told the crowd that “in
Fulton County, Republican poll watchers were ejected, in some cases,
physically from the room under the false pretense of a pipe burst.” The
President continued:
. . . then election officials pull boxes, Democrats, and suitcases of
ballots out from under a table. You all saw it on television, totally
fraudulent. And illegally scanned them for nearly two hours, totally
unsupervised. Tens of thousands of votes. This act coincided with a
mysterious vote dump of up to 100,000 votes for Joe Biden, almost
none for Donald Trump.260
No part of President Trump’s story was true. He had already been
informed that it was false.
In June 2021, when Giuliani’s law license was revoked by a New York
State appellate court, the court’s ruling cited his statements about sup-
posed suitcases of ballots in Georgia as one of its reasons for doing so. “If,
as respondent claims, he reviewed the entire video, he could not have rea-
sonably reached a conclusion that illegal votes were being counted,” the
court’s ruling reads.261
President Trump's conspiracy-mongering endangered innocent public
servants around the country, including in Fulton County. For example, dur-
ing a December 10, 2020, appearance in Georgia, Giuliani falsely accused
Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, two Black public servants shown in the
Fulton County video, of “surreptitiously passing around USB ports as if
they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” 262 In fact, Moss had been given a ginger
mint by her mother, Freeman.263 As described in Chapter 2, baseless accu-
sations like these forever changed the lives of election workers like Free-
man and Moss. All in service of President Trump's Big Lie.

THE FAKE BALLOT MYTH

The Trump Campaign’s distortion of the State Farm Arena video is just one
example of the “fake ballots” lie. President Trump frequently claimed that
“fake ballots” for Biden were injected into the vote-counting process. To
hear the President tell it, there were truckloads of ballots delivered in the
middle of the night to vote-counting centers and millions more votes were
cast than there were registered voters. Judges, Trump administration offi-
cials, State authorities, and independent election experts found each itera-
tion of the “fake ballot” claim to be just that: fake. The Trump Campaign
and its surrogates brought nine cases that raised some version of a “fake
ballots” claim. Every one of those cases was promptly dismissed.264 For
example, in Costantino v. City of Detroit, a Michigan court ruled that the
plaintiff’s claims regarding forged, backdated and double-counted votes in
 THE BIG LIE 227

Detroit were “incorrect and not credible” and “rife with speculation and
guess-work about sinister motives.” 265
Many of the fake ballot claims were publicly raised and repeated by
President Trump, but never included in any lawsuit. For example, a truck
driver for the U.S. Postal Service claimed that he delivered hundreds of
thousands of completed ballots from Bethpage, New York to Lancaster,
Pennsylvania.266 President Trump repeated this allegation numerous
times.267 The DOJ and FBI interviewed the relevant witnesses, including the
truck driver, and reviewed the loading manifests. They determined that the
allegation was not true.268 Both Attorney General Barr and his successor,
Jeffrey Rosen, told President Trump this claim was false. But that didn’t
stop the President from repeating it.
Another alleged “truckload of ballots” was supposedly delivered to the
Detroit counting center at 4:30 a.m. on election night. This truck allegedly
carried 100,000 ballots in garbage cans, wastepaper bins, cardboard boxes,
and shopping baskets.269 A widely circulated video purportedly showed an
unmarked van dropping off ballots, which were then wheeled into the
counting center on a wagon.270 In fact, the only ballot delivery in Detroit
after midnight on election night was an official delivery of 16,000 ballots,
stacked in 45 well-organized trays of approximately 350 ballots each.271
The wagon depicted in the video contained camera equipment being pulled
by a reporter.272 The claim of 100,000 fake ballots being smuggled into the
counting center in the middle of the night is even more ridiculous in light
of the fact that only 174,384 absent voter ballots were recorded in the City
of Detroit in the 2020 election.273 The addition of 100,000 fake ballots to
approximately 74,000 legitimate ballots would certainly have been obvious
to election officials.274
President Trump also repeatedly claimed that more votes were cast
than there were registered voters in certain States, cities, or precincts. It
was easy to fact-check these allegations and demonstrate they were false.
For example, in Pennsylvania, approximately nine million people were
registered to vote and approximately 6.8 million votes were cast in the 2020
presidential election.275 Nevertheless, President Trump and his allies made
numerous “more votes than voters” claims in Pennsylvania. Citing 2020
mail-in voting data tweeted by Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano,
President Trump claimed that 1.1 million ballots had been “created” and
counted improperly.276 In fact, there was no discrepancy in the actual
numbers—Mastriano erroneously compared the 2.6 million mail-in ballots
cast in the November general election to the 1.5 million ballots that were
returned in the June primary election.277
228 CHAPTER 1

President Trump also promoted a false claim by a different Pennsylva-

nia legislator that Pennsylvania had 205,000 more votes than voters.278
This claim was based on a flawed comparison by State Representative Frank
Ryan of the votes recorded by State election authorities as having been cast
and those reflected in a separate State registry.279 In fact, the discrepancy
was a result of some counties not yet uploading their official results to the
registry.280 In late-December 2020, Acting Deputy Attorney General Dono-
ghue told President Trump that this allegation was baseless.281 President
Trump kept repeating it anyway.282
The President and his surrogates made similar false claims concerning
excess votes in Michigan. Many of those claims originated with a grossly
inaccurate affidavit submitted by Russell Ramsland, the person behind the
“very amateurish” and “false and misleading” ASOG report regarding
Dominion voting machines in Antrim County.283 Ramsland claimed in a
similar affidavit filed in Federal court in Georgia that 3,276 precincts in
Michigan had turnout of between 84% and 350%, with 19 precincts report-
ing turnout in excess of 100%.284 Ramsland’s affidavit was widely ridiculed,
in part, because he relied on data for dozens of precincts that are located in
Minnesota, not Michigan.285 Even after he corrected his affidavit to remove
the Minnesota townships, his Michigan data remained wildly off-base.286

THE “MULTIPLE COUNTING OF BALLOTS” FICTION

The President and his surrogates repeatedly claimed that ballots for former
Vice President Biden were counted multiple times.287 These claims origi-
nated when some noticed election officials re-running stacks of ballots
through counting machines. But the allegation is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the vote-counting process—it is routine and appro-
priate for election officials to re-scan ballots if they are not properly
scanned and tabulated in the initial effort. In Costantino v. City of Detroit, the
court rejected the “incorrect and not credible” affidavits speculating that
ballots were run through scanners and counted multiple times in favor of
the “more accurate and persuasive explanation of activity” put forward by
the “highly-respected” election official with 40 years of experience.288
As with other misguided claims of election fraud, the claim that ballots
were counted multiple times disregards the safeguards in the voting pro-
cess. In particular, as noted above, it would certainly have been apparent in
the canvassing process if hundreds of ballots were counted multiple times
in Detroit because the total number of ballots would greatly exceed the
number of voters who voted. But that was not the case.
 THE BIG LIE 229

THE IMAGINARY “DEAD” AND “INELIGIBLE” VOTERS

In addition to their false claims regarding fake ballots, President Trump
and his surrogates also relentlessly asserted that tens of thousands of bal-
lots were cast by dead or otherwise ineligible voters. For example, President
Trump and Giuliani frequently alleged that more than 66,000 unregistered
juveniles voted in Georgia.289 In fact, no underage people voted in Geor-
gia.290 Giuliani offered several different made-up figures of the number of
non-citizens who supposedly voted in Arizona, but provided no evidence to
substantiate his claims.291 In fact, Arizona requires every new voter to pro-
vide proof of citizenship in order to register to vote—or to complete a Fed-
eral voter registration form that requires the individual to sign an
attestation to citizenship status under penalty of perjury—and no person
can vote without being registered.292 By mid-November, Trump Campaign
staff determined this allegation that thousands of non-citizens voted in
Arizona was based on “highly unreliable” information, and it is one of the
false claims that led to Giuliani losing his New York law license.293 These
“ineligible” voters did not exist.
Nor were thousands of votes cast in the names of dead Americans.
During his January 2nd, call with Georgia Secretary of State Raffensper-
ger, the President claimed that “close to about 5,000 [dead] voters” cast
ballots in the election. Raffensperger quickly informed the President this
wasn’t true. 294 But the “dead voter” lie wasn’t limited to Georgia. President
Trump wanted Americans to believe that “dead voters” contributed to his
defeat in several battleground States.295
But even the Trump Campaign and its lawyers recognized early on that
the claims regarding “dead voters” were grossly exaggerated, to say the
least. By early November, Trump lawyers discovered that many people
listed by the campaign as having died were actually alive and well.296 In
early December, Eric Herschmann advised Chief of Staff Meadows by text
message that the Trump legal team had determined that the claim of more
than 10,000 dead people voting in Georgia was not accurate.297 The ensuing
exchange makes clear that both men knew that Giuliani’s claims were
absurd:
Herschmann: Just an FYI. Alex Cannon and his team verified that
the 10k+ supposed dead people voting in GA is not accurate
Meadows: I didn’t hear that claim. It is not accurate. I think I found
22 if I remember correctly. Two of them died just days before the
general
Herschmann: It was alleged in Rudy's hearing today. Your number
is much closer to what we can prove. I think it's 12
230 CHAPTER 1

Meadows: My son found 12 obituaries and 6 other possibles

depending on the Voter roll acuracy [sic]
Herschmann: That sounds more like it. Maybe he can help Rudy find
the other 10k ??
Meadows: lol 298
Shortly thereafter, a Georgia court dismissed the claim that there were
tens of thousands of votes cast by ineligible voters, noting the claims “rest
on speculation rather than duly pled facts.” 299
The Trump Campaign’s own expert on the supposed “dead voters”
admitted that the Campaign lacked the necessary data to make any conclu-
sions about whether any (or how many) votes were cast in the name of a
deceased person.300 State officials did have such data, however, and were
able to conduct the type of matching analysis required. These State authori-
ties determined that there were only a handful of cases in which people
voted on behalf of deceased individuals.301
Even in those cases where the person who voted actually did die, Presi-
dent Trump’s lawyers knew that the vast majority of the voters included on
their list of dead voters actually cast their votes before they passed.302 In
early-January 2021, just days before January 6th, Republican Senator Lind-
sey Graham asked several Trump lawyers to provide evidence to support the
Campaign’s claims regarding dead voters.303 As Giuliani’s team investi-
gated, they concluded that they could not find evidence of dead voters any-
where near the number that Giuliani and President Trump were claiming
publicly. After noting the shortcomings in their evidence, Katherine Friess,
a lawyer working with the Giuliani legal team, warned that Senator Graham
would “push back” on their evidence.304 As predicted by Friess, Senator
Graham was not impressed by the information provided by Giuliani’s team.
In his speech on the Senate floor on January 6th, Graham explained why he
would not object to the certification of electoral votes. Senator Graham
referred to the failure of the Trump attorneys to provide the evidence he
requested:
They said there’s 66,000 people in Georgia under 18 voted. How
many people believe that? I asked, ‘Give me 10.’ Hadn’t had one.
They said 8,000 felons in prison in Arizona voted. Give me 10.
Hadn’t gotten one. Does that say there’s—There’s problems in
every election. I don’t buy this. Enough’s enough. We’ve got to end
it. 305

Documents obtained by the Select Committee reveal that President

Trump and his lawyers knew that the claims being made in court about
 THE BIG LIE 231

dead or ineligible voters in Georgia were inaccurate, and the lawyers were
concerned that if the President vouched for those claims in another court
pleading he might be criminally prosecuted. On December 31st, as the law-
yers rushed to file a Federal lawsuit in Georgia, some of the lawyers raised
concerns about the President signing a “verification” under oath that the
allegations regarding voter fraud in Georgia, including claims regarding
dead people voting, were true. As Eastman noted in an email to his col-
leagues on December 31st:

Although the President signed a verification [regarding the Georgia

claims] back on Dec. 1, he has since been made aware that some
of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts) has
been inaccurate. For him to sign a new verification with that
knowledge . . . would not be accurate. And I have no doubt that an
aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President
and his lawyers once all the dust settles on this.306
Despite these concerns, President Trump and his attorneys filed a com-
plaint that incorporated the same inaccurate numbers, and President
Trump signed a verification swearing under oath that the inaccurate num-
bers were “true and correct” or “believed to be true and correct” to the best
of his knowledge and belief.307 A Federal judge reviewing the relevant
emails and pleadings recently concluded:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific num-
bers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those num-
bers, both in court and to the public. The Court finds that these
emails are sufficiently related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy
to defraud the United States.308

1.9 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S JANUARY 6TH SPEECH

At noon on January 6, 2021, President Trump addressed thousands of his

supporters at a rally just south of the White House. The election had been
decided two months earlier. The courts found there was no evidence of sig-
nificant fraud. The States certified their votes by mid-December. It was
over—President Trump lost. But that’s not what the President told those in
attendance. He delivered an incendiary speech from beginning to end,
arguing that nothing less than the fate of America was at stake.
“Our country has had enough,” President Trump said. “We will not take
it anymore and that's what this is all about.” 309 He claimed that his follow-
ers had descended on Washington to “save our democracy” and “stop the
232 CHAPTER 1

Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images

steal.” 310 He refused, once again, to concede. And he proclaimed that

“[t]oday I will lay out just some of the evidence proving that we won this
election and we won it by a landslide.” 311
For months, President Trump had relentlessly promoted his Big Lie.312
He and his associates manufactured one tale after another to justify it. For
more than an hour on January 6th, the President wove these conspiracy
theories and lies together.313
By the Select Committee’s assessment, there were more than 100 times
during his speech in which President Trump falsely claimed that either the
election had been stolen from him, or falsely claimed that votes had been
compromised by some specific act of fraud or major procedural violations.
That day, President Trump repeated many of the same lies he had told for
months—even after being informed that many of these claims were false.
He lied about Dominion voting machines in Michigan, suitcases of ballots
in Georgia, more votes than voters in Pennsylvania, votes cast by non-
citizens in Arizona, and dozens of other false claims of election fraud.314
None of those claims were true.
As explained in the chapters that follow, the Big Lie was central to
President Trump’s plan to stay in power. He used the Big Lie to pressure
 THE BIG LIE 233

State and local officials to undo the will of the people. His campaign con-
vened fake electors on the baseless pretense that former Vice President
Biden won several States due to fraud or other malfeasance. The President
tried to subvert the Department of Justice by browbeating its leadership to
endorse his election lies. And when the DOJ’s senior personnel did not
acquiesce, President Trump sought to install a loyalist who would.
When all those efforts failed, President Trump betrayed his own Vice
President. He pressured Vice President Pence to obstruct the joint session of
Congress on January 6th, falsely claiming that he had the power to refuse to
count certain electoral votes. President Trump knew this was illegal but
attempted to justify it with lies about the election.
On December 19, 2020, President Trump summoned a mob to Washing-
ton, DC on the same day that Congress was set to certify former Vice Presi-
dent Biden’s victory by claiming the election was stolen and promising a
“wild” protest.315
And the bogus stolen election claim was the focus of President Trump’s
speech on January 6th. The litany of lies he told riled up a mob that would
march to the U.S. Capitol to intimidate Vice President Pence and Members
of Congress.
“And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don't fight like hell, you're
not going to have a country anymore,” President Trump told the crowd.316
He incited them with these words just after praising his own election night
lie—the Big Lie.
President Trump told his followers to “fight” to “save” their country
from a bogus specter of supposed election fraud.317 And many of them did.

ENDNOTES
1. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 60.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-75.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 75, 78.
5. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
6. We note that Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a
jury of his peers. See “Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two
Counts of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at
234 CHAPTER 1

https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-
two-counts-contempt-congress; Dan Friedman, "Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory," Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-
election-declare-victory/.
7. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment Right not to incriminate himself,
including to questions regarding his direct communications with Donald Trump and his
role on January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess.,
(Oct. 13, 2022), at 39:15 - 39:33 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
IQvuBoLBuC0.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 27.
9. Jennifer Agiesta and Marshall Cohen, “CNN Poll: Questions about Accuracy of Vote Counting
Rise as Most Want to Vote before Election Day,” CNN, (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2020/08/18/politics/cnn-poll-trump-biden-election-security-mail-in-voting/
index.html; Mark Murray, “Biden Leads Trump by 10 points in Final Pre-Election NBC News/
WSJ poll,” NBC News, (Nov. 1, 2020, updated Nov. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/biden-leads-trump-10-points-final-pre-
election-nbc-news-n1245667.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 44.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
15. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/. During
our October 13 hearing, Robert Costa tweeted: "CBS News has confirmed that Oct. 31, 2020,
was a key date in the pre-election maneuvers by Trump. Set off alarm with WH counsel
and Herschmann, among others. I’ve seen texts from that night from some aides and they
knew it was no joke; declaring victory was Trump’s plan. Period." Maggie Haberman
retweeted Costa, writing: "Trump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal
advisers working for him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won,
first reported by @jonathanvswan." Robert Costa (@costareports), Twitter, Oct. 13, 2022
1:29 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/costareports/status/
1580611586674151424?lang=en; see also Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT), Twitter, Oct. 13,
2022 1:35 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/maggienyt/status/1580613143637635072
(“Trump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal advisers working for
him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won, first reported by
@jonathanvswan”).
16. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
 THE BIG LIE 235

17. Fox Business, “Steve Bannon: Trump Won’t Allow the Election to Be Stolen,” YouTube, at
3:24, Nov. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDdxoyAUqoo.
18. “Steve Bannon: Donald Trump Will Claim Victory ‘Right Before the 11 O'clock News’,” Media
Matters, (Nov. 3, 2020), available at https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-
bannon-donald-trump-will-claim-victory-right-11-oclock-news-0.
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 38:18
- 39:32, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.
25. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
26. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
27. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
29. Months prior to the election, Josh Mendelsohn, the CEO of Hawkfish, a Democratic data
and analytics firm, warned that President Trump would try to take advantage of the Red
Mirage. See Margaret Talev, “Exclusive: Dem Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day
Landslide,” Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/
bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios. For other accounts warning that elec-
tion night would see a Red Mirage, see Marshall Cohen, “Deciphering the ‘Red Mirage,’ the
‘Blue Shift,’ and the Uncertainty Surrounding Election Results This November,” CNN, (Sept.
1, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/01/politics/2020-election-count-red-
mirage-blue-shift/index.html; Darragh Roche, “Trump Is Heading for a ‘Red Mirage’ Win on
Election Night, Bloomberg-Funded Data Firm Says,” Newsweek, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-phantom-win-election-1528948; Tom McCarthy, “‘Red
236 CHAPTER 1

Mirage’: The ‘Insidious’ Scenario If Trump Declares Victory,” The Guardian, (Oct. 31, 2020),
available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-
election-scenario-victory.
30. “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task
Force in Press Briefing,” White House, April 7, 2020, available at https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-april-7-2020/.
31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Apr. 8, 2020 8:20 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201201162757/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1247861952736526336 (archived).
32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, May 24, 2020 10:08 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20200701075716/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1264558926021959680 (archived).
33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Sept. 17, 2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201115164217/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1306562791894122504 (archived).
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000010941_0001-2, 076P-R000010940_0001-6 (July 23,
2020, emails regarding scheduling a meeting for the President with McCarthy, Stepien, and
others).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
36. Fox News, “President Trump Goes One-on-One with Chris Wallace,” YouTube, July 19, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6XdpDOH1JA; Pat Ward (@WardDPatrick),
Twitter, July 19, 2020 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/WardDPatrick/status/
1284854318575878144.
37. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
press-briefing-092420/.
38. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
press-briefing-092420/.
39. Barbara Sprunt, “Trump Questions Election Again after White House Walked Back His Ear-
lier Remarks,” NPR, (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/
916440816/republican-leaders-reject-trump-hedging-on-transfer-of-power-amid-war-over-
confi.
40. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105044240/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1323864823680126977 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov.
4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104153504/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324004491612618752 (archived).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
42. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
 THE BIG LIE 237

43. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104060648/https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977 (archived).
44. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
45. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at esp. 1:42-3:35, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324007806694023169.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324004491612618752.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020 8:22 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329233502139715586.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 8:49 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329602736053252107.jpg (archived).
46. For example, one widely shared post claimed that, in the early-morning hours of Novem-
ber 4, hundreds of thousands of mail in ballots were “found” in Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania, and all of the ballots were for Biden. Nick Adams (@NickAdamsinUSA), Twit-
ter, Nov. 4, 2020 4:48 p.m., available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201110150437/
https://twitter.com/NickAdamsinUSA/status/1324151663641448448 (archived).
47. In many metropolitan areas, absentee ballots are counted in centralized locations and
reported in batches. For example, the ballots that were supposedly “found” in Wisconsin
were absentee ballots reported by Milwaukee County when that county completed its tally.
Of the approximately 181,000 votes reported between 3:26 and 3:44 a.m., Biden received
approximately 83% of the votes and Trump received approximately 17%. See Eric Litke and
Madeline Heim, “Fact check: Wisconsin Did Not 'Find' 100K Ballots around 4 a.m. the Morn-
ing after the Election, or Take Break from Counting Votes,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
(Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/
11/04/wisconsin-didnt-find-ballots-stop-count-voter-fraud-claims-untrue-politifact/
6165435002/. In Michigan, no ballots were “found” between 3:30-5:00 a.m. Rather,
approximately 200,000 votes were reported by Wayne County shortly after 6:00 a.m., the
vast majority of which were for Biden. See Geoffrey Skelley, “Live Bog: 2020 Election
Results Coverage: Michigan’s Morning Update,” FiveThirtyEight, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://fivethirtyeight.com/live-blog/2020-election-results-coverage/#294294. Overall,
Biden won 68% of the vote in Wayne County, to 30% for Trump. However, among absentee
voters, Biden won 75% to Trump’s 23%. See “November 3, 2020 - General Election Results,”
Charter County of Wayne, Michigan, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/
clerk/november-3-2020-general-election-results.aspx.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; See also John Curiel, Charles
Stewart III, and Jack Williams, One Shift, Two Shifts, Red Shift, Blue Shifts: Reported Election
Returns in the 2020 Election, MIT Election Data and Science Lab, (July 9, 2021), p. 40, avail-
able at https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2021-07/
curiel_stewart_williams_blue_shift_esra_final.pdf, (detailed analysis of timed reporting
data shows that “smaller and more rural counties, which favored Trump, could report their
ballots before the counties with hundreds of precincts and hundreds of thousands of vot-
ers”).
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
238 CHAPTER 1

51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119, 124-26, 174.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 22–23.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 23, 26.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 35 (describing Ellis as “a co-counsel” and “my
number two person” so “generally, if you got an opinion from Jenna, it would be just like
getting an opinion from me”).
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 10, 15–18.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 92.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111–112.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark
Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email from Bill Stepien to Mark
Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller titled “Fwd: AZ Federal ID Voters”).
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 19–23.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 38–39.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 33-34.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117–18.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 112–13.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 88–91.
67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010951-52 (November 3, 2020, Jason
Miller text message to Mark Meadows at 10:27 pm); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows
Production), MM010972 (November 3, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Mead-
ows and David Bossie at 11:53 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production),
MM011343 (November 6, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Meadows, Ivanka
Trump, Bill Stepien, Hope Hicks, Dan Scavino, and Jared Kushner at 11:10 am).
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
 THE BIG LIE 239

70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115–17; Brian Slodysko, “Explainer:
Why AP Called Pennsylvania for Biden,” Associated Press (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/ap-called-pennsylvania-joe-biden-why-
f7dba7b31bd21ec2819a7ac9d2b028d3.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115–20.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 118.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.; Federal Election Commission,
“Federal Elections 2020 – Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives,” Oct. 2022, p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
77. “Risk-Limiting Audit Report – Georgia Presidential Contest, November 2020,” Georgia Secre-
tary of State, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/
11.19_.20_risk_limiting_audit_report_memo_1.pdf.
78. See “Summary of Hand Count Audits – 2020 General Election,” Arizona Secretary of State,
(Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://azsos.gov/2020-general-election-hand-count-results;
“Agreed Upon Procedures Report – Evaluation of the Accuracy of Voting Machine Tabula-
tors Used for the 2020 General Elections Held on November 3, 2020 (Voting System Check),”
New Mexico Secretary of State, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://
api.realfile.rtsclients.com/PublicFiles/ee3072ab0d43456cb15a51f7d82c77a2/f740346c-7b6b-
4479-acd6-068829382307/
2020%20Post%20Election%20Voting%20System%20Check%20Audit%20Results.pdf. Similar
audits conducted by Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin also affirmed the results in
those states, but their results are excluded from this list because in those instances their
audit results were not available until after January 6th. Shortly after the election, Nevada
also conducted some post-election checks that supported the validity of the results there
too, including testing a sample of the voting machines to make sure votes were accurately
recorded. Deposition of Joseph Gloria at 33, Law v. Whitmer, No. A-22-858609-W (Nev. Ct.,
Clark Cty. Dec. 1, 2020), p. 33, available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/
uploads/2022/09/2022.10.31-NV-Poll-Worker-Response-to-Application-for-Mandamus-
STAMPED.pdf; Rex Briggs, “Trump Supporters Asked me to Look into Voter Fraud in Nevada;
What I found Debunked What They were Alleging,” Nevada Independent, (Dec. 22, 2020),
available at https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/trump-supporters-asked-me-to-
look-into-voter-fraud-in-nevada-what-i-found-debunked-what-they-were-alleging.
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK00117-132 (November 12, 2020,
email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
240 CHAPTER 1

81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 106-107. Sidney Powell and Jenna
Ellis accompanied Giuliani. The campaign was represented by Jared Kushner, Bill Stepien,
David Bossie (a former senior official on President Trump’s 2016 campaign), Derek Lyons,
and Justin Clark. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 50-51; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 64-65. Eric Herschmann also arrived at the
campaign headquarters as the meeting was underway. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Her-
schmann, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 160-61.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 107.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan,
(Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 14-16.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 14-16.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35, 41-42.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
 THE BIG LIE 241

99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
100. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Philadelphia Press Conference at Four Seasons Total Land-
scaping,” Rev, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-philadelphia-press-conference-november-7.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 30-32.
102. “Memorandum from Attorney General William Barr on Post-Voting Election Irregularity
Inquiries to the United States Attorneys, to the Assistant Attorneys General for the Crimi-
nal Division, Civil Rights Division, and National Security Division, and to the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/20403358-william-barr-election-memo-november-9.
Longstanding DOJ policy had been not to conduct such investigations prior to certification
to avoid impacting election results. See Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, 8th ed.
Department of Justice, December 2017, at 84, available at https://www.justice.gov/
criminal/file/1029066/download.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God,
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431-432.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431.
106. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 7:11 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201117115935/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1327811527123103746 (archived).
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 37-38.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 174-175.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
112. Factba.se, “Interview: Brian Kilmeade of Fox News Interviews Donald Trump - December 13,
2020,” Vimeo, at 7:47, Dec. 13, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/490517184.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
114. Select Committee staff analyzed the lawsuits. See also, Brendan Williams, Did President
Trump’s 2020 Election Litigation Kill Rule 11?, 30 Pub. Interest L. J. 181, 189 (2021), available
at https://www.bu.edu/pilj/files/2021/06/Williams.pdf.
242 CHAPTER 1

115. The only case that involved a victory for the campaign was the Pennsylvania case of Trump
v. Boockvar. In that case, the court found that the Pennsylvania Secretary of State could
not extend the deadline for voters to cure their failure to provide proper identification for
absentee ballots. This decision affected just a few thousand votes, which were not
included in any tallies. Trump v. Boockvar, No. 602 MD 2020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 12, 2020),
available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/602-MD-20-
1.pdf.
116. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Con-
servative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p.
3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
117. Complaint at 2, Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-
02321), ECF No. 1.
118. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020).
119. Minute Entry and Order at 6-9, Ward v. Jackson, No. CV2020-015285 (Az. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4,
2020).
120. See Ward v. Jackson, No. CV-20-0343-AP, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 313, at *6 (Ariz. 2020), also avail-
able at https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/1984/
637437053596970000; Howard Fischer, “State Supreme Court rejects GOP bid to void
election,” Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://azcapitoltimes.com/
news/2020/12/08/federal-judge-hears-arguments-in-election-challenge/; “Meet the Jus-
tices,” Arizona Judicial Branch, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201208032900/https://www.azcourts.gov/meetthejustices/ (archived); “Brutinel Elected
as Next Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice,” Associated Press, (Nov. 20, 2018), available at
https://apnews.com/article/27b725d44d384e2cb7a0e491ac82fe7f; Bob Christie, “Ducey
Names 2 to New Arizona Supreme Court Seats,” Associated Press, (Nov. 28, 2016), available
at https://apnews.com/article/26fc7f154b0e4b4fb358987941ded8d0; “Arizona Governor
Appoints New Supreme Court Justice,” Associated Press, (Apr. 26, 2019), available at
https://apnews.com/article/4ce4bf1d79724c03b1d4cf36f4b97cf1; Jonathan J. Cooper, “Ducey
Appoints Montgomery to Arizona Supreme Court," Associated Press, (Sep. 4, 2019), available
at https://apnews.com/article/bac43d42185c4b8bb9e8c465a59792c8.
121. Complaint at 1-2, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2020),
available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Complaint.pdf.
122. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 8,
2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
123. Order Denying Appeal, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. S21M0565 (Ga. Dec. 14, 2020), available
at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-
GA-SC-Order-Denying-Appeal.pdf; Jonathan Ringel, “Deal Picks Krause, Richardson for Ful-
ton Superior,” Law.com, (Dec. 28, 2018), available at https://www.law.com/
dailyreportonline/2018/12/28/deal-picks-krause-richardson-for-fulton-superior/; “Chief
Justice Harold D. Melton,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201016174745/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/
biographies/justice-harold-d-melton/ (archived); “Presiding Justice David E. Nahmias,”
Supreme Court of Georgia, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201120204518/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-david-
e-nahmias/ (archived); “Chief Justice Michael P. Boggs,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/
biographies/justice-michael-p-boggs/; “Presiding Justice Nels S.D. Peterson,” Supreme
Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/
court-information/biographies/justice-nels-s-d-peterson/; “Justice Sarah Hawkins Warren,”
Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://
www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-sarah-hawkins-warren/; “Justice
Charles J. Bethel,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
 THE BIG LIE 243

https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-charles-j-bethel/; “Jus-
tice Carla Wong McMillian,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-carla-wong-
mcmillian/.
124. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
125. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
126. Complaint for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, King v. Whitmer,
Case No. 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW, (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1; King v. Whitmer, 505 F.
Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020). In a subsequent decision, the judge called the case “a
historic and profound abuse of the judicial process” and sanctioned the attorneys who
filed the lawsuit King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688-89 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
127. Opinion and Order at 1, 4, Stoddard v. City Election Commission, No. 20-014604-CZ, (Mich.
Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/
Websites/AG/releases/2020/november/
Stoddard_et_al_v_City_Election_Commission_et_al_-_11-06-2020.pdf?rev=
2fa32f93caa94365a1ee8c1c492a4e75.
128. Opinion and Order at 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov.
13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
129. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52,
54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching
and affirming lower court decision).
130. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8,
2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming
lower court decision).
131. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
132. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 803 Fed. App'x. 377, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
133. “Eleven Nominations Sent to the Senate Today,” Trump White House Archives, (June 19,
2017), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/eleven-
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134. Complaint at 72, Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Wis.
2020) (No. 2:20-cv-01785), ECF No. 1; Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp.
3d 620, 625 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (dismissing case with prejudice).
135. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 637-39 (E.D. Wis. 2020).
136. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 983 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2020); Bill Glauber, “Fed-
eral Appeals Court Turns Down Donald Trump Push to Overturn Election Results in Wiscon-
sin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/24/federal-appeals-court-rejects-trump-bid-
overturn-wisconsin-results/4043650001/.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 170-71.
139. For example, Select Committee data analysts found that certain legacy media networks
played a role in promoting false claims of voter fraud and other election conspiracies. See
Staff Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol Data Analysts, "Legacy Media Analysis," (Dec. 3, 2022).
244 CHAPTER 1

140. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet
Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 173,
available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
141. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet
Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 82,
available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 10.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 67.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021) pp. 59-60.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 36-37.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2022), p. 60.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61, 63-64.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 53, 67.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 59-60.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 61-62.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55.
154. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC
00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://
casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision); Donald
J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Wood v. Raffen-
sperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 6:23 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201228020228/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342974373632876545
(archived); Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense, “WATCH this BEFORE January 6th | Rudy Giu-
liani’s Common Sense | Ep. 100,” Rumble, at 29:30, available at https://rumble.com/
embed/vcrv8j/?pub=4.
155. “Fact Checks,” Michigan Department of State, (last accessed on Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/faqs/elections-and-campaign-finance/fact-checks.
 THE BIG LIE 245

156. See, e.g., “Secretary of State's Office Debunks Ware County Voting Machine Story,” Georgia
Secretary of State, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/news/secretary-states-
office-debunks-ware-county-voting-machine-story; “News Conference on Georgia Vote
Count,” C-SPAN, Nov. 9, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?477943-1/news-
conference-georgia-vote-count; “Georgia Election Security,” C-SPAN, Jan. 4, 2021, available
at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507710-1/georgia-election-official-refutes-president-
trumps-voter-fraud-allegations.
157. See, e.g., PBS NewsHour, "WATCH: Wisconsin Elections Commission Gives Vote Counting
Update,” YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Yg5liyyrObc.
158. See, e.g., Declaration of Charles Stewart III, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga.
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2020) (expert declaration of political scientist at MIT); Examining
Irregularities in the 2020 Election Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, 116th Cong. (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of Chris Krebs, former Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency); “Scientists Say No Credible Evidence of
Computer Fraud in the 2020 Election Outcome, But Policymakers Must Work with Experts to
Improve Confidence,” Matt Blaze's Exhaustive Search, (Nov. 16, 2020), available at https://
www.mattblaze.org/blog/election-letter/.
159. Search results for “Dominion,” Trump Twitter Archive V2, (last accessed Dec. 12, 2022),
available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22.
160. See, e.g., “Remarks by President Trump During Thanksgiving Video Teleconference with
Members of the Military,” Trump White House archives, (Nov. 27, 2020), available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
thanksgiving-video-teleconference-members-military/; Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bar-
tiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News – November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://factba.se/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-news-sunday-
morning-futures-maria-bartiromo-november-29-2020; “Donald Trump Speech on Election
Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-
december-2; Factba.se, “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results – December 22,
2020,” (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020; “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dal-
ton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-
election; “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
161. J.M. Rieger, “The False Claims from Fox News and Trump Allies Cited in Dominion’s $1.6 Bil-
lion Lawsuit,” Washington Post, (Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/26/fox-trump-election-dominion/.
162. Elahe Izadi and Sarah Ellison, “Fox News Has Dropped ‘Lou Dobbs Tonight,’ Promoter of
Trump’s False Election Fraud Claims,” Washington Post, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/02/05/lou-dobbs-canceled-fox/; 60 Minutes,
“Dominion Voting Systems and the Baseless Conspiracy Theories about the 2020 Election |
60 Minutes,” YouTube, at 2:12 – 3:20, (Oct. 23, 2022), at 2:12-2:51, available at https://
youtu.be/492jILlPtlA?t=132.
163. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020 11:34 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201112163413/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1326926226888544256 (archived).
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump
Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Zachary “Zach” Parkinson,
(May 18, 2022), pp. 46-47.
246 CHAPTER 1

165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump
Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020).
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sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM007666, MM007669 (November 12,
2020, email and attachment from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows transmitting abridged and
full internal Trump Campaign memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Produc-
tion), MM011902, MM011974 (Nov. 12 and 13, 2020 text messages from Jason Miller to Mark
Meadows discussing the investigation into Dominion and the lack of evidence of foreign
interference).
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 291.
169. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22engineered+by+china%22
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:26 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201116132750/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
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170. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the
Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” Department of Home-
land Security's Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-
government-coordinating-council-election.
171. Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, “How a County Clerk in Michigan Found Herself at the
Center of Trump’s Attempt to Overthrow the Election,” Time, (Dec. 15, 2021), available at
https://time.com/6128812/the-steal-antrim-county-michigan/; Emma Brown, Aaron C.
Davis, Jon Swaine, and Josh Dawsey, “The Making of a Myth,” Washington Post, (May 9,
2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/
trump-election-fraud-texas-businessman-ramsland-asog/.
172. Steven Nelson, “Michigan Republicans Claim Software Issue Undercounted Trump Votes,”
New York Post, (Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://nypost.com/2020/11/06/michigan-gop-
claims-software-issue-undercounted-trump-votes/.
173. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf; “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,”
Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/
resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-
county-confirms-previously-certified-result; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim
County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 17-27, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=
fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9; Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, 36-55, available at https://
misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/
SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
174. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,
(June 23, 2021), pp. 14-15, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
175. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State website, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
 THE BIG LIE 247

https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
176. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,
(June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12,
2020, email from Tim Walberg to Molly Michel re: Additional Presidential Phone call follow
up).
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 70-74; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department
of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 72-74; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department
of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan.
21, 2022), Exhibit 44, CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan Secretary of State
Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State Senators Lana Theis and Tom Barrett).
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77 Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf
(Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs
responding to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”).
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf
(Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs to
Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”); “Isolated User
Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties
or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 78-80. Even as the acting Secretary of
DHS was providing Meadows information he received from his Director of CISA debunking
the Dominion claims, the acting Assistant Secretary of DHS, Ken Cuccinelli, was providing
back channel information to Meadows in a possible effort to promote the false Dominion
claims. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), TEXT0000072,
TEXT0000073, (Nov. 12, 2020 text messages from Ken Cuccinelli to Mark Meadows) (Cuc-
cinelli: “I have the dominion list of everywhere the machines are deployed that we know
of. [I]t is pretty extensive. It is in my DHS email account. Where do you want me to send
it?” Meadows then provided Cuccinelli with his personal email address.)
183. Chris Krebs #Protect2020 (@CISAKrebs), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 11:45 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/CISAKrebs/status/1328741106624901120.
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010360_0001, 076P-
R000010361_0001, (November 17, 2020 email and attached letter to Christopher Krebs from
White House Office of Presidential Personnel, stating respectively that “the President has
248 CHAPTER 1

terminated your appointment” and that “Pursuant to the direction of the President, your
appointment… is hereby terminated, effective immediately”).
185. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 7:07 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040513/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1328852352787484677 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17,
2020 7:07 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040930/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1328852354049957888 (archived).
186. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud
Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
187. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud
Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 88-91. See also Tucker Carlson: “Time
for Sidney Powell to Show Us Her Evidence: We Asked the Trump Campaign Attorney for
Proof of her Bombshell Claims. She Gave Us Nothing,” Fox News, (Nov. 19, 2020), available
at https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-rudy-giuliani-sidney-powell-election-
fraud.
189. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 22, 2020, 5:23 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/JennaEllisEsq/status/1330638034619035655.
190. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET,
available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22
(archived).
191. One America News Network, “Cyber Analyst on Dominion Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,”
YouTube, at 0:41-1:14, 1:37-2:23, 2:42-3:36, Nov. 15, 2020, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKcPoCNW8AA.
192. Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:45 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201121092200/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/
1329299640848584710 (archived); Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020
12:46 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201175413/https://twitter.com/
CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329300069623820289 (archived); Donald J. Trump, Twitter, Nov. 21,
2020 11:30 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:31 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:32 p.m. ET, Nov. 22, 2020,
3:35 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-
izing%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-20%22%2C%222020-11-24%22%5D (archived).
193. Barr met with President Trump between election day and January 6th on November 23,
December 1, and December 14. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 16, 22,
28.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 25, 27, 50; William Barr, One Damn
Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at pp.
539, 554.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
196. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at. 1:00-1:43, 3:23-4:36, available at https://vimeo.com/
485180163.
197. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 1:00-1:43, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.
 THE BIG LIE 249

198. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 1:50-2:40, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.
199. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 3:50-4:24, 22:40-23:52, 24:26-24:50, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://
vimeo.com/485180163.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
202. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2,
2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-
election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
203. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
204. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding the complaint “void of
plausible allegations that Dominion voting machines were hacked or compromised in Ari-
zona during the 2020 General Election”).
205. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
206. Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order, Show Cause Order and Preliminary Injunction, No. 2020009238CZ (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 4, 2020).
207. Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 7:12 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1335014224532221952?s=20&t=20AZkk4gS2DeBo6q6QR-mw;
Ronn Blitzer, “Trump Legal Team Celebrates after Michigan Judge Allows Probe of Domin-
ion Voting Machines,” Fox News, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/trump-legal-team-michigan-antrim-county-judge-order-dominion-machines;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 19, 147.
208. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001368_00001, pp. 1, 6
(Allied Security Operations Group Antrim Michigan Forensics Report, dated Dec. 13, 2020).
209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R00001254_00001 (December 14,
2020, email from Joanna Miller to Peter Navarro attaching the ASOG Report and noting that
"POTUS and VPOTUS are briefed").
210. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-
PartII-01132022-000798(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael re: From POTUS asking
the AG to look at ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000001337_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Acting Attorney General
Jeffrey Rosen re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National
Archives Production), 076P-R000001367_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael
to Michigan Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production) 076P-R000001361_00001(December 14,
2020, email from Molly Michael to Senator Kelly Loeffler re: From POTUS attaching ASOG
report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
250 CHAPTER 1

on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-

R000001358_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Arizona Governor Doug
Ducey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000001370_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to
Republican Party Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001378_00001 (December
14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano re: From
POTUS attaching ASOG report).
211. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 2:59 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201214214435/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1338574268154646528 (archived).
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 28-29.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
216. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
217. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915111,
CTRL0000915117-CTRL0000915118 (draft analyses of ASOG report). Notably, the final version
of this review, which had been requested by the Attorney General, was edited by senior
DHS officials to remove the language most critical of ASOG before being sent to the
Department of Justice by Acting Assistant Secretary Ken Cuccinelli. See Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915120 (emails circulating
draft analyses), CTRL0000926941 (noting report was “currently in the Secretary’s office”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production) HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000687-HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000688 (email and report pro-
vided to Donoghue by Cuccinelli); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1,
2021), pp. 29-31.
218. See Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michi-
gan, (June 23, 2021), p. 16, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf; J. Alex
Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident,”
(Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://www.michigan.gov//media/Project/Websites/sos/
30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
219. For example, President Trump and others frequently cited ASOG’s finding that the Domin-
ion machines had a “68% error rate,” but that conclusion was based on a complete misun-
derstanding of the scanner log files reviewed by ASOG. Their report also claimed that, due
to these perceived “errors,” a “staggering number of votes” were determined through an
adjudication process that allowed for manipulation of votes, but no adjudication software
was installed on the Dominion machines. J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County,
Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 40-41, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=
fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
 THE BIG LIE 251

220. Halderman concluded that “I am not aware of any credible evidence that any security
problem was ever exploited against Antrim County's election system. As my analysis
shows, the anomalies that occurred in the November 2020 results are fully explained by
human error.” J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020
Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), p. 46, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/
Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
221. "Audits of the November 3, 2020 General Election," Michigan Secretary of State, (April 21,
2021), p. 32, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/
30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=
a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.; “Hand Count Calculation Sheet (Office: President of
the United States, County: Antrim),” Michigan Secretary of State, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
AntrimCounty_Presidential_Race_Full_Hand_Count_November2020.pdf?rev=
0bf12f08c33444c59bd145fbcfbb3e40.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 21-22, 99; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 44-50.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 42-43.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 50.
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 129.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert O'Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 163-65.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 97-98, 102-103; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ken Cuccinelli, (Dec. 7, 2021), pp. 49-54.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 157-59; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022),
pp. 102-03; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007465Ellis, J.007467Ellis
(December 28-29, 2020, emails with Katherine Freiss, Doug Mastriano, Christina Bobb, Giu-
liani, and others about accessing voting machines); Emma Brown and Jon Swaine, “Inside
the Secretive Effort by Trump Allies to Access Voting Machines,” Washington Post, (Oct. 28,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/28/coffee-
county-georgia-voting-trump/.
231. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript);Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
232. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
252 CHAPTER 1

Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
233. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-
transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
234. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-
transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 166.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182. Kerik also emailed President
Trump’s chief of staff, Mark Meadows, on December 28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the
investigations we want later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators that
have to be moved, and this will do just that.” Document on file with the Select Committee
(National Archives Production) 076P-R000004125_0001.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 46.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 89-96.
240. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, U.S. Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, No. 1:21-cv-00040
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 22, 2021), ECF No. 22-2.
241. Justin Gray, “Georgia Election Officials Show Frame-by-Frame What Happened in Fulton
Surveillance Video,” WSB-TV, (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/georgia-
election-officials-show-frame-by-frame-what-really-happened-fulton-surveillance-video/
T5M3PYIBYFHFFOD3CIB2ULDVDE/.
242. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate election hearing,” YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
243. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 8:57 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201217181730/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1338483200046354434; Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,
“Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Wash-
ington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-
322644d82356_story.html.
244. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
245. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate Runoff Elections
December 5,” Rev, (Dec. 5, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5.
246. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results—December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, (Dec. 22,
2020), at 9:11 – 9:31, available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
 THE BIG LIE 253

247. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffens-
perger: Says He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-
raffensperger-recording.
248. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7,
2021), pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 42-43.
250. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
251. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
253. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.
254. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.
255. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (Aug. 11,
2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Pak%20Transcript.pdf; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of
September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12,
2021).
256. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results
Today,” Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-
today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of September 20,
2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).
257. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results
Today,” Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-
today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of September 20,
2021, at 4-6 and Exhibit A: Videotaped Deposition of James P. Callaway (Deputy Chief Inves-
tigator of the Office of the Secretary of State) at 29-35, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938
(Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021) available at, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/
21084096/favorito-sos-brief-in-response-to-order-of-92021-with-exs-a-and-b.pdf.
258. Declaration of Frances Watson at 2-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of
Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (August 11, 2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf.
254 CHAPTER 1

259. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004670_0001-0013, 076P-
R000004888_0001-0013, 076P-R000004948_0001-0013 (January 5, 2021, emails from Molly
Michael re: “from POTUS” to Senators Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz and to Representative Jim
Jordan attaching Background Briefing on 2020 Fraud).
260. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
261. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
262. GA House Mobile Streaming, Governmental Affairs 12.10.20, Vimeo – Livestream, at 2:09:03
to - 2:13:10, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/
videos/214677184.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
264. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., “Lost, Not Stolen: The
Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election,” (July
2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
265. Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
266. Complaint, Exhibit 2: Affidavit of Jesse Richard Morgan at 2, 10, Mecalfe v. Wolf, 2020 Pa.
Commw. LEXIS 794 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020) (No. 636 MD 2020), available at https://
www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/212420-file-10836.pdf.
267. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 2:31 p.m. ET, available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20201202014959/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1333856259662077954 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec.
1, 2020 3:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201221335/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333875814585282567 (archived); Donald J. Trump
(@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec 2, 2020 6:42 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20201203024425/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1334327204847775744
(archived).
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 45-46.
269. FOX News, “Sean Hannity,” Nov. 19, 2020, available at https://archive.org/details/
FOXNEWSW_20201120_060000_Hannity?start/1983.1.end/2077.5.
270. Brandon Waltens, “VIDEO: Wagons, Suitcases, and Coolers Roll into Detroit Voting Center at
4 AM [UPDATED],” Texas Scorecard, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://texasscorecard.com/
federal/video-wagons-suitcases-and-coolers-roll-into-detroit-voting-center-at-4-am/;
“Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud
Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), at 22:29-26:53, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/
transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-
election-fraud-claims.
271. Affidavit of Christopher Thomas ¶ 18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describ-
ing ballot delivery), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/
163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf; see also Opinion and Order at *6, 13,
Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at
 THE BIG LIE 255

https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-
and-Order.pdf (relying on Christopher Thomas’ affidavit to deny a petition for various
relief related to allegations that the November 3, 2020 election in Michigan was fraudu-
lent).
272. “How a WXYZ Wagon Sparked False Election Fraud Claims in Detroit,” WXYZ, (Nov. 5, 2020),
available at https://www.wxyz.com/news/how-a-wxyz-wagon-sparked-false-election-fraud-
claims-in-detroit.
273. “Election Summary Report,” City of Detroit, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://
detroitmi.gov/document/november-3-2020-general-election-official-results.
274. A canvassing process in every State verifies that the number of voters indicated as having
voted matches the number of ballots cast. If, as claimed, tens of thousands of illegitimate
ballots were counted at the TCF Center in Detroit, the total number of ballots counted
would be substantially higher than the total number of voters who voted, but in Detroit
slightly fewer ballots were counted than voters who were listed as having voted. The net
number of ballots for the City of Detroit counting boards was 21 more names than ballots,
out of approximately 174,000 absentee votes cast. Michigan Secretary of State, “Audits of
the November 3, 2020 General Election,” (Apr. 21, 2021), p. 20, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=
a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.
275. Approximately 4.2 million ballots were cast in-person on election day and 2.6 million mail
and absentee ballots were cast. See “Pennsylvania's Election Stats,” Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.dos.pa.gov/
VotingElections/BEST/Pages/BEST-Election-Stats.aspx;“Official Returns – 2020 Presidential
Election,” Pennsylvania Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://
www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/SummaryResults?ElectionID=83&ElectionType=
G&IsActive=0.
276. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 28, 2020 12:09 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201128080915/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1332552283553476608 (archived), retweeting Senator Doug Mastriano (@SenMastriano),
Twitter, Nov. 27, 2020, 1:59 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenMastriano/status/
1332398733401591808.
277. Jessica Calefati, “Fact-Checking False Claims about Pennsylvania's Presidential Election by
Trump and His Allies,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-election-results-trump-fraud-fact-check-
20201206.html.
278. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020, 4:00 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201228211304/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1343663159085834248 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29,
2020, 8:59 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201229205204/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343919651336712199 (archived); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29, 2020, 5:55 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201229225512/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1344054358418345985. Note that timestamps in archived tweets may reflect a time zone
different from that where the tweet originated.
279. See Pennsylvania House Republican Caucus, “PA Lawmakers: Numbers Don’t Add Up, Certi-
fication of Presidential Results Premature and In Error,” (Dec. 28, 2020), available at
https://www.pahousegop.com/News/18754/Latest-News/PA-Lawmakers-Numbers-
Don%E2%80%99t-Add-Up,-Certification-of-Presidential-Results-Premature-and-In-Error.
Representative Ryan also promoted the groundless claim of an unexplained discrepancy of
400,000 mail-in ballots in the state’s database, which was based entirely on his ignorance
of the fact that the database in question accounts for mail-in ballots and absentee ballots
separately. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Examining
Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Written Testimony of Pennsylvania State
256 CHAPTER 1

Representative Frank Ryan, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/

Testimony-Ryan-2020-12-16.pdf; Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Letter Submitted by
Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar, available at https://
www.dos.pa.gov/about-us/Documents/statements/2020-12-16-Senator-Johnson-and-
Peters.pdf.
280. “Dept. of State: Republicans' Election Claims Are ‘Repeatedly Debunked Conspiracy Theo-
ries’,” WJAC-TV, (Dec. 29, 2020), available at https://wjactv.com/news/local/dept-of-state-
republicans-election-claims-are-repeatedly-debunked-conspiracy-theories.
281. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6,
2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
282. See “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev,
(Jan. 4, 2021), at 58:09, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election; “Transcript of Trump’s
Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press (January 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-
e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29; Affidavit of Russell James Ramsland,
Jr., 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2021), ECF 6-24, available at https://
www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/6/24/king-v-whitmer/. Ramsland submitted a
similar affidavit in a case in Georgia. See Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffens-
perger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.
284. Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020),
ECF No. 7-1.
285. Aaron Blake, “The Trump Campaign’s Much-Hyped Affidavit Features a Big, Glaring Error,”
Washington Post, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/11/20/trump-campaigns-much-hyped-affidavit-features-big-glaring-error/.
286. For example, Ramsland claimed 781.91% turnout in North Muskegon (actual turnout:
77.78%); 460.51% turnout in Zeeland Charter Township (actual turnout: 80.11%); and 139.29%
turnout in Detroit (actual turnout: 50.88%). See King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724
(E.D. Mich. 2021); Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Elec-
tion in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
287. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available athttps://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; “Donald Trump Speech on
Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2” Rev (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-
december-2; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020, 4:11 p.m. ET,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203211154/https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/1334606278388277253 (archived); “Trump Lawyers Rudy Giuliani &
Jenna Ellis Testify Before Michigan House Oversight Committee: Full Transcript,” Rev, (Dec.
3, 2020), at 26:13, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-lawyers-rudy-
giuliani-jenna-ellis-testify-before-michigan-house-oversight-committee-transcript; Affida-
vit of Mellissa A. Carone, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2020), ECF No. 1-5,
available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/1/5/king-v-whitmer/.
288. See, e.g., Opinion and Order at *3, 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty.
Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf; Affidavit of Christopher
Thomas ¶¶ 2-18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing his experience and
 THE BIG LIE 257

the process for tabulating votes), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/

22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf.
289. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press
(January 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-
donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Rudy Giuliani’s
Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble,
at 13:10 – 13:25, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-
national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html.
290. Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Georgia House Hearing on Election Fraud, Brad
Raffensperger to Participate 12/23/20,” YouTube, at 27:28, 43:02-43:28, Dec. 23, 2020, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4cuakECmuA&t=2582s (Testimony of Ryan Ger-
many, counsel to Georgia Secretary of State, before Georgia legislature stating: “The total
number of underage people who voted is zero. We were able to look at everyone who
voted and look at their birthdate in the voter registration system, and I think there was
four people who requested a ballot before they turned 18, and they all turned 18 prior to
November 3rd, which means they’re allowed to vote.”).
291. See, e.g. Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 980 – The Border Tipping Point … Peter Navarro on
the Stolen Election and Desperation in Del Rio,” Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://
rumble.com/vhpam3-episode-980the-border-tipping-pointpeter-navarro-on-the-stolen-
election-and.html; Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 979 – The HQ of the Runaway Train …
Rachel Maddow’s Anna Karenina Moment,” Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://
rumble.com/vhp8yn-episode-979-the-hq-of-the-runaway-train-rachel-maddows-anna-
karenina-moment.html; Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Arizona State Legislature
Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,” YouTube, at 2:06:33-2:07:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww.
292. “Proof of Citizenship Requirements,” Arizona Secretary of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022),
available at https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/proof-citizenship-requirements.
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s “evidence-of-citizenship” requirement as
applied to federal elections. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 4,
19 (2013). Arizona law allows voters to register as “federal only” voters without proof of
citizenship, but those voters must provide a driver’s license or Social Security Number,
which is then checked by election officials against immigration records before the person
is added to voter registration rolls. Daniel González, “Are Undocumented Immigrants Vot-
ing Illegally in Arizona?,” Arizona Republic, (Oct. 27, 2016), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/10/27/voter-fraud-undocumented-
immigrants-voting-illegally-arizona-donald-trump/91703916/.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email
from Bill Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller re: AZ Federal ID Voters);
In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *23-25 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
294. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
295. For example, the President alleged in his January 6th speech that large numbers of ballots
were cast on behalf of dead people not just in Georgia but also in Michigan, Nevada, and
Pennsylvania. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated
Press (January 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; See also Rudy Giuliani’s
Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble,
258 CHAPTER 1

at 15:10-15:46, (Dec. 30, 2020, reposted Mar. 22, 2021), available at https://rumble.com/
vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html (making similar
claims).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Alex Cannon Production) AC-0013946, (November 12, 2020, email
from Alex Cannon to Matt Wolking, Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, Ali Pardo, Matthew Mor-
gan, and Andrew Clark titled “Re: dead voters”); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh
Production) XXM-0009451 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson,
Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: PA Death Data stating that quality control checks will
“significantly decrease[]” the number of “possible dead voters”), XXM-0009467 (November
8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: GA
Dead Voters), XXM-0009566 (November 9, 2020 email from Zach Parkinson to Jason Miller,
Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re PA Death Data noting there “may be errors” with their
data about people who were dead voters); Mark Niesse, “Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters
Found Alive and Well after 2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021),
available at https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-
well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/.
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198, (December 3, 2020, text
message from Eric Herschmann to Mark Meadows).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198-203, (December 3, 2020,
text messages between Eric Herschmann and Mark Meadows).
299. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No.2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14
2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
300. The expert, Bryan Geels, based his claims on a comparison of public voter information to
public death records. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000683-
84, 692-93, 706-07 (Affidavit of Bryan Geels dated Dec. 1, 2020, in Trump v. Barron, a case
filed by the Trump Campaign in a Georgia Superior Court in Fulton County). However, the
records reviewed included only name and year of birth for each individual listed. Id. at ¶
28. Based on this limited information, it was impossible for Geels (or anyone else) to con-
clude that the person with a particular name and birth year was the same person listed in
public death records with that name and birth year. See id., at ¶ 50 (only the Secretary of
State has the information to conduct a full analysis of this issue); see also Declaration of
Charles Stewart III at 22, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec.
14, 2020).
301. In Georgia, the Secretary of State found four cases where people voted in the names of
deceased individuals. Mark Niesse, “Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters Found Alive and Well
after 2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021), available at https://
www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-
election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/; In Arizona, the Attorney General recently
concluded its investigation into claims of supposed dead voters in the 2020 election and
found only one instance in which a vote was cast on behalf of a person who died prior to
the election. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General to The Honorable Karen Fann, Ari-
zona Senate President, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/
files/2022-08/Letter%20to%20Fann%20-%20EIU%20Update%20080122.pdf. In Michigan, the
Senate Oversight Committee found only two instances in which votes were cast in the
names of dead people: one was a clerical error (poll worker attributed vote to deceased
father of person with same name residing at same address) and the other was a woman
who died four days before the election but had sent in her absentee ballot before her
death. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in
 THE BIG LIE 259

Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-

1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
302. In an email obtained by the Select Committee, Katherine Friess, a lawyer who worked
closely with Giuliani, shared this information with Giuliani and noted, “I don’t think this
makes a particularly strong case.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB-
_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead
votes memo for your consideration).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
U.S. Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00026036 (January 5, 2021 email from Cleta
Mitchell to Richard Perry re: GA Data request by Senator Graham); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina
Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re:
Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration); Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christina
Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 141-42.
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email
from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration).
305. ABC News, “Lindsey Graham Delivers Remarks on Capitol Breach,” YouTube, at 3:05-3:30,
Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKHkYlRm_XM.
306. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (Dec. 31, 2020
email from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurth Hibert); see also Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008384_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from
Eric Herschmann to Cleta Mitchell and cc’ed to Mark Meadows and Molly Michael in which
Herschmann wrote: “I was concerned about the President signing a verification about facts
that may not be sustainable upon detailed scrutiny.”).
307. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99-
DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/
62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
308. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, Case 8:22-cv-
00099-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/
docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
309. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
310. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
311. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
312. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
313. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-
rally-transcript-january-6.
314. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
260 CHAPTER 1

2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
315. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020, 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22wild+protest%22 (archived).
316. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
317. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
 2

“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES”

In a now infamous telephone call on January 2, 2021, President Trump
pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger for more than an
hour. The President confronted him with multiple conspiracy theories
about the election—none of which were true. Raffensperger and other
Georgia officials debunked these allegations, one after another, during their
call. Under Raffensperger’s leadership, Georgia had, by that time, already
conducted a statewide hand recount of all ballots. That recount and other
post-election reviews proved that there was no widespread fraud, and that
voting machines didn’t alter the outcome of the election.1 This should have
put President Trump’s allegations to rest. But, undeterred by the facts, the
President badgered Raffensperger to overturn the Georgia results.
President Trump insisted that “the ballots are corrupt” and someone
was “shredding” them.2 He issued a thinly veiled threat, telling Raffens-
perger, “it is more illegal for you than it is for them because you know what
they did and you’re not reporting it.” 3 Of course, the Georgia officials
weren’t doing anything “illegal,” and there was nothing to “report.” Even
so, President Trump suggested that both Raffensperger and his general
counsel, Ryan Germany, could face criminal jeopardy.4 “That’s a criminal,
that’s a criminal offense. And you can’t let that happen,” the President
said.5 “That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . I’m notifying
you that you’re letting it happen.” 6
And then the President made his demand. “So look. All I want to do is
this. I just want to find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have,”
President Trump told Raffensperger.7
It was a stunning moment. The President of the United States was ask-
ing a State’s chief election officer to “find” enough votes to declare him the
winner of an election he lost.
Raffensperger saw the President’s warning to him on January 2nd as a
threat. “I felt then—and I still believe today—that this was a threat,”
Raffensperger wrote in his book.8 And this threat was multifaceted: first,

263
264 CHAPTER 2

the President “notifying” Raffensperger and his team of criminal activity

could be understood as directing the law-enforcement power of the Federal
Government against them. While Raffensperger did not know for certain
whether President Trump was threatening such an investigation, he knew
Trump had “positional power” as President and appeared to be promising
to “make [my] life miserable.” 9
But the threat was also of a more insidious kind. As Raffensperger wrote
in his book: “Others obviously thought [it was a threat], too, because some
of Trump’s more radical followers have responded as if it was their duty to
carry out this threat.” 10 Raffensperger's deputy held a press conference and
publicly warned all Americans, including President Trump, that President
Trump's rhetoric endangered innocent officials and private citizens, and
fueled death threats against Georgia election workers, sexualized threats
directed towards Raffensperger's wife, and harassment at the homes of
Georgia election officials.11 The January 2nd call promised more of the
same. The upshot of President Trump’s message to Raffensperger was: do
what I ask, or you will pay.
President Trump’s phone call with Secretary Raffensperger received
widespread coverage after it was leaked. But Georgia was not the only State
targeted by President Trump and his allies. The call was one element of a
larger and more comprehensive effort—much of it unseen by and unknown
to the general public—to overturn the votes cast by millions of American
citizens across several States.
As Chapter 1 explained, the root of this effort was the “Big Lie”: Presi-
dent Trump and his allies publicly claiming that the election was rife with
fraud that could have changed the result, even though the President’s own
advisors, and the Department of Justice, told the President time and time
again that this was not the case.12 But in parallel with this strategy, Presi-
dent Trump and his allies zeroed in on key battleground States the Presi-
dent had lost, leaning on Republican State officials to overrule voters,
disregard valid vote counts, and deliver the States’ electoral votes to the
losing candidate. Had this scheme worked, President Trump could have, for
the first time in American history, subverted the results of a lawful election
to stay in power. His was a deeply anti-democratic plan: to co-opt State
legislatures—through appeals to debunked theories of election fraud, or
pure partisan politics—to replace Biden electors with Trump electors, so
President Trump would win the electoral vote count in the joint session of
Congress on January 6th.
Had enough State officials gone along with President Trump’s plot, his
attempt to stay in power might have worked. It is fortunate that a critical
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 265

mass of honorable officials withstood President Trump’s pressure to par-

ticipate in this scheme. They and others who stood up to him closed off
avenues for thwarting the election so that, by noon on January 6th, Presi-
dent Trump was left with one desperate, final gambit for holding on to
power: sending his armed, angry supporters to the U.S. Capitol.

2.1 THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, AND PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT IT

When Americans vote for a presidential candidate on election day, they are
actually casting votes for that candidate’s proposed presidential electors to
participate in the electoral college. After a State certifies its election results
and announces a winner, it also issues a “certificate of ascertainment,”
which contains the names of the duly chosen electoral college electors. The
electors whose names appear as having received the most votes on the cer-
tificate of ascertainment will go on to participate in the electoral college,
while a losing candidate’s proposed electors have no role to play and no
standing to participate in the electoral college. This happens after every
Presidential election, in each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia.
This process comes from a clause in the U.S. Constitution that gives
States the power to choose electoral college electors according to State
law.13 That clause says that each State “shall appoint” electoral college
electors “in such [m]anner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” All 50
States have decreed that electors will be selected by popular vote.
Tuesday, November 3rd, was the day established by Federal law as elec-
tion day in 2020. Each State’s rules had been set—and courts had weighed
in when certain rules were challenged. Polls opened around the country and
votes came in, whether in person or via the mail, according to each State’s
laws.
Over 154 million voters cast votes according to the rules in place on
election day.14 President Trump lost. He and his supporters went to court,
filing long-shot legal challenges to the election, but they failed in courts
around the country, before judges appointed by executives of both parties
(including President Trump himself), and, for those judges who were
elected, that are members of both parties.
Rather than abiding by the rule of law and accepting the courts’ rulings,
President Trump and his advisors tried every which way to reverse the out-
come at the State level. They pressured local and State elections officials to
stop counting votes once it became clear that former Vice President Joseph
Biden would prevail in the final count. They pressured Governors, secretar-
ies of State, and local officials not to certify the popular vote in several
swing States that former Vice-President Biden had won. And, when that did
266 CHAPTER 2

not work, they pressured State legislators to disregard the vote counts and
instead appoint Trump electors to vote in the electoral college.
This fundamentally anti-democratic effort was premised on the incor-
rect theory that, because the Constitution assigns to State legislatures the
role of directing how electoral college electors are chosen (which every
State legislature had done before the election, giving that power to the
people at the ballot boxes) then the State legislatures could simply choose
Trump/Pence electors after seeing the election results. In effect, President
Trump and his advisors pushed for the rules to be changed after the
election—even if it meant disenfranchising millions of Americans.

2.2 THE PLAN EMERGES

More than a month before the Presidential election, the media reported that
the Trump Campaign was already developing a fallback plan that would
focus on overturning certain election results at the State level. An article
published on September 23, 2020, in The Atlantic explained, “[a]ccording to
sources in the Republican Party at the State and national levels, the Trump
Campaign is discussing contingency plans to bypass election results and
appoint loyal electors in battleground States where Republicans hold the
legislative majority.” 15 Ominously, the same reporting predicted, almost
exactly, what would later come to pass: “With a justification based on
claims of rampant fraud, Trump would ask State legislators to set aside the
popular vote and exercise their power to choose a slate of electors
directly.” 16
Numerous senior Trump Campaign advisors—including Campaign
Manager William Stepien, Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel
Justin Clark, and President Trump’s lead attorney Rudolph Giuliani—all
told the Select Committee that there was, indeed, a State-focused “strat-
egy” or “track” to challenge the outcome of the election, which included
pressing State legislators to challenge results in key States and to appoint
new electoral college electors.17
“You know, in the days after election day, later in that first week,
bleeding into the second, as our numbers and data looked bleaker, inter-
nally we knew that,” Stepien told the Select Committee.18 “As the AP [Asso-
ciated Press] called the race, I think some surrounding the President were
looking for different avenues to pursue.” That’s when Stepien remembered
the concept first coming up.19
Those around President Trump were pushing this idea, and pushing it
hard.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 267

Just two days after the election, President Trump’s son, Donald Trump,
Jr., forwarded to White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows a suggestion
that “State Assemblies can step in and vote to put forward the electoral
slate[,] Republicans control Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, North
Carolina, etc. we get Trump electors” and so “we either have a vote WE
control and WE win OR it gets kicked to Congress 6 January . . .” 20 Chief of
Staff Meadows responded: “Working on this for pa, ga and nc already.” 21
Within one week after the election, Meadows had also sent or received
several other similar messages:
“The state legislature can take over the electoral process”—Mark
Meadows’s text to Georgia State Senator Marty Harbin.22
“Agreed”—Mark Meadows’s text to a different sender, who sug-
gested that the Trump Administration “should get that out there” if
they were “seriously considering the state legislature strategy.” 23
“I will tell him”—Mark Meadows’s text to a sender who suggested
President Trump “[s]tart building momentum for the state legisla-
tures.” 24
“I love it”—Mark Meadows’s text to Representative Andy Biggs,
who relayed what he acknowledged as a “highly controversial” idea
to have “Republican legislature’s (sic)” “appoint a look doors (sic)
[electors].” 25
“. . . Why can’t the states of GA NC PENN and other R controlled
state houses declare this is BS (where conflicts and election not
called that night) and just send their own electors . . . I wonder if
POTUS knows this . . .”—former Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to
Mark Meadows.26
Another White House official exploring such a plan less than a week
after the election was Vince Haley, Deputy Assistant to the President for
Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting. He suggested:
“. . . Imagine if every red state legislature slated zero electors. It
would reveal that we are a red country. To do this we would have to
jack this to the nth degree as a battle of tribes . . . .” 27
Haley pushed this strategy in several texts and emails, including to
Assistant to the President and Director of Presidential Personnel Johnny
McEntee,28 an individual Haley characterized as “a very trusted lieutenant”
for President Trump, “a direct conveyor to Boss with ideas,” and “[a]t his
side almost all the time.” 29
268 CHAPTER 2

For Haley, however, purported election fraud was a way to justify Presi-
dent Trump-friendly legislatures changing the outcome of the election, but
there were other reasons for doing so, too. Election fraud was “only one
rationale for slating Trump electors,” Haley told McEntee, and “[w]e
should baldly assert” that State legislators “have the constitutional right to
substitute their judgment for a certified majority of their constituents” if
that prevents socialism.30 Haley added, “[i]ndependent of the fraud—or
really along with that argument—Harrisburg [Pennsylvania], Madison
[Wisconsin], and Lansing [Michigan] do not have to sit idly by and submit
themselves to rule by Beijing and Paris,” proposing that radio hosts “rally
the grassroots to apply pressure to the weak kneed legislators in those
states . . .” 31
McEntee replied “Yes!” and then: “Let’s find the contact info for all
these people now.” 32 Hours later, Haley sent him names and—in most
cases—cell phone numbers for top GOP legislators in six States, suggesting
“. . . for POTUS to invite them down for a WH meeting . . .” 33 The President
would later call several named in that message, including Rusty Bowers and
Karen Fann in Arizona; Lee Chatfield and Mike Shirkey in Michigan; and
Jake Corman in Pennsylvania.34
Others weighed in with the President about a State-focused plan, too.
Some were already looking ahead to January 6th.
On November 8th, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich met
President Trump at the White House.35 Two days later, he sent a follow-up
note to the President’s executive assistant titled “please give to POTUS[,]
newt.” 36 It suggested that “[t]he only way Trump loses is rigged system”
and added that President Trump could encourage “GOP legislatures elect
not to send in electors,” forcing a House vote by State delegations on Janu-
ary 6th that Gingrich expected President Trump would win.37 Meadows
replied: “Thanks Speaker.” 38
Newsmax CEO Christopher Ruddy had President Trump’s ear and
reportedly spoke with him by phone at least four times before December.39
He forwarded a memo to other close advisors of the President recommend-
ing that the Trump team persuade one or more Republican-led chambers in
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and even Minnesota
to “pick a separate competitive State slate of Electors,” which the memo
predicted might turn January 6th into “a cat-fight in Congress wherein VP
Pence is Presiding.” 40
Attorney and conservative activist Cleta Mitchell was recruited by Mark
Meadows immediately after the election to assist the Trump Campaign’s
legal work.41 By November 5th, she emailed Dr. John Eastman of Chapman
University,42 who would later play an outsized role pushing a theory about
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 269

Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images

what Vice President Pence could or couldn’t do during the January 6th joint
session of Congress that is detailed in Chapter 5 of this Report. In her email,
Mitchell asked Eastman to write a memo justifying an idea that State legis-
lators “reclaim” the power to pick electors and asked, rhetorically, “Am I
crazy?” 43 Dr. Eastman wrote the memo, entitled “The Constitutional
Authority of State Legislatures to Choose Electors,” and sent it along for
sharing “widely.” 44
According to the Office of Presidential Scheduling, President Trump was
scheduled to meet in the Oval Office on November 10th with Morgan Warst-
ler and John Robison, Texas entrepreneurs close to former Governor Rick
Perry.45 The next day, Warstler tweeted that he “[w]as in Oval yester-
day,” 46 and months later wrote that “I told whole Trump team in Oval”
that “State legislatures can choose the electors-no matter what current
state law OR state courts say.” 47
After this apparent meeting, John Robison sent the White House an
email entitled “URGENT follow up to our Tuesday Meeting with POTUS,”
that he asked be printed out for the President to “explain the move forward
plan for what was discussed.” 48 The email stated that “[President Trump]
liked the plan we presented to use a parallel path of state legislators,” and
the attached memo proposed hundreds of briefings for State lawmakers by
270 CHAPTER 2

President Trump’s surrogates and members of the Freedom Caucus.49 The

email envisioned President Trump hosting “4+ MONSTER RALLY-TRIALS”
with “[t]ens of thousands of Trump voters staring up at the GOP state leg-
islators from their districts who ALONE control which slate of electors their
state will submit,” a proposal that seemed to foreshadow the State hearings
that Rudolph Giuliani and President Trump championed less than a month
later.50
Deputy White House Chief of Staff Dan Scavino called Robison’s mes-
sage “Bat. Shit. Crazy,” but the President’s executive assistant, who was
asked to print it for the President, wrote “Printed,” and may have shared it
with the President anyway.51
By then, President Trump was engaged. According to Stepien, his Cam-
paign Manager, the State-focused strategy came up in a November 11th
meeting among close advisors as “something to consider.” 52 At that point,
the election had been called, but the President “was very interested in
keeping pathways to victory open, so [Stepien] believe[d] [the President]
found the concept intriguing.” 53 Then, the plan “just started happening”
even though it was something Stepien, “honestly, kind of dismissed at
hand,” characterizing it as one “of the crazy, crazier ideas that w[as]
thrown out, in and around that time.” 54
But not everyone was convinced. On November 19th, the prior Republi-
can Presidential nominee, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), issued a harsh
public condemnation of President Trump’s open and notorious efforts to
overturn the election:
Having failed to make even a plausible case of widespread fraud or
conspiracy before a court of law, the President has now resorted to
overt pressure on state and local officials to subvert the will of the
people and overturn the election. It is difficult to imagine a worse,
more undemocratic action by a sitting American President.55

Senator Romney was right to identify and decry President Trump’s

actions. And yet, in hindsight, it is clear that the effort to pressure State and
local officials by the Trump team was only just getting started.

2.3 OUTREACH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Just one day after the State-focused plan came up in the Oval Office with
the President and his top lieutenants, President Trump started taking con-
crete steps aimed at State legislators. And in the weeks that followed, the
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 271

President spearheaded outreach aimed at numerous officials in States he

lost but that had GOP-led legislatures, including in Michigan, Pennsylva-
nia, Georgia, and Arizona.
The Select Committee estimates that in the two months between the
November election and the January 6th insurrection, President Trump or
his inner circle engaged in at least 200 apparent acts of public or private
outreach, pressure, or condemnation, targeting either State legislators or
State or local election administrators, to overturn State election results.
This included at least:
• 68 meetings, attempted or connected phone calls, or text messages,
each aimed at one or more State or local officials;
• 18 instances of prominent public remarks, with language targeting one
or more such officials;56 and
• 125 social media posts by President Trump or senior aides targeting one
or more such officials, either explicitly or implicitly, and mostly from
his own account.57

Furthermore, these efforts by President Trump’s team also involved

two other initiatives that tried to enlist support from large numbers of State
legislators all at once:

• The Trump Campaign contacted, or attempted to contact, nearly 200

State legislators from battleground States between November 30, 2020
and December 3, 2020, to solicit backing for possible Statehouse reso-
lutions to overturn the election. At least some messages said they were
“on behalf of the president.” 58
• Nearly 300 State legislators from battleground States reportedly par-
ticipated in a private briefing with President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani,
John Eastman, and others on January 2nd. The President reportedly
urged them to exercise what he called “the real power” to choose
electoral votes before January 6th, because, as President Trump said on
the call, “I don’t think the country is going to take it.” 59

It may be impossible to document each and every meeting, phone call,

text message, or other contact that President Trump and his allies had with
State and local officials in various battleground States. What follows is a
summary that focuses on four States and that demonstrates the lengths to
which President Trump would go in order to stay in power based on lies—
the Big Lie—about the election.
272 CHAPTER 2

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EARLY PRESSURE ON PUBLIC SERVANTS

To carry out his plan, President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani, and other surro-
gates of President Trump publicly and privately sought assistance from
State and local officials whom they assumed would help as Republicans on
the same team with the “same goal.” 60 Some helped. Others didn’t.
On November 12th, U.S. Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI) sent an
email to President Trump’s Executive Assistant Molly Michael, describing a
request he had received earlier that day:

During my conversation with the President this morning he asked

me to check with key leadership in Michigan’s Legislature as to how
supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election
irregularities and potential fraud. He wanted me to gauge their will-
ingness to talk with him about efforts to bring about transparency
and integrity in Michigan’s election and report back to him.61

Representative Walberg added that he had already acted on this request:

“I’ve had conversations with [Michigan] Speaker Lee Chatfield, Senate
Majority Leader Mike Shirkey, and Senate President Pro Tempore Aric Nes-
bitt. They all assured me they would look forward to speaking with the
President to report on their continuing efforts” related to overseeing the
election “and receiving any suggestions from President Trump.” 62 The
President would soon host Chatfield, Shirkey, Nesbitt, and four other
Michigan State lawmakers at the White House.63
In Arizona, on November 13, 2020, the day after officials finished
counting ballots cast in Maricopa County, Chairwoman Kelli Ward, of the
Arizona Republican Party, texted Mark Meadows that she had “[j]ust talked
to POTUS” and that “[h]e may call the Chairman of the Maricopa Board of
Supervisors,” Clint Hickman.64 Ward also left a message for Hickman that
said, “I just talked to President Trump, and he would like me to talk to you
and also see if he needs to give you a call to discuss what’s happening on
the ground in Maricopa. Give me a call back when you can.” 65 According to
Hickman, Ward was unusually active after the election, even for a party
chair, and was the first person to pressure him. One of her first messages to
Hickman before trying to connect him with President Trump was: “We
need you to stop the counting.” 66
In Georgia, the President initially took a more public approach. After the
Associated Press called the race there on November 12th, President Trump
tweeted harsh criticisms of Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State
Brad Raffensperger.67 Often these tweets called for them to take specific
actions that would have shifted the election results in his favor, such as
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 273

rejecting a court settlement (which he referred to as a consent decree) that

dictated the procedures for verifying signatures on absentee ballots. And he
was relentless.
In November alone, President Trump tweeted that Raffensperger was “a
so-called Republican (RINO)” and asked “Where is @BrianKempGA,” 68
before suggesting that “They knew they were going to cheat.” 69 He called
to “Break the unconstitutional Consent Decree!” 70 and urged stricter sig-
nature matches with a demand to “Get it done! @BrianKempGA.” 71 He
called Kemp “hapless” and asked why he wouldn’t use emergency powers
to overrule Raffensperger on the signature-verification procedures, declar-
ing that “Georgia Republicans are angry.” 72 President Trump also
retweeted posts asking, “Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans
like Brian Kemp,” and “why bother voting for Republicans if what you get
is Ducey and Kemp?” 73
Pennsylvania was an early, but not unique, example of how President
Trump’s State-pressure campaign affected the lives of the public servants
running this country’s elections.
On November 7th, Rudy Giuliani headlined a Philadelphia press confer-
ence in front of a landscaping business called Four Seasons Total Landscap-
ing, near a crematorium and down the street from a sex shop.74
Standing in front of former New York Police Commissioner and
recently-pardoned convicted felon, Bernard Kerik, Giuliani gave opening
remarks and handed the podium over to his first supposed eyewitness to
election fraud, who turned out to be a convicted sex offender.75 Giuliani
claimed “at least 600,000 ballots are in question” in Pennsylvania and
falsely suggested that large numbers of ballots in the State had been cast
for dead people, including boxer Joe Frazier and actor Will Smith’s father.76
Within days, Republican Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt
and others publicly debunked Giuliani’s specific allegations of election
fraud, including the claims about dead people voting in Pennsylvania elec-
tions.77 In reaction, President Trump tweeted on the morning of November
11th that “[a] guy named Al Schmidt, a Philadelphia Commissioner and
so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the Fake News
Media to explain how honest things were with respect to the Election in
Philadelphia. He refuses to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty.
We win!” 78
That statement targeting Schmidt led to a deluge of threatening and
harassing phone calls and emails by people who heard President Trump and
falsely held out hope that Schmidt or someone else could overturn the
results of Pennsylvania’s election.79
274 CHAPTER 2

As a public official, Schmidt was no stranger to threats. But being tar-

geted by the President of the United States was different. In Schmidt’s pub-
lic testimony to the Select Committee, he described why. “[P]rior to that
the threats were pretty general in nature. ‘Corrupt election officials in
Philadelphia are going to get what’s coming to them’” and other similar
threats.80 “After the President tweeted at me by name, calling me out the
way that he did,” Schmidt explained, “the threats became much more spe-
cific, much more graphic, and included not just me by name but included
members of my family by name, their ages, our address, pictures of our
home. Just every bit of detail that you could imagine.” 81
As the President continued to push the Big Lie and vilify public officials,
such threats multiplied.

EFFORTS TO PREVENT STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM CERTIFYING THE ELECTION
Some of President Trump’s early outreach was part of an effort to prevent
State and local officials from certifying his loss. One example comes from
Michigan, and the other from Arizona.
Wayne County, Michigan, includes Detroit and its surrounding areas. On
November 17th, the county’s Board of Canvassers met to certify election
results, a process the Michigan Supreme Court described over a century ago
as ministerial and clerical.82
The meeting started at 6:00 p.m. and lasted over three hours.83 Its two
Republican members, Board Chair Monica Palmer and Board Member Wil-
liam Hartmann, first voted to block the certification of the election.84 After
a brief break, Palmer and Hartmann returned, changed their votes, and cer-
tified the election results.85 Just over twenty minutes later, Palmer and
Hartmann received a call from President Trump and RNC Chair Ronna
McDaniel.86
Palmer claimed that the call “was not pressure.” Rather, she said, “[i]t
was genuine concern for my safety” and “there were general comments
about different States, but we really didn’t discuss the details of the certifi-
cation.” 87
The Select Committee doesn’t know exactly what President Trump pri-
vately said on that phone call.88 By the next evening, however, Palmer and
Hartmann had each issued signed affidavits reassuming their earlier posi-
tion that Wayne County’s results should not be certified.89 Palmer’s affida-
vit even declared that “I rescind my prior vote,” though rescinding wasn’t
possible and her statement had no legal effect.90 And, President Trump
apparently knew before it was public that Hartmann and Palmer would try
to change their votes; almost eight hours before either of these affidavits
were publicly released, President Trump tweeted that these “two harassed
patriot Canvassers refuse to sign the papers!” 91
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 275

Republicans in Arizona experienced similar treatment. In the most

populous and electorally significant county in Arizona, Maricopa County’s
Board of Supervisors met on November 20th to certify the county’s election
results. Their Board, made up of four Republicans and one Democrat, care-
fully reviewed the official canvass, asked questions for approximately two
hours, then unanimously voted to certify the results.92
Earlier that day, Kelli Ward contacted two of the board’s members, Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, and asked them to delay the certification on the basis
of supposed improprieties.93 According to Sellers and Gates, however, Ari-
zona law required certification that day and they had no information (nei-
ther then, nor ever) to doubt the county’s election results.94
When Arizona certified its 2020 statewide election results on November
30th, it fell to Governor Doug Ducey, a Republican, to sign the certification.
While on camera during the signing ceremony, Governor Ducey’s phone
played a ringtone for the song “Hail to the Chief,” which he immediately
silenced.95
The Governor later confirmed it had been President Trump calling and
that he returned the President’s call shortly afterwards, but declined to say
what the two discussed other than saying that President Trump did not ask
him to withhold certification.96 The Select Committee does not know
whether that is true, but that evening President Trump blasted Ducey on
Twitter, accusing him of “rushing to put a Democrat in office,” and warn-
ing that “Republicans will long remember!” 97 The President also retweeted
posts bashing Ducey and his Georgia counterpart Brian Kemp, which asked
“Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans like Brian Kemp and
Doug Ducey?”, “why bother voting for Republicans if what you get is Ducey
and Kemp?”, and “Brian Kemp: ‘My state ran the most corrupt election in
American history.’ Doug Ducey: ‘Hold my beer.’” 98 President Trump even
commented “TRUE!” when retweeting a post that “Gov Ducey has betrayed
the people of Arizona.” 99
Governor Ducey pushed back, writing on Twitter that, “I’ve been pretty
outspoken about Arizona’s election system, and bragged about it quite a bit,
including in the Oval Office . . . In Arizona, we have some of the strongest
election laws in the country . . . The problems that exist in other states sim-
ply don’t apply here.” 100 Governor Ducey explained the law for certifying
elections in Arizona and pointed out that the certification now triggered a
“5-day window for any elector to bring a credible challenge to the election
results in court. If you want to contest the results, now is the time. Bring
your challenges.” 101 And, Governor Ducey referenced his oath of office:
276 CHAPTER 2

Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images

“That’s the law. I’ve sworn an oath to uphold it, and I take my responsibil-
ity seriously.” 102 President Trump and his allies never brought a credible
challenge and, instead, lost every case they brought challenging the results
in Arizona.

EFFORTS TO REPLACE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ELECTORS AND OVERTURN THE ELECTION

Once counties and States certified the election, or when it was nearly cer-
tain that they would, President Trump and his team’s focus largely shifted.
President Trump and his team encouraged State legislators to meet in spe-
cial sessions, if necessary, and choose electoral college electors who would
vote for the Trump/Pence ticket. Ultimately, no State legislature took that
step, but it was the basis for pressuring State officials from November
through January 6, 2021.

MEETINGS WITH STATE LEGISLATORS—THE “HEARINGS”

The concept of State legislators appointing their own electors featured
prominently in a series of hastily arranged official and unofficial “hear-
ings” with State legislators that the Trump team announced on November
24, 2020.103
On November 25th, President Trump called in to an unofficial meeting
with legislators in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.104 The meeting was set up to
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 277

appear like an official hearing, but it was not. It took place in a hotel ball-
room, and those presenting arguments or purported evidence, like Giuliani,
Jenna Ellis, and others, were not placed under oath.105 According to Presi-
dent Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate Jake Corman, he had initially
been asked by State Senator Doug Mastriano to hold a hearing about the
election. Corman responded that any formal hearing should be official, with
sworn testimony, and open to both parties.106 That was not what Senator
Mastriano ultimately convened.
President Trump had originally made plans to attend the Pennsylvania
gathering in person, but he cancelled after several advisors tested positive
for COVID–19.107 When President Trump called in and spoke to those gath-
ered in the hotel ballroom, his false claims were met with cheers, and he
made his purpose clear: “this election has to be turned around . . . Why
wouldn’t they overturn an election? Certainly overturn it in your State . . .
We have to turn the election over.” 108
President Trump made the ask and Giuliani told the legislators how to
carry it out. Giuliani told the assembled legislators that it was their
“power” and “responsibility” to pick Pennsylvania’s presidential electors
and that “[they] have to convince the rest of [their] members, Republican
and Democrat, they owe that to the people of” Pennsylvania.109 Jenna Ellis
told them that although Pennsylvania law dictates that electors are chosen
by popular vote, “[y]ou can take that power back at any time. You don’t
need a court to tell you that.” 110
President Trump invited some of the lawmakers to come meet him at
the White House that evening and, according to Giuliani, it was “a large
group” that went.111 Special Assistant to the President Cassidy Hutchinson’s
text messages with Kerik included the guest list and descriptions of the
vehicles that would need access to the White House grounds.112 Pennsylva-
nia State Senator Doug Mastriano drove one car, a hired driver drove a van
with most of the State legislators, and Kerik drove an SUV with attorney
Katherine Friess and election-conspiracy proponent Phil Waldron.113
Hutchinson estimated that at least 29 visitors traveled from Pennsylvania
to the White House that day, and she explained that their conversation with
the President touched on holding a special session of the State legislature to
appoint Trump electors.114
Just a few days later, on November 30, 2020, President Trump also
called into another one of Giuliani and Jenna Ellis’s hotel “hearings,” this
time in Arizona. Several Arizona State lawmakers hosted the meeting at a
Hyatt Regency in Phoenix after they did not receive permission to organize
an official hearing at the State Capitol.115 Before the hearing started, State
GOP Representative Mark Finchem “promised information to show that the
278 CHAPTER 2

state’s 11 electoral votes should not go to Democrat Joe Biden,” and argued
that “the U.S. Constitution empowers lawmakers to decide, on their own,
whether the election was valid and, if not, to select the electors of their
choice.” 116
Giuliani told the assembled legislators that the officials certifying Ari-
zona’s election results “have made no effort to find out” if the results of
the election were accurate, “which seems to me gives the state legislature a
perfect reason to take over the conduct of this election because it’s being
conducted irresponsibly and unfairly.” 117 Likewise, Jenna Ellis said that it
was “not just the choice, but the actual duty and obligation of the legisla-
ture to step in and to make sure that you don’t certify false results.” 118
During a recess, she also took to Twitter, writing, “[t]he certification of
Arizona’s FALSE results is unethical and knowingly participating in the
corruption that has disenfranchised AZ voters. BUT, this in no way impacts
the state legislature’s ability to take back the proper selection of del-
egates.” 119
When it was President Trump’s turn to address this handful of lawmak-
ers over the phone, he called them “legends for taking this on,” and used
the opportunity to criticize Governor Ducey: “you’ll have to figure out
what’s that all about with Ducey. He couldn’t [certify] fast enough” and
“Arizona will not forget what Ducey just did. We’re not gonna forget.” 120
That night Giuliani joined President Trump in criticizing Governor Ducey,
while at the same time making baseless allegations about voting machines
in Arizona and calling for a special legislative session to change the out-
come of the election: “Governor Ducey of Arizona refuses to meet with me.
He doesn’t want to explain that he selected a foreign corrupt Voting
Machine company to count the vote. I understand his reluctance, but [sic]
just call a special session. Let’s find out how crooked your election really
was?” 121
Michigan was next. Giuliani’s team announced that the Michigan legis-
lature would hold a hearing on December 1st, but the relevant committee
chair excluded Giuliani because it was only open to witnesses “with first
hand knowledge.” 122 That chairman, Michigan State Senator Edward McB-
room (R-Vulcan), had already held Senate Oversight hearings by then in an
actual effort to evaluate claims of fraud in the 2020 election, which ulti-
mately resulted in a comprehensive report that concluded that the
Republican-led committee “found no evidence of widespread or systematic
fraud” in Michigan’s election.123
Michigan’s House Oversight Committee, however, did allow Giuliani to
testify in a hearing on December 2nd. Before the hearing, Giuliani joined
the State’s GOP chairwoman to give what was billed as a legal briefing. In
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 279

the online presentation, Giuliani told the audience there’s “nothing wrong
with putting pressure on your state legislators” 124 to pick new electors and
that “you have got to get them to remember that their oath to the Constitu-
tion sometimes requires being criticized. Sometimes it even requires being
threatened.” 125
When Giuliani appeared for the hearing in Michigan, he was not placed
under oath, used his time to refer to Michigan’s election as a “con job,” and
urged legislators to “have the courage to say that certification that was
done by your state is a complete phony.” 126 The information presented was
baseless—and sometimes racist—conspiracy theories. One witness brought
to criticize Michigan’s voter verification even said: “I think Chinese all look
alike. So how would you tell? If some Chow shows up, you can be anybody
and you can vote.” 127 And, as he had promised in the legal briefing the day
before, Giuliani then called on the legislators to do what the Trump Cam-
paign had reportedly been discussing since before election day. He said that
the State legislature could still singlehandedly decide the election result
“anytime you want to. Anytime. You can take it back tonight. You can take
it back the day before the electors go down to Washington.” 128 Jenna Ellis
also participated, insisting “no honest person can hear these citizens of
your own state today . . . and can let this proceed. What the Constitution
obligates you to do is to take back your plenary power.” 129
Finally, Georgia. There, Giuliani and others appeared in multiple hear-
ings, the first of which was held on December 3, 2020. In that hearing, Giu-
liani was direct and called on Georgia legislators to overturn the election
results—“you are the final arbiter of who the electors should be”—based
on the false premise that “there is more than ample evidence to conclude
that this election was a sham.” 130 Then, at a separate hearing on December
10th, he told State legislators that Georgia’s Governor, Lieutenant Gover-
nor, and secretary of State were engaged in a “cover up” of “a crime in
plain sight,” and that it fell to “the state legislature [ ] to vindicate the
honor of the state.” 131 And, Giuliani used yet another appearance, on
December 30th, to call the 2020 election “the most crooked election, the
most manipulated election in American history,” and implore the Republi-
can legislators to hold a special session to vote on appointing new electors,
something he said that they could do “right up until the last moment”
before January 6th.132
More perniciously, Giuliani also used these hearings to advance con-
spiracy theories that falsely accused Fulton County election workers of rig-
ging Georgia’s election results. His delegation to the December 3rd hearing
played clips of election-night surveillance footage from the State Farm
280 CHAPTER 2

Arena that showed election workers scanning ballots, sometimes after par-
tisan poll watchers had gone home.133 Although the poll watchers should
have been there the entire time while election workers counted the votes,
there was nothing nefarious about the circumstances and no question about
the end result. In fact, the FBI, Department of Justice, and Georgia Bureau
of Investigation would determine that these ballots were legitimate ballots,
that observers were not illegally ejected, and that the ballots were scanned
and counted properly, contrary to claims by President Trump and his attor-
neys.134 And yet Giuliani baselessly declared at the December 3rd hearing
that, to him, the video was a “powerful smoking gun” proving that “those
votes are not legitimate votes.” 135
But Giuliani’s claims took a more ominous turn during the December
10th hearing. There, he publicly named two of the election workers shown
in the video, Ruby Freeman and her daughter, Wandrea ArShaye “Shaye”
Moss, and accused them of vote-tampering and engaging in criminal con-
duct.136 He seized on a clip of Freeman passing Moss a ginger mint, claim-
ing that the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB drives “as if
they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” He also suggested that Freeman and
Moss should be jailed and that they deserved to have their homes
searched.137 Not only were Giuliani’s claims about Freeman and Moss reck-
less, racist, and false, they had real-world consequences that turned both
women’s lives upside down. And further heightening the personal impact of
these baseless attacks, President Trump supported, and even repeated,
them, as described later.
In the end, the hearings were widely panned. In Michigan alone, current
and former Republican lawmakers publicly questioned the hearings and
implored President Trump and his team to stop. U.S. Representative Paul
Mitchell (R-Mich.) implored on Twitter “Please JUST STOP!” and “won-
dered why Republican leaders allowed testimony he said was ‘driving the
party into this ditch.’” 138 Similarly, former Michigan lawmaker Martin
Howrylak (R-Oakland) said that he was “embarrassed” by the hearing, and
former Michigan Senator Ken Sikkema (R-Grand Rapids) said that “the way
the committee was run was atrocious.” 139 Later, the President promoted a
tweet calling a Democratic lawmaker a “#pos” for speaking out at the
Michigan hearing.140 Months later, Giuliani’s license to practice law in New
York was suspended for, among other reasons, the “false claims” he made
on various dates, including during the hearings in Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Arizona, and Georgia.141
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 281

THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN’S BARRAGE OF PHONE CALLS TO STATE LEGISLATORS

Not only was replacing electors a theme during the official and unofficial
State hearings, it was also a critical component of President Trump’s plan
both before and after the hearings took place.
In fact, while the hearings were happening, the Trump Campaign set up
an operation to contact hundreds of State legislators and ask them to sup-
port an effort to appoint electoral college electors for the Trump/Pence
ticket in States that President Trump had lost.
On the same day as Giuliani’s hearing in Michigan, Trump Campaign
staff contacted dozens of Republicans in Michigan’s State legislature. A
Trump Campaign supervisor sent text messages to his team, directing them
to reach out to lawmakers “to explain the process for legislative redress
and tell them how to send representative[s] to th[e] electoral college.” 142
He added: “We’re gonna be lobbyists. Woot.” 143
According to a Campaign staffer’s spreadsheet produced to the Select
Committee, the Trump Campaign apparently tried contacting over 190
Republican State legislators in Arizona, Georgia, and Michigan, alone.144
One voicemail left as part of this initiative was leaked to the press on
December 1, 2020. In it, a Trump Campaign staffer said, “I did want to per-
sonally reach out to you on behalf of the President.” 145 Her main point
came later in the message: “we want to know when there is a resolution in
the House to appoint electors for Trump if the President can count on you
to join in support.” 146 Another message from this effort that reached
reporters made the same ask and claimed that, “[a]fter a roundtable with
the President, he asked us to reach out to you individually” to whip support
for a “joint resolution from the State House and Senate” that would “allow
Michigan to send electors for Donald J. Trump to the Electoral College and
save our country.” 147
Soon after the voicemail leaked, the Campaign staffer who left this
voicemail got a text message from one of her supervisors, who wrote:
“Honest to god I’m so proud of this” because “[t]hey unwittingly just got
your message out there.” 148 He elaborated: “you used the awesome power
of the presidency to scare a state rep into getting a statewide newspaper to
deliver your talking points.” 149

OUTREACH BY PRESIDENT TRUMP AND SENIOR AIDES

While Campaign aides blanketed State officials with these calls, some State
officials received more personalized outreach directly from President
Trump, Giuliani, and their allies throughout the post-election period about
this issue.
282 CHAPTER 2

Michigan. As discussed earlier, Rep. Walberg reached out to State legislators

in Michigan at the President’s request in mid-November, including Senate
Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and House Speaker Lee Chatfield. By Novem-
ber 18th, President Trump called Chatfield and Shirkey to invite them to
what would become a meeting for a group of Michigan lawmakers in the
Oval Office.150 Although President Trump didn’t tell Shirkey what the meet-
ing would be about, the President was focused on the election and asked
Shirkey what he and others were doing to investigate election fraud.151 The
meeting happened on November 20th.152
In Shirkey’s words, there “wasn’t a mystery” about why the group was
at the White House once the meeting started.153 When the President men-
tioned several baseless claims of election fraud in Wayne County, Shirkey
told the President that he had lost the election and that it had nothing to do
with Wayne County, where he had actually performed better than he had in
2016.154
From the President’s body language, Shirkey concluded that wasn’t
what he wanted to hear. But the meeting continued, and the President
dialed in Giuliani, who delivered a “long monologue,” reciting a “litany” of
allegations about supposed fraud that was short on substance.155 Shirkey
challenged Giuliani, asking “when are you going to . . . file a lawsuit in
Michigan,” which he said Giuliani did not answer.156 Although Shirkey says
he did not recall the President making any precise “ask,” Chatfield recalled
President Trump’s more generic directive for the group to “have some
backbone and do the right thing.” 157 Chatfield understood that to mean
they should investigate claims of fraud and overturn the election by naming
electors for President Trump.158 Shirkey told the President that he was not
going to do anything that would violate Michigan law.159
After the meeting ended, Shirkey and Chatfield issued a joint statement:
“We have not yet been made aware of any information that would change
the outcome of the election in Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will
follow the law and follow the normal process regarding Michigan’s elec-
tors, just as we have said throughout this election.” 160
That was not the end, however. Chatfield and Shirkey received numer-
ous calls from the President in the weeks following the election. Chatfield
told the Select Committee that he received approximately five to ten phone
calls from President Trump after the election, during which the President
would usually ask him about various allegations of voter fraud.161 Chatfield
said that he repeatedly looked into the President’s claims but never found
anything persuasive that could have changed the outcome of the election.162
President Trump’s calls were not enough, so he turned to the public. On
January 3, 2021, the Trump Campaign posted a tweet that urged supporters
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 283

Photo by Rey Del Rio/Getty Images

to “Contact Speaker Lee Chatfield & Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey”
to “Demand [a] vote on decertification.” 163 Why President Trump thought
the Michigan legislature would convene to decertify the election in a matter
of hours when it had refused to do so since early November is not clear. But
that didn’t stop the President from making things personal. The President’s
January 3rd tweet included Shirkey’s personal cellphone number as well as
a number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong. As a result, Shirkey said
he received nearly 4,000 text messages, and another private citizen
reported being inundated with calls and texts intended for Chatfield.164

Pennsylvania. On November 21st, Mark Meadows texted a number appar-

ently belonging to Representative Scott Perry (R–PA) and asked: “Can you
send me the number for the speaker and the leader of the PA Legislature.
POTUS wants to chat with them.” 165 Hours later, Meadows received a
response of “Yes sir.” 166 At the time, the leader of the Pennsylvania Senate
was Jake Corman and the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House was Bryan
Cutler.
Corman told the Select Committee that he received a call on Thanksgiv-
ing Day 2020 from Giuliani, urging him to call the legislature into a special
session to replace Biden electors with Trump electors.167 This idea wasn’t
new to Corman. President Trump and his allies had gone public about their
284 CHAPTER 2

intentions before then, including during the Pennsylvania hotel hearing,

but Corman had braced himself for this even before the election. Before
election day in 2020, a reporter from The Atlantic interviewed Corman and
other prominent Republicans in Pennsylvania about the possibility that
President Trump would try to circumvent the popular vote in swing States
by asking the legislatures to appoint Trump/Pence electors. After the
article, Corman drafted an op-ed, making it clear that the Pennsylvania
legislature did not have the legal authority to appoint Trump/Pence electors
in contravention of the popular vote, a position that he would generally
maintain through the 2020 Presidential election cycle.168
During that call, Giuliani first tried “pumping [Corman] up as a patriot”
before asking the Senator to call the Pennsylvania legislature into a special
session. Corman told Giuliani that he did not have the authority to do that,
a position with which his own lawyers agreed.169 Giuliani’s reply was that
Corman must have bad lawyers. Corman said he offered to connect Giuliani
with his legal team. His legal team spoke with Giuliani and a lawyer work-
ing with him, Jenna Ellis, the following day, reiterating their view that such
a move by the legislature would be illegal.170 That same day, or possibly the
next, Giuliani and Ellis called him back to renew their request for a special
legislative session and to demean Corman’s attorneys, calling them “ter-
rible,” “bad,” and “wrong.” 171 Corman, however, held his ground and
ended the call.172
While packing to return to Pennsylvania from his Thanksgiving visit to
Florida, Corman says he received a call from an unknown number with a
Washington, DC area code, which he let go to voicemail.173 It turned out to
be a White House operator calling on behalf of President Trump.174
Corman called back and spoke to President Trump, who insisted that he
had won the election in Pennsylvania and said something to the effect of,
“Jake, this is a big issue. We need your help.” 175 Corman told the President
that he couldn’t do what the Trump team was asking; President Trump
replied, “I’m not sure your attorneys are very good.” 176 Corman wanted to
end the call and offered to have his lawyers speak again with President
Trump’s, but they never had another call with the President’s lawyers.177
Pennsylvania House Speaker Bryan Cutler was another main target for
the President’s team. He received voicemails in late November for four days
in a row from Giuliani and/or Jenna Ellis, which he provided to the Select
Committee.178 Cutler explained that he did not feel comfortable talking with
the President’s team in case he ended up having to preside over a legislative
session about the election, and he had his attorneys relay that to the Presi-
dent’s team.179 Giuliani received the message but continued to call Speaker
Cutler nonetheless.180
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 285

In the first of these voicemails, on November 26th, Giuliani asked to

“get together, quietly” to discuss “the amount of fraud that went on in
your State,” and said that Giuliani and Ellis had also just spoken to Penn-
sylvania House Majority Leader Kerry Benninghoff.181 On November 27th,
Ellis called and said in a second voicemail that they had just talked to Penn-
sylvania House Member Russ Diamond and were “very grateful” to the
State’s legislature “for doing your Article II duty.” 182 On November 28th,
Giuliani left a third voicemail and claimed to have “something important”
that “really changes things,” and said that “the president wanted me to
make sure I got it to you.” 183 And then on November 29th, Giuliani left a
fourth message and said, “I understand that you don’t want to talk to me
now” but still sought “the courtesy of being able to talk to you as the presi-
dent’s lawyer” and a “fellow Republican” because “you’re certifying what
is a blatantly false statement . . . I can’t imagine how that’s in your interests
or in the interests of our party.” 184
Giuliani and Ellis didn’t get through, but the President did. “[I]f we
wanted to do something, what were the options[?]” the President asked
Cutler.185 Cutler explained to President Trump that he could file a legal
challenge contesting the election, and asked the President why his team
had never requested a statewide recount.186 Cutler was also clear about the
“constitutional peculiarities” of Pennsylvania, where the State constitution
specifically prohibits retroactive changes to how electors are chosen.187
Practically, President Trump’s call achieved nothing. The President
wasn’t getting what he wanted in his calls to leaders in Pennsylvania: a
special session of the legislature to appoint Trump/Pence electors.
Seemingly undeterred, President Trump invited several leaders of the
Pennsylvania legislature to the White House for Christmas gatherings.188
Senator Corman decided not to go, although Speaker Cutler did. President
Trump spoke with Cutler on December 3rd, while Cutler, his chief of staff,
and their wives were at that White House Christmas tour.189 The issue of
overturning the results of Pennsylvania’s election came up again, as did the
possibility of a special session of the State legislature to appoint Trump
electors.190 Cutler told the President that the State legislature could not
reconvene without an order from the Governor and a petition from a super-
majority of legislators, neither of which was likely to happen.191 Cutler also
told the President that they could not appoint new electors without a court
order. In Cutler’s opinion, President Trump “seemed to understand. And
that was—that was clear.” 192 The President’s apparent understanding,
however, did not result in any meaningful changes to his public rhetoric.
On December 3rd, the same day that Cutler met with President Trump,
Cutler, Corman, House Majority Leader Benninghoff, and Senate Majority
286 CHAPTER 2

Leader Kim Ward issued a three-page single-spaced joint statement assert-

ing, in no uncertain terms, that Pennsylvania’s General Assembly “lacks
the authority . . . to overturn the popular vote and appoint our own slate of
electors,” since “[d]oing so would violate our Election Code and Constitu-
tion, particularly a provision that prohibits us from changing the rules for
election contests of the President after the election.” 193 In response, Presi-
dent Trump retweeted a December 4th post by Bernard Kerik, which tagged
all four of these State legislators with the hashtag “Traitors,” and declared
that “These are the four cowardice[sic] Pennsylvania legislators that intend
to allow the Democrat machine to #StealtheVote! #Cowards #Liars #Trai-
tors.” 194
But five days later, President Trump publicly thanked Cutler for signing
onto a December 4th letter that encouraged Members of Congress from
Pennsylvania to object to their State’s electoral votes on January 6th. The
President tweeted: “Thank you to Speaker Cutler and all others in Pennsyl-
vania and elsewhere who fully understand what went on in the 2020 elec-
tion. It’s called total corruption!” 195 When the Select Committee asked
Cutler about this apparent change in his position, he said that he signed on
to this letter not because of concerns that fraud or corruption meant the
results of the election Pennsylvania were wrong, but rather because of con-
cerns about “programmatic changes or areas for improvement” related to
the election.196 In fact, Cutler reiterated to the Committee that he “was not
personally aware of” any widespread election fraud that would have
changed the result of the election.197
The pressure facing State legislators during this period was significant.
On December 9th, the New York Times quoted Pennsylvania’s Senate Major-
ity Leader Kim Ward, revealing that she too had received a call from Presi-
dent Trump in which he pushed his election fraud narrative.198 Ward told
the Times that she hadn’t been given enough time to sign the same Decem-
ber 4th letter that Cutler did, but commented that if she had taken a stand
against it, “I’d get my house bombed tonight.” 199

Arizona. In late November, Arizona House Speaker Russell “Rusty” Bowers,

a longtime Republican who served 17 years in the State legislature, received
a call from President Trump and Giuliani.200 Giuliani alleged that Arizona’s
election results were skewed by illicit ballots, cast by non-citizens or on
behalf of dead people.201 Bowers demanded proof for these audacious
claims on the call and President Trump told Giuliani to comply, but the evi-
dence never came.202 The point of the call, however, was different. Like in
Michigan and Pennsylvania, President Trump and his allies were working
the phones to get something. They wanted Bowers to hold a public hearing
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 287

Photo by House Creative Services

with the ultimate aim of replacing Presidential electors for former Vice
President Joe Biden with electors for President Trump.203
Bowers had never heard of anything like that before, and Giuliani
acknowledged that it had never been done. Where President Trump and
Giuliani saw a potential opportunity, however, Bowers saw a fundamental
problem.
As Bowers explained it, what they wanted him to do was “counter to my
oath when I swore to the Constitution to uphold it.” 204 And he said that to
the President and Giuliani: “you are asking me to do something against my
oath, and I will not break my oath.” 205 Giuliani replied: “aren’t we all
Republicans here? I mean, I would think you would listen a little more open
to my suggestions, that we’re all Republicans.” 206
The pressure didn’t stop with that call. On December 1st, Giuliani and
Ellis got an audience with some of the most powerful Republican lawmak-
ers in Arizona, including Bowers, Senate President Karen Fann, Senate
President Pro Tempore Vince Leach, House Majority Leader and Senator-
Elect Warren Petersen, Senate Majority Whip Sonny Borrelli, Senator
Michelle Ugenti-Rita, and others.207 The Select Committee was unable to
get Giuliani and Ellis’ perspective on this outreach because Giuliani claimed
that his communications with Bowers—who was not his client nor part of
288 CHAPTER 2

his legal team—were “privileged,” while Ellis invoked her Fifth Amend-
ment rights against self-incrimination.208
Bowers, on the other hand, told the Select Committee that Giuliani and
Ellis asked the lawmakers to deliver Arizona’s electors for President Trump,
despite the certified popular vote count.209 To bolster their request, Giuliani
and Ellis raised numerous allegations of election fraud at the meeting,
though they never produced evidence in support of their claims. In live tes-
timony before the Committee, Bowers recalled Giuliani saying in this meet-
ing that “we’ve got lots of theories, we just don’t have the evidence.” 210 At
the time, Bowers didn’t know whether it was a gaffe or an example of Giu-
liani not thinking through what he had just said.211 In any event, Bowers
said he and others in his group made particular note of that comment.212
And it was borne out; Bowers testified that “No one provided me, ever, such
evidence.” 213
In late December, in another phone call with President Trump, Bowers
reiterated that he would not do anything illegal for him.214 Afterward, John
Eastman joined the chorus of Trump allies attempting to change his mind.
In a call on January 4th that included the Speaker’s chief counsel as well as
Arizona House Majority Leader-Elect Ben Toma, Eastman urged Bowers to
hold a vote to decertify Arizona’s Presidential electors.215 When Bowers told
Eastman he couldn’t unilaterally reconvene the legislature, Eastman urged
him to “just do it and let the court sort it out.” 216 Bowers refused and the
Arizona legislature took no such action.
Many of President Trump’s efforts in Arizona focused on State officials,
but his team also continued to reach out to the Board of Supervisors for
Maricopa County even after it certified the election. One focus was voting
machines. According to the Arizona Republic, Giuliani left a voicemail in
mid- to late-December for Board Member Steve Chucri that “I see we’re
gonna get a chance to take a good look at those machines . . . give me a call
as soon as you get a chance. The president also wanted me to pass on a few
things to you, too.” 217 On December 4th, Giuliani also left a message for the
Board’s Chairman Clint Hickman: “I was very happy to see that there’s
gonna be a forensic audit of the machines. And I really wanted to talk to you
about it a bit. The President wanted me to give you a call. All right? Thank
you. Give me a call back.” 218 Hickman chose not to call back.219
Then, on Christmas Eve, Giuliani left voicemails for Board Members Bill
Gates and Jack Sellers, asking them to call him back. In his message for
Gates, Giuliani said:
It’s Giuliani, President Trump’s lawyer. If you get a chance, would
you please give me a call? I have a few things I’d like to talk over
with you. Maybe we can get this thing fixed up. You know, I really
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 289

think it’s a shame that Republicans sort of are both in this, kind of,
situation. And I think there may be a nice way to resolve this for
everybody.220
In his message for Sellers, Giuliani said “I’d like to see if there is a way
that we can resolve this so that it comes out well for everyone. We’re all
Republicans, I think we all have the same goal. Let’s see if . . . we can get
this done outside of the court.” 221 Like Hickman, neither Gates nor Sellers
returned Giuliani’s calls.222
So President Trump made the call himself. On December 31st, Board
Chair Clint Hickman received a voicemail from the White House switch-
board, asking him to call back for President Trump. Hickman said that he
did not return the call, in part because the county was still facing litigation
over the election.223 Another call from the White House came through on
January 3rd with a request that Hickman call back for the President. But, by
then, the President’s call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensper-
ger, described below, had leaked, and Hickman “didn’t want to walk into
that space.” 224

Georgia. On December 5th, President Trump traveled to Georgia to headline

a rally and mobilize voters in advance of a January Senate runoff. But the
President’s day started with a morning call to Governor Brian Kemp during
which they discussed reconvening the legislature in a special session.225
After the call, Kemp took to Twitter. He acknowledged that he had spoken
to the President and that he told the President that he supported the idea
of, and had already called for, a signature audit in Georgia.226 President
Trump responded later that night by complaining that Georgia had not yet
done a signature-verification audit and instead insisted that the Governor
should “[a]t least immediately ask for a Special Session of the Legisla-
ture.” 227 The following day, Governor Kemp and Lieutenant Governor Geoff
Duncan issued a definitive statement rejecting President Trump and his
allies’ calls to overturn the results in Georgia:
While we understand four members of the Georgia Senate are
requesting the convening of a special session of the General Assem-
bly, doing this in order to select a separate slate of presidential
electors is not an option that is allowed under state or federal law.
State law is clear: the legislature could only direct an alternative
method for choosing presidential electors if the election was not
able to be held on the date set by federal law. In the 1960s, the Gen-
eral Assembly decided that Georgia’s presidential electors will be
determined by the winner of the State’s popular vote. Any attempt
290 CHAPTER 2

by the legislature to retroactively change that process for the

November 3rd election would be unconstitutional and immediately
enjoined by the courts, resulting in a long legal dispute and no
short-term resolution.228
President Trump responded by directing his ire at Georgia officials and,
throughout the month of December, President Trump grew even more
relentless in his social media attacks against Kemp than he had been the
previous month. He retweeted attorney Lin Wood calling on Georgians to
call and urge the FBI to focus more on election fraud and “[t]ell them to
also investigate @BrianKempGA @GeoffDuncanGA & @GaSecofState.” 229
And he retweeted another post by Lin Wood that depicted Governor Kemp
and Secretary Raffensperger wearing masks digitally altered to show the
Chinese flag, and warned that they “will soon be going to jail.” 230 Even
without his many retweets, President Trump posted an average of about
one tweet per day in December 2020 either criticizing Governor Kemp or
pressuring him explicitly or implicitly to take actions to help overturn the
election.231
President Trump seemed consumed with his plans to overturn the elec-
tion and, based on documents obtained by the Select Committee, it appears
that the President received input from many outside donors or advisors
who had access to his staff’s email addresses. On December 7th, a Trump
donor named Bill White emailed senior Trump advisors, including Dan
Scavino and Rudolph Giuliani, to say that he “[j]ust spoke to [Georgia
State] Senator [William Burton] Jones [who] asked if Potus can R[e]T[weet]
this now pls,” along with a tweet by Senator Jones that read: “Georgia
Patriot Call to Action . . . call your state Senate & House Reps & ask them to
sign the petition for a special session.” 232 President Trump and Giuliani
each retweeted Senator Jones’s tweet an hour later.233
Bill White also emailed Molly Michael, Dan Scavino, and Giuliani, on
December 8th with information that he said “POTUS asked me last night”
to send right away.234 He recommended a Presidential tweet criticizing
Georgia’s Lt. Gov. Duncan as well as tweets to put pressure on Senate
Majority Leader Mike Dugan and Senate President Pro Tempore Butch
Miller.235 He wrote that President Trump would be calling Dugan and Miller
“to ask them to call special session and strategize with them why they are
keeping this from happening.” 236 Dugan later confirmed that he had
received a call from President Trump’s office but that the two of them were
not able to connect.237 And the following day, Steve Bannon revealed on his
podcast that President Trump spoke to Georgia House Speaker Ralston and
Speaker Pro Tempore Jan Jones.238 Speaker Ralston confirmed that he spoke
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 291

to President Trump on December 7th about the election, during which he

told the President that Georgia law made a special legislative session “very
much an uphill battle.” 239

2.4 AN OUTRIGHT REQUEST FOR VICTORY

Beyond asking State officials to not certify, to decertify, or to appoint

Trump electors for consideration during the joint session, President Trump
and some of his closest advisors inserted themselves directly into the
counting of ballots and asked, outright, for enough votes to win.
White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows did this. Not only did he
place calls on behalf of the President to election officials in Georgia, Mead-
ows traveled there to personally visit election officials and volunteers,
coordinated with Members of Congress, and even suggested that the Presi-
dent send election workers Trump memorabilia like presidential challenge
coins and autographed MAGA hats, a suggestion that his assistant Cassidy
Hutchinson thought could be problematic and, ultimately, did not act on.240
When Meadows made a visit on short notice to examine the audit of
absentee ballots in Cobb County, Georgia, he spoke to Deputy Secretary of
State Jordan Fuchs and Frances Watson, the Secretary of State’s chief
investigator. Ultimately, Meadows connected Watson with the President,
who claimed that he had won the election and pressed her to say that he
had won. The Select Committee obtained a copy of their recorded call,
which is detailed below.
The President told Watson that he had “won Georgia . . . by a lot,” told
her, “you have the most important job in the country right now,” and sug-
gested, “when the right answer comes out you’ll be praised.” 241 Four days
later, Meadows texted Deputy Secretary of State Fuchs, in which he asked,
“[i]s there a way to speed up Fulton county signature verification in order
to have results before Jan 6 if the trump campaign assist[s] financially.” 242
Fuchs wrote in response that she “Will answer ASAP.” 243
Meadows also played a central role in the lead up to the President’s
January 2, 2021, call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. In
fact, it was Meadows who originally sent text messages to Raffensperger
and requested to speak: On November 19th, he texted “Mr Secretary. Mark
Meadows here. If you could give me a brief call at your convenience. Thank
you”.244 And on December 5th, Meadows texted, “mr Secretary. Can you
call the White House switchboard at [phone number]. For a call. Your voice-
mail is full.” 245 Then, on December 11th, Meadows texted, “Thanks so
much” to a number that apparently belongs to United States Representative
292 CHAPTER 2

Photo by House Creative Services

Jody Hice (R-GA) after Rep. Hice told him that he had just made a state-
ment “regarding a recall on Raffensperger. If this is something Potus wants
to know and help push. . . .” 246
All of that led to the remarkable January 2nd call between President
Trump and his advisors on one side, and Secretary of State Brad Raffens-
perger and his advisors on the other. By January 2nd, the President had
tried to speak by phone with Raffensperger at least 18 times.247 Raffensper-
ger, for his part, had avoided talking to the President because of ongoing
litigation with the President’s Campaign.248 Despite Raffensperger’s reluc-
tance, the two spoke, with their respective lawyers on the line. During the
call, President Trump went through his litany of false election-fraud claims
and then asked Raffensperger to deliver him a second term by “finding”
just enough votes to ensure victory. The President said, “I just want to find
11,780 votes, which is one more than we have because we won the
State.” 249 He reiterated it several different ways: “fellas, I need 11,000
votes. Give me a break. You know, we have that in spades already. Or we can
keep going, but that’s not fair to the voters of Georgia because they’re
going to see what happened.” 250
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 293

When it was clear that Raffensperger and his advisors would not agree
to the President’s request, the President ramped up the pressure by accus-
ing them of committing crimes: “the ballots are corrupt. And you are going
to find that they are—which is totally illegal—it is more illegal for you than
it is for them because, you know, what they did and you’re not reporting it.
That’s a criminal, that’s a criminal offense. And you can’t let that happen.
That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that
you’re letting it happen.” 251
The President would stop at nothing to win Georgia. Separate from ask-
ing Raffensperger to alter, without justification, the election results in
Georgia, he also attacked election workers. In that call, President Trump
mentioned Ruby Freeman’s name 18 times, referred to her daughter Shaye
Moss several of those times, and accused them of crimes.252 Raffensperger
and his aides rebutted President Trump’s false claims of fraud on the call
and explained why they were wrong, but they did not deliver the one thing
President Trump wanted most: the 11,780 votes he asked for.253
The next day, President Trump tweeted about his phone call with
Raffensperger, falsely claiming that “[Secretary Raffensperger] was unwill-
ing, or unable, to answer questions such as the ‘ballots under table’
scam. . . . He has no clue!” 254 He added that Raffensperger, Governor Kemp,
and Lt. Governor Duncan “are a disgrace” and “have done less than noth-
ing” about rampant political corruption.255
Even though Raffensperger and his team repeatedly told the President
why his specific allegations of election fraud in Georgia were wrong,256
President Trump met the next day with the top leadership of the Justice
Department in an effort to convince them to send a letter falsely claiming
that the Department had “identified significant concerns” affecting the
election results in Georgia and calling on Governor Kemp, Speaker Ralston,
and Senate President Pro Tempore Miller to convene a special session.257 It
was only after a showdown in the Oval Office, described in Chapter 4 during
which the White House Counsel and others threatened to resign that Presi-
dent Trump decided against replacing Department of Justice leadership and
issuing that letter.

