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com
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A BEGINNER’S FURTHER GUIDE

TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
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A BEGINNER’S FURTHER GUIDE

TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC

Raymond Smullyan
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Published by

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Smullyan, Raymond M., author.

Title: A beginner’s further guide to mathematical logic / Raymond Smullyan.
Description: New Jersey : World Scientific, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015033651 | ISBN 9789814730990 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789814725729
(pbk : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Logic, Symbolic and mathematical.
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On the cover, the three photos from left to right are the logicians Emil Post, Alan Turing, and Ernst
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Contents

Preface

Part I: More on Propositional and First-Order Logic

Chapter 1. More on Propositional Logic

I. Propositional Logic and the Boolean Algebra of Sets

II. An Algebraic Approach
III. Another Completeness Proof
IV. Fidelity to Modus Ponens

Chapter 2. More on First-Order Logic

I. Magic Sets
II. Gentzen Sequents and Some Variants
III. Craig’s Lemma and an Application
IV. A Unification
V. A Henkin-Style Completeness Proof

Part II: Recursion Theory and Metamathematics

Chapter 3. Some Special Topics

I. A Decision Machine
II. Variations on a Theme of Gödel
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III. R-Systems
IV. A Synthesis

Chapter 4. Elementary Formal Systems and Recursive Enumerability

I. More on Elementary Formal Systems

II. Recursive Enumerability
III. A Universal System

Chapter 5. Some Recursion Theory

I. Enumeration and Iteration Theorems

II. Recursion Theorems

Chapter 6. Doubling Up

Chapter 7. Metamathematical Applications

I. Simple Systems
II. Standard Simple Systems

Part III: Elements of Combinatory Logic

Chapter 8. Beginning Combinatory Logic

Chapter 9. Combinatorics Galore

I. The B-Combinators
II. The Permuting Combinators
III. The Q-Family and the Goldfinch, G
IV. Combinators Derivable from B,T,M and I (λ-I Combinators)

Chapter 10. Sages, Oracles and Doublets

Chapter 11. Complete and Partial Systems

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I. The Complete System

II. Partial Systems of Combinatory Logic

Chapter 12. Combinators, Recursion and the Undecidable

I. Preparation for the Finale

II. The Grand Problem

Afterword. Where to Go from Here

References

Index
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Preface

This book is a sequel to my Beginner’s Guide to Mathematical Logic [Smullyan,

2014]. I originally intended both volumes to be a single volume, but I felt that at
my age (now 96), I could pass away at any time, and I wanted to be sure that I
would at least get the basic material out.
The previous volume deals with elements of propositional and first-order
logic, contains a bit on formal systems and recursion, and concludes with
chapters on Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem, along with related results.
The present volume begins with a bit more on propositional and first order
logic, followed by what I would call a “fein” chapter, which simultaneously
generalizes some results from recursion theory, first-order arithmetic systems,
and what I dub a “decision machine.” Then come four chapters on formal
systems, recursion theory and metamathematical applications in a general
setting. The concluding five chapters are on the beautiful subject of combinatory
logic, which is not only intriguing in its own right, but has important
applications to computer science. Argonne National Laboratory is especially
involved in these applications, and I am proud to say that its members have
found use for some of my results in combinatory logic.
This book does not cover such important subjects as set theory, model theory,
proof theory, and modern developments in recursion theory, but the reader, after
studying this volume, will be amply prepared for the study of these more
advanced topics.
Although this book is written for beginners, there are two chapters – namely 3
and 8 – that I believe would also be of interest to the expert.
For brevity, all references to the first volume, The Beginner’s Guide to
Mathematical Logic, of this two-volume introduction to mathematical logic will
be given in the remainder of this volume as The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan,
2014].
Elka Park
November 2016
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Part I

More on Propositional and First-

Order Logic
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Chapter 1
More on Propositional Logic

I. Propositional Logic and the Boolean Algebra of Sets

Many of you have probably noticed the similarity of the logical connectives to
the Boolean operations on sets. Indeed, for any two sets A and B and any
element x, the element x belongs to the intersection A ∩ B if and only if x is in A
and x is in B. Thus x ∈ (A∩B) iff (x ∈ A) Λ (x ∈ B). Thus the logical connective
Λ (conjunction) corresponds to the Boolean operation ∩ (intersection). Likewise
the logical connective ∨ (disjunction) corresponds to the Boolean operation ∪
(union), since x ∈ (A ∪ B) iff (x ∈ A) ∨ (x ∈ B) Also, x ∈ (x is in the
complement of A) if and only if ∼(x ∈ A) (x is not in A), so that the logical
connective negation corresponds to Boolean operation of complementation.
Note: As in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], I will often abbreviate
the phrase “if and only if” by “iff”, following the valuable suggestion of Paul
Halmos.
We saw in Chapter 1 of The Beginner’s Guide how to verify the correctness
of a Boolean equation by the method of what I called “indexing”. However, due
to the correspondence between the logical connectives and the Boolean
operations on sets, one can also verify Boolean equations by truth tables. The
following single example will illustrate the general idea. Consider the Boolean
equation This equation is valid iff for every element x, the element
x is in iff x is in Thus the equation is to the effect that
for all x,
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Thus the proposition x ∈ iff x ∈ is equivalent to

And that formula is a tautology, for it is an instance of ∼ (p Λ q) ≡ ∼ p ∨∼ q, as

can be seen by replacing (x ∈ A) by p and replacing (x ∈ B) by q.
Similarly, the Boolean equation A ∩ (B ∪ C) = (A ∩ B) ∪ (A ∩ C) holds
since pΛ (q ν r) ≡ (p Λ q) ν (p Λ r) is a tautology.
In general, given a Boolean equation, define its counterpart to be the result of
substituting Λ for ∩ and ν for ∪; ∼t for (where t is any set variable or Boolean
term), ≡ for =, and propositional variables p, q, r, etc., for set variables A, B, C,
etc. For example, the counterpart of the Boolean equation is the
propositional formula ∼p ∨ q ≡ ∼(p Λ ∼q).
Well, a Boolean equation is valid if and only if its counterpart is a tautology
of propositional logic. And since the formula ∼p ∨ q ≡ ∼(p Λ ∼q) is again
easily seen to be a tautology, the Boolean equation is seen to be
valid.
Thus, truth tables can be used to test Boolean equations. Going in the other
direction, the method of “indexing,” described in Chapter 1 of The Beginner’s
Guide [Smullyan, 2014] can be used to verify a statement of propositional logic,
after making the appropriate Boolean equation counterpart to the propositional
statement (found by reversing the substitutions mentioned above).

II. An Algebraic Approach

This approach to propositional logic is particularly interesting and leads to the
subject known as Boolean rings.
For any two natural numbers x and y, if x and y are both even, so is their
product x × y. Thus an even times an even is even. An even times an odd is
even. An odd times an even is even, but an odd times an odd is odd. Let us
summarize this in the following table.

x y x × y
E E E
E O E
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O E E
O O O

Note the similarity of this table to the truth table for disjunction. Indeed, if we
replace E by T, O by F, and × by ∨, we get the truth table for disjunction:

x y x ∨ y
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F

This is not surprising, since x times y is even if and only if x is even OR y is

even.
However, this might well suggest (as it did to me, many years ago!) that we
might transfer the problem of whether a given formula is a tautology, to the
question of whether or not a certain algebraic expression in variables for natural
numbers is always even (for all possible values of the variables). So let us now
do this, i.e. define a transformation of a formula of propositional logic into an
arithmetic expression (using only + and × and variables for natural numbers)
such that the propositional formula will be a tautology iff every number
corresponding to the numerical value of an instance of the arithmetic expression
(i.e. an instance in which natural numbers replace the variables) is even.
We let even correspond to truth, odd to falsehood, and multiplication to
disjunction; then we take the letters p, q, r, … both as variables for propositions
in logical expressions and as variables for natural numbers in the corresponding
arithmetic expressions. Thus the logical expression p ∨ q is now transformed to
the arithmetic expression p × q, or more simply, pq.
What should we take for negation? Well, just as ∼ transforms truth into
falsehood, and falsehood into truth, we want an operation that transforms an
even number to an odd one, and an odd one to an even one. The obvious choice
is to add 1. Thus we let the logical expression ∼p correspond with the numerical
expression p + 1.
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As was seen in Chapter 5 of The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], once

we have ⋁ and ∼, we can obtain all the other logical connectives. We take p ⊃
q (implication) to be ∼ p ∨ q, which transforms to (p + 1)q, which is pq + q.
What about conjunction? Well, we take p ⋀ q to be ∼(∼p ∨ ∼q), and so in
the numerical interpretation we take p ⋀ q to be ((p + 1)(q + 1)) + 1, which is
(pq +p+q +1)+1, which is pq +p+q +2. But 2 is an even number, which means
that for any number z, the number z + 2 has the same parity as z (i.e. z + 2 is even
if and only if z is even). And so we can drop the final 2, and take p ⋀ q to be pq
+ p + q.
We could take p ≡ q to be (p ⊃ q) ⋀ (q ⊃ p) or we could take p ≡ q to be ((p
⋀ q) ⋁ (~p ⋀ ~q)). But it is much simpler to do the following: Now, p ≡ q is
true iff p and q are either both true or both false. Thus in our numerical
interpretation, we want the number p ≡ q to be even if and only if p and q are
either both even or both odd. And the simple operation that does the trick is
addition: we thus take p ≡ q to be p + q.
We note that p ∨ p is equivalent to p and thus p × p has the same parity as p.
So we can replace p × p (or pp) by p. Also, for any number p, p + p is always
even, and so we can replace p + p with 0 (which is always even). Moreover, we
can eliminate any even number that occurs as an addend, because eliminating an
even addend does not change the parity of a numerical expression: e.g. p + 0 and
p + 4 is of the same parity as p, so can be replaced by p.
Under the transformations just described, a formula is a tautology in the usual
propositional interpretation, if and only if it is always even in its numerical
interpretation.
Let us consider the tautology (p ⊃ q) ≡∼ (p ⋀ ∼q). Well, p ⊃ q corresponds
to pq + q. Now, p ⋀ ∼q transforms to p(q + 1) + p + (q + 1), which simplifies to
pq+p+p+q+1. We can drop p+p, which is always even, and so the transformation
of p ⋀ ∼q reduces to pq + q + 1. Thus ∼(p ⋀ ∼q) reduces to pq + q + 1 + 1, but
1 + 1 is even, and can be dropped, so that ∼(p ⋀ ∼q) reduces to pq + q, which is
the same thing that p ⊃ q reduced to. Thus (p ⊃ q) ≡ ∼(pLet us consider the
tautology ⋀ ∼q) reduces to (pq + q) + (pq + q), which expression can be
reduced to 0 (since, as mentioned above, the sum of the same two equal numbers
is always even). We have thus shown that (p ⊃ q) ≡ ∼(p ⋀ ∼q) is a tautology
by showing that the corresponding numerical expression it reduces to (in this
case 0) is always even.
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Note: Readers familiar with modern higher algebra know that a Boolean ring
is a ring with the additional properties that x + x = 0 and x2 = x for any element x
of the ring.

III. Another Completeness Proof

We now turn to a completeness proof for propositional logic of an entirely
different nature, and one which has a particularly interesting extension to first-
order logic, which we consider in the next chapter. It is based on the notion of
maximal consistency.
We will consider axiom systems using ∼, ⋀, ∨, and ⊃ as undefined
connectives, and in which modus ponens (from X and X ⊃ Y, to infer Y) is the
only rule of inference. We will say that a Boolean truth set is a set S of formulas
such that for any pair of formulas X and Y, the following conditions hold:
(1) (X ⋀ Y) ∈ S iff X ∈ S and Y ∈ S.
(2) (X ∨ Y) ∈ S iff either X ∈ S or Y ∈ S.
(3) (X ⊃ Y) ∈ S iff either X ∉ S or Y ∈ S.
(4) (∼X) ∈ S iff ∉ S (thus, one and only one of X, ∼X is in S).
Notes: [a] Whenever necessary to avoid a possible misreading, given a
formula X and a set S, I will abbreviate the statement that ∼X is a member of S
by (∼X) ∈ S instead of by ∼X ∈ S, as the latter could be read as “It is not the
case that X is in S.” Similarly, I write (∼X) ∉ S rather than ∼X ∉ S to mean that
∼X is not in S, for ∼X ∉ S might be read as ∼(X ∉ S), i.e. that it is not the case
that X is not a member of S (so that X is in S). Outer parentheses around formulas
are often omitted for easier reading, but may be included for greater clarity of
meaning; for instance, parentheses are used to distinguish between (X ⋀ Y) ∈ S
from X ⋀ (Y ∈ S), two possible readings of X ⋀ Y ∈ S (where X and Y are
variables for sentences, and S is a variable representing a set of sentences). [b]
The reader should also realize that for any statement of the form “X iff Y ”, the
statement is equivalent to its negated form “∼X iff ∼Y ”, by the very meaning of
the term “iff” (which is an abbreviation for “if and only if”). Thus,

If I refer to an assumption or condition in a proof or a problem solution, but want

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the reader to take it in its equivalent “negated” form, I often indicate this fact.
We also recall from The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] the unifying α, β
notation in propositional logic for unsigned formulas:

α α1 α2
X ∧ Y X Y
∼(X ∨ Y) ∼X ∼Y
∼(X ⊃ Y) X ∼Y
∼∼X X X

β β1 β2

∼(X ∧ Y) ∼X ∼Y
X ∨ Y X Y
X ⊃ Y ∼X Y

Problem 1. S is a Boolean truth set if and only if for every α and every formula
X the following conditions hold:
(1) α ∈ S iff α1 ∈ S and α2 ∈ S.
(2) Either X ∈ S or (∼X) ∈ S, but not both.
Exercise 1. Prove that S is a Boolean truth set iff for every β and every formula
X the following conditions hold:
(1) β ∈ S iff either β 1 ∈ S or β 2 ∈ S.
(2) Either X ∈ S or (∼X) ∈ S, but not both.
The definition of a Boolean truth set here can be shown to be equivalent to
the one given for a truth set in Chapter 6 (Propositional Tableaux) of The
Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], where we called a set S of propositional
formulas a truth set if it was the set of all formulas true under some
interpretation I of the propositional variables. We also showed there that the
definition was equivalent to the set S satisfying the following three conditions:
for any signed formula X and any α and β :
T0: Either X or its conjugate is in S, but not both.
T1: α is in S if and only if α1 and α2 are both in S.
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T2: β is in S if and only if either β1 is in S or β2 is in S.

With these facts in mind, the reader should easily see that the definitions of
(Boolean) truth set in The Beginner’s Guide and this work are equivalent. Note
that once one sees the equivalence between the definitions in the two books, it is
obvious that every Boolean truth set for propositional logic is satisfiable (since
the characterization in The Beginner’s Guide made a truth set satisfiable by
definition).
Indeed, to go a little further (to make connections between very similar
concepts a little clearer), we often define a Boolean valuation as follows. First,
by a valuation (in the context of propositional logic) is meant an assignment of
truth values t and f to all formulas. A valuation ∨ is called a Boolean valuation if
for all formulas X and Y, the following conditions hold:
B1: ∼X receives the value t under v if and only if v(X) = f [i.e. when X is false
under v]; and accordingly v(∼X) = f iff v(X) = t.
B2: X ⋀ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = v(Y) = t [i.e. when both X and Y
are true under the valuation v].
B3: X ∨ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = t or v(Y) = t [i.e. when either X is
true under v or Y is true under v, or both are true under v].
B4: X ⊃ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = f or v(Y) = t [i.e. when either X
is false under v or Y is true under v].
The interpretations that we used in The Beginner’s Guide in terms of
assigning truth values to all formulas by assigning truth values to the
propositional variables, and then working up through the structure of the
formulas, using the meanings of the connectives, to obtain a truth value for every
formula, are closely related to the truth values of formulas given through a
Boolean valuation. In fact a given Boolean valuation defines a unique
interpretation yielding the same truth value on all formulas in the interpretation
as in the Boolean valuation: we obtain the interpretation by looking at the truth
values the Boolean valuation assigns to the propositional variables. And if one is
given an interpretation of the propositional variables, it is clear that the
interpretation defines a Boolean valuation on the formulas, just by the way the
interpretation assigns truth values to all formulas, starting out only with truth
values on the propositional variables.
Because of this tight equivalence between Boolean valuations and
interpretations in propositional logic, we will use the words “valuation” and
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“interpretation” interchangeably (and will do so later in first-order logic as well,

where a similar tight relationship holds, this being something that was already
discussed in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014]).

Consequence Relations

We consider a relation S ⊢ X between a set S of formulas and a formula X. We

read S ⊢ X as “X is a consequence of S,” or as “S yields X”.
We call the relation ⊢ a consequence relation if for all sets S, S1 and S2 and
all formulas X and Y, the following conditions hold:
C1: If X ∈ S, then S ⊢ X.
C2: If S1 ⊢ X and S1 ⊆ S2 then S2 ⊢ X.
C3: If S ⊢ X and S, X ⊢ Y, then S ⊢ Y.
C4: If S ⊢ X, then F ⊢ X for some finite subset F of S.

In what follows, we assume that ⊢ is a consequence relation. We write ⊢X to

mean ⊢ X, where is the empty set. For any n, we write X1, …, Xn ⊢ Y to
mean {X1, …, Xn} ⊢ Y, and for any set S, we write S, X1, …, Xn to mean S ∪
{X1, …, Xn}.

An important example of a consequence relation is this. For any axiom

system , take S ⊢ X to mean that X is derivable from the elements of S together
with the axioms of by use of the inference rules of the system; in other words,
if we take the elements of S and add them as new axioms of , then X becomes
provable in that enlarged system. Note that under this relation ⊢, the statement
⊢ X simply says that X is provable in the system A. It is obvious that this
relation ⊢ satisfies conditions C1, C2, and C3. As for C4, if X is derivable from S,
any derivation uses only finitely many elements of S.
We now return to consequence relations in general.
Problem 2. Prove that if S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y, and X, Y ⊢ Z, then S ⊢ Z.

Consistency

In what follows, “set” shall mean a set of formulas.

We shall call a set S inconsistent (with respect to a consequence relationship
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⊢) if S ⊢ Z for every formula Z; otherwise, we shall call S consistent.

Problem 3. Show that if S is consistent, and S ⊢ X, then S, X is consistent.
Problem 4. Suppose S is consistent. Show the following:
(a) If S ⊢ X and X ⊢ Y, then S, Y is consistent.
(b) If S ⊢ X and S ⊢Y and X, Y ⊢ Z, then S, Z is consistent.

Maximal Consistency

We say that S is maximally consistent (with respect to ⊢) if no proper superset

of S is consistent. [By a proper superset of S is meant a set S′ such that S⊆ S′ and
S ′ contains one or more elements not in S.]
Problem 5. Show that if M is maximally consistent, then for all formulas X, Y
and Z:
(a) If X ∈ M and X ⊢ Y, then Y ∈ M.
(b) If X ∈ M and Y ∈ M and X, Y ⊢ Z then Z ∈ M.

Boolean Consequence Relations

We shall define a consequence relation ⊢ to be a Boolean consequence relation

if it satisfies the following additional conditions (for all formulas α, X and Y):
C5: (a) α ⊢ α1; (b) α ⊢ α2.
C6: α1, α2 ⊢ α.
C7: X, ∼X ⊢ Y.
C8: If S,∼X ⊢ X, then S ⊢ X.

We say that an interpretation satisfies a set S if all elements of S are true

under the interpretation. We shall say that X is a tautological consequence of S if
X is true under all interpretations that satisfy S.
Exercise 2. Define S╞ X to mean that X is a tautological consequence of S.
Prove that this relation ╞ is a Boolean consequence relation. (Hint: For C4, use
the Corollary to the Compactness Theorem for Propositional Logic on p. 95 in
The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014].)
We say a consequence relation ⊢ is tautologically complete if, for every set S
and formula X, whenever X is a tautological consequence of S, then S ⊢ X.
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Problem 6. Suppose ⊢ is tautologically complete. Does it necessarily follow

that ⊢ X for every tautology X? [We recall that is the empty set.]
The following, which we aim to prove, will be our main result:
Theorem 1. Every Boolean consequence relation is tautologically complete.
Thus, if ⊢ is a Boolean consequence relation, then:
(1) If X is a tautological consequence of S, then S ⊢ X.
(2) If X is a tautology, then ⊢ X (i.e. ⊢ X). This means that every system of
propositional logic based on a Boolean consequence relation is also
complete (i.e. that all tautologies are provable within the system).
To prove Theorem 1, we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 1. [Key Lemma] If ⊢ is a Boolean consequence relation and M is
maximally consistent with respect to ⊢, then M is a Boolean truth set.
Problem 7. Prove Lemma 1.

Compactness

We recall from Chapter 4 of The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] that a

property P of sets is called compact if for any set S, S has the property P if and
only if all finite subsets of S have property P. Thus, to say that consistency is
compact is to say that a set S is consistent if and only if all finite subsets of S are
consistent.
Problem 8. [A key fact!] Show that for a Boolean consequence relation ⊢,
consistency (with respect to ⊢) is compact.
Let us also recall the denumerable compactness theorem of Chapter 4 of The
Beginner’s Guide, which says that for any compact property P of subsets of a
denumerable set A, any subset of A having property P can be extended to (i.e. is
a subset of) a maximal subset of A having property P. We have just shown that
for a Boolean consequence relation, consistency is a compact property. Hence,
any consistent set is a subset of a maximally consistent set. This fact, together
with the Key Lemma, easily yields Theorem 1.
Problem 9. Now prove Theorem 1.
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IV. Fidelity to Modus Ponens

We shall say that a consequence relation ⊢ is faithful to modus ponens if

holds for all X and Y.

In what follows, we shall assume that ⊢ is faithful to modus ponens. We shall
say that a formula X is provable with respect to ⊢ when ⊢ X holds (i.e. if ⊢
X). Until further notice, “provable” will mean provable with respect to ⊢.
Problem 10. Show that if S ⊢ X and S ⊢ X ⊃ Y, then S ⊢ Y.
Problem 11. Show the following:
(a) If X ⊃ Y is provable, and S ⊢ X, then S ⊢ Y.
(b) If X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is provable, and S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y, then S ⊢ Z.
(c) If X ⊃ Y is provable, then X ⊢ Y.
(d) If X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is provable, then X, Y ⊢ Z.
We now consider an axiom system for propositional logic in which modus
ponens is the only inference rule. Such a system I will call a standard system. By
a deduction from a set S of formulas is meant a finite sequence X1, …, Xn of
formulas, such that for each term Xi of the sequence, Xi is either an axiom (of ),
or a member of S, or is derivable from two earlier terms by one application of
modus ponens. We call a deduction X1,…, Xn from S a deduction of X from S if
Xn = X. We say that X is deducible from S to mean that there is a deduction of X
from S. We now take S ⊢ X to be the relation that X is deducible from S. This
relation is indeed a consequence relation.
Problem 12. Prove that ⊢ is a consequence relation.
It is obvious that this relation ⊢ is faithful to modus ponens, since the
sequence X, X ⊃ Y, Y is a deduction of Y from {X, X ⊃ Y }.
We say that the axiom system has the deduction property if for all sets S
and formulas X and Y, if S, X ⊢ Y, then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y.
Theorem 2. [The Deduction Theorem] A sufficient condition for an axiom
system to have the deduction property is that the following are provable in
(for all X, Y and Z):
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A1: X ⊃ (Y ⊃ X).

A2: (X ⊃(Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃((X ⊃ Y) ⊃ (X ⊃ Z)).

For this, we need:

Lemma 2. If A1 and A2 hold then X ⊃ X is provable.

Until further notice, we assume that A1 and A2 hold.

Problem 13. To prove the above lemma, show that for any formulas X and Y, the
formula (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ (X ⊃ X) is provable. Then, taking Y ⊃ X for Y in the formula
just proved, conclude the proof of Lemma 2.
Problem 14. In preparation for the proof of the Deduction Theorem, show the
following:

(a) If S ⊢ Y, then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y.
(b) If S ⊢ X ⊃ (Z ⊃ Y) and S ⊢ X ⊃ Z, then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y.
Problem 15. Prove the Deduction Theorem as follows: Suppose S, X ⊢ Y. Then
there is a deduction Y1, …, Yn from S ∪ {X} in which Y =Yn. Now consider the
sequence X ⊃ Y1, …, X ⊃ Yn. Show that for all i ≤ n, if S ⊢ X ⊃ Yj for all j < i
then S ⊢ X ⊃ Yi. [Hint: Break the proof up into the following four cases: Yi is an
axiom of ; Yi ∈ S; Yi = X; Yi comes from two terms of the sequence Y1, …, Yi −1
by modus ponens.]
It then follows by complete mathematical induction that S ⊢ X ⊃ Yi for all i ≤
n, and so in particular, S ⊢ X ⊃ Yn, and thus S ⊢ X ⊃ Y. [Hint: In the original
sequence Y1,…, Yn, the term Yi is either an axiom of , or is X itself, or comes
from two earlier terms by modus ponens. Handle each case separately.]
We now have all the parts necessary to prove:
Theorem 3. A sufficient condition for a standard axiom system for propositional
logic to be tautologically complete is that for all X, Y, Z and α, the following
are provable:
A1: X ⊃ (Y ⊃ X)
A2: (X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ ((X ⊃ Y) ⊃ (X ⊃ Z))
A3: (a) α ⊃ α1 and (b) α ⊃ α2
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A4: α1 ⊃ (α2 ⊃ α)
A5: X ⊃ (∼X ⊃ Y)
A6: (∼X ⊃ X) ⊃ X

Problem 16. Prove Theorem 3 by showing that under the conditions given in
Theorem 3, the relation ⊢ is a Boolean consequence relation and thus
tautologically complete.
One can easily verify that A1–A6 are all provable in the axiom system S of
Chapter 7 of The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014]. [One can make a tableau
proof for each of these formulas and then convert them to proofs in S by the
method explained in that chapter. The completeness proof for tableaux is not
needed for this.] We thus have a second proof of the completeness of S based on
maximal consistency, and thus the theorem:
Theorem 4. The axiom system S of Chapter 7 of The Beginner’s Guide is
tautologically complete.
Maximal consistency and Lindenbaum’s Lemma also play a key role in
alternative completeness proofs for first-order logic, to which we turn in the next
chapter.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 1

1. We are to show that S is a Boolean truth set iff the two conditions of
Problem 1 hold. The second condition of Problem 1 is the same as the fourth
condition in the definition of the Boolean truth set, so we need only consider
the first condition of Problem 1. (Remember, when thinking about “negated”
conditions or assumptions, that ∼(X Λ Y) is equivalent to ∼X ∨∼ Y and
∼(X ∨Y) is equivalent to ∼X Λ∼Y.)

(a) Suppose S is a Boolean truth set. We must show that in all cases for α,
the first condition of Problem 1 holds, namely that α∈ S iff α1∈ S and
α2 ∈ S.
Case 1. α is of the form X Λ Y. This is immediate.
Case 2. α is of the form ∼(X ∨ Y). Then α1 = ∼ X and α2 = ∼Y. Thus
we are to show that (∼(X ∨ Y))∈ S iff (∼X) ∈ S and (∼Y) ∈ S. Well,
• (∼(X ∨ Y)) ∈ S is true iff (X ∨ Y) ∉ S [by (4) in the definition of a
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Boolean truth set].

• Then (X ∨ Y) ∉ S is true iff X ∉ S and Y ∉ S [by the negated form
of (2) in the definition of a Boolean truth set].
• And X ∉ S and Y ∉ S is true iff (∼ X) ∉ S and (∼ Y) ∈ S [by (4) in
the definition of a Boolean truth set].
Case 3. α is of the form ∼(X ⊃ Y). Then α1 = X and α2 = ∼Y. We are to
show that (∼(X ⊃ Y)) ∈ S iff X ∈ S and (∼ Y) ∈ S. Well,
• (∼(X ⊃ Y)) ∈ S is true iff X ⊃ Y∉ S [by (4) in the definition of a
Boolean truth set].
• Then X ⊃ Y ∉ S is true iff X ∈ S and Y ∉ S [by the negated form of
(3) in the definition of a Boolean truth set].
• And X ∈ S and Y ∉ S is true iff X ∈ S and (∼ Y) ∈ S [by (4) in the
definition of a Boolean truth set].
Case 4. α is of the form ∼∼X. Here both α1 and α2 are X, so we must
show that (∼∼ X)∈ S iff X ∈ S. Well, (∼ ∼ X)∈ S iff(∼ X) ∉ S [by (4)
in the definition of a Boolean truth set], which is true iff X ∈ S[again by
(4) in the definition of a Boolean truth set].
(b) Going in the other direction, suppose the conditions of Problem 1 hold:
(i) α ∈ S iff α1 ∈ S and α2 ∈ S, and (ii) for any X, either X ∈ S or ∼X ∈
S, but not both. We are to show that S is a Boolean truth set.
Case 1. We are to show that X Λ Y ∈ S iff X ∈ S and Y ∈ S: Well X Λ Y
is an α, where X = α1 and Y = α2 and α ∈ S iff α1 ∈ S and α2 ∈ S [by
assumption (i) above]. Thus it is immediate that X Λ Y ∈ S iff X ∈ S and
Y ∈ S.
Case 2. We are to show that X ∨ Y ∈ S iff X ∈ S or Y ∈ S: Note that
here ∼(X ∨ Y) is an α, with α1 = ∼X and α2 = ∼Y. Well,
• X ∨ Y ∈ S iff ∼ (X ∨ Y) ∉ S [by assumption (ii) above].
• ∼(X ∨ Y)∉ S is true iff (∼ X) ∉ S or (∼ Y) ∉ S [by the negated
form of assumption (i)].
• Then (∼X) ∉ S iff X ∈ S and (∼ Y) ∉ S is true Y ∈ S [by
assumption (ii) above].
Case 3. We are to show that (X ⊃ Y) ∈ S iff X∉ S or Y ∈ S. Note that
here ∼ (X ⊃ Y) is an α, with α1 = X and α2 = ∼ Y. Well,
• (X ⊃ Y)∈ S iff ∼(X ⊃ Y) ∉ S [by assumption (ii)].
• Then ∼(X ⊃ Y) ∉ S is true iff X ∉ S or (∼Y)∉ S [by the negated
form of assumption (i) above].
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• Since it is true that (∼Y) ∉ S iff Y ∈ S [by assumption (ii) above],

we now have X ∉ S or Y ∈ S, which is what was to be shown.
Case 4. To show that (∼X) ∈ S iff X ∉ S: As noted in the definition of a
Boolean truth set, condition (4) of a truth set and condition (2) of
Problem 1 are equivalent.
2. Suppose S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y and X, Y ⊢ Z. Since X, Y ⊢ Z, then S, X, Y ⊢ Z
[by C2, since { X, Y } ⊆ S ∪ { X, Y }]. Since S ⊢ Y, then S, X ⊢ Y [again by
C2]. Thus S, X ⊢ Y and S, X, Y ⊢ Z. Hence [by C3], S, X ⊢ Z. [To see this
more easily, let W = S ∪ { X}.] Then W ⊢ Y(since this is the same as S, X ⊢
Y). And W, Y ⊢ Z (since this is the same as S, X, Y ⊢ Z). Hence W ⊢ Z, by
C3, taking W for S. Then, since S, X ⊢ Z and S ⊢ X (given), then S ⊢ Z
[again by C3].
3. Suppose S ⊢ X. We are to show that if S is consistent, so is S, X (i.e. so is
the set S ∪ {X}). We will show the equivalent fact that if S, X is
inconsistent, so is S. Well, suppose S, X is inconsistent. Thus S, X ⊢ Z for
every Z. Since also S ⊢ X (which is given), then S ⊢ Z [by C3], and thus S is
also inconsistent.
4. Suppose S is consistent.
(a) Assume S ⊢ X and X ⊢ Y. We are to show that S, Y is consistent. Well,
since X ⊢ Y, then S, X ⊢ Y [by C2]. Since also S ⊢ X, we have S ⊢ Y
[by C3]. Since S is consistent and S ⊢ Y, then S, Y is consistent [by
Problem 3].
(b) Assume S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y and X, Y ⊢ Z. We are to show that S, Z is
consistent. Well, since S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y and X, Y ⊢ Z, it must also be
true that S ⊢ Z [by Problem 2]. Then, since S is consistent and S ⊢ Z,
we have that S, Z is consistent [by Problem 3].
5. Suppose M is maximally consistent. We first note that if M ⊢ X, then X ∈
M. For suppose M ⊢ X. Since M is consistent, then M, X is consistent [by
Problem 3]. Consequently M, X cannot be a proper superset of M (no
consistent set is). Thus X ∈ M. Now we consider the two parts of the
problem.
(a) Suppose X ∈ M and X ⊢ Y. Since X ∈ M, then M ⊢ X [by C1]. Since X
⊢ Y and M ⊢ X, we obtain M ⊢ Y [by C2]. Hence, as just noted, Y ∈ M.
(b) Suppose X ∈ M and Y ∈ M and X, Y ⊢ Z. Then M ⊢ X, M ⊢ Y [by C1]
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and X, Y ⊢ Z. Thus M ⊢ Z [by Problem 2]. Hence Z ∈ M, as noted

above.
6. Yes, if ⊢ is tautologically complete, then ⊢ X for every tautology X. Here
is the proof. Since there are no elements in the empty set it is vacuously
true that every element of the empty set is true under all interpretations. (If
you don’t believe this, just try to find an element of the empty set which is
not true under all interpretations!) Thus every interpretation satisfies both
and X, so X is a tautological consequence of . Then, since ⊢ is
tautologically complete, it follows from the definition of a consequence
relation being tautologically complete that ⊢ X (in fact S ⊢ X holds for
every set S [by C2]).
7. We are given that ⊢ is a Boolean consequence relation and that M is
maximally consistent with respect to ⊢. By virtue of Problem 1, to show
that M is a Boolean truth set, it suffices to show that the following two
things hold for every α and every X:
(1) α ∈ M if and only if α1 ∈ M and α2 ∈ M.
(2) Either X ∈ M or (∼ X) ∈ M, but not both.
Regarding (1): Suppose α ∈ M. Since α ⊢ α1 [by C5(a)], then α1 ∈ M[by
Problem 5(a)]. Thus if α ∈ M, then α1 ∈ M. Similarly, if α ∈ M, then α2 ∈
M [by C5(b)]. Thus if α ∈ M, then α1 ∈ M and α2 ∈ M.
Conversely, suppose α1 ∈ M and α2 ∈ M. We know that α1, α2 ⊢ α [by
C6]. Hence α ∈ M [by Problem 5(b)].
Thus α ∈ M if and only if α1 ∈ M and α2 ∈ M.
Regarding (2): Since M is consistent, it cannot be that X and ∼ X are both
in M, for if they were, then we would have both M ⊢ X and M ⊢ ∼ X, and
since X, ∼ X ⊢ Z for every Z [by C7], we would have M ⊢ Z [by Problem
2], which would mean that M is inconsistent. Thus, since M is consistent, it
cannot be that X ∈ M and ∼ X ∈ M. It remains to show that either X ∈ M or
(∼ X) ∈ M. Let me show that if ∼ X is not in M, then X ∈ M.
Well, suppose that ∼ X is not in M. Then M, ∼ X is not consistent (since
M is maximally consistent). Hence M, ∼ X ⊢ X (since M, ∼ X ⊢ Z for
every Z), and therefore M ⊢ X [by C8]. Thus X ∈ M (since M is maximally
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consistent).
This completes the proof.
8. To show that if all finite subsets of a set S are consistent, then so is S, it
suffices to show that if S is inconsistent, then some finite subset of S is
inconsistent. Well, suppose S is inconsistent. Then for any formula X, we
have both S ⊢ X and S ⊢ ∼ X (since S ⊢ Z for every Z). Since S ⊢ X, then
F1 ⊢ X for some finite subset F1 of S [by C4]. Similarly, F2 ⊢ ∼ X for some
finite subset F2 of S. Let F = F1 ∪ F2. Then F ⊢ X and F ⊢ ∼ X [by C2],
since F1 F and F2 F). Also, X, ∼ X ⊢ Z for all Z [by C7]. Thus, for all Z, F
⊢ Z [by Problem 2], and we have shown that F is inconsistent.
9. We wish to show that every Boolean consequence relation is tautologically
complete. By Problem 8 we know that for any Boolean consequence
relation, consistency with respect to that relation is a compact property, and
so [by the denumerable compactness theorem] every consistent set is a
subset of a maximally consistent set, which must be a Boolean truth set [by
the Key Lemma]. Thus every consistent set is satisfiable (by the discussion
after the definition of a Boolean truth set), and hence every unsatisfiable set
is inconsistent. Now, suppose X is a logical consequence of S. Then S, ∼ X
is unsatisfiable, hence inconsistent. Therefore S, ∼ X ⊢ X (since S, ∼ X ⊢ Z
for every Z), and so S ⊢ X [by C8]. This concludes the proof.
10. Suppose S ⊢ X and S ⊢ X ⊃ Y. It is also true that X, X ⊃ Y ⊢ Y, since we
assume ⊢ is faithful to modus ponens. Hence S ⊢ Y [by Problem 2].
11. Proofs of the four statements:
(a) Suppose X ⊃ Y is provable and S ⊢ X. Since X ⊃ Y is provable ( ⊢ X
⊃ Y), then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y [by C2]. Thus S ⊢ X and S ⊢ X ⊃ Y ; hence S ⊢
Y [by Problem 10].
(b) Suppose X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is provable, and S ⊢ X and S ⊢ Y. Since S ⊢ X
and S ⊢ X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) [by C2], then S ⊢ Y ⊃ Z [by Problem 10]. Since
also S ⊢ Y, then S ⊢ Z [again by Problem 10].
(c) In 11(a), we take the unit set { X} for S, and thus if X ⊃ Y is provable
and X ⊢ X, then X ⊢ Y. But X ⊢ X does hold, so that if X ⊃ Y is
provable, then X ⊢ Y.
(d) In 11(b), we take the set { X, Y } for S, and thus if X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is
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provable, and X, Y ⊢ X, and X, Y ⊢ Y, then X, Y ⊢ Z. But X, Y ⊢ X and

X, Y ⊢ Y both hold, and so if X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is provable, then X, Y ⊢ Z.
12. We must verify that conditions C1 − C4 hold.
C1: If X ∈ S, then the unit sequence X (i.e. the sequence whose only term
is X) is a deduction of X from S.
C2: Suppose S1 ⊆ S2. Then any deduction Y1, …, Yn from S1 is also a
deduction from S2.
C3: If Y1, …, Yn is a deduction of X from S, and Z1, …, Zk is a deduction
of Y from S, X, then the sequence Y1, …, Yn, Z1, …, Zk is a deduction
of Y from S (as is easily verified).
C4: Any deduction from S uses only finitely many elements X1, …, Xn of
S, hence is also a deduction from the set X1, …, Xn.
13. (a) We assume A1 and A2 hold. In A2;we take X for Z, and obtain

But by A1, we have ⊢ X ⊃ (Y ⊃ X). Hence, by modus ponens, we have

(b) In (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ (X ⊃ X), taking (Y ⊃ X) for Y, we have

But by A1 we have that X ⊃ (Y ⊃ X) is provable. So, by modus ponens, we

also have ⊢ X ⊃ X.
14. (a) Suppose S ⊢ Y. Now, by (a) of Problem 11, for any formulas W1 and
W2, if S ⊢ W1 and W1 ⊃ W2 is provable, then S ⊢ W2. Let us take Y for
W1 and X ⊃ Y for W2. When we do so, we see that if S ⊢ Y and Y ⊃ (X ⊃
Y) is provable, then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y. However, S ⊢ Y [by assumption] and Y ⊃
(X ⊃ Y) is provable [by A1]; hence S ⊢, X ⊃ Y.
(b) By Problem 11(b), for any formulas W1, W2, and W3, if W1 ⊃ (W2 ⊃ W3)
is provable, then if S ⊢ W1 and S ⊢ W2, it follows that S ⊢ W3. We now take
X ⊃ (Z ⊃ Y) for W1, X ⊃ Z for W2, and X ⊃ Y for W3. Well, the formula W1
⊃ (W2 ⊃ W3) is provable [by A2; it is the formula (X ⊃ (Z ⊃ Y)) ⊃ ((X ⊃ Z)
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⊃ (X ⊃ Y))]. Hence, if S ⊢ W1 and S ⊢ W2, then S ⊢ W3, i.e. we have that if

S ⊢ X ⊃ (Z ⊃ Y) and S ⊢ X ⊃ Z, then S ⊢ X ⊃ Y, which is what was to be
proved.
15. We assume that for all j < i, S ⊢ X ⊃ Yj, and we are to prove that S ⊢ X ⊃
Yi.
Cases 1 and 2. Suppose that either Yi is an axiom of , or that Yi ∈ S. If the
former, then Yi is provable, so that ⊢ Yi, and so S ⊢ Yi [by C2]. If Yi ∈ S,
then again S ⊢ Yi [by C1]. Thus, in either case, S ⊢ Yi. Hence S ⊢ X ⊃ Yi,
[by Problem 14(a)].
Case 3. Yi = X. Since X ⊃ X is provable [by Lemma 2], then S ⊢ X ⊃ X [by
C2], and since Yi = X, then X ⊃ Yi is the formula X ⊃ X, and so S ⊢ X ⊃ Yi.
Case 4. This is the case where in the original sequence Y1, … Yn, the formula
Yi came from terms earlier than Yi by modus ponens. Thus there is a formula
Z such that Z and Z ⊃ Yi are earlier terms than Yi. Hence in the new sequence
X ⊃ Y1, …, X ⊃ Yn the formulas X ⊃ Z and X ⊃ (Z ⊃ Yi) are earlier terms
than X ⊃ Yi, and so, by the inductive hypothesi, S ⊢ X ⊃ Z and S ⊢ X ⊃ (Z
⊃ Yi). Then by Problem 14(b), S ⊢ X ⊃ Yi. This completes the proof.

16. We already know that conditions C1−C4 hold, and so it remains to verify
conditions C5−C8.
Re C5: (a) Since α ⊃ α 1 is provable [by A3(a)], then α ⊢ α1 [by Problem
11(c)].
(b) Since α ⊃ α2 is provable [by A3(b)], then α ⊢ α2 [by Problem
11(c)].
Re C6: Since α1 ⊃ (α2 ⊃ α) is provable [by A4], then α1, α2 ⊢ α [by
Problem 11(d)].
Re C7: Since X ⊃ (∼X ⊃ Y) is provable [by A5], then X, ∼X ⊢ Y [by
Problem 11(d)].
Re C8: [This is the only part that needs the Deduction Theorem!] Suppos
that S, ∼X ⊢ X Then, by the deduction theorem, S ⊢ ∼X ⊃ X. But
also (∼X ⊃ X) ⊃ X is provable [by A6]. Therefore S ⊢ X [by
Problem 11(a), taking ∼X ⊃ X for X and X for Y ].
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This concludes the proof that ⊢ is a Boolean consequence relation, and so by

Theorem 1, it follows that all tautologies are provable in the system (and more
generally, that if X is a logical consequence of S, then S ⊢ X holds).
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Chapter 2
More on First-Order Logic

I. Magic Sets
There is another approach to Completeness Theorems, the Skolem–Löwenheim
Theorem and the Regularity Theorem that has an almost magic-like simplicity. I
accordingly dub the central player a magic set.
As in propositional logic, in the context of first-order logic a valuation is an
assignment of truth values t and f to all sentences (with or without parameters).
And a valuation v is called a Boolean valuation if for all sentences (closed
formulas) X and Y, the following conditions hold:
B1: The sentence ∼X receives the value t under v if and only if v(X) = f [i.e.
when X is false under v]; and accordingly v(∼X) = f iff v(X) = t.
B2: The sentence X ∧ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = v(Y) = t [i.e. when
both X and Y are true under the valuation v].
B3: The sentence X ∨ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = t or v(Y) = t [i.e.
when either X is true under v or Y is true under v].
B4: The sentence X ⊃ Y receives the value t under v iff v(X) = f or v (Y) = t [i.e.
when either X is false under v or Y is true under v].
By a first-order valuation (in the denumerable domain of the parameters) is
meant a Boolean valuation satisfying the following two additional conditions:
F1: The sentence ∀xφ(x) is true under v if and only if for every parameter a, the
sentence φ(a) is true under v.
F2: The sentence ∃xφ(x) is true under v if and only if the sentence φ(a) is true
under v for at least one parameter a.
Let S be a set of sentences of first-order logic. We say that S is truth-
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functionally satisfiable, if there is a Boolean valuation in which every sentence

in S is true. Similarly, we say that S is first-order satisfiable (in first-order
contexts, just satisfiable), if there is a first-order valuation in which every
sentence in S is true.
Note: Recall that it was noted in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] that
if we consider the set of all true sentences under a first-order valuation v, and
look at the universe in which the individuals to which predicates apply as
consisting of all the parameters, we can define an interpretation on that universe
in which each n-ary predicate is true precisely on the n-tuples of parameters on
which the valuation v says it is true (and false on the rest of n-tuples of
parameters). This is called an interpretation in the domain of the parameters, and
because of this we can say a set of sentences S is satisfiable in the denumerable
domain of the parameters whenever there is a first-order valuation that satisfies
S. Although here we are not using the concept of an interpretation of first-order
logic as defined in The Beginner’s Guide, it is easy to see that any interpretation
of first-order logic as defined there simultaneously defines a first-order valuation
as defined here.
We leave it to the reader to verify the following:
Lemma. From F1 and F2 it follows that under any first-order valuation,

(1) ∼∃xφ(x) is true iff ∼φ(a) is true for every parameter a, or, equivalently,
that ∼∃xφ(x) and ∀x∼φ(x) are logically equivalent (i.e. always have the
same truth value);
(2) ∼∀xφ(x) is true iff ∼φ(a) is true for at least one parameter a, or,
equivalently, that ∼∀xφ(x) and ∃x∼φ(x) are logically equivalent.
Now, let us again recall the uniform notation of The Beginner’s Guide, in
which we let γ be any formula of the form ∀xφ(x) or ∽∃xφ(x), and by γ(a) we
meant φ(a) or ∽φ(a) respectively. Similarly, we let δ be any formula of the form
∃xφ(x) or ∼∀xφ(x), and by δ(a) we respectively mean φ(a), ∽φ(a). Thus, in
uniform notation, under any first-order valuation v:
: The sentence γ is true under v if and only if for every parameter a, the
sentence γ(a) is true under v.
: The sentence δ is true under v if and only if the sentence δ(a) is true under v
for at least one parameter a.
The following proposition will be helpful:
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Proposition 1. Suppose that v is a Boolean valuation such that the following two
conditions hold (for all sentences γ and δ):

(1) if γ is true under v, then for every parameter a, the sentence γ(a) is true
under v, and
(2) if δ is true under v, then γ(a) is true under v for at least one parameter a.
Then v is a first-order valuation.
Problem 1. Prove Proposition 1.
We say that a set S of sentences of first-order logic is a Boolean truth set if
there is a Boolean valuation v such that S is the set of all sentences that are true
under v. This is equivalent to saying that for all sentences X and Y, (i) (∼X) ∈ S
iff X ∉ S; (ii) α ∈ S iff α1 ∈ S and α2 ∈ S; (iii)β ∈ S iff β1 ∈ S or β2 ∈S.

We call a set of sentences of first-order logic S a first-order truth set if and

only if it is a Boolean truth set and also, for all γ and δ:
(i) γ ∈ S iff γ(a) ∈ S for every parameter a; and
(ii) δ∈ S iff δ(a) ∈ S for at least one parameter a.
Alternatively, we could say that a set of sentences S is a first-order truth set if
and only if there is a first-order valuation v such that S is the set of all sentences
that are true under v.
Accordingly, Proposition 1 could be restated as follows:
Proposition 1′. Suppose S is a Boolean truth set satisfying the following two
conditions (for all sentences γ and δ):
(1) if γ ∈ S, then for every parameter a, the sentence γ(a) ∈ S, and
(2) if δ ∈ S, then δ(a) ∈ S for at least one parameter a.
Then S is a first-order truth set.
Recall that we say that a (first-order) valuation v satisfies a set of sentences S
if all elements of S are true under v. Also, a pure sentence is a sentence without
parameters.
Now for the definition of a magic set. By a magic set M we mean a set of
sentences that satisfies the following two conditions:
M1: Every Boolean valuation that satisfies M is also a first-order valuation.
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M2: For every finite set S0 of pure sentences, and every finite subset M0 of M, if
S0 is first-order satisfiable, so is S0 ∪ M0.

We shall soon prove that magic sets exist (which the reader might find
surprising!). But first you will see that one of the important features of magic
sets emerges from the following considerations:
We say that a sentence X is tautologically implied by a set of sentences S
when X is true under all Boolean valuations that satisfy S. We shall call S a
truth-functional basis for first-order logic if for any pure sentence X, the
sentence X is valid if and only if X is tautologically implied by some finite subset
S0 of S (which is equivalent to saying that there are finitely many elements X1,
…, Xn of S such that the sentence (X1∧ … ∧ Xn) ⊃ X is a tautology).

Note: “Truth-functionally imply” and “tautologically imply” have the same

meaning.
Theorem 1. Every magic set is a truth-functional basis for first-order logic.
Problem 2. Prove Theorem 1. (Hint: Use a fact proved in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014], Chapter 6, Problem 8, namely that if X is tautologically
implied by S, then it is tautologically implied by some finite subset of S. This
fact is an easy corollary of the compactness theorem for propositional logic,
namely that if every finite subset of a denumerable set S is satisfied by some
Boolean valuation, then S is satisfied by some Boolean valuation.)
Now we turn to the proof that magic sets exist. In Chapter 9 of The
Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] we defined a finite set of sentences to be
regular if its elements are each of the form γ ⊃ γ (a) or δ ⊃ δ(a), and the
elements can be placed in a sequence such that for each term of the sequence, if
it is of the form δ ⊃ δ(a), then a does not occur in δ or in any earlier term of the
sequence. We showed that for any pure sentence X, if X is valid, then there exists
a regular set {X1, …, Xn} such that (X1∧ … ∧ Xn) ⊃ X is a tautology. We also
showed that for any regular set R and any set S of pure sentences, if S is (first-
order) satisfiable, so is R ∪ S.
We now define a denumerably infinite set S to be regular if every finite subset
of S is regular. An infinite regular set M will be called complete if for every γ,
the sentence γ ⊃ γ(a) is in M for every parameter a, and if for every δ, the
sentence δ ⊃ δ(a) is in M for at least one parameter a.
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Theorem 2. Every complete regular set is a magic set.

Problem 3. Prove Theorem 2. [Hint: Proposition 1 will now be helpful.]
Finally, we show that there exists a complete regular set (which completes the
proof that there exists a magic set): We enumerate all δ-sentences in some
denumerable sequence δ1, δ2, …, δn, …. We then consider all our parameters in
some enumeration b1, b2, …, bn, …. We now let a1 be the first parameter in the
enumeration of parameters that does not occur in δ1, we let a2 be the first
parameter of the enumeration of parameters that occurs neither in δ1 nor in δ2
and so forth, i.e. for each n we let an be the first parameter of the enumeration of
parameters that occurs in none of the terms δ1, δ2, …, δn. We let R1 be the set of
all sentences δn ⊃ δn(an). We let R2 be the set of all γ ⊃ γ(a), for all γ and every
a. Then R1 ∪ R2 is a complete regular set.