2.5 SOME OFFICIALS EAGERLY ASSISTED PRESIDENT TRUMP WITH HIS PLANS

While many State officials resisted President Trump’s demands, some

eagerly joined the President’s efforts.
President Trump routinely coordinated with Pennsylvania State Senator
Doug Mastriano, whose request led to the November 25, 2020, hotel “hear-
ing” in Gettysburg, and who traveled to Washington to meet with the
294 CHAPTER 2

Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images

President afterward.258 Senator Mastriano, who would later charter and pay
for buses to Washington for the President’s “Stop the Steal” rally on Janu-
ary 6th and was near the Capitol during the attack, quickly rose to favor
with the President.259
On November 30th, President Trump called Mastriano, interrupting him
during a radio interview and telling listeners that “Doug is the absolute
hero” and people are “really angry in Pennsylvania.” 260
On December 5th, Senator Mastriano sent an email to President
Trump’s executive assistant, Molly Michael, with a Supreme Court Amicus
Brief for the President that the pair “discussed yesterday,” related to a case
brought by Representative Mike Kelly (R–PA) against his own State, which
the Supreme Court rejected just a few days later.261
On December 14th, President Trump’s executive assistant sent Mas-
triano an email “From POTUS” with talking points promoting a conspiracy
theory about election machines.262
And on December 21st, Mastriano sent another email for President
Trump, in which he wrote: “Dear Mr. President—attached please find the
‘killer letter’ on the Pennsylvania election that we discussed last night”
that “I only just completed.” 263 This letter recapped the Gettysburg hotel
hearing on November 25th, and claimed that “there is rampant election
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 295

fraud in Pennsylvania that must be investigated, remedied and recti-

fied.” 264 President Trump sent that letter to John Eastman, Acting Attorney
General Jeffrey Rosen, Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue,
Rush Limbaugh, former Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi, Lou Dobbs,
and others.265
As January 6th approached, Senator Mastriano’s involvement in
attempts to overturn the election only grew. On December 23rd, he led a
second group of Pennsylvania State senators for a meeting with President
Trump in the Oval Office, which Giuliani claimed “swayed about 20” of
them.266 Neither Speaker Cutler nor Senate President Corman participated.
Mastriano also sent emails indicating that he spoke with President
Trump on December 27th, 28th, and 30th, along with files that President
Trump had requested or that he had promised to him.267 One of these was a
pair of letters from State senators asking U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell and House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to reject Pennsylva-
nia’s electoral votes on January 6th.268 President Trump’s executive assis-
tant notified the White House’s Director of Legislative Affairs that “[t]he
President would like the below attached letters to be sent to Mitch and
Kevin and all GOP house and senate members,” but was told in reply,
“[g]iven the political nature of the letters, would you mind sending
them?” 269
On January 5th, President Trump spoke again with Mastriano and then
notified the White House operator that Mastriano “will be calling in for the
Vice President” soon.270 That evening Senator Mastriano sent two more
emails for the President. One was a letter addressed to Vice President Pence
on behalf of nearly 100 legislators from various States; the other was a let-
ter directed to McConnell and McCarthy from Pennsylvania lawmakers, this
time asking Congress to postpone acting on the 6th.271 President Trump
tweeted the letter that night, captioning it “BIG NEWS IN PENNSYLVANIA!”
and, after midnight, he retweeted that “Pennsylvania is going to Trump.
The legislators have spoken.” 272 As described elsewhere in this report, that
letter, and letters like it, were used in the effort to convince Vice President
Pence that he could and should affect the outcome of the joint session of
Congress on January 6th.
The Select Committee subpoenaed Senator Mastriano to testify about
these interactions with President Trump and his advisors, among other
matters. Unlike numerous other witnesses who complied with subpoenas
and provided deposition testimony to the Select Committee, Mastriano did
not; he logged in to a virtual deposition at the appointed time but logged
out before answering any substantive questions or even taking the oath to
the tell the truth.273
296 CHAPTER 2

The President apparently got what he wanted in State officials like

Senator Mastriano, but not those who dared question or outright reject his
anti-democratic efforts to overturn the election. In some cases, those who
questioned him made the President and his advisors dig in and push harder.
On January 1st, Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller asked for a “blast text
and Twitter blast out” that would urge President Trump’s supporters to
“Contact House Speaker Bryan Cutler & Senate President Pro Tem Jake Cor-
man!” to “Demand a vote on certification.” 274 Senior Campaign attorneys,
however, replied that this might violate Pennsylvania’s “very stringent”
lobbying laws and get them prosecuted or fined.275 Instead, they agreed on
a similar call to action aimed at Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and Arizona
House Speaker Rusty Bowers rather than Speaker Cutler and President Pro
Tempore Corman in Pennsylvania.276

2.6 THE FINAL OUTREACH TO STATE LEGISLATORS

The efforts to overturn the election through State legislatures continued

throughout the final two weeks before the joint session of Congress on
January 6th. Based on actual events and documents obtained by the Select
Committee, President Trump’s Campaign team, outside advisors, and
motivated volunteers generally acted in accord with what was written down
in a “Strategic Communications Plan” when engaging with, and sometimes
demonizing, State officials. Activities that occurred thereafter were in
accord with the plan.
The “Plan” was explained in a document that was presented to the
White House.277 The plan contemplated pressuring Republican legislators
both in Congress and in six key swing States. The document itself purports
to be the product of the “GIULIANI PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL DEFENSE
TEAM” and declared that “We Have 10 Days to Execute This Plan & Certify
President Trump!” 278
Kerik told the Select Committee that pieces of the plan had been in
place for some period of time before the document was actually created,
and that he thought that the “catalyst” for actually memorializing the plan
was the approaching deadline of January 6th.279 In fact, the 10-day plan to
help “certify president Trump” had been the subject of “continual discus-
sions” for “6 weeks” and was “being discussed every day at some point
prior to the 10 days that we’re talking about. So it was a continuous thing
that went on.” 280
Ultimately, the Giuliani team shared the Strategic Communications Plan
and urged its implementation. Kerik sent the plan to Mark Meadows via
email on December 28th with this note, in part:
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 297

There is only one thing that’s going to move the needle and force
the legislators to do what their [sic] constitutionally obligated to do,
and that is apply pressure . . . . We can do all the investigations we
want later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators
that have to be moved, and this will do just that. We’re just running
out of time.281
Neither Giuliani nor Kerik told the Select Committee that they recalled
officially implementing the plan, and Giuliani said that he thought Mead-
ows even rejected it, but there is no doubt that President Trump’s team
took certain actions consistent with it.282
The document described its goal as a “[n]ationwide communications
outreach campaign to educate the public on the fraud numbers, and inspire
citizens to call upon legislators and Members of Congress to disregard the
fraudulent vote count and certify the duly-elected President Trump.” 283
The “FOCUS of CAMPAIGN” was “SWING STATE REPUBLICAN SENATORS”
in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin,
“REPULBICAN [sic] MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE” and “REPUBLICAN MEM-
BERS OF THE SENATE.” 284 Among the steps that it recommended were
“RALLIES AND PROTESTS” in six key swing States, including protests at
“Governor’s Mansions,” “Lt. Governor’s home[s],” “Secretary of State’s
homes,” and “weak Members’ homes.” 285
Although the plan did not mention specific individuals by name, an
apparently related document produced to the Select Committee by Giuliani
did, naming State legislative leaders as “TARGETS” under a header of “KEY
TARGET STATE POINTS,” including Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers,
Arizona Senate President Karen Fann (incorrectly described as the State
Senate’s majority leader), Georgia House Speaker David Ralston, Georgia
Senate Majority Leader Mike Dugan, Georgia Senate President Pro Tempore
Butch Miller as a possible back up, Michigan House Speaker Lee Chatfield,
Michigan Senate Majority leader Mike Shirkey, Pennsylvania House Speaker
Brian Cutler, Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Kerry Benninghoff,
Pennsylvania Senate President Pro Tempore Jake Corman, Pennsylvania
Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward, Wisconsin State Assembly Speaker Robin
Vos, and Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald.286
Consistent with these proposals, Giuliani appeared as a guest on Steve
Bannon’s podcast on New Year’s Eve and told him that “we have a weak
element to our party . . . a cowardly element” 287 and, “[n]ow I think every
Republican knows—maybe this is worse—this election was stolen. Now the
question is: can they live up to their oath of office? . . . We gotta start work-
ing on the leadership.” 288 Giuliani also described President Trump’s objec-
tive in this effort: “For the president, the way forward is really it’s in the
298 CHAPTER 2

hands of the leaders of those legislatures and the Members of Congress,

and what our people can do is let them know what they think, and that
they’re not gonna get away with pushing this aside. That the consequences
of turning your back on a massive voter fraud are gonna be dire for them,
and historically these people are gonna become enemies of the country.” 289
A key component of this plan was to call out Republican officials who
rejected President Trump and his team’s efforts or claims of fraud. Kerik
and numerous other members of the Campaign’s legal team did just that.
On December 27th, Kerik suggested that Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) was
“corrupt” and said that “for any Pennsylvania official to certify their vote,
it’s malfeasance and criminal.” 290 That was entirely consistent with Kerik’s
past tweets about the election, one of which apparently called public offi-
cials “who betrayed” President Trump “spineless disloyal maggots.” 291 It
wasn’t just rhetoric, however, because, as described below, people showed
up outside certain officials’ home—sometimes menacingly—and, of
course, showed up at the Capitol on January 6th.
The pressure in those final days did not stop with the types of activities
outlined in the Strategic Communications Plan. January 2, 2021, was a busy
day for a Saturday at the Trump White House. That was the day President
Trump called on Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger to find enough
votes for victory in Georgia and participated in a call with Lindsay Graham
and Members of the Freedom Caucus to plan for the joint session on Janu-
ary 6th.292
It was also the day that the President joined in a virtual briefing for
nearly 300 Republican legislators from swing States.293 The event was
hosted by a short-lived organization called “Got Freedom?” that listed
Jenna Ellis among its leadership team,294 and included Giuliani, John East-
man, and Peter Navarro as the program’s “featured speakers.” 295 A press
release by Got Freedom? said that the meeting was hosted by Phillip Kline,
a former attorney general of Kansas, who was disbarred in 2013.296 It indi-
cated that purported proof of voter fraud “should serve as an important
resource for state legislators as they make calls for state legislatures to
meet to investigate the election and consider decertifying their state elec-
tion results.” 297
According to the Washington Examiner, when President Trump joined
the call he told the participants: “You know that we won the election, and
you were also given false numbers to certify.” It quoted him saying “[y]ou
are the real power” because “[y]ou’re more important than the courts.
You’re more important than anything because the courts keep referring to
you, and you’re the ones that are going to make the decision.” When asked
about that quote, specifically, Giuliani, who was on the call, said he didn’t
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 299

recall the exact words that the President used but told the Select Committee
“that would be the sum or substance of what he had been saying and what
he believed.” 298 During the call, the President reportedly “referenced the
planned protests in Washington” just days later on January 6th, and told
the group “I don’t think the country is going to take it.” 299
When reporting on the call, the Washington Examiner also provided
details about what Giuliani told the assembled State legislators. Consistent
with his team’s “Strategic Communications Plan,” Giuliani said, “[w]e
need you to put excessive pressure on your leadership where the real weak-
ness and cowardice is mostly located,” and the report quoted Navarro tell-
ing them that “Your job, I believe, is to take action, action, action.” 300 That
evening, Navarro stated on Fox News that “these legislators—they are hot,
they’re angry, they want action,” and “we explained exactly how the
Democrat Party as a matter of strategy stole this election from Donald J.
Trump.” 301
Organizers from Got Freedom? sent a follow-up email that evening to
participants on behalf of Phill Kline, in which they described the event as
“an important briefing for legislators who hold the power to decertify the
results of their state elections.” 302 It emphasized the following:
As elected officials in the House and Senate of your respective
States, Professor Eastman laid out the Constitutional imperatives
for you:
• Assert your plenary power
• Demand that your laws be followed as written
• Decertify tainted results unless and until your laws are followed
• Insist on enough time to properly meet, investigate, and properly
certify results to ensure that all lawful votes (but only lawful votes) are
counted.303
The email also recommended that they “. . . sign on to a joint letter
from state legislators to Vice President Mike Pence to demand that he call
for a 12-day delay on ratifying the election . . .” on January 6th.304 The let-
ter ultimately garnered more than 100 signatures by State legislators from
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.305 Doug Mas-
triano forwarded a copy of the letter via email to President Trump’s execu-
tive assistant, and the National Archives produced to the Select Committee
a printed version with a stamp at the top indicating, “THE PRESIDENT HAS
SEEN.” 306
But this plan would fail to sway its intended audience. As discussed in
Chapter 5, the Vice President rejected this and numerous other attempts to
convince him to act unlawfully on January 6th. The election had been
300 CHAPTER 2

decided and certified by the States. It was the Vice President and Congress’s
job to open and count the legitimate electoral college votes.
And in the early morning hours of January 7th, after a day unlike any
seen in American history, when a mob of angry insurrectionists attempted
to violently upend a Presidential election, the Vice President and Members
of Congress, shaken but steady, delayed but resolute, regrouped and recon-
vened and did their Constitutional duty to certify Joseph R. Biden as the
next President of the United States.
President Trump’s plot to pressure State legislators to overturn the vote
of the electoral college failed—but only barely. Even so, the consequences
of President Trump’s efforts to overturn State election results were signifi-
cant.

2.7 THE HARM CAUSED BY DEMONIZING PUBLIC SERVANTS

Many of the people who refused to be pushed into manipulating election

results—governors, secretaries of State, State legislators, State and local
election officials, and frontline election workers just doing their jobs—
found themselves subjected to public demonization and subsequent spam-
ming, doxing, harassment, intimidation, and violent threats. Some of the
threats were sexualized or racist in nature and targeted family members.
President Trump never discouraged or condemned these tactics, and in fact
he was an active participant in directing his supporters, through tweets and
speeches, to apply pressure to public servants who would not comply.
President Trump and his team were not above using incendiary rhetoric
or threats to achieve their goal of overturning the election. Giuliani said so
before the purported hearing in Michigan in December. Recall that he told
an online audience, there’s “nothin’ wrong with putting pressure on your
state legislators” 307 and “you have got to get them to remember that their
oath to the Constitution sometimes requires being criticized. Sometimes it
even requires being threatened.” 308
That pressure came privately and publicly in the post-election period.
Privately, for example, President Trump called Michigan Senate Major-
ity Leader Mike Shirkey three times after their White House meeting:
November 21st, November 25th, and December 14th.309 Shirkey did not
recall many specifics of those calls and claimed he did not remember the
President applying any specific pressure.310 The day after one of those calls,
however, Shirkey tweeted that “our election process MUST be free of
intimidation and threats,” and “it’s inappropriate for anyone to exert pres-
sure on them.” 311 From this and other public statements, it is clear that
Shirkey was sensitive to outside forces pressuring people with roles in the
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 301

election. In fact, the same day that the electoral college met and voted for-
mer Vice President Joe Biden as the winner of the 2020 Presidential elec-
tion, Shirkey received another call from President Trump and issued
another public statement. Shirkey’s statement that day, December 14, 2020,
read: “Michigan’s Democratic slate of electors should be able to proceed
with their duty, free from threats of violence and intimidation” and “[i]t is
our responsibility as leaders to follow the law . . . .” 312
Publicly, President Trump used both Twitter posts and paid social
media and cable television ads to advance his pressure campaign.
In Arizona, for example, President Trump used social media to both
praise and criticize legislators. When Speaker Bowers and Senate President
Karen Fann requested an audit of Maricopa County’s election software and
equipment, President Trump publicly commended them, retweeting a press
release about their announcement and commenting: “Thank you to Senate
President Karen Fann and House Speaker Russell Bowers—and all, for what
you are doing in Arizona. A fast check of signatures will easily give us the
state.” 313 But just days later, President Trump assailed Bowers for opposing
a special session to appoint new electors. He retweeted a post by Campaign
lawyer Christina Bobb that accused Bowers of “intentionally misleading the
people of Arizona” and that included a demand by Stop-the-Steal organizer
Ali Alexander for 50,000 phone calls to Rusty Bowers “[r]ight the heck
now” to threaten him with a primary challenge.314
And, as his efforts to change the outcome of the election continued to
meet resistance, President Trump personally approved a series of adver-
tisements that the Campaign ran on cable television and social media in
several important States. One advertisement in Arizona called for pressure
on Governor Ducey in particular, alleging, “The evidence is overwhelming.
Call Governor Ducey and your legislators. Demand they inspect the
machines and hear the evidence.” 315 Another claimed that “illegal aliens
voted, and here in Arizona Trump votes were discarded. It’s an outrage. Call
Governor Ducey and your legislators at 602–542–4331. Demand they
inspect the machines and hear the evidence. Call Governor Ducey, at 602–
542–4331. Stand up for President Trump. Call today. Paid for by Donald J.
Trump for President, Inc.” 316
Several days earlier, Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller had
explained the intention for this round of advertisements in an email. He
wrote that, “the President and Mayor Giuliani want to get back up on TV
ASAP, and Jared [Kushner] has approved in budgetary concept, so here’s
the gameplan” in order to “motivate the GOP base to put pressure on the
Republican Governors of Georgia and Arizona and the Republican-
controlled State legislatures in Wisconsin and Michigan to hear evidence of
302 CHAPTER 2

voter fraud before January 6th.” 317 Miller anticipated a budget of $5 million
and asked for the messaging to follow an earlier round of advertisements,
“but the endings need to be changed to include phone numbers and direc-
tions to call the local Governor or state legislature.” 318 On December 22nd,
Jason Miller texted Jared Kushner that “POTUS has approved the buy.” 319
References to anger and fighting were featured in some of the Presi-
dent’s remarks during that period. After the Georgia Secretary of State’s
Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, made an impassioned public plea
and accurately warned that someone would die as a result of the threaten-
ing election-related rhetoric that President Trump failed to condemn,
President Trump dismissively tweeted in response: “Rigged Election. Show
signatures and envelopes. Expose the massive voter fraud in Georgia. What
is Secretary of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what we’ll
find!!!” 320 The President also tweeted that, between Governor Ducey in Ari-
zona and Governor Kemp in Georgia, “the Democrat Party could not be
happier” because these Republicans “fight harder against us than do the
Radical Left” and were singlehandedly responsible for losing him both
States, something that “Republicans will NEVER forget[.]” 321 Regarding
Kemp, he asked “What’s wrong with this guy? What is he hiding?” 322 and
he alleged that “RINOs” Governor Kemp, Lieutenant Governor Geoff Dun-
can, and Secretary Raffensperger “will be solely responsible” for Senators
Loeffler and Perdue losing their senate runoff because they “[w]on’t call a
Special Session or check for Signature Verification! People are ANGRY!” 323
President Trump’s spoken remarks were not much different. After the
President wrapped up a November 26th public phone call to wish U.S. ser-
vice members a happy Thanksgiving, he answered a reporter’s question
about election integrity in Georgia by lashing out at Secretary Raffensperger
in particular. President Trump made several baseless claims of election
fraud in Georgia, declared that Raffensperger himself appeared to be com-
plicit, and labeled the Georgia Secretary of State “an enemy of the
people.” 324
President Trump and his team’s practice of naming and viciously criti-
cizing people had real consequences. Philadelphia City Commissioner Al
Schmidt’s story, recounted earlier, is just one of many examples. And the
consequences weren’t just limited to high-profile public figures. Schmidt’s
deputy, for example, Seth Bluestein faced threats after being demonized by
a surrogate for President Trump, and many of the threats he received were
anti-Semitic in nature. He received a Facebook message telling him that
“EVERYONE WITH A GUN IS GOING TO BE AT YOUR HOUSE- AMERICANS
LOOK AT THE NAME- ANOTHER JEW CAUGHT UP IN UNITED STATES
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 303

VOTER FRAUD.” 325 Bluestein got a security detail at his home, and the
experience gave his three-year-old daughter nightmares.326
Similarly, after President Trump promoted online accusations that Ari-
zona House Speaker Rusty Bowers had been “intentionally misleading the
people of Arizona . . .” 327 Bowers’s personal cell phone and home address
were published,328 leading demonstrators to congregate at his home, honk
horns and shout insults until police arrived.329 Bowers told the Select Com-
mittee this was the first of at least nine protests at his home, sometimes
with protesters shouting into bullhorns and calling him a pedophile.330 One
protestor who showed up at his home was armed and believed to be a
member of an extremist militia.331
Sadly, those were not isolated incidents. Stories similar to Schmidt’s
and Bowers’ proliferated after President Trump’s loss in the election.
Examples from each of the States discussed in this chapter are documented
below, but this list is by no means exhaustive:
• Arizona: After Secretary of State Katie Hobbs’s home address and son’s
phone number were publicly released, demonstrators congregated out-
side her home chanting “we are watching you.” 332 A social media user
at the time recommended: “Let’s burn her house down and kill her
family and teach these fraudsters a lesson.” 333 Secretary Hobbs has
continued to receive threats since then, reporting over 100 threats to
the FBI in mid-2022, including a September 2021 voicemail message
that “you should be hunted” and “will never be safe in Arizona
again.” 334
• Arizona: Maricopa County Recorder Adrian Fontes testified before Con-
gress that his family had “go-bags” packed in case they needed to
evacuate and that, because of the threats, he had moved his children
“out of the family home at least once for three days in the wake of
serious threats to [his] family’s safety.” 335
• Arizona: Paul Boyer, a Republican State senator, had to evacuate his
family, get police protection, and change his phone number after he
voted against jailing Maricopa’s County Supervisors over election dis-
putes.336
• Arizona: On January 5, 2021, a comment on a blog suggested some
members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors “have earned a
good old fashioned neck tie party” as “punishment for Treason.” 337
According to Board member Clint Hickman, “the threats never
abated.” 338 And on January 6th, police convinced Hickman and his
family to leave their home.339
• Michigan: Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and her family were driven
out of their home for several days after dozens of protestors with
304 CHAPTER 2

bullhorns and firearms congregated outside “shouting obscenities and

graphic threats into bullhorns” 340 while she spent time with her son
and got him ready for bed.341 Secretary Benson said that she only feels
safe “sometimes” as a result of continuing threats.342
• Michigan: Several members of the Wayne County Board of Canvassers
received threats, as did Aaron Van Langevelde, a Republican member of
the State Board of Canvassers.343 Van Langevelde was bombarded with
communications and people began showing up at his family's home,
forcing police to ensure his and his family’s safety and escort him
across the State after he voted to certify Michigan's election.344
• Michigan: Detroit City Clerk Janice Winfrey, a Democrat, and Rochester
Hills City Clerk Tina Barton, a Republican, were both targeted. Barton
had never before received a death threat in over a decade of work as an
election official but, as a result of the 2020 Presidential election, was
subject to “a torrent of threats and harassment,” such as an anony-
mous caller who “repeatedly threatened to kill her and her family.” 345
Winfrey was confronted outside her home by a man who indicated he
had been surveilling her and that “You are going to pay dearly for your
actions in this election!” 346 She started carrying a firearm because
death threats against her continued.347
• Michigan: Michigan House Speaker Lee Chatfield confirmed that “I and
my family have received numerous threats, along with members on
both sides of the aisle.” 348 This included the top Democrat on Michi-
gan’s House Oversight Committee, Rep. Cynthia Johnson, who was
threatened with lynching after she challenged the witnesses that Giu-
liani offered to her committee.349 One caller who allegedly threatened to
kill Rep. Johnson and wipe out her family in December 2020 called the
Capitol again on the morning of January 7, 2021, and said that “every-
one better get out of the building because it’ll fucking explode.” 350
• Pennsylvania: Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar said she
received so many threats “I didn’t feel comfortable walking the dog on
the street.” 351 This included a message in November 2020 threatening
to murder her in her home at night, forcing her and her husband to flee
for a week.352 Another voicemail she received after certifying Pennsyl-
vania’s election results threatened: “You crooked f***ing bitch. You’re
done.” 353
• Pennsylvania: House Speaker Bryan Cutler told the Select Committee
there were at least three protests outside either his district office or his
home, and that his then-15-year-old son was home by himself for the
first one.354 Senate Jake Corman’s spokesperson revealed in December
2020 that he, too, was being subjected to violent threats,355 something
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 305

Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward also received.356

• Pennsylvania: Philadelphia City Commissioner Omar Sabir, spent several
nights evacuated from his home and continued to receive death threats
a year after the 2020 election, reflecting that, “I feel anxiety every time
I walk outside of the house.” 357 Commissioner Lisa Deeley, another City
Commission colleague, also received death threats and said she suffers
occasional anxiety attacks as a result.358
• Georgia: After Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger’s email and
phone number were published, he said that he and his wife received
frequent hostile messages, some of which “typically came in sexualized
attacks.” 359 As a result, the Secretary’s wife cancelled visits from their
grandchildren out of fear for the kids’ safety.360 That was not an
overreaction as that came after police found self-identified members of
the Oath Keepers outside their home and after someone broke into their
daughter-in-law’s house.361
• Georgia: On January 5, 2021, Governor Kemp and Secretary Raffensper-
ger were reportedly named in a Craigslist post encouraging people to
“put an end to the lives of these traitors.” 362
• Georgia: Fulton County Elections Director Richard Barron was named
and depicted on screen in the video President Trump played at his
December 5th rally. He said that this incident led to a spike in death
threats targeted at election workers, including himself.363 His team’s
registration chief, Ralph Jones, received death threats following the
election including one calling him a “n[igger] who should be shot,” and
another threatening “to kill him by dragging his body around with a
truck.” 364
• Georgia: Election offices in ten Georgia counties received emailed
threats of bombings that would “make the Boston bombings look like
child’s play” and that the “death and destruction” would continue
“[u]ntil Trump is guaranteed to be POTUS . . . .” 365

One of the most striking examples of the terror that President Trump
and his allies caused came in Georgia, where election workers Ruby Free-
man and Shaye Moss, mother and daughter, were besieged by incessant,
terrifying harassment and threats that often evoked racial violence and
lynching, instigated and incited by the President of the United States.
As described earlier, in a State legislative hearing in Georgia, Giuliani
publicly—and baselessly—accused Freeman and Moss of engaging in
criminal conduct. He showed a video of Freeman passing Moss a ginger
mint before claiming that the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB
drives “as if they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” 366
306 CHAPTER 2

Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

President Trump seemed fixated on Freeman and Moss, too. He played

surveillance video showing them inside the State Farm Arena at a December
5th rally in Georgia,367 and mentioned Freeman by name 18 times during
the January 2nd call to Secretary of State Raffensperger in which he asked
the Secretary to simply “find” enough votes to ensure victory.368
Freeman’s and Moss’s lives were forever changed. After their contact
information was published, they were besieged by the President’s support-
ers. In early December 2020, Freeman “told police she had received hun-
dreds of threats at her home.” 369 Moss’s son also started receiving
threatening phone calls, including one stating he “should hang alongside
[his] nigger momma.” 370
In the wake of President Trump’s December 5, 2020, rally, Freeman
called 911 because strangers had come to her home trying to lure her out,
sending threatening emails and text messages.371 She pleaded with the 911
dispatcher for help after hearing loud banging on her door just before 10
p.m. “Lord Jesus, where’s the police?” she asked the dispatcher. “I don’t
know who keeps coming to my door.” “Please help me!” 372
Ultimately, Freeman fled from her own home based on advice from the
FBI.373 She would not move back for months.374
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 307

In her testimony to the Select Committee, Freeman recounted how she

had received “hundreds of racist, threatening, horrible calls and messages”
and that now “[t]here is nowhere I feel safe—nowhere.” 375 But it’s not just
a sense of security that the President and his followers took from Freeman.
She told the Select Committee that she also lost her name and reputation:
My name is Ruby Freeman. I've always believed it when God says
that he’ll make your name great, but this is not the way it was sup-
posed to be. I could have never imagined the events that followed
the Presidential election in 2020. For my entire professional life, I
was Lady Ruby. My community in Georgia where I was born and
lived my whole life knew me as Lady Ruby. . . . Now I won’t even
introduce myself by my name anymore. I get nervous when I bump
into someone I know in the grocery store who says my name. I’m
worried about who’s listening. I get nervous when I have to give my
name for food orders. I’m always concerned of who’s around me.
I’ve lost my name, and I’ve lost my reputation.
I’ve lost my sense of security—all because a group of people, start-
ing with Number 45 and his ally Rudy Giuliani, decided to scapegoat
me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies about how the
presidential election was stolen.376
Freeman’s sense of dread is well-founded. According to Federal pros-
ecutors, a member of the Oath Keepers militia convicted of multiple
offenses for his role in the January 6th insurrection had a document in his
residence with the words “DEATH LIST” written across the top.377
His death list contained just two names: Ruby Freeman and Shaye
Moss.378

ENDNOTES
1. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, “Risk-Limiting Audit Confirms Biden Won Georgia,” GPB, (Nov. 19,
2020), available at https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/19/risk-limiting-audit-confirms-
biden-won-georgia; Addie Haney, “Georgia Election Recount Results: Breaking Down Final
Numbers,” 11Alive, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://www.11alive.com/article/news/
politics/elections/georgia-election-recount-results-final-numbers/85-cbaacd70-f7e0-40ae-
8dfa-3bf18f318645.
2. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
3. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
308 CHAPTER 2

Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
4. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
5. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
6. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
7. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
8. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Brad Raffensperger, (Nov. 22, 2021), pp. 121-122, 126-27.
10. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.
11. The Georgia Secretary of State’s Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, gave an impas-
sioned public statement that included these points. “Georgia Election Official Gabriel Ster-
ling: ‘Someone’s Going to Get Killed’ Transcript,” Rev, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-official-gabriel-sterling-someones-going-
to-get-killed-transcript. Shortly thereafter, President Trump fired back on Twitter in the
form of a quote-tweet of a journalist’s post that included the full footage of these parts of
Sterling’s remarks. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (quoting Brendan Keefe (@BrendanKeefe),
Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/
1333884246277189633).
12. See Chapter 1.
13. U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an Elector.”).
14. See “Census Bureau Releases 2020 Presidential Election Voting Report,” United States Cen-
sus Bureau, (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2022/2020-presidential-election-voting-report.html.
15. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break America,” Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) avail-
able at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-
concede/616424/.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 309

16. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break America,” Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) avail-
able at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-
concede/616424/.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46, 148-53, 158; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 96, 98; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20,
2022), p. 42. Although certain Select Committee witnesses confirmed the existence of this
state-focused strategy, none testified that they knew about the strategy before the elec-
tion.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011213. Donald Trump Jr. publicly
urged State legislators to help the same day. He called on Twitter for his father to “go to
total war over this election” and retweeted a post by Fox News host Mark Levin urging
Republican State legislatures to “GET READY TO DO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY” by exer-
cising “THE FINAL SAY OVER THE CHOOSING OF ELECTORS.” David Knowles, “As Vote Count
Swings Toward Biden, Trump's Backers Hit the Caps-Lock Key on Twitter,” Yahoo! News,
(Nov. 5, 2020), available at https://www.yahoo.com/video/as-vote-count-swings-toward-
biden-trump-backers-hit-the-caps-lock-on-twitter-223931950.html.
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011318 (November 6, 2020, text mes-
sage from Mark Meadows to Donald J. Trump, Jr.).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011296 (November 5, 2020, text mes-
sage from Mark Meadows to Marty Harbin).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011686, MM011687 (November 9, 2020,
text messages between Mark Meadows and Russell Vought).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011560, MM011563 (November 7, 2020,
text messages between Mark Meadows and Rep. Warren Davidson).
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449, MM011451 (November 6, 2020,
text messages between Mark Meadows and Rep. Andy Biggs).
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011087 (November 4, 2020, text mes-
sage from Rick Perry to Mark Meadows).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, p. 44; see also Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003041.
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003543 (November 5, 2020, email
from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Dan Huff re: State legislature plenary power
under Constitution to state electoral college electors); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent
Haley Production), VMH-00003559 (November 5, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny
310 CHAPTER 2

McEntee and Dan Huff re: more notes on state legislature strategy); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000010233_0001 (November 6, 2020, email chain
between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact Info of key leaders in
key States); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010198_0001
(November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re:
Horowitz: How Republican-controlled state legislatures can rectify election fraud commit-
ted by courts and governors - TheBlaze); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Produc-
tion), 076P-R000010225_0001-10226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to
Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching
contact info); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, 4103-04,
4111-12, 4124-25 (various text messages between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel
Huff discussing the state legislature plan).
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003009 (November 8, 2020, email
chain between Vincent Haley and Newt Gingrich re: More of my exchange with John); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004103 (November 6, 2020, text
message from Vincent Haley to Randy Evans).
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002107 (November 5, 2020, email
chain between Vincent Haley, Daniel Huff, and Jonny McEntee re: more notes on the state
legislature strategy).
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004103 (November 6, 2020, text
message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004104 (November 6, 2020, text
message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001 - 076P-
R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and
Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching contact info); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010233_0001 (November 6,
2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact Info
of key leaders in key States).
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001 - 076P-
R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and
Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching contact info).
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004122-VMH-00004123 (November
8, 2020, text messages between Vincent Haley and Johnny McEntee).
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001 (November 10,
2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly Michael re: Only two options—please give to
POTUS newt).
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 311

37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001 (November 10,
2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly Michael re: Only two options—please give to
POTUS newt).
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010586_0001 (November 10,
2020, email from Mark Meadows to Newt Gingrich re: Only two options—please give to
POTUS newt).
39. Solange Reyner, “Newsmax CEO Ruddy: Trump 'Very Concerned' That Dems Will Steal Elec-
tion,” Newsmax, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/chris-
ruddy-2020-elections-democrats-white-house/2020/11/04/id/995386/; Christopher Ruddy
(@ChrisRuddyNMX), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020 4:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
ChrisRuddyNMX/status/1327004111154319360; “Digest of Other White House Announcements
(Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020),” Government Publishing Office, p. 114, available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf;
Michael M. Grynbaum and John Koblin,“Newsmax, Once a Right-Wing Also-Ran, Is Rising,
and Trump Approves,” New York Times, (Nov. 22, 2020), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/business/media/newsmax-trump-fox-news.html; Cordelia
Lynch, “Trump Ally on President's Next Move after Thanksgiving Phone Call,” Sky News,
(Dec. 4, 2020), available at https://news.sky.com/story/trump-ally-on-presidents-next-
move-after-thanksgiving-phone-call-12150612; Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000009409_0001 (December 2, 2020, email from John McLaughlin to
Molly Michael re: Newsmax National Poll).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM008861-MM008865 (November 7,
2020, email from John McLaughlin to Mark Meadows and Newt Gingrich re: “Gerald Brant's
birthday party/ my Nov 7, 2020 memo on ON 'ELECTORAL L COUNT ACT OF 1887' AND
REPUBLICAN PATHWAYS: [sic],” and attaching memo forwarded by Christopher Ruddy).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), pp. 14-15; Jeremy Herb and Sunlen Serfaty, “How
GOP Lawyer Cleta Mitchell Joined Trump’s ‘Team Deplorables’ Advancing His False Election
Fraud Claims,” CNN, (Oct. 13, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/13/politics/
trump-mitchell-georgia-election/index.html.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), pp. 74-75.
43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman006671.
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman007670-Chapman007671,
Chapman008087 (November 9, 2020, email chain between John Eastman, Lisa Nelson, Rep.
Seth Grove, and Cleta Mitchell re: Connections for today! and attaching memo).
45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),076P-R000010584_0001 (November 10,
2020, email chain scheduling an external meeting with President Trump).
46. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20201111104529/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1326475581005950976 (“Was in
Oval yesterday. You are right.”). For attribution of the account to Warstler, see The RSnake
Show, “S01E10 - Morgan Warstler,” YouTube, at 1:43:00 - 1:44:00, Apr. 20, 2022, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-ojD3QAYfo; Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June
16, 2022, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20220616124842/https://twitter.com/
BreakItUp3/status/1537414050510000128 (“NO it is not. I went to the Oval right after elec-
tion and spent an hour with Trump sitting at Resolute desk. I explain it all here: https://
312 CHAPTER 2

youtu.be/k-ojD3QAYfo?t=2724 . . . Hint: the electoral count act is unconstitutional—there is

only one slate of electors- whatever the state leg says”).
47. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June 15, 2022 7:40 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20220615234134/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/
1537218579225268225 (archived) (“She literally was advocating what I told whole Trump
team in Oval- it's a fact - state legislatures can choose the electors- no matter what cur-
rent state law OR state courts say . . . just ratify it amongst themselves That's WHY they
call it a plenary power ever since Bush v. Gore.”).
48. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001 - 076P-
R000008530_0001.
49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001-076P-
R000008528_0003, 076P-R000008530_0001 - 076P-R000008530_0002.
50. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001 - 076P-
R000008528_0003, 076P-R000008530_0001 - 076P-R000008530_0002.
51. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008531_0001, 076P-
R000008257_0001.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 151-52.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 153. This fits with several major
news reports at the time. The New York Times reported that President Trump went into the
meeting on the 11th with “something he wanted to discuss with his advisors,” and
“press[ed] them on whether Republican legislatures could pick pro-Trump electors in a
handful of key states and deliver him the electoral votes he needs.” Maggie Haberman,
“Trump Floats Improbable Survival Scenarios as He Ponders His Future,” New York Times,
(Nov. 12, 2020, updated Nov. 23, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/
us/politics/trump-future.html. Similarly, late on November 11th, the Washington Post
reported that President Trump had “raised the idea of pressuring state legislators to pick
electors favorable to him,” and the Wall Street Journal also called the option of state legis-
latures picking new electors “one potential strategy” discussed by his legal team. Philip
Rucker, Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, “Trump Insists He’ll Win, But Aides Say He Has No
Real Plan to Overturn Results and Talks of 2024 Run,” Washington Post, (Nov. 11, 2020),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-results-strategy/
2020/11/11/a32e2cba-244a-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0_story.html; Rebecca Ballhaus, “What Is
Trump’s Legal Strategy? Try to Block Certification of Biden Victory in States,” Wall Street
Journal, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-trumps-legal-
strategy-try-to-block-certification-of-biden-victory-in-states-11605138852.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 148-49.
55. Senator Mitt Romney (@MittRomney), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 10:36 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/1329629701447573504.
56. This figure is almost certainly a significant undercount, since it only includes public
remarks by President Trump, public testimony, or the most noteworthy interviews con-
ducted by one of his subordinates, but it does not include a review of every single remark
targeting State or local officials during this period by those presidential subordinates.
57. This figure is also almost certainly an undercount, since it only includes those posts by
President Trump’s campaign or advisors when they covered new ground that was substan-
tially different from social media posts that were already made by President Trump. Also,
many of these posts were replicated across multiple platforms.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 313

58. Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Campaign Lobbies Michigan Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him
Electors,” Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/
michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-
him-electors; MIRS Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator From Someone Claiming to be with
Trump Campaign (12/1/2020),” PodBean, Dec. 1, 2020, available at https://
www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum
Production), McCallum_01_001570, (Undated Basic Script for calls to Representatives/
Senators).
59. Paul Bedard, “Exclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, ‘You Are
the Real Power,’” Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-
legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power.
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020072
(December 24, 2020, copy of voice message and a transcription) pp. 1–2); see also Yvonne
Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “'Asked to Do Something Huge': An Audacious Pitch
to Reverse Arizona's Election Results,” AZ Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-
giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
61. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12,
2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly Michael).
62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12,
2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly Michael). The day after Representative Wal-
berg's call with the President, President Trump's assistant forwarded to the Acting Secre-
tary of the Department of Homeland Security a letter signed by two other Michigan
legislators outlining claims of supposed election fraud. Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department
of Homeland Security production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020 email from Molly
Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (no production
listed, Ex. 44 from Chad Wolf interview), CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan
Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State Senators Lana Theis and Tom Bar-
rett).
63. “Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of Other White House Announcements,”
Government Publishing Office, (Dec. 31, 2020), p. 115, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf; Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb &
Kevin Liptak, “Trump Courts Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid to Overturn Election He Lost,”
CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/politics/gop-michigan-
results-trump/.
64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012007 (text from Kelli Ward to
Meadows).
65. Brahm Resnik, “‘Stop the Counting’: Records Show Trump and Allies Pressured Top Mari-
copa County Officials Over Election Results,” 12News, (July 7, 2021), available at https://
www.12news.com/article/news/politics/stop-the-counting-records-show-trump-and-allies-
pressured-top-maricopa-county-officials-over-election-results/75-61a93e63-36c4-4137-
b65e-d3f8bde846a7.
66. Select Committee to Investigation the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview with Clint Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Maricopa
County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020004.
314 CHAPTER 2

67. Brian Slodysko, “EXPLAINER: Why AP called Georgia for Biden,” Associated Press, (Nov. 13,
2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/why-ap-called-georgia-for-joe-biden-
29c1fb0502efde50fdccb5e2c3611017.
68. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 13, 2020 7:50 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327413534901350400.jpg (archived).
69. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 14, 2020 9:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327619653020110850.jpg (archived).
70. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 9:04 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1328338211284616193.jpg (archived).
71. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 1:46 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329420741553643522.jpg (archived).
72. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 1:59 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1333410419554344964.jpg (archived).
73. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of November 30, 2020,” The American Presidency Proj-
ect, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020;
see also Fox 10 Staff, “Tweet mocking Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey and Georgia Gov. Brian
Kemp Now on Billboard,” Fox 10 News, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://
www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-
brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.
74. Miles Bryan, “From Obscure To Sold Out: The Story Of Four Seasons Total Landscaping In
Just 4 Days," NPR, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/11/11/933635970/
from-obscure-to-sold-out-the-story-of-four-seasons-total-landscaping-in-just-4-d.
75. Matt Friedman, “Man Featured at Giuliani Press Conference is a Convicted Sex Offender,”
Politico, (Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/
2020/11/09/man-featured-at-giuliani-press-conference-is-a-sex-offender-1335241.
76. McKenzie Sadeghi, “Fact Check: No Evidence Vote Was Cast in Joe Frazier's Name,” USA
Today, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/
2020/11/14/fact-check-no-evidence-late-joe-frazier-voted-2020-election/6283956002/; Led-
yard King and John Fritze, “Trump Attorney Rudy Giuliani Says Trump Won’t Concede,
Revives Baseless Claims of Voter Fraud,” USA Today, (Nov. 7, 2020) available at https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/07/joe-biden-victory-president-
trump-claims-election-far-over/6202892002/.
77. Veronica Stracqualursi, “Republican Election Official in Philadelphia Says He’s Seen No Evi-
dence of Widespread Fraud,” CNN, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/
11/11/politics/philadelphia-city-commissioner-2020-election-cnntv/index.html.
78. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020 9:03 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1326525851752656898.jpg (archived).
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to
1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to
1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to
1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
82. See McQuade v. Furgason, 91 Mich. 438 (1892). The various Boards of Canvassers in Michi-
gan know that the certification process is clerical because they are so instructed in the
official “Michigan Boards of County Canvassers Manual.” See “Procedures and Duties of the
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 315

Boards of County Canvassers,” State of Michigan, (July 2022), pp. 18-19, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/02lehman/BCC_Manual.pdf?rev=
7270a5ddcefa465b8ab8b95930ef5890.
83. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,” Wayne County Board of Canvass-
ers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 1, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-
of-canvassers.aspx.
84. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,” Wayne County Board of Canvass-
ers, (Nov. 17, 2020), pp. 1-5, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/
board-of-canvassers.aspx.
85. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,” Wayne County Board of Canvass-
ers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 5, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-
of-canvassers.aspx.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Monica Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel,
(Mar. 9, 2022); Phone records for Monica Palmer show calls from Ronna McDaniel at 9:53
PM and 10:04 PM. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
87. Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb, and Kevin Liptak, “Trump Courts Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid
to Overturn Election He Lost,” CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/
politics/gop-michigan-results-trump/.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Monica Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021). Palmer told the Select Committee that
she could not recall the exact words that President Trump used on the call, and she
claimed that she could not even recall whether the President raised issues related to the
election.
89. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin, “Republican Canvassers Ask to
‘Rescind’ Their Votes Certifying Michigan Election Results,” ABC News, (Nov. 19, 2020), avail-
able at https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-
certifying-election/story?id=74290114; Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, “Pair of
Wayne Co. Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind Certification of Election
Results,” WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-
wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-
election-results/; Paul Egan, “GOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers Say
They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,” Detroit Free Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-
canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.
90. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin, “Republican Canvassers Ask to
‘Rescind’ Their Votes Certifying Michigan Election Results,” ABC News, (Nov. 19, 2020), avail-
able at https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-
certifying-election/story?id=74290114; Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, “Pair of
Wayne Co. Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind Certification of Election
Results,” WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-
wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-
election-results/; Paul Egan, “GOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers Say
They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,” Detroit Free Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-
canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.
91. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020 10:38 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329086548093014022.jpg (archived).
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
316 CHAPTER 2

93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
95. Jonathan J. Cooper, “Arizona Governor Silences Trump’s Call, Certifies Election,” Associated
Press, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-
arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.
96. Jonathan J. Cooper, “Arizona Governor Silences Trump’s Call, Certifies Election,” Associated
Press, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-
arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.
97. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:39 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201201024920mp_/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1333556242984431616 (archived).
98. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of November 30, 2020,” The American Presidency Proj-
ect, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020;
“Tweet Mocking Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey and Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Now on Billboard,”
Fox 10 News, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-
mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.
99. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:40 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201201022358/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1333556458575818754 (archived).
100. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
101. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
102. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
103. “Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold Public Hearings on 2020 Election,”"
Donald J. Trump for President, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201130045430/https:/www.donaldjtrump.com/media/pennsylvania-arizona-michigan-
legislatures-to-hold-public-hearings-on-2020-election/.
104. “Donald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,”
Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.
105. Teresa Boeckel and J.D. Prose, “Pa. GOP Lawmakers Host Giuliani to Hear Election Con-
cerns. Trump Visits Via Cell Phone,” York Daily Record, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://
www.ydr.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/25/pa-gop-lawmakers-host-rudy-giuliani-hear-
election-concerns/6420319002/.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
107. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008474_0001 (Novem-
ber 25, 2020, email from Jared Small confirming that Trump will not be present in Gettys-
burg); Philip Rucker, Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Amy Gardner, “20 Days of Fantasy
and Failure: Inside Trump’s Quest to Overturn the Election,” Washington Post, (Nov. 28,
2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-overturn/
2020/11/28/34f45226-2f47-11eb-96c2-aac3f162215d_story.html; Alayna Treene and Rebecca
Falconer, “Trump Cancels Pennsylvania Trip for GOP Hearing on Voter Fraud Claims,” Axios,
(Nov. 25, 2020) available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/25/trump-pennsylvania-gop-
hearing-voter-fraud-claims. Apparently, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows also
contemplated going to Pennsylvania for the hearing when the President couldn’t attend.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 317

Text messages between Cassidy Hutchinson and Meadows’s Secret Service detail say, “U
heard how mark is motorcading to gburg right[,] and potus isn’t anymore.” Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000080 (Nov. 25, 2020).
108. “Donald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,”
Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.
109. “Pennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing Transcript on 2020 Election,” Rev,
(Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-
republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.
110. “Pennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing Transcript on 2020 Election,” Rev,
(Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-
republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 65–66; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24,
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115. Howard Fischer, “GOP Officials Still Fighting Arizona’s Vote Tally on Very Day Biden’s Win
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116. Howard Fischer, “GOP Officials Still Fighting Arizona’s Vote Tally on Very Day Biden’s Win
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121. Rudy Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 11:17 p.m. ET, available at https://
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122. “Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold Public Hearings on 2020 Election,”
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124. Wood TV8, “Giuliani and Laura Cox Hold 'Legal Briefing' Before Giving Testimony Wednes-
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125. Wood TV8, “Giuliani and Laura Cox Hold 'Legal Briefing' Before Giving Testimony Wednes-
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126. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing, (Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:03:13-4:04:22,
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127. Edward-Isaac Dovere (@IsaacDovere), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at
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130. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,” YouTube, at 1:56:30 to 1:57:15, 5:29:20-
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132. Global TV Online, “#LIVE: Georgia State Senate Holds Meeting on 2020 Election . . . ,” You-
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134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Byung J. Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 10-23; United States Senate Judiciary
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Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,”
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 319

Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-

election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today.
135. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,” YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:10, Dec. 3, 2020,
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136. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs 12.10.20,” Vimeo – Livestream, at
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137. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs 12.10.20,” Vimeo – Livestream, at
2:09:00-2:13:00, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/
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138. Mike Wilkinson, “The Rudy Giuliani ‘Circus’ Has Left Lansing. The Reviews Are Bad,” Bridge
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rudy-giuliani-circus-has-left-lansing-reviews-are-bad.
139. Mike Wilkinson, “The Rudy Giuliani ‘Circus’ Has Left Lansing. The Reviews Are Bad,” Bridge
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rudy-giuliani-circus-has-left-lansing-reviews-are-bad.
140. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 6:01 a.m. ET, https://media-
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141. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
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suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001501 (November 30,
2021, Michael Brown text message to group at 2:47 a.m.).
143. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001501 (November 30,
2021, Michael Brown text message to group at 2:47 a.m.).
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001528 - 1564 (Trump
Campaign spreadsheet).
145. Mirs Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator from Someone Claiming to Be With Trump Cam-
paign (12/1/20),” Podbean.com, at 0:08, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at https://
www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6.
146. Mirs Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator from Someone Claiming to Be With Trump Cam-
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www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6.
147. Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Campaign Lobbies Michigan Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him
Electors,” Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/
michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-
him-electors.
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum production), McCallum_01_001523 (text messages
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149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum production), McCallum_01_001523 (text messages
with Michael Brown).
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 8-10; Senator Mike Shirkey
(@SenMikeShirkey), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2020 6:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
SenMikeShirkey/status/1329925843053899780.
320 CHAPTER 2

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 10.
152. "Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of Other White House Announcements,”
Government Publishing Office, (December 31, 2020), p. 115, available at https://
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153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 16.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-18.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 21-22.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 22.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021). Leader Shirkey did not remember any specific
“ask” from the President during the Oval Office meeting. Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shir-
key, (June 8, 2022), p. 16 (“One thing I do remember is that he never, ever, to the best of
my recollection, ever made a specific ask. It was always just general topics[.]”).
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.
160. “Legislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,” State Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20,
2020), available at https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-
president-trump/.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
163. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/
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164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian, “Former Michi-
gan Resident Slammed with Calls after Trump Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on
Social Media,” Fox 17 West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-
trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012414 (text to Rep. Scott Perry from
Meadows).
166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012445 (text to Meadows from Rep.
Scott Perry).
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); Jake Corman and Kerry Benninghoff, “Pa. Law-
makers Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential Election,” Centre Daily Times, (Oct. 19,
2020), available at https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 321

168. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break America,” The Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020),
available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-
refuses-concede/616424/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); see Jake Corman,
“Pa. Lawmakers Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential Election,” Centre Daily Times,
(Oct. 19, 2020) available at https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html.
Senator Corman and other Pennsylvania lawmakers sent a letter to Congress in January
that mentioned “numerous unlawful violations” of State law and asked that Congress
“delay certification of the electoral college.” Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Pro-
duction), 076P-R000002160_00001. In his informal interview with the Select Committee,
however, Senator Corman acknowledged that he signed the letter due to pressure he was
receiving after the election, but explained that he believed fraud and these types of issues
should be adjudicated in the courtroom, not the legislature, and, in any event, he said that
he was never presented with credible evidence of voter fraud. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000131-0000134 (Giuliani and
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179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 21.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 21.
181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000131 (Giuliani and Ellis
voicemail).
182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000132 (Jenna Ellis voicemail).
183. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000133 (Giuliani voicemail).
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000134 (Giuliani voicemail).
322 CHAPTER 2

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 42-44, 46-47. The New York Times reported
that Speaker Cutler spoke with President Trump twice by phone, Cutler told the Select
Committee that this claim was incorrect and that he only spoke with the President by
phone once, followed by their second conversation on December 3rd, which was in person.
See Trip Gabriel, “Trump Asked Pennsylvania House Speaker about Overturning His Loss,”
New York Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/
politics/trump-pennsylvania-house-speaker.html; see also Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey and
Rachael Bade, “Trump Asks Pennsylvania House Speaker for Help Overturning Election
Results, Personally Intervening in a Third State,” Washington Post, (Dec. 8, 2020), available
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pennsylvania-speaker-call/2020/12/
07/d65fe8c4-38bf-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 43-44.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 26-27, 44.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 49-57; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan.
25, 2022).
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 50.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 50-55.
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 54-55.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 56-57.
193. “Statement on Election Reform,” Pennsylvania Senate GOP (Dec 3, 2020, accessed July 14,
2022), available at https://www.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/election-
reform-120320.pdf.
194. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 12:56 a.m. ET, available at
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2020/120420CongressElection2020B.pdf.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 60-61.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 61.
198. Trip Gabriel, “Even in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on State G.O.P. Lawmakers,” New York
Times, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/
trump-pennsylvania-electoral-college.html.
199. Trip Gabriel, “Even in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on State G.O.P. Lawmakers,” New York
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200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 323

Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
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allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-
allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-
allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-
allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og. In his testimony to the
Select Committee, Speaker Bowers said this appeal to party loyalty occurred in that call or
in a later meeting, and that the President brought it up “more than once.”
207. Dillon Rosenblatt and Julia Shumway, “Giuliani COVID-19 Diagnosis Closes Arizona Legisla-
ture,” Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/
2020/12/06/giuliani-covid-19-diagnosis-closes-arizona-legislature/; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ari-
zona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); Vince Leach (@VinceLeach), Twitter, Dec.
1, 2020 11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/VinceLeach/status/
1333991317500727298. Speaker Bowers told the Committee that Giuliani and Ellis were
accompanied by Katherine Friess, J. Philip Waldron, Bernard Kerik, and others. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal
Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021).
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 58-59; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jenna Ellis, (Mar. 8, 2022),
pp. 50-51.
209. "Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Russel “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 35-36; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona
324 CHAPTER 2

House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); “Speaker Bowers Addresses Calls for the Leg-
islature to Overturn 2020 Certified Election Results,” Arizona State Legislature, (Dec. 4,
2020), available at https://www.azleg.gov/press/house/54LEG/2R/201204STATEMENT.pdf
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell
Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 39-41.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
217. “Trump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July
2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/
02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-
contested-results/7837919002/.
218. “Trump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July
2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/
02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-
contested-results/7837919002/.
219. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Clint Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “'We
Need You to Stop the Counting': Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure
Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central (July 2, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-
kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.
220. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “'Fighting for Democracy Here': Election Audit Pits Maricopa
County Republicans vs. Arizona GOP,” AZ Central, (May 23, 2021) available at https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/05/23/election-audit-pits-
maricopa-county-republicans-against-arizona-gop-senators/5186141001/; see also “Trump
allies leave voicemail messages for Maricopa County supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021),
available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/
trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-
contested-results/7837919002/.
221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020072,
pp. 1-2 (December 24, 2020, copy of voice message and a transcription); see also Yvonne
Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “'Asked to Do Something Huge': An Audacious Pitch
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 325

to Reverse Arizona's Election Results,” AZ Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://

www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-
giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
223. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “'We Need You to Stop the Counting': Records Detail Intense
Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021),
available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/
records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-
results/7813304002/.
224. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “'We Need You to Stop the Counting': Records Detail Intense
Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021),
available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/
records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-
results/7813304002/.
225. Document on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS00104-105 (December 5, 2021, email from
Joshua Findlay to Matthew Morgan, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien at 11:44 pm).
226. Brian Kemp (@BrianKempGA), Twitter, Dec. 5, 2020 12:44 p.m., available at https://
twitter.com/briankempga/status/1335278871630008324.
227. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 5, 2020 9:35 pm ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335336916582084614.jpg (archived).
As detailed later in this report, the call for special sessions of legislatures in various
States, including Georgia, never gained traction and, when all else failed, became a focus
for two Department of Justice lawyers.
228. Office of Governor Brian P. Kemp, “Gov. Kemp, Lt. Gov. Duncan Issue Statement on Request
for Special Session of General Assembly,” MadMimi.com, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at
https://madmimi.com/p/50e7a11?pact=1301484-161142215-11561983238-
b09ac0db7ff3f3c8bd594d6a33e7f63d0cf4c135.
229. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 3:07 p.m., available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201208200907/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1336401919422640128 (archived) (retweeting Lin Wood (@LLinWood), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020,
11:22 a.m., available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201208200908/https://twitter.com/
LLinWood/status/1336390712380813313 (archived)).
230. Brett Samuels, “Trump Retweets Lawyer Who Said Republican Officials in Georgia Are
‘Going to Jail’,” The Hill, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/
campaign/530250-trump-retweets-lawyer-who-says-republican-officials-in-georgia-are-
going-to/.
231. Search results for “‘The Republican Governor of Georgia refuses’ | ‘As badly as we were
treated in Georgia’ | kemp | @briankempga,” from November 30 to December 31, 2020,
Trump Twitter Archive V2, (last accessed December 12, 2022), available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22%5C%22The+Republican+Governor+of+Georgia+refuses%5C%22+%7C+%5C%22As+badly
+as+we+were+treated+in+Georgia%5C%22+%7C+kemp+%7C+%40briankempga%22&dates=
%5B%222020-11-30%22%2C%222020-12-30%22%5D&results=1.
232. Document on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007750_0001, (December 7,
2020 email from Bill White to Dan Scavino and others) including screenshot of Burt Jones
(@burtjonesforga), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 11:26 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/
burtjonesforga/status/1335984150789173248), available at https://twitter.com/
burtjonesforga/status/1335984150789173248).
326 CHAPTER 2

233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 1:29 p.m. ET, available at
https://factba.se/biden/topic/twitter?q=burtjonesforga&f= (archived); Rudy W. Giuliani
(@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 12:25 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/
RudyGiuliani/status/1335998988101804035.
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.
237. David Wickert and Greg Bluestein, “Inside the Campaign to Undermine Georgia’s Election
(Part I),” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 30, 2021), available at https://www.ajc.com/
politics/election/georgia-2020-election-what-happened/.
238. Shepherd's Sling, “Steven K. Bannon - War Room Pandemic - Ep. #568/569 (Full 2hrs Pod-
cast),” BitChute, at 16:50 - 18:00, Dec. 8, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/
video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/; John Fredericks (@jfradioshow), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 5:30 p.m. ET,
available at https://twitter.com/jfradioshow/status/1336075668090654724; Jim Hoft,
“Developing: President Trump Speaks with Georgia House Speaker David Ralston and
Speaker Pro-Tem Jan Jones on Endorsing Special Session,” Gateway Pundit, (Dec. 7, 2020),
available at https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/12/developing-president-trump-
speaks-georgia-house-speaker-david-ralston-speaker-pro-tem-jan-jones-endorsing-
special-session/.
239. FYNTV FetchYourNews, “#BKP Has a Live Call-In with David Ralston,” YouTube, at 2:30 - 3:12
(Dec. 8, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201224164814/https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdN5vNOl6F4&gl=US&hl=en (archived); Julie Carr, “Georgia
Speaker of the House David Ralston Joins BKP Politics to Discuss His Call with President
Trump and a Legal Path Forward,” Tennessee Star, (Dec. 20, 2020), available at https://
tennesseestar.com/2020/12/20/georgia-speaker-of-the-house-david-ralston-joins-bkp-
politics-to-discuss-his-call-with-president-trump-and-a-legal-path-forward/.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 162-67.
241. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Georgia Secretary of State Production), GA SOS ORR (21-344) 005651
(Dec. 23, 2020 call between President Trump and Frances Watson); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Interview with Frances Wat-
son (Dec. 15, 2021); see also “Georgia Secretary of State Recording of Trump Phone Call to
Election Investigator,” American Oversight (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://
www.americanoversight.org/document/georgia-secretary-of-state-recording-of-trump-
phone-call-to-election-investigator.
242. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014152 (December 27, 2020 text mes-
sage at 5:18 p.m. from Mark Meadows to Jordan Fuchs).
243. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014153 (December 27, 2020 text mes-
sage at 5:20 p.m. from Jordan Fuchs to Mark Meadows).
244. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012317 (November 19, 2020 text mes-
sage at 9:56 a.m. from Mark Meadows to Brad Raffensperger).
245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013362.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 327

246. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013632-33; see also Newsmax
(@newsmax), Twitter, Dec. 11, 2020 9:45 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/newsmax/
status/1337589238078922752.
247. Philip Rucker, Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Sabotaging GOP on
His Way Out of Office with Push to Overturn Election,” Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sabotage-republicans/2021/
01/04/df5d301e-4eb1-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
248. “Georgia Sec. of State Discusses Phone Call with Trump About Election Results,” Good
Morning America, at 1:40 to 2:20, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/video/georgia-sec-state-discusses-phone-call-
trump-election-75032599.
249. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
250. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between
Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/
01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
251. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between
Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/
01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html (the
Washington Post redacted Freeman’s name and instead used “[name]” in the transcript);
“Donald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger: Says
He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/
transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.
253. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between
Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/
01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
254. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345731043861659650.jpg (archived).
The archived image is in universal time.
255. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345723944654024706.jpg, (archived).
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
257. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-32; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698–
000702 (Draft letter written by Jeffrey Clark).
328 CHAPTER 2

258. “Senate Committee to Discuss Election Issues in Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania Senate GOP
website (Nov. 24, 2020, last accessed on July 15, 2022), available at https://
www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-
pennsylvania/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 65-66. https://
www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-
pennsylvania/.
259. Jeremy Roebuck and Andrew Seidman, “Pa. GOP lawmaker Doug Mastriano says he left the
Capitol area before the riot. New videos say otherwise,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (May 25,
2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/news/doug-mastriano-capitol-riot-
pennslyvania-video-20210525.html.
260. Eric Metaxas, "Interview: Eric Metaxas Interviews Donald Trump with Douglas Mastriano,”
Factba.se Archive, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-
interview-eric-metaxas-douglas-mastriano-november-30-2020; Senator Doug Mastriano
(@SenMastriano), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 5:56 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
senmastriano/status/1333545380965986307.
261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008230_0001, 076P-
R000008231_0001 (email and attachment from Mastriano to Molly Michael); see also Kelly v.
Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 950 (2020) (order denying application for injunctive relief pre-
sented to Justice Alito and denying referral to the full Court).
262. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001378_00001, 076P-
R000001379_00001.
263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-
R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled “Letter
Requested by the President”).
264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-
R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled “Letter
requested by the President”).
265. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003748_0001,
076P-R000003749_0001, (Dec. 29, 2020, Doug Mastriano email to Molly Michael titled “Penn-
sylvania letter for AG Donoghue regarding election”; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National
Archives Production), 076P-R000003753_0001, 076P-R000003754_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly
Michael email to Rush Limbaugh titled “From POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National
Archives Production) 076P-R000003761_0001, 076P-R000003762_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly
Michael email to Pam Bondi titled “From POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National
Archives Production) 076P-R000003766_0001, (Dec. 21, 2020, Molly Michael email to Lou
Dobbs titled “2 attachments from POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Produc-
tion), 076P-R000008968_0001, (Jan. 1, 2021, Molly Michael email to Kevin McCarthy titled
“From POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archive Production) 076P-
R000003759_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to John Eastman, Justin Clark, and
Michael Farris titled “From POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production)
076P-R000003763_0001, (December 21, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Christopher
Michel re: From POTUS).
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 329

266. Charlotte Cuthbertson, “Trump ‘Resolved, Determined’ about Election, Says Pennsylvania
Senator,” Epoch Times (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-
resolved-determined-about-election-says-pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html; Marc Levy &
Mark Scolforo, “White House Invites GOP Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,” Associated
Press, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-
pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a; Jan Murphy, “Pa.
Senators Head to White House for Pre-Holiday Lunch with President Trump,” Penn Live –
Patriot-News, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-
senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html; “Ep 608-
Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special Hour 1 (w/ Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro,
Major Sgt. Scotty Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej Gill, Christopher Flannery ),” War Room Pod-
cast (Dec. 24, 2020), 25:17 to 25:25, available at https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-608-
pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-neil-
former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/. Charlotte Cuthbertson, “Trump ‘Resolved,
Determined’ about Election, Says Pennsylvania Senator,” Epoch Times (Dec. 24, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-resolved-determined-about-election-says-
pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html; Marc Levy & Mark Scolforo, “White House Invites GOP
Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,” Associated Press (Dec. 23, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-
c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a; Jan Murphy, “Pa. Senators Head to White House for Pre-
Holiday Lunch with President Trump,” Penn Live – Patriot-News (Dec. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-
holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html; “Ep 608- Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special
Hour 1 (w/ Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro, Major Sgt. Scotty Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej
Gill, Christopher Flannery)”, War Room Podcast (Dec.https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-
608-pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-
neil-former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/.
267. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008298_0001
(December 28, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Mark Meadows forwarding Senator Doug
Mastriano info for the president), 076P-R000007593_0001 (December 28, 2020, email from
Molly Michael to Scott Toland forwarding Senator Doug Mastriano info for the president),
076P-R000003748_0001, 076P-R000003749_0001 (December 29, 2020, email and attachments
from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Pennsylvania letter for AG Donoghue regarding
election), , 076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-R000003746_0001, 076P-R000003747_0001 (Decem-
ber 31, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by Presi-
dent Trump and attachments).
268. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-
R000003746_0001, 076P-R000003747_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano
to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by President Trump and attachments).
269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003732_0001(Email from
Molly Michael to Amy Swonger, passing along information from Mastriano, 076P-
R000008399_0001 (Email from Amy Swonger to Molly Michael responding)). According to
the White House’s Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, Amy Swonger, the President
repeatedly asked for her to distribute political materials after the election, which led her
to seek advice from the White House Counsel’s Office because fulfilling the President’s
request would likely violate the Hatch Act. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy Swonger, (Oct. 28,
2022), pp. 52-53.
270. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439_0001 (White House
switchboard call log from Jan. 5, 2022).
330 CHAPTER 2

271. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004788_0001, 076P-
R000004789_0001-0066 (January 5, 2021, email from Mastriano attaching letter for Vice
President Pence signed by Pennsylvania legislators), 076P-R000004957_0001 (Molly Michael
acknowledging receipt), 076P-R000005084_0001 (Molly Michael passing the letter along to
Marc Short), 076P-R000007338_0001 (acknowledgment that the letter was printed for
POTUS), 076P-R000004687_0001, 076P-R000004688_0001 (January 5, 2021, email and
attached letter to Molly Michael re: Caucus Letter to Sen. McConnell and Rep. McCarthy).
272. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:59 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&dates=%5B%222021-01-04%22%2C%222021-
01-06%22%5D&searchbox=
%22BIG+NEWS+IN+PENNSYLVANIA%21+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F7JqTWYUgOr%22 (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 12:46 a.m. ET, available at
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%22pennsylvania+is+going+to+trump.+The+legislators%22 (archived).
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Douglas Mastriano, (August 9, 2022), pp. 10-11.
274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153(emails with Jason Miller
re: emails to PA/AZ).
275. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153 (emails with Jason Miller
re: emails to PA/AZ).
276. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153 (emails with Jason Miller
re: emails to PA/AZ).
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-26; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022),
pp. 128-34.
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001891_00001.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 138-39.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 136-37.
281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001890_00001, 076P-
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282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-27; Select Committee to Investigate the
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283. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001891_00001.
284. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001891_00001.
285. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001891_00001.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 331

286. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudy Giuliani Production), RGGLOBAL_DOM_00008525.
287. Shepherd's Sling, “Steve Bannon's War Room, Episode 623,” BitChute, at 13:20 - 13:29, Dec.
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289. Shepherd's Sling, “Steve Bannon's War Room, Episode 623,” BitChute, at 24:49 - 25:14, Dec.
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290. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 11:53 a.m. ET, available at https://
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291. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 13, 2020 1:05 a.m. ET, available at https://
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scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 43-45; Select Committee to
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United States Capitol (National Archives Production),076P-R000008962_0006 (January 2,
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United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian
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298. Paul Bedard, “Exclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, ‘You Are
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legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giu-
liani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 99-100.
332 CHAPTER 2

299. Paul Bedard, “Exclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, ‘You Are
the Real Power’,” Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://
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300. Paul Bedard, “Exclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, ‘You Are
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301. Daniel Chaitan, “Navarro: Six-Person Team Briefed Hundreds of State Lawmakers Showed
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lawmakers-showed-receipts-of-stolen-election. The Select Committee attempted to ask
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United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian
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the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email
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GOT FREEDOM?)(quoted text bolded and italicized in original)
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334 CHAPTER 2

328. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:23 p.m. ET, available at https://
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Interview with Russel “Rusty” Bowers (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, “Arizona GOP
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getting-weirder; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do Something
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6349795001/.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
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331. House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview with Russel “Rusty” Bowers (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52.
332. Brahm Resnik, “VIDEO: Group chants ‘We are watching you’ outside Arizona Secretary of
State Katie Hobbs’ home,” KPNX 12 News, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://
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arizona-secretary-of-state-katie-hobbs-home/75-a569ae35-3b62-424e-88f8-f03ca8b89458;
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violence-following-election; Brahm Resnik, “Arizona Law Enforcement Investigating Social
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violence-following-election; Brahm Resnik, “Arizona Law Enforcement Investigating Social
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a325-8bbed6e3e231.
334. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, “‘It’s Absolutely Getting Worse’: Secretaries of State Tar-
geted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protec-
tion,” CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/
secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html; Michael Wines and
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335. Committee on House Administration, Election Subversion: A Growing Threat to Election
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 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 335

337. Nicole Valdes, “Online Death Threats Target Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,” ABC 15
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338. Washington Post, “The Arizona election official who faced death threats for telling the
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339. Genesis Sandoval, “Hickman: A Year after 2020 Elections, Threats, Abuse Still Coming In,”
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340. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Protecting our Democracy’s
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342. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, “‘It’s Absolutely Getting Worse’: Secretaries of State Tar-
geted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protec-
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secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html.
343. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Aaron Van Langevelde and Adrianne Van Langevelde, (Oct. 21, 2021); Tim
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345. Trey Grayson, Matthew Masterson, Orion Danjuma, and Ben Berwick, “State and Local Solu-
tions Are Integral to Protect Election Officials and Democracy,” Just Security, (Feb. 9, 2022),
available at https://www.justsecurity.org/80142/state-and-local-solutions-are-integral-to-
protect-election-officials-and-democracy/; Stanford Internet Observatory, “Tina Barton –
Aftermath – Death Threats,” YouTube, (Sept. 20, 2021), available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xi5Y7bwvy-Y.
346. Melissa Nann Burke and George Hunter, “‘I Feel Afraid’: Detroit Clerk Winfrey Testifies to
U.S. House Panel on Death Threats She Received,” Detroit News, (July 28, 2021), available at
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/28/winfrey-testifies-before-
house-panel-threats-election-workers/5400419001/.
347. Linda So and Jason Szep, “Campaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law
Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,” Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.
336 CHAPTER 2

348. Dave Boucher, “Black Michigan Lawmaker Posts Voicemails Saying She Should be Lynched,”
Detroit Free Press, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2020/12/06/michigan-lawmaker-posts-voicemails-saying-she-should-lynched/
3849695001/.
349. Dave Boucher, “Black Michigan Lawmaker Posts Voicemails Saying She Should be Lynched,”
Detroit Free Press, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2020/12/06/michigan-lawmaker-posts-voicemails-saying-she-should-lynched/
3849695001/.
350. Kayla Clarke, “Man faces felony charges for bomb threat at Michigan Capitol Building,
threats against state representative,” Click on Detroit, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://
www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2021/01/08/man-faces-felony-charges-for-bomb-
threat-at-michigan-capitol-building-threats-against-state-representative/ (linking to
affidavit).
351. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, “‘It’s Absolutely Getting Worse’: Secretaries of State Tar-
geted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protec-
tion,” CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/
secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html; see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6thAttack on the United States Capitol, Informal
Interview of Kathy Boockvar, (Dec. 22, 2021).
352. Linda So and Jason Szep, “Campaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law
Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,” Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.
353. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, “‘It’s Absolutely Getting Worse’: Secretaries of State Tar-
geted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protec-
tion,” CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/
secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html.
354. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 83-84.
355. Geoff Rushton, “Police Investigating Threat Made During State College Borough Council
Meeting,” StateCollege.com, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.statecollege.com/
police-investigating-threat-made-during-state-college-borough-council-meeting/.
356. Jan Murphy, “Meet Pa. Senate GOP Leader Kim Ward, the First Woman to Hold That Post: ‘I
Have To Do a Good Job’, PennLive.com, (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.pennlive.com/news/
2021/01/meet-pa-senate-gop-leader-kim-ward-the-first-woman-to-hold-that-post-i-have-
to-do-a-good-job.html.
357. Matt Petrillo, “‘We’re Coming after You’: Philadelphia Elections Officials Still Receiving
Death Threats Following 2020 Presidential Election,” CBS Philly 3, (Nov. 1, 2021), available at
https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2021/11/01/philadelphia-election-officials-death-threat-
donald-trump-joe-biden/; Linda So and Jason Szep, “Campaign of Fear: U.S. Election Work-
ers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,” Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021),
available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-
law-enforcement/.
358. Linda So and Jason Szep, “Special Report: Terrorized U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help
from Law Enforcement,” Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/
legal/government/terrorized-us-election-workers-get-little-help-law-enforcement-2021-09-
08/.
359. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:10:00 to
2:11:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 337

360. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,”
Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-
election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
361. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:10:00 to
2:11:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Linda So, “Special
Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,” Reuters, (June 11,
2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-
rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-
idUSKCN2DN14M.
362. Jeff Pegues and Robert Legare, “Texas Man Charged with Making Election-Related Threats
to Georgia Government Officials,” CBS News, (Jan. 21, 2022), available at https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/chad-christopher-stark-charged-election-related-threats-georgia-
government-officials/.
363. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,”
Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-
election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
364. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,”
Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-
election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
365. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,”
Reuters (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-
election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
366. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs 12.10.20,” Vimeo – Livestream, at
2:09:00-2:13:00, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/
videos/214677184; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21,
2022), at 2:25:45 to 2:26:00, available at https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.
367. Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate Runoff Elections December 5,” Rev,
(Dec. 5, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-
rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5; Jason Szep and Linda So, “A
Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and
Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
368. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,
“Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Wash-
ington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-
322644d82356_story.html (the Washington Post redacted Freeman’s name and instead used
“[name]” in the transcript); “Donald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State
Brad Raffensperger: Says He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-
raffensperger-recording.
369. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two
Georgia Election Workers – and Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
338 CHAPTER 2

370. Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22 (Amended
Complaint at 52), available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/
freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
371. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two
Georgia Election Workers – and Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
372. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two
Georgia Election Workers – and Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
373. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10,
2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/
freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
374. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10,
2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/
freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
377. Government’s Motion Regarding Anticipated Trial Evidence and Notice Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) at 1-2, 24-26, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
July 8, 2022), ECF No. 187; Brandi Buchman (@Brandi_Buchman), Twitter, Oct. 6, 2022 7:27
a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/Brandi_Buchman/status/1577983997711421441.
378. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, “Judge Says Oath Keepers Jury Won’t See ‘Death
List’,” CNN (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/06/politics/judge-says-oath-
keepers-jury-wont-see-death-list-trial-day-3.
Georgia Electors cast their Electoral College votes
at the Georgia State Capitol on December 14, 2020.
Photo by Jessica McGowan/Getty Images
 3

FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE

SENATE STRATEGY”
On the morning of January 6th, in his speech at the Ellipse, President
Trump exhorted his thousands of assembled supporters to march to the
U.S. Capitol, explaining that “[w]e have come to demand that Congress do
the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated,
lawfully slated.” 1 This was no off-the-cuff remark; it was the culmination
of a carefully planned scheme many weeks in the making. This plea by the
President turned the truth on its head. There was only one legitimate slate
of electors from the battleground States of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan,
Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and Trump wanted
them rejected. This scheme involved lawyers, such as Kenneth Chesebro
and Rudy Giuliani, as well as Mark Meadows. It also was aided at key points
by Chairwoman of the Republican National Committee Ronna McDaniel,
Members of Congress, and Republican leaders across seven States—some of
whom did not know exactly what they were being asked to do. President
Trump oversaw it himself.
President Trump and his allies prepared their own fake slates of elec-
toral college electors in seven States that President Trump lost: Arizona,
Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And
on December 14, 2020—the date when true, certified electors were meeting
to cast their electoral votes for the candidate who had won the popular vote
in each of those States—these fake electors also met, ostensibly casting
electoral votes for President Trump, the candidate who had lost.
There was no legitimate reason for Trump electors to meet, vote, and
produce fake slates on December 14th in States that former Vice President
Biden won. Instead, this effort was aimed directly at the President of the
Senate (which, under the Constitution, is the Vice President) in his role at
the joint session of Congress on January 6th. President Trump and his

341
342 CHAPTER 3

advisors wanted Vice President Pence to disregard real electoral college

votes for former Vice President Biden, in favor of these fake competing
electoral slates.
But there never were real, competing slates of electors. By the time the
fake Trump electors met on December 14th, appropriate government offi-
cials in each of the seven States had already certified their State’s official
election results for former Vice President Biden. No court had issued an
order reversing or calling into question those results, and most election-
related litigation was over. And as detailed in Chapter 2, despite the illicit
efforts of President Trump and his allies, no State legislature had agreed to
the President’s request to reverse the result of the election by appointing a
different slate of electors.
Given all of this, these groups of Trump backers who called themselves
Presidential electors were never actually electors, and the votes they pur-
ported to cast on December 14th were not valid. They were fake. They had
no legal standing, and their fake votes could not have been used by Vice
President Pence to disregard the real votes of electors chosen by the voters.
By January 6th, President Trump had been discouraged by his top law-
yers from following through on this plan. The Trump Campaign’s senior
staff attorneys had concerns,2 and several days before the joint session, the
Acting Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General blocked the send-
ing of a letter indicating that there were “competing slates” of electors,
including “in Georgia and several other States.” 3 But this reasoning did
nothing to change President Trump’s rhetoric or plan. He continued to
assert that there were “competing” or “dual” slates of electors to create an
opportunity to stay in office on January 6th.4
These lawyers were right: President Trump’s plan was illegal. In his
June 7, 2022, opinion, Federal District Judge David Carter wrote that this
initiative to “certify alternate slates of electors for President Trump” con-
stituted a “critical objective of the January 6 plan.” 5 This followed Judge
Carter’s earlier determination in March that “[t]he illegality of the plan was
obvious,” and “[e]very American—and certainly the President of the United
States—knows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not installed. With
a plan this ‘BOLD,’ President Trump knowingly tried to subvert this funda-
mental principle. Based on the evidence the Court finds it more likely than
not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session
of Congress on January 6, 2021.” 6
The fake elector effort was an unlawful, unprecedented and destructive
break from the electoral college process that our country has used to select
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 343

its President for generations.7 It led directly to the violence that occurred
on January 6th. To address the damage that it caused, it is important to
understand how it transpired.

3.1 LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE FAKE ELECTOR PLAN: THE CHESEBRO
MEMOS

The fake elector plan emerged from a series of legal memoranda written by
an outside legal advisor to the Trump Campaign: Kenneth Chesebro.
Although John Eastman would have a more prominent role in advising
President Trump in the days immediately before January 6th, Chesebro—an
attorney based in Boston and New York recruited to assist the Trump Cam-
paign as a volunteer legal advisor—was central to the creation of the plan.8
Memos by Chesebro on November 18th, December 9th, and December 13th,
as discussed below, laid the plan’s foundation.
Chesebro’s first memo on November 18th suggested that the Trump
Campaign could gain a few extra weeks for litigation to challenge Wiscon-
sin’s election results, so long as a Wisconsin slate of Republican nominees
to the electoral college met on December 14th to cast placeholder electoral
college votes on a contingent basis.9 This memo acknowledged that “[i]t
may seem odd that the electors pledged to Trump and Pence might meet
and cast their votes on December 14 even if, at that juncture, the Trump-
Pence ticket is behind in the vote count, and no certificate of election has
been issued in favor of Trump and Pence.” 10 However, Chesebro argued
that if such a slate of alternate electors gathered to cast electoral votes on a
contingent basis, this would preserve the Trump Campaign’s options so “a
court decision (or, perhaps, a state legislative determination) rendered after
December 14 in favor of the Trump-Pence slate of electors should be
timely.” 11
On December 9th, Chesebro penned a second memo, which suggested
another purpose for fake electoral college votes on January 6th. It stated
that unauthorized Trump electors in these States could be retroactively rec-
ognized “by a court, the state legislature, or Congress.” 12 Under this theory,
there would be no need for a court to decide that the election had been
decided in error; instead, Congress itself could choose among dueling slates
of purported electoral votes—and thereby decide the Presidential election—
even though Article II of the Constitution grants that power to the electoral
college via the States.13
344 CHAPTER 3

Chesebro’s contemporaneous communications make clear that the goal

was having Congress act on the fake electoral votes. He emailed an orga-
nizer of the fake electors in Nevada that “the purpose of having the elec-
toral votes sent in to Congress is to provide the opportunity to debate the
election irregularities in Congress, and to keep alive the possibility that the
votes could be flipped to Trump . . .” 14 And a legal advisor to the Arizona
GOP reportedly described being told by Chesebro around this time that their
supposed electors “would just be sending in ‘fake’ electoral votes to Pence
so that ‘someone’ in Congress can make an objection when they start
counting votes, and start arguing that the ‘fake’ votes should be
counted.” 15
Many of the States contested by the Trump team had laws that specified
requirements for electors to validly cast and transmit their votes—and the
December 9, 2020, memo recognized that some of these criteria would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the fake electors to fulfill. (As described
later, most were not fulfilled.) For example, Nevada State law required that
the secretary of state preside when Presidential electors meet,16 and Nevada
Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske, a Republican, had already signed a
certificate ascertaining the Biden/Harris electors as the authorized, winning
slate.17 Several States also had rules requiring electors to cast their votes in
the State capitol building, or rules governing the process for approving
substitutes if any original proposed electors from the November ballot were
unavailable. As a result, Chesebro’s December 9, 2020, memo advised the
Trump Campaign to abide by such rules, when possible, but also recognized
that these slates could be “slightly problematic in Michigan,” “somewhat
dicey in Georgia and Pennsylvania,” and “very problematic in Nevada.” 18
On December 13th, the fake elector scheme became even clearer in an
email sent by Chesebro to Giuliani. His message was entitled “Brief notes
on ‘President of the Senate’ strategy.” It addressed how the fake electors
meeting the next day, December 14th, could be exploited during the joint
session of Congress on January 6th by the President of the Senate—a role
that the Constitution grants to the Vice President of the United States.19
Chesebro argued that, on January 6th, the President of the Senate could:
. . . firmly take the position that he, and he alone, is charged with the
constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes, but to count
them—including making judgments about what to do if there are
conflicting votes . . .20
Chesebro’s email suggested that the President of the Senate (which
under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could toss out former Vice
President Biden’s actual electoral votes for any State where the Trump
Campaign organized fake electors, simply “because there are two slates of
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 345

votes.” 21 Of course, there were never two slates of electoral votes, so this
premise itself was fundamentally wrong. But he was arguing that even if
votes by fake electors were never retroactively ratified under State law,
their mere submission to Congress would be enough to allow the presiding
officer to disregard valid votes for former Vice President Biden.22 Chesebro
suggested this might result in a second term for President Trump, or, at
minimum, it would force a debate about purported election fraud—neither
of which was a lawful, legitimate reason to organize and convene fake elec-
tors.23
As discussed below and in Chapter 5, John Eastman worked with Chese-
bro as January 6th approached and wrote two additional memos that built
upon, and extended, the plan to use the fake electoral votes during the joint
session.24

3.2 PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THE CAMPAIGN ADOPT THE FAKE ELECTOR SCHEME

In early December, the highest levels of the Trump Campaign took note of
Chesebro’s fake elector plan and began to operationalize it. On December
6th, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows forwarded a copy of Chese-
bro’s November 18, 2020, memo to Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason
Miller writing, “Let’s have a discussion about this tomorrow.” 25 Miller
replied that he just engaged with reporters on the subject, to which Mead-
ows wrote: “If you are on it then never mind the meeting. We just need to
have someone coordinating the electors for states.” 26 Miller clarified that he
had only been “working the PR angle” and they should still meet, to which
Meadows answered: “Got it.” 27 Later that week, Miller sent Meadows a
spreadsheet that the Trump Campaign had compiled.28 It listed contact
information for nearly all of the 79 GOP nominees to the electoral college
on the November ballot for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsyl-
vania, and Wisconsin.29 And on December 8th, Meadows received a text
message from a former State legislator in Louisiana recommending that the
proposed “Trump electors from AR [sic] MI GA PA WI NV all meet next
Monday at their state capitols[,] [c]all themselves to order, elect officers,
and cast their votes for the President. . . . Then they certify their votes and
transmit that certificate to Washington.” 30 Meadows replied: “We are.” 31
Cassidy Hutchinson, a Special Assistant to the President and an assis-
tant to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, confirmed Meadows’s significant
involvement in the plan. Hutchinson told the Select Committee that Mead-
ows followed the progress of the fake elector effort closely and that she
“remember[ed] him frequently having calls, meetings, and outreach with
346 CHAPTER 3

individuals and this just being a prominent topic of discussion in our

office.” When asked how many of his calls or meetings it came up in, she
estimated “[d]ozens.” 32
The evidence indicates that by December 7th or 8th, President Trump
had decided to pursue the fake elector plan and was driving it. Trump Cam-
paign Associate General Counsel Joshua Findlay was tasked by the cam-
paign’s general counsel, Matthew Morgan, around December 7th or 8th
with exploring the feasibility of assembling unrecognized slates of Trump
electors in a handful of the States that President Trump had lost.33 Findlay
told the Select Committee “it was my understanding that the President
made this decision. . . .” 34 As recounted by Findlay, Morgan conveyed that
the client—President Trump—directed the campaign lawyers to “look into
electors in these potential litigation States[.]” 35
President Trump personally called RNC Chairwoman Ronna Romney
McDaniel days before December 14th to enlist the RNC’s assistance in the
scheme.36 President Trump opened the call by introducing McDaniel to
John Eastman, who described “the importance of the RNC helping the cam-
paign to gather these contingent electors in case any of the legal challenges
that were ongoing changed the results in any of the States.” 37 According to
McDaniel, she called President Trump back soon after the call ended, let-
ting him know that she agreed to his request and that some RNC staffers
were already assisting.38
On December 13th and 14th, President Trump worked with Rudolph
Giuliani on the plan’s implementation. On the 13th, Miller texted some of
his colleagues to check in about the fake elector meetings scheduled for the
following day. He let them know that Giuliani had told him “POTUS was
aware” that they would be filing litigation in four States just “to keep the
effort going”—which the Select Committee believes was to create a pretext
to claim that it was still possible for the fake electors to be authorized ret-
roactively.39 (In subsequent litigation, a Federal district court found that
President Trump “filed certain lawsuits not to obtain legal relief, but to
disrupt or delay the January 6th congressional proceedings through the
courts.” 40) The next day, Miller sent an email asking whether they were
going to issue a press release about electors, and he was told the “Mayor
[is] going to discuss with POTUS.” 41

3.3 THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL TEAM BOWS OUT, AND GIULIANI STEPS IN

Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake elector plan. On
December 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a high-profile lawsuit filed
by the State of Texas challenging the election results in Pennsylvania,
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 347

Ronna McDaniel at the Republican National Convention on August 24, 2020.

(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.42 After that decision, the Trump Cam-
paign’s senior legal staffers said that they reduced their involvement in the
fake elector effort, apparently because there was no longer a feasible sce-
nario in which a court would determine that President Trump actually won
348 CHAPTER 3

Rudy Giuliani speaks inside the Republican National Committee Headquarters in November
about various lawsuits related to the 2020 election.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

any of the States he contested.43 Justin Clark, who oversaw the Trump
Campaign’s general counsel’s office, said that he basically conveyed, “I’m
out,” and encouraged his colleagues on the legal team to do the same.44
Findlay told the Select Committee that “we backed out of this thing,” and
Morgan, his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for the electors
as “my way of taking that responsibility to zero.” 45
Clark told the Select Committee that “it never sat right with me that
there was no . . . contingency whereby these votes would count.” 46 “I had
real problems with the process,” Clark said, because “it morphed into
something I didn’t agree with.” 47 In his view, the fake electors were “not
necessarily duly nominated electors” despite being presented as such.48 He
said he believed he warned his colleagues that “unless we have litigation
pending like in these States, like I don’t think this is appropriate or, you
know, this isn’t the right thing to do.” 49
Morgan told the Select Committee that he saw no value in pushing
slates of purported electors if they were not authorized by a State govern-
ment’s certificate of ascertainment. As he put it, “[M]y view was, as long as
you didn’t have a certificate of ascertainment, then the electors were, for
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 349

lack of a better way of saying it, no good or not—not valid.” 50 Findlay con-
firmed that Morgan told him after the Supreme Court ruling on December
11th that “there’s not really anything left for us to do on this project” and
that “it doesn’t seem like a good idea for us to be involved in it.” 51
Campaign lawyers were not the only ones who doubted the legality of
the fake elector plan. The Office of White House Counsel appears to have
expressed concerns about it as well. In his testimony to the Select Commit-
tee, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-
December, the electoral process was “done.” Cipollone told the Select
Committee that the White House Counsel’s office “probably” had discus-
sions about the electors plan and that his Deputy, Pat Philbin, would have
been involved in evaluating the electors issue.52 In an informal Committee
interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the “bad
theories” that were like “Whac-A-Mole” in the White House during this
period.53 Mr. Cipollone agreed with this characterization.54
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least
one member of the White House Counsel’s Office say that the plan was not
legal:
Committee Staff: . . . to be clear, did you hear the White House Coun-
sel’s Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and
cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not
legally sound?
Hutchinson: Yes, sir.55
She also recalled a meeting that took place in or before mid-December
during which this view was relayed to Giuliani and members of his team by
lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office.56
By December 11th, Findlay emailed his main points of contact in six
battleground States to say “[t]hank you for your work on the presidential
elector project” and, in order to pass off his responsibilities, let them know
that “Rudy’s team has designated Kenneth Chesebro as the point person for
the legal documents” going forward.57
While the campaign’s core legal team stepped back from the fake elec-
tor effort on December 11th, it nonetheless went forward because “Rudy
was in charge of [it]” and “[t]his is what he wanted to do,” according to
Findlay.58 When Findlay was asked if this decision to let the effort proceed
under Giuliani’s direction “was coming from your client, the President,”
Findlay responded: “Yes, I believe so. I mean, he had made it clear that
Rudy was in charge of this and that Rudy was executing what he wanted.” 59
Findlay also recalled being told that Chesebro’s elector memos had become
“the justification for why Rudy and Ken were going to keep going forward
350 CHAPTER 3

with this stuff.” 60 He explained that Giuliani “really bought into Ken’s
theory on this,” and that the two of them “were kind of the main ones
driving this” from that point forward.61 Clark told the Select Committee
that “. . . my understanding of who was driving the process . . . was Mayor
Giuliani and his team.” 62 On December 10th, when Kenneth Chesebro
emailed one of the State party officials involved in organizing the fake elec-
tor effort in Nevada, he reported that “I spoke this evening with Mayor
Guiliani [sic], who is focused on doing everything possible to ensure that
that [sic] all the Trump-Pence electors vote on Dec. 14.” 63
In the days that followed this handoff, Chesebro would draft and dis-
tribute documents intended for use in the Trump team’s fake elector cer-
emonies that were then shared with key contacts in Arizona,64 Georgia,65
Michigan,66 Nevada,67 New Mexico,68 Pennsylvania,69 and Wisconsin.70 He
also gave some of the groups step-by-step logistical guidance, such as
when and where they should convene, how many copies each person would
need to sign, and to send their fake votes to Congress via registered mail.71
“Pretty Simple!” he commented in some of these emails.72
A campaign operative named Michael Roman was also tapped for a
major operational role in the fake elector effort. When Findlay sent his
email handing off certain responsibilities for the initiative, he also wrote
that Giuliani’s team had designated Roman “as the lead for executing the
voting on Monday” December 14th.73 Roman was the Trump Campaign’s
Director of Election Day Operations (EDO), with team members who spe-
cialized in political outreach and mobilization in battleground States where
the Trump team now urgently needed the fake electors to meet on Decem-
ber 14th.
With help from his EDO staff, as well as Giuliani’s team and RNC staff-
ers working alongside the Campaign as part of the Trump Victory Commit-
tee, Roman ran an improvised “Electors Whip Operation.” 74 For example,
Roman sent an email on December 12th directing an aide to create “a
tracker for the electors” with tabs for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, listing contact information, whether they had
been contacted, whether they agreed to attend on December 14th, and
names of “[s]ubstitute electors” to replace any reticent or unavailable par-
ticipants as needed.75 Roman referred to others on this email as the “WHIP
TEAM” and directed them to fill out the spreadsheet, to update him on
“what you have and what you need,” and to plan on a call that evening.76
In the days that followed, this group focused on tracking which Repub-
licans previously named as President Trump’s nominees to the electoral
college would be willing to show up for fake elector ceremonies, finding
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 351

adequate substitutes for those who refused to attend, and actually coordi-
nating the unrecognized elector signing ceremonies in seven States on
December 14th.77 In all seven States, these efforts to mobilize fake electors
benefitted from support from the RNC, as well as the State Republican par-
ties.78 However, it was the Trump team who drove the process from start to
finish, as one of the fake electors and later co-chair of the Michigan Repub-
lican party, Meshawn Maddock, told an audience in January 2022: “We
fought to seat the electors. The Trump campaign asked us to do that.” 79

3.4 SOME OF THE PROPOSED FAKE ELECTORS EXPRESS CONCERNS ABOUT THE PLAN

The Trump team’s fake elector plan raised concerns not just for several
senior officials but also for some of the Republican activists being recruited
to be the fake electors. Findlay told the Select Committee that “there were
definitely electors in probably most of the States that had concerns about
this process.” 80 After being tasked with reaching out to the potential fake
electors, Findlay notified his colleagues on December 10th that “a lot of
questions are arising” from them.81 He also noted that an RNC staffer sec-
onded to the Trump Victory Committee “requested a call with the PA elec-
tors and/or leadership to address concerns,” which “may be necessary to
get people to appear.” 82
The Republican Party of Pennsylvania’s general counsel relayed several
specific concerns to the Trump Campaign via email on December 13th.
Warning that “[w]e’re all getting call [sic] from concerned Electors,” he
elaborated as follows:
I’m told that on the call with the Electors they were told that the
Ballot form would be conditioned upon ultimate certification by the
Governor, indemnification by the campaign if someone gets sued or
worse, (charged with something by the AG or someone else), and
the receipt by the Electors of a legal opinion by a national firm and
certified to be accurate by a Pa. lawyer.
What was sent was a “memo” by Chesebro not addressed to the
Electors, and no certification by a Pa. lawyer. To make it worse,
Chesebro describes the Pa. plan as “dicey”. And there’s no indica-
tion by anyone with authority that there’s any indemnification
authorized by the campaign.83

Pennsylvania GOP Chairman Lawrence Tabas informed the Select Com-

mittee that his State’s fake electors never were indemnified by the Trump
Campaign.84
352 CHAPTER 3

When Wisconsin Republican Party Chairman Andrew Hitt was notified

in late November that “the campaign wants to [sic] list of electors,” he tex-
ted his executive director that “I am def concerned about their inquiry” and
that “I hope they are not planning on asking us to do anything like try and
say we are only the proper electors.” 85 On December 12th, after Hitt
received a message about a phone call with Giuliani to discuss the fake
elector issue, he texted a colleague: “These guys are up to no good and its
[sic] gonna fail miserably.” 86 Despite such concerns, Hitt and many other
fake electors participated anyway.87
Even so, 14 of the original Republicans who had been listed as electoral
college nominees on the November ballot bowed out when the fake Trump
electors gathered in December.88 Former Michigan Secretary of State Terri
Lynn Land declined to attend, which the State’s GOP chair, Laura Cox, told
the Select Committee was because “I think she just said she was uncom-
fortable with the whole thing” and that she “has her own beliefs.” 89 A
senior advisor for the Pennsylvania GOP said that Chairman Tabas “did not
serve as an elector because Joe Biden won the election and it was Biden’s
electors that were certified.” 90 Former U.S. Representative Tom Marino
(R-PA) said he backed out because “I’m a constitutionalist,” and “as a for-
mer prosecutor, when the attorney general says that he’s not finding any-
thing there, that’s good enough for me.” 91 The other eleven dropouts
included a Georgia State lawmaker, a former State party chair from New
Mexico, two former State party chairs from Pennsylvania, and Pennsylva-
nia’s RNC national committeewoman.92
Other participants asserted that they would have had much greater con-
cerns if the Trump team had been more forthcoming about how the fake
electoral votes would be used.93 The Trump Campaign’s director of election
day operations in Georgia told the Select Committee that “I absolutely
would not have” wanted to participate in organizing the Trump team’s fake
electors in Georgia “had I known that the three main lawyers for the cam-
paign that I’d spoken to in the past and were leading up were not on
board.” 94 He said he felt “angry” because “no one really cared if—if people
were potentially putting themselves in jeopardy” by doing this, and “we
were just . . . useful idiots or rubes at that point.” 95

3.5 ON DECEMBER 14TH, THE FAKE ELECTORS MEET AND VOTE

On December 14th, using instructions provided by Chesebro, the fake

Trump electors gathered and participated in signing ceremonies in all seven
States. In five of these States—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and
Wisconsin—the certificates they signed used the language that falsely
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 353

declared themselves to be “the duly elected and qualified Electors” from

their State.96 This declaration was false because none of the signatories had
been granted that official status by their State government in the form of a
certificate of ascertainment.
The paperwork signed by the fake Trump electors in two other States
contained partial caveats. In New Mexico, the document they signed made
clear that they were participating “on the understanding that it might later
be determined that we are the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .” 97 In
Pennsylvania, the document they signed indicated that they were partici-
pating “on the understanding that if, as a result of a final non-appealable
Court Order or other proceeding prescribed by law, we are ultimately recog-
nized as being the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .” 98
All seven of these invalid sets of electoral votes were then transmitted
to Washington, DC. Roman’s team member in Georgia, for example, sent
him an email on the afternoon of December 14th that affirmed the follow-
ing: “All votes cast, paperwork complete, being mailed now. Ran pretty
smoothly.” 99 Likewise, Findlay updated Campaign Manager Bill Stepien
and his bosses on the legal team that the Trump team’s slate in Georgia was
not able to satisfy all provisions of State law but still “voted as legally as
possible under the circumstances” before transmitting their fake votes to
Washington, DC, by mail.100
354 CHAPTER 3

On the evening of December 14th, RNC Chairwoman McDaniel provided

an update for President Trump on the status of the fake elector effort. She
forwarded President Trump’s executive assistant an “Elector Recap” email,
which conveyed that “President Trump’s electors voted” not just in “the
states that he won” but also in six “contested states” (specifically, Arizona,
Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).101 Minutes later,
President Trump’s executive assistant replied: “It’s in front of him!” 102
The Trump team and the fake electors also engaged in acts of subter-
fuge to carry out their plans on December 14th. For instance, a campaign
staffer notified the Georgia participants via email that he “must ask for
your complete discretion.” 103 He explained that their efforts required
“complete secrecy,” and told them to arrive at the State capitol building
and “please state to the guards that you are attending a meeting with either
Senator Brandon Beach or Senator Burt Jones.” 104 Indeed, Greg Bluestein of
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that he tried to enter this group’s
meeting room but “[a] guy at the door called it an ‘education meeting’ and
scrambled when I tried to walk in.” 105
Former Michigan GOP Chair Laura Cox told the Select Committee that
an attorney who “said he was working with the President’s Campaign”
informed her that the Michigan slate for President Trump was “planning to
meet in the capit[o]l and hide overnight so that they could fulfill the role of
casting their vote in, per law, in the Michigan chambers.” 106 She said that
she “told him in no uncertain terms that that was insane and inappropri-
ate,” and that she warned Michigan’s senate majority leader as a precau-
tion.107 Instead, the group of fake electors in Michigan signed their
paperwork in the State GOP headquarters, where staff told them not to
bring phones inside.108

3.6 THE FALLOUT FROM THE FAKE ELECTOR PLAN

In spite of the Trump Campaign’s efforts to give the fake electors’ votes the
sheen of authenticity, they failed. The U.S. Senate Parliamentarian noted in
correspondence by January 3rd that materials from the Trump team’s sup-
posed electors in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania
had “no seal of the state” and “no evidence votes were delivered by the
executive of the state for signature by electors,” 109 and, as a result, these
materials failed to meet requirements of federal law. Similarly, the Senate
Parliamentarian noted that the Trump team’s slates from Georgia, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania appeared to violate another statute which
requires the approval of the Governor for the substitution of electors.110
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 355

Meanwhile, the documents from Michigan and Wisconsin did not even
arrive to Congress on time, so they also had missed the required statutory
deadline.111
Several of the Trump team’s fake electoral slates also failed to follow
State rules specifying where they were required to meet. In Georgia and
Wisconsin, State lawmakers or their staff appear to have helped partici-
pants gather inside their State capitols.112 But in Michigan, the fake Trump
electors were blocked from entering the State capitol building.113 Despite
this, they still signed documents attesting that they “convened and orga-
nized in the State Capitol, in the City of Lansing, Michigan, and at 2:00
p.m. . . . performed the duties enjoined upon us.” 114 That document had
been signed earlier in the day off-site, and one of the signatories even told
the Committee she didn’t join their march to the State capitol building
because she “didn’t see a need to go.” 115
If the entire premise of the fake votes was not enough, these infirmities
also meant that they had no legal relevance. In no way could they ever have
been used by the Vice President to disregard the real votes of electors cho-
sen by the voters.
In the weeks between December 14th and January 6th, President
Trump’s team continued to embrace the idea that the fake electoral votes
had a purpose. Although Giuliani and White House speechwriter Stephen
Miller made public comments on December 14th suggesting that the uncer-
tified Trump votes were merely contingent, that pretense was dropped in
short order.116
For example, on December 17th, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh
McEnany said on Fox News that in numerous States “there has been an
alternate slate of electors voted upon that Congress will decide in Janu-
ary.” 117 On December 21st, President Trump and Vice President Pence each
joined parts of a White House meeting in which Members of Congress from
the Freedom Caucus encouraged the Vice President to reject Biden electors
from one or more of the seven contested States.118 And days later, Eastman
cited the existence of the fake votes in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a mem-
ber of the Giuliani legal team, writing, “[t]he fact that we have multiple
slates of electors demonstrate[s] the uncertainty of either. That should be
enough.” 119
As discussed further in Chapter 5, that email contained Eastman’s
2-page memo proposing a strategy for January 6th based on the incorrect
legal theory that Vice President Pence could assert some authority as Presi-
dent of the Senate to prevent or delay the election of former Vice President
Biden during the joint session. Eastman’s memo relied on the fake votes,
which the memo featured in the very first line: “7 states have transmitted
356 CHAPTER 3

dual slates of electors.” 120 When Eastman submitted his memo to

Epshteyn, he also copied Chesebro, who had edited the memo and called it
“[r]eally awesome.” 121
By that point, Chesebro and Eastman were coordinating their argu-
ments about the fake-elector votes and how they should be used. On Janu-
ary 1, 2021, Chesebro sent an email to Eastman and Epshteyn that
recommended that Vice President Pence derail the joint session of Con-
gress. In it, he raised the idea of Vice President Pence declaring “that there
are two competing slates of electoral votes” in several States, and taking
the position that only he, or possibly Congress, could “resolve any disputes
concerning them.” 122
Two days later, Eastman completed his second major memo advising
President Trump and his team on strategies for January 6th, again arguing
that there were “dual slates of electors from 7 states,” and calling for Vice
President Pence to assert power to act “[a]s the ultimate arbiter” to take
steps that could overturn the election, either by sending the election back to
State legislatures to reassess or by rejecting Biden’s certified electoral votes
from States in which there were also fake Trump electors.123
By early January, most of the fake elector votes had arrived in Washing-
ton, except those from Michigan and Wisconsin.124 Undeterred, the Trump
team arranged to fly them to Washington and hand deliver them to Con-
gress for the Vice President himself. “Freaking trump idiots want someone
to fly original elector papers to the senate President . . .” Wisconsin Republi-
can Party official Mark Jefferson wrote to Party Chairman Hitt on January
4th.125 Hitt responded, “Ok I see I have a missed call from [Mike] Roman
and a text from someone else. Did you talk to them already? This is just
nuts. . . .” 126
The next day, Trump Campaign Deputy Director for Election Day
Operations G. Michael Brown sent a text message to other campaign staff
suggesting that he was the person who delivered the fake votes to Con-
gress.127 After sending the group a photo of his face with the Capitol in the
background, Brown said, “This has got to be the cover a book I write one
day” and “I should probably buy [Mike] [R]oman a tie or something for
sending me on this one. Hasn’t been done since 1876 and it was only 3
states that did it.” 128 The reference to 1876 alludes to a controversy during
that election about certain States’ electoral college votes.129
President Trump and his Campaign apparently had assistance from
allies on Capitol Hill for this effort, including Senator Ron Johnson, his
chief of staff, and the chief of staff to Representative Mike Kelly, although
Senator Johnson has said that “[his] involvement in that attempt to
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 357

Senator Ron Johnson, February 12, 2021.

(Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)

deliver” fake elector paperwork “spanned the course of a couple sec-

onds.” 130 On the morning of January 6th, Representative Kelly’s then-chief
of staff texted an aide to the Vice President, Chris Hodgson, about hand-
delivering the fake elector votes to the Vice President’s team before the
joint session, a message that Hodgson ignored: “Just following up-any
chance you or someone from your team can meet to take the Michigan and
Wisconsin packets.” 131
According to the office of Senator Ron Johnson, Representative Kelly’s
chief of staff then had a phone call with Senator Johnson’s chief of staff at
11:58 a.m. “about how Kelly’s office could get us the electors [sic] because
they had it.” 132 Shortly after 11:30 a.m., the Trump Campaign’s lead attor-
ney in Wisconsin had texted Senator Johnson expressing a “[n]eed to get a
document on Wisconsin electors to you [for] the VP immediately. Is there a
staff person I can talk to immediately.” 133 Senator Johnson then put his
chief of staff in touch with the campaign to handle the issue.134
Shortly afterwards, Senator Johnson’s chief of staff texted Hodgson:
“[Sen.] Johnson needs to hand something to VPOTUS please advise.” 135
When Hodgson asked what it was, the response he got was, “Alternate slate
of electors for MI and WI because archivist didn’t receive them.” 136 Hodg-
son did not mince words: “Do not give that to him [the Vice President].
358 CHAPTER 3

Senator Mike Lee, April 28, 2016.

(Photo by Leigh Vogel/Getty Images)

He’s about to walk over to preside over the joint session, those were sup-
posed to come in through the mail.” 137
Those fake electoral votes, which the Trump team tried for weeks to
manufacture and deliver, never made it to the Vice President. But they
would have been invalid even if they did arrive on time. The Trump team’s
activities were based on the false pretense that these fake electoral votes
had a decisive role to play at the joint session of Congress. And yet any such
role that they could have played would have helped unlawfully obstruct an
official proceeding that determines how our Nation carries out the peaceful
transfer of power between Presidents.
Indeed, as the joint session approached, Senator Mike Lee had
expressed grave concerns about the fake elector effort in a series of text
messages to one of the Trump team’s senior legal advisors. Although Sena-
tor Lee had spent a month encouraging the idea of having State legislatures
endorse competing electors for Trump, he grew alarmed as it became clear
that the Trump team wanted the fake electors’ votes to be considered on
January 6th even without authorization from any State government body.138
On December 30th, Senator Lee texted Trump advisor Cleta Mitchell
that January 6th was “a dangerous idea,” including “for the republic
itself.” 139 He explained that, “I don’t think we have any valid basis for
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 359

objecting to the electors” because “it cannot be true that we can object to
any state’s presidential electors simply because we don’t think they
handled their election well or suspect illegal activity.” 140 Senator Lee even
questioned her about the plan’s dangerous long-term consequences: “[w]ill
you please explain to me how this doesn’t create a slippery slope problem
for all future presidential elections?” 141

ENDNOTES
1. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
2. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349 (December 13, 2020, and
December 14, 2020, text messages between Tim Murtaugh, Justin Clark, Jason Miller, and
Eric Herschmann); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Inter-
view of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 70–72; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay,
(May 25, 2022), pp. 38–43.
3. See Chapter 4; Senate Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff Report, Subverting Justice:
How the Former President and His Allies Pressured DOJ to Overturn the 2020 Election, (Oct.
7, 2021), pp. 20–39, 188, and Key Document H at pp. 185–191, available at https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
4. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chapman053476
(December 23, 2020, email titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on Jan 6
scenario.docx” from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with attached
memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923050
(Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, “Privileged and Confidential–
Jan 6 Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/
Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario; John C. Eastman, “Trying to
Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American
Greatness, (Sep. 30, 2021), available at https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-
prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/ (embedded).
See also Chapter 5.
5. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020–January 20, 2021 at 23, East-
man v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356, available at https://
storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/
gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.356.0_1.pdf.
6. Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4–7, 2021 at 36, Eastman v. Thompson, 594
F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), available at https://
storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/
gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.260.0_10.pdf.
7. The Trump team tried to justify its fake-elector scheme based in part on the 1960
Kennedy-Nixon election. At that time, following a close vote in Hawaii, Republican and
Democratic electors each met and cast purported electoral college votes on the same day
because there was ongoing litigation and a pending recount. Circumstances in 2020 were
different, however, in part because there were no pending recounts. Kenneth Chesebro
360 CHAPTER 3

reportedly recognized this difference in an email copied to Rudolph Giuliani that acknowl-
edged certain concerns about their efforts could be “valid,” because, as he put it, “in the
Hawaii 1960 incident, when the Kennedy electors voted[,] there was a pending recount.”
Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, “Arizona Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan
Could ‘Appear Treasonous’,” New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html.
8. David Thomas, “Lawyer Group Says Trump Attorney Broke Ethics Rules in Fake Elector
Plan,” Reuters, (Oct. 12, 2022), available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/
lawyer-group-says-trump-attorney-broke-ethics-rules-fake-elector-plan-2022-10-12/;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125 (November 18,
2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Elec-
toral Votes”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025124
(December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment “2020-11-20 Chesebro
memo on real deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay production), JF037
(November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a
State’s Electoral Votes”). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater,
“Memos Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,” New York Times,
(Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-
memos.html.
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125 (November 18,
2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Elec-
toral Votes”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025124
(December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment “2020-11-20 Chesebro
memo on real deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF037 (Nov.
18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s
Electoral Votes”). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, “Memos
Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2,
2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-
memos.html.
11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125, (November 18,
2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Elec-
toral Votes”) (underlining in original); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Pro-
duction), Chapman025124, (December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attach-
ment “2020-11-20 Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Joshua Findlay Production), CTRL0000082463_00009, (November 18, 2020, memo from Ken-
neth Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Electoral Votes”); Alan Feuer,
Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, “Memos Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6
and Alternate Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
12. Emphasis added. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044, (December 9,
2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “Statutory Requirements for December 14 Elec-
toral Votes”); Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, “Memos Show Roots of
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 361

Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
13. U.S. Const., art. II, §. 1, cl. 2: (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an Elector.”).
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000778, (Decem-
ber 11, 2020, email from Jim DeGraffenreid to Kenneth Chesebro with subject “URGENT—
Trump-Pence campaign asked me to contact you to coordinate Dec. 14 voting by Nevada
electors”).
15. Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, “‘Kind of Wild/Creative’: Emails Shed Light on
Trump Fake Electors Plan,” New York Times, (July 26, 2022), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/07/26/us/politics/trump-fake-electors-emails.html (emphasis in
original). Although this alleged email described by the New York Times was not produced
to the Select Committee, it matches certain information in a privilege log provided to the
Select Committee by its reported sender. This includes the same reported sender (Jack
Wilenchik), direct recipient (Boris Epshteyn), seven cc’ed recipients in the same order
(Christina Bobb, Lee Miller, Dennis Wilenchik, Aaron Green, Josh Offenhartz, Christine Fer-
reira, and Victoria Stevens), title (“RE: [EXTERNAL]FW: petition for Cert and Motion for Expe-
dited Consideration”), and date (12/8/2020), with only a negligible one-minute discrepancy
in the time sent (4:27 p.m. versus 4:26 p.m.). See Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jack Wilenchik
Production), CTRL0000922311, line 9 (Sept. 7, 2022, Jack Wilenchik Production 09_07_2022—
PrivLog UPDATED).
16. “Nevada Revised Statutes,” Title 24—Elections, Chapter 298—Presidential Electors and Elec-
tions, Nevada State Legislature, available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-
298.html#NRS298Sec065.
17. “Nevada Certificate of Ascertainment 2020,” National Archives and Records Administration,
(Dec. 2, 2020, also later updated Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://www.archives.gov/
files/electoral-college/2020/ascertainment-nevada.pdf.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044 (December 9, 2020, memo from
Kenneth Chesebro titled “Statutory Requirements for December 14 Electoral Votes”). Where
it wouldn't be possible to comply with State law, as in Nevada, Chesebro advised the
so-called electors to proceed anyway, writing: "[T]hese technical aspects of state law are
unlikely to matter much in the end." Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Pro-
duction), DEGRAFFENREID 000778, (December 11, 2020, email from Jim DeGraffenreid to Ken-
neth Chesebro with subject “URGENT—Trump-Pence campaign asked me to contact you to
coordinate Dec. 14 voting by Nevada electors”).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021,
email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which
includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021,
email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which
includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
362 CHAPTER 3

21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021,
email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which
includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021,
email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which
includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”). In his
email, Mr. Chesebro argues that the President of the Senate should open “two envelopes”
from the contested States including Arizona, “announce[ ] that he cannot and will not . . .
count any electoral votes from [the contested State] because there are two slates of
votes,” and refuse to count them unless the election is “rerun,” the courts engage in
“adequate judicial review,” or the State’s legislature “appoint[s] electors.” From this lan-
guage, it is clear that Mr. Chesebro contemplated the fake votes being used in Congress
without a court or State government adopting, ratifying, or otherwise selecting them as the
proper electoral college votes from a contested State. To be fair, Chesebro concludes this
email by telling Giuliani that “[m]any more points would need to be analyzed in making a
complete argument that the President of the Senate possesses the sole power to count
electoral votes, and anything to the contrary in the Electoral Count Act is unconstitu-
tional.” Despite that caution, the very next sentence advocates for a vigorous assertion of
that power: “But at minimum this seems a defensible interpretation of the Twelfth Amend-
ment, and one that ought to be asserted, vigorously, by whoever has the role of President
of the Senate.”
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021,
email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which
includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chap-
man053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on
Jan 6 scenario.docx” from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with
attached memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source),
CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, “Privileged
and Confidential–Jan 6 Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.scribd.com/
document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario and
embedded at John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election
is Not Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available at https://
amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-
election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771.
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771 (emphasis added).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003769.
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 363

30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013515.
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013516.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 54–55.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 27–28.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 29.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 86–87.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7–8. Ms. McDaniel didn’t
recall the exact date of the call, but thought it was at least “a few days before December
14th” and may have been sometime before the Supreme Court rejected the case Texas v.
Pennsylvania on December 11th.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 8–9.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9–13. McDaniel asserted to
the Select Committee that even after December 14th she was under the impression that
the seven slates of fake electors were strictly contingent in nature pending authorization
by a court of law, and that she relayed this to several concerned Republican officials in
the contested States. See id., at 18. However, there is also no indication that she took
action to condemn or block the misuse of these contingent elector slates by January 6th.
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349, (December 13, 2020, text
message from Jason Miller to Justin Clark and Eric Herschmann). For instance, on Decem-
ber 11th, Chesebro wrote to a lawyer working on litigation efforts in Arizona, asking him to
file a petition that would keep the litigation alive through the 14th: “[C]an you get the cert.
petition on file by Monday? Reason is that Kelli Ward & Kelly Townsend just spoke to the
Mayor about the campaign’s request that all electors vote Monday in all contested states.
Ward and Townsend are concerned it could appear treasonous for the AZ electors to vote
on Monday if there is no pending court proceeding that might, eventually, lead to the
electors being ratified as the legitimate ones. Which is a valid point . . . .” Maggie Haber-
man and Luke Broadwater, “Arizona Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan Could ‘Appear
Treasonous,’” The New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html (emphasis in original).
40. Order re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 15, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-
99-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372.
41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0019417 (December 14, 2020, emails
between Jason Miller and Boris Epshteyn).
42. Order Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying Certiorari, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S.
___, (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116.
364 CHAPTER 3

45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Mor-
gan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 74.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 118.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 114.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116, 118. However, Justin Clark’s mes-
sage in an email dated December 24th seems to potentially contradict his suggestions that
the campaign legal team fully backed out: “In terms of political judgements on January 6 I
know . . . that plans are being discussed and executed: alternate slates have been submit-
ted, votes are being whipped, all of the arguments are in place and a not insignificant ad
b[u]y was made highlighting the issues in the election.” Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (William
Stepien Production), WS 00036.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 39–40.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 69–70, 73.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 75–76.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64–65. (Hutchinson later clarified
that she recalled hearing that from Pat Cipollone and, potentially, also Pat Philbin.)
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 64–65.
57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 44.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 30.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 125.
63. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), CTRL0000044010_00031 (Dec. 10,
2020 email from Kenneth Chesebro to James DeGraffenreid and others).
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 365

64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF051, JF054.
65. Documents on file with the Select Committee to investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001_000004, 108751.0001_000019,
108751.0001_000020, 108751.0001_000021, 108751.0001_000024.
66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF049.
67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000786; Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Michael McDonald Production), MCDONALD 000789.
68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF061.
69. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061077.
70. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (David
Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Produc-
tion), CTRL0000061077; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production),
DEGRAFFENREID 000786; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kenneth Chesebro Production), KC_Elec-
tor_Correspondence_000211, KC_Elector_Correspondence_000215.
73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897, CTRL0000083898.
75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897.
76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897. Members of this team
appear to have included Trump Victory Committee or Trump Campaign EDO State or
regional directors for relevant States, including Arizona and New Mexico (Thomas Lane),
Georgia (Robert Sinners), Michigan (Shawn Flynn), Nevada (Jesse Law and Valerie McCona-
hay), Pennsylvania (James Fitzpatrick), and Wisconsin (Ryan Terrill, who had originally
worked on North Carolina issues but later shifted to Wisconsin), as well as Mr. Roman’s
deputy (G. Michael Brown). See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Laura Cox Production), Laura Cox
000339; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Rudy Giuliani Production), RGGLOBAL_DOM_00001373; Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production) XXM-0010338, XXM-0008776, XXM-0011867;
Richard Ruelas, “Trump Campaign Official Subpoenaed by FBI Appears to Be at Meeting of
Fake Arizona Electors,” Arizona Republic, (June 23, 2022), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2022/06/23/fbi-subpoenas-thomas-lane-
trump-campaign-arizona/7708133001/; Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Fake Elector Probe into
366 CHAPTER 3

2020 Race Expands with Michigan Subpoenas,” Bridge Michigan, (June 23, 2022), available
at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-fake-elector-probe-2020-race-
expands-michigan-subpoenas; Zach Montellaro and Holly Otterbein, “Trump Calls for Poll
Watchers. Election Officials Call for Calm,” Politico, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/09/30/trump-poll-watchers-election-423996; Luke Broadwa-
ter, “Jan. 6 Inquiry Subpoenas 6 Tied to False Pro-Trump Elector Effort,” New York Times,
(Feb. 15, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/us/politics/jan-6-
subpoenas-trump.html.
77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083898.
78. David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 12:51 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/1338542161932021762; David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twit-
ter, Dec. 14, 2020 1:07 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/
1338546066346676224; “Republican Electors Cast Procedural Vote, Seek to Preserve Trump
Campaign Legal Challenge,” Pennsylvania Republican Party website, (Dec. 14, 2020), avail-
able at https://pagop.org/2020/12/14/republican-electors-cast-procedural-vote/; “State-
ment on Republican Electors Meeting,” Republican Party of Wisconsin, (Dec. 14, 2020),
available at https://wisgop.org/republican-electors-2020/; Republican Party of Arizona
(@AZGOP), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 5:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AZGOP/
status/1338608056985239554.
79. Marshall Cohen, Zachary Cohen, and Dan Merica, “Trump Campaign Officials, Led by Rudy
Giuliani, Oversaw Fake Electors Plot in 7 States,” CNN, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/politics/trump-campaign-officials-rudy-giuliani-fake-electors/
index.html.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 58.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10, 2020, email
from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10, 2020, email
from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 55–59; Michael C. Bender, “Republicans Hire
Nine Regional Directors for Trump 2020 Election,” Wall Street Journal, (May 8, 2019), avail-
able at https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-campaign-hires-nine-regional-directors-for-
2020-election-11557355628.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061085 (December 13, 2020,
email chain between Thomas King III and James Fitzpatrick re: Pa. Electors).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lawrence Tabas, (Apr. 11, 2022).
85. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000076 (December 4, 2020, Text mes-
sages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson); Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), p. 8.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000083 (December 12, 2020, Text mes-
sages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson).
87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020,
memorandum from purported electors in Wisconsin).
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 367

88. Kira Lerner, “UPDATED Trump’s Fake Electors: Here’s the Full List,” News from the States,
(June 29, 2022), available at https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-
fake-electors-heres-full-list; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945, CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947,
CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of pur-
ported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wis-
consin).
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 77–78.
90. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and Rosalind S. Helderman, “As
Giuliani Coordinated Plan for Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors
Balked,” Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-
8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.
91. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and Rosalind S. Helderman, “As
Giuliani Coordinated Plan for Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors
Balked,” Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-
8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.
92. Kira Lerner, “UPDATED Trump’s fake electors: Here’s the full list,” News from the States,
(June 29, 2022), available at https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-
fake-electors-heres-full-list.
93. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50–51.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 18–19.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 37–38.
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944,
CTRL0000037945 CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949
(December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia,
Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin).
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037946 (December 14, 2020,
memorandum from purported electors in New Mexico).
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037948 (December 14, 2020,
memorandum from purported electors in Pennsylvania).
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083893 (December 14, 2020,
email chain from Robert Sinners to Mike Roman and others re: Whip Update).
100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (William Stepien Production), WS 00095, WS 00096 (December 14,
2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Matt Morgan, Justin Clark, and cc’ing Bill Stepien re:
Georgia Update).
101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009527_0001, (December
14, 2020, forwarded email from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line:
“FWD: Electors Recap—Final”).
368 CHAPTER 3

102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009527_0001, (December
14, 2020, forwarded email from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line:
“FWD: Electors Recap—Final”).
103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018 (December 13, 2020,
email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan subject: “Fwd: Information on Duties of Presidential
Electors—Monday, December 14th”).
104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018 (December 13, 2020,
email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan subject: “Fwd: Information on Duties of Presidential
Electors—Monday, December 14th”).
105. Greg Bluestein (@bluestein), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 11:32 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/bluestein/status/1338522299360800771; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shawn Still, (Feb. 25, 2022),
pp. 41–48; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, “Exclusive: Fulton County DA Sends ‘Target’
Letters to Trump Allies in Georgia Investigation,” Yahoo! News, (July 15, 2022), available at
https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-
in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 53–54.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 53–54.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Mayra Rodriguez, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 14–18.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001
(January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker” with attach-
ment); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from
Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker”).
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001
(January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker” with attach-
ment); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from
Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker”).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 144–45, 206–07.
112. In Wisconsin they were able to enter with apparent help from the chief of staff for then
majority leader of the Wisconsin State Senate, Scott Fitzgerald, who now represents Wis-
consin in the U.S. House of Representatives. In Georgia, a freelance reporter who has testi-
fied to the Fulton County grand jury claims to have found that the room in which the fake
electors met was reserved by the office of Georgia House Speaker David Ralston, which is
consistent with what Georgia GOP Chairman David Shafer told the Select Committee. See
“Open Records Regarding Wisconsin’s Fake Electors Suggest Congressman Scott Fitzgerald
Played Significant Role in Trying to Overturn a Free and Fair Election,” Office of Wisconsin
State Senator Chris Larson, (Jan. 25, 2022), available at https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/
07/Larson/media/2056/1-25-22-fitzgerald-electors-pr.pdf; Letter from Cyrus Anderson,
Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Wisconsin State Senate to State Sen. Chris Larson, attaching
documents, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/07/Larson/
media/2052/12-14-20-open-records-request-results-short.pdf; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of David Shafer, (Feb.
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 369

25, 2022), pp. 93–94, 106; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Kladman, “Exclusive: Fulton County DA
Sends ‘Target’ Letters to Trump Allies in Georgia Investigation,” Yahoo! News, (July 15, 2022),
available at https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-
trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html; George Chidi, “Bearing Witness,” The
Atlanta Objective with George Chidi, (June 29, 2022), available at https://
theatlantaobjective.substack.com/p/bearing-witness; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Shawn Still
Production), 108755.0001_000009 (December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana
Pagan re: “Fwd: Information of Duties of Presidential Electors—Monday Dec. 14th”).
113. Daniel Villareal, “Michigan Republicans Tried to Submit Fake Electoral Votes to Capitol,”
Newsweek, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/michigan-republicans-
tried-submit-fake-electoral-votes-capitol-1555028.
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945, p. 2 (December 14,
2020, memorandum of purported Michigan electors for Donald J. Trump).
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Mayra Rodriguez, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 18, 21; Laina G. Stebbins, “Feds Serve Subpoe-
nas to Pro-Trump Fake Electors in Michigan,” Michigan Advance (June 23, 2022), available at
https://michiganadvance.com/blog/feds-serve-subpoenas-to-pro-trump-fake-electors-in-
michigan/.
116. Brett Samuels, “Stephen Miller: ‘Alternate’ Electors Will Keep Trump Election Challenge
Alive,” The Hill, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/
530092-stephen-miller-alternate-electors-will-keep-trump-challenge-alive-post/; Steve
Bannon’s War Room Radio, “STEVE BANNON’S WAR ROOM RADIO SPECIAL EPISODE582,” Bit-
Chute, (aired on Dec. 14, 2020, reposted on BitChute Aug. 22, 2021), at 10:30–13:00, available
at https://www.bitchute.com/video/v889V3Thxgcj/.
117. Mike Wereschagin, “Pa. Republicans’ Hedged Language May Have Saved Them from Pros-
ecution over Electoral Vote Scheme,” Lancaster Online, (Jan. 17, 2022), available at https://
lancasteronline.com/news/politics/pa-republicans-hedged-language-may-have-saved-
them-from-prosecution-over-electoral-vote-scheme/article_849d4f7e-7589-11ec-8881-
6383a823557d.html.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 143–48.
119. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475 (December 23,
2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).
120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (Word Document,
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL January 6 Scenario,” attached in Dec. 23, 2020, John East-
man email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475 (December 23,
2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021,
Kenneth Chesebro email to John Eastman and Boris Epshteyn at 10:26 p.m.).
123. Both of Dr. Eastman’s memos described here are discussed at length in the chapter
addressing President Trump’s pressure on the Vice President. See Chapter 5. See also
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chap-
man053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on
Jan 6 scenario.docx” from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with
attached memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on file with the Select Committee
370 CHAPTER 3

to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source),
CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, “Privileged
and Confidential–Jan 6 Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.scribd.com/
document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario and
embedded at John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election
is Not Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available at https://
amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-
election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001
(January 3, 2021 email and attachment from Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the Vice
President); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) 00094 (additional copy of
same attachment sent from Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the Vice President).
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4, 2021, Andrew Hitt
text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02 p.m.).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4, 2021, Andrew Hitt
text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02 p.m.).
127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576, McCal-
lum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela McCallum at undetermined time);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p. 122.
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576, McCal-
lum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela McCallum at undetermined time);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p. 122.
129. The Select Committee does not know where Brown delivered the fake votes. The Select
Committee attempted to contact Brown multiple ways, including by subpoena, but servers
could not locate him and he never responded to outreach. The Select Committee served
Mike Roman with a subpoena, but he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and did not
answer any substantive questions about the fake-elector scheme. What the Select Commit-
tee has determined, however, is that Brown likely delivered the fake electoral eollege
votes to at least one of President Trump’s allies in Congress. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael
Roman, (Aug. 10, 2022), p. 40.
130. Jason Lemon, “Johnson Says Involvement With 1/6 Fake Electors Plan Only ‘Lasted Sec-
onds’,” Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at https://www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-
involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-seconds-1735486; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message at 8:41
a.m. ET from Matt Stroia to Chris Hodgson); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Produc-
tion), CTRL0000056548_000035 (Jan. 6, 2021, text message around 12:37 p.m. ET from Sean
Riley to Chris Hodgson) (“Johnson needs to hand something to VPOTUS please advise . . .
Alternate slate of electors for MI and WI because archivist didn’t receive them . . .”).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021,
Matt Stroia text message to Chris Hodgson at 8:41 a.m. ET).
 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY” 371

132. Lawrence Andrea, “Pennsylvania Congressman Concludes Internal Investigation with Few
Answers After Ron Johnson’s Claims About False Electors,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (July
14, 2022), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2022/07/14/few-
answers-mike-kellys-probe-into-false-electors-ron-johnson-pennsylvania-wisconsin/
10059776002/.
133. “The Vicki McKenna Show—Keep and Bear Arms,” iHeart Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30–15:00,
available at https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-
vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true; John Solomon, “Jan. 6
Panel’s Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes Ills of One-Sided Hearing,” Just The News, (June 23,
2022), available at https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-
narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing (linking to image of text message available at
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/TroupisJohnson1.pdf).
134. “The Vicki McKenna Show—Keep and Bear Arms,” iHeart Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30–15:00,
available at https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-
vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true; John Solomon, “Jan. 6
Panel’s Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes Ills of One-Sided Hearing,” Just The News, (June 23,
2022), available at https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-
narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing (linking to image of text message available at
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/JohnsonTroupis2Redacted.pdf).
135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021,
Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).
136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021,
Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).
137. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021,
Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).
138. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013494, MM014589, MM014592,
MM014595, MM014598, MM014722 (Mark Meadows text messages with Sen. Mike Lee on
December 8, 2020, January 3, 2021, and January 4, 2021); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitch-
ell Production), CM00015452, CM00015477 (Cleta Mitchell text messages with Sen. Mike Lee
on December 9, 2020 and December 30, 2020).
139. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
 4

“JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME”

4.1 THE DOJ FOUND NO SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE OF FRAUD

U.S. Attorney General William Barr knew there would be trouble before all
the votes had been counted. “So, right out of the box on election night, the
President claimed that there was major fraud underway,” Barr explained. “I
mean, this happened, as far as I could tell, before there was actually any
potential of looking at evidence.” 1 President Trump was quick to claim,
“there was major fraud” based solely on the phenomenon known as the
“Red Mirage.” 2
As explained elsewhere in this report, Democrats were more inclined to
vote via mail-in ballot during the 2020 Presidential election than Republi-
cans, who were more likely to vote in-person on election day. This was
widely known, and partly a result of, President Trump’s own public state-
ments criticizing mail-in balloting. It also created a gap in the timing of
how votes were tallied. The early vote tally favored Republicans on election
night because the mail-in ballots, which skewed toward Democrats, were
not yet fully counted. This occurred not just in 2020, but also in previous
elections.3 The President knew of this phenomenon but exploited it on elec-
tion night, nonetheless, as he and his allies had planned to do.4
President Trump exploited this timing gap and used it as “the basis for
this broad claim that there was major fraud,” Barr said.5 But the Attorney
General “didn’t think much of that.” People “had been talking for weeks
and everyone understood for weeks that that was going to be what hap-
pened on election night,” Barr explained.6 Cities with Democratic majori-
ties in the battleground States wouldn’t have their votes fully counted until
“the end of the cycle,” with “a lot of Democratic votes coming in at the
end.” 7 This was not some well-guarded secret, as “everyone understood

373
374 CHAPTER 4

that the dynamic of election night in many States would be whether or not
the Democratic votes at the end of the day would overcome the election day
votes.” 8
Within days of the election, the President made an “avalanche” of fraud
allegations. It “was like playing Whac-A-Mole,” Barr explained, “because
something would come out one day and the next day it would be another
issue.” 9 Barr told his “staff very soon after the election” that he “didn’t
think the President would ever admit that he lost the election, and he would
blame it on fraud, and then he would blame the actions and evidence on the
Department of Justice.” 10
Barr soon took steps to investigate claims of fraud in the 2020 Presi-
dential election, even in the absence of evidence. The Department of Jus-
tice’s (DOJ) longstanding policy had been to avoid any substantive
investigations until after the election’s results were certified.11 As the coun-
try’s premier Federal law enforcement agency, DOJ is justifiably concerned
that its substantial power can influence the outcome of an election, and it
has enacted policies to mitigate this possibility.12
On November 7, 2020, the media declared former Vice President Biden
the winner of the Presidential election. Two days later, on November 9th,
Attorney General Barr authorized wider investigations into claims of elec-
tion fraud.13 Barr instructed DOJ and FBI personnel “to pursue substantial
allegations of voting and vote tabulation irregularities prior to the certifica-
tion of elections in your jurisdictions in certain cases.” 14 Barr noted that
nothing in his memo “should be taken as any indication that the Depart-
ment has concluded that voting irregularities have impacted the outcome of
any election.” 15

4.2 NOVEMBER 23, 2020: BARR CHALLENGES PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ELECTION LIES

As Barr predicted, the President did call on him for information about
alleged election fraud. Trump challenged him with a blizzard of conspiracy
theories in three face-to-face meetings after the election. The first such
meeting occurred on November 23, 2020.
On November 23rd, the Attorney General spoke with White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone, who said that it was important for him come to the
White House and speak to President Trump.16 Barr had not seen the Presi-
dent since before the election in late October, and the White House counsel
believed that it was important that the Attorney General explain what the
Department of Justice was doing related to claims of election fraud.17
“The President said there had been major fraud and that, as soon as the
facts were out, the results of the election would be reversed,” Barr recalled.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 375

U.S. Attorney General William Barr at the Department of Justice on December 21, 2020.
(Photo by Michael Reynolds-Pool/Getty Images)

Trump continued “for quite a while,” and Barr was “expecting” what came
next.18 President Trump alleged that “the Department of Justice doesn’t
think it has a role looking into these fraud claims.” 19 Barr anticipated this
line of attack because the President’s counsel, Rudolph Giuliani, was mak-
ing all sorts of wild, unsubstantiated claims.20 And Giuliani wanted to
blame DOJ for the fact that no one had come up with any real evidence of
fraud.21 Of course, by the time of this meeting, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices had
been explicitly authorized to investigate substantial claims for 2 weeks and
had yet to find any evidence of significant voter fraud.22
Barr explained to the President why he was wrong. DOJ, was willing to
investigate any “specific and credible allegations of fraud.” 23 The fact of
the matter was that the claims being made were “just not meritorious” and
were “not panning out.” 24 Barr emphasized to the President that DOJ
“doesn’t take sides in elections” and “is not an extension of your legal
team.” 25
During the November 23rd meeting, Barr also challenged one of Presi-
dent Trump’s central lies. He “specifically raised the Dominion voting
machines, which I found to be one of the most disturbing allegations.” 26
“Disturbing,” Barr explained, because there was “absolutely zero basis for
the allegations,” which were being “made in such a sensational way that
376 CHAPTER 4

they obviously were influencing a lot of people, members of the public.” 27

Americans were being deceived into thinking “that there was this system-
atic corruption in the system and that their votes didn’t count and that
these machines, controlled by somebody else, were actually determining it,
which was complete nonsense.” 28 Barr stressed to the President that this
was “crazy stuff,” arguing that not only was the conspiracy theory a waste
of time, but it was also “doing [a] great, great disservice to the country.” 29
As Attorney General Barr left the meeting, he talked with Mark Mead-
ows, the White House Chief of Staff, and Jared Kushner, President Trump’s
son-in-law.30 “I think he’s become more realistic and knows that there’s a
limit to how far he can take this,” Meadows said, according to Barr.31 Kush-
ner reassured Barr, “we’re working on this, we’re working on it.” 32 Barr
was hopeful that the President was beginning to accept reality.33 The oppo-
site happened.
“I felt that things continued to deteriorate between the 23rd and the
weekend of the 29th,” Barr recalled.34 Barr was concerned because Presi-
dent Trump began meeting with delegations of State legislators, and it
appeared to him that “there was maneuvering going on.” 35 Barr had “no
problem” with challenging an election “through the appropriate process,”
but “worried” that he “didn’t have any visibility into what was going on”
and that the “President was digging in.” 36

4.3 DECEMBER 1, 2020: PRESIDENT TRUMP IS IRATE AFTER BARR SAYS THERE IS NO
SIGNIFICANT FRAUD

Attorney General Barr had been clear that DOJ was investigating claims of
fraud. The Department simply was not turning up any real evidence of mal-
feasance, and certainly nothing that would overturn the election. Just as
Barr feared, the President turned on DOJ anyway.
On November 29, 2020, Fox News’s Maria Bartiromo interviewed Presi-
dent Trump. It was his first TV interview since he lost his bid for reelection.
The President claimed the election was “rigged” and rife with “fraud.” 37
President Trump repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the
claim that Dominion’s voting machines had “glitches,” which moved
“thousands of votes from my account to Biden’s account.” 38 President
Trump pointed to “dumps of votes,”a reference to the batches of mail-in
ballots that had been tabulated later in the counting process.39 He rambled
off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead people voted in
significant numbers.40
“This is total fraud,” the President said.41 “And how the FBI and
Department of Justice—I don’t know—maybe they’re involved, but how
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 377

people are getting away with this stuff—it’s unbelievable. This election was
rigged. This election was a total fraud.” 42
“Where is the DOJ and the FBI in all of this, Mr. President?” Bartiromo
asked.43 “You have laid out some serious charges here. Shouldn’t this be
something that the FBI is investigating? Are they? Is the DOJ investigat-
ing?” Bartiromo asked incredulously.44
“Missing in action,” the President replied, “can’t tell you where they
are.” 45 He conceded that when he asked if DOJ and FBI were investigating,
“everyone says yes, they’re looking at it.” 46 But he didn’t leave it there.
“You would think if you’re in the FBI or Department of Justice, this is, this
is the biggest thing you could be looking at,” President Trump said. “Where
are they? I’ve not seen anything. I mean, just keep moving along. They go
onto the next President.” 47 He claimed the FBI was not even investigating
Dominion, adding that votes processed in its machines “are counted in for-
eign countries.” 48
None of this was true. Just 6 days earlier, Attorney General Barr had
explained to President Trump how DOJ and FBI were investigating fraud
claims. Barr also made it a point to emphasize that the Dominion claims
were nonsense. The President simply lied. The “crazy stuff,” as Barr put it,
was all Trump could cite.
Attorney General Barr then decided to speak out. He invited Michael
Balsamo, an Associated Press (AP) reporter, to lunch on December 1st. Barr
told the journalist that “to date, we have not seen fraud on a scale that
could have effected a different outcome in the election.” 49
That made the President irate.
Later that evening, Attorney General Barr met with President Trump at
the White House. It was their second face-to-face meeting after the
November election.50 At first, President Trump didn’t even look at Attorney
General Barr.51 The President “was as mad as I’ve ever seen him, and he
was trying to control himself,” Barr said.52 The President finally “shoved a
newspaper” with the AP quote in Barr’s face.53
“Well, this is, you know, killing me. You didn’t have to say this. You
must’ve said this because you hate Trump—you hate Trump,” Barr
remembered him saying.54 “No, I don’t hate you, Mr. President,” Barr
replied. “You know, I came in at a low time in your administration. I’ve
tried to help your administration. I certainly don’t hate you.” 55
President Trump peppered him with unsupported conspiracy theories.56
Because he had authorized DOJ and FBI to investigate fraud claims, Attor-
ney General Barr was familiar with the conspiracy theories raised by the
President. The “big ones” he investigated included claims such as: Domin-
ion voting machines switched votes, votes had been “dumped at the end of
378 CHAPTER 4

the night in Milwaukee and Detroit,” non-residents voted in Nevada, the

number of ballots counted in Pennsylvania exceeded the number of votes
cast, as well as a story about a truck driver supposedly driving thousands of
pre-filled ballots from New York to Pennsylvania, among others.57 Under
Attorney General Barr, DOJ would also investigate a false claim that a video
feed in Fulton County captured multiple runs of ballots for former Vice
President Biden. As explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this report, there was
no truth to any of these allegations, but that didn’t stop President Trump
from repeatedly citing these fictional accounts.
“And I told him that the stuff that his people were shoveling out to the
public was bullshit, I mean, that the claims of fraud were bullshit,” Barr
recalled about the December 1st meeting.58 “And, you know, he was indig-
nant about that. And I reiterated that they wasted a whole month of these
claims on the Dominion voting machines and they were idiotic claims.” 59
President Trump repeated that there had been a “big vote dump” in
Detroit.60 But Attorney General Barr quickly parried this claim.61 There was
nothing suspicious in how the votes flowed into a central location, Barr
explained, because that is how votes are always counted in Wayne County.62
Moreover, Barr pointed out that the President performed better in Detroit in
2020 than he had in 2016. “I mean, there’s no indication of fraud in
Detroit,” Barr said.63 Barr explained that the “thing about the truck driver
is complete, you know, nonsense.” 64 DOJ and FBI had investigated the
matter, including by interviewing the relevant witnesses.65 There was no
truck filled with ballots.
Nothing that Attorney General Barr said during that meeting could sat-
isfy President Trump. So, the President shifted the focus to Barr. He com-
plained that the Attorney General hadn’t indicted former FBI Director
James Comey and that U.S. Attorney John Durham’s investigation into the
origins of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation hadn’t made more
progress.66 “Look, I know that you’re dissatisfied with me,” Barr said, “and
I’m glad to offer my resignation.” 67 President Trump pounded the table in
front of him with his fist and said, “Accepted.” 68
White House lawyers Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann tracked Barr
down in the parking lot after he left.69 They convinced Barr to stay in the
administration.70 But his days as Attorney General were numbered. Presi-
dent Trump was not going to stop spreading conspiracy theories. Nor would
the President cease in his effort to co-opt DOJ for his own corrupt political
purposes.
President Trump released a video on Facebook the very next day.71 He
repeated many of the same lies, including the conspiracy theory about
Dominion voting machines switching votes. The President also offered
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 379

charts, falsely claiming that fraudulent “vote dumps” had swung the elec-
tion against him.72 Among the examples he cited was the supposed “vote
dump” in Detroit, Michigan.73 In fact, Barr had already debunked this and
other claims.
On December 3, 2020, Rudolph Giuliani appeared before the Georgia
Senate Government Oversight Committee to allege that massive cheating
had occurred during the election.74 Giuliani offered a video recorded on
election night at the State Farm Arena in Atlanta, Georgia, as a key piece of
evidence.75 Giuliani alleged that the video showed a secret suitcase of bal-
lots being double- and triple-counted after Republican poll watchers had
been inappropriately dismissed.76 The video was selectively edited and
showed nothing of the sort. The Georgia Secretary of State’s Office investi-
gated and immediately debunked the claim, finding that the secret suitcase
was just a secure box and nothing nefarious had occurred.77 President
Trump, Giuliani and others continued to push the lie anyway.
On December 4th, Attorney General Barr asked Byung J. (“BJay”) Pak,
who was then the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, to
independently investigate the State Farm claim. Barr told Pak that this was
a “priority,” because “he was going to go to the White House for a meet-
ing” and the “issue might come up.” Barr asked Pak to “try to substantiate
the allegation made by Mr. Giuliani.” 78
Pak watched the video from State Farm Arena and asked the FBI to
investigate the matter further. Pak told the Select Committee that FBI
agents “interviewed the individuals” shown in the video who were suppos-
edly “double, triple counting” the ballots, and “determined that nothing
irregular happened in the counting and the allegations made by Mr. Giuliani
were false.” 79 And, as noted above, the supposed “suitcase” was a secure
storage container used to store ballots. With this evidence in hand, Pak told
Attorney General Barr that there was no substance to the allegations.80

4.4 DECEMBER 14, 2020: BARR SUBMITS HIS RESIGNATION

Finally, Attorney General Barr had had enough. He submitted his resigna-
tion on December 14, 2020.81 During an interview with the Select Commit-
tee, former Attorney General Barr reflected on his face-to-face encounters
with President Trump in November and December 2020:
And, in that context, I made clear I did not agree with the idea of
saying the election was stolen and putting out this stuff which I told
the President was bullshit. And, you know, I didn’t want to be part
of it. And that’s one of the reasons that went into me deciding to
leave when I did.
380 CHAPTER 4

Former Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen testifies before the Select Committee on June
23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)

I observed, I think it was on December 1st, that—you know, I

believe you can’t live in a world where the incumbent administra-
tion stays in power based on its view, unsupported by specific evi-
dence, that the election—that there was fraud in the election.82
Around mid-day on December 14th, Attorney General Barr met with
President Trump and Meadows in the Oval Office to discuss his resigna-
tion.83 When he arrived, and even before Barr could mention his resigna-
tion, President Trump began speaking at length about the recently released
Allied Security Operations Group (ASOG) report on Dominion voting
machines in Antrim County, Michigan.84 While the Attorney General had
been briefed on the allegations in Antrim County and did not find them
credible, he promised the President that he would have DOJ investigate
them.85 The Attorney General then told President Trump that he had come
for a separate reason and wished to speak to the President privately, so
Meadows left.86
Barr told President Trump that it was clear the President was dissatis-
fied with him as Attorney General and that he had decided to resign.87
President Trump accepted his resignation and asked Barr who would
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 381

replace him; Attorney General Barr recommended Jeffrey A. Rosen as Acting

Attorney General and Richard Donoghue as his deputy.88 Although Presi-
dent Trump called Donoghue to discuss the possibility of appointing him
Acting Attorney General, Donoghue advised that normal procedures be fol-
lowed and Rosen be named Acting Attorney General.89 President Trump fol-
lowed this advice, and upon Barr’s departure, Rosen became Acting
Attorney General while Donoghue would function as his deputy.