Applications of Magic Sets

The mere existence of magic sets (even those not necessarily regular) yields
particularly simple and elegant proofs of the Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem and
of the first-order compactness theorem as a consequence of the compactness
theorem for propositional logic. We will see these proofs in a moment.
Note: But first a reminder of something from The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014]. It was noted there that if we consider the set of all true
sentences under a first-order valuation v, and look at the universe in which the
individuals to which predicates apply as consisting of all the parameters, we can
define an interpretation in which each n-ary predicate is true precisely on the n-
tuples of parameters on which the valuation v says it is true (and false on the rest
of n-tuples of parameters). This is called a (first-order) interpretation in the
(denumerable) domain of the parameters, and because of this we can say a set of
sentences S is first-order satisfiable in the domain of the parameters whenever
there is a first-order valuation that satisfies S. Although we are not using the
concept of an interpretation of first-order logic at the moment here, it is easy to
see that any interpretation of first-order logic simultaneously defines a first-order
valuation over the denumerable domain of the parameters.
Now suppose S is a denumerable set of pure sentences (no free variables, no
parameters) such that every finite subset of S is first-order satisfiable. Here is an
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alternative proof that S is first-order satisfiable in the denumerable domain of the

parameters (which simultaneously yields the compactness theorem for first-order
logic, and the Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem, since if S is first-order satisfiable,
then obviously so is every finite subset of S). The proof we now give uses the
compactness theorem for propositional logic.
Let S be as above and let M be any magic set. Let K be any finite subset of S
∪ M. We first show that K is first-order satisfiable. Well, K is the union S0 ∪ M0
of some finite subset S0 of S with some finite subset M0 of M. Since S0 is first-
order satisfiable, so is S0 ∪ M0 [by property M2 of a magic set]. Since S0 ∪ M0
is first-order satisfiable, by definition there is a first-order valuation v that
satisfies S0 ∪ M0, and v is obviously also a Boolean valuation [since every first-
order valuation is]. This proves that every finite subset K of S∪M is truth-
functionally satisfiable. Hence, by the compactness theorem for propositional
logic, the entire set S∪M is truth-functionally satisfiable. Thus there is a Boolean
valuation v that satisfies S∪M, and since v satisfies M, it must be a first-order
valuation [by property M1 of a magic set]. Thus, by what we said above about
the relationship between the first-order interpretations of The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014] and first-order valuations, all sentences of S are true
(simultaneously satisfiable) in an interpretation over the denumerable domain of
the parameters.
We recall the Regularity Theorem, which is that for every valid pure sentence
X, there is a (finite) regular set R which truth-functionally implies X. (This is a
somewhat simplified version of what we proved in The Beginner’s Guide. We
will return to the full version of the Regularity Theorem later in this chapter.)
We proved this using the completeness theorem for tableaux, namely we showed
how, from a closed tableau for ∼X, such a regular set could be found (we took R
to be the set of all γ ⊃ γ(a) such that γ (a) was inferred from γ by Rule C,
together with all sentences δ ⊃ δ (a) such that δ(a) was inferred from δ by Rule
D). A much simpler proof of the Regularity Theorem is easily obtained from the
existence of a complete regular set (which is also a magic set).
Problem 4. How?

II. Gentzen Sequents and Some Variants

In Part III of this chapter, we will state and prove an important result known as
Craig’s Interpolation Lemma, which has significant applications that we will
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also consider. Craig’s original proof of this result was quite complicated, and
many simpler proofs of this have subsequently been given. One of these which I
will give uses a variant of some axiom systems due to Gerhard Gentzen [1934,
1935], to which we now turn.

Background

We first need to speak of subformulas. In propositional logic, the notion of

immediate subformula is given explicitly by the following conditions:
I0: Propositional variables have no immediate subformulas.
I1: ∼X has X as its only immediate subformula.
I2: X ∧ Y, X ∨ Y, X ⊃ Y have X and Y as immediate subformulas, and no other
immediate subformulas.
For first-order logic, the notion of immediate subformula is given explicitly
by the following conditions (we recall that an atomic formula of first-order logic
is a formula which contains no logical connectives or quantifiers):
I′0: Atomic formulas have no immediate subformulas.
I′1: Same as I1.
I′2: Same as I2.
I′3: For any parameter a and variable x, φ (a) is an immediate subformula of ∀ xφ
(x) and of ∃xφ (x).
Both in propositional logic and first-order logic, the notion of subformula is
implicitly defined by the following conditions:
S1: If Y is an immediate subformula of X, or is identical to X, then Y is a
subformula of X.
S2: If Y is an immediate subformula of X, and Z is a subformula of Y, then Z is a
subformula of X.
The above implicit definition can be made explicit as follows: Y is a
subformula of X if and only if either Y = X or there is a finite sequence of
formulas whose first term is X and whose last term is Y and is such that each
term of the sequence other than the first is an immediate subformula of the
preceding term.
Now, G. Gentzen was out to find finitary proofs of the consistency of various
systems (finitary in the sense that the proofs did not involve the use of infinite
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sets). For this purpose, he needed a proof procedure that required that any proof
of a formula X used only subformulas of X. Such a proof procedure is said to
obey the subformula principle. Of course, tableaux using signed formulas obey
the subformula principle (and these are closely related to the Gentzen systems,
as we will see). Tableaux using unsigned formulas, almost, but not quite, obey
this principle — they use either subformulas or negations of them. [For example
∼X is not necessarily a subformula of ∼(X ∨ Y), but is the negation of one.]
Gentzen took a new symbol “→” and defined a sequent to be an expression of
the form θ → Γ, where each of θ, Γ is a finite, possibly empty, sequence of
formulas. Such an expression is interpreted to mean that if all terms of are true,
then at least one term of Γ is true. That is, under any valuation v, the sequent θ
→ Γ is true under v iff it is the case that if all terms of θ are true, then at least
one term of is Γ true. A sequent is called a tautology if it is true under all
Boolean valuations, and valid if it is true under all first-order valuations. If θ is a
non-empty sequence X1, …, Xn and Γ is a non-empty sequence Y1, …, Yk, then
the sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk is logically equivalent to the formula (X1 ∧
… ∧Xn) ⊃ (Y1∨ … ∨Yk). If θ is the empty sequence, then θ → Γ is written as
, where is the empty set, or more simply → Γ.
Now, if Γ is a non-empty sequence, then the sequent → Γ (which is ) is
read “if all elements of the empty set are true, then at least one element of Γ is
true.” Well, all elements of the empty set are true (since there are no elements of
the empty set), and so the sequent → Γ is logically equivalent to the proposition
that at least one element of Γ is true. Thus a sequent →Y1, …, Yk is logically
equivalent to the formula Y1 ∨ … ∨Yk.

Now, suppose that the right side Γ of the sequent θ → Γ is empty. The
sequent is then more simply written as θ →. It is interpreted to mean that if all
the terms of the sequence θ are true, then at least one element of the empty set
is true. Well, it is obviously not the case that some element of the empty set is
true, so that θ → expresses the proposition that it is not the case that all terms of
the sequence θ are true. If θ is a non-empty sequence X1, …, Xn, then the sequent
X1, …, Xn → is logically equivalent to the formula ∼ (X1 ∧ … ∧Xn).

Finally, the → written alone is a sequent, and abbreviates → , where is

the empty set. What does → by itself mean? It means that if all elements of the
empty set are true, then at least one element of the empty set is true. Well, all
elements of the empty set are vacuously true, but is it obvious that it is not the
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case that at least one element set if true. Thus the sequent → is simply false
(under all valuations).
At this point, I must tell you an amusing incident: I was once giving a lecture
on Gentzen sequents to a mathematics group. I started with Gentzen sequents in
which both sides of the arrow were non-empty, and after having erased, first the
left side, and then the right side, I was left with just the arrow alone on the board.
After explaining that it meant falsehood, the logician William Craig (the
inventor of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma) was in the audience, and with his
typical sense of humor, raised his hand and asked, “And what does it mean if
you write nothing on the board?”
In more modern Gentzen type systems, the sequents are of the form U → V,
where U and V are finite sets of formulas, instead of sequences of formulas, and
this is the course we will take.

Gentzen Type Axiom Systems

We shall first consider a Gentzen type axiom system G0 for propositional logic.
For any finite set S of formulas and any formulas X1, …, Xn, we abbreviate S ∪
{X1, …, Xn} by S, X1, …, Xn. Thus,

abbreviates

The system G0 for propositional logic has only one axiom scheme and the
eight inference rules below. Here X and Y are formulas of propositional logic,
and U and V are sets of formulas of propositional logic.

Axiom Scheme of the system G0

Rules of the system G0

Conjunction
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Disjunction

Implication

Negation

The inference rules introduce the logical connectives. There are two rules for
each connective — one to introduce the connective on the left side of the arrow,
the other to introduce the connective on the right side of the arrow. As an
example of how the rules are applied, the conjunction rule C1 is that from the
sequent U, X, Y → V one can infer the sequent U, X, ∧ Y → V. As for Rule C2, it
says that from the two sequents U → V, X and U → V, Y one can infer the
sequent U → V, X ∧ Y.
It should be obvious that the axioms of G0 are tautologies, and we leave it to
the reader to verify that the inference rules preserve tautologies, in other words,
that in any application of an inference rule, the conclusion is truth-functionally
implied by the premises. It therefore follows (by mathematical induction) that
we have: All provable sequents of G0 are tautologies; thus the system G0 is
correct.
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We will soon prove that the system G0 is complete, i.e. that all tautologies are
provable in G0.

Problem 5. Show that the sequent U, X → V is logically equivalent to U → V, ∼

X and that the sequent U → V, X is logically equivalent to U, ∼ X → V.

The System G0 in Uniform Notation

Let S be a non-empty set {TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk} of signed formulas. By |S|
we shall mean the sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk. We call |S| the corresponding
sequent of S. We leave it to the reader to verify the important fact that S is
unsatisfiable if and only if its corresponding sequent |S| is a tautology (and, for
later use when we get to Gentzen systems for first-order logic), that if the
elements of S are signed formulas of first-order logic, then S is unsatisfiable iff
|S| is valid.
Of course, if S is a set {FY1, …, FYk} in which there are no formulas signed
T, we take |S| to be the sequent → Y1, …, Yk, and if S is a set {TX1, …, TXn} in
which there are no formulas signed F, we take |S| to be the sequent X1, …, Xn
→.
More generally, for any set of signed formulas, if U is the set of formulas X
such that TX ∈ S, and V is the set of formulas Y such that FY ∈ S, then |S| is the
sequent U → V.
The system G0 in uniform notation is the following:

Axioms

(where S is a set of signed formulas)

Inference Rules

A: (α,α1, and α2 are signed formulas)

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B: (β, β1, and β2 are signed formulas)

Problem 6. Verify that the above uniform system really is the system G0.

Proofs in Gentzen type systems are usually in tree form, unlike the linear
form of proofs in the axiom systems previously considered. Only now, unlike the
trees of tableaux, the tree must grow upwards if the user wishes to prove a
statement by analyzing it from the outside in (as must take place by the tableau
rules): the origin is at the bottom and the end points are at the top. The origin is
the sequent to be proved, and the end points are the axioms used in the proof. As
an example, here is a proof in tree form of the sequent p ⊃ q → ∼q ⊃ ∼p.

Completeness of G0

We now wish to show that all tautologies are provable in the Gentzen system G0
for propositional logic.
By a tableau proof of a sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk is meant a closed
tableau proof showing that the set {TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk} is unsatisfiable
(if the tableau is started with all these formulas, the tableau can be extended by
the tableau rules for propositional logic in such a way that every branch closes).
We will now show how, from a tableau proof of a sequent, we can obtain a proof
of the sequent in the Gentzen system G0. To this end, it will be useful to first
introduce, as an intermediary, another type of tableau that I will now call a block
tableau (this was called a modified block tableau in my book First-Order Logic
[Smullyan, 1968, 1995]). The analytic tableaux, which we have studied so far,
are variants of the tableaux of Evert Beth [1959], whereas the block tableaux, to
which we now turn, are variants of the tableaux of J. Hintikka [1955]. Like the
tableaux of Hintikka, the points of the tree in a block tableau proof (this time
again with the origin at the top, as in analytic tableaux) are not single formulas,
but are finite sets of formulas, which we call the blocks of the tableaux. And
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what we do at any stage of the construction depends solely on the end points of
the tree (rather than on the branch as a whole, as in analytic tableaux).
We will first consider block tableaux for propositional logic. By a block
tableau for a finite set K of signed formulas of propositional logic, we mean a
tree constructed by placing the set K at the origin, and then continuing according
to the following rules (here, for a set S and formulas X, Y, we abbreviate the sets
S ∪ {X} and S ∪ {X} ∪ {Y} by {S, X} or {S, X, Y} respectively):

Block Tableau Inference Rules for Propositional Logic

A′:

B′:

In words, these rules are:

A′: To any end point {S,α} on the tree, we subjoin {S,α1, α2} as sole successor.
B′: To any end point {S,β} on the tree, we simultaneously subjoin {S,β1} as left
successor and {S,β2} as right successor.

We call a block tableau closed if each end point contains some element and
its conjugate.
Changing from an analytic tableau to a block tableau is a relatively simple
matter. To begin with, in constructing an analytic tableau, when using Rule A,
and inferring α1 from α, subjoin α2 immediately after it. That is, use Rule A in
the form:
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Now, to start a block tableau for a sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk, put the set
{TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk} at the origin, for we wish to prove that set of
formulas is unsatisfiable. This concludes stage 0 of the construction of the block
tableau corresponding to the analytic tableau that begins as follows:

Then, for each n, after completion of stage n for the two tableaux, when we
use Rule A (Rule B) in the analytic tableau, we use Rule A′ (Rule B′,
respectively) in the block tableau, and that concludes stage n + 1 of the
constructions. We continue this until both tableaux close (which must happen at
some stage, if the set of formulas {TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk} is unsatisfiable,
i.e. the sequent is a tautology). Since we know that the tableau method for
propositional logic is complete, this construction shows that the block tableau
method for propositional logic is also complete.
As an example, here is a closed analytic tableau for the sequent p ⊃ q, q ⊃ r
→ p ⊃ r:
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Here is the corresponding block tableau:

To convert a block tableau to a proof in the Gentzen system G0, just replace each
block

by the sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk, and the resulting tree, when turned
upside down, is a proof in the Gentzen system.
For example, from the above closed block tableau, we get the following proof
in the Gentzen system:
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Remarks. It is not surprising that this conversion of a block tableau to a proof in

the Gentzen system works, because the block tableau rules are essentially the
rules of the Gentzen system G0 turned upside down. That is, in Rule A′ of block
tableaux

if we replace the premise and conclusion by the corresponding sequents, we get

the rule

which is Rule A of the system G0 turned upside down. Likewise, if in Rule B′ of

block tableaux

we replace the premise and conclusions by the corresponding sequents, we get

the rule
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which is Rule B of the system G0 turned upside down.

A Gentzen Type System G1 for First-Order Logic

For the Gentzen system G1, we take the axioms and inference rules of the system
G0 (only now applied to formulas of first-order logic instead of formulas of
propositional logic), and add the following inference rules:

One proves the completeness of G1 from the completeness of first-order block

tableau in essentially the same manner as in propositional logic. One first makes
a block tableau, whose rules are those of G0 (with sequents replaced by sets of
signed formulas and turned upside down) together with:

One then converts a closed block tableau into a proof in the Gentzen system
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G1 as before, i.e. one replaces each block {S} by the sequent |S| and turns the
resulting tree upside down.

The System GG

In some of the inference rules of the systems G0 and G1 (specifically the

negation and implication rules), one transfers a formula from one side of the
arrow to the other (or at least incorporates it into some formula on the other
side). We need a modification of the system in which this does not happen. This
modification, which we will call GG, has a certain symmetry with respect to the
two sides of the arrow, and was called a symmetric Gentzen system in Smullyan
[1968, 1995].
Here is the system GG, which is admirably suited to uniform notation (since
we are dealing with sequents here, all formulas refer to unsigned sentences):

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

The Completeness of GG

We need another variant of analytic tableaux to prove the completeness of GG.

In some of the rules of analytic tableaux, a conclusion of a rule has a different
sign than that of the premise (which reflects the fact that in the corresponding
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Gentzen system, a sentence might change from one side of the arrow to the
other). We now need an analytic tableau system in which this does not happen.
By an altered tableau we mean one constructed according to the following
rules:
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In the quantification rules (above and below), the asterisk “*” means that the
parameter in the conclusion must not appear in the premise.
Here are the rules of the system altered tableaux in uniform notation (where
the α, β, γ and δ are of course unsigned formulas):

For altered tableaux, a set of signed formulas is called closed if it contains

either some TX and FX or some TX and T∼X or some FX and F∼X. A branch is
called closed if the set of sentences on the branch is a closed set, and an altered
tableau is called closed if every branch is closed.
We will need to know that the altered tableau method is both correct and
complete, i.e. that there is a closed altered tableau for a set S if and only if S is
unsatisfiable. To this end, we can save half the labor by the following notation,
which might aptly be dubbed a super-unifying notation.
We let A be any signed sentence of the form Tα or Fβ. If it is the former, we
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let A1 = Tα1 and let A2 = Tα2; if the latter, we let A1 = Fβ1 and let A2 = Fβ2. We
let B be any sentence of the form Tβ or Fα. If it is the former, we let B1, B2 be
Tβ1 and Tβ2 respectively; if the latter, we let B1, B2 be Fα1 and Fα2, respectively.
We let C be any sentence of the form Tγ or Fδ, and we take C(a) to be Tγ(a),
Fδ(a), respectively. We let D be any sentence of the form Tδ or Fγ, and we take
D(a) to be Tδ(a), Fγ(a), respectively. With this notation, the altered tableau rules
for first-order logic are now most succinctly expressed as follows:

Problem 7. Prove that the altered tableau system is correct and complete, and
then finish the proof of the completeness of the Gentzen system GG.

III. Craig’s Lemma and an Application

Craig’s Interpolation Lemma

A sentence Z of first-order logic is called an interpolant for a sentence X ⊃ Y if

X ⊃ Z and Z ⊃ Y are both valid and every predicate and parameter of Z occurs in
both X and Y. Craig’s celebrated Interpolation Lemma (often simply called
Craig’s Lemma) is that if X ⊃ Y is valid, then there is an interpolant for it,
provided that Y alone is not valid and X alone is not unsatisfiable [Craig, 1957].
If we allow t’s and f’s to be part of our formal language, and define “formula”
accordingly, then the proviso above is unnecessary, because if X ⊃ Y is valid and
Y alone is valid, then t is an interpolant for X ⊃ Y, or if X alone is unsatisfiable,
then f is an interpolant for X ⊃ Y (as the reader can verify). This is the course we
shall take.
Formulas that involve t or f will temporarily be called non-standard formulas.
As shown in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], any non-standard formula
is logically equivalent to either a standard formula or to t or to f.
There is a corresponding interpolation lemma for propositional logic. For
propositional implication X ⊃ Y, a propositional formula Z is called an
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interpolant for X ⊃ Y if X ⊃ Z and Z ⊃ Y, and if every propositional variable in

Z occurs in both X and Y. Craig’s Lemma for proposition logic is that if X ⊃ Y is
a tautology, it has an interpolant.
Returning to first-order logic, a formula Z is called an interpolant for a
sequent U → V, if U → Z and Z → V are both valid, and if every predicate and
parameter of Z occurs in at least one element of U and at least one element of V.
Obviously, Z is an interpolant for a sequent

if and only if Z is an interpolant for the formula

so that the existence of interpolants for all valid sequents is equivalent to the
existence of interpolants for all valid sentences X ⊃ Y. Thus we will consider
Craig’s Lemma for First-Order Logic in the equivalent form that there exist
interpolants for all valid sequents.
We will prove Craig’s Lemma for the Gentzen system GG.

Proof of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma for the Gentzen System GG

It suffices to show that there is an interpolant for each of the axioms of GG, and
that for each of the inference rules of GG, if there is an interpolant for the
premise, or interpolants for the two premises, then there in an interpolant for the
conclusion.
Exercise. Prove this for the axioms and for Rules A and B (which don’t involve
the quantifiers).
Proving the claim of the exercise really proves Craig’s Interpolation Lemma
for propositional logic. Now let’s turn to Rules C and D, which do involve the
quantifiers.
The proof for Rule D is relatively simple. Suppose that X is an interpolant for
U, δ(a) → V, and that a does not occur in U, δ or V. Then X must also be an
interpolant for U, δ → V for the following reasons:
Since X is an interpolant of U, δ(a) → V, then every parameter of X occurs in
V (as well as in U, δ(a)). But since a does not occur in V (by hypothesis), then a
cannot occur in X. From this, it follows that all parameters of X occur in U, δ (as
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well as in V).
To see this, let b be any parameter that occurs in X. We know that b ≠ a. We
also know that b occurs in V (all parameters of X do). It remains to show that b
occurs in U, δ. If b occurs in U, we are done. If not, then b must occur in δ(a)
(since b occurs in U, δ(a)). But the parameters of δ are those of δ(a) other than a.
Since b occurs in δ(a) and b ≠ a, then b must occur in δ. This proves that all
parameters of X occur in U, δ (as well as in V). Also all predicates of X occur in
U, δ and in V since they all occur in U, δ(a) and in V, and the predicates of δ are
the same as those of δ(a).
Finally, since U, δ(a) → X is valid (as well as X → V), and a does not occur
in U, δ or in X, then U,δ → X is valid (in fact it follows from U, δ(a) → X by
Rule D). Thus X is an interpolant for the sequent U, δ → V.
The proof that if X is an interpolant for U → V, γ(a), and a does not occur in
U or in V, γ (a), then X is an interpolant for U → V, γ is similar to the preceding
proof, and is left to the reader. This takes care of Rule D.
The proof for Rule C is much trickier! Suppose that X is an interpolant for U,
γ(a) → V. Then U, γ(a) → X and X → V are of course valid, but X may fail to be
an interpolant for U, γ → V because the parameter a might occur in X, but not in
U, γ. If a does not occur in X, or if a does occur in U, γ, there is no problem. The
critical case is one in which a does occur in X, but not in U, γ. For this case, we
find another interpolant for U, γ → V as follows:
We take some variable x that does not occur in X and we let φ(x) be the result
of replacing every occurrence of a in X by x. We note that φ(a) is X itself. We
will show that ∀ xφ(x) is an interpolant for U, γ → V.
Let γ′ = ∀xφ(x). Then γ′(a) = φ(a), which is X. We already know that U, γ →
γ′(a) is valid (because it is U, γ → X), and since a does not occur in U, γ, and
obviously not in γ′ (which is ∀xφ(x)), then U, γ → γ′ is valid (it is in fact
derivable from U, γ → γ′(a) by Rule D of the system GG). Also γ′(a) → V
(which is X → V) is valid by hypothesis. Hence γ′ → V is valid (by Rule C,
taking U to be the empty set). Thus U, γ → γ′ and γ′ → V are both valid, and all
predicates and parameters of γ′ are both in U, γ and in V (since a does not occur
in γ′). Thus ∀xφ(x), which is γ′, is an interpolant for U, γ → V. This completes
the proof for the γ rule of Rule C.
As to the δ rule of Rule C, a similar proof, which we leave to the reader,
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reveals the following: Suppose X is an interpolant for U → V, δ (a). Then if a

does not occur in X, or a does occur in V, δ, then X is an interpolant for U → V,
δ. But if a does occur in X but not in V, δ, then an interpolant for U → V, δ is
∃xφ(x), where φ(x) is the result of replacing every occurrence of a in X by a
variable x that does not occur in X.
This concludes the proof of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma.

Beth’s Definability Theorem

One important application of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma is that it provides a

neat proof of an important result of the Dutch logician E. Beth [1959]. While
discussing Beth’s Definability Theorem, I will switch to the language of first-
order interpretations that we used frequently in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014] rather than that of first-order valuations, with which we have
spent more time here.
We consider a finite set S of sentences without parameters and involving only
predicates P, P1, … Pn of degree 1. For any sentence X whose predicates are
among P, P1, …, Pn, as usual we write S ⊢ X to mean that X is a logical
consequence of S (i.e. is true in all interpretations that satisfy S). We say that P is
explicitly definable from P1, …, Pn with respect to S iff there is a formula φ(x)
whose predicates are among P1, …, Pn (and hence do not involve P) such that S
⊢ ∀x(P x ≡ φ(X)). Such a formula φ(x) is called an explicit definition of P from
P1, …, Pn with respect to S.

There is another type of definability called implicit definability, which

consists of the following: We take a new predicate P′, distinct from any of P, P1,
…, Pn and which does not occur in any element of S, and we let S′ be the result
of replacing P by P′ in every sentence in S. Then P is said to be implicitly
definable from P1, …, Pn with respect to S iff

When this is true, we also say that the sentences of S implicitly define the
predicate P.
We remark that this condition is equivalent to the condition that for any two
interpretations that satisfy S, if they agree on each of P1, …, Pn, then they agree
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on P. (Two interpretations I1 and I2 are said to agree on a predicate Q iff they

assign the same value to Q.) This equivalence is not necessary for the proof of
Beth’s theorem, but is of independent interest. A proof of this can be found in
my book Logical Labyrinths [Smullyan, 2008, 2009, pp. 294–295].
It is relatively easy to show that if P is explicitly definable from P1, …, Pn
with respect to S, then it is implicitly so definable.
Problem 8. Show that if P is explicitly definable from P1, …, Pn with respect to
S, then it is implicitly so definable.
Theorem B. [Beth’s Definability Theorem] If P is implicitly definable from P1,
…, Pn with respect to S, then it is explicitly so definable.

This theorem is far from obvious, but Craig’s Lemma provides a neat and
elegant proof of it.
Suppose that P is implicitly definable from P1, …, Pn with respect to S. Let P′
and S′ be as previously defined, and assume we have

Let X be the conjunction of the elements of S (the order does not matter), and let
X′ be the conjunction of the elements of S′. We thus have

Since the above sentence is valid, then for any parameter a the sentence (X ∧ X′)
⊃ (Pa ≡ P′a) is valid. [We recall that S is a set of sentences without parameters
because that is one of the conditions on both explicit and implicit definitions.
Thus the sentence X ∧ X′ has no parameters.] Hence by propositional logic, the
sentence (X ∧ X′)⊃ (Pa ⊃ P′a), is valid. Thus, again by propositional logic, so is
the following sentence:

In this sentence, P does not occur in X′ ⊃ P′a and P ′ does not occur in X ∧ Pa.
By Craig’s Lemma, there is an interpolant Z for the sentence (X ∧ Pa)⊃ (X′ ⊃
P′a). All predicates and parameters of Z occur in both X ∧ Pa and in X′ ⊃ P′a.
Hence neither P nor P′ can occur in Z; in fact all the predicates of Z are among
P1, …, Pn. Also,Z contains no parameters other than a, since X and X′ contain no
parameters, as noted above. Let x be a variable that does not occur in Z, and let
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φ(x) be the result of substituting x for all occurrences of a in Z. But φ(a) = Z, so

φ(a) is an interpolant for (X ∧ Pa)⊃ (X′ ⊃ P′a). Hence the following two
sentences are valid:
(1) (X ∧ Pa) ⊃ φ(a).
(2) φ(a) ⊃(X′ ⊃ P′a).
From (1), we get the valid sentence:
(1′) X ⊃ (Pa ⊃ φ(a)).
From (2), we get the valid sentence:
(2′) X′ ⊃ (φ(a) ⊃ P′(a)).
Since (2′) is valid, so is its notational variant:
(2″) X ⊃ (φ(a) ⊃ P(a)).
[If a sentence is valid, it remains valid if we replace any predicate by a new
predicate.]
By (1′) and (2″) we get the valid sentence:

Since a does not occur in X, the sentence is valid. Since X is

the conjunction of the elements of S, it then follows that and
so the formula φ(x) explicitly defines P from P1, …, Pn with respect to S.

This concludes the proof of Beth’s Definability Theorem.

Note: The fact that S was assumed finite was not really necessary for the
proof. A compactness argument can be used to modify the proof for an infinite
set.

IV. A Unification
Let us review some of the main results that we have proved about first-order
logic in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] and in this chapter.
T1: The Completeness Theorem for Analytic Tableaux. Every valid formula is
provable by the tableau method.
T2: The Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem. For any set S of formulas, if S is
satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a denumerable domain.
T3: The Compactness Theorem. For any infinite set S of formulas, if every finite
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subset of S is satisfiable, so is S.
T4: The Completeness of a First-Order Axiom System.
T5: The Regularity Theorem. For every valid pure sentence X, there is a (finite)
regular set R which truth-functionally implies X.
T6: Craig’s Interpolation Lemma. If the sentence X ⊃ Y (of propositional or
first-order logic) is valid, there is a sentence Z such that X ⊃ Z and Z ⊃ Y are
both valid and, for propositional logic, every propositional variable occurring
in Z occurs in both X and Y, while, for first-order logic, every predicate and
parameter of Z occurs in both X and Y.
In my paper “A Unifying Principle in Quantification Theory” [Smullyan,
1963], I stated and proved a result that yields all of T1 − T6 as special cases. To
this we now turn. What follows is slightly different from the original formulation
of 1963.
Consider any property ϕ of sentences. A set of sentences that has property ϕ
will be called ϕ-consistent (i.e. “consistent” with having the property ϕ).
We are now going to be especially interested in certain sets of sentences that
have what we will call an analytic consistency property, and we will use the
Greek symbol Γ to signal that a property of sets is an analytic consistency
property. Thus we define a set S of sentences to be Γ-consistent — which means
the same as saying that the set S has the analytic consistency property Γ — if the
following conditions hold:
Γ0: S contains no element and its negation (or no element and its conjugate, if we
are considering signed formulas).
Γ1: For any α in S, the sets S ∪ {α1} and S ∪ { α2} are both Γ-consistent (and
hence so is S ∪{υ1, υ2}).
Γ2: For any β in S, at least one of the sets S ∪ {β1} and S ∪ {β2}is Γ-consistent.
Γ3: For any γ in S and any parameter a, the set S Γ {γ(a)} is Γ-consistent.
Γ4: For any δ in S, the set S ∪ {δ(a)} is Γ-consistent for any parameter a that
does not occur in any element of S.
Theorem U. [The Unification Theorem] For any analytic consistency property
Γ, if S is Γ-consistent, then S is satisfiable in the domain of the parameters.
One proof of Theorem U is quite similar to the completeness proof for
tableaux: Given a Γ-consistent set S, it easily follows that no tableau for S can
close (verify this!). Hence a systematic tableau for S will contain an open branch
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that includes all elements of S, and is a Hintikka set, and thus satisfiable in the
domain of the parameters.
Discussion. We proved Theorem U using analytic tableaux, although the
theorem makes no reference to tableaux. My 1963 proof used neither tableaux
nor König’s lemma, and is as follows: We shall consider now only the case that
S is denumerable (the construction for a finite set S is even simpler, and the
modification is left to the reader). We shall also assume that only finitely many
parameters are found in the formulas of S (if not, we can always introduce a new
denumerable group of parameters, and use them along with the parameters in the
formulas of S, in the construction ahead).
In what follows, consistent will mean Γ-consistent. Given a consistent
denumerable set of sentences S, the idea is to define an infinite sequence of
formulas whose set of terms is a Hintikka set that contains all the elements of S.
The sequence is defined in stages: at each stage we have a finite segment (X1,
…, Xk) of our desired infinite sequence, and at the next stage, we extend that
sequence to a larger finite sequence (X1, …, Xk, …, Xk+m).

First some definitions and notations: Let θ be a finite sequence (X1, …, Xk).
We shall say that θ is consistent with S when the set S ∪{X1, …, Xk} is
consistent. For any formulas Y1, …, Ym, by the expression θ, Y1, …, Ym is meant
the sequence (X1, …, Xk, Y1, …, Ym).

Given a consistent denumerable set S, let s1, …, sn, … be an enumeration of

S. We let θ1 be the unit sequence (s1). This sequence is obviously consistent with
S, since s1 ∊ S. This concludes the first stage.

Now suppose we have completed the nth stage and have on hand a sequence
(X1, …, Xk), where k ≥ n. We call this sequence θn, and we assume it to be
consistent with S. We then extend θn to a finite sequence θn+1 in a manner
depending on the nature of Xn:
(a) If Xn is an α, we take θn+1 to be θn, α1, α2, sn+1.
(b) If Xn is an β, then either θn, β1 or θn, β2 is consistent with S. If the former we
take βn+1 to be θn, β1, sn+1; if the latter, we take θn+1 to be θn, β2, sn+1.
(c) If Xn is a γ, we let a be the first parameter for which γ(a) is not a term of θn,
and we take θn+1 to be θn,γ(a), γ, sn+1.
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(d) If Xn is a δ, we take θn+1 to be θn, δ(a), sn+1, where a is a parameter new to S

and new to θn.

This concludes stage n + 1 of the sequence.

Since for each n the sequence θn is consistent with S, then no formula and its
conjugate (or negation, if we are dealing with unsigned formulas) are terms of
θn. Hence no formula and its conjugate (or negation) are terms of θ. Also it is
obvious from the construction that if α is a term of θ, so are α1 and α2; and if β is
a term of θ, so is either β1 or β2; and if γ is a term of θ, then so is γ(a) for every
parameter a (since we encounter γ denumerably many times); and if δ is a term
of θ, then so is δ(a) for some parameter a. Thus the set of terms of θ is a
Hintikka set and includes all elements of S, and so S is denumerably satisfiable
in the domain of the parameters.
This construction makes no explicit reference to trees, although θ is in fact
the leftmost open branch of a systematic tableau for S. This proof does not use
König’s Lemma.
Applications: We will provide a sketch of the application of Γ-consistency in
proofs of the important results listed above. The details will be left to the reader.
T1: (Completeness of the tableau method).

Call a set S tableau-consistent if there exists no closed tableau for S. It is

easily seen that tableau-consistency is an analytic consistency property. Hence
by the Unification Theorem, every tableau-consistent set is satisfiable.
Therefore, if a set S is unsatisfiable, there must be a closed tableau for S. Now, if
a formula X is valid, then the set {∼X} is unsatisfiable, so that there is a closed
tableau for ∼X, which means that X is tableau provable.
T2: (The Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem).

Satisfiability itself is easily seen to be an analytic consistency property.

Hence by Theorem U, every satisfiable set is satisfiable in the denumerable
domain of the parameters.
T3: (The Compactness Theorem).

Call a set S F-consistent if all finite subsets of S are satisfiable. F-consistency

is easily seen to be an analytic consistency property. Hence, by Theorem U, if all
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finite subsets of S are satisfiable, then S is satisfiable.

T4: (Completeness of an axiom system for first-order logic).

Give an axiom system for first-order logic, call a set S consistent (with
respect to the system) if no element of S is refutable, and no finite set {X1, …,
Xn} of elements of S are such that the conjunction X1∧ … ∧ Xn is refutable. For
the axiom system given in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], or for any
other standard system, this consistency is easily shown to be an analytic
consistency property. Hence every consistent set is satisfiable and every
unsatisfiable set is inconsistent. If now X is valid, then ∽X is unsatisfiable, and
hence inconsistent. This means that ∽X is refutable, i.e. (∽∽X) is provable, and
so is X. Thus every valid formula is provable, and the system is complete.
T5: (The Regularity Theorem).

Let us review some definitions and facts: We recall that a (finite) regular set
R means a set whose members can be arranged in a sequence

where for each i ≤ n, Qi is either a γ or a δ, and if Qi is a δ, the parameter ai does

not occur in δ, nor in any earlier term of the sequence. Such a parameter
(occurring in a Qi(ai) where Qi is a δ in a regular set R) is called a critical
parameter of R.
We recall that a set S is said to tautologically imply a formula X if X is true in
all Boolean valuations that satisfy S. For S a finite set {X1, …, Xn}, this condition
is equivalent to the condition that the sentence (X1 ∧ …∧ Xn) ⊃ X is a tautology
(or, in the case that n = 1, that X1 ⊃ X is a tautology). A finite set {X1, …, Xn} is
said to be truth-functionally unsatisfiable if the sentence ∽(X1 ∧ … ∧ Xn) is a
tautology.
The Regularity Theorem is that for every valid sentence X, there is a regular
set R that tautologically implies X, and which is such that no critical parameter
of R occurs in X.
For any finite set S (of sentences), an associate of S is a regular set R such
that R ∪ S is truth-functionally unsatisfiable, and no critical parameter of R
occurs in any element of S. Now the Regularity Theorem is equivalent to the
proposition that every unsatisfiable (finite) set S has an associate.
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Problem 9. Show that the Regularity Theorem is equivalent to the proposition

that every unsatisfiable (finite) set S has an associate.
Let us now call a finite set S A-consistent if S has no associate. It can be
shown that A-consistency is an analytic consistency property. Hence by Theorem
U, for any finite set S, if S has no associate, then S is satisfiable. Hence if S is
unsatisfiable, then S has an associate, which proves the Regularity Theorem [by
Problem 8].
T6: (Craig’s Interpolation Lemma).

By a partition S1|S2 of a set S we mean a pair of subsets S1 and S2 of S such

that every element of S is in either S1 or S2, but not in both; in other words S1 ∪
S2 = S and

By a partition interpolant between S1 and S2 we mean a sentence Z such that

all predicates and parameters of Z occur in both S1 and S2, and S1 ∪ {∽Z} and
S2 ∪ {Z} are both unsatisfiable. Now, call a set S Craig-consistent if there is a
partition S1|S2 of S such that there is no partition interpolant between S1 and S2.
Well, Craig-consistency can be shown to be an analytic consistency property.
Hence by Theorem U, every Craig-consistent set is satisfiable. Therefore if S is
unsatisfiable, then for every partition S1|S2 of S, there is a partition interpolant
between S1 and S2.

Now, suppose X ⊃ Y is valid. Then the set {X,∽ Y} is unsatisfiable. Consider

the partition {X}|{∽Y}. Then there is a partition interpolant Z between {X} and
{∽Y }. Thus {X, ∽Z} (which is {X} ∪ {∽Z}) and {Z, ∽Y } (which is {∽Y } ∪
{Z}) are both unsatisfiable, hence X ⊃ Z and Z ⊃ Y are both valid, and of course
every predicate and parameter of Z are in both X and Y. Thus Z is an interpolant
of X ⊃ Y.
Grand Exercise. Verify that the six properties which I claimed to be analytic
consistency properties really are so.

V. A Henkin-Style Completeness Proof

Adolf Lindenbaum (a Polish logician born in 1904 and killed by the Nazis in
1941), proved in the 1920s that every consistent set could be extended to a
maximally consistent set, a result that afterwards became known as
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Lindenbaum’s Lemma. Leon Henkin [1949] published a proof of the

completeness of various axiom systems for first-order logic by a method which
is completely different from the ones we have so far considered, and which
incorporates the method Lindenbaum used to prove his lemma.
Henkin’s method combines maximal consistency with another condition: A
set S of sentences is called E-complete (existentially complete) if for any element
δ in S, there is at least one parameter a such that δ(a) ∊ S. Henkin showed that
every consistent set S can be extended to a set M that is both maximally
consistent and E-complete, and that every such set M is a (first-order) truth set.
We will see now that Henkin’s method applies to a more general situation.
Recall from Section IV that we are using the phrase “the set S of sentences is
Γ-consistent” to mean that S has the property Γ and that Γ is an analytic
consistency property. We define a property Δ of sentences to be a synthetic
consistency property, if it is an analytic consistency property and satisfies the
additional condition that for any set S having property Δ, and any sentence X,
either S ∪ {X} has the property Δ, or S ∪ {∽X} has the property Δ. We will call
a set Δ-consistent if it has a particular synthetic consistency property Δ. So in
what follows “ Γ ” will be used to designate any analytic consistency property,
and “Δ” will be used to designate any synthetic consistency property (but
remember that any synthetic consistency property is also an analytic consistency
property).
A property P of sets is said to be of finite character if for any set S, S has the
property P if and only if all finite subsets of S have property P.
Henkin’s completeness proof for standard axiom systems for first-order logic
goes through for any synthetic consistency property Δ of finite character. In this
more general form its statement is the following: for any synthetic consistency
property Δ of finite character, any Δ-consistent set S can be extended to a
maximally Δ-consistent set M, and this can be done in such a way that the set M
will be a first-order truth set.
We will show a suitable modification of Henkin’s proof for Δ-consistent
properties (synthetic consistency properties) of finite character yields the
following Henkin-style proof for Γ-consistent properties of finite character, i.e.
for any analytic consistency property of finite character).
So, consider any analytic consistency property Γ that is also of finite
character. We will show that if S is Γ-consistent, then S can be extended to a set
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M which is both maximally Γ-consistent and E-complete, and that the set M
obtained in this way is a Hintikka set, and hence satisfiable (so that M ’s subset S
is also satisfiable).
Problem 10. Show that if M is both maximally Γ-consistent and E-complete,
then M is a Hintikka set.
Note: As previously remarked, for any synthetic consistency property Δ of
finite character, if M is both maximally Δ-consistent and E-complete, then M is
not only a Hintikka set, but even a truth set. Indeed, more generally, any
Hintikka set S having the property that for every X, either X ∊ S or (∽ X) ∊ S,
must be a truth set. We leave the proof of this as an exercise for the reader.
Now, given an analytic consistency property Γ of finite character, how do we
actually go about extending a given Γ-consistent set S of finite character to a set
M which is both maximally Γ-consistent and E-complete? (As in our proof of
Theorem U above, we will assume that the number of parameters in S is finite,
or that we have an additional denumerable number of parameters available to us,
none of which occur in any formula of S, i.e. parameters that we can just add to
the parameters in S if necessary.)
Here is Lindenbaum’s method of extending a consistent set S to a maximally
consistent set M (assuming consistency to be of finite character), which we will
extend from the conventional meaning of consistent to our meaning of Γ-
consistent (i.e. analytically consistent): We first arrange all the sentences of first-
order logic in some infinite sequence X1, X2 …, Xn, Xn+1, …. Now consider a Γ-
consistent set S. We construct an infinite sequence of sets S0, S1, …, Sn, Sn+1, …
as follows: We take S0 to be S. Then, for every positive n, assuming Sn already
defined, we take Sn+1 to be Sn if Sn ∪ {Xn} is not consistent; while if Sn ∪ {Xn}
is consistent, and if Xn is not some δ, then we take Sn+1 to be Sn ∪ {Xn}. But if
Sn ∪ {Xn} is consistent and Xn is some δ, then Sn ∪ { δ, δ(a)} is also consistent
for any parameter a new to Sn ∪ {δ} (since we are dealing with an analytic
consistency property). In this case we take Sn+1 to be Sn ∪ {δ, δ(a)}, where a is
a parameter new to Sn and to δ. The set M that results from taking the union of
all the sets S0, S1, …, Sn, Sn+1, … is both maximally consistent and E-complete.
For it is easily seen to be E-complete by construction (realize that at every stage
of the construction, there will always be a new parameter available). And the
union M of all the consistent sets Sn is consistent because we are assuming our
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consistency property to be of finite character. And it is maximally consistent

because any formula not already in it was kept out of M because adding it would
have made a finite subset of M inconsistent.
Immediately after proving that every consistent set S can be extended to a set
M that is both maximally consistent and E-complete, Henkin stated as a
corollary the completeness of first-order logic, that is, that every valid formula
was provable. But he did use a well-known property of the axiom systems he
was considering that does not apply to the slightly different formalization of
first-order logic in this volume (his systems included the constants t and f, which
we did discuss in the context of propositional logic in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014], and which can also be employed in first-order logic).
Now, we might try to show the completeness of first-order logic similarly to
the way Henkin did by first showing that ordinary consistency is an analytic
consistency property (a common definition of an individual sentence X being
consistent would be that there exists a formula Z such that X ⊃ Z is not
provable). But far easier for us is to just remind ourselves that in Section IV of
this chapter (the Unification section), we showed that both the first-order tableau
method of proof and the standard first-order axiomatic systems of proof are
complete by defining the appropriate analytic consistency property for each of
them.
We now see that there are basically two types of completeness proofs directly
applicable to the usual formulations of First-Order Logic. One is along the lines
of Lindenbaum and Henkin, which extends a consistent set directly to a truth set,
and for this we need the full force of synthetic consistency properties. The
second type of completeness proof (which is along the lines of Gödel, Herbrand,
Gentzen, Beth, and Hintikka) extends a consistent set, not directly to a truth set,
but to a Hintikka set, which can be further extended to a truth set. And for the
second type of proof, we do not need synthetic consistency, but only analytic
consistency.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 2

1. We are given that v is a Boolean valuation.

(1) We are given that if γ is true under v, then so is γ(a) for every parameter
a. In addition, we must prove the converse, i.e. that if γ(a) is true under v
for every parameter a, then γ is true under v. We shall prove the
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equivalent proposition that if γ is false under v, then so is γ(a) for at least

one parameter a.
We first consider the case that γ is of the form . Now suppose
that is false under v. Then is true under v [since v is a
Boolean valuation]. Hence by (2) of the lemma, there is at least one
parameter a such that ∼φ(a) is true under v. Hence φ(a) is false under v,
which is what was to be shown [since if γ is , γ(a) is φ(a)].
Now consider the case that γ is of the form ∼∃xφ(x). Well, suppose
that ∼∃xφ(x) is false under v. This means that ∃xφ(x) is true under v
[since v is a Boolean valuation]. Then by F2, φ(a) is true for at least one
parameter a. But then ∼φ(a) is false for that parameter. And that is
what we needed to prove, since when the γ formula is of the form
∼∃xφ(x), γ(a) is ∼φ(a).
(2) We are given that if δ is true under v, then so is δ(a) for at least one
parameter a. Again we must prove the converse, i.e. that if δ(a) is true
for at least one parameter a, so is δ. We will prove the equivalent
proposition that if δ is false, then so is δ(a) for every parameter a.
We first consider the case that δ is of the form ∃xφ(x). So suppose
∃xφ(x) is false. Then ∼∃xφ(x) is true under v [since v is a Boolean
valuation]. Then by (1) of the Lemma, ∼φ(a) is true for every
parameter a. Hence φ(a) is false for every parameter a, which was what
had to be proved [since φ(a) is δ(a) when δ is of the form suppose
∃xφ(x)].
Now consider the case that δ is of the form . Well, suppose
is false. Then is true [since v is a Boolean valuation].
Then by F1, φ(a) is true for every parameter a. This means that, ∼φ(a)
is false for every parameter a [since v is a Boolean valuation], which is
what had to be proved [since when δ is of the form , δ (a) is of
the form ∼φ(a)].
2. We must show that every magic set M is a truth-functional basis for first-
order logic. Thus we must show that if M is a magic set and X is a pure
sentence, then X is valid if and only if X is tautologically implied by some
finite subset M0 of M. We assume M is a magic set.
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(a) Suppose that X is a valid pure sentence. Then X is true under all first-
order valuations, and thus also true under all Boolean valuations that
satisfy M (because all such valuations are also first-order valuations by
condition M1 in the definition of a magic set). Thus X is tautologically
implied by M [by the definition of tautological implication], and hence
by some finite subset M0 of M [by Problem 8 of Chapter 6 of The
Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014]].
(b) Conversely, suppose X is a pure sentence that is tautologically implied
by some finite subset M0 of M. Then the set M0∪{∼X} is not truth-
functionally satisfiable (i.e. not satisfied by any Boolean valuation), so
that M0∪{∼X} is not first-order satisfiable (since every first-order
valuation is also a Boolean valuation). If ∼X were first-order satisfiable,
then M0 ∪ {∼X} would also be first-order satisfiable [by M2], but since
it isn’t, then ∼X is not first-order satisfiable, which means that X is
valid.
This completes the proof.
3. We must show that if M is a complete regular set of sentences, then M is a
magic set. So let M be a complete regular set of sentences.
Proof of M1: We must show that any Boolean valuation that satisfies M is
also a first-order valuation. So suppose v is a Boolean valuation that satisfies
M. By Proposition 1, to show that v is a first-order valuation, it suffices to
show that if γ is true under v, so is γ(a) for every parameter a, and that if δ is
true under v, then so is δ(a) for at least one parameter a. Well, suppose γ is
true under v. Since M is complete, γ ⊃ γ(a) is in M for every parameter a.
Thus γ ⊃ γ (a) is true under v (since every member of M is true under v).
Then γ (a) must also be true under v (since v is a Boolean valuation).
Now suppose δ is true under v. Since M is complete, δ ⊃ δ (a) is in M
for some parameter a. Thus δ ⊃ δ (a) if true under v (since every member of
M is true under v). Then δ (a) must also be true under v (since v is a
Boolean valuation).
Proof of M2: We must show that for every finite set S of pure sentences,
and every finite subset M0 of M, if S is first-order satisfiable, so is S ∪ M0.
We first show that for any finite set S of sentences (possibly with
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parameters), if S is (first-order) satisfiable, then:

(1) S ∪ {γ ⊃ γ(a)} is satisfiable, for any γ and any a;
(2) S ∪ {δ ⊃ δ (a)} is satisfiable, for any δ and any a that does not occur in
δ or in any element of S.
Now (1) is obvious, since γ ⊃ γ(a) is valid, hence true under all
interpretations.
As for (2), let I be an interpretation of all predicates and parameters of S
in some non-empty universe U which is such that all elements of S are true
under I. Extend I to an interpretation I1 by assigning values in U to all
predicates and parameters of δ which do not occur in S. Now let a be any
parameter which occurs neither in δ nor in any element of S. We now wish
to extend I1 to an interpretation I2 in which δ (a) has a truth value — that
is, we must assign a value k of U to the parameter a and we wish to do so
in a way that makes δ ⊃ δ (a) true. Well, if δ is false under I1, then any k in
U will do, since δ ⊃ δ (a) will automatically be true. On the other hand, if δ
is true under I1, then there must be at least one element k in U such that δ
(a) is true when k is assigned to a. Thus, we assign such an element k to a,
and then, since this assignment makes δ ⊃ δ (a) true, δ ⊃ (a) must also be
true.
This proves (1) and (2). Finally, consider a finite subset M0 of M. Then
M0 is a finite regular set. Arrange M0 in some regular sequence Q1 ⊃
Q1(a1), …, Qn ⊃ Qn(an), where for each i ≤ n, Qi is either a γ or a δ, and if
Qi is a δ, the parameter ai does not occur in δ, nor in any earlier term of the
sequence.
Now let S be any satisfiable finite set of pure sentences. Let

And for each i < n, let

By (1) and (2) above, S1 is satisfiable, and for each i < n, if Si is satisfiable,
so is Si+1. It then follows by mathematical induction that each of the sets S1,
S2, …, Sn is satisfiable. Thus S ∪ M0, which is Sn, is satisfiable.
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4. Let M be a complete regular set of sentences. By Theorem 2, it is also a

magic set, so that by Theorem 1, it is a truth-functional basis for first-order
logic. Thus, for any valid pure sentence X there is a finite subset R of M
which truth-functionally implies X. The set R is obviously regular.
5. For any set S of formulas, let Con S be the conjunction of the elements of S
(the order does not matter) if S is non-empty, or t if S is empty (in which
case all elements of S are true). In either case, under any interpretation, Con
S is true if and only if all elements of S are true. Let Dis S be the disjunction
of all the elements of S if S is non-empty, or f if S is empty. In either case,
under any interpretation, Dis S is true iff at least one element of S is true. A
sequent U → V is logically equivalent to the simple formula Con U ⊃ Dis
V.
We are to show that U, X → V is logically equivalent to U → V, ∼X, or
what is the same thing, that Con (U,X) ⊃ Dis V is equivalent to Con U ⊃
Dis (V, ∼X). [The proof that U → V, X is logically equivalent to U, ∼X →
V is similar.]
Well, under any interpretation (Boolean valuation), X is either true or
false.
Case 1. Let X be true. Then Con (U, X) is logically equivalent to Con (U),
so that Con (U, X) ⊃ Dis V is logically equivalent to Con (U) ⊃ Dis V. But
also, since X is true, ∼X is false, so that Dis (V, ∼X) is logically equivalent
to Dis (V). Thus Con U ⊃ Dis (V, ∼X) is also equivalent to Con U ⊃ Dis
(V). So in this case, the sequents U, X → V and U → V, ∼X are both
equivalent to U → V, hence equivalent to each other.
Case 2. Let X be false. Then Con (U, X) is false, hence Con (U, X) ⊃ Dis V
is true. But also, since X is false, then ∼X is true, so that Dis (V, ∼X) is
true, and therefore Con U ⊃ Dis (V, ∼X) is true. Thus in this case the
sequents U, X → V and U → V, ∼X are both true, hence equivalent to each
other.
6. S is a set T X1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk of signed formulas. We let U be the
set X1, …, Xn and let V be the set {Y1, …, Yk}.
First, let us consider the axioms {S, T X, F X} of the uniform system.
The set {S, T X, F X} is the set
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and so |S, T X, F X| is the sequent

This is U, X → V, X, the axiom of G0.