4.5 ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFFREY ROSEN AND ACTING DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL RICHARD DONOGHUE HOLD THE LINE

Barr felt that he was leaving the Department in the hands of two trusted
lieutenants. But President Trump immediately began to pressure Rosen and
Donoghue, just as he had Barr.
On December 14, 2020, the day Barr resigned, Molly Michael, Special
Assistant to the President and Oval Office Coordinator, sent an email to
Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen. The email had two documents
attached, both of which were labeled “From POTUS.” 90 The first was a set
of talking points focused on false allegations of voter fraud in Antrim
County, Michigan. The second document was the same ASOG report the
President had given Barr.91
The next day, President Trump held a meeting in the White House with
Acting Attorney General Rosen, Acting Deputy Attorney Donoghue, Cipol-
lone, Meadows, Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Ken Cuc-
cinelli, and Acting General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security
Chad Mizelle.92 Barr did not attend, even though he was not scheduled to
leave DOJ until the following week. The timing of the meeting was notable,
as the previous day the electoral college had met and cast their votes in
favor of former Vice President Biden.
During testimony before the Select Committee, Donoghue explained
that the December 15th, meeting “was largely focused on” the ASOG
report.93 According to Donoghue, the President “was adamant that the
report must be accurate, that it proved that the election was defective, that
he in fact won the election, and the [D]epartment should be using that
report to basically tell the American people that the results were not trust-
worthy.” 94 President Trump discussed “other theories as well,” including
erroneous allegations of voter fraud in Georgia and Pennsylvania, but “the
bulk of that conversation on December 15th focused on Antrim County,
Michigan.” 95 President Trump asked why DOJ wasn’t “doing more to look
at this” and whether the Department was “going to do its job.” 96
382 CHAPTER 4

Former Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue testifies before the Select
Committee on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)

The Department of Justice was doing its job. In fact, Attorney General
Barr had ordered unprecedented investigations into the many specious
claims of voter fraud. The President simply didn’t want to hear the truth—
that DOJ found that not one of the bogus claims was true. As explained in
Chapter 1, the original vote totals in Antrim County were the result of a
human error that had since been corrected, not the result of any problem
with Dominion machines or software. There was no evidence of fraud.

4.6 PRESIDENT TRUMP IS INTRODUCED TO JEFFREY CLARK

On December 21, 2020, 11 House Republicans met with President Trump at

the White House to discuss their plans for objecting to the certification of
the electoral college vote on January 6th.97 After the meeting, Mark Mead-
ows tweeted: “Several members of Congress just finished a meeting in the
Oval Office with @realDonaldTrump preparing to fight back against
mounting evidence of voter fraud. Stay tuned.” 98 Among those in atten-
dance was Congressman Scott Perry, a Republican from Pennsylvania.99
By the next day, Representative Perry had introduced a little-known
DOJ official named Jeffrey Clark to the President.100 At the time, Clark was
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 383

Former Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Clark appears on a screen during a Select
Committee hearing on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by Mandel Ngan-Pool/Getty Images)

the Acting Head of the Civil Division and Head of the Environmental and
Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice.101 Clark had no
experience in, or responsibilities related to, investigating allegations of
election fraud.
President Trump called Acting Attorney General Rosen “virtually every
day” between December 23rd and January 3rd.102 The President usually dis-
cussed his “dissatisfaction” with DOJ, claiming the Department was not
doing enough to investigate election fraud.103 On Christmas Eve, Trump
brought up Jeffrey Clark’s name. Rosen found it “peculiar,” telling the
Select Committee: “I was quizzical as to how does the President even know
Mr. Clark?” 104
Rosen then spoke directly with Clark on December 26th.105 Clark
revealed that he had met with the President in the Oval Office several days
prior.106 Clark had told the President that if he were to change the leader-
ship at the Department of Justice, “then the Department might be able to
do more” to support the President’s claims that the election had been sto-
len from him.107
In his discussion with Acting Attorney General Rosen, Clark was
“defensive” and “apologetic,” claiming that the meeting with President
384 CHAPTER 4

Trump was “inadvertent and it would not happen again, and that if anyone
asked him to go to such a meeting, he would notify Rich Donoghue and me
[Rosen].” 108 Of course, Clark had good reasons to be defensive. His meeting
with President Trump and Representative Perry on December 22nd was a
clear violation of Department policy, which limits interactions between the
White House and the Department’s staff. As Steven Engel, former Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, explained to the Select
Committee, “it’s critical that the Department of Justice conducts its crimi-
nal investigations free from either the reality or any appearance of political
interference.” 109 For that reason, the Department has longstanding polices
in place, across administrations, to “keep these communications as infre-
quent and at the highest levels as possible, just to make sure that people
who are less careful about it, who don't really understand these implica-
tions, such as Mr. Clark, don’t run afoul of the of those contact policies.” 110
Rosen added that only the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General
“can have conversations about criminal matters with the White House,” or
they can “authorize” someone from within DOJ to do so.111 Clark had no
such authorization.
Representative Perry continued to advocate on Clark’s behalf. The Con-
gressman texted Meadows on December 26th, writing: “Mark, just check-
ing in as time continues to count down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to
inauguration. We gotta get going!” 112 Representative Perry followed up:
“Mark, you should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he
explained to me why the principal deputy [position] won’t work especially
with the FBI. They will view it as not having the authority to enforce what
needs to be done.” 113 Meadows responded: “I got it. I think I understand.
Let me work on the deputy position.” 114 Representative Perry then sent
additional texts: “Roger. Just sent you something on Signal”, “Just sent you
an updated file”, and “Did you call Jeff Clark?” 115

4.7 DECEMBER 27TH PHONE CALL

On December 27, 2020, President Trump called Acting Attorney General

Rosen once again. At some point during the lengthy call, Rosen asked that
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue be conferenced in.116 According
to Donoghue’s contemporaneous notes, Trump referenced three Republican
politicians, all of whom had supported the President’s election lies and the
“Stop the Steal” campaign.117 One was Representative Scott Perry. Another
was Doug Mastriano, a State senator from Pennsylvania who would later be
on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol during the January 6th attack.118 Presi-
dent Trump also referenced Representative Jim Jordan from Ohio, praising
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 385

him as a “fighter.” 119 Representatives Perry and Jordan had often teamed
up to spread lies about the election. The two spoke at a “Stop the Steal”
rally in front of the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg, just days after
the November election.120 The pair also pressed their conspiratorial case
during interviews with friendly media outlets.121
President Trump made a “stream of allegations” during the December
27th call.122 As reflected in his notes, Donoghue considered the call to be an
“escalation of the earlier conversations,” with the President becoming
more adamant that “we weren’t doing our job.” 123 President Trump traf-
ficked in “conspiracy theories” he had heard from others, and Donoghue
sought to “make it clear to the President these allegations were simply not
true.” 124 Donoghue sought to “correct” President Trump “in a serial fash-
ion as he moved from one theory to another.” 125
The President returned to the discredited ASOG report, which former
Attorney General Barr had already dismissed as complete nonsense. ASOG
had claimed—based on no evidence—that the Dominion voting machines
in Antrim County, Michigan had suffered from a 68 percent error rate. As
noted above and in Chapter 1, that was not close to being true.
Bipartisan election officials in Antrim County completed a hand recount
of all machine-processed ballots on December 17, 2020, which should have
ended the lies about Dominion’s voting machines.126 The net difference
between the machine count and the hand recount was only 12 out of 15,718
total votes.127 The machines counted just one vote more for former Vice
President Biden than was tallied during the hand recount.128 Donoghue
informed the President that he “cannot and should not be relying on”
ASOG’s claim, because it was “simply not true.” 129 This did not stop the
President from later repeating the debunked allegation multiple times,
including during his January 6th speech at the Ellipse.130
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked a “series” of other
conspiracy theories offered by President Trump during the December 27th
call as well. One story involved a truck driver “who claimed to have moved
an entire tractor trailer of ballots from New York to Pennsylvania.” 131 There
was no truth to the story. The FBI “interviewed witnesses at the front end
and the back end of” the truck’s transit route, “looked at loading mani-
fests,” questioned the truck driver, and concluded that there were no bal-
lots in the truck.132
President Trump then returned to the conspiracy theory about voting in
Detroit. Former Attorney General Barr had already debunked the claim that
a massive number of illegal votes had been dumped during the middle of
the night, but the President would not let it go. President Trump alleged
that someone “threw the poll watchers out,” and “you don’t even need to
386 CHAPTER 4

look at the illegal aliens voting—don’t need to. It’s so obvious.” 133 The
President complained that the “FBI will always say there’s nothing there,”
because while the Special Agents (“the line guys”) supported him, the
Bureau’s leadership supposedly did not.134 This was inconsistent with
Donoghue’s view.135 But President Trump complained that he had “made
some bad decisions on leadership” at the FBI.136
President Trump also “wanted to talk a great deal about Georgia, [and]
the State Farm Arena video,” claiming it was “fraud staring you right in the
face.” 137 President Trump smeared Ruby Freeman, a Georgia election
worker who was merely doing her job, as a “Huckster” and an “Election
scammer.” 138 President Trump said the “networks,” meaning the televi-
sion networks, had “magnified the tape and saw them running them [bal-
lots] through repeatedly.” 139 The President repeated the lie that Democrats
had “[c]losed the facility and then came back with hidden ballots under the
table.” 140 He suggested that both Rosen and Donoghue “go to Fulton
County and do a signature verification.” They would “see how illegal it is”
and “find tens of thousands” of illegal ballots.141
President Trump “kept fixating” on the supposed suitcase in the
video.142 But Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked the
President’s obsession. “There is no suitcase,” Donoghue made clear.143
Donoghue explained that the DOJ had looked at the video and interviewed
multiple witnesses. The “suitcase” was an official lock box filled with
genuine votes.144 And election workers simply did not scan ballots for for-
mer Vice President Biden multiple times.145 All of this was recorded by
security cameras.146
In response to what President Trump was saying during the conversa-
tion, Rosen and Donoghue tried to make clear that the claims the President
made weren’t supported by the evidence. “You guys must not be following
the internet the way I do,” the President remarked.147 But President Trump
was not finished peddling wild conspiracy theories.
The President pushed the claim that Pennsylvania had reported 205,000
more votes than there were voters in the state.148 “We’ll look at whether we
have more ballots in Pennsylvania than registered voters,” Acting Attorney
General Rosen replied, according to Donoghue. They “[s]hould be able to
check that out quickly.” 149 But Rosen wanted President Trump to “under-
stand that the DOJ can’t and won’t snap its fingers and change the outcome
of the election. It doesn’t work that way.” 150
“I don’t expect you to do that,” President Trump responded. “Just say
the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Con-
gressmen.” 151
Donoghue explained this “is an exact quote from the President.” 152
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 387

“We have an obligation to tell people that this was an illegal, corrupt
election,” President Trump told the DOJ team at another point in the call.153
President Trump insisted this was DOJ’s “obligation,” even though Rosen
and Donoghue kept telling him there was no evidence of fraud sufficient to
overturn the outcome of the election. “We are doing our job,” Donoghue
informed the President. “Much of the info you’re getting is false.” 154
The call on December 27th was contentious for additional reasons.
President Trump did not want to accept that the Department of Justice was
not an arm of his election campaign. He wanted to know why the Depart-
ment did not assist in his campaign’s civil suits against States. There was a
simple answer: There was no evidence to support the campaign’s claims of
fraud.155
Donoghue and Rosen also “tried to explain to the President on this
occasion and on several other occasions that the Justice Department has a
very important, very specific, but very limited role in these elections.” 156
The States “run their elections” and DOJ is not “quality control for the
States.” 157 DOJ has “a mission that relates to criminal conduct in relation to
federal elections” and also has “related civil rights responsibilities.” 158 But
DOJ cannot simply intervene to alter the outcome of an election or support
a civil suit.159
When President Trump made these demands on December 27th, it was
already crystal clear that the Department of Justice had found no evidence
of systemic fraud.160 The Department simply had no reason to assert that
the 2020 Presidential contest was “an illegal corrupt election.” 161
“People tell me Jeff Clark is great” and that “I should put him in,”
President Trump said on the call. “People want me to replace the DOJ lead-
ership.” 162 Donoghue responded “[S]ir, that’s fine, you should have the
leadership you want, but understand, changing the leadership in the
Department won’t change anything.” 163
The President did not really care what facts had been uncovered by the
Department of Justice. President Trump just wanted the Department to say
the election was corrupt, so he and the Republican Congressmen could
exploit the statement in the days to come, including on January 6th. And
when Rosen and Donoghue resisted the President’s entreaties, he openly
mused about replacing Rosen with someone who would do the President’s
bidding.

4.8 CONGRESSMAN SCOTT PERRY CALLS DONOGHUE

Toward the end of the December 27th call, President Trump asked Dono-
ghue for his cell number.164 Later that day, Representative Perry called
388 CHAPTER 4

Representative Scott Perry, November 14, 2022.

(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

Donoghue to press the President’s case.165 Representative Perry was one of

President Trump’s key congressional allies in the effort to overturn the
election’s results. Representative Perry was an early supporter of the “Stop
the Steal” campaign and, as noted above, addressed the crowd at one such
event outside the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg on November 5,
2020.166 Representative Perry was also one of 27 Republican Congressmen
who signed a letter requesting that President Trump “direct Attorney Gen-
eral Barr to appoint a Special Counsel to investigate irregularities in the
2020 election.” The letter was dated December 9, 2020—more than 1 week
after Barr told the press there was no evidence of significant fraud.167 There
was no reason to think that a Special Counsel was warranted. Representa-
tive Perry and the other congressmen advocated for one to be appointed
anyway.
Representative Perry attended the December 21st Oval Office meeting
along with at least 10 other congressional Republicans to discuss the strat-
egy for objecting to the electoral college votes on January 6th. Along with
125 other Republican Members of Congress. Representative Perry also sup-
ported Texas’s lawsuit against Pennsylvania and three other states.168 That
is, Representative Perry supported Texas’s effort to nullify the certified
electoral college vote from four states, including his own home state.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 389

Donoghue took notes during his conversation with Representative Perry

and provided those notes to the Select Committee.169 The notes reflect that
when Representative Perry called Donoghue on December 27th, Represen-
tative Perry explained that President Trump asked him to call and that he,
Representative Perry, did not think DOJ had been doing its job on the elec-
tion.170 Representative Perry brought up other, unrelated matters and
argued that the “FBI doesn’t always do the right thing in all instances.” 171
Representative Perry also brought up Jeff Clark. He said he liked him and
thought that Clark “would do something about this,” meaning the election
fraud allegations.172
On the evening of December 27th, Representative Perry emailed Dono-
ghue a set of documents alleging significant voting fraud had occurred in
Pennsylvania.173 One document asserted that election authorities had
counted 205,000 more votes than had been cast.174 Representative Perry
also shared this same claim on Twitter the following day.175 President
Trump kept raising the same claim. Sometimes there was an alleged dis-
crepancy of 205,000 votes, other times it was supposedly 250,000 votes.176
Either way, it was not true.
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue forwarded Representative
Perry’s email to Scott Brady, who was the U.S. Attorney for the Western
District of Pennsylvania at the time.177 As Brady soon discovered, there was
no discrepancy.178 President Trump’s supporters came up with the claim by
comparing the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s website, which reported
the total number of votes as 5.25 million, to a separate State election regis-
try, which showed only 5 million votes cast.179 The problem was simple:
Pennsylvania’s election site had not been updated.180 The totals for four
counties had not yet been reported on the election site. Once those votes
were counted on the site, the totals matched. This was simply not an
example of fraud, as President Trump, Representative Perry and others
would have it.

4.9 DECEMBER 28, 2020: THE CLARK LETTER

On December 28, 2020, Clark sent a 5-page draft letter to Donoghue and
Rosen.181 The letter was addressed to three Georgia State officials: Governor
Brian Kemp, Speaker of the House David Ralston, and President Pro Tem-
pore of the Senate Butch Miller. It contained places for Rosen and Donoghue
to affix their signatures, which they steadfastly refused to do.182 The letter,
if signed and sent, may very well have provoked a constitutional crisis.183
The letter was attached to an email from Clark, in which he requested
authorization to attend a classified briefing by the Office of the Director of
390 CHAPTER 4

National Intelligence (ODNI) “led by DNI Ratcliffe on foreign election inter-

ference issues.” 184 ODNI did not find any foreign interference in the voting
process or counting,185 but Clark apparently believed some of the con-
spiracy theories that had been floated. Specifically, Clark claimed that
“hackers have evidence (in the public domain) that a Dominion machine
accessed the internet through a smart thermostat with a net connection
trail leading back to China.” Clark added: “ODNI may have additional clas-
sified evidence.” 186 This crackpot claim had been shared by other Trump
officials and associates as well.187 Ultimately, after Clark received the ODNI
briefing, “he acknowledged [to Donoghue] that there was nothing in that
briefing that would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign
involvement.” 188
Clark intended to send the letter to officials in Georgia and several other
contested States that President Trump needed to flip if he was going to
overturn the election results. “The Department of Justice is investigating
various irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the United
States,” Clark wrote.189 Clark continued: “The Department will update you
as we are able on investigatory progress, but at this time we have identified
significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election in
multiple States, including the State of Georgia.” 190
Clark continued by arguing that Georgia’s State legislature should call a
special session. “In light of these developments, the Department recom-
mends that the Georgia General Assembly should convene in special session
so that its legislators are in a special position to take additional testimony,
receive new evidence, and deliberate on the matter consistent with its
duties under the U.S. Constitution,” Clark wrote.191 Clark referenced the fake
electors that the President and his campaign organized and argued that
there were two competing slates of electors, both of which were legiti-
mate.192 “The Department believes that in Georgia and several other States,
both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a separate slate
of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on [December 14, 2020] at
the proper location to cast their ballots, and that both sets of those ballots
have been transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be opened by Vice President
Pence,” Clark wrote.193
The letter was a lie. Senior DOJ officials—Barr, Rosen and Donoghue—
had repeatedly stated the opposite. They found no evidence of fraud that
would have impacted the election’s results—none. But since mid-
November, the Trump Campaign’s legal team under Giuliani attempted to
execute its dual-track strategy of both filing lawsuits and convincing state
legislatures in contested states to appoint separate slates of Presidential
electors for President Trump.194 By late December, however, the dual-track
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 391

approach had largely failed, and no legislatures had sent a second lawful
slate of electors for Trump to Congress. Clearly, President Trump and his
campaign team could not get the job done. So, the President and those
around him sought to use the hefty imprimatur of the U.S. Department of
Justice to achieve the same thing. No doubt, a letter coming from the
Department of Justice is different from a meandering call from Giuliani or
one of his associates. And, because it was December 28th and there was
little more than a week until the January 6th joint session of Congress,
President Trump needed more, and soon. Clark’s letter, which laid out a
plan that was almost identical to what President Trump and his team had
pressured State officials to carry out virtually since election day, could have
been just what President Trump needed.
Several examples demonstrate the parallels between President Trump’s
and Rudolph Giuliani’s approach to overturning the election in November
and December, and what Clark proposed in this letter. First, the letter
sought to have the Georgia State legislature convene a special session to
focus on allegations of fraud in the election.195 Giuliani and his team had
been making calls to State legislatures and telling them in both official and
unofficial State legislature committee hearings that State legislatures
should convene in special sessions.196 They also argued that State legisla-
tures had the authority to convene a special session themselves, despite
limitations in State law requiring such a session to be convened by the gov-
ernor.197 Clark included the same argument in his draft letter.198
Additionally, the draft letter recommended that the Georgia legislature
consider choosing the alternate—fake—slate of electoral college electors
that sent fake electoral college votes to Congress and Vice President
Pence.199 Having State legislatures choose Trump electors in States where
President Trump lost was one of the Trump team’s early goals immediately
after the election, but it didn’t work.200 When no State legislature appointed
its own set of electors before December 14th, the Trump Campaign
arranged for electors to meet in contested States anyway and cast fake elec-
toral college votes.201 This letter, with the Department of Justice seal at the
top, was just one more way that President Trump and those close to him
could pressure State officials to send competing electoral college votes to
Congress for consideration during the joint session, despite former Vice
President Biden’s certified victory in each of the contested States.
Despite the similarities between the requests in Clark’s proposed letter
and the requests that President Trump and his team made to State officials
for nearly 2 months, the extent to which Clark directly coordinated his
actions with the Trump Campaign and its outside advisors is unclear. Clark
asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and various other privileges to avoid
392 CHAPTER 4

answering the Select Committee’s questions about these and other top-
ics.202 When Giuliani was asked during his Select Committee deposition
whether he remembered discussing DOJ issuing a letter like Clark’s, Giu-
liani refused to answer because it implicated attorney-client privilege with
President Trump, but when asked if he recalled ever recommending that
Clark be given election-related responsibilities at DOJ, Giuliani said, “I do
recall saying to people that somebody should be put in charge of the Justice
Department who isn’t frightened of what’s going to be done to their repu-
tation, because the Justice Department was filled with people like that.” 203
And the investigation has also revealed that Clark and John Eastman were
in communication throughout this period.204
One person who had worked with Eastman and others in his circle was a
lawyer installed to work with Clark at the Department of Justice in mid-
December—the final weeks of the Trump administration—named Ken Klu-
kowski.205 Klukowski was a Trump administration political appointee
serving as a senior counsel under Clark in DOJ’s Civil Division.206 After
serving as a lawyer in the Office and Management and Budget (OMB) for
more than a year and volunteering as a lawyer for the Trump Campaign
after election day, Klukowski only joined the Department when the admin-
istration’s personnel staff “expedite[d]” his appointment because the
White House’s Presidential Personnel Office “want[ed] him in soon.” 207
On the morning of December 28th, Clark asked Klukowski to draft the
Georgia letter for him.208 Clark dictated the substantive key points of the
letter to Klukowski and told him exactly what to include.209 After several
meetings with Clark throughout the day to update him on progress, Klu-
kowski turned in his assignment and gave the letter to Clark, which Clark
sent along to Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney
General Donoghue, as described above.210
Donoghue quickly responded to Clark’s email, stating “there is no
chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely like this.” 211 The
plan set forth by Clark was “not even within the realm of possibility.” 212
Donoghue warned that if they sent Clark’s letter, it “would be a grave step
for the Department to take and it could have tremendous Constitutional,
political and social ramifications for the country.” 213 Contrary to President
Trump’s and Clark’s wild claims about the election, Donoghue stressed that
DOJ’s ongoing investigations related to matters of such a “small scale that
they simply would not impact the outcome of the Presidential Election.” 214
Clark’s assertion to the contrary was baseless.
Donoghue and Rosen reaffirmed their strong opposition to the draft
letter in a “contentious” meeting with Clark on December 28th.215 “What
you are doing is nothing less than the United States Justice Department
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 393

meddling in the outcome of a presidential election,” Donoghue admonished

Clark, to which Clark indignantly responded, “I think a lot of people have
meddled in this election.” 216
Under questioning by Rosen and Donoghue, Clark eventually also
revealed that he had been in a meeting in the Oval Office with President
Trump. Donoghue demanded to know, “Why the hell are we hearing your
name from the President of the United States and a Congressman?” 217
When Clark was reminded that meeting the President without authorization
or informing his superiors was a clear violation of the White House contacts
policy, he retorted, “It’s a policy, there’s a lot more at stake here than a
policy.” 218 In fact, the contacts policy was designed for situations just like
this where political figures might try to influence criminal investigations or
legal actions taken by the Department of Justice, as President Trump
attempting to do.219
In the days that followed, Clark called witnesses, got a briefing from
ODNI and pursued his own investigations. Acting Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue was “shocked” to learn that Clark did not cease his efforts even
after learning there was “no foreign interference.” 220 Instead of adhering
to the facts, Clark “doubled down.” During a follow-up meeting on January
2nd, Clark acknowledged he had received the ODNI briefing, and he
acknowledged that there was nothing in the briefing that would have sup-
ported his earlier suspicion about foreign involvement, but he nevertheless
“spewed out some of these theories, some of which we’d heard from the
President, but others which were floating around the internet and media,
and just kept insisting that the Department needed to act and needed to
send those letters.” 221

4.10 DECEMBER 29TH MEETING

The next day, Rosen, Donoghue, and Engel had a meeting with Mark Mead-
ows, Pat Cipollone, and Cipollone’s deputy, Pat Philbin, in the White House
Chief of Staff’s office.222 While the meeting dealt primarily with the Presi-
dential transition, the group discussed a draft civil complaint modeled after
Texas v. Pennsylvania that the President wanted the Department of Justice to
file challenging the results of the Presidential election, tentatively called
United States v. Pennsylvania.223 The DOJ officials said that they had not had
time to thoroughly review the proposed suit, but initially indicated that it
appeared to be flawed and did not seem “viable” for DOJ to file.224 Meadows
suggested that the DOJ leadership meet with William Olson and Kurt Olsen,
394 CHAPTER 4

the two attorneys affiliated with the Trump Campaign that had been work-
ing on the proposed suit, and added that Eastman and a retired judge from
North Carolina named Mark Martin both had views about the lawsuit.225
In this meeting, Meadows also raised a new and outrageous allegation
of election fraud: that an Italian company had been involved in changing
votes in the Presidential election.226 According to Meadows, there was a
man, whom Donoghue later learned was in an Italian prison, who claimed
to have information supporting the allegation and that CIA officers sta-
tioned in Rome were either aware of the plot to interfere in the election or
had participated in it.227 Donoghue described how it was apparent that
Meadows was not clear on the specifics of the allegation but passed them
along to DOJ to investigate, nonetheless.228 Following the meeting Dono-
ghue provided the information to the FBI, which quickly determined that
the allegations were not credible.229 Meadows and other senior officials in
the Trump administration, however, pressed DOJ to investigate every alle-
gation of fraud regardless of how absurd or specious.
In the days after the December 29th meeting with Meadows, the senior
DOJ officials more closely examined the proposed United States v. Pennsylva-
nia lawsuit and determined that DOJ could not file it.230 Engel was princi-
pally tasked with examining the veracity of the suit and summarized his
analysis in a series of talking points that he provided to Donoghue on
December 31st.231 Engel concluded that for multiple reasons, the proposed
lawsuit lacked merit. First, the U.S. Government did not have standing to
challenge how a State administered its election.232 Such a challenge could
only be brought by President Trump as a candidate and his campaign, or,
possibly, an aggrieved electoral college elector.233 Second, there was no
identified precedent in the history of the Supreme Court establishing that
such a lawsuit could be filed by the U.S. Government.234 Third, by late
December, States had already certified the results of their elections and the
electoral college had met, so suing States by this point would not impact
the results of the election.235 Finally, unlike Texas v. Pennsylvania, which
was one State suing another State, this lawsuit would not automatically be
heard by the Supreme Court, so it should have been filed in a Federal dis-
trict court months prior—if at all—to have any possibility of impacting the
outcome of the election.236
When asked about it during his interview with the Select Committee,
Engel described United States v. Pennsylvania as “a meritless lawsuit” and
said, “there was never a question” about whether “the Department was
going to file” it.237 As senior DOJ officials had already explained to Presi-
dent Trump multiple times in November and December 2020, the Depart-
ment of Justice was strictly limited in what election-related actions it could
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 395

Steven Engel testifies before the Select Committee on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)

take. It could not oversee States’ actions in administering their elections,

and it could not support litigation filed by President Trump’s campaign.238
Nonetheless, President Trump continued to push DOJ to file this lawsuit
over the following days and essentially act as an arm of his political cam-
paign.

4.11 ROSEN’S DECEMBER 30TH CALL WITH PRESIDENT TRUMP

Even after the December 29th meeting, President Trump and those working
on his behalf still wanted DOJ leadership to file United States v. Pennsylvania.
On December 30th, Acting Attorney General Rosen had a phone call with
President Trump that included a discussion about the lawsuit.239 During the
call, Rosen clearly explained to the President that DOJ could not file the
lawsuit.240 Rosen said, “This doesn’t work. There’s multiple problems with
it. And the Department of Justice is not going to be able to do it.” 241
According to Rosen, President Trump accepted what he said without argu-
ment.242 Yet President Trump and his allies continued pressuring the
Department to file the lawsuit.
396 CHAPTER 4

4.12 DECEMBER 31ST MEETING

On December 31st, 2020, President Trump suddenly returned to Washing-

ton, DC, from Florida, where he had been celebrating Christmas. Shortly
after Air Force One landed, Rosen and Donoghue were summoned to the
Oval Office once again. They met with the President that afternoon. Presi-
dent Trump “was a little more agitated than he had been in the meeting on
the 15th,” according to Donoghue.243 The President remained “adamant
that the election has been stolen, that he won, that the American people
were being harmed by fraud, and that he believed the Justice Department
should be doing something about it.” 244
The President once again raised the prospect of naming Clark the Acting
Attorney General.245 Donoghue and Rosen repeated what they had told the
President previously—that he “should have the leaders that” he wanted,
“but it’s really not going to change anything.” 246
President Trump again asked why DOJ would not file a complaint with
the Supreme Court, alleging that the election was fraudulent. Rosen and
Donoghue explained, once more, that the DOJ did not have standing.247 DOJ
represents the Federal government, not the American people. President
Trump was incredulous and became “very animated.” 248 The President
kept repeating the same questions, “How is that possible? How can that
possibly be?” 249
President Trump also floated the prospect of naming a special counsel,
suggesting Ken Cuccinelli from the Department of Homeland Security as a
possible candidate.250 “This sounds like the kind of thing that would war-
rant appointment of a special counsel,” Donoghue recalled the President
saying.251 The President did not order the DOJ to name a special counsel,
but he was clearly still thinking about it. Donoghue and Rosen “didn’t say a
lot” in response, but simply pointed out that there was no evidence to sup-
port the many individual allegations that had been made, so there was “no
evidence that would warrant appointing a special counsel.” 252
President Trump again raised the Antrim County, Michigan allega-
tions.253 As mentioned above, bipartisan election officials in Antrim County
completed a hand recount of all ballots on December 17th.254 This should
have resolved the matter once and for all. There was simply no evidence
that Dominion’s machines had manipulated the result. But President
Trump would not accept this reality.
During the December 31st meeting, the President also raised the pros-
pect of seizing the voting machines. “Why don’t you guys seize machines?”
he asked.255 “You guys should seize machines because there will be evi-
dence,” Donoghue recalled President Trump saying.256 Rosen pushed back,
saying the DOJ had no basis to seize voting machines from the States. They
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 397

needed a search warrant, but there was no evidence to justify one.257 Rosen
explained to President Trump again that the DOJ has no responsibility for
oversight, as the States conduct the elections. Rosen added that to the
extent that any Federal agency is involved, it is the Department of Home-
land Security, which ensures “software selection and quality control.” 258 At
that point, the President called Ken Cuccinelli.259 Donoghue recalled the
President saying something along the lines of, “Ken, the Acting Attorney
General is telling me it’s your job to seize machines.” 260 Rosen had said
nothing of the sort, but Cuccinelli quickly shot down the President’s line of
inquiry, making it clear that the Department of Homeland Security had no
such authority.261 White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was also in atten-
dance and supported the DOJ leadership throughout the meeting.262
When Rosen spoke to Clark by phone on December 31st or January 1st,
Clark revealed that he had spoken to the President again, despite previously
promising Rosen and Donoghue that he would inform them of any other
contact that he received from the White House.263 Clark told Rosen that
President Trump had offered Clark the position of Acting Attorney General
and asked him to respond by Monday, January 4th. Clark, however, said
that he needed to do some “due diligence” related to claims of election
fraud before deciding whether he would accept the President’s offer.264

4.13 JANUARY 2, 2021: ROSEN AND DONOGHUE CONFRONT CLARK AGAIN

On Saturday, January 2nd, Rosen and Donoghue attempted, once again, to

persuade Clark to stand down. The two reiterated that Clark should stop
meeting with the President.265 Donoghue reprimanded Clark, emphasizing
that he was the boss and that Clark’s ongoing contacts with the President
were a violation of DOJ’s White House contact policy.266 Clark acknowl-
edged that he had been briefed by the ODNI, as he had requested, and “that
there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his earlier
suspicion about foreign involvement.” 267 Nevertheless, Clark still wanted
to send his letter to Georgia and other contested States alleging voter
fraud.268
During the conversation, Clark confirmed President Trump had offered
him the position of Acting Attorney General.269 Clark told Rosen that he
would decline the offer—if Rosen and Donoghue signed his dishonest letter
to officials in Georgia.270 The two refused once again, making it clear “that
there was no way we were going to sign that letter.” 271 Rosen reiterated his
decision in an email on the night of January 2nd, writing: “I confirmed
again today that I am not prepared to sign such a letter.” 272
398 CHAPTER 4

That same day, President Trump attempted to coerce Georgia Secretary

of State Brad Raffensperger into manufacturing enough votes to steal the
election in that State. That call is discussed in Chapter 2 of this report. But
one part of it deserves mention here. During that same call, President
Trump brought up BJay Pak, whom President Trump had appointed as the
U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. President Trump referred
to Pak as “your never-Trumper U.S. attorney there.” 273 The implication
was that Pak was not doing enough to validate President Trump’s fictitious
claims of voter fraud. President Trump’s mention of Pak proved to be omi-
nous.

4.14 JANUARY 3, 2021: CLARK INFORMS DOJ LEADERSHIP THAT HE WILL ACCEPT
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S OFFER

On January 3rd, Clark informed Rosen that he had decided to accept the
President’s offer to serve as the Acting Attorney General. Clark offered
Rosen the position of his deputy.274 Rosen thought that Clark’s offer was
“preposterous” and “nonsensical.” 275 Rosen told the Select Committee
that “there was no universe where I was going to do that to stay on and
support someone else doing things that were not consistent with what I
thought should be done.” 276 Donoghue believed it was a done deal, and
Clark would become the head of DOJ. But Pat Cipollone told Rosen that it
was “not a done deal and that we should fight this out at the White
House.” 277
White House call logs from January 3rd show that President Trump and
Clark spoke four times that day starting at 6:59 a.m.278 The first three calls
of the day, two in the morning and one in the early afternoon, show that
the President spoke with “Mr. Jeffrey Clark.” 279 The final call between the
two of them, from 4:19 to 4:22 p.m., however, shows that President Trump
spoke to “Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Clark,” suggesting that Clark had,
in fact, accepted the President’s offer.280
Acting Attorney General Rosen told the Select Committee that he would
have felt comfortable being replaced by either Donoghue or Engel, but he
did not “want for the Department of Justice to be put in a posture where it
would be doing things that were not consistent with the truth, were not
consistent with its own appropriate role, or were not consistent with the
Constitution.” 281
As a result, Rosen took four immediate steps to try and prevent Clark’s
ascension to Attorney General. First, he called Meadows and asked him to
set up a meeting for that evening with President Trump.282 Second, he
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 399

Select Committee graphic

spoke to Cipollone, who told Rosen that Clark’s appointment was not inevi-
table and that he would also be at the meeting that evening to support
Rosen and Donoghue.283 Third, Rosen called Engel and asked him to come
to DOJ headquarters so he could attend the White House meeting.284
Finally, Rosen asked Donoghue and another senior Department attorney
named Patrick Hovakimian to convene a meeting of the rest of the Depart-
ment’s leadership to describe the situation to them and hear how they
would react to Clark’s appointment.285
Hovakimian set up a conference call. Although some of the Assistant
Attorneys General were not able to participate in the call, all of those who
did agreed that they would resign if Rosen were removed from office.286 Pat
Hovakimian drafted a resignation letter that read:
This evening, after Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen over the
course of the last week repeatedly refused the President’s direct
instructions to utilize the Department of Justice’s law enforcement
powers for improper ends, the President removed Jeff from the
Department. PADAG Rich Donoghue and I resign from the Depart-
ment, effectively immediately.287
Hovakimian never sent the letter because the threat of mass resigna-
tions dissuaded President Trump from replacing Rosen. Regardless, the let-
ter stated a plain truth: President Trump was trying to use DOJ for his own
“improper ends.”
400 CHAPTER 4

THE JANUARY 3, 2021, OVAL OFFICE MEETING

At Rosen’s request, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows arranged a
meeting with the President at 6:15 p.m. that evening.288
We should pause to reflect on the timing and purpose of the meeting.
Congress was set to meet in a joint session in less than 72 hours. The States
had already certified their electors. Former Vice President Biden was going
to be certified as the winner of the 2020 Presidential election. There was no
material dispute over Biden’s victory. Trump and his lawyers had not pro-
duced any evidence of significant fraud. Instead, they presented one non-
sensical conspiracy theory after another. The DOJ and FBI were forced to
debunk these claims—and they did.
None of this stopped President Trump’s effort to subvert DOJ. Quite the
opposite. The President pushed forward with a plan to install Jeff Clark as
the Acting Attorney General, apparently to attempt to interfere with the
certification of the electoral college vote on January 6th. It is for this reason
Rosen requested an emergency meeting on January 3rd.
Before heading into the Oval Office, Rosen and Donoghue discussed the
possible leadership change with Cipollone and Pat Philbin. “They were
completely opposed to it,” Donoghue explained.289 In fact, no one who
attended the Oval Office meeting supported the leadership change—other
than Jeff Clark.290 Donoghue didn’t initially join the meeting, but the Presi-
dent soon called him in.291
During the meeting, Clark attempted to defend the last-minute move to
make him Acting Attorney General. Clark said he would “conduct real
investigations that would, in his view, uncover widespread fraud.” 292 Clark
declared that this was the “last opportunity to sort of set things straight
with this defective election,” and he had the “intelligence,” the “will,” and
“desire” to “pursue these matters in the way that the President thought
most appropriate.” 293 Everyone else quickly disagreed.294
President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do, and
both confirmed they would resign.295 Donoghue added that theirs would not
be the only resignations. “You should understand that your entire Depart-
ment leadership will resign,” Donoghue recalled saying.296 This included
every Assistant Attorney General. “Mr. President, these aren’t bureaucratic
leftovers from another administration,” Donoghue continued.297 “You
picked them. This is your leadership team. You sent every one of them to
the Senate; you got them confirmed.” 298 Donoghue argued that the Presi-
dent would look bad in the wake of the mass resignations. “What is that
going to say about you, when we all walk out at the same time?” 299 Dono-
ghue recalled asking the President. “And what happens if, within 48 hours,
we have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department because of
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 401

your actions? What does that say about your leadership?” 300 Steve Engel
reinforced Donoghue’s point, saying that Clark would be leading a “grave-
yard.” 301
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as well,
describing Clark’s letter as a “murder-suicide pact.” 302 Cipollone warned
that the letter would “damage everyone who touches it” and no one should
have anything to do with it.303
Some of the participants in the meeting argued that Clark was the
wrong person for the job of Attorney General. Clark attempted to defend his
credentials, arguing that he had been involved in complicated civil and
environmental litigation.304 “That’s right. You’re an environmental law-
yer,” Donoghue fired back.305 “How about you go back to your office, and
we’ll call you when there’s an oil spill.” 306
The meeting lasted approximately 3 hours.307 Only toward the end of
the contentious affair did President Trump decide to reverse his earlier
decision to make Clark the Acting Assistant Attorney General. Donoghue
recalled President Trump addressing Clark along the following lines:
I appreciate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you being willing
to suffer the abuse. But the reality is, you’re not going to get any-
thing done. These guys are going to quit. Everyone else is going to
resign. It’s going to be a disaster. The bureaucracy will eat you alive.
And no matter how you want to get things done in the next few
weeks, you won’t be able to get it done, and it’s not going to be
worth the breakage.308
Clark tried to change President Trump’s mind, saying “history is call-
ing, this our opportunity” and “we can get this done.” 309 But the President
was clearly rattled by the threat of mass defections and reiterated that the
change would not happen. President Trump then wondered what would
happen to Clark, and if Donoghue was going to fire him. Donoghue
explained that only the President had that authority. That was the end of
the matter. “And we all got up and walked out of the Oval Office,” Dono-
ghue recalled.310
But for one DOJ employee, the matter was not entirely settled. During
the January 3rd meeting in the Oval Office, President Trump complained
bitterly about BJay Pak, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Geor-
gia.311 Barr had tasked Pak with investigating the State Farm Arena video in
early December 2020. Like the FBI and Georgia State officials, Pak con-
cluded that nothing nefarious had occurred. President Trump was dissatis-
fied.312
“No wonder nothing’s been found in Atlanta, because the U.S. attorney
there is a Never Trumper,” Donoghue recalled the President saying.313
402 CHAPTER 4

Donoghue objected, saying Pak had “been doing his job.” 314 But the Presi-
dent insisted, pointing out that Pak criticized him years earlier. “This guy is
a Never Trumper,” the President reiterated.315 “He should never have been
in my administration to begin with. How did this guy end up in my admin-
istration?” 316 The President threatened to fire Pak.317 When Donoghue
pointed out that Pak was already planning to resign the next day, a Mon-
day, President Trump insisted that it be Pak’s last day on the job.318 Pak
later confirmed to Donoghue that he would be leaving the next day.319
President Trump asked if those in attendance at the Oval Office meeting
knew Bobby Christine, who was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of Georgia.320 Even though Pak had a first assistant, who was next in line
for Pak’s job upon his resignation, President Trump wanted Christine to
take the role.321 Christine did take over for Pak, but he did not find any evi-
dence of fraud either. It was Donoghue’s impression that Christine “con-
cluded that the election matters . . . were handled appropriately.” 322
Later in the evening of January 3rd, President Trump called Donoghue
to pass along yet another conspiracy theory.323 The President had heard
that an ICE agent outside of Atlanta was in custody of a truck filled with
shredded ballots.324 Donoghue explained that ICE agents are part of the
Department of Homeland Security, so the matter would be under that
Department’s purview. President Trump asked Donoghue to inform Ken
Cuccinelli.325 That story—like all the others—turned out to be fiction when
DOJ investigators evaluated the claim. The truck was carrying shredded bal-
lots, but they were from a previous election. The old ballots had been shred-
ded to make room for storing ballots from the 2020 election.326

4.15 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S UNPRECEDENTED ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE DOJ

The most senior DOJ officials at the end of President Trump’s term stopped
him from co-opting America’s leading law enforcement agency for his own
corrupt purposes. Recall that Attorney General Barr commented “you can’t
live in a world where the incumbent administration stays in power based on
its view, unsupported by specific evidence, that the election—that there
was fraud in the election.327
Richard Donoghue concluded that Jeffrey Clark’s letter “may very well
have spiraled us into a constitutional crisis.” 328
Jeffrey Rosen summed up his short time as the Acting Attorney General
like this:
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 403

[D]uring my tenure, we appointed no special prosecutors, we sent

no letters to States or State legislators disputing the election out-
come; we made no public statements saying the election was cor-
rupt and should be overturned; we initiated no Supreme Court
actions, nor filed or joined any other lawsuits calling into question
the legitimacy of our election and institutions.329
President Trump attempted to get DOJ to do each of those things.

ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8. The Select Committee recognizes and
appreciates the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the
report it issued about this Chapter’s topic. See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 117th
Cong. 1st sess., Subverting Justice: How the Former President and His Allies Pressured DOJ to
Overturn the 2020 Election, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8; See Margaret Talev, "Exclusive: Dem
Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day Landslide," Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios.
3. See Chapter 1.
4. See Chapter 1.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8−9.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8-9.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8-9.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8-9.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 23.
11. Richard C. Pilger, ed., "Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses: Eighth Edition," Depart-
ment of Justice (December 2017), p. 84, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/
1029066/download.
12. Richard C. Pilger, ed., "Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses: Eighth Edition," Depart-
ment of Justice (December 2017), p. 84 available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/
1029066/download. The DOJ further advises that “federal law enforcement personnel
should carefully evaluate whether an investigative step under consideration has the
potential to affect the election itself.” The department’s concern is that “[s]tarting a public
criminal investigation of alleged election fraud before the election to which the allega-
tions pertain has been concluded runs the obvious risk of chilling legitimate voting and
campaign activities.” Moreover, “[i]t also runs the significant risk of interjecting the investi-
gation itself as an issue, both in the campaign and in the adjudication of any ensuing
election contest.” Id.
404 CHAPTER 4

13. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-
01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-
01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-
01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 18-19.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 19-20.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 20.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 22.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22-23.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 405

36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22-23.
37. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
38. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
39. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
40. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
41. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, at 4:20, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox
News, "Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube,
Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Elec-
tion. It Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/
11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
42. "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,"
Vimeo, at 4:25, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, "Trump
Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste,
"Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was
Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
43. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
44. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
406 CHAPTER 4

29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-

veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
45. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
46. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
47. Factba.se, "Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020," Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
"Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," YouTube, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Ben-
veniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It
Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/
media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
48. Fox News, "Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Interview Since the Election," You-
Tube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; "Inter-
view: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020," Vimeo,
Nov. 29, 2020, available at ; Fox News, "Trump Asks, 'Where's Durham?' During First Inter-
view Since the Election," YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump
His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview. https://
vimeo.com/485180163; see also Alexis Benveniste, "Fox News' Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump
His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies," CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
49. Michael Balsamo, "Disputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud," Associated
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no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23-24. Also attending the meeting were
Pat Cipollone (Chief White House Counsel to the President), Pat Philbin (Deputy White
House Counsel to the President), Eric Herschmann, and Barr’s chief of staff, Will Levi. Id.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23-24.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23-24.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23-24.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23-24.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24-25.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 407

56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 11, 25-26.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
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61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 26-28.
71. “Campaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020 Election Results,” C-SPAN, Dec. 2,
2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-
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72. “Campaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020 Election Results,” C-SPAN, Dec. 2,
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ber 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-
trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2. Trump said: “Here's an
example. This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the morning, a vote dump of 149,772 votes came in
unexpectedly. We were winning by a lot. That batch was received in horror. We have a
company that's very suspect. Its name is Dominion. With the turn of a dial or the change
of a chip, you can press a button for Trump and the vote goes to Biden. What kind of a
system is this?” Id.
408 CHAPTER 4

74. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,” YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 -
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75. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,” YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 -
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76. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,” YouTube, at 0:33:30 - 0:58:00, Dec. 3,
2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw. The Trump campaign
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77. Gabriel Sterling (@GabrielSterling), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 6:41 a.m. ET, available at https://
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5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1334825233610633217%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=
https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gpb.org%2Fnews%2F2020%2F12%2F04%2Ffact-checking-rudy-
giulianis-grandiose-georgia-election-fraud-claim. At the time, Gabe Sterling was the Chief
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78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
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81. "Read William Barr's Resignation Letter to President Trump," Washington Post, (Dec. 14,
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84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
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85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 28-30.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 30.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 39-40.
90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000425, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426, HCOR-Pre-
CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to
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 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 409

91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000425, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426, HCOR-Pre-
CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to
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92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 32-33.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
96. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7,
2021), at p. 34, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (December 21, 2020,
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98. Mark Meadows (@MarkMeadows), Twitter, Dec. 21, 2020 6:03 pm, available at https://
twitter.com/MarkMeadows/status/1341157317451124745.
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (WAVES visitor records
for December 21, 2020).
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (March 24, 2022), pp. 205-06; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National
Archives Production), 076P-R000009364_0001 (December 21 and 22, 2020 email chain
between Molly Michael and Jeffrey Clark discussing a December 22, 2020 meeting at the
White House); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009365_0001
(December 22, 2020 email from Molly Michael to staff regarding a meeting at 6 p.m. in the
Yellow Oval with Jeffrey Clark and another guest); Jonathan Tamari & Chris Brennan, “Pa.
Congressman Scott Perry Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center of Elec-
tion Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/
politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 52-53.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 117th sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
410 CHAPTER 4

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55-56, 78.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55-56.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 53-55.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th ; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department
of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (May 11, 2009, memo-
randum laying out the policy for "Communications with the White House and Congress").
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26, 2020, text
message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM0140100 (December 26, 2020, text
message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014101 (December 26, 2020, text mes-
sage from Mark Meadows to Rep. Perry).
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014102-014103, MM014178.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48.
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-
07282021-000735.
118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-
07282021-000735; Ryan Deto, “Sen. Mastriano and Former State Rep. Saccone among Trump
Supporters who Occupied U.S. Capitol,” Pittsburgh City Paper, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/sen-mastriano-and-former-state-rep-saccone-
among-trump-supporters-who-occupied-us-capitol/Content?oid=18690728; Erin Bamer,
“Mastriano Defends Protest Appearance; Other GOP Lawmakers Say Little,” York Dispatch,
(Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/2021/01/07/
mastriano-at-no-point-did-he-storm-us-capitol/6579049002/.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-50; see also Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-
000735.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 411

120. Dan Geiter, "Rally to 'Stop the Steal' of the 2020 Election" PennLive, (Nov. 5, 2020) available
at https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.
121. See, e.g., Scott Perry for Congress, "#StopTheSteal," Facebook, November 6, 2020, available
at https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=406418637058079.
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
126. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certi-
fied Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020),
available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-
presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.
127. "Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certi-
fied Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate," Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020),
available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-
presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.
128. "Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certi-
fied Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate," Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020),
available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-
presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Pro-
duction), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten
notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/
house/committee/january6th.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
412 CHAPTER 4

https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investi-

gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Pro-
duction), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten
notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 55-56; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 413

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000741
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes
from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes
from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes
from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCOR-
Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from
Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58. Trump also mentioned
the possibility of the DOJ saying the “election is corrupt or suspect or not reliable” during
a public press conference. “We told him we were not going to do that,” Donoghue
explained. Id. at p. 59.
414 CHAPTER 4

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739, HCOR-
Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from
Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 61.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
160. Donoghue testified before the Select Committee: “There were isolated instances of fraud.
None of them came close to calling into question the outcome of the election in any indi-
vidual state.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President
Trump).
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 65.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-75.
166. Dan Gleiter, "Rally to 'Stop the Steal' of the 2020 Election," Penn Live, (Nov. 5, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.
167. Letter from the Office of Rep. Lance Gooden and Signed by 26 other Members of Congress
to the President of the United States, Dec. 9, 2020, available at https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=00000176-4701-d52c-ad7e-d7fdbfe50000.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 415

168. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by U.S. Representative Mike Johnson and 125 other
Members, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163550/
20201211132250339_Texas%20v.%20Pennsylvania%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20126%20
Representatives%20--%20corrected.pdf.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). Dono-
ghue’s handwritten notes from the call are dated Dec. 28, 2020, but he confirmed the call
took place on Dec. 27.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-
Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).
173. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000001 - HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000018.
174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000008.
175. RepScottPerry (@RepScotPerry), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/RepScottPerry/status/1343693703664308225.
176. See Chapter 1.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 74-75.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75-76.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75-76.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75-76.
181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
416 CHAPTER 4

(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200

(December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen,
including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
185. See National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to
the 2020 US Federal Elections, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2192-intelligence-
community-assessment-on-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-federal-elections (declassified
version of a January 7, 2021, report to President Trump, senior Executive Branch officials,
and Congressional leadership). The report concluded, among other things, "We have no
indications that any foreign actor attempted to alter any technical aspect of the voting
process in the 2020 US elections, including voter registration, casting ballots, vote tabula-
tion, or reporting results."
186. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
187. Zachary Cohen & Sara Murray, "New Details Shed Light on Ways Mark Meadows Pushed
Federal Agencies to Pursue Dubious Election Claims," CNN, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/02/politics/mark-meadows-election-fraud-liaison/
index.html; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022) at pp. 168-69.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
189. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
192. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
193. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
194. See Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the Trump Campaign’s efforts to overturn the results of the
election in contested states and have fake Electoral College electors submit fake votes to
Congress.
195. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 417

196. See Chapter 2 for additional information on these hearings.

197. See Chapter 2; see also Ga. Const., art. V, § 2, ¶ VII.
198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
199. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000698 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
200. See Chapter 2.
201. See Chapter 3.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb 2, 2022), pp. 24-27.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 101-03.
204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman production), Chapman061893 (January 1, 2021, emails
between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, July
1, 2022) (showing five calls between John Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from January 1, 2021,
through January 8, 2021)
205. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 182. The Select Committee ques-
tioned, and sought documents from, Klukowski about his interactions with Eastman and
others related to the 2020 election and the January 6th joint session of Congress. Klu-
kowski, however, objected to certain questions, and withheld a number of relevant com-
munications, on the basis of attorney-client privilege, work product, or the First
Amendment, including communications that he had with Eastman. For example, on Decem-
ber 9th, before Klukowski joined the Department of Justice, he sent an email to Eastman
with an attachment of draft talking points arguing that state legislators in states where
Biden won could disregard the election results and appoint electors for Trump. See Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman028219, Chapman028220
(December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to Eastman, attaching memo). Those same talking
points were circulated the same day among Ken Blackwell, Ed Meese, John Eastman, Jason
Miller, Alan Dershowitz, and Chief of Staff Mark Meadows with Blackwell’s comment, “A
constitutional road map to victory and DJT’s reelection! It’s a matter of political will and
courage to do the right thing.” See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman027943, Chapman027944 (Klukowski was not included on the email from Black-
well, but his talking points were attached). During his deposition with the Select Commit-
tee, Klukowski said that the document containing the talking points looked like a
document he had drafted, but asserted attorney-client privilege when asked certain ques-
tions asked about the document. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (June 10,
2022), pp. 27-29. The Select Committee also obtained from a source other than Klukowski
an email sent to him, Eastman, Rep. Louis Gohmert’s Chief of Staff, and others on Decem-
ber 28th with the subject line “VP Briefing on 1/6/21 Meeting” and a message from Edward
Corrigan that said, “I believe the VP and his staff would benefit greatly from a briefing by
John and Ken” but cautioned to “make sure we don’t overexpose Ken given his new posi-
tion.” See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman056164
(December 28, 2020, email to Klukowski and others). Klukowski said he never participated
in such a briefing, but Eastman did in the days leading up to January 6th and encouraged
418 CHAPTER 4

the Vice President to prevent or delay the certification of the presidential election during
the joint session of Congress. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (June 10, 2022), pp. 50-57;
see also Chapter 5 about Eastman and his communications with the Vice President. As
described here, Klukowski drafted the letter for Clark that included discussions about
state legislatures, Electoral College electors, and the joint session of Congress.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 17.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 23; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-12142021-000104. Klukowski’s first day on the
job was December 15th. When asked why he would be willing to start a job on December
15th that would end by January 20th, Klukowski said that he had been trying to get to the
Department of Justice for several months, he was “hopeful” that he could “get as many
medals on my chest as possible during that short period of time,” and “given that it was
going to cross the New Year’s dateline, [he] figured [his] resume would say Department of
Justice 2020 and 2021,” enabling him to get into an interview for future jobs before a
future employer “would find out how few of days in each of those calendar years we were
actually talking about.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 30, 41.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 65-66.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 71-73.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 66, 75-76.
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 81-82.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 83.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 419

219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000681 (Department of Justice policy), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-
000685 (White House policy).
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 27-28.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 86-87; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 79-80, 91-92, 132-33.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91-93, 132-33.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 87; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91-93, 132-33.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88-89; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000678
(January 1, 2021, email from Mark Meadows to Jeffrey Rosen with link to YouTube video);
Brad Johnson, “Rome, Satellites, Servers: an Update,” YouTube, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210102201919/https:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YwtbK5XXAMk&feature=youtu.be (archived) (showing the conspiracy Meadows asked DOJ to
investigate).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88-90.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 89.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 90-91.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91-92; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000708
(December 31, 2020, email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching “U.S. v. Penn
OJ suit”).
231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000708 - HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (December 31, 2020,
email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching “U.S. v. Penn OJ suit” re: one
pager, with document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court"); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 91-92.
420 CHAPTER 4

232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000709 (Document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court").
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000709 (Document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court").
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000709 (Document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court").
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-
07262021-000709 (Document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court").
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-
07262021-000709 (Document titled "Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court"). The memo cites “United States v. Texas” although it likely refers to the
case filed by Texas and rejected by the Supreme Court, Texas v. Pennsylvania. See Order
Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying Certiorari, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ___,
(Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 33.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91-92 (noting the
Department's limited authority relative to United States v. Pennsylvania); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (summarizing the many times Department
officials told the President about the limited authority to take actions related to the elec-
tion).
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96-97.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96-97.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96-97.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96-97.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 421

247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 107-08.
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108-09.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108-09.
254. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certi-
fied Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020),
available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-
presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109-10.
259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.
261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109-10.
262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109-11.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen,
(Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72-73.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen,
(Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72-73.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 113-14.
422 CHAPTER 4

267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 111-15.
270. Rosen confirmed this during testimony before the Select Committee. “ADAM KINZINGER: So
in that meeting did Mr. Clark say he would turn down the President's offer if you reversed
your position and signed the letter? JEFFREY A. ROSEN: Yes.” Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
272. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue re: Two
Urgent Action Items).
273. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, "Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call between Trump and Raffensperger," Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-18; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-18; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-18; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118.
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 - 076P-
R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
279. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 - 076P-
R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
280. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 – 076P-
R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 423

281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“And so it was unanimous; every-
one was going to resign if Jeff Rosen was removed from the seat,” Donoghue explained).
The only exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Secu-
rity Division. Donohue encouraged Demers to stay on because he didn’t want to further
jeopardize national security. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021),
pp. 119-20.
287. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000729 (January 3, 2021, Resignation Letter by Patrick Hovakimian).
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 121-22; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.
290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 127. “It was definitely a con-
sensus. We were all on the same page except for Jeff Clark,” Donoghue said. Id. The Oval
Office meeting attendees include Jeffrey Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Pat Cipollone, Pat Phil-
bin, Eric Herschmann, Steve Engel, Jeff Clark and President Trump. See id., at 123.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 124-25.
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
424 CHAPTER 4

296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126-27.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 133.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-32.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 129-31.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Byung Jin Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 11-19.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129-30.
319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134-35.
 JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME 425

320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.
321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 135-36.
323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133-34.
324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133-34.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 134.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134-37.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 66.
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 8-9.
 5

“A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY”

On the morning of January 6, 2021, Vice President Michael R. Pence gath-
ered his staff to pray. Vice President Pence and his closest advisors knew
the day ahead “would be a challenging one.” 1 They asked God for “guid-
ance and wisdom” in the hours to come.2 No Republican had been more
loyal to President Donald J. Trump throughout his turbulent presidency
than Vice President Pence. The Vice President rarely, if ever, criticized his
boss. But as January 6th approached, President Trump turned on his own
Vice President.
President Trump was desperate. As described in the previous chapters,
the President was searching for a way to stay in power. He had lost the
election to former Vice President Biden. He had run out of legal options to
overturn the election weeks earlier, when his lawyers lost nearly every
court challenge they filed.
The President pursued other means as well. President Trump and his
lawyers tried to convince State and local officials to overturn the election,
but they met resistance. Those same officials would not break the law or
violate their oath to the Constitution. President Trump and his associates
tried to convince State legislatures to replace the legitimate electors won by
former Vice President Biden with Trump electors. The Trump Campaign
even convened their own fake electors who submitted false electoral votes
to Washington. But those efforts failed, too.
President Trump also attempted to use the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for his own corrupt political purposes. President Trump offered the job of
Acting Attorney General to a loyalist. He wanted this same DOJ official,
Jeffrey Clark, to send a letter to several States suggesting that they should
certify the fake electors convened by the Trump Campaign. President
Trump’s effort to subvert the DOJ came to a head on January 3rd, when the
Department’s senior personnel and lawyers in the White House Counsel’s
Office threatened mass resignations if Clark was installed.

427
428 CHAPTER 5

At that point, theories about a role the Vice President could play at the
joint session had been circulating in certain corners of the internet and
among Trump-supporting attorneys.3 President Trump focused his atten-
tion on the man who had loyally served by his side for four years.
On January 4, 2021, President Trump summoned Vice President Pence
to a meeting in the Oval Office with John Eastman, a law professor repre-
senting President Trump in litigation challenging the election result. East-
man argued, on President Trump’s behalf, that the Vice President could
take matters into his own hands during the joint session on January 6th.
Eastman offered Vice President Pence two options. First, the Vice President
could unilaterally reject the certified electors from several States won by
former Vice President Biden, thereby handing the presidency to President
Trump. Or, according to Eastman, Vice President Pence could delay the joint
session to give State legislatures the opportunity to certify new electors
loyal to the President. Eastman admitted, in front of the president, that
both options violated the Electoral Count Act of 1887, the statute that sets
forth the process for counting and disputing electoral votes during the joint
session.4 Eastman admitted as much in a subsequent conversation with the
Vice President’s staff as well.5
Therefore, President Trump knew, or should have known, that this
scheme was illegal—in fact, it violated the Electoral Count Act and the U.S.
Constitution. President Trump repeatedly demanded that Vice President
Pence go through with it anyway.
Vice President Pence rejected President Trump’s demands “many
times” on January 4th and in the days that followed.6 Vice President Pence
correctly pointed out that he had no power to take any action other than
counting the certified electoral votes. America’s founders could not possibly
have contemplated a scenario in which the Vice President could unilaterally
reject electoral votes and decide the outcome of a Presidential election.
However, instead of backing down, President Trump ratcheted up the pres-
sure even further, relentlessly harassing Vice President Pence both in public
and in private.
President Trump used his bully pulpit, at rallies and on Twitter, to lie to
his supporters. President Trump told them that Vice President Pence had
the power to deliver another 4 years in the White House. It was not true.
President Trump’s campaign of coercion became so intense that Marc
Short, Vice President Pence’s Chief of Staff, alerted the head of the Vice
President’s Secret Service detail to the impending danger. On January 5th,
Short warned that as the “disagreements” between President Trump and
Vice President Pence “became more public, that the president would lash
out in some way.” 7
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 429

Indeed, President Trump did. And those around him recognized that his
lashing out at the Vice President could have disastrous consequences. On
the morning of January 6th, an agent in the Secret Service’s intelligence
division was alerted to online chatter “regarding the VP being a dead man
walking if he doesn’t do the right thing.” 8 A few minutes later, another
agent made a comment that turned out to be an ominous prediction: “I saw
several other alerts saying they will storm the [C]apitol if he [the Vice
President] doesn’t do the right thing etc.” 9
During his speech at the Ellipse on January 6th, President Trump
repeatedly pointed his finger at Vice President Pence. President Trump
insisted that “if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.” 10
President Trump added: “And Mike Pence is going to have to come through
for us, and if he doesn’t, that will be a, a sad day for our country because
you’re sworn to uphold our Constitution.” 11
President Trump’s scheme required Vice President Pence to break his
oath to the Constitution, not uphold it. By the time President Trump spoke
at the Ellipse, he also knew that Vice President Pence had no intention of
overturning the election.
President Trump then sent a mob to the U.S. Capitol. He did so even
after being informed by the Secret Service that people in the crowd pos-
sessed weapons. He wanted his supporters to intimidate Vice President
Pence and any other Republican who refused his demands. The President
told the crowd assembled before him to march down Pennsylvania Avenue,
to “our Republicans, the weak ones” at the U.S. Capitol, “to try and give
them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our coun-
try.” 12
The mob overran the U.S. Capitol in short order. At 2:24 p.m., while the
attack was well underway, President Trump tweeted:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done
to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to
certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones
which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth! 13

Again, the opposite was true. Vice President Pence showed courage on
January 6th. The Vice President refused to be intimidated by President
Trump’s mob, even as chants of “Hang Mike Pence!” echoed throughout
the halls of the U.S. Capitol and a makeshift gallows was constructed on the
Capitol grounds.14
It is no mystery why the mob turned on Vice President Pence. President
Trump told his supporters that the election was stolen, and that Vice Presi-
dent Pence had the power, but lacked the courage, to fix it. None of this was
true.
430 CHAPTER 5

President Trump and Vice President Pence have both reflected on the
events of January 6th in the months since then. Vice President Pence has
described President Trump’s demands as “un-American.” 15 President
Trump has since insisted that Vice President Pence “could have overturned
the Election!” 16 Asked about the calls to hang the Vice President, President
Trump said it was “common sense.” 17
In early 2022, U.S. District Judge David Carter evaluated the Trump-
Eastman scheme to pressure the Vice President. Judge Carter described it as
“a campaign to overturn a democratic election, an action unprecedented in
American history.” 18 It was “a coup in search of a legal theory,” Judge
Carter found, that likely violated at least two Federal laws.19 The Trump-
Eastman scheme was not a feature of the U.S. Constitution, as President
Trump told his supporters. Instead, it “would have permanently ended the
peaceful transition of power, undermining American democracy and the
Constitution.” 20
And it all began because President Trump refused to accept the result of
the election, expressed through the votes of 81 million Americans.

5.1 PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS ALLIES EMBARK ON A DESPERATE GAMBIT TO

BLOCK CERTIFICATION OF THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEORY THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT COULD
CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION AT THE JOINT SESSION EMERGED FROM
DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE LAWYERS WORKING WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN AFTER
THE 2020 ELECTION.
When the electoral college met to cast votes for the certified winner in each
State on December 14, 2020, any possibility of President Trump reversing
his defeat came to an end. The contest was decided well before then, but
December 14th marked what should have been the formal end of the Trump
campaign. Former Vice President Biden had won the election and his victory
was cemented by the States’ electoral votes. Instead of bowing to this real-
ity, some pro-Trump lawyers had already begun scheming ways to deny the
inevitable. Over the course of the post-election period, as their other plans
each failed, the importance of January 6th and the need to pressure Vice
President Pence increased. These same lawyers concluded that the Vice
President could help President Trump subvert the election on January 6th,
but they would need Vice President Pence to set aside history and the law to
do so. They’d need him to violate the Electoral Count Act of 1887 (“the
ECA”). The ECA had governed the joint session for 130 years, but it was an
inconvenient barrier for President Trump’s plan to stay in office.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 431

KENNETH CHESEBRO ARTICULATED A “PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE” STRATEGY IN

EARLY DECEMBER, WHEN THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN WAS CONVENING “ALTERNATE”
ELECTORS IN KEY STATES PRESIDENT TRUMP LOST.
On December 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro, a pro-Trump lawyer, sent a
memo to Rudolph Giuliani, the President’s lead outside counsel, upon
request from Trump Campaign official Boris Epshteyn.21 Chesebro laid out a
“‘President of the Senate’ strategy,” arguing that the “President of the
Senate” (“he, and he alone”) is charged with “making judgments about
what to do if there are conflicting votes.” 22 Chesebro argued that when the
joint session met on January 6th, the President of the Senate should not
count Arizona’s electoral college votes for former Vice President Biden,
“[b]ecause there are two slates of votes.” 23 Of course, there were not two
legitimate “slates of votes” from Arizona. There were the official electors,
certified by the State, and a group of fake electors convened by the Trump
campaign.
Chesebro’s memo set President Trump’s pressure campaign on a course
to target the Vice President on January 6.24 Judge Carter found that the
“draft memo pushed a strategy that knowingly violated the Electoral Count
Act” and “is both intimately related to and clearly advanced the plan to
obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.” 25 That plan was
also advanced by John Eastman.26

ON DECEMBER 23, JOHN EASTMAN DRAFTED THE FIRST OF HIS TWO “JANUARY 6TH
SCENARIO” MEMOS, ARTICULATING THE ARGUMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
THE VICE PRESIDENT IS THE “ULTIMATE ARBITER.”
On December 23, 2020, Eastman wrote a two-page memo summarizing
ways to ensure that “President Trump is re-elected.” 27 Eastman suggested
that Vice President Pence could refuse to count the electoral college votes
from seven States: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, and Wisconsin. According to Eastman, Vice President Pence could
simply reject these States’ electoral college votes. At that point, President
Trump would have 232 electoral college votes compared to former Vice
President Biden’s 222. This was sufficient, in Eastman’s view, to guarantee
President Trump’s victory, because he would have a majority of the elec-
toral college votes. “Pence then gavels President Trump as re-elected,”
Eastman wrote.
Eastman considered the possibility that Democrats in Congress would
object, stating the plain truth that 270 electoral college votes are necessary
to win. In that event, according to Eastman, the election could be sent to
the House of Representatives.28 The Republican-majority of delegations in
the House would then re-elect Trump as president. Eastman concluded:
“The main thing here is that Pence should do this without asking for
432 CHAPTER 5

permission—either from a vote of the joint session or from the Court. . . .

The fact is that the Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as
the ultimate arbiter. We should take all of our actions with that in mind.” 29
From the start, President Trump was looped in on Eastman’s proposal.
The same day Eastman started preparing the memo, he sent an email to
President Trump’s assistant Molly Michael, at 1:32 p.m.: “Is the President
available for a very quick call today at some point? Just want to update him
on our overall strategic thinking.” 30 Only five minutes later, Eastman
received a call from the White House switchboard; according to his phone
records, the conversation lasted for almost 23 minutes.31

EASTMAN CHANGED HIS EVALUATION OF THE 12TH AMENDMENT, AND THE ROLE OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT, AFTER PRESIDENT TRUMP LOST THE ELECTION.
In Eastman’s theory, which was the foundation of President Trump’s Janu-
ary 6th plot, the Vice President of the United States is the “ultimate arbi-
ter” and could unilaterally decide the victor of the 2020 Presidential
election.32 However, just before the 2020 presidential election, Eastman had
acknowledged in writing that the Vice President had no such expansive
power.
In the course of a lengthy exchange of ideas and emails throughout the
pre- and post-election period with an individual named Bruce Colbert,
Eastman provided comments on a letter Colbert was drafting to President
Trump.33 The draft letter purported to provide recommendations of “cru-
cial legal actions” for the Trump Campaign to take “to help secure your
election victory as President of the United States.” 34 One of the draft let-
ter’s recommendations was that “the President of the Senate decides
authoritatively what ‘certificates’ from the states to ‘open.’” In response,
Eastman wrote on October 17, 2020, “I don’t agree with this” and contin-
ued, “[t]he 12th Amendment only says that the President of the Senate
opens the ballots in the joint session and then, in the passive voice, that the
votes shall then be counted. 3 USC § 12 says merely that he is the presiding
officer, and then it spells out specific procedures, presumptions, and
default rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it suggest that
the President of the Senate gets to make the determination on his own. § 15
doesn’t, either.” 35
By the first week of December, Eastman’s correspondence with this
same individual illustrates that he was open to advocating for the very
point he had rejected before the election—that is, that “the 12th Amend-
ment confers dispositive authority on the President of the Senate to decide
which slate to count.” 36 And on December 5, 2020, Eastman wrote to Col-
bert, “I have spoken directly with folks at the top of the chain of command
on this. They are now aware of the issues.” 37
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 433

The emails also signaled another idea that Eastman would continue to
repeat in the coming weeks: that the Vice President could act without get-
ting permission from a court. Specifically, he argued that they could take
the position that the Vice President’s authority was a “non-justiciable
political question”—in other words, that Vice President Pence could just
act, and no court would have jurisdiction to rule on the issue.38 As East-
man’s emails later in the month make clear, he thought there was an
important reason to keep this issue out of the courts—they would rule that
the theory was unlawful.

EASTMAN’S “JANUARY 6 SCENARIO” CLEARLY REQUIRED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO

VIOLATE THE ELECTORAL COUNT ACT, THE FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE CERTIFICA-
TION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
There are other parts of Eastman’s two-page December 23rd memo worthy
of attention. Eastman wrote that Vice President Pence could recuse himself
from presiding over the joint session of Congress on January 6th. In that
event, the session would be overseen by the Senate President Pro Tempore,
Senator Charles Grassley. Eastman was clearly arguing that Vice President
Pence (or Senator Grassley) should violate the Electoral Count Act. “When he
gets to Arizona, he announces that he has multiple slates of electors, and so
is going to defer decision on that until finishing the other States,” Eastman
wrote.39 “This would be the first break with the procedure set out in the
Act.” 40 This “break” with “procedure” that Eastman’s memo was openly
advocating for was in other words the Vice President breaking the law.
When Chesebro read Eastman’s memo, he commented favorably, declaring
it “[r]eally awesome.” 41
At this point, Eastman continued, Congress would likely follow the
“process” set forth in the Electoral Count Act, and “the two houses [would]
break into their separate chambers” for debate.42 But Eastman advised “we
should not allow the Electoral Count Act constraint on debate to control”
and the Trump team “should demand normal rules (which includes the fili-
buster).” 43 Eastman thought this would create a “stalemate,” giving “the
state legislatures more time to weigh in to formally support the alternate
slate of electors, if they had not already done so.” 44 As discussed previously
in this report, at the time he drafted this memo—and throughout the post-
election period—Eastman, Giuliani, President Trump and others were
simultaneously working to replace certified electors for former Vice Presi-
dent Biden in certain States. Eastman, Giuliani, and President Trump all
pressured State legislators to name their own separate electors or to certify
the campaign’s fake electors.
434 CHAPTER 5

EASTMAN’S THEORY WAS—IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S SENIOR WHITE

HOUSE AND CAMPAIGN OFFICIALS—“INSANE,” “CRAZY,” “NUTTY” AND IT WOULD
NEVER PRACTICALLY WORK.
Eric Herschmann, an attorney working for President Trump in the White
House, met with Eastman to discuss his memo. Herschmann thought East-
man’s plan was “crazy.” Herschmann summarized the conversation to the
Select Committee:
And I said to him, hold on a second, I want to understand what
you’re saying. You’re saying you believe the Vice President, acting
as President of the Senate, can be the sole decisionmaker as to,
under your theory, who becomes the next President of the United
States? And he said, yes. And I said, are you out of your F’ing mind,
right? And that was pretty blunt. I said, you’re completely crazy.
You’re going to turn around and tell 78 plus million people in this
country that your theory is, this is how you’re going to invalidate
their votes because you think the election was stolen? I said, they’re
not going to tolerate that. I said, you’re going to cause riots in the
streets. And he said words to the effect of there’s been violence in
this history of our country to protect the democracy or to protect
the [R]epublic.45

As recounted by Herschmann, Eastman was shockingly unconcerned

with the prospect of violence should Vice President Pence follow his and
President Trump’s recommended course.
Herschmann asked a straightforward question—if the States wanted to
recertify their electors, then why weren’t they doing it themselves? “Why
aren’t they already coming into session and saying, we want to change the
[S]tates, and why do you need the VP to go down this path[?]” 46 Eastman
had no response. In addition to being “crazy,” Herschmann “didn’t think
there was any chance in the world” that Eastman’s plan “could work.” 47
Herschmann pressed Eastman further, asking if he had “any precedent
at all for the VP or anyone acting in the capacity as the President of the
Senate declaring some statute invalid.” 48 Eastman replied “no,” but argued
that “these are unprecedented times.” 49 Herschmann was unimpressed,
calling this a “ridiculous” answer.50
White House Counsel Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone thought the
Eastman plan was “nutty.” 51 Trump Campaign official Jason Miller testified
that the Campaign’s General Counsel, Matt Morgan, and Deputy Campaign
Manager, Justin Clark, thought Eastman was “crazy,” understood that
there was “no validity to [his theory] in any way, shape, or form,” and
shared their views with “anyone who would listen.” 52
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 435

THE VICE PRESIDENT’S CONCLUSION THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO AFFECT
THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION
Vice President Pence’s counsel, Greg Jacob, was simultaneously researching
the role of the Vice President during the joint session. The Office of the Vice
President produced a preliminary staff memo on the subject on October 26,
2020.53 Jacob then discussed the matter with Marc Short on election day or
the day before.
This wasn’t the first time Jacob would be required to write a memo
about the Vice President’s role in the electoral process. Before the election,
Short explained to him that some in the White House were encouraging
President Trump to prematurely declare victory on election night.54 Of
course, that is exactly what President Trump did. Jacob and Short wanted to
avoid the Vice President getting drawn in to any such declarations, and
Jacob pointed to his role in presiding over the counting of the electoral
votes on January 6th as a reason not to. Jacob sent a memo to Short on
election day reflecting this advice.55
Then, on December 7, 2020, the Lincoln Project aired a provocative ad
taunting President Trump, saying that Vice President Pence “Will Put the
Nail in Your Political Coffin” during the joint session on January 6th.56 This
prompted a discussion between Jacob and Vice President Pence.57 Jacob
authored another memo, dated December 8, 2020.58 Jacob continued
researching the Vice President’s role during the joint session into early
January. Jacob told the Select Committee that his view of the matter was not
fully formed until then.59
Jacob did extensive research on and historical analysis of both the Elec-
toral Count Act of 1887 and the 12th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.60
The 12th Amendment contains a single relevant line: “The President of the
Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.” 61 Though
Jacob concluded that this line was “inartfully drafted,” it said nothing
about resolving disputes over electoral votes.62
Jacob concluded that the Vice President must adhere to the Electoral
Count Act.63 The ECA has been followed for 130 years and “every single
time that there has been any objection to electors, it has been resolved in
accordance with the Electoral Count Act procedures,” Jacob testified.64 After
reviewing the history and relevant cases, Jacob found that “[t]here is no
justifiable basis to conclude that the Vice President has that kind of author-
ity” to affect the outcome of the presidential election.65 Jacob stated that
his “review of text, history, and, frankly, just common sense” all confirmed
that the Vice President had no such power.66
436 CHAPTER 5

Greg Jacob testifies before the Select Committee on June 16, 2022.
Photo by House Creative Services

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ALLIES FILED LAWSUITS SEEKING A COURT ORDER DIRECTING

VICE PRESIDENT PENCE NOT TO COUNT CERTAIN ELECTORAL VOTES.
One of President Trump’s congressional allies, Representative Louie
Gohmert (R–TX), pushed a version of Eastman’s theory in the courts. On
December 27, 2020, Representative Gohmert and several of the Trump
Campaign’s fake electors for the State of Arizona (including Republican
Party Chair Kelli Ward) filed suit against Vice President Pence in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.67 As Ward explained to Marc
Short in a phone call the day the suit was filed, President Trump was aware
of the lawsuit and had signed off on it: “We wouldn’t have done that with-
out the president telling us it was okay,” she told him.68
In the suit, the Plaintiffs alleged that there were “competing slates” of
electors from five States.69 They asked the court to rule that portions of the
Electoral Count Act of 1887 were unconstitutional and that “the Twelfth
Amendment contains the exclusive dispute resolution mechanisms” for
determining an objection raised by a Member of Congress to the electors
submitted by any State.70 Essentially, Representative Gohmert was asking
the court to tell Vice President Pence that he was prohibited from following
the procedures set forth in the Electoral Count Act. Much like Eastman’s
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 437

Representative Louie Gohmert outside the Capitol on March 17, 2021.

(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

theory, the Gohmert plaintiffs asserted that the Vice President has the
“exclusive authority and sole discretion” to determine which electoral
votes to count.71
Although the Gohmert suit was premised on the same theory Eastman
advocated, Eastman did not agree with the decision to file suit. Eastman
argued that filing a suit against the Vice President had “close[ ] to zero”
chance of succeeding, and there was a “very high” risk that the court would
issue an opinion stating that “Pence has no authority to reject the Biden-
certified ballots.” 72 As highlighted by Judge Carter, Eastman’s theory was
that Vice President Pence should take this action “without asking for per-
mission” from Congress or the courts.73 Another attorney, Bill Olson, stated
that getting a judicial determination “that Pence is constrained by [the
Electoral Count Act]” could “completely tank the January 6 strategy.” 74
Those who were advocating to press on with the Eastman scheme did not
want to bring it before a Federal judge because of the high risk that a
court’s determination that the scheme was illegal would stop the plan to
overturn the election dead in its tracks.
Eastman himself pushed this cavalier attitude towards the courts and
compliance with the law during a call with Arizona House Speaker Rusty
438 CHAPTER 5

John McEntee, February 28, 2020.

(Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images)

Bowers on January 4th. During this call, just two days before the joint ses-
sion, Eastman pressed Speaker Bowers to bring the Arizona House into ses-
sion to certify Trump electors or decertify the Biden electors.75 Speaker
Bowers responded as he had previously responded to similar entreaties by
Giuliani and President Trump: by explaining that doing so would require
him to violate his oaths to the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions and that he
“wasn’t going to take such an action.” 76 Undeterred, Eastman still pushed
Speaker Bowers to “just do it and let the courts sort it through.” 77
Ultimately, Representative Gohmert’s legal gambit failed; a U.S. district
judge dismissed the case quickly.78 The judge’s ruling was upheld by the
Supreme Court, which rejected Gohmert’s appeal without further consider-
ation.79
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 439

OTHER INDIVIDUALS ADVISING PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS CAMPAIGN ALSO ADVO-
CATED FOR A ROLE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT AT THE JOINT SESSION.
Other individuals inside and outside the White House also advanced ver-
sions of the theory that the Vice President had agency in the joint session.
The issue of Vice President Pence’s role came up during a December meet-
ing in the Oval Office. Either President Trump or his chief of staff, Mark
Meadows, tasked John McEntee, the director of the Presidential Personnel
Office, with researching the matter further.80 Though McEntee was one of
President Trump’s close advisors, he was not a lawyer and had no relevant
experience. Yet, he wrote a one-page memo claiming that “the VP has sub-
stantial discretion to address issues with the electoral process.” 81
This wasn’t the only one-page analysis drafted by McEntee before
January 6th.82 He later proposed a “middle path” in which he envisioned
the Vice President accepting only half the electoral votes from six disputed
States (specifically, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona
and Nevada).83 McEntee portrayed this as a way to avoid “disenfranchis-
[ing]” States while still achieving the desired result: delivering a second
term to President Trump. McEntee conveyed this memo to the President
with a cover note reading, “This is probably our only realistic option
because it would give Pence an out.” 84 McEntee told the Select Committee
that this judgment was based on his assessment that “it was, like, pretty
obvious [the Vice President] wasn’t going to just reject . . . the electors or
whatever was being asked of him at that time.” 85
Another advocate of a plan for the Vice President to play a role in the
joint session was Jenna Ellis, a lawyer working for the Trump Campaign.
She argued in two memos that Vice President Pence had the power to delay
the counting of certified electoral votes. In the first memo, addressed to
President Trump and dated December 31, 2020, Ellis advised that Vice
President Pence should “not open any of the votes” from six States that
“currently have electoral delegates in dispute.” 86 Ellis asserted that this
“dispute” provided “sufficient rational and legal basis to question whether
the [S]tate law and Constitution was followed.” Ellis proposed a delay of ten
days, as the Vice President and Congress awaited a “response from the
[S]tate legislatures, which would then need to meet in an emergency elec-
toral session.” If any of the State legislatures “fails to provide a timely
response, no electoral votes can be opened and counted from that [S]tate.”
Ellis claimed that Vice President Pence would not be “exercising discretion
nor establishing new precedent,” but instead “simply asking for clarifica-
tion from the constitutionally appointed authority.” 87
Ellis sent the substance of this memorandum in an email to Fox News
host Jeanine Pirro on January 1, 2021, under the subject line “Constitutional
440 CHAPTER 5

Jenna Ellis on December 2, 2020 in Lansing, Michigan.

(Photo by Rey Del Rio/Getty Images)

option.” 88 And, on January 4, 2021, she sent the same substance to Fox
News contributor John Solomon under the subject line “Pence option.” 89
Ellis addressed a second memo, dated January 5, 2021, to Jay Sekulow,
an outside attorney who represented President Trump during his first
impeachment proceedings and in other litigation.90 Ellis again claimed that
Vice President Pence had the power to delay the certification of the vote.
Ellis recommended that the Vice President should, when he arrived at the
first contested State (Arizona), “simply stop the count” on the basis that
the States had not made a “final determination of ascertainment of elec-
tors.” “The [S]tates would therefore have to act.” 91
Sekulow clearly disagreed. “Some have speculated that the Vice Presi-
dent could simply say, ‘I’m not going to accept these electors,’ that he has
the authority to do that under the Constitution,” Sekulow said during an
episode of his radio show.92 “I actually don’t think that’s what the Consti-
tution has in mind.” Sekulow added that the Vice President serves a merely
“ministerial, procedural function.” 93
In addition, Herschmann discussed this memo with Sekulow. They
agreed that Ellis did not have the “qualifications or the experience to be
giving advice on this” or to be “litigating the challenges” that President
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 441

Trump’s team was filing in court.94 Herschmann did not think that Sekulow
shared the memo with the President.95

5.2 PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS ALLIES EXERT INTENSE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRES-
SURE ON THE VICE PRESIDENT IN ADVANCE OF THE JOINT SESSION OF CON-
GRESS ON JANUARY 6TH

JANUARY 2, 2021: THE VICE PRESIDENT MEETS WITH HIS ADVISORS, CEMENTING HIS
INTENDED PATH FOR THE JOINT SESSION.
On January 2, 2021, Vice President Pence met with his counsel Greg Jacob,
Chief of Staff Marc Short, and Matt Morgan to discuss the joint session.96
Morgan was the Trump Campaign’s General Counsel and had previously
served as counsel to Vice President Pence. At this point, the Vice President
already had a clear understanding of what his role would be in the electoral
count.97 Vice President Pence was concerned that most people did not
understand how the certification of the electoral votes worked. So Jacob
began drafting a statement for the Vice President to issue on January 6th.
The statement was intended to provide a “civic education” on the joint ses-
sion, explaining to the American people his actions, including why the Vice
President “didn’t have the authorities that others had suggested that he
might.” 98
The men discussed the various points of pressure being applied to the
Vice President, including Eastman’s theories, the Gohmert suit, Ellis’s argu-
ments, as well as how the electoral count process should work. They also
discussed allegations of irregularities and maladministration of the elec-
tion, concluding that none of the allegations raised was sufficient to reverse
President Trump’s defeat.99
While Vice President Pence recognized Congress’s authority under the
Electoral Count Act to raise objections to the certification, neither he nor
his staff were aware of any evidence of fraud that would have had a material
effect on the outcome of the election in any State.100 Because of President
Trump’s repetition of election fraud allegations, Jacob and the Vice Presi-
dent’s staff conducted their own evaluation of these claims. Jacob asked
Morgan to send the campaign’s best evidence of election “fraud, malad-
ministration, irregularities, [and] abuses in the system.” 101 The Vice Presi-
dent’s legal staff memorialized the review they conducted of these
materials in a memo to Vice President Pence, which concluded: “most alle-
gations of substantive voter fraud—defined to mean the casting of illegal
ballots in violation of prevailing election laws—are either relatively small in
number, or cannot be verified.” 102
442 CHAPTER 5

Vice President Pence also discussed the Trump Campaign’s fake electors
with his advisors. Both Jacob and Morgan assured Vice President Pence that
there were not dual slates of electors. The electors organized by the Trump
Campaign were not valid.103 Morgan had already written a memo on the
topic in December, concluding that the “alternate” electors—that is, fake—
lacked a certificate of ascertainment issued by the State.104 Without such an
ascertainment, the Trump Campaign’s fake electors had no standing during
the joint session. Jacob had also prepared a “flow chart” memo outlining
each of the legal provisions implicated in the joint session on January
6th.105 Jacob advised Vice President Pence that “none of the slates that had
been sent in would qualify as an alternate slate within the meaning of the
Electoral Count Act.” 106 Vice President Pence was still worried that the fake
elector issue was sowing confusion, so he wanted his statement on January
6th to be as transparent as possible.107
That same day, January 2nd, Marc Short released a brief statement on
behalf of the Vice President. “Vice President Pence shares the concerns of
millions of Americans about voter fraud and irregularities in the last elec-
tion,” the statement read. “The vice president welcomes the efforts of
members of the House and Senate to use the authority they have under the
law to raise objections and bring forward evidence before the Congress and
the American people on January 6th.” 108 Short testified that the statement
was consistent with the Vice President’s view that he did not have the
power to reject electors.109 Short issued this statement because of the
“swirl” regarding the question of “where [Vice President Pence] stood.” 110
Steve Bannon’s podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the primary
sources of this swirl.

JANUARY 2, 2021: EASTMAN AND BANNON QUESTION THE “COURAGE AND SPINE” OF
VICE PRESIDENT PENCE.
Steve Bannon’s podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the primary
sources of this swirl. Eastman was a guest on a January 2nd episode of Ban-
non’s show. Much of their conversation focused on Vice President Pence,
and the belief that he had the power to overturn the election.
“[W]e are entering into one of the most, um, important constitutional
crisis [sic] the country’s ever had,” Bannon said.111 Bannon complained that
Vice President Pence had “spit the bit,” meaning he had given up on efforts
to keep President Trump in power.112 Eastman claimed that the election had
been “illegally conducted,” and so the certified votes now “devolved back
to the [S]tate legislature[s], and the only other place where it devolved back
to is to Congress and particularly the Vice President, who will sit in presid-
ing over a Joint Session of Congress beginning on January 6 to count the
ballots.” 113 Eastman claimed that the Vice President (and Congress) had the
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 443

power to reject the certified electors from several States out-of-hand.

“[T]hey’ve got multiple slates of ballots from seven states,” Eastman said.
“And they’ve gotta decide [ ] which is the valid slate to count . . . I think they
have that authority to make that determination on their own.” 114
Bannon claimed the Vice President of the United States is “hardwired
in,” and an “actual decisionmaker.” 115 The Vice President’s role is not
“ministerial,” Bannon declared.116 Eastman agreed.117 “Are we to assume
that this is going to be a climactic battle that’s going to take place this week
about the very question of the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act of
1887?” Bannon asked.118
Eastman replied, “I think a lot of that depends on the courage and the
spine of the individuals involved.” Bannon asked Eastman if he meant Vice
President Mike Pence. “Yes,” Eastman answered.119

JANUARY 3, 2021: EASTMAN DRAFTS ANOTHER “JANUARY 6 SCENARIO” MEMO “WAR

GAMING” THE WAYS THAT VICE PRESIDENT PENCE COULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF
THE ELECTION.
The next day, January 3, 2021, Eastman drafted a six-page memo that
imagined several scenarios for January 6th, only some of which led to
President Trump’s victory.120 In a section titled, “War Gaming the Alterna-
tives,” Eastman set forth the ways he thought President Trump could
remain in power.121 Importantly, Eastman concluded that President Trump
could remain president if—and only if—Vice President Pence followed
Eastman’s illegal advice and determined which electoral college ballots
were “valid.” 122 In another scenario, Eastman imagined that President
Trump may somehow win re-election in January 2021 if Vice President
Pence remanded the electoral votes to State legislatures, such that they
could have ten days to investigate President Trump’s baseless claims of
fraud. In that case, Eastman allowed that former Vice President Biden may
still win, should the State legislatures determine that the evidence was
“insufficient to alter the results of the election.” 123

Eastman Knew that there Were No Valid “Alternate” Slates, But He Nonetheless
Predicated His Advice to the Vice President and President on this Claim. In his
six-page memo, consistent with the earlier two-page memo, Eastman
states that “the Trump electors” met and transmitted votes, finding that
“[t]here are thus dual slates of electors from 7 [S]tates.” 124 Even since
January 6th, Eastman has continued to affirm and defend his assertion that
there were dual slates of electors, writing: “Trump electors from seven
[S]tates in which election challenges were still pending met (albeit of their
own accord) on the date designated by Congress, cast their votes, and
transmitted those votes to Congress.” 125
444 CHAPTER 5

Eastman used these slates as a premise for his argument that the result
of the election was disputed. However, Eastman acknowledged on multiple
occasions—both before and after January 6th—that these “dual slates” had
no legal significance. In an email sent on December 19, 2020, Eastman
wrote that the seven Trump/Pence slates of electors “will be dead on arrival
in Congress” “unless those electors get a certification from their State Leg-
islators.” 126 Of course, this certification never came and there was no basis
for any action on the “dual slates.” 127
Nevertheless, on December 23, 2020, Eastman used the existence of
these slates as a justification for the Vice President to act, in an email to
Boris Epshteyn, a Trump Campaign lawyer. “The fact that we have multiple
slates of electors demonstrates the uncertainty of either. That should be
enough.” 128
Again after January 6th, Eastman acknowledged in an email that the
fake electors’ documents were invalid and irrelevant.129 “Alas,” he said,
“[T]hey had no authority” because “[n]o legislature certified them.” 130
Eastman concluded his memo by asserting that his plan was “BOLD,
Certainly,” but he attempted to justify it, arguing that “this Election was
Stolen by a strategic Democrat plan to systematically flout existing election
laws for partisan advantage; we’re no longer playing by Queensbury Rules,
therefore.” 131
Eastman repeated what he wrote in his earlier, shorter memo, claiming
that Vice President Pence should act “without asking for permission—
either from a vote of the joint session or from the Court.” 132 Eastman
claimed “that the Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as
the ultimate arbiter.” 133 Eastman ended on an especially hyperbolic note. If
the election’s results were not upended, “then the sovereign people no lon-
ger control the direction of their government, and we will have ceased to be
a self-governing people. The stakes could not be higher.” 134
January 4, 2021: President Trump and Eastman Meet with Pence and His
Staff in the Oval Office.

Eastman Argues in an Oval Office Meeting that the Vice President can Reject Elec-
toral Votes or that He Can Delay the Certification, Sending the Electoral Votes
Back to the States. Late in the afternoon of January 4, 2021, President
Trump summoned Vice President Pence to the Oval Office for a show-
down.135 President Trump and Eastman sought to convince the Vice Presi-
dent that he had the power to refuse to count the certified electors from
several States won by former Vice President Biden.
Short and Jacob attended with the Vice President.136 Trump’s chief of
staff, Mark Meadows, was only briefly present, leaving as the meeting
started.137
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 445

The White House Counsel is Excluded from the Meeting. One key lawyer was
conspicuously absent: Pat Cipollone, the White House Counsel. Cipollone
and his deputy, Pat Philbin, were shooting down a series of “terrible” pro-
posals at the time.138 Philbin told the Select Committee that he considered
resigning every day from approximately November 15 until the end of the
administration.139 Philbin had researched the Vice President’s role in the
January 6th joint session and concluded that Vice President Pence had no
power to affect the outcome.140 Cipollone agreed and informed Short and
Jacob that this was the opinion of White House Counsel’s Office.141
Mark Meadows invited Cipollone to speak with Eastman prior to the
Oval Office meeting.142 Cipollone told Eastman that his scheme was “not
something that is consistent with the appropriate reading of the law.” 143
After delivering this assessment directly to Eastman in Meadows’ office,
Cipollone walked to the Oval Office with the intent to attend the meeting.
However, by the time the Vice President and his staff arrived, Cipollone was
gone.144
Cipollone declined to testify as to what he told President Trump or why
he did not attend the Oval Office meeting, but he was clear that he didn’t
end up attending the meeting because of something that happened after he
walked into the Oval Office.145 Whatever happened, Cipollone maintained,
was protected by executive privilege, suggesting that he was asked to leave
by the President.146 What is clear, however, is that Cipollone had already
shared his view directly with Meadows and Eastman, i.e., that the proposal
President Trump and Eastman were about to advocate to the Vice President
was illegal.147

During this Oval Office Meeting, Eastman Admits that Both Paths are Based on the
Same Legal Theory and Concedes His Plan Violates the Electoral Count Act. Dur-
ing the Oval Office meeting, Eastman claimed that there were two legally
viable options.148 First, Vice President Pence could reject outright the certi-
fied electors submitted by several States, and second, he could suspend the
joint session and send the “disputed” electoral votes back to the States.149
Eastman advised that the Vice President had the “raw authority to deter-
mine objections himself,” according to Jacob.150 However, by the end of the
meeting Eastman was emphasizing the second option that he argued would
be “more politically palatable” than the “more aggressive” option of the
Vice President rejecting electoral votes outright.151 If Vice President Pence
did not want to reject the electors, Eastman claimed, then the Vice Presi-
dent could send the certified electoral votes back to the States for further
deliberation.
Eastman later conceded that both actions were based on the same
underlying legal theory of the Vice President’s power.152 Eastman also
446 CHAPTER 5

Pat Cipollone is seen on a screen during a Select Committee hearing on July 12, 2022.
(Photo by Sarah Silbiger-Pool/Getty Images)

admitted—during this meeting with the President and Vice President—that

his proposal violated the Electoral Count Act.153 Moreover, Eastman eventu-
ally acknowledged that the concept of the Vice President unilaterally reject-
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 447

ing electors was not supported by precedent and that the Supreme Court
would never endorse it.154
Jacob recorded his reflections on the January 4th meeting in a contem-
poraneous memo to the Vice President.155 Jacob’s memo confirms that
Eastman admitted that his proposal violated the law in the presence of
President Trump.
First, Jacob wrote, Eastman acknowledged that “his proposal violates
several provisions of statutory law”—namely, the Electoral Count Act of
1887.156 Jacob’s memo explains that the Electoral Count Act calls for all vote
certificates to be “acted upon,” and any objections to a State’s certificates
be “finally disposed of.” However, as Jacob wrote, Eastman was proposing
instead that “no action be taken” on the certificates from the States East-
man asserted were “contested.” And, according to the Electoral Count Act,
the Vice President (as President of the Senate) is to “call for objections.”
But Eastman did not want the Vice President to “call for objections” for
these States. As Jacob noted, this would have deprived Congress of the abil-
ity under the Act to make, debate, and vote on objections.157
Additionally, the Electoral Count Act contains a provision that requires
any “competing slates of electors” to be “submitted to the Senate and
House for debate and disposition.” As Jacob noted, Eastman conceded that
the “alternate” (fake) electors’ votes were not proper. But Eastman’s pro-
posal still would have refused to count the real electors’ votes from those
States and instead referred both the real and fake electors’ votes to State
legislatures “for disposition.” Finally, in order for State legislatures to take
action to determine which of the slates should be counted, Eastman’s pro-
posal called for “an extended recess of the joint session.” But this too
would have violated the Electoral Count Act, which provides only for very
short delays.158
There was another foundational problem with Eastman’s plan. There
were no legitimate “competing” or “alternate” slates of electors. President
Trump, Eastman and others had manufactured the conditions they needed
in order to claim that the election result was “disputed” by convening fake
electors who sent fake documents to Washington before January 6th. And
their efforts to convince State legislatures to certify Trump electors had
already failed.
Jacob noted in his memo that in the Oval Office meeting, Eastman con-
ceded “no legislature has appointed or certified any alternate slate of elec-
tors” and that the purported “alternate slates” (fake electors) were
illegitimate without what Jacob described as “the imprimatur of approval
by a State legislature.” 159 Moreover, Eastman acknowledged that “no
Republican-controlled legislative majority in any disputed States has
448 CHAPTER 5

expressed an intention to designate an alternate slate of electors.” 160 In

other words, Eastman acknowledged that the fake votes were invalid, that
no State legislature had approved them, and no State legislature would
approve them.161 But President Trump and Eastman still pressed this
unlawful scheme on the Vice President. Although Eastman started the Janu-
ary 4th Oval Office meeting maintaining that Vice President Pence had uni-
lateral authority to reject electors, by the end of the meeting he conceded
that he would “not recommend that the Vice President assert that he has
the authority unilaterally to decide which of the competing slates of elec-
tors should be counted.” 162
Jacob ended his memo with a scathing summary. “If the Vice President
implemented Professor Eastman’s proposal, he would likely lose in court,”
Jacob wrote. “In a best-case scenario in which the courts refused to get
involved, the Vice President would likely find himself in an isolated stand-
off against both houses of Congress, as well as most or all of the applicable
State legislatures, with no neutral arbiter to break the impasse.” 163
Following the Oval Office meeting, during the evening of January 4,
2021, Jacob invited Eastman to send along “any written materials on elec-
toral vote counting issues,” including a law review article by Laurence Tribe
that Eastman had cited in the Oval Office meeting that day, for Jacob to
review on the Vice President’s behalf.164 Jacob reviewed everything that
Eastman submitted; nothing changed the analysis he had already done for
the Vice President, indeed much of it did not even support Eastman’s own
arguments.165

The Vice President was Not Persuaded by Eastman’s Theory and Remained Con-
vinced That His Role at the Joint Session would be Merely Ceremonial. Pence did
not relent on January 4th, or at any point during the harrowing two days
that followed. “[F]rom my very first conversation with the Vice President
on the subject, his immediate instinct was that there is no way that one
person could be entrusted by the Framers to exercise that authority,” Jacob
testified. “And never once did I see him budge from that view, and the legal
advice that I provided him merely reinforced it. So, everything that he said
or did during [the January 4th meeting in the Oval Office] was consistent
with his first instincts on this question.” 166

JANUARY 4, 2021: PRESIDENT TRUMP PUBLICLY PRESSURES THE VICE PRESIDENT

DURING A RALLY SPEECH IN GEORGIA.
President Trump did not relent either. His instinct was to increase public
pressure on Vice President Pence, despite the Vice President’s consistent
message to President Trump about the limits of his authority. That evening,
during a Senate campaign rally in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump made it
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 449

seem as if the Presidential election hadn’t already been decided and pro-
jected his unhinged ambitions onto his opponents.167 President Trump
claimed that “there’s nothing the radical Democrats will not do to get
power that they so desperately crave,” including “the outright stealing of
elections, like they’re trying to do with us.” 168
“We’re not going to let it happen,” President Trump said, adding, “I
hope Mike Pence comes through for us, I have to tell you.” President Trump
called Vice President Pence a “great vice president,” a “great guy,” as well
as a “wonderful” and “smart man.” But he alluded to the Vice President’s
role, “he’s going to have a lot to say about it,” and added an ominous note.
“Of course, if he doesn’t come through, I won’t like him quite as much,”
President Trump said.169

JANUARY 5, 2021: EASTMAN PRESSURES PENCE’S STAFF IN A PRIVATE MEETING

WHILE PRESIDENT TRUMP TWEETS.
In a Reversal of Where the Oval Office Meeting Ended the Day Before, Eastman
Argues that Pence Should Reject Electors Outright. Eastman met with Jacob
and Short again the following day.170 During the Oval Office meeting the
Vice President had made clear that he would not unilaterally reject electors,
and, by pivoting to recommend the Vice President send the electors back to
the States, Eastman seemed to recognize this. But the following morning,
Eastman returned to pressing for the more “aggressive” path.171
Jacob recorded Eastman’s request on January 5, 2021, in a handwritten
note: “Requesting VP reject.” 172 Jacob later summarized Eastman’s
remarks as follows: “I’m here asking you to reject the electors.” 173 This
overnight reversal surprised Jacob because Eastman was returning to the
more aggressive position he had seemed to abandon in the Oval Office
meeting the day before.174 President Trump’s tweets that morning may
explain Eastman’s reversal. While Eastman was meeting with the Vice
President’s staff, his client, President Trump, was pressing the argument
publicly.
At 11:06 a.m. on the morning of January 5th, President Trump tweeted:
“The Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors.”
As his tweet made clear, President Trump would not be persuaded by
reason—or the law. The President made this public statement despite the
Vice President’s clear and consistent rejection of this theory including dur-
ing an in-person meeting the day before. During that same meeting, East-
man conceded that this “aggressive” path of rejecting electors was not
advisable.
Herschmann briefly participated in the January 5th meeting, seeing it as
“an opportunity . . . to just chew [Eastman] out.” 175 Herschmann had
already pushed back “brutal[ly]” on Eastman’s theory regarding the Vice
450 CHAPTER 5

President. In this conversation, he emphasized the need to fact check dubi-

ous claims of election fraud.176 Herschmann told Eastman that “someone
better make sure” that the allegations Eastman provided to members of
Congress were accurate before they objected to the certification of the vote
the next day.177 “[N]othing should come out of someone’s mouth that
[isn’t] independently verified and [ ] reliable.” 178

At the End of the Morning Meeting, Eastman Concedes to Pence’s Counsel That His
Theory Has No Historical Support. Jacob then had his own “Socratic” debate
with Eastman over the legal merits of his position. According to Jacob,
Eastman conceded much ground by the end of the session. Eastman “all but
admitted that it [his plan] didn’t work.” 179
For example, Eastman had previously claimed to have found historical
support in the actions of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who both pre-
sided over the counting of electoral votes when they were Vice President.
Not so. Jacob told the Select Committee that Eastman conceded in private
that the cases of Jefferson and Adams did not serve “as examples for the
proposition that he was trying to support of a Vice Presidential assertion of
authority to decide disputes[,] because no dispute was raised in either case
during the joint session.” Jacob added: “And, moreover, there was no
[question] as to the outcomes in those States.” 180
Eastman conceded that there was no historical support for the role that
he and President Trump were pushing Vice President Pence to play. No Vice
President—before or after the adoption of the Electoral Count Act—had
ever exercised such authority. This included then-Vice President Richard
Nixon’s handling of the electoral votes of Hawaii following the 1960 elec-
tion. Though Eastman and other Trump lawyers used this Hawaii example
to justify the theory that the Vice President could unilaterally choose which
electors to count, Eastman admitted to Jacob that Vice President Nixon had
not in fact done what Eastman was recommending Vice President Pence
do.181
Eastman also admitted that he would not grant the expansive powers he
advocated for Vice President Pence to any other Vice President. Eastman did
not think that Vice President Kamala Harris should have such power in
2025, nor did he think that Vice President Al Gore should have had such
authority in 2001.182 He also acknowledged that his theory would lose 9-0 at
the Supreme Court.183
According to Jacob, Eastman “acknowledged by the end that, first of all,
no reasonable person would actually want that clause [of the 12th Amend-
ment] read that way because if indeed it did mean that the Vice President
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 451

Judge J. Michael Luttig testifies before the Select Committee on June 16, 2022.
Photo by House Creative Services

had such authority, you could never have a party switch thereafter.” If poli-
ticians followed Eastman’s advice, “[y]ou would just have the same party
win continuously if indeed a Vice President had the authority to just declare
the winner of every State.” 184
The Vice President’s office was unmoved by Eastman’s specious rea-
soning. As he left Marc Short’s office, Eastman was thinking of his client’s
reaction. “They’re going to be really disappointed that I wasn’t able to per-
suade you,” Eastman said.185

Former Republican Officials with Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Experience All
Agreed with Vice President Pence’s Conclusion about His Limited Role at the Joint
Session. As President Trump’s pressure campaign intensified, the Vice
President’s outside counsel, Richard Cullen, turned for support to John
Michael Luttig, a conservative former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.186 Eastman had clerked for Luttig—a man with impec-
cable legal and conservative credentials—more than two decades prior.
Luttig rejected Eastman’s so-called legal analysis of the Vice President’s
role in no uncertain terms. In a series of tweets, posted at 9:53 a.m. on
January 5th, Luttig set forth his legal conclusions.
452 CHAPTER 5

“The only responsibility and power of the Vice President under the
Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college votes as they have
been cast,” Judge Luttig wrote. “The Constitution does not empower the
Vice President to alter in any way the votes that have been cast, either by
rejecting certain of them or otherwise.” 187
Confusion in the media about where the Vice President stood on this
issue prompted former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan to reach out to the
Vice President to share his belief that the Vice President had no unilateral
authority.188 Short also spoke with former Speaker Ryan and as he testified
to the Select Committee, “I said to him, Mr. Speaker, you know Mike . . . you
know he recognizes that. And we sort of laughed about it, and he said, I get
it.” 189
The Vice President also consulted with former Vice President Dan
Quayle, who reinforced and affirmed Vice President Pence’s consistent
understanding of his role.190

JANUARY 5, 2021: PRESIDENT TRUMP AGAIN PRESSURES VICE PRESIDENT PENCE IN A

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND ANOTHER PHONE CALL WITH
EASTMAN.
President Trump demanded to see Vice President Pence again that same
day. Vice President Pence had canceled a planned lunch with President
Trump, intending to work on the statement he planned to issue on January
6th to explain publicly why he wouldn’t bow to the President’s pressure.191
But Pence couldn’t avoid Trump. Vice President Pence had to delay a Coro-
navirus Task Force meeting later that same day when he was called to the
Oval Office to meet with the President.192
The two men met alone, without staff present. While we have not
developed direct evidence of what was discussed during this one-on-one
meeting between the President and Vice President, it did not change the
fundamental disagreement between them about the limits of the Vice Presi-
dent’s authority during the joint session. Jacob said the Vice President left
the meeting “determined.” 193 Vice President Pence did tell Marc Short what
transpired during the meeting, but Short refused to tell the Select Commit-
tee what was said.194 Short described Vice President Pence’s demeanor as
“steady.” 195 Short testified that the below excerpt from the book Peril may
have been sensationalized but was generally consistent with Short’s under-
standing of the discussion:
“If these people say you have the power, wouldn’t you want to?”
Trump asked.
“I wouldn’t want any one person to have that authority,” Pence said.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 453

“But wouldn’t it almost be cool to have that power?” Trump asked.