As for the inference rules, we must consider the various α and β cases
separately. For example, consider the case that α is of the form F X ⊃ Y.
Then α1 = TX and α2 = FY. Then |S,α1,α2| is |TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk, TX,
FY|, which is the sequent

which is U, X → V, Y, and so for the case α = F X ⊃ Y, Rule A is Rule I1 of

the system G0.
We leave it to the reader to verify the other cases, specifically that if α is
T X ∧ Y, F X ∨ Y, T∼X, F∼X, then Rule A is respectively Rule C1, D1, N2,
N1 of the system G0, and if β is F X∧Y, T X∨Y, T X ⊃ Y, then Rule B is
respectively Rule C2, D2, I2.
7. First for the correctness of the altered tableau method. We are to show that
if there is a closed altered tableau for a set, then the set is really
unsatisfiable.
For any satisfiable finite set S of signed formulas, the following facts
hold:

(1) If A ∊ S then S ∪ {A1} and S ∪ {A2} are both satisfiable.

(2) If B ∊ S then either S ∪ {B1} or S ∪ {B2} is satisfiable.
(3) If C ∊ S then for every parameter a the set S ∪{C(a)} is satisfiable.
(4) If D ∊ S then for every parameter a new to S, the set S ∪ {D(a)} is
satisfiable.
These facts can be proved in the same manner as in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014], replacing α,β,γ,δ by A,B,C,D respectively. It then follows
that if S is satisfiable, at no stage can an altered tableau for S close. Hence if
there is a closed altered tableau for S, then S is unsatisfiable. Thus the
altered tableau method is correct.
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As for completeness, one can make a systematic altered tableau for a set
in essentially the same manner as for analytic tableaux (in the instructions
given in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014], just replace α,β,γ,δ by
A,B,C,D respectively). If the systematic altered tableau runs on forever
without closing, then it contains at least one infinite open branch, and the
set S of the sentences on the branch satisfies the following conditions:
(0) For no X in S is it the case that both T X and F X are both in S, or that T
X and T ∼X are both in S or that F X and F ∼X are both in S.
(1) If A ∊ S, so are A1 and A2.
(2) If B ∊ S, then B1 ∊ S or B2 ∊ S.
(3) If C ∊ S, then so is C(a) for every parameter a.
(4) If D ∊ S, then so is D(a) for at least one parameter a.
Such a set S is very much like a Hintikka set, and the proof of its
satisfiability is very close to that for Hintikka set. About the only significant
difference is in the assignment of truth values to the atomic sentences. Now,
for any atomic unsigned sentence X, if T X ∊ S or F ∼X ∊ S, give X the
value truth (in which case T X and F ∼X are then true). If either T ∼X ∊ S
or F X ∊ S, then give X the value false (in which case T ∼X and F X are
then true). [No ambiguity can result, because if T X ∊ S or F ∼X ∊ S, then
neither T ∼X ∊ S nor F X ∊ S can hold, and if T ∼X ∊ S or F X ∊ S, then
neither T X ∊ S nor F ∼X ∊ S can hold.] If none of T X, T ∼X, FX, F ∼X
occur in S, then give X the value truth or falsity at will — say truth. Under
this valuation, all elements of S can be shown to be true by mathematical
induction on degrees, much as in the proof of Hintikka’s Lemma. Thus S is
satisfiable.
We now see that if the systematic altered tableau for S does not close,
then S is satisfiable, hence if S is not satisfiable, then any systematic altered
tableau for S must close. This completes the completeness proof for the
altered tableau method.
To complete the proof of the completeness of the Gentzen system GG,
we now need altered block tableaux for first-order logic, whose rules in
uniform notation are the following:
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We recall that if S is the set {TX1, …, TXn, FY1, …, FYk}, by |S| we

mean the sequent X1, …, Xn → Y1, …, Yk.
For any block tableau rule of the form

by the counterpart of the rule we mean

(i.e. “from the sequent |S2|, to infer the sequent |S1|”). For any block tableau
rule of the form

by its counterpart is meant the rule

(i.e. “from the sequents |S2| and |S3|, to infer the sequent |S1|”). Well, the
counterparts of the eight block tableau rules are precisely the eight rules of
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the system GG. To see this, let U be the set of unsigned sentences X such
that T X ∊ S and let V be the set of sentences Y such that F Y ∊ S. Consider,
for example, the block tableau rule

The counterpart of this rule is

but this is just

which is a rule of GG.

Another example: The counterpart of the rule is

which is

which is a rule of GG.

The reader can verify the cases of the other six rules.
Now if is a closed altered block tableau for a set of signed formulas
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whose counterpart is the sequent U → V, each end point S is closed, and the
sequence |S| is an axiom of GG:

(i) |S, T X, F X| is U, X → V, X;
(ii) |S, T X, T ∼X| is U, X, ∼X → V ;
(iii) |S, F X, F ∼X| is U → V, X, ∼X.
And since the counterparts of the block rules are rules of GG, it follows that
if we replace each point S of the tree by the sequent |S| and turn the tree
upside down, we have a proof of the sequent U → V in the system GG. This
concludes the proof of the completeness of GG.
8. It is understood that P′ is a predicate distinct from each of P, P1, …, Pn, and
that P′ occurs in no element of S, and that S′ is the result of substituting P′
for P in every element of S.
Now suppose that P is explicitly definable from P1, …, Pn with respect
to S. Let φ(x) be a formula whose predicates are among P1, …, Pn but do
not involve P and which is such that

Then also, of course, . Hence,

which implies

Therefore is logically valid, as the reader can verify

(say, with a tableau). Thus P′ is implicitly definable from P1, …, Pn with
respect to S.

9. (a) Suppose every unsatisfiable set has an associate. Consider any valid
sentence X. Then the unit set {∼X} is unsatisfiable, hence has an associate
R. Since R ∪ {∼X} is not truth-functionaly satisfiable, then R tautologically
implies X [since X must be clearly true in any Boolean valuation satisfying
R]. Moreover, X contains no critical parameter of R, which proves the
Regularity Theorem.
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(b) Conversely, assume the Regularity Theorem. Let S be a finite set {X1,
…, Xn} of sentences which is unsatisfiable. Then the sentence ∼(X1 Λ
… Λ Xn) is valid. Hence by the assumed Regularity Theorem, there is a
regular set R which tautologically implies ∼(X1 Λ … Λ Xn) and which is
such that no critical parameter of R occurs in any element of ∼(X1 Λ …
Λ Xn), and thus no critical parameter of R occurs in any element of S.
Since R tautologically implies ∼(X1 Λ … Λ Xn), then R ∪ {X1, …, Xn} is
truth-functionally unsatisfiable, i.e. R ∪ S is truth-functionally
unsatisfiable. Thus R is an associate of S.
10. We are given that M is maximally Γ-consistent and E-complete, and we
are to show that M is a Hintikka set. In what follows, “consistent” will
mean Γ-consistent. We shall say that a sentence X is consistent with M if
the set M ∪ {X} is consistent. Since M is maximally consistent, then if X is
consistent with M, then X must be a member of M (otherwise M would be
only a proper subset of the larger consistent set M ∪ {X}, contrary to M’s
maximality).
H0: No formula and its conjugate (or formula and its negation, if unsigned
formulas are in questions) can be in the set M, because M is consistent,
and that is one of the conditions on (Γ) consistency.
H1: Suppose α ∊ M. Then of course is consistent with M. Thus α1 and α2
are both consistent with M (since Γ is an analytic consistency property).
Therefore α1 and α2 are members of M. This proves that if α ∊ M, then
α1 ∊ M and α2 ∊ M.
H2: Suppose β ∊ M. Then β is consistent with M and thus either β1 is
consistent with M or β2 is consistent with M, and therefore either β1 ∊ M
or β2 ∊ M.
H3: Suppose γ ∊ M. Then γ is consistent with M, so that γ(a) is consistent
with M for every parameter a. Therefore γ(a) ∊ M for every parameter a.
H4: Suppose δ ∈ M. Then δ(a) ∈ M for at least one parameter a by the
assumption that M is E-complete.
By H1–H4, M is a Hintikka set.
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Part II

Recursion Theory and

Metamathematics
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Chapter 3
Some Special Topics

The items of this chapter represent reconstructions and generalizations of various

results in recursion theory, undecidability and incompleteness.
First for a preliminary matter, which I should have addressed much earlier:
By a pair (x, y) [more often called an ordered pair], is meant a set whose
elements are x and y, together with a designation which specifies that x is the
first element and y the second. In contrast, the unordered pair {x, y} [note the
curly brackets instead of parentheses] is just the set whose members are x and y,
without any specification that one of the two elements comes first and the other
second. The set {x, y} is the same as the set {y, x}, but the pair (x, y) is different
from the pair (y, x) [except in the case when x = y].
Throughout this chapter, the word number shall mean positive integer, and we
will consider an operation that assigns to each pair (x, y) of numbers a number
denoted xy, or sometimes x * y. We will assume the operator is such that xy (or x
* y) uniquely determines the x and the y — that is, the only way that x * y can be
the same as z * v is when x = z and y = v. And we assume that every number n is
assigned to some pair x * y, for some x and some y. We generally assume also
that since the function * is 1-1 and onto from the set of ordered pairs of positive
integers to the set of positive integers, we can use its inverse to go from a given a
number n to the pair (x, y) such that n = x * y.

I. A Decision Machine
We consider a calculating machine with infinitely many registers R1, R2,…,Rn,
…. We call n the index of Rn. Each register is, so to speak, in charge of a certain
property of numbers. To find out whether a given number n has a certain
property, one goes to the register in charge of that property and feeds in the
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number. The machine then goes into operation, and one of three things happens:
(1) The machine eventually halts and flashes a signal — say a green light —
signifying that the number does have the property, in which case we say
that the register affirms n.
(2) The machine eventually halts and flashes a different signal — say a red
light — to indicate that the number doesn’t have the property, in which case
we say that the register denies n.
(3) The machine runs on forever, without ever being able to determine whether
or not the number does have the property, in which case we say that n
stumps the register, or that the register is stumped by n.
We assume we are given a machine M that satisfies the following two
conditions:
M1: With each register R in the calculating machine is associated another register
R′ in the calculating machine called the opposer of R, which affirms those
numbers which R denies, and denies those numbers which R affirms (and
hence is stumped by those and only those numbers which stump R).
M2: With each register R in the calculating machine is associated another register
R# in the calculating machine called the diagonalizer of R, such that for any
number x, the register R# affirms x iff R affirms xx and denies x iff R denies
xx. (I.e. R# affirms x iff R affirms x * x and R# denies x iff R denies x * x, for
our special function * which has the properties listed above for it; we will
write xy for x * y from now on in this chapter.)
Recall our denumerable list of registers R1, R2,…, Rn,…. For any number n,
we let n′ be the index of (Rn)′, and let n# be the index of (Rn)#. Thus Rn′ = (Rn)′
and Rn# = (Rn)#.

We will say that two registers Ra and Rb behave the same way towards a
number n when they either both affirm n, or both deny n or are both stumped by
n. We call two registers similar if they behave the same way towards every
number. It is easy to see that for any register R, the registers R′# and R#′ are
similar, for each denies x iff R affirms xx, and each affirms x iff R denies xx. (R#′
means the same as (R′)# and R#′ means the same as (R#)′, but we will always
eliminate the parentheses if the resulting meaning is clear.)

Universal Registers
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Universal Registers

We shall call a register U universal if, for all numbers x and y, the register U
affirms xy iff Rx affirms y.

The propositions that follow will be proved later on in a more general

framework. Meanwhile, some of you might like to try proving them on your
own.
Proposition 1.1. Any universal register can be stumped (by some number or
other).
Proposition 1.2. If at least one of the registers is universal, then some register is
stumped by its own index (i.e. for some number n, the register Rn is stumped by
n).

Contra-Universal Registers

We shall call a register V contra-universal if for all numbers x and y, the register
V affirms xy iff Rx denies y.

Proposition 1.3. Any contra-universal register V can be stumped.

Proposition 1.4. If some register is universal, then some register is stumped by
the index of its opposer. If some register is contra-universal, then some register
is stumped by its own index.

Creative Registers

We shall call a register C creative if, for every register R, there is at least one
number n such that C affirms n iff R affirms n.
Proposition 1.5. Any creative register can be stumped.
Proposition 1.6. Every universal register is creative, and every contra-universal
register is creative.
Note: Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 provide additional and particularly simple
proofs of Propositions 1.1 and 1.3.
For the rest of this section, we let A be the set of all numbers xy such that Rx
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affirms y, and let B be the set of all numbers xy such that Rx denies y.

Fixed Points

We call a number xy a fixed point of a register R if R affirms xy iff xy ∊ A (i.e. Rx

affirms y) and R denies xy iff xy ∊ B (i.e. Rx denies y).

Proposition 1.7. Every register has a fixed point.

Proposition 1.8. Suppose that U is universal and V is contra-universal. Then:
(a) Any fixed point of U′ will stump U.
(b) Any fixed point of V will stump V.
Proposition 1.9. Suppose R is a register that affirms all numbers in A and
doesn’t affirm any number in B. Then R can be stumped. [This proposition is
particularly interesting.]

A Halting Problem

Let us say that a register R halts at a number n if R either affirms n or denies n.

Call a register R a stump detector if R halts at those and only those numbers xy
such that Rx is stumped by y.

Proposition 1.10. No register is a stump detector.

Domination

We say that n dominates m if Rn affirms all numbers affirmed by Rm.

Proposition 1.11. Suppose U is universal and V is contra-universal and that R

affirms all numbers affirmed by U and denies all numbers affirmed by V. Then R
can be stumped.
This proposition can be restated in terms of domination as follows: Suppose
U is universal and V is contra-universal and there is a register R such that R
dominates U and R′ dominates V. Then there exists an x such that R is stumped
by x.

Affirmation Sets
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Affirmation Sets

By the affirmation set of a register R we shall mean the set of all numbers
affirmed by R. We shall call a set of numbers S an affirmation set if it is the
affirmation set of some register.
Proposition 1.12. If one of the registers is universal, then there exists an
affirmation set whose complement is not an affirmation set.

II. Variations on a Theme of Gödel

Some of the items here are repetitions of results in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014]. The reason for these repetitions will be apparent later on.
Again, the propositions that follow will be proved later, in a more general
setting.
We consider a mathematical system in which we have an infinite sequence
H1, H2, …, Hk, …, of expressions called predicates, and to each predicate H and
each number n is assigned an expression denoted H(n), called a sentence.
[Informally, we think of H as the name of some property of numbers, and of the
sentence H(n) as expressing the proposition that the number n has the property
named by H.]
We assume that every sentence is H(n) for some H and some n. We arrange
all the sentences in a sequence S1, S2, …, Sk, … in such a manner that for
numbers x and y the sentence Sx * y is the sentence Hx(y). We call n the index of
the predicate Hn, and we call k the index of the sentence Sk. Thus x * y is the
index of the sentence Hx(y).

Provable, Refutable and Undecidable Sentences

Some of the sentences are called provable and some are called refutable, and we
assume the system is consistent, by which we mean that no sentence is both
provable and refutable. A sentence is called decidable if it is either provable or
refutable, and it is called undecidable if it is neither provable nor refutable. The
system is called complete if every sentence is decidable, and is called incomplete
otherwise. We let P be the set of all provable sentences and R be the set of all
refutable sentences.
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For any set W of sentences, we let W0 be the set of all indices of the elements
of W. Then P0 is the set of all n such that Sn is provable, and R0 is the set of all n
such that Sn is refutable.

We shall call two sentences X and Y equivalent if when one is provable, so is

the other, and when one is refutable, so is the other (and hence, when one is
undecidable, so is the other); in other words, they are either both provable, both
refutable, or both undecidable.
We are given that the system obeys two conditions:
(1) With each predicate H is associated a predicate H′ called the negation of H
such that for every number n the sentence H′(n) is provable iff H(n) is
refutable, and is refutable iff H(n) is provable.
(2) With each predicate H is associated a predicate H# called the diagonalizer of
H such that for each number n the sentence H#(n) is equivalent to the
sentence H(n * n).

Set Representation

We shall say that a predicate H represents the set of all numbers n such that H(n)
is provable. Thus to say that H represents a number set A is to say that for all
numbers n, the sentence H(n) is provable iff n ∊ A. We call the set A
representable if some predicate represents it.

Provability and Refutability Predicates

We shall call H a provability predicate if it represents the set P0. Thus the
statement that H is a provability predicate is equivalent to the condition that for
every n the sentence H(n) is provable iff Sn is provable.

We shall call K a refutability predicate if it represents the set R0. Thus the
statement that K is a refutability predicate is equivalent to the condition that for
every n the sentence K(n) is provable iff Sn is refutable.

Proposition 2.1. If H is a provability predicate, then H(n) is undecidable for

some n.
Proposition 2.2. If one of the predicates is a provability predicate, then there is
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some n such that Hn(n) is undecidable.

Proposition 2.3. If K is a refutability predicate, then K(n) is undecidable for

some n.
Recall that n′ is the index of the negation of Hn, so that (Hn′) = (Hn)′.

Proposition 2.4. If some predicate is a provability predicate, then there is some

n such that Hn(n′) is undecidable. If some predicate is a refutability predicate,
then there is some n such that Hn(n) is undecidable.

Creative Predicates

We shall call a predicate K creative if for every predicate H there is at least one
number n such that H(n) is provable iff K(n) is provable.
Proposition 2.5. If K is creative, then K(n) is undecidable for some n.
Proposition 2.6. Every provability predicate is creative, and every refutability
predicate is creative.

Fixed Points

We shall call a number n a fixed point of a predicate H if Sn is equivalent to

H(n). [This is the same as saying that a number xy is a fixed point of a predicate
H if Hx(y) is equivalent to H(xy).]

Proposition 2.7. Every predicate has a fixed point.

Proposition 2.8. Suppose that H is a provability predicate and that K is a
refutability predicate. Then:
(a) If n is a fixed point of H′, then H(n) is undecidable.
(b) If n is a fixed point of K, then K(n) is undecidable.
Proposition 2.9. Suppose H is a predicate such that H(n) is provable for any n
in the set P0, and H(n) is not provable for any n in R0. Then H(n) is undecidable
for some n. [This is related to Rosser’s incompleteness proof.]
Proposition 2.10. There cannot be a predicate H such that for all numbers n the
sentence H(n) is decidable iff Sn is undecidable.
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Domination

We will say that a predicate Hb dominates a predicate Ha if Hb(n) is provable for

every n for which Ha(n) is provable.

Proposition 2.11. If H dominates some provability predicate, and H′ dominates

some refutability predicate, then H(n) is undecidable for some n.
Proposition 2.12. If one of the predicates is a provability predicate, then there
exists a representable number set whose complement is not representable.

III. R-Systems
The systems of I and those of II are really the same, only in different dress. The
common underlying theme will be fully explained in the next section of this
chapter. Meanwhile, we will consider yet another embodiment of the theme,
which has direct applications to recursion theory.
We consider a denumerable collection of number sets, which we will call “R-
sets”, and an enumeration A1, A2, …, An, … of them in some order, and another
enumeration B1, B2, …, Bn, … of them in some other order, such that for any
disjoint pair (S1, S2) of R-sets, there is some n such that S1 = An and S2 = Bn. We
shall call such a pair of enumerations an R-system if the following three
conditions hold:
R0: For every n, the set An is disjoint from Bn i.e.,
R1: Associated with each number n is a number n′ such that An′ = Bn and Bn′ = An
[thus the ordered pair (An′, Bn′) is the pair (Bn, An)].
R2: Associated with each n is a number n# such that for every number x,
(1) x ∊ An# iff xx ∊ An.
(2) x ∊ Bn# iff xx ∊ Bn.

Note: The collection of all recursively enumerable sets can be arranged in a

pair of sequences A1, A2, …, An, … and B1, B2, …, Bn, … such that conditions
R0, R1 and R2 all hold (for a recursive function f(x, y) = x * y). Thus all the
results that follow are generalizations of results in recursion theory.

Universal and Contra-Universal Sets

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Universal and Contra-Universal Sets

We call an R-set Aw universal if for all numbers x and y the number xy ∊ Aw iff y
∊ Ax. We call an R-set Av contra-universal if for all numbers x and y the number
xy ∊ Av iff y ∊ Bx.

Proposition 3.1. If some R-set Aw is universal, then Aw is not the complement of

Bw (i.e. some number x lies outside both Aw and Bw).

Proposition 3.2. If some R-set Aw is universal, then there is some n such that n
itself lies outside both An and Bn.

Proposition 3.3. If the R-set Av is contra-universal, then Av is not the

complement of Bv (i.e. some number x lies outside both Av and Bv).

Proposition 3.4. If some R-set Aw is universal, then there is a number n such

that n′ lies outside both An and Bn. If some R-set Av is contra-universal, then
there is a number n such that n lies outside both An and Bn.

Creative R-Sets

We shall call an R-set Ac creative if for every R-set Ax there is a least one
number n such that n ∊ Ac iff n ∊ Ax.

Proposition 3.5. If Ac is creative, then Ac is not the complement of Bc.

Proposition 3.6. Any universal or contra-universal R-set is creative.

Fixed Points

We now let A be the set of all numbers xy such that y ∊ Ax, and let B be the set of
all numbers xy such that y ∊ Bx.

We shall call a number x a fixed point of the pair (An, Bn) if x ∊ An iff x ∊ A
and x ∊ Bn iff x ∊ B. [An equivalent definition is that a number xy is a fixed
point of a pair (An, Bn) if xy ∊ An iff y ∊ Ax and xy ∊ Bn iff y ∊ Bx.]

Proposition 3.7. Every pair (An, Bn) has a fixed point.

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Proposition 3.8. (a) If Aw is a universal R-set, then any fixed point of (Aw′, Bw′) =
(Bw, Aw) lies outside both Aw and Bw. (b) If Av is a contra-universal R-set, then
any fixed point of (Av, Bv) lies outside both Av and Bv.

Proposition 3.9. If A ⊆ Ah and Ah is disjoint from B, then some number lies

outside both Ah and Bh.

Proposition 3.10. There is no number n such that for all numbers x and y, xy ∈
An ∪ Bn iff y ∉ Ax ∪ Bx.

R-Separable R-Sets

We shall say that an R-set S1 is R-separable from an R-set S2 if there is some R-

set S such that S1 is a subset of S and S2 is a subset of the complement of S.

Domination

We say that n dominates m when Am ⊆ An, i.e. when Am is a subset of An.

Proposition 3.11. If Aw is universal and Av is contra-universal, then Aw is not R-

separable from Av. [This generalizes an important result in recursion theory,
namely that there exist two disjoint recursively enumerable sets that are not
recursively separable.]
Note. Proposition 3.11 can be rewritten in terms of domination, but the
rewritten version is very long. It is simpler just to say that the solution to
Problem 11 in the synthesis section (whose statement is expressed in terms of
the concept of domination) can be used to prove Proposition 3.11 (by
contradiction), as the reader will be able to see in the solutions to the problems
of this chapter.
Proposition 3.12. If some R-set is universal, then there is an R-set whose
complement is not an R-set. [This generalizes the important fact that there is a
recursively enumerable set whose complement is not recursively enumerable.]

IV. A Synthesis

The Synthesis System

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The Synthesis System

As already mentioned, the discussions and problems of sections I, II and III are
really all the same, only dressed differently. In each of the three, we have
numerical relations A(x, y) and B(x, y) such that the following three conditions
hold:
D0: A(x, y) and B(x, y) cannot both hold simultaneously for any ordered pair of
numbers (x, y).
D1: Associated with each number x is a number x′ such that for all numbers y:
(1) A(x′, y) iff B(x, y);
(2) B(x′, y) iff A(x, y).
D2: Corresponding to each number x is a number x# such that for all y:
(1) A(x#, y) iff A(x, y * y);
(2) B(x#, y) iff B(x, y * y).
• For the decision machine M of I, A(x, y) is the relation “Rx affirms y”,
and B(x, y) is the relation “Rx denies y”.
• For the mathematical system of II, A(x, y) is the relation “Hx(y) is
provable”, and B(x, y) is the relation “Hx(y) is refutable”.
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, A(x, y) is the relation “y ∈ Ax”,
and B(x, y) is the relation “y ∈ Bx”.

We shall call the pair A(x, y) and B(x, y) a duo if conditions D0, D1 and D2
hold. Any result proved about duos in general is simultaneously applicable to the
items of sections I, II, and III. Thus, in the problems that follow, for each n ≤ 12,
the solution to Problem n simultaneously proves Propositions 1 n, 2n, and 3n of
sections I, II, and III.
In this section we will again abbreviate x * y by xy and we will omit the word
“section” in front of I, II, and III. We let A be the set of all numbers xy such that
A(x, y) is true, and we let B be the set of all numbers xy such that B(x, y) is true.
It will be valuable to know that not only are A(x, y) and B(x, y) disjoint [for
every pair (x, y)], but A and B are also disjoint (contain no common element n).
This is because every n is xy for some x and y, and it is given that A(x, y) and
B(x, y) don’t both hold, which means that xy cannot be in both A and B, and thus
n cannot be in both A and B.
• For the decision machine M of I, A is the set of all numbers xy such that Rx
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affirms y, and B is the set of all numbers xy such that Rx denies y.

• For the mathematical system of II, A is the set P0 (which is the set of all
numbers xy such that Hx(y) is provable), and B is the set R0 (the set of all
numbers xy such that Hx(y) is refutable).
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, A is the set of all numbers xy such that
y ∈ Ax, and B is the set of all numbers xy such that y ∈ Bx.

Undecidable Numbers

We shall call a number n undecidable if n is in neither A nor B. Thus xy is

undecidable if neither A(x, y) nor B(x, y) holds. If the number n is not
undecidable, we call it decidable.
• For the decision machine M of I, n = xy being undecidable means that Rx is
stumped by y.
• For the mathematical system of II, n = xy being undecidable means that the
sentence Hx(y) is undecidable (i.e. neither provable nor refutable).
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, n = xy being undecidable means that y
lies outside both Ax and Bx.

The following is an important fact: Since A is disjoint from B, it follows that

to prove that a number n is undecidable, it suffices to show that n ∈ A iff n ∈ B,
because this would mean that n is either in both A and B, or in neither one. Since
it cannot be in both, it must be in neither one, i.e. it is undecidable.

Universal Numbers

We shall call a number w universal if for all x it is the case that wx ∈ A iff x ∈ A,
or, which is the same thing, for all x and y, the relation A(w, xy) holds iff A(x, y)
holds.
• For the decision machine M of I, to say that Rw is a universal register is to say
that for all x and y, Rw affirms xy iff Rx affirms y.
• For the mathematical system of II, to say that Hw is a provability predicate
(a “universal predicate for provability”) is to say that for all x and y, Hw(xy)
is provable iff Sxy is provable (which is the same as saying Hx(y) is
provable).
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that w is universal is to say that
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Aw is a universal set, i.e. that xy ∈ Aw iff y ∈ Ax.

Contra-Universal Numbers

We call a number v contra-universal if vx ∈ A iff x ∈ B, or, what is the same

thing, for all x and y, A(v, xy) iff B(x, y).
• For the decision machine M of I, to say that Rv is a contra-universal register is
to say that for all x and y, Rv affirms xy iff Rx denies y.
• For the mathematical system of II, to say that Hv is a refutability predicate
(a “contra-universal predicate”) is to say that for all x and y, Hv(xy) is
provable iff Sxy is refutable (which is the same as saying that Hx(y) is
refutable or that ∼ Hx(y) is provable).
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that v is contra-universal is to
say that, for all x and y, xy ∈ Av iff y ∈ Bx.

Creative Numbers

We call a number c creative if for every number n there is at least one number x
such that cx ∈ A iff nx ∈ A.
• For the decision machine M of I, to say that a register Rc is creative is to say
that for every register Rn, there is at least one number x such that Rc affirms x
iff Rn affirms x.
• For the mathematical system of II, to say the predicate Hc is creative is to
say that for every predicate Rn, there is at least one number x such that Hc(x)
is provable iff Hn(x) is provable.
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that c is creative is to say that,
for every number n, there is at least one number x such that x ∈ Ac iff x ∈ An.

Fixed Points

We let “x is a fixed point of n” mean that nx ∈ A iff x ∈ A and nx ∈ B iff x ∈ B.

• For the decision machine M of I, to say that a number x * y is a fixed point of
a register R is to say that R affirms x * y iff x * y ∈ A (i.e. Rx affirms y) and R
denies x * y iff x * y ∈ B (i.e. Rx denies y).
• For the mathematical system of II, to say that xy is a fixed point of the
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predicate Hn is to say that Hn(xy) is equivalent to Sxy, i.e. both these

sentences are provable, or both are refutable, or both are neither. [This is the
same as saying that Hn(xy) is equivalent to Hx(y).]
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that a number x is a fixed point
of a pair (An, Bn) if x ∈ An iff x ∈ A and x ∈ Bn iff x ∈ B.

Problem 1. Prove that if w is universal, then there is at least one number x such
that wx is undecidable.
Problem 2. Prove that if some number is universal, then there is at least one
number x such that xx is undecidable.
Problem 3. Prove that if v is contra-universal, then there is at least one number x
such that vx is undecidable.
Problem 4. Prove that if some number is universal, then there is some number x
such that xx′ is undecidable. And prove that if some number is contra-universal,
then there is some number x such that xx is undecidable.
Problem 5. Prove that if c is creative, then there is at least one number x such
that cx is undecidable.
Problem 6. Prove that every universal number is creative, and that every contra-
universal number is creative.
Problem 7. Prove that every number has a fixed point.
Problem 8. Suppose w is universal and v is contra-universal. Prove:
(a) If x is any fixed point of w′, then x is undecidable, and so is wx.
(b) If x is any fixed point of v, then x is undecidable, and so is vx.
Problem 9. Suppose h is a number such that, for all numbers x:
(a) If x ∈ A, then hx ∈ A.
(b) If x ∈ B, then hx ∉ A.
Prove that hx is undecidable for some x.
Why is this a strengthening of the result of Problem 1?
Problem 10. Prove that there is no number n such that for all numbers x the
number nx is decidable if and only if x is undecidable.
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Domination

Let us say that a number n dominates a number m if, for every number x, if mx ∊
A, then nx ∊ A.
• For the decision machine M of I, to say that the register Rn dominates the
register Rm is to say that Rn affirms all numbers affirmed by Rm.
• For the mathematical system S of II, to say that the predicate Hn dominates
the predicate Hm is to say that that for all x, if Hm(x) is provable, so is Hn(x).
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that An dominates Am is to say
that Am ⊆ An.

Problem 11. Show that if n dominates some universal number w and n′

dominates some contra-universal number v, then nx is undecidable for some x.

Set Representation

We will say that the number n represents the set S if, for all x, nx ∊ A iff x ∊ S.
• For the decision machines of I, to say that a register R represents a set S is
just to say that the set S is the affirmation set of the register R.
• For the mathematical systems S of II, to say that predicate H represents a set
S is just to say that S is the set of all numbers n such that H(n) is provable.
• For the mathematical R-systems of III, to say that the R-set An represents a
set S is just to say that y ∊ An iff y ∊ S, i.e., An = S.

Problem 12. Prove that if some number is universal, then there is a

representable set whose complement is not representable.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 3

1. Suppose w is universal. Then for any number x, w(w#′x) ∊ A holds iff w#′x ∊
A, which is true iff w#x ∊ B, which is true iff w(xx) ∊ B. Thus:
(1) w(w#′x) ∊ A iff w(xx) ∊ B.
If we take w#′ for x in (1), we obtain:
(2) w(w#′w#′) ∊ A iff w(w#′w#′) ∊ B.
But A and B are disjoint, so w(w#′w#′) can be in neither A nor B, which
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shows that w(w#′w#′) is undecidable; w(w′#w′#) is also undecidable, as the

reader can verify.
2. Suppose w is universal. Then, by D1, for any number x, w#′x ∊ B holds iff
w#x ∊ A, which is true iff w(xx) ∊ A, which is true iff xx ∊ A. Thus w#′x ∊ B
iff xx ∊ A. We take w#′ for x and obtain w#′w#′ ∊ B iff w#′w#′ ∊ A. Hence
w#′w#′ is undecidable.
3. Suppose v is contra-universal. Then for any number x, v(v#x) ∊ A is true iff
v#x ∊ B, which is true iff v(xx) ∊ B. Thus v(v#x) ∊ A iff v(xx) ∊ B. We take
v# for x and obtain v(v#v#) ∊ A iff v(v#v#) ∊ B. Thus v(v#v#) is undecidable.
4. Suppose w is universal. We have seen in the solution to Problem 2 that w#′w#′
is undecidable. Therefore w#w#′ is undecidable. [For any numbers x and y,
x′y is undecidable iff xy is undecidable. (Why?)] Thus nn′ is undecidable for
n = w#.
Next, suppose that v is contra-universal. For any number x, we know that
v#x ∊ A iff v(xx) ∊ A. We take v# for x and obtain v#v# ∊ A iff v(v#v#) ∊ A,
which in turn is the case iff v#v# ∊ B (since v is contra-universal). Thus v#v#
∊ A iff v#v# ∊ B, so that v#v# must be undecidable.
5. Suppose c is creative. Then for any x there is some n such that cn ∊ A iff xn
∊ A. Taking c′ for x, we obtain that for some n, cn ∊ A iff c′n ∊ A. But c′n ∊
A iff cn ∊ B. Thus cn ∊ A iff cn ∊ B, so that cn is undecidable.
6. (a) Suppose w is universal. For any number x, w(x#x#) ∊ A is true iff x#x# ∊
A, which is true iff x(x#x#) ∊ A. Thus wn ∊ A iff xn ∊ A, for n = x#x#.
(b) Suppose v is contra-universal. For any x, v(x#′x#′) ∊ A is true iff x#′x#′ ∊
B, which is true iff x#x#′ ∊ A, which is true iff x(x#′x#′) ∊ A. Thus vn ∊ A
iff xn ∊ A, for n = x#′x#′.
7. For any number n, n#n# ∊ A holds iff n(n#n#) ∊ A, and n#n# ∊ B holds iff
n(n#n#) ∊ B. Hence n#n# is a fixed point of n.
8. (a) Suppose w is universal and n is a fixed point of w′. Then n ∊ A iff wn ∊ A
is true (since w is universal), which is true iff w′n ∊ B (by D1), which is true
iff n ∊ B (since n is a fixed point of w′). Thus n ∊ A iff n ∊ B, so that n is
undecidable. Since n is a fixed point of w′, then w′n is also undecidable
(why?), and hence wn is undecidable.
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(b) Suppose v is contra-universal and n is a fixed point of v. Then n ∊ A iff

vn ∊ A is true (since n is a fixed point of v). But vn ∊ A iff n ∊ b (since v
is contra-universal). Thus n ∊ A iff n ∊ B, and is thus undecidable. Since
n is a fixed point of v, it is also true that vn ∊ B iff n ∊ B. Since n can be
in neither A nor B, it follows from what we just saw that vn can be in
neither A nor B either, and is thus also undecidable.

Remarks. We know that w′#w′# is a fixed point of w′ (since by the solution to

Problem 7, x#x# is a fixed point of x, for any x). But it is also true that w#′w#′ is a
fixed point of w′ (in fact x#′x#′ is a fixed point of x′, for any x, as the reader can
verify). Thus (a) alone provides another proof that w(w#′w#′) is undecidable.

9. We are given that for all x:

Let k be the number h#′. We first show that kk is undecidable.

(a) Suppose kk ∊ A. Then h(kk) ∊ A [by (a)]. Thus h#k ∊ A so that h#′k ∊ B.
And thus kk ∊ B [since k = h#′]. Thus if kk ∊ A it is also true that kk ∊ B,
but kk cannot be in both A and B, and so kk∉ A.
(b) Suppose kk ∉ B. Then h(kk) ∉ A [by (b)]. Hence h#′k ∉ B, which means
that kk ∉ B [since k = h#′]. Thus if kk ∊ B, then kk ∉ B, which is a
contradiction. Therefore kk ∉ B.

Thus kk ∉ A and kk ∉ B, and so kk is undecidable. Thus h#′h#′ is undecidable,

hence so is h#h#′, and therefore so is h(h#′h#′).
Note: The above proof is from scratch. A swifter proof is possible using the
fact that every number has a fixed point. We leave it to the reader to show that if
n is any fixed point of h, then hn is undecidable.
Next, why is this result a strengthening of the result of Problem 1? The
answer is that if h is universal, then it obviously satisfies conditions (a) and (b).

10. If a number n exists, it must have a fixed point, by Problem 7. But if x is a

fixed point of n, then (by the definition of a fixed point) nx ∊ A iff x ∊ A
and nx ∊ B iff x ∊ B. Clearly, for such an x, it cannot be that nx if
decidable iff x is undecidable.
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11. This follows easily from Problem 9: Suppose h dominates w and h′

dominates v, where w is universal and v is contra-universal.
If x ∊ A, then wx ∊ A, so that hx ∊ A [since h dominates w]. Thus,

Next, suppose x ∊ B. Then vx ∊ A, so that h′x ∊ A, and then hx ∊ B, and

finally hx ∉ A. Thus,

Thus, by (1) and (2), h satisfies the hypotheses of Problem 9, and so hx

is undecidable for some x.
Because the relationship between the solution to Problem 11 and
Propositions 11 and 35 are a little more complex than some of the others,
we will give the proofs of these propositions (using the solution to Problem
11) here. First let us review what “n dominates m” means for the first three
sections of this chapter:

First let us consider Proposition 11: Suppose U is universal and V is

contra-universal and that R affirms all numbers affirmed by U and denies
all numbers affirmed by V. Then R can be stumped.
In the text we gave a restatement of this claim in terms of domination:
Suppose U is universal and V is contra-universal and there is a
register R such that R dominates U and R′ dominates V. Then there
exists an x such that R is stumped by x.
It is easy to see that the restatement is equivalent to the original
statement, for to say that R denies all numbers affirmed by V is equivalent
to saying that R′ affirms all numbers affirmed by V. To bring this
restatement closer to the expression of Problem 11 in the synthesis, all we
have to do is the following: We let n be the index of R, w be the index of U,
and v be the index of V ; then the restatement of Proposition 11 is
equivalent to: If Rn dominates the universal register Rw and R′n dominates
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the contra-universal register Rv, then the register Rn can be stumped by

some x. And this is the statement of Problem 11, reinterpreted in the
vocabulary of the concepts of I.
The application to Proposition 23 is obvious.
Finally, let us consider Proposition 35: If Aw is universal and Av is
contra-universal, then Aw is not R-separable from Av.
To show that Aw is not R-separable from Av, suppose that S1 and S2 are
disjoint R-sets such that Aw ⊆ S1 and Av ⊆ S2. We must show that some
number lies outside of both S1 and S2. Now, for some number n, S1 = An
and S2 = Bn. Then S1 = An and S2 = An′. So Aw ⊆ An and Av An′, which
means that n dominates w and n′ dominates v, and so, by the solution to
Problem 11, there is some number x such that nx is undecidable, i.e x ∉ An
and x ∉ Bn. Thus x ∉ An and x ∉ An′, i.e. x ∉ S1 and x ∉ S2, which is what
was to be shown.

12. We first show that no number x can represent the complement of A. To

show this it suffices to demonstrate that, given any number x there is at
least one number y such that it is not the case that xy ∊ A iff y ∊, or,
what is the same thing, that there is at least one number y such that it is the
case that xy ∊ A iff y ∊ . Well, any fixed point y of x is such a number.
Thus the set is not representable.
Now, if there is a universal number w, then w represents A (why?), so
that A is then a representable set whose complement is not representable.
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Chapter 4
Elementary Formal Systems and Recursive
Enumerability

I. More on Elementary Formal Systems

Let us review the definition of an elementary formal system and some of the
basic properties of such systems established in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan,
2014].
By an alphabet K is meant a finite sequence of elements called symbols. Any
finite sequence of these symbols is called a string or expression in K.
By an elementary formal system (E) over K is meant a collection of the
following items:
(1) The alphabet K.
(2) Another alphabet V of symbols called variables. We will usually use the
letters x, y, z, w with or without subscripts, as variables.
(3) Still another alphabet of symbols called predicates, each of which is
assigned a positive integer called the degree of the predicate. We usually
use capital letters for predicates.
(4) Two more symbols called the punctuation sign (usually a comma) and the
implication sign (usually “→”).
(5) A finite sequence of expressions, all of which are formulas (formulas will be
defined below).
By a term is meant any string composed of symbols of K and variables. A
term without variables is called a constant term. By an atomic formula is meant
an expression Pt, where P is a predicate of degree 1 and t is a term, or an
expression Rt1, …, tn, where R is a predicate of degree n and t1, …, tn are terms.
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By a formula is meant an atomic formula, or an expression of the form F1 →

F2 … → Fn, where F1, F2, …, Fn are atomic formulas. This concludes the
definition of a formula.
By a sentence is meant a formula with no variables.
By an instance of a formula is meant the result of substituting constant terms
for all variables in the formula.
An elementary formal system (E) over K is thus formed by distinguishing a
particular finite subset of the formulas, which are called the axiom schemes of
the system. The set of all instances of all the axiom schemes is called the set of
axioms of the system.
A sentence is called provable in the elementary formal system (E) if its being
so is a consequence of the following two conditions:
(1) Every axiom of the system is provable.
(2) For every atomic sentence X and every sentence Y, if X and X → Y are
provable, so is Y.
More, explicitly, by a proof in the system is meant a finite sequence of
sentences such that each member Y of the sequence is either an axiom of the
system, or there is an atomic sentence X such that X and X → Y are earlier
members of the sequence. A sentence is then called provable in the system if it is
an element in the sequence of some proof in the system.
Elementary formal systems are designed to formalize the nature of a
mechanical procedure, and the provable sentences of a given elementary formal
system that have the form of some predicate P of degree n followed by an n-
tuple of elements of the alphabet K are just those that can be generated by the
given elementary formal system (which must of course include the predicate P in
at least one of its axiom schemes if such a sentence is to be provable). And when
such a term Pk1 … kn can be generated by the system, we say that it is true that
the n-tuple k1, …, kn stands in the relation P, or we may say that Pk1 … kn is
true. Thus we identify provability and truth when it comes to elementary formal
systems.

Representability
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We say that a predicate P of degree n represents a relation R of degree n of n-

tuples of strings of K if for all constant terms x1, …, xn, the sentence Px1, …, xn
is provable in (E) iff the relation Rx1, …, xn holds. For n = 1, a predicate P of
degree (1) represents the set of all constant terms x such that Px is provable in
(E). A set or relation is said to be representable in (E) if some predicate
represents it, and a relation or set is called formally representable if it is
representable in some elementary formal system.

Some Basic Closure Properties

For any n ≥ 2 we regard a relation of degree n on a set S as being a set of n-

tuples (x1, …, xn) of members of S. We consider subsets of S to be special cases
of relations on S, namely relations of one argument. We now wish to establish
some basic closure properties of the collection of all relations (and sets)
representable over K.
First, let us review some more facts discussed in The Beginner’s Guide
[Smullyan, 2014]. Consider two elementary formal systems (E1) and (E2) over a
common alphabet K. We shall call the two systems independent if they contain
no common predicates. By (E1) ∪ (E2) we shall mean the EFS (elementary
formal system) whose axioms are those of (E1) together with those of (E2).
Obviously every provable sentence of (E1) and of (E2) is provable in (E1) ∪
(E2). And if (E1) and (E2) are independent, then any sentence provable in (E1) ∪
(E2) is clearly provable in (E1) or (E2) alone, and hence the representable
relations of (E1) ∪ (E2) are the representable relations in (E1) alone, together
with those representable in (E2) alone.

Similarly, if (E1), (E2), …, (En) are mutually independent (no two having a
common predicate), then the representable relations of (E1) ∪ … ∪ (En), are the
result of joining together those of each of (E1), …, (En) alone.

Now suppose R1, …, Rn are each formally representable over K. Since we are
assuming an unlimited stack of predicates at our disposal, we can represent R1,
…, Rn in mutually independent systems (E1), (E2), …, (En), and so we have:

Proposition 1. If R1, …, Rn are each formally representable over K, then they

can all be represented in a common EFS over K.
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Now for our closure properties:

(a) Unions and Intersections. For any two relations R1(x1 …, xn), R2(x1, …, xn)
of the same degree, by their union R1 ∪ R2 — also written R1(x1, …, xn) ∨
R2(x1, …, xn) — is meant the set of all n-tuples (x1, …, xn) that are in either
R1 or R2 or in both. Thus (R1 ∪ R2)(x1, …, xn) iff R1(x1, …, xn) ∨ R2(x1, …,
xn). By the intersection R1 ∪ R2 — also written R1(x1, …, xn) Λ R2(x1, …,
xn) — is meant the relation that holds for (x1, …, xn) iff

(b) Existential Quantifiers. For any relation R(x1, …, xn, y) of degree two or
higher, by its existential quantification ∃yR(x1, …, xn, y) — also abbreviated
∃R — is meant the set of all n-tuples (x1, …, xn) such that R(x1, …, xn, y)
holds for at least one y:
(c) Explicit Transformation. Let n be any positive integer and consider n
variables x1, …, xn. Let R be a relation of degree k and let α1, …, αk each be
either one of the n variables x1, …, xn or a constant term (i.e. a string of
symbols of K). By the relation λx1, …, xnR(α1, …, αk) is meant the set of all
n-tuples (a1, …, an) of strings of K such that R(b1, …, bk) holds, where each
bi is defined as follows:
(1) If αi is one of the variables xj, then bi = aj.
(2) If αi is a constant c, then bi = c.

[For example, for n = 3 and constants c and d, λx1, x2, x3R(x3, c, x2, x2, d) is the
set of all triples (a1, a2, a3) such that the relation R(a3, c, a2, a2, d) holds.]

In this situation, we say that the n-ary relation

is explicitly definable from the k-ary relation R and that the operation which
assigns λx1, …, xnR(α1, …, αk) to the relation R is an explicit transformation.

Problem 1. Show that the collection of relations formally representable over K

is closed under unions, intersections, existential quantification and explicit
transformations. In other words, prove the following:
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(a) If R1 and R2 are of the same degree and formally representable over K, then
R1 ∪ R2 and R1 ∩ R2 are formally representable over K and of the same
degree as R1 and R2.
(b) If the relation R(x1, …, xn, y) is a relation of degree n + 1(n greater than or
equal to one) that is formally representable over K, then the relation ∃yR(x1,
…, xn, y) is a relation of degree n that is formally representable over K.
(c) If the relation R(x1, …, xk) is a relation of degree k that is formally
representable over K, then λx1, …, xnR(α1, …, αk) is a relation of degree n
that is formally representable over K (here each αi is one of the variables x1,
…, xn or a constant).

We recall that a set or relation W is said to be solvable over K if W and its

complement are both formally representable over K.
Problem 2. Prove that the collection of all sets and relations which are solvable
over K is closed under union, intersection, complementation and explicit
transformation.

II. Recursive Enumerability

We shall now identify the positive integers with the dyadic numerals which
represent them (as defined in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014]). We
consider the two-sign alphabet {1, 2}, which we call “D”, and define a dyadic
system to be an elementary formal system over the alphabet D. We define a
numerical relation to be recursively enumerable if it is representable in some
dyadic system. (In The Beginner’s Guide we called these relations dyadically
representable.) It turns out that the recursively enumerable sets and relations are
the same as the ∑1-relations — and also the same as those representable in
Peano Arithmetic.
We call a set R recursive if it and its complement are both recursively
enumerable. Thus a set is recursive if it is solvable in some dyadic system.
In The Beginner’s Guide, we showed that the relations Sxy (y is the successor
of x), x < y, x ≤ y, x = y, x ≠ y, x + y = z, x × y = z and xy = z are all recursively
enumerable (in fact, recursive).
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We also know (taking D as our alphabet K) that the collection of recursively

enumerable relations is closed under unions, intersections, explicit
transformations, and existential quantifications. We now need some further
closure properties.

Finite Quantifications (Bounded Quantifiers)

For any numerical relation R(x1, …, xn, y), by the relation

[sometimes abbreviated by ∀F R and called the finite universal quantification of

R] is meant the set of all (n + 1)-tuples (x1, …, xn, y)such that R(x1, …, xn, z)
holds for every z that is less than or equal to y. Thus (∀z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z) holds
iff R(x1, …, xn,1), R(x1, …, xn, 2), …, R(x1, …, xn, y) all hold. (∀z ≤ y)R(x1, …,
xn, z) is equivalent to the formula

By the relation (∃z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z) [sometimes abbreviated by ∃F R and

called the finite existential quantification of R] is meant the set of all (n + 1)-
tuples (x1, …, xn, y) such that there is at least one z ≤ y such that R(x1, …, xn, z)
holds. Thus (∃z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z) is the disjunction of the relations R(x1, …,
xn,1), R(x1 …, xn,2), …, R(x1 …, xn, y). The formula (∃z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z) is
equivalent to the formula

The quantifiers (∀x ≤ c) and (∃x ≤ c) are called bounded quantifiers.

Problem 3. Show the following:
(a) If R(x1 …, xn, y) is recursively enumerable, so are ∀FR and ∃F R.
(b) If R(x1 …, xn, y) is recursive, so are ∀FR and ∃F R.

Before continuing, let us recall the definitions of ∑0 and ∑1 formulas of

elementary arithmetic. In The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] we defined a
∑0 formula and a ∑0 relation as follows: By an atomic ∑0 formula we mean any
formula of one of the forms c1 = c2 or c1 ≤ c2, where c1 and c2 are both terms.
We then define the class of ∑0 formulas of Elementary Arithmetic by the
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following inductive scheme:

(1) Every atomic ∑0 formula is a ∑0 formula.
(2) For any ∑0 formulas F and G, the formulas ∼ F, F ∧ G, F ∨ G, and F ⊃ G
are ∑0 formulas.
(3) For any ∑0 formula F, and any variable x, and any c which is either a Peano
numeral or a variable distinct from x, the expressions (∀x ≤ c)F and (∃x ≤
c)F are ∑0 formulas.

No formula is a ∑0 formula unless its being so is a consequence of (1), (2)

and (3) above.
Thus a ∑0 formula is a formula of Elementary Arithmetic in which all
quantifiers are bounded. A set or relation is called a ∑0 set or relation (or just
“∑0”) if it is expressed by a ∑0 formula.

A relation is called ∑1 if it is expressed by a formula of the form ∃zR(x1, …,

xn, z), where the relation R(x1, …, xn, z) is ∑0.

We noted in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] that all ∑0 and ∑1

relations and sets are arithmetic, because the formulas that express them are just
a subset of all the formulas of Elementary Arithmetic that can be used to express
number sets and relations. Moreover, we discussed the fact that, given any ∑0
sentence (a ∑0 formula with no free variables), we can effectively decide
whether it is true or false.
By Problem 2, taking D for the alphabet K, the collection of all recursive sets
and relations is closed under unions, intersections, complements, and explicit
transformations. It is also closed under finite universal and existential
quantifications, as we have just seen. This collection also contains the relations x
+ y = z and x × y = z. From all these facts, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Every ∑0-relation is recursive.

We also know by Problem ∑1, taking D for the alphabet K, that the existential
quantification of a recursively enumerable relation is recursively enumerable.
Now, every ∑1-relation is the existential quantification of a ∑0-relation, hence of
a recursively enumerable (in fact recursive) relation, and is therefore recursively
enumerable. This proves that:
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Proposition 3. All ∑1-relations are recursively enumerable.

We now wish to prove that, conversely, all recursively enumerable relations

are ∑1, and hence that being recursively enumerable is the same as being ∑1!

First, for some very useful facts about ∑1-relations:

Problem 4. Suppose R(x1, …, xn, y) is ∑1. Show that the relation ∃yR(x1, …, xn,
y) [as a relation between x1, …, xn] is ∑1.

For any function f(x) (from numbers to numbers), we say that the function f(x)
is ∑1 if the relation f(x) = y is ∑1.

Proposition 4. If A is a ∑1 set and f(x) is a ∑1-function, and A′ is the set of all x

such that f(x) ∊ A, then A′ is ∑1. [A′ is what is called the domain of the function
f(x) when the range of the function is restricted to the set A.]
Problem 5. Prove the above proposition.
To prove that every recursively enumerable relation is ∑1, we will illustrate
the proof for recursively enumerable sets. We will show that every recursively
enumerable set A is ∑1. The proof for relations is a modification we leave to the
reader.
We use the dyadic Gödel numbering of The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan,
2014]: For any ordered alphabet K, viz. {k1, k2, …, kn}, we assign the Gödel
number 12 to k1, 122 to k2, and a 1 followed by n 2’s to kn. And then, for any
compound expression, we take its Gödel number to be the result of replacing
each symbol of K by its Gödel number. We use g to denote the Gödel number
function, e.g. the Gödel number of g(k3k1k2) = 122212122.

In The Beginner’s Guide, we showed that if a set S of strings of symbols of K

is formally representable over K, then the set S0 of Gödel numbers of the
members of S is ∑1. Of course this also holds when K is the two-sign alphabet
{1, 2}. Thus if A is recursively enumerable, then the set A0 of the Gödel numbers
of the members of A (in dyadic notation) is ∑1. Our job now is to get from the
fact that a set of Gödel numbers A0 is ∑1 to the fact that A itself is ∑1. Now, A is
the set of all x such that g(x) ∊ A0, and so [by Proposition 4 above] it suffices to
show that the relation g(x) = y is ∑1. To this end, we use the following lemma,
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which was proved in The Beginner’s Guide:

Lemma K. There exists a ∑0 relation K(x, y, z) such that the following two
conditions hold:
(1) For any finite set (a1, b1), …, (an, bn) of ordered pairs of numbers (positive
integers), there is a number z (called a code number of the set) such that for
all x and y, K(x, y, z) holds if and only if (x, y) is one of the pairs (a1, b1),
…, (an, bn).
(2) For all x, y, z if K(x, y, z) holds, then x < z and y < z
Problem 6. Using Lemma K, prove the relation g(x) = y is ∑1.

Extending this results to all relations gives:

Proposition 5. Every recursively enumerable relation is ∑1 and every ∑1
relation is recursively enumerable.

A Recursive Pairing Function δ(x, y)

A function f which assigns to each pair (x, y) of numbers a number f(x, y) is said
to be 1-1 (which is read as “one-to-one”) if for every number z there is at most
one pair (x, y) such that f(x, y) = z. In other words, if f(x, y) = f(z, w), then x = z
and y = w. The function f is said to be onto the set N of numbers, if every number
z is f(x, y) for some pair (x, y). Thus f is 1-1 onto N iff every number z is f(x, y)
for one and only one pair (x, y).
We now want a recursive function δ(x, y) which is 1-1 onto N. [Note that
such a function provides an enumeration of all ordered pairs of positive
integers.] There are many ways to construct such a function. Here is one way:
We start with (1, 1) followed by the three pairs whose highest number is 2, in the
order (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 1), followed by the five pairs whose highest number is 3,
in the order (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2), followed by … (1, n), (2, n), …, (n,
n), (n, 1), (n, 2), …, (n, n - 1), etc. We then take δ(x, y) to be the position that (x,
y) takes in this ordering, which is the number of pairs which precede (x, y) plus
1. For example,
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In fact, the following hold:

(a) If m ≤ n, then δ(m, n) = (n − 1)2 + m.
(b) If n < m, then δ(m, n) = (n − 1)2 + m + n.
To see that (a) is true, we first note that for any n, the pairs that preceded (1,
n) in the ordering are those in which x and y are both less than n, and there are (n
− 1)2 such pairs [since there are n − 1 numbers (positive integers) that are less
than n]. Thus δ(1, n) = (n − 1)2 + 1. Hence δ(2, n) = (n − 1)2 + 2, δ(3, n) = (n −
1)2 + 3, …, δ(n, n) = (n − 1)2 + n. Thus, for any m ≤ n, δ(m, n) = (n − 1)2 + m.
This proves (a).

As for (b), since δ(m,m) = (m − 1)2+m, then δ(m, 1) = (m − 1)2+m+1; δ(m,2)

= (m − 1)2 + m + 2, …, δ(m,m − 1) = (m − 1)2 + m + (m − 1). Thus for any n ≤
m, δ(m,n) = (m − 1)2 + m + n.
Problem 7. Prove that the function δ(x,y) is recursive, in fact Σ0.

The Inverse Functions K and L

Each number z is δ(x, y) for just one pair (x, y). We let K (z) [to often be
abbreviated Kz] be x, and let L(z) [or Lz] be y. Thus Kδ(x,y) = x and Lδ(x,y) = y.
Problem 8. (a) Prove that δ(Kz, Lz) = z. (b) Prove that the functions K(x) and
L(x) are Σ0, and hence recursive.

The n-tupling Functions δn(x1, …, xn)

For each n ≥ 2 we define the function δn(x1, …, xn) by the following inductive
scheme:

An obvious induction argument shows that for each n ≥ 2 the function δn(x1,
…, xn) is a 1-1 recursive function onto the set N of positive integers.
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Problem 9. Prove the following:

(a) For any recursively enumerable set A and n ≥ 2, the relation δn(x1, …, xn) ∊
A is recursively enumerable.
(b) For any recursively enumerable relation R(x1, …, xn), the set A of all
numbers δn(x1, …, xn) such that R(x1, …, xn) is recursively enumerable.

The Inverse Functions

For each n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define (x) as follows: x = δn(x1, …, xn) for just
one n-tuple (x1, …, xn), and we take (x) to be xi. Thus (δn(x1, …, xn)) = xi.

Problem 10. Prove the following:

(a) δn( (x), (x), …, (x)) = x.
(b) (x) = Kx and (x) = Lx.
(c) If x =δn+1(x1, …, xn+1), then Kx = δn(x1,…, xn) and Lx = xn+1.
(d) If i ≤ n then (x) = (Kx). If i = n + 1, then (x) = Lx.
(e) For any recursively enumerable relation R(x1, …, xn, y1, …, ym), there is a
recursively enumerable relation M(x, y) such that for all x1, …, xn, y1, …,
ym, we have R(x1, …, xn, y1, …, ym) iff M(δn(x1, …, xn), δm(y1, …, ym)).

III. A Universal System

We now wish to construct a “universal” system (U), in which we can express all
propositions of the form that such and such a number is in such and such a
recursively enumerable number set, or that such and such an n-tuple of numbers
stands in such and such a recursively enumerable relation on n-tuples of
numbers. (We recall that we are using the word “number” to mean “positive
integer”.)
In preparation for the construction of the system (U), we need to “transcribe”
all dyadic systems (elementary formal systems over the alphabet {1, 2}) into a
single finite alphabet. We now define a transcribed dyadic system — to be
abbreviated “TDS” — to be a system like a dyadic system, except that instead of
taking our variables and predicates to be individual symbols, we take two signs,
v and the “accent sign” ′ and we define a transcribed variable — to be
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abbreviated “TS variable” — to be any string v∝v, where ∝ is a string of accents.

Similarly, we define a transcribed predicate — to be abbreviated “TS predicate”
— to be a string of p’s followed by a string of accents; the number of p’s is to
indicate the degree of the predicate. A transcribed dyadic system is then like a
dyadic system, except that we use transcribed variables instead of single symbols
for variables, and transcribed predicates instead of individual symbols for
predicates. We thus have a single alphabet K7, namely the symbols from which
all TS variables and predicates, and eventually formulas, are constructed:

Note that the symbols 1 and 2, from which we will construct our dyadic
numerals for the positive integers, correspond to the alphabet K in the definition
of an elementary formal system given in The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014]
and earlier here.
It is obvious that representability in an arbitrary dyadic system is equivalent
to representability in a transcribed dyadic system.
We define “TS term”, “atomic TS formula”, “TS formula”, “TS sentence” as
we did “term”, “atomic formula”, “formula”, “sentence”, only using TS
variables and TS predicates instead of variables and predicates, respectively.
We now construct the universal system (U) in the following manner: We first
extend the alphabet K7 to the alphabet K8 by adding the symbol “∧”. Then, by a
base we mean a string of the form X1, …, Xk (or a single formula X, if k = 1).
Here X and X1, …, Xk are all TS formulas. These TS formulas are called the
components of the base X1 ∧ … ∧ Xk, or of the base X. Then we extend the
alphabet K8 to the alphabet K9 by adding the symbol “ ⊢ ”, and we define a
sentence of (U) to be an expression of the form B⊢ X, where B is a base and X is
a TS sentence (a TS formula with no variables). We call the sentence B⊢ X true
if X is provable in that TDS whose axiom schemes are the components of B.
Thus X1 ∧ … ∧ Xk ⊢ X is true iff X is provable in that TDS whose axiom
schemes are X1, …, Xk.

By a predicate H of (U) [not to be confused with a TS predicate], we mean an

expression of the form B ⊢ P, where B is a base and P is a transcribed predicate.
We define the degree of B ⊢ P to be the degree of P (i.e. the number of
occurrences of p in P). A predicate H of the form B ⊢ P of (U) of degree n is
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said to represent the set of all n-tuples (a1, …, an) of numbers such that the
sentence B ⊢ Pa1, …, an is true. Thus a predicate X1 ∧ … ∧ Xk ⊢ P of degree n
represents (in U) the set of all n-tuples (a1, …, an) such that Pa1, …, an is
provable in that TDS whose axiom schemes are X1, …, Xk; thus it represents in
(U) the same relation as P represents in the TDS whose axiom schemes are X1,
…, Xk. Thus a relation or set is representable in (U) if and only if it is recursively
enumerable. In this sense, (U) is called a universal system for all recursively
enumerable relations.
We shall let T be the set of true sentences of (U), and let T0 be the set of
Gödel numbers of the members of T (using the dyadic Gödel numbering).
We now wish to show that the set T is formally representable in an
elementary formal system over the alphabet K9, and that the set T0 is recursively
enumerable. Our entire development of recursion theory is based on this crucial
fact!
We are to construct an elementary formal system W over K9 in which T is
represented. To do this, we must first note that the implication sign of W must be
different from the implication sign of transcribed systems. We will use “→” for
the implication sign of W, and use “imp” for the implication sign of transcribed
systems. Similarly, we will use the ordinary comma for the punctuation sign of
W and use “com” for the punctuation sign of transcribed systems. For variables
of W, (not to be confused with transcribed variables), we will use the letters x, y,
z, w, with or without subscripts. Predicates (not to be confused with predicates of
(U) or transcribed predicates) are to be introduced as needed.
Problem 11. Construct w by successively adding predicates and axiom schemes
to represent the following properties and relations:
N(x) : x is a number (dyadic numeral)
Acc(x) : x is a string of accents
Var(x) : x is a transcribed variable
dv (xy) : x and y are distinct TS variables
P (x) : x is a transcribed predicate
t(x) : x is a transcribed term
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F0(x) : x is a transcribed atomic formula

F (x) : x is a transcribed formula

S0(x) : x is a transcribed atomic sentence

Sub(x, y, z, w) : x is a string compounded from TS variables, numerals, TS

predicates, com and imp, and y is a TS variable, and w is the result of
substituting z for every occurrence of y in x
pt(x, y) : x is a TS formula and y is the result of substituting numerals for some
(but not necessarily all) TS variable of x (such a formula y is called a partial
instance of x)
in(x, y) : x is a TS formula and y is the result of substituting numerals for all
variables of x (such a y is an instance of x)
B(x) : x is a base
C(x, y) : x is a component of the base y
T (x) : x is a true sentence of (U)
Since T0 is formally representable, then T0 is ∑1, hence recursively
enumerable.

The Recursive Unsolvability of (U)

We now wish to show that the complement of T0 is not recursively

enumerable, and thus that the set T0 is recursively enumerable, but not recursive.

For any set A of numbers, define a sentence X of (U) to be a Gödel sentence

for A if either X is true and its Gödel number X0 is in A, or X is false and its
Gödel number is not in A. In other words, a sentence X of (U) is a Gödel
sentence for A if X is true iff X0 ∈ A. There obviously cannot be a Gödel
sentence for , for such a sentence would be true iff it were not true (i.e. iff its
Gödel number was not in T0), which is impossible. Thus, to show that is not
recursively enumerable, it suffices to show that for any recursively enumerable
set, there is a Gödel sentence.
To this end, for any string X of symbols of K7, we define its norm to be XX0,
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where X0 is the Gödel number of X. Any dyadic numeral n itself has a Gödel
number n0, hence a norm nn0. We recall that our dyadic Gödel numbering has
the advantage of being an isomorphism with respect to concatenation, i.e. if n is
the Gödel number of X and m is the Gödel number of Y, then nm is the Gödel
number of XY. Therefore, if n is the Gödel number of X, then nn0 is the Gödel
number of Xn (the norm of X). Thus the Gödel number of the norm of X is the
norm of the Gödel number of X.
For any number x, we let normx be the norm of x.
Problem 12. Show that the relation normx = y is recursively enumerable.
For any set A of numbers we let be the set of all numbers whose norm is in
A.
Lemma. If A is recursively enumerable, so is .
Problem 13. Prove the above lemma.
Problem 14. Using the above lemma, now prove that if A is recursively
enumerable, then there is a Gödel sentence for A.
As we have seen, there cannot be a Gödel sentence for , and thus by
Problem 14, the set cannot be recursively enumerable. And so the set T0 is
recursively enumerable, but not recursive.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 4

1. (a) We have already proved this for when R1 and R2 are sets (i.e. relations of
degree 1), but the proof for relations of degree n is essentially the same:
Suppose R1 and R2 are relations of degree n and that both are formally
representable over K. There they are representable in a common elementary
formal system over K. In this system let P1 represent R1 and let P2 represent
R2. Then take a new predicate Q and add the following two axioms:

Then Q represents R1∪R2.

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To represent R1 ∩ R2, instead of the above two axioms, add the

following single axiom:

Then Q will represent R1∩R2.

(b) Let P represent the relation R(x1, …, xn, y) in (E). Take a new predicate
Q of degree n and add the following axiom scheme:

Then Q represents the relation

(c) Let P represent the relation R(x1, …, xk) in (E). Take a new predicate Q
and add the following axiom scheme:

Then Q represents the relation

2. Complementation is trivial. As for unions and intersections, suppose that W1

and W2 are of the same degree and are both solvable over K. Then W1, W2,
and are all formally representable over K. We already know from
Problem 1 that W1 ∪ W2 and W1 ∩ W2 are formally representable over K. It
remains to show that the complements of W1 ∪ W2 and W1 ∩ W2 are
formally representable over K. But these complements are and
, which we can use our knowledge of Boolean sets to see to be equal
to and , respectively. Since these latter sets are the
intersections and unions of sets we know to be formally representable over
K, we now see that and are formally representable over K,
and thus that the union or intersection of two sets that are solvable over K is
solvable over K.
Now assume that the R(x1, …, xk) is solvable over K. Then its
complement, which we will denote by is also solvable over K,
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since the two are complements of each other. We have seen that the explicit
transformations λ x1, …, xnR(α1,…, αk) and λ x1, …, xn , where
each αi is one of the variables x1, …, xn or a constant, are also formally
representable over K. But each of these is the complement of the other, so
we see that the collection of sets and relations solvable over K is closed
under explicit transformation as well.
3. (a) Suppose that the relation R(x1, …, xn, y) is recursively enumerable. Let D
be a dyadic system in which R is represented by the predicate P, x < y is
represented by E, and the relation “the successor of x is y” is represented by
S.
Let W (x1, …, xn, y) be the relation z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z). To
represent the relation W, take a new predicate Q and add the following
two axiom schemes:

Then Q represents W.
As for the relation (∃z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z) (as a relation between x1,
…, xn, y), it is equivalent to the relation ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ R(x1, …, xn, z). Let
S(x1, …, xn, y, z) be the relation z ≤ y∧R(x1, …, xn, z). It must be
recursively enumerable, because it is the intersection S1 ∩ S2 of the
relations S1 and S2 where

and

Since S1 and S2 are respectively definable from the recursively

enumerable relations z ≤ y and R(x1, …, xn, z) by explicit
transformation, they are recursively enumerable, and so is their
intersection S. Thus so is the existential quantification ∃zS(x1, …, xn, z),
which is the relation (∃z ≤ y)R(x1, …, xn, z).
(b) Suppose R is recursive. Thus R and its complement are both
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recursively enumerable. Since R is recursively enumerable, so are

and ∃F(R) [by (a)]. Since is recursively enumerable, so are and
[again by (a)]. But as the reader can verify, and are
respectively the complements of ∃F(R) and , and so the
complements of ∃F (R) and are both recursively enumerable,
which means that ∃F (R) and are both recursive.
4. Let us first note that for any relation R(x1, …, xn, y, z) the following
conditions are equivalent:
(1) ∃y∃zR(x1, …, xn, y, z)
(2) ∃ω(∃y ≤ ω)(∃z ≤ ω)R(x1, …, xn, y, z)
It is obvious that (2) implies (1). Now, suppose that (1) holds. Then there
are numbers y and z such that R(x1, …, xn, y, z). Let ω be the maximum of y
and z. Then y ≤ ω and z ≤ ω, and so (∃y ≤ ω)(∃z ≤ ω)R(x1, …, xn, y, z) holds
for such a number ω. Hence (2) holds.
Now suppose R(x1, …, xn, y) is Σ1. Then there is a Σ0 relation S(x1, …,
xn, y, z) such that R(x1, …, xn, y) is equivalent to ∃zS(x1, …, xn, y, z). Thus
∃yR(x1, …, xn, y) is equivalent to ∃y∃zS(x1, …, xn, y, z), which, as shown
above, is Σ1 [since the relation (∃y ≤ ω)(∃z ≤ ω)S(x1, …, xn, y, z) is Σ0].
5. x ∊ A′ iff f(x) ∊ A, which is true iff ∃y(f(x) = y ∧ y ∊ A). We first show that
the relation f(x) = y ∧ y ∊ A is Σ1.
Well, since the relation f(x) = y is Σ1, then there is a Σ0 relation S(x, y, z)
such that f(x) = y iff ∃zS(x, y, z).
Since the set A is Σ1, there is a Σ0 relation R(x, y) such that x ∊ A iff
∃ωR(x, ω). Thus f(x) = y ∧ y ∊ A, iff

which is true iff ∃z∃ω(S(x, y, z) ∧ R(x, ω)). Since the condition S(x, y, z) ∧
R(x, ω) is Σ0, then ∃ω(S(x, y, z)R(x, ω), is Σ1, hence so is the condition
∃z∃ω(S(x, y, z)R(x, ω)) [by Problem 4].
Thus the condition f(x) = y ∧ y ∊ A is Σ1, and therefore so is ∃y(f(x) = y
∧ y ∊ A) [again by Problem 4]. Thus A′ is Σ1.
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6. Our goal is to prove that the relation g(x) = y is Σ1. First let R1(x, y) be the Σ0
relation (x = 1 ∧ y = 12)∨ (x = 2 ∧ y = 122) Thus R1(x, y) holds iff x is the
single digit 1 or the single digit 2 and g(x) = y.
Let R2(x, y, x1, y1) be the Σ0 relation

Call a set S of ordered pairs of numbers special, if for every pair (x, y) in S,
either R1(x, y) or (∃x1 ≤ x)(∃y1 ≤ y)((x1, y1) ∊ S ∧ R2(x, y, x1, y1)). It is
easily seen by mathematical induction on the length of x (i.e. the number of
occurrences of 1 or 2) that if S is special, then for every pair (x, y) in S, it
must be that g(x) = y.
Next we must show that conversely, if g(x) = y, then (x, y) belongs to
some special set.
Well, the x in g(x) = y must be of the form x = d1d2 … dn, where each di
is the digit 1 or the digit 2. For each i ≤ n, we let gi be the dyadic Gödel
number of di (thus, if di = 1, then gi = 12 and if di = 2, then gi = 122). Now
let Sx be the set

The set Sx is obviously special, and contains the pair (x, g(x)) [which is the
pair (d1d2 … dn, g1g2 … gn)]. Thus if g(x) = y, then (x, y) ∈ Sx and so (x, y)
belongs to a special set. Thus we have:
(1) g(x) = y iff (x, y) belongs to a special set.
We now use Lemma K. For any number z, we let Sz be the set of all pairs (x,
y) such that K(x, y, z) holds. Thus (x, y) ∈ Sz iff K(x, y, z). Since (x, y) ∈ Sz
iff K(x, y, z), then to say that Sz is special is to say that for all x and y, K(x,
y, z) implies that the following ∑0 condition — call it A(x, y, z) — holds:

Thus Sz is special iff the following condition holds:

However, C(z) is equivalent to the following 0 condition:

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To see the equivalence, it is obvious that C(z) implies P (z). To see the
converse, suppose P (z) holds. We must show that C(z) holds. Let x and y
be arbitrary numbers. We need to show that if K(x, y, z) holds, then so does
A(x, y, z). If K(x, y, z) holds, then it must also be true that x ≤ z and y ≤ z [by
the second condition in Lemma K], and therefore A(x, y, z) holds [by the
assumption P (z)]. Thus, for all x and y, K(x, y, z) ⊃ A(x, y, z), and so C(z)
holds.
This proves that C(z) is equivalent to P (z), and hence Sz is special iff
P(z) holds.
Finally, g(x) = y iff (x, y) belongs to some special set, which is true iff

which is true iff

Thus the relation g(x) = y is ∑1 (since K(x, y, z) ∧ P (z) is ∑0), which

completes the proof that every recursively enumerable set A is ∑1.
7. δ(x, y) = z iff

The condition z = (y − 1)2 + x can be written

The condition z = (x − 1)2 + x + y can be written

As the formula expressing δ(x, y) = z can be rewritten as a ∑0 formula, the

function δ is ∑0, and consequently recursive [by Proposition 2].
8. (a) z = δ(x, y) for some x and y. Then Kz = x and Lz = y, so that δ(x, y) =
δ(Kz, Lz). Thus z [which is δ(x, y)] equals δ(Kz, Lz).
(b) K(z) = x iff (∃y ≤ z)(δ(x, y) = z) and L(z) = y iff (∃x ≤ z)(δ(x, y) = z). (It is
not difficult to verify that if δ(x, y) = z, both x ≤ z and y ≤ z.)
9. Conceptually, we know the following:
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(a) δn(x1, …, xn) ∈ A iff ∃y(δn(x1, …, xn) = y ∧ y ∊ A).

(b) x ∊ A iff ∃x1 … ∃xn(x = n(x1, …, xn) ∧ R(x1, …, xn)).
To see that this understanding solves the problem, we can amplify as
follows:
(a) When we say the set A is recursively enumerable, what we mean is that
there’s a relation of degree 1, R(x), in the form of a 1 formula F1 with
one free variable x (and one existential quantifier) such that the set of
numbers in A is the set of all numbers x for which F1(x) holds. Also,
since δn(x1, …, xn) = y has been shown to be recursive, there is a ∑0
formula F2 containing the free variables x1, …, xn, y which holds for an n
+ 1-tuple of numbers iff the equation δn(x1, …, xn) = y is true (when the
n + 1 numbers are “plugged in” appropriately). So δn(x1, …, xn) ∊ A can
be expressed by the formula

This can be seen to be a ∑1 formula, for the single unbound quantifier in

F1 can be brought to the front in a way the reader should be familiar
with by now.
(b) Since the relation R(x1, …, xn) is recursively enumerable, there is a Σ1
formula F1 with the free variables x1, …, xn such that F1(x1, …, xn)
holds iff R(x1, …, xn) is true. Assuming F2 as in part (a) of this problem,
x ∈ A can be expressed by the formula ∃x1 … ∃xn(F2(x1, …, xn, x)∧
F1(x1, …, xn)).
10. (a) For a given x, since δn is 1-1 and onto, x is equal to δn(x1, …, xn) for just
one n-tuple x1, …, xn. Moreover for each is defined to be xi. So

(b) Since x = δ2(Kx, Lx) [by the definition of δ2 and Problem 8], we have
that and
(c) Suppose x = δn+1(x1, …, xn+1). Then [by the definition of δn+1], x =
δ(δn(x1, …, xn), xn+1). Thus Kx = δn(x1, …, xn) and Lx = xn+1.
(d) Let x = δn+1(x1, …, xn, xn+1) for some x1, …, xn+1. Then by definition
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Now suppose i≤ n. Then Kx = δn(x1, …, xn) [by (c)], so that

But also

Now,
(e) Take Then R(x1, …, xn, y1,
…, ym) iff M(δn(x1, …, xn), δm(y1, …, ym)).
11. N(x): x is a number

Acc(a): xs a string of accents

Var (x): x is a TS variable

dv(x, y): x and y are distinct TS variable

P(x): x is a TS predicate

t(x): x is a TS term

F0(x): x is a TS atomic formula

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F (x): x is a TS formula

S0(x): x is a TS atomic sentence

S(x): x is a TS sentence

Sub(x, y, z): x is a string, y a TS variable, z a numeral, and …

pt(x, y): x is a TS atomic formula and y is a partial instance of x

in(x, y): x is a TS atomic formula and y is an instance of x

B(x): x is a TS base

C(x, y): x is a component of the base and y

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T (x): x is a true TS sentence

12. Let D be a dyadic system with predicate G and the following axiom
schemes:

Then G represents the relation “the Gödel number of x is y”. Now add a
predicate M and the axiom scheme:

Then M represents the relation “norm(x) = y”.

13. Suppose A is recursively enumerable. Let D be a dyadic system in which
“A” represents the set A and “M” represents the relation “the norm of x is
y”. Add a predicate “B” and the axiom scheme

Then B represents the set A#.

Remark. Without using elementary formal systems or dyadic system, one

can directly show that if A is Σ1, so is A#, and hence that if A is recursively
enumerable, so is A#. As a good exercise, show that if A is Σ1, so is A#.
14. The following beautiful proof is a modification of Gödel’s famous
diagonal argument in his incompleteness theorem proof, and does for
recursion theory what Gödel did for mathematical systems.

Suppose A is recursively enumerable. Then so is A# (by the Lemma). Let H be

a predicate of (U) that represents A#. Then for every number n,

Hn is true iff n ∈ A#, which if true iff nn0 ∈ A.

Thus Hn is true iff nn0 ∈ A.

We take for n the Gödel number h of H, and obtain that H h is true iff hh0 ∈
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A.
However, hh0 is the Gödel number of Hh! Thus Hh is true iff its Gödel
number is in A, and if thus a Gödel sentence for A.
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Chapter 5
Some Recursion Theory

I. Enumeration and Iteration Theorems

We now turn to two basic theorems of recursion theory — the enumeration
theorem, due to Emil Post [1943; 1944] and to Stephen Kleene [1952], and the
iteration theorem, due to Kleene [1952] and independently discovered by Martin
Davis [1958, 1982]. Once we have established these two results, the universal
system (U) of the last chapter will have served its purpose, and will no longer be
needed.

The Enumeration Theorem

We wish to arrange all recursively enumerable sets in an infinite sequence ω1,

ω2, …, ωn, … (allowing repetitions) in such a way that the relation “ωx contains
y” is a recursively enumerable relation between x and y.
We recall that for any number (dyadic numeral) y, we are letting y0 denote the
dyadic Gödel number of y. For any x and y we now define r(x, y) to be xy0 [x
followed by y0].

We use the letter T to denote the set of true sentences of the universal system
(U) and use T0 to denote the set of Gödel numbers of the sentences in T. We now
define ωn to be the set of all x such that r(n, x) ∈ T0. Thus x ∈ ωn iff r(n, x) ∈
T0.

Problem 1. (a) Prove that ωn is recursively enumerable. (b) Prove that for every
recursively enumerable set A, there is some n such that A = ωn.
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We shall call n an index of a set A if A = ωn. We have just shown that a set A
is recursively enumerable if and only if it has an index, and so we have
succeeded in arranging all recursively enumerable sets in an infinite sequence
ω1, ω2, …, ωn, … in such a manner that the relation ωx contains y (which is the
relation r(x, y) ∊ T0) is recursively enumerable.

We next wish to show that for each n ≥ 2, we can enumerate all recursively
enumerable relations of degree n in an infinite sequence such
that the relation is a recursively enumerable relation among the
variables x, y1, …, yn. For this, it will be useful to use the indexing of recursively
enumerable sets that we already have, along with the pairing function δ(x, y) and
the n-tupling functions δn(x1, …, xn). We simply define to be δn(x1,
…, xn) ∊ ωi. Since ωi is recursively enumerable and the function δn(x1, …, xn) is
also recursively enumerable, so is [by (a) of Problem 9 of Chapter
4]. Also, for any recursively enumerable relation R(x1, …, xn), the set A of
numbers δn(x1, …, xn) such that R(x1, …, xn) holds is recursively enumerable [by
(b) of Problem 9 of Chapter 4]. Thus the set A has some index i so that R(x1, …,
xn) holds iff δn(x1, …, xn) ∊ ωi, which is true iff . Thus Thus
every recursively enumerable relation has an index. [We also write for x ∊
ωn, since we are regarding number sets as relations of degree 1.]

We have thus proved:

Theorem E. [The Enumeration Theorem] For each n, the set of all recursively
enumerable relations of degree n can be enumerated in an infinite sequence
such that the relation , as a relation among x, y1, …,
yn, is recursively enumerable.

For each n we let Un+1(x, y1, … yn) be the relation [as a relation
among x, y1, …, yn]. These relations are referred to as universal relations: U2 is
the universal relation for all recursively enumerable sets, U3 is the universal
relation for all recursively enumerable relations of degree 2, and so forth.
We sometimes write Rx(y1, …, yn) instead of , since the number of
arguments makes the superscript n clear. And we write U(x, y1, …, yn) instead of
Un+1(x, y1, …, yn).
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Iteration Theorems

The second basic tool of recursion theory is the iteration theorem, which we will
shortly state and prove in both a simple and more general form. To fully
appreciate the significance and power of these theorems, the reader should first
try solving the following exercises:
Exercise 1. We know that for any two recursively enumerable sets A and B, the
union A ∪ B is recursively enumerable. Moreover, the process of finding this
union is effective, in the sense that there is a recursive function φ(i, j) such that if
i is an index of A and j is an index of B, then φ(i, j) is an index of A ∪ B — in
other words there is a recursive function φ(i, j) such that for all numbers i and j,
ωφ(i,j) = ωi ∪ ωj. Prove this.

For any relation R(x, y), by its inverse is meant the relation satisfying the
condition (x, y) iff R(x, y).
Exercise 2. Show that there is a recursive function t(i) such that for every
number i the relation Rt(i)(x, y) is the inverse of the relation Ri(x, y), i.e. Rt(i)(x, y)
iff Ri(y, x). [This can be paraphrased: Given an index of a recursively
enumerable relation of two arguments, one can effectively find an index of its
inverse.]

For any function f(x) and number set A, by f-1(A) is meant the set of all
numbers n such that f(n) ∊ A. Thus n ∊ f-1(A) iff f(n) ∊ A.
Exercise 3. Prove that for any recursive function f(x), there is a recursive
function φ(i) such that for every number i, it is the case that

The reader who has solved the above exercises has probably had to go back to
the universal system (U) each time. The iteration theorem, to which we now
turn, will free us from this once and for all!
Theorem 1. [Simple Iteration Theorem] For any recursively enumerable
relation R(x, y) there is a recursive function t(i) such that for all numbers x and
i, x ∊ ωt(i) iff R(x, i).

Problem 2. Prove Theorem 1. [Hint: The recursively enumerable relation R(x,

y) is represented in the universal system (U) by some predicate H. Consider the
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Gödel number h of H, as well as the Gödel number c of the punctuation symbol

com.]
Theorem 2. [Iteration Theorem] For any recursively enumerable relation R(x1,
…, xm, y1, …, yn) there is a recursive function φ(i1, …, in) such that for all x1,
…, xm, i1, …, in,

One way to prove Theorem 2 is to use Theorem 1 and the fact that for any
recursively enumerable relation R(x1, …, xm, y1, …, yn) there is a recursively
enumerable relation M(x, y) such that R(x1, …, xm, y1, …, yn) iff M(δm(x1, …,
xm), δn(y1, …, yn)) [by Problem 10 (e) of Chapter 4].

Problem 3. Prove Theorem 2.

Let us now see how the iteration theorem provides simple and elegant
solutions to the three recently given exercises.
In Exercise 1, let R(x, y1, y2) be the recursively enumerable relation

Then, by the iteration theorem, there is a recursive function φ(i1, i2) such that for
all numbers x, i1, i2,

Therefore,
For Exercise 2, let R(x1, x2, y) be the recursively enumerable relation Ry(x2,
x1). It is recursively enumerable because it is explicitly defined from the
recursively enumerable relation U(x1, x2, y). Then by the simple iteration
theorem there is a recursive function φ(i) such that for all x and i, Rφ(i)(x1, x2) iff
R(x1, x2, i), which is true iff Ri(x2, x1).

For Exercise 3, given a recursive function f(x), consider the recursively

enumerable relation R(x, y) – viz. f(x) ∊ ωy [it is recursively enumerable since it
is equivalent to ∃z(f(x) = z ∧ z ∊ wy)]. By the simple iteration theorem there is a
recursive function t(i) such that for all x and i, x ∊ ωt(i) iff R(x, i) which is true iff
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f(x) ∊ ωi. Thus ωt(i) = f-1(ωi).

More serious applications of the iteration theorem will soon follow.

Maximal Indexing

A denumerable sequence A1,A2, … ,An, … of all recursively enumerable sets is

called a recursively enumerable indexing if the relation x ∊ Ay is recursively
enumerable. It is called a maximal indexing if for every recursively enumerable
indexing B1, B2, …, Bn, … there is a recursive function f(i) such that for all i the
condition Af(i) = Bi holds. [Informally, this means that given a B-index of a
recursively enumerable set, we can effectively find an A-index of the set.]
Another application of the iteration theorem yields:
Theorem 3. The enumeration ω1, ω2, …, ωn, … given by the enumeration
theorem in maximal.
Problem 4. Prove Theorem 3.
The following theorem is easily obtained from the iteration theorem,
combined with the enumeration theorem.
Theorem 4. [Uniform Iteration Theorem] For any numbers m and n, there is a
recursive function φ(i, i1, …, in) [sometimes written ] such that for
all x1, …, xm, i1, …, in,

Problem 5. Prove Theorem 4.

II. Recursion Theorems

Recursion theorems, which can be stated in many forms, and are sometimes
called fixed point theorems, have many applications to recursion theory and
metamathematics. To illustrate their rather startling nature, consider the
following mathematical “believe it or nots.”
Which of the following propositions, if true, would surprise you?
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1. There is a number n such that ωn = ωn+1.

2. For any recursive function f(x), there is a number n such that ωf(n) = ωn.
3. There is a number n such that ωn contains n as its only member, i.e. ωn = {n}.
4. For any recursive function f(x) there is a number n such that ωn = {f(n)}.
5. There is a number n such that for every number x, x∊ωn iff n ∊ ωx.

Well, believe it or not, all the above statements are true! They are all special
cases of the theorem that follows:
Consider a recursively enumerable relation R(x, y). Now consider a number n
and the set x: R(x, n), i.e. the set of all numbers x such that R(x, n) holds. This set
is recursively enumerable, hence is ωn* for some n*. Given the relation R, what
n* is depends on what n is. Wouldn’t it be curious if n could be chosen such that
n* is n itself? Well, this is indeed so:
Theorem 5. [Weak Recursion Theorem] For any recursively enumerable
relation R(x, y), there is a number n such that ωn = {x : R(x, n)} [in other words,
for all x, we have n ∊ ωn iff R(x, n)].

I will give the beginning of the proof, and leave it as a problem for the reader
to finish it.
The relation Ry(x, y), as a relation between x and y is recursively enumerable.
Hence, by the simple iteration theorem there is a recursive function t(y) such that
for all x and y, x ∊ ωt(y) iff Ry(x, y).

Now, take any recursively enumerable relation R(x, y). Then the relation R(x,
t(y)) is also a recursively enumerable relation between x and y, hence has some
index m. Thus Rm(x, y) iff R(x, t(y)). Now comes the great trick: ….

Problem 6. Finish the proof.

As a consequence of Theorem 5, we have:
Theorem 6. For any recursive function f(x) there is a number n such that ωf(n) =
ωn.

Problem 7. (a) Prove Theorem 6. (b) Now prove the other four “believe it or
nots”.
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Discussion. We have derived Theorem 6 as a corollary of Theorem 5. One can

alternatively first prove Theorem 6 directly, and then obtain Theorem 5 as a
corollary of Theorem 6 as follows: Assume Theorem 6. Now consider a
recursively enumerable relation R(x, y). By the iteration theorem, there is a
recursive function f(x) such that for all x and y,

But by Theorem 6, there is a number n such that ωf(n) = ωn. Thus for all x, x ∊
ωn iff x ∊ ωf(n), which is true iff R(x, n). Thus x ∊ ωn iff R(x, n).

Unsolvable Problems and Rice’s Theorem

Some of the aforementioned believe it or nots may seem to be somewhat

frivolous applications of the weak recursion theorem. We now turn to a far more
significant application.
Let us call a property P(n) solvable if the set of all n having the property is a
recursive set. For example, suppose P(n) is the property that ωn is a finite set. To
ask whether this property is solvable is to ask whether the set of all indices of all
finite sets is recursive.
Here are some typical properties P(n) that have come up in the literature:

(1) ωn is an infinite set.

(2) ωn is empty.
(3) ωn is recursive.
(4) ωn = ω1.
(5) ωn contains 1.
(6) The relation Rn(x, y) is single-valued, i.e. for each x there is at most one y
such that Rn(x, y).
(7) The relation Rn(x, y) is functional, i.e. for each x there is exactly one y such
that Rn(x, y).
(8) All numbers are in the domain of Rn(x, y), i.e. for each (positive integer) x
there is at least one y such that Rn(x, y).
(9) All numbers are in the range of Rn(x, y), i.e. for each (positive integer) y
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there is a least one x such that Rn(x, y).

For each of these nine properties, we can ask if it is solvable. These are
typical questions of recursion theory that have been answered by individual
methods. Rice’s theorem, to which we now turn, answers a host of such
questions in one fell swoop.
A number set A is called extensional if it contains with any index of a
recursively enumerable set all other indices of it as well — in other words, for
every i and j, if i ∊ A and ωi = ωj, then j ∊ A.

Theorem R. [Rice’s Theorem] The only recursive extensional sets are ℕ and .
We will soon see how Rice’s theorem [Rice, 1953] is relevant to the nine
properties mentioned above, but first let us go to its proof. We first need the
following:
Lemma. For any recursive set A other than ℕ and , there is a recursive
function f(x) such that for all n, n ∊ A iff f(n) ∉ A
Problem 8. (a) Prove the above lemma. [Hint: If A is neither ℕ nor , then
there is at least one number a ∊ A and at least one number b ∉ A.Use these two
numbers a and b to define the function f(x). (b) Now prove Rice’s Theorem.
[Hint: Use the function f(x) of the Lemma and then apply Theorem 6 to the
function f(x).]

Applications

Let us consider the first of the aforementioned nine properties P (n), namely that
ωn is infinite. Obviously, if ωi is infinite and ωi = ωj, then ωj is also infinite.
Thus the set of the indices of all infinite sets is extensional. Also, there is at least
one n such that ωn is infinite and at least one n such that ωn is not infinite. Hence
by Rice’s Theorem, the set of the indices of all infinite sets is not recursive.
The same argument applies to all the other eight cases, so that none of them
are solvable!

The Strong Recursion Theorem

By the weak recursion theorem, for any number i, there is a number n such that
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ωn = {x : Ri(x, n)}. Given the number i, can we effectively find such an n as a

recursive function of i? That is, is there a recursive function φ(i) such that for
every number i, ωφ(i) = {x : Ri(x, φ(i))}? The answer is yes, and this is Myhill’s
famous fixed point theorem, which is a special case of the following:
Theorem 7. [Strong Recursion Theorem] For any recursively enumerable
relation M(x, y, z), there is a recursive function φ(i) such that for all i, ωφ(i) = {x
: M(x, i, φ(i))}.
We will give two proofs of this important theorem. The first is along
traditional lines, and requires two applications of the iteration theorem. The
second proof is along different lines, and requires only one application of the
iteration theorem.
Here is the beginning of the first proof (to be finished by the reader in
Problem 9(a)).
As in the proof of the weak recursion theorem, by the (simple) iteration
theorem, for every y, there is a recursive function d(y) such that ωd(y) = {x : Ry(x,
y)}. Now, given a recursively enumerable relation M(x, y, z), consider the
recursively enumerable relation M(x, z, d(y)) as a relation among x, y and z. By
another application of the iteration theorem, there is a recursive function t(i)
such that for all i, x and y, Rt(i)(x, y) iff M(x, i, d(y)). Then ….

For the second proof (to be finished by the reader – Problem 9 (b) below), let
S(x, y, z) be the recursively enumerable relation Rz(x, y, z). By the iteration
theorem, there is a recursive function t(y, z) such that for all y and z, ωt(y,z) = {x :
S(x, y, z)}, and thus ωt(y,z) = {x : Rz(x, y, z)}.

Now, given a recursively enumerable relation M(x, y, z), the relation M(x, y,
t(y, z)) is recursively enumerable, hence has an index h. Thus Rh(x, y, z) iff M(x,
y, t(y, z)). Then ….
Problem 9. (a) Finish the first proof. (b) Finish the second proof.
As a special case of Theorem 7, we have:
Theorem 8. [Myhill’s Fixed Point Theorem] There is a recursive function φ(y)
such that for all y, ωφ(y) = {x : Ry(x, φ(y))}.

Problem 10. Why is this a special case?

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Creative, Productive, Generated and Universal Sets

To say that a set A is not recursively enumerable is to say that given any
recursively enumerable subset ωi of A there is a number n in A but not in ωi — a
witness, so to speak that ωi is not the whole of A. A set A is called productive if
there is a recursive function φ(x) — called a productive function for A — such
that for every number i, if ωi is a subset of A, then φ(i) ∊ A – ωi [i.e. φ(i) is in A,
but not in ωi].

A set A is called co-productive if its complement is productive. This is

equivalent to the condition that there is a recursive function φ(x) — called a co-
productive function for A — such that for every number i, if ωi is disjoint from
A, then φ(i) lies outside A and outside ωi.

A set A is called creative if it is co-productive and recursively enumerable.

Thus a creative set A is one which is recursively enumerable, and is such that
there is a recursive function φ(i) — called a creative function for A — such that
for any number i, if ωi is disjoint from A, then φ(i) lies outside both A and ωi (it
is a witness to the fact that is not recursively enumerable).

Post’s Sets C and K

A simple example of a creative set is Post’s set C, the set of all numbers x such
that x ∊ ωx. Thus for any number i, i ∊ C iff i ∊ ωi. If ωi is disjoint from C, then
i is outside both ωi and C, and therefore the identity function I(x) is a creative
function for C.
A less immediate example of a creative set is the set K of all numbers ∂(x, y)
such that x ∊ ωy. The set K was also introduced by Post [1943] and is sometimes
called the complete set. The proof that K is creative is less immediate than the
proof for C, and involves use of the iteration theorem, as we will see.

Complete Productivity and Creativity

It is also correct to say that a set A is not recursively enumerable iff for every
recursively enumerable set ωi, whether a subset of A or not, there is a number j
such that j ∊ A iff j ≠ ωi — thus attesting to the fact that A ≠ ωi. By a completely
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productive function for A is meant a recursive function φ(x) such that for every
number i, φ(i) ∊ A iff φ(i) φ ∉ ωi. A set A is called completely productive if
there is a completely productive function for A.
A set A is called completely creative if A is recursively enumerable and there
is a completely productive function φ(x) for the complement of A; and such a
function is called a completely creative function for A. Thus a completely
creative function for A is a recursive function φ(x) such that for every number i,
φ(i) ∊ A iff φ(i) ∊ ωi.

Post’s set C of all x such that x ∊ ωx is obviously not only creative, but
completely creative, since the identity function is a completely creative function
for C. Therefore a completely creative set exists. Post apparently did not
capitalize on the fact that C is not only creative, but completely creative. I hazard
a guess that if he had capitalized on this fact, then many results in recursion
theory would have come to light sooner.
We will see later that in fact any productive set is completely productive, and
hence that any creative set is completely creative. This important result is due to
John Myhill [1955], and will be seen to be a consequence of the strong recursion
theorem.

Generative Sets

Many important results about completely creative sets do not use the fact that the
set is recursively enumerable, and so we define a set A to be generative if there
is a recursive function φ(x) — called a generative function for A — such that for
all numbers i, φ(i) ∊ A iff φ(i) ∊ ωi. Thus a generative set is like a completely
creative set except that it is not necessarily recursively enumerable. A set A is
generative iff its complement is completely productive. Our emphasis will be
on generative sets.

Many-One Reducibility

By a (many-one) reduction of a set A to a set B is meant a recursive function f(x)

such that A = f−1(B); i.e. for all numbers x, x ∊ A iff f(x) ∊ B. A set A is said to
be (many-one) reducible to B if there is a (many-one) reduction of A to B. There
are other important types of reducibility that occur in the literature of recursion
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theory, but throughout this chapter, reducible will mean many-one reducible.
Theorem 9. If A is reducible to B and A is generative, then B is generative.
It will be useful to state and prove Theorem 9 in a more specific form: For
any recursively enumerable relation R(x, y), by the iteration theorem there is a
recursive function t(y) such that ωt(i) = {x : R(x, i)}. Such a function t(y) will be
called an iterative function for the relation R(x, y). We will now state and prove
Theorem 9 in the more specific form:

Theorem 9*. If f(x) reduces A to B and φ(x) is a generative function for A, and
t(y) is an iterative function for the relation f(x) ∊ ωy, then f(φ(t(x))) is a
generative function for B.

Problem 11. Prove Theorem 9*.

Universal Sets

A set A is called universal if every recursively enumerable set is reducible to A.

Post’s complete set K is obviously universal.
Problem 12. Why?
Theorem 10. Every universal set is generative.
Problem 13. Prove Theorem 10. [Hint: Use Theorem 9.]

Uniformly Universal Sets

For any function f(x, y) of two arguments, and for any number i, by fi is meant
the function which assigns to each x the number f(x, i). Thus fi(x) = f(x, i).

A set A is called uniformly universal under a recursive function f(x, y) if for

all i and x, x ∊ ωi iff f(x, i) ∊ A; in other words, iff fi reduces ωi to A. And we say
that A is uniformly universal if it is universal under some recursive function f(x,
y).
Theorem 11. Every universal set is uniformly universal.
Problem 14. Prove Theorem 11. [Hint: Use the fact that Post’s set K is not only
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universal, but is also uniformly universal. Why?]

Exercise. Suppose A is uniformly universal under f(x, y) and that t(y) is an
iterative function for the relation f(x, x) ∊ ωy. Show that the function f(t(x), t(x))
is a generative function for A.
Remarks. The above, together with the fact that every universal set is uniformly
universal, yields another proof that every universal set is generative, and unlike
our previous proof of this fact, make no appeal to the existence of a previously
constructed recursively enumerable generative set (for instance, Post’s set C).
Actually, the two proofs can be seen to yield two different generative functions
for Post’s set K.
Having shown that every universal set is generative, we now wish to show
that, conversely, every generative set is universal, and thus that a set is
generative if and only if it is universal.
To begin with, it is pretty obvious that if B is a generative set under φ(x) (i.e.
if φ(x) is a generative function for B), then, for every i:
(1) If ωi = ℕ, then φ(i)∈ B [ℕ is the set of positive integers];
(2) If ωi = , then φ(i) ∉ B [ is the empty set].

Problem 15. Why is this so?

Problem 16. Prove that for every recursively enumerable set A, there is a
recursive function t(y) such that for every number i :
(1) If i ∈ A, then ωt(i) = ℕ ;
(2) If i ∉ A, then ωt(i) = . [Hint: Define M(x, y) iff y ∈ A. The relation M(x, y)
is recursively enumerable, hence by the iteration theorem there is a recursive
function t(y) such that for all i, ωt(i) = {x : M(x, i)}.]

Theorem 12. Every generative set is universal.

Problem 17. Prove Theorem 12. [Hint: This follows fairly easily from Problems
15 and 16.]
We next wish to show that every co-productive set is generative. Then, by
Theorem 12, we get Myhill’s result that every co-productive set (and hence
every creative set) is universal. [We recall that a set is creative iff it is both co-
productive and recursively enumerable.]
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Weak Co-productivity

We recall that a set A is said to be co-productive under a recursive function φ(x)

if for every number i such that ωi is disjoint from A, the number φ(i) lies outside
both A and ωi. This obviously implies the following weaker condition:
C1: For every i such that ωi is disjoint from A and such that ωi contains at most
one member, the number φ(i) lies outside both A and ωi.

Amazingly enough, this weaker condition on a recursive function is enough

to ensure that A is generative (and hence universal).
This weaker condition C1 implies the following even weaker condition:
C2: For every number i,
(1) If ωi = Then φ(i) ∉ A;
(2) If ωi = {φ(i)}, then φ(i) ∊ A.

Problem 18. Why does C1 imply C2?

We will say that A is weakly co-productive under φ(x) if φ(x) is recursive and
condition C2 holds.

Theorem 13. [After Myhill] If A is co-productive — or even weakly co-

productive — then A is generative.
To prove Theorem 13, we need the following lemma:
Lemma. For any recursive function φ(x) there is a recursive function t(y) such
that for all y,

Problem 19. Prove the above lemma. [Hint: Let M(x, y, z) be the recursively
enumerable relation x ∊ ωy ∧x = φ(z). Then use the strong recursion theorem,
Theorem 7.]
Problem 20. Now prove Theorem 13. [Hint: Suppose φ(x) is a weakly co-
productive function for A. Let t(y) be a recursive function related to φ(x) as in the
above lemma. Then show that the function φ(t(y)) is a generative function for A.]
From Theorems 13 and 12 we have:
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Theorem 14.[Myhill] If A is productive, or even weakly productive, then A is

universal.

Discussion

One can go directly from co-productivity (or even weak co-productivity) to

universality as did Myhill. Briefly, the argument is the following: Suppose B is
weakly co-productive under φ(x) and that A is a set that we wish to reduce to B.
Applying the strong recursion theorem to the recursively enumerable relation y
∊ A ∧ x = φ(z) [as a relation among x, y and z], we have a recursive function t(y)
such that for all y, if y ∊ A, then ωt(y) = {φ;(y)}, and if y ∉ A, then Then
the function φ(t(x)) can be seen to reduce A to B. The reader should find it a
profitable exercise to fill in the details.