“No,” Pence said. “Look, I’ve read this, and I don’t see a way to do it.
We’ve exhausted every option. I’ve done everything I could and then
some to find a way around this. It’s simply not possible. My interpreta-
tion is: No. . . .
“No, no, no!” Trump shouted. “You don’t understand, Mike. You can do
this. I don’t want to be your friend anymore if you don’t do this.” 196
Later that day, Jacob and Short were both present for a call between
President Trump and Vice President Pence.197 Eastman and at least one
other lawyer were with President Trump on the call as well.198
Eastman recognized that Vice President Pence was not going to change
his mind on rejecting electors outright, but he still asked if the Vice Presi-
dent would consider sending the electors back to the States.199 “I don’t see
it,” Vice President Pence responded, “but my counsel will hear out what-
ever Mr. Eastman has to say.” 200
Jacob received other calls from Eastman on January 5th.201 Jacob told
the Select Committee that he had a detailed discussion with Eastman con-
cerning the ways his proposal would violate the Electoral Count Act.202
Eastman resorted to a ridiculous argument—comparing their current situa-
tion to the crisis that faced President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.
Eastman invoked President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus.203 He also told Jacob to “stay tuned” because “we” were trying to get
some letters from State legislators indicating that they were interested in
the Vice President sending the electors back to the States.204

JANUARY 5, 2021: AN ACCURATE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ABOUT THE VICE PRESI-
DENT PROMPTS A FALSE STATEMENT IN RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT TRUMP.
On the evening of January 5th, The New York Times published an article
titled, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election
Result.” 205 The Times reported on the tension brewing within the White
House, citing “people briefed on the conversation” between President
Trump and Vice President Pence that had taken place in the Oval Office the
previous day. “Vice President Mike Pence told President Trump on Tuesday
[January 4th] that he did not believe he had the power to block congressio-
nal certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s victory in the presidential election
despite Mr. Trump’s baseless insistence that he did,” the Times reported.206
The Times’ report was published at approximately 7:36 that evening.207
Jason Miller called President Trump to make sure he had seen it.208 Presi-
dent Trump spoke to Miller at least twice, once at 8:18 p.m. and a second
time at 9:22 p.m.209 Immediately after concluding his second call with Jason
454 CHAPTER 5

Miller, President Trump asked to speak to the Vice President; President

Trump and Vice President Pence spoke from 9:33 to 9:41 p.m.210 President
Trump also spoke with Steve Bannon and Eastman, among others.211
At 9:58 p.m. on January 5th, President Trump issued a statement that
he had dictated to Jason Miller disputing the Times’ account.212 President
Trump lied—repeatedly—in his short statement.213 The President claimed
the article was “fake news.” It wasn’t. President Trump claimed he and Vice
President Pence were “in total agreement that the Vice President has the
power to act.” They weren’t. President Trump claimed the election “was
illegal.” It wasn’t. President Trump then laid out Vice President Pence’s
options for the next day, summarizing Eastman’s theory:
Our Vice President has several options under the U.S. Constitution.
He can decertify the results or send them back to the [S]tates for
change and certification. He can also decertify the illegal and cor-
rupt results and send them to the House of Representatives for the
one vote for one [S]tate tabulation.214
This was also a blatant attempt to mischaracterize the Vice President’s
position in the hope that public opinion would somehow sway the resolute
Vice President. President Trump knew full well at the time that he and Vice
President Pence were not “in total agreement.” The Vice President’s coun-
sel, Greg Jacob, was shocked by the statement.215 “[T]he Vice President was
not in agreement that the Vice President had the power to take the actions
that were being asked of him that day,” Jacob later told the Select Commit-
tee.216 Marc Short was furious as well and called Jason Miller to forcefully
“express [his] displeasure that a statement could have gone out that mis-
represented the Vice President’s viewpoint without consultation.” 217
The Vice President was “obviously irritated that a statement putting
words in his mouth” was issued by the President and considered issuing his
own statement contradicting President Trump’s.218 Ultimately, Pence and
Short concluded that it was not worthwhile since it was already late in the
evening and they expected the question to be resolved by Vice President
Pence’s “Dear Colleague” letter the next day.219

JANUARY 5, 2021: BANNON PUBLICLY AMPLIFIES THE PRESSURE ON VICE PRESIDENT

PENCE.
While President Trump misrepresented the Vice President’s agreement with
Eastman’s theory, his on-again, off-again political advisor, Steve Bannon,
pressed President Trump’s campaign against Vice President Pence in public.
Bannon echoed the public pressure on Pence that the President continued
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 455

to propagate by talking about his purported authority. The Select Commit-

tee learned from phone records that Bannon spoke to President Trump at
least twice on January 5th.220
During a January 5, 2021, episode of War Room: Pandemic, Bannon and
his guests openly berated Vice President Pence. Bannon cited an erroneous
news report claiming that Senator Grassley would preside over the certifi-
cation of the electoral college vote—instead of Vice President Pence.221
Bannon’s cohost, Raheem Kassam, took credit for the public pressure
placed on Vice President Pence. “I want to remind people who has been sit-
ting here, saying ‘Light Pence Up’ for the last couple of weeks. Right? That
would be Raheem Kassam.” They then discussed President Trump’s speech
in Georgia the previous evening. “I think the President of the United States
took your advice last night, wrote a line in there,” Bannon said. To which
Kasseem responded: “. . . and yours . . . hold the line.”
Jack Posobiec, an alt-right personality with a large Twitter following,
chimed in quoting a member of their audience as saying that “Pence will
betray Donald Trump.” 222 In response, Bannon stated: “Call the play. Run
the play.” 223
The “play” was Bannon’s version of the “Green Bay Sweep”—a plan to
subvert the transfer of power on January 6th named for a brutally effective
power running play developed in the National Football League (NFL) in the
1960’s. Steve Bannon’s political version of the sweep was intended to
undermine the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election.
One account of Bannon’s “Green Bay Sweep” comes from Peter
Navarro, Director of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing
Policy. Navarro refused to cooperate with the Select Committee and was
subsequently indicted for contempt of Congress. Although he doesn’t fully
explain in his book, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year, how
Bannon’s sweep was intended to work, Navarro writes that Vice President
Pence was envisioned as the “quarterback” who would “assert his consti-
tutional power” to delay certification.224 Navarro writes that his own role
was to “carefully document the fraud and myriad election irregularities,”
while Bannon’s “role was to figure out how to use this information—what
he called the ‘receipts.’” 225
Navarro’s account helps explain why Trump and his loyalists became so
fixated on Vice President Pence. They saw Vice President Pence as their last
hope for keeping President Trump in office. Navarro writes of Pence’s sup-
posed “betrayal.” 226 In a telling sentence, Navarro likens Vice President
Pence to Brutus, a Roman politician and the most famous assassin of Julius
Caesar. Navarro writes:
456 CHAPTER 5

On this cold, momentous day, I shiver as I think to myself, “January 6

will be either Mike Pence’s finest hour or the traitorous ‘Et tu, Brute?’
end of both his and Donald Trump’s political careers.” 227
The goal of these Trump allies was clear: to overturn the election
result.228 Statements by participants in this effort indicate there were sev-
eral different endgame strategies in mind. One was to get the Vice President
to unilaterally reject the Electoral College votes of Arizona, Georgia, Penn-
sylvania, and other States, then simply declare that Trump had won a
majority of the electors actually submitted. The other major possibility was
to reject or “return” the Electoral College votes of these States and then
declare there was no majority in the Electoral College process, thereby trig-
gering a so-called contingent election under the 12th Amendment.229 This
would have meant that the House of Representatives had chosen the presi-
dent not on the basis of one-member-one-vote, but on the basis of one-
State-one-vote, pursuant to the 12th Amendment. Donald Trump’s
strategists emphasized repeatedly that the GOP had a 27-to-22 margin in
control of the States’ Congressional delegations, with Pennsylvania being
tied at 9-to-9, therefore presumably a non-factor.

5.3 PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS ALLIES CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE VICE PRESI-
DENT ON JANUARY 6TH, THREATENING HIS LIFE AND OUR DEMOCRACY.

JANUARY 6, 2021: PRESIDENT TRUMP CONTINUED TO FALSELY ASSERT IN MULTIPLE

TWEETS POSTED THE MORNING OF JANUARY 6TH THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD A
ROLE TO PLAY IN THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION.
Despite the public pressure initiated by the President and amplified by Ban-
non, Navarro and others, there was no ambiguity in the Vice President’s
decision. By January 6th, President Trump had been told multiple times
that Vice President Pence was not going to reject the certified electors from
any State. Nor was Vice President Pence going to move for a delay and send
the electors back to the States. Either move would have been illegal, requir-
ing Vice President Pence to break the law, violating his oath to the U.S.
Constitution. Pence made his decision clear “[m]any times” to President
Trump, and he was “very consistent” in rejecting the President’s
demands.230 President Trump continued to publicly pressure the Vice Presi-
dent anyway.
At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, President Trump tweeted:
If Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win
the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 457

made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process

NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike
can send it back!231
Later that morning, at 8:17 a.m., President Trump tweeted again:
States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based
on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received leg-
islative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the
States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme cour-
age!232

And, at 8:22 a.m., President Trump tweeted again, making a pitch for
Congress to choose him, as if people’s votes on election day and the elec-
toral college didn’t matter:
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR COUN-
TRY, NEEDS THE PRESIDENCY MORE THAN EVER BEFORE—THE
POWER OF THE VETO. STAY STRONG!233
President Trump’s tweets made it clear that he thought the Republican
State legislatures would simply deliver him victory. President Trump
emphasized this point, writing twice that if Vice President Pence gave in,
“we win.” However, there was no sign of a change in the Vice President’s
position. A moment of truth was looming.

January 6, 2021: President Trump Has a “[H]eated” Conversation with Vice Presi-
dent Pence Before his Rally on the Ellipse. President Trump tried to reach Vice
President Pence by phone early that morning.234 He finally talked to his
Vice President at approximately 11:20 a.m.235 The exchange quickly became
contentious.
Eric Herschmann, a lawyer in the White House Counsel’s Office, over-
heard the conversation. Members of President Trump’s family and other
White House officials were present as well.236 Herschmann recalled that “it
started off as a calmer tone, everything, and then it became heated.” 237
Ivanka Trump also described the call as “pretty heated.” 238 Ivanka Trump
elaborated: “It was a different tone than I’d heard him take with the Vice
President before.” 239 Ivanka Trump told her Chief of Staff, Julie Radford,
that “her dad had just had an upsetting conversation with the Vice Presi-
dent.” 240 President Trump had even called Vice President Pence the “P
Word.” 241
Nick Luna, President Trump’s personal assistant (commonly known as
the “body man”), was also in the Oval Office during the conversation. Luna
told the Select Committee that President Trump called Vice President Pence
458 CHAPTER 5

President Trump on the phone in the Oval Office.

Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration.

a “wimp” on the call, with President Trump adding that he “made the
wrong decision” in choosing Pence as his running mate.242
Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence’s National Security Advisor, also
heard the conversation. President Trump “told the Vice President that, you
know, he has legal authority to send these folks [the electors] back to the
respective States,” Kellogg told the Select Committee.243 President Trump
insisted that Vice President Pence had the “constitutional authority to”
reject certain electoral college votes.244 When Vice President Pence would
not budge, President Trump told him “you’re not tough enough to make
the call.” 245
But Vice President Pence would not be bullied. The Vice President, who
was at his residence at the time, had been meeting with Greg Jacob to final-
ize the statement he would be releasing later that day. When the President
called, Pence stepped away to answer the phone. According to Jacob, when
Pence returned, he did not say anything about the call—but he looked
“steely, determined, [and] grim,” as he reentered the room.246
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 459

c. January 6, 2021: Trump, Eastman and Giuliani Continue to Pressure Vice Presi-
dent Pence at the Ellipse Rally. Despite the Vice President’s unwavering
stance, the President and his outside counsel continued to turn up the heat
of public pressure.
At President Trump’s urging, thousands had gathered on the morning
of January 6th to hear the President and others speak at a rally held at the
Ellipse, a park just south of the White House. Before President Trump
spoke, Eastman took the stage alongside Giuliani. Both would further
amplify the President’s public pressure on the Vice President, but when
Giuliani spoke on the Ellipse, he already knew that what Eastman had out-
lined would never practically happen.
At 9:31 a.m. that morning, Giuliani called Eric Herschmann “out of the
blue” to ask him for his view and analysis of the practical implications of
Eastman’s theory.247 According to Herschmann, after an “intellectual dis-
cussion about . . . the VP’s role,” Giuliani agreed that the “practical implica-
tion of [what Eastman had proposed] would be almost impossible.” 248
Immediately after this 5½ minute conversation with Herschmann, Giuliani
had two calls with the White House, at 9:41 a.m. and 9:53 a.m.249
Giuliani recognized Eastman who joined him on stage, claiming that he
was “one of the preeminent constitutional scholars in the United
States.” 250
Giuliani said Vice President Pence could either “decide on the validity of
these crooked ballots, or he can send it back to the legislat[ures], give them
five to 10 days to finally finish the work.” 251 He added that that they had
“letters from five legislat[ures] begging us to do that.” 252 This was not
true. At most, what Giuliani, Eastman and other allies of President Trump
had managed to procure were letters from individual State legislators or
groups of State legislators. None of the letters came from a majority of any
State’s legislative chamber, let alone a majority of an entire State legisla-
ture.253
For instance, a letter that Eastman described to Jacob as a “[m]ajor new
development” on the evening of January 5th contained the signatures of 21
members of the Pennsylvania Senate.254 Eastman claimed that it “now
looks like PA Legislature will vote to recertify its electors if Vice President
Pence implements the plan we discussed,” but the letter asked only for a
“delay” in certification to “allow for due process.” 255 The Select Committee
learned from the most senior Pennsylvania Senate Republican that he
signed the letter because of pressure he was feeling due to the voluminous
post-election outreach from President Trump, Trump allies, and the pub-
lic.256 And, he only agreed to sign a letter directed to Congressional
460 CHAPTER 5

leaders—not the Vice President—after raising in a conversation with Vice

President Pence’s brother, Congressman Greg Pence, his desire to avoid
pressuring the Vice President.257
Moreover, as Jacob explained, “what any of the State legislatures said
they did or did not want to do had no impact on the legal analysis of what
the Vice President’s authorities were.” 258 There was simply no legal path to
send any votes back to the States on January 6th.
On the stage at the President’s rally on the Ellipse, Giuliani repeated a
conspiracy theory about the “crooked Dominion machines . . . deliberately”
changing votes via an algorithm.259 He explained that the 10-day delay in
the certification would be used “to see the machines that are crooked” and
“to find criminality there”—demonstrating that his repeated assertions of
a stolen election were not based on any real proof, or even evidence, of
actual widespread fraud or criminality.260
“Let’s have trial by combat,” Giuliani told the crowd.261
Eastman came to the microphone following Giuliani, and he proceeded
to repeat proven falsehoods regarding voting machines. He then issued his
“demand”:
And all we are demanding of Vice President Pence is this afternoon,
at 1:00, he let the legislatures of the state look into this so we get to
the bottom of it, and the American people know whether we have
control of the direction of our government, or not. We no longer live
in a self-governing republic if we can’t get the answer to this ques-
tion. This is bigger than President Trump. It is a very essence of our
republican form of government, and it has to be done. And anybody
that is not willing to stand up to do it, does not deserve to be in the
office. It is that simple.262
Eastman told the assembled crowd that nothing less than the fate of the
American Republic was in Vice President Pence’s hands.

President Trump Directs the Angry Mob at the Capitol to Pressure Vice Presi-
dent Pence.
When President Trump later took the stage at the Ellipse, he heaped praise
on Giuliani and Eastman. “He’s got guts, unlike a lot of people in the
Republican Party,” President Trump said of Giuliani. “He’s got guts. He
fights, he fights.” 263 President Trump described Eastman as “one of the
most brilliant lawyers in the country.” 264 President Trump claimed that
Eastman had looked at the election and said, “What an absolute disgrace
that this can be happening to our Constitution.” 265 Trump falsely argued
that the keys to the election were in Vice President Pence’s hands, saying:
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 461

And he [Eastman] looked at Mike Pence, and I hope Mike is going to do

the right thing. I hope so. I hope so. Because if Mike Pence does the right
thing, we win the election. . . . [T]his is from the number one, or certainly
one of the top, Constitutional lawyers in our country. He has the abso-
lute right to do it.266
President Trump repeatedly lied, claiming that several States wanted to
overturn former Vice President Biden’s victory:
States want to revote. The States got defrauded. They were given false
information. They voted on it. Now they want to recertify. They want it
back. All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the States to
recertify and we become president and you are the happiest people.267
Contrary to the statement President Trump dictated the night before, he
all but admitted that Vice President Pence did not agree with him:
And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: “Mike, that doesn’t take cour-
age. What takes courage is to do nothing. That takes courage.” And then
we’re stuck with a president who lost the election by a lot and we have
to live with that for four more years. We’re just not going to let that
happen.268
Later in his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump repeated:
So, I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he
doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s listening
to.269
This was nothing less than a direct appeal to the large angry crowd to
pressure Vice President Mike Pence to change his settled and oft-repeated
conclusion about the limits of his authority. It was a shocking attempt to
use public opinion to change the Vice President’s position. President Trump
launched a mob toward the Capitol with the false hope that there was a sce-
nario in which Vice President Pence would do what Eastman and President
Trump had asked him to do, preventing the transfer of authority to
President-elect Biden.

VICE PRESIDENT PENCE FULFILLED HIS DUTY ON JANUARY 6TH

The Vice President Waited to Release His Statement Out of Deference to Presi-
dent Trump, Who Was Still Speaking on the Ellipse, and Ultimately Released It
Just Minutes Before the Joint Session Convened at 1:00 p.m. President Trump’s
speech began late and ran long. He didn’t finish speaking until approxi-
mately 1:10 p.m.—after the joint session had begun at 1:00 p.m. Minutes
before he gaveled the joint session into order, Vice President Mike Pence
released the “Dear Colleague” letter he had been working on for days with
462 CHAPTER 5

his staff.270 There was never any ambiguity in Vice President Pence’s
understanding of his role and authority, but he wanted to make it clear for
everyone to see. “This may be the most important thing I ever say,” Vice
President Pence remarked.271
“Today it will be my duty to preside when the Congress convenes in
Joint Session to count the votes of the Electoral College, and I will do so to
the best of my ability,” Vice President Pence wrote. Vice President Pence
explained that his “role as presiding officer is largely ceremonial” and dis-
missed the arguments that he could take unilateral action as contrary to his
oath to support and defend the Constitution:
As a student of history who loves the Constitution and reveres its
Framers, I do not believe that the Founders of our country intended
to invest the Vice President with unilateral authority to decide
which electoral votes should be counted during the Joint Session of
Congress, and no Vice President in American history has ever
asserted such authority. Instead, Vice Presidents presiding over
Joint Sessions have uniformly followed the Electoral Count Act,
conducting the proceedings in an orderly manner even where the
count resulted in the defeat of their party or their own candidacy.272

Vice President Pence Adheres to the U.S. Constitution and Complies with the Law
Governing the Certification of the Presidential Election. When Vice President
Pence gaveled the opening of the joint session, he knew that many of his
Republican colleagues planned to challenge the election’s results based on
fictitious claims of fraud. The Vice President took steps to ensure that those
objections adhered to the process set forth in the Electoral Count Act.
Every four years, on January 6th, vice presidents read from a script that
remains essentially unchanged. Eastman’s theory of the Vice President’s
power and the Trump Campaign’s scheme to convene and submit the slates
of “alternate” (fake) electors motivated Vice President Pence and his advi-
sors to alter the script and to make sure they were prepared to respond to
any unexpected actions in the joint session.273
Vice President Pence met with the Senate Parliamentarian on January
3rd to discuss the joint session and revised the joint session scripts in con-
sultation with her office.274 Vice President Pence and the Parliamentarian
agreed that the Vice President’s role is ministerial.275
The Vice President knew that the fake slates of electors organized by the
Trump Campaign were not certified by the States and thus were not valid;
he revised the script for the joint session to be transparent with the Ameri-
can people about what the Vice President would—and wouldn’t—be doing
during the joint session.276
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 463

Vice President Pence during the Joint Session of Congress.

(Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

One of the most noticeable and important changes to the script was
directed specifically at thwarting the fake electors scheme. The Vice Presi-
dent knew, informed by the research and analysis of his staff, that absent
certification of the electoral votes by a State authority, the purported
“alternate” slates were “not consequential” and would play no role in the
certification of the Presidential election at the joint session.277 The Senate
Parliamentarian confirmed this understanding.278
For decades, Vice Presidents read a similar simple passage concerning
the ascertainment of the vote. Most recently, Vice President Joseph Biden
read this passage aloud in 2017, as did his most recent predecessors:
After ascertainment has been had that the certificates are authentic
and correct in form, the tellers will count and make a list of the
votes cast by the electors of the several States.
On January 6, 2021, Vice President Pence read from a revised script
(emphasis added):

After ascertaining that the certificates are regular in form and

authentic, tellers will announce the votes cast by the electors for
each state, beginning with Alabama, which the parliamentarians
464 CHAPTER 5

advise me is the only certificate of vote from that State and purports
to be a return from the State that has annexed to it a certificate
from an authority of that State purporting to appoint or ascertain
electors.279
Vice President Pence used the same phrasing for each of the 50 States
counted.
The Vice President’s attention to this issue was warranted. Trump’s
allies pushed the fake electors scheme until the very end. Although the
Trump Campaign had taken pains to direct the fake electors to send their
documents to the appropriate authorities immediately after voting on
December 14th, and though the Senate Parliamentarian’s and Vice Presi-
dent’s offices had been tracking the receipt by mail of both the legitimate
and fake certificates, the Trump Campaign apparently became concerned
that two States’ documents had not been received before the joint ses-
sion.280
On January 4th, the Trump campaign asked Republican Party officials in
Wisconsin to fly their fake electors’ documents to Washington, DC.281
Shortly after, staffers for Representative Mike Kelly (R–PA) and Senator
Ron Johnson (R–WI) reached out to Vice President Pence’s Director of Leg-
islative Affairs, apparently seeking to deliver the fake certificates.282 A mes-
sage from Senator Johnson’s staffer was sent just minutes before the
beginning of the joint session. This staffer stated that Senator Johnson
wished to hand-deliver to the Vice President the fake electors’ certificates
from Michigan and Wisconsin. The Vice President’s aide unambiguously
turned him away.283
Vice President Pence made certain to call for objections as well, in com-
pliance with the Electoral Count Act. After the tellers read off the votes cast
for each State, he asked: “Are there any objections to counting the certifi-
cate of vote of the state . . . that the teller has verified, appears to be regular
in form and authentic?” 284
For most States, there were no objections. Republicans only rose to
object to the States that President Trump contested. The first such state
was Arizona. At approximately 1:46 p.m., Congressman Paul Gosar (R–AZ)
announced his objection.285 “I rise for myself and 60 of my colleagues to
object to the counting of the electoral ballots from Arizona,” Gosar said.286
Vice President Pence then asked: “Is the objection in writing and Signed
by a senator?” It was. Senator Ted Cruz endorsed the unfounded challenge
to Arizona’s electoral votes.287 Because the objections complied with the
law, Vice President Pence directed the House and Senate to withdraw from
the joint session so that the House and Senate could separately debate and
vote on the objection.288
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 465

When the joint session finally resumed after the attack on the Capitol,
the clerks announced the results of each chamber’s vote. Just six U.S. Sena-
tors voted for the objection to the counting of Arizona’s electoral college
votes. The objection was also defeated in the House, though 121 Republican
Members voted to reject Arizona’s legitimate electors.289 Pennsylvania was
the only other State the chambers debated, after the House’s objection was
signed by Senator Josh Hawley (R–Mo.).290

5.4 PRESIDENT TRUMP ENDANGERS PENCE’S LIFE, CAUSING THE VICE PRESIDENT,
HIS FAMILY, AND STAFF TO NARROWLY MISS THE RIOTERS AS THEY FLEE THE
MOB ATTACKING THE CAPITOL.

As the debate over Arizona’s legitimate electors took place on the Senate
floor, the Vice President’s staff could see trouble brewing outside.291 From
inside the Vice President’s ceremonial office, staffers witnessed the crowds
swelling on the east side of the Capitol. Then, the rioters broke through
security barriers.292 Jacob told young staffers that they should stand back
from the windows, because the Vice President’s office was not “the most
popular office on the block right now.” 293
The Vice President was presiding over the Senate debate on the Arizona
objection when the noise from the rioters became audible and those in the
Senate Chamber realized the rioters had entered the Capitol.294 The Secret
Service evacuated Vice President Pence from the Senate floor at 2:12 p.m.295
Twelve minutes later, at 2:24 p.m., President Trump tweeted that Vice
President Pence “didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done
to protect our country and our Constitution.” 296 By that time, the Secret
Service had moved the Vice President to his ceremonial office across the
hall.297 But the situation was spiraling out of control—and they wouldn’t
stay there long. As Sarah Matthews, the Deputy White House Press Secre-
tary, later explained: President Trump’s tweet was like “pouring gasoline
on the fire.” 298
Thirty seconds after President Trump’s tweet, rioters who were already
inside the Capitol opened the East Rotunda door just down the hall. A mere
thirty seconds later, rioters breached the crypt one floor below the Vice
President.
Though the Vice President refused the Secret Service’s first two
attempts to evacuate him from his ceremonial office, the situation quickly
became untenable and the Vice President was told that the Secret Service
could no longer protect him in this office in the Capitol that was quickly
being overrun.299 Marc Short recalls Tim Giebels, the head of the Vice
President’s Secret Service protective detail, saying, “At this point, I can’t
466 CHAPTER 5

protect you behind these glass doors, and so I need to move you.” 300 This
time, the third, the Secret Service was not asking the Vice President to
move; they were stating the fact that the Vice President must be moved.301
At 2:20 p.m., NSC staff monitoring radio communications reported that the
second floor of the Capitol and the door to the Senate Chamber “ha[ve] now
been breached.” 302
At 2:25 p.m., the Secret Service rushed the Vice President, his family,
and his senior staff down a flight of stairs, through a series of hallways and
tunnels to a secure location.303 The Vice President and his team stayed in
that same location for the next four and a half hours.
The angry mob had come within 40 feet of the Vice President as he was
evacuated.304 President Trump never called to check on Vice President
Pence’s safety, so Marc Short called Mark Meadows to tell him they were
safe and secure.305 Short himself became persona non grata with President
Trump. The President directed staff to revoke Short’s access to the White
House after Vice President Pence refused to betray his oath to the Constitu-
tion.306 Marc Short never spoke with President Trump again.307
After arriving at the secure location, the head of the Vice President’s
Secret Service detail wanted to move the Vice President away from the
Capitol, and staff hurried into the waiting vehicles. But the Vice President
refused to get in the car.308 As Greg Jacob explained in his testimony to the
Select Committee:
The Vice President wouldn’t get in his car. . . . [H]e was determined
that unless there was imminent danger to bodily safety that he was
not going to abandon the Capitol and let the rioters have a victory of
having made the Vice President flee or made it difficult to restart
the process later that day.309
It was an unprecedented scene in American history. The President of
the United States had riled up a mob that hunted his own Vice President.
The Vice President’s staff came to believe that the theory “pushed and
sold” to the public that the Vice President had a role to play in the joint
session was a cause of the attack on the Capitol. “The reason that the Capi-
tol was assaulted was that the people who were breaching the Capitol
believed that . . . the election [outcome] had not yet been determined, and,
instead, there was some action that was supposed to take place in Washing-
ton, D.C., to determine it,” Jacob said.310 “I do think [the violence] was the
result of that position being continuously pushed and sold to people who
ended up believing that with all their hearts.” 311 The people had been “told
that the Vice President had the authority” to determine the outcome of the
election during the joint session.312
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 467

Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration.

Of course, that was President Trump’s and John Eastman’s plan all
along—to convince people that the election had been stolen, and that Vice
President Pence could take action to change the outcome during the joint
session on January 6th.
Jacob was writing an email to Eastman when the Capitol was
breached.313 At 2:14 p.m., just before being evacuated, Jacob hurriedly hit
send on his email, but not before adding the following: “thanks to your
bullshit, we are now under siege.” 314
Eastman quickly replied to Jacob’s email and, incredibly, blamed Vice
President Pence and Jacob for the attack. “The ‘siege’ is because YOU and
your boss did not do what was necessary to allow this to be aired in a public
way so the American people can see for themselves what happened,” East-
man wrote.315 Naturally, Jacob was “somewhere between aghast and
livid.” 316 It was “ridiculous” to blame Vice President Pence for the attack,
when he simply followed the law.317

THE JOINT SESSION RECONVENES: “LET’S GET BACK TO WORK.”

The Senate reconvened at approximately 8:06 p.m.318 Congressional leader-
ship and the Vice President insisted on finishing the work of the people.
“Today was a dark day in the history of the United States Capitol,” Vice
President Pence said. “But thanks to the swift efforts of U.S. Capitol Police,
468 CHAPTER 5

Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration.

federal, state and local law enforcement, the violence was quelled. The
Capitol is secured, and the people’s work continues.” The Vice President
addressed “those who wreaked havoc in our Capitol today,” saying “you did
not win.” Vice President Pence continued:
Violence never wins. Freedom wins. And this is still the people’s house.
And as we reconvene in this chamber, the world will again witness the
resilience and strength of our democracy, for even in the wake of
unprecedented violence and vandalism at this Capitol, the elected repre-
sentatives of the people of the United States have assembled again on
the very same day to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States.
“Let’s get back to work,” Vice President Pence concluded.319
Despite the violence that had unfolded at the Capitol, Eastman kept agi-
tating for further delay. At 11:44 p.m. on January 6th, Eastman sent yet
another email to Greg Jacob.320 In a shockingly tone-deaf manner, Eastman
claimed that the Electoral Count Act had been violated already, by allowing
debate beyond two hours, so—he argued—Vice President Pence should no
longer be concerned that what President Trump and Eastman had pressured
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 469

him to do also would violate it.321 “Of course,” as Jacob pointed out, the
debate couldn’t have been completed in two hours due to the “intervening
riot of several hours.” 322
Eastman argued that Vice President Pence should “adjourn for 10 days
to allow the legislatures to finish their investigations, as well as to allow a
full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has
occurred here.” 323 Eastman described this—a delay in the certification of
the vote and the peaceful transfer of power with no legal or historical prec-
edent or support, based on entirely specious and disproven allegations of
election fraud, following on a violent attack on the seat of American
democracy—as a “relatively minor violation.” 324
Vice President Pence later described Eastman’s email as “rubber room
stuff,” meaning it was certifiably crazy.325

5.5 AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK.

Eastman called Herschmann on January 7th to discuss litigation on behalf

of the Trump Campaign in Georgia.326 This gave Herschmann another
opportunity to lay into Eastman. “[Are] you out of your F’ing mind?” Her-
schmann asked. “I only want to hear two words coming out of your mouth
from now on: orderly transition.” Herschmann said. After some berating,
Eastman repeated after Herschmann: “Orderly transition.” “Now I’m going
to give you the best free legal advice you’re ever getting in your life,” Her-
schmann said. “Get a great F’ing criminal defense lawyer, you’re going to
need it.” 327 Days afterward, Eastman sent an email to Giuliani, making a
request that tacitly acknowledged just how much trouble he was in: “I’ve
decided that I should be on the pardon list, if that is still in the works.” 328
Vice President Pence and his team never bowed to President Trump’s
relentless pressure. They began January 6, 2021, with a prayer. The attack
on the U.S. Capitol delayed the peaceful transfer of power. The joint session
did not end until early in the morning on January 7th.
At 3:50 a.m. that morning, Short texted Vice President Pence a passage
from Second Timothy, chapter 4, verse 7: “I fought the good fight. I fin-
ished the race. I have kept the faith.” 329

ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 10–11.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 10–11.
3. See, e.g., Ivan E. Raiklin (Former Green Beret Commander) (@Raiklin), Twitter, Dec. 22, 2020,
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201222232155/https://twitter.com/Raiklin/
470 CHAPTER 5

status/1341520753984942081 (archived) (“America, @VP @Mike_Pence MUST do this, tomor-

row!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 23, 2020 7:40:30 p.m. ET,
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201224033528/http://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (archived).
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 95, (“[T]he Vice President mostly asked a series of
questions in that meeting of Mr. Eastman”), 130 (Q: “Did John Eastman ever admit, as far as
you know, in front of the President that his proposal would violate the Electoral Count
Act?” A: “I believe he did on the 4th.” Q: “Okay. And can you tell us what the President’s
reaction was?” A: “A I can’t.”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob memo to Vice President Pence, titled “Analysis of Professor
Eastman’s Proposals”).
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 96 (Eastman acknowledging that the legal basis for
his proposed paths was the same and, as recounted by Greg Jacob, “[y]ou couldn’t get
there either way unless you . . . set aside a number of the positions of the Electoral Count
Act”).
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26–27 (“But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it
your impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his position on these issues
to the President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to
President Trump?” A: “Many times.” Q: “And had been consistent in conveying his position
to the President?” A: “Very consistent.”).
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 18–20.
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (U.S. Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092958 (January 6, 2021,
message at 10:39 a.m. ET).
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (US Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092978 (January 6, 2021,
message at 10:43 a.m. ET).
10. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
11. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
12. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
13. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346900434540240897 (archived).
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Rebecca Shabad, “Noose Appears
Near Capitol; Protesters Seen Carrying Confederate Flags,” NBC News, (Jan. 6, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/live-blog/electoral-college-
certification-updates-n1252864/ncrd1253129#blogHeader.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 471

15. See Quint Forgey, “ ‘Almost No Idea More Un-American’: Pence Breaks with Trump on Jan.
6,” Politico, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/25/pence-
trump-jan-6-496237.
16. Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America, Jan. 30,
2022, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20220131171840/https://
www.donaldjtrump.com/news/news-8nkdvatd7g1481 (archived) (“If the Vice President (Mike
Pence) had ‘absolutely no right’ to change the Presidential Election results in the Senate,
despite fraud and many other irregularities, how come the Democrats and RINO Republi-
cans, like Wacky Susan Collins, are desperately trying to pass legislation that will not allow
the Vice President to change the results of the election? Actually, what they are saying, is
that Mike Pence did have the right to change the outcome, and they now want to take that
right away. Unfortunately, he didn’t exercise that power, he could have overturned the
Election!”) (emphasis added).
17. Mike Allen, “Exclusive Audio: Trump Defends Threats to ‘Hang’ Pence,” Axios, (Nov. 12, 2021),
available at available at https://www.axios.com/2021/11/12/trump-hang-mike-pence-
january-6-audio (“Jonathan Karl: ‘Were you worried about him during that siege? Were you
worried about his safety?’ Trump: ‘No, I thought he was well-rotected, and I had heard that
he was in good shape. No. Because I had heard he was in very good shape. But, but, no, I
think—’ Karl: ‘Because you heard those chants—that was terrible. I mean—’ Trump: ‘He
could have—well, the people were very angry.’ Karl: ‘They were saying ‘hang Mike Pence.’’
Trump: ‘Because it’s common sense, Jon. It’s common sense that you’re supposed to pro-
tect. How can you—if you know a vote is fraudulent, right?—how can you pass on a fraudu-
lent vote to Congress? How can you do that?’) (emphasis added).
18. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
19. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 36, 40, 44, Eastman v. Thomp-
son et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (“Based
on the evidence, the Court finds that it is more likely than not that President Trump and
Eastman dishonestly conspired to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6,
2021.”).
20. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708. This document
was ordered to be produced to the Select Committee by Judge Carter over Eastman’s
assertion of attorney-client privilege and upon a finding that the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege applied. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7,
2021 at 41-42, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No.
8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.
24. Neither Eastman nor Chesebro provided substantive answers in response to the Select
Committee’s questions about the development of this strategy. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John East-
man, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Chesebro, (Oct. 25, 2022). It is thus difficult to deter-
mine who first suggested this concept. Evidence obtained by the Select Committee sug-
gests that key players like Eastman, Giuliani, and Epshteyn were starting to discuss the
Vice President’s role at the joint session in late November or early December. See, e.g.,
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 71–73 (discussing conversations
472 CHAPTER 5

involving Mark Meadows, Rudolph Giuliani’s legal team, and Members of Congress in late
November or early December); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman023534 (December 5, 2020 email from John Eastman remarking that “folks at the
top of the chain of command on this . . . are now aware of the issues”). See also Michael
Wolff, Landslide: The Final Days of the Trump Presidency (New York: Henry Holt and Com-
pany, 2021), p. 135 (describing post-Thanksgiving outreach from Boris Epshteyn to the
White House regarding the Vice President theory).
25. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 41-42, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (“Because the
memo likely furthered the crimes of obstruction of an official proceeding and conspiracy
to defraud the United States, it is subject to the crime-fraud exception and the Court
ORDERS it to be disclosed.”).
26. The Select Committee’s investigation found that Eastman was communicating about the
joint session with Kenneth Chesebro in December 2020. See e.g., Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Chapman University Production), Chapman053460, Chapman053475 (December 23, 2020,
emails between John Eastman, Kenneth Chesebro, and Boris Epshteyn regarding proce-
dural proposals for joint session).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. This memo was
originally obtained by the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Robert Costa and subse-
quently published by CNN. “READ: Trump Lawyer’s Memo on Six-Step Plan for Pence to
Overturn the Election,” CNN, (Sept. 21, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/
21/politics/read-eastman-memo/index.html.
28. Under the Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority of electoral college votes, this
triggers a process where the House of Representatives decides the president. When that
happens, each State gets one vote for President, chosen by the Representatives from that
state. The candidate who receives a majority of the 50 State votes becomes the president.
At the time, there were more Republicans than Democrats in 26 of the 50 State House del-
egations, leading Eastman to predict that “President Trump [would be] re-elected” under
that scenario. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. Note that East-
man has acknowledged the authenticity of a publicly disclosed version of this document,
describing it as “a preliminary, incomplete draft” of “the legal memo [he] wrote in Janu-
ary.” John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election Is Not
Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at https://
amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-
election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/ (linking to two-page document titled “PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL, January 6 scenario, available at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2021/images/09/
20/eastman.memo.pdf).
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053561 (December 23,
2020, email from John Eastman to Molly Michael).
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022) (Dec. 23, 2020 cellular data records
from John Eastman). The morning that Eastman began preparing the memo, he received a
call from Boris Epshteyn at 8:58 am. Eleven minutes later, Eastman called Chesebro, and
the two spoke for over 41 minutes. Eastman continued to trade calls with Epshteyn and
Chesebro throughout the day. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022)
(December 23, 2020, phone records for John Eastman)
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 473

32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976, p. 2 (Memo
regarding January 6 scenario).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003226.
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228. Note that this
letter refers to, and purports to supplement, the recommendations of what Eastman
described in his correspondence with Mr. Colbert as “a major war game simulation” that
he claimed—on October 24, 2020—was “already before the President and his team.” Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983. The war game
exercise in which Eastman participated is reflected in a report issued by the Claremont
Institute and the Texas Public Policy Foundation. “79 Days Report”, (Oct. 20, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.texaspolicy.com/79-days-to-inauguration-taskforce-report/.
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (emphasis added).
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.
37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023534.
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding
January 6 scenarios).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding
January 6 scenarios).
41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052966 (December 23,
2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro).
42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding
January 6 scenarios).
43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding
January 6 scenarios).
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding
January 6).
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26; see also id., at 36-377 (stating
that he did not understand Eastman’s statement to be suggesting that violence would be
justified to keep President Trump in office).
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 28.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26, 28-29.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
474 CHAPTER 5

49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 142, 152.
53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000731. Neither this memo,
nor a December 8, 2020, memo that followed, reflects the full advice that Greg Jacob ulti-
mately gave to the Vice President regarding the joint session. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 10–11, 32. The OVP Legal Staff memo, dated October 26, 2020, is titled
“The Unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count Act.” This memo adopts certain legal aca-
demics’ criticism of the Electoral Count Act and introduces several concepts that would
later be cited by proponents of the theory of an expansive view of the Vice President’s
power. Greg Jacob’s legal memo to the Vice President, dated December 8, 2020, notes that
the Electoral Count Act prescribes the process for counting electoral votes “to the extent it
is constitutional” and seems to allow for the possibility of the Vice President “assert[ing] a
constitutional privilege.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-
R0000785. Through his extensive research and analysis, Greg Jacob’s understanding devel-
oped both as to the legal and historical precedent for the joint session and ultimately led
him to the unavoidable conclusions that, one, the Electoral Count Act governed the joint
session and, two, its procedures had never been deviated from since it was passed.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob Deposition, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 11–13, 25–26 (noting that Marc Short
didn’t “name names” of the people he was concerned would encourage the President to
prematurely declare victory).
55. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079VP-R000011579_0001, 079VP-
R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, Greg Jacob memo to Marc Short, titled “Electoral Vote
Count”). The Election Day memo identifies the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count
Act as the relevant legal framework, but leaves open “whether it is the Vice President, or
Congress, that has ultimate constitutional authority to decide electoral vote disputes.” It
also represents an incomplete understanding of the factual precedents, describing then-
Vice President Nixon’s conduct in January 1961 as “single-handedly resolv[ing] a dispute
over competing slates of electors that were submitted by the State of Hawaii.” (In fact,
after additional research Jacob concluded the opposite was true.) As addressed elsewhere
in this chapter, this memo does not reflect Greg Jacob’s full legal analysis or ultimate
advice, nor the Vice President’s conclusion, about the authority of the Vice President at
the joint session.
56. Daniel Villarreal, “Lincoln Project Ad Tells Trump That Pence ‘Will Put the Nail in Your
Political Coffin’,” Newsweek, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/
lincoln—project-ad-tells-trump-that-pence-will-put-nail-your-political-coffin-1553331.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 13; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 135–36 (noting the ad buy was limited
to “D.C. and Palm Beach”).
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 475

58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000785_0001, 079P-
R0000785_0002, 079P-R0000785_0003, 079P-R0000785_0004 (December 8, 2020, Greg Jacob
memo to Vice President Pence, titled “January 6 Process for Electoral Vote Count”); see
also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 32. This December 8, 2020, memo reflects Jacob’s
more detailed understanding of the mechanics of “modern practice” under the Electoral
Count Act, including the process by which the House and Senate separate to debate a
member of the House’s objection if it is signed by a Senator, but not the full analysis of
the precedent that Jacob would ultimately do before January 6, 2021.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 102.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 33, 102.
61. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl 3; U.S. Const., Amend. XII.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14–16.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14–16.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. In testimony given at a Select
Committee hearing, Judge Luttig disagreed with Jacob’s characterization of the sentence
carried through from the Constitution to the 12th Amendment, describing it instead as
“pristine[ly] clear,” but the witnesses were in agreement that there was “no basis in the
Constitution or laws of the United States at all for the theory espoused by Mr. Eastman.”
Id.; see Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“I am in complete agreement
with Judge Luttig; it is unambiguous that the Vice President does not have the authority to
reject electors.”). Note that Vice President Pence apparently agreed with Jacob regarding
the clarity of the Constitutional language, as Jacob testified that he joked, “I can’t wait to
go to heaven and meet the Framers and tell them, ‘The work that you did in putting
together our Constitution is a work of genius. Thank you. It was divinely inspired. There is
one sentence that I would like to talk to you a little bit about.’” Id.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
67. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
68. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 443.
69. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
70. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
71. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
476 CHAPTER 5

72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337 (December 22,
2020, John Eastman email to William Olson, Larry Joseph, Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris
Kobach, Phillip Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled “Re: Draft Complaint”).
73. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 6, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337 (December 22,
2020, William Olson email to Larry Joseph, Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris Kobach, John East-
man, Phillip Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled “Re: Draft Complaint”).
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 42–45; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003584, (January 4, 2021, emails between
John Eastman and Andrew Pappas, coordinating the call between Eastman and Speaker
Bowers). Eastman also asked Speaker Bowers to sign a letter drafted by Arizona Rep. Mark
Finchem directed to Vice President Pence asking him not to certify the election on January
6th; Bowers refused. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 45–46.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker Bowers had
already addressed publicly both the pressure he was receiving to overturn the result of
the election as well as his firm belief that doing so would violate his oath of office. Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rusty Bowers Production), CTRL0000062389 (Nov. 18, 2020, Dear Col-
league letter with attached “Post-Election Frequently Asked Questions”), Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Rusty Bowers Production), CTRL0000071098_00069 (December 4, 2020, Press Release
titled “Speaker Bowers Addresses Calls for the Legislature to Overturn 2020 Certified Elec-
tion Results).
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker Bowers also
received a call on the morning of January 6th from Representative Andy Biggs in which
Rep. Biggs asked Speaker Bowers to sign a letter being sent by other Arizona legislators
and/or to support decertification of Arizona’s electors; Speaker Bowers again refused.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
78. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (E.D. Tx. 2021).
79. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2021).
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 132–34.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (John McEntee Production), McEntee0001 (document titled “JEFFER-
SON USED HIS POSITION AS VP TO WIN”).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-000238 (John McEntee
note and drafted analysis, titled “PENCE CAN LET THE STATES DECIDE”). Note that the Select
Committee received both documents from the National Archives in a format consistent
with the documents having been torn apart and taped back together.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-237 (John McEntee note
and drafted analysis, titled “PENCE CAN LET THE STATES DECIDE”).
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 477

84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000237; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEn-
tee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 147.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 147-48.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Short production), J6C-TSM-0001, J6C-TSM-0002. Note that the file
name of the document (“MEMO_POTUS_January6VPAction.pdf”) is visible in an email in
which Marc Short forwards to Greg Jacob the memo received from Mark Meadows. Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000033, VP-R0000034.
87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000034.
88. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007206Ellis.
89. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007472Ellis.
90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002, (January 5, 2021,
memo from Jenna Ellis to Jay Sekulow). This document was published by Politico on
December 10, 2021. Betsy Woodruff Swan and Kyle Cheney, “Trump Campaign Lawyer
Authored 2 Memos Claiming Pence Could Halt Biden’s Victory,” Politico, (Dec. 10, 2021),
available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/10/trump-lawyer-pence-biden-
524088. In response to a Select Committee subpoena, Ellis produced a privilege log reflect-
ing several communications from Ellis to Sekulow on January 5 and 6, 2021, each of which
was described as “[e]mail discussion of internal legal strategy for possible pending litiga-
tion.”
91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002 (January 5, 2021,
memo from Ellis to Jay Sekulow).
92. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
politico/status/1346539955724681221 (“‘I actually don’t think that’s what the Constitution
has in mind,’ Jay Sekulow, the chief counsel of the American Center for Law & Justice, says
about the possibility of Pence rejecting the Electoral College results”).
93. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
politico/status/1346539955724681221.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 19, 113.
Matt Morgan was at the time a lawyer with Elections, LLC serving as General Counsel of the
Trump Campaign and also acting as counsel to Vice President Pence’s leadership PAC.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117, 125 (“I had no question about
what he was going to do on January 6th.”).
478 CHAPTER 5

98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68. See also Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p.
179 (stating that the reasons why Vice President Pence wanted to issue a public statement
included the public discourse, letters from State legislators, and reporting about commu-
nications between the President and Vice President).
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166-68 (“I’m not aware of any evidence that the
campaign had, and I’m not aware of any evidence the campaign shared with our office
that would have again provided specific evidence of theft or fraud that would have had a
material change in any of the States.”).
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 99–00; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), pp. 36-37.
102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000745; see also Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 38. Following the meeting on January 2, 2021, Greg Jacob
shared the following memo with Matt Morgan. See Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack, (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000103.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 61-62.
104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000066; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 74 (“My view, for an electoral count vote to count, you need
a certificate of ascertainment and then the vote of the elector itself, that the vote of an
elector without a certificate of ascertainment would not be validly submitted.”).
105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000698; see also Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production),00131; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p.
128 (stating that as of the date of this memo, January 2, 2021, “there were no open ques-
tions at that point that I’m aware of.”).
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 52.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-69. Jacob shared a draft version of the statement
with Matt Morgan. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 119-120.
This draft version clearly set forth Vice President Pence’s position, “I Preside, Congress
Decides.” The draft statement read: I cannot believe that the Framers, who above all else
feared the concentrated power of a Caesar, intended to appoint a single individual, often
directly interested in the outcome, to unilaterally determine the validity of electoral votes.
In the wrong hands, such a power would be the undoing of the Republic.” Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000149.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 479

108. Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey, ‘‘Growing Number of Trump Loyalists in the Senate Vow to
Challenge Biden’s Victory,” Washington Post, (Jan. 2, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senators-challenge-election/2021/01/02/81a4e5c4-4c7d-
11eb-a9d9-1e3ec4a928b9_story.html.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166–68.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 165-66.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 3 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 6 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
116. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 8 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2,
2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
119. Andrew Kaczynski, Em Steck, “Trump Lawyer John Eastman Said ‘Courage and the Spine’
Would Help Pence Send Election to the House in Comments before January 6,” CNN, (Oct.
30, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/30/politics/kfile-john-eastman-said-
pence-could-throw-election-to-house/index.html.
120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman
memo). Note that Eastman publicly disclosed this document, describing it as “the final
version of [his] memo” and embedding it with a filename “Jan 3 Memo on Jan 6 Scenario.”
John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal Conduct From Deciding an Election Is Not
Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at https://
amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-
election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/. Eastman has also tried to rewrite history with regard to
this memo, arguing that it noted that Congress has the power to make the final determi-
nation regarding electoral votes, even though the memo concludes, “[t]he fact is that the
Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the ultimate arbiter. We should
take all of our actions with that in mind.” See John McCormack, “John Eastman vs. the East-
man Memo,” National Review, (Oct. 22, 2021), available at https://www.nationalreview.com/
2021/10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo (emphasis added).
480 CHAPTER 5

121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, pp. 4-5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page East-
man memo).
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman
memo) (describing the majority of the “TRUMP WINS” scenarios as resulting from the Vice
President unilaterally determining “which” electoral slate from a State is valid, after
“asserting that the authority to make that determination under the 12th Amendment . . . is
his alone (and anything in the Electoral Count Act to the contrary is therefore unconstitu-
tional).”).
123. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman
memo) p. 5.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman
memo) p. 2; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976
(December 23, 2020, 2-page Eastman memo).
125. John C. Eastman, “Constitutional Statesmanship,” Claremont Review of Books, (Fall 2021)
available at https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/constitutional-statesmanship/.
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman043035 (December 19,
2020, email from John Eastman to Bruce Colbert, re: Latest draft). It is not clear what rela-
tionship or connection existed between John Eastman and Bruce Colbert before the elec-
tion; documents produced to the Select Committee demonstrate that Eastman and Mr.
Colbert exchanged dozens of emails during the time period covered by the Select Commit-
tee’s subpoena to Chapman University (November 3, 2020, to January 20, 2021).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022), available at
[https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.] (Judge Luttig testifying, “[T]here
was no support whatsoever in either the Constitution of the United States nor the laws of
the United States for the Vice President, frankly, ever to count alternative electoral slates
from the States that had not been officially certified by the designated State official in the
Electoral Count Act of 1887.”).
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, (December 23,
2020, email from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, “FW: Draft 2, with
edits”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (December
23, 2020, 2-page Eastman memo).
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984 (January 10, 2021,
email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon, re: Tell us in layman’s language, what the heck
happened with the dual electors? Please?). This email appears to be a response by East-
man to an unsolicited email from a member of the public.
130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984 (January 10, 2021,
email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon, re: Tell us in layman’s language, what the heck
happened with the dual electors? Please?).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman
memo).
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 481

132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page East-
man memo).
133. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page East-
man memo).
134. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page East-
man memo).
135. The pressure placed on the Vice President by the President was a “multiweek campaign”
that reached a crescendo in the days before January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 33. The Vice President’s Chief of Staff, Marc Short, saw the separation between the
President and the Vice President building for weeks. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022),
pp. 34–35, 216-17.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p.
82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 49 (regarding the
declaration of martial law), 56 (regarding the appointment of Sidney Powell as special
counsel), 58–59, 66 (regarding the seizure of voting machines), 110 (regarding the elevation
of Jeff Clark to Acting Attorney General).
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 5. Philbin told the Select Committee that
in the end he decided not to resign out of a sense of obligation: “All of the pilots can’t
jump off the plane because there’s still a lot of passengers in the back and we need to
land the plane.”
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 79 (“My view was
that the Vice President didn’t have the legal authority to do anything except what he
did.”), 81 (testifying that his views on the role of the Vice President were “extremely
aligned” with the Vice President’s staff), 88 (“I thought that the Vice President did not have
the authority to do what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law.”); See
also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85–86.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 94 (testifying that
482 CHAPTER 5

the privileged interaction that resulted in his exclusion from the meeting took place in the
presence of Meadows and Eastman, but before the Vice President, Short, and Jacob
arrived).
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85–86 (“I did walk
to that meeting and I did go into the Oval Office with the idea of attending that meeting,
and then I ultimately did not attend the meeting.”).
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86, 94. Cipollone
refused to describe further why he didn’t attend the meeting—“[t]he reasons for that are
privileged”—and would not tell the Select Committee whether he voluntarily decided not
to attend or was told not to.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85, 88.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 88–89 (“[A]t the meeting on the 4th, Eastman
expressed the view that both paths were legally viable.”).
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 89. See also Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 90
(“I think that was threaded throughout, that, again, both were legally viable but that the
preferred course would be to send it back to the States.”), 91 (“. . . he [Eastman] thought
that the more prudent course was a procedural send it back to the States, rather than
reject electors.”), 93 (“On the 4th, I think that he said that both were legally viable options.
But I do think that he said that he was not saying that that was the one that the Vice
President should do.”).
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 89, 91 (“[H]e thought that the more prudent course
was a procedural send it back to the states, rather than reject electors”), 96 (“[M]y impres-
sion was he was thinking more acceptance [by] the country of the action taken”). See also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ings on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 96; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 95, 130 (Q: “Did John Eastman ever admit, as far as
you know, in front of the President that his proposal would violate the Electoral Count
Act?” A: “I believe he did on the 4th.” Q: “Okay. And can you tell us what the President’s
reaction was?” A: “A I can’t.”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob writing after the Oval Office meeting on January 4th, “Professor
Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory law.”).
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 202–03.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 483

155. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 127.
156. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (“Professor Eastman
acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory law”); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 127–28.
157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
158. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Jacob notes in his
memo that Eastman’s proposal also “contradicted the opinion authored by Republican
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley as the decided vote on the Electoral Commission of
1877.” Whereas Eastman wanted the Vice President to refer the manufactured dispute over
slates of electors back to the State legislatures, Justice Bradley wrote that the President of
the Senate (the Vice President) “is not invested with any authority for making any investi-
gation outside of the joint meeting of the two Houses.”
159. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (“[Professor Eastman]
stated that in his view, the imprimatur of approval by a State legislature is important to
the legitimacy of counting any slate of electors other than the one initially certified by the
State’s executive.”).
160. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
161. When pressed by Eric Herschmann on whether states really wanted to certify an alternate
slate, and why they hadn’t taken steps to do so on their own, Eastman had no explanation
or response. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 28–29.
162. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (“Professor Eastman
does not recommend that the Vice President assert that he has the authority unilaterally
to decide which of the competing slates of electors should be counted”); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 127.
163. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000085.
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000182, VP-R0000183,
VP-R0000180, VP-R0000181; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 102–03 (“[I]n fact, there
were no materials, new materials that were actually presented to me by Mr. Eastman . . . I
was open to receiving anything that anybody wanted to give me that might bear on that
question . . . But I also correctly was of the view that I had already looked at everything
and that we knew [ ] where we stood.”).
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 95.
167. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ (“Hello, Georgia, by the way. There’s no
484 CHAPTER 5

way we lost Georgia. There’s no way. That was a rigged election, but we’re still fighting it
and you’ll see what’s going to happen. We’ll talk about it.”).
168. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.
169. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 96, 105; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 201;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000182.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short Deposition (Jan. 26, 2022) p. 201; see also, Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1,
2022) pp. 92, 94, 106; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16,
2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
172. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Greg Jacobs Production), CTRL0000070421, p. 1 (Jan. 5, 2021, Greg
Jacob handwritten notes).
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 92 (“He, again, came into the meeting saying, ‘What I’m here to ask you
to do is to reject the electors.’”).
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 93–95. Eastman acknowledged to Jacob that the pre-
vious day’s discussions had included the “send it back to the states” path, but he
reaffirmed that the ask on the morning of January 5th was to reject electors outright.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 105; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th (“So on the 4th, that had been the path that he had said, ‘I am not recom-
mending that you do that,’ but on the 5th, he came in and expressly requested that.”).
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24-25.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26-27.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107, 117.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107–08. Jacob debated with Eastman all of the his-
torical examples, concluding that in “the 130 years of practice” the Electoral Count Act had
been followed “every single time”; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 485

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 108. What Jacob found when he looked into the Nixon
example is that first, there were no competing slates of electors from Hawaii. In fact, a
Republican slate was originally certified by the outgoing Governor, but after a judicially
ordered recount, it was clear that the Democratic candidate had won, and the incoming
Governor certified a new slate consistent with the outcome of the election after the
recount. Then-Vice President Nixon, when he arrived at Hawaii in the joint session, “mag-
nanimously” acknowledged that it was clear that Hawaii’s votes for Kennedy were the cor-
rect votes and called for objections (of which there were none). This precedent was
therefore an example of the Vice President complying with the Electoral Count Act’s proce-
dures regarding objections to electors. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 15-16.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110 (“[H]e ultimately acknowledged that none of [the
Justices] would actually back this position when you took into account the fact that what
you have is a mildly ambiguous [constitutional provision], a nonsensical result that has all
kinds of terrible policy implications, and uniform historical practice against it”).
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 111. Jacob told the Select Committee he did not know
to whom Eastman was referring when he indicated “they” would be disappointed that Vice
President Pence had not been convinced it was appropriate to reject electors.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 95–96, 210–11.
187. J. Michael Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53 a.m. ET, et seq., available at
https://twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592 (“The only responsibility and
power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral col-
lege votes as they have been cast,”).
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 152, 209; see also Tom Hamburger, Josh Dawsey,
and Jacqueline Alemany, “Jan. 6 Panel Grapples with How to Secure Testimony from Law-
makers, Pence,” Washington Post, (Jan. 15, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/15/jan-6-subpoenas-committee (“‘I did not
notice any hesitation on his part,’ Quayle said of his conversation with Pence. ‘I inter-
preted his questions as looking for confirmation that what he was going to do was right
and that he had no flexibility. That’s the way I read it. Given the pressure he was under, I
thought it was perfectly normal, very smart on his part to call me.’”).
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 157.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 158; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-17.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 157-58.
486 CHAPTER 5

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 215.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 216.
196. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 229; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-16.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 160.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 220-22; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 116,
120. Note that Marc Short recalled that it was this afternoon phone call that led to the
in-person meeting between Eastman and Jacob, however, documents received by the
Select Committee and Jacob’s more detailed recollection of his interactions with Eastman
establishes that the in-person meeting occurred in the morning of January 5, 2021.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (describing the message on this
phone call between the Vice President and President Trump with Eastman’s participation
as, “Well, we hear you loud and clear, you are not going to reject. But remember last night,
I said that there was this more prudent course where you could just send it back to the
States? Would you be willing to do that[?]”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
96-97, 120.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 121.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 121-22 (describing calls from Eastman and at least
one other lawyer (likely either Kurt Olsen or Bill Olson)).
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 123 (recounting Eastman’s argument that election
fraud was resulting in the Constitution being “shredded across all these different states”
and comparing it to the Civil War).
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-24.
205. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to
Change Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/
pence-trump-election-results.html. The same Times reporters had also published on
January 4th an article again accurately reporting that President Trump “had directly
pressed Mr. Pence to find an alternative to certifying Mr. Biden’s win.” Annie Karni and
Maggie Haberman, “Pence’s Choice: Side with the Constitution or His Boss,” New York
Times, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/us/politics/pence-
trump.html.
206. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to
Change Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
207. Maggie Haberman and Anne Karni, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to
Change Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 487

web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/
pence-trump-election-results.html (archived version showing original publication date of
Jan. 5, 2021, at 7:36 p.m. ET).
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 169-70.
209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597)
(January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).
210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597)
(January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597)
(January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).
212. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en (emphasis added); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 175 (“[T]ypically on these, I might have a couple of wording
suggestions . . . ultimately the way this came out was the way he wanted [it] to.”); see id at
174-76.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26,
2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 184-85.
214. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161 (“[W]hoever drafted the statement it was not
accurate.”).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 163.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.
220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000082597, (reflecting calls with
Mr. Stephen Bannon on Jan. 5, 2021, from 8:57 a.m. to 9:08 a.m. and from 9:46 p.m. to 9:52
p.m.).
221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082317 (Jan. 5, 2021, Steve
Bannon War Room Transcript) (Bannon: “All hell is going to break loose tomorrow. Just
understand this: All hell is going to break loose tomorrow. It’s going to be quick . . . It’s the
fog of war.” Bannon discussed putting Sen. Grassley’s number on the screen, and sug-
gested they encourage users at TheDonald.win to contact the Senator. (At the time, users
at TheDonald.win were openly planning for violence and to surround the U.S. Capitol on
488 CHAPTER 5

January 6. See Chapter 6.) Bannon told his audience. “I’ll tell you this, it’s not going to hap-
pen like you think it’s going to happen, Ok? It’s going to be quite extraordinarily different.
And all I can say is strap in.”).
222. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317, (Jan. 5, 2021)
(Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317, (Jan. 5, 2021)
(Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
224. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All
Seasons Press, 2021), p. 252.
225. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All
Seasons Press, 2021), p. 263.
226. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All
Seasons Press, 2021), p. 271.
227. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All
Seasons Press, 2021), p. 252.
228. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All
Seasons Press, 2021), p. 263.
229. See e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27 (“But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it
your impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his position on these issues
to the President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to
President Trump?” A: “Many times.” Q: “And had been consistent in conveying his position
to the President?” A: “Very consistent.”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 102
(“[T]hat’s where the Vice President started. That’s where he stayed the entire way.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 181 (“I believe that the Vice President was consistent
in his understanding of the law and the precedent and his belief as to what his authority
was and was not on January 6th.”).
231. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346698217304584192 (archived).
232. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106131747/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1346808075626426371 (archived).
233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106132244/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346809349214248962 (archived).
234. At 9:02 a.m., President Trump instructed the White House operator to call back with the
Vice President; the operator instead informed the President at 9:15 a.m. that a message
was left for the Vice President. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
P-R000261 (Presidential Call Log, White House Switchboard), P-R000255 (Daily Diary).
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (“11:20 –c w/ VPOTUS”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (“The President talked on
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 489

a phone call to an unidentified person”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p.
12 (stating that a military aide interrupted Pence’s meeting with staff to inform the Vice
President that the President was holding to speak with him).
236. Present in the Oval Office during the call with the Vice President were Melania Trump,
Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka Trump, Eric Trump, Kimberly Guilfoyle, and Lara Trump, as well
as Mark Meadows, Stephen Miller, Eric Herschmann, and Gen. Keith Kellogg. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 30-32, 37.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 39.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 41.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), pp. 17-18.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19 (“And the word that she relayed to you that the
President called the Vice President—apologize for being impolite—but do you remember
what she said her father called him?” “The ‘P’word.”). See also Peter Baker, Maggie Haber-
man, and Annie Karni, “Pence Reached His Limit with Trump. It Wasn’t Pretty,” New York
Times, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-
pence-trump.html; Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York:
Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273–74 (“[Y]ou said, ‘You can be a patriot or you can be a pussy.’ Did
you really say that or is that an incorrect report? ‘‘I wouldn’t dispute it,’ [President Trump]
answered.”).
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald J. Trump,
Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84 (“I know the line of questioning was about sending it back to the
States, but that’s about the extent of my recollection.”).
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 91 (“Q: [Y]ou said he told the Vice President that
he has the legal authority to reject certain votes. Is that what you said? A: That he had the
constitutional authority to do that, yes.”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann
(Apr. 6, 2022), p. 48 (describing it as “a general discussion about the legal and constitu-
tional authority of the VP”).
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 169.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T
Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
490 CHAPTER 5

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 40–41.
249. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
250. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
251. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
252. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat (“We now have
letters from five legislators begging us to do that. They’re asking us. Georgia, Pennsylvania,
Arizona, Wisconsin, and one other coming in.”).
253. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Marc Short Production), J6C-TSM-0003, J6C-TSM-0004,
(January 6, 2021, email from Molly Michael to March Short containing subject line
“2057Rayburn_20210106_002040.pdf” and an attached letter). The letter bore the signatures
of 19 of the 60 members of the Arizona House and 4 of the 30 members of the Arizona
Senate.
254. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235, Chapman005236,
(January 5, 2021, email from John Eastman to Greg Jacob with an attached letter dated
January 4, 2021). In an interview given after January 6th, Eastman argued that the Vice
President still should have acted on the basis of the statement of a minority of the Penn-
sylvania legislature because “it was over Christmas, and they were having trouble getting
ahold of people to sign the letter.” John McCormack, “John Eastman vs. the Eastman
Memo,” National Review, (Oct. 22, 2021), available at https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/
10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo/.
255. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235, Chapman005236.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022). Corman told the Select Committee that he
understood the Vice President’s role at the joint session was not substantive.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 167-68; see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p.
14; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 166-67.
259. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
260. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
261. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 491

262. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Com-
bat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-
speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat (emphasis
added). Note in particular Eastman’s assertions regarding voting machines, for example,
“They put those ballots in a secret folder in the machines. Sitting there waiting until they
know how many they need.” Eastman would later describe what he was calling on the Vice
President to do as merely “to pause the proceedings.” John C. Eastman, “Setting the
Record Straight on the POTUS ‘Ask’,” The American Mind, (Jan. 18, 2021), available at
https://americanmind.org/memo/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-potus-ask/.
263. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
264. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
265. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
266. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
267. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
268. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
269. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
270. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762. Between 12:45 and 1:00 p.m., Vice
President Pence processed with the Senate to the House Chamber. See Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris
Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 202-03. The Vice President’s statement was issued publicly
and distributed on the House floor before the Vice President convened the joint session at
approximately 1:05 p.m. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 173; see also Donna Cas-
sata and Felicia Sonmez, “Congress Meets in Joint Session to Confirm Biden’s Win, Over the
Objections of Dozens of Republicans,” Washington Post, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-
updates/#link-DUX3QUF3TVDNZDEGO7KIK2JSYE.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 164.
272. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762; see also Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), VP-R0000121, (January 6, 2021, Dear Colleague letter issued
by Vice President Pence).
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 27-28 (testifying that, in consultation with the Sen-
ate Parliamentarian, the Vice President purposefully revised the standard language used
by previous vice presidents at the joint session of Congress because of efforts by the
492 CHAPTER 5

Trump Campaign and allies to create the public perception that there were “other slates
of electors that were being considered or [ ] being put forward.”).
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 186-88; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 53-54;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 50-51. The Senate Parliamentarian offers
advice and guidance on compliance with the Senate’s rules. See CRS Report, The Office of
the Parliamentarian in the House and Senate, (Nov. 28, 2018) RS20544. The Office of the
Secretary of the Senate, on behalf of the Senate Parliamentarian and her staff, declined
requests for information about this topic, as well as other January 6-related topics, from
the Select Committee citing the independent relationship of the Senate and House as well
as “historical congressional norms.”
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 64; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 54-56
(testifying that the Vice President’s understanding of his role as explained in the Dear Col-
league letter he released on January 6th was set as of his meeting with the Parliamentar-
ian on January 3rd).
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 2728;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00163, (Vice President Superscript for
Joint Session to Count Electoral Ballots January 6, 2021), 00181, (Response to Submissions
NOT Certified by a State); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000103_0001 (Pence joint session scripted responses).
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 42. Jacob learned through the media that Trump
electors had met and purported to cast electoral votes but, seeing no indication that any
of the groups that met had “an imprimatur of State authority,” he concluded that they
would not qualify as competing slates under the Electoral Count Act. See Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 51; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 54 (“I’m sure I,
either in my oral conversation with Elizabeth [MacDonough] or in looking at this spread-
sheet, confirmed my conclusion that none of these had the requisite State authority.”).
278. The Senate Parliamentarian and her staff tracked the receipt of legitimate electoral votes
from the states as well as the private citizen submissions (including the fake slates sub-
mitted by Trump electors) and identified the many deficiencies of the fake documents.
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP R0000323_0001 (Jan. 3, 2021 email
exchange with Senate Parliamentarian), VP R0000417_0001 (Jan. 2 and 3, 2021 email
exchange with Senate Parliamentarian), VP R0000418_0001 (list of deficiencies in alternate
elector slates); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094, (list of deficiencies
in alternate elector slates). The Senate Parliamentarian reviewed each purported slate of
electoral votes to separate those in regular form and authorized by a State from those
submitted by private citizens—the Trump Campaign’s fake electors fell into this latter cat-
egory. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 53—54; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodg-
son, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 44-45.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 493

279. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at 11:07–11:37, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session (emphasis added).
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 94-95. See also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National
Archives Production), VP-R0000076, VP-R0000417, VP-R0000418, (January 3, 2021, emails and
spreadsheet showing OVP staff tracking the arrival of fake electors’ certificates).
281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000090 (text messages exchanged
between Republican officials in Wisconsin, including statement that “[f]reaking trump idi-
ots want someone to fly original elector papers to the Senate President.”).
282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00012, (message from Rep. Kelly’s Chief
of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson on Jan. 6, 2021, at 8:41 am), 00058, (messages from
Senator Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson on Jan. 6, 2021, around 12:37
pm).
283. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00058 (Chris Hodgson responding to
Sean Riley, “Do not give that to him. He’s about to walk over to preside over the joint ses-
sion, those were supposed to come in through the mail[.]” And, “The VP absolutely should
not receive any mail that hasn’t been screened.”).
284. See, e.g., “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at 15:33–15:59, Jan. 6, 2021, avail-
able at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
285. Karoun Demirjian, “GOP Members Object to Arizona’s Electoral Votes for Biden,” Washing-
ton Post, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/
congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/#link-TSWL74F2SVHBHET7GQR5IEP6FI .
286. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at 15:59–17:16, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
287. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at 17:16–18:01, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 29.
289. House vote on Arizona (Roll No. 10): 167 Cong. Rec. H93 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 121-303;
House vote on PA (Roll No. 11): 167 Cong. Rec. H112 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 138-282; Senate
vote on Arizona (Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.): 167 Cong. Rec. S31-32 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 6-93;
Senate vote on PA (Rollcall Vote. No. 2 Leg.): 167 Cong. Rec. S38 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 7-92.
290. Katie Meyer, “Congress Certifies Pa. Results, Biden’s Victory After Chaotic Day of Violent
Insurrection,” WHYY, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://whyy.org/articles/casey-fitzpatrick-
condemn-violent-insurrection-as-congress-moves-toward-certifying-biden/.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-74.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-75.
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 193.
294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-09.
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-10; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), P-R001019–P-R001020 (Jan. 6, 2021, NSC Chat Log).
494 CHAPTER 5

296. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346900434540240897.
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019–P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 37-38.
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019–P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).
303. See Chapter 8; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 31-32.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 63-65.
306. On the evening of January 6, 2021, the President’s Military Aide told the Vice President’s
Military Aide (who relayed it to the Secret Service) that Marc Short’s access to the White
House complex had been cancelled. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production),
CTRL0000513149 (January 6-7, 2021), CTRL0000673145 (January 6, 2021). Several people
relayed to Marc Short that “some who instigated the President”—possibly Peter Navarro—
suggested to the President that “Marc was responsible for leading the Vice President on
the path he took,” which resulted in the President exclaiming that Mr. Short should be
locked out of the White House. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 236-37; see also
Biba Adams, “Pence’s Chief of Staff Denied Entry into WH: Trump ‘Blaming Me’,” Yahoo
News, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.yahoo.com/video/pence-chief-staff-denied-
entry-173848235.html.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 238.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 31, 45 (“The reason was he felt like, for the world’s
greatest democracy, to see a motorcade, a 15-car motorcade fleeing the Capitol would
send all the wrong signals. So he was adamant to say: I want to stay here in the Capitol.”);
see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 29-31, 44-45; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” 495

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 198.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.
313. Jacob told the Select Committee that he recognized that January 6 was going to be “an his-
torically important day” and he wanted to memorialize exactly what he thought of the
arguments made by Eastman on January 5th, to supplement the memo he wrote to Vice
President Pence reflecting the arguments Eastman made on January 4th. Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 200-01.
314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005370 (January 6, 2021,
emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).
315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005379 (January 6, 2021,
emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 246-47.
319. “READ: Mike Pence’s Statement to the Senate on the Storming of the Capitol,” U.S. News,
(Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2021-01-06/
read-mike-pences-statement-to-the-senate-on-the-storming-of-the-capitol; see also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 246 (testifying that the Vice President wrote his
remarks himself in his ceremonial office after the Capitol was cleared).
320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, (January 6, 2021, emails
between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).
321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, p. 1, (January 6, 2021,
emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, (January 6, 2021, emails
between Greg Jacob and John Eastman). Note that Greg Jacob’s testimony establishes that
this email was likely received on January 6, 2021, at 11:44 p.m., not at 4:44 a.m. the follow-
ing morning as shown on the face of this document as produced. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 205. As noted in the Executive Summary, the Select Committee also
received certain documents in UTC time, which is five hours ahead of EST.
324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005479 (January 6, 2021,
emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman). This email represents John Eastman again
encouraging, in writing and just after the violent attack on the Capitol had been quelled,
496 CHAPTER 5

that the Vice President use this as a justification for a further and much more serious vio-
lation of the law—delaying the certification. Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th. Eastman attempted to minimize what he was doing by calling the Electoral
Count Act a “minor procedural statute.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 133. In an
email sent at 1:33 p.m., just before the Capitol was breached, Eastman wrote, “I’m sorry
Greg, but this is small minded. You’re sticking with minor procedural statutes while the
Constitution is being shredded.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000166.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
328. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman0064047, (January 11, 2021,
email from John Eastman to Rudy Giuliani).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 35-36.
 6

“BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!”

On December 14, 2020, electors around the country met to cast their
Electoral College votes. Their vote ensured former Vice President Joe
Biden's victory and cemented President Donald J. Trump's defeat. The
people, and the States, had spoken. Members of President Trump’s own
Cabinet knew the election was over. Attorney General William Barr viewed it
as “the end of the matter.” 1 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary
of Labor Eugene Scalia concurred.2 That same day, Scalia told President
Trump directly that he should concede defeat.3
President Trump had no intention of conceding. As he plotted ways to
stay in power, the President summoned a mob for help.
At 1:42 a.m., on December 19th, President Trump tweeted: “Big protest
in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” 4
The President’s tweet galvanized tens of thousands of his supporters
around the country. President Trump had been lying to them since election
day, claiming he won, and that the Democrats had stolen victory from him.
Now, with a single tweet, the President focused his supporters’ anger on
the joint session of Congress in Washington, DC on January 6th.
Anika Navaroli, the longest-tenured member of Twitter’s Trust and
Safety Policy team, monitored the reaction to President Trump’s “be wild”
tweet. She told the Select Committee that the President was “essentially
staking a flag in DC . . . for his supporters to come and rally.” 5 The tweet
created a “fire hose” of calls to overthrow the U.S. Government. President
Trump’s supporters had a new sense of urgency because they felt “as if
their Commander in Chief” had summoned them.6
For many extremists and conspiracy theorists, the President’s
announcement was a call to arms.7
For the Proud Boys—described in more detail below—and their leader,
Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, President Trump’s tweet set in motion a chain of
events that led directly to the attack on the U.S. Capitol. In the days that
followed, the Proud Boys reorganized their hierarchy, imposed a stricter

499
500 CHAPTER 6

Tarrio’s video appears on a screen during a Select Committee hearing on June 09, 2022.
Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images

chain-of-command, and instructed followers to go “incognito” on January

6th.8 The Proud Boys had made their presence known at previous pro-
Trump events, including “Stop the Steal” rallies, where they brandished
their black and yellow apparel and engaged in street brawls.9 Suddenly, they
did not want to stand out from the crowd. They wanted to blend in. They
were planning something big.10
Tarrio allegedly used encrypted messages to plot the January 6, 2021,
attack. On January 4, 2021, Tarrio told his men that they should “storm the
Capitol.” 11 While the attack was underway, Tarrio claimed credit in a pri-
vate chat, writing: “We did this.” 12 And on the evening of January 6th,
Tarrio released a video of a man, presumably Tarrio himself, dressed in an
odd costume standing in front of the U.S. Capitol. The eerie production had
been recorded prior to the events of that day. Tarrio—who was not in
Washington, DC on January 6th13—titled it, “Premonition.” 14
The Oath Keepers, a far-right, anti-government militia movement—
also described in more detail below—began planning for January 6th after
the President’s tweet as well. Stewart Rhodes, the group’s leader, had agi-
tated against the U.S. Government for years.15 Immediately following the
2020 presidential election, Rhodes and others schemed to stop the peaceful
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 501

transfer of power. They stored weapons outside of Washington, DC,16 hop-

ing that President Trump would deputize them as his own militia.17 An Oath
Keeper leader, Kelly Meggs, read President Trump’s December 19th tweet
and commented in a Facebook message: “He called us all to the Capitol and
wants us to make it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!!” 18 The Oath Keepers formed two
military “stacks” and marched up the steps of the U.S. Capitol on January
6th. Meggs led one of them.19
Members of both the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers have been charged
with “seditious conspiracy” and other serious crimes, including conspiracy
to interfere with a Federal proceeding; some, including Stewart Rhodes,
have been convicted.20 U.S. law defines seditious conspiracy as plotting “to
overthrow,” or “to oppose by force,” or to use “force to prevent, hinder, or
delay the execution of any law of the United States.” 21 Some of the two
groups’ members have already admitted that this is what they intended to
do.22
Other extremists and conspiracy theorists mobilized after President
Trump’s tweet as well. These movements are described in more detail in
subsequent sections. Three Percenter militias—another far-right, anti-
government movement—shared “#OccupyCongress” memes23 and planned
for violence at the U.S. Capitol.24 Nick Fuentes, leader of the white national-
ist “Groypers,” rallied his followers for January 6th.25 Fuentes bragged
afterwards that the “Capitol siege was fucking awesome.” 26 Users on
TheDonald.win, a website populated by some of President Trump’s most
ardent fans, openly discussed surrounding and occupying the U.S. Capitol.27
Adherents of QAnon, a bizarre and dangerous conspiracy cult, believed
January 6th would bring the prophesied “Storm”—a violent purge of
Democrats and government officials promised by the mysterious online
personality known only as “Q.” 28 QAnon’s devotees flocked to Washington,
DC because of the President’s tweet and subsequent rhetoric. They shared a
digital banner, “Operation Occupy the Capitol,” which depicted the U.S.
Capitol being torn in two.29
One especially notorious conspiracy theorist, Alex Jones, repeatedly told
his InfoWars’ viewers that January 6th would be a day of reckoning.30 Jones
is known for his outlandish conspiracy-mongering, including his baseless
claim that the massacre of school children at Sandy Hook Elementary
School was really a “false flag” operation staged by the U.S. Government. Of
course, his vicious lie was disproven in court, but Jones is obsessed with
“deep state” conspiracy theories and often propagates them.31 After the
2020 presidential election, Jones argued that President Trump should use
the power of the Government to impose martial law on American citizens.32
Along with his InfoWars co-hosts, Jones amplified President Trump’s “Big
502 CHAPTER 6

Lie” and relentlessly promoted President Trump’s “wild” protest. One of

Jones’ co-hosts floated the idea of “storming right into the Capitol.” 33
Jones himself marched to the Capitol January 6th.34
Jones’s influence helped shape the planning for January 6th behind the
scenes as well. The Select Committee investigated how event organizers and
the White House staff planned President Trump’s rally at the Ellipse, a park
south of the White House. This event was intended to rile up the President’s
supporters just prior to the joint session of Congress. A wealthy heiress paid
for the event after listening to Jones’ InfoWars rant about the importance of
President Trump’s tweet. She spent $3 million with the goal to “get as
many people there as possible.” 35 It worked—Americans who believed the
election was stolen flocked to the Nation’s capital.
By January 5th, President Trump’s supporters—a large, angry crowd
ready for instructions—had assembled in Washington. That evening, he
could hear his raucous supporters at a rally not far from the White House.
The President knew his supporters were “angry,” 36 and he planned to call
on them to march on the U.S. Capitol.37 He even wanted to join them on the
march.38 It was all part of President Trump’s plan to intimidate officials
and obstruct the joint session of Congress.
“We fight like hell,” President Trump told the crowd assembled at the
Ellipse on January 6, 2021. “And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going
to have a country anymore.” 39 Some of those in attendance, as well as else-
where in Washington that day, were already prepared to fight. They had
begun preparing two and a half weeks earlier—when President Trump told
them it would “be wild!”

6.1 HOW FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISTS AND CONSPIRACY THEORISTS PLANNED FOR

JANUARY 6TH

THE “STOP THE STEAL” COALITION

President Trump’s “be wild” tweet immediately mobilized extremists and
conspiracy theorists in the “Stop the Steal” coalition. The phrase “Stop the
Steal” was originally coined in early 2016 by President Trump’s longtime
political advisor, Roger Stone.40 At the time, Stone alleged first that Candi-
date Trump’s Republican rivals were attempting to steal Candidate Trump’s
nomination.41 After Trump became the nominee, Stone repurposed the say-
ing to claim that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would steal the
presidency.42 When President Trump won the 2016 election, “Stop the
Steal” was rendered moot—and did not become a significant political
movement until President Trump’s defeat on election night in 2020.43 As
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 503

early as November 5, 2020, Stone advised associates that he intended to

reconstitute “Stop the Steal” by building an army of lawyers and suing
“like there’s no tomorrow.” 44
Ali Alexander, a rightwing provocateur who has worked closely with
Stone,45 quickly organized a new “Stop the Steal” campaign. On November
10, 2020, Alexander established “Stop the Steal” as an entity incorporated
in Alabama.46 Alexander added a bank account and various websites.47
One of Alexander’s key allies in the “Stop the Steal” movement was
Alex Jones. Prior to January 6th, Jones riled up crowds both in-person and
online with incendiary rhetoric about the election. Jones’ InfoWars was also
a platform for others in the election-denial coalition. For instance, both
Enrique Tarrio and Stewart Rhodes made multiple appearances on InfoWars,
including between election day 2020 and January 6, 2021.48
Another frequent guest on InfoWars was Roger Stone—a nexus charac-
ter in the “Stop the Steal” coalition.49 Stone recommended that then Presi-
dential Candidate Donald Trump appear on Jones’s show in December
2015.50 Trump accepted the invitation and praised Jones at length during
his appearance.51 The significance of Trump’s interview with Jones should
not be underestimated. Donald Trump was a leading presidential contender
at the time and would go on to win the election. His appearance with Jones
normalized InfoWars, welcoming its conspiracy-minded audience into
Trump’s base.52 Trump did not appear on InfoWars again. However, Stone
continued to make regular guest appearances.53
After election day 2020, Alexander Jones, and other “Stop the Steal”
organizers, held rallies around the country to protest fictional claims of
voter fraud. These events provided an opportunity for radicals and extrem-
ists to coalesce. The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters were
all attendees. QAnon adherents were well-represented. So, too, were the
white nationalist Groypers and their leader, Nick Fuentes.
“Stop the Steal” events and other protests throughout 2020 helped
build the momentum for January 6th. The Select Committee collected data
on 85 right-wing events between January 1, 2020, and January 20, 2021,
which were inspired by opposition to COVID-19 lockdown measures, racial
justice protests, and, later, the perceived theft of President Trump’s vic-
tory.54 Far-right extremists protested at or inside State capitols, or at other
government buildings, in at least 68 instances.55 Of those, 49 occurred dur-
ing the period after the election through January 6th.56 In the year leading
up to January 6th, there were at least nine events at which far-right actors
entered State capitols.57At least four of these capitol incursions—in
Michigan,58 Idaho,59 Arizona,60 and Oregon61—involved identifiable indi-
viduals who later participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
504 CHAPTER 6

Alex Jones and Ali Alexander inside the Georgia State Capitol during a "Stop the Steal" rally
on November 18, 2020 in Atlanta, Georgia.
Photo by Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images

Consider, for example, the protests held in Atlanta between November

18 and 21, 2020. Leaders and rank-and-file members of the Proud Boys,
Oath Keepers, and Groypers, gathered outside the State capitol and the gov-
ernor’s mansion for nonstop events, including armed protests. Enrique
Tarrio62 and Stewart Rhodes63 personally led contingents of the Proud Boys
and Oath Keepers, respectively.
Jones first announced the Atlanta events on InfoWars on November
16th. In his announcement, Jones teased that he would be joined by Roger
Stone and also called on listeners to “surround the governor’s mansion” in
order to prevent the election results from being certified.64 Fuentes adver-
tised that he would be speaking at the capitol every day at noon.65 In fiery
speeches across Atlanta, Fuentes spread election lies as well as wink-and-
nod hints at intimidation and violence.66
Alexander, standing alongside Jones and Fuentes outside the State
capitol on November 18th, exhorted the crowd to “storm the capitol” with
them.67 The three men led a crowd into the State capitol building. On
November 20th, Roger Stone gave a speech outside the Georgia capitol.
Speaking through a telephone held up by Alexander, Stone advanced elec-
tion lies, and finished with a provocative rallying cry: “Victory or death!” 68
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 505

That same day, Fuentes told the crowd, “Look, we’ve been in front of the
State capitol, maybe we’ve been trying the wrong approach.” 69 Days ear-
lier, at a nighttime event outside the governor’s mansion, Alexander, again
flanked by Jones and Fuentes, goaded the crowd: “We’ll light the whole shit
on fire.” 70
While the crowd did not turn violent, the “Stop the Steal” protests in
Atlanta, Georgia, prefigured January 6th in important respects. “Stop the
Steal” organizers tried to use the mob they had assembled—including
extremists from the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters and
Groypers—to intimidate lawmakers and overturn the election results in
Georgia, which was required to certify former Vice President Biden’s victory
in the State by the end of that week.71 They implored their followers to
“storm the capitol.” 72 As discussed in Chapter 8, this same coalition of
radicals did just that on January 6, 2021.
Other “Stop the Steal” events helped pave the way for the events of
January 6th. Two rallies in Washington D.C.—on November 14 and Decem-
ber 12, 2020—were critically important. Alexander’s “Stop the Steal” was
not the only protest organization present at these events. Both were called
“Million MAGA Marches” and drew in other rally organizers. One of these
other protests was called the “Jericho March” prayer rally.73 Regardless,
the same constellation of actors that appeared in Atlanta also incited
Trump supporters in Washington.
For instance, during the Jericho March rally on December 12th, Stewart
Rhodes called on President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act as part of
a desperate gambit to remain in power. In Rhodes’ vision, he would lead
militiamen on behalf of President Trump when others tried to remove him
from office.74 If President Trump did not invoke the Insurrection Act,
Rhodes warned the crowd, then they would be forced to wage a “much
more desperate [and] much more bloody war.” Alex Jones also gave an
incendiary speech at the Jericho March event, declaring: “I don't know who
is going to the White House in 38 days, but I sure know this, Joe Biden is a
globalist, and Joe Biden will be removed, one way or another!” 75
As the crowds gathered in Washington on December 12th, President
Trump was publicly lobbying the Supreme Court to hear his fictious claims
of election fraud. The President assailed the Supreme Court on Twitter
throughout the day.76 The “Stop the Steal” coalition was eager to help.
After the Jericho March event ended, Jones, his InfoWars co-host Owen
Shroyer, and Ali Alexander led a march on the Supreme Court. Once there,
the crowd chanted slogans such as “Stop the Steal!”; “1776!!”; “Our revo-
lution!”; and “The fight has just begun!!” 77
506 CHAPTER 6

“Million MAGA March” protest on November 14, 2020 in Washington, DC.

Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images

President Trump made sure to let the protestors in Washington know

that he personally approved of their mission. During the November rally,
President Trump waved to the crowd from his presidential motorcade.78
Then, on the morning of December 12th, President Trump tweeted: “Wow!
Thousands of people forming in Washington (D.C.) for Stop the Steal.
Didn’t know about this, but I’ll be seeing them! #MAGA.” 79 Later that day,
President Trump flew over the protestors in Marine One.80
When President Trump tweeted one week later that there would be a
“wild” protest in Washington on January 6th, the “Stop the Steal” coalition
immediately began to mobilize. Jones posted an article on the InfoWars
website asking readers if they would “answer President Trump’s call to
defend the Republic?” 81 The next day, December 20th, Jones devoted much
of his InfoWars show to the President’s announcement. Jones told his audi-
ence several times that if 10 million Americans came to Washington, DC on
January 6th, Congress would have to listen to them.82 He repeated this idea
over the course of the episode, saying things such as, “He’s calling you, he
needs your help, we need your help, we need 10 million people there,”
“[w]e need martial law and have to prevent the police state of foreigners
from taking over.” Jones added: “It’s literally in our hands. It’s literally up
to us.” 83
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 507

Other InfoWars hosts promoted the “wild” protest as well. In late

December, Matt Bracken told InfoWars viewers that it may be necessary to
storm the U.S. Capitol. “We're going to only be saved by millions of Ameri-
cans moving to Washington, occupying the entire area, if—if necessary
storming right into the Capitol,” Bracken said. “You know, they're—we
know the rules of engagement. If you have enough people, you can push
down any kind of a fence or a wall.” 84
Far-right extremists planned to do just that.

6.2 THE PROUD BOYS: “[Y]OU WANT TO STORM THE CAPITOL”

From the Proud Boys’ founding in 2016, violence was intrinsic to their mis-
sion. “We will kill you. That’s the Proud Boys in a nutshell,” their founder
said.85 New recruits pledge an oath, established in the group’s bylaws,
identifying themselves as unapologetic “Western chauvinists,” 86 promot-
ing an exclusionary, hyper-masculine interpretation of Western culture.87
They find common ground in an embrace of misogyny and hate for their
perceived enemies.88 The group is somewhat ethnically diverse, but their
public and private messages fester with toxic white supremacist, xenopho-
bic, and anti-Semitic slurs.89
The Proud Boys have participated in, or instigated, protests since their
founding.90 They’ve long been known as street brawlers looking for a
fight.91 But 2020 was a watershed year for the group. As protests spread
around the country, the Proud Boys deputized themselves as agents of law
and order—vigilantes against perceived threats.92 More often, they played
the role of instigators.93 They portrayed themselves as counter-protestors
and identified their targets as Black Lives Matter and Antifa—though they
were hard-pressed to define their organizational enemies.94
During the presidential debate on September 29, 2020, President Trump
was asked to disavow far-right extremists, including the Proud Boys. The
President did not explicitly condemn the group. Instead, he seemingly
endorsed their mission. “Stand back and stand by,” President Trump told
the Proud Boys, before adding, “but I’ll tell you what . . . somebody’s got to
do something about Antifa and the left.” 95 The President’s words electri-
fied the group, injecting new life into their recruitment and activities.
According to Nick Quested, a filmmaker who spent significant time with the
group and testified before the Select Committee, the Proud Boys had found
their “savior” in President Trump.96
Joseph Biggs, a senior Proud Boy, immediately trumpeted President
Trump’s debate statement on Parler,97 a fringe social media platform. Biggs
made it clear that the Proud Boys were ready to fight Antifa.98 The group’s
508 CHAPTER 6

A Proud Boy during a "Stop the Steal" rally on November 7, 2020 in Salem, Oregon.
Photo by Nathan Howard/Getty Images

size “tripled” in response to President Trump’s apparent endorsement,

according to Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boys leader who has pleaded guilty to
seditious conspiracy in relation to January 6th.99 Similarly, Enrique Tarrio
and another Proud Boys member, George Meza, testified to the Select Com-
mittee that the President’s comment was a pivotal, energizing moment.100
The group started selling merchandise with their new “stand back and
stand by” slogan the very same night.101
As the presidential votes were tallied, the Proud Boys became agitated
at the prospect that President Trump would lose. On November 5, 2020,
Biggs posted on social media, “It’s time for fucking war if they steal this
shit.” 102 As former Vice President Joe Biden’s victory became apparent,
Proud Boys leaders directed their ire toward others in the Government.
Biggs, speaking on a Proud Boys livestream show with Tarrio and others,
warned that government officials are “evil scum, and they all deserve to die
a traitor’s death.” Ethan Nordean—another Proud Boys leader who alleg-
edly helped lead the attack at the Capitol—responded, “Yup, Day of the
Rope,” 103 referring to a day of mass lynching of “race traitors” in the white
supremacist novel The Turner Diaries.104
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 509

THE PROUD BOYS IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO JANUARY 6TH

Within days of the election, dozens of “Stop the Steal” protests were orga-
nized around the country.105 The Proud Boys participated alongside other
right-wing extremist groups in some of them, including a November 7,
2020, protest outside of the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg.106 The
two events in Washington, DC—on November 14, 2020, and the other on
December 12, 2020—proved to be especially important for the group’s evo-
lution.
The daytime events on both dates passed by without violence or major
unrest, but as the sun set, bouts of violence erupted,107 driven by clashes
between far-right extremist groups—chiefly the Proud Boys—and counter-
protestors.108 Among far-right extremists, the Proud Boys had the largest
showing in both November and December,109 with roughly 200 to 300
Proud Boys at the November 14th rally, and the same number or more in
December.110 As discussed in Chapter 8, they mustered about the same con-
tingent for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
The gathering on November 14th provided a chance for Tarrio to social-
ize with rally leaders and far-right celebrities. In fact, his travel to DC by
private jet appears to have been paid for by Patrick Byrne, a businessman
who had President Trump’s ear in the last weeks of his presidency and
encouraged the President to authorize the seizure of voting machines in a
December 18th meeting.111 Tarrio’s testimony and photographs from the
day show that he met with “Stop the Steal” organizer Ali Alexander that
evening, and the pair toasted each other.112 Tarrio described the event as a
“historic” meeting of Trump supporters and celebrated the opportunity to
share that platform with Alexander, Jones, and Jones’ InfoWars co-host,
Owen Shroyer.113 Shroyer would later be charged with crimes committed
during the January 6th attack.114
A month later, the Proud Boys returned to the Nation’s capital. On the
evening of December 11th, hundreds of Proud Boys and friends gathered in
downtown Washington, DC to listen to an impromptu bullhorn speech by
Tarrio and Nordean, along with Roger Stone and Shroyer.115 Stone implored
the crowd to “fight to the bitter end.” 116
The next day, as the Proud Boys marched in force on the streets, Tarrio
teased in a social media post that he had a meeting in the White House.117
The visit, which was only a public White House tour, appears to have been
facilitated by a friend, Bianca Gracia, the head of Latinos for Trump.118 As
the rallies concluded the next day, the Proud Boys took to the streets again.
Two key events occurred that evening.
First, members of the Proud Boys tore down a Black Lives Matter ban-
ner from a historically Black church in downtown Washington, DC.119 They
510 CHAPTER 6

filmed themselves burning it.120 Tarrio was eventually charged with

destruction of property.121 He was arrested on January 4, 2021, and banned
from Washington, DC, barring him from joining the group at the Capitol.122
As explained in Chapter 8, however, Tarrio’s arrest did not stop him from
conspiring with his men on January 6th.
Minutes after the flag burning, a man wearing black clothes walked into
a crowd of Proud Boys.123 Assuming he was associated with Antifa, they
began pushing and harassing him, and he drew a knife in response.124 In
the ensuing melee, four Proud Boys suffered stab wounds, including
Bertino, a confidant to Tarrio.125 Bertino’s wounds were severe and life-
threatening, preventing him from joining the group on January 6th.126

STORMING THE WINTER PALACE

The Proud Boys began to reorient and formalize their operations to focus
on January 6th after President Trump’s December 19th tweet. Inspired, in
part, by Bertino’s stabbing, the Proud Boys centered their new hierarchy in
group chats that used terms such as “Ministry of Self Defense” (MOSD).127
However, the words “Self Defense” were misleading: Enrique Tarrio and
others would soon go on the offense. And the MOSD served as their organi-
zational scaffolding for the January 6, 2021, attack.
On December 20, 2020, Tarrio established a “national rally planning
committee” and created an encrypted MOSD chat to organize their activi-
ties.128 Tarrio added Proud Boys leaders from across the country, including
several who played lead roles in the violence on January 6th.129 In the ensu-
ing weeks, the Proud Boys traded equipment recommendations, shared
maps marked with law enforcement positions, and established command
and control structures.130 A separate encrypted chat, named “Boots on the
Ground,” was established for foot soldiers who would be in Washington, DC
on January 6th.131
The Proud Boys’ planning for January 6th was a significant step in the
group’s evolution. Previously, they were loosely organized. The MOSD was
created to enforce a “top down structure” with a defined leadership.132
Tarrio stressed the command structure by telling members that they
needed to “[f]it in [] or fuck off.” 133
From the start, it was clear that MOSD chat members were intensely
interested in disrupting the electoral count on January 6th. On December
20, 2020, one MOSD leader stated, “I assume most of the protest will be at
the capital [sic] building given what’s going on inside.” 134 On December 29,
2020, in a group message to the MOSD, a member wrote, “I know most of
the events will be centered around freedom plaza. . . .” Tarrio responded,
“Negative. They’re centered around the Capitol.” 135
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 511

On December 30, 2020, Tarrio received an intriguing document titled,

“1776 Returns.” 136 The document was apparently sent to him by cryptocur-
rency investors in South Florida.137 The file’s author(s) divided their plan
into five parts, “Infiltrate, Execution, Distract, Occupy and Sit-In,” with
the goal of overrunning several Federal buildings around the U.S. Capitol.
The plan specifically mentioned House and Senate office buildings, setting
forth steps for occupying them. The author(s) called for “the masses to
rush the building[s],” distract law enforcement in the area by pulling fire
alarms around the city, target specific Senators’ offices, and disguise par-
ticipants’ identities with COVID masks.138
One proposal mentioned in the document is titled, “Storm the Winter
Palace.” 139 This is a reference to a dramatic reenactment of the 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, during which Vladimir Lenin ordered his forces to
take over the Romanovs’ residence in Petrograd. The “Winter Palace” was
the seat of the provisional government, which had held out against the
Bolshevik revolutionaries. The Proud Boys would frame their actions on
January 6th as part of the American Revolution. But the “1776 Returns”
document shows their inspiration came at least in part from the
Communist Revolution, which led to 70-plus years of totalitarian rule. No
historical event has been less American.
The Proud Boys did not adopt the “1776 Returns” plan in full. Several
Proud Boys testified that they were unaware of the document before it
became public.140 But the document does appear to have been significantly
edited while in the Proud Boys’ hands.141 The person who sent it to Tarrio—
his ex-girlfriend, Eryka Gemma Flores—commented, “The revolution is
[more] important than anything.” To which Tarrio responded: “That’s
what every waking moment consists of . . . I’m not playing games.” 142
On January 3rd, Tarrio posted a conspicuous question on Telegram:
“What if we invade it?” The first response to his post read: “January 6th is
D day [sic] in America.” 143 In private, on the Proud Boys’ leadership group
message, planning continued. One MOSD leader, John Stewart, floated a
plan that centered around “the front entrance to the Capitol building.” 144
At 7:10 p.m. on January 3rd, Stewart wrote to the MOSD leaders:
I mean the main operating theater should be out in front of the
house of representatives. It should be out in front of the Capitol
building. That’s where the vote is taking place and all of the objec-
tions. So, we can ignore the rest of these stages and all that shit and
plan the operations based around the front entrance to the Capitol
building. I strongly recommend you use the national mall and not
Pennsylvania avenue though. It’s wide-open space, you can see
everything coming from all angles.145
512 CHAPTER 6

Early the next morning, on January 4th, Tarrio sent a voice memo to the
same group of MOSD leaders stating, “I didn’t hear this voice until now,
you want to storm the Capitol.” 146
One of Tarrio’s comrades in the Proud Boys’ leadership, Charles
Donohoe—who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct an official proceed-
ing and assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers147—later told
authorities that by January 4th he “was aware that members of MOSD lead-
ership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol.” 148 Donohoe
“believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the group’s goal of stop-
ping the government from carrying out the transfer of presidential power”
and “understood that storming the Capitol would be illegal.” 149 By the fol-
lowing evening, January 5th, Tarrio was discussing with other Proud Boy
leaders a “tactical plan” for the following day. Their “objective” was “to
obstruct, impede, or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College
vote.” 150 Moreover, Donohoe understood that the Proud Boys “would pur-
sue this through the use of force and violence, in order to show Congress
that ‘we the people’ were in charge.” 151 On January 6th, Charles Donohoe
understood that two of his fellow Proud Boys’ leaders—Ethan Nordean and
Joe Biggs—“were searching for an opportunity to storm the Capitol.” 152
Jeremy Bertino, the Proud Boys leader who was stabbed on the night of
December 12th, later told authorities that his fellow extremists plotted to
stop the peaceful transfer of power. In October 2022, Bertino pleaded guilty
to “seditious conspiracy” and other crimes.153 Bertino admitted that the
Proud Boys traveled to Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, “to stop the
certification of the Electoral College Vote.” They “were willing to do what-
ever it would take, including using force against police and others, to
achieve that objective.” 154
In testimony before the Select Committee, Bertino recalled a telling text
exchange with Tarrio on the evening of January 6th. “I was like, ‘holy shit,’
or something like that I said to him,” Bertino recalled. “And I was like, ‘I
can’t believe this is happening,’ or something like that, and ‘1776.’ ” 155
Tarrio replied to Bertino: “Winter Palace.” 156

6.3 THE OATH KEEPERS: “HE CALLED US ALL TO THE CAPITOL AND WANTS US TO
MAKE IT WILD!!!”

The Oath Keepers, founded in 2009 by Elmer Stewart Rhodes, is a far-right

anti-government organization. The group targets former and current mili-
tary and law enforcement for recruitment. Their name refers to the oath
taken by public servants to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. The
Oath Keepers’ claimed fealty to the U.S. Constitution is belied by their
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 513

obsession with conspiracy theories about alleged evil-intentioned elites in

the Government.157 Rhodes has often spouted these conspiracy theories on
InfoWars.158
Over the summer of 2020, the Oath Keepers organized armed groups,
ostensibly to serve as volunteer, self-appointed security at protests around
the country. The Oath Keepers used the protests to draw in new recruits.159
They also built muscle memory by coordinating for these events. For
example, the Oath Keepers hired Michael Greene, who later coordinated
Oath Keepers’ activities on January 5th and 6th, to lead security operations
in multiple cities around the country.160 In the early part of 2020, protests
against COVID-related lockdowns served as additional growth and net-
working opportunities. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, met
the Oath Keepers at a lockdown protest in Austin, Texas in early 2020.
SoRelle saw these COVID events as a “coalescing moment” for different
far-right groups.161
The “Stop the Steal” movement created another opportunity for the
Oath Keepers to grow their influence. Rhodes repeatedly amplified the sto-
len election conspiracy theory. On November 10, 2020, he posted a “Call to
Action!” on the Oath Keepers website, alleging the election was “stolen”
and exhorting his followers to “refuse to EVER recognize this as a legiti-
mate election, and refuse to recognize Biden as a legitimate winner.” 162
Under a section entitled “What We the People Must Do,” Rhodes quoted a
“patriot from Serbia, who also loves America.” The Serbian author
described how his fellow countrymen fomented a political revolution. Parts
of the statement presaged the attack on the U.S. Capitol:
. . . Millions gathered in our capital [sic]. There were no barricades
strong enough to stop them, nor the police determined enough to
stop them. Police and Military aligned with the people after few
hours of fist-fight [sic]. We stormed the Parliament. And burned
down fake state Television! WE WON!163
The Oath Keepers were obsessed with the Insurrection Act—seeing it as
a way for President Trump to cling to power. Rhodes believed that the
President could empower militias like the Oath Keepers to enforce law and
order after other Americans refused to accept President Trump’s rule.164
Indeed, President Trump had been intensely interested in the Insurrection
Act as a potential tool to quell the protests in summer 2020.165 Rhodes
wished the Act had been invoked then, but he did not give up on the fan-
tasy.166 As mentioned above, Rhodes called for President Trump to invoke
the Insurrection Act during his speech in Washington on December 12,
2020.167
That day, Rhodes also coordinated with Jericho March organizers to
provide security.168 He coordinated with a paramilitary group known as 1st
514 CHAPTER 6

Amendment Praetorian (1AP), to guard VIPs, including retired Lieutenant

General Michael Flynn and Patrick Byrne.169 Rhodes indicated that the Oath
Keepers would be “working closely” with them for the event.170
The Oath Keepers continued to call for President Trump to invoke the
Insurrection Act throughout December 2020, arguing that the President
needed to do so to “Stop the Steal.” 171 This fantasy reflected a warped sense
of reality. Rhodes testified that President Trump could have mobilized
“unorganized militia,” including the Oath Keepers, to suppress an insur-
rection if he attempted to stay in power after losing the election.172 But the
Oath Keepers themselves were the ones contemplating insurrection. On
December 10, 2020, Rhodes messaged others: “Either Trump gets off his
ass and uses the Insurrection Act to defeat the Chicom puppet coup or we
will have to rise up in insurrection (rebellion) against the ChiCom puppet
Biden. Take your pick.” 173 Rhodes was blunt in other messages to the Oath
Keepers, writing: “We need to push Tump [sic] to do his duty. If he doesn’t,
we will do ours. Declare Independence. Defy[,] Resist[,] Defend[,] Conquer
or Die. This needs to be our attitude.” 174

6.4 “TRUMP SAID IT’S GONNA BE WILD!!!!!!! IT’S GONNA BE WILD!!!!!!!”

As the Proud Boys began their plans for January 6th, Kelly Meggs, the
leader of the Florida chapter of the Oath Keepers, reached out. In the past,
the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers had their differences, deriding each
other’s tactics and ethos during the summer 2020 protests.175 But President
Trump’s tweet on December 19th conveyed a sense of urgency which pro-
vided the two extremist rivals the opportunity to work together for a com-
mon goal.
After President Trump’s tweet, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio. They spoke
for 3 minutes and 26 seconds.176 Meggs also sent a message on Facebook,
bragging about an alliance he had formed among the Oath Keepers, the
Florida Three Percenters, and the Proud Boys: “We have decided to work
together and shut this shit down.” 177 The Oath Keepers were making plans
of their own, too.
“Oath Keepers president [Rhodes] is pretty disheartened,” Roberto
Minuta, one of Rhodes’ men, messaged someone on December 19th. “He
feels like it's go time, the time for peaceful protest is over in his eyes. I was
talking with him last night.” 178 Minuta has been charged with “seditious
conspiracy” and other crimes.179
In the days that followed, the Oath Keepers planned for violence. They
used encrypted chats on Signal to discuss travel plans, trade tips on tactical
equipment to bring, and develop their plans for once they were on the
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 515

ground in the DC area.180 On December 21st, 2020, Joshua James messaged

the group, stating, “SE region is creating a NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION
FOR DC JAN 6TH. . . . 4 states are mobilizing[.]” 181 Meggs, Rhodes, and oth-
ers created several different chat groups to coordinate for January 6th.182
On December 22nd, Meggs echoed President Trump’s tweet in a
Facebook message to someone else:
Trump said It’s gonna be wild!!!!!!! It’s gonna be wild!!!!!!! He wants
us to make it WILD that’s what he’s saying. He called us all to the
Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!! Gentlemen we
are heading to DC pack your shit!!” 183
Meggs also wrote that the Oath Keepers would have 50–100 members in
Washington, DC on January 6th.184
The Oath Keepers hosted periodic group video meetings to discuss plans
for January 6th. Richard Dockery, a former Oath Keepers member, testified
to the Select Committee about a video call that took place around December
31st, and related specifically to planning for January 6th.185 During the call,
Oath Keepers’ leadership announced plans to provide security for far-right
celebrities like Roger Stone.186 If there were any problems while they were
providing security, “there was a quick reaction force in Virginia that would
come help them out . . . and that they would have firearms.” 187
Rhodes announced during an episode of InfoWars in November 2020
that the Oath Keepers had established a “Quick Reaction Force” (QRF) out-
side of Washington, DC.188 After President Trump announced the “wild”
protest, the group’s advanced coordination largely focused on planning
related to their QRF, as well as the various security details for VIPs and
stage areas on January 5th and 6th.189 Oath Keepers from North Carolina,
Florida, South Carolina, and Arizona converged on the Comfort Inn in
Ballston, Virginia, and used the location to store their cache of weapons for
January 6th.190 Oath Keepers leaders communicated actively about the QRF
for January 6th.191 Rhodes and another contingent of Oath Keepers stayed at
the Hilton Garden Inn in Vienna, Virginia, and stored weapons there as
well.192
Rhodes amassed an arsenal of military-grade assault weapons and
equipment in the days leading up to January 6th. On December 30th,
Rhodes spent approximately $7,000 on two night-vision devices and a
weapon sight and shipped them to Marsha Lessard, a rally organizer who
lived near Washington, DC and who had previously been in contact with the
organizers of the Ellipse rally.193 On January 1st and 2nd, Rhodes purchased
additional weapons and accessories at a cost of approximately $5,000.194
The following day, January 3rd, Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle departed Texas
for Washington, DC. While traveling, Rhodes spent an additional $6,000 on
516 CHAPTER 6

an AR-style rifle and firearms attachments.195 Making one final shopping

trip in Mississippi, Rhodes purchased $4,500 of firearms equipment includ-
ing more sights, magazines, and weapons parts on January 4th.196
On the morning of January 6th, with weapons stockpiled, Rhodes mes-
saged the Signal group of Oath Keepers leaders:
We have several well equipped [sic] QRFs outside DC. And there are
many, many others, from other groups, who will be watching and
waiting on the outside in case of worst case [sic] scenarios.197

6.5 “READY TO STEP IN AND DO WHAT IS NEEDED”

Stewart Rhodes’s and Oath Keepers’ lawyer Kellye SoRelle arrived in

Washington on the afternoon of January 5th.198 They immediately went to
Freedom Plaza, where President Trump had instructed rally organizers to
give some of his most extreme supporters time to speak.199 As a small group
of Oath Keepers patrolled Freedom Plaza, they were able to see the results
of President Trump’s call to mobilize.200 SoRelle testified that there were
Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and “Alex Jones people” mingling together in
the crowd, with “just a small distinction between them.” 201
The Oath Keepers later found themselves at the Phoenix Park Hotel,202
where they ate and drank with a motley coalition of far-right political
activists who were united in their shared belief in President Trump’s Big
Lie.203 Among them were: Proud Boys-linked Bianca Gracia of Latinos for
Trump; Joshua Macias, leader of Vets for Trump;204 and Amanda Chase, a
Virginia State senator.205 In a livestream discussion moderated by Chase,
they promoted false election fraud claims. Macias and Rhodes encouraged
President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act and call up combat veterans
who are “ready to step in and do what is needed.” 206
SoRelle later told the Select Committee that there was discussion of
going to “storm the Capitol,” although she claimed that this was “normal”
discussion and supposedly did not indicate violence or “any of that type of
stuff.” 207
That same evening, Gracia asked SoRelle and Rhodes to follow her to a
garage where she was supposed to meet Proud Boys leader Enrique
Tarrio,208 who had just been released from custody and ordered to leave the
DC area.209 Instead of immediately leaving Washington, DC, Tarrio instead
made his way to a garage near the hotel where the others gathered.210 Por-
tions of the ensuing meeting were captured on video by documentary film-
maker Nick Quested and his camera crew. SoRelle claims that she was asked
to attend to discuss Tarrio’s legal woes,211 but there is evidence indicating
that the conversation turned tactical.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 517

Tarrio discussed the court’s order, informing the group he was going
north to Maryland, so he could “stay close just to make sure my guys are
ok.” 212 Tarrio discussed his confiscated phone with Gracia. He told her that
“they couldn’t get in there,” apparently referencing the two-factor authen-
tication enabled on his phone.213 Tarrio also appeared familiar with another
attendee, Vets for Trump leader Macias, who rested his hand on Tarrio’s
shoulder at various points.214 Rhodes and Tarrio shook hands.215
Much of the substantive conversation between Rhodes, Tarrio, and the
others cannot be heard because Tarrio asked Quested’s camera crew to stop
recording.216 However, some of the conversation is audible from afar and
Rhodes can be heard telling Tarrio that he “has three groups in Tyson’s
Corner,” 217 a reference to the QRFs that he had mustered in the event that
President Trump called the Oath Keepers into service.
Tarrio later expressed appreciation for Rhodes’s presence at the garage
meeting and underscored that their two organizations needed to stand
together on January 6th. Tarrio explained that the Proud Boys and Oath
Keepers are “just two different groups” and that he and Rhodes “don’t get
along,” but said that “for situations like this where there is a need to unite
regardless of our differences . . . what he did today was commendable.” 218
Tarrio added that Rhodes’s presence at the garage meeting was “thought-
ful” because Rhodes had “quickly provided security” for the meeting and
“seemed concerned” about Tarrio’s legal situation.219 In a likely nod to
prior coordination between Proud Boys and Oath Keepers at other post-
election events, Tarrio further explained that “my guys have helped him
[Rhodes] out in the past,” and that he and Rhodes have “mutual respect”
for one another.220 Tarrio then traveled north to a hotel near Baltimore,
Maryland, where he stayed through the events of the next day.221

6.6 “FRIENDS OF STONE”

As explained above, a constellation of far-right characters came together in

late 2020 as part of the “Stop the Steal” cause. Among them was Roger
Stone, a right-wing political operative whose career as a self-trumpeted
dirty trickster stretched back decades. Stone is arguably President Trump’s
oldest political advisor.222 For example, he worked for Donald Trump’s
independent presidential bid during the 2000 campaign.223 In addition to
his political connections, Stone cultivated relationships with far-right
extremists, including the two groups charged with seditious conspiracy: the
Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys.
The Select Committee found that at least seven members of the Oath
Keepers provided security for Stone, or were seen with him, in the weeks
518 CHAPTER 6

Roger Stone in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021 in Washington, DC.
Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images

immediately preceding the attack on the U.S. Capitol.224 Text messages

released by Edward Vallejo, an Oath Keeper charged with seditious con-
spiracy and other crimes, show that Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs dis-
cussed providing security for Stone.225 Some of these Oath Keepers guarded
Stone during an event at Freedom Plaza in Washington, DC on the night of
January 5th.226 Stone was also flanked by Oath Keepers outside of the
Willard Hotel on the morning of January 6th.227 One of the Oath Keepers
who provided security for Stone was Joshua James, who pleaded guilty to
seditious conspiracy, obstruction of Congress and other charges in March
2022.228 James was also reportedly seen in Stone’s hotel room at the Willard
hours before the attack on the U.S. Capitol.229
Stone has a longstanding, close relationship with the Proud Boys. Stone
has taken the Proud Boys oath230 and repeatedly defended the group.231
Danish documentarians filmed him working with Proud Boys for years.232
In one scene, filmed in 2019, Stone warmly greets Joe Biggs, a Proud Boys
leader central to the Capitol violence. Stone says of Biggs: “My guy, right
here.” 233 In a 2019 court case, Stone identified Enrique Tarrio as one of his
volunteers, explaining that Tarrio had access to his phone and could post to
Stone’s Instagram account from it.234
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 519

As mentioned above, Stone, Tarrio and another Proud Boy leader, Ethan
Nordean, addressed an impromptu rally in Washington, DC on the night of
December 11, 2020. Owen Shroyer, an InfoWars host, was also with them.235
“We will fight to the bitter end for an honest count of the 2020 election,”
Stone told the crowd. “Never give up, never quit, never surrender, and fight
for America!” 236 A few weeks later, on January 2, 2021, Tarrio led a Proud
Boys protest outside of Senator Marco Rubio’s home in Florida. The Proud
Boys wanted to convince Rubio to vote against certification of the vote on
January 6th.237 Stone reportedly called into the event to speak to Tarrio’s
crowd.238
One way in which Stone maintained these contacts was through a Signal
chat group named “F.O.S.”—or Friends of Stone.239 Two days after the
election, Stone sent a text: “We provide information several times a day. So
please monitor the F.O.S. feed so you can act in a timely fashion.” 240 Ali
Alexander and Stone continued to coordinate about Stop the Steal strategy
and events between the election and January 6th.241 In addition to
Alexander, Stone’s “Friends” on the Signal chat included Rhodes and
Tarrio.242
In July 2020, President Trump granted Stone clemency after he was
convicted of lying to Congress and other charges.243 Then, on December
23rd, President Trump pardoned Stone.244 Several days later, at a dinner on
the evening of December 27th, Stone thanked President Trump. In a post on
Parler, Stone wrote that he “thanked President Trump in person tonight for
pardoning me” and also recommended to the President that he “appoint
a special counsel” to stop “those who are attempting to steal the 2020
election through voter fraud.” Stone also wrote that he wanted “to ensure
that Donald Trump continues as our president.” 245 Finally, he added:
“#StopTheSteal” and “#rogerstonedidnothingwrong.” 246 The Select Com-
mittee has learned that Stone discussed the January 6th event with the
President, likely at this same dinner on December 27th.247 The President
told Stone he “was thinking of speaking.” 248
The Select Committee sought to question Roger Stone about his rela-
tionships with President Trump and far-right extremists, as well as other
issues. During his deposition, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right
nearly 90 times.249 Stone has publicly stated that he committed no wrong-
doing and that he encouraged a peaceful protest.250

6.7 WHITE NATIONALISTS: “THE CAPITOL SIEGE WAS FUCKING AWESOME…”

Nick Fuentes is an online provocateur who leads a white nationalist move-

ment known as “America First,” or the “Groypers.” Fuentes immediately
responded to President Trump’s “be wild” tweet. On December 19, 2020,
520 CHAPTER 6

Fuentes wrote on Twitter: “I will return to Washington DC to rally for

President Trump on January 6th!” 251 Fuentes and his Groypers did return
to Washington, DC for the joint session. As the attack was underway,
Fuentes incited followers from his perch immediately outside of the U.S.
Capitol. Some of his followers joined the attack inside, with one even sitting
in Vice President Pence’s seat on the Senate dais.252
Fuentes and a fellow Groyper leader, Patrick Casey, rose to prominence
in 2017 after rallying at the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” event.253 For
years, the Groypers have repeatedly promoted white supremacist and
Christian nationalist beliefs, often cloaked in wink-and-nod humor, puns,
or religion, and they regularly gin up public opposition to other right-wing
organizations or politicians whom they deem insufficiently conservative.254
Fuentes was a key voice for “Stop the Steal” conspiracy theories leading
up to January 6th. He spent 2 months leading rallies in State capitals across
the country,255 spreading the Big Lie and livestreaming coded calls to vio-
lence.256 He also used his livestream to raise significant funds between
November 2020 and January 2021.257
On November 9, 2020, Fuentes promised, “GROYPERS ARE GOING TO
STOP THIS COUP!” 258 Two days later, Fuentes organized a “Stop the Steal”
rally at the Michigan State Capitol. He told the crowd that they should be
“more feral” in their tactics to overturn the election, suggesting that they
target lawmakers in their homes.259 On November 14th, Fuentes rallied a
crowd of his followers at the Million MAGA March in Washington, DC,
pushing “Stop the Steal” conspiracies, calling for President Trump to rule
for life, and exhorting his followers to “storm every State capitol until
January 20, 2021, until President Trump is inaugurated for 4 more
years.” 260
As discussed above, Fuentes was a prominent figure at the “Stop the
Steal” rally in Atlanta, Georgia, in November 2020.261 He promoted election
conspiracies, criticized the Republican Party, joked about the Holocaust,
and denounced former Vice President Biden as illegitimate.262 Fuentes also
suggested his followers intimidate politicians in their homes.263
On December 12th, Fuentes again rallied a crowd of supporters at the
“Stop the Steal” events in Washington, DC, calling for the destruction of
the Republican Party because it had failed to overturn the election.264 As
others spoke at the Jericho March rally, Fuentes headlined a “Stop the
Steal” protest just a few blocks away.265
On January 4th, Fuentes suggested that his followers kill State legisla-
tors who don’t support efforts to overturn the 2020 election. As discussed
in Chapter 2, President Trump and his surrogates were pressuring State
legislators at the time to do just that. Fuentes complained that his side “had
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 521

no leverage.” Fuentes then asked: “What can you and I do to a state legisla-
tor, besides kill them?” He then quickly added: “Although we should not do
that. I am not advising that, but I mean, what else can you do, right?266
On January 5th, Casey advertised the marches in Washington, DC on his
Telegram channel and provided repeated updates on the logistics of getting
into the city. Casey also spoke to his followers about the next day’s rally on
a livestream on DLive.267 As discussed in Chapter 8, the Groypers clearly
played a role in the January 6th attack. They even planted their flag in the
inner chambers of the U.S. Capitol.268 Fuentes crowed about the attack the
day after, tweeting: “The Capitol Siege was fucking awesome and I’m not
going to pretend it wasn’t.” 269 In another tweet on January 7th, Fuentes
wrote: “For a brief time yesterday the US Capital [sic] was once again occu-
pied by The American People, before the regime wrested back control.” 270
Despite his boasts on Twitter, Fuentes exercised his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and refused to provide information
about his organizing activities to the Select Committee.271

6.8 THE THREE (III%) PERCENTERS: “#OCCUPYCONGRESS”

The Oath Keepers were not the only anti-government extremists who
viewed President Trump’s December 19th, tweet as a call to arms. Militias
around the country were similarly inspired to act. “People were retweeting
it right and left. . . . I saw people retweeting it, talking about, yeah, it’s going
to be crazy, going to be a huge crowd,” Michael Lee Wells, a militia leader
in North Carolina, told the Select Committee.272 Members of militias known
as the “Three Percenters” were electrified.
The Three Percenters believe that three percent of American colonists
successfully overthrew the British during the American Revolution.273 This
is not true. Far more than a tiny fraction of the colonial population fought
in or supported the Revolutionary War.274 Regardless, this ahistorical belief
has become an organizing myth for militias around modern-day America.
As with the Oath Keepers, many Three Percenters have turned against
the U.S. Government, such that they equate it with the British monarchy
and believe it should be overthrown.275 The movement does not have one,
centralized hierarchy. Instead, semi-autonomous branches organize and
run themselves.276 The Three Percenter cause was growing prior to the
attack on the U.S. Capitol. Jeremy Liggett, a militia leader in Florida, told
the Select Committee it was “trendy” in far-right circles to identify with
the Three Percenter movement in the months leading up to January 6th.277
President Trump tapped into this well of anti-government extremism.
The President’s repeated insistence that the election had been stolen reso-
nated with militia members who were already inclined to believe in shady
522 CHAPTER 6

political conspiracies. The President’s December 19th tweet mobilized Three

Percenters around the country. Suddenly, they had a focal point for their
anti-government beliefs: the joint session of Congress on January 6th.
Court filings and other evidence reveal that Three Percenters immediately
began planning for violence after President Trump’s “be wild” announce-
ment.
For example, Lucas Denney and Donald Hazard led a militia affiliated
with the Three Percenter movement called the “Patriot Boys of North
Texas.” Both Denney and Hazard were charged with assaulting officers on
January 6th.278 Denney pleaded guilty and has been sentenced to 52 months
in prison.279 After President Trump’s tweet, they discussed travel plans, as
well as the need to procure body armor, helmets, knuckle gloves and pepper
spray.280 But they did not plan to act alone. Instead, they saw themselves as
part of a coalition. In multiple messages, both Denney and Hazard claimed
they were also affiliated with Proud Boys and intended to work with them
on or before January 6th.281
Denney repeatedly cited President Trump’s tweet. “Trump himself is
calling for a big protest in DC on January 6th. I’m not going to miss this
one,” Denney told Hazard on December 21st.282 On December 30th, Denney
wrote in a Facebook message:
Trump has called this himself. For everyone to come. It’s the day
the electoral college is suppose to be certified by congress to offi-
cially elect Biden. But, Pence is in charge of this and he’s going
to throw out all the votes from States that were proved to have
fraud. There’s so much more going on behind the scenes though.
That’s why he’s called this rally for support. . . . Trump will stay
President . . . 283
As this message indicates, Denney was well-aware of President
Trump’s multi-part plan to disrupt the transfer of power. He thought that
Vice President Pence had the power to “throw out” electoral votes, just as
the President demanded. In other messages, Denney claimed that President
Trump wanted militias to descend on Washington, DC so they could serve
as a security force against a perceived threat from Antifa and Black Lives
Matter on January 6th.284
Additional messages between the two reveal their intent to march on
the U.S. Capitol. For instance, Denney attempted to post two banners on
Facebook that advertised events on January 6th.285 Both banners contained
the hashtag “#OccupyCongress.” The pictures contained images of the U.S.
Capitol and referenced “The Great Betrayal.” One of them read “If They
Won’t Hear Us” and “They Will Fear Us.” In another post, Denney wrote: “I
can’t wait to be in the middle of it on the front line on the 6th.” 286
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 523

Curiously, Denney had also heard a “rumor” that President Trump

would march with them. On January 4, 2021, he stated in a Facebook
message:
Things are going to be happening here. Trump is going to be speak-
ing to everyone Wed [January 6] before everyone marches to the
capital [sic]. Rumour [sic] has it that he may march with us. I’ll tell
you more when you get here on where to be wed and what time so
you have the best seats.287
On or about January 6th, Denney sent another message via Facebook,
writing: “Trump speaking to us around 11 am then we march to the capital
and after that we have special plans that I can’t say right now over Face-
book. But keep an eye out for live feed tomorrow from me. Tomorrow will
be historic.” 288 Later on January 6th, during the attack, Hazard was cap-
tured on video bragging: “We have stormed our nation’s capitol.” 289
The Patriot Boys of North Texas were not the only Three Percenter
group that mobilized after President Trump’s tweet. The Department of
Justice has alleged that multiple other cadres of Three Percenter militiamen
prepared for violence on January 6th and then took part in the attack on the
U.S. Capitol.
In Florida, a Three Percenter organization known as the “Guardians of
Freedom” established a “B-squad” for January 6th because they allegedly
wanted to avoid being called a “militia.” 290 These men were led by Jeremy
Liggett, mentioned above.291
On December 24, 2020, the B-squad sent out a flyer, “CALLING ALL
PATRIOTS!” to Washington, D.C.292 The flyer read: “The Guardians of
Freedom III% are responding to the call from President Donald J. Trump to
assist in the security, protection, and support of the people as we all protest
the fraudulent election and re-establish liberty for our nation. JOIN US &
Thousands of other Patriots!” 293 The B-Squad claimed it was the “right &
duty of the people to alter or to abolish” the Government.294 Its members
discussed bringing tactical gear to Washington, DC.295
On December 30th, Liggett posted a meme to Facebook stating that
“3% Will Show In Record Numbers In DC.” 296 When the Select Committee
asked about this post, Liggett downplayed its significance or disclaimed any
knowledge about other Three Percenter groups that might “show in record
numbers.” 297 However, on January 3, 2021, Liggett posted a “safety video”
on Facebook in which he and others dressed in military gear. Liggett
instructed listeners about self-defense and the tools they (like him) could
bring to Washington, DC, including “an expandable metal baton, a walking
cane and a folding knife.” 298 He advised “all of you Patriots going to
524 CHAPTER 6

Washington, D.C. . . . to support Trump,” and to “keep up the fight.” 299 Sev-
eral “B-squad” members have been charged with civil disorder and disor-
derly and disruptive conduct, which took place while rioters nearby were
assaulting officers in the tunnel area of the Capitol’s Lower West Terrace on
January 6th.300
In California, another group of men associated with the Three Percenter
movement quickly began plotting their next moves after President Trump’s
tweet. Alan Hostetter and Russell Taylor ran a non-profit known as the
American Phoenix Project, which protested COVID-19 lockdowns and the
2020 election results, while also promoting violence ahead of January
6th.301 Ahead of the joint session, Hostetter and Taylor organized a small
group in an encrypted chat they named “The California Patriots—DC
Brigade.” 302
On December 19th, Taylor linked to President Trump’s “will be wild”
tweet and asked members of the chat “Who is going?” 303 The same day,
Hostetter posted a message to his Instagram account, explaining he was
traveling to Washington, DC on January 6th because President Trump
“tweeted that all patriots should descend on Washington DC” and that day
“is the date of the Joint Session of Congress in which they will either accept
or reject the fake/phony/stolen electoral college votes.” 304 The next day,
Taylor renamed the Telegram chat as “The California Patriots-Answer the
Call Jan 6.” 305 On December 29th, Taylor posted to that chat: “I personally
want to be on the front steps and be one of the first ones to breach the
doors!” 306
Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor and their
alleged co-conspirators exchanged messages about bringing weapons, such
as hatchets, bats, or large metal flashlights, as well as possibly firearms,
with them to Washington, DC.307 They were “ready and willing to fight.” 308
In one message, Hostetter predicted that January 6th would be similar to
the “War of Independence” because “[t]here will likely be 3% of us again
that will commit fully to this battle, but just as in 1776 patriots will
prevail.” 309
There are additional examples of how President Trump’s “be wild”
tweet led Three Percenters to descend on the U.S. Capitol. One Three Per-
center group issued an open letter on December 16, 2020, announcing that
they “stand ready and are standing by to answer the call from our President
should the need arise that We The People are needed to take back our coun-
try from the pure evil that is conspiring to steal our country away from the
American people. . . . We will not act unless we are told to.” 310 In late
December, after the President’s tweet, The Three Percenters Original
(TTPO) issued a letter to its members announcing that “this organization
will be answering that call!” 311
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 525

There is also additional evidence showing that militia groups like the
Three Percenters coordinated with other groups both before and on January
6th. Josh Ellis, the owner of the MyMilitia website, testified that he used
Zello (a walkie-talkie app) when he was in Washington, DC on January 6th.
The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, other militia members, and “regular patri-
ots” all used these Zello channels in the leadup to January 6th and in
response to President Trump’s December 19th tweet. They used these chan-
nels to share intelligence.312

6.9 QANON: “OPERATION OCCUPY THE CAPITOL”

Shortly after the January 6th attack, a video of a bearded man in a “Q” shirt
chasing U.S. Capitol Police Officer Ryan Goodman through the halls of the
U.S. Capitol went viral.313 That man was Doug Jensen, a QAnon believer.314
After Jensen’s arrest, FBI agents asked him why he traveled from Iowa to
Washington, DC in the first place. “Trump posted make sure you're there,
January 6 for the rally in Washington, D.C.,” Jensen responded.315
Jensen was not the only QAnon believer to attack the U.S. Capitol on
January 6th. The letter “Q” and related slogans, such as “Where We Go
One, We Go All,” were ubiquitous among the rioters. They were visible on
shirts, signs, and flags throughout the crowd. What was once a marginal
digital movement had become a bricks-and-mortar force powerful enough
to help obstruct a joint session of Congress.
QAnon is a bizarre and dangerous cult that gained popularity in 2017,
when a person known only as “Q” began posting on 4chan, an anonymous
message board.316 The poster supposedly held a “Q” security clearance at
the Department of Energy. QAnon adherents believe that President Trump
is a messianic figure battling the forces of the “deep state” and a Satanic
pedophile ring operated by leading Democrats and the American elite.317 Q’s
first post in October 2017 predicted that former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton would be arrested in short order.318 Although that prophecy did not
come to pass, the conspiracy theory evolved and grew over time, spreading
across social media platforms and eventually finding a home in 8kun,
another anonymous message board known for trafficking in conspiracy
theories and hate.319
President Trump was given multiple opportunities to disavow QAnon.
Instead, he essentially endorsed its core tenets. During an August 19, 2020,
press briefing, President Trump was asked what he thought about the
QAnon belief that he was fighting a Satanic cabal. “I mean, you know, if I
can help save the world from problems, I’m willing to do it. I’m willing to
put myself out there,” he replied.320 During a townhall on NBC News two
526 CHAPTER 6

weeks prior to the election, President Trump first claimed he “knew noth-
ing” about QAnon, but he then praised its believers for being “very strongly
against pedophilia.” The President emphasized: “And I agree with that. I
mean, I do agree with that.” 321
In 2020, QAnon played a significant role in spreading various election
conspiracy theories. After the election, QAnon accounts amplified the claim
that Dominion Voting System’s software had altered votes.322 On November
19th, President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on One
America News Network (OAN) that was captioned, “Dominion-izing the
Vote.” 323 The segment claimed that Dominion had switched votes from
President Trump to former Vice President Biden. OAN featured a supposed
cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key figure in the QAnon conspiracy move-
ment.324 Watkins’s father, Jim, owned the 8kun site that “Q” called home,
and Ron helped oversee its message boards.325
After promoting the OAN segment, President Trump retweeted Ron
Watkins’s account on several other occasions. On December 15, 2020, Presi-
dent Trump retweeted a post in which Watkins spread false claims of for-
eign influence in the election.326 Then, on January 3rd, President Trump
retweeted Ron Watkins’s account four more times.327
QAnon’s adherents were clearly paying attention to President Trump’s
words—and tweets. The President’s “be wild” tweet was widely heard as a
clarion call. Jim Watkins told the Select Committee that “thousands and
thousands of people probably” agreed that the President’s December 19th
tweet was a call for them to come to Washington, DC.328 Jim Watkins him-
self marched in Washington, DC on January 6th because of the President’s
call, but he has not been charged with any crime.329
Other QAnon adherents flocked to Washington, DC in response to the
President’s call to action. “POTUS HAS REQUESTED YOUR ATTENDANCE
Washington DC JANUARY 6TH 2021,” Thomas Munn, a QAnon believer,
posted on Facebook. Munn added: “Our President has only asked two things
from us, so far…#1 Vote #2 January 6, 2021.” 330 Jacob Chansley, better
known as the QAnon Shaman, told the FBI that he traveled from Arizona
because President Trump had requested that all “patriots” come to
Washington, DC on January 6th.331
During the investigation, the Select Committee learned that the QAnon
conspiracy theory often overlaps with other extremist beliefs. Stewart
Rhodes of the Oath Keepers testified to the Select Committee that he’s “not
a Q-tard” and “not a follower of Q at all.” 332 However, Rhodes cynically
exploited QAnon for his own purposes. The Oath Keepers’ website and text
messages were littered with QAnon phrases.333 Nick Quested, a filmmaker
who shadowed the Proud Boys, often heard QAnon themes in the Proud
Boys’ private discussions.334
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 527

As January 6th drew closer, multiple posts on the QAnon-linked website

8kun indicated that violence was imminent. “You can go to Washington on
Jan 6 and help storm the Capitol,” one user wrote. This same user contin-
ued: “As many Patriots as can be. We will storm the government buildings,
kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agents, and
demand a recount.” 335 Other posts on 8kun debated the politicians that
users should target once they got inside the Capitol.336
A QAnon-inspired banner was also widely shared by groups planning
events for January 5th and 6th. The top of the image read: “Operation
Occupy the Capitol.” The central image showed the U.S. Capitol being
torn in two. In the lower left corner, there appeared a QAnon phrase:
“#WeAreTheStorm.” 337

6.10 THEDONALD.WIN: “OCCUPY THE CAPITOL”

Within three minutes of President Trump’s tweet, a user on TheDonald.win

message board posted: “Trump Tweet. Daddy Says Be In DC on Jan. 6th.” 338
Moderators pinned the post to the top of the board from December 19th
until January 6th. It garnered nearly 6,000 comments and more than
24,000 upvotes during that time.339 Many of the site’s users quickly inter-
preted President Trump’s tweet as a call for violence. For example, one user
wrote, “[Trump] can’t exactly openly tell you to revolt. This is the closest
he’ll ever get.” 340 Jody Williams, the site’s then-owner, testified that while
users had been talking about traveling to Washington, DC since the elec-
tion, after the tweet “anything else was kind of shut out, and it just was
going to be the 6th.” 341
In the days that followed, users on TheDonald.win discussed: surround-
ing and occupying the U.S. Capitol; cutting off access tunnels used by
Members of Congress; the types of weapons they should bring; and even
how to build a hangman’s gallows.342 The parallels to what transpired on
January 6th are obvious.
TheDonald.win and its predecessor site was a website for some of its
namesake’s most ardent fans. Even before President Trump was elected, his
social media team monitored and interacted with the site’s users. In the
summer of 2016, then-candidate Trump himself engaged in a written ques-
tion and answer session on TheDonald, which at the time was a forum on
Reddit.343 This online community, which had upwards of 790,000 users,
was banned by Reddit in mid-2020.344 However, the site’s users migrated
to another online location, becoming TheDonald.win.345
Dan Scavino, the President’s social media guru, amplified content from
this website. During the 2016 presidential campaign, “a team in the war
528 CHAPTER 6

White House social media director Dan Scavino Jr.

Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

room at Trump Tower was monitoring social media trends, including

TheDonald subreddit . . . and privately communicating with the most active
users to seed new trends.” 346 “Campaign staffers monitored Twitter and
TheDonald subreddit, and pushed any promising trends up to social media
director Dan Scavino, who might give them a boost with a tweet.” 347 In
2017, President Trump tweeted a video of himself attacking CNN.348 The
video had appeared on The Donald four days earlier.349 In 2019, Politico
reported that Scavino “regularly monitors Reddit, with a particular focus on
the pro-Trump /r/The_Donald channel.” 350
The Select Committee sought to question Scavino about how he and
others on President Trump’s social media team interacted with The Donald
subreddit and then TheDonald.win. But Scavino refused to cooperate with
the committee’s subpoena.351
After President Trump’s December 19th tweet, users on the site posted
simple maps of the U.S. Capitol and telegraphed their intent to invade the
building.352 “If we occupy the capitol building, there will be no vote,” one
user wrote.353 “The media will call us evil if we have to occupy the Capitol
Building on January 6th. Let them,” another post read.354 One user argued
the goal should be to “surround the enemy” and “create [a] perimeter”
around the Capitol on January 6th, such that no one was allowed to leave
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 529

until President Trump was “re-admitted for another 4 years.” 355 This same
user posted a diagram of the U.S. Capitol’s perimeter with arrows indicating
where the “Capitol Access Tunnels” were located.
On January 5th, another user on TheDonald.win encouraged President
Trump’s supporters to “be prepared to secure the capitol building,” claim-
ing that “there will be plenty of ex military to guide you.” 356 Multiple other
posts made it clear that the U.S. Capitol was the target on January 6th, with
one poster writing that people should bring “handcuffs and zip ties to DC,”
so they could enact “citizen’s arrests” of those officials who certified the
election’s results.357 Another post highlighted the “most important map for
January 6th. Form a TRUE LINE around the Capitol and the tunnels.” 358
That “post included a detailed schematic of Capitol Hill with the tunnels
surrounding the complex highlighted.” 359
Other posts on TheDonald.win included specific plans to build gallows
outside the U.S. Capitol. “Gallows are simpler and more cost effective, plus
they’re an American old west tradition too,” one user wrote on December
22, 2020.360 A week later, another wrote: “Let’s construct a Gallows outside
the Capitol building next Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from
their office windows shit their pants.” 361 Another said that “building a
hanging platform in front of Congress on the 6 should send a strong mes-
sage.” 362 The site hosted a diagram showing how to tie a hangman’s
knot,363 with one site member writing that they should build gallows “so
the traitors know the stakes.” 364 On January 5, 2021, hours before the
attack began, a user posted an image of gallows and titled it, “Election
Fraud Repair Kit.” 365
Text messages between Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller
and White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows show that these kinds of
posts reached deep into the President’s inner circle. Miller sent Meadows a
text on December 30th, declaring, “I got the base FIRED UP.” 366 The thread
contained a link to a TheDonald.win comment thread filled with reactions
to a post by Miller promoting January 6th.367 Users in the thread made
comments such as “gallows don’t require electricity,” and that millions will
“bust in through the doors if they try to stop Pence from declaring Trump
the winner,” all in response to Miller.368
On December 19, 2020, the same day President Trump posted his
inflammatory “be wild” tweet, he also tweeted a noteworthy video. The
short clip was titled, “FIGHT FOR TRUMP!—SAVE AMERICA—SAVE THE
WORLD.” 369 The video reportedly appeared on TheDonald.win two days
earlier.370 As with so much else on TheDonald.win, this refrain featured
prominently on the day of the attack on the Capitol. During his speech at
the Ellipse south of the White House on January 6th, the crowd broke out
into a chant of “Fight for Trump! Fight for Trump!” President Trump
thanked those in attendance.371
530 CHAPTER 6

In the two and a half weeks since he first announced the January 6th
“protest,” extremists and conspiracy theorists plotted to make the unprec-
edented, presidentially announced protest against the peaceful transfer of
power “wild” indeed. Meanwhile, event organizers and White House staff-
ers prepared for the final rally of President Trump’s term.

6.11 HOW THE WHITE HOUSE AND RALLY ORGANIZERS PREPARED FOR JANUARY 6TH

In the days following President Trump’s tweet, rally organizers secured

permits for about one dozen events in Washington, DC on January 5th and
6th.372 At 7:12 a.m., not even 6 hours after President Trump’s tweet, Cindy
Chafian, an executive at Women for America First (WFAF), emailed the
National Park Service (NPS) about an event that had been planned to coin-
cide with President-elect Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021.373
Chafian’s ask was simple: “Can I change the date to January 6th?” 374
WFAF was founded in 2019 by Amy and Kylie Kremer, a mother-
daughter pair who were longtime supporters of the President.375 WFAF
became a significant player in the “Stop the Steal” movement.376 The
Kremers started a “Stop the Steal” Facebook group that gathered some
365,000 members in less than 24 hours.377 Their online organizing coin-
cided with their on-the-ground mobilization activities. The Kremers orga-
nized a bus tour to promote the Big Lie, in addition to events in
Washington, DC on November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020.378 After
President Trump’s December 19th tweet, the Kremers focused on January
6th. Kylie Kremer proudly declared their support on Twitter: “The
calvary [sic] is coming, President! JANUARY 6th | Washington, DC
TrumpMarch.com #MarchForTrump #StopTheSteal.” 379 After the date
of their permit was revised, WFAF ultimately provided President Trump
the stage on the Ellipse where he would direct the crowd to march on the
Capitol.380
The Kremers were not alone in responding quickly to the President’s
tweet. Ali Alexander, the founder of Stop the Steal, LLC,381 was eager to get
ahead of other organizers. On the morning of December 19th, Alexander
told his event planner, “Everyone is trying to get the jump on us so I’d like
to get the court side of the capitol (lawn) and I’d like to get capitol steps
and court.” 382 Alexander told his event planner to “grab whatever we can.
All of it.” 383 Alexander’s team did just that: they registered and launched a
new website, WildProtest.com,384 which advertised planned events for
January 6th under a banner that read: “President Trump Wants You in DC
January 6.” 385
Still other organizers were quick to seize on the President’s tweet. Arina
Grossu and Robert Weaver, co-founders of the self-proclaimed “Judeo-
Christian” Jericho March organization,386 held a rally in Washington, DC on
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 531

December 12, 2020. Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes, Flynn, Jones,
Alexander, and others shared a stage at that event.387 Grossu and Weaver
exchanged emails just a few hours after President Trump’s first mention of
January 6th. In an email on the morning of December 19th, Weaver told
Grossu to “enjoy the peace before the storm” and said, “Trump has called
for a protest on 1/6, FYI.” 388 The Jericho March’s website used President
Trump’s “Be there, will be wild!” language to advertise additional events
between January 2nd and January 6, 2021.389
Marsha Lessard, the leader of a vaccine-skeptic group, Virginia
Freedom Keepers, worked to stage an event with Bianca Gracia, the leader
of Latinos for Trump on January 6th.390 The women had ties to the Oath
Keepers391 and Proud Boys,392 respectively—two groups central to the vio-
lence on January 6. Latinos for Trump reportedly advertised their January
6th event with the same QAnon-inspired banner, “Operation Occupy the
Capitol.” 393 Another conservative group, Moms for America, worked with
Alexander before securing a permit for an event on January 5th.394

6.12 “HE’S CALLING ON YOU, HE NEEDS YOUR HELP”

As discussed above, Alex Jones was one of the loudest supporters of the
“Stop the Steal” movement. Jones dedicated much of the December 20th
episode of his InfoWars show to President Trump’s “be wild” tweet, telling
his listeners that nothing less than the fate of the American Republic was at
stake. “He’s calling you, he needs your help, we need your help,” Jones told
his audience.395 The Select Committee has learned that, between the time of
the President’s tweet and Jones’s December 20th show, Jones’s staff had
several calls with Chafian, who had just procured a new permit for WFAF’s
event on the Ellipse.396 The two parties apparently discussed whether this
newly hatched January 6th event was an opportunity to work together.397
Jones’s broadcast also led to an influx of funds for the January 6th
event at the Ellipse. Julie Fancelli is the billionaire heiress to the Publix
supermarket fortune and a longtime supporter of President Trump.398
Fancelli had recently become a donor to Jones’s InfoWars site.399 She lis-
tened to Jones’s December 20th show,400 and decided she wanted to back
the cause.
Inspired by Jones and the fervor that continued to surround the Presi-
dent’s tweet, Fancelli called Caroline Wren, a Republican fundraiser linked
to the Trump Campaign, the next day.401 According to Wren, Fancelli said
that “she wanted to see a lot of people there in DC, so how much would that
cost?” 402 Fancelli spoke with Jones’s staff and they recommended that she
connect with Chafian, who was organizing the Ellipse rally.403 In the wan-
ing days of 2020, Fancelli and Jones spoke several times.404
532 CHAPTER 6

Fancelli worked with Wren to create a multimillion-dollar budget to

convene as many supporters of President Trump as possible.405 To ensure
that Fancelli’s dollars made maximum impact, Wren contacted some of
the major players who were rallying supporters for January 6th. Wren
emailed Kylie Kremer406 and exchanged texts with Jones407 and Chafian.408
Fancelli’s goal was clear: she wanted to spend $3 million to “get as many
people there as possible.” 409 The resulting budget allocated $500,000 to a
busing program and a centralized ad campaign by the Tea Party Express to
promote the event.410 Another $500,000 went to assisting WFAF and Jones
in their organizational efforts.411
Caroline Wren also connected with Ali Alexander. On December 29th,
Wren told the Stop the Steal leader, “I can pay for the buses and I have my
team looking for available companies, so let me know what cities you need
them in!” 412 Wren’s offer came in response to a tweet from Alexander
earlier that day: “Coalition of us working on 25 new charter buses to
bring people FOR FREE to #JAN6 #STOPTHESTEAL for President Trump.
If you have money for more buses or have a company, let me know. We will
list our buses sometime in the next 72 hours. STAND BACK & STAND
BY!” 413
The final words of Alexander’s tweet directly echoed President Trump’s
command to the Proud Boys during the September 29, 2020, presidential
debate.414 Alexander’s word choice was apt. The Proud Boys were already
planning to show up in force, and to ensure that the crowd would be
“wild.”

6.13 “TRUMP IS SUPPOSED TO ORDER US TO THE CAPITOL”

On the evening of December 27th, President Trump boosted the upcoming

event on Twitter: “See you in Washington, DC, on January 6th. Don’t miss
it. Information to follow!” 415 The Select Committee learned that this tweet
came after the White House spoke with a former Trump staffer, Justin
Caporale, who was asked to help produce the Ellipse rally.416 That same
evening, the President had dinner with Donald Trump, Jr., and his girlfriend
Kimberly Guilfoyle,417 who spoke with rally organizer Caroline Wren during
the meal.418 Wren also texted Guilfoyle talking points that described her
ambitions for the event, saying that “buses of people are coming in from all
over the country to support you. It’s going to be huge, we are also adding in
programming the night of January 5th.” 419
After Guilfoyle’s call with Wren, there was a series of calls among the
senior White House staff,420 likely underscoring the seriousness of the
White House’s interest in the event.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 533

Within a few days, the White House began to take a more direct role in
coordinating the rally at the Ellipse.421 In a December 29th text to Wren,
Caporale wrote that after the President’s planned speech there “maybe [sic]
a call to action to march to the [C]apitol and make noise.” 422
This is the earliest indication uncovered by the Select Committee that
the President planned to call on his supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol.
But it wasn’t the last. On January 2nd, rally organizer Katrina Pierson
informed Wren that President Trump’s Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows,
had said the President was going to “call on everyone to march to the
[C]apitol.” 423
Inside the White House, the President’s intent was well-known. Cassidy
Hutchinson, an aide to Meadows, recalled in her testimony that she over-
heard discussions to this effect toward the end of December or early
January. One such discussion included an exchange between Meadows and
Rudolph Giuliani that occurred on January 2nd.424 Hutchinson understood
that President Trump wanted to have a crowd at the Capitol in connection
with what was happening inside—the certification of the electoral count.425
Hutchinson also recalled that President Trump’s allies in Congress were
aware of the plan. During a call with members of the House Freedom
Caucus, the idea of telling people to go to the Capitol was discussed as a
way to encourage Congress to delay the electoral college certification and
send it back to the States.426
On January 4th, WFAF’s Kylie Kremer informed Mike Lindell, the CEO of
MyPillow and an ally of President Trump, that “POTUS is going to have us
march there [the Supreme Court]/the Capitol” but emphasized that the plan
“stays only between us.” 427
The “Stop the Steal” coalition was aware of the President’s intent. On
January 5th, Ali Alexander sent a text to a journalist saying: “Ellipse then
US capitol [sic]. Trump is supposed to order us to the capitol [sic] at the end
of his speech but we will see.” 428

6.14 “WELL, I SHOULD WALK WITH THE PEOPLE.”

President Trump wanted to personally accompany his supporters on the

march from the Ellipse to the U.S. Capitol. During a January 4th meeting
with staffers and event organizer Katrina Pierson, President Trump empha-
sized his desire to march with his supporters.429 “Well, I should walk with
the people,” Pierson recalled President Trump saying.430 Though Pierson
said that she did not take him “seriously,” she knew that “he would abso-
lutely want to be with the people.” 431 Pierson pointed out that President
Trump “did the drive-by the first time and the flyover the second time”—a
534 CHAPTER 6

reference to the November and December 2020 protests in Washington,

DC.432 During these previous events, President Trump made cameo appear-
ances to fire up his supporters. Now, as January 6th approached, the
President again wanted to be there, on the ground, as his supporters
marched on the U.S. Capitol.
The President’s advisors tried to talk him out of it. White House Senior
Advisor Max Miller “shot it down immediately” because of concerns about
the President’s safety.433 Pierson agreed.434 But President Trump was per-
sistent, and he floated the idea of having 10,000 National Guardsmen
deployed to protect him and his supporters from any supposed threats by
leftwing counter-protestors.435 Miller again rejected the President’s idea,
saying that the National Guard was not necessary for the event. Miller testi-
fied that there was no further conversation on the matter.436 After the
meeting, Miller texted Pierson, “Just glad we killed the national guard and
a procession.” 437 That is, President Trump briefly considered having the
National Guard oversee his procession to the U.S. Capitol. The President did
not order the National Guard to protect the U.S. Capitol, or to secure the
joint session proceedings.
Although his advisors tried to talk the President out of personally going,
they understood that his supporters would be marching.438 Pierson’s
agenda for the meeting reflected the President’s plan for protestors to go to
the U.S. Capitol after the rally.439 But President Trump did not give up on
the idea of personally joining his supporters on their march, as discussed
further in Chapter 7.

6.15 “POTUS…LIKES THE CRAZIES.”

As Katrina Pierson helped plan the Ellipse rally, she faced another compli-
cation. The “Stop the Steal” movement played an outsized role in promot-
ing January 6th. And now, as the day approached, its leading voices wanted
prime speaking gigs—perhaps even on the same stage as President Trump.
Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander were all angling for significant
stage time. Pierson knew they were trouble.
In her testimony before the Select Committee, Pierson cited several
concerns, including that Jones and Alexander had played a prominent role
in the November 2020 protest in Atlanta, Georgia. This was no ordinary
protest. Jones and Alexander “had gone into the Georgia Capitol with some
inflammatory rhetoric,” Pierson explained.440 When Pierson was asked if
Jones and Alexander “surrounding the governor’s mansion” and “going
into the Capitol” were the “kind of thing” that gave her pause, she
responded: “Absolutely.” 441 After the Georgia protest, Pierson explained,
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 535

Photos of Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander appear on a screen during a Select
Committee hearing on July 12, 2022.
Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

the Kremers—who had helped organize “Stop the Steal” activities—

distanced themselves from Jones and Alexander.442
But there was an additional problem. President Trump wanted to
include the “Stop the Steal” leaders in the January 6th event. As Pierson put
it in a text message to Kylie Kremer: “POTUS . . . likes the crazies.” 443
Pierson said that she believed this was the case because President Trump
“loved people who viciously defended him in public.” 444 But their “vicious”
defenses of the President clearly troubled Pierson.
Pierson tried to trim the speaker lineup—which still included the “Stop
the Steal” trio of Stone, Jones, and Alexander. She was initially vetoed by
the White House after Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications Dan
Scavino,445 who had approved the “original psycho list.” 446 At one point,
she texted Scavino’s boss, Mark Meadows, saying: “Things have gotten
crazy and I desperately need some direction.” 447 She was concerned by the
possibility of “crazy people” being included in the event, their incendiary
role in Georgia, and the fact that people coming to Washington, DC were
planning to protest at the U.S. Capitol.448
Meadows told Pierson that she should take control of the situation and
remove the possibility of controversial speakers.449 Pierson agreed to do
536 CHAPTER 6

so.450 But the President remained an obstacle. During their January 4th
meeting, Pierson tried to convince President Trump to minimize the role of
these potentially explosive figures at the Ellipse. She offered to place them
at a planned event the night before in Freedom Plaza or on other stages in
DC on January 6th. She told the President to “[k]eep the fringe on the
fringe” 451 and advised him to “[e]liminate convicted felons that could
damage other speakers.” 452
President Trump was still unwilling to remove them from the lineup
entirely. The President instructed Pierson to give Stone a speaking slot on
January 5th and asked for more information about Ali Alexander.453 After
discussing the matter with Scavino, President Trump also requested that
Alexander be given a speaking slot. President Trump “brought up Ali [Alex-
ander] . . . just keep him on stage not associated with POTUS or main
event,” Scavino wrote.454
In the end, the “Stop the Steal” leaders—Stone, Jones and Alexander —
did not appear on the stage at the Ellipse on January 6th, although they did
speak at other planned events, consistent with the President’s request
about Alexander. “POTUS expectations are [to have something] intimate
and then send everyone over to the Capitol,” Pierson explained in a text
message to Justin Caporale and Taylor Budowich.455 Caporale redacted
this text and others in his early production of documents to the Select
Committee, and he only revealed them after they had already been pro-
duced by other witnesses.456
However, other incendiary voices—in addition to President Trump’s —
were given time on the Ellipse stage. The Select Committee learned that
President Trump’s aides warned him against the inclusion of figures like
John Eastman457 and Rudolph Giuliani,458 given their false claims about
election fraud.459 Both men, of course, ended up sharing a stage with him
on January 6th.460 Meadows himself directed that they be allowed to
speak.461

6.16 JANUARY 5, 2021: “FORT TRUMP”

While the “Stop the Steal” coalition was not given speaking slots on the
Ellipse stage on January 6th, its leaders had plenty of opportunities to
speak the day before. And they used their platforms to rile up the crowd in
Washington, DC in advance of the joint session.
Ali Alexander spoke at an event sponsored by Moms for America in
front of the U.S. Capitol. Alexander claimed that he was honored to be shar-
ing the same stage with President Trump the following day, even though
behind the scenes his appearance had been nixed.462
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 537

“We must rebel,” Alexander told rallygoers. “I’m not even sure if I’m
going to leave D.C. We might make this ‘Fort Trump,’ right?” Alexander
said, while standing in front of the U.S. Capitol. “We’re going to keep fight-
ing for you, Mr. President.” 463 On his Twitter account, Alexander also
spread the idea that President Trump’s supporters should occupy areas of
Washington, DC, using the phrases and hashtags such as “Fort Trump” and
“#OccupyDC”.464
Alex Jones and Roger Stone spoke at a separate event hosted by Virginia
Women for Trump in front of the Supreme Court.465 The event, named the
“One Nation Under God” prayer rally, was cohosted by the American
Phoenix Project—the Three Percenter-linked group run by Alan Hostetter
and Russel Taylor, discussed above, which is charged with conspiracy to
obstruct an official proceeding.466
Jones repeated his claims about the election being stolen, claiming that
those in attendance stood against a “Satanic world government.” 467 Stone
led a “Stop the Steal” chant, claiming the “evidence of election fraud is not
only growing, it is overwhelming, and it is compelling.” President Trump
“won the majority of the legal votes cast” and President Trump “won this
election,” Stone said. Nothing less than the fate of Western Civilization was
at stake, according to Stone:
Let’s be very clear. This is not fight between Republicans and
Democrats. This is not a fight between liberals and conservatives.
This is a fight for the future the United States of America. It is a
fight for the future of Western Civilization as we know it. It’s a fight
between dark and light. It’s a fight between the godly and the god-
less. It’s a fight between good and evil. And we dare not fail, or we
will step out into one thousand years of darkness.468
Stone claimed that they “renounce violence” and those on “the
left . . . are the violent ones.” But he insisted that “nothing is over until we
say it is,” and “Victory will be ours.” 469
Both Taylor and Hostetter spoke as well. Hostetter told the crowd, “We
are at war.” 470 Taylor promised to “fight” and “bleed,” vowing that
“Patriot[s]” would “not return to our peaceful way of life until this election
is made right.” 471
A long rally was also hosted at Freedom Plaza, an open-air space on
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. It is a symbolic protest site,
standing in the direct line between the White House and the U.S. Capitol.
Stone, Jones and Alexander all appeared at Freedom Plaza on the evening of
January 5th. Their remarks were incendiary.
Stone repeated his apocalyptic language from earlier in the day, claim-
ing that rallygoers were embroiled in “an epic struggle for the future of this
country between dark and light.” 472 “I want them to know that 1776 is
538 CHAPTER 6

always an option,” Ali Alexander said. “These degenerates in the deep state
are going to give us what we want, or we are going to shut this country
down.” 473 When Alex Jones took to the stage, he screamed at the crowd:
“It’s 1776!” 474
Another speaker that evening was Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.).
“Tomorrow, tomorrow, trust me, the American people that are standing on
the soil that we are standing on tonight, and they’re going to be standing
on this soil tomorrow, this is soil that we have fought over, fought for, and
we will fight for in the future,” Flynn also told the crowd. Flynn addressed
Members of Congress, saying “those of you who are feeling weak tonight,
those of you that don’t have the moral fiber in your body, get some tonight
because tomorrow, we the people are going to be here, and we want you to
know that we will not stand for a lie. We will not stand for a lie.” 475

6.17 “TOGETHER, WE WILL STOP THE STEAL.”

On the evening of January 5th, the President edited the speech he would
deliver the next day at the Ellipse. The President’s speechwriting team had
only started working on his remarks the day before.476 Despite concerns
from the speechwriting team, unfounded claims coming from Giuliani and
others made their way into the draft.477
The initial draft circulated on January 5th emphasized that the crowd
would march to the U.S. Capitol.478 Based on what they had heard from oth-
ers in the White House, the speechwriting team expected President Trump
to use his address to tell people to go to the Capitol.479
That evening, President Trump convened an impromptu gathering in
the Oval Office with members of his staff, primarily his press team480 and
White House Deputy Chief of Staff Dan Scavino, who was in charge of
President Trump’s personal Twitter account.481 Despite the bitter cold, the
President ordered his staff to keep the door to the Rose Garden open so he
could hear the music and cheering from his supporters at Freedom Plaza.482
The music playing at Freedom Plaza was so loud “you could feel it shaking
in the Oval.” 483
As President Trump listened, he was tweeting, at one point telling his
supporters he could hear them from the Oval Office.484 His speechwriters
incorporated those tweets into a second draft of the speech that was circu-
lated later that evening.485 The following appeared in both tweet form486
and was adapted into the speech:
“All of us here today do not want to see our election victory stolen
by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had
enough, they won’t take it anymore! Together, we will STOP THE
STEAL.” 487
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 539

President Trump and members of his staff in the Oval Office on the evening of January 5,
2021.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration.

In speaking with staff, he still seemed optimistic that “Congress would

take some sort of action in his favor.” 488 The White House photographer,
who was also in attendance, recalled that President Trump again remarked
that he should go to the Capitol the next day, and even asked about the best
route to get there.489 The President peppered staff for ideas concerning how
“we could make the RINOs do the right thing” and make the next day
“big.” 490 Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews, who was present in the
Oval Office that evening, understood that President Trump wanted to get
Republican Members of Congress to send the electoral votes back to the
States, rather than certify the election.491 Matthews recalled that initially
no one spoke up in response, since they were trying to “process” what he
had said.492
Eventually, Deere suggested that President Trump should focus his
speech on his administration’s accomplishments, rather than on his claim
that the election had been stolen.493 But the President told Deere that while
they had accomplished a lot, the crowd was going to be “fired up” and
“angry” the next day because they believed the election had been stolen
and was rigged.494 President Trump knew the crowd was angry because he
could hear them.495 Of course, President Trump was responsible, more than
any other party, for ginning up their anger.
President Trump ended the evening by asking an aide how many people
were going to be at the rally. The aide responded that he was not sure but
540 CHAPTER 6

told President Trump that he saw videos on Twitter of “pro-trump people

chanting on planes heading to DC,” which he asked to be shared with
Scavino.496
“We will not let them silence your voices,” the President told the crowd
from the podium at the Ellipse. “We're not going to let it happen, I'm not
going to let it happen.” 497 His supporters started chanting, “fight for
Trump!” The President thanked them.498
President Trump knew not only that his supporters were angry, but also
that some of them were armed.499 At times, he ad-libbed, deliberately stok-
ing their rage even more. At one point he said: “And we fight. We fight like
hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country any-
more.” 500 The word “fight,” or a variation thereof, appeared only twice in
the prepared text.501 President Trump would go on to utter the word twenty
times during his speech at the Ellipse.502
President Trump had summoned a mob, including armed extremists
and conspiracy theorists, to Washington, DC on the day the joint session of
Congress was to meet. He then told that same mob to march on the U.S.
Capitol and “fight.” They clearly got the message.

ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 62.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 27,62; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael
Pompeo, (Aug. 9, 2022), p. 30; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eugene Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eugene Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11. Others throughout the White
House similarly recognized that December 14 was a milestone in America’s constitutional
process, and it was time for the President to move on. But it was not just members of
President Trump’s Cabinet who viewed that the election was over, and that President
Trump had lost by December 14—President Trump’s top advisors at the White House came
to similar conclusions. For example, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone agreed with
Senator McConnell’s December 15th comments on the Senate floor and viewed the process
for challenging the election as “done.” See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat”
Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 73. White House Deputy Press Secretary and Deputy Assistant to
the President Judd Deere also recognized the significance of the electoral college vote in
determining the president and vice president and conveyed this to President Trump. He
also advised him to concede. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25. White
House Advisor Ivanka Trump viewed the electoral college vote as important and had
already started planning for leaving the administration prior to then. See Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Inter-
view of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 193. White House Advisor Jared Kushner similarly
viewed that day as “significant.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 107.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 541

4. President Trump’s full tweet read: “Peter Navarro releases 36-page report alleging election
fraud ‘more than sufficient’ to swing victory to Trump https://t.co/D8KrMHnFdK. A great
report by Peter. Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big protest in D.C.
on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 19,
2020, The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/tweets-december-19-2020.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Smith, (May 9, 2022), p. 79. Navaroli appeared for two deposition session with
the Select Committee, the first of which was conducted anonymously to protect her iden-
tity. In this deposition session, she was called “J. Smith.” She later agreed to put her name
in the record and sat for another round of questioning. Testimony from that second ses-
sion is referred to as “Deposition of Anika Navaroli.”
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Anika Navaroli, (Sept. 1, 2022), pp. 66-67. She went on to characterize the tweet as
an “RSVP card” that became a “rallying point” for the President’s supporters, one that
prompted violent responses from users that were highly suggestive of the coming violence
targeting DC on January 6th. Id., at p. 64. Another former Twitter employee, whose deposi-
tion was also conducted anonymously, testified that the tweet “in many ways kind of crys-
tallized the plans” for violence and that, after that point, supporters of President Trump
began tweeting about movements to D.C. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Johnson, (Sept. 7, 2022), p. 55.
7. The President’s call to action quickly reverberated beyond Twitter and spread across the
internet. On one social networking site, Discord, a forum called “DonaldsArmy.US” erupted
in the hours after the tweet, with users seeing it as a “call to action” and beginning to
organize travel plans to D.C., including by discussing how and whether to evade DC gun
restrictions and bring firearms into the city. See Summary Memorandum from Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. Briefing with Dis-
cord, (July 29, 2022); see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Discord Production),
JAN6C_DIS_000269 (Memo from Discord titled “DonaldsArmy.US and BASEDMedia.”).
8. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 28, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
9. See, e.g., Ian Ward, “How a D.C. Bar Became the ‘Haven’ for the Proud Boys,” Politico, (Dec.
14, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/14/harrys-bar-
proud-boys-washington-dc-445015.
10. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶37, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305 (citing Tarrio's message to the Proud Boys on December
29, 2020, that they would "not be wearing our traditional Black and Yellow" on January 6th;
they would "be incognito.").
11. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 50, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
12. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 100, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.
14. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 107, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
15. See, e.g., Mike Levine, “How A Standoff in Nevada Years Ago Set The Militia Movement on A
Crash Course with The US Capitol,” ABC News, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at https://
abcnews.go.com/US/standoff-nevada-years-ago-set-militia-movement-crash/story?id=
82051940.
542 CHAPTER 6

16. Indictment at ¶¶ 67, 68, United States v. Rhodes, III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No. 167.
17. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 132,134; Stewart Rhodes and Kellye
SoRelle, “Open Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to ‘Stop the
Steal’ and Defeat the Coup,” Oathkeepers.org, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-
president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/
(archived). Jason Van Tatenhove, the former spokesman of the Oath Keepers described
how he suspected that Rhodes saw the Insurrection Act as a blank check: “He could pretty
much do whatever he wanted, and [President Trump] could install Stewart and the Oath
Keepers as some sort of security force that would bring them real legitimacy and political
power.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason Van Tatenhove, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 73.
18. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C.,
Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.
19. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 95-99, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C.,
Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.
20. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29,
2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, “Oath Keepers Leader Convicted of Sedition in Land-
mark Jan. 6 Case,” New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2384.
22. For example, one Proud Boy, Jeremy Bertino, pleaded guilty to “seditious conspiracy” and
other crimes in October 2022. Bertino admitted to authorities that the Proud Boys traveled
to Washington on January 6, 2021, “to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote.”
They “were willing to do whatever it would take, including using force against police and
others, to achieve that objective.” See “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Sedi-
tious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Elec-
tion,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
23. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021),
ECF No. 1.
24. See, e.g., Indictment at ¶¶ 34-37, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C.
June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
25. Malachi Barrett, “Far-Right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation Also Organized
‘Stop the Steal’ Rally in Michigan,” Mlive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.mlive.com/
politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-
stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.
26. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 10:56 p.m. ET, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/
1347255833516765185 (archived).
27. Ken Dilanian and Ben Collins, “There Are Hundreds of Posts About Plans to Attack the
Capitol. Why Hasn’t This Evidence Been Used in Court?,” NBC News, (Apr. 20, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/we-found-hundreds-posts-
about-plans-attack-capitol-why-aren-n1264291.
28. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at pp. 3-6.
29. See, “NCRI Assessment of The Capitol Riots,” Rutgers Miller Center for Community Protec-
tion and Resilience,” Network Contagion Research Institute, (Jan. 9, 2021) available at
https://millercenter.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NCRI-Assessment-of-the-
Capitol-Riots-1.pdf.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 543

30. “Breaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,”
InfoWars, (Dec. 19, 2020), (archived) available at https://web.archive.org/web/
20201219175757/https://www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-
march-on-dc-january-6-to-stop-foreign-takeover/.
31. Jacob Knutson, “Jury Orders Alex Jones to Pay Nearly $1 Billion in Sandy Hook Defamation
Trial,” Axios, (Oct. 12, 2022), available at https://www.axios.com/2022/10/12/alex-jones-
sandy-hook-defamation-trial.
32. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, at 21:53, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://
tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
33. Jones’s promotion of the January 6th event began almost immediately after the President’s
tweet. See The Alex Jones Show, “January 6th Will Be a Turning Point in American History,”
Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=
5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.
34. See, Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw
During the Attack on the Capitol,” Pro Publica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=5OCkdwJRD0a3 (showing Alex Jones
marching down Pennsylvania Avenue at 1:10 p.m.).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-108, 135.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 70-71.
39. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on
Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6” (Staff Report), (June 8, 2021), p.
B-22.
40. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, “Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinforma-
tion Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-
disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
41. Charles Homans, “How ‘Stop the Steal’ Captured the American Right,” New York Times, (July
19, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/19/magazine/stop-the-steal.html.
(“During his time as a Trump campaign adviser, Stone urged the candidate to run on immi-
gration, and now he linked these views to the plots that he claimed were afoot to deny
Trump the nomination. In the Republican primaries, Trump was ‘a nationalist in a field of
globalists,’ Stone said in an interview that April with Stefan Molyneux, a Canadian alt-right
podcaster. If the globalists failed to steal the primaries outright, there would be a ‘naked
attempt to steal this from Donald Trump’ at the Republican National Convention in Cleve-
land, Stone declared. ‘The fix is in.’ ”)
42. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, “Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinforma-
tion Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-
disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
43. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, “Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinforma-
tion Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
544 CHAPTER 6

2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-

disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201105.
45. See, Hugo Lowell, “Film Offers Inside Look at Roger Stone’s ‘Stop the Steal’ Efforts before
January 6,” The Guardian, (July 8, 2022), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ali Alexander, (Jan. 9, 2021), p. 18.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 199-200.
48. See, e.g., WillfulWarrior, “Hispanic Proud Boys Leader: ‘We Fought Off Antifa Terrorists for
12 Hrs’,” BitChute, Nov. 19, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/
if5u7EuD7NU3/; Infowars: War Room, “Enrique Tarrio Spat on While Flying to Austin Texas,”
BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/yKijHk6m25RL/; BNN,
“Full Show: Witnesses Testify on Michigan Voter Fraud; Thousands of Illegal Votes Counted
for Biden,” BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/
74N0WNHOjiRy/; Jan 6th Protest and Save America March (2020-2H), “Patriots Plot Their
Recapture of America in D.C. This Weekend,” Banned.Video, Nov. 9, 2020, available at
https://archive.org/details/banned.video_-_jan_6th_protest_and_save_america_march_
2020-2h/2020-11-11T02%3A07.148Z+-+Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+America+In+D.C.+
This+Weekend/2020-11-11T02%3A19%3A07.148Z+-+%20Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+
America+In+D.C.+This+Weekend.mp4 (archived); The Alex Jones Show, “Oathkeepers
Founder: Americans Need to Overcome Their Fears And Join The March on DC,” Banned-
.Video, Nov. 10, 2020, available at https://freeworldnews.tv/watch?id=
5fab1b880ad7422090a8242f.
49. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, described Stone (along with Alexander) as
among the key players who were the “midpoint,” “the ones who tr[ied] to orchestrate”
joint efforts in the post-election period. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp.
60-66.
50. Frontline, “Alex Jones and Donald Trump: How the Candidate Echoed the Conspiracy Theo-
rist on the Campaign Trail,” PBS, (July 28, 2020), available at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/article/alex-jones-and-donald-trump-how-the-candidate-echoed-the-conspiracy-
theorist-on-the-campaign-trail/.
51. Eric Bradner, “Trump Praises 9/11 Truther’s ‘Amazing’ Reputation,” CNN, (Dec. 2, 2015),
available at https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-praises-9-11-truther-
alex-jones.
52. See Elizabeth Williamson, “Alex Jones and Donald Trump: A Fateful Alliance Draws Scru-
tiny,” New York Times, (Mar. 7, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/
us/politics/alex-jones-jan-6-trump.html (“Infowars grossed more than $50 million annually
during the Trump presidency by selling diet supplements, body armor, and other products
on its website.”).
53. See, e.g., Joshua Zitser, “Roger Stone Makes Donation Plea for Alex Jones After Verdict Says
He Must Pay $49m for Sandy Hook ‘Hoax’ Claims,” Business Insider, (Aug. 7, 2022), available
at https://www.businessinsider.com/video-roger-stone-asks-donations-infowars-alex-
jones-sandy-hook-2022-8.
54. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
55. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 545

56. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
57. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
58. Jonathan Oosting, “FBI arrests Ryan Kelley, Michigan GOP Governor Candidate, over Capitol
Riots,” Bridge Michigan, (June 9, 2022), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-
government/fbi-arrests-ryan-kelley-michigan-gop-governor-candidate-over-capitol-riots.
59. James Dawson, “Unmasked Protesters Push Past Police into Idaho Lawmakers’ Session,”
NPR, (Apr. 25, 2022), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/08/25/905785548/unmasked-
protesters-push-past-police-into-idaho-lawmakers-session; Jeremy Stiles, “Boise Woman
Sentenced for Role in U.S. Capitol Riot,” KTVB, (May 24, 2022), available at https://
www.ktvb.com/article/news/crime/boise-woman-sentenced-for-role-in-us-capitol-riot-
pamela-hemphill-january-6-2021/277-3aa12194-5a54-4abe-88a2-d644cf5043aa.
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Sergeant at Arms for the Arizona House of Representatives Produc-
tion), CTRL0000930907, CTRL0000930908 (December 4, 2020, surveillance footage from the
Arizona House of Representatives). available at https://house.app.box.com/folder/
183317506767.
61. Sergio Olmos and Conrad Wilson, “At Least 3 Men from Oregon Protest Appear to Have
Joined Insurrection at U.S. Capitol,” Oregon Public Broadcasting, (Jan. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.opb.org/article/2021/01/10/oregon-washington-protest-insurrection-david-
anthony-medina-tim-davis/.
62. Brendan Guttenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 1:03 p.m. ET, available
at https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329485442165706752.
63. Justwanna Grill, “Oathkeepers leader GROYPED in Atlanta,” YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_rDOm5oKu0.
64. Timothy Johnson, “Alex Jones Calls on Supporters to ‘Surround’ the Georgia Governor’s
Mansion to Prevent Election Results from Being Certified,” Media Matters, (Nov. 17, 2020),
available at https://www.mediamatters.org/alex-jones/alex-jones-calls-supporters-
surround-georgia-governors-mansion-prevent-election-results.
65. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20201120061341/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes (archived).
66. See, e.g., Aquarium Groyper, “Nick Fuentes Georgia State Capitol 11/20/2020,” YouTube,
Nov. 20, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f—Tkn1M.
67. Jacqueline Alemany et al., “Red Flags,” Washington Post, (Oct. 31, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.
68. Derrick Mullins, “‘Stop the Steal’ Connected 2 Roger Stone-Roger Stone Calls Ali Anderson
in Front of Atlanta GA Crowd,” YouTube Nov. 24, 2020, available at https://perma.cc/MWS3-
HNGD.
69. Brendan Gutenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2022 12:38 p.m. ET, available
at https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329841457377800198.
70. Zach D. Roberts (@zdroberts), Twitter, Jan. 14, 2022 11:38 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/zdroberts/status/1482210446769807360.
71. Alexandra Hurtzler, “Alex Jones Leads ‘Stop the Steal’ Rally at Georgia’s Capitol to Protest
Election Results,” Newsweek, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/alex-
jones-leads-stop-steal-rally-georgias-capitol-protest-election-results-1548533.
72. Jacqueline Alemany et al., “Red Flags,” Washington Post, (Oct. 31, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.
73. Statement of Andrew Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at p. 9.
546 CHAPTER 6

74. Mike Giglio, “The Oath Keepers’ Radical Legal Defense of January 6th,” New Yorker, (Oct. 1,
2022), available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-oath-keepers-
radical-legal-defense-of-january-6th.
75. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,” Anti-Defamation
League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-
attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence. Despite this, one of the organizers of the Jericho
March maintained that the “tone” of the rally was supposed to be “prayerful, spirit-filled,
peaceful, joyful, and vibrant, a unified celebration.” See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Arina Grossu,
(Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.
76. See President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 12, 2020, The American Presidency
Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-19-
2020.
77. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,” Anti-Defamation
League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at http://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-DC-
attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
78. Grace Segers, “Trump’s Motorcade Passes Supporters Gathered for ‘Million MAGA March’,”
CBS News, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/million-maga-
march-washington-dc-trumps-motorcade-passes-supporters/.
79. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 12, 2020 9:59 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22Wow%21+Thousands+of+people+forming%22 (archived).
80. Ashraf Khalil, “Marine One Buzzes Trump Supporters Rallying for President’s Bid to Stay in
Office in Washington,” Chicago Tribune, (Dec. 12, 2020), available at https://
www.chicagotribune.com/election-2020/ct-trump-election-20201212-
z4zwtovupzhsppphzrlfhj3i3a-story.html.
81. “Breaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,”
InfoWars, (Dec. 19, 2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201219175757/https://
www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-march-on-dc-january-6-
to-stop-foreign-takeover/ (archived).
82. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://tv.infowars.com/
index/display/id/11151.
83. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020, at 1:27:13, available at http://
tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
84. The Alex Jones Show, “January 6th Will Be a Turning Point in American History,”
Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=
5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.
85. “Proud Boys,” Anti-Defamation League, (Jan. 23, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/
proudboys.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Proud Boys International Production), PBI 12 (The Constitution and
Bylaws of Proud Boys International L.L.C., revised November 24, 2018).
87. “Proud Boys,” Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January
2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.
88. “Proud Boys,” Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (Janu-
ary 2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-
boys.
89. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December
27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.); “Proud
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 547

Boys,” Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January
2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.
90. See, e.g., Jason Wilson, “Portland Rally: Proud Boys Vow to March Each Month after Biggest
Protest of Trump Era,” The Guardian, (Aug. 17, 2019), available at https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/17/portland-oregon-far-right-rally-proud-boys-
antifa.
91. See Statement of Heidi L. Beirich, Ph.D., (Mar. 22, 2022), at p.1.
92. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 155.
93. See, e.g., Cleve R. Wootson Jr., “Thousands of Proud Boys Plan to Rally in Portland, Setting
Up Another Clash in a Combustible City,” Washington Post, (Sept. 25, 2020), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/25/portland-oregon-proud-boys-rally/;
see also, Aaron Wolfson and Hampton Stall, “Actor Profile: Proud Boys,” Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at https://acleddata.com/2021/04/
22/actor-profile-proud-boys/ (noting the “percentage of events with counter-
demonstrators in which Proud Boys members participated was more than 10 times the
rate at which others engaged with counter-demonstrators.”).
94. Nick Quested, a filmmaker who followed the Proud Boys through January 6th, described
how Proud Boys couldn’t define Black Lives Matter or Antifa—and that, in person, Proud
Boys simply identified them as “people of color and people with progressive values.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 78.
95. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, “Trump to Far-Right Extremists: ‘Stand Back
and Stand By’,” Associated Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/
election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-
0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 117.
97. Emails obtained by the Select Committee show that Parler featured alarmingly violent and
specific posts that in some cases advocated for civil war. See, e.g., Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Parler Production), PARLER_00000006 (December 24, 2020, email forwarded to the FBI, “We
need to mass an armed force of American Patriots 150,000 on the Virginia side of the
Potomac prepared to react to the congressional events of January 6th”). In a January 2,
2021, email, a Parler employee wrote that they were “concerned about Wednesday,” which
would be January 6th. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000009
(January 2, 2021, email forwarded to the FBI, “One more from same account. More where
came from. Concerned about Wednesday...”).
98. Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, “#StopTheSteal: Timeline of Social Media and Extremist Activities
Leading to 1/6 Insurrection,” Just Security, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://
www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-
activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 38; see also “Former Leader of Proud Boys
Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020
Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-
efforts-stop-transfer-power.mer-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-
efforts-stop-transfer-power.
548 CHAPTER 6

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 50-51, 221-22; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022),
pp. 21-22.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 221.
102. Tom Dreisbach, “Conspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boys’ History Of Violence into Spotlight,”
NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-
charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.
103. Tom Dreisbach, “Conspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boys’ History Of Violence into Spotlight,”
NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-
charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.
104. “Day of the Rope,” Anti-Defamation League, available at https://www.adl.org/resources/
hate-symbol/day-rope.
105. “Contested States,” #StopTheSteal, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at http://archive.ph/C9lwN
(archived).
106. Christopher Mathias, “After Trump’s Defeat, His Supporters Held a Heavily Armed Pity
Party,” Huff Post, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/harrisburg-
trump-rally-defeat-extremists-proud-boys-armed-militias_n_5fa756ddc5b67c3259afbc42.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Michael Simmons, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Douglas Smith, Jr., (Apr.
28, 2022), p. 47.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 81-82; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover,
(May 2, 2022), p. 19; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 26.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Patrick Byrne, (July 15, 2022), pp. 151-52.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09; Luke O’Brien, “How Republican Politics
(And Twitter) Created Ali Alexander, The Man Behind ‘Stop the Steal’,” Huff Post, (Mar. 7,
2021), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republicans-twitter-ali-alexander-stop-
the-steal_n_6026fb26c5b6f88289fbab57.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09.
114. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Shroyer, No. 1:21-mj-572 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021), ECF No.
1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1428181/
download.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 17-19; Ryan Goodman, Justin Hendrix,
Just Security, “Exclusive: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have
Planned for Capitol Attack,” (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/
exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-
capitol-attack/.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 549

116. Ryan Goodman & Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys
Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-
leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
117. Will Carless, “How a Trump Booster Group Helped the Head of Extremist Proud Boys Gain
Access to the White House,” USA Today, (Dec. 19, 2020), available at https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/19/latinos-trump-group-tied-proud-boys-
leader-enrique-tarrio/3931868001/.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 125-27; Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant,
United States v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553, (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2020).
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 127.
121. Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553, (D.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2020).
122. Peter Herman and Martin Weil, “Proud Boys Leader Arrested in the Burning of Church’s
Black Lives Matter Banner, D.C. Police Say,” Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/proud-boys-enrique-tarrio-arrest/
2021/01/04/8642a76a-4edf-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html; Laura Wamsley, “Proud
Boys Leader Released from Police Custody and Ordered to Leave D.C.,” NPR, (Jan. 5, 2021),
available at https://www.npr.org/2021/01/05/953685035/proud-boys-leader-released-
from-police-custody-and-ordered-to-leave-d-c.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 16.
124. Elizabeth Elizalde, “Proud Boys Surround Man with Knife at Violent DC Trump Rally,” New
York Post, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://nypost.com/2020/12/13/one-person-
stabbed-during-massive-proud-boys-brawl-in-dc/.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 128-29.
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 129.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 130-131.
128. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 30, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
129. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 32, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production),
CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages
from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
130. See, Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28,
2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
131. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 55, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
132. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 38, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production),
550 CHAPTER 6

CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages

from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
133. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 33, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
134. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 31, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; see also Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member Tar-
geted in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at
https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-
search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html
(identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).
135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 29, 2020,
“Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram message at 11:09 a.m.).
136. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 41, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF No. 305.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 10-14 (describing Armes’ role in draft-
ing a prior version of the document, which he then shared with Eryka Gemma Flores,
another cryptocurrency investor who shared the document with Tarrio); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Eryka Gemma Flores, (July 1, 2022).
138. Zachary Rehl’s Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1:
“1776 Returns,” United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15, 2022) ECF No.
401-1, available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.
139. Zachary Rehl’s Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1:
“1776 Returns,” United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15, 2022) ECF No.
401-1, available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), pp. 70-71; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Christopher Barcenas,
(Mar. 10, 2022), p. 98; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy
Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 23.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 14.
142. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 41, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
143. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to
Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-
capitol-attack-11610911596.
144. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 49, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted in
Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at https://
lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-
warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html (identifying
John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).
145. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 49, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted in
Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at https://
lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 551

warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html (identifying
John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).
146. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 50, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF No. 305.
147. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No.
335.
148. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022).
149. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022).
150. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022).
151. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022).
152. Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022).
153. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop
Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-
guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
154. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop
Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 22,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-
guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.
157. Statement of Sam Jackson, Ph.D., (Mar. 30, 2022), at p. 2.
158. Zachary Cohen, “Oath Keepers Leader Spewed Anti-government Hate for More than a
Decade. Alex Jones Gave Him the Audience,” CNN, (Jan. 14, 2022), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/oath-keepers-stewart-rhodes-alex-jones-invs/
index.html.
159. The Select Committee found that the idea that violence loomed from the left was a power-
ful draw for people to join the Oath Keepers. Richard Dockery, a former Oath Keepers
member from Florida, decried “all the riots and stuff I was seeing on the news all over the
country” and expressed concern about Antifa and Black Lives Matter activity in his area of
Florida, a prospect that he called “nerve-wracking.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2,
2022), pp. 10, 31. Because of this, he said that the Oath Keepers “seemed like a really good
organization to support” in order to keep communities safe. Id., at p. 9. Similarly, Jeff
Morelock told the Select Committee that joining the Oath Keepers “would give me a
chance to do something to help instead of just sitting on the couch,” referring to watching
protests on television. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Lawrence Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 87-88.
Jason Van Tatenhove, a former spokesman for the Oath Keepers and confidant to Rhodes
who has since publicly denounced the group, described how the Oath Keepers tried to
deliberately leverage this dynamic to increase their clout. Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason Van
Tatenhove, (Mar. 9, 2022), pp. 54-55.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 103-104.
552 CHAPTER 6

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 9-10.
162. Stewart Rhodes, “Call to Action! March on DC, Stop the Steal, Defend the President, &
Defeat the Deep State,” Oath Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at https://
oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-
president-defeat-the-deep-state/.
163. Stewart Rhodes, “Call to Action! March on DC, Stop the Steal, Defend the President, &
Defeat the Deep State,” Oath Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at https://
oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-
president-defeat-the-deep-state/.
164. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, “Open Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the
Insurrection Act to ‘Stop the Steal’ and Defeat the Coup,” Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14, 2020),
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/
open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-
defeat-the-coup/.
165. Michael S. Schmidt and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Aides Prepared Insurrection Act Order
During Debate Over Protests,” New York Times, (June 25, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/us/politics/trump-insurrection-act-protests.html.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 131.
167. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,” Anti-Defamation
League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-
attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
168. In texts between Rhodes and Rob Weaver, one of the organizers of the Jericho March,
Weaver instructed his associate to work with Rhodes “on extra security.” Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes)0001 (December 11, 2020,
text from Rob Weaver at 1:39 p.m.).
169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Thomas Speciale Production), CTRL0000050180, pp. 1-6, 26-28
(Signal Chat Titled Dec 12 DC Security/Leadership); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Weaver
Production), Weaver J6 Production) Prod. (S. Rhodes)0039 (Signal Chat Titled Dec 12 DC
Security/Leadership).; Superseding Indictment at 12, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167 (noting that on December 11, 2020, Rhodes
“sent a message to an invitation-only Signal group chat titled, ‘Dec 12 DC Security/
Leadership,’ which included James, MINUTA, and others. RHODES stated that if President-
Elect Biden were to assume the presidency, ‘It will be a bloody and desperate fight. We are
going to have a fight. That can’t be avoided.’ ”).
170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes) 0045
(December 10, 2020, Stewart Rhodes chat with Dec. 12 DC Security/Leadership at 10:17p.m.).
171. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, “Open Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the
Insurrection Act to ‘Stop the Steal’ and Defeat the Coup,” Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14, 2020),
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/
open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-
defeat-the-coup/.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 132, 134.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 553

173. Trial Exhibit 6748, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022); Kyle
Cheney, “Prosecutors Detail Oath Keepers’ Mounting Frustration with Trump as Jan. 6
Approached,” Politico, (Oct. 20, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/
10/20/oath-keepers-trump-jan-6-00062779.
174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alondra Propes Production), CTRL0000029585, p.1 (Stewart Rhodes
writing in ‘OKFL Hangout’ chat).
175. Stewart Rhodes and Alondra Propes characterized the Proud Boys as street brawlers in
contrast to the Oath Keepers’ discipline. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22,
2022), pp. 40, 43; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alondra Propes, (Jan. 31, 2022), pp. 42-43, 136.
Kellye SoRelle described the Proud Boys as extreme white supremacists. See Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 63-64. Enrique Tarrio characterized the Oath Keepers as
“oath breakers” and embarrassing. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 77,
193-94.
176. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
177. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Request for Pretrial Release at 7, United
States v. Meggs, No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021). Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022),
p. 125.
178. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 28, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
179. “Leader of Oath Keepers and 10 Other Individuals Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Jan.
13, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-10-
other-individuals-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy.
180. See Superseding Indictment at ¶ 17, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C.
June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Landon Bentley, (May 12, 2022), p. 11 (dis-
cussing use of Signal as an encrypted chat).
181. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 29, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
182. Superseding Indictment at ¶¶ 38, 39, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
183. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C.,
Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.
184. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C.,
Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 48-52.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 49.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 51.
188. Infowars Army, “Alex Jones Show—DOJ Launches National Probe of Election Fraud,”
BitChute, Nov. 10, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/NoELuXs06RzX/.
554 CHAPTER 6

189. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S.
Rhodes) 0011 (January 1, 2021, Stewart Rhodes chat with Jan 5/6 DC OK Security/VIP Chat at
7:58-8:00 pm).
190. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 45, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 34.
191. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 44, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
192. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 68, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167. Documents filed with the Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hilton Garden Inn Production), MHG000049-103
(January 2-8, 2021, Hilton Garden Inn invoices).
193. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
194. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 47, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022) ECF No. 167.
195. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 57, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
196. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 61, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
197. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 70, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 39.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.
202. Select Comittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 40-42.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 45-47.
204. Macias had traveled to DC after his arrest for bringing weapons to a vote-counting center
in Philadelphia while votes were being counted in November 2020. Claudia Lauer, “Philly
DA Seeks Contempt Charge for Vets for Trump Cofounder,” AP News, (June 13, 2022), avail-
able at https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-pennsylvania-riots-philadelphia-virginia-
d74b05c01aebde1ca26a9c080a5022d8.
205. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442 (January 5, 2021,
Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live stream).
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442, (January 5, 2021,
Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live stream) at 0:36.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 207-08.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 555

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
210. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 23, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-
GC_1859.mov, at 0:50 (Jan. 5, 2021).
213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-
GC_1859.mov, at 1:31 (Jan. 5, 2021).
214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-
GC_1859.mov, at 1:00 (Jan. 5, 2021).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 202.
216. Spencer S. Hsu, “Video Released of Garage Meeting of Proud Boys, Oath Keepers Leaders,”
Washington Post, embedded video at 3:20, (May 24, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/05/24/tarrio-rhodes-video/.
217. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-
GC_1864.mov, at 0:14 (Jan. 5, 2021).
218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).
219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).
220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.
222. See In re Stone, 940 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1,
7-8 (D.D.C. 2019).
223. David Freedlander, “An Oral History of Donald Trump’s Almost-Run for President in 2000,”
Intelligencer, (Oct. 11, 2018), available at https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/trumps-
almost-run-for-president-in-2000-an-oral-history.html.
224. See Trial Transcript at 3806, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 17,
2022) (testimony and exhibits showing Kelly Meggs and Jessica Watkins discussed providing
security for Roger Stone); Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, “The Roger Stone Tapes,” Wash-
ington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/
2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/; Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin,
Ali Dukakis, and Fergal Gallagher, “Video Surfaces Showing Trump Ally Roger Stone Flanked
by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,” ABC News, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://
abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-stone-flanked/story?id=
75706765; Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc), Twitter, Feb. 19, 2021 4:35 p.m., available at https://
twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1362878609334165505 (Kelly Meggs with Roger Stone); Spencer S.
556 CHAPTER 6

Hsu, Manuel Roig-Franzia, and Devlin Barrett, “Roger Stone Keeps Appearing in Capitol
Breach Investigation Court Filings,” Washington Post, (Mar. 22, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/roger-stone-court-filings-capitol-riot/2021/
03/22/c689a77c-87f8-11eb-82bc-e58213caa38e_story.html (Mark Grods with Roger Stone);
Andrew Smrecek (@combat_art_training), Instagram, Dec. 15, 2020, available at https://
www.instagram.com/p/CI0g8dlhEyG/ (Connie Meggs and Jason Dolan with Roger Stone)
(last accessed Dec. 11, 2022).
225. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 76, 90, 96, 98, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022), ECF No. 102-1.
226. Christiaan Triebert, Ben Decker, Derek Watkins, Arielle Ray, and Stella Cooper, “First They
Guarded Roger Stone. Then They Joined the Capitol Attack,” New York Times, (Feb. 14, 2021),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/14/us/roger-stone-capitol-
riot.html.
227. Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin, Ali Dukakis, and Fergal Gallagher, “Video Surfaces Showing
Trump Ally Roger Stone Flanked by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,” ABC News, (Feb. 5,
2021), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-
stone-flanked/story?id=75706765.
228. “Leader of Alabama Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy and
Obstruction of Congress for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential
Election,” Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-seditious-
conspiracy-and-obstruction.
229. Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, “The Roger Stone Tapes,” Washington Post, (Mar. 4, 2022),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-
stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/.
230. Kelly Weill, “How the Proud Boys Became Roger Stone’s Personal Army,” Daily Beast, (Jan.
29, 2019), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-proud-boys-became-roger-
stones-personal-army-6.
231. See, e.g., Andy Campbell, “EXCLUSIVE: Roger Stone Admits He’s Been Advising The Proud
Boys For Years,” Huff Post, (Sept. 22, 2022), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
roger-stone-we-are-proud-boys_n_632c57ebe4b09d8701bd02e2.
232. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video files
190926 I bil + fondraiser, 191003 Stone dag 3 backstage fundraiser 2 onstage, 200220.
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 190926 i bil + fond-
raiser.
234. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys
Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-
leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
235. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys
Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-
leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
236. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys
Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-
leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 557

237. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “ Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to
Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-
capitol-attack-11610911596.
238. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “ Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to
Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-
capitol-attack-11610911596.
239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060762 - CTRL0000060858
(screenshotting messages in the Friends of Stone chat); Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine,
“The Roger Stone Tapes,” Washington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 200705.
240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201105.
241. Hugo Lowell, “Film Offers Inside Look at Roger Stone’s ‘Stop the Steal’ Efforts Before Janu-
ary 6,” The Guardian, (July 8, 2022), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.
242. Document on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060802, CTRL0000060798
(screenshots from the Friends of Stone chat).
243. “Executive Grant of Clemency for Roger Jason Stone, Jr.,” Department of Justice, (July 10,
2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1293796/download.
244. Amita Kelly, Ryan Lucas, and Vanessa Romo, “Trump Pardons Roger Stone, Paul Manafort
And Charles Kushner,” NPR, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/12/23/
949820820/trump-pardons-roger-stone-paul-manafort-and-charles-kushner.
245. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336.
246. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336; See also Ali Dukakis, “Roger
Stone Thanks President Trump for Pardon in Person,” ABC News, (Dec. 28, 2020), available
at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/roger-stone-president-trump-pardon-person/story?id=
74940512.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kristin Davis, (August 2, 2022), p. 41; Documents on file with Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Kristin Davis
Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from Kristin Davis to
Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).
248. Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kristin Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020,
text message from Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021).
250. Will Steakin, Matthew Mosk, James Gordon Meek, and Ali Dukakis, “Longtime Trump Advis-
ers Connected to Groups Behind Rally that Led to Capitol Attack,” ABC News, (Jan. 15, 2021),
available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/longtime-trump-advisers-connected-groups-rally-
led-capitol/story?id=75261028.
558 CHAPTER 6

251. “Nicholas J. Fuentes: Five Things to Know,” Anti-Defamation League, (July 9, 2021, updated
Nov. 30, 2022), available at https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/nicholas-j-fuentes-five-
things-know?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4ITXgYH6-wIVaUpyCh08sgxaEAAYASAAEgLGNPD_BwE;
Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2020 11:26 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201219072617/https:/twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/
1340196694571540490 (archived). As noted in the Executive Summary, this tweet, like oth-
ers, was likely sent from or archived in a separate time zone, which explains why it shows
a sent date of December 18, 2020, while President Trump issued his tweet at 1:42 a.m. on
December 19, 2020.
252. “California Man Sentenced to 42 Months in Prison for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
california-man-sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Tom Dreisbach,
Allison Mollenkamp, “A Former UCLA Student Was Sentenced to over Three Years in Prison
for Capitol Riot,” NPR, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/
1129912913/a-former-ucla-student-was-sentenced-to-over-three-years-in-prison-for-
capitol-ri.
253. “Student Who Attended Charlottesville White Supremacist Rally Leaves Boston University
After Backlash,” Time, (Aug. 17, 2017), https://time.com/4905939/nicholas-fuentes-white-
supremacist-rally-charlottesville/; “Neo-Nazi Hipsters Identity Evropa Exposed In Discord
Chat Leak,” Unicorn Riot, (Mar. 6, 2019), https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/neo-nazi-hipsters-
identity-evropa-exposed-in-discord-chat-leak/.
254. See Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022); “Groypers
Army and ‘America First’,” Anti-Defamation League, (Mar. 17, 2020), available at https://
www.adl.org/reources/backgrounders/groyper-army-and-america-first.
255. See, e.g., Malachi Barrett, “Far-right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation also
Organized ‘Stop the Steal’ Rally in Michigan,” MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://
www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-
also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html; Studio IKN, “Nick Fuentes at Stop the
Steal Phoenix,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
U_vjzjMDenk.
256. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.
257. Fuentes personally earned $50,000 from his livestreams between November 3, 2020, and
January 19, 2021. He raised his highest-ever total the day after the 2020 election, and he
raised similarly high figures on January 5, 2021. Some of Fuentes’ proceeds were refunded
to customers following Fuentes’ ban from DLive. See Statement of Michael Edison Hayden,
Megan Squire, Ph.D., Hannah Gais, and Susan Corke, (Apr. 7, 2022), at 6-7.
258. See, Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 12.
259. Malachi Barrett, “Far-Right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation Also Organized
‘Stop the Steal’ Rally in Michigan,” MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://
www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-
also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.
260. Chuck Tanner, “Deciphering Nick Fuentes’ ‘Stop the Steal’ Speeches,” Institute for Research
and Education on Human Rights, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/
74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-
insurrection/.
261. “#StopTheSteal: Timeline of Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrec-
tion,” Just Security (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/
stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-
insurrection/.
262. Chuck Tanner, “White Nationalists Prominent at ‘Stop the Steal’ Mobilization in Georgia,”
Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights,” (Nov. 24, 2020), available at
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 559

https://www.irehr.org/2020/11/24/white-nationalists-prominent-at-stop-the-steal-
mobilization-in-georgia/.
263. Aquarium Groyper, “Nick Fuentes Georgia State Capitol 11/20/2020,” YouTube, at 1:38, Nov.
20, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f--Tkn1M.
264. Peter White, “MAGA Protestors Chant ‘Destroy the GOP’ at Pro-Trump Rally,” Rolling Stone,
(Dec. 12, 2020), available at https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/
protesters-chant-destroy-the-gop-at-pro-trump-rally-1102967/.
265. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,” Anti-Defamation
League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-
attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
266. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.
267. Patrick Casey (@Patrickcaseyusa), Telegram, Jan. 5, 2021 6:20 p.m.; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Public Source), CTRL0000930909 - CTRL0000930912 (collection of Patrick Casey telegram
posts).
268. Mallory Simon and Sara Sidner, “Decoding the Extremist Symbols and Groups at the Capi-
tol Hill Insurrection,” CNN, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/09/
us/capitol-hill-insurrection-extremist-flags-soh/index.html.
269. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 10:56 a.m. ET, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/
1347255833516765185 (archived).
270. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 1:03 p.m. ET, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210107210736/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/
1347287851629764610 (archived).
271. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas J. Fuentes, (Feb. 16, 2022).
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Michael Lee Wells, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 72.
273. Alejandro J. Beutel, Daryl Johnson, “The Three Percenters: A Look Inside an Anti-
Government Militia,” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, (Feb. 2021), at 8, available
at https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20210225-Three-Percenter-PR-NISAP-
rev051021.pdf; “Three Percenters,” Southern Poverty Law Center, available at https://
www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/three-percenters.
274. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 12-13.
275. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.
276. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp. 6-7.
278. “Two Texas Men Charged with Assault on Law Enforcement During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Dec. 14, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
two-texas-men-charged-assault-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
279. “Texas Man Sentenced to 52 Months in Prison For Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers Dur-
ing Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sept. 28, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/texas-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-
officers-during-jan-6-capitol.
280. Criminal Complaint at 9, 13, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021),
ECF No. 1.
281. Criminal Complaint at 8-12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021),
ECF No. 1. For example, Denney told Hazard that they “will need linking up with the proud
560 CHAPTER 6

boys.” Id., at 8. Denney described the hotel he booked as “the same place everyone else is
getting in the Proud Boys crew and other militia’s until it gets full.” Id., at 9. In a separate
post on Facebook, Denney stated that the Patriot Boys of North Texas were “allied with the
Patriot Prayer and the Proud Boys.” Id., at 9. In another Facebook message on December
29, Denney wrote: “We are linking up with thousands of Proud Boys and other militia that
will be there. This is going to be huge. And it’s going to be a fight.” Id., at 10. Similarly,
Hazard wrote on Facebook: “I belong to a militia group that’s affiliated with the proud
boys” and “We’re affiliated with the proud boys which have folks of all races as there’s
several thousand members.” Id., at 12.
282. Criminal Complaint at 8, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
283. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
284. Criminal Complaint at 11, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1. Hazard also echoed this idea. Id., at 14.
285. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021),
ECF No. 1.
286. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
287. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
288. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
289. Criminal Complaint at 16, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
290. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184-RMM (D.D.C. Aug, 29,
2022), ECF No. 5-1
291. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
292. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
293. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
294. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
295. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
296. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp. 50-51.
298. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
299. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
300. “Five Florida Men Arrested on Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” United
States Department of Justice, (Aug. 24, 2022) available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/
pr/five-florida-men-arrested-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 561

301. Indictment Dated June 9, 2021 at 1, United States v. Hostetter et. al., No. 1:1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C.
June 9, 2021); Michael Kunzelman, “Capitol Rioter Used Charity to Promote Violence, Feds
Say,” Associated Press, (June 16, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/donald-
trump-joe-biden-riots-health-coronavirus-pandemic-71a7b8121b6f70016f7cab601021a989.
302. Indictment at ¶ 38, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
303. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No.
1.
304. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
305. Indictment at 8, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
306. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
307. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
308. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
309. Indictment at 12, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
310. The National Council and The Three Percenters - Original, “TTPO Stance on Election Fraud,”
Dec. 16, 2020, available at http://archive.ph/YemCC (archived).
311. See post by username @hatdonuts2, patriots.win, December 29, 2020, 7:56 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s; Statement of Facts at 7-8,
United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Josh Ellis, (May 19, 2022), p. 38.
313. “Lone Capitol Police Officer Eugene Goodman Diverts Capitol Rioters,” Washington Post,
(Jan. 11, 2021). available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/lone-capitol-
police-officer-eugene-goodman-diverts-capitol-rioters/2021/01/11/ba67a5e8-5f9b-4a9a-
a7b7-93549f6a81b3_video.html
314. Scott MacFarlane and Gillian Morley, “QAnon Follower Doug Jensen Convicted on All Jan. 6
Charges,” CBS News, (Sept. 23, 2022), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qanon-
follower-doug-jensen-convicted-on-all-jan-6-charges/.
315. Interview of: Douglas Austin Jensen Dated Jan. 8, 2021 at 19, United States v. Jensen, No.
1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C., Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 69-1.
316. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 12.
317. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 2-3.
318. “QAnon,” Anti-Defamation League, (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/
resources/backgrounder/qanon.
319. Kelly Weill, “QAnon’s Home 8kun is Imploding - and Q Has Gone Silent,” Daily Beast, (Nov.
13, 2020), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanons-home-8kun-is-
implodingand-q-has-gone-silent?ref=scroll.
320. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White House, (Aug. 19, 2020), available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
press-briefing-august-19-2020/.
321. NBC News, “Trump Denounces White Supremacy, Sidesteps Question on QAnon,” YouTube,
at 1:32, 2:34, Oct. 15, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/3hybkzCWb_w.
562 CHAPTER 6

322. Ben Collins, “QAnon’s Dominion Voter Fraud Conspiracy Theory Reaches the President,”
NBC News, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/q-
fades-qanon-s-dominion-voter-fraud-conspiracy-theory-reaches-n1247780; National Conta-
gion Research Institute, “The QAnon Conspiracy: Destroying Families, Dividing
Communities, Undermining Democracy,” p. 20, available at https://networkcontagion.us/
wp-content/uploads/NCRI-%E2%80%93-The-QAnon-Conspiracy-FINAL.pdf.
323. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET,
available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Dominion-
izing+the+Vote%22 (archived).
324. One America News Network, “Cyber Analyst on Dominion Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,”
YouTube, at 0:45, Nov. 15, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/eKcPoCNW8AA.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), p. 11. Watkins denied under oath that either he or
his son Ron are “Q.” Id., at 38, 122.
326. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 15, 2020 12:32 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Soon-to-be+AG+Rosen+recently+
wrote+an+essay+on+foreign+influence+in+US+elections.+foreign+actors+are+covertly+
trying+to%22 (archived).
327. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of January 3, 2021,” The American Presidency Project,
available at, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-3-
2021 (archived).
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), p. 77; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), p. 67
(noting, as the then-owner of TheDonald.win, that President Trump’s December 19th tweet
was “everywhere,” including with “Q people.”).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), pp. 74, 76.
330. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Munn, No. 1:21-cr-474 (D.D.C. May 13, 2022), ECF
No. 78.
331. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No.
1-1.
332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 162.
333. See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9257), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022) (Rhodes messaging an Oath Keepers chat that “Let’s adopt the Q slo-
gan of WWG1WGA. Where We Go One, We Go All. We nullify TOGETHER We defy TOGETHER.
We resist TOGETHER We defend TOGETHER. They come for one of us, they come for all of
us. When they come for us, we go for them. When they strike at our leaders, we strike at
their leaders. This is the path of the Founders. It’s what they did.”); Trial Exhibit 4064,
United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022) (printout of December 23,
2020, open letter to President Trump posted by Stewart Rhodes on the Oath Keeper web-
site, imploring the President to invoke the Insurrection Act to prevent a communist take-
over of the United States through the inauguration of Joe Biden).
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 53.
335. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, “Extremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to ‘Occupy’
Capitol in Weeks Before Attack,” NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://
www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-
weeks-attack-n1253499.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 563

336. Kari Paul, Luke Harding and Severin Carrell, “Far-Right Website 8kun Again Loses Internet
Service Protection Following Capitol Attack,” The Guardian, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jan/15/8kun-8chan-capitol-breach-
violence-isp.
337. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, “Extremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to ‘Occupy’
Capitol in Weeks Before Attack,” NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://
www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-
weeks-attack-n1253499.
338. Post by username r3deleven, “Trump Tweet. Daddy Says Be In DC On Jan. 6th,” Patriots.Win,
Dec. 19, 2020, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210105024826/https://
thedonald.win/p/11R4q2aptJ/trump-tweet-daddy-says-be-in-dc-/c/ (archived).
339. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to ‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Hand-
cuffs and Zip Ties’,” SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://
ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-
strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
340. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to ‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Hand-
cuffs and Zip Ties’,” SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://
ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-
strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), p. 72.
342. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “The Absence of ‘The Donald’,” Just Security, (Dec. 6,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79446/the-absence-of-the-donald/.
343. Amrita Khalid, “Donald Trump Participated in a Reddit AMA, but not Much of Anything was
Revealed,” Daily Dot, (July 27, 2016), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/donald-
trump-reddit-ama-fail/.
344. Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Briefing with Reddit, (May 19, 2022); Mike Isaac, “Reddit, Acting Against Hate
Speech, Bans ‘The_Donald’ Subreddit,” New York Times, (Jan. 29, 2020, Updated Jan. 27,
2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/technology/reddit-hate-
speech.html.
345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), pp. 31-32. In fact, Williams testified that he and other
moderators had the opportunity to advertise the new website on Reddit for months. See
id., at 32-33. This gave TheDonald.win “immediate” access to “hundreds of thousands of
people” who used the Reddit forum. See id., at 33.
346. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos
Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,”
Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.
347. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos
Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,”
Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.
348. Daniella Silva, “President Trump Tweets Wrestling Video of Himself Attacking ‘CNN’,” NBC
News, (July 2, 2017), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/
president-trump-tweets-wwe-video-himself-attacking-cnn-n779031.
349. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trump’s Foreknowledge of the Attack on the
Capitol,” Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/
thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
564 CHAPTER 6

350. Andrew Restuccia, Daniel Lippman, and Eliana Johnson, “‘Get Scavino in Here’: Trump’s
Twitter Guru is the Ultimate Insider,” Politico, (May 16, 2019), available at https://
www.politico.com/story/2019/05/16/trump-scavino-1327921.
351. H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter
K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a
Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
352. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trump’s Foreknowledge of the Attack on the
Capitol,” Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/
thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
353. Post, “If we occupy the capitol building, there will be no vote,” Patriots.Win, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1RiP9l/if-we-occupy-the-capitol-buildin/.
354. Post by username REDMARAUDER, “The media will call us evil if we have to occupy the
Capitol Building on January 6th. Let them,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 2, 2021, available at https://
patriots.win/p/11ROC9U7EM/the-media-will-call-us-evil-if-w/.
355. Post by username Sharker, “THIS IS NOT A RALLY OR PROTEST. We are all here for the sole
purpose of correcting this ILLEGAL election. Surround the enemy and do NOT LET THEM
LEAVE until this mess is cleaned up with Trump being re-admitted for 4 more years. SACK
UP PATRIOTS.” Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1WGo3K/
this-is-not-a-rally-or-protest-w/c/.
356. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos
Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump—and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,”
Politico Magazine, (March/April 2017) available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856.
357. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to ‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Hand-
cuffs and Zip Ties’,” SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://
ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-
strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
358. Alex Thomas, “Team Trump Was in Bed With Online Insurrectionists before He Was Even
Elected,” Daily Dot, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-
scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.
359. Alex Jones, “Team Trump Was in Bed With Online Insurrectionists before He Was Even
Elected,” Daily Dot, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-
scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.
360. Post by username wartooth6, “Gallows are simpler and more cost effective, plus they’re an
American old west tradition too,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 22, 2020, available at https://
patriots.win/p/11RNfN5v3p/gallows-are-simpler-and-more-cos/c/.
361. Post by username psybrnaut, “Builder Pedes...Let’s construct a Gallows outside the Capitol
Building next Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from their office windows shit
their Pants...,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2pYG2P/
builder-pedes-lets-construct-a-g/c/.
362. Post by username TacticalGeorge, “Building a hanging platform in front of Congress on the
6 should send a strong message,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://
patriots.win/p/11RO2oQy77/building-a-hanging-platform-in-f/.
363. Post by username Krunchi, “The One Thing You Must Know Before Going To DC on The
6th...,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 3, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210105080829/
https://thedonald.win/p/11ROGmlHG5/the-one-thing-you-must-know-befo/ (archived).
364. Post by username Badradness, “We will be building a gallows right in front of the Capitol
so the traitors know the stakes. I’m driving up in a sedan but if a patriot with a pickup will
assist I’m down to spend from my credit line at Home Depot for all of the supplies needed
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 565

for this. Driving up Monday night or early Tuesday.,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 3, 2021, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11ROGrJPVQ/we-will-be-building-a-gallows-ri/c/.
365. Post by username AFLP, “Gallows on the Capitol Lawn,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available
at https://patriots.win/p/11RhArKEQ3/gallows-on-the-capitol-lawn/.
366. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3,
2022), pp. 209.
367. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. In his testimony to the Select
Committee, Miller denied reading such comments and claimed not to recall whether Mead-
ows had followed up with him about the thread. However, Miller did say that “sometimes”
he would “click and see what people are saying” on sites like TheDonald.win, if he
received a Google alert about himself. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 209, 212,
214.
368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 209, Exhibit 47.
369. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340362336390004737.
370. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trumps Foreknowledge of the Attack on the
Capitol,” Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/
thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
371. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During
the Attack on the Capitol,” Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021, available,
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/; Statement of Catherine A. Sander-
son, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.
372. Through review of public records, the Select Committee identified organizers for about a
dozen events scheduled for January 5th or 6th secured permits from either the U.S. Capitol
Police (USCP) or National Park Service (NPS). Except for two events—one unrelated to Janu-
ary 6th and the other put on by a group that regularly held demonstrations around D.C.—
all of the applications were submitted after President Trump’s December 19th tweet. The
three most important events were: Cindy Chafian’s January 5th event at Freedom Plaza
(using the group name “The Eighty Percent Coalition”); WFAF’s January 6th event at the
Ellipse; and Ali Alexander’s January 6th event on the Capitol grounds (under the “One
Nation Under God” moniker). In addition to the permits issued to WFAF, Cindy Chafian, and
Ali Alexander (under the “One Nation Under God” moniker), at least nine additional per-
mits were issued by USCP or NPS for events in Washington, D.C., on January 5, 2021 or Janu-
ary 6, 2021.
373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162
(Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at
7:12 AM).
374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162
(Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at
7:12 AM).
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kylie Kremer, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 5.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Amy Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.
566 CHAPTER 6

377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Amy Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.
378. Women for America First, “March for Trump Bus Tour,” trumpmarch.com, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201226001527/https://trumpmarch.com/..
379. Kylie Jane Kremer (@KylieJaneKremer), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/kyliejanekremer/status/1340399063875895296?lang=en.
380. Women For America First Ellipse Public Gathering Permit, National Park Service, available
at https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/21-0278-Women-for-America-First-Ellispse-
permit_REDACTED.pdf.
381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), p. 15.
382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec. 19, 2020, Ali
Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at 10:49 a.m.).
383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec. 19, 2020, Ali
Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at 10:49 a.m.).
384. “Valuation and Analysis,” WildProtest.com, (Jan. 14, 2021 (last updated)), available at
https://wildprotest.com.siteindices.com/.
385. “President Trump Wants You in DC January 6,” WildProtest.com, (Dec 19.2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201223062953/http://wildprotest.com/ (archived).
386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Arina Grossu, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.
387. Statement of Andrew J. Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at 11, 13.
388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Arina Grossu Production), Grossu_01_002721 (Dec. 19, 2020, Rob
Weaver email message to Arina Grossu at 8:20 a.m. CT).
389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Arina Grossu Production), Arina Grossu Exhibit 20 (Jericho March
Rally registration page).
390. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Marsha Lessard, (Dec. 10, 2021); see also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol
Police Production), CTRL0000001834 (Permit Relating to Demonstration Activities on United
States Capitol Grounds for Virginia Freedom Keepers, No. 20-12-25).
391. . See Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
June 22, 2022) (noting that Stewart Rhodes, President of the Oath Keepers, shipped weap-
ons to Lessard’s home in Virginia before his arrival in DC for January 6th); Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye
SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
392. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2021), p. 117 (testifying that Gracia arranged a White
House tour for him in December 2020).
393. Latinos for Trump (@Officiallft2021), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 7:58 p.m., available at https://
twitter.com/i/web/status/1343360740313321474.
394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Nathan Martin Production), NMartin0318 (December 30, 2020, email
from Kimberly Fletcher of Moms for America to Ali Alexander and Nathan Martin re: MFA
VIP list for White House); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Resource Group Production),
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 567

CTRL0000010100 (December 27, 2020, text messages between Nathan Martin, Stephen Mar-
tin, Kimberly Fletcher, and Ali Alexander discussing permitting); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capi-
tol Police Production), CTRL0000000086, CTRL0000000086.0001 (December 23, 2020, Special
Event Assessment identifying Fletcher as a speaker at the “Wild Protest” event during the
same time as MFA’s permitted event in a different area).
395. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, at 10:07, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://
tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (T-Mobile Production, Nov. 19, 2021).
397. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Cynthia “Cindy” Chafian (Nov. 1-2, 2021).
398. See, Beth Reinhard, Jaqueline Alemany, and Josh Dawsey, “Low-Profile Heiress Who ‘Played
a Strong Role’ in Financing Jan. 6 Rally is Thrust Into Spotlight,” Washington Post, (Dec. 8,
2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/publix-heiress-capitol-
insurrection-fancelli/2021/12/08/5144fe1c-5219-11ec-8ad5-b5c50c1fb4d9_story.html.
399. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Julia Fancelli Production), REL0000000994, (Bank Statements for Julia
Fancelli at the Bank of Central Florida from December 10, 2020, to January 10, 2021).
400. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 58.
401. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
402. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 45-46.
403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 71.
404. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021,
Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan).
406. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000005 (December 27, 2020, Kylie
Kremer e-mail to Caroline Wren at 11:25 am).
407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000468 (December 27, 2020,
Caroline Wren text message thread with Alex Jones).
408. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000550 (Dec. 27, 2020, Caroline
Wren text messages with Cindy Chafian).
409. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.
410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021,
Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan
411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021,
Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan
568 CHAPTER 6

412. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December 29, 2020,
Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at 4:19 p.m.).
413. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December 29, 2020,
Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at 4:19 pm).
414. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, “Trump to Far-Right Extremists: `Stand Back
and Stand By,’ ” Associated Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/
election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-
0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.
415. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived).
416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2022), pp. 20-21.
417. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., (May 3, 2022), p.30; Anthony Man, “At Trump
Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Roger Stone Thanks President for Pardon,” Orlando Sun
Sentinel, (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/
elections/fl-ne-roger-stone-thanks-trump-pardon-20201228-2ejqzv6e7vhyvf26cxz6e6jysa-
story.html.
418. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Dec. 17, 2021).
419. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000444, pp. 1-3 (December 27,
2020, text message from Caroline Wren to Kimberly Guilfoyle at 7:10 p.m.).
420. As revealed in the phone records for the personal cell phones of Max Miller and Anthony
Ornato. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Dec. 17, 2021); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Verizon Production, Sep. 23, 2022). The Select Committee also subpoenaed the phone
records for the personal cell phones of Robert Peede, Mark Meadows, Dan Scavino, and
Justin Caporale. They each filed lawsuits to block the respective phone companies’ pro-
duction of the phone records, which were still pending at the time of writing. Thus, there
may have been additional relevant phone calls among or involving these four of which the
Select Committee is not aware.
421. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 36-37.
422. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2020), p. 44; Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Produc-
tion), REVU_0644 (December 29, 2020, text messages with Justin Caporale).
423. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0181 (January 2nd email from Katrina Pierson to Caroline
Wren and Taylor Budowich).
424. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-08, 135.
425. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 42.
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 569

426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 44-45, 47, 52-54; Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 87.
427. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5447, p. 3 (January 4, 2021, text
message from Kylie Kremer to Mike Lindell at 9:32 a.m.).
428. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017718, p. 41 (January 5, 2021 text
message with Liz Willis at 7:19 a.m.).
429. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 120-21.
430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 91-92.
434. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 123.
435. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 121-26.
436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 98-99.
437. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Max Miller Production) Miller Production 0001, p. 1 (January 4, 2021,
text message from Max Miller to Katrina Pierson).
438. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
439. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 95; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0180, at 180, 196-97 (January 4, 2021, President Trump
Meeting Agenda).
440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 41.
441. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 42.
442. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 42-43.
443. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0374 (December 30, 2020,
Katrina Pierson text message to Kylie Kremer); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25,
2022), p. 4.
444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 86.
570 CHAPTER 6

445. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 62-63.
446. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 84; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0924 (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message
to Mark Meadows at 1:39 p.m. and 1:40 p.m.)
447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (March 25, 2022), p. 74; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0921, (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message
to Mark Meadows at 5:16 p.m.).
448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 76-77, 80-81.
449. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 75-77.
450. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0924 (January 2, 2021 Katrina
Pierson text message to Mark Meadows at 5:49 p.m.).
451. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 108; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson180 (January 4, 2021, agenda for meeting with
President Trump at 1:21 p.m.).
452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 107-08; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0196 (Document titled: “Meeting w/ POTUS - January
4th 2021 at 3:30pm ET”).
453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 116-18.
454. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0906 (January 5, 2021, text
message from Dan Scavino to Katrina Pierson at 4:23 a.m.).
455. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_05_003987, (Jan. 3, 2021,
Katrina Pierson text message to Justin Caporale and Taylor Budowich); see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 79; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Taylor Budowich
Production), Budo-00714 (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson email to Caroline Wren and Tay-
lor Budowich at 10:49 p.m.).
456. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_02_000673-88, (Jan. 3, 2021,
Justin Caporale text message to Katrina Pierson, redacted).
457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83. Miller testified that he had not been involved
in or paying attention to the conversation until the President directly addressed him
about Giuliani. Miller’s testimony was not credible on this point. Miller said he did not take
notes, yet in communications with people after the fact he recounted details about the
President’s decision regarding speakers other than Giuliani, Eastman, Powell, Wood, and
Flynn. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 571

Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 85 (stating that neither he nor Peede
took notes); id. at p. 107 (confirming that he told Megan Powers on January 5th that Presi-
dent Trump cut Paxton from the list).
458. In the January 4 meeting with Pierson and Miller, President Trump initially indicated that
Giuliani would not be able to speak at the Ellipse because he needed to be working on
lobbying Members of Congress to block certification of the electoral college vote, yet
another sign that the President intended January 6th to be a full-fledged effort to stay in
power. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 117.
459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83, 129-30.
460. User-Generated Clip, “John Eastman at January 6 Rally,” CSPAN, Mar. 24, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4953961/user-clip-john-eastman-january-6-rally.
461. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 115-116.
462. It appears that Alexander was given front row seating for the Ellipse rally. He tweeted a
picture in front of the Ellipse stage, writing: “Nice seats! Thank you @realdonaldtrump!” Ali
[Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali (archived)
463. Moms for America, “Save the Republic: Ali Alexander,” Rumble, at 2:24, Jan. 29, 2021, avail-
able at https://rumble.com/vdepmx-save-the-republic-ali-alexander.html.
464. Ali [Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali (archived).
465. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, Jan. 5,
2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.
466. Radley Balko, “Meet the Police Chief Turned Yoga Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburban-
ites to Civil War,” Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-
yoga-instructor/.
467. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, at
20:10, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/
220171109588984.
468. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, at
1:44:14 -1:45:54, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/
220171109588984.
469. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at Supreme Court,” Facebook Live,
at1:46:04 – 1:49:40, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/
videos/220171109588984.
470. Radley Balko, “Meet the Police Chief Turned Yoga Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburban-
ites to Civil War,” Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-
yoga-instructor/.
471. Indictment at ¶ 56, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C., June 9, 2021),
ECF No. 1.
472. EpiqEpoch, “Roger Stone January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,” Rumble, at 8:09, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://rumble.com/vchgtl-roger-stone-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.
473. Project Truth Beam, “Jan 5th Freedom Plaza: Ali Alexander,” Rumble, at 1:58-2:21, Jan.16,
2021, available at https://rumble.com/vcx1mt-jan-5th-freedom-plaza-ali-alexander.html.
474. EpiqEpoch, “Alex Jones January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,” Rumble, at 1:24, Jan. 6, 2021, avail-
able at https://rumble.com/vchguz-alex-jones-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.
572 CHAPTER 6

475. EpiqEpoch, “Gen. Michael Flynn, January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,” Rumble, at 5:28, Jan. 6,
2021, available at https://rumble.com/vchisz-gen.-michael-flynn-january-5-2021-freedom-
plaza.html.
476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112.
477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Bock IV, (Apr. 15, 2022), pp. 23, 32; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000002884_00001, (January 5, 2021, email from
Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m., attaching a draft speech). In the final hours
before the speech, White House lawyers would insist that the speech needed fact-checking
and were most worried about the claims about Dominion Voting. See Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, (National Archives Production) 076P-R000007308_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from
Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m.). But President Trump would deliver the speech
with the allegations intact. See Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmen-
tal Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, “Examining the U.S.
Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6”
(Staff Report), p. B-18, (June 8, 2021).
478. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002701-02 (Draft Speech, “Stop
the Steal Rally”).
479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Stephen Miller (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 125-26; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ross Worthington
(Feb. 15, 2022), p. 124.
480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 15-16.
481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 16; see also Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(National Archives Production), Photo files 69c1_x032_555c_7, 0d9d_x039_557d_7 (January 5,
2021, photos of the meeting).
482. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 76-77; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb.
8, 2022), pp. 17, 19-20; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Madison Fox Porter, (May 5, 2022), p. 19.
483. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 16-17; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar.
3, 2022), pp. 83-84.
484. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Washington+is+being+inundated%22
(archived). (“Washington is being inundated with people who don’t want to see an election
victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they
won’t take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA
GREAT AGAIN!”).
485. The Select Committee has obtained two drafts of the speech from January 5th, one of
which was circulated at approximately 3:30 p.m. and another at 7:40 p.m. See Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” 573

States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002700, VMH-00002708 (January 5, 2021,

email from Ross Worthington to Stephen Miller circulating draft speech at 3:30 p.m.); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002878_00001, 076P-
R000002879_00001, (January 5, 2021, email from Ross Worthington to Stephen Miller circu-
lating draft speech at 7:40 p.m.).
486. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived). (“Washington is being inundated with people
who don’t want to see an election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats.
Our Country has had enough, they won’t take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from
the Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”).
487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002879_00001 (Draft of Jan.
6, 2021 speech by President Donald Trump).
488. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 91-92.
489. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 32-33. Craighead believed that she later
shared this with Ornato. See id., at 33.
490. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3,
2022), p. 99.
491. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17. Deere did not recall this specific
question nor responding to it, but did remember advising President Trump that he should
focus on his administration’s accomplishments during his January 6th Ellipse rally speech
rather than his stolen election claims. Deere recalled President Trump asking about which
Members of Congress would be with him the next day and vote against certifying the elec-
tion. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 88-90, 92, 99-100.
492. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17.
493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3,
2022), pp. 85-86.
494. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 86-87, 99.
495. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.
496. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, 076P-R000007361_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from Austin Ferrer to
Dan Scavino at 10:16 p.m.).
497. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on
Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6” (Staff Report), p. B-2, (June 8,
2021); Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.
498. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During
the Attack on the Capitol,” Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021, available,
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/; Statement of Catherine A.
Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.
574 CHAPTER 6

499. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11-19.
500. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on
Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6” (Staff Report), pp. B-22, 23,
(June 8, 2021).
501. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002911_00001, 076P-
R000002912_00001 (January 6, 2021, email from Robert Gabriel Jr. to Dan Scavino at 1:25
p.m. re: Final draft attached with attachment ‘210106 Save America March.doc’); Statement
of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 18.
502. Statement of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 18.
President Trump speaks at the January 6th Ellipse
rally.
Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images
 7

187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION

At 1:10 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump concluded his speech at the
Ellipse. By that time, the attack on the U.S. Capitol had already begun. But it
was about to get much worse. The President told thousands of people in
attendance to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. He told
them to “fight like hell” because if they didn’t, they were “not going to
have a country anymore.” Not everyone who left the Ellipse did as the
Commander-in-Chief ordered, but many of them did. The fighting intensi-
fied during the hours that followed.1
By 1:21 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under
attack. He could have interceded immediately. But the President chose not
to do so. It was not until 4:17 p.m. that President Trump finally tweeted a
video in which he told the rioters to go home.
The 187 minutes between the end of President Trump’s speech and
when he finally told the mob to leave the U.S. Capitol was a dereliction of
duty. In the U.S. military, a service member is deemed to be “derelict in the
performance of duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to per-
form that person’s duties or when that person performs them in a culpably
inefficient manner.” 2 As Commander-in-Chief, President Trump had the
power—more than any other American—to muster the U.S. Government’s
resources and end the attack on the U.S. Capitol. He willfully remained idle
even as others, including his own Vice President, acted.
President Trump could have called top officials at the Department of
Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense,
the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Department, or the DC Mayor’s Office to ensure
that they quelled the violence. He made no such calls. Instead, President
Trump reached out to Rudolph Giuliani and friendly Members of Congress,
seeking their assistance in delaying the joint session of Congress. And the
President tweeted at 2:24 p.m., at the height of the violence, that his own
Vice President lacked the “courage” to act—a statement that could only
further enrage the mob. Meanwhile, Vice President Michael Pence assumed

577
578 CHAPTER 7

the duties of the President, requesting the assistance of top officials, even
though he was not in the chain of command and had no constitutional
power to issue orders.
In testimony before the Select Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Mark Milley explained that President Trump did “[n]oth-
ing,” “[z]ero” to marshal the Government’s resources during the assault
on the U.S. Capitol.3 In contrast, Vice President Pence had “two or three
calls” with General Milley and other military officials—even as the mob
hunted him. During those calls, Vice President Pence was “very animated”
and “issued very explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders.” The Vice
President told Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller to “get the military
down here, get the [National] [G]uard down here,” and “put down this
situation.” 4 President Trump could have made those same demands. He
chose not to do so—a damning fact that President Trump’s own Chief of
Staff, Mark Meadows, quickly tried to cover up.
“We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making all the
decisions,” General Milley recalled Meadows as saying. “We need to estab-
lish the narrative, you know, that the President is still in charge and that
things are steady or stable,” Meadows said, which General Milley described
as a “[r]ed flag.” 5 In his testimony, General Milley also reflected on what it
meant for a President not to be taking action in a time of crisis:
You know, you’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve got an assault
going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and there’s
nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero? And it’s not my place to, you
know, pass judgment or—I’m the, you know—but no attempt to
call the Secretary of Defense? No attempt to call the Vice President
of the United States of America, who’s down on the scene? To my
knowledge, it wasn’t—I just noted it.6
President Trump’s closest advisors—both inside and out of the White
House—implored him to act sooner. Earlier in the week, two of the Presi-
dent’s most trusted aides, Eric Herschmann and Hope Hicks, both wanted
President Trump to emphasize that January 6th would be a peaceful protest.
President Trump refused.7
On the 6th, as the riot began to escalate, a colleague texted Hicks and
wrote, “Hey, I know you’re seeing this. But he really should tweet some-
thing about Being NON-violent.” 8 “I’m not there,” Hicks replied. “I sug-
gested it several times Monday and Tuesday and he refused.” 9
Once the attack was underway, President Trump initially ignored the
counsel of his own family, members of his administration, Republican
elected officials, and friendly Fox News personalities. Both Ivanka Trump
and Donald Trump, Jr. wanted their father to tell the rioters to go home
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 579

sooner. The President delayed. At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this
tweet: “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are
truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” 10 Sarah Matthews, the
White House Deputy Press Secretary, told the Select Committee that Presi-
dent Trump resisted using the word “peaceful.” The President added the
words “Stay peaceful!” only after Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase.11
Trump, Jr. quickly recognized that his father’s tweet was insufficient. “He’s
got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not
enough,” Trump, Jr. wrote in a text to White House Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows.12 President Trump did not tell the rioters to disperse in either his
2:38 p.m. tweet, or another tweet at 3:13 p.m.13
Multiple witnesses told the Select Committee that Minority Leader
Kevin McCarthy contacted the President and others around him, desper-
ately trying to get him to act. McCarthy’s entreaties led nowhere. “I guess
they’re just more upset about the election theft than you are,” President
Trump told McCarthy.14 Top lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office
attempted to intercede. Two Fox News primetime personalities, always so
obsequious, begged those around the President to get him to do more. But
President Trump was unmoved.
There’s no question that President Trump had the power to end the
insurrection. He was not only the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military,
but also of the rioters.
One member of the mob, Stephen Ayres, told the Select Committee that
he and others quickly complied as soon as President Trump finally told
them to go home. “[W]e literally left right after [President Trump’s 4:17
p.m. video] come out. You know, to me if he would have done that earlier in
the day, 1:30 [p.m.] . . . maybe we wouldn’t be in this bad of a situation or
something,” Ayres said.15 Another rioter, Jacob Chansley, commonly
referred to as the “QAnon Shaman,” was one of the first 30 rioters to enter
the U.S. Capitol. Chansley told a reporter that he left the building because
“Trump asked everybody to go home.” 16 At 4:25 p.m., just eight minutes
after President Trump tweeted his video, an Oath Keeper named Ed Vallejo
messaged other members of his group, a fair number of whom were at the
Capitol: “Gentleman [sic], Our Commander-in-Chief has just ordered us to
go home. Comments?” 17
Even then, President Trump did not disavow the rioters. He endorsed
their cause, openly sympathized with them, and repeated his Big Lie once
again. “I know your pain, I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was
stolen from us,” President Trump said at the beginning of his 4:17 p.m.
video. “It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the
other side. But you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have
580 CHAPTER 7

President Trump appears on a monitor in the White House briefing room depicting a video
he released instructing rioters to go home.
(Photo by Joshua Roberts/Getty Images)

to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order.
We don’t want anybody hurt.” The President portrayed the violence as
something his political foes would use against him, saying: “This was a
fraudulent election, but we can’t play into the hands of these people.” 18
The President concluded his short video by again praising the men and
women who had overrun the U.S. Capitol. “We have to have peace. So go
home. We love you. You’re very special,” President Trump said. “You’ve
seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and
so evil. I know how you feel, but go home, and go home in peace.” 19
Just after 6:00 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump issued his final
tweet of the day, again lauding the rioters and justifying their cause. Presi-
dent Trump made excuses for the riot, saying this is what happens “when a
sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped
away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so
long.” The President added: “Go home with love & in peace. Remember this
day forever!” 20
The following day, President Trump’s advisors encouraged him to
deliver a short speech denouncing the attack on the U.S. Capitol. The Presi-
dent struggled to deliver his prepared remarks. According to Cassidy
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 581

Hutchinson, President Trump wanted to say that he would pardon the riot-
ers. Lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office objected, so this language
was not included.21 John McEntee, the Director of the White House Presi-
dential Personnel Office, also testified that in the days following the attack,
he heard President Trump mention the possibility of a “blanket pardon” for
all those involved in the events of January 6th.22
President Trump never did give up on the prospect. Since leaving office,
the now former President has said he would consider “full pardons with an
apology to many” of the January 6th defendants if he is reelected.23

7.1 “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES”

President Trump tweeted three times on the morning of January 6th,

repeating a false claim of election fraud at 8:06 a.m.,24 pressuring Vice
President Pence to delay the electoral count at 8:17 a.m.,25 and urging
Republican party officials to do the same at 8:22 a.m.26 He made calls to his
Republican allies in Congress, many of whom were already committed to
objecting to the electoral count.27 And he dialed his lawyers and advisors—
including Steve Bannon and Rudolph Giuliani (twice), both of whom had
been counseling the President on how to stay in power.28
There was one person—critical to his plan—whom President Trump
tried to reach but couldn’t. At 9:02 a.m., he asked the switchboard operator
to call his Vice President. Vice President Pence did not answer the call.29
Instead, between 9:52 a.m. and 10:18 a.m., the President spoke with his
speechwriter, Stephen Miller, about the words he would deliver at the Save
America Rally just hours later.30 The former President’s speech had come
together over the course of 36 hours, going from a screed aimed at encour-
aging congressional objections to one that would ultimately incite mob vio-
lence.31
Only four minutes after the call concluded, at 10:22 a.m., Miller emailed
revisions to the speechwriters, instructing them to “[s]tart inputting these
changes asap” that included “red highlights marking POTUS edits.” 32 The
President had made some cosmetic additions, like peppering in the word
“corrupt” throughout,33 but there was one substantive edit—a new
target—that would focus the crowd’s anger on one man.
None of the preceding drafts mentioned Vice President Pence whatso-
ever. But now, at the very last minute, President Trump slipped in the fol-
lowing sentences calling the Vice President out by name:
Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the integ-
rity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike Pence enters
history as a truly great and courageous leader. All he has to do is
582 CHAPTER 7

President Trump speaks with speechwriter Stephen Miller about his Ellipse speech in the
Oval Office on the morning of January 6, 2021.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

refer the illegally-submitted electoral votes back to the states that

were given false and fraudulent information where they want to
recertify. With only 3 of the 7 states in question we win and become
President and have the power of the veto.34
No one on the speechwriting team could explain why President Trump
added these lines just 30 minutes before he was originally scheduled to
speak at 11:00 a.m.35 But by 10:49 a.m., Vincent Haley, a speechwriter who
was helping load the teleprompter at the Ellipse, was told to hold off and
delete the mention of the Vice President—for now.36 Miller said that Eric
Herschmann, a lawyer who was one of the President’s senior advisors,
asked him in a “brief sidebar” that morning to omit reference to the Vice
President and his role in the certification process because he “didn’t concur
with the legal analysis” and that it “wouldn’t advance the ball” but would
be “counterproductive” instead.37 As detailed in Chapter 5, Herschmann
and others in the White House were vocal critics of Dr. John Eastman’s
theory, which claimed that the Vice President had the unilateral power to
reject electors during the joint session of Congress. President Trump
repeatedly pressured Pence to either reject certified electors, or delay the
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 583

President Trump on a phone call with Vice President Mike Pence in the Oval Office on the
morning of January 6, 2021.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

electoral count based on Eastman’s unconstitutional and illegal theory. Vice

President Pence would not budge. The Vice President consistently rejected
President Trump’s demands.
After tweeting four more times that morning—all of them spreading
lies about the election38—the President apparently thought he had one last
chance to convince his number two to overrule the will of the American
people.
As recounted in Chapter 5, President Trump called Vice President Pence
at 11:17 a.m.39 The call between the two men—during which the President
soon grew “frustrat[ed] or heated,” 40 visibly upset,41 and “angry” 42—
lasted nearly 20 minutes.43 And President Trump insulted Vice President
Pence when he refused to obstruct or delay the joint session.
After that call, General Keith Kellogg said that the people in the room
immediately went back to editing the Ellipse speech.44 At 11:30 a.m., Miller
emailed his assistant, Robert Gabriel, with no text in the body but the sub-
ject line: “insert—stand by for phone call.” 45 At 11:33 a.m., Gabriel emailed
the speechwriting team: “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES. Confirm
receipt.” 46 One minute later, speechwriter Ross Worthington confirmed
584 CHAPTER 7

President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the Ellipse.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

that he had reached Vincent Haley by phone.47 Haley corroborated that he

added one “tough sentence about the Vice President” while he was at the
teleprompter.48
The final written draft had the following Pence reference: “And we will
see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous
leader.” 49 Haley wasn’t confident that line was what he reinserted, but
email traffic and teleprompter drafts produced by the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) indicate that he was mistaken.50
After defying President Trump’s pressure, Vice President Pence—and
the ire of the President he inspired—was back in the speech.
After the heated call, President Trump’s personal assistant Nicholas
Luna handed him a message on White House card stock and the President
departed for the Ellipse to give his speech.51 Preserved by NARA, the mes-
sage read: “THEY ARE READY FOR YOU WHEN YOU ARE.” 52 When it finally
came time for him to speak, President Trump repeatedly directed his anger
at Vice President Pence—often ad-libbing lines that were not included in
the draft text.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 585

7.2 “I’LL BE THERE WITH YOU”

From a tent backstage at the Ellipse, President Trump looked out at the
crowd of approximately 53,000 supporters and became enraged. Just under
half of those gathered—a sizeable stretch of about 25,000 people53—
refused to walk through the magnetometers and be screened for weapons,54
leaving the venue looking half-empty to the television audience at home.
According to testimony received by the Committee, earlier that morning
at the White House, the President was told that the onlookers were unwill-
ing to pass through the magnetometers because they were armed. “We have
enough space, sir. They don’t want to come in right now,” Deputy Chief of
Staff Tony Ornato reportedly told President Trump. “They have weapons
that they don’t want confiscated by the Secret Service.” 55
So, when President Trump got to the rally site and could see the crowd
for himself, “[h]e was fucking furious,” as Cassidy Hutchinson later texted
Ornato.56 Hutchinson testified that just minutes before addressing the
crowd, President Trump shouted to his advance team: “I don’t [fucking]
care that they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. Take the [fuck-
ing] mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here.
Take the [fucking] mags away.” 57
By noon, President Trump took to the stage at the Ellipse.58 The Presi-
dent wanted all of those in attendance, including those who hadn’t passed
through the magnetometers, to come closer to the stage. “And I’d love to
have if those tens of thousands of people would be allowed,” President
Trump said. “But I’d love it if they could be allowed to come up here with
us. Is that possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?” 59
President Trump repeatedly made it clear to those around him in the
days before January 6th that he wanted to march to the Capitol alongside
his supporters. That is, President Trump wanted to join his supporters in
what the Secret Service refers to as an “off-the-record” movement (OTR).
While the President spoke, Hutchinson texted Ornato, “He also kept
mentioning OTR to Capitol before he took the stage.” 60 Minutes before the
President stepped out, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows assured the President
he was working on it.61
President Trump’s plan to march appeared once in an early draft of the
script, then a later revision was made to add the word “building” after
“Capitol,” making it clear exactly where the crowd should go.62 And the
President repeatedly told the crowd that he would join them.
“[A]fter this, we’re going to walk down, and I’ll be there with you,
we’re going to walk down, we’re going to walk down,” he said to the crowd.
“[W]e’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on
586 CHAPTER 7

our brave senators and congressmen and women, and we’re probably not
going to be cheering so much for some of them.” 63
President Trump used the phrase scripted for him by his White House
speechwriters, “peacefully and patriotically” once, about 20 minutes into
his speech.64 Then he spent the next 50-or-so minutes amping up his
crowd with lies about the election, attacking his own Vice President and
Republican Members of Congress, and exhorting the crowd to fight. “And
we fight. We fight like hell” the President said to a crowd that had already
spent the day chanting, “Fight for Trump! Fight for Trump!,” and that
would keep up the chorus when storming the Capitol.65
Finally, he told the crowd where to go to “take back our country”: “So
we’re going to, we’re going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. I love
Pennsylvania Avenue. And we’re going to the Capitol, and we’re going to try
and give . . . we’re going to try and give our Republicans, the weak ones
because the strong ones don’t need any of our help. We’re going to try and
give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our
country. So let’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.” 66
When the President announced his intentions from the microphone,
people listened.
House Republican Leader Representative. Kevin McCarthy called
Hutchinson mid-speech: 67
“Do you guys think you’re coming to my office[?]” he asked her.68
She assured him that they weren’t coming at all.69

“Figure it out. Don’t come up here,” he replied.70

The announcement from the stage put the Secret Service on alert,
prompting agents to designate over email a last-minute response team “to
filter in with the crowds” on the President’s “walk/motorcade over” to the
Capitol and establish an emergency plan “if things go south.” 71 White
House security officials were monitoring the situation in real time, remark-
ing that President Trump was “going to the Capitol” and that “they are
finding the best route now.” 72 Nonetheless, these staffers were in “a state
of shock,” 73 because they knew—particularly if the President joined—this
would “no longer [be] a rally.” 74
“[W]e all knew . . . that this was going to move to something else if he
physically walked to the Capitol,” an employee said. “I don’t know if you
want to use the word ‘insurrection,’ ‘coup,’ whatever. We all knew that this
would move from a normal democratic . . . public event into something
else.” 75
But the logistics made the move all but impossible.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 587

It was complicated for the Secret Service to coordinate a presidential

movement even on a normal day. But today was not a normal day. Tens of
thousands of President Trump’s supporters had flooded into downtown DC
in the days before the rally, and the Secret Service would have to account
for that unpredictability. By the end of the President's speech, it was clear
that the crowd at the Capitol was growing violent.
At 1:19 p.m., a Secret Service agent wrote to Bobby Engel, the head of
President Trump’s Secret Service detail: “FYSA . . . [Capitol Police] having
serious challenges securing [the Capitol]. Nine priority breach attempts at
this time. OTR to anywhere near there is not advisable. Give me a call when
free. Front Office concerned about OTR to [the Capitol].” 76

7.3 THE PRESIDENT’S ANGER WHEN HE COULD NOT MARCH TO THE CAPITOL

President Trump concluded his remarks at 1:10 p.m. Luna heard the Presi-
dent mention his intention to join the march to the Capitol “after he fin-
ished his remarks.” 77 Just before the President got into his vehicle,
Meadows told him, “We’re going to work on it, sir.” 78 President Trump
was seated in his motorcade vehicle by 1:17 p.m.79
The Committee received information informally from current and for-
mer members of the Secret Service and former White House staff relevant
to what happened next—what a number of witnesses have described as an
“angry,” “irate,” or “furious” interaction in the Presidential vehicle
between the President and the Secret Service.80 That initial information,
received informally, shaped the Committee’s questioning of witnesses. The
Committee’s principal concern was that the President actually intended to
participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol, leading the
effort to overturn the election either from inside the Chamber or from a
stage outside the Capitol. The Committee regarded those facts as important
because they are relevant to President Trump’s intent on January 6th. But a
book published by Mark Meadows in November 2021 made the categorical
claim that the President never intended to travel to the Capitol that day.81
Because the Meadows book conflicted sharply with information that was
being received by the Committee, the Committee became increasingly wary
that witnesses might intentionally conceal what happened.
In our initial informal discussion with the lead of the President’s detail,
Robert Engel confirmed that President Trump did wish to travel to the
Capitol from the Ellipse, but stated that he did not recall many other
details.82 But the Committee also received information from Kayleigh McE-
nany and Cassidy Hutchinson that also directly contradicted Mark Mead-
ows’s book and provided considerably more detail. McEnany testified that
588 CHAPTER 7

President Trump did indeed wish to travel to the Capitol on January 6th,
and continued to have that goal even after returning from the Ellipse to the
White House.83 McEnany, who spoke with President Trump shortly after he
returned to the White House, recalls him expressing a desire to go to the
Capitol: “I recall him . . . saying that he wanted to physically walk and be a
part of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed
to, ride in the Presidential limo.” 84 When asked, McEnany confirmed that
“yes, he did seem sincere about wanting to do that.” 85 Hutchinson’s testi-
mony was generally consistent with the information the Select Committee
was receiving informally. Like McEnany, Hutchinson confirmed that the
President did ask to be transported to Capitol Hill.86 Many other White
House witnesses would ultimately confirm that President Trump wished to
travel to the Capitol on January 6th, comprehensively rebutting the false
statements in Meadows’s book.87
Part of Hutchinson’s account was a second-hand description of what
occurred in the Presidential vehicle, which built upon and was consistent
with information the Committee has received informally.
Hutchinson testified that, when she returned from the Ellipse, Ornato
was standing outside his office door when he “waved me down,” Hutchin-
son said. The two of them walked into Ornato’s office, and he shut the door
behind them.88 Engel was already there, sitting in a chair “looking down,
kind of looking a little lost and kind of discombobulated.” 89
According to Hutchinson, Ornato then recounted a struggle in the
President’s car.90 At no point during Ornato’s telling—or at any point
thereafter—did Engel indicate that what Ornato relayed was untrue.91
Another witness, a White House employee with national security
responsibilities, provided the Committee with a similar description: Ornato
related the “irate” interaction in the presidential vehicle to this individual
in Ornato’s White House office with Engel present.92 And just as Hutchin-
son testified, this employee told the Select Committee that Engel listened to
Ornato’s retelling of the episode and did not dispute it: “I don’t remember
his specific body language, but . . . [h]e did not deny the fact that the Presi-
dent was irate.” 93 Engel testified that he does not recall either the conver-
sation with Hutchinson or the similar conversation with the White House
employee with national security responsibilities.94
The Committee regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating testi-
mony by the White House employee with national security responsibilities
national security official as earnest and has no reason to conclude that
either had a reason to invent their accounts. A different Secret Service
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 589

Cassidy Hutchinson describes a story relayed to her by Tony Ornato about President
Trump’s desire to go to the Capitol after the Ellipse speech on January 6th during a January
6th Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by Brandon Bell/Getty Images)

agent, who served on a protective detail at the White House and was pres-
ent in the presidential motorcade at the Ellipse, provided this view:
Committee Staff: Just a couple of additional questions. Ms. Hutchin-
son has suggested to the Committee that you sympathized with her
after her testimony, and believed her account. Is that accurate?