Recursive Isomorphism

A set A is said to be recursively isomorphic to a set B if there is a recursive 1-1

function from A onto B. Such a function φ(x) is called a recursive isomorphism
from A to B, and A is said to be recursively isomorphic to B under φ(x), if φ(x) is
a recursive isomorphism from A to B.
If A is recursively isomorphic to B under φ(x), then obviously B is recursively
isomorphic to A under the inverse function φ-1(x). [We recall that φ-1(x) = y iff
φ(y) = x.]
Exercise. Suppose A is recursively isomorphic to B. Prove that if A is
recursively enumerable, (recursive, productive, generative, creative, universal)
then B is respectively recursively enumerable (recursive, productive, generative,
creative, universal).
Myhill [1955] proved the celebrated result that any two creative sets are
recursively isomorphic.
Bonus Question. Is it possible for a universal set to be recursive?

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 5

1. (a) We showed in the last chapter that the relation g(x) = y (i.e. x0 = y) is
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recursively enumerable. Hence the relation r(x, y) = z is recursively

enumerable, since it is equivalent to

Therefore, for any number n, the relation r(n, x) = y [as a relation between x
and y] is recursively enumerable. And so for any recursively enumerable set
A, the condition r(n, x) ∈ A [as a property of x] is recursively enumerable,
since it is equivalent to ∃ y(r(n, x) = y ∧ y ∈ A). In particular, since T0 is
recursively enumerable, the condition ∃ y(r(n, x) = y ∧ y ∈ T0) is
recursively enumerable, and this is the condition x ∈ ωn. Thus ωn is
recursively enumerable.
(b) Every recursively enumerable set A is represented in (U) by some
predicate H. Thus for every number x, x ∈ A iff Hx ∈ T. We let h be the
Gödel number of H, and so for all x, Hx ∈ T iff r(h, x) ∈ T0, which is
true iff x ∈ ωh. Thus A = ωh.
2. The relation R(x, y) is represented in (U) by some predicate H, and so for all
numbers i and x, R(i, x) iff Hicomx ∈ T, the latter of which is true iff hi0cx0
∈ T0, where h, i0, c,x0 are the respective Gödel numbers of H, i, com, x (in
dyadic notation). Thus R(i, x) iff r(hi0c,x) ∈ T0, which is true iff x ∈ ωhi0c.
We thus take t(y) to be hy0c, and so t(i) = hi0c, so that now R(i, x) iff x ∈
ωt(i).
3. Given a recursively enumerable relation R(x1, …, xm, y1, …, yn), we use the
recursively enumerable relation M(x, y), which yields, for all numbers x1, …,
xm, i1, …, in,
(1) R(x1, …, xm, i1, …, in) iff M(δm(x1, …, xm), δn(i1, …, in)). We now
apply Theorem 1 to the relation M(x, y), and so there is a recursive
function t(i) such that for every x and i we have x ∈ ωt(i) iff M(x, i). We
now take δm(x1, …, xm) for x and δn(i1, …, in) for i, and obtain
(2) δm(x1, …, xm) ∈ ωt(δn(i1,…,in)) iff M (δm(x1, …, xm), δn(i1, …, in)). By
(1) and (2) we have:
(3) R(x1, …, xm, i1, …, in) iff δm(x1, …, xm) ∈ ωt(δn(i1,…,in)) which is true
iff Rt(δn(i1,…,in))(x1, …, xm).
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We thus take φ(i1, …, in) to be t(δn(i1, …, in)) and obtain

4. We will show that our recursively enumerable enumeration ω1, ω2, …, ωn,
… is maximal. Given a recursively enumerable enumeration B1, B2, …, Bn,
…, let R(x, y) be the recursively enumerable relation x ∈ By. By the simple
iteration theorem, there is a recursive function f(x) such that for all x and i,
we have x ∈ ωf(i) iff R(x, i), which is true iff x ∈ Bi. Thus x ∈ ωf(i) iff x ∈ Bi,
and so ωf(i) = Bi.
5. Define S(x1, …, xm, y, y1, …, yn) iff Ry(x1, …, xm, y1, …, yn). The relation S
is recursively enumerable (why?), and so by the iteration theorem, there is a
recursive function φ(i,i1, …, in) such that for all x1, …, xm, i, i1, …, in:
Rφ(i,i1,…,in)(x1, …, xm) iff S(x1, …, xm, i, i1, …, in) iff Ri(x1, …, xm, i1, …,
in).
6. The great trick is to take m for y, and we thus obtain Rm(x, m) iff R(x, t(m)).
But we also have Rm(x, m) iff x ∈ ωt(m)! Thus x ∈ ωt(m) iff R(x, t(m)), and so
x ∈ ωn iff R(x, n), where n is the number t(m). [Clever, huh?]
7. (a) Given a recursive function f(x) let R(x, y) be the relation x ∈ ωf(y). It is
recursively enumerable [since it is equivalent to ∃ z(f(y) = z ∧ x ∈ ωz)], so
that by Theorem 5, there is some n such that for all x, x ∈ ωn iff R(x, n). But
R(x, n) ≡ x ∈ ωf(n), and so, for all x, x ∈ ωn iff x ∈ ωf(n). Thus ωn = ωf(n).
(b) Believe it or not:
#1 is but a special case of (a), namely when f(x) = x + 1.
#2 is just Theorem 6!
#3 is but the special case of #4 in which f(x) = x. And so we must show #4:
For f(x) a recursive function, the relation x = f(y) is recursively enumerable.
Hence by Theorem 5, there is some n such that for all x, x ∈ ωn iff x = f(n).
This means that f(n) is the one and only member of ωn, and so ωn = {f(n)}.
As for #5, let R(x, y) be the relation y ∈ ωx. This relation is recursively
enumerable, and so there is a number n such that for all x, x ∈ ωn iff R(x,
n), but R(x, n) iff n ∈ ωx, and so x ∈ ωn iff x ∈ ωx.
8. (a) We are given that A is recursive and that A ≠ ℕ and A ≠ . Since A ≠ ,
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then there is at least one number a such that a ∈ A, and since A ≠ ℕ there is
at least one number b such that b ∉ A. Define f(x) to be b if x ∈ A and to be
a if x ∉ A. Since A is recursive, then A and its complement Ā are both
recursively enumerable. Hence the function f(x) is recursive, since the
relation f(x) = y is equivalent to the recursively enumerable relation (x ∈ A
∧ y = b) ∨ (x ∈ Ā ∧ y = a). If x ∈ A, then f(x) ∈ A [since f(x) = b], and if x
∉ A, then f(x) ∈ A [since f(x) = a]. Thus x ∈ A iff f(x) ∉ A.
(b) Let A be a recursive set that is neither ℕ nor . Take f(x) as in the
lemma. By Theorem 6, there is some n such that ωn = ωf(n). Thus n and
f(n) are indices of the same recursively enumerable set, yet one of them
is in A and the other isn’t. Therefore A is not extensional.
9. (a) If we take t(i) for y in the statement Rt(i)(x, y) iff M(x, i, d(y)) we obtain
Rt(i)(x, t(i)) iff M(x, i, d(t(i))). But it is also true that ωd(t(i)) = {x : Rt(i)(x,
t(i))} [this is true because, for any n, ωd(n) = {x : Rn(x, n)}]. Thus ωd(t(i)) = {x
: M(x, i, d(t(i))). We now take φ(i) to be d(t(i)), yielding ωφ(i) = {x : M(x, i,
φ(i))}.
(b) As noted, Rh(x, y, z) iff M(x, y, t(y, z)). We take h for z and so Rh(x, y,
h) iff M(x, y, t(y, h)). But since ωt(y,h) = {x : Rh(x, y, h)}, it follows that
ωt(y,h) = {x : M(x, y, (t(y, h))) }. We thus take φ(y) to be t(y, h), yielding
ωφ(y) = {x : M(x, y, φ(y))}.
10. This is the case that M(x, y, z) is the relation Ry(x, z).
11. Since f reduces A to B, then for all x, f(x) ∈ B iff x ∈ A. For any number i
we take φ(t(i)) for x and we obtain:
(1) f(φ(t(i))) ∈ B iff φ(t(i)) ∈ A.
Also, φ(t(i)) ∈ A iff φ(t(i)) ∈ ωt(i) [since φ(x) is a generative function for A],
so we have that:
(2) f(φ(t(i))) ∈ B iff φ(t(i)) ∈ ωt(i).
Next, since t(y) is an iterative function for the relation f(x) ∈ ωy, then for all
x and i we have x ∈ ωt(i) iff f(x) ∈ ωi. We now take φ(t(i)) for x and obtain:
(3) φ(t(i)) ∈ ωt(i) iff f(φ(t(i))) ∈ ωi.
By (2) and (3), we see that f(φ(t(i))) 2 B iff f(φ(t(i))) ∈ ωi, and thus
f(φ(t(x))) is a generative function for B.
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12. For any number i, x ∈ ωi iff for all x,δ (x, i) ∈ K. Let φi be the function
that assigns to each x the number δ(x, i). Thus φi(x) = δ (x, i).
Consequently, x ∈ ωi iff φi(x) ∈ K, and so φi reduces ωi to K.
13. Suppose A is universal. Postφs set C is recursively enumerable and
generative. Since C is recursively enumerable and A is universal, then C is
reducible to A. Then, since C is generative, so is A [by Theorem 9].
14. Post’s set K is obviously uniformly universal under the recursive function
δ (x, y). Now, suppose A is universal. Then K is reducible to A under some
recursive function f(x). Then A must be uniformly universal under the
function f(δ (x, y)), because for any numbers i and x, x ∈ ωi iff δ (x, i) 2 K,
which is true iff f(δ (x, i)) ∈ A. Thus x ∈ ωi iff f(δ (x, i)) ∈ A.
15. We are given that φ(x) is a generative function for B. Thus for every
number i,

(1) Suppose ωi = ℕ. Then by (a), φ(i) ∈ ℕ iff φ(i) ∈ B, but φ(i) is in ℕ, so

φ(i) ∈ B.
(2) Suppose ωi = . Then by (a), φ(i) ∈ ; iff φ(i) ∈ B, but φ(i) ∉ , so φ(i) ∉
2 B.
16. For all x, we have M(x, y) iff y 2 A. We are letting t(y) be an iterative
function for the relation M(x, y), i.e. t is a recursive function such that for
every x and i: x ∈ ωt(i) iff M(x, i), which is true iff i ∈ A. Thus x ∈ ωt(i) iff
i ∈ A.
(1) If i ∈ A, then for every x, x ∈ ωt(i), which means that ωt(i) = ℕ.
(2) If i ∉ A, then for every x, x ∉ ∈ ωt(i), which means that ωt(i) is the
empty set .
17. Suppose B is a generative set. We wish to show that B is universal. Let
φ(x) be a generative function for B. Consider any recursively enumerable
set A which we wish to reduce to B. Let t(y) be a recursive function related
to A as in Problem 16. We assert that the function φ(t(x)) reduces A to B.
(1) Suppose i ∈ A. Then ωt(i) = ℕ [by Problem 16(1)]. Hence ωφ(t(i)) ∈ B
[by Problem 15(a), taking t(i) for i].
(2) Suppose i ∉ A. Then ωt(i) = [by Problem 16(2)]. Hence ωφ(t(i)) ∉ B
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[by Problem 15(b), taking t(i) for i].

Thus if i ∊ A, then φ(t(i)) ∈ B, and if i ∉ A, then φ(t(i)) ∉ B, or, what is the
same thing, if φ(t(i)) ∈ B then i ∈ A. Thus i ∈ A iff φ(t(i)) ∈ B, and so the
function φ(t(x)) reduces A to B.
18. Assume condition C1.
(1) Suppose ωi = . Obviously is disjoint from A, and so by C1, the
number φ(i) ∉ A [also, φ(i) ∉ ∈ ωi].
(2) Suppose ωi = {φ(i)}. If ωi were disjoint from A, then by C1, we would
have φ(i) ∉ ∈ ωi, and thus φ(i) ∉φ(i)}, which is absurd. Thus φ(i) ∈ A.
19. Define M(x, y, z) to be x ∈ ωy ∧ x = φ(z). By the strong recursion theorem
(Theorem 7), there is a recursive function t(y) such that

20. We want to show that for any number y, φ(t(y)) ∈ ωy iff φ(t(y)) ∈ A.
(1) Suppose φ(t(y)) ∈ ωy. Then ωy ∩ {φ(t(y))} = {φ(t(y))}. But also ωy ∩
{φ(t(y))} = ωt(y) [by the Lemma]. Then φ(t(y)) ∈ A [by condition C2,
taking t(y) for i, since A is weakly co-productive under φ(x)]. Thus if
φ(t(y)) ∈ ωy, then φ(t(y)) ∈ A.
(2) Suppose φ(t(y)) ∉ ωy. Then ωy ∩ {φ(t(y))} = . Again by the Lemma,
ωy ∩ {φ(t(y))} = ωt(y). Thus ωt(y) = . Again by condition C2, taking t(y)
for i, φ(t(y)) ∉ A. Thus if φ(t(y)) ∉ ωy, then φ(t(y)) ∉ A, or, equivalently
if φ(t(y)) ∈ A, then φ(t(y)) ∈ ωy, and thus φ(t(y)) is a generative function
for A.
Answer to the Bonus Question. Of course not! A universal set is generative and
a generative set A cannot be recursive, for if it were, its complement Ā would be
recursively enumerable, hence there would be a number n such that n ∈ A iff n ∈
Ā, which is impossible.
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Chapter 6
Doubling Up

For my intended applications to the mathematical systems of the next chapter,

we will need double analogues of earlier results.

Double Recursion Theorems

In preparation for the double recursion theorems we will consider here, we note
that by the iteration theorem, there is a recursive function d such that for all y
and z, ωd(y,z) = {x : Ry(x, y, z)}. This function will play a key role, and I shall call
it the double diagonal function.
Theorem 1. [Weak Double Recursion Theorem] For any two recursively
enumerable relations M1(x, y, z) and M2(x, y, z) , there are numbers a and b such
that:
(1) ωa = {x : M1(x, a, b)};
(2) ωb = {x : M2(x, a, b)}.

Problem 1. Prove Theorem 1. [Hint: Use the double diagonal function d and
consider the relations M1(x, d(y, z) , d(z, y)) and M2(x, d(z, y) , d(y, z)).]

The Strong Double Recursion Theorem

We now wish to show that in Theorem 1, the numbers a and b can be found as
recursive function of the indices i and j of the relations M1(x, y, z) and M2(x, y,
z). This is Theorem 3 below, which will soon be seen to be a consequence of:
Theorem 2. [Strong Double Recursion Theorem] For any recursively
enumerable relations M1(x, y1, y2, z1, z2) and M2(x, y1, y2, z1, z2), there are
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recursive functions φ1(i, j) and φ2(i, j) such that for all numbers i and j:
(1)
(2)
Problem 2. Prove Theorem 2. [Hint: We again use the double diagonal function
d. By the iteration theorem there are recursive functions t1(i, j) and t2(i, j) such
that for all numbers i, j, x, y, z:
(1)
(2)
As an obvious corollary of Theorem 2 we have:
Theorem 3. For any two recursively enumerable relations M1(x, y, z1, z2) and
M2(x, y, z1, z2), there are recursive functions φ1(i, j) and φ2(i, j) such that for all
numbers i and j:
(1)
(2)
A special case of Theorem 3 is:
Theorem 4. [Strong Double Myhill Theorem] There are recursive functions
φ1(i, j) and φ2(i, j) such that for all numbers i and j:
(1)
(2)
Problem 3. (a) Why is Theorem 3 a corollary of Theorem 2. (b) Why is
Theorem 4 a special case of Theorem 3?

Discussion

The proof we have given of the strong double recursion theorem involved three
applications of the iteration theorem. Actually, the theorem can be proved using
only one application of the iteration theorem, and that can be done in more than
one way.
Several workers in the field of recursion theory have found a way of deriving
the weak double recursion theorem as a consequence of the strong (single)
recursion theorem, and I have subsequently found a way of deriving the strong
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double recursion theorem as a consequence of the strong (single) recursion

theorem.
All this can be found in a more in-depth study of recursion theorems in my
book Recursion Theory for Metamathematics [Smullyan, 1993], in which several
other variants of the recursion theorem are also treated.

More Doubling Up

We shall say that an ordered pair (A1, A2) is reducible to the ordered pair (B1, B2)
under a recursive function f(x) if f(x) simultaneously reduces A1 to B1 and A2 to
B2. This means that A1 = f–1(B1) and A2 = f–1(B2); in other words, it means that
for every number x:
(1) If x ∈ A1, then f(x) ∈ B1;
(2) If x ∈ A2, then f(x) ∈ B2;
(3) If x ∉ A1 ∪ A2, then f(x) ∉ B1 ∪ B2.

If (1) and (2) above both hold, without (3) necessarily holding, we say that
(A1, A2) is semi-reducible to the ordered pair (B1, B2) under the recursive
function f(x).
We shall call a pair (U1, U2) doubly universal if every disjoint pair (A, B) of
recursively enumerable sets is reducible to (U1, U2). We shall call a pair (U1, U2)
semi-doubly universal if every disjoint pair (A, B) of recursively enumerable sets
is semi-reducible to (U1, U2).

We shall call a disjoint pair (A, B) doubly generative under a recursive

function φ(x, y) if, for every disjoint pair (ωi, ωj) of recursively enumerable sets,
the following holds:
(1) φ(i, j) ∈ A iff φ(i, j) ∈ ωi;
(2) φ(i, j) ∈ B iff φ(i, j) ∈ ωj.

In this chapter we will prove that a pair (A, B) is doubly generative iff it is
doubly universal.
We shall call a disjoint pair (A, B) doubly co-productive under a recursive
function g(x, y) if for every disjoint pair of recursively enumerable sets (ωi, ωj),
if ωi is disjoint from A and ωj is disjoint from B, then the number g(i, j) is
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outside all four sets ωi, ωj, A and B.

It is obvious that if (A, B) is doubly generative, then (A, B) is doubly co-

productive. The converse is also true, but this is not trivial. The proof requires
something like the strong double recursion theorem.
All this is closely connected to the topic of effective inseparability, to which
we now turn.

Effective Inseparability

First we must discuss a very useful principle: Consider two recursively

enumerable sets A and B. They are both Σ1 and so there are Σ0 relations R1(x, y)
and R2(x, y) such that for all x,
(1) x ∈ A iff ∃yR1(x, y);
(2) x ∈ B iff ∃yR2(x, y).

Now define the sets A′ and B′ by the following conditions:

The sets A′ and B′ are both recursively enumerable and disjoint.

Problem 4. Why are the sets A′ and B′ disjoint?
We thus have:
Separation Principle: For any two recursively enumerable sets A and B, there are
disjoint recursively enumerable sets A′ and B′ such that A – B ⊆ A′ and B – A ⊆
B′.
A disjoint pair of sets (A, B) is said to be recursively inseparable if there is no
recursive superset of A disjoint from B, or, what is the same thing, if there is no
recursive superset of B disjoint from A (these are the same because if C is a
recursive superset of B disjoint from A, its complement is a recursive superset
of A disjoint from B). A pair of sets (A, B) is said to be recursively separable if
the pair is not recursively inseparable (i.e. there does exist a recursive superset of
A disjoint from B or a recursive superset of B disjoint from A). Clearly a pair of
sets (A, B) that is recursively separable must be disjoint.
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Now, to say that (A, B) is recursively inseparable is equivalent to saying that

for any disjoint recursively enumerable supersets ωi and ωj of A and B
respectively, there is a number n outside both ωi and ωj [i.e. ωi is not the
complement of ωj].

Problem 5. Why are the characterizations of recursive inseparability in the two

preceding paragraphs equivalent?
A disjoint pair (A, B) is called effectively inseparable if there is a recursive
function ζ(x, y) [the Greek letter ζ is read as “zeta”] — called an effective
inseparability function for (A, B) — such that for any recursively enumerable
disjoint supersets ωi and ωj of A and B respectively, the number ζ(i, j) lies
outside both ωi and ωj [ζ(i, j) is a witness, so to speak, that ωi is not the
complement of ωj].

We shall call a disjoint pair (A, B) completely effectively inseparable if there

is a recursive function ζ(x, y)—called a completely effective inseparability
function for (A, B) —such that for any recursively enumerable supersets ωi and
ωj of A and B respectively, whether they are disjoint or not, the number ζ(i, j) is
either in both ωi and ωj or in neither, in other words ζ(x, y) ∈ ωi iff ζ(x, y) ∈ ωj.
[If ωi and ωj happen to be disjoint, then ζ(x, y) is obviously outside both ωi and
ωj, and so any completely effective inseparability function for (A, B) is also an
effective inseparability function for (A, B).]
We will later show that the non-trivial result that if (A, B) is effectively
inseparable, and A and B are both recursively enumerable, then (A, B) is
completely effectively inseparable. The only proof of this that I know of uses the
strong double recursion theorem.

Kleene’s Construction

There are several ways to construct a completely effectively inseparable pair of

recursively enumerable sets. The following way is due to Kleene [1952].
We shall call a recursive function k(x, y) a Kleene function for a disjoint pair
(A1, A2) if, for all numbers i and j,
(1) If k(i, j) ∈ ωi – ωj, then k(i, j) ∈ A2;
(2) If k(i, j) ∈ ωj – ωi, then k(i, j) ∈ A1.
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Proposition 1. If k(x, y) is a Kleene function for a disjoint pair (A1, A2), then
(A1, A2) is completely effectively inseparable under k(x, y).

Problem 6. Prove Proposition 1.

We shall call a disjoint pair (A1, A2) a Kleene pair if there is a Kleene
function for (A1, A2).

By Proposition 1, any Kleene pair is completely effectively inseparable.

Theorem 5. There exists a Kleene pair (K1, K2) of recursively enumerable sets.

Problem 7. Prove Theorem 5. [Hint: Use the pairing function δ(x, y). Let A1 be
the set of all numbers δ(i, j) such that δ(i, j) ∈ ωj and let A2 be the set of all
numbers δ(i, j) such that δ(i, j) ∈ ωi. Show that δ(x, y) is a Kleene function for
the pair (A1 − A2, A2 − A1). Then use the separation principle to get the
recursively enumerable sets K1 and K2.]

From Theorem 5 and Proposition 1, we have:

Theorem 6. There is a completely effectively inseparable pair of recursively
enumerable sets, to wit, the Kleene pair (K1, K2).

Proposition 2. If (A1, A2) is a Kleene pair and if (A1, A2) is semi-reducible to

(B1, B2) and B1 is disjoint from B2, then (B1, B2) is a Kleene pair.

Problem 8. Prove Proposition 2. [Hint: Let f(x) be a function that semi-reduces

(A1, A2) to (B1, B2), and let k(x, y) be a Kleene function for (A1, A2). By the
iteration theorem, there is a recursive function t(y) such that ωt(y) = {x : f(x) ∈
ωy}. Show that ωt(y) = f−1(ωy). From the functions k(x, y), f(x), t(y) construct a
Kleene function for (B1, B2).]

Theorem 7. Every disjoint semi-doubly-universal pair is completely effectively

inseparable.
Problem 9. Why is Theorem 7 true?

Doubly Generative Pairs

We recall that a disjoint pair (A, B) is called doubly generative if there is a

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recursive function φ(x, y) — called a doubly generative function for (A, B) —

such that, for every disjoint pair (ωi, ωj), the following holds:
(1) φ(i, j) ∈ A iff φ(i, j) ∈ ωi;
(2) φ(i, j) ∈ B iff φ(i, j) ∈ ωj.

Problem 10. Prove that if (A, B) is called doubly generative, then A and B are
each generative sets.
The next theorem is vital:
Theorem 8. If (A, B) is completely effectively inseparable and A and B are both
recursively enumerable, then (A, B) is doubly generative.
Problem 11. Prove Theorem 8. [Hint: (A, B) is completely effectively
inseparable under some recursive function ζ(x, y). By the iteration theorem, there
are recursive functions t1(n), t2(n) such that for all x and n:
(1)
(2)
Let φ(i, j) = ζ(t1(j), t2(i)). Show that (A, B) is doubly generative under the
function φ(i, j).]
Since the Kleene pair (K1, K2) is completely effectively inseparable and K1
and K2 are both recursively enumerable, it follows from Theorem 8 that the pair
(K1, K2) is doubly generative. Thus there exists a doubly generative pair of
recursively enumerable sets.

Doubly Generative, Doubly Universal

Suppose (A1, A2) is a disjoint pair which is doubly generative under the function
g(x, y). Then, for all numbers i and j, the following three conditions hold:
C1: If ωi = ℕ and ωj = , then g(i, j) ∈ A1;
C2: If ωi = and ωj = ℕ, then g(i, j) ∈ A2;
C3: If ωi = and ωj = , then g(i, j) ∉ A1 ∪ A2.

Problem 12. Prove this.

Problem 13. Suppose (A1, A2) is a disjoint pair and that g(x, y) is a recursive
function such that conditions C1 and C2 above hold. Prove that for any disjoint
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pair (B1, B2) of recursively enumerable sets there are recursive functions t1(x),
t2(x) such that:
(1) (B1, B2) is semi-reducible to (A1, A2) under g(t1(x), t2(x));
(2) If condition C3 also holds, then (B1, B2) is reducible to (A1, A2) under g(t1(x),
t2(x)). [Hint: Use the result of Problem 16 of the previous chapter.]

From Problems 12 and 13 immediately follows:

Theorem 9. Every doubly generative pair is doubly universal.
We now see that for a disjoint pair (A, B), being completely effectively
inseparable, being doubly generative, and being doubly universal, are all one and
the same thing. Now to complete the picture.

Double Co-productivity

We recall that a disjoint pair (A, B) is defined to be doubly co-productive under a

recursive function g(x, y) if for all i and j, if ωi is disjoint from ωj, and ωi is
disjoint from A and ωj is disjoint from B, then g(i, j) lies outside all the four sets
ωi, ωj, A and B.

We claim that if (A, B) is doubly co-productive under a recursive function g(x,

y), then, for all numbers i and j, the following conditions hold:
D0: If ωi = ωj = , then g(i, j) ∉ A ∪ B;
D1: If ωi = {g(i, j)} and ωj = , then g(i, j) ∈ A;
D2: If ωi = and ωj = {g(i, j)}, then g(i, j) ∈ B.

Problem 14. Prove that if (A, B) is doubly co-productive under the recursive
function g(x, y), then conditions D0, D1 and D2 hold.

We will say that (A, B) is called weakly doubly co-productive under the
recursive function g(x, y) if conditions D0, D1 and D2 hold.

We now wish to prove:

Theorem 10. If (A, B) is doubly co-productive, or even weakly doubly co-
productive, under a recursive function g(x, y), then (A, B) is doubly generative
(and hence also doubly universal).
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For the proof of Theorem 1. we need:

Lemma. For any recursive function g(x, y), there are recursive functions t1(i, j),
t2(i, j) such that for all numbers all i and j,
(1)
(2)
To prove this, we will need the strong double recursion theorem, or rather its
corollary, Theorem 3.
Problem 15. Prove the above Lemma. [Hint: Let M1(x, y, z1, z2) be the
recursively enumerable relation x ∈ ωy ∧ x = g(z1, z2), and let M2(x, y, z1, z2) be
the same relation. Then use Theorem 3.]
Problem 16. Now prove Theorem 10. [Hint: Suppose (A, B) is weakly doubly
co-productive under g(x, y). By the lemma, there are recursive functions t1(x, y),
t2(x, y) such that for all i and j,
(1)
(2)
Let φ(x, y) = g(t1(x, y)t2(x, y)), and show that (A, B) is doubly generative under
φ(x, y).]
Next we wish to prove:
Theorem 11. If (A, B) is effectively inseparable and A and B are both
recursively enumerable, then (A, B) is doubly generative (and hence doubly
universal).
Problem 17. Prove Theorem 11. [Hint: (a) First prove that for any recursively
enumerable set A there is a recursive function t(i) such that for all i, ωt(i) = ωi ∪
A. (b) Now suppose that (A, B) is effectively inseparable under g(x, y) and that A
and B are both recursively enumerable sets. Let t1(i), t2(i) be recursive functions
such that for all i, and . Let g(x, y) = ζ(t1(y), t2(x)) and
show that (A, B) is doubly generative under the function g(x, y).]

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 6

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1. Let m be an index of the relation M1(x, d(y, z), d(z, y)), and let n be an index
of M2(x, d(z, y), d(y, z)). Then:
(1) Rm(x, y, z) iff M1(x, d(y, z), d(z, y)),
(2) Rn(x, y, z) iff M2(x, d(z, y), d(y, z)).
In (1), take m for y and n for z, and in (2), take n for y and m for z. As a
result, we have:
(1′) Rm(x, m, n) iff M1(x, d(m, n), d(n, m)),
(2′) Rn(x, n, m) iff M2(x, d(m, n), d(n, m)).
Now, ωd(m,n) = {x : Rm(x, m, n)} = {x : M1(x, d(m, n), d(n, m))} [by (1′)];
and
ωd(n,m) = {x : Rn(x, n, m)} = {x : M2(x, d(m, n), d(n, m))} [by (2′)].
We thus take a = d(m, n) and b = d(n, m), and have:

2. We define:

where t1(i, j) and t2(i, j) are the functions mentioned in the hint and d(x, y) is
the double diagonal function. We will see that these two functions work.
By the definitions of t1 and t2, we know that for all numbers i, j, x, y, z,
(1) iff M1(x, i, j, d(y, z), d(z, y));
(2) iff M2(x, i, j, d(z, y), d(y, z)).
In (1), we take t1(i, j) for y and t2(i, j) for z, and in (2), we take t2(i, j) for y
and t1(i, j) for z, obtaining:
(1′) iff M1(x, i, j, φ1(i1, i2), φ2(i1, i2));
(2′) iff M2(x, i, j, φ1(i1, i2), φ2(i1, i2)).
Also:
(3)
(4)
From (3) and (1′), we have ωφ1(i,j) = {x : M1(i, j, φ1(i, j), φ2(i, j))}.
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From (4) and (2′), we have ωφ2(i,j) = {x : M2(i, j, φ1(i, j), φ2(i, j))}.
3. (a) Given the recursively enumerable relations M1(x, y, z1, z2) and M2(x, y, z1,
z2) define two new relations iff M1(x, y1, z1, z2) and
iff M2(x, y2, z1, z2). Then apply Theorem 2 to the relations
and .
(b) This follows from Theorem 3 by taking M1(x, y, z1, z2) and M2(x, y, z1,
z2) to both be the relation Ry(x, z1, z2).
4. If x ∈ A′ and x ∈ B′, we get the following contradiction: There must be
numbers n and m such that:
(1) R1(x, n).
(2) R2(x, m).
(3) If R2(x, m), then m > n [since (∀ z ≤ n) ∼R2(x, z)].
(4) If R1(x, n), then n > m [since (∀ z ≤ m) ∼R1(x, z)].
From (1) and (4) it follows that n > m. From (2) and (3) it follows that it is
also true that m > n, which is impossible.
5. We are to show that the following two characterizations of the recursive
inseparability of the disjoint pair of sets (A, B) are equivalent:
C1: There is no recursive superset of A disjoint from B.
C2: For any disjoint recursively enumerable supersets ωi of A and ωj of B,
ωi cannot be the complement of ωj.
To show that C1 implies C2, assume C1. Now suppose ωi, ωj are disjoint
supersets of A and B respectively. If ωi were the complement of ωj then ωi
would be a recursive superset of A disjoint from B, contrary to C1.
Therefore ωi is not the complement of ωj, which proves C2.
Conversely, suppose C2 holds. Let A′ be any superset of A disjoint from
B. We are to show that A′ cannot be recursive and hence C1 holds. Well, if
A′ were a recursive set ωi, its complement would be a recursively
enumerable superset ωj of B, disjoint from A, which would be contrary to
C2. Thus A′ is not recursive.
6. We are given that k(x, y) is a recursive function such that for all i and j,
(1) k(i, j) ∈ ωi − ωj implies k(i, j) ∈ A2;
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(2) k(i, j) ∈ ωj − ωi implies k(i, j) ∈ A1.

Now consider any recursively enumerable superset ωi of A1 and any
recursively enumerable superset ωj of A2. We are to show that k(i, j) ∈ ωi
iff k(i, j) ∈ ωj [and thus that (A1, A2) is completely effectively inseparable
under k(x, y)].
If k(i, j) ∈ ωi − ωj, then k(i, j) ∈ A2 [by (1)], and hence k(i, j) ∈ ωj [since
A2 ⊆ ωj], but no number in ωi − ωj could possibly be in ωj, and therefore
k(i, j) ∉ ωi − ωj. By a symmetric argument, k(i, j) ∉ ωj − ωi. Consequently,
k(i, j) ∈ ωi iff k(i, j) ∈ ωj.
This completes the proof.
7. Since δ(i, j) ∈ ωj iff δ(i, j) ∈ A1 and δ(i, j) ∈ ωi iff δ(i, j) ∈ A2, then δ(i, j) ∈
ωj − ωi iff δ(i, j) ∈ A1 − A2 and δ(i, j) ∈ ωi − ωj iff δ(i, j) ∈ A2 − A1. Thus
δ(x, y) is a Kleene function for (A1−A2, A2−A1). By the separation principle,
there are recursively enumerable sets K1 and K2 such that A1 − A2 ⊆ K1 and
A2 − A1 ⊆ K2. Since δ(x, y) is a Kleene function for (A1 − A2, A2 − A1), and
A1 − A2 ⊆ K1 and A2 − A1 ⊆ K2, it follows that δ(x, y) is a Kleene function
for the recursively enumerable pair (K1, K2). [In general, it is easily verified
that if ζ(x, y) is a Kleene function for a pair (B1, B2), and if are disjoint
supersets of B1B2 respectively, then ζ(x, y) must be a Kleene function for
.]
8. As mentioned in the hint: Let f(x) be the function that semi-reduces (A1, A2)
to (B1, B2), and let t(y) be a recursive function given by the iteration theorem
such that for all x and y, x ∈ ωt(y) iff f(x) ∈ ωy [thus ωt(y) = {x : f(x) ∈ ωy}].
Also f(x) ∈ ωy iff x ∈ f−1(ωy) and so x ∈ ωt(y) iff x ∈ f−1(ωy). Let k be a
Kleene function for the (disjoint) Kleene pair (A1A2). We now let k′(x, y) be
the function f(k(t(x), t(y))), and we will show that k′(x, y) is a Kleene
function for the pair (B1, B2). [At this point, the reader might like to try
showing this without reading further.]
First we show that if k′(i, j) ∈ ωj − ωi, then k′(i, j) ∈ B1.
Well, suppose k′(i, j) ∈ ωj − ωi. Thus f(k(t(i), t(j))) ∈ ωj − ωi, and so
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But

[since f−1(ωj) = ωt(j) and f−1(ωi) = ωt(i), as we have shown]. Thus

so that k(t(i), t(j)) ∈ A1 [since k(x, y) is a Kleene function for (A1, A2)], and
therefore f(k(t(i), t(j))) ∈ B1 [since (A1, A2) is semi-reducible to (B1, B2)
under f(x)]. Thus k′(i, j) ∈ B1.
This proves that if k′(i, j) ∈ ωj − ωi, then k′(i, j) ∈ B1.
By a similar argument, if k′(i, j) ∈ ωi − ωj, then k′(i, j) ∈ B2. Thus k′(x,
y) is a Kleene function for (B1, B2).
9. If (A, B) is semi-doubly universal, then by definition the Kleene pair (K1, K2)
is semi-reducible to (A, B). Hence [by Proposition 2] (A, B) is in turn a
Kleene pair, and therefore completely effectively inseparable [by
Proposition 1].
10. Suppose φ(x, y) is a doubly generative function for (A, B). Let c be any
index of the empty set, and thus for every number i, the set ωi is disjoint
from ωc. Thus φ(x, c) [as a function of x] is a generative function for A,
because for every number i, ωi is disjoint from ωc, so that φ(i, c) ∈ A iff
φ(i, c) ∈ ωi [by (1)]. Similarly, φ(c, x) [as a function of x] is a doubly
generative function for the set B.
11. The set {x : x ∈ ωn ∨ x ∈ A} is simply ωn ∪ A, and the set {x : x ∈ ωn ∨ x
∈ B} is simply ωn ∪ B. Using the t1 and t2 recommended in the hint, we
have:
(1)
(2)
Thus A and ωn are both subsets of for all n, and B and ωn are both
subsets of for all n. Also as in the hint, we take
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Given two numbers i and j, let k = φ(i, j). Thus k = ζ(t1(j), t2(i)). Since
(A, B) is completely effectively inseparable under ζ(x, y) and A ⊆ ωt1(j) and
B ⊆ ωt2(i) [remember, A ⊆ ωt1(n) and B ⊆ ωt2(n) for all n], and ζ(x, y) is a
completely effective inseparability function for (A, B), then
(a) k ∈ ωt1(j) iff k ∈ .

Now, consider any disjoint pair (ωi, ωj). We are to show that k ∈ A iff k
∈ ωi and k ∈ B iff k ∈ ωj, and thus that (A, B) is doubly generative under
φ(x, y).
Suppose that k ∈ A. Then k ∈ ωt1 (j) [since A ⊆ ωt1(j) for every n].
Hence k ∈ ωt2(i) [by (a)]. Thus k ∈ ωi ∪ B [since ωt2(i) = ωi ∪ B]. But k ∉
B, since B is disjoint from A. Thus k ∈ ωi. This proves that if k ∈ A then k
∈ ωi.
Conversely, suppose that k ∈ ωi. Then k ∈ ωt2(i) [since ωi ⊆ ]. Thus
k ∈ [by (a)], and since ωt1(j) = ωj ∪ A, then k ∈ ωj ∪ A. But since ωj
is disjoint from ωi we have the k ∉ ωj, and so k ∈ A. Thus if k ∈ ωi, then k
∈ A.
This proves that k ∈ A iff k ∈ ωi. The proof that k ∈ B iff k ∈ ωj is
similar.
12. We are given that (A1, A2) is doubly generative under g(x, y).
(a) Suppose that ωi = ℕ and ωj = . Of course ωi is disjoint from ωj, so that
g(i, j) ∈ ℕ iff g(i, j) ∈ A1 [and also g(i, j) ∈ iff g(i, j) ∈ A2], but since
g(i, j) ∈ ℕ, it follows that g(i, j) ∈ A1.
(b) Similarly, if ωi = and ωj = ℕ, then g(i, j) ∈ A2.
(c) If and , since is obviously disjoint from , then g(i, j) ∈ A1
iff , and iff g(i, j) ∈ A2. But since , then g(i, j)
∈ A1 and g(i, j) ∈ A2.
13. By Problem 16 of the last chapter, for any recursively enumerable set B
there is a recursive function t(y) such that for all numbers i, if i ∈ B then
, and if i ∉ B, then .
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Now, let (B1, B2) be any disjoint pair of recursively enumerable sets.
There are recursive functions t1(i), t2(i) such that for any number i,
(1) If i ∈ B1, then ;
(2) If i ∉ B1, then ;
(3) If i ∈ B2, then ;
(4) If i ∉ B2, then .
Now assume that conditions C1 and C2 hold between the function g(x, y)
and the pair (A1, A2).
(a) Suppose i ∈ B1. Then [by (1)]. Since B2 is disjoint from B1,
then i ∉ B2, and hence [by (4)], and thus the pair is
(ℕ, ), and so g(t1(i), t2(i)) ∈ A1. This proves that i ∈ B1 implies g(t1(i),
t2(i)) ∈ A1.
(b) The proof that i ∈ B2 implies g(t1(i), t2(i)) ∈ A2 is similar. Thus (B1, B2)
is semi-reducible to (A1, A2) under the function g(t1(x), t2(x)).
(c) Suppose that condition C3 also holds. Now suppose that i ∉ B1 and i ∉
B2. Then by (2) and (4), and , and therefore g(t1(i),
t2(i)) ∉ A1 and g(t1(i), t2(i)) ∉ A2 [by C3]. Thus g(t1(x), t2(x)) reduces
(B1, B2) to (A1, A2).
14. We are given that (A, B) is doubly co-productive under the recursive
function g(x, y).
D0: This is obvious!
D1: Suppose ωi = {g(i, j)} and . We are to show that g(i, j) ∈ A.
Consider the following conditions:
(1) ωi is disjoint from ωj;
(2) ωj is disjoint from B;
(3) ωi is disjoint from A.
If these three conditions all hold, then g(i, j) would be outside all four sets
A, B, ωi, ωj [by the definition of double co-productivity]. Hence g(i, j)
would be outside ωi, hence outside {g(i, j)}, which is not possible.
Therefore it cannot be that all three of these conditions hold, but (1) and (2)
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do hold, therefore (3) doesn’t hold, which means that ωi is not disjoint from
A. Thus g(i, j) is not disjoint from A, so that g(i, j) ∈ A This proves D1.
D2: The proof of D2 is symmetric to that of D1.
15. By Theorem 3 there are recursive functions t1(i, j) and t2(i, j) such that for
all numbers i and j,
(1)

Thus,
(1′)
(2′)
16. Consider any disjoint pair (ωi, ωj). Let φ(i, j) = g(t1(i, j), t2(i, j)), where
t1(y1, y2), t2(y1, y2) are as given by the lemma. Then by the lemma,
(a)
(b)
We first wish to show:
(1) If φ(i, j) ∈ ωi, then φ(i, j) ∈ A;
(2) If φ(i, j) ωj, then φ(i, j) ∈ B.
To show (1), suppose that φ(i, j) ∈ ωi. Then ωi ∩ {φ(i, j)} = {φ(i, j)}
is the set {φ(i, j)}.
Since φ(i, j) ∈ ωi and ωi is disjoint from ωj, then φ(i, j) ∉ ωj, and
therefore . Hence, by (b), . Thus is the unit
set {φ(i, j)} and is the empty set , and so by condition D1 of the
definition of “weakly doubly co-productive,” g(t1(i, j), t2(i, j)) ∈ A. Thus
φ(i, j) ∈ A, which proves (1).
The proof of (2) is similar (using D2 instead of D1).
It remains to prove the converses of (1) and (2). To this end, we first
establish:
(3) If φ(i, j) ∈ A ∪ B, then φ(i, j) ∈ ωi ∪ ωj.
We will prove the equivalent propositions that if φ(i, j) ∉ ωi ∪ ωj, then φ(i,
j) ∉ A ∪ B.
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Well, suppose φ(i, j) ∉ ωi ∪ ωj. Then ω(i, j) ∈ ωi and φ(i, j) ∉ ωj. Since
φ(i, j) ∉ ωi, then . Then by (a), . Similarly, since
φ(i, j) ∉ ωj, then . Hence by condition D0 of the definition of
“weakly doubly productive,”

Thus φ(i, j) ∉ A ∪ B. This proves that if φ(i, j) ∉ ωi ∪ ωj, then φ(i, j) ∉ A

∪ B, and therefore if φ(i, j) ∈ A ∪ B then φ(i, j) ∉ ωi ∪ ωj which is (3).
Now, to prove the converse of (1), suppose φ(i, j) ∈ A. Then φ(i, j) ∈ A
∪ B, so that φ(i, j) ∈ ωi ∪ ωj. Since φ(i, j) ∈ A, then φ(i, j) ∉ B [because B
is disjoint from A]. Therefore φ(i, j) ∉ ωj [because if φ(i, j) ∈ ωj, then by
(2) φ(i, j) would be in B, which it isn’t]. Since φ(i, j) ∈ ωi ∪ ωj but φ(i, j) ∉
ωj, then φ(i, j) ∈ ωi. Thus if φ(i, j) ∈ A, then φ(i, j) ∈ ωi, which is the
converse of (1). The proof of the converse of (2) is similar.

17. (a) Suppose that A is recursively enumerable. Let M(x, y) be the recursively
enumerable relation x ∈ ωy ν x ∈ A. By the iteration theorem, there is a
recursive function t(i) such that for all i, ωt(i) = {x : M(x, i)}. Thus

(b) Suppose (A, B) is effectively inseparable under ζ(x, y) and A and B are
both recursively enumerable. Now let (ωi, ωj) be a disjoint pair such that
ωi is disjoint from A and ωj is disjoint from B. Since ωi is disjoint from
both ωj and A, then ωi is disjoint from ωj ∪ A. Since B is disjoint from
both ωj and A, then B is disjoint from ωj ∪ A. Thus ωi and B are both
disjoint from ωj ∪ A, so that ωi ∪ B is disjoint from ωj ∪ A.
Thus, ωj ∪ A and ωi ∪ B are disjoint supersets of A and B
respectively. By (a), there are recursive functions t1 and t2 such that
and . Therefore , are disjoint supersets
of A and B respectively. Because the pair (A, B) is assumed to be
effectively inseparable under ζ(x, y), ζ(t1(j), t2(i)) [which we define g(i, j)
to be] lies outside both and . But and ,
which means g(i, j) must of course lie outside both ωi and ωj (and A and
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B as well). Thus we see that (A, B) is doubly generative under the

function g(x, y).
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Chapter 7
Metamathematical Applications

In The Beginner’s Guide [Smullyan, 2014] we studied the system of Peano

Arithmetic. Some of the results regarding that system, as well as those regarding
other formal systems, depend on the use of the logical connectives and
quantifiers, but not all do. Those that do not can be neatly generalized to more
abstract systems called representation systems, which I introduced in the Theory
of Formal Systems [Smullyan, 1961]. In this chapter, I generalize further using
systems I call simple systems, in terms of which it is shown that many results of
Peano Arithmetic and other systems are essentially results of recursion theory in
a new dress.
In what follows, number shall mean natural number, and function shall mean
function whose arguments and values are natural numbers. Any argument of a
function ranges over the whole set of natural numbers.

I. Simple Systems
By a simple system I shall mean a pair (P, R) of disjoint sets, together with a
function neg(x) and a function r(x, y) satisfying condition C1 below.

For any numbers h and n, we abbreviate neg(h) by h′, and r(h, n) by h(n), or
sometimes by rh(n).

C1: For any numbers h and n, h′(n) ∊ P iff h′(n) ∊ R, and h′(n) ∊ R iff h(n) ∊
P.

Intended Applications

With any first-order system of arithmetic we associate a simple system S as

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follows: We arrange all the sentences of in an infinite sequence S1, S2, …, Sn,
… according to the magnitude of their Gödel numbers. We refer to n as the index
of the sentence Sn. We take one particular variable x and arrange all formulas
with x as their only free variable in an infinite sequence φ1(x), φ2(x), …, φn(x), …
according to the magnitude of their Gödel numbers. We refer to n as the index of
φn(x). We arrange all formulas with the two variables x and y as their only free
variables in an infinite sequence ψ1(x, y), ψ2(x, y), …, ψn(x, y), …, according to
the magnitudes of their Gödel numbers, and for any numbers n, x and y, we
define s(n, x, y) to be the index of the sentence
For the associated simple system S of , we take P to be the set of indices of
the provable sentences, and take R to be the set of indices of the refutable
sentences. For any numbers h and n, we take r(h, n) to be the index of the
sentence [i.e. the sentence resulting from substituting the number (the
name of n) for all free occurrences of x in φh(x)]. We take h′ [which is the
abbreviation of neg(h)] to be the index of the formula ∼φh(x) Of course φh′ (x) is
provable (refutable) iff φh(x) is refutable (provable). And so the items (P, R),
neg(h), and r(x, y) constitute a simple system. Consequently, whatever we prove
for simple systems in general will hold for Peano Arithmetic and other systems.
Returning to simple systems in general, in accordance with intended
applications, we might call members of P provable numbers, and members of R
refutable numbers. We will call a number decidable if it is in either P or R, and
call it undecidable otherwise. We call S complete if every number is decidable,
otherwise incomplete.
We call two numbers equivalent if whenever either one is in P, so is the other,
and if either one is in R, so is the other.
We will refer to the function r(x, y) as the representation function for sets of
the system S, and we say that a number h represents the set A of all numbers n
such that h(n) ∈ P. Thus, to say that h represents A is to say that for all n, h(n) ∈
P iff n ∈ A. We call A representable in if some number h represents it.
We say that h completely represents A iff h represents A and h′ represents the
complement of A.
We say that h defines A if, for all numbers n:
(1) n ∈ A implies h(n) ∈ P ;
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(2) n ∈ implies h(n) ∈ R.

We say that A is definable (completely representable) if some number h
defines (completely represents) A.
We say that h contra-represents A if for all n the number h(n) ∈ R iff n ∈ A.
Problem 1. (a) Show that h defines A iff h completely represents A.
(b) Show that h contra-represents A iff h′ represents A, so that A is contra-
representable iff it is representable.

For any function f(x) and set A, by f–1(A) is meant the set of all n such that
f(n) ∈ A. Thus n ∈ f–1(A) iff f(n) ∈ A.
Recall that rh(n) is r(h, n) and that rh(n) = h(n), where r(x, y) is the
representation function for sets.
Problem 2. Show that h represents A iff . Show also that h contra-
represents A iff
Problem 3. Prove that if some set A is represented in S and its complement is
not, then S is incomplete.

For any set A, by A* we shall mean the set of all numbers h such that h(h) ∈
A.

Problem 4. Prove that neither the complement of P*, nor the complement
of R*, is representable in S.
By the diagonalization of a number h we shall mean the number h(h). By the
skew diagonalization of h we shall mean the number h(h′).

It follow from Problems 3 and 4 that if either P* or R* is representable in S,

then S is incomplete. The following problem yields a sharper result.
Problem 5. Prove the following:
(a) If h represents R*, then its diagonalization h(h) is undecidable.
(b) If h represents P*, then its skew-diagonalization h(h′) is undecidable.
The following problem yields still stronger results.
Problem 6. Prove the following:
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(a) If h represents some superset of R* disjoint from P*, then h(h) is

undecidable.
(b) If h represents some superset of P * disjoint from R*, then h(h′) is
undecidable.
Why are these results stronger than those of Problem 5?

Discussion

Gödel’s original incompleteness proof essentially involved representing the set

P*. [In the Theory of Formal Systems [Smullyan, 1961], I pointed out that
incompleteness also follows if R* is representable.] To represent P* Gödel had to
assume that the system was ω-consistent. It was John Barkley Rosser [1936]
who was able to eliminate the hypothesis of ω-consistency by representing, not
R*, but some superset of R* disjoint from P*.

The Diagonal Function d(x)

We define d(x) to be r(x, x), which is x(x). We note that for any set A the set A* is
d–1(A).
Problem 7. Prove that for any sets A and B:
(a) If A ⊆ B, then f–1(A) ⊆ f–1(B).
(b) If A is disjoint from B, then f–1(A) is disjoint from f–1(B).
(c) f–1( ) is the complement of f–1(A).
In particular, taking d(x) for f(x),
(a1) If A ⊆ B, then A* ⊆ B *.
(a2) If A is disjoint from B, then A* is disjoint from B *.
(a3)

Admissible Functions

We shall call a function f(x) admissible if for every number h there is a number k
such that for every n the number k(n) is equivalent to h(f(n)).
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Separation

Given a disjoint pair (A, B), we say that a number h separates A from B (in ) if
h represents a superset of A and contra-represents some superset of B.
We say that h exactly separates A from B if h both represents A itself and
contra-represents B.
The following problem is key.
Problem 8. Suppose f(x) is admissible. Prove the following:
(a) If A is representable, so is f–1(A). If A is contra-representable, so is f–1(A).
(b) If a disjoint pair (A, B) is exactly separable in S, then so is the pair (f–1A), f–
1(B)).

Normal Systems

We shall call S a normal system if the diagonal function d(x) is admissible. This
means that for every number h there is a number — which we shall denote h# —
such that for all n the numbers h#(n) is equivalent to h(d(n)).
Problem 9. Suppose is normal. If A is representable in , does it necessarily
follow that A* is representable in ?
Problem 10. Show that for any normal system, neither nor is representable.

Fixed Points

By a fixed point of h is meant a number n such that h(n) is equivalent to n.

Problem 11. Prove that if is normal, then every number h has a fixed point.
Problem 12. Prove the following:
(a) If h represents R, then any fixed point of h is undecidable.
(b) If h represents P, then any fixed point of h′ is undecidable.
Exercise. Show the following strange facts:
(1) If h represents some superset of R disjoint from P, then h(h) is undecidable.
(2) If h represents some superset of P disjoint from R, then h(h′) is undecidable.
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We will later have important use for the following:

Problem 13. Show that no superset A of R*, with A disjoint from P*, can be
definable in . [Hint: Show that if R* ⊆ A, and h defines A in , then h is in both
A and P*(and hence that A is not disjoint from P*).]

Exercise. Show that if P* ⊆ A, and h defines A in , then h′ is in both A and R*

(and hence that A is not disjoint from R*).

II. Standard Simple Systems

Now recursion theory enters the picture. We shall call a simple system a
standard simple system if the sets P and R are recursively enumerable, and the
functions neg(x), r(x, y) and s(x, y, z) are recursive. In what follows, will be
assumed to be a standard simple system. [Recall that the function s(n, x, y) is the
index of the sentence
Problem 14. Show that for any set A,
(1) If A is recursively enumerable, so is A*.
(2) If A is recursive, so is A*.
More generally, show that for any recursive function f (x),
(1′) If A is recursively enumerable, so is f–1(A).
(2′) If A is recursive, so is f–1(A).
Problem 15. Show that every set representable in is recursively enumerable,
and that every set definable in is recursive.
Problem 16. Show the following:
(a) If some recursively enumerable but non-recursive set is representable in ,
then is incomplete.
(b) If all recursively enumerable sets are representable in , then is incomplete.
Question: Suppose we are given, not that all recursively enumerable sets are
representable in , but only that all recursive sets are representable in . Is that
enough to guarantee that is incomplete? The reader might like to try answering
this on his or her own. The answer will appear in this text later on.
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Undecidability and Incompleteness

The word “undecidable” has two very different meanings in the literature, which
might sometimes cause confusions. On the one hand, a sentence of a system is
called undecidable in the system if it is neither provable nor refutable in the
system. On the other hand, the system as a whole is called undecidable if the set
of provable sentence is not recursively solvable (or: under an effective Gödel
numbering, the set of Gödel numbers of the provable sentences is not recursive).
We shall thus call a simple system undecidable if the set P is not recursive.
The two senses of undecidable, though different, have the following
important link:
Theorem 1. If is undecidable (but standard), then is incomplete (some
number is undecidable in , i.e. outside both P and R).

Problem 17. Prove Theorem 1.

It was known prior to 1961 that if all recursively enumerable sets are
representable in a system, then the system is undecidable. In the Theory of
Formal Systems [Smullyan, 1961] I proved the stronger fact that if all recursive
sets are representable in a system, the system is undecidable. My proof goes over
to simple systems.
Theorem 2. If all recursive sets are representable in , then is undecidable.
Problem 18. Prove Theorem 2. [Hint: Use the fact already proved that if P is
recursive, so is P* (Problem 14).]
Remark. For a standard system , if all recursive sets are representable in , then
is undecidable by Theorem 2, hence incomplete by Theorem 1. Thus if all
recursive sets are representable in a standard system , then is incomplete,
which answers the question raised following Problem 16.

Recursive Inseparability

Problem 19. If the pair (P, R) is recursively inseparable, does it necessarily

follow that is undecidable?
Problem 20. Show that for any recursive function f(x) and any disjoint pair (A,
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B), if the pair (f–1(A), f–1(B)) is recursively inseparable, then the pair (A, B) is
also recursively inseparable. Conclude that if (P*, R*) is recursively inseparable,
so is (P, R).
We next wish to prove:
Theorem 3. If every recursive set is definable in then the pair (P*, R*) is
recursively inseparable, and so is the pair (P, R).
Problem 21. Prove Theorem 3. [Hint: Use Problem 13.]
Recall that, given a disjoint pair (A, B), we say that a number h separates A from
B (in ) if h represents a superset of A and contra-represents some superset of B.
And we say that h exactly separates A from B if h both represents A and contra-
represents B.
We next wish to prove the following theorem, which has the interesting
corollaries that follow it:
Theorem 4. If some disjoint pair (A1, A2) is recursively inseparable in , but
separable in , then the pair (P, R) is recursively inseparable.
Corollary 1. If some recursively inseparable pair is separable in , then is
undecidable.
Corollary 2. If some recursively inseparable pair is separable in , then is
incomplete (assuming S is standard).
Note: Corollary 2 is essentially Kleene’s symmetric form of Gödel’s theorem
[Kleene, 1952]. Kleene proved this for a particular pair of recursively
inseparable sets, but the proof works for any recursively inseparable pair of
recursively enumerable sets.
Problem 22. Prove Theorem 4.

Rosser Systems

We shall call a Rosser system if for any two recursively enumerable sets A and
B, there is a number h that separates A − B from B − A. [If A and B are disjoint,
then of course such an h also separates A from B.]
We shall call a Rosser system an exact Rosser system, if for any two disjoint
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recursively enumerable sets A and B, there is a number h that exactly separates A

from B.
Gödel’s proof of the incompleteness of systems like Peano Arithmetic
involved representing a certain recursively enumerable set, but the only way of
representing recursively enumerable sets that was known at that time involved
the hypothesis of ω-consistency. However, Andrzej Ehrenfeucht and Solomon
Feferman [1960] found a way of representing all recursively enumerable sets in
Peano Arithmetic, without having to assume ω-consistency! In terms of simple
systems, what they showed was that if is a Rosser system in which all recursive
functions of one argument are admissible, then all recursively enumerable sets
are representable in . Later came a stronger result, which, for simple systems,
is:
Theorem 5. [After Putnam, Smullyan, 1961] If is a Rosser system in which all
recursive functions of one argument are admissible, then is an exact Rosser
system.
Theorem 5 is an obvious consequence of the following two propositions:
Proposition 1. If is a Rosser system, then some doubly universal pair is exactly
separable in .
Proposition 2. If some doubly universal pair is exactly separable in and if all
recursive functions of one argument are admissible, then every disjoint pair of
recursively enumerable sets is exactly separable in .
Problem 23. Prove Propositions 1 and 2. [Hint: For Proposition 1, show that if
the Kleene pair (K1, K2) (or any other effectively inseparable pair of recursively
enumerable sets) is separable in , then some doubly universal pair is exactly
separable in .]

Effective Rosser Systems

We shall call an effective Rosser system if there is a recursive function Π(x, y)

such that for any numbers i and j, Π(i, j) separates (ωi − ωj) from (ωj − ωi). Such
a function Π(x, y) will be called a Rosser function.
Effective Rosser systems have some very interesting properties, as we will
see. For one thing, we will soon see that every effective Rosser system is an
exact Rosser system (a result that is incomparable in strength with Theorem 5).
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The following proposition is key for this, as well as for some further results.
Proposition 3. If is an effective Rosser system, then for any recursively
enumerable relations R1(x, y), R2(x, y), there is a number h such that for any n:

(1) R1(n, h) ∧ ∽ R2(n, h) implies h (n)∈ P ;

(2) R2(n, h) ∧ ∽ R1(n, h) implies h (n)∈R ;

Problem 24. Prove Proposition 3. [Hint: Apply the weak double recursion
theorem to the relations R1 (x, Π(y, z)), R2(x, Π(y, z)), where Π(x, y) is a Rosser
function for .]
Now we can prove:
Theorem 6. If is an effective Rosser system, then is an exact Rosser system.
Problem 25. Prove Theorem 6. [Hint: Let R1(x, y) be the relation x ∈ A ∨y(x) ∈
R, and let R2(x, y) be the relation x ∈ B ∨ y(x) ∈ P. Recall that y(x) = r(y, x).
Apply Proposition 3 to R1(x, y) and R2(x, y).]

Rosser Fixed-Point Property

We say that S has the Rosser fixed point property if for any two recursive
functions f1(x) and f2(x), there is a number h such that for all n for which ωf1(n)
is disjoint from ωf2(n):
(1) h(n) ∈ ωf1(n) implies h(n) ∈ P ;
(2) h(n) ∈ ωf2(n) implies h(n) ∈ R.

Theorem 7. Every effective Rosser system has the Rosser fixed point property.
Problem 26. Prove Theorem 7. [Hint: Given recursive functions f1(x) and f2(x),
apply Proposition 3 to the relations y(x) ∈ ωf1(x) and y(x) ∈ωf2(x).]

Uniform Incompleteness

By the principal part of a simple system S we mean the pair (P, R).
We call a simple system S ′ an extension of a simple system S if P ⊆ P′ and R
⊆ R′, where (P′, R′) is the principal part of S′, and the representation function
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r(x, y) and the function neg (x) are the same in both S and S′.
Now consider an infinite sequence = 1, 2, …, n, …, where each Sn+1 is an
extension of Sn. Such a sequence is called an effective sequence, or a recursively
enumerable sequence, if the relations x ∈ Py and x ∈ Ry are both recursively
enumerable. The system is called uniformly incompletable if, for any
recursively enumerable sequence 1, 2, …, n,…, of extensions of , there is a
number h such that, for every n, the number h(n) is an undecidable number of n
(i.e. h(n) is outside Pn ∪ Rn).

The following is one of the main results.

Theorem 8. Every effective Rosser system is uniformly incompletable.
Problem 27. Prove Theorem 8. [Hint: Given a recursively enumerable sequence
of extensions of , show that there are recursive functions f1(x) and f2(x) such
that for all n the set ωf1(n) is Rn and ωf2(n) is Pn. Then use the Rosser fixed point
property.]

Before leaving this chapter, I should say a little more about the relation of
simple systems to the first-order arithmetical systems in standard formalization
of Tarski [1953].
Consider such a first-order system and its associated simple system S, as
defined much earlier in this chapter.
is called a Rosser system, more specifically a Rosser system for sets, iff its
associated simple system S is a Rosser system, as defined here, which is
equivalent to the condition that for any pair of recursively enumerable sets A and
B there is a formula φh(x) such that for all n, if n ω A − B, then φh( ) is provable
(in ), and if n ∈ B − A, then φh( ) is refutable in . [In terms of the associated
simple system S, if n ∈ A − B, then h(n) ∈ P and if n ∈ B − A, then h(n) ∈ R.]
The system is called an exact Rosser system (for sets) if for any pair of disjoint
recursively enumerable sets A and B, there is a predicate H such that for all n, n
∈ A iff H(n) is provable, and n ∈ B iff H(n) is refutable.
In the literature, a function f(x) is said to be definable if there is a formula
Ψ(x, y) such that for all n and m:
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(1) If f(n) = m, then Ψ( , ) is provable;

(2) If f(n) ≠ m, then Ψ( , ) is refutable;
(3) The sentence ∀x∀y((Ψ( , x) Λ Ψ( , y)) ⊃ x = y) is provable.
As far as I know, the term admissible function does not appear in the
literature, except in my own writings. However, if a formula F (x, y) defines a
function f(x), then for any formula H(x), if we take G(x) to be the formula ∃y(F
(x, y) Λ H(x)), then it can be verified that for every n, not only is it the case that
G( ) is equivalent to H( ), but the very sentence G( ) ≡ H( ) is provable in
the system. For details, see Theorem 2, Chapter 8 of Gödel’s Incompleteness
Theorems [Smullyan, 1992], in which I use the term “strongly definable” for
what I am calling “definable” here.
Thus every definable function f(x) is indeed admissible. The Ehrenfeucht–
Feferman Theorem, as stated, is that any consistent Rosser system in which all
recursive functions f(x) are definable is an exact Rosser system.
In the context of a first-order system Ƒ, a formula Ψ(x, y) is said to separate a
relation R1(x, y) from a relation R2(x, y) if for all n and m,
(1) R1(n, m) implies that Ψ( , ) is provable.
(2) R2(n, m) implies that Ψ( , ) is refutable.

Ƒ is called a Rosser system for binary relations if for any two recursively
enumerable relations R1(x, y), R2(x, y), there is a formula Ψ(x, y) that separates
the relation R1(x, y)Λ ∼ R2(x, y) from R2(x, y) Λ ∼ R1(x, y). Sheperdson’s
Theorem is that every consistent Rosser system for binary relations is an exact
Rosser system for sets. This appears to be incomparable in strength with the
Putnam–Smullyan Theorem, which is that every consistent Rosser system in
which all recursive functions of one argument are definable is an exact Rosser
system for sets.
The proof of Shepherdson’s Theorem (which can be found in [Shepherdson,
1961]) is not very different from my proof that every effective Rosser system is
an exact Rosser system. Indeed, this theorem and its proof borrowed heavily
from Shepherdson’s Theorem and proof.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 7

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1. (a) It is obvious that if h completely represents A, then h defines A. To show

the converse, suppose h defines A. Then for all n,
(1) n ∈ A implies h(n) ∈ P ;
(2) n ∈ implies h(n) ∈ R.
We are to show the converses of (1) and (2).
Suppose h(n) ∈ P. Then h(n) ∉ R (since R is disjoint from P). Thus
by (2) n ∈ doesn’t hold, so that n ∈ A. The proof that h(n) ∈ R implies
that n ∈ A is similar.
(b) h contra-represents A iff for every n, n ∈ A holds iff h ∈ R, which is true
iff h′(n) ∈ P, which is true iff h′ represents A. Conversely, suppose h′
represents A. Then for all n, n ∈ A iff h′(n) ∈ P, which is true iff h(n) ∈
R. And so h contra-represents A.
2. We are to show that h represents A iff . We first recall that rh(n) =
h(n), since rh(n) = r(h, n) = h(n).
(1) Suppose h represents A. Then n ∈ A iff h(n) ∈ P, which is true iff rh(n)
∈ P, which is true iff . Thus n ∈ A iff . Since this is
true for all n, .
(2) Conversely suppose . Then n ∈ A iff . But
is true iff rh(n) ∈ P, which is true iff h(n) ∈ P. Thus n ∈ A iff h(n) ∈ P.
Since this is true for all n, h represents A.
The proof that h contra-represents A iff is similar.
(3) We prove the equivalent proposition that if is complete, then the
complement of any representable set is representable.
Well, suppose is complete, and that h represents A. We will show
that h′ represents . Consider any number n.
(1) Suppose n ∈ . Then n ∉ A. Hence h(n) ∉ P [since h represents A].
Hence h(n) ∈ R [since is complete]. Thus h′(n) ∈ P. Thus n ∈
implies h′(n) ∈ P.
(2) Conversely, suppose h′(n) ∈ P. Then [by condition C1] h(n) ∈ R, so
that h(n) ∉ P. Thus n ∉ A [since h represents A], so that n ∈ . Thus
h′(n) ∈ P implies that n ∈ .
By (1) and (2), h′ represents A.
(4) If some number h represents , we can reach contradiction as follows: h(h)
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∈ P iff h ∈ [since h represents , for all n we have n ∈ iff h(n) ∈ P ].

But h ∈ iff h ∉ P*, which is true iff h(h) ∉ P. Thus we get the
contradiction that h(n) ∈ P iff h(n) ∉ P, so that no number h represents .
By a similar argument (using R instead of P), the set cannot be
contra-representable. Thus cannot be representable [by Problem 1(b)].
(5) (a) Suppose h represents R*. Then, for all n, h(n) ∈ P iff n ∈ R*, which is
true iff n(n) ∈ R. Taking h for n, we have h(h) ∈ P iff h(h) ∈ R. Since h(h)
cannot be in both P and R, h(h) must be outside both of them, and is thus
undecidable.
(b) Suppose h represents P*. Then, for all n, h(n) ∈ P iff n ∈ P*. Thus
h(h′) ∈ P iff h′ ∈ P*, and h′ ∈ P* iff h′(h′) ∈ P, which is true iff h(h′) ∈
R. Thus h(h′) ∈ P iff h(h′) ∈ R, and since P is disjoint from R, h(h′) is
outside both P and R, and is thus undecidable.
(6) (a) Suppose h represents some superset A of R* that is disjoint from P*. We
must show that h(h) is undecidable.
Well, if h ∈ P*, then h(h) ∈ P, and h ∈ A [since h represents A],
contrary to the fact that P* is disjoint from A. Thus h ∉ P*, since
assuming so led to a contradiction, and so h(h) ∉ P.
If h ∈ A, then h(h) ∈ P [since h represents A]. Thus h ∈ P*, again
contrary to the fact that A is disjoint from P*. Thus h ∉ A, since
assuming so led to a contradiction. Then h ∉ R* [since R* ⊆ A], and so
h(h) ∉ R.
Thus h(h) ∉ P and h(h) ∉ R so that h(h) is undecidable.
(b) Suppose h represents some superset A of P* disjoint from R*. We must
show that h(h′) is undecidable.
Well, if h′ ∈ A, then h(h′) ∈ P [since h represents A]. Hence h′(h′) ∈ R
[by condition C1], and so h′ ∈ R*, contrary to the fact that R* is disjoint
from A. Therefore h′ ∉ A, since assuming so led to a contradiction. Then h′
∉ P* [since P* ⊆ A], and so h′(h′) ∉ P, and therefore h(h′) ∉ R.
If h′ ∈ R*, then h′(h′) ∈ R, so that h(h′) ∈ P, so that h′ ∈ A [which is
represented by h], which is again contrary to the fact that R* is disjoint
from A. Hence h′ ∉ R*, since assuming so led to a contradiction. Then
h′(h′) ∉ R, and therefore h(h′) ∉ P.
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Thus h(h′) ∉ R and h(h′) ∉ P, and therefore h(h′) is undecidable.

The reason why these results are stronger than those of Problem 5 is this:
To begin with, since P is disjoint from R, then P* is disjoint from R*
(why?). Therefore, if h represents R*, it automatically represents some
superset of R* disjoint from P*, namely R* itself. [Any set is both a subset
and a superset of itself.] Similarly, if h represents P*, then it represents a
superset of P* disjoint from R*, namely P* itself. Thus the results of
Problem 5 are but special cases of those of Problem 6.
7. (a) Suppose A ⊆ B. For any n, if n ∈ f−1(A), then f(n) ∈ A. Thus f(n) ∈ B
[since A ⊆ B], and hence n ∈ f−1(B). Thus n ∈ f−1(A) implies n ∈ f−1(B),
and so f−1(A) ⊆ f−1(B).
(b) Suppose A is disjoint from B. If n ∈ f−1(A), then f(n) ∈ A. Thus f(n) /2
B. Thus n ∈ f−1(A) implies that n ∉ f−1(B), and thus f−1(A) is disjoint
from f−1(B).
(c) n ∈ f−1(A) iff f(n) ∈ A, which is true iff f(n) /2 A, which is true iff n ∉
f−1(A), which is true iff n ∈ f−1(A). Thus n ∈ f−1(A) iff n ∈ f−1(A), and
since this holds for every n, we have

The statements (a1), (a2), and (a3) clearly follow from statements (a), (b),
and (c) when f = d(x), because d-1(A) is the set A* for any set A.
8. Suppose f(x) is admissible. Given h, let k be such that k(n) is equivalent to
h(f(n)) for all n.
(a) We assert that if h represents a set A, then k represents f-1(A), and that if
h contra-represents A, then k contra-represents f-1(A).
To prove the former, suppose h represents A. Then n ∈ f−1(A) iff f(n) ∈
A, which is true iff h(f(n)) ∈ P [since h represents A], which is true iff k(n)
∈ P. Thus, for all n, n ∈ f-1(A) iff k(n) ∈ P, and thus k represents f-1(A).
The proof that if h contra-represents A, then k contra-represents f-1(A)
is similar (just replace “P “ by “R” and “represents” by “contra-
represents”).
(b) Suppose h exactly separates the set A from the set B. Then h represents
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A and contra-represents B. Then, by the solution to part (a), k represents

f-1(A) and contra-represents f−1(B), and so k exactly separates f-1(A) from
f−1(B).
9. Of course it follows! If is normal, the diagonal function d(x) is admissible.
Hence if A is representable, so is d-1(A) [by Problem 8], and d-1(A) is the set
A*.
10. For a normal system, if were representable, then would be
representable [by Problem 9]. But [by Problem 7], so that
would be representable, which is contrary to Problem 4. A similar
argument show that R is not representable.
11. Suppose is normal. For any numbers h and n, h#(n) is equivalent to
h(d(n)), so that h#(h#) is equivalent to h(d(h#)). But d(h#) = h#(h#) and so
h#(h#) is equivalent to h(h#(h#)), which means that h#(h#) is a fixed point
of h.
12. (a) Suppose h represents R and that n is some fixed point of h [i.e. n is
equivalent to h(n)]. Since h represents R, then n ∈ R iff h(n) ∈ P. But h(n)
∈ P iff n ∈ P [since n is a fixed point of h]. Thus n ∈ R iff n ∈ P. But R and
P are assumed to be disjoint, so the fixed point n of h can belong to neither
P nor R, which means that n must be undecidable.
(b) Suppose h represents P and that n is some fixed point of h′. Since h
represents P, then n ∈ P iff h(n) ∈ P. But h(n) ∈ P iff h′(n) ∈ R [by
condition C1]. And h′(n) ∈ R iff n ∈ R [since n is a fixed point of h′].
Thus n ∈ P iff n ∈ R, and so again the arbitrary fixed point n of h′ is
undecidable.
13. Suppose R ⊆ A and h defines A in . We will show that A cannot be
disjoint from P*. Suppose h ∉ A. Then h(h) ∈ R [since h defines A].
Hence h ∈ R, which would mean h ∈ A [since R ⊆ A], which is
impossible. Thus it cannot be that h ∉ A, which implies h ∈ A. It then
further follows that h(h) ∈ P [since h defines, and hence represents, A].
Therefore h ∈ P*. Thus h ∈ A and h ∈ P*, so that A is not disjoint from
P*.
14. We will first consider the general case.
(1′) Let f(x) be a recursive function and suppose the set A is recursively
enumerable. For any number x, x ∈ f-1(A) iff f(x) ∈ A which is true iff
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∃y(y = f(x) Λ y ∈ A). Thus f-1(A) is recursively enumerable.

(2′) If A is also recursive, then A and its complement are both recursively
enumerable, so that f−1(A) and f−1( ) are both recursively enumerable,
as just shown. However, f−1( ) is the complement of f−1(A), so that f−1(
) is recursive.

To apply the general case to (1) and (2): Since the function r(x, y)
is recursive, so is the diagonal function d(x) [which is r(x, x)], and
since A* = d-1(A), it follows from (1′) and (2′) that if A is recursively
enumerable (recursive), so is A*.
15. We must show that (a) every set representable in is recursively
enumerable, and that (b) every set definable in is recursive.
(a) Suppose h represents A. Then for all n, n ∈ A iff r(h, n) ∈ P. Let f(x) =
r(h, x) Since the function r(x, y) is recursive, so is the function f(x).
Thus for all, n ∈ A iff f(n) ∈ P, and so A = f−1(P). Since P is
recursively enumerable, and f(x) is a recursive function, then f−1(P) is
recursively enumerable [by Problem 14], and thus A is recursively
enumerable.
(b) If A is completely representable [which is equivalent to A being
definable, by Problem 1(a)], then A and are both representable, hence
both recursively enumerable, and so A is then recursive.
16. (a) Suppose that A is a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive, and
that A is representable in . Since A is not recursive, its complement is not
recursively enumerable, hence not representable [since only recursively
enumerable sets are representable in , by Problem 15]. Thus A is a
representable set whose complement is not representable. Hence is
incomplete [by Problem 3].
(b) This follows from (a) and the fact that there exists a recursively
enumerable set that is not recursive, such as Post’s complete set K [if all
recursively enumerable sets were representable in , K would also have
to be recursively enumerable].
17. Suppose is undecidable and effective. Then the set P is not recursive, and
so its complement is not recursively enumerable. Yet the set R is
recursively enumerable [since is effective], and so R is not the
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complement of P. But R is disjoint from P, which means that some n must

be outside both P and R, and is thus undecidable. Thus is incomplete.
18. Suppose all recursive sets are representable in . If P were recursive, then
P* would be recursive [by Problem 14]. Thus would be recursive,
hence representable in , which would be contrary to Problem 4. Therefore
P is not recursive, and is thus undecidable [by the definition of an
undecidable system].
19. Of course it does! If a disjoint pair of sets (A, B) is recursively inseparable,
then by definition no recursive superset of A can be disjoint from B. Thus
A cannot be recursive [for it were, then A itself would be a recursive
superset of A disjoint from B]. Similarly, B cannot be recursive.
Thus, if (P, R) were recursively inseparable, then P would not be
recursive, so that would be undecidable.
20. We are to show that if f(x) is a recursive function and (A, B) is any disjoint
pair, if (f−1(A), f−1(B)) is disjoint and recursively inseparable, so is (A, B).
We will prove the equivalent proposition that if a disjoint pair (A, B) is
recursively separable, so is (f−1(A), f−1(B)).
Well, suppose that A is disjoint from B and that A is recursively
separable from B. Then there is a recursive superset A′ of A disjoint from B.
Hence f−1(A) is disjoint from f−1(B) [by Problem 7(b)]. And f−1(A) is
recursive [by Problem 14]. Thus f−1(A′) is a recursive superset of f−1(A) that
is disjoint from f−1(B), and so f−1(A) is recursively separable from f−1(B).
Since (P*, R*) = (d−1(P)d−1(R)) and d(x) is a recursive function, it
follows from what was just shown that if (P* R*) is recursively inseparable,
so is (P, R).
21. Suppose all recursive sets are definable in . We will show that (P*, R*) is
recursively inseparable, from which we will be able to conclude that so is
the pair (P, R) [by Problem 20].
Let A be any superset of R* disjoint from P*. By Problem 13, A cannot
be definable in . If A were recursive, then it would be definable in [since
the problem assumes this]. Thus A cannot be recursive. Consequently there
is no recursive superset of R* disjoint from P*, which means that (P*, R*)
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is recursively inseparable.
22. Suppose (A1, A2) is disjoint and recursively inseparable, and that h
separates A1 from A2 in . Then h represents some superset B1 of A1 and
contra-represents some superset B2 of A2. In this situation B1 and B2 must
be disjoint [because n ∈ B1 iff h(n) ∈ P and n ∈ B2 iff h(n) ∈ R, but P and
R are disjoint]. Since (A1, A2) is recursively inseparable, and A1 ⊆ B1 and
A2 ⊆ B2, then the pair (B1, B2) is recursively inseparable (verify this!).
Now, by Problem 2, B1 = (P) and B2 = (R), where r(x, y) is the
representation function for sets. Thus the pair ( (P), (R)) is
recursively inseparable, and since the function rh(x) is recursive [because
r(x, y) is], then the pair (P, R) is recursively inseparable [by Problem 20].
Now, Corollary 1 follows because if (P, R) is recursively inseparable,
then of course P is not recursive, so that is undecidable.
Corollary 2 then follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 (if is
effective but undecidable, then is incomplete).
23. (a) To prove Proposition 1, suppose K1 is separable from K2 in and let h
effect the separation. Then h represents some superset A1 of K1 and contra-
represents some superset A2 of K2. Since P is disjoint from R, then A1 is
disjoint from A2. Of course, h exactly separates A1 from A2.
Since (K1, K2) is effectively inseparable, so is the pair (A1, A2)
[verify this!]. Since is an effective system, then A1 and A2 are
recursively enumerable sets. Thus (A1, A2) is an effectively inseparable
pair of recursively enumerable sets, hence is doubly universal [by
Theorem 1. of Chapter 6]. Thus h exactly separates the doubly universal
pair (A1, A2).
(b) To prove Proposition 2, suppose that some doubly universal pair (U1,
U2) is exactly separable in and that all recursive functions of one
argument are admissible in . Let (A, B) be a disjoint pair of
recursively enumerable sets that we wish to exactly separate in .

Since (U1, U2) is doubly universal, then there is a recursive

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function f(x) such that A = f−1(U1) and B = f−1(U2). By hypothesis, f(x)

is admissible (all recursive functions of one argument are). Thus, by
Problem 8, f−1(U1) is exactly separable from f−1(U2), and thus A is
exactly separable from B.
24. Suppose Π(x, y) is a Rosser function for . Given recursively enumerable
relations R1(x, y), R2(x, y), by the weak double recursion theorem
(Theorem 1 of Chapter 6), taking M1(x, y, z) to be R1(x, Π(y, z)) and M2(x,
y, z) to be R2(x, Π(y, z)), there are numbers a and b such that:
ωa = {x : R1(x, Π(a, b))};
ωb = {x : M2(x, Π(a, b))}.
We let h be the number Π(a, b). Then ωa = {x : R1(x, h)} and ωb = {x :
R2(x, h)}. Thus ωa − ωb = {x : R1(x, h) ∧ ∽R2(x, h)} and ωb − ωa = {x :
R2(x, h) ∧ ∼R1(x, h)}. Since Π(x, y) is a Rosser function, then h, which is
Π(a, b), separates ωa − ωb from ωb − ωa, and thus separates {x : R1(x, h)∧
∼ R2(x, h)} from {x : R2(x, h) ∧ ∼ R1(x, h)}.
25. Let A and B be disjoint recursively enumerable sets. Let R1(x, y) be the
relation x ∈ A ∨ y(x) ∈ R and let R2(x, y) be the relation x ∈ B ∨ y(x) ∈ P.
Applying Proposition 3 to the pair (R1, R2), there is a number h such that
for all n,
R1(n, h) ∧ ∼R2(n, h) implies h(n) ∈ P and
R2(n, h) ∧ ∼R1(n, h) implies h(n) ∈ R. Thus
(1) [(n ∈ A ∨ h(n) ∈ R) ∧ ∼(n ∈ B ∨ h(n) ∈ P)] ⊃ h(n) ∈ P ;
(2) [(n ∈ B ∨ h(n) ∈ P) ∧ ∼(n ∈ A ∨ h(n) ∈ R)] ⊃ h(n) ∈ R.
Also
(3) ∼(n ∈ A ∧ n ∈ B) [since A is disjoint from B];
(4) ∼(h(n) ∈ P ∧ h(n) ∈ R) [since P is disjoint from R].
From (1), (2), (3) and (4) it follows by propositional logic that n ∈ A iff
h(n) ∈ P, and n ∈ B iff h(n) ∈ R.
To see this, let us use the following abbreviations:
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Thus we have:
(1) [(p1 ∨ q2) ∧ ∼(p2 ∧ q1)] ⊃q1;
(2) [(p2 ∨ q1) ∧ ∼(p1 ∧ q2)] ⊃q2;
(3)∼ (p1 ∧ p2);
(4)∼ (q1 ∧ q2).
We are to infer that p1 ≡ q1 and p2 ≡ q2.
(a) First we show that p1 ⊃ q1. Well, suppose p1. Then p1 ∨ q2 is true.
Thus (1) is equivalent to

Since p1 is true (by assumption), then p2 is false [by (3)], so that p2 ∨

q1 is equivalent to q1, so that (1′) is equivalent to

From this q1 follows, which proves that p1 ⊃ q1.

(b) For the converse, suppose q1 is true. Then p2 ∨ q1 is true, and so (2) is
equivalent

Since q1 is true (by assumption), then q2 is false [by (4)], so that p1 ∨

q2 is equivalent to p1, so that (2′) is equivalent to

Since q2 is false, it follows from (2′′) that p1 is true. This proves that q1
⊃ p1. Thus p1 ≡ q1.
The proof that p2 ≡ q2 is similar (just interchange p1 with p2 and q1
with q2).
Note: This proof is a modification of a proof of a result of John
Shepherdson.
26. Suppose is an effective Rosser system. Given two recursive functions
f1(x) and f2(x) let R1(x, y) be the relation y(x) ∈ ωf1(x) and let R2(x, y) be
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the relation y(x) ∈ ωf2(x).

Applying Proposition 3 to these two relations, there is a number h such

that for every n,
(1) h(n) ∈ ωf1(n) ∧ ∼(h(n) ∈ ωf2(n)) implies h(n) ∈ P ;
(2) h(n) ∈ ωf2(n) ∧ ∼(h(n) ∈ ωf1(n)) implies h(n) ∈ R.
If is disjoint from , then (1) and (2) are respectively equivalent to:
(1′) h(n) ∈ implies h(n) ∈P ;
(2′) h(n) ∈ implies h(n) ∈ R.
Thus has the Rosser fixed point property.
27. Consider a recursively enumerable sequence of
extensions of . The relation x ∈ Ry is recursively enumerable. Hence by
the iteration theorem, there is a recursive function f1(x) such that for all n,
we have = {x : x ∈ Rn}. Thus = Rn. Similarly, there is a
recursive function f2(x) such that, for all n, we have = Pn.
Now suppose that is effectively a Rosser system. Then has the Rosser
fixed point property, since for every n the sets and are disjoint.
So by the Rosser fixed point property, there is a number h such that for all
n:
(1) h(n) ∊ wf1(n) implies h(n) ∊ P ;
(2) h(n) ∊ wf2(n) implies h(n) ∊ R.
Thus,
(1′) h(n) ∊ Rn implies h(n) ∊ P ;
(2′) h(n) ∊ Pn implies h(n) ∊ R.
Since P ⊆ Pn and R ⊆ Rn, then by (1′) and (2′), we have:
(1′) h(n) ∊ Rn implies h(n) ∊ Pn;
(2′) h(n) ∊ Pn implies h(n) ∊ Rn.
Since Pn is disjoint from Rn, it must be the case that h(n) ∉ Pn and h(n) ∉
Rn. Thus is uniformly incompletable.
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Part III

Elements of Combinatory Logic

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Chapter 8
Beginning Combinatory Logic

The subject of combinatory logic, initiated by Moses Schönfinkel [1924], is a

most elegant one, as the reader will see. It plays a significant role in computer
science and provides yet another approach to recursion theory. In this book we
provide only the beginnings of the subject, hoping to whet the reader’s appetite
for more.
By an applicative system is meant a set together with an operation that
assigns to each element x and each element y (in that order) an element denoted
(xy). In combinatory logic we often omit parentheses, with the understanding
that parentheses are to be restored to the left: xyz abbreviates ((xy)z), not (x(yz)).
Also xyzw abbreviates (((xy)z)w), etc. Note that this is not the same as the
common set of rules for eliminating parentheses in school mathematics and even
in many college mathematics courses, so it takes some getting used to. But have
courage, for it will become natural fairly quickly. (But always remember to put
outside parentheses around an expression when you replace a variable by a
compound expression; for instance, replacing the variable x with SI in the
expression S(Kx)K would result in S(K(SI))K.) Also note that, in general, in
applicative systems xy is not the same as yx, nor is x(yz) the same as (xy)z (i.e.
the commutative and associative rules of elementary arithmetic do not generally
apply here).
The elements of are called combinators. It is to be understood that
contains more than one element.

Fixed Points

An element y is called a fixed point of an element x if xy = y. Fixed points play a

key role in combinatory theory.
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The Composition Condition

For any elements A, B and C, we say that C combines A with B if Cx = A(Bx) for
every element x. We say that the composition condition holds if for every A and
B, there is some C that combines A with B.

Introducing the Combinator M, the Mocker (the Mockingbird)

A combinator M will be called a mocker, or a duplicator, if

for every element x. Here is our first interesting result:

Theorem 1. The following two conditions are sufficient to ensure that every
element A has a fixed point:
C1: The composition condition holds.
C2: There is a mocker M.

Problem 1. Prove Theorem 1.

Note: Theorem 1 states a basic fact of combinatorial logic. The solution,
though quite brief, is very ingenious, and derives ultimately from the work of
Gödel. It is related to many of the fixed point results in several areas in
mathematical logic.
The solution given in the proof of Theorem 1 reveals more information than
is given in the statement of the theorem. This extra information is important, and
we record it as follows:
Theorem 1*. If C combines x with M, then CC is a fixed point of x.

Egocentric Elements

We shall call an element x egocentric if it is a fixed point of itself, i.e. if xx = x.

Problem 2. Prove that if conditions C1 and C2 of the hypothesis of Theorem 1
hold, then at least one element is egocentric.

Agreeable Elements
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We shall say that two elements A and B agree on an element x if Ax = Bx. We

shall call an element A agreeable if for every element B, there is at least one
element x on which A and B agree. Thus A is agreeable if, for every B, Ax = Bx
for at least one x.
Problem 3. (a) [A Variant of Theorem 1] Suppose we are given condition C1 of
the hypothesis of Theorem 1 [i.e. for every A and B, there is some C that
combines A with B], but instead of being given that there is a mocker M, we are
given that at least one element A is agreeable. Prove that every element has a
fixed point. (b) Theorem 1 is really but a special case of (a). Why?
Problem 4. As an exercise, show that if the composition condition C1 holds, and
if C combines A with B, then if C is agreeable, so is A.
Problem 5. Again, assuming the composition condition C1, show that for any
elements A, B and C, there is an element E such that Ex = A(B(Cx)) for every x.

Compatible Elements

We will say that an element A is compatible with B if there are elements x and y
such that Ax = y and By = x. When such a pair of elements (x, y) exists, it is
called a cross point of the pair (A, B).
Problem 6. Prove that if conditions C1 and C2 of Theorem 1 hold, then any two
elements A and B are compatible, i.e. any two elements have a cross point.

Smug Elements

We shall call an element smug if it is compatible with itself.

Problem 7. If an element has a fixed point, is it necessarily smug?
Problem 8. Prove that if the composition condition C1 holds and if there is also
at least one smug element, then there is at least one element that has a fixed
point.

Fixation

We shall say that the element A is fixated on B if Ax = B for every element x.

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Problem 9. Is it possible for an element A to be fixated on more than one

element?
Problem 10. Which, if either, of the following two statements are true?
(a) If y is a fixed point of x, then x is fixated on y.
(b) If x is fixated on y, then y is a fixed point of x.

Narcissistic Elements

We shall call an element A narcissistic if it is fixated on itself, i.e. if Ax = A for

every x.
Problem 11. Which, if either, of the following statements is true?
(a) Every narcissistic element is egocentric.
(b) Ever egocentric element is narcissistic.
Problem 12. Determine whether or not the following statement is true: If A is
narcissistic, then for all elements x and y, Ax = Ay.
Problem 13. If A is narcissistic, does it necessarily follow that for all x and y,
Axy = A?
Problem 14. Narcissism is contagious! If A is narcissistic, then so is Ax for
every x. Prove this.

Introducing the Combinator K, the Kestrel

We shall call a combinator K a cancellator, or a kestrel, if

for every x and y. This K plays a key role in combinatory logic, as we shall see.
Note: Why the alternative word “kestrel”? Well, in my book To Mock a
Mockingbird [Smullyan, 1985], I used talking birds as combinators. If one calls
out the name of a bird y to a bird x the bird x calls back the name of some bird,
and this bird I call xy. Thus xy is the bird named by x upon hearing the name of
y. I gave bird names to the standard combinators of the literature, usually names
whose first letter is the first letter of the combinator in the literature. For
example, I call the bird representing the standard combinator K by the name
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kestrel. The standard combinators B, C, W and T, which we will soon come

across, I respectively called the bluebird, cardinal, warbler and thrush. I called
the mocker M a mockingbird, because in my bird model, Mx = xx means that M’s
response to x is the same as x’s response to x.
To my surprise, I recently found out that many of my bird names have been
adopted in the more recent combinatory literature! For example, there is a book
by Reginald Braithwaite entitled Kestrels, Quirky Birds and Hopeless
Egocentricity [2013]. In light of this, I feel justified in sometimes using bird
names for various combinators.
In what follows, K is a kestrel.
Problem 15. Prove that any fixed point of K is egocentric.
Problem 16. Prove that if Kx is egocentric, then x is a fixed point of K.
Problem 17. Prove that if Kx is a fixed point of K, then x is a fixed point of K.
Problem 18. In general, it is not the case that if Ax = Ay, then x must necessarily
be y, but it is the case if A is a kestrel. Prove that if Kx = Ky, x must necessarily
be y.
The principle expressed in Problem 18 (that if Kx = Ky, x must necessarily be
y) is important and will be called the cancellation law.
Problem 19. Prove that for all x, Kx ≠ K.
Problem 20. (a) Prove that no kestrel can be egocentric. (b) Prove that any fixed
point of a kestrel is narcissistic.
Next I want to show that if contains a kestrel, then contains infinitely
many elements (recall that always contains more than one element).
Problem 21. Consider the set {K, KK, KKK, …}. Is this set infinite?
Problem 22. What about the set {K, KK, K(KK), K(K(KK)), …}, i.e. the set {K1,
K2, …, Kn, …} where K1 = K and Kn+1 = K(Kn) for all n. Is this set infinite?

Introducing the Combinator L, the Lark

We shall call a combinator L a lark if for all x and y, the following condition
holds:
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The lark was not a standard combinator in the literature prior to the publication
of my To Mock a Mockingbird, but it is so now. Several papers have been
written about it. The lark plays a key role in my treatment of combinatory logic.
One nice thing about the lark is that without assuming conditions C1 and C2,
the mere existence of a lark ensures that every element has a fixed point.
Problem 23. Prove this.
Problem 24. Prove that no element can be both a lark and a kestrel.
Problem 25. Prove that if a lark L is narcissistic, then L must be a fixed point of
every element x.
Problem 26. Prove that no kestrel can be a fixed point of a lark.
However, it is possible for a lark to be a fixed point of a kestrel.
Problem 27. Show that if a lark L is a fixed point of a kestrel, then L must be a
fixed point of every element.
An interesting thing about larks is that the existence of a lark L, without any
other information, is enough to guarantee the existence of an egocentric element.
In fact, we can write down an expression using only the letter L and parentheses
that names an egocentric element. The shortest expression I have been able to
find uses twelve occurrences of the letter L. Is there a shorter one? I raised this
as an open problem in To Mock a Mockingbird, and I don’t know if this problem
has been solved yet.
Problem 28. Given a lark L, prove that there is an egocentric element, and then
write down the name of such an element, using only the letter L and parentheses.

Discussion

Given two expressions involving only L and parentheses, is there a purely

mechanical procedure to decide whether or not they name the same element? I
posed this as an open problem in To Mock a Mockingbird, and it has been solved
affirmatively by at least three people — Richard Statman in his paper “The
Word Problem for Smullyan’s combinatorial lark is decidable [1989], and by M.
Sprenger and M. Wymann-Böni in “How to decide the lark” [1993].
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Introducing the Combinator I, the Identity Combinator

By an identity combinator is meant an element I satisfying the condition that Ix =

x for every x.
Despite its apparently lowly status, the identity operator I will later be seen to
play an important role. Meanwhile, here are some trivial facts about I:
(1) I is agreeable if and only if every element has a fixed point.
(2) If every pair of elements is compatible, then I is agreeable.
(3) I, though egocentric, cannot be narcissistic.
Problem 29. Prove these three facts. [It is not necessary to assume the
composition principle, but it is necessary to use the fact that contains more than
one element.]
Problem 30. Prove that if contains a lark L and an identity element I, then
contains a mocker M.

Sages

An element θ will be called a sage if its existence not only guarantees that every
element has a fixed point, but θ is also such that when applied to any element x,
it yields a fixed point of x. Thus, θ is a sage, if, for every x, θx is a fixed point of
x, i.e., x (θx) = θx for every element x.
In the classic literature of combinatory logic, sages are called fixed point
combinators. I introduced the word sage in my book To Mock a Mockingbird,
and the term sage has subsequently become standard in the literature, so I will
use the term sage here. Much study has been devoted to sages, and in a later
chapter, I will show many ways of deriving a sage from various other
combinators. For now, let me just state that if contains a lark L and a mocker
M, and if the composition law holds, them contains a sage.
Problem 30. Prove this.
Note: It follows from the last problem that if contains a lark L and an
identity combinator I, and obeys the composition condition, the contains a
sage, because in that case must also contain a mocker M by Problem 30.
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Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 8

1. Let C be an element that combines A with M. Thus, for every element x, we

have Cx = A(Mx). But Mx = xx, and so Cx = A(xx) for every x. Now take C
for x, and we see that CC = A(CC) which shows us that CC is a fixed point
of A. [Clever, eh?]
2. From conditions C1 and C2, there is a mocker M. Moreover, every element
has a fixed point [by Theorem 1]. Thus M itself has a fixed point E. Thus
ME = E. Also ME = EE [since M is a mocker], and so E = EE, which means
that E is egocentric. Thus any fixed point of M is egocentric.
Remark. Since E is egocentric and ME = E, it follows that ME is
egocentric. Doesn’t the world “ME” tell its own tale?
3. (a) Suppose A is agreeable. Given any element x, by condition C1 there is
some element C that combines x with A. Thus Cy = x(Ay) for every element
y. Since A is agreeable, then there is some y* such that Cy* = Ay*, and hence
it follows from Cy* = x(Ay*) that Ay* = x(Ay*), and so Ay* is a fixed point of
x.
(b) Theorem 1 is a special case of (a), since a duplicator M is obviously
agreeable: M agrees with every element x on some element, namely on x
[since Mx = xx].
4. We are given that the composition condition C1 holds and that C combines A
with B and that C is agreeable. We are to show that A is agreeable. Well,
consider any element D. We are to show that A agrees with D on some
element. Well, let E be an element that combines D with B. Now, C agrees
with E on some element F, since C is agreeable. We will show that A agrees
with D on BF.
Since C agrees with E on F, then CF = EF. Also EF = D(BF), since E
combines D with B. Thus CF = EF = D(BF), and so CF = D(BF). But also
CF = A(BF), since C combines A with B, and so A(BF) = D(BF). Thus A
agrees with D on BF.
5. We assume that the composition condition C1 holds. Given A, B and C, let D
combine B with C. Thus for any x, Dx = B(Cx). Now let E combine A with
D. Then Ex = A(Dx) = A(B(Cx)).
6. For any elements A and B, we are given that there is some C that combines A
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with B. Thus for all y, we have Cy = A(By). We are also given that there is a
mocker M, and so C has some fixed point y. Thus y = Cy and Cy = A(By),
yielding y = A(By). Now take x to be By, so that y = Ax and x = By. Thus Ax
= y and By = x.
7. Of course it is: Suppose x is a fixed point of A, so that Ax = x. Now take y to
be x itself. Then Ax = y and Ay = x, which means that A is smug.
8. We are given that the composition condition C1 holds and that there is a
smug element A. Thus there are elements x and y such that Ax = y and Ay =
x. Since Ax = y, we can substitute Ax for y in the equation Ay = x, yielding
A(Ax) = x. Now let B be an element that combines A with itself. Thus Bx =
A(Ax), and since A(Ax) = x, we have Bx = x. Thus B has the fixed point x.
9. Of course not! If A is fixed on x and A is fixed on y, then for any element z
we see that Az = x and Az = y so that x = y.
10. It is obviously (b) that is true. Suppose x is fixated on y. Then xz = y for
every z. Hence, taking y for z, we see that xy = y, so that y is a fixed point
of x.
11. It is obviously (a) that is true. Suppose A is narcissistic. Then Ax = A for
every x, so of course AA = A.
12. As given, the statement is obviously true: If A is narcissistic, then Ax = A
and Ay = A. Thus Ax and Ay are both equal to A, so that Ax = Ay.
13. Yes, it does: If A is narcissistic, then Ax = A, so that Axy = Ay. But also Ay
= A, yielding Axy = A.
14. Suppose A is narcissistic. Then by the last problem Axy = A. Thus (Ax)y =
A for every y, which means that Ax is narcissistic.
15. Suppose Kx = x (i.e that x is a fixed point of K). Then Kxx = xx. But also
Kxx = x (since Kxy = x for every y). Thus Kxx is equal to both xx and to x,
so that xx = x, which means that x is egocentric.
16. Suppose Kx is egocentric. Thus Kx(Kx) = Kx. Also Kx(Kx) = x (since Kxy
= x for every y). Thus Kx(Kx) is equal to both Kx and x, so that Kx = x.
17. Suppose Kx is a fixed point of K. Then Kx is egocentric by Problem 15.
Hence x is a fixed point of K by Problem 16.
18. Suppose Kx = Ky. Now, Kxz = x for every z. Since Kx = Ky, it follows that
Kyz = x for every z. But also Kyz = y. Hence x = y.
19. We will show that if Kx = K, then for any elements y and z, it must be the
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case that y = z, which is contrary to the assumed condition that C contains

more than one element.
Well, suppose Kx = K. Then for any y and z, Kxy = Ky and Kxz = Kz. But
Kxy = x and Kxz = x, so that Ky = Kz. Then by the cancellation law (see
Problem 18), y = z.
20. (a) This is immediate from the last problem: Since Kx ≠ K for all x, then KK
≠ K, so that K is not egocentric.
(b) Suppose KA = A (i.e. A is a fixed point of K). Then Ax = KAx for all x.
But also KAx = A for all x. Thus Ax = A for all x, which means that A is
narcissistic.
21. Let U1 = K; U2 = KK; U3 = KKK, etc. We show that the set {U1, U2, U3, …,
Un, …} is far from infinite. It contains only K and KK. We see this as
follows:
If Un = K, then Un+2 = KKK, which is K (because K is a kestrel). Thus if
Un = K, then Un+2 = K, and, since U1 = K, then Un = K for every odd
number n.
Also, if Un = KK then Un+1 = KKK which is K (again because K is a
kestrel). Thus, if Un = KK then Un+2 = KK and since U2 = KK it follows that
Un = KK for every even n. Therefore we see that, for all n, Un = K or Un =
KK.
22. This is a very different story! Let K1 = K, K2 = KK; K3 = K(KK) [which is
K(K2)], etc. Thus for each n, we have Kn+1 = K(Kn). The set {K1, K2, …,
Kn, …} is indeed infinite, as we will see.
We will show that for any numbers n and m, if n ≠ m, then Kn ≠ Km. To
show this, it suffices to show that if n > m, then Kn ≠ Km (because if n ≠ m,
then either n < m or m < n). Thus it suffices to show that for any positive
integers n and b, Kn ≠ Kn+b.
By Problem 19, K ≠ K(Kb); in fact K ≠Kx for any x. Since K = K1 and
K(Kb) = Kb+1, we have:
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Next, by the cancellation law (Problem 18), if Kx = Ky, then x = y.