Witness: I have no—yeah, that’s accurate. I have no reason—I

mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked every day
with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a
good working relationship. I have no reason—she’s never done me
wrong. She’s never lied that I know of. I don’t have any reason—I
don’t—I don’t distrust Ms. Hutchinson.95
Also, the White House employee with national security responsibilities
indicated that knowledge of the angry altercation in the Presidential vehicle
was known within the White House—and was “[water] cooler talk.” 96 In
addition, Hutchinson has provided testimony to the Committee about
efforts by her prior counsel, who was apparently paid by a Trump-funded
590 CHAPTER 7

organization, to suggest that Hutchinson did not need to testify about the
issue in the presidential vehicle, could suggest that she “did not recall” it,
or should downplay it.97
To further corroborate the accounts received of President Trump’s
intent to travel to the Capitol, the Committee interviewed a member of the
Metropolitan Police who was also present in the motorcade, Officer Mark
Robinson. Officer Robinson confirmed that he was aware contemporane-
ously of the “heated discussion” that took place in the Presidential vehicle:

Committee Staff: And was there any description of what was occur-
ring in the car?
Mr. Robinson: No. Only that—the only description I received was
that the President was upset and that he was adamant about going
to the Capitol, and there was a heated discussion about that.
Committee Staff: When you say “heated,” is that your word, or is
that the word that was described by the TS agent?
Mr. Robinson: No. The word described by the TS agent meaning that
the President was upset, and he was saying there was a heated
argument or discussion about going to the Capitol.
....
Mr. Schiff: So about how many times would you say you’ve been
part of that motorcade with the President?
Mr. Robinson: Probably over a hundred times.
Mr. Schiff: And, in that hundred times, have you ever witnessed
another discussion of an argument or a heated discussion with the
President where the President was contradicting where he was sup-
posed to go or what the Secret Service believed was safe?
Mr. Robinson: No.98
The Committee also interviewed the Secret Service agent who was in the
same car as Officer Robinson. That person shared a similar account, and
confirmed that he did not take issue with Officer Robinson’s testimony:
“[The driver of the Presidential car] said something to the effect of, ‘The
President is pretty adamant that he wants to go to the Capitol,’” the agent
said, recalling what he had heard on the 6th.99
In addition, the Committee interviewed the USSS Press Secretary, who
communicated with both Engel and with the driver in the presidential
vehicle after Hutchinson appeared publicly. That witness indicated that
Engel’s account of the events confirmed that the President was indeed
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 591

angry, or furious.100 In fact, when asked about a reporter’s tweet indicating

that sources within the Secret Service confirmed that “Trump was furious
about not being [able] to go to [the] Capitol with his supporters,” the Press
Secretary said he “certainly corroborated it” with the reporter because
“that’s what I had been told, you know, that [the President] was upset, he
was agitated, about not being able to go[.]” 101
In addition to the testimony above, the Committee has reviewed hun-
dreds of thousands of new Secret Service documents, including many dem-
onstrating that the Secret Service had been informed of potential violence
at the Capitol before the Ellipse rally on January 6th. (These documents
were critical to our understanding of what the Secret Service and White
House knew about the threat to the Capitol on January 6th.) The Committee
has also more recently conducted additional interviews with Engel and
Ornato, and has also interviewed the driver of the Presidential vehicle.
Both Engel and the driver 102 testified that, within 30 seconds of getting
into the vehicle, the President asked if he could travel to the Capitol.103 This
again is directly inconsistent with the account of events in Meadows’s book.
According to Engel, he told the President immediately that the move wasn’t
happening.104 The President was unhappy with Engel’s response and began
“pushing pretty hard to go.” 105 The President repeatedly asked why he
could not go to the Capitol.106 Engel replied that the Secret Service “didn’t
have any people at the Capitol” to provide the President with appropriate
security.107 The President responded angrily, telling Engel and the driver
“I’m the President and I’ll decide where I get to go.” 108 He reassured Engel
that “it would essentially be fine and that the people there [meaning the
people who were marching from the Ellipse to the Capitol at President
Trump’s instruction] were [Trump] supporters or something to that
effect,” 109 According to the Secret Service agent driving the vehicle, the
President was “animated and irritated” about not going to the Capitol.110
According to Mr. Engel, he ultimately told the President that they would
“assess what our options were and wait until we can get a plan in place
before we went down there.” 111 We note that the driver’s account acknowl-
edged President Trump’s anger to a greater degree than either Engel’s ini-
tial account in Spring 2022, or his more recent account in November 2022.
Engel did not characterize the exchange in the vehicle the way Hutchinson
described the account she heard from Ornato, and indicated that he did not
recall President Trump gesturing toward him.112 Engel did not recall being
present when Ornato gave either Hutchinson or the White House employee
with national security responsibilities an accounting of the events.113 The
driver testified that he did not recall seeing what President Trump was
doing and did not recall whether there was movement.114
592 CHAPTER 7

The Select Committee has great respect for the men and women of the
Secret Service. That said, it is difficult to fully reconcile the accounts of sev-
eral of the witnesses who provided information with what we heard from
Engel and Ornato.115 But the principal factual point here is clear and undis-
puted: President Trump specifically and repeatedly requested to be taken to
the Capitol. He was insistent and angry, and continued to push to travel to
the Capitol even after returning to the White House.
The motorcade didn’t disband upon arriving to the White House, as
they usually do. Instead, they were instructed to stand by in case the Presi-
dent’s move to the Capitol did indeed happen.116 The Select Committee
received a document from the Secret Service that reflects that at 1:25 p.m.,
“PPD IS ADVISING THAT [THE PRESIDENT] IS PLANNING ON HOLDING AT
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE NEXT APPROXIMATE TWO HOURS, THEN
MOVING TO THE CAPITOL.” 117 “They had not made a decision whether or
not we were going to transport the President to the Capitol,” Robinson was
told.118
Engel testified that he went to Ornato’s office when he returned to the
West Wing in order to discuss a possible move to the Capitol by President
Trump.119 Given the deteriorating security conditions at the Capitol, it was
quickly determined that they could not safely transport the President
there.120 The motorcade waited on West Executive Drive approximately 40
minutes before finally receiving word from the Secret Service that the move
had been officially nixed. Internal Secret Service communications bear this
out: Not until 1:55 p.m. did Engel notify other agents via email that “[w]e
are not doing an OTR to [the Capitol].” 121

7.4 “WE’RE GOING TO TRY TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO PUT OUT A STATEMENT”

Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a
member of the White House staff and asked whether he or she watched his
speech on television.122
“Sir, they cut it off because they’re rioting down at the Capitol,” the
employee said.
The President asked what he or she meant by that.
“[T]hey’re rioting down there at the Capitol,” the employee repeated.
“Oh really?” the President asked. “All right, let’s go see.” 123
A photograph taken by the White House photographer—the last one
permitted until later in the day—captures the moment the President heard
the news from the employee at 1:21 p.m.124 By that time, if not sooner, he
had been made aware of the violent riot at the Capitol.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 593

President Trump walked through the corridor from the Oval Office into
the Presidential Dining Room and sat down at the table with the television
remote and a Diet Coke close at hand.125 For the rest of the afternoon—as
his country faced an hours-long attack—he hunkered down in or around
the dining room, watching television.126 He left only for a few minutes—
from 4:03 p.m. to 4:07 p.m.—to film a video in the Rose Garden, only a few
steps away, after hours of arm-twisting.127 But otherwise, the President
remained in the dining room until 6:27 p.m., when he returned to his pri-
vate residence.128
What happened during the 187 minutes from 1:10 p.m. to 4:17 p.m.,
when President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, is—from an offi-
cial standpoint—undocumented.
For instance, the Presidential Daily Diary—the schedule that tracks
every meeting and phone call in which the President partakes—is inexpli-
cably blank between 1:21 p.m. and 4:03 p.m.129 When asked to explain the
gap in record-keeping on and around January 6th, White House officials in
charge of its maintenance provided no credible explanation, including: “I
don’t recall a specific reason.” 130
The men who spent most of the afternoon in that room with the Presi-
dent, Mark Meadows and Dan Scavino, both refused to comply with lawful
subpoenas from the Select Committee.131 Others in the dining room
appeared before the Select Committee but cited executive privilege to avoid
answering questions about their direct communications with President
Trump.132 Others who worked just outside of the Oval Office, like the Presi-
dent’s personal secretaries Molly Michael and Austin Ferrer Piran Basauldo,
claimed not to remember nearly anything from one of the most memorable
days in recent American history.133
The White House photographer, Shealah Craighead, had been granted
access to photograph the President during his January 6th speech, but once
she got to the White House—and it became clear that an attack was unfold-
ing on the Capitol’s steps—she was turned away.134
“The President [didn’t] want any photos,” she was told.135
Here’s what President Trump did during the 187 minutes between the
end of his speech and when he finally told rioters to go home: For hours, he
watched the attack from his TV screen.136 His channel of choice was Fox
News.137 He issued a few tweets, some on his own inclination and some
only at the repeated behest of his daughter and other trusted advisors.138 He
made several phone calls, some to his personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani,
some to Members of Congress about continuing their objections to the
electoral certification, even though the attack was well underway.139
594 CHAPTER 7

Here’s what President Trump did not do: He did not call any relevant
law enforcement agency to ensure they were working to quell the violence.
He did not call the Secretary of Defense; he did not call the Attorney Gen-
eral; he did not call the Secretary of Homeland Security.140 And for hours on
end, he refused the repeated requests—from nearly everyone who talked to
him—to simply tell the mob to go home.141
Throughout the afternoon, senior staff regularly entered the room to
give him updates on what was happening at the Capitol.142 And, of course,
President Trump used Twitter, where information is shared on an instanta-
neous basis.
Shortly after President Trump entered the dining room, White House
Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany swung by to “check in with him” about
the letter Vice President Pence released around 1:00 p.m. announcing that
he would not, in fact, overturn the will of the voters.
The President, once again, brought up going to the Capitol.143 McEnany
recorded what he said in her notes, certain of which she later produced to
the Select Committee: “POTUS wanted to walk to [sic] capital. Physically
walk. He said fine ride beast,” referring to the nickname for the presidential
vehicle. “Meadows said not safe enough[.]” 144
Meadows told Hutchinson at some point in the day that “the President
wasn’t happy that Bobby [Engel] didn’t pull it off for him,” meaning the
trip to the Capitol, “and that Mark didn’t work hard enough to get the
movement on the books.” 145
Despite the turmoil just outside its walls, the proceedings in the joint
session—which had begun at 1:00 p.m.—were still ongoing, and the Presi-
dent was watching them on the television.146 He was eager to know which
senators were lodging objections on his behalf.147 “Back there and he wants
list of senators,” McEnany’s notes read. “Who [sic] objecting to what. He’s
calling them one by one.” 148
The Select Committee subpoenaed several Members of Congress who
reportedly spoke with President Trump during the afternoon.149 None of
them complied.150
Cellular records obtained by the Select Committee suggest that Presi-
dent Trump was on the phone with his lawyer Rudolph Giuliani at least
twice during this period. Giuliani’s phone connected with the White House
switchboard for 3 minutes and 53 seconds at 1:39 p.m. and again for more
than 8 minutes at 2:03 p.m.151 Between the two calls, at 1:49 p.m., President
Trump tweeted a link to a video of his speech from the Ellipse.152
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 595

Before 1:57 p.m., Herschmann phoned Senior Advisor to the President

Jared Kushner—who was on a plane travelling home from overseas—
advising him that “people are trying to break into the Capitol” and that
“this is getting pretty ugly.” 153
“We’re going to see what we can do here,” Herschmann said. “We’re
going to try to get the President to put out a statement.” 154

7.5 “HE DOESN’T WANT TO DO ANYTHING”

Throughout the afternoon, the President’s advisors tried to get him to tell
the mob to leave the Capitol, but to no avail.
Ben Williamson, the White House Acting Director of Communications,
watched on the news as officers and rioters pepper sprayed each other and
crowds used bicycle barricades to push against officers holding the line.155
He and Sarah Matthews, the Deputy Press Secretary, devised a plan: He
would go to Meadows and she would go to McEnany to urge that the Presi-
dent issue a statement.156 Williamson first texted Meadows:
“Would recommend POTUS put out a tweet about respecting the police
over at the Capitol.” 157
Minutes later, around 2:05 p.m., Hutchinson found Meadows seated in
his office on the couch, absorbed by his cell phone screen.158
“Are you watching the TV, chief?” she asked. He indicated he was.
“Have you talked to the President?” she asked.
“No,” he replied. “He wants to be alone right now.” 159
Rioters broke into the west side of the Capitol building around 2:13
p.m.160 Just a few minutes later, Hutchinson saw Cipollone “barreling down
the hallway” and—after looking at Hutchinson and shaking his head—
opened the door to Meadows’s office unannounced.161 Meadows was right
where she left him, “still sitting on his phone.” 162
“The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and
see the President now,” she heard Cipollone say.163 Cipollone would not
confirm or deny any of this exchange, citing executive privilege.164
“He doesn’t want to do anything, Pat,” Meadows said, peering up from
his phone.165
“Mark something needs to be done, or people are going to die and the
blood’s gonna be on your [fucking] hands,” Cipollone said. “This is getting
out of control. I’m going down there.” 166
Meadows finally stood up from the couch and walked with Cipollone
toward the dining room to meet with the President.167
596 CHAPTER 7

7.6 “HE THINKS MIKE DESERVES IT”

At exactly 2:24 p.m., President Trump made his first public statement dur-
ing the attack on the Capitol by tweet. It read nothing like the statement his
advisors had envisioned. It read:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been
done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a
chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inac-
curate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA
demands the truth! 168
Minutes later, Meadows and Cipollone returned from their talk with the
President.169 No statement was forthcoming.
“Mark, we need to do something more. They’re literally calling for the
Vice President to be [fucking] hung,” Hutchinson heard Cipollone say.170
“You heard him, Pat,” Meadows replied. “He thinks Mike deserves it.
He doesn’t think they’re doing anything wrong.” 171
“This is [fucking] crazy. We need to be doing something more,” Cipol-
lone said.172
Cipollone told the Select Committee that “there needed to be an imme-
diate and forceful response, statement, public statement, that people need
to leave the Capitol now.” 173 He said he was “pretty clear” about his view in
the White House that day, and he made that view known as soon as he
became aware of the unrest.174 He would not comment on how the Presi-
dent responded, or on this conversation with Meadows, citing executive
privilege.175 He did indicate that everyone in the White House—except
President Trump—agreed that people needed to leave the Capitol:
Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to
leave the Capitol?

Mr. Cipollone: On the staff?

Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House.
Mr. Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who didn’t want
people to get out of the Capitol once the—particularly once the vio-
lence started. No. I mean—
Mr. Schiff: What about the President?
Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.
Mr. Cipollone: Well, she said the staff. So I answered.
Vice Chair Cheney: No. I said in the White House.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 597

Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Mr. Cipollone: Oh, I’m sorry. I apologize. I thought you said who
else on the staff. [Pauses to confer with counsel] Yeah. I can’t reveal
communications. But obviously I think, you know—yeah.176
What the President did tweet—a broadside at his Vice President—
enlarged the target on Vice President Pence’s back. A Secret Service agent in
the Protective Intelligence Division, tasked with monitoring threats against
protectees in part by scouring social media, told his colleagues the tweet
was “probably not going to be good for Pence.” 177
A second agent in reply noted that it had garnered “[o]ver 24K likes in
under 2 mins.” 178

7.7 “I GUESS THEY’RE JUST MORE UPSET ABOUT THE ELECTION THEFT THAN YOU
ARE”

Minutes after drawing increased attention to his besieged Vice President,

the President called newly elected Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama at
2:26 p.m.179 He misdialed, calling Senator Mike Lee of Utah instead, but one
passed the phone to the other in short order.180
598 CHAPTER 7

President Trump wanted to talk objections to the electoral count. But

Senator Tuberville—along with every other elected official trapped and sur-
rounded in the building—had other things on his mind.181
“I said, ‘Mr. President, they’ve taken the Vice President out. They want
me to get off the phone, I gotta go,’” Senator Tuberville told reporters.182
“ ‘[W]e’re not doing much work here right now.’ ” 183
In the next half hour, between 2:26 p.m. and 3:06 p.m., President
Trump spoke with House Leader Kevin McCarthy.184
Leader McCarthy told the public in a live interview with CBS News,
while he and his colleagues were sheltering at a secure location,185 that he
was “very clear” in telling President Trump “to talk to the nation to tell
them to stop this.” 186
Leader McCarthy later recounted his conversation to a number of
people, including Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler, a Republican con-
gresswoman from Washington State.187 “You have got to get on TV, you’ve
got to get on Twitter, you’ve got to call these people off,” he said he told
the President.188
“[These] aren’t my people, you know, these are—these are Antifa,”
President Trump insisted, against all evidence.189 “They’re your people.
They literally just came through my office windows, and my staff are run-
ning for cover. I mean, they’re running for their lives. You need to call them
off,” Leader McCarthy told him.190
What President Trump said next was “chilling,” in Representative Her-
rera Beutler’s words.191
“Well, Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about the election theft
than you are,” the President said.192
The call then devolved into a swearing match.193
Mick Mulvaney, former Chief of Staff to President Trump, had a similar
call with Leader McCarthy in the days after the attack. McCarthy told Mul-
vaney that he urged the President to get the rioters to stop, and the Presi-
dent replied, “Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this
than you are.” 194
Marc Short, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, spoke with Leader
McCarthy later that afternoon.195 Leader McCarthy told Short that he had
spoken with President Trump and that he was “frustrat[ed]” that the White
House was “not taking the circumstance as seriously as they should at that
moment.” 196 The administration was demonstrating a “lack of response or
lack of responsibility,” Leader McCarthy told Short.197
At 2:49 p.m.—as the violence escalated—President Trump’s speech-
writer Gabriel Robert texted someone: “Potus im sure is loving this.” 198
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 599

7.8 “STAY PEACEFUL!”

No one was getting through to the President.

So Herschmann went to Ivanka Trump’s office, hoping she would come
to the dining room and be “a calming influence” on her father.199 Her-
schmann “just sort of barged in” and told her to turn on the television.200
After taking in a few of the violent scenes together, Herschmann and
Ivanka Trump left the room and walked to the dining room, where her
father was holed up.201
At 2:38 p.m., the President issued a tweet: 202
Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are
truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful! 203
Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee that the President “did not
push back on [her] suggestion” to issue the tweet, and that it was either
she or President Trump himself who suggested the last line, “Stay peace-
ful!” 204 She confirmed there may have been some tweaking of the word-
ing.205 McEnany, who was in the room at the time, wrote in her notes that
“I say add ‘we support PEACEFUL protest.’ Ivanka add stay peaceful!
Instead.” 206 To the Select Committee, McEnany echoed Ivanka Trump that
the President wasn’t resistant in any way to putting out the message.207
But in private, McEnany told a different story to her deputy Sarah Mat-
thews.
Back in the White House press office, Matthews told McEnany that the
tweet did not go far enough in condemning the violence.208 McEnany—
noting that other staffers in the room were distracted—said “in a hushed
tone . . . that the President did not want to include any sort of mention of
peace in that tweet.” 209
That took “some convincing on their part,” McEnany said, and “it
wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase ‘Stay peaceful!’ that he
finally agreed to include it.” 210
Ivanka Trump repeatedly returned to the dining room to counsel her
father throughout the day. It has been reported that each time Ivanka
Trump “thought she had made headway” with her father, Meadows would
call her “to say the [P]resident still needed more persuading”—a cycle that
repeated itself over “several hours” that afternoon.211 After one such trip,
Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee she went to her husband’s office
next door because she needed to “regroup” and collect herself.212
Several witnesses corroborated pieces of this account. General Kellogg
said he saw Ivanka Trump coming and going from the dining room at least
twice that afternoon.213 Hutchinson said that it was “several times.” 214
Once, Ivanka Trump reportedly left her father with a look on her face as if
600 CHAPTER 7

Sarah Matthews testifies at a January 6th Select Committee hearing.

(Photo by House Creative Services)

“[s]he had just had a tough conversation.” 215 Radford, Ivanka Trump’s
Chief of Staff, saw that she was “[v]isibly upset” but continued going
“down there when people were asking her to be down there and trying to
get action taken.” 216
Radford told the Select Committee that Ivanka Trump believed that
“[s]omething should be said or put out that was even stronger.” 217
Hutchinson, too, recalled Ivanka Trump dropping by Meadows’s office
alongside Cipollone and talking about trying to convince her father to say
something “more direct than he had wanted to at that time and throughout
the afternoon.” 218
“I remember her saying at various points,” Hutchinson said, “she
wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to tell them to go
home peacefully, and she wanted to include language that he necessarily
wasn’t on board with at the time.” 219

7.9 “THE PRESIDENT NEEDS TO STOP THIS ASAP”

President Trump’s 2:38 p.m. tweet did not condemn the violence at the
Capitol. It did not tell rioters to leave the building.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 601

Testimony footage of former White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany is played
during a January 6th Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by Pool/Getty Images)

In the minutes before the tweet, Fox News—on the President’s

screen—relayed that the Capitol was on lockdown; 220 that Capitol police
officers were injured; that rioters were in the building and “just feet from
the House chamber.” 221 In the minutes afterward, networks would report
there was tear gas in the Capitol, forcing Members of Congress to evacuate
in protective masks.222 At 2:39 p.m., Secret Service agents reported that
“[m]ore just got in.” 223
“I don’t know how they’re gonna retake the Capitol building back at
this point,” one agent wrote to others two minutes later.224
At 2:44 p.m., a Capitol police officer shot a rioter named Ashli Bab-
bitt.225 A handwritten note—dashed off onto a White House pocket card and
preserved by the National Archives—read: “1x civilian gunshot wound to
chest @ door of House cha[m]ber.” 226 One White House employee saw the
note on the dining table in front of President Trump.227
A barrage of text messages inundated Meadows’s phone with a consis-
tent plea.228 Everyone from conservative media personalities to Republican
allies in Congress—and even the President’s own family—urged the Presi-
dent to do more:
602 CHAPTER 7

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, 2:28 p.m.: “Mark I was just

told there is an active shooter on the first floor of the Capitol Please
tell the President to calm people[.] This isn’t the way to solve any-
thing.” 229
Laura Ingraham, 2:32 p.m.: “Hey Mark, The [sic] president needs to
tell people in the Capitol to go home.” “This is hurting all of us.”
“He is destroying his legacy and playing into every stereotype . . .
we lose all credibility against the BLM/Antifa crowd if things go
South.” “You can tell him I said this.” 230
Mick Mulvaney, 2:35 p.m.: “Mark: he needs to stop this, now. Can I
do anything to help?” 231
Representative Barry Loudermilk, 2:44 p.m.: “It’s really bad up here
on the hill.” “They have breached the Capitol.” 232 At 2:48 p.m.,
Meadows responded: “POTUS is engaging.” 233 At 2:49 p.m., Loud-
ermilk responded: “Thanks. This doesn’t help our cause.” 234
Representative William Timmons, 2:46 p.m.: “The president needs
to stop this ASAP.” 235 At 2:49 p.m., Meadows responded: “We are
doing it.” 236
Donald Trump, Jr., 2:53 p.m.: “He’s got to condem [sic] this shit.
Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.” 237 Meadows
responded: “I am pushing it hard. I agree.” 238 Later, Trump, Jr.,
continued: “This his [sic] one you go to the mattresses on. They will
try to fuck his entire legacy on this if it gets worse.” 239
White House staff discussed issuing yet another, stronger statement to
address the ongoing—and escalating—violence. Around 3:00 p.m., one
proposal was written in block capital letters on a pocket card from the chief
of staff’s office:
ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT
PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY[.] 240
The handwriting appears to have been scrawled quickly and somewhat
messily. Hutchinson recalled Meadows returning from the dining room
with the note in hand and placing it on her desk.241 The word “illegally”
had been newly crossed out.242
But there would be no further action, Meadows told her.243
At 3:13 p.m., 35 minutes after his last tweet, the President issued
another tweet. Rather than coming out with a stronger statement, the 3:13
p.m. tweet largely parroted the one preceding it:
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 603

Guns are drawn in the House Chamber on January 6th as rioters attempt to break in.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No

violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the
Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you! 244
Ivanka Trump—who was in the room when her father published the
message—told the Select Committee that “the gravity of the situation”
made her feel “that it would be helpful to tweet again.” 245 “The [earlier]
tweet didn’t stop the violence,” Herschmann said.246
This tweet—like the last one—didn’t tell the rioters to go home. It sug-
gested that they “remain” at the Capitol, albeit peacefully.

7.10 “WE LOVE YOU. YOU’RE VERY SPECIAL”

The President’s tweets were not tamping down on the violence, and White
House staff knew it.247 By 3:17 p.m., Fox News was reporting gunshots on
Capitol Hill. Law enforcement officers could be seen in the House chamber,
pointing guns over the barricaded door: The chyron blared “Guns Drawn on
House Floor.” 248 Between 3:29 p.m. and 3:42 p.m., the network was flash-
ing images of a protestor in the presiding officer’s chair, right where Vice
604 CHAPTER 7

President Pence had been sitting 90 minutes earlier.249 Other images

showed Members of Congress trapped in the House gallery, crouching
below the balcony for cover.250
Allies continued to text Meadows, begging the President to order the
mob to go home and indicating that it was time the American people hear
from the President directly:
Unknown, 3:04 p.m.: “Are you with potus right now? Hearing he is
in the dining room watching this on TV . . .” “Is he going to say
anything to de-escalate apart from that Tweet?” 251
Reince Priebus, 3:09 p.m.: “TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!” 252
Unknown, 3:13 p.m.: “POTUS should go on air and defuse this.
Extremely important.” 253
Alyssa Farah, 3:13 p.m.: “Potus has to come out firmly and tell pro-
testors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed . . .” 254
Representative Chip Roy, 3:25 p.m.: “Fix this now.” 255 Meadows
responded: “We are.” 256
Sean Hannity (Fox News), 3:31 p.m.: “Can he make a statement. I
saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital [sic].” 257
Meadows responded: “On it.” 258
Katrina Pierson, 3:40 p.m.: “Note: I was able to keep the crazies off
the stage. I stripped all branding of those nutty groups and removed
videos of all of the psychos. Glad it [sic] fought it.” 259
Unknown, 3:42 p.m.: “Pls have POTUS call this off at the Capitol.
Urge rioters to disperse. I pray to you.” 260
Unknown, 3:57 p.m.: “Is he coming out?” “He has to right?” 261
Brian Kilmeade, 3:58 p.m. (Fox News): “Please get him on tv.
Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished.” 262
Donald Trump, Jr., 4:05 p.m.: “We need an oval address. He has to
lead now. It’s gone too far and gotten out of hand.” 263
At any moment in the afternoon, it would have been easy for President
Trump to get before cameras and call off the attack. The White House Press
Briefing Room is just down the hallway from the Oval Office, past the Cabi-
net Room and around the corner to the right. It would have taken less than
60 seconds for the President to get there.264 The space, moreover, is outfit-
ted with cameras that are constantly “hot,” meaning that they are on and
ready to go live at a moment’s notice.265 The White House press corps is
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 605

also situated in the West Wing, right by the briefing room.266 The whole
affair could have been assembled in minutes.267
However, it was not until nearly 3 hours after the violence began that
President Trump finally agreed to tell the mob to go home.268
The Presidential Daily Diary notes that President Trump left the dining
room to shoot the video at 4:03 p.m.269 By this point—per Fox News cover-
age playing continually in the dining room—more law enforcement officers
had arrived at the Capitol to resist the violent mob.270
The video shoot took place in the Rose Garden, the outdoor space that
borders the Oval Office and the West Wing.271 The setup was not ornate, just
a camera and a microphone. Luna made sure that the background and
lighting looked good, and that President Trump’s hair and tie were in
place.272 President Trump delivered his remarks in one take, more or less,
although he stopped and restarted at one point.273 In all, the video took less
than 4 minutes to shoot, and the President was back in the dining room by
4:07 p.m.274
“I would stick to this script . . . ,” McEnany told President Trump before
he stepped out to film.275
He didn’t.
606 CHAPTER 7

Kushner and others had drafted a statement, but President Trump

spoke entirely off the cuff.276 Here’s what he said:
I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was
stolen from us. It was a landslide election and everyone knows it,
especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We have to
have peace. We have to have law and order. We have to respect our
great people in law and order. We don’t want anybody hurt. It’s a
very tough period of time. There’s never been a time like this where
such a thing happened where they could take it away from all of us,
from me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent elec-
tion. But we can’t play into the hands of these people. We have to
have peace. So go home, we love you. You’re very special. You’ve
seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so
bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home and go home in
peace.277
A photo obtained from the National Archives shows President Trump
and Herschmann huddled next to each other, watching a completed take
through the monitor on the video camera.278
“There needs to be a more direct statement” telling the rioters to leave
the Capitol, Luna heard Herschmann—yet again—tell the President.279
Herschmann testified that he did not recall this exchange.280
But according to Luna, President Trump rejected the note.
“These people are in pain,” he said in reply.281
Down at the Capitol, the video began streaming onto rioters’ phones,
and by all accounts including video footage taken by other rioters, they lis-
tened to President Trump’s command.
“Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home,” one rioter shouted
as he “deliver[ed] the President’s message.” “That’s our order,” another
rioter responded. Others watching the video responded: “He says, go
home.” 282
The crowd afterward began to disperse.283 The video made clear what
had been evident to many, including those closest to him: The President
could have called off the rioters far earlier and at any point that day.284 But
he chose not to do so.285
It was not until it was obvious that the riot would fail to stop the certi-
fication of the vote that the President finally relented and released a video
statement made public at 4:17 p.m.286
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 607

President Trump huddles with aides, watching a completed take of a video through the
monitor of the video camera.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

7.11 “REMEMBER THIS DAY FOREVER!”

After leaving the Rose Garden, the President returned to the dining room.
At 6:01 p.m., he issued another tweet, the last of the day:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred land-
slide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped
away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for
so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day for-
ever! 287
He retired to his residence for the evening at 6:27 p.m.288 A White House
photographer captured the President walking back to the residence with an
employee in tow, carrying personal items President Trump wished to bring
home with him for the night.289 In the employee’s hands are the gloves the
President was wearing while addressing the crowd at the Ellipse.290
The President had one parting comment to the employee—the thing
that was evidently occupying his mind even after an afternoon of
violence—before he retired to his home.
“Mike Pence let me down,” the President concluded.291
608 CHAPTER 7

7.12 PRESIDENT TRUMP STILL SOUGHT TO DELAY THE JOINT SESSION

Even after President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, he and his
lead attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, continued to seek to delay the joint session
of Congress.
Giuliani began frantically calling the White House line the very minute
that the President’s video went up on Twitter.292 Failing to get through, he
called back, once every minute—4:17 p.m., 4:18 p.m., 4:19 p.m., 4:20 p.m.293
He managed to get through, briefly, to Mark Meadows at 4:21 p.m., and
then kept calling the White House line: at 4:22 p.m., three times on two dif-
ferent phones at 4:23 p.m., 4:24 p.m., and once more at 5:05 p.m.294 He
finally managed to speak with President Trump at 5:07 p.m., and the two
spoke for almost 12 minutes.295
After he spoke with President Trump, Giuliani’s phone calls went nearly
without fail to Members of Congress: Senator Marsha Blackburn, and then
Senator Mike Lee.296 He made three calls to Senator Bill Hagerty, then two
to Representative Jim Jordan.297 He called Senator Lindsey Graham,298
Senator Josh Hawley,299 and Senator Ted Cruz.300 Giuliani had two calls
with Senator Dan Sullivan over the course of the evening.301 There were
another three calls to Representative Jordan, none of which connected.302
After 8:06 p.m., when the joint session resumed, the calls to Members of
Congress finally stopped.303 Shortly afterward, at 8:39 p.m., Giuliani had
one final call of 9 minutes with the President.304
When asked about these calls during his deposition before the Select
Committee, Giuliani initially refused to answer. Giuliani insisted his calls to
Members of Congress—none of whom were his client—were all attorney-
client privileged.305 But Giuliani eventually relented.
“I was probably calling to see any—if anything could be done,” he said.
“About the vote—the vote.” 306
We know definitively what Giuliani was up to because he left a voice
message for Senator Tuberville—inadvertently on Senator Lee’s phone—
recording his request.307 He wanted for “you, our Republican friends to try
to just slow it down,” referring to the electoral count, and delay the joint
session.308 Here are his own words:

The only strategy we can follow is to object to numerous States and

raise issues so that we get ourselves into tomorrow—ideally until
the end of tomorrow. So if you could object to every State and, along
with a congressman, get a hearing for every State, I know we would
delay you a lot, but it would give us the opportunity to get the legis-
lators who are very, very close to pulling their vote.309
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 609

Mike Pence reopens the joint session of Congress and resumes counting electoral votes.
(Photo by Will McNamee/Getty Images)

The President, too, was at home, but he remained focused on his goal.
Between 6:54 p.m. and 11:23 p.m., he spoke with 13 people, some more than
once.310 Of the 13, six ignored or expressly refused to comply with Select
Committee requests for their testimony.311 Two agreed to appear but
refused to answer questions about their phone calls with the President, cit-
ing executive privilege.312 Two more refused to answer questions, claiming
attorney-client privilege.313
Of the 13, five were President Trump’s attorneys or lawyers who worked
with him on efforts to reverse the outcome of the election. With one excep-
tion, each of these calls took place before 8:06 p.m., when Vice President
Pence reopened the joint session of Congress and resumed counting the
electoral votes.314 The President spoke with White House Counsel Pat Cipol-
lone for 7 minutes at 7:01 p.m.315 He spoke with Kurt Olsen and Mark Mar-
tin, lawyers who both advised him on the Vice President’s role in the joint
session: 316 He spoke with Martin for 9 minutes at 7:30 p.m., and Olsen
twice, for 11 minutes at 7:17 p.m. and for another 10 minutes at 7:40 p.m.317
He spoke with Cleta Mitchell, the lawyer leading his election challenges in
Georgia, for 2 minutes at 7:53 p.m.318 The President spoke with Her-
schmann for 5 minutes at 10:50 p.m.319
610 CHAPTER 7

Another five of the people who spoke with President Trump that night
were employees or outside advisors who counseled him on communications
issues. These calls, by contrast, predominantly took place after the joint
session resumed.320 He spoke with his communications director, Scavino,
twice: for 7 minutes at 7:08 p.m. and for 15 minutes at 9:55 p.m.321 He spoke
with McEnany for 11 minutes at 9:42 p.m.322 He took calls from Steve Ban-
non, for 7 minutes at 10:19 p.m., and Sean Hannity, for 8 minutes at 11:08
p.m.323
At 9:23 p.m., President Trump spoke with Jason Miller, his Campaign
Communications Director, for 18 minutes.324
Of his own initiative, Miller had drafted a statement for the President
assuring the nation that the transfer of power—despite the day’s events—
would, indeed, take place.325 On their call, the President pushed back on the
phrasing.
The President wanted the statement to promise a “peaceful transition”
of power, rather than just an “orderly” one.326
Miller rejected the change and told him why rather bluntly.
“[T]hat ship’s kind of already sailed,” he said, “so we’re going to say
‘orderly transition.’ ” 327

7.13 HE “JUST DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT ANYMORE”

The President did not, by any account, express grief or regret for what hap-
pened at the Capitol. Neither did he appear to grasp the gravity of what he
had set in motion.
In his last phone call of the night, the President spoke with Johnny
McEntee, his Director of Personnel.328
“[T]his is a crazy day,” the President told him. McEntee said his tone
was one of “[l]ike, wow, can you believe this shit . . .?” 329
Did he express sadness over the violence visited upon the Capitol?
“No,” McEntee said. “I mean, I think he was shocked by, you know, it
getting a little out of control, but I don’t remember sadness, specifi-
cally.” 330
President Trump didn’t make any other phone calls for the rest of the
night.331 The President didn’t call Vice President Pence. In fact, President
Trump never called to check on his Vice President’s safety that day. He
didn’t call the heads of any of the Federal law enforcement agencies. He
didn’t call the leadership—neither Republican nor Democrat—of the legis-
lative branch of government that had just been overrun by a mob.332
Only two days after the riot, by January 8th, the President was over the
whole thing.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 611

He “just didn’t want to talk about it anymore,” he told his press aides.
“[H]e was tired of talking about it.” 333
Ivanka Trump claimed to the Select Committee that her father was
“disappointed and surprised” by the attack, but she could not name a spe-
cific instance of him expressly saying it.
“He—I just felt that,” she said. “I know him really well.” 334
Here’s what she could definitively say:
Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed to you any sentiment that
he did or did not do the right thing in how he responded on the day
of the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed any sentiment about some-
thing that he wished he had done on the day of the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about the people
who were injured or who died that day?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about whether he
should or should not continue to talk about the 2020 Presidential
election after the events on the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.335

7.14 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S “RHETORIC KILLED SOMEONE”

The President may not have expressed regret over his behavior, but some of
his most loyal supporters made the connection between his words and the
violence.
A member of the speechwriting team, Patrick MacDonnell, conceded the
next day in a text that “maybe the rhetoric could have been better.” 336 As
the riot was in full throttle, even steadfast supporter Ali Alexander of “Stop
the Steal” texted, “POTUS is not ignorant of what his words will do.” 337
“We all look like domestic terrorists now,” Hope Hicks texted Julie
Radford.338
Separately, Hicks texted Herschmann, “So predictable and so sad.”
“I know,” he replied. “Tragic.”
“I’m so upset. Everything we worked for wiped away,” she continued.
“I agree. Totally self-inflicted,” he wrote.339
612 CHAPTER 7

Brad Parscale, Trump’s Former Campaign Manager, texted Katrina

Pierson at 7:21 p.m. on January 6th, saying the day’s events were the result
of a “sitting president asking for civil war.” 340
“This week I feel guilty for helping him win . . . a woman is dead,”
Parscale added.
“You do realize this was going to happen,” Pierson answered.
“Yeah. If I was trump [sic] and knew my rhetoric killed someone,” he
said.
“It wasn’t the rhetoric,” she said.
Parscale’s reply: “Yes it was.” 341

ENDNOTES
1. As explained in Chapter 8, the Proud Boys and other extremists initiated the attack shortly
before the joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m. The rioters who
streamed down Pennsylvania to the U.S. Capitol from the Ellipse then provided crucial
momentum for the attack.
2. “Manual for Courts-Martial United States,” Department of Defense, (2019), at 334, available
at https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/
2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (October 25, 2022), pp. 108-110; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope
Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at
2:19 p.m. EST).
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text
message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text
message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg (archived).
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39–41.
12. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925 (January 6, 2021, Donald
Trump Jr. text message to Mark Meadows at 2:53 p.m. ET).
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 613

13. At 3:13 p.m., President Trump tweeted: “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to
remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the
Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/
realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg (archived).
14. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
16. “New Video of Capitol Rioter: ‘Trump is Still Our President,’” CNN Business, at 0:37, Feb. 6,
2021, available at https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2021/02/06/qanon-capitol-rioter-
video-trump-still-president-sot-nr-vpx.cnn.
17. Trial Exhibit 6732 (1.S.159.1165-67, 84), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C
Nov. 1, 2022). Vallejo was manning the quick reaction force at a hotel in Arlington, Virginia,
awaiting word to bring in a cache of weaponry; he was not at the Capitol on January 6th.
Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (Vallejo
messaged his group in the afternoon “QRF standing by at hotel. Just say the word”); Trial
Transcript at 2728, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2022) (Oath
Keeper Terry Cummings testified that “I had not seen that many weapons in one location
since I was in the military” when he arrived at the Arlington hotel).
18. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
19. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
20. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 ET, available at https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-6-2021 (archived).
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 125.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 157.
23. Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardon, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,”
Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
24. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:06 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22Sleepy+Eyes+Chuck+Todd+is+so+happy%22 (archived).
25. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22All+Mike+Pence+has+to+do+is%22 (archived).
26. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1 (archived).
27. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily
Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET).
614 CHAPTER 7

28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily
Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET). The Select Committee issued subpoe-
nas to Bannon, Olson, and Giuliani in order to learn more about these telephone conver-
sations, among other things. Bannon refused to comply with his subpoena, leading to his
referral and ultimate conviction for criminal contempt of Congress. Olson sued to block
the Select Committee from enforcing his subpoena. Giuliani spoke with the Select Commit-
tee but asserted attorney-client privilege with respect to all of his telephone conversa-
tions with President Trump on January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 198.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily
Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 9:02 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p.
12.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 145.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross
Worthington Production), RW_0002633 (Jan. 4, 2021, email at 10:00 p.m. from Ross Wor-
thington to Patrick MacDonnell asking for research related to the January 6th speech).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–RW_0002351 (Jan. 6,
2021, Stephen Miller emails to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley and Robert Gabriel, Jr. at
10:22 and 10:23 a.m. ET, attaching draft speech).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the
United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2344 (Jan. 6, 2021, email
from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS,
attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the
United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2343 (Jan. 6, 2021, email
from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS,
attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 164. Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (April 12, 2022),
pp. 88–89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Miller, (April 14, 2022), p. 148.
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007430_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Ross Worthington email to Vincent M. Haley at 10:49 a.m. ET).
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 154.
38. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+just+happened+to+find%22
(archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:15 a.m. ET, available
at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=
%22they+states+want+to+redo%22 (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 6, 2021 9:16 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=
1&searchbox=%22even+Mexico%22 (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 6, 2021 10:44 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=
1&searchbox=%22these+scoundrels+are+only+toying%22 (archived).
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 615

39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
Capitol, (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, Schedule marked pri-
vate with handwritten notes at 11:22 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021) pp.
90–93; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2021), p. 126.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 48–49; see also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 22 (“I could just tell in his voice when he was
talking to the Vice President that he was disappointed and frustrated.”).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 4.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2020), p. 18.
43. Compare Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6,
2021, schedule with handwritten notes about the meeting); with Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret
Service Production), CTRL0000100198 (communication noting “Mogul” en route to the
Ellipse at 11:39 a.m.).
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 93.
45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007558_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Stephen Miller email to Robert Gabriel Jr.).
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Robert Gabriel Jr. email to Ross Worthington at 11:33 a.m. ET).
47. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007531_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Ross Worthington email to Robert Gabriel Jr. at 11:34 a.m. ET).
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95.
49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the
United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2343 (January 6, 2021,
email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re:
EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
50. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95; Document on file with the Select Com-
mittee (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007557_0001, 076P-R000007557_0034,
076P-R000002896_00001, 076P-R000002896_00025, 076P-R000002984_0001, 076P-
R000002984_00304 (various drafts, including teleprompter inputs, of the speech).
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 126.
52. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000286 (January 6, 2021, note from
Nicholas Luna to President Trump).
53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000111236 (January. 6, 2021, Email
Re: CSD Activity Log #2 at 2:49 p.m. ET).
616 CHAPTER 7

54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87–88; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000005179_0001–0002 (January 6, 2021 email report-
ing on the status of people going through the magnetometers and noting “[s]everal thou-
sand on the mall watching but not in line.”).
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
56. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069, (January 6, 2021,
Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 15–16; see also Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“[W]e were standing towards the front of
the tent with the TVs really close to where he would walk out to go on to the stage. The—
these conversations happened two to three minutes before he took the stage that morn-
ing”).
58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump at 11:55 a.m. ET).
59. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6 (time-stamping the speech).
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069 (January 6, 2021,
Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002879_00001 (“Save
America March” speech early draft); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 157.
63. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
64. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).
65. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6 (time-stamping the speech); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Holder
Production) Video file Clip 45DAY32CAMB0050.mov at 3:10–3:40 (capturing ”fight for Trump”
chants during Donald Trump, Jr.’s speech); Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed,
and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, at 12:01
pm at 3:33 and at 12:05 pm at 0:30 (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/ (capturing “fight for Trump” chants droning
out the President after he told the crowd “we will not let them silence your voices”); FOR-
MER WAGIE, “FULL FOOTAGE: Patriots STORM U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, at 59:00, Jan. 6, 2021,
posted Jan. 8, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNFcdpZdkh0.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 617

66. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. But see Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 129 (“It wasn’t—he didn’t give me an impressions that he was
frustrated or angry at the prospect of what the President had said on the stage. It was
more of him trying to rush to get insight on what our plans were and wanted to have
insight and be read in on that in case we had been planning to go up to the Capitol.”).
68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp.128–29; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000176702.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001005-1026 (January 6, 2021,
National Security Council staff chat logs); See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview White House Security Offi-
cial, (July 11, 2022), p. 47 (discussing clearing a route to the Capitol for “Mogul”).
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official , (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6, 2021, email
to Robert Engel at 1:19 p.m. ET). Despite the fact that the prospect of an OTR to the Capitol
was raised at the highest levels within the Secret Service, some of its highest-ranking
agents insisted to the Select Committee that they did not recall any such discussions on
the day of January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4. 2022), p. 77. When
presented with his text messages with Cassidy Hutchinson in which she referred to an
“OTR to Capitol,” Tony Ornato insisted that he didn’t “recall ever talking about this with
her.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 62.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 117.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257 (January 6, 2021, Presiden-
tial Daily Diary).
618 CHAPTER 7

80. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,”
(October 31, 2022), pp. 49–51 (the word “furious” was “consistent with what was described
to me that occurred—you know, agitated, furious, upset, angry, whatever adjective”).
81. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief, (St. Petersburg: All Seasons Press, 2021), at p. 250 ("When
he got offstage, President Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically
about the walk to the Capitol. . . . It was clear the whole time that he didn’t actually intent
to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue with the crowd.”).
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 158–62.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 160.
86. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 5–8.
87. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 90; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3,
2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022) p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House
Security Official, (July 11, 2022) pp. 35–36.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 6–7.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 69–71.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), p. 71.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147-48.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 92–93.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities (July 19,
2022), p. 73 (“In the days following that, I do remember, you know, again, hearing again
how angry the President was when, you know, they were in the limo.”)
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), pp. 34, 36, 37–38, 55.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 619

98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18, 23.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 4, 2022), pp. 99–100.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (Oct. 31,
2022), pp. 46, 50.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (Oct. 31,
2022), p. 50; see also Carol Leonnig (@CarolLeonnig), Twitter, June 28, 2022 7:46 p.m. ET,
available at https://twitter.com/CarolLeonnig/status/1541931078184845312. The press sec-
retary confirmed that he or she confirmed this information to the reporter because “that’s
what I had been told.” “[Engel] did indicate—you know, kind of outlined . . . that the Presi-
dent did want to go to the Capitol, and Mr. Engel advised that we cannot go,” the press
secretary testified. “And you know, [President Trump] was agitated, but Mr. Engel advised
that—you know, it was kind of a non-issue. It was agitated verbally, and they proceeded to
the White House.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Sec-
retary,” (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.
102. The Select Committee has agreed not to name the Secret Service agent who was driving
the vehicle to protect his privacy. We will refer to him in this report as “the driver.”
103. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77; Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Inter-
view of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 79.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78. This recollection
of the President’s phrasing seems very similar to Hutchinson’s testimony about President
Trump’s statement before he took the stage at the Ellipse: “I’m the President. Take the
F’ing mags away. They’re not here to hurt me.” Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June
20, 2022), pp. 11–12.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 78, 92.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 102. Mr. Engel also did not recall
another occasion where testimony indicates that the incident in the presidential vehicle
was mentioned. Mr. Engel’s counsel has asked the Committee not to make certain evi-
dence relating to that occasion public.
620 CHAPTER 7

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147–48.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 80.
115. The Justice Department will have all of the relevant information and can make decisions
about whether and how to proceed based upon this evidence.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 at p. 4 (January 6, 2021,
PID update at 1:25 p.m.).
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18–19.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 125.
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6 2021, email
from Robert Engel at 1:55 p.m.).
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
123. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8_hi_j0087_0bea.
125. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27–28.
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump). See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Produc-
tion), P-R000028 (Memorandum from White House Diarist confirming that “[t]he Oval Log
for January 6, 2021 was not received”).
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p 29 (“Why did that change, that you were not tak-
ing any records?” “I don’t recall a specific reason.”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann,
(Apr. 6, 2022), p. 111–12 (attributing the lack of recordkeeping to Michael’s absence in the
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 621

White House, though she was present in the Outer Oval during the afternoon); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 86.
131. H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark
Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly
Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Ssess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/
hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for
Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
132. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 155–57.
133. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 136 (“The phones were ringing. A lot was
happening. I don’t recall.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 109–10
(“I don’t remember where I was that afternoon.” “Do you remember being at the White
House that afternoon, even if you don’t remember where exactly you were in the White
House?” “No, I do not.” “Do you remember being home, wherever home is for you, on the
afternoon of January 6th, as opposed to being at the White House?” “No, I don’t.” “So you
don’t remember whether you were at home or at the White House in the afternoon of
January 6th, 2021?” “Again, that day was very blurry.”).
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46. It is the standard practice of the White
House photographers to cover the President from the moment he steps out of the resi-
dence until he returns there at the end of the day. Id. at 7. Craighead pushed back, telling
Michael that the White House would want to document the day for historical purposes, but
Michael did not relent. Id. at p. 28.
136. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 115 (“Well, I saw the President watch-
ing TV.”).
137. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 23.
138. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“I recall walking in and
saying, ‘You have to put out a strong statement condemning violence and asking for peace
to be restored.”).
139. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022); See also Jonathan Karl,
Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 287.
140. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 174; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 129.
622 CHAPTER 7

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 169–70.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 159–60.
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kay-
leigh McEnany notes).
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kay-
leigh McEnany notes).
149. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at https://
january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-
for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan,
(May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/
democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-
Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at https://
january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-
for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan,
(May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/
democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-
Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
152. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 1:49 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FizItBeFE6G%22
(archived).
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 144.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 145.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Benjamin Williamson, (Jan. 25, 2022) p. 60. Live feeds of the Capitol began showing
pepper spray exchanges between officers and rioters around 1:29 p.m. See Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094153; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Produc-
tion), CTRL0000094192; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July
21, 2022), at 40:00, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 623

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 36–37.
157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Benjamin Williamson Production), CTRL0000034784 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Benjamin Williamson text message to Mark Meadows at 2:02 p.m. EST); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin
Williamson (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24 (“I saw that he was sitting on
his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just kind of scrolling and
typing.”).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24.
160. The Select Committee’s review of U.S. Capitol Police surveillance footage showed that
Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola smashed a Senate Wing window at 2:13 p.m. and rioters
entered through that window, as well as an adjacent door, shortly thereafter. See also
Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the
Capitol through this broken window”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 25. Cipollone confirmed that he
first went to the dining room when he saw that “people had breached the Capitol, they
had gotten into the Capitol.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), p. 149.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26. Cipollone did not elaborate
but testified generally that he was “very upset about what was happening” at the Capitol
and wanted “action to be taken related to that.” Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony
“Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
168. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22Mike+Pence+didn%E2%80%99t+have+%22 (archived).
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
624 CHAPTER 7

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. President Trump himself has
defended publicly the rioters who chanted “Hang Mike Pence!” In an interview, journalist
Jonathan Karl asked President Trump about the chants. “Well, the people were very angry,”
he responded. The President continued: “Because it’s common sense . . . . How can you—if
you know a vote is fraudulent, how can you pass a fraudulent vote to Congress? How can
you do it?” Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton,
2021), p. 340.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. Hutchinson recalled one
other thing that Meadows said, referring to the tweet attacking Vice President Pence:
“[T]his is the best we’re going to get for now.” Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May
17, 2022), p. 17. Hutchinson believes that this conversation took place after the 2:24 p.m.
tweet, but the context suggests that it may have taken place after the 2:38 p.m. or 3:13 p.m.
tweets.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:45–1:31:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095185.
178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095247.
179. Lauren Fox and Clare Foran, “GOP Sen. Mike Lee Hands Over Phone Records to House
Impeachment Managers,” CNN, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/
13/politics/mike-lee-phone-records-impeachment-trial/index.html.
180. Mike Lillis, “Tuberville Defends Account of Trump Call During Capitol Riot,” The Hill, (Feb.
12, 2021), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/538704-tuberville-defends-
account-of-trump-call-during-capitol-riot/. Sen. Tuberville stated publicly that the origi-
nating number was identified as “White House” on Sen. Lee’s phone, suggesting that the
call came through the White House Switchboard. Id.
181. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p.
287.
182. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p.
287.
183. Eddie Burkhalter, “Tuberville Says He Attended Jan. 5 Fundraiser at Trump’s Washington
Hotel,” Alabama Political Reporter, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://www.alreporter.com/
2021/02/19/tuberville-says-he-attended-jan-5-fundraiser-at-trumps-washington-hotel/.
184. The call likely happened after the evacuation of the House chamber starting at approxi-
mately 2:38 p.m., and Rep. McCarthy spoke about it to CBS News’s Norah O’Donnell by
phone between approximately 3:00 to 3:15 p.m. CBS News, “House Minority Leader Kevin
McCarthy: I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU. Molly Michael testified that she
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 625

recalls receiving the incoming call from Leader McCarthy on Dan Scavino’s landline and
transferring it to a landline in the dining room. She does not recall when the call took
place, nor did she hear anything about what was discussed. Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar.
24, 2022), pp. 131–32.
185. “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capi-
tol,’” CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-
minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.
186. “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capi-
tol,’” CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-
minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.
187. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
188. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
189. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
190. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
191. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
192. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
193. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with
McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://
www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-
mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 47.
198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002307 (Jan. 6, 2021, Gabriel
Roberts text message at 2:49 p.m.).
626 CHAPTER 7

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 72.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 68; see also Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68–69.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 70.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 69 (“And she was in there for a few
minutes, and then came out and he had issued a tweet.”); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump,
(Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“Within, I believe, a few minutes he had issued that—he put out that
tweet, a version of that tweet.”).
203. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22please+support+our%22 (archived).
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 87–89.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 88.
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724, (January 6, 2021,
Kayleigh McEnany Notes); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 88–89; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany,
(Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
211. Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final
Year (New York: Penguin, 2021), p. 474.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 91.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p 141.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 170.
215. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 248.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 32.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 30.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 627

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 37; Hutchinson recalls that
Meadows, Herschmann, Ivanka Trump, and others would come and go from the Chief of
Staff’s office at intervals throughout the afternoon. “I don’t know if it was for a breather or
to have a conversation away from the dining room,” she said. Id., at 31.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 38.
220. Fox News, “U.S. Capitol on Lockdown as Protests Threaten Security,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFWGBnJ0rQA.
221. Fox News, “Breaking News: Protestors Now inside U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, at 2:40, Jan. 6,
2021, available at https://www.fox29.com/video/887421.
222. Fox News, “Pro-Trump Protestors Storm U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVPSYr-xG6s.
223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095389.
224. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095393 (Jan. 6, 2021, text
between Secret Service agents at 2:41 p.m. EST).
225. Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, “The January 6 Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute,” CNN, (July
29, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-
timeline/index.html.
226. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000241 (Jan. 6, 2021, Note to Presi-
dent Trump).
227. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47.
228. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921, MM014923,
MM014926.
229. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906. Recently, Representative
Greene has qualified her stance on armed rioters at the Capitol. At a Young Republicans
event in New York, she said: “I got to tell you something, if Steve Bannon and I had
oganized [January 6th], we would have won. Not to mention, it would’ve been armed.” She
claims she was joking. Aaron Blake, “Analysis: Marjorie Taylor Greene’s Jan. 6 ‘Joke’ Has
Been Building for a Long Time,” Washington Post, (Dec. 12, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/12/greene-january-6-punchline/.
230. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907, MM014908, MM014909, (Jan. 6,
2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows at 2:32 pm); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark
Meadows Production), MM014911 (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Mead-
ows at 2:32 p.m.).
231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
232. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014914, MM014915.
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921.
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014922.
628 CHAPTER 7

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014923.
237. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
238. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014926.
239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014928.
240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000240 (January 6, 2021 proposed
statement).
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
244. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. EST, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22remain+peaceful%22 (archived).
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 119.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88.
247. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 172; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July
8, 2022), p. 155.
248. “Pergram: Most Significant Breach of Government Institution Since 1814,” Fox News, Jan. 6,
2021, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220760122001#sp=show-clips.
249. Fox News, “Individual Shot in U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, at 1:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oL-M0LuE3Hk.
250. “Andy McCarthy Blasts Pro-Trump Protesters after Breach at Capitol,” Fox News, at 1:28, Jan.
6, 2021, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220757649001#sp=show-clips.
251. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014932, MM014934.
252. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935. This was sent from a phone
number associated with Priebus’s family member.
253. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014936.
254. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 629

255. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
256. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014943.
257. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
258. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014947.
259. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014948.
260. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014949.
261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014956, MM014957.
262. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
263. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014964.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also CBS News, “House Minor-
ity Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I completely condemn the violence in the Capitol,’” YouTube,
Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 22, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony ”Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
268. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22
(archived).
269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
270. ”Bill Hemmer Reports,” Fox News, at 3:56 p.m. ET, available at https://archive.org/details/
FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/3360/end/3420 (archived).
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 162–63.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 162.
273. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Video file 40983.
630 CHAPTER 7

274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 234. President Trump did not react to her
suggestion, McEnany said. See id.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), pp. 97–99.
277. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22
(archived).
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 4243_hi_j0233_61ae.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 182. See Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June
10, 2022), pp. 49–50 (remembering that someone in the Rose Garden told the President
something along the lines “that he needed to use stronger, more forceful” language in the
video).
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 99.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 181.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:58:30, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“[A]s soon as that come out,
everybody started talking about it and that’s—it seemed like it started to disperse.”).
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6h Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“Basically, when President Trump
put his tweet out. We literally left right after that [had] come out.”).
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“[I]f he would have done that ear-
lier in the day, 1:30, I—you know, we wouldn’t be in this—maybe we wouldn’t be in this bad
of a situation or something.”).
286. “Bill Hemmer Reports,” Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://archive.org/details/
FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/780/end/840.
287. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
288. T, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22 (archived).
289. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 631

290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives production), Photo file 364c_hi_j0246_2fa8.
291. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
299. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
300. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
301. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206. (“You were leaving messages or having
phone calls with United States Senators about the joint session of Congress. How could
that possibly be [a] privileged conversation?” “Because the conversation is about the
theory of the case, and my representation of the client.”).
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 207.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert O’Brien
Production), NSA 0040 (January 6, 2021, text message from Sen. Mike Lee to Robert O’Brien
at 10:55 p.m. EST reading, “You can’t make this up. I just got this voice message [from]
Rudy Giuliani, who apparently thought he was calling Senator Tuberville.” “You’ve got to
listen to that message. Rudy is walking malpractice.”).
632 CHAPTER 7

308. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it Down,’” The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.
309. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it Down,’” The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.
310. Those 13 people are Pat Cipollone, Dan Scavino, Kurt Olsen, Mark Martin, Cleta Mitchell,
Rudy Giuliani, Kayleigh McEnany, Jason Miller, Mark Meadows, Steve Bannon, Eric Her-
schmann, Sean Hannity, and John McEntee. See Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261 (Jan. 6, 2021, the Presidential Call
Log).
311. H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Ste-
phen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly
Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/
hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf; H. Rept. 117–216, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Com-
ply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf; H. Rept. 117–284, Resolution Rec-
ommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino,
Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th
Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-
117hrpt284.pdf; Erik Larson, “Lawyer Who Talked to Trump on Day of Capitol Riot Sues over
Subpoena,” Bloomberg, (Mar. 25, 2022), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2022-03-25/lawyer-who-talked-to-trump-on-day-of-mob-riot-sues-over-subpoena
(discussing Kurt Olsen); Caleb Ecarma, “Sean Hannity Wants the January 6 Committee to
Believe He’s a Journalist,” Vanity Fair, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/01/sean-hannity-january-6-committee-journalist.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 195.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p.
211.
314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump); “WATCH: ‘Let’s Get Back to Work,’ Pence Urges Senate,” PBS,
(Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-
work-pence-urges-senate.
315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
316. Olsen authored a memo urging Vice President Pence to adjourn the joint session of Con-
gress without counting electoral votes. See Documents on file with the Select Committee
on the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production)
Chapman004979 (Jan. 2, 2021, Kurt Olsen Draft Memorandum Entitled, “The Role of the Vice
President in Receiving Votes from the Electoral College.”) Martin advised President Trump
that Vice President Pence possessed the constitutional authority to impede the electoral
 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION 633

count. See Nicholas Fandos, Peter Baker, and Maggie Haberman, “House Moves to Force
Trump Out, Vowing Impeachment if Pence Won’t Act,” New York Times, (Jan. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html. Both
corresponded with John Eastman and others regarding plans to convene alternate electors
in states won by Joe Biden. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman023998 (Dec. 6, 2020, Michael Farris email forwarding an email concerning the
“Importance of Republican Electors in AZ, GA, MI, NV, PA and WI Voting on Dec 14” at 1:54
p.m. ET). President Trump asked to speak with Mr. Olsen and Mr. Martin before he left the
dining room. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000007401_00001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Molly Michael email to MBX WHO MA Joint White House
Switchboard at 11:28 p.m. ET).
317. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump).
318. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump). Mitchell declined to discuss her conversations with President
Trump on attorney-client privilege grounds. She did, however, acknowledge that following
the phone call, she took steps to dismiss the President’s pending election suit in Georgia.
See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131.
319. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
the President Donald J. Trump); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118
(Herschmann refused to answer questions about the phone call, citing executive privilege).
320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
322. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 258–59.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.
634 CHAPTER 7

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 160–61; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
331. Insert: Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).
332. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, The Daily
Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 42–43.
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 179–80.
335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 180.
336. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Patrick MacDonnell Production), PM000158 (Jan. 7, 2021, Patrick Mac-
Donnell text message to personal contact at 9:46 p.m. EST).
337. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017719, p. 3; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexan-
der, (Dec. 9, 2021), p. 57.
338. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_042.
339. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_040.
340. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0717 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale
text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:14 p.m. ET).
341. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0718– KPierson20 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:22 p.m. ET).
 8

ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK

Late in the evening on January 6, 2021, Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, the head of
the Proud Boys, posted a video on his Parler account. The brief footage
showed a masked man, wearing a black cape, standing in front of the U.S.
Capitol Building. Tarrio titled the 18-second video, set to ominous music,
“Premonition.” He offered no further explanation. The clear implication of
the brief footage, recorded sometime prior to January 6th, was that Tarrio
had foreknowledge of the events that transpired earlier that same day.1
Indeed, Tarrio cheered on his fellow Proud Boys as they attacked the
U.S. Capitol. He had been arrested and ordered to leave Washington, DC two
days earlier. Although Tarrio was not physically present, he continued to
monitor and communicate with his men via encrypted chats and social
media. At 2:36 p.m. on January 6th, Tarrio wrote on Parler that he was
“enjoying the show,” adding: “Do what must be done” and “#WeTheP-
eople.” 2 Two minutes later, Tarrio wrote: “Don’t fucking leave.” Several
minutes after that, Tarrio messaged his Proud Boys: “Make no mistake . . .”
and “We did this . . .” 3
Law enforcement officials subsequently uncovered significant evidence
showing that Tarrio and his lieutenants planned to storm the U.S. Capitol.
In June 2022, Tarrio and four other Proud Boys were charged with seditious
conspiracy and other crimes related to their alleged responsibility for the
assault.4 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has alleged that they “con-
spired to prevent, hinder and delay the certification of the Electoral College
vote, and to oppose by force the authority of the government of the United
States.” 5 On January 6, 2021, the Proud Boys “directed, mobilized and led
members of the crowd onto the Capitol grounds and into the Capitol, lead-
ing to dismantling of metal barricades, destruction of property, breaching
of the Capitol building, and assaults on law enforcement.” 6
The Select Committee’s analysis corroborates the DOJ’s findings and
allegations. The Select Committee reviewed extensive footage of the attack,
including that recorded by the U.S. Capitol Police’s (USCP) surveillance

637
638 CHAPTER 8

cameras, the Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) body-worn cameras,

publicly available videos, as well as on-the-ground film produced by an
embedded documentarian. The Select Committee interviewed rioters, law
enforcement officers, and witnesses that were present on January 6th,
while also consulting thousands of court filings. Using these sources of
information, the Select Committee developed a timeline of events to under-
stand how the unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol unfolded.
As explained below, the Proud Boys marched from the Washington
Monument to the U.S. Capitol on the morning of January 6th. While tens of
thousands of President Trump’s supporters gathered at a rally at the Ellipse
near the White House, the Proud Boys prepared to attack. Shortly before the
joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m., the Proud Boys
instigated an assault on outmanned law enforcement at the Peace Circle, a
key location. They quickly overran security barriers and made their way
onto the U.S. Capitol’s restricted grounds. Throughout the next several
hours, members of the Proud Boys led the attack at key breach points, pre-
venting law enforcement from gaining crowd control and inciting others to
press forward.
President Trump finished his speech at the Ellipse at approximately 1:10
p.m. Toward the end of his remarks, the President directed his supporters
to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. Their natural path took
them through the Peace Circle, which had already been cleared out by the
Proud Boys and their associates. Thousands of rioters and protestors
streamed onto the Capitol’s restricted grounds in short order.
The Proud Boys were not solely responsible for attacking the U.S. Capi-
tol. As explained in Chapter 6, other far-right extremists and conspiracy
theorists prepared for violence after President Trump summoned them to
Washington for a “wild” protest on January 6th. And they joined in the
assault as well. Three Percenters, QAnon adherents, and other radicals were
on the frontlines, pressing the charge. The Oath Keepers attacked the Capi-
tol, forming two military-style “stacks” to push their way into the build-
ing. The white nationalist Groypers were present as their leader gave an
inflammatory speech from the same Peace Circle where the attack was
launched. Like members of the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Per-
centers, some of the Groypers have been charged for their actions on
January 6th.
Unaffiliated Americans enraged by President Trump’s lies rioted as well.
The January 6th, attack has often been described as a riot—and that is
partly true. Some of those who trespassed on the Capitol’s grounds or
entered the building did not plan to do so beforehand. But it is also true that
extremists, conspiracy theorists and others were prepared to fight. That is
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 639

Trump supporters from around the country gather at the Washington Monument on the
morning of January 6, 2021.
Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images

an insurrection. They answered President Trump’s call to action. Some, like

the Proud Boys, deliberately harnessed the mob’s anger to overrun the
Capitol.

8.1 THE MOB ASSEMBLES IN WASHINGTON

During the early morning hours of January 6th, tens of thousands of

Americans from around the country began to gather at the Ellipse and the
Washington Monument. They had come to hear President Trump speak
and, more importantly, for his “wild” protest.
Nick Quested, a documentary filmmaker, captured the mood that morn-
ing. Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the QAnon Shaman) proclaimed “this is our
1776,” vowing “Joe Biden is never getting in.” 7 An unnamed woman from
Georgia, who said she hosted a podcast dedicated to a new so-called Patriot
Party, also proclaimed January 6th to be the new 1776. She added an omi-
nous warning. “I’m not allowed to say what’s going to happen today
because everyone’s just going to have to watch. Something’s gonna happen,
one way or the other.” 8
640 CHAPTER 8

The Secret Service set up magnetometers to screen for weapons and

other contraband, but many rally-goers chose to avoid the screening alto-
gether.
At 6:29 a.m., Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, reminded
his group’s members that DC prohibited blades over “3 inches” and
encouraged them to “[k]eep [the knives] low profile.” 9 Others were think-
ing along the same lines. At 7:25 a.m., the National Park Service reported
that a significant number of attendees ditched their bags in trees, rather
than have them inspected.10 Cassidy Hutchinson told the Select Committee
she heard that thousands of people refused to walk through magnetometers
to enter the Ellipse because they did not want to be screened for weapons.11
According to Hutchinson, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations whose
responsibilities included security-related issues, Tony Ornato, told the
President that the onlookers “don’t want to come in right now. They—they
have weapons that they don’t want confiscated by the Secret Service.” 12
When he arrived at the Ellipse that morning, President Trump angrily said:
“I don’t [fucking] care that they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me.
They can march to the Capitol from here.” 13
Approximately 28,000 rally-goers did pass through the magnetometers.
The Secret Service confiscated a significant number of prohibited items
from these people, including: 269 knives or blades, 242 cannisters of pep-
per spray, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3 gas masks,
30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like scissors,
needles, or screwdrivers.14
At 8:07 a.m., Secret Service countersurveillance agents reported that
“members of the crowd are wearing ballistic helmets, body armor and car-
rying radio equipment and military grade backpacks.” 15 By 9:45 a.m., the
Secret Service noted people openly carrying pepper spray as they strolled
the streets.16
President Trump’s mob was itching for a fight. National Park Service
officers arrested a man who had entered the restricted area around the
Washington Monument. Immediately, about 100 people started forming a
circle around the officer, “threaten[ing] law enforcement,” as the officer
later recounted.17 The officer retreated into the Washington Monument
with the man in custody.18 The crowd responded angrily, punching the
Monument’s glass windows and continuing to threaten officers.19 Law
enforcement around the Washington Monument felt so unsafe that they
“locked themselves in a security box by the mall.” 20 Rioters nevertheless
“scaled the sides of the security box and climbed on top of the structure.” 21
It was a harbinger of things to come.
MPD monitored and responded to a stream of threats that morning.
Three men in fatigues from Broward County, Florida brandished AR-15s in
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 641

front of MPD officers on 14th Street and Independence Avenue.22 MPD

advised over the radio that one individual was possibly armed with a
“Glock” at Fourteenth Street and Constitution Avenue, and another was
possibly armed with a “rifle” at Fifteenth Street and Constitution Avenue
around 11:23 a.m.23 The National Park Service detained an individual with a
rifle between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m.24
Far-right extremists brought guns into Washington or the surrounding
area. Christopher Kuehne, a member of the Proud Boys, met up with friends
on January 5th to discuss their plans for the following day. One person in
attendance said he did not travel to Washington just to “march around”
and asked, “do we have patriots here willing to take it by force?” 25 Kuehne
told them he had guns, and he was ready to go.26 During the attack, Kuehne
helped prop open Capitol blast doors as besieged law enforcement retreated
inside.27 Guy Reffitt, a Three Percenter from Texas, attended the rally at the
Ellipse, and then carried a loaded firearm onto Capitol grounds.28 Jerod
Thomas Bargar lost his gun—that he’d carried from the Ellipse in a ‘We the
People’ holster29—while scuffling with police on the west side of the Capi-
tol around 2:30 p.m.30 Bargar wanted to be armed, he said, when he went
into the “belly of the beast.” 31
Mark Andre Mazza drove from Indiana, bringing a Taurus revolver, a
.45-caliber weapon that he loaded with both shotgun and hollow-point
rounds.32 After assaulting a police officer, he lost the weapon,33 dropping it
or losing it on the steps of the lower West Plaza leading to the Capitol’s
West Front Terrace.34 The Select Committee reviewed Mazza’s social media
accounts before they were taken down, finding that he shared multiple
conspiracy theories, including QAnon material.35 Mazza later indicated that
he intended to target House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, telling authorities that
“you’d be here for another reason” if he had found the Speaker inside the
Capitol.36
Lonnie Leroy Coffman from Falkville, Alabama, parked by the Capitol
building before walking nearly 2 miles to the Ellipse to hear the President
speak.37 In his car, he had stocked a handgun, a rifle, a shotgun, hundreds
of rounds of ammunition, large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices,
machetes, camouflage smoke devices, a bow and arrow, and 11 Mason jars
filled with gasoline and styrofoam, as well as rags and a lighter (tools
needed to make Molotov cocktails).38 Police found two more handguns on
Coffman when he was arrested later that day.39
Many in attendance were aware of Washington’s prohibition on carry-
ing a concealed weapon and made plans accordingly. The Oath Keepers left
their guns stowed away in their cars or across State lines for easy access
should they be needed.40 The group staged a “quick reaction force” across
642 CHAPTER 8

the river in Virginia, amassing an arsenal to come to DC “by land” or “by

sea,” as Florida State-chapter lead—and defendant convicted of seditious
conspiracy—Kelly Meggs said.41 Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified at the
seditious conspiracy trial that the “quick reaction force [was] ready to go
get our firearms in order to stop the election from being certified within
Congress.” 42 Dolan further testified that the Oath Keepers came to
Washington, DC “to stop the certification of the election. . . . [b]y any means
necessary. That’s why we brought our firearms.” 43
Garret Miller—a January 6th defendant who traveled from Richardson,
Texas—posted on Facebook that “he was bringing guns with him but
‘might just keep 1 hidden one and store the rest in Virginia’” after learning
about the DC law.44 He also threatened to assassinate Congresswoman
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and predicted a “civil war could start.” 45
Many members of the crowd decided against bringing firearms into the
nation’s capital, and armed themselves in other ways. Alex Kirk Harkrider
from Carthage, Texas, and his co-defendant, Ryan Nichols, left guns in a
parked car just outside the district before attending the rally.46 Harkrider
still brought a tomahawk axe.47 During the march to the Capitol, he yelled
“[c]ut their fucking heads off!” 48 One rioter told the Select Committee he
saw another carrying a “pitchfork.” 49
Members of the mob carried flags and turned the flagpoles into weap-
ons. Michael Foy, from Wixom, Michigan, carried a hockey stick to the
Ellipse—he draped a Trump flag over it.50 Just hours later, Foy used that
hockey stick to repeatedly beat police officers at the inaugural tunnel.51
Former New York City police officer Thomas Webster carried a Marine flag,
which he later used to attack an officer holding the rioters back at the lower
West Plaza.52 Another individual, Danny Hamilton, carried a flag with a
sharpened tip, which he said was “for a certain person,” to which Trevor
Hallgren(who had traveled with Hamilton to Washington, DC) responded:
“it has begun.” Later, Hallgren commented that “[t]here’s no escape
Pelosi, Schumer, Nadler. We’re coming for you. . . . Even you AOC. We’re
coming to take you out. To pull you out by your hairs.” On January 5th,
Hallgren took a tour of the Capitol with Representative Barry Loudermilk,
during which he took pictures of hallways and staircases.53
The mob President Trump summoned to Washington, DC, on January
6th, was prepared to fight.

8.2 MARCH OF THE PROUD BOYS

While tens of thousands of President Trump’s supporters attended the rally

at the Ellipse, the Proud Boys had other plans. On the morning of January
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 643

6th, they gathered at the Washington Monument. At 10:30 a.m., the Proud
Boys started their march down the National Mall towards the U.S. Capitol.
In total, there were approximately 200–300 Proud Boys, as well as their
associates, in the group.54
Enrique Tarrio, the chairman of the Proud Boys, was not in attendance.
As explained in Chapter 6, Tarrio had been arrested two days earlier and
ordered to leave Washington. However, Tarrio continued to monitor events
remotely from Baltimore, communicating with his men throughout the day.
With Tarrio offsite, the Proud Boys were led by three other senior members
of the group: Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, and Zachary Rehl.
Ethan Nordean (a.k.a. “Rufio Panman”) was a member of the Proud
Boys’ Elders chapter and president of his local chapter in Seattle,
Washington.55 Nordean was regarded as the leader for January 6th after
Tarrio was arrested.56 In the days leading up to January 6th, Nordean made
ominous comments on social media. In conversations with his fellow Proud
Boys, he argued that the Presidential election was tainted by fraud and vio-
lence was a necessary remedy. For example, on January 4th, Nordean
posted a video on social media with the title: “Let them remember the day
they decided to make war with us.” 57 In another social media post on
January 5th, Nordean warned “we are coming for them.” 58 He added a tell-
ing line: “You’ve chosen your side, black and yellow teamed with red, white
and blue against everyone else.” 59 The “black and yellow” is a reference to
the Proud Boys. And when Nordean wrote the “red, white and blue,” he
likely meant the Trump supporters who would be in attendance for January
6th.
Joseph Biggs (a.k.a. “Sergeant Biggs”) was a senior Proud Boys member
and served as an event “organizer” for the group.60 Biggs previously
worked with Alex Jones and InfoWars.61 In late December 2020, Biggs
posted a message on Parler in which he explained that the Proud Boys “will
not be attending DC in colors.” 62 That is, unlike at previous events, the
Proud Boys would not wear their branded, black and yellow clothing, but
instead seek to be inconspicuous. Biggs continued:
We will be blending in as one of you. You won’t see us. You’ll even
think we are you . . . We are going to smell like you, move like you,
and look like you. The only thing we’ll do that’s us is think like us!
Jan 6th is gonna be epic.63
Tarrio posted a similar message, saying the Proud Boys would go
“incognito” on January 6th.64 Consistent with this decision, Biggs was
dressed in a plaid shirt, glasses, and dark hat as he led the march from the
Washington Monument.65 Other Proud Boys dressed in a similar fashion.
644 CHAPTER 8

Protestors, including a group of Proud Boys, gather at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Photo by Jon Cherry/Getty Images

Zachary Rehl (a.k.a. “Captain Trump”) was president of the local

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Proud Boys chapter.66 Like his comrades, Rehl
believed President Trump’s Big Lie about the 2020 Presidential election.67
He raised more than $5,500 in funds for January 6th. Like Nordean, Biggs
and others, Rehl was dressed “incognito” as he helped lead the group from
the Washington Monument.68
Shortly after 11:00 a.m., the Proud Boys arrived at the west side of the
Capitol, near a reflecting pool. From there, they marched to the east front
of the Capitol. Surveillance footage shows the Proud Boys passing Garfield
Circle on the southwest corner of the Capitol at 11:15 a.m.69 They walked
north towards the Peace Circle next, and surveillance cameras captured
them on video there at approximately 11:21 a.m.70 There was just one USCP
officer standing guard at the Peace Circle fence at the time.71
As the Proud Boys paraded around the Capitol grounds, Nick Quested, a
documentary filmmaker who spent time with the group, recalled them
taunting USCP officers. One Proud Boy told the officers to “[r]emember
your oath,” “[c]hoose a side,” and “[b]e on the right side of history.” 72 By
11:41 a.m., the Proud Boys made their way around to the east side of the
Capitol, crossing along Constitution Avenue.73 While on the east front, they
posed for pictures with members of their Arizona delegation, who were
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 645

clearly identifiable by their orange caps.74 They then walked back across the
north side of the Capitol towards the National Mall, where they stopped to
eat at food trucks.75 The Proud Boys stayed by the food trucks until they
returned to the Peace Circle at approximately 12:49 p.m.76

8.3 THE INITIAL ATTACK

Within minutes of arriving at the Peace Circle, the Proud Boys and their
associates launched the attack on the U.S. Capitol. The circle is the site of
the Peace Monument, a statue erected from 1877 to 1878 to commemorate
naval deaths at sea during the Civil War with “two classically robed”
women—one woman representing “grief,” covering her face, and the other
woman representing “history.” The woman standing in for “history” holds
a tablet that reads, “They died that their country might live.” 77
The Peace Circle’s geographical location is crucially important for
understanding how the January 6th, attack unfolded. It sits at the end of
Pennsylvania Avenue, just in front of the U.S. Capitol. At the conclusion of
his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump directed rally attendees to march
down Pennsylvania Avenue to the U.S. Capitol. Their shortest natural path
would lead them right to the Peace Circle and to the northwest side of the
Capitol grounds, also known as the West Plaza. By the time rally-goers
arrived, the Proud Boys and their allies had already removed the fencing
that stood in the crowd’s way. As a result, thousands of people streamed
into the restricted Capitol grounds with relative ease.
When the Proud Boys arrived back at the Peace Circle at 12:49 p.m., they
still had about 200 to 300 members and many other protestors had joined
them.78 Shortly after arriving, the Proud Boys incited the crowd with
antagonistic chants such as “1776.”79 Officer Caroline Edwards, who was
standing guard, explained to the Select Committee that the Proud Boys
asked her and the other USCP officers if they could walk past the fencing
and talk to the officers. “No,” she replied. The Proud Boys and others
immediately turned on Edwards and her fellow officers, referring to them
as “Nancy Pelosi’s dogs” and shouting.80
At approximately 12:51 p.m., Quested captured a rioter named Ryan
Samsel with his arm around Proud Boys leader Joe Biggs, who led the
chants.81 Samsel subsequently claimed that Biggs encouraged him to push
through the barricades and, when Samsel hesitated to follow through, Biggs
“flashed a gun, questioned his manhood and repeated his demand” to move
to the front and “challenge the police.” 82 Biggs has contested Samsel’s
version of events.83 After speaking with Biggs, Samsel breached the outer
fencing of the Peace Circle at 12:53 p.m.84 The first set of fencing at the
646 CHAPTER 8

Peace Circle was staged on 1st Street Northwest, with the second set of
fencing not far behind. Once Samsel breached the outer fencing, USCP offi-
cers, including Officer Edwards, moved from their posts to meet Samsel and
other rioters.85
In less than a minute, at 12:54 p.m., the rioters pushed USCP officers to
the ground, removed the fencing, and quickly stormed east towards the U.S.
Capitol building.86 Officer Edwards was thrown to the ground, causing her
to hit her head on concrete steps.87
Two Proud Boys from New York, Dominic Pezzola and William Pepe,
were among those leading the march to the next line of security barriers.88
Pepe, an employee of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in upstate
New York, took sick leave to travel to Washington for the January 6th
events.89 Pepe dragged part of the fence away at the next security barrier,
ensuring that USCP officers were left defenseless.90 The Proud Boys’ actions
were not spontaneous. Jeffrey Finley, a Proud Boys leader from West
Virginia, later admitted “there appeared to be a coordinated effort to pull
the barricades apart.” 91 Proud Boy Jeremy Bertino admitted to similar facts
when pleading guilty to seditious conspiracy, stating stated that he
“believed . . . that the purpose of traveling to Washington, DC, on January 6,
2021, was to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote, and that
the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it would take, including
using force against police and others, to achieve that objective.” Based on
discussions he and other Proud Boys leaders had in the leadup to January
6th, he “believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the group’s goal
of stopping Congress from certifying the Electoral College Vote. Bertino
understood that storming the Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and
would require using force against police or other government officials.” 92
Parallel to the Peace Circle, at the Garfield Circle walkway located at the
southeast corner of the Capitol grounds, rioters breached the fencing at
12:55 p.m. and began rushing the West Plaza where they would converge
with others from the Peace Circle.93
By 12:58 p.m., the crowd filled the lower West Plaza of the Capitol just
below the inauguration stage that had been built for the ceremony sched-
uled two weeks later. After the initial breaches, the USCP was able to deploy
enough officers to stop the rioters from advancing past the base of the
inauguration stage. More importantly, rioter momentum was further halted
when the first group of MPD officers arrived on scene at 1:11 p.m.,94 almost
precisely as President Trump finished his Ellipse speech. The MPD officers
initially pushed back the rioters on the West Plaza, slowing them down
before they would later breach the Capitol.95
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 647

A stalemate ensued on the West Plaza before rioters were able to make
any further progress. Rally-goers arriving from the Ellipse provided crucial
momentum.

8.4 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S MOB DESCENDS ON THE U.S. CAPITOL

Toward the end of his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump made sure an
already angry crowd of his supporters stayed enraged. “We fight like hell[,]
and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country any-
more,” the President told the tens of thousands of people who had
assembled at the Ellipse, or in the vicinity. About one minute later, Presi-
dent Trump directed those in attendance “to walk down Pennsylvania
Avenue . . . to the Capitol.” The President told the people they were “going
to try and give” Republicans, including his own Vice President, “the kind of
pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.” 96
“There’s enough people here to storm the Capitol,” a member of the
crowd said at 1:06 p.m., just as the President was concluding his remarks.97
Ronald Sandlin, who pleaded guilty to and has been sentenced for felonies
committed on January 6th, including telling officers in the Capitol that
“[y]ou’re going to die,” watched the President’s speech from a nearby res-
taurant and live-streamed a video in which he encouraged “other patriots”
to “take the Capitol.” 98 Sandlin repeated the phrase “freedom is paid for
with blood” several times during his video.99
“We’re getting ready to go march on Capitol Hill. We’re gonna go fuck
some shit up,” Cody Mattice, another January 6th defendant who pleaded
guilty and has been sentenced,100 said while walking to the Capitol. Mattice
later added: “We’re getting up front, and we’re taking this shit.” 101 Ryan
Nichols, who was charged with eight felonies, livestreamed a diatribe as he
marched towards the Capitol at 1:40 p.m. Nichols echoed the President’s
unconstitutional claim that Vice President Pence had the power to decide
the election himself. “I’m hearing that Pence just caved. . . . I’m telling you
if Pence caved, we’re gonna drag motherfuckers through the streets,”
Nichols said.102 “Cut their heads off!” Nichols yelled with his codefendant
Harkrider, before encouraging others to join “Republican protestors [who]
are trying to enter the House right now.” 103
On the way to the Capitol, Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins chatted with
others in a Zello group named “Stop the Steal J6.” Watkins said that
“100%” of the Ellipse crowd was “marching on the Capitol,” because “it
has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us.” 104 As she approached
the Capitol with a contingent of Oath Keepers, Watkins said: “I’m probably
gonna go silent when I get there ‘cause I’m a be a little busy.105 Donald
648 CHAPTER 8

Hazard, a Three Percenter from Texas who claimed to be allied with Proud
Boys on January 6th, told a Washington Post reporter that he wanted his face
recorded on video as he marched to the Capitol. “I want the enemy to know
exactly who is coming after them,” Hazard explained.106
Leaders of the “Stop the Steal” movement continued to incite the crowd
during the march as well. Alex Jones of InfoWars arrived at the Ellipse
shortly before 9:00 a.m. on the morning of January 6th.107 After some initial
difficulty gaining access to the event area, Jones was seated in the VIP
section.108 While Jones stayed to listen to a portion of President Trump’s
speech, planning for the crowd’s march to the Capitol was already under-
way and Jones intended to leave the Ellipse early to lead the march. The
origins of the plan to have Jones lead the march are unclear. Jones has pub-
licly stated that “the White House told me three days before, we are going
to have you lead the March.” 109 Stop the Steal’s Ali Alexander also believed
“the White House” wanted him to lead a march to the Capitol.110 It is likely
that both got that idea from Caroline Wren, a Republican fundraiser who
helped organize the Ellipse event.111 Jones texted Wren at 12:27 p.m., asking
when he should leave the Ellipse and begin the march.112
While Wren originally expected Jones, Roger Stone, and retired Lt. Gen.
Michael Flynn to march to the Capitol, Stone did not attend the Ellipse rally
and so he was not present to accompany Jones on the march as planned.113
Additionally, while President Trump was delivering his speech, Wren asked
Flynn if he was going to march with Jones. Flynn responded, “Hell, no. It’s
freezing.” 114
While Stone and Flynn did not march, Jones and Alexander led others to
the Capitol, though it is not clear how many people followed them.115 Jones
and Alexander gathered with Jones’s camera and security crew just outside
the event perimeter, near Freedom Plaza, to discuss their plans.116 The dis-
cussion, recorded by Alex Jones’s film crew, sheds some light on what Jones
and Alexander knew about the President’s plans and what they intended for
the march. The group, which included InfoWars host Owen Shroyer,
huddled outside the Ellipse security perimeter to discuss how best to pro-
ceed. They tried to predict the Presidential motorcade’s route to the Capitol.
The video shows Alex Jones telling his crew, “I think the Wren lady,
where’s she at? She knows what they said they were going to do. Everything
she’s said has been accurate, so we need to call her real quick.” 117 They
then decided to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue, as the President had
directed in his speech.
Shroyer recommended the group wait for President Trump to finish
speaking, and they agreed to at least delay their departure from Freedom
Plaza to allow Jones to gather a crowd. 118 Jones began speaking from his
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 649

Alex Jones uses a bullhorn to speak to crowd on January 6, 2021.

Photo by Jon Cherry/Getty Images

bullhorn, imploring people to gather and walk down Pennsylvania

Avenue.119 While using the bullhorn, Jones told the crowd that they were
experiencing “the second American revolution,” 120 and stated, “[l]et’s go
take our country back. Trump is only minutes away. Let’s start marching to
the Capitol, peacefully.” 121
Proud Boys were among the crowd Jones gathered during his march.
Matthew Walter, president of a Tennessee chapter of the organization,122
was near the National Mall with two other Proud Boys from Tennessee and
decided to join Jones.123 Other, more prominent members of the Proud Boys
appear to have been in contact with Jones and Shroyer about the events of
January 6th and on that day. Records for Enrique Tarrio’s phone show that
while the attack on the Capitol was ongoing, he texted with Jones three
times and Shroyer five times.124 Ethan Nordean’s phone records reflect that
he exchanged 23 text messages with Shroyer between January 4th and 5th,
and that he had one call with him on each of those days.125 Records of
Joseph Biggs’s communications show that he texted with Shroyer eight
times on January 4th and called him at approximately 11:15 a.m. on January
6th, while Biggs and his fellow Proud Boys were marching at and around
the Capitol.126
650 CHAPTER 8

Once they had marched the length of Pennsylvania Avenue and reached
the west side of the Capitol, Jones and Alexander used a bullhorn to con-
tinue directing those around them to the east side, making further refer-
ences to President Trump’s alleged imminent arrival. A video recorded by a
rallygoer at 1:51 p.m. shows Jones and Alexander standing together as Jones
encourages the crowd to proceed to the east side of the Capitol. He tells
those listening that “we’ve got a permit on the other side, it’s great that
this happened, but Trump’s not going to come when we’ve taken this over.
We are not Antifa, we are not BLM.” 127
Jones has repeatedly claimed that he tried to calm the crowd, but his
actions also coincided with two police line breaches and one breach of the
Capitol building itself. At 1:57 p.m., minutes after Jones encouraged rally
goers to move east, newly arrived protestors breached the bike rack
fencing used to keep the crowd away from the east side steps.128 After the
breach, police retreated to the base of the large set of steps behind
them and the crowd moved forward to meet the newly established police
line.129
Jones followed shortly behind the crowd that led the initial east fence
breach, and his arrival coincided with the next breach up the east stairs.
Publicly available video shows Jones already departed from the west side,
rounding the north side of the Capitol on the way to the east side at 2:00
p.m.130 As he was walking, Jones told his group, “those fucking cops need to
fucking back off man.” 131 He was then asked about Vice President Pence, to
which Jones responded: “he floundered and was neutral, he passed the
ball.” 132 At the conclusion of the video, one of Jones’s camera crew can be
heard saying, “let’s take a break here. Let me talk to this cop to see if I can
get Alex up there to deescalate the situation.” Other video released by Jones
shows one of his camera crew interacting with USCP officers and asking
how Jones can help deescalate the situation.133 The Select Committee’s
review of the evidence showed that Jones simultaneously called on the
crowd to “fight” and start a “revolution,” while occasionally peppering his
rhetoric with the word “peacefully.”
Minutes after Jones’s arrival on the scene, at approximately 2:06 p.m.,
rioters breached the new police line and stormed up the stairs towards the
Columbus Doors (also known as the Rotunda Doors).134 The crowd’s cheers
and celebration as they move up the steps can be heard while Jones’s cam-
era crew negotiates with USCP officers nearby.135 As explained below, the
rioters broke through another key breach point with Jones and Alexander
on the scene just minutes later.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 651

Rioters clash with police at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images

8.5 THE MOB SURGES

Far-right extremists continued to lead the charge as protestors streamed

onto the U.S. Capitol’s restricted grounds. On the north side of the West
Plaza, there was a scaffold with stairs used by construction workers to build
the inauguration stage. Law enforcement officers were stationed at the base
of the stairs, preventing rioters from climbing to the upper West Plaza,
where doors to the Capitol building itself were located. At 1:49 p.m., MPD
declared a riot at the Capitol.136
Shortly before 1:50 p.m., rioters gathered in front of this scaffold on the
northwest corner of the Capitol. The rioters included Proud Boys and other
extremists. One rioter, Guy Reffitt, belonged to a Three Percenter group
from Texas.137 By approximately 1:50 p.m., he stood at the front of the pack
near the scaffold, carrying a pistol and flexicuffs.138 He wore body armor
under a blue jacket and a helmet with a mounted body camera.139
Reffitt advanced on the police line, absorbing rubber bullets and push-
ing through chemical spray.140 As he recounted shortly after the attack,
Reffitt got “everything started moving forward.” 141 He “started the fire”
652 CHAPTER 8

and the presence of law enforcement was not going to prevent Reffitt’s
advance.142 According to Reffitt:
[T]here was no reason for me to give up because I had come so far
to do what I wanted, what we wanted and needed to do. And I had a
mindset. I didn’t mean to actually be the first guy up there. I didn’t
even mean to do that. I just, the adrenaline and knowing that I can’t
let my country fall.143
Reffitt had indeed planned for violence on January 6th, noting on
December 28, 2020, that he would “be in full battle rattle.” 144 While driving
to Washington, DC on January 5th, Reffitt expressed his desire to “drag[ ]
those people out of the Capitol by their ankles” and “install[ ] a new gov-
ernment.” 145 On the morning of January 6th, Reffitt clarified the target,
telling “other members of his militia group and those gathered around
him” at the Ellipse that “I’m taking the Capitol with everybody fucking
else”and that “[w]e’re all going to drag them mother fuckers out kicking
and screaming. . . . I just want to see Pelosi’s head hit every fucking stair on
the way out . . . And Mitch McConnell too. Fuck’ em all.” 146 Reffitt was con-
victed and ultimately sentenced to 7 years in prison for his conduct.147
A member of the Proud Boys, Daniel Scott, helped lead the charge up
the scaffolding stairs.148 Scott, also known as Milkshake, had marched with
the Proud Boys from the Washington Monument to the Capitol. During the
march, Scott was recorded in a video yelling, “Let’s take the fucking
Capitol!” 149 Someone else responded, “Let’s not fucking yell that, alright?”
And then Nordean added: “It was Milkshake, man, you know . . . idiot.” Scott
had apparently blurted out the Proud Boys’ plan. At the scaffolding, Scott
then helped others “take” the U.S. Capitol. While wearing a blue cap with
white lettering that read, “Gods, Guns & Trump,” he pushed police officers
backwards, clearing a path for the rioters. Another Proud Boy, Chris
Worrell, was also nearby.150 As rioters massed under the scaffold, Worrell
sprayed officers with OC (or pepper) spray. 151 Other Proud Boys were pres-
ent at the scaffold, including Micajah Jackson152 and Matthew Greene.153
The attack at and in the vicinity of the scaffolding cleared a path for a
wave of rioters who forced their way up the stairs and to the U.S. Capitol
building itself.154 As the rioters rushed up the stairs, another January 6th
defendant, Ryan Kelley, climbed up the scaffolding around 1:51 p.m.155 In
the ensuing minutes he waved people on, encouraging them to follow.156
Kelley—who ran in the Republican primary to be the governor of Michigan
in 2022—denied to the Select Committee that he had climbed the scaffold-
ing to wave people on.157 The FBI arrested Kelley a few months after his
deposition.158
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 653

By 2:00 p.m., rioters at the top of the scaffolding stairs were only feet
away from Capitol building doors and windows.

8.6 THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL IS BREACHED

Incited by President Trump, over the course of the next hour, extremists,
conspiracy theorists and others breached the U.S. Capitol building at several
locations. They probed for weaknesses in the building’s defenses, battling
law enforcement personnel who stood in their way. Once again, the Proud
Boys and other extremists played conspicuous roles.

THE SENATE WING IS BREACHED AT 2:13 P.M.

At 2:13 p.m., Dominic Pezzola, a Proud Boy from New York, smashed a win-
dow on the Senate wing.159 This was the first breach of the Capitol building.
Pezzola used a riot shield he stole from a law enforcement officer to break
through the window. After climbing through, rioters were able to easily
open a nearby Senate wing door from the inside—giving them unfettered
passage into the building at 2:14 p.m. Two minutes later, at approximately
2:16 p.m., rioters pushed opened a second door, the Senate fire door, from
the inside.160 Just as the building was being breached, Vice President Pence
and Speaker Pelosi were ushered off the Senate and House floors, respec-
tively.161
The first person to enter the Capitol building was a Kentucky native
named Michael Sparks. Sparks had expressed his desire to kill people after
watching protests in the summer of 2020.162 Following one of President
Trump’s calls to Washington, DC on December 30, 2020, Sparks answered
that he would “be there.” 163
As Pezzola entered the building, he was joined by other noteworthy
extremists and conspiracy theorists. Robert Gieswein, an individual from
Colorado affiliated with Three Percenters who espoused conspiracy beliefs,
climbed through the Senate wing window.164 Doug Jensen, a QAnon adher-
ent, was part of this first cadre of people to enter the Capitol as well.165
Jensen wore a brazen “Q” shirt. Jensen later told authorities that he “inten-
tionally positioned himself to be among the first people inside the United
States Capitol because . . . he wanted to have his t-shirt seen on video so that
‘Q’ could ‘get the credit.’” 166 Another prominent QAnon believer, Jacob
Chansley (a.k.a. the “QAnon Shaman”), also entered through the Senate
wing door at approximately 2:14 p.m.167
White supremacists and Confederate-sympathizers were among the
first rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Kevin Seefried and his son, Hunter,
entered the building at approximately 2:13 p.m. through the Senate wing
window smashed by Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola.168 Kevin Seefried carried a
654 CHAPTER 8

Doug Jensen and rioters confront police after storming the Capitol.
(Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

Confederate Battle Flag with him and unfurled it inside the building.
According to some historians, while the Confederate Flag has appeared in
the building before, it was the first time that an insurrectionist ever carried
the banner inside the U.S. Capitol.169 According to court filings, Hunter
Seefried helped punch out the Senate wing window and then clear the bro-
ken glass before he, his father and others entered the Capitol.170 Kevin
Seefried was found guilty of obstructing an official proceeding, which is a
felony offense, as well as four misdemeanors.171 The Department of Justice
has alleged that at 2:16 p.m., just 3 minutes after the Senate wing was first
breached, five individuals associated with the Nick Fuentes’s white nation-
alist “America First” movement entered the U.S. Capitol.172 The five, all of
whom are in their 20s, have been identified as: Joseph Brody, Thomas
Carey, Gabriel Chase, Jon Lizak, and Paul Lovley.173 Four of the five “ini-
tially met at an America First event and attended subsequent events
together.” 174 Nick Fuentes and other America First leaders espouse “a
belief that they are defending against the demographic and cultural
changes in America.” 175 Online researchers say that Brody is the masked
man seen in a photo wearing a MAGA hat and holding a rifle in front of a
Nazi flag.176 (The photo was not taken on January 6th.) As discussed in
Chapter 6, members of the America First movement, commonly known as
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 655

“Groypers,” were well-represented at “Stop the Steal” events in late 2020

and these rallies helped pave the road to January 6th. Indeed, at least three
members of the group—Lovley, Lizak and Chase—attended the “Stop the
Steal, March for Trump” rally in Washington, DC on November 14, 2020.177
On January 6th, Brody and his America First associates made their way
to various points inside and outside of the Capitol after the initial breach,
including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s conference room and office, as well
as the U.S. Senate Chamber.178 After exiting the Capitol, the group went to
the north side of the building. One of the five, Brody, and another rioter
allegedly used a “metal barricade” to assault a law enforcement officer who
was defending the North Door.179 (The attack on the North Door is dis-
cussed below.) Brody and Chase also allegedly helped others destroy media
equipment.180 Still another America First associate, Riley Williams, directed
rioters up a staircase to Speaker Pelosi’s office and was accused of aiding
and abetting the theft of a laptop found there.181 Other white supremacists
were among the first rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Timothy Hale-
Cusanelli, an Army Reservist from New Jersey who was identified by a con-
fidential source to law enforcement as an “an avowed white supremacist
and Nazi sympathizer,” entered through the Senate wing breach around
2:14 p.m.182 Hale-Cusanelli “[u]sed tactical hand signals” to direct other
members of the mob, and he commanded them to “‘advance’ on the Capi-
tol.” 183 Afterwards, he bragged to a friend that January 6th was “exhilarat-
ing,” that he hoped “for a ‘civil war,’ and that the ‘tree of liberty must be
refreshed with the blood of patriots and tyrants.’ ” 184 Robert Packer was
also among the first rioters to enter the Capitol, and he made his way into
the Crypt by 2:25 p.m.185 Packer was wearing a “Camp Auschwitz” sweat-
shirt, a “symbol of Nazi hate ideology,” at the time.186
After breaking in, some of the first rioters headed north toward the
Senate chambers.187 Officer Eugene Goodman, a USCP officer, intercepted
them before they headed up the stairs leading to the chambers. Immedi-
ately after entering, a rioter asked Officer Goodman, “Where are the
[M]embers at?” and “where are they counting the votes?” 188 Jensen, Gies-
wein, Sparks, and others stalked Officer Goodman through the halls of the
Senate.189 Jensen demanded that Officer Goodman and other USCP officers
arrest Vice President Pence.190 Sparks chanted, “This is our America!” 191
Other rioters who entered through the Senate wing door clashed with police
offices at the Senate carriage door located on the northeast side of the
Capitol.192 When the rioters followed Officer Goodman up the stairs to the
Senate Chamber, they were stopped by a line of USCP officers outside the
Ohio Clock Tower.193
656 CHAPTER 8

Joe Biggs of the Proud Boys entered the Capitol shortly after the first
breach. At 2:14 p.m., Biggs walked through the senate wing door and moved
north. Part of his route was captured in videos posted on Parler, a right-
wing social media site.194 Someone recorded the Proud Boys leader shortly
after he entered the Capitol and asked him, “Hey Biggs what do you gotta
say?” 195 Smiling, Biggs replied: “this is awesome!” 196 Other Proud Boys
were seen with Biggs, or near him, as he entered the Capitol. One of them is
Paul Rae, a Proud Boys member from Florida, who appears to have commu-
nicated directly with Biggs after they entered through the door.197 Another
Proud Boy from Florida, Arthur Jackman, was seen with his hand on Biggs’s
right shoulder. Jackman “became involved in the Proud Boys to support
Donald Trump,” was in Washington on January 6th “to support President
Trump and to stop the steal” and “believe[d] the election was stolen.” Still
another, Joshua Pruitt, who was clad in a Punisher shirt, entered the Capitol
through the Senate wing door around this time.198 At approximately 2:17
p.m., 3 minutes after entering the U.S. Capitol for the first time, Biggs
exited through another door.199
At 2:43 p.m., law enforcement was able to regain control of the Senate
wing door, forcing all the rioters out. But their success lasted for only 5
minutes. At 2:48 p.m., rioters again breached the Senate wing door, pushing
law enforcement out of the way.200 The second breach was one of the more
violent breaches of the day, with the mob forcefully pushing law enforce-
ment backwards until the pathway was clear for them to enter.

THE COLUMBUS DOORS (EAST ROTUNDA DOORS) ARE BREACHED AT 2:24 P.M. AND
2:38 P.M.
While the Proud Boys and other extremists were overwhelming law
enforcement at the West Plaza scaffolding, another group led the attack on
security barriers on the East Plaza. At 2:06 p.m., a crowd broke through
security barriers and charged a set of doors just outside the Rotunda.201 The
mob’s surge occurred just minutes after Alex Jones arrived on the scene.202
The crowd’s cheers and celebration as they move up the steps can be heard
while Jones’s camera crew negotiates with USCP officers nearby.203
Once rioters had filled the Rotunda stairs, Jones and his team, along
with the Proud Boy Walter, ascended the stairs. They moved into the thick
of the crowd at the top of the stairs, where Jones began calling for peace but
also revolution, leading the crowd in chants of “1776” and other bellicose
rhetoric.204 Publicly available video shows that Jones reached the top of the
stairs at 2:18 p.m.205 Walter told the Select Committee that he thought Jones
was successful in getting some people down, “but I also think that may
have created enough space for people to be able to move, whereas before
you couldn’t move.” 206 Apparently, Jones’s security team also realized he
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 657

was not successfully controlling the crowd, as one of his security guards
reportedly told him, “Alex, they’re going to blame this all on you, we got to
get out of here as fast as possible.” 207 By approximately 2:21 p.m., Jones
began descending the stairs.208 Despite claiming to make attempts to calm
the crowd, Jones further incited the mob as he departed, loudly proclaiming
“we will never submit to the new world order” and then leading the crowd
in the chant “fight for Trump.” 209
At 2:24 p.m., rioters gained entrance to the Capitol through the doors
leading into the Rotunda,210 an entrance that was only a few feet directly
behind Jones as he was speaking. As the Rotunda was breached by rioters,
Jones and Alexander left the area and decided to leave the Capitol complex
area altogether.211
Law enforcement officials were able to thwart the initial breach of the
doors leading into the Rotunda. By 2:28 p.m., they temporarily regained
control and stopped rioters from entering.212 But their success was short-
lived. Within ten minutes, the doors were breached once again.213 And two
members of the Proud Boys—Ronald Loehrke and James Haffner—helped
lead the attack.214
Loehrke was allegedly recruited by Nordean, the Proud Boys leader, for
January 6th. In late December 2020, Nordean asked Loehrke via text mes-
sage if he was coming to “DC.” 215 After Loehrke indicated he was, Nordean
said he wanted Loehrke “on the front line” with him.216 Loehrke replied,
“Sounds good man.” 217 Loehrke and Haffner marched with the Proud Boys
from the Washington Monument to the Capitol grounds and were present
during the breach at the Peace Circle.218 The pair made their way to the east
side of the Capitol, where they began removing the security barriers and
resisting USCP officers. 219 Other members of the crowd joined. Eventually,
the rioters breached these barriers too, allowing them to reach the doors of
the Rotunda.
When the rioters reached the Columbus Doors, they were again stopped
by USCP officers. But as the officers explained to the Select Committee, the
rioters pushed them against the doors and sprayed them with OC spray
(commonly known as pepper spray), making it impossible to defend the
Capitol.220 James Haffner was one of the rioters who allegedly sprayed the
officers.221
Shortly after Haffner and others assaulted the USCP officers, they were
able to breach the Columbus Doors at approximately 2:38 p.m. A Proud Boys
contingent—including Haffner, Loehrke, and Joe Biggs—then entered the
Capitol.222 It was the second time that Biggs entered the U.S. Capitol that
day.
658 CHAPTER 8

A military-style “stack” of Oath Keepers entered through the Columbus

Doors as well. The Oath Keeper members attended the Ellipse rally, where
they were provided personal security details for VIPs in attendance.223
Afterwards, they marched to the Capitol, as directed by President Trump.
Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, monitored the attack on
the Capitol from just outside, including during the assault on the Columbus
Doors. At 2:28 p.m., Rhodes texted members of the F.O.S., or Friends of
Stone, (FOS) Signal chat—which included Roger Stone, the Proud Boys’
Enrique Tarrio, Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, and others224—that he was at the
“Back door of the U.S. Capitol.” 225 Rhodes followed up at 2:30 p.m. by
texting members of another chat that there was “Pounding on the doors”
of the Capitol.226
At 2:32 p.m., Rhodes held a three-way call with two other Oath Keepers,
Kelly Meggs and Michael Green.227 Three minutes later, Meggs’s group
(“Stack 1”) started pushing through the rioters amassed on the East Plaza
steps in a military-stack formation, with each person placing a hand on the
shoulder of the person in front.228 This stack entered the Capitol around
2:40 p.m.229
One minute later, Rhodes was caught on camera on the Upper West
Terrace responding to a rioter who said the Members of Congress must be
“shitting their pants inside.” Rhodes replied: “Amen They need to shit their
fucking pants. Sic semper tyrannis.” 230
Once inside, Stack 1 moved through the Rotunda. At 2:44 p.m., Stack 1
pushed into the Senate hallway, which was filled with officers blocking the
way. “Push, push, push. Get in there. They can’t hold us,” Watkins
implored the others. However, the officers repelled their attack, pushing
them back into the Rotunda.231
Other Oath Keepers made their way to the Capitol as Stack 1 tried to
advance. Joshua James and another group of Oath Keepers (“Stack 2”)
pushed through the Columbus Doors at approximately 3:15 p.m.232 “This is
my fucking Capitol. This is not yours. This is my building,” James shouted
at officers inside the Rotunda who were trying to push the rioters out of the
Capitol.233

ADDITIONAL BREACH POINTS

In addition to the breaches discussed above, rioters opened other entry
points into the U.S. Capitol. The Upper West Terrace door, which leads
directly into the Rotunda, was breached at 2:33 p.m. when rioters opened it
from the inside.234
Inside the Capitol, rioters broke through the police lines, such as in the
Crypt, a space located directly underneath the Rotunda. The Crypt is
anchored by a marble “compass stone,” marking the center of the building,
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 659

and is lined with 13 statues representing the original American colonies.235

The rioters quickly moved towards the House Chambers and, by 2:40 p.m.,
started to crowd the main doors outside the Chambers, moving to the east
side near the Speaker’s lobby. As they moved to the east side, rioters
opened the east House doors from the inside at 2:41 p.m., allowing rioters
from the northeast side of the Capitol to enter.236
The north doors were the last Capitol doors breached. At 3:10 p.m., riot-
ers entered through the north doors where they were quickly met by
USCP.237 Within a minute, the hallway just inside the doors was filled with
rioters. At 3:12 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD officers forcefully
pushed the rioters out of the doors.238 However, rioters continued to attack
just outside the north doors throughout the afternoon and evening.
The north doors have an outer entranceway that is separated by a vesti-
bule from a set of inner doors that lead directly into the Capitol. Rioters
threw bricks at the doors and forcefully tried to stop police officers from
clearing the area.239 Law enforcement officers briefly opened the inner
doors to spray a chemical irritant that was intended to disperse the mob.240
But the rioters continued to fight. For instance, as the crowd held the outer
doors open, John Thomas Gordon of West Virginia repeatedly threw a heavy
projectile at the inner doors, while swearing at the officers.241 Another
rioter gave Gordon, who came to Washington to attend the “Stop the Steal”
rally, a pair of goggles so he would withstand the chemical spray. Gordon
kicked the inner doors as he and others desperately tried to enter the Capi-
tol.242 Law enforcement held the doors, withstanding the mob’s best efforts
to break in.
As law enforcement officers started to clear the building, rioters contin-
ued to fight police officers at the tunnel on the West Plaza. Rioters violently
struck officers, including MPD Officer Daniel Hodges, and sprayed them
with OC spray. Although rioters did not break through the police line at the
tunnel, they were able to successfully break a window just north of it. There
is no surveillance coverage for this area, so Select Committee staff was
unable to determine the precise time of the breach. According to open-
source videos, however, the breach appears to occur at approximately 4:15
p.m.243

8.7 PRESIDENT TRUMP POURS FUEL ON THE FIRE

After Dominic Pezzola and others breached the Capitol at 2:13 p.m., a mob
quickly entered and headed towards the Senate and House Chambers, where
Members were meeting.244 As the crowd moved through the Capitol, they
chanted “Fight for Trump” and “Stop the Steal!” They also chanted
660 CHAPTER 8

“Nancy, Nancy” as they searched for Speaker Pelosi.245 At 2:18 p.m., the
House went into recess as hundreds of rioters confronted USCP officers
inside the Crypt, which is a short distance from the first breach point.246
USCP officers formed a line across the Crypt in an attempt to stop the
mob’s advance.247 By 2:21 p.m., the rioters had tried to break through police
lines, but they were temporarily unsuccessful.248
As USCP officers held the line inside the Crypt, President Trump poured
fuel on the fire, tweeting at 2:24 p.m.:

“Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been
done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving states a
chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inac-
curate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA
demands the truth!” 249
One minute later, the mob violently pushed through the USCP officers
in the Crypt and continued moving south towards the House Chamber.250
Joshua Pruitt, the Proud Boy dressed in a Punisher shirt, was at the front of
the line as rioters broke through in the Crypt.251 Officer David Millard told
the Select Committee that rioters in the Crypt claimed they were in the
Capitol because their “boss” told them to be there—meaning President
Trump.252 Officer Millard also recalled members of the mob telling him they
were there to stop the steal.253
After breaking through the police line in the Crypt, the mob pursued
USCP officers as they retreated to the U.S. Capitol Visitor’s Center (CVC).
Pruitt was among the rioters who advanced into the CVC, where he came
close to Senator Chuck Schumer.254 When the USCP officers attempted to
lower metal barriers to halt the crowd’s momentum, another small group
of Proud Boys immediately interceded to prevent the barricades from com-
ing down.255 The Proud Boy contingent included three men from the Kansas
City, Kansas area: William Chrestman,256 Chris Kuehne,257 and Louis
Colon.258 Felicia Konold and Cory Konold, two Proud Boy associates from
Arizona, joined the Kansas City group while marching from the Washington
Monument to the Capitol earlier in the day and were on the scene.259 Two
other Proud Boys, Nicholas Ochs and Nicholas DeCarlo, filmed the
incident.260
Surveillance footage shows Chrestman using a wooden club, or modi-
fied axe handle, to prevent the barrier from being lowered to the floor.261
Colon later admitted to authorities that he purchased and modified an axe
handle “to be used as both a walking stick and an improvised weapon” on
January 6th.262 Colon also told authorities that he attended a meeting with
Chrestman and others on the night of January 5th, during which someone
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 661

Rioters enter the Senate Chamber.

Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images

asked, “do we have patriots here willing to take it by force?” Colon under-
stood that the individual meant that they should use “force against the
government.” This same individual commented that they should “go in
there and take over.” 263
At 2:36 p.m., the mob pushed through a line of USCP officers guarding
the House Chamber.264 Rioters also entered the Senate Chamber.265 Within
minutes, Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the QAnon Shaman) entered the Senate
Chamber, making his way to the Senate dais, where Vice President Pence
had been presiding over the joint session. An officer asked Chansley to
vacate the dais, but instead he shouted, “Mike Pence is a fucking traitor.”
Chansley also left a note that read: “It’s Only a Matter of Time. Justice is
Coming!” 266 Surrounded by others, Chansley held a conspiracy-laden
prayer session, saying: “Thank you for allowing the United States of
America to be reborn. Thank you for allowing us to get rid of the commu-
nists, the globalists, and the traitors within our government.” 267 Other
extremists, including at least one associate of the white nationalist
“America First” movement, also sat in the Vice President’s seat.268
While law enforcement fought to contain the mob inside the Capitol,
the fighting raged outside as well. Key agitators continued to fire up the
662 CHAPTER 8

crowd. Nick Fuentes, the leader of the “America First” movement, ampli-
fied President Trump’s rhetoric aimed at Vice President Pence, including
the President’s 2:24 p.m. tweet.269 Speaking through a bullhorn while
standing on the Peace Monument, Fuentes shouted:
We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent
elector votes! That’s right, you heard it here first: Mike Pence has
betrayed the United States of America. Mike Pence has betrayed the
President and he has betrayed the people of the United States of
America—and we will never ever forget!270
As rioters flowed through the halls and offices inside the Capitol, others
broke through the defensive lines of USCP and MPD officers on the lower
West Plaza at 2:28 p.m., allowing them to take over the inauguration
stage.271 According to MPD Officer Michael Fanone, MPD officers were then
forced to conduct the “first fighting withdrawal” in the history of the force,
with law enforcement seeking to “reestablish defensive lines” to prevent
the “crowd that had swelled to approximately 20,000 from storming the
U.S. Capitol.” 272
After surging through the West Plaza, rioters quickly headed towards
the West Plaza tunnel. The violence that escalated at 2:28 p.m. on the lower
West Plaza continued as rioters reached the tunnel. By 2:41 p.m., law
enforcement retreated inside the tunnel, allowing rioters to slowly fill in.273
Just ten minutes later, the mob jammed the tunnel, desperately trying to
break through the police lines.274 The fighting in and immediately outside
of the tunnel raged for over two hours.275
Throughout the afternoon, members of the mob struck officers with
weapons, shot them with OC (or pepper) spray, and dragged officers from
the tunnel into the crowd. Lucas Denney, a Three Percenter from Texas who
carried a baton on January 6th, pushed a riot shield into and on top of
police officers at the tunnel. The crowd chanted “heave-ho!” as Denney did
so.276 Jeffrey Scott Brown sprayed a chemical or pepper spray at officers
and pushed the front of the line in the tunnel.277 Kyle Young, a January 6th
defendant with a long prior criminal history, participated in multiple
assaults and violence at the tunnel, including using a pole to jab at police
officers.
Young’s 16-year-old son was present during the fighting.278 Robert
Morss, a former Army Ranger who wore a military-style vest, participated
in a heave-ho effort in the tunnel where he and rioters had created a shield
wall.279 Peter Schwartz and another rioter passed a large cannister of spray
back and forth before Schwartz’s companion sprayed officers and then the
two joined in the heave-ho.280
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 663

Rioters assault police officers at a tunnel to the Capitol.

Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images

One of the most brutal attacks of the day occurred outside the tunnel
when rioters dragged MPD Officer Michael Fanone into the crowd, and then
tased, beat, and robbed him while a Blue Lives Matter flag fluttered above
him. Albuquerque Head, a rioter from Tennessee, grabbed Officer Fanone
around the neck and pulled him into the mob.281 “I got one!” Head
shouted.282 Lucas Denney, the Three Percenter, “swung his arm and fist” at
Officer Fanone, grabbed him, and pulled him down the stairs.283 Daniel
Rodriguez then tased him in the neck. Kyle Young lunged towards Officer
Fanone, restraining the officer’s wrist.284 While Young held him, still
another rioter, Thomas Sibick, reached towards him and forcibly removed
his police badge and radio.285 Officer Fanone feared they were after his gun.
Members of the crowd yelled: “Kill him!,” “Get his gun!” and “Kill him
with his own gun!” 286
In an interview with FBI agents, Daniel Rodriguez admitted his role in
the attack on Officer Fanone.287 During that same interview, Rodriguez dis-
cussed the influences that led him down the path to January 6th. Rodriguez
was a fan of Alex Jones’s InfoWars and told FBI agents that he became
active at rallies after watching the conspiracy show.288 Rodriguez was moti-
vated by Jones’s decision to support then candidate Trump in 2015.289 He
also began to affiliate himself with the Three Percenter movement, which
664 CHAPTER 8

he learned about by watching InfoWars.290 And when President Trump

called for a “wild” protest in Washington on January 6th, Rodriguez
thought it was necessary to respond. “Trump called us. Trump called us to
DC,” Rodriguez told interviewing agents.291 “If he’s the commander in chief
and the leader of our country, and he's calling for help—I thought he was
calling for help,” Rodriguez explained. “I thought he was—I thought we
were doing the right thing.” 292
Rodriguez and another January 6th defendant, Edward Badalian, began
preparing for violence after President Trump’s December 19th tweet. They
gathered weapons and tactical gear293 and discussed their plans in a Signal
chat named, “Patriots 45 MAGA Gang.”
“Congress can hang. I’ll do it,” Rodriguez posted to the chat. Please let
us get these people dear God.” 294
Badalian also posted a flyer titled “MAGA_CAVALRY,” which showed
rally points for “patriot caravans” to connect with the “Stop The Steal”
movement in DC.295 The same flyer was popular among Three Percenters
and other self-described “patriot” groups. It also garnered the attention of
law enforcement. The FBI’s Norfolk, Virginia division noted in a January
5th intelligence assessment that the flyer was accompanied by another
image, titled “Create Perimeter,” which depicted the U.S. Capitol and other
buildings being surrounded by the same caravans.296

8.8 THE EVACUATION

When rioters surrounded the perimeter of the Capitol, and reached the Sen-
ate and House Chambers, Members were forced to evacuate for safety. USCP
officers responded to both Chambers and served as escorts. By the time the
Capitol was breached, the Senate and House had split from the joint ses-
sion, with Senators returning to their Chamber to debate the objection to
Arizona’s electoral vote. The House remained in its Chamber to debate the
objection.297
Starting in the Senate, Vice President Pence was escorted off the floor at
2:12 p.m. and was taken to his Senate office. Between 2:12 p.m. and 2:25
p.m., Secret Service agents worked to identify potential threats and a route
that could be used to transport Vice President Pence.298 One of the issues
for Vice President Pence’s evacuation was that the rioters were outside the
Ohio Clock Tower, which was just feet away from the staircase that Vice
President Pence could descend to evacuate.299 Eventually, after the mob
started filling the entire Capitol, the Secret Service made the decision to
move Vice President Pence, and he was escorted from the Senate at 2:25
p.m.300 By 2:27 p.m., the Vice President can be seen moving toward a secure
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 665

Members of Congress are evacuated from the House Chamber.