Equivalently, if x ≠ y, then Kx ≠ Ky. Thus if Kn ≠ Km, then KKn ≠ KKm, and
so we have:

Now, by (1), we have K1 ≠ K1+b. Hence by repeated applications of (2), we

see that K2 ≠ K2+b, K3 ≠ K3+b, …, Kn ≠ Kn+b. This concludes the proof.
23. We consider a lark L. For any x and y, (Lx)y = x(yy). Now, taking Lx for y,
we see that (Lx)(Lx) = x((Lx)(Lx)). Thus (Lx)(Lx) is a fixed point of x!
Note that (Lx)(Lx) is the same element as Lx(Lx) by how we define the use
of parentheses (or rather the lack thereof).
24. Consider a kestrel K. For any x and y, Kxy = x. Taking K for both x and y,
we have:

If K were a lark, then Kxy = x(yy) for all x and y, so that for x = K and y = K,
we would have:

For (1) and (2) it would follow that K = K(KK), violating the fact that for no
x can K = Kx (by Problem 19). Thus K cannot be a lark.
25. Suppose that a lark L is narcissistic. Then Lxy = L for every x and y by the
solution to Problem 13. Taking Lx for y, we obtain Lx(Lx) = L. But Lx(Lx)
is a fixed point of x [by the solution to Problem 23]. Thus L is a fixed
point of x.
26. Suppose that LK = K (i.e. that K is a fixed point of L). Then LKK = KK.
But LKK = K(KK) (since L is a lark), so that K(KK) = KK. Then by the
cancellation law, taking KK for x and K for y, we see that KK = K, which
means that K is egocentric, which is contrary to Problem 20. Therefore K
cannot be a fixed point of L.
27. If the lark L is a fixed point of the kestrel K, then KL = L. So, for any x,
KLx = Lx. But KLx = L, since K is a kestrel. So we have Lx = L for all x,
and L is narcissistic. Thus L is a fixed point of every element x by Problem
25.
28. We first show that if x is any fixed point of LL, then xx must be egocentric.
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Well, suppose that LLx = x. Now LLx = L(xx) [since L is a lark]. Thus x
= L(xx). Therefore xx = L(xx)x, which is xx(xx). Thus xx is egocentric.
We can actually compute a fixed point of LL, in terms of just L: As we
saw in the solution of Problem 23, for any x, a fixed point of x is Lx(Lx).
Taking LL for x, we see that a fixed point of LL is L(LL)(L(LL)), and
therefore an egocentric element is L(LL)(L(LL)) repeated, which is:

29. (1) Suppose I is agreeable. Then for any x there is some y such that Iy = xy.
But Iy = y, so that y = xy, and thus y is a fixed point of x. Conversely,
suppose that every element x has a fixed point y. Then xy = y. But y = Iy, so
that xy = Iy, and thus I agrees with x on y.
(2) Suppose that every pair of elements is compatible. Now consider any
element A. Then A is compatible with I. Thus there are elements x and y
such that Ax = y and Iy = x. Since Iy = x, then y = x (since y = Iy). Thus
Ax = y and y = x and it follows that Ax = x, which means that x is a fixed
point of A. Thus every element has a fixed point, and consequently I is
agreeable by (1).
(3) Since Ix = x for every x, it follows that II = I, which means that I is
egocentric. If I were narcissistic, that would mean that for every x, Ix =
I. But also Ix = x. Hence if I were narcissistic, then we would have x = I
for every element x, contrary to the fact that has more than one
element.
30. Take M to be LI. Well, LIx = I(xx) = xx. Thus LI is a mocker.
31. We will see that any element θ that combines M with L must be a sage.
We already know that Lx(Lx) is a fixed point of x (by the solution to
Problem 23). Now, Lx(Lx) = M(Lx), and consequently M(Lx) is a fixed
point of x. Now, suppose that combines M with L. Then θx = M(Lx), and so
θx is a fixed point of x. Thus θ is a sage.
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Chapter 9
Combinatorics Galore

We now discuss some of the most prominent combinators of the literature, as

well as some which I introduced in To Mock a Mockingbird.

I. The B-Combinators

Introducing the B Combinator, the Bluebird

The B-combinator is a combinator satisfying the following condition (for all x, y

and z):

This combinator is also known as the bluebird, a name I introduced in To Mock

a Mockingbird. I shall sometimes use that name. This combinator is one of the
basic combinators.
Problem 1. Suppose contains a bluebird B and a mocker M. Then the
composition condition must hold (why?). Hence, by Theorem 1 of the last
chapter, every element x has a fixed point. Moreover, one can write down an
expression for a fixed point of x, using just the symbols B, M and x (and
parentheses, of course). Write down such an expression.
Problem 2. Show that if B and M are present (as members of ), then some
element of is egocentric; in fact, write down the name of an egocentric element
in terms of B and M.
Problem 3. Now write down a narcissistic element in terms of B, M and K
(kestrel).
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Some Derivatives of B

From B alone, one can derive combinators D, B1, E, B2, D1B+, D2, , which are
defined by the following conditions:
(a) Dxyzw = xy(zw), the dove
(b) B1xyzw = x(yzw)
(c) Exyzwv = xy(zwv), the eagle
(d) B2xyzwv = x(yzwv)
(e) D1xyzwv = xyz(wv)
(f) B+xyzw = x(y(zw))
(g) D2xyzwv = x(yz)(wv)
(h) xy1y2y3z1z2z3 = x(y1y2y3)(z1z2z3).

All these combinators, including B, are called compositors, since they serve
to introduce parentheses. The standard ones are the bluebird B and D, which I
call the dove. We shall also have good use for E, which I call the eagle.
Problem 4. (1) Derive these combinators from B. [Hints: Do the following in
order:
(a) Express D in terms of B.
(b) Express B1 in terms of B and D (which can then be reduced to an expression
in terms of B alone).
(c) Express E in terms of B and B1.
(d) Express B2 in terms of B and E.
(e) Express D1 in terms of B and B1, or, alternatively, in terms of B and D.
(f) Express B+ in terms of B and D1.
(g) Interestingly, D2 can be expressed in terms of D alone!
(h) Express in terms of E alone!]
(2) Using mathematical induction, show that for each positive integer n, there is
a combinator Bn, derivable from B, satisfying the condition

Note that by this definition, the bluebird B also has the name B0, and B1 and B2
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are the same as defined above (where different variables were used in the
definition).

II. The Permuting Combinators

We now come to an interesting family of combinators known as permuters.

Introducing the Combinator T, the Thrush

The simplest permuting combinator is T, which is defined by the following:

This permuter T is standard. In To Mock a Mockingbird, I called it the thrush.

Two elements x and y are said to commute if xy = yx.
Problem 5. Prove that from the thrush T and the lark L one can derive a
combinator A that commutes with every element x.

Introducing the Combinator R, the Robin

In To Mock a Mockingbird, I introduced a combinator R, which I termed a robin.

It was defined by the condition:

Problem 6. Show that a robin R can be derived from B and T.

Introducing the Combinator C, the Cardinal

The combinator C is defined by the condition:

This C is standard in the literature, and of basic importance. I called it the

cardinal in To Mock a Mockingbird. It is derivable form B and T, as was
discovered by Alonzo Church [1941]. Church’s construction was quite tricky! It
used eight letters, and I doubt that it can be done with fewer.
Having derived R from B and T, it is quite simple to get C.
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Problem 7. How can one derive C from R?

Problem 8. The solution of Problem 7, when reduced to B and T has nine letters.
It can easily be shortened to eight, thus yielding Church’s expression for C. Do
this reduction.
Problem 9. Can a thrush T be derived from C and the identity combinator I?
Problem 10. We have seen that C is derivable from R alone. Can one derive R
from C alone?
Note: Taking BBT for R, and RRR for C, a useful fact to observe is that for
any x:

because Cx = RRRx = RxR = BBT xR = B(T x)R.

Introducing the Combinator F, the Finch

A finch F is defined by the following condition:

A finch F can be derived from B and T in several ways. It can be derived

from B and R, or from B and C, or from T and the eagle E.
Problem 11. (a) It is easiest to derive F from all three of B, R and C. How?
[Then, of course, F is derivable from B and R, or from B and C, since R and C
and inter-derivable.] (b) Show how to derive F from B and E.

Introducing the Combinator V, the Vireo

A vireo is a combinator V satisfying the following condition:

The combinator V has a sort of opposite effect to that of the finch F. V is

derivable from B and T. It is easiest to derive it from C and F.
Problem 12. Derive V from C and F.
Problem 13. We have seen that V is derivable from C and F. It is also true that F
is derivable from C and V. How?
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Problem 14. As a curiosity, show that the identity combinator I is derivable

from R and K (kestrel).

Some Relations

Given a permuting combinator A satisfying the condition Axyz = abc, where abc
is some permutation of xyz, by A* is meant the combinator satisfying the
condition:

Thus C*, R*, F*, V* are combinators defined by the following conditions:

Each of these combinators is derivable from B and T. It is easiest to derive

them from combinators already derived from B and T.
Problem 15. Derive:
(a) C* from B and C;
(b) R* from B and C;
(c) F* from B, C* and R*;
(d) V* from C* and F*.
Consider again a permutation combinator A satisfying the condition Axyz =
abc, where abc is a permutation of xyz. We let A** be the combinator defined by
the condition

Thus C**, R**, F**, V** are combinators defined by the following conditions:

Problem 16. Show that C**, R**, F**, V** are all derivable from B and T.
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The problem is far simpler than it might appear. One can handle all four cases
in one fell swoop!

Vireos Revisited

We have derived V from C and F, obtaining an expression, which, when reduced

to B and T, has 16 letters. It can alternatively be derived from C* and T, yielding
an expression, which, when reduced to B and T, has only ten letters. How?

Problem 17. Derive V from C* and T.

Problem 18. We have not yet considered a combinator A satisfying the
condition Axyz = yxz. Is there one derivable from B and T ?

III. The Q-Family and the Goldfinch, G

We now come to a family of combinators, all derivable from B and T, that both
permute and introduce parentheses. The first member is Q defined by the
condition:

I termed Q the queer bird in To Mock a Mockingbird.

Problem 19. Derive Q from B and T. [Hint: There is a two-letter expression
involving B and one other combinator already derived from B and T that works!]
Q1 and Q2

The two combinators Q1 and Q2 are defined by the following conditions:

In To Mock a Mockingbird, the combinators Q1 and Q2 were respectively

called the quixotic and the quizzied birds.
Problem 20. Derive Q1 and Q2 from B and T, or from any combinators already
derived from them.
There is an old Chinese proverb that says that if a cardinal C is present, then
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you cannot have a quixotic bird without a quizzied bird, nor a quizzied bird
without a quixotic bird, or if there isn’t such a Chinese proverb, then there
should be!
Problem 21. What is the sense behind such a proverb?

The Birds Q3 (Quirky), Q4 (Quacky), Q5 (Quintessential), Q6

(Quivering)

The quirky bird, Q3, the quacky bird, Q4, the quintessential bird, Q5, and the
quivering bird, Q6, are defined by the following conditions:

Problem 22. Derive these from combinators derivable from B and T.

There is, or should be, another Chinese proverb which says that if a cardinal
is present, then you cannot have a quirky bird without a quacky bird, nor a
quacky bird without a quirky bird.
Problem 23. What is the sense behind that one?
Problem 24. Show that Q4 can be derived from T and Q1.

Problem 25. We have seen that Q is derivable from B and T. But also, B is
derivable from Q and T. Prove this. [It is not obvious.]
Problem 26. One can derive C from Q and T more easily than from B and T, in
fact, with an expression of only four letters. How can this be done?

The Combinator G, the Goldfinch

In To Mock a Mockingbird I introduced a combinator G, called the goldfinch,

which I found quite useful. It is defined by the condition:

I do not know if this combinator was previously known or not.

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Problem 27. Derive G from B and T, or from combinators already derived from
B and T.

IV. Combinators Derivable from B, T, M and I (λ-I Combinators)

Combinators derivable from B, T, M and I form an extremely important class,
whose significance will be discussed in a later chapter. These combinators are
known as λ – I combinators.
A useful combinator M2 is defined by the condition

It is easily derivable from M and B.

Problem 28. Do so.

The Combinator W, the Warbler and the Combinator W′, the

Converse Warbler

A standard combinator is W, which is defined by the condition

W should not be confused with the lark L: Lxy = x(yy).

Alonzo Church showed how to derive W from B, T, M and I. His derivation
was both bizarre and ingenious. His expression for W involved 24 letters and 14
pairs of parentheses! Fairly soon afterwards, J. B. Rosser found an expression
for W in terms of just B, T and M that included only ten letters.
I called W the Warbler in To Mock a Mockingbird. Before deriving it from B,
T and M, it will prove convenient to first consider another combinator W′, which
might be called a converse Warbler. W′ is defined by the condition

Problem 29. There are two interesting ways of deriving W′ from B, T and M.
One way is to first derive W′ from M2 and the robin R, and then reduce that
expression to B and T, which should yield an expression of five letters. Another
way is to first derive W′ from B, T and M2, which when reduced to B, T and M
yields a different expression, one that also contains five letters. The reader
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should try to find both these expressions!

Problem 30. One can easily derive W from W′ and the cardinal C, getting an
expression which, when reduced to B, T and M, will have 13 letters. However, it
can be further reduced to an expression having only ten letters in two different
ways, depending on the choice for W. Do these things.
Problem 31. M is obviously derivable from W and T, and also from W and I.
Also, I is derivable from W and K. Find these derivations.
Problem 32. Some useful relatives of W are W1 , W2, W3, defined by the
following conditions:

Show that these are all derivable from B, T and M, in fact from W and B.

The Combinator H, the Hummingbird

I have found good use for a combinator H (dubbed the hummingbird in To Mock
a Mockingbird). The combinator H is defined by the condition

Problem 33. Show that H is derivable from B, C and W, and thus from B, M and
T.
Problem 34. One can also derive W from H and R, or, more neatly, from C, H
and R. How? [Hint: First derive W′.]

Larks Revisited

We recall the lark L defined by the condition Lxy = x(yy). The lark can be
derived from B, T and M in many ways.
Problem 35.
(a) Show that L is derivable from B, R and M or from B, C and M, and then
reduce the latter expression to one in terms of B, M and T.
(b) Show that L is derivable from B and W. This fact is rather important.
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(c) My favorite derivation of L is from M and the queer combinator Q. It is also

the simplest. When reduced to B, M and T, we get the same expression as in
(a). Try this!

The Combinator S, the Starling

One of the most important combinators in the literature of Combinatory Logic is

the combinator S, which is defined by the following definition:

I called S the starling in To Mock a Mockingbird. One reason why S is so

important is that from S and K one can derive all possible combinators, in a
sense I will make precise in a later chapter.
The starling is derivable from B, M and T, and more easily from B, C and W.
The standard expression for S in terms of B, C and W has seven letters, but in To
Mock a Mockingbird, I found another expression having only six letters. For this
I used the goldfinch G, which we recall is defined by the condition Gxyzw =
xw(yz).
Problem 36. Derive S from B, W and G, and then reduce the resulting
expression to B, C and W. [Hint: Use W2, which we learned from the solution to
Problem 32 can be expressed as B(BW).]
We recall that the hummingbird H was defined by the condition Hxyz = xyzy.
Problem 37. Derive H from S and R.
Problem 38. Show that both W and M are derivable from S and T.
Problem 39. Express a warbler W in terms of S and C.
Note: We now see that the class of combinators derivable from B, C and W is
the same as the class of combinators derivable from B, C and S, since S is
derivable from B, C and W [by Problem 36], and W is derivable from S and C
[by Problem 39].

The Order of a Combinator

By a combinator of order one is meant a combinator A such that Ax can be

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expressed in terms of x alone (a single variable and no combinators). For

example, M is of order 1, since Mx = xx, and the expression xx does not involve
the letter M. Another example is the identity combinator I, since Ix = x. Another
is W L, since W Lx = Lxx = x(xx).
By a combinator of order two is meant one whose defining condition involves
just two variables (and no combinators), as is the case for W and L. In general,
for any positive integer n, by a combinator of order n is meant one whose
defining condition involves n variables. The permuting combinators C, R, F and
V are of order three, as are B and Q.
It is not true that every combinator has an order, for T I cannot be of any
order n, since T Ix1 , …, xn = x1 Ix2 , …, xn, which cannot be reduced any further
(and so we cannot get rid of the combinator I on the right side of this equation).
On the other hand IT has an order, since it is equal to T, which is of order two.
A useful fact to note is that for any combinators A1 and A2, the combinator
RA1A2 is equal to CA2A1, since RA1A2 x = A2xA1, and also CA2A1 x = A2xA1.

The P Group of Combinators

Problem 40. We shall have good use for some of the combinators P, P1 , P2 and
P3 satisfying the following conditions:

These can be derived from B, M and T, in fact from B, Q and W (and hence from
B, C and W). How?
Problem 41. Show that M is derivable from P and I.

The Φ Group of Combinators

We will later need combinators Φ, Φ2, Φ3, Φ4, defined by the following
conditions:
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Problem 42. (a) Derive Φ from B and S. (b) Show by induction that for each n,
there is a combinator Φn derivable from B and S satisfying the equation:

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 9

1. To begin with, let us note that if B is present, then the composition condition
must hold, since for any elements x and y, an element that combines x with y
is Bxy [since (Bxy)z is Bxyz, which is x(yz)].
We recall from the solution of Problem 1 of the last chapter that if C is
any element that combines x with M, then CC is a fixed point of x (we
stated this result as Theorem 1*). Well, BxM combines x with M, and so
BxM(BxM) is a fixed point of x. But BxM(BxM) is also equal to M(BxM), by
the definition of M [as applied to the first M in the expansion of M(BxM)].
So M(BxM) is also a fixed point of x (for every x!). We will use this result
several times in this chapter and the next.
2. Since B is present, the composition condition holds. Then by the solution of
Problem 2 of the last chapter, any fixed point of M is egocentric. Now,
M(BMM) is a fixed point of M [by the previous problem of this chapter,
taking M for x]; hence M(BMM) is egocentric. Let us double-check: To
reduce clutter, let A be BMM. We are to show that MA is egocentric. Well,
MA = M(BMM) = BMM(BMM). But BMM(BMM) = M(M(BMM)), since B is
a bluebird. Then we have M(M(BMM)) = M(MA) = MA(MA). Thus MA =
MA(MA), and MA is egocentric.
3. By Problem 20 (b) of the last chapter, any fixed point of a kestrel K is
narcissistic. Since M(BKM) is a fixed point of K [by the solution to Problem
1], it must be narcissistic [as the reader can check directly, by showing that
M(BKM)x = M(BKM)].
4. (1) (a) We take D to be BB. Let us check that this works: BBxy = B(xy).
Hence BBxyz = B(xy)z. Then
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Thus Dxyzw = xy(zw).

(b) We take B1 to be DB, which can then be expressed in terms of B alone,
since D can be so expressed. We can see this definition works as
follows:

Thus,

Since D = BB, then DB = BBB. Thus in terms of B alone B1 = BBB.

(c) We take E to be BB1, which in terms of B alone is B(BBB). We can see
this definition works as follows:
Exy = BB1xy = B1(xy). Thus

(d) We take B2 to be EB (which, in terms of B, is B(BBB)B). Now,

Hence

(e) We can take D1 to be B1B, or we can take D1 to be BD. Actually B1B is

the same as BD because

It will be quicker to take D1 to be B1B. Then

Hence,

(f) We take B+ to be D1B. Thus,

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(g) We take D2 to be DD. Then

(h) >We take Ê to be EE. Then

(2) We will show by mathematical induction that we can define all the
combinators

in terms of the combinator B. Well, we have already noted that B0 is B

itself. Now assume that Bn can be defined in terms of the combinator B.
Then we claim that Bn+1 = BBBn:

5. Actually, any fixed point A of T will commute with every element x. For
suppose T A = A. Then for every element x, we see that Ax = T Ax = xA.
Thus A commutes with x.
6. Take R to be BBT. Then

7. Actually C is derivable from R alone! Take C to be RRR. Then:

8. In terms of B and T, C = BBT (BBT)(BBT), which has nine letters. It is equal

to B(T (BBT))(BBT), which is Church’s expression.
9. Easily! Take T to be CI. Then Txy = CIxy = Iyx = yx.
10. Yes. Take R to be CC. Then Rxyz = CCxyz = Cyxz = yzx.
11. (a) BCR is a finch, because
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In terms of B and R, F = B(RRR)R. In terms of B and C, F = BC(CC).

(b) ETT ET is a finch, because

We might note that in terms of B and T, the expression BCR for the finch
has 12 letters (since C has 8 and R has 3), while using the expression
B(RRR)R for the finch gives us 13 letters in terms of B and T; using the
expression BC(CC) for the finch, we get 25 letters in terms of B and T.
As for F = ETT ET, as it stands, when E is replaced by B(BBB), we get
an expression of 11 letters, but the expression can be reduced to only 8
letters in terms of B and T, as we will now see:

Hence,

Thus, expressing F in terms of E and T, and then reducing that expression

to one in terms of B and T, yields the shortest expression for the finch F.
12. Take V to be CF. Then CF xyz = F yxz = zxy.
Note: When reduced to B and T, the expression CF has 16 letters (since C
and F each have 8). This 16-letter expression cannot be reduced further.
However, one can get an expression for V in terms of B and T which has
only ten letters, as we will later see.
13. CVxyz = Vyxz = zyx. Thus CV is a finch, F.
14. For any element A, the element RAK must be an identity combinator, for
RAKx = KxA = x. In particular, RKK and RRK are both identity
combinators.
15. Here are the derivations requested for C*, R*, F* and V*:
(a) Take C* to be BC: BCwxyz = C(wx)yz = wxzy.
(b) We have just derived C* from B and C, and R* can in fact be derived
from C* alone. Thus take R* to be C*C*. Well, C*C* wxy = C* wyx.
Hence
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So, in terms of B and C, R* = BC(BC).

(c) Take F* to be BC*R*. Then,

(d) Take V* to be C*F*. Well, C*F* wxyz = F* wyxz = wzxy.

16. Here is the secret! Let A be any of the four combinators C, R, F, V. We can
take A** to be BA*. Here is why:

17. Take V to be C* T. Well,

Thus C*T is a vireo.

18. Of course! The combinator T itself is such a combinator, since T xy = yx,
so that T xyz = yxz.
19. The expression CB works:

We thus take Q to be CB.

20. Take Q1 to be C*B. Well, C* Bxyz = Bxzy = x(zy). Take Q2 to be R*B.
Now, R* Bxyz = Byzx = y(zx).
21. The fact is that Q2 is derivable from C and Q1, and Q1 is derivable from C
and Q2:

22. Q3: Take Q3 to be V* B. Well, V* Bxyz = Bzxy = z(xy). Alternatively, we

can take Q3 to be BC(CB) or QQC. In terms of B and T, we could simply
take Q3 to be BT.
Q4: We could take Q4 to be F* B: We see that
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Alternately, we could take Q4 to be

Q5: Take Q5 to be BQ: Q3: BQxyzw = Q(xy)zw = z(xyw).

Q6: Take Q6 to be B(BC)Q5. Then

23. Q4 is derivable from C and Q3, and Q3 is derivable from C and Q4:

24. We can express Q4 as Q1T:

25. The bluebird B can be seen to be the same as QT (QQ) as follows:

26. The cardinal C can be expressed as QQ(QT):

27. Take G to be BBC. Then

28. Obviously, take M2 to be BM :

29. For the first method, we take W′ to be M2R. Then

Reducing to B, T and M, we take BM for M2 and BBT for R, obtaining the

expression BM(BBT).
As for the second way to derive W′, we take W′ to be B(M2B)T. In this
case,
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Taking BM for M2, this version of W′ reduces to B(BMB)T. Thus we have

two ways of expressing W′ from B, T and M: BM(BBT) and B(BMB)T.
30. CW′ is a warbler, since CW′ xy = W′yx = xyy = W xy.
We now use the fact previously noted that for any x, Cx = B(T x)R (this
was shown right after the statement of Problem 10 in this chapter), and so
CW′ = B(TW′)R. Thus B(TW′)R is a warbler. Hence B(T W′)BBT is a
warbler (since R = BBT). As seen in the last problem, we can take W′ to be
either BM(BBT) or B(BMB)T, and so we can take W to be either

The latter is Rosser’s expression for W.

31.

32. We will take W1 to be BW, W2 to be BW1, W3 to be BW2 Then

Note: In general, if for all n we take Wn+1 to be BW n, then, for every n,

as can be shown by mathematical induction.

33. We take H to be W* C*, which is BW (BC). Then

Thus,

34. First we take W′ to be HR. Thus HRxy = Rxyx = yxx = W′xy. Then take W
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to be CW′. This is a warbler: CW′xy = W′yx = xyy = W xy. Thus C(HR) is a

warbler, and since C is RRR, the warbler is also derivable from H and R
alone.
35. (a) RMB is a lark, since RMBxy = BxMy = x(My) = x(yy) = Lxy. Also, so is
CBM (as the reader can verify). To express RMB in terms of B, M and T,
we take BBT for R in RMB, so that

Thus B(T M)B is a lark.

(b) BWB is also a lark, since

(c) QM is a lark, since QMxy = x(My) = x(yy) = Lxy. Reducing this to B, M

and T, we see that QM = CBM [since Q = CB by Problem 19]. Also, for
any x and y, it is a fact that Cxy = Ryx, because [by Problem 7] Cxy =
RRRxy = RxRy = Ryx. Thus Cxy = Ryx. In particular, CBM = RMB, so
that QM = RMB, which is the expression we obtained for L in (a), and
which reduced to B(T M)B.
36. Recall that W2 was defined by the condition W2xyzw = xyzww in the
statement of Problem 32 and that in the solution to Problem 32 we saw W2
to be B(BW), i.e. defined in terms of B and W. We can take the starling S
to be W2G, since Since we saw in the
solution to Problem 27 that G = BBC, we also see that S is B(BW)(BBC) in
terms of to B, C and W.
37. SR is a hummingbird, since
38. (a) ST is a warbler, since
(b) ST T is a mocker, since Another way
to see this is based on our having seen that W T in a mocker [in the
solution to Problem 31], and since we can take ST for W [because ST xy
= T y(xy) = xyy = W xy], again we see that STT is a mocker.
39. By Problem 34, C(HR) is a warbler W. By the solution to Problem 37, SR
is a hummingbird (H). Thus C(SRR) is a warbler. But by the solution to
Problem 10, CC is a robin R, and so, for W, we can take C(S(CC)(CC)).
40. (a) Take P to be W2Q5. Then
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(b) Take P1 to be LQ. Then

(c) Take P2 to be CP1. Then
(d) Take P3 to be BCP. Then

41. Take M to be P II. Then

42. (a) Take Φ to be B(BS)B. Then

(b) We take Φ = Φ. Now, suppose Φn is defined and behaves as shown in

the equation Φnxyzw1 … wn = x(yw1 … wn)(zw1 … wn). We take Φn+1 to
be B ΦnΦ. Then
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Chapter 10
Sages, Oracles and Doublets

Sages Again

We recall that by a sage is meant a combinator θ such that θx is a fixed point of x

for every x; in other words, x(θx) = θx.
Several papers in the literature are devoted to the construction of sages.
In the chapter before last, we did not construct any sages. We merely proved
that a sage exists, providing that the mocker M exists and that the composition
condition holds. We now turn to several ways of constructing sages.
Problem 1. Construct a sage from B, M and the robin R, recalling that Rxyz =
yzx. [Hint: Recall from the solution to Problem 1 in Chapter 9 that M(BxM) is a
fixed point of x.]
Problem 2. Now derive a sage from B, M and the cardinal C.
Problem 3. A simpler construction of a sage uses M, B and the lark L. One such
construction provides simple alternative solutions to the last two problems. Can
you find it?
Problem 4. Derive a sage from B, M and W.
It is a bit tougher to derive a sage from B, W and C. We will consider some
ways of doing so.
Problem 5. Let us first derive a sage from B, L and the queer bird Q [Qxyz =
y(xz)].
Problem 6. Using the result of the last problem, now write down an expression
for a sage in terms of B, W and C.
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Problem 7. A particularly neat and simple construction of a sage is from Q, M

and L. Can you find it?
Problem 8. Actually, a sage can be constructed from Q and M alone. How?
We recall the starling S satisfying the condition Sxyz = xz(yz).
Problem 9. Construct a sage from L and S.
Problem 10. Now show that a sage can be constructed from B, W and S. This
can be done in several ways, one of which uses only five letters. (The sage
presented in the set of solutions with 5 letters is due to Curry.)
Problem 11. Construct a sage from M and P. [Pxyz = z(xyz)].
Problem 12. Construct a sage from P and W.
Problem 13. Construct a sage from P and I.

The Turing Combinator

In 1937, the great Alan Turing discovered a remarkable combinator U, which

will soon surprise you! It is defined by the condition:

It is ultimately derivable from B, T and M in several ways (it is also derivable

from S, L and I).
Problem 14. Derive U from W1 and P1.

Problem 15. Derive U from W and P.

Problem 16. Derive U from P and M.
Problem 17. Derive U from S, I and L.
Now for the surprise!
Problem 18. There is a sage that is derivable from U alone! How?

The Oracle O

A truly remarkable combinator O is defined by the condition:

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You will soon see why O is so remarkable! In To Mock a Mockingbird, I

dubbed it the owl, but I now prefer the grander name oracle, which is befitting it.
Problem 19. Derive O from Q and W.
Problem 20. Derive O from B, C and W.
Problem 21. Derive O from S and I.
Problem 22. Derive O from P and I.
Problem 23. Derive a sage from O, B and M.
Problem 24. Derive a sage from O and L.
Problem 25. Derive a Turing combinator U from O, B and M.
Problem 26. Derive a Turing combinator from O and L.
Now, why is the oracle O so remarkable? Well, in the solutions to Problems
23 and 24, we have seen two sages constructed from O and other combinators,
and in both cases the sages happened to be fixed points of O. Was that a mere
coincidence? No! The first remarkable fact about the oracle O is that all of its
fixed points are sages.
Problem 27. Prove that all fixed points of O are sages.
Now for the second remarkable fact about O. The converse of the statement
of Problem 27 holds, i.e., all sages are fixed points of O. Thus the class of all
fixed points of O is the same as the class of all sages!
Problem 28. Prove that every sage is a fixed point of O.

Double Sages

A pair (y1, y2) is called a double fixed point of a pair (x1, x2) if x1y1y2 = y1 and
x2y1y2 = y2. We say the system has the weak double fixed point property if every
pair (x1, x2) has a double fixed point. We say that the system had the strong
double fixed point property if there is a pair (θ1, θ2), called double sage pair —
or, more briefly, a double sage — such that for every x and y, the pair (θ1xy,
θ2xy) is a double fixed point of (x, y), i.e.
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There are many ways to construct double sages from the combinators B, M and
T, several of which can be found in Chapter 17 of my book Diagonalization and
Self-Reference [Smullyan, 1994], and one of which we shall now consider.
Others, which I will leave as exercises, have solutions which can be found in the
book just mentioned.

The Nice Combinator N

My favorite construction of a double sage uses a combinator N satisfying the

following condition:

The existence of such an N obviously implies that the system has the weak
double fixed point property.
Problem 29. Why?
Before considering the construction of a double sage, let us see how a nice
combinator N can be ultimately derived from B, T and M. To this end, we will
use a combinator n defined by the condition:

Problem 30.
(a) Derive n from B, C and W or from combinators derivable from them. [It is
easiest to derive n directly from C, W, W*, V* and Φ3.]
(b) Now show that any fixed point of n (such as M(Ln)) is a nice combinator.
Problem 31. Show that from N, C, W and W1 one can construct combinators θ1
and θ2 such that (θ1, θ2) is a double sage.

Double Oracles

We will call a pair (A1, A2) a double oracle if every double fixed point of (A1,
A2) is a double sage. It turns out that every double sage is a double fixed point of
any double oracle (A1, A2).
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To my delight, double oracles exist, if B, T and M are present.

Let O1 and O2 be defined by the following conditions:

Problem 32. Show that (O1, O2) is a double oracle.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 10

1. Since BxM(BxM) = M(BxM) is a fixed point of x (by the solution to Problem
1 of Chapter 9), we want to find a combinator θ such that θx = M(BxM).
Well, by the definition of R, BxM = RM Bx, and so M(BxM) = M(RM Bx).
Also, by the definition of B,

We thus take θ to be BM(RM B).

2. Let us now use a fact stated at the end of the last chapter, namely that for
any combinators A1 and A2, the combinator RA1A2 is equal to CA2A1. In
particular, RM B is equal to CBM, so that RM Bx = CBMx. Then, since
M(RM Bx) is a fixed point of x, so is M(CBMx). Also, M(CBMx) =
BM(CBM)x. We thus now take θ to be BM(CBM).
3. We now use the fact that Lx(Lx) is a fixed point of x. Thus so is M(Lx),
which is also BM Lx. Thus BML is a sage.
We proved in the last chapter (in the solution to Problem 35) that RMB is
a lark, so that CBM is also a lark, since it is equal to RMB. We can replace
the L in BML with either RMB or CBM, showing that both BM(RMB) and
BM(CBM) are sages.
This shows us alternative ways of solving Problems 1 and 2.
4. As we saw in the solution of Problem 35 of the last chapter, BW B is also a
lark. Thus we can also replace the L In BML by BW B, showing us that
BM(BW B) is also a sage.
5. We again use the fact that Lx(Lx) is a fixed point of x. Now,
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Thus W (QL(QL)) is a sage.

6. We have just proved that W (QL(QL)) is a sage. We can take CB for Q (by
the solution to Problem 19 in Chapter 9), thus getting the expression W
(CBL(CBL)), which can be shortened to W (B(CBL)L). Then, by the solution
of Problem 35 of Chapter 9, we can take BW B for L, thus getting the sage

We will later find another solution to this problem.

7. Again we use the fact that Lx(Lx), and hence M(Lx), is a fixed point of x.
But M(Lx) = QLMx. Thus QLM is a sage.
8. In the expression QLM of the previous problem, we can take QM for L (by
Problem 35 of Chapter 9), thus obtaining Q(QM)M as another sage.
9. Lx(Lx) is a fixed point of x. But SLLx = Lx(Lx). Hence SLL is a sage!
10. Here is one way to get a sage from S, W and B: Since SLL is a sage (as
shown in the solution to the last problem), we can take BWB for L in SLL,
obtaining S(BWB(BWB)), which can be shortened to S(W (B(BWB))), which
has six letters. However, there is a more clever and more economical way:
By the definition of W, SLL = WSL. Now replace L by BWB in WSL, and we
have the sage WS(BWB), one letter shorter! This is Curry’s expression for a
sage.
Note that since S is derivable from B, C and W (by Problem 36 of
Chapter 9), so is W S(BWB), thus getting a third way of deriving a sage
from B, C and W.
11. M(PM) is a sage: M(PM)x = PM(PM)x = x(M(PM)x).
12. WP (WP) is a sage: WP (WP)x = P (WP)(WP)x = x((WP)(WP)x).
13. PII(P(PII)) is a sage, since M(PM) is a sage by the solution to Problem 11
above, and M can be expressed by PII, as seen in the solution to Problem 41
of Chapter 9.
14. W1P1 is a Turing combinator: W1P1xy = P1xyy = y(xxy) = Uxy.
15. Another Turing combinator is WP, since

16. Another Turing combinator is PM, since

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17. Another Turing combinator is L(SI), since

18. In the equation Uxy = y(xxy), just substitute U for x, and we have UUy =
y(UUy). Thus UU is a sage.
19. QQW is an oracle, since QQW xy = W (Qx)y = Qxyy = y(xy) = Oxy.
20. We take CB for Q in QQW from the previous problem, which shows us that
CB(CB)W is an oracle.
21. SI is an oracle, since SIxy = Iy(xy) = y(xy) = Oxy.
22. PI is an oracle, since PIxy = y(Ixy) = y(xy) = Oxy.
23. See the solution to Problem 25 below.
24. See the solution to Problem 26 below.
25. BOM is a Turing combinator, since

Now, since BOM is a Turing combinator, and if U is any Turning

combinator, then UU is a sage (by the solution to Problem 18), it follows
that BOM(BOM) is a sage (which can also be verified directly), which
solves Problem 23.
Please note that BOM(BOM) is also a fixed point of O. Indeed (as noted
in the solution to Problem 1 of Chapter 9 and recalled in the solution to
Problem 1 of this chapter), BxM(BxM) is a fixed point of x, for any x.
26. LO is a Turing combinator, since LOxy = O(xx)y = y(xxy) = Uxy. Now,
since LO is a Turing combinator, then LO(LO) is a sage, which solves
Problem 24. [Now we can say, “Lo! Lo! A sage!!”] Again LO(LO) is not
only a sage, but also a fixed point of O!
27. Suppose A is a fixed point of O. Then OA = A. Hence

Since Ax = x(Ax), A is a sage.

28. Consider any sage θ. For any x, we have θx = x(θx). Also Oθx = x(θx). Thus
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θx = O(θx) (they are both equal to x(θx)). Since x = Oθx for every term x, it
follows that θ = Oθ, which means θ that θ is a fixed point of O!
29. In the equation Nzxy = z(Nxxy)(Nyxy) substitute x for z to obtain:
(1) Nxxy = x(Nxxy)(Nyxy).
Next, in the equation Nzxy = z(Nxxy)(Nyxy) substitute y for z to obtain:
(2) Nyxy = y(Nxxy)(Nyxy).
By (1) and (2), the pair (Nxxy, Nyxy) is a double fixed point of (x, y).
30. (a) We take n to be C(V*Φ3W (W2C)). We leave it to the reader to verify that

(b) Let N be any fixed point of n. Then N = nN. Thus

31. Take θ1 to be WN and θ2 to be W1(CN) Then

(a) θ1xy = WNxy = Nxxy, so that θ1xy = Nxxy.
(b) θ2xy = W1(CN)xy = CNxyy = Nyxy, so that θ2xy = Nyxy.
Now,
(1) Nxxy = x(Nxxy)N(yxy) and
(2) Nyxy = y(Nxxy)N(yxy).
Since Nxxy = θ1xy and Nyxy = θ2xy, then, by (1) and (2), we have:
(1′) θ1xy = x(θ1xy)(θ2xy) and
(2′) θ2xy = y(θ1xy)(θ2xy).
Thus (θ1, θ2) is a double sage.
32. Suppose (A1, A2) is a double fixed point of (O1, O2). Then

and O2A1A2 = A2. Hence:

Thus (A1, A2) is a double sage, and (O1, O2) is a double oracle, as we were
asked to show.
Before proving that every double sage is a double fixed point of (O1,
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O2), let us note that if A1xy = A2xy for all x and y, then A1 = A2, because
from A1xy = A2xy for all x and y it follows that A1x = A2x for all x, and
hence that A1 = A2.
Now, suppose that (θ1, θ2) is a double sage. Thus:
(1) θ1xy = x(θ1xy)(θ2xy),
(2) θ2xy = y(θ1xy)(θ2xy).
Also,
(1′) O1θ1θ2xy = x(θ1xy)(θ2xy),
(2′) O2θ1θ2xy = y(θ1xy)(θ2xy).
Therefore, θ1xy = O1 θ1 θ2xy and θ2xy = O2 θ1 θ2xy.
Then θ1 = O1 θ1 θ2 and θ2 = O2 θ1 θ2, which means that (θ1, θ2) is a
double fixed point of (O1, O2).
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Chapter 11
Complete and Partial Systems

I. The Complete System

From the two combinators S and K, all possible combinators are derivable! Let
me explain just what I mean by this.
In the formal language of combinatory logic, we have a denumerable list x1,
x2, …, xn, … of symbols called variables, and some symbols called constants,
each of which is the name of an element of the applicative system.
The notion of term is recursively defined by the following conditions:
(1) Every variable and constant is a term.
(2) If t1 and t2 are terms, so is (t1t2).

It is understood that no expression is a term unless its being so is a consequence

of conditions (1) and (2) above.
Problem 1. Give a more explicit definition of what it means for an expression to
be a term.
We continue to abbreviate terms by removing parentheses if no ambiguity can
result, using the afore-mentioned convention that parentheses are to be restored
to the left, e.g. xyz is to be read ((xy)z) etc.
For a moment, let us recall in general all the combinators you have been
introduced to in Chapters 8 through 10. You learned each combinator’s meaning
from what we have called its “defining equation” (its defining condition). Most
of those defining equations for combinators are of the form Ax1x2 … xn = t(x1x2,
…, xn), where x1x2, …, xn are the variables that occur in the term t and the term t
is built only from these variables (and parentheses; we will now [mostly] stop
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mentioning those necessary parentheses, which are always there whenever a

term is not a single variable or a single constant, even if we suppress writing
some of them for easier reading). For instance, you were introduced to the robin
by its defining equation Rxyz = yzx = ((yz)x) and to the cardinal by its defining
equation: Cxyz = xzy = ((xz)y). However, the defining equation of the kestrel,
Kxy = x is different in that not all the variables that we wish to have as
arguments of the combinator K occur in the term t (which is x in this case),
although all the variables in t occur in the list of arguments for K, the combinator
being defined.
Combinators A of the first type, in which the variables of the term and the
combinator being defined are identical, are called non-cancellative combinators
(or λ-I combinators). We will discuss this subgroup of combinators further in
Section II. Combinators A of the second type, in which not all the variables in
the arguments of the combinator being defined occur in the term t are called
cancellative combinators, because A effectively cancels out those of the
variables that do not occur in t. For example, the bluebird has the defining
equation Bxyz = x(yz) in which the variables are identical on both sides of the
equation, so it is non-cancellative. But in Kxy = x and (KI)xy = y, one of the two
arguments on the left is missing in the term on the right, so the two combinators
K and KI are cancellative (these are the only cancellative operators you have
seen so far).
Thus the general form of a defining equation for a combinator is Ax1x2 … xn =
t, where t is constructed only from variables and the variables of t are among x1,
x2, …, xn. I.e. although t must contain at least one variable in order to be a term,
and every variable in t is one of the variables x1, x2, …, xn, not all the variables
that occur in x1, x2, …, xn need to occur in t (e.g. as in the case of the kestrel).

When t is a term constructed only from variables that are among x1, x2, …, xn,
and our applicative system contains an element A (no element of contains
variables) such that Ax1x2 … xn = t holds, then we say that A is a combinator of
the applicative system and also say that the combinator A with arguments x1,
x2, …, xn realizes the term t. The equation Ax1x2 … xn = t is called the defining
equation of the combinator A.
It turns out that all constants in any applicative system are combinators,
because in applicative systems the meaning of constants is always specified by a
defining equation. And the systems are also always defined so that every term
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constructed from constants alone is assumed to be a combinator of the system.

Thus the combinators and elements of the system are one and the same. But the
constants may be a subset of the set of elements.
So now you know what I mean by “every possible combinator” when I said
that every possible combinator is derivable from S and K. I was talking about
any combinator that can be specified by a defining equation of the above form!
Thus the claim that every combinator in our applicative system C can be
derived from (constants) S and K just says that for every combinator A specified
by a defining equation Ax1x2 … xn = t (where t is built only from variables, and
those variables are among x1, x2, …, xn), we can find a term AS,K constructed
only from S and K (and no variables at all!) such that we can replace the A in its
defining equation by AS,K and get a true equation (true because of the meanings
of S and K): AS,Kx1x2 … xn = t.

Consequently, if we assume our applicative system includes the elements

(combinators) S and K, and we can prove our claim, then every defining equation
you have seen that has defined one of the combinators you were introduced to,
specifies a combinator that can be derived only from S and K, so that the only
constants we need in our system to obtain all the combinators you have seen
(and infinitely many more) are S and K.
But why should a specification of the ordered arguments of a combinator and
a term built only from variables included in those arguments be enough to
specify any combinator? Well, first of all, as you have just seen, such a
specification includes an infinite number of combinators, including all you have
studied, as well as all those that can be defined from any term built from
variables, and an ordered list of argument variables that includes the variables of
the term. The claim that these are “all the combinators” essentially says that the
essence of combinators is hidden in those terms built from variables and the
argument list for the combinator. Here’s one way to think about that: Since
applicative systems are to be imagined as being concerned with the order of
“applications” of some sort of things to other things of the same sort (say,
applications involving functions, algorithms, processes, etc.; you will see some
quite varied interpretations of applications in the next chapter), the structure of
parentheses in complex terms involving variables can be seen as defining an
order on the applications of whatever is filled in for the variables at some point
in time. For instance, consider the order of applications defined by the
parentheses of (((rs)((tu)v))((wx)y)). [It certainly has nothing to do with the
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alphabetical order of the names of the variables.] In any case, you can see that, if
we can prove what we have claimed, then in any applicative system including at
least S and K as constants, there is a combinator A for which

as well as a (cancellative) combinator A′ for which

Combinatorial Completeness

Now we wish to prove our principal claim, namely that given any ordered list of
variables to be taken as arguments for a combinator, and any term t built only
from variables included in the list of arguments, there is a combinator with the
given arguments (in the order specified in the list) that is derivable from just S
and K (no variables) which realizes the term t.
To begin with, the identity combinator I is derivable from S and K: just take I
to be SKK, for SKKx = Kx(Kx) = x = Ix. Thus it suffices to show that every
combinator is derivable from S, K and I. This is what we will now do.
Let us first mention the following induction principle, which we will call the
term induction principle: Consider a set S whose members are variables or
constants or both, and let S+ be the set of all terms built from elements of S (and
parentheses). To show that all terms in S+ have a certain property P, it suffices to
show that all elements of S have the property, and that for any terms t1 and t2 of
S+, if t1 and t2 have property P, then so does (t1t2). This principle is as self-
evident as mathematical induction, and can in fact be derived from mathematical
induction on the number n of occurrences of elements of S in the term.
Let us call a simple term if it is built only from variables and S, K, and I. In
the algorithm we are about to present, we will assume we will be starting with a
simple term W built only from variables, but we will successively turn it into a
simple term built from S, K, and I and variables. In the end, we will have built a
term from that is built only of S, K, and I (by having eliminated all the
variables in a specified ordered list of arguments for a combinator , a list that
includes all the variables in ). And if x1, …, xn is the list of variables specified
as arguments for the combinator, it will be the case that x1 … xn = , where the
in question is the original one containing only variables (all of which are
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included among the x1, …, xn).

Now, consider any simple term and consider a variable x, which may or
may not be in . We shall call a term x an x-eliminate of if the following
three conditions hold:
(a) The variable x does not occur in x.
(b) All variables in x are in .
(c) The equation = holds.
We wish to first show that every simple term has an x-eliminate x that is
derivable from S, K and I and variables in excluding the variable x. We define
x by the following inductive rules:
(1) If is x itself, we take x to be I.
(2) If is any term in which x does not occur, we take x to be K .
(3) If is a compound term in which x occurs, we take ( )x to be .
Note that for any possible simple term, one and only one of the three rules will
apply. When rule (3) is applied, it will require finding the x-eliminates of the two
parts of the compound term.
When we called the scheme of rules for x-elimination we just introduced
inductive, we meant that if we have a simple term from which we wish to
eliminate the variable x we operate repeatedly on the components of our term
working from outside inwards looking for x-eliminates of the components of the
term, until we have eliminated x from all the subterms and finally the whole
term.
Let us consider an example. Let’s see if we can derive from S, K and I a
combinator A of one argument x with the defining equation Ax = (xx). (Thus we
are checking whether the mocker/mockingbird is derivable from S, K and I.) We
want to see if eliminating x, the only variable in the term (and the only variable
in the list of required arguments for the combinator) will give us a term in S, K
and I. Well, (xx) is a compound term in which x occurs, so rule (3) tell us that the
x-eliminate of (xx) consists of the starling S placed in front of the x-eliminates of
the two parts of the compound term, which are both x. By rule (1), the x-
eliminate of x is I. So the x-eliminate of (xx) is SII. Let us check that the three
conditions which an x-eliminate must satisfy actually hold here: (a) The variable
x does not occur in SII; (b) All variables in SII are in (xx) [this holds vacuously,
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since there are no variables in SII]; (c) SIIx = Ix(Ix) = xx. (Of course xx is just
(xx) with its outer parentheses suppressed for easier reading.)
Now let us prove that for any simple term, the method of x-eliminates we
have described does result in a term that satisfies the conditions on an x-
eliminate.
Proposition 1. is an x-eliminate of . In other words:
(1) The variable x does not occur in .
(2) All variables of occur in .
(3) The equation x = holds.
This proposition is proved by term induction.
Problem 2. (i) Show that if is x, then is an x-eliminate of .
(ii) Show that if is any term in which x does not occur, then is an x-
eliminate of .
(iii) Show that if and are x-eliminates of and respectively, so is

It then follows by term induction that the term Wx is an x-eliminate of W for

every simple term .
Problem 3. Since I is an x-eliminate of x, it follows that an x-eliminate of is S
I. However, if x does not occur in , there is a much simpler x-eliminate of
, namely itself! Prove this.
Now the reader might already realize that if the term t from which we wish to
“eliminate” variables contains a number of variables, we must successively
“eliminate” each of the variables that occur in the term, if we wish to arrive at a
variable-free term (i.e. the desired combinator). Indeed, we must also
“eliminate” all the variables that do not occur in our original term, but which
occur in the ordered list of argument variables for the combinator we are
seeking. Moreover, we must do our variable eliminations in a particular order.
To that process we now turn.
For two variables x and y, by is meant .

We shall call a term an x, y eliminate of if the following three conditions

hold:
(1) Neither of the variables x, y occurs in .
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(2) All variables of occur in .

(3) The equation holds.
Problem 4. Which, if either, of the following statements is true?
(1) is an x, y eliminate of .
(2) is an y, x eliminate of .
We now take as an abbreviation of .
We define a term to be an x1, x2, …, xn eliminate of if the following three
conditions hold:
(1) None of the variables x1, x2, …, xn occur in .
(2) All the variables in occur in .
(3) The equation holds.
From the result of Problem 4, and mathematical induction, we have:
Proposition 2. is an x1, x2, …, xn eliminate of .

Now let be a term built only from variables among x1, x2, …, xn. Suppose
we want a combinator A with arguments x1x2 … xn derivable from only S, K and
I (using no variables) and satisfying the condition Ax1 … xn = . Well, we take
A to be , which is an x1, x2, …, xn eliminate of .

All variables of A occur in , hence are among x1, x2, …, xn, yet none of the
variables x1, x2, …, xn are in A, which means that A contains no variables at all.
Since A has been formed by a variable-elimination scheme which introduces
only the combinators S, K, and I, A must be built only from S, K, and I. And the
condition Ax1x2 … xn = holds.

Now we define a class of combinators to be combinatorially complete when,

for every simple term t and every list of possible arguments x1, x2, …, xn for a
combinator, if every variable in the term t occurs in x1, x2, …, xn, there is a
combinator A in the class such that Ax1x2 … xn = t (i.e. when, for any such term
t, there is a combinator A with arguments x1, x2, …, xn that realizes t).

Thus we have proved:

Theorem. The class of combinators derivable from S and K is combinatorially
complete.
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We would like to point out that, given a term t in S, K and I (that is, including
terms in which variables are liberally strewn throughout) and an ordered list of
variables x1, x2, …, xn including all the the variables in t, the method of
eliminates described here can also be used, if one wishes, to transform any such
term t into an expression Wx1x2 … xn in which W is a combinator built only with
S, K and I. (To see this one only has to look once more through the method and
the proof that the method works to see that it applies as well in this situation.)
Now let us consider an example of how to find a cancellative combinator with
more than one variable using the method of eliminates: Suppose we want a
combinator A satisfying the condition Axy = y. Thus A has the two arguments x,
y and the term we want to use to define A does not include x. Well, we want A to
be a y, x eliminate of y, i.e. an x-eliminate of a y-eliminate of y. Thus we must
first find a y-eliminate of y, and that is simply I. We then want an x-eliminate of
I, which is KI. Thus our solution should be KI. Let us check: KIx = I, so that
KIxy = Iy = y.
Now for a permuting combinator: How can we derive the thrush T from S, K
and I? [Txy = yx]. We have to find an x-eliminate of a y-eliminate of yx. Well, a
y-eliminate of y is I, and a y-eliminate of x is Kx, and so a y-eliminate of yx is
SI(Kx). We now need an x-eliminate of SI(Kx) = (SI)(Kx). Well, an x-eliminate
of SI is K(SI), and an x-eliminate of Kx is simply K (by Problem 3), and so an x-
eliminate of SI(Kx) is S(K(SI))K. Thus S(K(SI))K should be our solution. Let us
check:

Then S(K(SI))Kxy = SI(Kx)y = Iy(Kxy) = y(Kxy) = yx.

It would be a good exercise for the reader to try to derive various combinators
for M, W, L, B, C from S, K and I, using the procedure of eliminates. The
procedure can be easily programed for a computer. However, it should be
pointed out that the procedure, surefire as it is, can be very tedious and often
leads to much longer expressions than can be found by using some cleverness
and ingenuity.
There is an interesting table on Internet called “Combinator Birds” that gives
an expression in S and K alone (no I) for all the combinators you have
encountered in this book and more. This table can currently be found at
angelfire.com/tx4/cus/combinator/birds.html. For instance, there you will see
how exceedingly long are the derivations from S and K alone of the finch and the
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hummingbird. In the first column of the table it is immediately after the Greek
letter λ (and before the period) that the creators of the table list the arguments of
the combinator in question, since those arguments cannot be determined simply
from the constant-free term used to define the combinator. For the goldfinch, the
first column entry in the goldfinch row, λabcd.ad(bc), tells us that the
combinator referred to in this row of the table has the arguments a, b, c and d,
and the defining equation is Gabcd = ad(bc). The next two column entries for
the row tells us that the common symbol for this combinator is G and that it is
commonly called the goldfinch. The next column entry on the row tells us that
this combinator can be derived from B, C and W as BBC. And then the final
column entry for the goldfinch row tells us the goldfinch can be derived from S
and K alone by the term

A Fixed Point Problem

There are two results of combinatory logic known as the First and Second Fixed
Point Theorems. The second one will be dealt with in the next chapter. The first
will be considered now. To motivate this, the reader should try the following
exercise:
Exercise. (a) Find a combinator Γ that satisfies the condition Γxy = x(Γy). (b)
Find a combinator Γ that satisfies the condition Γxy = Γyx.
The solutions of (a) and (b) are special cases of the First Fixed Point
Theorem.
In what follows t(x, x1, …, xn) is a term in which x, x1, …, xn are precisely the
variables that occur in the term. Recall that all realizable terms are built up only
from variables (and parentheses).
Theorem F1. [First Fixed Point Theorem] For any realizable term t(x, x1, …, xn)
there is a combinator Γ satisfying the condition Γx1 … xn = t(Γ, x1, …, xn).

Remarks. This theorem may be a bit startling, since the satisfying condition for
Γ involves Γ itself! This is related to self-reference or recursion, as will be seen
in the next chapter.
Problem 5.
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(1) Prove Theorem F1. [There are two different proofs of this. One involves a
fixed point of a combinator that realizes the term t(x, x1, …, xn). The other
uses a combinator that realizes the term t((xx), x1, …, xn).]
(2) Now find solutions to (a) and (b) of the exercise stated before Theorem F1.

Doubling Up

Theorem F1 has the following double analogue:

Theorem F1F1. [First Double Fixed Point Theorem] For any two realizable
terms t1(x, x1, …, xn) and t2(x, x1, …, xn) there are combinators Γ1, Γ2 such that:
(1) Γ1x1 … xn = t1(Γ2, x1, …, xn).
(2) Γ2x1 … xn = t2(Γ1, x1, …, xn).

Problem 6. Prove Theorem F1F1.

II. Partial Systems of Combinatory Logic

λ-I Combinators

We will now consider combinators A defined by some condition Ax1 … xn = t,

where t is a term all of whose variables are among the variables x1 … xn. We
recall that if all of the variables x1 … xn occur in t, then A is called a λ-I
combinator, or a non-cancellative combinator, while all other combinators (i.e.
those for which one or more of the variables x1 … xn do not occur in t) are called
cancellative combinators (e.g. K and KI), since they cancel out those of the
variables x1 … xn that do not occur in t.

For any class of combinators, a set of elements of is called a basis for if

all elements of are derivable from elements of S. We have already shown that
the class of all combinators has a finite basis, namely the two elements S and K.
We now wish to show that the four combinators S, B, C and I form a basis for
the class of all λ-I combinators (and hence that B, M, T and I also form a basis,
since S, B, C and I are themselves derivable from B, M, T and I).
To this end, let us define a nice term to be a term built from the symbols S, B,
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C and I and variables. If a nice term has no variables, then it is a combinator, and
will accordingly be called a nice combinator. Thus a nice combinator is a
combinator built only from S, B, C and I.
We define an x-eliminate of a term as before and we must now show that if
is any nice term, then has a nice x-eliminate, provided that x actually occurs
in ! Well, for this purpose we must redefine our set of recursive rules to
produce the appropriate x-eliminate .
1. If = x, we take to be I. [Thus xx = I.]
2. For a compound term in which x occurs, it occurs either in or in or in
both.
(a) If x occurs both in and , we take to be .
(b) If x occurs in but not in , we take ( to be .
(c) If x occurs in but not in , then:
(c1) if consists of x alone, we take to be . [Thus , if
x does not occur in .]
(c2) if V ≠ x (but x occurs in and not in ), we take to be .

Note that this set of rules, unlike the previous set of rules for x-elimination,
contains no rule for eliminating x when the original term you wish to eliminate x
from is a term in which x doesn’t occur. But this causes no problem in our
current non-cancellative combinator situation. If our original term contains no
occurrence of x, we would have no reason to even start off on an x-elimination,
because we only eliminate variables from the list of arguments for the desired
combinator, and if the original term contains no x, there would be no x in the
argument list, so we wouldn’t try to do x-elimination at all. So we are only
concerned with doing an x-elimination either on an x standing alone, which is
covered by Rule (1), or on a compound term in which x occurs in either or
or both. If we do find after eliminating x from such a compound term (and we
are told by the rules as to what to do when x doesn’t occur in one of the terms)
that there are no longer any x’s in the compound term that result, we just know
that we have the final x-eliminate for the term (or subterm) we are working on.
Proposition 3. For any nice term in which x occurs, the term is a nice x-
eliminate of .
Problem 7. Prove Proposition 3.
We leave it to the reader to show that for a nice term , if variables x and y
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occur in , then is a nice y, x eliminate of , and more generally that if x1,

…, xn occur in , then is a nice x1, …, xn eliminate of , and so if x1,
…, xn are all the variables of , then is a nice combinator A satisfying
the condition . Since A is nice, then it is also a λ-I combinator
(since S, B, C and I are all λ-I combinators, and for any two λ-I combinators
A1A2 is again a λ-I combinator).

Notice that this time we are proving Proposition 3 for every term built up
from S, B, C, I and variables (we said any nice term). I pointed out earlier we
also could have done this for terms built from S and K and variables with the
earlier method of eliminates and the same proofs. But since terms built up only
from variables are also terms built up from S, B, C, I and possibly variables, we
have the following immediate consequence of Proposition 3:
Corollary. For every constant-free term t and every list of possible arguments
x1, x2, …, xn for a combinator, if the variables occurring in the term t are x1, x2,
…, xn too, there is a combinator A in the class of variable-free terms built from
S, B, C and I such that Ax1x2 … xn = t (i.e. there is a non-cancellative
combinator A that realizes the term t).
This proves that S, B, C and I form a basis for the class of all λ-I combinators.
It is known that no proper subset of {S, B, C, I} is a basis for the class of λ-I
combinators, but J. B. Rosser found a curious two-element basis for the class of
λ-I combinators, namely I and a combinator J defined by the condition:

How Rosser found that is a mystery to me! If the reader is interested, a

derivation of B, T and M from J and I can be found in To Mock a Mockingbird,
and probably in other books on combinatory logic.

B, T, I Combinators

The class of all combinators derivable from B, T and I has been studied by
Rosser [1936] in connection with certain logical systems in which duplicative
combinators like M, W, S, J have no place. In To Mock a Mockingbird I showed
that these three combinators can be replaced by only two, namely I and the
combinator G (the goldfinch), which we recall is defined by the condition:
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Whether this discovery was new or not, I honestly don’t know. Now let us derive
B and T from G and I.
Problem 8.
(a) First derive from G and I the combinator Q3 (which, we recall, is defined as
satisfying the condition Q3xyz = z(xy)).
(b) Then derive the cardinal C from G and I. [Cxyz = xzy.]
(c) From C and I, we can obtain T. [Alternatively, we can get T from Q3 and I].
(d) From C we can get the robin R [Rxyz = yzx], and then from C, R and Q3, we
can get the queer combinator Q [Qxyz = y(xz)], and then from Q and C we
can obtain B.

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 11

1. t is a term if and only if there is a finite sequence t1, …, tn = t such that for
each i ≤ n, either ti is a variable or constant, or there are numbers j1 and j2
both less than i such that ti = (tj1, tj2).
2. We will show that no matter which rule applies to our simple term , then
will be an x-eliminate of .
(i) Let us first consider the case that is x itself. Then, by rule (1),
. We must thus show that I is an x-eliminate of . Well, since there
are no variables in the term I, then of course the variable x does not occur in
I, and it is vacuously true that all variables in I (of course there are none)
occur in . Also, Ix = x, and so I is an x-eliminate of .
(ii) Now we will show that if is any term in which x does not occur,
then, by rule (2) is an x-eliminate of . Clearly, x does not occur in
. Secondly, the variables of are variables of , so that all variables of
are variables of . Thirdly, . Thus is indeed an x-eliminate
of .
(iii) Finally, we consider the composite term in which x does occur,
so that rule (3) applies. Suppose that is an x-eliminate of , and that
is an x-eliminate of . We must show that is an x-eliminate of .
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Let us check the three conditions to see if is an x-eliminate of :

(a) Since x does not occur in (since is an x-eliminate of ) and x does not
occur in ), and x does not occur in S, it follows that x does not occur in
.
(b) Every variable y in must occur in , because y either occurs in
or or both, which means it occurs in or or both. So it occurs in the
compound term .
(c) Lastly, we must show that . Well,

Since and , then . Thus .

By (a), (b), and (c), is an x-eliminate of (assuming is an x-
eliminate of and assuming is an x-eliminate of ).

3. (a) The variable x does not occur in (by hypothesis).

(b) All variables of obviously occur in .
(c) Obviously .
4. It is clear that the statement (2) is true. Here is why:
(a) The variable y does not occur in . The variable x does not occur in
, hence not in ( , since all the variables in occur in . Thus neither
x nor y occurs in .
(b) All variables of occur in , and all variables in occur in .
Hence all variables of occur in .
(c)
By (a), (b), and (c), is an y, x eliminate of .
5. For the first proof, let A be a combinator that realizes the term t. Thus

We let Γ be a fixed point of A, so that

Thus Γx1 … xn = t(Γ, x1, …, xn).

For the second proof, suppose A realizes the term t(xx, x1, …, xn), i.e. for
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all x, x1, …, xn

If we take A for x, we obtain

We thus take AA to be Γ!
Note to the reader: I believe that virtually all fixed points and recursion
theorems in recursion theory and in combinatory logic, as well as the
construction of Gödel self-referential sentences, are simply elaborate
variations on this trick of the above second proof. In all cases, one has an
equation containing Ax of the left side of an equal sign, and xx on the right
side. Taking A for x, we end up with AA on both sides.
Now here is the solution of the Exercise:

(a) Since Qzxy = x(zy), we take Γ to be a fixed point of Q, so that

Thus Γxy = x(Γy).

(b) Since Czxy = zyx, we take Γ to be a fixed point of C, so that

Thus Γxy = Γyx.

6. Again, there are two different ways of proving this, and both are of interest.
For the first proof, we recall that by a cross point of a pair of compatible
points (A, B) is meant a pair of elements (x, y) such that Ax = y and By = x.
Since we are working with a complete system, the hypothesis of Problem 6,
Chapter 8 (that conditions C1 and C2 both hold) is met, so that every pair of
terms has a cross point (in the language of that problem, any two
combinators are compatible).
Now let A1 realize t1 and let A2 realize t2. Thus
(3) A1xx1 … xn = t1(x, x1, …, xn).
(4) A2xx1 … xn = t2(x, x1, …, xn).
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We now let (Γ1, Γ2) be a cross point of (A2, A1) [not of (A1, A2) but of (A2,
A1)]. Thus, A2Γ1 = Γ2 and A1Γ2 = Γ1. Then
(1′) Γ1x1 … xn = A1Γ2x1 … xn = t1(Γ2, x1, …, xn).
(2′) Γ2x1 … xn = A2Γ1x1 … xn = t2(Γ1, x1, …, xn).
For the second proof, given terms t1(x, x1, …, xn) and t2(x, x1, …, xn), let A1
and A2 be combinators satisfying the following conditions:
(1) A1xyx1 … xn = t1(xyx, x1, …, xn).
(2) A2xyx1 … xn = t2(xyx, x1, …, xn).
Then,
(1′) A1A2A1x1 … xn = t1(A2A1A2, x1, …, xn).
(2′) A2A1A2x1 … xn = t2(A1A2A1, x1, …, xn).
We thus take Γ1 = A1A2A1 and Γ2 = A2A1A2.
7. We are given that is a nice term and that x occurs in . At each stage of
the construction of , no new constant was introduced other than S, B, C or
I, so that is certainly nice.
We leave it to the reader, using term induction, to prove that x does not
occur in and that all variables in occur in . It remains to show that
. We do this by induction.
1 If = x, then is I and . So . It remains to
show the statement for when we have a compound term .
2(a) Suppose that x is in both and , and that and . We
are to show that . Well,

so that

2(b) For the case when x occurs in but not in , we assume by the induction
hypothesis that . Now, in this case,

so that
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2(c) Now for the case that x is in but not in .

(c1) Suppose = x. Then , so that

(c2) In the case that (and when x does not occur in ), we assume
that and we must show that . Well, in this
case , so that

This concludes the proof.

8. (a) We take Q3 to be GI. Then GIxyz = Iz(xy) = z(xy) = Q3xyz.
(b) We take C to be GGII. Then GGIIx = Gx(II) = GxI, so that

(c) We can take T to be CI. Then CIxy = Iyx = yx = Txy. Alternatively, we

can take T to be Q3I. Then

(d) We recall that CC is the robin R, since

We now take Q to be GRQ3. Then

Finally, we take B to be CQ. Then

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Chapter 12
Combinators, Recursion and the Undecidable

In this chapter, we work with the complete system: all combinators derivable
from S and K. We shall now see how combinatory logic is related to
propositional logic, recursion theory, and the undecidable.

Logical Combinators

We now want two combinators t and f to stand for truth and falsity respectively.
Several workable choices are possible, and the one we take is due to Henk
Barendregt [1985]. We take t to be the kestrel K, and for f we take the
combinator KI, so that in what follows t is an abbreviation for K, while f is an
abbreviation for KI. We shall call t and f propositional combinators. We note
that for any combinators x and y, whether propositional combinators or not, txy =
x and fxy = y, which turns out to be a technical advantage.
There are only two propositional combinators t and f (i.e. K and KI). We now
use the letters p, q, r, s as standing for arbitrary propositional combinators,
rather than propositions, and we call p true if p = t, and false if p = f. We define
the negation ∼ p of p by the usual conditions: ∼t = f and ∼f = t; we define the
conjunction p ∧ q by the truth-table conditions: t ∧ t = t, t ∧ f = f, f ∧ t = f, f ∧ f
= f. We define the disjunction p ∨ q, the conditional p ⊃ q, and the bi-
conditional p ≡ q similarly. We now want combinators that can realize these
operations.
Problem 1. Find combinators N (negation combinator), c (conjunction
combinator), d (disjunction combinator), i (implication combinator), and e
(equivalence or bi-conditional combinator), satisfying the following conditions:
(a) Np = ∼ p,
(b) cpq = p ∧ q,
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(c) dpq = p ∨ q,
(d) ipq = p ⊃ q,
(e) epq = p ≡ q.
We now see that by combining the above combinators in various ways, we
have combinators that can do propositional logic, in the sense that they can
compute compound truth tables.

Arithmetic Combinators

We shall now see how the arithmetic of the natural numbers can be embedded in
combinatory logic.
Each natural number is represented by a combinator denoted (not to be
confused with the Peano numeral designating n). There are several schemes of
doing this, one of which is due to Church [1941]. The scheme we will use is
again due to Henk Barendregt [1985]. Here the vireo V plays a major role [Vxyz
= zxy]. We let σ (read as “sigma”) be the successor combinator Vf (which is
V(KI)). We take to be the identity combinator I, take to be ; take to be
,… take …. The first thing that needs to be shown is that the
combinators, , are all distinct.
Problem 2. Show that if m ≠ n, then . [Hint: First show that for every
, where n+ is an abbreviation for n + 1. Then show that if , then
. Finally, show, for all m and n and all positive k, that
The combinators are called numerical combinators. A combinator A
is called an arithmetical combinator of type 1 if, for every n, there is some m
such that . We call A an arithmetical combinator of type 2 if, for every n
and m, there is some number p such that . In general, A is called an
arithmetical combinator of type n if, for all numbers x1, …, xn, there is a number
y such that .
We now wish to show that there is an addition combinator, which we will
denote ⊗, such that , and a multiplication combinator, which we
will denote ⊗, such that and an exponential combinator such
that .
We need some items in preparation for all this:
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For any positive number n, by its predecessor is meant the number n − 1.

Thus, for any number n, the predecessor of n+ is n. We now need a combinator P
that calculates predecessors, in the sense that for all n.

Problem 3. Find such a combinator P.

The Zero Tester

We have vital need of a combinator Z, called the zero tester, such that
and for any positive n.
Problem 4. Find such a combinator Z.
Problem 5. Does there exist a combinator A such that , but , for
positive?
We now consider some recursion properties.
Problem 6. Prove that for any combinator A and any number k, there is a
combinator Γ satisfying the following two conditions:

Hints:
1. C2 is equivalent to the following condition: For any positive n,

2. Use the zero tester Z as in Problem 5.

3. Use the fixed point theorem.
Problem 7. Now show that there are combinators ⊗, ⊗ and satisfying the
following conditions:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The Recursion Property for Combinatory Logic, in its most general form, is
that for any terms f(y1, …, yn) and g(x, z, y1, …, yn), there is a combinator Γ such
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that for all numerals , the following two conditions hold:

(1)
(2)
A combinator Γ that does this exists by the fixed point theorem, and is
defined by the condition:

This brilliant idea was due to Alan Turing!

I. Preparation for the Finale

Property Combinators

By a property combinator is meant a combinator such that for every number n,

or .
A set A of (natural) numbers is said to be (combinatorially) computable if
there is a property combinator Γ such that for every n in A, and
for every n that is not in A. Such a combinator is said to compute A.
We might remark that the important thing about combinatorial computability
is that a set A is combinatorially computable if and only if it is recursive.
Problem 8. Show that the set E of even numbers is computable. [Hint: The
property of being even is the one and only property satisfying the following
conditions: (1) 0 is even; (2) for positive n, n is even if and only if its
predecessor is not even. Now use the fixed point theorem.]
Problem 9. Suppose Γ computes A. Does it follow that NΓ computes the
complement of A? [N is the negation combinator Vft.]

Relational Combinators

By a relational combinator of degree n is meant a combinator A such that for all

numbers k1, …, kn, either or , and such a combinator A
is said to compute the set of all n-tuples (k1, …, kn) such that . Thus
for any relation R(x1, …, xn), we say that A computes R to mean that for all n-
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tuples (k1, …, kn), if R(k1, …, kn) holds, then , and if R(k1, …, kn)
doesn’t hold, then .
Problem 10. Show that there is a relational combinator g that computes the
relations x > y (x is greater than y). [Hint: This relation is uniquely determined
by the following conditions:
1. If x = 0, then x > y is false.
2. If x ≠ 0 and y = 0, then x > y is true.
If x ≠ 0 and y ≠ 0, then x > y is true if and only if x − 1 > y − 1 is true.]

Functional Combinators

Consider a function f(x) of one argument, i.e. an operation that assigns to each
number n a number devoted by f(n). A combinator A will be said to realize the
function f(x) if, for every number n, the condition holds.

Problem 11. Show that if functions f(x) and g(x) are both realizable, so is the
function f(g(x)), i.e. the operation that assigns to each number n the number
f(g(n)).
Problem 12. Suppose R(x, y) is computable and that f(x) and g(x) are both
realizable. Show that the following are computable:
(a) The relation R(f(x), y).
(b) The relation R(x, g(y)).
(c) The relation R(f(x), g(y)).

The Minimization Principle

Consider a relational combinator A of degree 2 such that for every number n,

there is at least one number m such that . Such a combinator is
sometimes called regular. If A is regular, then, for every n, there must be a
smallest number k such that . The minimization principle is that for every
regular combinator A, there is a combinator A′, called a minimizer of A, such that
for every number , where k is the smallest number for which
We seek to prove the minimization principle. The following preliminary
problem will be most helpful:
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Problem 13. Show that for any regular relational combinator A of degree 2,
there is a combinator A1 such that for all numbers n and m,
(1) If , then .
(2) If , then .
Problem 14. Now prove the Minimization Principle: for every regular relational
combinator A of degree 2, there is a combinator A′, called a minimizer of A, such
that for every number n, , where k is the smallest number for which
. [Hint: Use the A1 of Problem 13 and the cardinal C [Cxyz = xzy].]

The Length Measurer

By the length of a number n we shall mean the number of digits in n when n is in

ordinary base 10 notation. The numbers from 0 to 9 have length 1; those from 10
to 99 have length 2, those from 100 to 999 have length 3, etc. Actually the length
of n is the smallest number k such that 10k > n.
We now want a combinator L′ that measures the length of any number, that is,
we want such that , where k is the length of n.
Problem 15. Prove that there is a length measurer L′.

Concatenation to the Base 10

For any numbers n and m, by n * m we shall now mean the number which, when
written in ordinary base 10 notation, consists of n (in base 10 notation) followed
by m (in base 10 notation). For example

We now want a combinator that realizes this operation of concatenation *.

Problem 16. Show that there is a combinator such that for every n and m,
. [Hint: x * y = (x × 10k) + y, where k is the length of y.
For example,

and 3 is the length of 587.]

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II. The Grand Problem

By an S, K term we shall mean a term without variables, built from just the
constants S and K. We use letters X, Y, Z to stand for unspecified S, K terms. In
what follows “term” will mean S, K term.
Of course, distinct terms might designate the same combinator. For example,
KKK designates the same combinator as KKI. For both designate the kestrel K,
or as we say the equation KKK = KKI holds, or is true. An equation is true if and
only if its being so is a consequence of the given conditions (which can be called
the axioms for combinatory logic) — SXYZ = XZ(Y Z) and KXY = X — and by
using the inference rules of identity, namely X = X and if X = Y, then XZ = Y Z
and ZX = ZY ; also, the additional rules of equality: if X = Y then Y = X; if X = Y
and Y = Z then X = Z.
The grand question now is this: Given two terms X and Y, is there a
systematic way of deciding whether or not the equation X = Y holds? This can be
reduced to a question of deciding whether a given number belongs to a certain
set of numbers. This translation uses the device of Gödel numbering. How this
translation is effected is the first thing we shall now consider.
All sentences (frequently called equations here) are built from the following
five symbols:

In this section all such sentences will be equations of the form

Under each symbol I have written its Gödel number. The Gödel number of a
compound expression (a complex term, or a sentence) is the number obtained by
replacing S by 1, K by 2, …, = by 5, and reading the result as a number in base
10. For example, the Gödel number of KS(= is 2135).
We let be the set of true sentences, and let be the set of the Gödel
numbers of the true sentences. The question now is whether the set is
combinatorially computable. Is there a combinator Γ such that for every if
n ∊ , and if n ∉ ?
The question is of staggering importance, since any formal mathematical
question can be reduced to whether a certain number belongs to . The question
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is thus equivalent to the question of whether there can be a universal computer

that can settle all formal mathematical questions.
As the reader has doubtless guessed, the answer is no, which we now set out
to prove.

Gödel Numerals

Let me first point out that there are two different schemes for constructing terms,
which involve two different ways of introducing parentheses. One scheme
consists of building terms according to the following two rules:
(1) S and K are terms.
(2) If X and Y are terms, so is (XY).
The second scheme replaces (2) by:
(2′) If X and Y are terms, so is (X)(Y).
We shall continue to use the first scheme.
Now, for any number n, the numeral , like any other term, has a Gödel
number. We let n# be the Gödel number of the numeral . For example, is the
combinator I, which in terms of S and K is ((SK)K), whose Gödel number is
3312424. Thus 0# = 3312424.

As for 1#, it is the Gödel number of the numeral , and , where σ is the
combinator Vf, and Vf, when reduced to S and K, is a horribly long expression,
and consequently has an unpleasantly long Gödel number, which I will
abbreviate by the letter “s”. Thus, in what follows, s is the Gödel number of (the
term whose abbreviation is) σ, and so 1# is the Gödel number of , which is 3
* s * 0# * 4.
Next, 2# uses the Gödel number of , and the Gödel number of that term is
3 *s * 1# * 4. Similarly 3# = 3 * s * 2# * 4. And so on ….
We now need to show that the function f(n) = n# is combinatorially realizable,
i.e. that there is a combinator δ such that holds (for every n).
Problem 17. Show that there is such a combinator δ.

Normalization
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Normalization

For any expression X, by ⌈X⌉ is meant the numeral that designates the Gödel
number of X; we might call ⌈X⌉ the Gödel numeral of X. By the norm of X is
meant X⌈X⌉, i.e. X followed by the Gödel numeral of X. If n is the Gödel number
of X, then n# is the Gödel number of ⌈X⌉, so n * n# is the Gödel number of X⌈X⌉,
i.e. of the norm of X.
We now want a combinator Δ, called a normalizer, such that
holds, for all n.
Problem 18. Exhibit such a combinator Δ.
Problem 19. Which, if either, of the following statements is true?
(a) Δ⌈X⌉ = X⌈X⌉
(b) Δ⌈X⌉ = ⌈X⌈X⌉⌉
The normalizer can do some amazing things, as you will see!

The Second Fixed Point Principle

We say that a term X designates a number n if the equation holds.

Obviously one term that designates n is the numeral , but there are many others.
For example, for n = 8, the terms all designate 8. Indeed there are
infinitely many terms that designate , e.g. , etc.
We call a term an arithmetic term if it designates some number. Every
numeral is an arithmetic term, but not every arithmetic term is a numeral.
It is impossible for any numeral to designate its own Gödel number, because
the Gödel number of is larger than n (n# > n). However, this does not mean
that no arithmetic term can designate its own Gödel number. In fact, there is an
arithmetic term that designates its own Gödel number! Also there is one that
designates twice its Gödel number; one that designates eight times its Gödel
number plus 15 — indeed, for any realizable function f(x), there is an arithmetic
term X which designates f(n), where n is the Gödel number of X! This is
immediate from the second fixed point principle, which is that for any
combinator A, there is a term X such that A⌈X⌉ = X holds. We now wish to prove
this principle.
Problem 20. Prove the Second Fixed Point Theorem: show that for any
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combinator A, there is a term X such that A⌈X⌉ = X holds.

Problem 21. Prove that for any realizable function f(x) there is an (arithmetic
term) X that designates f(n), where n is the Gödel number of X. [Hint: Use the
second fixed point theorem.]

Representability

We shall say that a combinator Γ represents a number set A if for every number
n, the equation holds iff n ∊ A. Thus Γ represents the set of all n such that
holds. (Note that the combinatorial computability of a number set A by a
combinator Γ that we worked with earlier requires more than representability, for
in the case of combinatorial computability if n ∉ A then it must be the case that
, while for representability, it is only necessary that .)
Problem 22. Suppose Γ computes A. Which, if either, of the following
statements are true?
(1) A is representable.
(2) The complement of A is representable.

Recall that for any function f(x) and set A, by f−1(A) is meant the set of all
numbers n such that f(n) ∊ A. Thus n ∊ f−1(A) iff f(n) ∊ A.
Problem 23. Prove that if the function f(x) is realizable, and if A is
representable, then f−1(A) is representable.

Gödel Sentences

We shall call a sentence (equation) X a Gödel sentence for a number set A if X is

true if and only if the Gödel number of X is in A. We now aim to prove that if A
is representable, then there is a Gödel sentence for A.
Problem 24. Suppose A is representable. Prove that the set of all n such that (n *
52) ∈ A is representable. [The significance of n * 52 is that if n is the Gödel
number of X, then n * 52 is the Gödel number of X = t.]
Problem 25. Now prove that for any representable set A, there is a Gödel
sentence for A.
Now we have all the key pieces to prove that the set of Gödel numbers of
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the true sentences is not computable.

Problem 26. Prove that is not computable.

Discussion

We have just seen that the complement of the set is not representable. What
about the set ? Is it representable? Yes, it is. As suggested earlier, combinatory
logic can be formalized. The following is an axiom system for the full
combinatory logic:
Symbols: S, K, (,), =
Terms: As previously defined recursively
Sentences (or Equations): Expressions of the form X = Y, where X and Y are
terms.
Axiom Schemes: For any terms X, Y, Z:
(1) SXY Z = XZ(Y Z)
(2) KXY = X
(3) X = X.

Inference Rules

R 1 : From X = Y to infer Y = X.
R 2 : From X = Y to infer XZ = YZ.
R 3 : From X = Y to infer ZX = ZY.
R 4 : From X = Y and Y = Z to infer X = Z.
It is relatively easy to construct an elementary formal system in which one
can successively represent the set of terms, sentences, and provable sentences.
Thus the set is formally representable, from which it easily follows that the set
is recursively enumerable. And it is well known that recursive enumerability
is the same thing as representability in combinatory logic. Thus the set is
indeed representable.
The set is another example of a recursively enumerable set that is not
recursive.
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As previously mentioned, any formal mathematical question can be reduced

to a question of whether a certain number is in , that is, one can associate with
each formal mathematical question a number n such that n ∊ iff the question
has an affirmative answer. Since there is no purely mechanical method of
determining which numbers are in , there is then no purely mechanical method
of determining which formal mathematical statements are true and which are
false. Mathematics requires intelligence and ingenuity. Any attempt to fully
mechanize mathematics is doomed to failure. In the prophetic words of Emil
Post [1944], “Mathematics is and must remain essentially creative.” Or, in the
witty words of Paul Rosenbloom: “Man can never eliminate the necessity of
using his own intelligence, regardless of how cleverly he tries.”

Solutions to the Problems of Chapter 12

1. (a) We need a negation combinator N satisfying the condition Nx = xft. Well,

we can take N to be V ft, where V is the vireo [V xyz = zxy]. Thus Nx = V ftx
= xft as desired. Then Nt = tft = f (since t = K, or because txy = x, for all x
and y), and Nf = fft = t (since f = KI, or because fxy = y, for all x and y). Thus
Np =∼ p, where p is either t or f.
(b) This time we want the conjunction combinator c to be such that cxy =
xyf. We take c to be Rf, where R is the Robin [Rxyz = yzx]. Thus cxy =
Rfxy = xyf, as desired. Then (using the fact that for all x and y, txy = x
and fxy = f):
(1) ctt = ttf = t,
(2) ctf = tff = f,
(3) cft = ftf = f,
(4) cff = fff = f.
(c) Now we want the disjunction combinator d to be such that

For this purpose, we take d to be Tt, where T is the thrush [Txy = yx].
Then dxy = xty (verify!). And dpq = p ∨ q (verify all four cases!).
(d) Take the implication combinator i to be Rt, where R is the robin [Rxyz =
yzx]. Then ixy = xyt, because ixy = Rtxy = xyt. Then ipq = p ⊃ q
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(verify!).
(e) We want the equivalence combinator e to be such that

For this we may take e to be CSN:

Then epq has the same values as p ≡ q. Verify, recalling that we have
shown above that Nt = f, that Nf = t, and that, for all x and y, txy = x and
fxy = f.
2. Suppose for some n. Thus Consequently,
Thus IK = KI, so that K = KI contrary to Problem 19
of Chapter 8.
Next, we must show that if then To do so, we instead
show the equivalent fact that if then .
Well, suppose that . Then or so that
Applying V here, we see that which implies that
[again since it is always true that fxy = y]. This proves that if
then
Now, for any positive k, we saw at the beginning of this solution that
After what we have just proved, we now see as well that it follows
from that This proves that if m ≠
n, then (because if m ≠ n then for some positive k, m = n + k or n = m
+ k).
3. Since we want a combinator P such that We take P to be
Tf, where T is the thrush [Txy = yx]. Then

Voila!
4. We take Z to be Tt, where T is the thrush [Txy = yx]. Recall that and σ =
Vf.
(1) Thus
(2) Thus
5. Yes, the zero tester Z is such an A.
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6. Conditions C1 and C2 are respectively equivalent to:

if for n positive
Now, by Problem 5, is if and is A(Γ(Px)) if for
n positive. We thus want a combinator Γ which satisfies the condition:

Well, such a combinator Γ exists by the fixed point theorem. Specifically,

we can take Γ to be a fixed point of a combinator θ satisfying the condition:
Then
7. (1) The addition combinator ⊗ is uniquely determined by the following two
conditions:
a. n + 0 = n.
b. n + m+ = (n + m)+.
We therefore want a combinator ⊗ such that:

We thus want ⊗ to be such that, for any n and m, whether 0 or positive,

the following holds:
Such a combinator exists by the fixed point theorem.
(2) The multiplication operation × is uniquely determined by the following
two conditions:
a. n × 0 = 0.
b. n × m + = (n × m) + n.
Thus the combinator ⊗ that we want, and which exists by the fixed
point theorem, is defined by the condition:

(3) The exponential operation is uniquely determined by the following two

conditions:
a. n0 = 1.

Thus the combinator we want, and which exists by the fixed point
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theorem, is defined by the condition

8. By virtue of conditions (1) and (2) of the hint, we want a combinator Γ to
satisfy the condition:

Such a combinator can be found by the fixed point theorem.

9. No, it does not follow that NΓ computes . Suppose n ∈ A. Then
However, it does not follow that what does follow is that
Thus it is not NΓ that computes but rather BNΓ [Bxyz = x(yz)]. For
when (i.e. when n ∈ A) and
when (i.e. when n ∈ ).
10. We want a combinator g such that for all numbers x and y the following
conditions hold:
(1) If then
(2) If then
(a) If then
(b) If then
We thus want g to satisfy the following:

Such a g exists by the fixed point theorem.

11. Suppose A1 realizes f(x) and A2 realizes g(x). Then the functions f (g (x)) is
realized by BA1A2, since

12. Let Γ compute the relation R(x, y), and let A1 realize f(x) and A2 realize
g(x). Then:
(a) BΓA1 computes the relation R(f(x),y), because:

which is t if R(f(n),m) holds, and is f if R(f(n),m) doesn’t hold.

Thus BΓA1 computes R(f(x),y).
(b) This is trickier! A combinator that computes the relation R(x, g(y)) is
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BCDΓA2, where C is the cardinal [Cxyz = xzy] and D is the combinator

defined by Dxyzw = xy (zw). We learned that D = BB.
Well,

which is t if R(n, g(m)) holds, and is f if R(n, g(m)) doesn’t hold. Thus
BCDΓ A2 computes R(x, g(y)).
(c) Let S(x, y) be the relation R(x, g(y)), which is computed by BCDΓ A2.
Then by (a) S(fx), y), which is R(f(x), g(y)) is computed by B(BCDΓ
A2)A1.
Alternatively, let δ(x, y) be the relation R(f(x), y). It is computed by
BΓ A1, according to (a). Then R(f(x), g(y)) is δ(x, g(y)), hence is
computed by BCD(BΓA1)A2, according to (b).
13. Given a regular relational combinator A of degree 2, by the fixed point
theorem, there is a combinator A1 satisfying the condition:

14. We take A′ to be CA1 , where C is the cardinal and A1 is the combinator of

Problem 13. Then, for any number n, A′ Now let k be the
smallest number such that = t. We illustrate the proof for k = 3 (the
reader should have no trouble in generalizing the proof for arbitrary k).
Thus it must be the case that = f;
Now, . Since , then . Since , then
. Since , then . Since , then .
Thus . So .

15. Let R(x, y) be the relation 10y > x. We must first find a combinator A that
computes the relation 10y > x.
We let R1(x, y) be the relation R(y, x), i.e. the relation 10x > y. If we find
a combinator A1 that computes the relation R1 (x, y), then CA1 will compute
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the relation R(x, y) (why?).

To compute the relation 10x > y, we know that g computes the relation x
> y and that realizes the function 10x. Hence by Problem 11, the
relation 10x > y is computed by Bg( ). Thus C(Bg( )) computes the
relation 10y > x. We thus take the length measurer L′ to be a minimizer of
C(Bg( )).
16. Take
17. Let A be a combinator satisfying the equation
[Specifically, we can take A to be where B is the bluebird
and C is the cardinal, as the reader can verify.] Then

Then, by the Recursion Property, or more directly by Problem 6, there is

a combinator δ such that:

By mathematical induction it follows that by the following

reasoning:

(b) Now suppose n is such that

We must show that Well, by (2), And, of
course, by the induction hypothesis. Therefore,

And so

This completes the induction.

18. Take Δ to be S where S is the starling [Sxyz = xz(yz)]. Then, recalling
that we have:

Note: In To Mock a Mockingbird, I took Δ to be W (DC ), which also

works, which should not be surprising, since for any x, y and z, Sxyz = W
(DCxy)z, as the reader can verify.
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19. It is (b) that is true. Let n be the Gödel number of X. Then so that
and since we have:
Since n is the Gödel number of X, then n#, which we first defined to be the
Gödel number of , must also be the Gödel number of since
#
Thus n*n is the Gödel number of X and so:
(2)
(c) By combining (1) and (2), we see (b), i.e. that
20. We take X to be BA where Δ is the normalizer. By the definition of
the bluebird B, we have BAΔ = A(Δ Consequently,

Here is the reason for (2): By Problem 19,Δ for any Y.

Hence

which is which proves

(2).
By (1) and (2), we have X = and so X =
21. Suppose the function f(x) is realizable, and let A realize f(x). By the second
fixed point principle just proved, there is a term X such that X = Let
n be the Gödel number of X, so that and therefore
since A realizes f(x), which means
that X designates f(n), where n is the Gödel number of X.
22. Both (1) and (2) are true: Suppose Γ computes A. This means that for
every n:

(1) We must show that A is representable. Well, it is Γ itself that represents

A. To see this, it suffices to see that the converse of (a) holds, i.e. that if
then n ∈ A. So suppose Γn = t. If n were not in A, then by (b) we
would have that and hence that t = f, which cannot be. Thus n ∈
A.
(2) Now we must show that is representable. Since Γ computes A, then
BNΓ computes the complement of A [by the solution of Problem 9].
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Thus BNΓ represents [by (1)].

23. Suppose that Γ1 realizes f(x) and that Γ2 represents A. We let = BΓ2Γ1
[Bxyz = x(yz)], and we show that Γ represents f–1(A). Well,

Thus which is true iff f(n) ∈ A

[since Γ2 represents A], which is true iff n ∈ f–1(A). Thus iff n ∈ f–
1(A), which means that Γ represents f–1(A).

24. This is but a special case of Problem 23: Let f(x) = x*52. By Problem 16,
f(x) is realizable by the combinator If A is representable, so is f–1(A)
[by Problem 23], and f–1(A) is the set of all n such that f(n) ∈ A, i.e. the set
of all n such that (n*52) ∈ A.
25. Suppose A is representable. Let A′ be the set of all n such that the number
n*52 is in A. Then A′ is representable [by Problem 24]. Let Γ represent the
set A′. By the fixed point theorem, there is some X such that We
will show that the sentence X = t is a Gödel sentence for A.
Let n be the Gödel number of X. Then Hence and
therefore which is true iff n ∈ A′ [since represents A′].
And n ∈ A′ iff (n * 52) ∈ A. Thus iff (n * 52) ∈ A. But n * 52 is
the Gödel number of the sentence X = t. Thus the sentence X = t is a Gödel
sentence for A.
26. There cannot be a Gödel sentence for the complement of for such a
sentence X would be true if and only if its Gödel number n was not in
which means that X would be true iff its Gödel number was not the Gödel
number of a true sentence, and this is impossible. [Looked at it another
way, every sentence is a Gödel sentence for the set and no sentence can
be a Gödel sentence for both a set A and its complement (why?). Hence no
sentence can be a Gödel sentence for the complement of .]
Since there is no Gödel sentence for the complement of then the
complement of is not representable [by Problem 25], and therefore the set
is not computable [by Problem 22].
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Afterword
Where to Go from Here

This book and its predecessor have only scratched the surface of the collection
of topics subsumed under the name of “Mathematical Logic.” We have done
only the beginnings of the fields of recursion theory and combinatory logic, and
have done virtually nothing in model theory, proof theory, and other logics such
as modal logic, intuitionistic logic, relevance logic, and others.
I strongly suggest that you next turn your attention to set theory and the
continuum problem. Let me tell you a wee bit about this, hoping to whet your
appetite.
One purpose of the subject known as axiomatic set theory is to develop all
mathematics out of the notions of logic (the logical connectives and the
quantifiers) together with the notion of an element being a member of a set of
elements. We have used the symbol “∈” for “is a member of” and “x ∈ A” for “x
is a member of the set A”.
A pioneer in the development of axiomatic set theory was Gottlob Frege
[1893]. His system had, in addition to axioms of first-order logic, just one axiom
of set theory, namely that for any property P, there is a unique set consisting of
those and only those things that have the property P. Such a set is written {x :
P(x)}, which is read “the set of all x’s having the property P.
This principle of Frege is sometimes referred to as the abstraction principle,
or the unlimited abstraction principle. One can define the identity relation x = y
in terms of set inclusion as “x and y belong to the same sets”
Frege’s abstraction principle has the marvelous advantage
of allowing us to obtain just about all the sets necessary for mathematics, for
example, the following:
P1: The empty set , which is{x :∼ (x = x)}.
P2: For any two elements a and b, the set {a, b} whose members are just a and b.
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This set is {x: x = a ν x = b}.

P3: For any set a, the power set thus

P4: For any set a, the union ∪a, i.e. the set of all elements that are members of
an element of a, thus ∪a = {x: ∃y(y ∈ a ∧ x ∈ y)}.
Despite the useful things Frege’s system can do, it has an extremely serious
drawback: it is inconsistent! This was pointed out to Frege in a letter by Bertrand
Russell [1902], who observed that according to Frege’s abstraction principle,
there would exist the set A of all sets which are not members of themselves (A =
{x: x ∉ x}). Thus, for any set x, one would have x ∈ A iff x ∉ x Taking A for x,
we would have A ∈ A iff A ∉ A, which is a contradiction! Thus Frege’s system
is inconsistent.
Frege was broken-hearted over Russell’s discovery, and felt that his whole
life’s work had been in vain. Here he was wrong: His work was salvaged by
Zermelo and others, and is really the basis for Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory
(frequently abbreviated as ZF), which is one of the most significant systems of
set theorem in existence, the other of similar rank being the system in Principia
Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell [1910].
What Zermelo [1908] did was to replace Frege’s abstraction principle by the
following, known as the limited abstraction principle, which is that for any
property P of sets and any set a, there exists the set of all the elements of a
having property P. Thus for any set a, there exists the set {x: P(x)∧ x ∈a}. This
principle appears to be free of any possible contradiction. However, Zermelo had
to take the existence of the sets {a,b}, and ∪a as separate axioms. He also
took an additional axiom known as the axiom of infinity, which we will discuss
later.
On the basis of the Zermelo axioms on hand, one can now derive the positive
integers. First, let us note that the set {a, b} is well-defined even if a and b are
the same element, and then {a, a} is simply the set {a}. Well, Zermelo took 0 to
be the empty set ; 1 to be the set whose only element is 0; 2 to be the
set whose only element is 1, and so forth. Thus the Zermelo natural numbers are
etc. Thus for each natural number n, n+1 is{n}.
Later, Von Neumann [1923] proceeded differently. In his scheme, each
natural number is the set of all lesser natural numbers. Thus 0 is . and 1 is { }
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as with Zermelo, but 2 is now not {1}, but rather the set {0, 1}; 3 is the set {0, 1,
2}; …, n+1 is the set {0, 1, …, n}. This is the scheme now generally adopted,
since it generalizes in the infinite case to the important sets called ordinals,
which we will soon discuss. Note that in Zermelo’s scheme, each natural number
other than 0 contains just one element, whereas in Von Neumann’s scheme, each
number n contains exactly n elements.
Now that we have the natural numbers, how do we define what it means to be
a natural number? That is, we want a formula N(x) using just the logical
connectives and quantifiers and the single predicate symbol ∈ such that for any
set a, the sentence N(a) is true if and only if a is a natural number. Well, for any
set a, we define a+ as a ∪ {a}, i.e. the set whose elements are those of a,
together with a itself. Thus

We now define a set a to be inductive if 0 ∈ a, and if, for all sets b, if b ∈ a, then
b+ a. We then define a set x to be a natural number if it belongs to all inductive
sets. The principle of mathematical induction follows immediately from the very
definition of a natural number. Indeed, the five Peano Postulates follow from the
definition of “natural number”.
However, we don’t yet have any guarantee that there is such a thing as the set
of all natural numbers. Zermelo had to take this as an additional axiom, and this
is known as the axiom of infinity. The set of all natural numbers is denoted “ω”.
Let us recall the Peano Postulates:
1. 0 is a natural number.
2. If n is a natural number, so is n+.
3. There is no natural number such that n+ = 0.
4. If n+ = m+, then n = m.
5. [Principle of Mathematical Induction] Every inductive set contains all the
natural numbers.
All these five postulates are easy consequences of the definition of natural
number. The axiom of infinity is not necessary to prove the Peano Postulates!
This fact appears to not be completely well known. I recall that when I once
announced these facts at a lecture, a very eminent logician later told me that he
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was quite shocked!

Now for the ordinals: First we define a set x to be transitive if it contains with
each of its elements y all elements of y as well; in other words, each element of x
is a subset of x. We recall that for any set a, we are taking a+ to be the set a ∪
{a}, and a+ is called the successor of a. Roughly speaking, the ordinals are those
sets, starting with , which can be obtained by taking the successor of any
ordinal already obtained, and by taking any transitive set of ordinals already
obtained. That is, we want to define ordinals such that 0 is an ordinal, every
successor of an ordinal is an ordinal, and every transitive set of ordinals is an
ordinal. One definition that works is this: Define x to be an ordinal if x is
transitive and every transitive proper subset of x is a member of x. [We recall
that by a proper subset of x is meant a subset of x that is not the whole of x.] It
can be seen from this definition that is an ordinal, the successor of any ordinal
is an ordinal, and any transitive set of ordinals is an ordinal.
It is obvious that every natural number is an ordinal (use mathematical
induction). Also, the set ω of all natural numbers is transitive (verify!), and so ω
is an ordinal. Once we have ω, we have the ordinal ω+, also denoted ω+1.
Successively, we have ω+2 (ω++), ω+3, …, ω+n, …. However, we do not yet
have a set which contains all these ordinals, and the existence of such a set
cannot be derived from Zermelo’s axioms. But then Abraham Fraenkel [1958]
added another axiom known as the axiom of substitution, also called the axiom of
replacement, which does ensure the existence of such a set, and this set is
denoted ω×2 or ω.2.
Roughly speaking, the axiom of replacement is that given any operation F
which assigns to each set x a set F (x), and given any set a, there is a set [denoted
F-1(a)] consisting of all, and only, those sets x such that F (x) ∈a.

Well, there is the set denoted ω . 2 of all elements ω+ n, where n is any

natural number. Then we have the ordinals

After that finally come ω·4, ω·5, …, ω · ω, … ωω, …. We can keep going.
The ordinals so far considered are all denumerable. But there exist non-
denumerable ordinals as well. Indeed, with the axiom of
substitution/replacement (of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory), for every set x, there
is an ordinal α of the same size as x (i.e. α can be put into 1-1 correspondence
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with x).
An ordinal is called a successor ordinal if it is α+[α∪{α}] for some ordinal α.
Ordinals other than 0 and successor ordinals are called limit ordinals. All natural
numbers other than 0 are successor ordinals. The first limit ordinal is ω. The
ordinals ω + 1, ω + 2, …, ω+n are all successor ordinals, and ω·2 (the set of all
of them) is the next limit ordinal. The ordinals ω·3, ω·4, …, ω· n are all limit
ordinals, and so is ω·ω. Actually, an infinite ordinal is a successor ordinal if and
only if it is of the form +n, for some limit ordinal α and some positive integer n.
An ordinal α is said to be less than an ordinal β(in symbols, α < β) if α ∈ β.
Thus each ordinal is the collection of all lesser ordinals.

Rank

Given a scheme that assigns to each ordinal α a set denoted S, for any ordinal α,
by Uα<λ Sα is meant the union of all the sets S, where α < λ. By an important
result known as the transfinite recursion theorem, one can assign to each ordinal
α a set Rα such that for every ordinal α and every limit ordinal λ, the following
three conditions hold:
(1)
(2) Rα+ = [the set of all subsets of Rα].
(3) Rα = Uα<λ Rλ.

A set is said to have rank if it is a member of some Rα, and by the rank of
such a set x is meant the least ordinal α such that x ∈ Rα.

Do all sets have rank? This is so iff the ’ relation is well founded, i.e. iff there
exists no infinite sequence x1, x2, … xn, … such that for each n, the set xn+1 is a
member of xn. This condition is taken as another axiom of set theory, and is
known as the axiom of foundation. It rules out sets without rank.

The Axiom of Choice and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis

The Axiom of Choice (frequently abbreviated AC) in one form is that for any
non-empty set a of non-empty sets, there is a function C (a so-called choice
function for a) that assigns to each member x of a an element of x. [The function,
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so to speak, chooses one element from each of the elements of a.]

An equivalent form of AC is that for any non-empty set a of non-empty sets,
there is a set b whose members consist of just one member of each of the
members of a.
What is the status of AC? Most working mathematicians of the world accept
it as being true. There are a few, though, who don’t. What is its status with
respect to ZF (Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory)? Well, Gödel [1940] showed that
it is consistent with ZF (assuming that ZF is itself consistent, which we will
continue to assume). Thus AC is not refutable in ZF. Sometime later, Paul
Cohen [1963, 1964] proved that the negation of AC is consistent with ZF. Thus
AC is undecidable in ZF.
We recall Cantor’s theorem, that for any set a, its power set is larger than
a. Cantor conjectured that for an infinite set there is no set b intermediate in size
between a and [that is, that there is no set b which is larger than a but
smaller than ], and this result is known as the Generalized Continuum
Hypothesis (frequently abbreviated as GCH). What is its status? This is far more
puzzling! Unlike the case of the axiom of choice, which most logicians believe is
true, most mathematicians, as well as most logicians specializing in set theory,
don’t have the slightest idea as to whether GCH is true or false. Gödel
conjectured that it is false, despite the fact that he proved it consistent with the
axioms of ZF. His proof of the consistency of GCH with ZF is surely one of the
most remarkable things in mathematical logic! Equally remarkable is the proof
of Paul Cohen that the negation of GCH is consistent with ZF, even when AC is
added to the axioms of ZF. Thus GCH is undecidable in ZF.
Gödel’s proof of the consistency of AC and GCH used his notion of
constructible sets, to which we now turn.

Constructible Sets

Consider a sentence X whose constants are all in a set a. X is said to be true over
a if it is true when the quantifiers are interpreted as ranging over all elements of
a, i.e. it is true when is read as “for all x in a” and “∃x” is read as “for some
x in a”. A formula φ(x) whose constants are all in a is said to define over a the
set of all elements k such that φ(k) is true over a, and a subset b of a is called
definable over a (more completely, first-order definable over a) if it is defined
over a by some formula whose constants are all in a.
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We let be the set of all sets definable over a.

Gödel introduced the notion of constructible sets as follows: Again by the
transfinite recursion theorem, one can assign to each ordinal α a set Mα such that
for every ordinal α and every limit ordinal λ, the following three conditions hold:
(1)
(2) Mα+ = F (Mα).
(3) Mλ = Uα<λ Mα.

The definition of the Mα’s differs from that of the Rα’s only in condition (2):
Whereas Rα+1