(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

location connected to the Capitol. The Vice President arrived at the secure
location at 2:29 p.m.301 Following the Vice President’s evacuation, Senators
were evacuated at 2:30 p.m.302
On the House side, Speaker Pelosi, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer,
and House Majority Whip James Clyburn were removed from the House
floor at the same time as Vice President Pence. By 2:18 p.m., USCP surveil-
lance showed Speaker Pelosi in the basement hallway headed towards the
garage.303 The surveillance footage also showed Leader Hoyer and Whip
Clyburn in the same basement as Speaker Pelosi. At 2:23 p.m., Speaker
Pelosi and Whip Clyburn were moved to an undisclosed location.304
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy was evacuated just after Speaker Pelosi
left the Capitol. At 2:25 p.m., as rioters were moving through the Crypt and
breaking through the east Rotunda door, Leader McCarthy and his staff
hurriedly evacuated his office.305 At approximately 2:38 p.m., the Members
of Congress on the House floor began their evacuation.306 Members of Con-
gress can be seen evacuating through the Speaker’s Lobby when a USCP
officer fatally shot Ashli Babbitt at 2:44 p.m.307 Members and staffers were
just feet away when Babbitt attempted to climb through a shattered glass
door. USCP officers had barricaded the door with furniture to prevent the
rioters from gaining direct access to elected officials.
666 CHAPTER 8

The congressional Members in the House Gallery were evacuated after

the Members on the House floor. Congressional Members in the Gallery had
to wait to be evacuated because rioters were still roaming the hallways right
outside the Chamber. At 2:49 p.m., as Members were trying to evacuate the
House Gallery, the USCP emergency response team cleared the hallways
with long rifles so that the Members could be escorted to safety.308 USCP
surveillance footage shows several rioters lying on the ground, with long
rifles pointed at them, as Members evacuate in the background.309 By 3:00
p.m., the area had been cleared and Members were evacuated from the
House gallery to a secure location. 310

8.9 CLEARING THE U.S. CAPITOL BUILDING AND RESTRICTED GROUNDS

Shortly after law enforcement officers evacuated the House and Senate
Members, they started to clear rioters out of the Capitol and off the
grounds. Starting before 3:00 p.m., law enforcement spent approximately
three hours pushing rioters out of the Capitol building and off the East and
West Plazas. In general, law enforcement cleared rioters out of the Capitol
through three doors: (1) the House side door located on the northeast side
of the Capitol; (2) the Columbus Doors (East Rotunda Doors); and (3) the
Senate wing door, which was next to the first breach point. As discussed
above, the Proud Boys and other extremists led the charge at the latter two
locations during the early stages of the attack.
Outside the Capitol, law enforcement pushed the mob from the upper
West Plaza towards the East Plaza, crossing the north doors. Eventually,
these rioters were forced to exit the Capitol grounds on the east side. The
last point where rioters were removed was the lower West Plaza—the scene
of some of the most intense hand-to-hand fighting that day. After law
enforcement cleared the tunnel, where violence had raged for hours, police
officers corralled rioters to the west and away from the Capitol building.311
After rioters first breached the Senate wing door on the first floor, they
immediately moved south towards the House Chamber. This route took
them to the Crypt—with the mob filling this room by 2:24 p.m. This was
also one of the first rooms that law enforcement cleared as they started to
secure the building. By 2:49 p.m., law enforcement officers cleared the
Crypt by pushing towards the Senate wing door and up the stairs to the
Rotunda.312
Around the same time that police officers cleared the Crypt, they also
removed rioters from hallways immediately adjacent to the House and Sen-
ate Chambers. On the House side, rioters were pushed out shortly before
3:00 p.m. The House hallway immediately in front of the House Chamber’s
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 667

door was cleared at 2:56 p.m.313 The mob outside of the Speaker’s lobby was
pushed out of the House side door at 2:57 p.m.314
USCP officers were able to quickly clear out the Senate Chamber, which
was initially breached at 2:42 p.m.315 Rioters were cleared from the hallways
outside the Senate by 3:09 p.m.316 Surveillance shows officers checking the
Senate Gallery and hallways for rioters; there are no people on camera by
this time.317
The Rotunda served as a key point where the mob settled during the
Capitol attack. For example, at 2:45 p.m., hundreds of people can be seen
standing in the Rotunda.318 It appears law enforcement officers funneled
rioters from other parts of the Capitol into the Rotunda. Once they had
President Trump’s supporters herded there, law enforcement started to
push them towards the east doors shortly after 3:00 p.m. At 3:25 p.m., law
enforcement successfully pushed rioters out of the Rotunda and closed the
doors so that the room could remain secure.319 By 3:43 p.m., just 18 minutes
after the Rotunda doors were closed, law enforcement successfully pushed
the rioters out of the east doors of the Capitol.320
The last rioters in the Capitol building were cleared out of the Senate
wing door—the same location where rioters first breached the building at
2:13 p.m. Like the other locations inside the Capitol, law enforcement began
forcing rioters out of the Senate wing door after 3:00 p.m. By 3:40 p.m., law
enforcement had successfully pushed many of the rioters out of the door
and onto the upper West Plaza.321 However, officers were unable to close
the doors because some rioters remained in the doorway and attempted to
re-enter the building. At 4:23 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD offi-
cers forced these people out of the doorway and successfully secured the
door.322
After clearing the inside of the Capitol, law enforcement officers pro-
ceeded to sweep the perimeter adjacent to the building, starting with the
upper West Plaza. After pushing the last rioter out of the Senate wing door,
officers started to clear the upper West Plaza, which is located just outside
this same doorway. Law enforcement officers in riot gear formed a line and
marshalled the crowd north from the upper West Plaza. By 4:31 p.m., 8
minutes after closing the Senate wing door, rioters were cleared from the
upper West Plaza.323
Many of these same officers started to secure the north side of the
Capitol as they pushed rioters from the upper West Plaza towards the East
Plaza. By approximately 4:32 p.m., law enforcement officers walked out of
the North Doors, forming additional lines to push rioters eastward. As dis-
cussed earlier, the North Doors had been the location of violent fighting
throughout much of the afternoon. By 4:46 p.m., law enforcement had
668 CHAPTER 8

Police officers form line to push rioters away from the Capitol building.
(Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

successfully pushed the rioters from the north side of the Capitol to the
East Plaza.324
Law enforcement cleared the East Plaza next. By 4:59 p.m., officers had
swept all the remaining rioters from the east stairs of the Capitol.325 At this
point, the mob that had overrun the upper West Plaza, the north side of the
Capitol, and the East Plaza had been moved off the grounds adjacent to the
Capitol.
The last areas of the Capitol grounds to get cleared were the tunnel and
the lower West Plaza. Thousands of rioters had packed into the West Plaza
just after the initial invasion, led by the Proud Boys and their associates.
The tunnel was the location of the day’s most violent fighting and the con-
flict extended until late in the day.
After 5:00 p.m., it appears that law enforcement directed their attention
to clearing the lower West Plaza, including the tunnel. At 5:04 p.m., police
officers in the tunnel shot smoke bombs to get the remaining rioters to
back away from the doors.326 By 5:05 p.m., the rioters had all retreated and
the police officers inside the tunnel moved out and started clearing out the
area.327
At 5:13 p.m., on the opposite side of the lower West Plaza, officers
pushed the mob down the scaffold stairs and to the lower West Plaza.328
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 669

Vice President Pence and Speaker Pelosi preside over the joint session of Congress.
Photo by Erin Schaff—Pool/Getty Images

These are the same stairs that rioters, led by the Proud Boys and other
extremists, had previously climbed before reaching the Senate wing door.
Once the rioters from the tunnel and the scaffold were all situated on
the lower West Plaza, officers formed another line and started walking the
mob back towards the grass—which was away from the actual Capitol
building. The line appears to have been fully formed at 5:19 p.m., and the
officers started their sweep at 5:30 p.m.329 By 5:37 p.m., police officers
pushed rioters back to the grassy area away from the Capitol. It was at this
time that in or around the Capitol building.330 At 6:56 p.m., a little more
than an hour after the Capitol grounds were cleared, Vice President Pence
returned to the Capitol from the loading dock.331 Vice President Pence
walked up the stairs in the basement of the Capitol to his office in the Sen-
ate at 7:00 p.m.332
Shortly after 8:00 p.m., the joint session of Congress resumed, with Vice
President Pence saying: “Let’s get back to work.” 333 At 3:32 a.m., the Con-
gress completed the counting of the votes and certified the election of
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as the 46th President of the United States.
670 CHAPTER 8

ENDNOTES
1. Enrique Tarrio (@NobleLead), Parler, Jan. 6, 2021 11:16 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1533921251743391745 (Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter,
June 6, 2022 5:18 p.m. ET (retweeting the Premonition video)).
2. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380.
3. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380.
4. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-
other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
5. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-
other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
6. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-
other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
7. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0065_1, at 0:04 and 1:14 (Jacob Chansley being interviewed
the morning of the 6th).
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0067_1, at 11:43 (an unnamed woman being interviewed the
morning of the 6th).
9. Trial Transcript at 4542 and Trial Exhibit No. 6370, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-
cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478, p. 1 (event summary of
January 6th rally).
11. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87–88; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview
of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11–12.
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000086772, (Coordinated Response
to a Request for Information from the Select Committee, Nov. 18, 2021).
15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (event summary of
January 6th rally).
16. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (event summary of January 6th rally).
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 671

17. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (gen-
eral arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (gen-
eral arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (gen-
eral arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of National Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27–28, 2021), p. 6.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of National Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27–28, 2021), p. 6.
22. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu, “Evidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd
Grows as Arrests and Trials Mount,” Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (event summary of Jan 6
rally).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73–78 (District of Columbia, Metro-
politan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District
of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police
Department, audio file of radio traffic from Jan. 6, 2021, from 12:00–13:00).
25. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF
143.
26. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF
143.
27. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 21–23, United States v.
Kuehne, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366446/download.
28. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, “First Jan. 6 Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives
Longest Sentence of 7 Years,” Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.
29. Statement of Facts at 3, 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF
No. 1-1. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (District of Columbia Production, Axon Body 3
X6039BLAL, at 14:30:03 (MPD body camera footage).
30. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF
No. 1-1.
31. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF
No. 1-1.
32. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022), ECF
No. 25.
33. Statement of Offense at 3-4, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022),
ECF No. 25; Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. Nov. 12,
2021), ECF No. 1-1.
34. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 9–10, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736
(D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2022), ECF No. 30.
672 CHAPTER 8

35. For example, on November 13, 2020, Mazza (@MarkNunzios64) tweeted at President Trump:
“Can you unseal obama’s birth certificate and college transcripts?” On Facebook, Mazza
shared a Q “drop” titled “The Armor of God,” a 9/11 Truther video, and multiple posts
dedicated to lies about the 2020 Presidential election. Screenshots on file with the Select
Committee.
36. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, “Armed US Capitol Rioter Tells Investigators if He
Had Found Pelosi, ‘You’d be Here for Another Reason,’” CNN, (Nov. 23, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/22/politics/loaded-firearm-january-6-charged-mark-mazza/
index.html.
37. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-
cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.
38. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-
cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.
39. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 4, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-
cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jeffrey Lawrence Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 81.
41. Trial Exhibit 1.S.159.524, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C Oct. 4, 2022);
Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29,
2022)
42. Trial Transcript at 4109, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022).
43. Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18,
2022)
44. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge’s Detention
Order at 4, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119, (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No. 16.
45. Statement of Facts at 2, 9, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1.
46. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify Release Conditions at 3, United
States v. Harkrider, No. 1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.
47. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify Release Conditions at 3, United
States v. Harkrider, No. 1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.
48. Dylan Stableford, “New Video Shows Alleged Jan. 6 Capitol Rioters Threatening Pence,”
Yahoo! News (Feb. 7, 2022), available at https://news.yahoo.com/new-video-jan-6-capitol-
riot-pence-threat-drag-through-streets-195249884.html.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 41.
50. Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No.
1-1.
51. Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No.
1-1; Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Emergency Bond Review Motion at 5 n.3,
United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021), ECF No. 11.
52. Statement of Facts at 2–4, United States v. Webster, No. 1:21-cr-208 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021),
ECF No. 1-1. See also Holmes Lybrand, “Former NYPD Officer Sentenced to 10 Years in
Prison for Assaulting a Police Officer on January 6,” CNN (Sept. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/01/politics/nypd-officer-january-6-sentencing/index.html.
53. January 6th Committee, “Loudermilk Footage,” YouTube, June 5, 2022, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9RNJ1tx4zw.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 123–25.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 673

55. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26; “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with
Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department
of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-
washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
56. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 21-cr-175 (TJK)
(D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1510971/download; Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No.
1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. March 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1492396/download.
57. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceed-
ing, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-
charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
58. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceed-
ing, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-
charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
59. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceed-
ing, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-
charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
60. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1510971/download.
61. See “War Room - 2019-AUG 09, Friday - Joe Biggs and Owen Shroyer Talk Internet Censor-
ship and Democrat Party Terrorism,” Spreaker.com, (Aug. 9, 2019), available at https://
www.spreaker.com/user/realalexjones/08-09-19-warroom; Alexandra Garrett, “Joe Biggs,
Proud Boys Leader and Former Infowars Staffer, Arrested Over Capitol Riot,” Newsweek,
(Jan. 20, 2021), available at https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biggs-proud-boys-leader-
former-infowars-staffer-arrested-over-capitol-riot-1563181.
62. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/
download.
63. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/
download.
64. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/
download.
65. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/
download.
66. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No. 1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 38, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1492396/
download; First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1377586/download.
67. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1377586/download.
674 CHAPTER 8

68. First Superseding Indictment at 8–9, 12, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1377586/download.
69. U.S. Capitol Police Camera U.S. Capitol Police Camera 9004.
70. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 3187.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1081_1_1.mov, at 0:14; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested,
(Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 139–40.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 138.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 130–31.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick
Quested Production), Video file M_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0486.mov.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 132, 143.
76. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.
77. “Peace Monument,” Architect of the Capitol, available at https://www.aoc.gov/explore-
capitol-campus/art/peace-monument.
78. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 946, 3187.
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498.mov, at 0:00–0:30.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 33–38; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498 2022-
05-15 15.00.38 at 1:15.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1116_1.mov.
82. Alan Feuer, “Dispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader Urged Attack at Capitol,” New York
Times, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-
boys-capitol-riot.html.
83. Alan Feuer, “Dispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader Urged Attack at Capitol,” New York
Times, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-
boys-capitol-riot.html.
84. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 41–42.
86. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 945, 946, and 3187; Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Pro-
duction), Video files Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov, Iphone_Nick_DC_
20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov; Elijah Schaffer (@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 675

6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/

1346966514990149639.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 44; Video files
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov, Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov;
Elijah Schaffer (@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1346966514990149639.
88. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 6–8, United States v. Jack-
man, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
89. Statement of Facts at 1–2, United States v. Pepe, No. 1:21-cr-52 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2021), ECF No.
1-1.
90. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 7, United States v. Jack-
man, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
91. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Finley, No. 1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 38.
92. Statement of Offense at 2–5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022),
ECF No. 5.
93. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 908.
94. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
95. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944; Trial Exhibit 1515.1, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-
cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022); Trial Exhibit 6757, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022) (showing timelapse of security footage outside the Capitol).
96. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6.
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alex Holder Production), Video file 45DAY32CAMB0059.mov, at 2:11
(using audio track 4 to hear the statement clearly from someone off camera).
98. “Tennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
99. “Tennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
100. “Two Men Sentenced to 44 Months in Prison for Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers Dur-
ing Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (July 15, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-
officers-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
101. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Mattice, No. 1:21-cr-657 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2022), ECF
No. 44.
102. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at
10–11, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61; Tom Dreis-
bach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%
5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Public
Hearing, (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11–0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing
on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43–8:00, United States v. Nichols,
No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021). Nichols had made similarly violent statements since
the November 2020 election, with increasing references to fighting on January 6th follow-
ing President Trump’s December 19th tweet. See Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s
676 CHAPTER 8

Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at 4–8, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61 (documenting the many communications Nichols had with
his codefendant planning for violence).
103. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at
10–11, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61; Tom
Dreisbach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40 p.m. ET, available at: https://
twitter.com/TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%
5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Public
Hearing, (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11–0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing
on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43–8:00, United States v. Nichols,
No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021).
104. On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on ‘Stop The Steal J6’ Zello Channel (Unedited),” Sound-
Cloud, at 4:00–4:12, Mar. 8, 2021, available at https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/
jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.
105. On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on ‘Stop The Steal J6’ Zello Channel (Unedited),” Sound-
Cloud, at 5:30–5:34, Mar. 8, 2021, available at https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/
jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.
106. Statement of Facts at 13, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No.
1-1; Joy Sharon Yi and Kate Woodsome, “How the Capitol Attack Unfolded, from Inside
Trump’s Rally to the Riot | Opinion,” The Washington Post, at 1:32–1:42, (Jan. 12, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/opinions/how-the-capitol-attack-
unfolded-from-inside-trumps-rally-to-the-riot-opinion/2021/01/12/a7146251-b076-426e-
a2e3-8b503692c89d_video.html.
107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones
text message to Caroline Wren).
108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones
text message to Caroline Wren).
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 13 at 0:29 (excerpt from The Alex Jones
Show on Jan. 7, 2022).
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260–61.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260–61; See generally The Alex Jones Show,
“Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/
watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Ex. 13 at 0:29 (Excerpt from The Alex Jones Show
on Jan. 7, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000475 (Jan. 6,
2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren
Production), REVU_000484 (Jan. 5, 2021, Tim Enlow text message to Caroline Wren).
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 677

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
116. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
117. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:44, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
118. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:26, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
119. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:58, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
120. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 38:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
121. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planet’s Cor-
rupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 38:16, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://
banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580 .
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Matthew Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 78.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Matthew Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 75.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Nov. 19, 2021).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Nov. 24, 2021).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 12 at 0:20.
128. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=HS34fpbzqg2b.
129. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=Qo3hom0Qb1at.
130. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
131. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
132. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
133. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam: Watch As Alex Jones Works With
Capitol Police To Try And Quell The Riot,” Banned.Video, at 8:45, Jan. 12, 2021, available at
https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.
678 CHAPTER 8

134. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.
135. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam: Watch as Alex Jones Works with
Capitol Police To Try And Quell The Riot,” Banned.Video, at 15:10, Jan. 12, 2021, available at
https://Banned.Video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.
136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 125–MPD 126 (District of
Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021)
137. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Ref-
fitt at 4, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
138. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 4–5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
139. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 4–5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
140. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
141. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
142. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
143. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 6, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
144. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 12, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
145. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley
Reffitt at 4, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.
146. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. July
15, 2022), ECF No. 158.
147. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, “First Jan. 6 Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives
Longest Sentence of 7 Years,” Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.
148. See Statement of Facts at ¶¶ 14, 20, United States v. Scott, No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29,
2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/
1395876/download.
149. See Statement of Facts at ¶ 16, United States v. Scott, No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29, 2021),
ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/
1395876/download.
150. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1379556/
download.
151. Statement of Facts at 10–11, United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021),
ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/
1379556/download.
152. Statement of Offense at ¶ 9, United States v. Jackson, No. 1:21-cr-484 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2021),
ECF No. 19, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/
1452291/download.
153. Statement of Offense at ¶¶ 1, 25, United States v. Greene, No. 1:21-cr-52-33 (D.D.C. Dec. 22,
2021), ECF No. 105, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/
1458266/download.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 679

154. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=zOZ8CgfNU1SY.
155. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No.
1.
156. Statement of Facts at 6, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No.
1.
157. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Ryan Kelley, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 7, 70–71, 79–80, and Exhibit 15.
158. Arrest Warrant at 1, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 9, 2022), ECF No. 5.
159. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102; Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pez-
zola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that
“[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken window”); 167
Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/
2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
160. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 689; Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nor-
dean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola
“used [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he
first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken window.”); 167 Cong.
Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/
02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
161. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the
Capitol through this broken window”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
See also Ashley Parker, Carol D. Leonnig, Paul Kane, and Emma Brown, “How the Rioters
Who Stormed the Capitol Came Dangerously Close to Pence,” Washington Post, (Jan. 15,
2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-rioters-capitol-attack/
2021/01/15/ab62e434-567c-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html; Kat Lonsdorf, Courtney
Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise Kelly, and Aeilsa Chang, “A Timeline of How The Jan. 6
Attack Unfolded—Including Who Said What and When,” NPR, (June 9, 2022), available at
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-
unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.
162. Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed
the Capitol Anyway,” Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-
christian/.
163. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Sparks, No. 1:21-cr-87 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1.
164. Complaint and Affidavit at 9–10, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16,
2021), ECF No. 1. As an example of his conspiracy beliefs, Gieswein claimed that American
politicians “have completely destroyed our country and sold them to the Rothschilds and
Rockefellers.” This is a standard anti-Semitic trope. See Complaint and Affidavit at 11,
United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1. Gieswein also
denied that he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though he affiliated with
an apparent Three Percenter group at previous times. See Mr. Gieswein’s Motion for Hear-
ing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2–3, 18–19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-
cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal
complaint noted that he “appears to be affiliated with the radical militia group known as
the Three Percenters.” Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24
(D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/
680 CHAPTER 8

download. See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315 (highlighting photos of
Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter symbol).
165. Statement of Facts at 1–2, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.
166. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.
167. “Arizona Man Sentenced to 41 Months in Prison On Felony Charge in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
arizona-man-sentenced-41-months-prison-felony-charge-jan-6-capitol-breach.
168. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), avail-
able at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.
169. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download; Maria Cra-
mer, “Confederate Flag an Unnerving Sight in the Capitol,” New York Times, (Jan. 9, 2021),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/politics/confederate-flag-
capitol.html.
170. Statement of Facts at 2, 5, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021),
available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.
171. “Delaware Man Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Oct. 24, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
delaware-man-sentenced-24-months-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
172. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capi-
tol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/
usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203
(D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/
1536736/download.
173. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capi-
tol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/
usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach.
174. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
175. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
176. Neil Vigdor and Alan Feuer, “A Jan. 6 Defendant Coordinated Volunteers to Help Youngkin’s
Campaign,” New York Times, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/
06/us/politics/joseph-brody-jan-6-youngkin.html.
177. Statement of Facts at 43, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
178. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capi-
tol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/
usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach.
179. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capi-
tol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/
usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach.
180. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capi-
tol Breach,” Department of Justice (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 681

usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 40–43, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203
(D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/
1536736/download.
181. Statement of Facts at 2–3, 6–7, United States v. Williams, No. 1:21-cr-618 (D.D.C. Jan. 17,
2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357051/download. A jury found
Williams guilty of certain felony and misdemeanor charges, but could not reach a verdict
on other charges, including the aiding and abetting charge. See “Pennsylvania Woman
Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Related to Capitol Breach,” Department
of Justice, (Nov. 21, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/pennsylvania-
woman-found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.
182. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37
(D.D.C. Sep. 15, 2022), ECF No. 110; “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for
Actions Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-
capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37,
(D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1356066/
download. Pictures available online depict Hale-Cusanelli with a Hitler-style mustache. See
Holmes Lybrand and Andrew Millman, “U.S. Capitol Rioter and Alleged Nazi Sympathizer
Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison,” CNN, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/
2022/09/22/politics/timothy-hale-cusanelli-stephen-ayres-capitol-riot/index.html.
183. “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
184. “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
185. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Packer, No. 1:21-cr-103 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021),
available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1469561/
download.
186. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 4–5, United States v.
Packer, No. 1:21-cr-103, (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/
press-release/file/1353201/download.
187. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 102, 123.
188. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594; Spencer S. Hsu, “Officer Describes How Jan. 6 Riot-
ers Pursued Him through Capitol,” Washington Post, (June 15, 2022), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/06/13/eugene-goodman-capitol-police-
testimony/.
189. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594; Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him
Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,” Washington Post, (Feb. 19,
2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-
capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/; Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Hearing
& Revocation of Detention Order at 8, United States v. Robert Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (EGS)
(D.D.C. June 15, 2021), available at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/
Robert%20Gieswein%20Government%20Opposition%20to%20Motion%20for%20Hearing%
20and%20Revocation%20of%20Detention%20Order.pdf.
190. “Iowa Man Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Related to Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/iowa-man-
found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.
682 CHAPTER 8

191. Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed
the Capitol Anyway,” Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-
christian/.
192. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.
193. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 213; Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET,
available at https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594.
194. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
195. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
196. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
197. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Rae,
No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1.
198. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Pruitt, No. 1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF
No. 61, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510401/
download.
199. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.
200. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
201. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 932, 933.
202. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.
203. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam: Watch as Alex Jones Works with
Capitol Police to Try and Quell the Riot,” Banned.Video, at 15:10, posted Jan. 12, 2021, avail-
able at https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1
204. CNN Business, “Alex Jones’ Influence on January 6,” CNN, Feb. 26, 2022, available at https://
www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-
documentary.cnnbusiness.
205. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th
Capitol Attack Footage,” YouTube, at 31:53, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.
208. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th
Capitol Attack Footage,” YouTube, at 36:15, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s
209. CNN Business, “Alex Jones’ Influence on January 6,” CNN, at 2:20–2:28, Feb. 26, 2022, avail-
able at https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-
documentary.cnnbusiness.
210. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th
Capitol Attack Footage,” YouTube, at 39:19, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 683

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 64–66.
212. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 7029, 7216.
213. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
214. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 16–19, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C.
Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1459171/download.
215. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov.
30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/
file/1459171/download.
216. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov.
30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/
file/1459171/download.
217. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov.
30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/
file/1459171/download.
218. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 14–19, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C.
Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1459171/download; “Two Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement
During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Dec. 3, 2021), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-
capitol-breach.
219. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 24–29, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C.
Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-
defendant/file/1459171/download.
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Brian Adams and Marc Carrion, (Apr. 20, 2022).
221. “Two Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Dec. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-
men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
222. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
223. See Chapter 6.
224. Trial Transcript at 4532:20–4534:9, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
20, 2022).
225. Trial Transcript at 4642:24–4643:6 and Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
226. Trial Transcript at 4643:22–4644:4 and Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
227. Trial Transcript at 4520:9–4521:5, 4744:20–4745:21, Trial Exhibits 1503, 6740, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
228. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 21–22, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C.
Jan. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/
download.
229. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Jan.
12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/download.
230. Trial Transcript at 4724:8–15 and Trial Exhibit 1500 at 13:02–13:25, United States v. Rhodes et
al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
231. Trial Transcript at 4779:1–4790:3 and Trial Exhibit 1505, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
684 CHAPTER 8

232. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029; “Leader of Alabama Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads Guilty
to Seditious Conspiracy and Obstruction of Congress for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power
Following 2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-
seditious-conspiracy-and-obstruction#:~:text=Joshua%20James%2C%2034%2C%20of%
20Arab,with%20the%20government's%20ongoing%20investigation; Statement of Offense at
8, United States v. James, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF No. 60, available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1479551/download.
233. Trial Transcript at 4803:10–4804:23 and Trial Exhibit 1089.1, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
234. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 912.
235. “Crypt,” Architect of the Capitol, available at https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/
buildings-grounds/capitol-building/crypt.
236. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.
237. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.
238. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.
239. Watchers Guild, “Rioters Fight with Police at Capitol Building - Washington D.C. - JAN/6/
2020,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7DiLh2Pbl4;
News2Share, “January 6 United States Capitol Attack,” YouTube, June 4, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TshRdxXi9c.
240. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022),
ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/
download.
241. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022),
ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/
download.
242. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022),
ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/
download.
243. Hunting Insurrectionists, “West Terrace ‘Tunnel’ - 3:50 - 4:21 pm - Jan 6th,” YouTube, Mar.
12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yil1JemYMM0&t=1405s.
244. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside Capitol.mov at 23:01–
23:35.
246. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
247. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside Capitol.mov at 13:10–
15:47.
248. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
249. Jake Tapper (@jaketapper), Twitter, Feb. 10, 2021 5:50 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/jaketapper/status/1359635955389509638 (screenshotting Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22usa+demands+the+truth%22).
250. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
251. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
252. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 685

253. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.
254. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Pruitt, No. 1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF No. 61.
255. Complaint at 34–38, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download;
Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378 (showing video Proud Boy Nicholas
DeCarlo filmed while inside the Capitol).
256. Complaint at 34–38, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.
257. Indictment at 5, 8–9, United States v. Kuehne et al., No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF
No. 29.
258. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF
No. 143.
259. Indictment at 5, 8–9, United States v. Kuehne et al., No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF
No. 29.
260. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available
at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download; Ryan J.
Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378 (showing video Proud Boy Nicholas DeCarlo filmed
while inside the Capitol).
261. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available
at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.
262. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF
No. 143.
263. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF
No. 143.
264. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.
265. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the
Attack on the Capitol,” ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://
projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=sbGOy4rN0ue4.
266. Statement of Offense at 12–14, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021),
ECF No. 70.
267. Statement of Offense at 15, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021), ECF
No. 70.
268. Christian Secor, a young Groyper, sat in the Vice President’s seat. See “California Man Sen-
tenced to 42 Months in Prison for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Jus-
tice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/california-man-
sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Complaint at 6, 14–15, United States
v. Secor, No. 1:21-mj-232 (D.D.C. Feb 13, 2021), ECF No. 1.
269. Other agitators, such as Vets 4 Trump founder Joshua Macias (who was with Stewart Rho-
des and Enrique Tarrio on January 5th), also attacked Vice President Pence outside the
Capitol. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Joshua Macias, (May 2, 2022), pp. 27–28, and Exhibit 14; capitolhunt-
ers (@capitolhunters), Twitter, May 27, 2021 8:36 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
capitolhunters/status/1398075750482337792 (video of Macias calling Vice President Pence a
“Benedict Arnold” outside of the Capitol on January 6th).
270. Reagan Battalion (@ReaganBattalion), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 5:03 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ReaganBattalion/status/1347121703823044608.
271. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
686 CHAPTER 8

272. Sentencing Transcript at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2022),
ECF No. 170.
273. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.
274. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.
275. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 4–8, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C.
Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 159.
276. Statement of Facts at 5, 29–31, 39, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7,
2021), ECF No. 1-1; Status Coup News, “UNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump Supporters Battle
Cops Inside the Capitol,” YouTube, at 24:09, Jan. 7, 2021, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.
277. Statement of Facts at 2, 6–7, United States v. Brown, No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2021),
ECF No. 1-1; Storyful Viral, “Scenes of Chaos Captures Inside US Capitol as Crowd Chal-
lenges Police,” YouTube, at 20:05, 21:03, Jan. 7, 2021, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qc0U755-uiM.
278. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 25–28, 55, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291
(D.D.C. Sep. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140; Status Coup News, “UNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump Sup-
porters Battle Cops Inside the Capitol,” YouTube, at 9:45–9:56, Jan. 7, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.
279. Statement of Facts for Stipulated Trial at 6–9, United States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C.
Aug. 23, 2022), ECF No. 430; Torsten Ove, “Former Army Ranger Charged with Assaulting
Cops during Capitol Riot Faces DC Bench Trial,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (Aug. 17, 2022),
available at: https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2022/08/17/robert-morss-
pittsburgh-glenshaw-army-ranger-charged-assaulting-police-capitol-riot-insurrection-
january-6-bench-trial/stories/202208170094.
280. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Set Bond and Conditions of Release at
6–7, United States v. Schwartz, No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. June 15, 2021), ECF No. 26.
281. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. May 6, 2022), ECF
No. 124; Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, 18, 25, United States v. Head, No.
1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 159; Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia
Production), Axon Body 3 No. X6039B9N0, at 15:17–15:20 (MPD body camera footage); “Ten-
nessee Man Sentenced to 90 Months in Prison for Assaulting Law Enforcement Officer Dur-
ing Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 27, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-
enforcement-officer-during-capitol-breach.
282. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, 18, 25, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022).
283. Statement of Facts at 33–34, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1.
284. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 30–31, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291
(D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140.
285. Statement of Facts at 4–11, United States v. Sibick, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1 (noting that Sibick told the FBI he was trying to help Officer Fanone while other
rioters attempted to get the officer’s gun).
286. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), (Axon Body 3 No. X6039B9N0), at
15:18:51–15:21:12 (MPD body camera footage); Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at
27-28, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140.
287. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 38–39, 43–45, 70–71, United States v.
Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 687

288. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 17–18, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
289. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 118, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (quoting Rodriguez saying: “And I was
already—Trump was already, like—this is 2015, and I was already into InfoWars and Alex
Jones, and he’s backing up Trump. And I’m like, all right, man. This is it. I’m going to—this
is—I’m going to fight for this. I’m going to do—I want to do this.”).
290. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 131, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
291. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 34, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
292. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 34, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
293. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021),
ECF No. 65.
294. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021),
ECF No. 65.
295. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021),
ECF No. 65.
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001 (Jan. 5, 2021, FBI
Situational Information Report); see also Statement of Facts at 11, 39, United States v.
Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 (noting that Denney, a Three Percen-
ter, posted similar messages about occupying Congress on Facebook).
297. See 167 Cong. Rec. S633-38 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/
117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz,
“The January 6 Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute,” CNN, (July 29, 2022), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html.
298. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:14–14:25. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency. See also, U.S. Capitol Police Camera 462.
299. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 961.
300. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:14–14:25. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency. See also U.S. Capitol Police Camera 462.
301. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7023.
302. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 461.
303. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 077.
304. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 3062, 6059, 6146.
305. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 269.
306. Select Committee staff analyzed thousands of hours of surveillance footage from the United
States Capitol. There is no camera that captured the evacuation because CSPAN cameras
focus on the dais (so they miss the activity on the floor), and there are no CCTV cameras
around the floor. The staff first identified Members appearing in the basement of the Capitol
at exactly 2:40 p.m. ET. Based on knowledge of the Capitol and judging the distance traveled,
staff have estimated that it took Members approximately 2 minutes from leaving the floor to
getting to the basement, which puts the evacuation at approximately 2:38 p.m. This time is
consistent with informal contemporaneous accounts provided by Members and law enforce-
ment officers who were there. See U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077.
307. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077
308. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.
688 CHAPTER 8

309. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.

310. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.
311. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
312. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 403.
313. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.
314. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.
315. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 304.
316. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.
317. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.
318. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.
319. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.
320. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
321. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
322. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
323. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 926.
324. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 927, 928, 929.
325. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 933.
326. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 074, 944.
327. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 074.
328. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 924.
329. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
330. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
331. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7032.
332. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 011.
333. “WATCH: ‘Let’s Get Back to Work,’ Pence Urges Senate,” PBS, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate.
 RECOMMENDATIONS 689

1. Electoral Count Act.

As our Report describes, Donald J. Trump, John Eastman, and others
corruptly attempted to violate the Electoral Count Act of 1887 in an effort to
overturn the 2020 Presidential Election. To deter other future attempts to
overturn Presidential Elections, the House of Representatives has passed
H.R. 8873, “The Presidential Election Reform Act,” and the Senate should
act promptly to send a bill with these principles to the President. H.R. 8873
reaffirms that a Vice President has no authority or discretion to reject an
official electoral slate submitted by the Governor of a state. It also reforms
Congress’s counting rules to help ensure that objections in the joint session
conform to Congress’s narrow constitutional role under Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment. It provides that presidential candidates may sue in
federal court to ensure that Congress receives the state’s lawful certifica-
tion, and leaves no doubt that the manner for selecting presidential electors
cannot be changed retroactively after the election is over.

2. Accountability.
The Select Committee has made criminal referrals to the Department of
Justice, and both the Department of Justice and other prosecutorial
authorities will now make their determinations on whether to prosecute
individuals involved in the events resulting in an attack on the United
States Congress on January 6, 2021. Additional steps may also be appropri-
ate to ensure criminal or civil accountability for anyone engaging in mis-
conduct described in this Report. Those courts and bar disciplinary bodies
responsible for overseeing the legal profession in the states and the District
of Columbia should continue to evaluate the conduct of attorneys described
in this Report. Attorneys should not have the discretion to use their law
licenses to undermine the constitutional and statutory process for peace-
fully transferring power in our government. The Department of Justice
should also take appropriate action to prevent its attorneys from partici-
pating in campaign-related activities, or (as described in this report)
activities aimed at subverting the rule of law and overturning a lawful elec-
tion. This report also identifies specific attorney conflicts of interest for the
Department to evaluate.

3. Violent Extremism.
Federal Agencies with intelligence and security missions, including the
Secret Service, should (a) move forward on whole-of-government strate-
gies to combat the threat of violent activity posed by all extremist groups,
including white nationalist groups and violent anti-government groups
while respecting the civil rights and First Amendment civil liberties of all
citizens; and (b) review their intelligence sharing protocols to ensure that
threat intelligence is properly prioritized and shared with other responsible
690 RECOMMENDATIONS
intelligence and security agencies on a timely basis in order to combat the
threat of violent activity targeting legislative institutions, government
operations, and minority groups.

4. Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3.

Under Section 3 of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, an indi-
vidual who previously took an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, but who has “engaged in an insurrection” against the same,
or given “aid or comfort to the enemies of the Constitution” can be dis-
qualified from holding future federal or state office. The Select Committee
has referred Donald Trump and others for possible prosecution under 18
U.S.C. 2383, including for assisting and providing aid and comfort to an
insurrection. The Committee also notes that Donald J. Trump was
impeached by a majority of the House of Representatives for Incitement of
an Insurrection, and there were 57 votes in the Senate for his conviction.
Congressional committees of jurisdiction should consider creating a formal
mechanism for evaluating whether to bar those individuals identified in
this Report under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment from holding future
federal or state office. The Committee believes that those who took an oath
to protect and defend the Constitution and then, on January 6th, engaged in
insurrection can appropriately be disqualified and barred from holding gov-
ernment office—whether federal or state, civilian or military—absent at
least two-thirds of Congress acting to remove the disability pursuant to
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Committee notes that Ms.
Wasserman Schultz and Mr. Raskin have introduced H. Con. Res. 93 to
declare the January 6 assault an insurrection and H.R. 7906 to establish
specific procedures and standards for disqualification under section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the United States district court for the District of
Columbia.

5. National Special Security Event.

Until January 6th, 2021, the joint session of Congress for counting elec-
toral votes was not understood to pose the same types of security risks as
other major events on Capitol Hill. Both the inaugural and the State of the
Union have long been designated as National Special Security Events,
requiring specific security measures and significant advance planning and
preparation. Given what occurred in 2021, Congress and the Executive
Branch should work together to designate the joint session of Congress
occurring on January 6th as a National Special Security Event.
 RECOMMENDATIONS 691

6. To the extent needed, consider reforming certain criminal statutes, including to

add more severe penalties.
As indicated in the Report, the Committee believes that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)2 and other existing provisions of law can be applied to efforts to
obstruct, influence, or impede the joint session on January 6th, including to
related planning efforts to overturn the lawful election results on that date.
To the extent that any court or any other prosecutorial authorities ulti-
mately reach any differing conclusion, Congress should amend those stat-
utes to cover such conduct. Congress should also consider whether the
severity of penalties under those statutes is sufficient to deter unlawful
conduct threatening the peaceful transfer of power.

7. House of Representatives Civil Subpoena Enforcement Authority.

The current authority of the House of Representatives to enforce its
subpoenas through civil litigation is unclear. Congressional committees of
jurisdiction should develop legislation to create a cause of action for the
House of Representatives to enforce its subpoenas in federal court, either
following the statutory authority that exists for the Senate in 2 U.S.C.
§ 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365 or adopting a broad approach to facilitate
timely oversight of the executive branch.

8. Threats to Election Workers.

Congressional committees of jurisdiction should consider enhancing
federal penalties for certain types of threats against persons involved in the
election process and expanding protections for personally identifiable
information of election workers.

9. Capitol Police Oversight.

Congressional committees of jurisdiction should continue regular and
rigorous oversight of the United States Capitol Police as it improves its
planning, training, equipping, and intelligence processes and practices its
critical incident response protocols, both internally and with law enforce-
ment partners. Joint hearings with testimony from the Capitol Police Board
should take place. Full funding for critical security measures should be
assured.1

10. Role of the Media.

The Committee’s investigation has identified many individuals involved
in January 6th who were provoked to act by false information about the
2020 election repeatedly reinforced by legacy and social media. The
Committee agrees that individuals remain responsible for their own
actions, including their own criminal actions. But congressional commit-
tees of jurisdiction should continue to evaluate policies of media companies
692 RECOMMENDATIONS
that have had the effect of radicalizing their consumers, including by pro-
voking people to attack their own country.

11. Discussion of the Insurrection Act.

The Committee has been troubled by evidence that President Trump’s
possible use of the Insurrection Act was discussed by individuals identified
in this Report. Congressional Committees of jurisdiction should further
evaluate all such evidence, and consider risks posed for future elections.

ENDNOTE
1. The Select Committee has shared concerns about two specific areas of security with the
Committee on House Administration.
 APPENDIX 1 693

GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND

RESPONSE TO JANUARY 6TH
INTRODUCTION

The Select Committee investigated the facts relating to law enforcement

entities’ preparation for, and response to, the January 6th events at the
Capitol, including the character of the intelligence prior to the insurrection.
This appendix does not address the cause of the attack, which resulted from
then President Trump’s multi-pronged effort to overturn the 2020 presi-
dential election.
Prior to January 6th, numerous government agencies received intelli-
gence that those descending on The Mall for a rally organized by the Presi-
dent were armed and that their target may be the Capitol. The intelligence
community and law enforcement agencies detected the planning for poten-
tial violence directed at the joint session of Congress.
That intelligence included information about specific planning by the
Proud Boys and Oath Keepers militia groups who ultimately led the attack
on the Capitol. By contrast, the intelligence did not support a conclusion
that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent coun-
terdemonstration, or attack President Trump’s supporters on January 6th.
Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that some left-wing groups
were instructing their members to “stay at home” and not attend on Janu-
ary 6th.1
As January 6th approached, some of the intelligence about the potential
for violence was shared within the executive branch, including the Secret
Service and the President’s National Security Council. That intelligence
should have been sufficient for President Trump, or others at the White
House, to cancel the Ellipse speech, and for President Trump to cancel
plans to instruct his supporters to march to the Capitol. Few in law enforce-
ment predicted the full extent of the violence at the Capitol, or that the
President of the United States would incite a mob attack on the Capitol, that
he would send them to stop the joint session knowing they were armed and
dangerous, that he would further incite them against his own vice President
while the attack was underway, or that he would do nothing to stop the
assault for hours.
Nevertheless, as explained below, and in multiple hearings by the Com-
mittee on House Administration, there are additional steps that should have
been taken to address the potential for violence on that day.
694 APPENDIX 1
DISCUSSION

INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted: “Big protest in D.C. on
January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” 2 Following President Trump’s tweet,
an analyst at the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium
(NTIC) noticed a tenfold uptick in violent online rhetoric targeting Congress
and law enforcement.3 The analyst also noticed that violent right-wing
groups that had not previously been aligned had begun coordinating their
efforts.4 These indications reached the head of the D.C. Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), Christopher Rodriguez, as
well as incoming Chief of D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Rob-
ert Contee.5 Chief Contee remembered that the information prompted the
DC Police to “change the way that we were going to deploy for January the
6th.” 6
Following President Trump’s “be there, will be wild!” tweet, Director
Rodriguez arranged a briefing to provide the DC Mayor Muriel Bowser the
latest threat intelligence about January 6th, outline the potential for vio-
lence, and “make operational recommendations,” including that the Mayor
request assistance from the DC National Guard.7 During the briefing, the
Mayor was told that “there is greater negative sentiment motivating con-
versation than the last two events in November and December of 2020,”
and that “others are calling to ‘peacefully’ storm the Capitol and occupy the
building to halt the vote.” 8
As early as December 30th, in its intelligence briefing entitled, “March
for Trump,” the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) highlighted the President’s “will
be wild!” tweet alongside hashtags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and
#OccupyCapitols, and wrote, “President Trump supporters have proposed a
movement to occupy Capitol Hill.” 9 It added that promoters of the January
6th rally on social media had borrowed the President’s phrase and were
marketing the January 6th rally as the “WildProtest.” 10
Other law enforcement entities were receiving similar indications from
both government and private entities. By December 21st, the U.S. Capitol
Police (USCP) had learned of a surge in viewers of online maps of the Capi-
tol complex’s underground tunnels, which were attracting increased atten-
tion on www.thedonald.win, alongside violent rhetoric supporting the
President.11 By the late afternoon of January 5, 2021, Capitol Police Assistant
Chief for Intelligence Yogananda Pittman urged Capitol Police Chief Steven
Sund to convene a “brief call” to discuss “a significant uptick in groups
wanting to block perimeter access to the Capitol tomorrow starting as early
as 0600 hours.” 12 Chief Sund remembered discussing those indications and
the preparations Capitol Police already had “in place, and [that] everybody
 APPENDIX 1 695

seemed fine with utilizing the resources we had.” 13 Chief Sund added that,
by that time, he had already deployed “all the available resources.” 14
The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) were
also aware of the increased online interest in the Capitol tunnels. The FBI’s
special agent in charge of the intelligence division at the Washington Field
Office, Jennifer Moore, pointed out that there was nothing illegal about dis-
cussing the tunnels. Without a very specific discussion of violence, it was a
matter of ensuring that the appropriate law enforcement partner agencies
were aware of the uptick, ensuring that the Capitol Police were aware.15
“People’s First Amendment rights, obviously, are protected. We cannot
troll—can[’t] just troll the internet looking for things that’s out there,”
Moore said.16 “So it would have to be with such specificity and such plan-
ning and such detail that we would be able to open a case, immediately seek
authority for an undercover, have enough probable cause for that under-
cover off of one tip would be tough.” 17
Other agencies were also surfacing indications and receiving tips. On
December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud Boys
detailing plans of having “a large enough group to march into DC armed
and will outnumber the police so they can’t be stopped.” 18 It stressed,
“Their plan is to literally kill people . . . . Please please take this tip seriously
and investigate further.” 19 On December 24th, the Secret Service received a
compilation of social media posts from “SITE,” a private intelligence group.
One of them urged that protesters “march into the chambers.” 20 Another,
referring to President Trump’s December 19th “will be wild!” post, wrote
that Trump “can’t exactly openly tell you to revolt,” so the December 19th
post was “the closest he’ll ever get.” 21 Another understood the President’s
tweet to be urging his supporters to come to Washington “armed.” 22
Others were to the same effect (“there is not enough cops in DC to stop
what is coming,” 23 “make sure they know who to fear,” 24 and “waiting for
Trump to say the word” 25).
By December 28th, that compilation had reached the newly installed
head of the Capitol Police intelligence unit, Jack Donohue.26 The same day,
a self-styled “internet expert” who had been “tracking online far right
extremism for years” sent an email to the Capitol Police public information
inbox warning of “countless tweets from Trump supporters saying they will
be armed,” and of tweets “from people organizing to ‘storm the Capitol’ on
January 6th.” 27 She added, “January 6th will be the day most of these
people realize there’s no chance left for Trump. They’ll be pushed to what
they feel is the edge,” noting that many would be armed and that she was,
for the first time, “truly worried.” 28 Other senior Capitol Police officers do
not recall seeing that email before the January 6th attack.29 The next day,
696 APPENDIX 1
Secret Service agents forwarded to Capitol Police warnings that pro-Trump
demonstrators were being urged to “occupy federal building[s],” “march
into the capital building [sic] and make them quake in their shoes by our
mere presence.” 30
In addition, on January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch of
the MPD forwarded to the Capitol Police intelligence unit a tip—later for-
warded to USCP Deputy Chief Sean Gallagher—that he had “found a website
planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the rally.” 31 The source
included a link to www.thedonald.win site, describing a “detailed plan on
[s]torming the capitol in DC on Jan 6th.” 32 On January 2, 2021, the FBI
saved in its system a social media post stating, “This is not a rally and it’s
no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . . many are ready to die to take
back #USA . . . . And don’t be surprised if we take the #capital building
[sic].” 33 On January 3rd, FBI and Capitol Police received a Parler post that
“after weds we are going to need a new congress,” and “Jan 6 may actually
be their last day in Congress.” 34
On January 4th, Jack Donoghue, head of USCP’s intelligence unit, and
his assistant director, Julie Farnam, briefed Capitol Police leadership,
including Chief Gallagher and Chief Pittman (but not Chief Sund), about the
January 3rd Threat Assessment, which highlighted that Congress itself was
the target of potential violence on January 6th. Assistant Director Farnam
explicitly warned the group:
Supporters see this as the last opportunity to overturn the election.
There was disappointment and desperation amongst the protestors,
and this could be an incentive to become violent, because they have
nothing left to lose. The targets are not the counter protestors; the
target is Congress. The protests are heavily publicized. Stop the
Steal has a propensity for attracting White supremacists, militia
groups, groups like the Proud Boys. There are multiple social media
posts saying that people are going to be coming armed, and it's
potentially a very dangerous situation.35
On January 5, 2021, at 12:19 p.m., the Architect of the Capitol head of
security, Valerie Hasberry, forwarded an alert to Capitol Police incident
command that an individual was calling on thousands to “go to Washing-
ton Jan 6 and help storm the Capital [sic],” adding “we will storm the gov-
ernment buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and
agents.” 36 “There is now chatter on Parler about storming the Capitol,”
Ms. Hasberry wrote to her AOC employee working at the USCP.37 “Please let
me know if there are any updates to credible threats.” 38 Within an hour,
she was advised by her staff that “[t]here is no talk about any credible
threats or storming the Capitol.” That same day, representatives from DHS,
 APPENDIX 1 697

FBI, HSEMA, Secret Service, DC Police, and Capitol Police shared notice of a
website, Red State Secession, that urged its visitors to post the home and
work addresses of Democratic Members of Congress and “political
enemies” under the title, “Why the Second American Revolution Starts Jan
6.” 39 It asked for their routes to and from the January 6th congressional
certification because “the crowd will be looking for enemies.” 40
The FBI was uploading to, and tagging in, its system incoming
information from all FBI field offices about January 6th under the label,
“CERTUNREST2021.” While the incoming information was reviewed on a
regular basis by the Washington Field Office, “unified monitoring” of the
items in the aggregate didn’t begin until January 5th.41 That same day, the
FBI captured a January 6th-related threat that warned a “Quick Reaction
Force” of Trump supporters was preparing for January 6th in Virginia with
weapons and prepared “to respond to ‘calls for help’” in the event that
“protesters believed the police were not doing their job,” and a “Situation
Incident Report” from FBI’s Norfolk Field Office warned of a “war” on
January 6th.42 While Capitol Police leadership received neither warning
until after the attack,43 Assistant Director Farnam, USCP intelligence unit,
warned that Congress would be the target on January 6th. She noted that a
“sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive
to become violent. Unlike previous post-election protests, Congress itself is
the target on the 6th.” 44 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Mark Milley, remembers Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist
expressing a similar view based on the social media traffic in early January
2021: “Norquist says . . . [t]he greatest threat is a direct assault on the Capi-
tol. I’ll never forget it.” 45

DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE

Federal and local agencies agreed that there was a potential for violence on
January 6th. As noted above, the intelligence leading up to January 6th did
not support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely
engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack President Trump’s
supporters on January 6th. In fact, none of these groups was involved to
any material extent with the attack on the Capitol on January 6th.
That said, certain witnesses testified that they believed that there would
be violence with Antifa or similar counter protest groups. President
Trump’s National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, said the White House
saw a risk of violence from counter-protesters.46 Then Acting DHS Secre-
tary Chad Wolfe said that his “main concern [. . .] at the time was what we
had seen throughout the summer and throughout the fall, which was you
were going to have groups on either side, and so you were going to have
counterprotests. And usually where those counterprotests interacted was
where you had the violence.” 47
698 APPENDIX 1
General Milley said the potential for violence was clear to all: “Everyone
knew. I can't imagine anybody in those calls that didn't realize that on the
6th was going to be the certification of an intensely contested election, and
there were large crowds coming into town, and they were coming into pro-
test. And everybody knew there was a probability, more than a possibility, a
probability of violence.” 48 He expected “street fights when the sun went
down,” while [Deputy Secretary] Norquist said the most dangerous thing
was assault on the Capitol.49 Director of DHS Special Operations
Christopher Tomney remembered, “[T]here was broad discussion/
acknowledgment that folks were calling for bringing weapons into the city
on that day, so there was no surprise, there was no—you know, no one dis-
agreed that there was going to be the high likelihood that there could be
some violence on January 6.” 50
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue described the dis-
cussion about the threat landscape as “generally about left-wing, right
wing, or Pro-Trump, anti-Trump groups coming to the Capitol. It didn't
really matter what they called themselves. It was a matter of they're upset,
they're coming to the Capitol, and there's a potential for violence.” 51
Donoghue added: “Everyone knew what everyone else was doing. Everyone
knew that there was a danger of violence. Everyone knew that the Capitol
and other facilities were potential targets. And I think we all felt comfort-
able that we were aware what the situation was, and we had the resources
in place to address it.” 52

OPERATIONALIZATION OF JANUARY 6-RELATED INTELLIGENCE

Preparing for January 6th required coordination among the several local
and Federal law enforcement agencies that have distinct authorities and
jurisdiction over adjacent areas in the Washington, DC, area. These range
from the MPD, United States Park Police (USPP), and USSS to the USCP.

DC GOVERNMENT PREPARATION
December 30, 2020, HSEMA briefing. Following the DC HSEMA’s December
30th intelligence briefing, Mayor Bowser, anticipating that President
Trump’s December 19th “will be wild!” tweet would have a big effect on the
number of people coming into the District,53 agreed with HSEMA Director
Rodriguez, who thought “the intelligence was showing that we needed to
posture ourselves, we needed to brace ourselves, and we needed additional
resources in the city particularly the DC National Guard.” 54 MPD Chief
Contee, who attended the December 30th briefing and was seeing similar
intelligence, concurred with the request for the DC National Guard.55
In light of the upcoming holiday weekend, HSEMA Director Rodriguez
wanted to expedite the DC request for National Guard assistance.56 On
December 31st, Mayor Bowser requested the assistance of the DC National
 APPENDIX 1 699

Guard to assist the MPD at traffic points within the city.57 Mayor Bowser’s
request explicitly limited National Guard assistance to “non-law enforce-
ment activities” so that the MPD could focus on the civil protests and
specified that Guard troops should not be armed.58Army Secretary Ryan
McCarthy approved Mayor Bowser’s request.59 By this time, DC HSEMA
Director Rodriguez had fully activated HSEMA and coordinated with Fed-
eral, State and local partners, to deal with “consequence management.” 60
On January 4th, Mayor Bowser held a press conference and invited the
MPD, USCP, and USPP.61 Mayor Bowser announced that she had activated
the DC Fire and Emergency Management Services (DC FEMS) in preparation
of the January 6th event and that the DC National Guard would assist MPD
at traffic points and with crowd control. Mayor Bowser urged DC residents
to stay out of downtown on January 5th and 6th, acknowledging the possi-
bility of violence. She stated that, while “[p]eople are allowed to come into
our city to participate in First Amendment activities,” DC officials would
“not allow people to incite violence, intimidate our residents, or cause
destruction in our city.” 62
The next day, Mayor Bowser sent a letter requesting that Federal agen-
cies coordinate with the Mayor’s office and the MPD in their response on
January 6th.63 The letter plainly stated that it was intended to ensure coor-
dination among the agencies involved. DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez testi-
fied that there was a concern, in light of the Federal response to the
previous summer’s civil justice protests, “that in the event that activities
on the street escalated, the city could once again become . . . militarized and
that armed military and Federal law enforcement personnel could be
brought into the District,” perhaps intimidating residents.64

DC FEMS PREPARATION
Mayor Bowser also activated DC FEMS (Fire and Emergency Medical Service
Department), several days before January 6th.65 DC FEMS focused most of
its attention on the event at the Ellipse since the permits indicated it would
be the largest event of the day, with an estimated 5,000 people attending.
Other DC and Federal agencies believed the number would likely be closer to
35,000. This led DC FEMS to establish an area command for the Ellipse,
including a Mobile Command Unit, six ambulances, four engine companies,
and a first aid tent staffed by George Washington University medical staff.66

MPD PREPARATION
After the DC HSEMA’s December 30th intelligence briefing, MPD Chief
Contee ordered full deployment of the Department, cancelling previously
scheduled days off, fully deploying the Civil Disturbance Unit, and contact-
ing police departments in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in
Maryland so that their forces would be pre-staged at certain locations.
700 APPENDIX 1
Chief Contee also staged police at the White House and Lafayette Park. Chief
Contee said that although the MPD “are normally not fully deployed for
civil disturbance for counting votes at the U.S. Capitol,” 67 “obviously, as we
got closer from the time of the initial [December 19th Trump] tweet leading
up, with all of the rhetoric that's out there on social media, you know, people
were going to bring guns, were going to do this and that and so forth, that
caused us obviously to change the way that we were going to deploy for
January the 6th.” 68 Because of the numerous social media posts about
guns, MPD also posted signs on the National Mall indicating that posses-
sion of firearms in Washington, D.C., was illegal and would be prosecuted.69

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE PREPARATION

On January 3rd, the same day Capitol Police’s Intelligence and Interagency
Coordination Division (IICD) issued a threat assessment indicating that
“Congress itself is a target,” Chief Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms
Paul D. Irving to discuss requesting the DC National Guard to assist in
policing the Capitol’s perimeter.70 Chief Sund needed approval from the
Capitol Police Board, which consisted of Irving, Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
Michael C. Stenger, and the Architect of the Capitol J. Brett Blanton. Chief
Sund remembers that Irving responded immediately that he did not “like
the optics” and that the intelligence did not support the request.71 Irving,
however, remembers Chief Sund calling him to say the DC National Guard
had offered 125 unarmed National Guardsmen to the USCP and MPD.72 He
also remembered that, during a conference call, Chief Sund told Stenger
and him that the National Guard would be utilized in similar fashion to the
assistance provided to the DC police, namely, staffing intersections, and for
traffic control to free up officers, but then could be used for crowd control,
although he acknowledged that the Capitol campus does not have many
intersections in need of staffing.73
The Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed that a
request for the DC National Guard would not be necessary, particularly if
the USCP was in an “all hands on deck” posture.74 Chief Sund agreed with
Stenger and Irving that the intelligence did not support a request for DC
National Guard assistance.75 According to Irving, Chief Sund did not believe
the National Guard would add much to the USCP security plan for January
6th.76 Chief Sund briefed the Capitol Police Board on the USCP’s enhanced
security plan, and “all hands on deck posture”—including 1,200-plus offi-
cers, added Civil Disturbance Units (CDU), an enhanced Containment Emer-
gency Response Team (“CERT”), and an expanded perimeter.77 Chief Sund
did not believe, based on the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary
to cancel officers’ days off.78
USCP leadership did not create a department-wide plan for the January
6th event.79 In retrospect Chief Sund believed “there should have been a
 APPENDIX 1 701

plan for the joint session of Congress inside the Capitol to reflect all the
planning and all the coordination that goes on inside the Capitol.” 80

GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION

Interagency Coordination. In the appendix on Deployment of the National
Guard, we describe certain reasons why the deployment of the National
Guard was delayed, highlighting the activity of Secretary of the Army
McCarthy and how he understood an order given by Acting Secretary of
Defense Christopher Miller. In our interviews with Department of Defense
(DoD) officials, they testified that they had asked the Department of Justice
to serve the role of “lead Federal agency,” meaning to lead the coordination
and the response on January 6th. The Justice Department does not com-
mand National Guard units. Department of Defense, Department of Justice
(DOJ), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials testified from
each agency’s perspective about the discussions concerning which depart-
ment would serve as a lead Federal agency. Notably, these discussions
occurred at the same time President Trump was offering the Acting Attor-
ney General position to Jeffrey Clark, replacing then Acting Attorney Gen-
eral Jeffrey Rosen. Had Clark ultimately been appointed, and had he been
placed in charge of the Federal security response to the violence on January
6th, the situation could have been materially worse.

January 3rd Coordination Call. Realizing that there had not yet been a coordi-
nation call among the Federal agencies engaged in planning for the January
6th events and related contingencies, Acting Secretary Miller convened one
for January 3rd, because “nobody else was doing it.” 81 In addition to DoD
officials including General Milley, DOJ, DHS, Department of the Interior
(DOI) officials participated. Acting Secretary Miller’s objectives were to
ensure that “everyone had the same perception of the threat and then fig-
ure out how to synchronize, coordinate.” He also wanted to make sure that
DoD was prepared for any additional requests for support.82
Director of DHS Special Operations Tomney remembered that partici-
pants discussed the threat outlook and estimated crowd83 of up to 30,000—
not large for the District.84 The consensus was that 8,000 to 10,000 police
officers would be available on January 6th, a force regarded as appropriate
for up to a million protesters. General Milley asked the police participants
on the call whether they needed any other assistance from the Department
of Defense.85 General Milley and Secretary Miller expressed concern about
the number of groups requesting permits and the attendance of groups like
the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers who, as Secretary Miller explained, had
“conducted acts of violence in the past.” 86 General Milley asked whether
702 APPENDIX 1
requests for permits could be declined, canceled, or permits revoked.87 Par-
ticipants from the Department of the Interior responded that “that wasn't
an option.” 88
According to Director Tomney, DHS felt confident in the United States
Secret Service’s ability to protect the White House and Vice President, the
Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) ability to protect potentially affected
Federal buildings, as well as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and Customs and Border Protection’s ability to augment FPS, if needed.89
General Milley and the other DoD participants left the call reassured that
the law enforcement agencies involved were prepared for January 6th.90
During the January 3rd call, the DoD also raised the issue of a lead Fed-
eral agency. General Milley noted the desirability of a law enforcement lead
for coordinating the interagency planning and response effort, given the
“potpourri of jurisdictions” and diversity of agency authorities.91 Secretary
Miller testified that he believed he and Acting Attorney General Jeffrey
Rosen were in agreement that the DOJ should lead interagency coordination
for January 6th,92 although when asked during the call, Rosen did not con-
firm that the DOJ would play that role.93 The question of a lead Federal
agency remained “an open, unanswered question” at the end of the January
3rd call.94 The same day, Rosen was attempting to secure a White House
meeting with President Trump regarding the imminent appointment of
Clark in his stead.95

DELIBERATION ON AGENCY ROLES

On a January 4th inter-agency call with the same group, Acting Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue made the DOJ’s role clear: it would take the
lead in certain areas of responsibility, although he stressed that the DOJ was
never designated lead Federal agency and could not serve in that capacity.96
On the evening of January 4th, the FBI established a Strategic Information
Operations Center (“SIOC”) at FBI headquarters, which became operational
on January 5th.97 Unlike the previous summer’s civil protests, DoD did not
have a representative at the SIOC. All the DoD officials who were inter-
viewed by the Select Committee, however, believe that the DOJ agreed to
take—and may have been assigned by the White House—the lead coordi-
nating role.98 Director Tomney, however, remembered that the DOJ partici-
pants neither agreed to, nor explicitly declined, the lead agency role.99
During the January 3rd and 4th calls, General Milley, according to
Donoghue, noted that “[t]here should be plenty of police forces available
without using Federal military troops,” so he was adamant that no active-
duty troops would be deployed on January 6th.100 During this call, partici-
pants also discussed whether there was a need for a police-based quick
reaction force and concluded that the size of the MPD and USCP police
forces made that unnecessary.101
 APPENDIX 1 703

According to Donoghue, at the end of the January 4th call, “[i]t was
clear that everyone understood what everyone else’s responsibility was, and
everyone understood what was available to them if they needed more
resources to meet their responsibilities.” 102 The calls had also given local
and Federal law enforcement entities the chance to “voice any issues, con-
cerns, or requests for Department of Defense support if they felt that they
were incapable of handling at their level. So, institutionally, there was
agreement on the threat assessment and the plan going forward.” 103 The
DoD’s leading role during the January 3rd and 4th calls had, in fact, left
Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf with the impression that DoD was the lead
agency, as they were “coordinating phone calls, they were setting agendas
for phone calls, and they were calling out different people, okay, what do
you need . . . So they were quarterbacking the situation and the response.” 104

AGENCY ACTIONS ON PERMITTING

Three organizations in the National Capitol Region handle permits for
organized activities depending on where the planned activity is to occur.
The USSS issues permits for the Ellipse, while the DC MPD issues permits
for the area around the Ellipse. The USCP handles permitting for activities
on the Capitol campus. All three entities, as well as other law enforcement
agencies, communicate about applications for permits and the expected
number of attendees. They are reluctant to deny permits for what appears
to be First Amendment-protected protests.105 The USCP received, evaluated,
and approved six group permit requests for January 5th and 6th activity on
Capitol Grounds.106
On December 19th, the day of President Trump’s “will be wild!” tweet,
Cindy Chafian, spokesperson from the “Eighty Percent Coalition,” applied
to the MPD and USCP for a permit to hold a rally.107 On December 29th,
Chafian applied to USPP for a permit for a January 5th rally in Freedom
Plaza.108 The next day, Kylie Kremer filed for a permit for “Women for
America First” to hold a rally for up to 5,000 people on the Ellipse.109 On
December 31st, the National Park Service (NPS) held two meetings with
Chafian as well as the MPD and USCP.110 Then, on January 1st, the USSS
confirmed that President Trump would attend the January 6th rally at the
Ellipse, prompting USPP to provide additional support for the rally.111
On January 4th, “Women for America First” requested that the NPS
increase the authorized attendance at its rally to 20,000 from the 5,000 in
the original application. The same day, reacting to the USPP briefing that
5,000 people were expected, Joseph Roth, the USSS site lead, commented
that he found it “funny that this permit says 5,000 people when they have
said 30k repeatedly.” 112 On January 5th, the NPS issued a permit for 30,000
704 APPENDIX 1
participants for the Ellipse event.113 At no point was any permit granted for
a march from the Ellipse to the Capitol. The President planned to announce
that march “spontaneously.” 114
At the White House, the increased crowd estimate concerned Bobby
Peede, Director of Presidential Advance, who emailed White House Deputy
Chief of Operations Anthony Ornato, noting that the USSS was planning on
using only 12 magnetometers. Peede added that “the mag issue is a pretty
major problem if the expected crowd shows up.” Secret Service documents
reveal internal discussion of an initial USSS assessment that 17 magnetom-
eters would be needed. On January 6th, only 10 magnetometers were ini-
tially assigned to the Ellipse.115

AGENCY PREPARATIONS FOR JANUARY 6TH

January 5th Congressional Briefing by Chief Sund and Paul Irving. On January
5th, Chief Sund briefed the Chairperson of the Committee on House Admin-
istration (CHA), Representative Zoe Lofgren, along with numerous staff, as
well as House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul Irving. Given CHA's oversight of the
Capitol Police, this was “an opportunity for the chair of the committee to
hear from the security professionals on the security plan.” 116 Chair
Lofgren’s staff director described it as a “topline” briefing that covered
various aspects of the security plan, including Chief Sund’s direction of “all
hands on deck,” his focus on the prospect of counter protesters, as well as
Chair Lofgren’s concern that Members of Congress speaking at the Ellipse
that day could incite protesters.117 After the briefing, the CHA staff director
specifically asked about the availability of the National Guard in case it was
needed. “Chief Sund said that the Guard could be activated with an emer-
gency declaration from the [Capitol Police] board, but they are here. They
are a phone call away, and if we need them, they are ready to go.” 118
Speaker Pelosi did not receive a similar briefing, but her chief of staff
was given a readout of Chief Sund’s briefing to Chairperson Lofgren. On
that basis, as well as the assurances Chief Sund provided, the Speaker’s
chief of staff said, “So I believed and the Speaker believed the security pro-
fessionals were in charge of the security and they were prepared. We were
told that there was a plan.” 119

FEDERAL AGENCY RESPONSE ON JANUARY 6TH

Although intelligence was available suggesting potential violence at the
Capitol, it was not apparent exactly what President Trump would do to pro-
voke the crowd at the January 6th Ellipse rally. Chief Sund, for example,
drove into work on January 6th believing that preparations for the day’s
events were sound and that there was no extraordinary risk or threat. “You
know, on my way in, I called Inspector Glover with MPD just to get a read.
He said he was actually parked over by the Ellipse. Asked him, Hey, how are
 APPENDIX 1 705

things going over there? He said, there's big crowds, lots of people in line,
but right now he wasn't seeing any concern with the folks that we had. So
that was my initial take,” Sund told the Select Committee.120
Throughout the morning, Robert Engel, the special agent in charge of
the President’s Secret Service detail, received updates from the event at the
Ellipse. At 10:35 a.m., an update informed Engel that 20,000 attendees had
been processed and outside of the magnetometers, but that there were
“several thousand on the mall watching but not in line.” 121 An hour later,
Engel forwarded an update to White House Deputy Chief of Operations
Ornato, informing him that 30,000 attendees had been processed.122
Acting Attorney General Rosen met with FBI leadership for a briefing
that morning.123 He remembered this briefing, unlike previous ones, as
“more of a situational update,” adding that the DOJ was “going to hope for
the best, prepare for the worst.” 124 At 10:43 a.m., Acting Deputy Attorney
General Donoghue received an email from Matt Blue, Acting Chief of the
Counterterrorism Section, stating “[t]here are no credible threats as of the
10:00 brief.” 125 Twelve minutes later, Rosen spoke to White House Counsel
Pat Cipollone via phone.126 Acting Attorney General Rosen admits that “in
hindsight” no one at the Department contemplated “how bad that after-
noon turned out to be.” 127 Nobody in the DOJ leadership could have pre-
dicted President Trump’s actions that day.
The President’s speech at the Ellipse began just before noon. David Tor-
res,128 head of the USSS’s Protective Intelligence Division (PID), insisted
that the Secret Service was not listening to the President’s speech, however
PID agents monitored the speech throughout.129 At 12:20 p.m., Faron Par-
amore, assistant director of Strategic Intel & Information (SII), sent an
email to USSS leadership that “POTUS just said that he is going up to the
U.S. Capitol to ‘watch’ the vote” and asked whether this is true. Secret Ser-
vice executive Kimberly Cheatle responded “[h]e said it, but not going, to
our knowledge.” 130 Minutes later, the USSS PIOC warned that “Mogul just
mentioned in his speech that he would accompany the protesters to the
Capitol,” with a note that “DAD Torres requested this be sent for aware-
ness.” 131 At 1:14 p.m., the USSS Joint Operations Center (JOC) sent an email
designating a response team to accompany the President in his march to
the Capitol, “per [his] announcement” at the Ellipse. The JOC notes: “Mul-
tiple reports of armed individuals with various weapons and malicious
intent. Be on your guard.” 132
At 12:24 p.m., while the President was speaking, the Vice President, with
his USSS detail, departed the Vice President’s Residence for the Capitol.133
After being routed to the Senate side due to the protests, the Vice Presi-
dent’s detail arrived at the Capitol at 12:38 p.m. and was inside the Senate
Chamber at 12:54 p.m.134
706 APPENDIX 1
Around 1 p.m., Chief Contee notified Mayor Bowser about the discovery
of a pipe bomb at the Republican National Committee and of the Capitol
perimeter breach.135 Within minutes, Mayor Bowser was at the Joint Opera-
tions Center with Chief Contee.136 They tried to contact Chief Sund and sent
command officials to Capitol Police headquarters.137 At approximately 12:59
p.m., once the violence had begun, Chief Sund first called Deputy Chief Jeff
Carroll of the MPD, which provided almost immediate reinforcements.138
Approximately 10 minutes later, MPD officers arrived at the West Front bal-
cony to assist the USCP officers. Chief Sund’s next call was to the House and
Senate Sergeants-at-Arms to request National Guard resources.139
As the violence at the Capitol escalated, DC FEMS realized that they
were facing an “expanding incident with the potential for mass casualties,
fires, active shooter, and hazardous materials incidents that would exceed
the resources at hand.” 140 As violence escalated at the West Front, non-
lethal grenadiers began launching chemical munitions at the crowd.141
Around the same time, the USCP discovered a nearby truck containing fire-
arms and Molotov cocktails,142 as well as a second explosive device at the
Democratic National Headquarters at 1:07 p.m., while Vice President-elect
Kamala Harris was inside. Responding to these incidents required a com-
mitment of significant USCP resources for mitigation and to evacuate
nearby buildings, preventing their deployment to the Capitol to help secure
the building.
Chief Gallagher recalled that “it started to really unfold into an
investigative—heavy on the investigation of let's pull up the cameras. Let's
try to get an image of the pipe bombs. Let's get the images to our law
enforcement partners. Let's try to play back the cameras and see if we can
identify anybody that placed these pipe bombs. Let's get the owner of the
vehicle, run the vehicle information for that suspicious vehicle. So we were
coordinating all of that type of response that was from our Investigations
Division . . . . We also had our IICD team trying to run down as much infor-
mation, working with our Investigations Division as they could, on the sus-
picious vehicle, the tags of the vehicle, stuff of that nature.” 143 Not
including those in the command center, the incidents would require the
response of 34 USCP personnel, with additional assistance provided by the
FBI and ATF. USCP’s senior leadership at the Command Center and in the
intelligence division also divided their time between the escalating threat to
their officers at the Capitol and the explosive devices elsewhere on campus.
The next update to the DOJ was at 1:17 p.m., after President Trump had
finished speaking at the Ellipse. After several attempts, Acting Attorney
General Rosen got in touch with Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia Michael Sherwin, who was at the Ellipse. Rosen admits he was not
very concerned with the situation at the time, because “[i]t was early, but
 APPENDIX 1 707

at least the initial report was: Crowd size doesn't appear to be unexpected,
and the conduct so far is okay.” 144 He had only watched the end of the
President’s speech.145 It was early afternoon before the DOJ’s senior leader-
ship began to realize the extent of what was occurring. Acting Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue remembered hearing protesters outside the
Department of Justice “marching down Constitution, going from the Ellipse
toward the Capitol” in the late morning, early afternoon, but wasn’t spe-
cifically monitoring the protests as “there were a million things going
on.” 146
At the same time, the President was pressing his request to go to the
Capitol. According to Robert Engel, the head of his Secret Service detail,
President Trump asked to go to the Capitol once they had gotten into the
Presidential SUV.147 Engel denied the President’s request and returned to
the White House.148 The Committee has significant evidence regarding this
period of time.149
President Trump, nevertheless, persisted in his request to go to the
Capitol. A 1:35 p.m. entry in the USSS Civil Disturbance Unit’s time log
shows that the plan was to hold at the White House for the next 2 hours and
then move the President to the Capitol.150 Soon after, Engel emailed USSS
leadership from the West Wing to say they were “discussing options and
setting expectations.” 151 Minutes later, after receiving an email from USSS
leadership saying that it would not be advisable for the President to go
“anywhere near” the Capitol, Engel responded, “[w]e are not doing an OTR
to Punch Bowl.” 152
Mayor Bowser also spoke directly with Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy
who informed her that they had not gotten a request for National Guard
assistance from the USCP. Mayor Bowser informed Secretary McCarthy that
she did not have the authority to re-direct the 340 DC National Guard
troops at traffic points across the city, but that she had already deployed
the DC MPD and FEMs to the Capitol. Because she and Chief Sund had not
connected, Mayor Bowser concluded that the security of the Capitol was
“now our responsibility” and requested National Guard assistance. At the
end of this call, Mayor Bowser believed that Secretary McCarthy was “run-
ning [her request] up his chain of command.” 153
USCP Chief Sund was concerned when the explosive device was discov-
ered near RNC Headquarters but did not then believe there was a need to
change the USCP’s operational posture. Minutes later, when a large group
of rioters approached the outer west perimeter of the Capitol, Chief Sund
raised the alarm and began to reposition his officers: “When we looked up,
and I saw them approaching the officers that were standing, you know,
right there on the barrier, I looked over to Chief Thomas and I said, Chad,
where's our—where's CDU? Get CDU down there now.” 154
708 APPENDIX 1
The USCP timeline shows that at 12:55 p.m. all available officers were
directed to the West Front of the Capitol. Then, at approximately 1:25 p.m.,
FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich received a report about the pipe bombs
at the RNC and DNC.155 Bowdich testified that the FBI considered the possi-
bility that the DNC and RNC bombs were possible distractions.156 At 1:28
p.m., USCP requested the AOC deliver 400 additional bike racks to the East
Front to serve as protective barriers, even though rioters were using bike
racks as weapons. The pipe bomb discovery at the DNC prevented the AOC
from delivering them.157
Chief Gallagher was surprised that the violence had escalated so fast.
“The amount of violence that immediately took place when that crowd of
30,000, 35,000, whatever the number that was estimated to come was, that
did catch, I think, caught Capitol Police and all of our partners a little off
guard with how violent they were and how quick they were.” 158 At 1:49
p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover declared a riot on the West Front of the
Capitol. “Cruiser 50, we’re going to give riot warnings. We’re going to give
riot warnings. Going to try to get compliance, but this is now effectively a
riot,” Commander Glover yelled into his radio. “1349 hours. Declaring it a
riot,” the dispatcher responded, which allowed a change in the type of
equipment the MPD could use in responding to the violence.159
While the violence continued to escalate at the Capitol, the USCP lead-
ership focused on three things: (1) requesting support from local and Fed-
eral law enforcement agencies nearby; (2) planning for and coordinating
with arriving reinforcements; and (3) protecting congressional leadership
and other Members of Congress. Chief Sund was “still making other calls to
other agencies for support—ATF, FBI, you name it, Secret Service.” 160
Yogananda Pittman, Gallagher’s direct supervisor, told the Select Com-
mittee that she took roles that day beyond her responsibility as Assistant
Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations. “So we
started—so I started to take Protective Services Bureau resources, as well as
the chief's staff, to set up operations adjacent to headquarters building,
specifically lot 16, so that we could have a check-in procedure for those
units so they could stage vehicles,” Pittman said.161 “Because like we know
now, there were breaches on both sides of the buildings and these folks are
inside of the Capitol. So you have to deploy them with your officers. They
don't know the layout of the land. We're telling them to respond to north
barricade. They don't know the north from the south.” 162
Just after 2 p.m., when the Capitol was breached, Assistant Chief Pitt-
man turned her full attention to the protection of congressional leader-
ship.163 Meanwhile, the USCP officers at the West Front were overwhelmed.
Commander Glover praised the actions of his fellow law enforcement offi-
cers that day but also noted a lack of leadership.164 He observed that the
 APPENDIX 1 709

USCP officers he encountered when walking toward the Capitol’s West

Front seemed to be “very hectic and scattered, with no clear direc-
tion, . . . fighting for every inch on the line,” capable, but “without a whole
lot of command and control.” 165
When it became clear to him that securing the Capitol would require
additional resources, Chief Sund requested the assistance of the DC
National Guard.166 During a 2:30 p.m. call set up by HSEMA Director Rodri-
guez, the USCP specified the support they needed from the Guard.167 Mayor
Bowser also made “two urgent requests of the President” that she commu-
nicated to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.168 One was for the National Guard’s
assistance.169 The other was that the President make a statement asking
“people to leave, to leave the building and to get out of the city, to stop.” 170
At 2:56 p.m., Meadows told Mayor Bowser that the President “had approved
the request” and was “going to make a statement.” 171
At the Justice Department, it had become clear by early afternoon that
the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Donoghue first became aware of the
Capitol breach when he walked into Rosen’s office and saw on television
that the rioters were in the Rotunda.172 Rosen turned to him and said, “[D]o
you see this, do you see what's going on, can you believe this?” 173
At 2:14 p.m., the Vice President’s detail had alerted Secret Service over
their radio channel that the Capitol Building had been breached and that
they were holding the Vice President in his Senate office.174 About 5 min-
utes later, the detail reported that the rioters had gained access to the sec-
ond floor and that they would need to relocate the Vice President,175 despite
the Vice President’s objection.176 Five to 7 minutes later, after confirming
that the route was safe, the lead agent on the Vice President’s Secret Service
detail reasserted the need for the Vice President to leave his Senate office.177
(At 2:24 p.m. President Trump tweeted, “Mike Pence didn’t have the cour-
age to do what should have been done.”) At 2:25 p.m., the Vice President
and his detail left for a secure location.178 Vice President Pence refused to
leave the Capitol for his residence and remained in the secure Capitol loca-
tion until the Senate and House floors were cleared around 7 that eve-
ning.179
At 2:29 p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover transmitted an emergency
radio message: “Cruiser 50. We lost the line. We've lost the line. All MPD,
pull back. All MPD, pull back up to the upper deck ASAP. All MPD, pull back
to the upper deck ASAP. All MPD, come back to the upper deck. Upper deck.
Cruiser 50. We've been flanked. 10–33. I repeat, 10–33 West Front of the
Capitol. We have been flanked, and we've lost the line.” 180 Commander
Glover later told the Select Committee that a “10–33” indicates an immedi-
ate need for “emergency assistance for any officer, life or death at that
moment in time. That's when that line on the north side finally just broke
710 APPENDIX 1
and we just lost it, and we kind of got overrun behind us . . . [W]hen you hear
that in general daily activity, it's like the radio stops and you're focused on
getting to that officer, wherever they are, because you know it's that bad,
that they're fighting for their life; something they're perceiving or seeing or
realizing is that their life is in immediate danger.” 181
Donoghue left Rosen’s office to go to the FBI’s Strategic Information
and Operations Center (SIOC) across the street at the FBI’s Hoover Build-
ing.182 Before he left, Donoghue remembers someone at SIOC telling him
“Capitol Police say they don't need help at this point, they've got it cov-
ered.” 183 When Donoghue arrived at the Washington Field Office, he found
FBI Deputy Director Bowdich in a conference room by himself on the phone
with a senior FBI official.184 After a brief discussion, Donoghue and Bowdich
agreed that they should both go to the Capitol to evaluate the situation
firsthand.185 Donoghue remembered that they arrived at the assembly area
on D Street.186 Donoghue called Rosen to say that he and Bowdich were
going to the Capitol.187
Around this time, Bowdich says that he received a call from Senator
Mark Warner, who said “[t]his is a mess, and we now have the vast major-
ity of the Senate in one room.” 188 Bowdich recalls the number being about
87 senators,189 and that he directed the FBI’s Baltimore team to “protect
that room, recognizing you have almost the entire Senate in one room.” 190
Bowdich also directed a SWAT team to Senator Mitch McConnell’s office, in
response to a call from McConnell’s staff informing him that rioters were
kicking in their door. On arriving, the SWAT team found that McConnell’s
staff had reached safety.191
At 3:25 p.m., Rosen spoke to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Chuck
Schumer about the ongoing crisis. A video of the call shows Senator
Schumer imploring Rosen, “get the President to tell them to leave the Capi-
tol, Mr. Attorney General, in your law enforcement responsibility. A public
statement that they should all leave.” 192
As the day’s crisis unfolded, Mayor Bowser activated the DC mutual
assistance compact with neighboring jurisdictions for law assistance sup-
port and spoke to the Governors of Maryland and Virginia to solicit addi-
tional National Guard support. At about 3:30 p.m., Mayor Bowser spoke to
congressional leadership, including Speaker Pelosi and House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer.193 Then, around 4 p.m., Mayor Bowser, MPD Chief
Contee and Army Secretary McCarthy met in the Joint Operations Center at
MPD headquarters.194 At 4:30 p.m., Mayor Bowser held a press conference
with DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez as well as Secretary McCarthy.195 Mayor
Bowser also declared a 6 p.m. curfew for the District.196
Vice President Pence, who remained inside the Capitol, called Acting
Attorney General Rosen at 4:34 p.m. to ask what the DOJ was doing and
 APPENDIX 1 711

what more the Department could do to help.197 Vice President Pence told
Rosen that the situation at the Capitol seemed then to be “improving.” 198
The head of his USSS security detail recalls overhearing the Vice President
asking USCP Chief Sund, over the phone, whether it would be possible to
“go back to finish the business of the government this evening.” 199 At 4:42
p.m., the head of the Vice President’s detail emailed the USSS Office of Pro-
tective Operations that the Vice President was confirming with Chief Sund
that it would “take days to sweep and reopen” the Capitol.200
Congressional leadership continued to push to return to the Capitol to
continue certifying the electoral votes. Senior DOJ and FBI officials—
including Rosen, Bowdich, and Donoghue—held two conference calls.
Donoghue remembered that the first, at 6 p.m., was a “law enforcement-
level call” with General Daniel R. Hokansen, chief of the National Guard
Bureau, and focused on the role of the DC National Guard.201 The second
call, at approximately 7 p.m., included Speaker Pelosi, Leader McConnell,
Leader Schumer, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and General
Milley, as well as other congressional leaders.202 During that call, FBI and
other law enforcement officials on the ground provided an updated timeline
for clearing the Capitol to “hopefully get in an hour later.” 203
At 8:05 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police announced that the Capitol Building
was clear and that Congress could resume counting electoral votes.204
Shortly after Members returned, Donoghue left the Capitol.205
DC FEMS statistics help describe the scope of the January 6th riot at the
Capitol. Over the course of the day, DC FEMS reported 22 EMS responses, 14
EMS transports, including two cardiac arrests and two critical injury trans-
ports. There were an estimated 250 injured law enforcement officers from
numerous agencies.206 One hundred-fourteen USCP officers reported inju-
ries.207 Five police officers who were at the Capitol on January 6th died in
the days following the riot.
Federal and local law enforcement authorities were in possession of
multiple streams of intelligence predicting violence directed at the Capitol
prior to January 6th. Although some of that intelligence was fragmentary, it
should have been sufficient to warrant far more vigorous preparations for
the security of the joint session. The failure to sufficiently share and act
upon that intelligence jeopardized the lives of the police officers defending
the Capitol and everyone in it.
While the danger to the Capitol posed by an armed and angry crowd was
foreseeable, the fact that the President of the United States would be the
catalyst of their fury and facilitate the attack was unprecedented in Ameri-
can history. If we lacked the imagination to suppose that a President would
incite an attack on his own Government, urging his supporters to “fight
712 APPENDIX 1
like hell,” we lack that insight no more. And the best defense against that
danger will not come from law enforcement, but from an informed and
active citizenry.

ENDNOTES
1. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United States
Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division communication noting left-wing groups tell-
ing members to “stay at home” on January 6th).
2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Be+there+will+be+wild%22.
3. See Select Committee Interview of Donell Harvin on January 24, 2022 at p. 14:9–12 (“Harvin
Interview (January 24, 2022)”); see also Select Committee Informal Interview of Donell Har-
vin on November 12, 2021.
4. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Har-
vin, (Nov. 12, 2021).
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 22; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25,
2022), p.16.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 20.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 44.
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001 (December 30,
2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled “March for Trump”).
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls
on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building).
11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000436, CTRL0000000436.0001,
CTRL0000000436.0002, CTRL0000000436.0003. CTRL0000000436.0004, CTRL0000000436.0005
(December 21, 2020, email re: Part II: FYSA - thread in OSINT research, attaching Donald.Win
screenshots).
12. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000091,
CTRL0000000091,0001, CTRL0000000091,0002, CTRL0000000091,0003, CTRL0000000091,0004,
CTRL0000000091,0005, CTRL0000000091,0006, CTRL0000000091,0007, CTRL0000000091,0008,
CTRL0000000091,0009 (January 5, 2021, Yogananda Pittman email to Steven Sund at
4:55 p.m. re: FW: Interest in Tunnels Leading to the US Capitol, attaching screenshots of
theDonald.win posts).
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60–61.
 APPENDIX 1 713

14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60–61.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), pp. 55, 57, 62.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 95.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 24.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995 (December 26, 2021,
email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO) Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021
(Online Tip)).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995 (December 26, 2021,
email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO) Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021
(Online Tip)).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: Fwd: "Armed and Ready, Mr. President": Demonstrators Urged to
Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 "Stop the Steal" Protest in DC, with attach-
ments).
714 APPENDIX 1
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020,
email re: 1/6 warning.).
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020,
email re: 1/6 warning.).
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John K. Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 54; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda
Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 42; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Sean Gallagher (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 37, 57.
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls
on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.)
31. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email from Shane
Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.).
32. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email from Shane
Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.).
33. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (FBI Production, Jan. 31, 2022). This document is not being
released due to national security concerns.
34. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000011 - PARLER_00000013 (Janu-
ary 2, 2021 email from Parler to FBI re: Another to check out).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 33–36.
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January
5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6 and
help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill secu-
rity guards, kill federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January
5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6 and
help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill secu-
rity guards, kill federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January
5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6 and
help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill secu-
rity guards, kill federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January 5, 2021, email
re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January 5, 2021, email
re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).
 APPENDIX 1 715

41. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Briefing by Steve Jensen, (Nov. 18, 2021). In an email sent by the FBI to the Select
Committee on November 8, 2021, the FBI stated that on December 27, the FBI created a
system to collect threats related to the “election certification” on January 6 by using a tag,
“CERTUNREST.” Despite making multiple requests for the number of guardians that were
tagged prior to January 6, the FBI did not provide a precise number. The FBI identified sev-
eral dozen guardians opened in advance of January 6th that included a reference to Janu-
ary 6, Washington D.C., and either the U.S. Capitol or a specific threat of violence.
42. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (FBI Production), CTRL0000930224 p. 23, (noting “Communication
and Establishment of a Quick Reaction Force by USPERs Related to an Identified Protest in
Washington, District of Columbia, on 6 January 2021”).
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Nov. 12, 2021).
44. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766,
CTRL0000001766.0001 (Document from January 3, 2021, titled: "Special Event Assessment:
Joint Session of Congress—Electoral College Vote Certification”); see also, Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp 51–52.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert O'Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), p. 19.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 31.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 235.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 40.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169–70.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169–70.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 45.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 18.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 26.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24.
57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000007104 (December 31,
2020, letter from Mayor Bowser to General William Walker).
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 30.
716 APPENDIX 1
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 78-79.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 63.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
62. See DC Mayor’s Office, “Mayor Bowers Provides Situational Update, 1/4/21,” YouTube, Jan.
4, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbZ07wdnQ-s; Julie Zauzmer Weil,
Marissa J. Lang, and Dan Lamothe, “National Guard Activated for D.C. Protests, with More
Restraints than in June, Officials Say,” Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-national-guard-protests-bowser/2021/01/04/220ced16-
4e8d-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 27–28.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 28.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p.66.
66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final Janu-
ary 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 14.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15. (emphasis added)
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 14–15.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9. 21–23.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p.125.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p.12.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 12–13. The result was an estimated 923
Capitol Police officers on the Capitol campus at 7 a.m. on January 6 (50% of strength), 1,214
officers at 2 p.m. (66%), and a total of 1,457 at some point during the day (79% of a total of
1,840 officers).
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 76.
 APPENDIX 1 717

79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 86.
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 87.
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43–44.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 237; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), Exhibit 38.
86. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 82–83; Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 194, 281.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81-82; See also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 236–37.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81–82.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43–44.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 202–04.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 88.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 206.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 41, 45–46.
95. See Chapter 4.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 157, 165–67.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 97–98; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 162.
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1—000017 (“On
January 3, 2021, during an interagency meeting hosted by the White House, the Department
of Justice was designated as the lead Federal agency for the planned First Amendment
demonstrations on January 5–6.”).
718 APPENDIX 1
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 46.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 168.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 83.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolfe, (Jan 29, 2022), pp. 48–49
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58–59.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58–59.
107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162
(Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at
7:12 AM).
108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
114. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000481288 (January 6, 2021 email at
8:17 AM referencing 2 magnetometers being surged); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Ser-
vice Production), CTRL0000495699 (January 6, 2021, email at 10:46 a.m re: Mags Update ref-
erencing 12 magnetometers, which means there were 10 earlier in the day).
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 24.
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), pp. 25–26, 30.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 28.
 APPENDIX 1 719

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 146.
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000481790 (January 6, 2021, email
to Robert Engel at 10:35 am).
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000536285 (January 6, 2021, email
forwarded by Robert Engel to Anthony Ornato at 11:32 am).
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 168.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000587
(January 6, 2021, email to Richard Donoghue at 10:43 am).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000621
(January 6, 2021, Jeffrey Rosen call list).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Torres, (Mar. 2, 2020), p. 80.
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000093384 (January 6, 2021, mes-
sage to PID agents at 12:00 p.m.).
130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000152321 (January 6, 2021, emails
at 12:20 p.m. and 1:34 p.m.).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000542477 (January 6, 2021, internal
email at 12:26 p.m.).
132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000087742 (January 6, 2021, Joint
Operations Center (JOC) email designating a response team at 1:14 pm).
133. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.
134. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6–7.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 7–8.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 8–9.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.
720 APPENDIX 1
139. This call, and subsequent coordination for National Guard assistance between various
entities is detailed in the National Guard appendix.
140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final Janu-
ary 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (noting the event at
1:06 p.m.).
142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (marking the event at
1:03 p.m.).
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sean Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 19.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 171.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).
148. For further details of the SUV incident, see Chapter 7.
149. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.
150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478.
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000496064.
152. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6–7.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111–12.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111–12.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Valerie Hasberry, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 59–61.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sean Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 8, 9, 22–25.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 155.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 72.
 APPENDIX 1 721

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73–74.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73–74.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 80.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 77.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 154.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 16-17.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
174. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.
175. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.
178. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff
reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 72–73.
180. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070377 (recording of Met-
ropolitan Police Department, Radio Transmission, from 1400–1500 hours).
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 61–62.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 179–80.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 180.
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 180–81.
722 APPENDIX 1
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 111; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 181.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 182.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey A. Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 176.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113–14.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113–14.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.
192. "Video Shows Pelosi Trying to Secure the Capitol," New York Times, (Oct. 13, 2022), available
at https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000008581029/jan-6-pelosi-video.html.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 15.
194. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1—000017.
195. ”D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser Press Conference on Capitol Protests Transcript January 6,” Rev,
(Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/d-c-mayor-muriel-
bowser-press-conference-on-capitol-protests-transcript-january-6.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 7.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 182.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 182–83.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 82.
200. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000512238 (January 6, 2021, email
at 4:42 p.m. noting “Hoosier going to call chief of Capital [sic] Police”).
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 190. Donoghue memorialized
this call in handwritten notes. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Produc-
tion), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard
Donoghue, 7:00 p.m.).
202. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614
(January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.).
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 116.
204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614
(January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.)
 APPENDIX 1 723

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 191.
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final Janu-
ary 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
207. United States Government Accountability Office, CAPITOL ATTACK: Additional Actions
Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations, 117th Cong., 2d
sess. (March 2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104829.pdf.
724 APPENDIX 2
DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO JANUARY 6TH
INTRODUCTION

H. Res. 503 Section 4(a) directs the Select Committee to examine the “facts,
circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the
Capitol,” including the “activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to intelligence col-
lection, analysis, and dissemination and information sharing among the
branches and other instrumentalities of government.” This appendix
focuses on the activities of the DC National Guard in the days leading up to
and on January 6, 2021.
In contrast to the National Guard units in 50 States and three territo-
ries, where deployment authority lies with the governor of those respective
jurisdictions, the DC Guard falls directly under the command of the United
States President. In the discussion section below, this appendix provides a
narrative of the preparations for and eventual deployment of the DC Guard
on January 6th, and the interaction between then-President Trump and the
DC Guard in the relevant time period. It is based on the Select Committee’s
interviews of 24 witnesses and review of over 37,000 pages of documents.

DISCUSSION

A “GUT-WRENCHING” SUMMER
The approval process for the deployment of the DC National Guard is
unique, unlike any of the 50 States or three territories across the country
where ultimate authority rests in the hands of the governor.1 In the nation’s
capital, where no governorship exists, the Guard is ultimately under the
command of the President of the United States when acting in its militia
capacity to support civil authorities.2 By executive order, however, Presi-
dent Richard Nixon delegated the President’s day-to-day control of the DC
Guard to the Secretary of Defense and specified that its Commanding Gen-
eral should report to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary’s designee.3
By memorandum, the Secretary of Defense, in turn, delegated day-to-day
control of the DC Guard to the Secretary of the Army.4 The commander of
the DC Guard reported directly to the Secretary of the Army on January 6,
2021.5
During the 2020 summer protests in response to the murder of George
Floyd,6 the approval process for Guard deployment ran smoothly. “Very,
very proactive,” then-Commanding General of the DC Guard William
 APPENDIX 2 725

Walker said.7 Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy “really wanted us out
there.” 8 Secretary McCarthy, with all his authorities, was physically beside
Major General Walker throughout that summer. “[H]e was with me for all
of it,” Major General Walker said.9 “He came to the [A]rmory every day. He
brought his staff with him.” 10 As has been widely reported, a number of
President Trump’s senior advisors, including Attorney General Bill Barr,
resisted President Trump’s requests to deploy the Guard or other troops in
various states and cities where violence had occurred or was underway.11
In the summer of 2020, nothing was being written down; it “was just
all verbal back and forth.” 12 That approach sped up response times. But as
the DC Guard footprint grew and controversies began plaguing the opera-
tion, Secretary McCarthy came away with the lesson that deliberative and
by written order beat fast and by oral command.13
“What we learned in the process was we were not capturing a lot of the
information in writing in the orders process, which is fundamental, foun-
dational because of the stress of the situation and the speed of the situa-
tion,” Secretary McCarthy said.14
While a concept of operations (“con-op”) was developed at the lower
level during the summer 2020 operations, it did not require approval or
input at the secretary level.15 That approach came to be seen as a mistake
that should not be replicated the next time there was a civil disturbance cri-
sis in the nation’s capital. General Walter Piatt, director of the Army staff,
explained: “That’s where Secretary McCarthy put that restriction to say, I
want a concept of the operation before we just send a force to do some-
thing.” 16
One of the most visible and highly criticized of the summer 2020 opera-
tions was the use of low-flying helicopters that appeared to be bearing
down on protesters with the aim of dispersing them. On June 1st, as Guard
presence tripled overnight, the use of helicopters meant for aerial surveil-
lance 17 “somehow got translated to a very competent Army officer that ‘I
am to fly low and loud to deter looters,’ ” General Piatt said.18 “[W]hat the
investigation revealed was that we did not have good procedures in place to
provide military support to a very serious civil disturbance ongoing. The—
because—the pilot of that aircraft believed that was his mission.” 19
The “embarrass[ment]” 20 of the low-flying helicopter affected Secre-
tary McCarthy. General Charles Flynn, then- deputy chief of staff for opera-
tions, plans, and training, told the Select Committee, “I know the Secretary
was concerned.” 21 He further explained: “I’m sure that affected his think-
ing.” 22
Secretary McCarthy became convinced that a concept of operations
needed to be “explicit, tailored” 23 and—most importantly—that it needed
to “come from [the] top down.” 24 Secretary McCarthy told his staff,
726 APPENDIX 2
“[W]hen we get a request next time, we have to be absolutely certain that
we understand the mission clearly,” 25 and that “no other civil authority
could re-mission off that support without the approval of either the Secre-
tary of the Army or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense.” 26
In mid-June 2020, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Secretary
McCarthy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and
Major General Walker huddled to talk about what went wrong in the pre-
ceding weeks. Senior defense officials then decided they would take a
“more active” role in directing the force.27 “[A]s a result, we all took a
more active interest in what was happening down to the tactical level to
make sure that we were, again, abiding by kind of the core principles of
civil-military relations,” former Secretary Esper said.28
Major General Walker said he was not told about that shift in perspec-
tive: “[I]f the Army thought different of how we respond to civil unrest,
civil disturbance, I would hope . . . they would communicate that with the
guy—with the person who is going to execute that change.” 29
In the words of General Milley, the summer of 2020 had been “a pretty
gut-wrenching experience.” 30 The Department of Defense was still recov-
ering when it was faced with the decision of the manner and degree to
which the DC Guard should provide assistance to law enforcement authori-
ties planning, just seven months later, for the events anticipated in connec-
tion with Congressional certification of the electoral votes on January 6,
2021.

A “Tailored” Request for Guard Resources. On December 19, 2020, President

Trump tweeted, “Big protest in DC on January 6th. Be there! Will be wild!”
From that day forward, a rookie DC intelligence analyst saw a tenfold uptick
in violent rhetoric targeting Congress and law enforcement.31 Right-wing
groups were sharing histories of violence and some not traditionally
aligned had begun coordinating their efforts.32 The analyst’s report reached
more senior DC leadership, including, eleven days later, Mayor Bowser.33 In
the course of the Committee’s investigation, it received and reviewed a sig-
nificant number of documents indicating that certain intelligence and law
enforcement agencies understood that violence was possible or even likely
on January 6th. The Committee received many of those materials from the
U.S. Secret Service, but also from other agencies as well.
On Thursday, December 31, 2020, the day after the briefing, Mayor
Bowser sent a letter to Major General Walker requesting Guard assistance
for January 5 and 6, 2021.34 A second letter specified the District’s request
as limited to two forms of assistance: crowd management at Metro stations
and blocking vehicles at traffic posts. It did not request help with potential
civil disturbance.35
 APPENDIX 2 727

General Piatt viewed the “limited request” 36 as a “pretty good, tailored

mission,” that was “not vague.” 37 General James McConville, chief of staff
of the Army, called the request appropriately “restricted” 38 with “a very
low military signature.” 39
According to testimony by Defense Department witnesses, after a sum-
mer of perceived overreach, military leadership was grateful for the delin-
eated parameters set by the city itself.
The substance of the request—limited to traffic and crowd control “so
they could have more police officers to do police functions” 40—was not
seen as narrow by District officials. “I would say it’s a specific request,”
Chief of DC Police (Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)) Robert Con-
tee said.41 “[L]eave the unlawful stuff, leave that to the police to deal
with.” 42 Mayor Bowser said: “I don't know any law enforcement person
who would suggest that urban disturbances aren’t best handled by the
police.” 43
“Civil disturbance was not something we requested at that time. Mostly
also because the vast majority of the, if not all, of the permitted protests
were taking place on Federal lands,” said Director of the DC Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Agency Christopher Rodriguez.44 The
District had no jurisdiction. “Mayor Bowser cannot make a request on
behalf of the White House or on behalf of the Capitol for U.S. Capitol—for
. . . DC National Guardsmen to deploy to those two entities. She can’t,”
Chief Contee said.45 At this time, it was well known that President Trump
had planned a speech and rally on “Federal lands”—on the Ellipse south of
the White House. It was not widely known that President Trump intended
to “spontaneously” instruct the tens of thousands of supporters at that
Ellipse rally to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.46

Five Days of “Tremendous Resistance”. At first, Secretary McCarthy was not

sold on involving the Guard at all. Major General Walker called Secretary
McCarthy “instantly when I got the letters” from the District on Thursday,
December 31st, and “initially I felt I must have caught him at a bad time.” 47
Secretary McCarthy recalls it being a short conversation. “I said, ‘okay, got
it. Thank you.’ You want to immediately flip it so that Secretary of Defense
knows that we alerted his office,” he said.48
According to Major General Walker’s account of this call, the Secretary
initially stated “‘We’re not doing it,’ ” 49 and then left the door open for
further discussion. Major General Walker explained: “‘I said, ‘Well, sir, I
think you should look at it.’ And then he told me, ‘Well, we’ll talk about it,
but we don’t really want to do this, because the look it would give, the mili-
tary out there interfering.’ . . . He says, ‘Well, we’ll discuss it on Mon-
day.’ ” 50
728 APPENDIX 2
On Sunday, January 3rd, Secretary McCarthy called Chief Contee, who
had formally assumed the role of acting head of MPD just the day before.51
“I thought initially that . . . he is just calling me basically as a rubber
stamp to say, . . . ‘You asked for it, you got it.’ . . . It didn’t go that way,”
Chief Contee said.52 “[H]e had concerns about deploying National Guard for
this event. He talked about the optics of the event, having boots on the
ground. . . . And I pushed back on that.” 53
In his interview with the Select Committee, Secretary McCarthy
described evaluating the request on the evening of January 3rd. “I sat at
home. I chewed on it,” he said.54 “You know, I'm not particularly inclined
to support it, because my concern was really we didn't have a command-
and-control architecture in place. We didn't really have all of the mecha-
nisms to be successful, you know. . . . So it was a very tough decision for
me.” 55
Over five days, from December 31st to January 4th, District officials
faced what Major General Walker called “tremendous resistance.” 56
Both Chief Contee and Director Rodriguez recalled that five-day period
on January 6th, when Chief Steven Sund, of the U.S. Capitol Police, was
pleading for reinforcements.57 Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller,
“heard through the grapevine that [Secretary McCarthy] was inclined—I
don't want to say inclined to disapprove, but, you know, looking at it care-
fully or whatever. So—but that's fine. He can do whatever he wants. I knew
that I was going to honor [the mayor’s] request . . . .” 58
How close those Guard assets could go to the Capitol became a sticking
point. Colonel Craig Hunter, the highest-ranking commander on the
ground on January 6th, said the Army “really want[ed] to go through the
concept of operations to see, okay, exactly—basically Metro stop by Metro
stop, intersection by intersection, to see where will Guardsmen be exactly,
you know, how close are you to the Capitol . . . .” 59 He said an initial request
by MPD to post Guard troops at the South Capitol Metro station—like all
other Metro stations—was denied.60 In conference calls that “went back
and forth,” 61 Major General Walker was told, “There was a concern about
being too close, military uniforms too close to the Capitol.” 62
Major General Walker had a different perspective. He saw his people as
“citizen soldiers,” “your neighbors that are going to come to your aid and
rescue when you need us,” 63—not traditional boots on the ground.
“[T]hat’s where, to me, the vest came in. This was the National Guard, not
the Army,” he said.64
Military authorities determined that a geographical boundary would
have to be established as a condition of approving the Guard’s deployment
to assist MPD. No servicemember could go east of Ninth Street. It wasn’t
made explicit to District officials, but they all knew what lay east. “[T]he
 APPENDIX 2 729

Capitol is east,” Chief Contee said.65 “[I]f you move them anywhere east of
Ninth Street, they will be close to the Capitol. That was certainly the way I
understood it.” 66
Director Rodriguez worried “that it constrained our ability to react
quickly if the situation got out of hand.” 67 Without the limitation, the Dis-
trict fully intended to post its resources farther east: “[W]e couldn't get as
close to the Capitol as could have been helpful,” Mayor Bowser said.68
“[W]e would have had a broader traffic box.” 69

Fears of Politicizing the Military in an Antidemocratic Manner. Both Acting Sec-

retary Miller and Secretary McCarthy were sensitive to the sight of troops
near the site of the Congressional certification of electoral votes, because of
President Trump’s previous expression of interest in using Federal troops
in civilian situations. Again, Attorney General Barr and other members of
the Trump Administration had resisted President Trump’s desire to deploy
such troops. Secretary Esper said it “tended to be the case . . . that the
President was inclined to use the military,” contrary to longstanding prin-
ciples of reserving the armed forces as a last resort.70
According to his testimony, Acting Secretary Miller’s express first
priority—after being installed with just two months left in the Trump
administration—was “to make every effort to return the Department of
Defense to a nonpoliticized entity,” because previously, “the Department
was being showcased too much.” 71 In testimony to the U.S. House Commit-
tee on Oversight and Reform on May 12, 2021, he cited “fears that the
President would invoke the Insurrection Act to politicize the military in an
antidemocratic manner” as shaping his thinking.72 “No such thing was
going to occur on my watch,” he wrote,73 later adding that “if I would have
put troops on Capitol Hill” before the attack and without a request from
civil authorities, “that would have been seen as extremely provocative, if
not supporting this crazy narrative that the military was going to try to
overturn the election.” 74
Secretary McCarthy felt similar pressure. He had been taken aback
when—as he was walking down the Pentagon’s hallways—“one of the
most seasoned reporters” asked him whether the Army was planning to
seize ballot boxes.75 It was “an incredibly tense period,” according to Sec-
retary McCarthy.76 As our investigation has demonstrated, President Trump
had considered proposals from Lt. General (ret.) Michael Flynn, Sidney
Powell, and others that troops be utilized to seize ballot boxes in certain
parts of the country.
On December 18, 2020—the same day as the contentious White House
meeting with Flynn and others,—Secretary McCarthy issued a statement,
“mirror[ing] what General Milley said about a month before,” 77 reiterating
that “There is no role for the U.S. military in determining the outcome of an
730 APPENDIX 2
American election.” 78 Given the heat of the rhetoric, he thought, “[I]f we
don't say anything, it's going to scare people.” 79 Secretary McCarthy told
the Select Committee he thought he would be fired after publicly stating
that the military would not assist in a coup.80 General McConville, who
signed the statement alongside Secretary McCarthy’s signature,81 linked
their words directly to the Ninth Street limitation: “[T]here was no plan to
put any military anywhere near the Capitol because of what we had said,
the military has no role in determining the outcome of elections.” 82
On January 1st, Executive Officer to Secretary McCarthy Colonel John
Lubas wrote in an internal email that the Secretary “wants to clearly com-
municate that this request is NOT from the White House.” 83 The email
noted that the Secretary wanted to “aggressively message” that the request
had come from District officials, not the President.84
“We wanted everybody to know that, because it would create confusion
and even more tension of having soldiers on the street without a request
and that they be near the Capitol with certification of an election, a con-
tested election,” Secretary McCarthy said.85
On January 3, 2021, 10 former Secretaries of Defense, including the
recently fired, former Secretary Esper, published a joint op-ed warning that
“[i]nvolving the military in election disputes would cross into dangerous
territory.” 86 Secretary McCarthy had himself worked for five of the 10 sec-
retaries.87 “I know all these [men],” he said.88 “[T]hey were—everyone was
telling us, be very conscious of your actions and how you—you know, what
you're going to do that day. So we wanted to know where every soldier was
by street corner.” 89
Was Secretary McCarthy concerned that President Trump might use the
military to cling to power? “There was a lot of talk in the lead-up about
martial law . . . and the employment of forces, and you know, that was
something that we were all, you know, conscious of.” 90 Our investigation
suggests that those civilian and military officials who had considerable
experience working directly with President Trump had genuine concerns
about whether he would attempt to use the military to change the election
results. Again, at this time, there is no evidence the Department of Defense
understood exactly what President Trump and his associates planned for
January 6th.

“Very Strict on the Use of the Military” on January 6th. By Monday, January 4th,
with Secretary McCarthy now backing the operation, Acting Secretary Miller
was briefed. He told the Select Committee that he “made the decision right
there to honor the request.” 91 That approval came with strings attached.
The role of the DC Guard would be spelled out and tightly circumscribed in
a memorandum that, as characterized by General Milley, was “very strict
on the use of the military.” 92 It decreed that without the Acting Secretary’s
 APPENDIX 2 731

“subsequent, personal authorization,” the Guard would not be issued

batons, helmets, or body armor; could not interact physically with protes-
tors, except in self-defense; and that the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)—40
servicemembers staged in case of an emergency at Joint Base Andrews in
Prince George’s County, Maryland—could be deployed only as a last
resort.93
Above the tactical level, changes in the mission of the Guard had to be
approved by the Secretary of the Army and, in some cases—in order to
“interact physically with protestors” or be issued batons—required run-
ning further up the chain to the Secretary of Defense.94
To District officials, that seemed new—and unnecessary. “[The Secre-
tary told us,] if you send them to any other kind of mission, that has to
get approval from me. And I just think that those were unnecessary restric-
tions . . .” Chief Contee said.95
What the QRF would be called upon to do, even in the case of an emer-
gency, is a matter of debate. The letter and memorandum do not expressly
note whether the QRF could be used to support the original mission of the
Guard—traffic and crowd control—or a new mission helping contain sud-
den and out-of-hand civil disturbance.96 The DC Guard official put in
charge of the QRF for January 5th and 6th, Lieutenant Colonel David
Reinke, said he had not been given much guidance as to their role.97
The Army and the DC Guard appear to have had different understand-
ings. “[T]he intent of the quick reaction force was really to send these
troops over to help if they had a problem at one of the traffic command
posts,” General McConville said.98 “There never was an intent for a quick
reaction force to go to the Capitol . . . .” 99 According to Army officials,
without a con-op and a formal change in mission, the QRF could do traffic
control and no more.
That was not how others imagined an emergency unit would or should
operate. According to Major General Walker, “a quick reaction force, some-
thing's happening; do I have time to find you and call you and ask you?” 100
He called the preapproval language “highly unusual,” 101 particularly as
their name “already implied that it's a last resort,” 102 their intended pur-
pose was if “[u]nexpectedly, you have a spontaneous unrest,” 103 and if “I
need to write a concept of operations for a quick reaction force? They're no
longer quick. It's just a reaction force.” 104

Capitol Police Board “Prepared” without Guard Help. It wasn’t clear to every-
one involved in planning for the events anticipated on January 6th that all
agencies, including the Capitol Police, were deploying all their resources
ahead of that day. “We had had issues understanding, getting the full pic-
ture of U.S. Capitol Police's operational posture and what their planning
was,” Director Rodriguez said.105
732 APPENDIX 2
Mayor Bowser was struck when—right before the press briefing that
Monday, January 4th—the mayor asked the Capitol Police representative,
“[W]here does your perimeter start? [And h]e gets up out of the room, calls
somebody. And the next thing I know he can’t participate in the confer-
ence.” 106 She elaborated: “[T]hat should have been like a trigger to me.
Like these people, they don't want to answer questions about their prepara-
tion.” 107
On the morning of January 3rd, Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund
approached two of the members of the Capitol Police Board and purportedly
requested—but concededly did not push for—Guard resources for the Capi-
tol.108 According to Chief Sund, in a minutes long meeting in the office of
House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving, Irving told Chief Sund he did not like
the optics of asking for the Guard in advance and that the intelligence did
not support it.109 Chief Sund said he did not push back on either point.110 In
fact, he agreed that his reading of the intelligence—despite a forewarning
put out by his own intelligence unit that “Congress was itself the target” on
January 6th 111—did not call for Guard support,112 only that having more
personnel on his perimeter would make him “more comfortable.” 113 Irving
suggested he talk to the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and then-chairman of the
Capitol Police Board, Michael Stenger.114 According to Irving, Stenger, in a
meeting in his office, asked Chief Sund to reach out to the Guard and find
out, if an emergency called for it, “how many people can [the commanding
general] give us and how quickly can he give us those people?” 115 Chief
Sund said he took their responses to mean “no,” despite conceding that he
was never told “you cannot have the National Guard” or anything to that
effect.116 “It was 100 percent a denial,” he maintained.117
Irving recalled the matter coming up on a three-way phone conference
during which “the consensus was that we didn’t need” the Guard.118 He did
not consider it a request.119 On the call, Chief Sund noted that the District
planned to use the servicemembers to staff intersections, but the Capitol
grounds had few of those, and it would not relieve many officers if they
were used in a similar fashion.120 “It was a combination of operationally the
chief didn't feel that they would add much to his plan, and the intelligence
really didn't speak for anything that we felt would justify the need for
them,” Irving said.121 Irving doesn’t recall taking the “optics” into consid-
eration.122 According to Irving, the conversation ended the same way Chief
Sund said it had: “Why don't you just tell them to be on standby?” Stenger
suggested.123 It was never brought up again.124
The discussion about the use of the Guard remained within the Capitol
Police Board and did not reach congressional leadership, including the
Speaker of the House. That was normal. “[F]rom a tactical perspective, we
would make decisions without the input from congressional leadership,”
 APPENDIX 2 733

Irving said.125 “I always felt that I had full authority to implement security
decisions as I deemed appropriate.” 126 In fact, when the three men briefed
congressional leaders on January 5th, Chief Sund conveyed the same opti-
mistic outlook as he had with Major General Walker: “[We told them] we
felt we were prepared based on the information we had, yes,” he said.127
To keep these exchanges in perspective, we note again that we are
aware of no evidence that these individuals were privy to President Trump’s
plans to instruct tens of thousands of his supporters to walk down Pennsyl-
vania Avenue to the Capitol to help “take back” their country. Nor were
they aware of how President Trump would suggest to his followers that Vice
President Pence had the authority to change the outcome of the election, or
how President Trump would behave in the hours that followed. Certain
members of Congress, including those who met at the White House on
December 21, 2020, may have had considerably more insight into President
Trump’s planning, but the Committee has no information suggesting that
any of those members alerted the Capitol Police or other authorities of
President Trump’s plans.

Soldiers Prepare for the Worst in Secret. Guard reinforcements could draw
from a pool of three groups already activated for the day: (1) the 40 mem-
bers making up the QRF, staged in Maryland; 128 (2) the 90 members at the
traffic control points, 24 at the Metro stations, and four as part of the com-
mand staff distributed throughout the city—but no farther east than Ninth
Street—for a total of 118 representing the first shift; 129 and (3) the second
shift of another 118 members,130 preparing at the Armory in Southeast
Washington, D.C, for a 3:00 p.m. shift takeover.131 The Armory also housed
a command-and-control squad that handled logistics at about 52 members
strong, in addition to a Civil Support Team of about 20 members.132 That
gave Colonel Hunter a maximum limit of 348 activated servicemembers,
eight more than the allotted 340—nearly all of whom reported directly to
him on January 6th.133
The QRF was most prepared for responding to sudden and escalating
civil unrest. At Joint Base Andrews, they were provisioned with full riot-
control kits,134 including a helmet with a face shield already attached, pro-
tective vest, shin guards, knee guards, shield, and baton.135 The head of the
QRF—himself provided little guidance on the contours of his mission—had
his squad train for civil disturbance on January 5th and the morning of the
6th as they waited.136 Not only had they trained, but they trained together,
as a unit—a benefit military officials all agreed is ideal. Army leadership, all
the way up to Secretary McCarthy,137 had no idea that Lt. Col. Reinke had
taken these initiatives. Secretary McCarthy agreed that had he known of
their civil disturbance preparation, “it could have” affected the speed with
which approval was ultimately given for their deployment.138
734 APPENDIX 2
As to the second group of available resources—the servicemembers sta-
tioned at traffic control points since the early morning of January 6th—
Army leadership held misconceptions about what equipment was available
to them. Secretary McCarthy had agreed that some gear—expressly not
batons—could remain stowed away in vehicle trunks.139 Colonel Hunter had
his troops put the gear into a white box truck instead and designated a rally
point for the truck that would be central to all traffic control points.140 On
the night of January 5th, in anticipation of January 6th, Colonel Hunter had
his troops move the civil disturbance gear—including the prohibited
batons—into the individual vehicles themselves.141 Captain Tarp, the head
of the second shift, agreed that they were told to load the equipment into
their vehicles “on the down low. Done so it wasn’t visible, so it wouldn’t
look like we were escalating [our] role.” 142
The commanding general of the DC Guard was aware that the troops
had all they needed in their trunks and—in the case of an emergency—
would not need to return to the Armory to get it: “They already had it,”
Major General Walker said.143
But Army leadership did not know that. Although General Piatt said
“We never asked, like, what was actually—I have no knowledge of what
they [actually] had in” the vehicles,144 the guidance from Secretary
McCarthy’s letter led him to believe that “weapons, ammunition, batons,
shields, kneepads, other protection that we may be asked to do for civil dis-
turbance, that was not [there]—because they were specifically told they
would not participate in that mission . . . .” 145 Secretary McCarthy said,
“The only thing I authorized General Walker to do was their ballistic hel-
mets and body armor in the vehicle, not their shields or their riot
batons.” 146 He figured his orders had been followed.147 When asked why he
was not aware of the moves the Guard had made, Secretary McCarthy said,
“I mean, I made a mistake. I think a local unit commander was anticipating
more than what potentially we were prepared for.” 148
DC Guard leadership understood that loading this equipment flouted
direct orders. “I wasn’t going to have my soldiers unprepared,” Major Gen-
eral Walker said.149 The prohibition on batons, in particular, had been sent
54 minutes after the Guard had already begun their traffic control shifts on
the morning of January 5th.150
The third group of available resources—the servicemembers awaiting at
the Armory to take over as the second shift at the traffic control points—
had equipment accessible to them at headquarters. Captain Tarp did note
that it took time to ensure that the Armory equipment was in working
order: repairing straps that were broken, wiping off dirt on the shields
because “they were the same from the George Floyd protests,” and affixing
the helmet to the shields, which took upwards of 20 to 30 minutes.151 In the
 APPENDIX 2 735

three different locations where the Guard was stationed as the Capitol was
being breached, all servicemembers had access to full civil disturbance gear
right there with them.
Outside of the QRF, which had recently returned from two days of
training together, there is debate as to how ready the rest of the Guard was
to engage in civil disturbance response on January 6th. The notion that the
military is not primed or naturally skilled to deal with civil disturbance
appears to stand in tension with National Guard traditions, training, and
doctrine. “They were not missioned, tasked, organized, equipped to do civil
disturbance operations,” General Flynn said.152 Although General Piatt con-
ceded that “[a]ll soldiers are trained in civil disturbance,” he maintained
that on “that day we were not postured to do civil disturbance opera-
tions.” 153
Major General Walker—who pointed out that the DC Guard shield, on
Guard troop uniforms, features the Capitol building itself: “Protect the
Capitol. That’s why Thomas Jefferson created it” 154—called civil distur-
bance “foundational” to what they do.155

DC Ground Commander Takes Initiative. On January 5th, as he led his forces in

traffic control, Colonel Hunter did not observe activity that raised con-
cerns.156 But by the next morning—as thousands of out-of-towners invited
by President Trump descended on the nation’s capital—that all changed. “I
could see like the Proud Boys,” he said.157 “I could see different people with
Kevlars on, with bulletproof vests on. You know, they're all kitted up and
they're wearing different patches and colors. And I said, ‘Well, this crowd is
definitely different . . . .’ ” 158 This, of course, was an indication of the
potential for violence in the hours that followed.
Colonel Hunter, sitting at the intersection of 15th Street and Pennsylva-
nia Avenue, saw crowds flowing past him and his soldiers toward the
Capitol—walking as one, chanting as one. “Hey, is it that way to the Capi-
tol? Where’s the Capitol?” some asked.159 Colonel Hunter got in his car and
began writing an update report.160
He was interrupted by a soldier who had been watching CNN on his
phone: “Hey, sir, I think there’s been shots fired at the Capitol.” 161 It was
then that Colonel Hunter began to put a plan in place for the redeployment
of the Guard. “So at that point in my mind I said, ‘Okay, then they will be
requesting the DC National Guard now, so we have to move.” 162 The time
was 2:12 p.m.163
The first thing he did was designate a rally point for DC Guard rein-
forcements.164 Over the radio, he relayed the rally point to all 118 members
currently spread across the city doing traffic control, and one by one, in
order by their points, they called in to acknowledge where they would go
once approval came down.165 At 2:17 p.m., he called Lt. Col. Reinke, the head
736 APPENDIX 2
of the 40-strong QRF, and ordered his subordinate to “have all of your guys
put their gear on and get on the bus.” 166 “In my mind, this is about to hap-
pen really fast,” he said.167 “As soon as I make one call, I will get clearance
to go and support. The United States Capitol was breached. I mean, this is
unheard of.” 168 Accordingly, he advised Lt. Col. Reinke that, “[W]e will be
getting a call soon.” 169
He next tried to find the incident command post. He ran into the Assis-
tant MPD Chief Jeffery Carroll, piled into a car and, sirens flipped on, sped
off to U.S. Capitol Police headquarters.170
Once there, they got into the elevator, and “before the doors even
closed,” Assistant Chief Carroll asked him, “How many do you have coming
right now?” 171 Colonel Hunter said, “I’m working on it. I need to make
some calls, but we are—we’re coming . . . . And I said, as soon as I start
making these calls, I’m going to have so many National Guardsmen just
flooding this way. I just need to have the location, have the plan set, be
ready to receive them.” 172
No later than 2:50 p.m., Colonel Hunter had confirmed with Lt. Col.
Reinke that the QRF was on the bus and ready.173 The highest-ranking
Guard official on the ground had sorted out all of the details and linked up
with the law enforcement agencies that would lead them in support. At
least 135 National Guard servicemembers—the 40 QRF members already in
gear and on the bus and the 90 at traffic control posts awaiting word, with
gear in their trunks to be donned at the rally point, along with four com-
mand staff plus Colonel Hunter himself—were ready to go. At 3:10 p.m.,
Colonel Hunter felt it was time to tell his superiors all that he had done and
hopefully get fast approval.174

3 Hours and 19 Minutes At the Capitol, MPD Chief Contee was on the West
Front, himself inhaling chemical agents—“you can smell it before you see
it, felt it in my throat” 175—as officers tried to resist rioters beating back
the perimeter, having reached the stage built for the Inauguration set for
two weeks later. “[T]he gas stuff and the spray, the mist that’s in the air, I
mean, it’s real,” he said.176 “I'm trying to talk to the Mayor to give her a
situational update, and the city administrator—I've got them both on the
line. I’m coughing, trying to explain what's going on.” 177 Chief Contee cut
through the crowds of people around the Capitol to meet the mayor at MPD
headquarters.178
Chief Sund said he reached out to House Sergeant at Arms Irving at
12:57 or 12:58 p.m., and told him, “We are getting overrun on the West
Front by thousands. We need the National Guard now.” 179 Irving recalled
the call coming before a break in the electoral certification session just
short of 1:30 p.m. and that the Chief said “that conditions were deteriorat-
ing outside and he might be making a request for the National Guard.” 180
 APPENDIX 2 737

Although Irving was firm in his stance that only the Capitol Police Board
had the authority to request National Guard assistance, he nonetheless
sought out the chief of staff to the Speaker to inform her of the impending
request.181 He did not need her to sign off, but “[a]ny change in security
posture, given the time, I would give them a heads-up.” 182
The Speaker’s chief of staff “immediately scribbled down a note” and
went over to inform the Speaker—who was in the chair presiding over the
floor debate on the Arizona objections—about the request for the National
Guard.183 “Absolutely. Go,” Speaker Nancy Pelosi said.184 Later, as they were
evacuating the floor to an undisclosed location, the Speaker asked her, “Is
the National Guard coming?” 185 The Speaker’s chief of staff said, “Yes, we
asked them.” 186
Irving said the formal request for Guard assistance came in a call after 2
p.m. from Chief Sund “and, of course, we said absolutely.” 187 Chief Sund
said he had made the request in that earlier 12:57 or 12:58 call and had been
waiting for 71 minutes.188 “I hung up the phone. I yelled across the com-
mand center, [‘M]ark the time, 2:10, I finally got approval from the Capitol
Police Board for the use of the National Guard,’” Chief Sund said.189
At around 2:30 p.m., Director Rodriguez patched Chief Contee—and a
largely silent Mayor Bowser listening in 190—into the conference call with
Chief Sund and Major General Walker, who brought in General Piatt.191
Major General Walker ordered his aide-de-camp on his second day on the
job, Lt. Timothy Nick, to take handwritten notes of the call and the rest of
the day.192
On the line at the Pentagon—gathered around the speaker of the Secre-
tary of the Army’s desk phone—were General Piatt, General McConville,
and Secretary McCarthy.193 According to Secretary McCarthy, it was during
the call that he learned the Capitol had been breached,194 watching it unfold
in real time on television.195 He didn’t recall hearing Chief Sund’s voice on
the call, but said “we were trying to get . . . what we call the operational
sight picture. What is going on? How big is the crowd? How violent is the
crowd? . . . They started laying out really the—just how bad it was.” 196 Sec-
retary McCarthy resolved to run to the office of Acting Secretary of Defense
Miller, leaving behind instructions to General Piatt to “find out the require-
ments,” as he was “going to get the authority.” 197 “[W]e go zipping down
there,” General McConville said.198 As they were leaving, General Flynn
showed up.199
General Flynn said, “when I came by the phone,” he “heard voices
screaming on the end.” 200 He called the tones of their voices as “cha-
otic” 201 and that “[y]ou couldn’t tell who was talking sometimes.” 202 Chief
Sund was pleading for help. “I want to say he even used the word, like, ‘I
738 APPENDIX 2
am pleading,’” Chief Contee said.203 Col. Matthews, listening in beside
Major General Walker, said of Chief Sund: “His voice was cracking. He was
almost crying.” 204
According to Chief Contee, the reaction to his pleas was “tepid.” 205 “It
was a very sluggish response,” Chief Contee said.206 “I remember just, you
know, with all that was going on, not hearing a ‘yes,’ you know, just . . .
what I would in my mind qualify as, like, excuses and not decisive action . . .
I was hearing, like, all the reasons, you know, why we shouldn't be doing
this.” 207 Director Rodriguez called it a “kind of bureaucratic” response in
the midst of “a rapidly evolving situation where literally the Capitol was
being overrun.” 208 He added: “I don't want to use the word disinterested,
but more just, ‘let’s just hold on. Let’s just wait. Let’s just kind of calm
down for a second while literally Rome is burning.’ ” 209
For his part, General Flynn depicted General Piatt—the main
interlocutor—as “the calming voice in an otherwise chaotic situation.” 210
General McConville agreed: “I talked to some of my staff, and they said that
General Piatt did an incredible job. He was like the—you know, in a very
calm [voice], just saying, ‘let’s just settle . . . .’ ” 211
But Major General Walker said he “just couldn't believe nobody was
saying: ‘Hey, go.’ ” 212 He asked the generals on the other line, “‘Aren't you
watching the news? Can't you see what's going on? We need to get there.’
And [I was] cognizant of the fact that I'm talking to senior . . . people, but I
could see what was happening . . . .” 213 Chief Sund was “perplexed” and
“dumbfounded.” 214 “It wasn’t what I expected of, yeah, the cavalry's com-
ing. It was a bunch of, round-the-house, oh, hey, let’s do this, let’s do
that,” he said.215 “I was borderline getting pretty pissed off.” 216
Many participants on the call say General Piatt’s stated concern was the
optics of sending troops to the site of a democratic process.
“[T]he infamous talk about optics. That came up again. There was talk
about boots on the ground again. You know, that's not good optics, having
boots on the ground,” Chief Contee said.217 He recalled how Secretary
McCarthy had vocalized the same hesitance during the five-day delibera-
tion preceding January 6th.218
Director Rodriguez believed General Piatt replied to the request by say-
ing, “[W]e don’t like the optics of having military personnel at the Capitol
against peaceful protesters.” 219
He recalls Chief Contee replying bluntly, “[W]ell, they're not peaceful
anymore.” 220
Major General Walker heard one of the Army generals say it “wouldn’t
be their best military advice or guidance to suggest to the Secretary that we
 APPENDIX 2 739

have uniformed presence at the Capitol.” 221 He added: “They were con-
cerned about how it would look, the optics.” 222 Chief Sund heard the gen-
eral use the word twice.223 “General Piatt said—and I will never forget
this—‘Yeah, I don't know. I'm concerned about the optics of the National
Guard standing a line with the Capitol in the background,’” Chief Sund
said.224 “[M]y officers are getting beaten, and they're worried about the
optics of the National Guard.” 225
Although General Piatt denies explicitly using the word “optics”—“I
don't recall ever saying that word on that phone call, because at the time it
just wasn't important” 226—he agreed that he said use of the Guard was
“not my best military judgment or my best military advice.” 227 He said he
“made a couple of suggestions that were not well-received,” 228 including
“if there was any other facility where we could go and relieve police . . . I
think they took that as I was saying no, because they immediately came
back and said, you’re denying our request.” 229
General McConville—who wasn’t present at the time—said he talked to
people in the room about the use of the word “optics,” and “some people
said, ‘No, it wasn’t said.’ And then some people said it was said.” 230 None-
theless, the sentiment behind it should not be a particularly controversial
one, according to General McConville. “People like to use optics—I'm going
to stay away because that's a political term in my eyes. But what type of
signature do you want on the streets in Washington, DC? Do you want a
police signature? Do you want a military signature? Do you want a Federal
signature?” he said.231 “[T]hat creates a reaction from the American people,
and we need to think our way through that . . .” 232
On the call, talk of needing a plan—the so-called con-op that had been
a lesson learned from the summer—emerged. “[A]fter the optics, . . . then it
was, you know, they wanted, like, specific information. There was some-
thing they were talking about, like, mission and . . . what exactly they're
going to be doing when they get there,” Chief Contee said.233 Before run-
ning off, Secretary McCarthy had instructed General McConville to put
together a plan: “My charter, my direction from him is to get a plan. We’re
gonna support; I just wanted to get something to support with.” 234 But he
acknowledged the impression nonetheless remained that he was “denying
or pushing back.” 235
That impression was made explicit: “They said three times to me
clearly, ‘You’re denying my request,’” General Piatt said.236
Chief Contee interrupted “Chief Sund mid-sentence” and said, “Wait a
minute. Hold up. Let me make sure that I understand this correctly . . . [A]re
you asking for support from the National Guard at the U.S. Capitol?” 237
Chief Sund said, “Yes.” 238
740 APPENDIX 2
Chief Contee then addressed the Army generals: “‘Are you guys honor-
ing his request?’ I asked them that. And they didn't say ‘no,’ but they also
didn't say ‘yes.’ ” 239 Chief Sund recalled it the same way.240
General Piatt said he was “clear in my response, ‘I don't have any
authority to deny or approve. The Secretary is getting approval.’ ” 241
“[T]he third time when they said, ‘You're denying our request,’ they
also said, ‘And we're going to go to the media,’” General Piatt said.242
“[W]e were desperate. Everyone was desperate. So I’m not angry at that,
but I just knew it wasn’t helpful, so we told that to Secretary McCarthy.” 243
As for the threat to go public, Major General Walker said, “I remember
that very clearly.” 244 According to him, after the generals would not say yes
or no, “Chief Contee says: ‘I’m going to call the mayor and ask her to have
a press conference saying that the Army is not going to allow the DC Guard
to come and support.’ ” 245 General Piatt reportedly replied, “Please don't
do that. I don't have the authority to authorize the National Guard to go. So
please don't do that. Please don't hold the press conference.” 246 Chief Con-
tee doesn’t recall saying that.247 Mayor Bowser doesn’t know if she was still
on the line when the remark was made, but “it was certainly going to be
something that I would do.” 248
In the end, “the call sort of ended very abruptly, . . . .” 249 The DC head
of homeland security and emergency management left the call thinking
“that help was not coming, and—at least [not] from the National
Guard.” 250 That was Chief Sund’s belief, too. “[I]f a general says his troops
are not coming, his troops aren't coming,” he said.251
Before the call ended, General Flynn set up a video-conferencing bridge.
General Piatt explained to the Select Committee that this was meant “to get
the principals and the team together to start making a plan.” 252 But Major
General Walker—under whom “it was actually written . . . would maintain
control of National Guard forces” 253—said he was not privy to any plan-
ning while on the call.
“We were just told to hold,” he said.254
How long did Major General Walker hold?
“Three hours and 19 minutes,” he said.255
Major General Walker told the Select Committee regarding what
occurred during this time. “[W]e all thought, it’s in a minute, we're going
to be told to go, in a minute. Then 5 minutes, then 10 minutes, then 15
minutes. We kept thinking, any minute now, somebody is going to say
‘go,’ ” he said.256 “And then an hour went by, then more time went by . . . .
But we never thought it would take that long.” 257 Col. Matthews confirmed
that there were periods on the call when no one was talking.258 At times,
there was talk of securing buildings other than the Capitol.259 He called the
open channel essentially “a general officer chat line.” 260
 APPENDIX 2 741

What did Major General Walker think was happening in those 3 hours
and 19 minutes?
“Delay.” 261

An Absent Commander-in-Chief. Vice President Mike Pence called several

times to check in on the delayed response of the Guard. President Trump
did not.
Vice President Pence called Acting Secretary Miller at least two times.262
“He was very animated, and he issued very explicit, very direct, unambigu-
ous orders. There was no question about that,” General Milley said.263 “And
he said, ‘Get the National Guard down here. Get them down here now, and
clear the Capitol.’ You know, and this is the Vice President of the United
States. And there was other forceful language.’ ” 264
Acting Secretary Miller clarified that “he did not order me,” as “he’s
not in the chain of command,” but he considered the talk with the Vice
President “[h]yper professional” and “[v]ery focused,” in which the secre-
tary “highlighted that District of Columbia National Guard . . . was acti-
vated, and we were throwing every asset we could marshal to support law
enforcement.” 265
In contrast, according to General Milley, Chief of Staff Meadows called
and said, “‘We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making
all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative, you know, that the
President is still in charge and that things are steady or stable,’ or words to
that effect. I immediately interpreted that as politics, politics, politics.” 266
President Trump himself did not call. As reports of Departments of
Defense denials and delay were echoing in the media, no high-level Defense
official—including Secretaries Miller 267 and McCarthy 268—received a call
from him that day.269 At the time, General Milley thought that was “abso-
lutely . . . highly unusual.” 270
“[Y]ou're the Commander in Chief. You've got an assault going on on
the Capitol of the United States of America, and there's nothing? No call?
Nothing? Zero?” he said.271 “I grew up in an organization where command-
ers are responsible and take charge and they see situations unfolding and
they issue orders and take charge.” 272
On January 3rd, at the end of a national security meeting concerning a
foreign threat, the President asked “in passing” about January 6th prepa-
rations.273 Acting Secretary Miller informed him they would be fulfilling
Mayor Bowser’s request for DC Guard support.274 From then on, if not ear-
lier, the secretary “felt like I had all the authorities I needed and did not
need to discuss anything with the President regarding authorities.” 275 The
conversation lasted all of 30 seconds to a minute.276 Secretary Miller testi-
fied that he never received any order at any time from President Trump to
742 APPENDIX 2
deploy the National Guard on January 6th. “There was no direct—there was
no order from the President,” he said.277
On January 5th, as demonstrators rallied in support of the President,
Acting Secretary Miller received a call from the commander-in-chief.278
The President asked him if he was watching the events on television.279 The
secretary told him he had caught some of the coverage.280
Unprompted, President Trump then said, “You’re going to need 10,000
people” the following day, as in troops.281 An email sent by Chief of Staff
Meadows on January 5th explicitly noted that the DC Guard would be on
hand to “protect pro Trump people.” 282 The President and his staff
appeared to be aware of the likelihood of violence on the day the election
certification of his loss was slated to transpire. This communication from
President Trump contemplated that the Guard could support and secure the
safety of Trump supporters, not protect the Capitol. At that time, Secretary
Miller apparently had no information on what President Trump planned for
January 6th.
Acting Secretary Miller thought the 10,000 number was astronomical—
“we expected 35,000 protesters . . . [and] even if there were more protesters
than expected, [we thought] that local law enforcement could handle
it” 283—but, again, this was “no order from the President,” just “President
Trump banter that you all are familiar with.” 284

Parallel Plans in the Midst of Crisis. While the Army and the District engaged
in the “heated” 285 2:30 p.m. phone call, Secretary McCarthy was hurrying
down the Pentagon hallways to Acting Secretary Miller’s office. General
Milley had been summoned there before Secretary McCarthy arrived with
General McConville in tow,286 “running down the hall, and he was actually
winded when he showed up . . .” 287
The next half hour was spent in “a quick, rapid fire meeting, [with] lots
of quick questions.” 288 Secretary McCarthy—out of breath—said he started
by saying, “We've got to go. We've got to get something—we've got to put
every capability we can up there.” 289 The response he received was, “They
were all kind of, like, ‘Slow down. What's going on?’ They wanted to get a
sense of the situation.” 290 Secretary McCarthy said it took about 15 to 20
minutes to “relay this,” “laying out what I thought we needed to do.” 291
By 3:04 p.m., Acting Secretary Miller said he approved deployment of
the DC Guard to assist law enforcement at the Capitol at that time.292 Acting
Secretary Miller did not understand why Major General Walker—if he felt
the exigency demanded it—did not deploy troops as soon as his 3 p.m.
order allowed it. “Why didn’t he launch them? I'd love to know,” he said.293
Secretary McCarthy agreed “that’s where we may have talked past each
other in his office,” because Secretary McCarthy thought he “had the
 APPENDIX 2 743

authority as the Secretary of the Army” to conduct a mission analysis and

send troops at his discretion, not that of Major General Walker.294
Major General Walker himself understood he had to wait for approval
from Secretary McCarthy to deploy his forces. But as he waited on that video
call for hours, he did strongly consider sending them anyway. He turned to his
lawyer and said, “Hey, you know what? You know, we’re going to go, and
I'm just going to shoulder the responsibility.” 295 According to Major Gen-
eral Walker, his lawyer responded, “What if you get sued?” 296 Colonel
Mathews, that lawyer, “told him not to do that. Just hold on.” 297 The Guard
officials located with Major General Walker at the Armory all say he seri-
ously contemplated aloud the possibility of breaking with the chain of com-
mand.
“Should we just deploy now and resign tomorrow?” was how Lieuten-
ant Nick recalled Major General Walker bluntly putting it.298
“I would have done just that,” Major General Walker said, “but not for
those two letters” 299 from his superiors curtailing Guard redeployment.300
The man who signed one of the letters, however—himself a former
member of the DC Guard 301—now says Major General Walker should have
moved forward regardless of whether he had proper authorization.
“I've launched QRF without approval more than once,” Acting Secretary
Miller said.302 “If you’re the person on the ground in the Army, and you
realize that there’s something that is unpredictable or unexpected and you
have the ability to influence it, the culture, the training, the education, the
expectation of you, the American people, is that you will execute and do
what you can, even if it costs you your job.” 303
After authorization at 3:04 p.m., Secretary McCarthy said he gave Major
General Walker a call. He told him to “[m]obilize the entire Guard, bring
everybody in. . . . And I said, you know, move the QRF to the armory and get
as many people as you can to the armory and configure them in a minimum
of riot gear and batons. And then we’re going to do a mission analysis of
what we need to do with the police . . . .” 304 Major General Walker “cat-
egorically denies” that any such call took place.305 In fact, Major General
Walker said the two men did not talk at all until much later that night.306
“Here’s the bottom line. The Secretary was unavailable to me, and he never
called me,” Major General Walker said.307
Beginning around 3:00 p.m., 25 minutes of Secretary McCarthy’s time
was spent reassuring members of Congress that the Guard was indeed com-
ing,308 although he had not yet conveyed the order. That was time unspent
on facilitating their actual coming. In addition to the alleged threat on the
2:30 p.m. call, a media tweet had gone out at 2:55 p.m. declaring that the
Department of Defense had denied requests for Guard support.309
744 APPENDIX 2
By 3:45 p.m., Secretary McCarthy was done with his calls and—after
picking up some things from his office—headed down to the MPD head-
quarters to draft a con-op beside law enforcement.310 Acting Secretary
Miller arrived at 4:10 p.m.311
While he was waiting, Colonel Hunter decided he would keep the first
shift handling traffic control out at their posts in case they were needed for
re-mission by the MPD, relying instead only on the QRF and the second
shift at the Armory to respond to the Capitol.312 Those servicemembers
ended up manning their traffic control posts up to 20 hours straight.313
Army leadership never found out that the servicemembers at the traffic
control posts didn’t end up responding to the Capitol that night, incorrectly
crediting some of the Guard’s delay that day to their travel time.314
By 3:50 p.m., the QRF had arrived at the Armory, bringing their own
equipment, given no new information upon making the extra pit stop there
instead of the Capitol.315 They were ready to go, steeped in “a lot of
nerves.” 316 The second shift of servicemembers originally missioned for
traffic control had been told as early as 2:30 p.m. to expect a switch in mis-
sion to handling civil disturbance.317 They rushed to gear up and prepare,
but it was a lot of “hurry up and wait.” 318 Not long afterward, “we’re all
ready. Now we’re all donned. So go sit on the bleachers and wait . . . We
were in a tight holding pattern until the time to deploy.” 319
At around the same time, at 3:49 p.m., Speaker Pelosi is heard in video
footage from that day urging Acting Secretary Miller to hurry.
“Just pretend for a moment this was the Pentagon or the White House
or some other entity that was under siege,” she told him over the phone
while she—and the rest of the Congressional leadership—were huddled in a
secure location.320 “Just get them there!” 321
When Secretary McCarthy arrived at MPD headquarters, he joined Chief
Contee, his Army Operations Director Brigadier General Chris LaNeve, and
Assistant Chief Carroll by phone.322
In the next 20 minutes, Secretary McCarthy developed a con-op.
As Secretary McCarthy had decided after the summer, crafting a strat-
egy was his job—“I was doing it with the Mayor, the police chief, and the
deputy director of the FBI, my counterparts, and then ultimately wanted to
understand what our role would be, the conditions”—and afterward, “we
turned to [Major General Walker] to work the tactical details for that.” 323
But Major General Walker said, “If I need you to tell me how to execute
a civil disturbance mission,” he “[s]hould relieve me. Should fire me.” 324
It wasn’t until later, post-January 6th, that Major General Walker said
he found out that Secretary McCarthy, his boss, had been putting together a
con-op—without him. “Then later they said they had to put together a plan
 APPENDIX 2 745

for me to execute . . . which I found kind of disturbing,” Major General

Walker said.325 “You're coming up with a plan without me being involved in
the plan?” 326
General McConville agreed that “usually[,] the Secretary of Army is not
developing concepts for the employment, but because of the situation that
wasn’t done,” so the secretary had to fill in the gap.327 That, of course—
given the preparations Colonel Hunter had laid out hours earlier—was not
true. But Secretary McCarthy did not know that.328
He said Major General Walker never told him about how Colonel Hunter
had prepared and that it was his responsibility to tell him.329 “I don't talk
to troop lead commanders, no,” he said.330
Ultimately, no plan from Army leaders—strategic or tactical—made it
to the troops.
“[I]f they came up with a plan, they never shared it with us,” Major
General Walker said.331 “They claim they were putting a plan together. That’s
what took so long. I never saw a plan from the Department of Defense or the
Department of the Army.” 332
Colonel Hunter agreed that “[n]o one ever told me, because I already
had the plan there, and no one ever informed me that there was a different
plan or a different [con-op].” 333 He said to the extent a “hasty plan” was
put into action on January 6th, it was his: “I created the concept of opera-
tion.” 334 He added: “The [plan] that was actually used as far as which lot
they would come into, who would meet them at the lot, and then who
would lead them over to the Capitol. That was between myself and MPD and
Capitol Police.” 335
After hours of wait, Major General Walker said, “The plan was executed
just like we said it would be [from the start], get to the Capitol, take direc-
tion from the ranking police officers there . . . to help restore order.” 336
Colonel Hunter passed the details of his hasty plan onto Lt. Col. Reinke—
the highest ranking officer at the rally point—letting him know, “Hey,
when you pull into this lot, they will meet you there. This is who is—you
know, you’re going with these personnel,” exactly what Secretary McCarthy
had just spent 20 minutes putting together.337
Although Lt. Col. Reinke said his QRF servicemembers were given rules
of engagement before arriving at the rally point, he was not told more than
report to Capitol Police and supplement and assist them.338
Captain Tarp, outranked by Lt. Col. Reinke but in charge of the second
shift, was merely told by Brigadier General Ryan: “‘You need to act like
there’s a fire now. You’re going to [the] Capitol.’ Those were his direc-
tions.” 339
746 APPENDIX 2
After an hour and a half spent in calls, travel, and making plans, Secretary
McCarthy was prepared to green light the deployment of the Guard at 4:35 p.m.
But miscommunication led to another half-hour delay.
Secretary McCarthy relayed the “go” order to Major General Walker—
with his subordinate Brigadier General LaNeve serving as the
intermediary—in a conversation Major General Walker said never hap-
pened.
According to Secretary McCarthy, Brigadier General LaNeve “wasn’t a
junior aide.” 340 In his role, “he can speak, once given the authority, del-
egated authority to speak as the Sec Army . . .” 341 He said that the first-star
officer “was standing next to me,” 342 and General Piatt said that it was
generally “not uncommon” for him to ask his staff to “transmit [the] com-
munication from the Secretary to General Walker.” 343
For his part, Brigadier General LaNeve denies that he himself conveyed
the “go” order.344 He said he spoke with Major General Walker first at 4:25
p.m. to tell him that his forces should, “Get on the bus, do not leave.” 345 On
a second call at 4:35 p.m., Brigadier General LaNeve said he overheard Sec-
retary McCarthy himself convey the “go” order to Major General Walker:
He said something “to the effect of ‘You’re approved to provide sup-
port.’ ” 346 Secretary McCarthy, on his part, said he never spoke a word.347
Brigadier General LaNeve said the secretary then again handed him the
phone to convey the details of “where to go and what officer to meet up
with.” 348 Those two details would be the full extent of the “con-op” alleg-
edly communicated to Major General Walker.349 He even recalled Major
General Walker saying, “Roger,” to acknowledge the plan.350 But, Brigadier
General LaNeve said, there was “mass confusion in that room,” and he
agreed that “[t]here were huge communications problems.” 351
Major General Walker said there was no such call, nor any like it.352 He
said he remained on the video conference line the whole time “with every-
body else,” he said.353 He said he would not have taken an order from
Brigadier General LaNeve anyhow. “[W]hy would I ever take directions
from General LaNeve? Anybody? Brigadier General LaNeve, one-star,”
Major General Walker said.354 “I mean, he’s not a peer, it wouldn’t be
somebody that would convey that type of message to me. . . So my thinking
wouldn’t have been that he would have been speaking on behalf of the Sec-
retary.” 355
Although his staff confirms they didn’t see him field a call from Secre-
tary McCarthy or Brigadier General LaNeve,356 including never seeing him
leave their conference room,357 Major General Walker’s own note taker
appears to have jotted down at 4:37 p.m. the following: “advised to sent
[sic] 150 to establish D st / 1st outer perimeter, General LaNeve,” beside
what appears to be his phone number.358 That address is the rally point
 APPENDIX 2 747

Secretary McCarthy had asked General LaNeve to convey, the same one
Colonel Hunter and law enforcement had already chosen earlier. Major
General Walker said, “the only way [Lt. Nick] could have got it was listening
to the VTC, which I was on.” 359 He further said, “I never saw General
LaNeve on the [video teleconference] . . . I didn’t hear General LaNeve’s
voice.” 360 Lt. Nick said he had it penned at much later—at 5:09 p.m.—“as
the time they received the orders” to deploy.361
Major General Walker certainly did not act as if he had been given
authority until, fortuitously, General McConville—who had heard about the
4:35 p.m. call—walked by the teleconference screen and was “surprised” to
see the commanding general sitting idly at 5:09 p.m.362
Major General Walker agreed the first time he heard he had the author-
ity was from the lips of the general: “General McConville came back into
the call and said, Hey, you’re a go.” 363
Lt. Col. Reinke’s QRF and Captain Tarp’s second shift got on the bus at
5:10 p.m.364 They left at 5:15 p.m.365 Lt. Col. Reinke said they didn’t arrive at
the Capitol Police parking lot until 5:55 p.m.,366 although official timing
from the Army and Department of Defense put their arrival time at 5:40
p.m. and from the DC Guard at 5:20 p.m.367 At the earliest, the troops
arrived in the vicinity of the Capitol grounds at 5:29 p.m., when Lt. Col.
Reinke texted Colonel Hunter: “Apparently we pulled into the wrong lot,
trying to reroute to LOT 16 now.” 368 He said they sat around for 20 minutes
once they arrived, and then were sworn in, before relieving an entire line of
officers.369 Captain Tarp said they remained idle for 45 minutes waiting for
Capitol Police to come “bus by bus to swear-in the officers. It was a long
wait. Frustrating—we’re sitting a mile from where we[’re] going.” 370
Captain Tarp said, “By the time we got there, we were just holding back
the people who remained past the curfew.” 371 The height of the riot had
passed.
Colonel Hunter estimated that—had his preparations been approved—
the DC Guard could have arrived as early as an hour and a half earlier than
they did.
“Within one hour, I'd say I could’ve had 135. So the [about 40] coming
from Joint Base Andrews, if they would’ve headed directly to me at the
Capitol, and then the 90 I had on the street and the 4 that were—including
myself,” he said.372 “[S]o I arrived at the Capitol at 3:10. So, if I would’ve
recalled everyone by 3:30, 3:40, we could've been—had gear on and walk-
ing towards the Capitol.” 373
He further stated: “I would give them another hour. So by 4:40 I
should've had at least 250 coming from the Armory . . . That includes the
second shift as well as full-timers.” 374
748 APPENDIX 2
Presented with the plans Colonel Hunter had set in motion and the easy
accessibility of their equipment, neither of which he had known about at
the time, Secretary McCarthy conceded “you could have shaved min-
utes,” 375 and the speed of deployment “could have” been pushed up, but
“[i]t depends.” 376
When the Guard finally arrived at the Capitol, “pretty much all the
other fighting, per se, had stopped on the Capitol complex,” according to
Robert Glover, head of the MPD Special Operations Division.377 Then-
Inspector Glover received the Guard troops when they arrived.378 “[T]he
bus just kind of showed up. It was my decision at that point, looking at their
numbers and their capabilities at that moment in time and what was the
most pressing activity—and that was to make the arrests,” he said.379 He
had them create a secure “prisoner cordon” where they could stand guard
as arrested individuals waited transport to jail.380 “They were the freshest
personnel that we had at that moment in time. And, again, they didn't have
any significant numbers to really do much else at that moment in time
either,” he said.381 “[T]heir orders were basically, support us in whatever
we told them to do . . .” 382
Secretary McCarthy said that it was possible that DOD and DC National
Guard leaders had simply not been coordinating their planning.383 He
acknowledged that “a lot of things were probably missed. It was tremen-
dously confusing,” 384 and “that makes for a messy response.” 385
No one within the Department of Defense, Army, or Guard leveled accu-
sations of an intentional delay. “I didn't see anybody trying to throw sand
in the gearbox and slow things down,” General Milley said.386
Major General Walker said the Army’s reluctance to approve National
Guard assistance to the Mayor during the planning for the anticipated
January 6th events continued through January 6th itself.387 “I don’t know
where the decision paralysis came from, but it was clearly there. The deci-
sion paralysis, decision avoidance,” he said.388

CONCLUSION

Former President Trump’s eagerness to engage the U.S. military to play a

visible role in addressing domestic unrest during the late spring and sum-
mer of 2020 does appear to have prompted senior military leadership to
take precautions, in preparing for the joint session, against the possibility
that the DC Guard might be ordered to deploy for an improper purpose.
Those precautions seem to have been prudential as much as legal in nature.
What that entailed in the unprecedented circumstances of the January
6th attack on the Capitol is, however, harder to accept: a 3 hour and 19
 APPENDIX 2 749

minute lag-time in making a relatively small, but riot-trained and highly

capable military unit available to conduct one of its statutory support mis-
sions.
While the delay seems unnecessary and unacceptable, it was the
byproduct of military processes, institutional caution, and a revised deploy-
ment approval process. We have no evidence that the delay was intentional.
Likewise, it appears that none of the individuals involved understood what
President Trump planned for January 6th, and how he would behave during
the violence. Imperfect inter-government and intra-military communica-
tions as the January 6th rally morphed, with President Trump’s active
encouragement, into a full-blown riot at the Capitol also help explain the
time it took to deploy Guard troops to the Capitol after their assistance
there was requested and approved. Post-hoc evaluation of real-time com-
munications during an unprecedented and evolving crisis and limited tacti-
cal intelligence, nevertheless, carries the risk of a precision that was
unrealistic at the time. It is also clear from testimony provided to the Select
Committee that DoD and DC National Guard leaders have differing perspec-
tives that are not reconcilable regarding the timing of deployment authori-
zation.
Where the DC Guard’s deployment on January 6th is concerned, then,
the “lessons learned” at this juncture include: careful evaluation on the
basis of limited information may take time; statutorily constrained inter-
governmental requests for assistance and multi-level approval processes
are complex and may be time-consuming; any visible military presence in
the domestic setting is circumscribed by law and triggers considerable,
constitutionally-driven sensitivities; and crisis communications are often
imperfect, especially in unforeseen and rapidly evolving situations.

ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 8.
2. DC Code § 49-409, (“The President of the United States shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
the militia of the District of Columbia.”), available at https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/
council/code/sections/49-409 (The DC National Guard is the “organized militia” of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. DC Code § 49-406, available at https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/
council/code/sections/49-406). Subject to that top-level command distinction, the DC
National Guard is, when acting in its civil support or militia capacity, comparable to the
National Guard of the various States, which act as those States’ militias. 32 U.S.C. §101(4)
(“Army National Guard” statutorily defined as “that part of the organized militia of the sev-
eral States . . . and the District of Columbia . . .”). The Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel has interpreted the DC Code provisions authorizing the DC National Guard’s
use as a militia in support of DC law enforcement activities as within the exemptions from
the Posse Comitatus Act’s prohibitions on use of the military for domestic law enforce-
ment (18 U.S.C. § 1385 (“Whoever, except in cases and under conditions expressly autho-
rized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
750 APPENDIX 2
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined . . . or impris-
oned . . . .”)). See Memorandum Opinion, “Use of the National Guard to Support Drug Inter-
diction Efforts in the District of Columbia,” 13 Op. O.L.C. 91, 92, 93, 97 (Apr. 4, 1989),
available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions-volume (Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1385, does not prohibit use of DC National Guard as a militia in support of DC Metropolitan
Police Department). The President also has authority to mobilize the National Guard,
which is a reserve component of the U.S. armed forces, to active duty (10 U.S.C. §12301 et
seq.), and may “federalize” any National Guard unit to assist in addressing insurrection (10
U.S.C. §§251-253), invasion, or rebellion and to give effect to Federal law (10 U.S.C. §12406).
The President did not exercise those authorities on January 6, 2021. The DC National Guard
operated that day as the DC militia, in its civil support and law enforcement assistance
capacity under the separate authorities noted above. See also, Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 8.
3. Executive Order 11485, 34 F.R. 15411, § 1, (Oct. 1, 1969), available at https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bterm%5D=34+f.r.15411# (“The
Commanding General of the [DC] National Guard shall report to the Secretary of Defense
or to an official of the Department of Defense designated by the Secretary . . .”). The Sec-
retary of Defense exercises command authority over the “military operations, including
training, parades and other duty” of the DC National Guard while in its non-federalized
militia status, through the Commanding General of the DC National Guard. Id. Executive
Order 11485 reserves appointment of the Commanding General of the DC National Guard to
the President (i.e., does not delegate that authority to the Secretary of Defense or the Sec-
retary’s designee). Id., at §§ 1, 3. That Executive Order also specifies that, “[s]ubject to the
direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary [of Defense] may order
out the [DC] National Guard . . . to aid the civil authorities . . . of the District of Columbia.”
Id., at § 1. Under a longstanding Congressional authorization, the Mayor of the District of
Columbia may request that the Commander-in-Chief (now, by the President’s delegation,
the Secretary of Defense), direct the National Guard to assist in suppressing “violence to
persons or property” or “force or violence to break and resist the laws,” including when
“tumult, riot or mob is threatened.” DC Code §49-103 (“Suppression of riots”), available at
https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-103. See also, Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Inter-
view of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
4. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Air
Force, “Supervision and Control of the National Guard of the District of Columbia,” (Oct. 10,
1969), ¶ 3. That memorandum is available as an attachment to the Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin’s December 30, 2021 memorandum modifying that 1969 delegation: “Effective
immediately, the Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for DC Government
requests for the DCNG to provide law enforcement support” to the District of Columbia if
the support is to be provided within 48 hours of the request or if acceding to the request
would require the DC National Guard to engage directly in civilian law enforcement activi-
ties, including “crowd control, traffic control, search, seizure, arrest, or temporary deten-
tion.” Memorandum, Secretary of Defense for Secretary of the Army, “Authority to Approve
District of Columbia Government Requests for District of Columbia National Guard Support
Assistance,” (Dec. 30, 2021), available at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/austin-
streamlines-authority-to-deploy-dc-national-guard. See also, Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 10.
6. George Floyd was murdered on Monday, May 25, 2020. See Catherine Thorbecke, “Derek
Chauvin Had His Knee on George Floyd’s Neck for Nearly 9 Minutes, Complaint Says,” ABC
News, (May 29, 2020)), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/derek-chauvin-knee-
george-floyds-neck-minutes-complaint/story?id=70961042. Over the ensuing days, weeks,
and months, Americans demonstrated in cities across the country. See Major Cities Chiefs
 APPENDIX 2 751

Association Intelligence Commanders Group, Report on the 2020 Protests & Civil Unrest
(Oct. 2020) at p. 8, Fig. 6, https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/
MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 5.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 8.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2021), pp. 67-68 (“[Trump] was very upset at the
news that had come out that he had been taken down to the bunker in the preceding
days, you know, when some of the rioting right by the White House was at its worst. He
was very upset by this, and, as I recall, he bellowed at everyone sitting in front of him in a
semicircle and he waved his finger around the semicircle saying we were losers, we were
losers, we were all fucking losers,” Barr said. “[H]e then raised—you know, he talked about
whether he should invoke the Insurrection Act . . . And, you know, my position was that the
Insurrection Act should only be invoked when you really need to invoke it as a last resort,
when you don't really have other assets that can deal with civil unrest.”).
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 86.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 47-48.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 47.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 17-18. “Brigadier General Rob-
ert Kenneth Ryan was the joint task force commander [who] authorized the—the
helicopters to fly over the crowd to observe and report, and the Secretary of the Army
approved that,” Major General Walker said. Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13,
2021), p. 55. “Now, the pilots came a little too close to the civilians on the ground.” Id., at
57.
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
752 APPENDIX 2
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 1, 2022), p. 25.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 242–43.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 14; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Harvin,
(Nov. 12, 2021).
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 24.
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001680 (December 31,
2020, Letter from Mayor Bowser to Major General Walker re: DCNG).
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001679 (December 31,
2020, Letter from Dr. Christopher Rodriguez to Major General Walker re: DCNG).
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 20.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 14.
39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 75.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 47.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 44.
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 47.
 APPENDIX 2 753

45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 49.
46. See Chapter 7.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 79, 85.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 56.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 6.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 53-54.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 54.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 75.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 75-76.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 10.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), pp. 32-33.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 11.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 11-12.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 98.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 97.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 103.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 99.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 49.
754 APPENDIX 2
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 22-23.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 12-13, 15.
72. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Unexplained Delays and Unan-
swered Questions, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C. Miller,
p. 4.
73. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Unexplained Delays and Unan-
swered Questions, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C. Miller,
p. 4.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 133.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.
78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00005855–DoD 00005886
(December 18, 2021, email from General James C. McConville to Curtis Kellogg re: HOT
MEDIA FOX NEWS & POLITICO MEDIA QUERY: Response to MG (R) Flynn's remarks.).
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 54-55 (“Q: Were you ever told you
would be fired if you ever made such a statement again? A: It was implied. It was implied
that I was, you know, not to do that again, . . . .”).
81. Lara Seligman (@laraseligman), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2021 11:27 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1339985580785086466.
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.
84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
86. Ashton Carter, Dick Cheney, William Cohen, Mark Esper, Robert Gates, Chuck Hagel, James
Mattis, Leon Panetta, William Perry, and Donald Rumsfeld, “All 10 living former defense
secretaries: Involving the military in election disputes would cross into dangerous terri-
tory,” Washington Post, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/10-former-defense-secretaries-military-peaceful-transfer-of-power/2021/01/03/
2a23d52e-4c4d-11eb-a9f4-0e668b9772ba_story.html.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
 APPENDIX 2 755

88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 148.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 247.
93. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4,
2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of
the Army Ryan McCarthy).
94. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4,
2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of
the Army Ryan McCarthy); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.
96. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4,
2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of
the Army Ryan McCarthy); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD
#2/000633, (January 5, 2021, Colonel John Lubas email to Major General William Walker with
the subject, "Final Signed Memo to DCNG," at 7:54 a.m. ET).
97. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Lt. Col. David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 89.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 92.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 93.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 90.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 93–94.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 42.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
756 APPENDIX 2
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 133 (“Q: It doesn't sound to me,
like, really, you're pushing for it when you raised the National Guard with Sergeant At Arms
Irving or Stenger? It would have been nice, but not essential for you to be ready. Is that a
fair characterization of your personal position on that? A: Yes.”).
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 116-17.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 124.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766, CTRL0000001766.0001
(Document from January 3, 2021, titled: "Special Event Assessment: Joint Session of
Congress—Electoral College Vote Certification”); see also, Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam,
(Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 51-52.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 125.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 119.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9-10.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 12.
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 41.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 45.
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 52-53.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 131-32.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
 APPENDIX 2 757

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Robert Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2022).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 116.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 31.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 23.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 25, 27-28.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 130.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 45.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 29.
150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003050 (January 5, 2021,
email from John Lubas to William Walker and Earl Matthews re: Final Signed Memo to
DCNG).
151. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
758 APPENDIX 2
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 33.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 49.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 65.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 22.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 35.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 37.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 41-42.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 38-39. Text messages show that Lieu-
tenant Colonel Reinke texted Colonel Hunter, “Loading buses now. Meeting police escort.
Do you have destination. Contact info?” at 2:43 PM. See Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Davie Reinke
Production), CTRL0000930918 (January 6, 2021, text messages).
 APPENDIX 2 759

174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 44-45. (He called his direct supervisor,
Brigadier General Robert Ryan: “The first conversation with him, I first informed him, hey,
sir, this is where I am, this is who I've talked to, and they both asked for assistance. And I
asked for release of the QRF now. And I asked for, basically send all the additional forces,
you know, that you have now. And his response to me was, we are working on it. So he
said he was going to coordinate with General Dean and Major General Walker, but they
were working on it.”).
175. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Dec. 16, 2021).
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 75-76.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 148.
180. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 18.
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 19.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 19, 53 (“[Q: T]he Speaker’s office isn’t
part of that process in terms of requesting the National Guard, correct? A[:] Correct. It
would just be on the notification side.”).
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 21.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 148-50.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 152.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 57 (“I wasn't speaking, but I was
there.”).
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.
760 APPENDIX 2
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 98-99.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2022), p. 54.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Wal-
ter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2022), p. 56 (“And he immediately says, ‘I'm going to get approval. Get me
a plan,’ is what he tells me”).
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 84.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99. The Army at first denied that Gen-
eral Flynn was present for the call at all. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles
McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 98 (“I think there was just confusion—I know some people are
trying, you know, to make it something else, but I think there was just confusion. There
were a whole bunch of meetings going on because, you know, I didn't think he was there,
because when I was there, he wasn't there.”). General McConville said: “And there was no
intent to deceive anybody, or there's no conspiracy because of who Charlie Flynn's brother
is,” General Michael Flynn. Id., at 99. General Flynn said he did not speak on the call. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 41 (“A [:] I did not
speak on that call. Q [:] Did you identify yourself as being on the call? A [:] I did not. Now,
if I said anything, if I—my recollection, if I said anything, I may have tugged on General
Piatt's sleeve and asked and said, "What's going on here?" like, "What's the situation?" you
know.” But others, like Colonel Matthews listening in from the National Guard end of the
call, said both Generals Piatt and Flynn were the main interlocuters. See Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021). On Lt. Nick’s notes, at 2:35 p.m., General Flynn’s title is writ-
ten down. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), CTRL0000930917
(January 6, 2021, handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy Nick). Lt Nick said, “I was just try-
ing to jot down who was on the call.” See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021). Gen-
eral Flynn ultimately said he was there for a short time. See Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), pp. 40, 42 (“It was—I was literally there—the total
time that I'm talking about was about 4 to 5 minutes. I was really around that phone call,
rough order of magnitude, for maybe a minute of that;” “it became clear to me that I was
in the wrong place. And so I made the decision to leave because General Piatt had a
handle on the situation.”).
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 39.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 79-80.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
 APPENDIX 2 761

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 83.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 81.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 40.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 81-82.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 113.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 115.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 162.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 161.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 156-57.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 57.
762 APPENDIX 2
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 58.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 99.
231. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.
232. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.
233. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 81-82.
234. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 157.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 116-17.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 59.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.
252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 60.
 APPENDIX 2 763

253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 39.
254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 141-42.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.
262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 288.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 125.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 124.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 143.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 82 (“So at no time did I and I
am not aware of anyone in the Pentagon having a conversation with President Trump on
the day of the 6th.”).
270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 95-96.
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.
764 APPENDIX 2
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 97-98.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01.
278. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 102.
282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM000789 (January 5, 2021, emails
between Mark Meadows and John Aycoth, “Re: DC mayor activates National Guard ahead of
pro-Trump demonstrations, The Hill”).
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-100.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-101. (Q: “[D]id you take that
as a request for you or an order to you to deploy 10,000 troops? A[:] No, absolutely not. I
interpreted it as a bit of presidential banter or President Trump banter that you all are
familiar with, and in no way, shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.”);
(“Q[:] So I want to be clear here that—since then, in February 2021, Mark Meadows said on
Fox News that, quote: Even in January, that was a given as many as 10,000 National Guard
troops were told to be on the ready by the Secretary of Defense. Is there any accuracy to
that statement? A[:] I'm not—not from my perspective. I was never given any direction or
order or knew of any plans of that nature.”); (Q: “To be crystal clear, there was no direct
order from President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6th, cor-
rect? A[:] No. Yeah. That's correct. There was no direct—there was no order from the Presi-
dent.”).
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 13.
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 78-79.
287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 252-53.
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 253.
289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 113 (“So, at 3 o'clock, I gave the
order to mobilize the entire District of Columbia National Guard, however, big they
are . . . . everybody show up at the [Armory and], . . . move them to the Capitol immedi-
ately to support local law enforcement.”).
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.
 APPENDIX 2 765

294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 124 (emphasis added).
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.
296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
299. The two letters referenced include Secretary Miller’s January 4 memorandum setting
restrictions on the Guard and a follow-up letter from Secretary McCarthy on January 5
expounding on those limitations. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense
Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, memorandum), DoD Production DoD 00003493
(January 5, 2021 follow-up letter).
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 45.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 123.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 104.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 47; Earl Matthews, "The Harder Right:
An Analysis of a Recent DoD Inspector General Investigation and Other Matters," (Dec. 1,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-
clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-
Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 55.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 52.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 125.
309. Aaron C. Davis (@byaaroncdavis), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:55 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/byaaroncdavis/status/1346908166030766080.
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 109, 127, 129.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 130.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 49. (“I mentioned that to Chief Carroll. I
said, hey, Chief, you know, I may just pull everyone back. And he told me, he said, well,
right now I may need your Guardsmen who are on the traffic control points, because all of
my officers are here at the Capitol, so I don't have officers out there in the city right now,
so I may need to re-mission those guys for other things. Can you just send me the person-
nel from the Armory here? You know, so it was almost like we were talking about splitting.
766 APPENDIX 2
We'll use that 90 to support MPD on anything they needed in the city, but I can still get,
you know, another 200, 250 from the Armory to come to the Capitol now.”). But Assistant
Chief Carroll didn’t recall such a conversation. Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jeffrey Carroll, (Nov. 18, 2022)
(“I don’t think it happened. It doesn’t sound like something that would’ve happened.”) Ser-
geant Major Brooks said it was him who made the recommendation to hold the first shift
at their posts. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Michael F. Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).
313. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ken Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2021) (“Those that were on the TCPs on the 6th did not
go to the Capitol on the night of the 6th.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022),
p. 81; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp.88-89 (“Well, what I
would think was happening during that hour and a half is they're . . . leaving their check
points, the traffic control points, the 30 traffic control points so that all of those vehicles,
they're hopping in their cars and they're driving back in traffic through the [A]rmory and
getting set.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 50 (“They were out
on traffic control points. They were doing another job. The QRF was across the river. We
brought them over to the Armory. But they had to reconfigure, reorganize now to go into a
civil disturbance operation.”).
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Con-
tee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 86.
323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 129.
324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 121-22.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.
 APPENDIX 2 767

327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 91-92.
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 123.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 141.
331. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.
332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 122 (emphasis added).
333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 67.
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 65, 70.
335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 65.
336. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.
337. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 66.
338. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
339. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
340. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 134.
341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.
342. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.
343. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 15.
344. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
346. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
347. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 133.
348. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
349. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles
McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 91 (“General LaNeve provided the link up location and the
lead.”).
768 APPENDIX 2
350. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
351. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
352. Earl Matthews, "The Harder Right: An Analysis of a Recent DoD Inspector General Investiga-
tion and Other Matters," (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-
of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf
(“MG Walker denies that LaNeve called him at 4:25PM, or that he spoke to LaNeve at any-
time between the phone call from Chief Sund at 1:49PM and the eventual DCNG deploy-
ment to the Capitol at 5:08PM.”).
353. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 139.
354. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.
355. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 65-66.
356. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021) (“One reason I know that there is no 4:30
call—is that I was sitting next to Gen. Walker”).
357. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Michael F. Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).
358. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), CTRL0000930917 (January 6,
2021, handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy Nick).
359. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.
360. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 60-61.
361. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
362. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 90-92.
363. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 140.
364. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
365. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
366. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001196 (January 8, 2021,
Memorandum for Record from Office of the Secretary of Defense re: Timeline for December
31, 2020–January 6, 2021), DoD 00001090 (January 7, 2021, Memorandum for Record from the
Secretary of the Army re: Timeline For 31 December–7 January 2021), 00000490 (January 7,
2021, Memorandum for Record from Joint Force Headquarters re: Timeline for Request for
Assistance during Civil Unrest on 6 January 2021 and DC National Guard Authorization to
Respond).
368. Text message from David Reinke to Colonel Hunter on January 6, 2021.
 APPENDIX 2 769

369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
370. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
371. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
372. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 50-51.
373. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 51.
374. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 53.
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 120.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 111-12.
377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
378. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
379. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
380. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 67-68.
381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
382. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 73.
383. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 144.
384. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 111.
385. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 130.
386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
387. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p.71.
388. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 72.
770 APPENDIX 3
THE BIG RIP-OFF: FOLLOW THE MONEY

INTRODUCTION

This appendix will consider the extent to which President Trump’s Cam-
paign and related entities raised an unprecedented amount of political
donations using inflammatory messaging alleging that the 2020 U.S. Presi-
dential election was fraudulent or stolen. It will review what tools and
methods were used to produce, transmit and optimize these fundraising
solicitations; who drafted and approved the messaging and what they knew
about the accuracy of the messaging; who ultimately benefitted from these
donations; and the impact of these messages on their recipients.
The Select Committee’s investigation demonstrates that President
Trump’s baseless claims of election fraud—the Big Lie—served a dual pur-
pose, forming the foundation of his attempts to overturn the 2020 Presi-
dential election and launching a fundraising effort to fund the former
President’s other endeavors and to enrich his associates—the Big Rip-off.
The false election fraud narrative embedded in fundraising emails and
text messages amplified the Big Lie by perpetuating a belief that the 2020
election was stolen from President Trump and effectuated the Big Rip-off
by misleading donors into thinking their donations could alter the election
results.
At the same time, the Big Lie helped President Trump and the Republi-
can National Committee (RNC) raise more than $250 million after the elec-
tion, much of it from small-dollar donors who were promised their money
would “Stop the Steal.”
Despite what they told their supporters, however, most of their money
was not used to stop any purported steal—it was diverted to accomplish the
Big Rip-off. Millions of dollars that were raised ostensibly for “election
defense” and “fighting voter fraud” were not spent that way at all.
Moreover, the Select Committee’s investigation shows that the RNC
knew that President Trump’s claims about winning the election were base-
less and that post-election donations would not help him secure an addi-
tional term in office. Yet, both the Trump Campaign and the RNC decided to
continue fundraising after the election, a decision that would have come
from President Trump himself.
In short, President Trump and his Campaign ripped off supporters by
raising more than $250 million by claiming they wanted to fight fraud they
knew did not exist and to challenge an election they knew he lost.
 APPENDIX 3 771

DISCUSSION

THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING TEAM

As detailed below, the Trump Campaign misled the American public and
President Trump’s donors on how they planned to use, and did use, the
donated funds while bombarding supporters with hundreds of emails, as
many as twenty-five emails per day, stating the election had been stolen. In
those emails, they used inflammatory language accusing Democrats of try-
ing to “steal the election,” encouraged supporters to join the “Trump
army”; “Defend” the election: and to “fight back” over, and over, and over
again.1 They sent these emails out because they knew they were effective at
raising money.2 This was made possible by the creation of a fundraising
machine powered jointly by the Trump Campaign and the RNC.

A. The TMAGAC Fundraising Machine

During the 2020 election cycle, President Trump operated a structure under
which the Trump reelection campaign and the RNC merged programs and
raised money jointly through the Trump Make America Great Again Com-
mittee (internally referred to by its acronym TMAGAC, which RNC officials
pronounced “T-Magic”).3 TMAGAC was focused on raising money online
through small-dollar donations.4 Tim Murtaugh, the Trump Campaign’s
communications director, described the TMAGAC fundraising operation as
“an entity unto itself within the campaign.” 5
The individual charged with leading the digital operation in 2020 was
Gary Coby.6 Coby first started working with the RNC in 2016 even before
President Trump became the nominee.7 Coby explained that, as digital
director, his role during the 2020 Presidential election cycle was to “over-
see the digital operation.” 8 Similarly, senior staffers at the Trump Cam-
paign and the RNC all made clear that Coby was the individual in charge of
the TMAGAC digital team.9 Both high-level staffers at the Trump Campaign
and at the RNC confirmed that Coby had the trust of Jared Kushner, the
President’s son-in-law.10
Coby explained that during the 2020 Presidential election cycle, the
TMAGAC digital team was a “big team with multiple organizations and
vendor teams all working together as one, that include[d] RNC staff,
[Donald J. Trump for President] staff, [and] maybe a half dozen vendor
teams.” 11 The RNC digital team, a subset of the TMAGAC digital team, was
led operationally by Kevin Zambrano, Chief Digital Officer at the RNC. In
2020, members of the digital staff of both the RNC and Trump Campaign
merged in an office building in Arlington, Virginia, with some suites jointly
hosting RNC and Trump Campaign staff on the digital team, and other
suites hosting third-party companies, such as Opn Sesame and Direct Per-
suasion.12 Thereafter, Zambrano assisted Coby in managing the TMAGAC
772 APPENDIX 3
digital team.13 Zambrano explained, “The majority of the staff was at the
RNC doing both RNC and TMAGAC work.” 14 This work was focused squarely
on fundraising.15
The RNC digital team included Austin Boedigheimer, who, starting in
January 2019, was the RNC’s digital deputy director 16 and technically served
as Zambrano’s deputy.17 In reality, Boedigheimer reported to both Zam-
brano and Coby.18 Boedigheimer also led the TMAGAC digital fundraising
team, which was comprised of all online fundraising efforts, including
fundraising emails and text messages.19 At the end of the 2020 cycle, that
team had 20 or 30 people within smaller teams, such as the copy team, the
text message team, the data team, the advertising team, and the graphics
team.20
The RNC digital team also included a team of copywriters, who were
responsible for writing the fundraising emails and text messages to solicit
small-dollar donations through TMAGAC.21 These copywriters reported to
Hanna Allred, the RNC’s Chief Copywriter.22 By mid-2020, there were three
copywriters who reported to Allred: Alex Murglin,23 Ethan Katz,24 and Alex
Blinkoff.25 Blinkoff and Katz worked in that role from June 2020 until they
were fired approximately three weeks after the 2020 election, while Murglin
remains a copywriter at the RNC.
Although the TMAGAC team consisted of both Trump Campaign and
RNC staffers, TMAGAC operated as one entity working towards one goal—
raising as much money as possible.26

B. The Fundraising Assembly Line

The copywriting process worked like an assembly line, where different
individuals performed a task and passed on the work product to someone
else, including for internal approval.27 To generate content for fundraising
communications, Allred explained, the copywriting fundraising team was
“watching the messaging coming out of the committee [RNC] and the cam-
paign and from the President himself and what his family was talking
about.” 28 For example, in a November 2020 email, Boedigheimer stated to
Allred, “Good to include lines like [‘]we need the resources to make sure
they don’t try to steal this election. We saw what happened on election
night, we can’t let them take the senate too.[’]” 29
It was evident that the copywriters “would draft a lot of the content
based on . . . what the President was saying.” 30 And there was no mistaking
it, President Trump “was providing us [the copywriters] with a lot of con-
tent online.” 31 Allred said Boedigheimer was encouraging her to use this
language because it would cause President Trump’s supporters to donate by
“giving a purpose to their donation” 32 and that they used this repeatedly
because it worked.33 Boedigheimer did not dispute this, and reaffirmed that
such language had been successful at fundraising.34
 APPENDIX 3 773

Further, the emails that were signed by President Trump or “Team

Trump” were intentionally drafted to capture President Trump’s voice,
tone and messaging.35 Boedigheimer explained, “[President Trump] obvi-
ously has a very aggressive[,] excitable tone, and we would try to incorpo-
rate that in our messaging as well.” 36 The goal was to make the millions of
recipients of aggressive, hyperbolic fundraising emails believe that the
emails were coming from President Trump himself. In Zambrano’s words,
the purpose was to give recipients “red meat.” 37

C. The Approvals Process

The Structure. Draft emails were submitted for approval to a designated
group that handled approvals of all TMAGAC fundraising copy (the
“Approvals Group”).38 Boedigheimer retained responsibility for ensuring
that TMAGAC’s fundraising copy was approved before being sent to the
public.39
The Approvals Group consisted of three sets of stakeholders from the
RNC and the Trump Campaign,40 and included a variety of other interested
staffers, including Zambrano, Boedigheimer, and Allred.41 TMAGAC’s fund-
raising copy could not be sent without approval from the legal, communi-
cations and research departments.42

Perceived Responsibilities. After election day, a small group of staffers in the

Approvals Group actively reviewed and approved the numerous fundraising
emails and text messages that spread false election fraud claims. These
staffers included:
• RNC Legal: Justin Reimer, RNC Chief Counsel 43 and Jenna Kirsch, RNC
Associate Counsel 44
• RNC Communications: Cassie Docksey, Deputy Communications
Director 45
• RNC Research: Michael Reed, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communica-
tions 46
• Trump Campaign Legal: Alex Cannon, Deputy General Counsel 47
• Trump Campaign Communications and Research: Zach Parkinson,
Deputy Director of Communications and Director of Research 48

Boedigheimer, as head of the fundraising team handling the drafting

and propagation of fundraising messaging, told the Select Committee his
understanding of the role the three components of the Approvals Group
(legal, communications, and research) performed when reviewing emails
and text messages.
Regarding legal, Boedigheimer explained that he understood Alex Can-
non’s role, as the Trump Campaign’s Deputy General Counsel, was to
774 APPENDIX 3
review the emails from a “legal perspective” by “essentially making sure
that there’s no legal issues with the content.” 49
Regarding communications, Boedigheimer stated that the communica-
tions staffers in the Approvals Group were reviewing the content and
“[m]aking sure that it’s on message and good from a comms perspec-
tive.” 50
Lastly, Boedigheimer explained that the research team was “looking
for . . . things that are inaccurate.” 51
Although Boedigheimer provided only a vague explanation of the role of
the Approvals Group, he emphasized that he had to “trust that the
research, the comms, and the legal team are going to do their processes to
make sure it’s [the TMAGAC fundraising copy was] accurate.” 52 He further
noted, “[I]t was the approval chain’s job to see what the accuracy of the
email is and whether it’s true or not. . . . We were sending information and
then leaning on our approval chain to make sure that it’s accurate.” 53
The Select Committee’s investigation revealed that the Approvals Group
did not operate that way, however. The Select Committee interviewed
members of the Approvals Group handling the communications, research,
and legal functions and confirmed that members of the Approvals Group
typically engaged only in cursory reviews of the fundraising messages and
did not review substantive claims of election fraud for accuracy.
Zach Parkinson, the Trump Campaign’s Deputy Director of Communi-
cations and Research Director, represented the Trump Campaign’s commu-
nications and research functions in the Approvals Group. Parkinson made
clear, “Generally, our role when it came to fundraising emails and texts was
to approve them for the communications team.” 54 Parkinson noted that
that he was typically the person who weighed in on behalf of the Trump
Campaign’s communications and research team.55 He added, “we would
review them for messaging consistency, sometimes we would review them
for factual accuracy, and then we would provide the communications
approval for those.” 56
Parkinson clarified that the scope of review for “factual accuracy” was
limited. Specifically, his review of fundraising emails and text messages for
accuracy was limited to questions concerning items such as time and loca-
tion.57
Critically, Parkinson did not review statements regarding election fraud
in the fundraising copy for accuracy because “most political text messages
and fundraising emails are political rhetoric, and so a lot of them don’t
necessarily require fact checking.” 58 He added that “political rhetoric,”
such as “Democrats are trying to steal the election,” was not something he
and his team were “necessarily tasked to say no to.” 59 Parkinson made
clear that he thought the legal department, namely Alex Cannon, would
 APPENDIX 3 775

handle reviewing for accuracy, noting “I deferred to the legal team on the
legitimacy and the ability to substantiate claims that were made that were
put through these approvals and whether or not we could, again, substanti-
ate them or they were in line with our legal efforts.” 60 Parkinson, as the
head of the research team, the very campaign team meant to fact-check
and ensure accuracy in the Trump Campaign’s statements, said he was
“simply looking for messaging consistency.” 61 Whether Democrats were
engaged in fraud to steal the election was a “political argument” to
Parkinson, which he did not review for accuracy.62
Like Parkinson, Michael Reed, then the RNC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for
Communications, was not reviewing the TMAGAC emails about election
fraud for broader accuracy. Notably, Reed could not recall a single email
that he researched to do a fact-check or follow up on to see if claims con-
tained in the email were, in fact, true.63
Boedigheimer and the copywriters believed the research staffers were
looking for messages that they believed were inaccurate, but they were
doing no such thing.
Alex Cannon, the Trump Campaign’s legal representative in the
Approvals Group, was no different—the TMAGAC fundraisers thought he
was doing far more than he was in fact doing. The Select Committee
received a November 4, 2020, email from Nathan Groth, counsel for the
Trump Campaign, to Alex Cannon. This email reflected that Cannon was not
tasked with substantively reviewing fundraising emails like Boedigheimer
thought. Groth wrote to Cannon, “Matt [Morgan, Trump Campaign’s Gen-
eral Counsel] has instructed me to hand off all compliance matters, includ-
ing approvals, to you.” 64 Cannon confirmed, “I saw myself as doing exactly
what I was instructed to do here, which is do what Nathan had previously
been doing. So it’s this. It’s compliance issues like disclaimers and
typos.” 65 Therefore, when Cannon received emails that included claims
such as “the Democrats are trying to steal the election,” he viewed review-
ing the veracity of this statement as “outside the purview of what [he] was
tasked.” 66 When asked, Cannon stated that he did not know who was
tasked with ensuring that fundraising emails were true and accurate.67
Boedigheimer, and other members of the digital fundraising team he
led, claimed to see the Approvals Group as a guardrail of sorts in the fund-
raising effort to protect from the dissemination of false messaging about
the election, but the Approvals Group served no such role. The very staffers
in the Approvals Group repeatedly told the Select Committee that they did
not review the claims about election fraud to confirm whether they were
even true.
776 APPENDIX 3
When all was said and done, no one in the Trump Campaign claimed to
be responsible for confirming the accuracy of President Trump’s words, or
other allegations of election fraud, before they were blasted to millions of
Americans.68
Thus, after the election, the TMAGAC team drafted emails filled with
inflammatory and unfounded claims, and the members of the Approvals
Group tasked with fact checking these claims did no such thing—
effectively, President Trump’s claims were treated as true and blasted to
millions of people with little to no scrutiny by those tasked with ensuring
accuracy. This process was a fertile ground for the Big Lie to spread through
hundreds of emails and text messages.

D. Focus on Fundraising Metrics

Boedigheimer spoke with Coby and Zambrano often about how much
money TMAGAC was raising, and they provided feedback regarding fund-
raising goals.69 Trump Campaign leadership was fully aware of post-
election fundraising totals. According to Coby, President Trump’s son-in-
law and senior advisor Jared Kushner “had the most interest in the digital
program” and “would just check in on [fundraising] results,” and routinely
received updates regarding fundraising from Coby.70 Coby also made clear
that Kushner was heavily involved in the Campaign’s budget process 71 and
that he updated Kushner on TMAGAC’s post-election fundraising totals.72
The Select Committee received documents confirming Kushner’s
involvement. For example, on November 8, 2020, Kushner requested that a
daily tracker be created showing the Trump Campaign’s financial position
from election day forward.73 In an email, Kushner noted that the tracker
would allow the Campaign to consider its cash flow ahead of the creation of
“a new entity for POTUS[’s] other political activities.” 74 Just days after the
election, and after the Campaign had three of its four best fundraising days
ever on November 4th, 5th, and 6th,75 Kushner was preparing for the
launch of President Trump’s new leadership PAC, Save America. Kushner
stated that he needed this new daily tracker because the Trump Campaign
was going to continue fundraising post-election.76 Kushner continued to
receive these detailed daily trackers, which included Save America’s fund-
raising hauls, through at least December 2020.77

2020 ELECTION: THE ROLE OF ELECTION FRAUD MESSAGING

A. The Decision to Continue Fundraising after Election Day

Heading into election night of the 2020 Presidential race, as Americans
across the country waited in line to vote on election day, the Trump Cam-
paign and the RNC were planning what they would tell the American public
about the results in the upcoming days. On election day, Boedigheimer and
 APPENDIX 3 777

Darren Centinello, a Trump Campaign staffer, discussed the three message

options that the Trump Campaign had on the table.78
The first option was to send out copy claiming President Trump had
won the 2020 election. But the Campaign knew this message was false, and
Boedigheimer told Centinello that he could not get this messaging approved
yet.79 The Trump Campaign’s second option was an email stating they were
still waiting on the election results. This message would have been the truth.
The Campaign rejected this option.
Instead, the Trump Campaign chose a third option. Boedigheimer con-
firmed that TMAGAC fundraisers had received approval for copy claiming
that the Democrats are going to “try to steal the election” before election
night.80
Zambrano confirmed that it would not surprise him that TMAGAC was
immediately claiming that Democrats were trying to steal the election,
because President Trump has been pushing that message.81 Zambrano
added, “That was the President’s phrasing in the messaging that the team
was sourcing from.” 82 Importantly, Boedigheimer confirmed that the TMA-
GAC copywriting team did not base its use of the “trying to steal” language
on any awareness of actual fraud.83

B. Post-Election Fundraising Off the Big Lie

Both the Trump Campaign and the RNC directed TMAGAC to continue
fundraising after the election.84 Justin Clark, the deputy campaign manager,
explained that the decision to continue fundraising after the election would
have come from President Trump himself.85
Starting after the election and until January 6th, the Trump Campaign,
along with the RNC, sent millions of emails to their supporters, with mes-
saging such as claiming that the election was “RIGGED.” 86 The Trump
Campaign viewed the TMAGAC emails as another avenue to get out Presi-
dent Trump’s post-election messaging about the alleged fraud.87 These
emails used false claims of voter fraud to create a sense of urgency that the
election was being stolen. The Trump Campaign and the RNC told their
supporters that their donations could stop Democrats from “trying to steal
the election.” They consistently encouraged donors to give money to con-
tinue “uncovering” fraud that had not occurred. These emails were sent out
after being reviewed and approved by the Approvals Group.88
The TMAGAC fundraisers used inflammatory language and false elec-
tion fraud claims after the election because it was both effective at fund-
raising and accurately captured President Trump’s ongoing tone and
messaging.89 When the digital fundraising team drafted emails claiming,
for example, that “Democrats are trying to steal the election,” they did not
bother to confirm whether or not those inflammatory statements were true,
778 APPENDIX 3
and instead they merely took President Trump’s words and made an effec-
tive fundraising email.90 As Zambrano stated, “the President issuing state-
ments or tweets would be the genesis of the copy that would then go into
the approval process for edits, for checks. That is why the approval process
worked.” 91 President Trump was the source of the lies. Not only was Presi-
dent Trump’s fundraising driven by his daily deluge of lies about the elec-
tion, but these lies were also able to go unchallenged before being spread
because TMAGAC had an ineffective process when it came to scrutinizing
and correcting those lies.
The TMAGAC fundraising machine continued to churn out hundreds of
fundraising emails and text messages regardless of external developments.
For example, Zambrano said that, after former Vice President Biden was
widely declared the winner of the election, TMAGAC’s fundraising efforts
moved ahead the same way they had previously,92 even though he “would
say it wasn’t looking good” as soon as one week after the election.93

ALARMS RAISED ABOUT TMAGAC FUNDRAISING CONTENT

A number of individuals and entities associated with the TMAGAC fundrais-

ing campaign raised concerns about the dangerous and inflammatory lan-
guage used in the emails issued for this campaign.

Concerns Raised in Internal RNC Review

Evidence obtained by the Select Committee shows that the RNC knew that
President Trump’s claims about winning the election were baseless and
that additional donations would not help him secure an additional term in
office. They walked as close to the line as they dared—making several
changes to fundraising copy that seemingly protected the RNC from legal
exposure while still spreading and relying on President Trump’s known lies
and misrepresentations.
The Select Committee did not interview a member of the RNC legal
team due to concerns surrounding attorney-client privilege, but the Select
Committee nonetheless got insight into their role from documents pro-
duced by Campaign and RNC staff, as well as interviews with staffers. As
detailed below, the RNC lawyers were the only individuals who even
attempted to walk back the fundraising emails.
Allred and Katz both received direction from the RNC’s lawyers shortly
after the election to not say “steal the election” and instead were told to
use “try to steal the election.” 94 Allred also recalled that, at some point, the
RNC legal team directed the copywriters not to use the term “rigged.” 95
After the media called the election for former Vice President Joe Biden
on Saturday, November 7, 2020, the RNC began to quietly pull back from
definitive language about President Trump having won the election and
 APPENDIX 3 779

instead used language of insinuation. For example, on November 10, 2020,

Justin Reimer, RNC’s then-chief counsel, revised a fundraising email sent
to the Approvals Group to remove the sentence that “Joe Biden should not
wrongfully claim the office of the President.” 96 Instead, Reimer indicated
the email should read, “Joe Biden does not get to decide when this election
ends. Only LEGAL ballots must be counted and verified.” 97 Both Alex
Cannon and Zach Parkinson signed off on Reimer’s edits.98
On November 11, 2020, Reimer again revised a fundraising email sent to
the Approvals Group. This time, he revised a claim that “President Trump
won this election by a lot” to instead state that “President Trump got 71
MILLION LEGAL votes.” 99 Once again Cannon and Parkinson signed off on
Reimer’s edits.100
Also on November 11, 2020, Jenna Kirsch, associate counsel at the RNC,
revised a fundraising email sent to the Approvals Group to, among other
things, remove the request “to step up and contribute to our critical Elec-
tion Defense Fund so that we can DEFEND the Election and secure FOUR
MORE YEARS.” 101 Instead of “secure FOUR MORE YEARS,” Kirsch’s revised
version stated a contribution would “finish the fight.” 102 Once again
Cannon and Parkinson signed off on these edits for the Trump Campaign.103
Regarding the change to finish the fight, Zambrano conceded, “I would say
this a substantive change from the legal department.” 104 Kirsch made
numerous edits like this, in which she removed assertions about “four
more years.” 105 Such edits continued into late November 2020.
Further, Boedigheimer stated that he took questions to RNC legal in the
post-election period about TMAGAC fundraisers using the “steal the elec-
tion” language.106 The RNC was clearly aware that President Trump’s
claims regarding the election were not true and tried to have it both ways.
The private split between the RNC and the Trump Campaign became
even more pronounced when President Trump decided to double down on
his false election fraud claims and chose Rudolph Giuliani to lead his legal
efforts to overturn the election.107 On November 19, 2020, Giuliani held a
press conference at the RNC’s headquarters in which he falsely suggested
that the Biden Campaign orchestrated an elaborate nationwide voter-fraud
scheme.108 Cassie Docksey, a senior RNC staffer at the time, recalled that
she spoke that day with Michael Ahrens, then the RNC’s communications
director, about the diverging from the Trump Campaign.109 Ahrens told her
that the RNC would no longer automatically amplify or replicate statements
from the Trump Campaign or President Trump’s legal team.110 Docksey
understood Ahrens to be relaying a decision made at the most senior levels
of the RNC.111
Ahrens asserted that the RNC was unwilling to adopt the wide-ranging,
baseless assertions President Trump’s legal team was making and quietly
780 APPENDIX 3
decided to focus its communication strategy elsewhere.112 Distancing the
RNC from President Trump’s false statements was a “regular course of the
job before the election,” and it “carried through after the election” in rela-
tion to President Trump’s false claims about the election.113 Starting at or
before the November 19, 2020, press conference, the RNC senior leadership
was in agreement that they would not claim that President Trump had won
the election,114 although the RNC “frequently” had to have internal discus-
sions about President Trump’s false statements about the election.115
According to Michael Reed, then the RNC’s deputy chief of staff for
communications, “there were conversations amongst [RNC] legal and
comms and digital to ensure that anything that was being written by the
digital team based off of something President Trump or the Campaign said
was something we all were more comfortable with.” 116 RNC Chairwoman
McDaniel was a part of these conversations.117
RNC leadership knew that President Trump was lying to the American
people. Yet, they did nothing to publicly distance themselves from his
efforts to overturn the election. The RNC’s response was merely to tinker
around the edges of the fundraising copy but never to fundamentally chal-
lenge the one message that remained present in TMAGAC’s post-election
fundraising copy—President Trump’s Big Lie.
In the end, multiple senior RNC staffers approved fundraising emails
raising questions about the election results even though they did not know
of any evidence about fraud impacting the winner of the 2020 Presidential
election. For example, Cassie Docksey stated that she was not aware of any
fraud that impacted the results of the Presidential election.118 Ahrens con-
ceded that “there was not evidence that we [the RNC] had seen that he
[President Trump] won the election, that Biden had not won the elec-
tion.” 119
Similarly, Justin Clark was “not aware of [fraudulent activity . . . to like
defraud voters] by an individual or an entity that would have [changed the
outcome of an election].” 120 Alex Cannon “did not find or see, in [his] lim-
ited ability as one individual . . . evidence that would be sufficient within the
time period to change any sort of election results in any of the States.” 121
Nonetheless, the RNC and the Trump Campaign continued to send out
hundreds of emails, spreading the Big Lie to and fundraising off of millions
of supporters. Even though the RNC had closely held reservations about
repeating the most extreme and unsupportable claims of fraud, the RNC
stayed the course with a coordinated, single fundraising plan with the
Trump Campaign. The RNC privately and quietly softened the most bla-
tantly egregious claims written by its own copywriters but publicly stood
shoulder to shoulder with President Trump and his Big Lie.
 APPENDIX 3 781

This is clearly evidenced by multiple TMAGAC emails in late December

2020 that asserted that former Vice President Joe Biden would be an “ille-
gitimate President” when he took office.122 These emails came after
December 14, 2020, the day electors from each State met to cast their votes
for President and Vice President. These emails came after Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell made it clear that he accepted the electoral col-
lege’s certification of Biden’s victory. These emails came after President
Trump and his allies had lost all but one lawsuit challenging the election.123
None of this made a difference to TMAGAC. When asked why TMAGAC
would repeatedly send these emails stating that former Vice President
Biden would be an illegitimate President, Hanna Allred, the chief copy-
writer, stated that it would be because the emails were “effective” for
fundraising.124

Trump Campaign Discussions

Alex Cannon was so bothered by the emails he was reviewing as a member
of the Approvals Group that he took his concerns to Justin Clark, the cam-
paign’s deputy campaign manager. Cannon explained that he had discus-
sions with Clark about the problematic tone of the post-election TMAGAC
emails and noted to Clark that the emails “seemed a little over the top to
[him].” 125 Cannon raised those concerns because, after spending weeks
researching which fraud claims were verifiable and which were not, Cannon
saw that the TMAGAC emails were inconsistent with the fact that systemic
fraud did not exist.126 Cannon also recalled that he may have expressed
concern to Matt Morgan, the campaign’s general counsel, regarding the
difference between claims of election fraud made in the TMAGAC fundrais-
ing emails and his conclusion that there was not fraud that impacted the
election results.127 Cannon was not aware of any actions taken to address
the concerns he had with this inconsistency.128
Justin Clark could not recall whether he looked at any fundraising
emails after Cannon raised these concerns or whether Cannon spoke to
Gary Coby about the substance of the fundraising emails.129

Challenges From Within the Digital Team

In the days after the election, one junior copywriter presented senior Cam-
paign staffers with a template for a more honest approach. Shortly after
election night, Coby led a meeting of the entire Trump digital team, which
included individuals from the Campaign, the RNC, Opn Sesame, Direct Per-
suasion, and others. In that meeting, as Coby addressed the staff and
expressed that the digital team would continue to work, Ethan Katz, an RNC
staffer in his early twenties, rose to ask a question: 130 How were staffers
supposed to tell voters that the Trump Campaign wanted to keep counting
votes in Arizona but stop counting votes in other States (like Pennsylvania,
Georgia, and Michigan)? 131
782 APPENDIX 3
Katz said that Coby provided an answer without substance, which
caused Katz to reiterate his question. His question made clear that the
Campaign’s position was wildly inconsistent.132 Allred and Boedigheimer
corroborated that Katz confronted leadership.133
Katz also recalled that, shortly after the election, Allred directed him to
write an email declaring that President Trump had won the State of Penn-
sylvania before anyone had called Pennsylvania for either party.134 Katz
believed the Trump Campaign wanted to send this email out to preempt a
potential call that was likely to be in former Vice President Biden’s favor.135
He refused to write the email. Allred was stunned, and instead assigned it to
another copywriter.136 Allred confirmed that Katz expressed discomfort at
writing such an email and that she relied on another copywriter.137 On
November 4, 2020, the Trump Campaign sent out an email preemptively
and falsely declaring that President Trump won Pennsylvania.138
Katz was fired approximately three weeks after the election.139 In an
interview with the Select Committee, when Allred was asked why Katz, her
direct report, was fired, she explained that she was not sure why because
TMAGAC was raising more money than ever after the election, but that the
decision was not hers to make.140

Concerns Raised by Trump Campaign Vendor Iterable

The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group had
blessed were being rejected by another email service provider. After the
election, the Trump Campaign attempted to expand the reach of their false
voter fraud emails. The Trump Campaign formed a company named Data-
Pier, owned by Cannon and Sean Dollman.141 DataPier hired an outside
company named Iterable to deliver its emails.142 Cannon tried to send
“toned-down RNC emails,” through Iterable, but they still had to be “fur-
ther toned [] down through [an] iterative process[.]” 143 For example, on
November 7, 2020, Seth Charles, who was then Iterable’s principal email
deliverability and industry relations manager, said that there was an issue
with the TMAGAC copy and offered line edits.144 Two days later, Charles
recommended to the Trump Campaign staffers that they look for “modified
copy there [from TMAGAC emails] to be a little less threatening.” 145 Charles
claimed that some TMAGAC copy “obviously insinuates the so far unsub-
stantiated theory of voter fraud, as well as contributions and legal actions
will result in some sort of different outcome.” 146
But Salesforce, TMAGAC’s original email service provider, continued
sending millions of Trump Campaign emails up until January 6th.

Internal Complaints at Salesforce

The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group had
blessed were being rejected by Iterable. However, the RNC continued to
 APPENDIX 3 783

send millions of Trump Campaign emails through Salesforce, TMAGAC’s

original email service provider, up until January 6th. Evidence uncovered by
the Select Committee shows that there were internal concerns at Salesforce
regarding the content of the TMAGAC emails.
The Select Committee interviewed an individual (“J. Doe”) who worked
at Salesforce during the post-election period during which TMAGAC was
sending out the fundraising emails concerning false election fraud
claims.147 Doe worked for Salesforce’s privacy and abuse management
team, colloquially known as the abuse desk.148 An abuse desk is responsible
for preventing fraud and abuse emanating from the provider’s user or sub-
scriber network.
Doe indicated to the Select Committee that, as soon as early 2020, they
recalled issues arising with the RNC’s use of Salesforce’s services and that a
“deluge of abuse would’ve started in June-ish.” 149 Doe noted that Sales-
force received a high number of complaints regarding the RNC’s actions,
which would have been primarily the fundraising efforts of TMAGAC.150 In
the latter half of 2020, Doe noticed that the emails coming from the RNC’s
account included more and more violent and inflammatory rhetoric in vio-
lation of Salesforce’s Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) with the RNC,
which prohibited the use of violent content.151 Doe stated that, near the
time of the election, they contacted senior individuals at Salesforce to high-
light the “increasingly concerning” emails coming from the RNC’s
account.152 Doe explained that senior individuals at Salesforce effectively
ignored their emails about TMAGAC’s inflammatory emails 153 and Sales-
force ignored the terms of the MSA and permitted the RNC to continue to
use its account in this problematic manner.154 Doe said, “Salesforce very
obviously didn’t care about anti-abuse.” 155
Ultimately, the Trump Campaign and the RNC let the Big Lie spread
because they were making hundreds of millions of dollars from President
Trump’s supporters who believed that lie. The Big Rip-off needed the Big
Lie to motivate unsuspecting individuals to donate their money to a lost
cause, and it worked.

WHERE DID THE MONEY GO?

The Trump Campaign and the RNC had three of their largest fundraising
days of the 2020 election cycle immediately after the election.156 Together,
the Trump Campaign and the RNC raised more than one hundred million
dollars in three days, telling people they were raising the money for the
“Official Election Defense Fund.” According to the TMAGAC fundraising
pitches, the Trump Campaign and RNC team had created a so-called “Offi-
cial Election Defense Fund” to help pay for legal challenges to the election
784 APPENDIX 3
results.157 But there was no “Official Election Defense Fund”—it was simply
“a marketing tactic.” 158 The TMAGAC fundraisers did not know where the
donated money was actually going.159 The TMAGAC copywriting team sim-
ply took the lies that President Trump told them about the need to raise
money to overturn the election results and put them into emails to his sup-
porters.
The false claims of election fraud and the “Official Election Defense
Fund” were so successful President Trump and his allies raised more than
$250 million after the election.160 However, the Trump Campaign was rais-
ing too much money to spend solely on their legal efforts to overturn the
results of the 2020 election. The Trump Campaign continued to publicly
state the election had been stolen by “the Left,” while behind closed doors
they prepared a new plan to spend their supporters’ money.

A. The Creation of the Save America PAC

On November 9, 2020, President Trump created a separate leadership PAC
called Save America that allowed him to keep millions of dollars raised after
the election and spend it with very few restrictions in the future. Jared
Kushner worked with Alex Cannon, Deputy General Counsel for the Trump
Campaign, in creating the entity.161 Prior to the formation of Save America,
any money raised by the Trump Campaign could effectively only be spent
on recount and election-contest related expenses, and to pay off campaign
debt.162 But now the money raised into Save America could allow President
Trump to pay for his personal expenses, such as travel or hotel stays. After
Save America was formed, it was added to the TMAGAC joint fundraising
agreement with the RNC, and the percentage of the proceeds allocated to
the Trump Campaign began to flow to Save America.163
Importantly, Save America, as a leadership PAC, was not even legally
permitted to pay for recount and election-contest related expenses in
excess of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) limit of $5,000.164
Save America never hit that limit in 2020, as it spent no money on recount
and election-contest related expenses.165
Several reporters noticed the switch and contacted the Campaign asking
about the “bait and switch” and the “misleading” nature of the emails. One
reporter said directly: “it’s misleading to raise money for a committee
marked on the website as an ‘election defense fund’ if it’s going to a lead-
ership PAC.” 166 Another reporter asked, “Why is the campaign telling its
supporters they are contributing toward an ‘Election Defense Fund’ if only
a small percentage of those funds are actually going toward funding legal
efforts?” and “How can the campaign justify directing 75% of contributions
intended for a 2020 legal fund toward the President’s political action com-
mittee?” 167
 APPENDIX 3 785

The Trump Campaign came up with a messaging plan about this tactic,
which President Trump personally approved.168 Tim Murtaugh, the Trump
Campaign’s communications director, repeatedly asked Justin Clark, the
deputy campaign manager, whether they should respond to the report-
ers.169 When Murtaugh flagged that the communications team was not
responding to the reporters, Justin Clark said, “Good. Don’t.” 170

B. Outlays to Trump-Associated Individuals and Companies

The Trump Campaign spent the money on President Trump, giving dona-
tions to his associates, and keeping it for himself in Save America. Hun-
dreds of millions of dollars that were raised to go towards “election
defense” and “fighting voter fraud” were not spent that way at all. To the
contrary, most of the funds remain unspent, and millions have been paid to
companies that are known affiliates of President Trump, or payments to
entities associated with former Trump administration officials. Since the
election, former Trump officials who are still working for President
Trump’s PACs, and are publicly receiving salaries as FEC-reported “pay-
roll,” are also associated with these companies.
For example, from July 2021 to the present, Save America has been pay-
ing approximately $9,700 per month to Dan Scavino,171 a political adviser
who served in the Trump administration as White House Deputy Chief of
Staff.172 Save America was also paying $20,000 per month to an entity
called Hudson Digital LLC. Hudson Digital LLC was registered in Delaware
twenty days after the attack on the Capitol, on January 26, 2021,173 and
began receiving payments from Save America on the day it was regis-
tered.174 Hudson Digital LLC has received payments totaling over $420,000,
all described as “Digital consulting.” 175 No website or any other informa-
tion or mention of Hudson Digital LLC could be found online.176 Though
Hudson Digital LLC is registered as a Delaware company, the FEC Schedule
B listing traces back to an address belonging to Dan and Catherine
Scavino.177
Nick Luna, President Trump’s former personal assistant and “body
man,” was being paid from April 2021 to December 2021 approximately
$12,000 per month by Save America for “payroll.” 178 The Make America
Great Again PAC (MAGA PAC)—formerly the authorized committee of
President Trump’s reelection campaign, Donald J. Trump for President—
paid $20,000 per month to a limited liability corporation called Red State
Partners LLC from April 2021 through October 2021, and Save America paid
Red State Partners LLC $20,000 in February 2022.179 The company was reg-
istered in Delaware on March 11, 2021 180 and has received a total of
$170,000.181 Though it is registered in Delaware, disclosures filed with the
786 APPENDIX 3
Federal Election Committee (FEC) list Red State Partners at an address in
Miami, Florida, that is an address for Nick Luna and his wife, Cassidy
Dumbauld.182
Further, Vince Haley, Taylor Swindle, and Ross Worthington are corpo-
rate officers of a company known as Pericles LLC.183 Haley is a former
policy advisor to President Trump,184 Swindle is the Chief Financial Officer
for Gingrich 360,185 and Ross Worthington is the former White House
speechwriter 186 who wrote the speech President Trump delivered on the
Ellipse on January 6th.187 Pericles LLC was registered on January 27,
2021,188 the day after Scavino’s Hudson Digital LLC, and, since then, has
received payments from Save America totaling at least $352,700.189
Another former speechwriter for President Trump, Robert Gabriel, Jr.,
has also been receiving payments from Save America. Gabriel was involved
in writing the speech President Trump delivered on the White House Ellipse
on January 6th, and specifically told the speechwriters, including
Worthington, to reinsert previously removed incendiary lines about Vice
President Pence into the speech.190 This direction came after Vice President
Pence told President Trump that he would not try to change the outcome of
the election.191 In September 2021, Gabriel formed called Gabriel Strategies
LLC,192 which began receiving payments from Save America the following
month.193 Since October 2021, Save America has paid Gabriel Strategies LLC
at least $167,674.00.194 For both Pericles and Gabriel Strategies, the
description of the payments is always for “consulting” in political strategy
or communications, and some payments are purported to include travel
expenses.
Through October 2022, Save America has paid nearly $100,000 in
“strategy consulting” payments to Herve Pierre Braillard,195 a fashion
designer who has been dressing Melania Trump for years.196
From January 2021 to June 2022, Save America has also reported over
$2.1 million in “legal consulting.” Many firms perform different kinds of
practice, but more than 67% of those funds went to law firms that are rep-
resenting witnesses involved in the Select Committee’s investigation who
were subpoenaed or invited to testify.
Additionally, Save America has reported other expenditures, like:

• $1,000,000 donation to America First Policy Institute, home to several

former Trump officials and witnesses subpoenaed to testify before the
Committee.197
• $1,000,000 donation to Conservative Partnership Institute, a conser-
vative nonprofit organization where Mark Meadows is a senior part-
ner.198
• More than $10.6 million to Event Strategies, Inc., the preferred staging
company for President Trump that staged the January 6th rally.199
 APPENDIX 3 787

• More than $327,000 in payments to the Trump Hotel Collection and

Mar-A-Lago Club since the 2020 election.200
• An “event sponsorship fee” of $165,937.50 to American Conservative
Union,201 the Chairman of which is Matt Schlapp. Schlapp and his wife
have offered to pay the legal fees of witnesses called to testify before
the January 6th Committee and have extensive ties with former Presi-
dent Trump.
• A little over $140,000 to National Public Affairs, LLC,202 a consulting
company started by former Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien and
Deputy Campaign Manager Justin Clark.203 Stepien testified that he
knew the claims of voter fraud were false, that he didn’t think what
was happening was necessarily honest, and that he was stepping away
from the Trump Campaign.204 However, he continues to work and
receive hundreds of thousands of dollars consulting for President
Trump and several other congressional candidates who continue to
spread false voter fraud claims related to the 2020 election.205

C. Payments to 2M Management LLC

As described above, the Trump Campaign, after paying off its general elec-
tion debt, raised millions of dollars that flowed into a segregated recount
account (“Recount Account”) by encouraging donors to help pay for legal
challenges to the election results. Pursuant to the FECA, the Trump Cam-
paign could only spend these funds on a few limited purposes (e.g., for
actual recounts and election-contest expenses or, in the case of surplus
funds, donations to charitable organizations or transferring the funds to a
national party committee’s separate, segregated account for election
recounts).206
Justin Clark told the Select Committee that he understood that, “[a]fter
election day, . . . you can raise money for a recount and to pay off debt,” 207
and that “[t]he money going into the campaign, principal campaign com-
mittee, at that point, [after the election] was dead money. It couldn’t be
spent on things.” 208 Alex Cannon agreed.209 That’s why, after the election,
the Trump Campaign set up the Recount Account—“a segregated restricted
account [held] by the campaign” 210—and raised money for the Recount
Account through TMAGAC.211
In February 2021, the Trump Campaign was converted into MAGA
PAC.212 In March 2021, MAGA PAC began disclosing on required FEC forms
that it was paying millions of dollars to an eDiscovery vendor called 2M
Document Management & Imaging LLC (“2M Management”) for what
MAGA PAC described as “recount” and “Recount: Research Consulting.”213
Although the MAGA PAC reported that 2M Management was being paid
for recount-related expenses, 2M Management was primarily processing
and reviewing documents slated to be produced by the National Archives
788 APPENDIX 3
and Records Administration in response to subpoenas from (1) the House
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (“Covid Subcommittee”)
and (2) the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack.214
From just March 2021 to May 2021, MAGA PAC paid 2M Management
almost $1 million from the Recount Account to review documents related
solely to the Covid Subcommittee.215 Alex Cannon confirmed that he under-
stood these payments to 2M Management came from the Recount
Account.216 Federal campaign finance law requires committees to accurately
report information related to expenditures, including the purpose of pay-
ments. FEC regulations provide that the “purpose” be described in relevant
reports through a brief statement of why the disbursement was made and
must be sufficiently specific to make the purpose of the disbursement
clear.217

IMPACT OF THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN’S FALSE CLAIMS

Between the election and January 6th, the Trump Campaign sent out hun-
dreds of emails urging President Trump’s supporters to “fight the Liberal
MOB” and “join the Trump army.” Users on the same extreme social media
platforms used to plan the attack on the Capitol repeatedly shared the
“Official Election Defense Fund” donation links in the week following elec-
tion day.218 Links to donate were often accompanied by mentions of voter
fraud and calls to save the country, mirroring the language of the fundrais-
ing emails and the countless discussions being held by the President’s sup-
porters of coming to Washington, DC, on January 6th to “Stop the steal.” 219
On January 6th, while President Trump was speaking at the Ellipse rally
and directing his supporters to march to the Capitol, his Campaign was also
sending fundraising emails inflaming people to “fight back.” One email
stated, “100 Members of Congress. . . . Join them in the FIGHT to DEFEND
the Election. . . . This is our last line of defense.” 220 Another email stated,
“TODAY will be a historic day in our Nation’s history. Congress will either
certify, or object to, the Election results. Every single Patriot from across
the Country must step up RIGHT NOW if we’re going to successfully
DEFEND the integrity of this Election.” 221 A third email stated, “TODAY.
This is our LAST CHANCE . . . The stakes have NEVER been higher. President
Trump needs YOU to make a statement and publicly stand with him and
FIGHT BACK.” 222
Thirty minutes after the last fundraising email was sent, the Capitol
was breached. It was then and only then that TMAGAC fundraisers decided
to stop sending emails containing baseless claims of election fraud.223
Boedigheimer explained, “And at some point during that time, I don’t know
if it was right then, if it was a little after, maybe a little before, but either
 APPENDIX 3 789

Gary or Kevin kind of directed us to stop sending fundraising messages

out.” 224 Cannon stated, “[O]n January 6th, Gary called me and said, [‘]are
you seeing what’s happening? I’m obviously turning everything off.[’]” 225
After raising $250 million dollars on false voter fraud claims, mostly
from small-dollar donors, President Trump did not spend it on fighting an
election he knew he lost. Instead, a significant portion of the money was
deposited into the Save America account and not used for the purposes the
Campaign claimed it would be. President Trump got a war chest with mil-
lions of dollars, and the American people were left with the U.S. Capitol
under attack.
There is evidence suggesting that numerous defendants charged with
violations related to the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol and others
present on the Capitol grounds that day were motivated by false claims
about the election.226
Further, J. Doe, the Salesforce employee interviewed by the Select Com-
mittee, provided insight into the action that Salesforce took after the attack.
Doe explained that after they became aware of the ongoing attack, they
(Doe) took unilateral action to block the RNC’s ability to send emails
through Salesforce’s platform.227 Doe noted that the shutdown lasted until
January 11, 2021, when senior Salesforce leadership directed Doe to remove
the block from RNC’s Salesforce account.228 Doe stated that Salesforce
leadership told Doe that Salesforce would now begin reviewing RNC’s email
campaigns to “make sure this doesn’t happen again.” 229

CONCLUSION

In the weeks after the 2020 election leading up to January 6, 2021, President
Trump’s Campaign and his allies sent his supporters a barrage of emails
and text messages pushing lies about a stolen election and asking for con-
tributions to challenge the outcome of the election. In reality, the funds
raised went primarily towards paying down the Trump Campaign’s out-
standing 2020 debt, financing President Trump’s newly created Save
America PAC, and raising money for the RNC.
Overall, only a small amount of the contributions ever went to President
Trump’s recount account or were otherwise obviously used in connection
with post-election recounts or litigation. As President Trump used the Big
Lie as a weapon to attack the legitimacy of the 2020 election, his Campaign
used that same Big Lie to raise millions of dollars based on false claims and
unkept promises.
Not only did President Trump lie to his supporters about the election,
but he also ripped them off.
790 APPENDIX 3

ENDNOTES
1. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020, 5:30 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1330277503160741888 (“Democrats are attempting
to STEAL this Election and the White House. This Election is far from over as long as we
have YOU on our team to FIGHT BACK.”); Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter,
Nov. 21, 2020, 7:16 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/
1330122927958859777 (“With your help, we will DEFEND the Election and keep America
America.”).
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 104 (“I do think those words are effec-
tive, because people were upset and they wanted their donation to go towards an effort
to—the legal effort.”).
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Walters, (May 25, 2022), pp. 15-16; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 28; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred,
(Mar. 30, 2022), p. 13.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 95.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10. (noting that as digital director he
oversaw the digital operation).
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 6-7; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano,
(Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 187 (naming Coby as person control-
ling fundraising operation); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9
(“And then Gary Colby would have been the kind of the lead of the entire digital team for
the Joint Fundraising Committee”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022),
p. 81 (“Gary ran the campaign’s digital team”).
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 3 (Zambrano stated that Coby
expressed that he spoke with “the family,” meaning the Trumps, and Zambrano believed
that Kushner was the family member to whom Coby spoke most frequently.); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 190; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Cole Blocker, (Dec.
29, 2021), p. 2 (Blocker stated that he knew Coby talked to Jared Kushner a lot, and that
their relationship was common knowledge.).
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 13.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11; Select Committee to Investigate
 APPENDIX 3 791

the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred,
(Mar. 30, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 11-13.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 15.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10 (“I think that's fair to say. I
think my direct report was Kevin but then we also viewed Gary as a leader of kind of the
digital JFC team”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (indicating
Boedigheimer reported to Coby but that there may have been additional people between
Boedigheimer and Coby).
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 16-17 (“Austin
led the fundraising team . . . [and] [o]versaw the variety of fundraising channels and led
that team.”).
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 9-10.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 14 (Committee Staff: “Now, the
emails that Austin and Hannah and folks were working on, those are primarily drafting
emails for TMAGAC, correct?” Zambrano: “Yes, I believe so.”).
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov.
3, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Murglin,
(Mar. 17, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Blinkoff, (Feb. 7, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 11 (“Alex Murglin joined I believe in
March of 2020 . . . That summer, Ethan Katz and Alex Blinkoff both joined.”); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Inter-
view of Alex Murglin (Mar. 17, 2022), p. 2.
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 12.
792 APPENDIX 3
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9 (“So, we, as in the RNC digi-
tal employees and then campaign employees and vendors as well, came to work together
on the JFC. And the general structure was all working together on that goal.”); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Inter-
view of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 3 (“ALLRED said that on the 5th floor, the RNC and
Campaign employees all worked together for joint fundraising committee, and exactly who
worked for which entity kind of didn’t matter. . . . Rather, everyone just referred to every-
thing as TMAGAC.”).
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (“He explained that the copywriting process
worked like a Henry Ford style assembly line, where different individuals performed a task
and passed on the work product to someone else.”).
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 15-16.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0003821, (Nov. 30, 2020 email
from Austin Boedigheimer to Hanna Allred, “Fwd: It’s happening again, Austin.”).
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 20.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 30.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 103-104.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 112-113 (“On average, yes, you repeat
things that do well.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 21 (“[I]f you
were sending it repeatedly[,] it’s the understanding that it's doing well so you want to
keep sending e-mails like that.”).
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 107-108 (“President Trump’s
saying it, surrogates are saying it, everybody's saying it. So my, you know, I don’t remem-
ber exactly this but it seems like it was, you know, we should do something like that since
it's been working.”).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 23; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred,
(Mar. 30, 2022), p. 28; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 8 (agreeing that
copywriters sought to capture the voice and tone of President Trump in its messaging);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 9 (agreeing that President Trump was
focused on a particular issue, copywriters they would also tend to focus on similar issues).
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 45 (“I think we’ve determined that it’s aggressive lan-
guage. We would want to use that for this.”).
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 25-29.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 23-24.
 APPENDIX 3 793

39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 14, 49 (“Austin would have
reviewed all the content before it would go up to the approval chains or Hannah.”).
Zambrano stated that, on a day-to-day basis, he was not very involved in overseeing
Boedigheimer’s handling of the copywriting process. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano,
(Apr. 27, 2022), p. 16.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 43.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 44.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 63-64.
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael
Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 9-10.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 6 (“And then that’s also where I
started doing some of the approval for the fundraising emails, the small-dollar fundraising
emails.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 8 (“To the best of my
recollection, that was primarily Cassie Docksey, Mike Reed, who handled approvals on that
content.”).
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 7 (“I had a role in approv[ing] them
[the TMAGAC fundraising emails], yes.”).
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 80 (“There would be—I don’t
know if my team members were routinely getting those emails as well or if they were just
being directed to me, but we were participants in them.”); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 45-46 (“I know from the Trump Campaign, I remember Zach Parkinson
was someone who responded. I was never sure if he was from research or comms, or
maybe he did both, I’m not entirely sure, but he would typically, if something was wrong,
like, inaccurate, he would flag it.”).
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 58.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60, 75-76 (“I think what I said
earlier was, at the time the election wasn’t over, President Trump was saying those things.
I didn’t have a reason to believe it was false. So as far as the accuracy of that in the
approval chain, that was up to them to decide.”).
794 APPENDIX 3
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 78.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 77-78.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 86-87.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 88-89 (“I, as best I recall, that
is who I assumed would be doing that type of review [about whether it was true that
Democrats were trying to steal the election].”).
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 91.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 96.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 54-55.
64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Alexander Cannon production), AC-0001631, (Nov. 4, 2020, “Re:
Hand-off on Compliance Review”).
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 89.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 17.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 19-20.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 26.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 116.
73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020, email from Jared
Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm,
and Nov. 7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54 pm).
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020, email from Jared
Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm,
and Nov. 7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54 pm).
 APPENDIX 3 795

75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00416, (Nov. 7, 2020, text messages
between Jared Kushner and Gary Coby).
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 200.
77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Sean Dollman Production), DOLLMAN-0003821, (Dec. 23. 2020, emails
between Jared Kushner, Sean Dolman, Gary Coby, Justin Clark, and Cassie Dumbauld “Re:
[EXTERNAL]Re: 12/22/20 Cash Position Update”). Despite email communications showing
his involvement in the Campaign’s finances through late December 2020, Kushner claimed
that, from around November 13 onward, he was only “nominally involved” with the Cam-
paign’s budgeting and fundraising. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 205.
78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal
chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (“Austin could have. I'm not sure if people on the campaign
instructed anyone else on the campaign or anything, but I wouldn't be surprised if there
were a couple different scenarios floating around most people’s heads on that.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (“I don't recall specific—I don’t recall
conversations around it, other than there may have just been general [‘]we need to be
ready for whatever may come[’].”).
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal
chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello).
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823 (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal
chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 39 (“I’m basically saying on the victory topic, which is the
first one that he covered. We’re waiting until closer to election results are coming in to be
able to get that approved and then I’m giving him some copy about how they are trying to
steal the election that has already been approved.”).
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55.
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 56 (“But, again, this was the President's messaging and his
phrasing”).
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 44 (“I didn’t have a great
understanding of what was going to happen or what happened on the ground. I wouldn’t
have really any knowledge into that.”).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 52-53; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 55; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 66
(“. . . reported to Austin, so I would've received direction from him”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 52-54.
796 APPENDIX 3
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 146 (“Well, it would have been approval
by the principal. So Mr. Trump would have had to do that.”).
86. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2020 7:24 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1329762574494298112.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 104 (“Yeah, I think they [the Trump Cam-
paign] viewed that as helping to get the message out, especially, you know, that’s the
base, right?”).
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 57.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 56-57.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 57.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 67.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 86.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 86-87.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 4 (“Similarly, they could say the Democrats
were trying or tried to steal the election, but not state that they were or had.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal
Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (“KATZ recalled that Allred told him to say the
Democrats were “trying to” steal the elections. He added that he did not have any discus-
sions about why “trying to” was important, but his impression was that it was used to give
some legal wiggle room and make the statement about stealing the election to be ‘less
false.’”).
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 75, (“I do remember at some point we
were told we could no longer use the word ‘rigged.’”).
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714, (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundraising
email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundraising
email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vac-
cine”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 106 (Zambrano concedes that
the revision “creates a new sentence” that means something different.); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 109 (In response to whether fair to say that that
this was a substantive change, Parkinson states, “You could characterize it as that, I guess,
yeah.”).
 APPENDIX 3 797

100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vac-
cine”).
101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”)
(emphasis in original).
102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”).
103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”).
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 101.
105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013891 (Nov. 12, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: NC, GA Election Defense” at 3:08 a.m.); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013928 (Nov. 12, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: NC, GA Election Defense” at 4:49 a.m.); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0014006 (Nov. 13, 2020, Fundrais-
ing email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defense Fund & GA/NC Vic-
tory”).
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 84, 137.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 14-15.
108. Jane C. Timm, “Rudy Giuliani baselessly alleges ‘centralized’ voter fraud at free-wheeling
news conference,” NBC News (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/donald-trump/rudy-giuliani-baselessly-alleges-centralized-voter-fraud-free-
wheeling-news-n1248273.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37 (“So on that press conference
day, which I think is November 19th, Michael and I talked after that where he was generally
telling me, ‘Hey, we don't need to be out there. It’s not automatic that we’re just going to
go out there and parallel or mimic what the campaign or what Rudy Giuliani or that legal
team might be saying. Don’t feel the need to put that through on the GOP social chan-
nels.’”).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 38.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 15-16. Ahrens thought this press
conference was “embarrassing” and that other members of the RNC leadership team
shared his view. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 28-29.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 19-20.
798 APPENDIX 3
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 21-22.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 25-27.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 56, 58 (“[T]here was a conversation at
some point in November, December with either colleagues of mine or the legal team at
the RNC” about the messaging that was coming out of TMAGAC.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 65, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 66
(recalling “that there were conversations at some point that the RNC was more comfort-
able with more toned-down emails”).
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 85, 86 (“I generally remember in
regards to these emails in the post-election period conversations to make sure that the
legal team and the chairman’s office or whatever else was comfortable with the language
that was going out of the JFC.”).
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 45.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 22.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 202.
121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 183.
122. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec. 20, 2020 12:20 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1341433522331017217; Trump Fundraising Emails
(@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 3:23 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
TrumpEmail/status/1343291529943781378.
123. William Cummings, Joey Garrison and Jim Sergent, “By the numbers: President Donald
Trump's failed efforts to overturn the election,” USA Today, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-
efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 117-118.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 144; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin
Clark, (May. 17, 2022), pp. 177-178 (“[I]n terms of people raising concerns about it, Alexander
Cannon, at one point, came into my office and said something to the effect—and he was
just doing legal reviews. It was like, I can’t believe we’re sending this stuff out, or some-
thing to that effect. I said—I told him he should go talk to Gary and speak to him about it,
and I told him you don’t need to do legal reviews on these anymore. . . . It was just about
information that he knew wasn't correct.”).
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 178.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
 APPENDIX 3 799

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 178.
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022),
p. 1.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022),
p. 1.
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022),
p. 1.
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 89.
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022),
p. 1.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022),
p. 1.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 83-86. (Allred confirmed that
Boedigheimer would have given the directive to draft this email); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.
138. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020, 9:42 a.m. available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1324180321676546050.
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 3.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 7.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 176.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 116-117.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 137. Similarly, on January 6th,
DataPier stopped sending emails, and the list went cold, and, therefore, DataPier is now
defunct; see Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 122.
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0002048 (Nov. 7, 2020, email from
Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder,
800 APPENDIX 3
“FW: [PROOF] Michael – increase your impact NOW”). (“Again this comes in chorus with less
inflammatory language that could be misleading as accusatory or assuming intent upon a
particular population.”).
145. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0004724 (Nov. 9, 2020, email from
Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder,
“Re: FW: [PROOF] Hanna—I need you.”).
146. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013741 (Nov. 11, 2020, email from
Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder,
“Re: FW: [PROOF] BIG NEWS”).
147. J. Doe expressed safety concerns and a fear of retaliation for cooperating with the Select
Committee. Accordingly, the Select Committee has not revealed their identity.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 7-8.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 30.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 30-31.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 42-43.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 46.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 47.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 49-50.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 25.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 49 (noting that the Trump Campaign had
“three of our best four fundraising days occur immediately after the election”).
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86 (“We frequently use funds as a
marketing tactic. . . So I don’t believe there is actually a fund called the ‘Election Defense
Fund,’ not that I'm aware of.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp.
91-92.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 87; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 96-97 (Allred noting that she only became aware of Save America in
February 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 92 (“From
my understanding, the money was going towards, I believe this is a TMAGAC e-mail. So it
was going to TMAGAC. And then how the money was spent from there, you know, that’s not
something that I would do or have knowledge to.”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 94 (“I’m not sure how the funds went or how they were
allocated. I don’t know precisely.”).
 APPENDIX 3 801

160. Shane Goldmacher and Rachel Shorey, “Trump Raised $255.4 Million in 8 Weeks as He
Sought to overturn Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 31, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/trump-voter-fraud-fundraising.html (“President
Donald J. Trump and the Republican Party raised $255.4 million in the eight-plus weeks
following the Nov. 3 election, new federal filings show, as he sought to undermine and
overturn the results with unfounded accusations of fraud.”).
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 153.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143 (“After election day . . . you can raise
money for a recount and to pay off debt.”).
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 125; Jarrett Renshaw and Joseph Tanfani,
“Donations under $8K to Trump ‘election defense’ instead go to president, RNC,” Reuters,
(Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-
fundraising-insigh/donations-under-8k-to-trump-election-defense-instead-go-to-
president-rnc-idUSKBN27R309 ("The emailed solicitations send supporters to an ‘Official
Election Defense Fund’ website that asks them to sign up for recurring donations to ‘pro-
tect the results and keep fighting even after Election Day.’ The fine print makes clear most
of the money will go to other priorities. A large portion of the money goes to ‘Save
America,’ a Trump leadership PAC, or political action committee, set up on Monday, and
the Republican National Committee (RNC).”).
164. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2006-24, (Oct. 5, 2006), p. 6, available at
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2006-24/2006-24.pdf (The Act “prohibits Federal
officeholders and candidates, their agents, and entities directly or indirectly established,
financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of one or more Federal office-
holders or candidates, from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending funds
for expenses related to a recount of the votes cast in a Federal election, including the
recount activities described above, unless those funds are subject to the limitations, pro-
hibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act. . . . [A] Federal candidate’s recount fund
must not receive or solicit donations in excess of the Act’s amount limitations. . . . [A]ny
recount fund established by a Federal candidate may not receive donations that in the
aggregate exceed . . . $5,000 per multicandidate political committee.”).
165. FEC Reported Disbursements in 2020 by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 18, 2022),
available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee_id=
C00762591&two_year_transaction_period=2020&data_type=processed.
166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov. 11, 2020, emails
between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and lead-
ership PAC”).
167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails
between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questions”).
168. When the Trump Campaign learned that reporters were going to write about their mislead-
ing fundraising, Murtaugh advised further comment from the Campaign would “serve to
highlight the argument that the fundraising pitch is misleading.” Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1, 2020, emails between Timothy
Murtaugh, Jason Miller, Sean Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien, “Re: [EXTERNAL
]$$$$$$”). Murtaugh further noted that “POTUS is on board with how it will be described.”
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1, 2020, emails
between Timothy Murtaugh, Jason Miller, Sean Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien, “Re:
[EXTERNAL ]$$$$$$”).
802 APPENDIX 3
169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov. 11, 2020, emails
between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and lead-
ership PAC”), (Murtaugh asking Justin Clark, “Still ignoring?”); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails between Timothy Mur-
taugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questions”), (Murtaugh telling Justin
Clark, “FYI – Still not answering.”).
170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails
between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questions”).
171. FEC Reported Disbursements to Daniel Scavino by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10,
2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=scavino%2C+dan.
172. Katelyn Polantz and Ryan Nobles, “Trump’s former deputy chief of staff, Dan Scavino, not
ready to cooperate with January 6 committee, attorney says,” CNN, (Oct. 21, 2021), available
at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/politics/dan-scavino-january-6-committee/
index.html.
173. “Hudson Digital LLC,” State of Delaware Division of Corporations, (last accessed on Dec. 9,
2022), available at https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx
(search “Hudson Digital LLC” in the “Entity Name” field).
174. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available
at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.
175. FEC Reported Disbursements to Hudson Digital LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) avail-
able at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=
hudson+digital+llc.
176. An unrelated company, Hudson Digital, has operated for approximately 10 years in Hud-
son, NY, over 80 miles from the addresses associated with Hudson Digital LLC.
177. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available
at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.
178. FEC Reported Disbursements to Nicholas Luna by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10,
2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=luna%2C+nicholas.
179. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022)
available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.
180. “Red State Partners LLC,” State of Delaware Division of Corporations, (last accessed on Dec.
9, 2022), available at https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx
(search “Red State Partners LLC” in the “Entity Name” field).
181. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022)
available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.
182. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Make America Great Again PAC, (Dec.
2, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202112029469645374.
183. “Pericles, LLC,” District of Columbia Department of Business Licensing Division, (last
accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://corponline.dcra.dc.gov/BizEntity.aspx/
ViewEntityData?entityId=4292880.
184. “Vincent M. Haley,” ProPublica: Trump Town, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/vincent-m-haley.
185. “Taylor Swindle,” Gingrich360, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://
www.gingrich360.com/about/gingrich-360-team/taylor-swindle/.
 APPENDIX 3 803

186. “Ross Worthington,” ProPublica: Trump Town, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/ross-worthington.
187. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6,
2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).
188. “Pericles, LLC,” District of Columbia Department of Business Licensing Division, (last
accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://corponline.dcra.dc.gov/BizEntity.aspx/
ViewEntityData?entityId=4292880.
189. FEC Reported Disbursements to Pericles LLC by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10,
2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=pericles+llc.
190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6,
2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).
191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6,
2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).
192. The organization was originally formed as Believe in America LLC, then changed its name
the following day to Gabriel Strategies LLC. See “Gabriel Strategies LLC”, State of New Jer-
sey Division of Revenue and Enterprise Search, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at
https://www.njportal.com/DOR/BusinessNameSearch/Search/BusinessName (search
“Gabriel Strategies LLC” in the “Business Name” field).
193. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (May 5, 2022), available
at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664518.
194. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC by Save America, (last accessed on
Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=gabriel+strategies.
195. FEC Reported Disbursements to Herve Pierre Braillard by Save America, (last accessed on
Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=Herve+Pierre+Braillard.
196. Suzy Menkes, “Herve Pierre: Dressing the First Lady,” Vogue, (Apr. 12, 2017), available at
https://www.vogue.pt/herve-pierre-dressing-the-first-lady; Rosemary Feitelberg, “Melania
Trump’s Former Stylist Addresses $60,000 Save America Payment,” Women’s Wear Daily,
(Aug. 8. 2022), available at https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/melania-
trump-herve-pierre-60000-save-america-payment-1235294733/.
197. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available
at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699856.
198. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (May 5, 2022), available
at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664847.
199. FEC Reported Disbursements to Event Strategies Inc by Save America, (last accessed on
Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=event+strategies+inc.
200. FEC Reported Disbursements to Trump Hotel and Mar-A-Lago by Save America, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/
?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=mar-a-
lago&recipient_name=trump+hotel.
201. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (June 15, 2022), avail-
able at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202206159514906341.
202. FEC Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs by Save America, (last accessed on
Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=
processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=National+Public+Affairs.
804 APPENDIX 3
203. “Meet Our Team,” National Public Affairs, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://natpublicaffairs.com/.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
205. FEC disclosures show that other than Save America, National Public Affairs LLC received
payments from only three other organizations since 2021. All three are campaigns for elec-
tion deniers, Kelly Tshibaka (AK-Senate), Jason Smith (MO-08), and Harriet Hageman
(WY-AL). See FEC Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs LLC since 2021, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/
?data_type=processed&recipient_name=national+public+affairs+llc&min_date=
01%2F01%2F2021.
206. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2019-02, (Mar. 28, 2019), available at
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2019-02/2019-02.pdf.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 145.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 156 (“[G]enerally after an election,
you can raise money for debt retirement, and you can raise money for recount.”).
210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12, 2020, emails
between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell, “Re: [External]Legal defense fund”).
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12, 2020, emails
between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell, “Re: [External]Legal defense fund”).
212. Statement of Organization FEC Form 1, filed by Make America Great Again PAC, (Feb. 27,
2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/093/202102279429078093/
202102279429078093.pdf#navpanes=0.
213. FEC Reported Disbursements to 2M Document Management and Imaging, LLC by Make
America Great Again PAC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/
data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00580100&recipient_name=
2m+document&two_year_transaction_period=2022.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Clarke (Aug. 4, 2022), p. 28 (agreeing that “the vast majority of
the work that 2M has done to date that has been paid for by MAGA PAC relates to January
6th documents or COVID-related documents coming from NARA”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 31 (“There was a House Oversight investigation into
the administration’s COVID response, and there were a large number of documents that
were coming through that needed to be processed.”).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Clarke, (Aug. 4, 2022), pp. 31-32 (“During that time, I believe
all we were doing was work related to the White House—the Trump administration's
response to COVID.”).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 15-16 (noting his understanding
that “if the funds were raised to DJTFP and they were not spent on debt retirement, any
remaining funds that were not spent on debt retirement would have gone to this segre-
gated, restricted account for recounts for MAGA PA?”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Can-
non, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 16; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
 APPENDIX 3 805

United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 37-38
(agreeing that if funds paid to 2M are labeled recount then he would assume they came
from Recount Account).
217. See Statement of Policy: “Purpose of Disbursement” Entries for Filings with the Commis-
sion, 72 Fed. Reg. 887 (Jan. 9, 2007) (citing 11 C.F.R. § § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(b), (4)(i)(A)).
218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising communication
rhetoric’s influence on social media).
219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising communication
rhetoric’s influence on social media).
220. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 12:20 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346794824591093763.
221. Trump Fundraising Emails, (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 1:31 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346887173438636032.
222. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 11:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346856536338030601.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 42 (noting “yes, we stopped
sending emails on January 6”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 128 (“I
believe we got some sort of message, either on Microsoft Teams or Signal from Austin,
saying pause everything.”).
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 140.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 124.
226. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Grayson, No. 1:21-mj-00163 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021);
Criminal Complaint, United States v. Fitzsimmons, No. 1:21-cr-00158-RC (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2021);
(noting that the defendant in that case “believed voter fraud occurred” and that “[c]on-
vinced that the election results had been fraudulently reported, he was moved by the
words of then-President Trump to travel to the District of Columbia for the ‘Save America
Rally.’”).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 64-65.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 68-69.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 72.
806 APPENDIX 4
MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, President Donald J.

Trump and his apologists attempted to blame his loss on foreign interfer-
ence. They falsely claimed that foreign-manufactured voting machines had
been manipulated so that votes cast for Trump were instead recorded as
votes for Joseph R. Biden, Jr.1 No one has ever, either at the time or since,
offered any evidence to support Trump’s assertion. On the contrary, ample
evidence collected by the Intelligence Community (IC) and reviewed by the
Select Committee disproves those claims.
That is not to say foreign actors made no attempt to influence the
American political climate during and after the 2020 Presidential election.
This appendix evaluates the role foreign influence played in the circum-
stances surrounding the insurrection.2

DISCUSSION

ELECTION MEDDLING IN 2020:

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE? NO. FOREIGN INFLUENCE? YES.
In its postmortem assessment of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, the
Intelligence Community comprehensively examined two types of foreign
meddling: interference and influence. The distinction between the two is
critical in evaluating President Trump’s repeated public assertions that
there had been massive and widespread “fraud” that had the effect of
“stealing” the election for then-candidate Biden.
For its analytic purposes, the Intelligence Community defines election
interference as “a subset of election influence activities targeted at the tech-
nical aspects of the election, including voter registration, casting and
counting ballots, or reporting results.” 3 That definition notes that election
interference is a subset of election influence, which the Intelligence Com-
munity defines to include “overt and covert efforts by foreign governments
or actors acting as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign governments intended
to affect directly or indirectly a US election—including candidates, political
parties, voters or their preferences, or political processes.” 4
The Intelligence Community’s Assessment (ICA) found no factual basis
for any allegation of technical interference with the 2020 U.S. election: “We
have no indications that any foreign actor attempted to interfere in the
2020 US elections by altering any technical aspect of the voting process,
including voter registration, ballot casting, vote tabulation, or reporting
 APPENDIX 4 807

results.” 5 Put simply, allegations that foreign powers rigged voting

machines and swapped ballots were false and unsupported.
Although there is no evidence of foreign technical interference in the
2020 election, there is evidence of foreign influence. Specifically, the Intel-
ligence Community’s Assessment concluded that “Russian President Putin
authorized, and a range of Russian government organizations conducted,
influence operations aimed at denigrating President Biden’s candidacy and
the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining
public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical
divisions in the US.” 6 The two Intelligence Community analytic conclusions
about the 2020 U.S. Presidential election—that there was evidence of for-
eign influence, but not foreign interference—are completely consistent.

MALIGN FOREIGN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE 2020 U.S. ELECTIONS

The 2020 U.S. elections saw an increase in the number of foreign state and
non-state entities that attempted to influence the U.S. electorate. The U.S.
Intelligence Community suggests, as a possible explanation, that more such
foreign entities “may view influence operations as important tools for pro-
jecting power abroad.” 7 More ascertainably, “[t]he growth of internet and
social media use means foreign actors are more able to reach US audiences
directly, while the tools for doing so are becoming more accessible.” 8
The United States’ principal foreign adversaries—Russia, China, and
Iran—all of them autocracies, engage, to varying degrees, in disguised
efforts to influence U.S. public opinion.9 In the context of these overarching
efforts,10 U.S. elections offer special opportunities.
For Russia, “[e]lections . . . often serve as an opportune target. But
attacks on elections are typically just one part of ongoing, multi-pronged
operations.” 11 The U.S. Intelligence Community’s definitive post-election
assessment of foreign influence activities during the 2020 Presidential
election concluded that Russia was deeply engaged in disinformation
activities intended to influence the outcome by supporting President Trump
while disparaging then-candidate Biden; Iran also engaged in efforts to
influence the election’s outcome, but unlike Russia, did not actively pro-
mote any candidate; and that China considered opportunities to influence
the election’s outcome, but ultimately decided that potential costs out-
weighed any foreseeable benefits.12 Both Russia and Iran worked to under-
mine the American public’s confidence in U.S. democratic processes and to
deepen socio-political divisions in the United States.13

RUSSIA’S MALIGN INFLUENCE EFFORTS TARGETING THE UNITED STATES

Russian malign disinformation efforts are both strategic in scope and
opportunistic in nature. They aim to corrode the power and appeal of the
U.S. democratic processes, worsen U.S. domestic divisions, and weaken
America at home and abroad. The Intelligence Community’s February 2022
808 APPENDIX 4
unclassified “Annual Threat Assessment” puts this sustained Russian
threat in a nutshell:
Russia presents one of the most serious foreign influence threats to
the United States, using its intelligence services, proxies, and wide-
ranging influence tools to try to divide Western alliances, and
increase its sway around the world, while attempting to undermine
U.S. global standing, amplify discord inside the United States, and
influence U.S. voters and decisionmaking.14

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Foreign adversaries’ influence campaigns routinely push disinformation to
U.S. audiences. Elections offer an important forum for Russia and other U.S.
adversaries to seek to deepen divisions within American society through
disinformation campaigns.15 The Intelligence Community projects that both
Russia and China will, for the foreseeable future, continue to press their
disinformation campaigns attempting to undermine the U.S. population’s
confidence in their government and society.16 Russia certainly did so in the
period following the election and preceding the January 6th attack.
The disinformation spread by Russia and its messengers during that
time was not, however, entirely original. The Intelligence Community
Assessment found that Russia’s disinformation engine borrowed President
Trump’s own words to achieve its goals:

Russian online influence actors generally promoted former Presi-

dent Trump and his commentary, including repeating his political
messaging on the election results; the presidential campaign;
debates; the impeachment inquiry; and, as the election neared, US
domestic crises.17
Indeed, President Trump’s messaging during and after the 2020 elec-
tion was reflected in Russian influence efforts at the time. In September of
2020, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and
Analysis warned that Russia was engaged in pre-election activity targeting
the U.S. democratic process.18 The bulletin advised that “Russia is likely to
continue amplifying criticisms of vote-by-mail and shifting voting pro-
cesses amidst the COVID–19 pandemic to undermine public trust in the
electoral process.” 19
Deliberately spreading disinformation to discredit a U.S. election was
not new to Russia’s influence arsenal. In the judgment of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Community, it is a tactic Russia was prepared to deploy after the 2016
U.S. Presidential election:
 APPENDIX 4 809

Even after the [2020] election, Russian online influence actors con-
tinued to promote narratives questioning the election results and
disparaging President Biden and the Democratic Party. These efforts
parallel plans Moscow had in place in 2016 to discredit a potential
incoming Clinton administration, but which it scrapped after for-
mer President Trump’s victory.20
Russian influence efforts in the 2016 and 2020 elections, while distinct
in their particulars, shared some similarities. Historically, Russia has
engaged in near-industrial scale online influence efforts.21 The Intelligence
Community Assessment states that in 2020, Russia again relied on internet
trolls to amplify divisive content aimed at American audiences:
The Kremlin-linked influence organization Project Lakhta and its
Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm—commonly referred to
by its former moniker Internet Research Agency (IRA)—amplified
controversial domestic issues. LIR used social media personas, news
websites, and US persons to deliver tailored content to subsets of
the US population. LIR established short-lived troll farms that used
unwitting third-country nationals in Ghana, Mexico, and Nigeria to
propagate these US-focused narratives. . . .22
The threats posed by Russia’s influence efforts are not new, nor are
they diminishing. The latest unclassified Intelligence Community Annual
Threat Assessment throws this into sharp relief:
Moscow has conducted influence operations against U.S. elections
for decades, including as recently as the 2020 presidential election.
We assess that it probably will try to strengthen ties to U.S. persons
in the media and politics in hopes of developing vectors for future
influence operations.23

PROXIES AMONG US: MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND U.S. AUDIENCES

Tech-enabled or not, if ever there was a “people business,” foreign influ-
ence is it. People working on behalf of a foreign government—foreign gov-
ernment officials, their agents, and proxies—work to influence, directly or
indirectly, a target audience in another country—its officials and citizens at
large. Most who are engaged in those efforts act overtly: ambassadors, con-
suls general, government delegations and so forth. Their foreign influence
efforts are not, however, focused on philanthropy or foreign aid. Moreover,
the perspectives they seek to embed in their target audiences may be inten-
tionally and materially inaccurate, propagandistic, or driven by unstated
motives. In such instances, foreign influence may amount to injecting for-
eign disinformation into the U.S. media ecosystem for re-branding and
onward transmission to an American audience.24
810 APPENDIX 4
Foreign state adversaries of the United States generally disguise their
efforts to influence U.S. audiences, particularly when they seek to influence
U.S. voters’ views in the run-up to an election. Among the many ways of
concealing the foreign-state origin or sponsorship of such a message is to
use unattributable proxies—“cut-outs”—or fully independent ideological
allies in the United States as messaging organs. A cooperative American
messenger—a proxy for the foreign government itself—may be needed
to make the foreign-origin message congenial to the target American
audience.
Malign foreign influencers, including foreign governments, used an
additional such masking tool during the Trump administration: amplifying
U.S.-originated messages so that they reached a broader audience. These
influencers often took advantage of the algorithms by which social media
platforms bring congenial messages and other information to users whose
views are likely to be similar or compatible.
Shortly after the January 6th attack, the National Intelligence Council
summarized the scope and significance of Russia’s use of proxies in the
2020 U.S. Presidential election:
A key element of Moscow’s strategy this election cycle was its use of
proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push influence narratives—
including misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against Presi-
dent Biden—to US media organizations, US officials, and prominent
US individuals, including some close to former President Trump and
his administration.25
The success of the proxy depends on shielding its foreign sponsorship.
For that reason, it can be difficult or impossible to determine conclusively
whether someone parroting a foreign government adversary’s point of view
to a U.S. audience is that government’s controlled proxy or a volunteer tak-
ing full advantage of U.S. First Amendment freedoms.

ANTI-U.S. FOREIGN STATE PROPAGANDA AND THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK

U.S. adversaries use anti-American propaganda and disinformation to
advance their strategic foreign policy objectives. They aim to corrode U.S.
influence abroad while diluting U.S. citizens’ trust in their democratic insti-
tutions and processes. They hope to deepen and sharpen the sociopolitical
divisions in American society.26 In doing so, foreign adversaries hope not
only to limit U.S. ability to influence the policy choices of other foreign
states, but also to help immunize their own populations against the attrac-
tions of American-style democracy.
That matters, as Russia and other adversaries of the United States well
know. If the United States has long demonstrated such a globally effective
cultural power to attract, its corrosion must be a primary strategic objective
 APPENDIX 4 811

of Russia or any other of the United States’ principal adversaries. Accord-

ingly, over the next 20 years, the Intelligence Community expects that
“China and Russia probably will try to continue targeting domestic audi-
ences in the United States and Europe, promoting narratives about Western
decline and overreach.” 27 The January 6th attack played into their hands.

PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THE 2020 ELECTION AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN

INFLUENCE
With President Trump in the White House, Russia benefited from a power-
ful American messenger creating and spreading damaging disinformation it
could amplify. The Intelligence Community’s comprehensive March 2021
assessment noted that throughout the 2020 Federal election cycle, “Russian
online influence actors generally promoted former President Trump and his
commentary. . . .”28
President Trump’s relentless propagation of the Big Lie damaged
American democracy from within and made it more vulnerable to attack
from abroad. His actions did not go unnoticed by America’s adversaries,
who seized on the opportunity to damage the United States. According to
the Intelligence Community’s March 2021 assessment, “[e]ven after the
election, Russian online influence actors continued to promote narratives
questioning the election results. . . .” 29 What President Trump was saying
was, in sum, exactly what the Russian government wanted said—but he
was doing it on his own initiative and from the trappings of the Oval Office.

ENDNOTES
1. Taking the Trump conspiracy theory of manipulated Venezuelan voting machines head-on
in an overarching assessment, the Intelligence Community’s definitive post-election
assessment stated: “We have no information suggesting that the current or former
Venezuelan regimes were involved in attempts to compromise US election infrastructure.”
National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 8, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
2. For case studies illustrating how such efforts may have manifested at the Capitol on Janu-
ary 6th, see Staff Memo, “Case Studies on Malign Foreign Influence,” (Dec. 19, 2022).
3. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
4. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
5. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. i, 1, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived) (emphasis removed).
812 APPENDIX 4
6. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived)
(emphasis removed).
7. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
8. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
9. The U.S. Intelligence Community is well aware of these foreign influence campaigns,
including in the context of elections. See, e.g., National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence
Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–
00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4–5, 7, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (“Russian state media, trolls,
and online proxies, including those directed by Russian intelligence, published disparaging
content about President Biden, his family, and the Democratic Party, and heavily amplified
related content circulating in US media …”, p. 4; “Iran’s election influence efforts were pri-
marily focused on sowing discord in the United States and exacerbating societal tensions
…”, p. 5; “China has long sought to influence US policies by shaping political and social
environments to press US officials to support China’s positions and perspectives.” p. 7).
Over the next 20 years, the Intelligence Community assesses that “China and Russia prob-
ably will try to continue targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Europe,
promoting narratives about Western decline and overreach.” National Intelligence Council,
“Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World,” (March 2021), p. 94, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf
(archived).
10. The National Intelligence Council notes that “some foreign actors may perceive influence
activities around US elections as continuations of broad, ongoing efforts rather than spe-
cially demarcated campaigns.” National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10,
2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-
declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
11. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the
Environment, Hearing on Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influ-
ence, Testimony of Laura Rosenberger, 116th Cong., 1st sess., (May 21, 2019), p. 1, available
at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20190521/109537/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-
RosenbergerL-20190521.pdf. Ms. Rosenberger was, at the time, Director of the Alliance for
Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
In an August 2018 briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dr. John Kelly,
the chief executive officer of Graphika, an analytics firm that studies online information
flows, stated: “The data now available make it clear that Russian efforts are not directed
against one election, one party, or even one country. We are facing a sustained campaign
of organized manipulation, a coordinated attack on the trust we place in our institutions
and in our media—both social and traditional.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms, Statement of
Dr. John W. Kelly, 115th Cong., 2d sess., (Aug. 1, 2018), p. 1, available at https://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17963-john-w-kelly-chief-executive-officer-graphika.
12. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived). But
see, John Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence, “Views on Intelligence Community
Election Security Analysis,” (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://context-
cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6d274110-a84b-4694-96cd-
6a902207d2bd/note/733364cf-0afb-412d-a5b4-ab797a8ba154 (archived). In this
 APPENDIX 4 813

memorandum, DNI Ratcliffe, who had been in office seven months and lacked any prior
intelligence experience, said he felt the need to “lead by example and offer my analytic
assessment.” He argued that the ICA majority’s “high confidence” view that “China consid-
ered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US presi-
dential election” did not “fully and accurately reflect[ ] the scope of the Chinese
government’s efforts to influence the 2020 U.S. federal elections.” Aside from the DNI’s
very willingness to conclude, in conformity with then-President Trump’s contention but
without reference to any supporting data, that the IC’s combined analytic judgment on
China was wrong, this seems a very odd document for the DNI to have chosen to issue the
day after the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol.
13. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
14. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Community,” (Feb. 2022), at p. 12, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf (emphasis removed).
15. The National Intelligence Council’s comprehensive post-election assessment covers the
spectrum, including not only Russia, but also China, Iran, and others, as well as certain
non-state actors. See generally, National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10,
2021), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-
16MAR21.pdf (archived). See also, “Dual U.S. / Russian National Charged With Acting Ille-
gally As A Russian Agent In The United States,” Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, S. Dist. N.Y., (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/dual-
us-russian-national-charged-acting-illegally-russian-agent-united-states (archived); “Rus-
sian National Charged with Conspiring to Have U.S. Citizens Act as Illegal Agents of the
Russian Government,” Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, (July 29, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-us-
citizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government (archived).
16. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
17. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
18. Department of Homeland Security, “Russia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S.
Electoral Process,” Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://
publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/.
19. Department of Homeland Security, “Russia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S.
Electoral Process,” Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://
publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/ (emphasis removed).
20. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4–5, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
21. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Russian Active Measures Campaigns And Inter-
ference In The 2016 U.S. Election,” Volume 2, (Nov. 10, 2020), pp. 18–19, available at https://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-
states-senate-russian-active-measures.
22. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
814 APPENDIX 4
23. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Community,” p. 12, (Feb. 7, 2022), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
24. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. 1, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
25. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. i, Key Judgment 2, avail-
able at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(emphasis removed).
26. National Intelligence Council, “Emerging Dynamics – International: More Contested, Uncer-
tain, and Conflict Prone – Contested and Transforming International Order – Increasing
Ideological Competition,” Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 95, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
27. National Intelligence Council, “Emerging Dynamics – International: More Contested, Uncer-
tain, and Conflict Prone – Contested and Transforming International Order – Increasing
Ideological Competition,” Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 94, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
28. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
29. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol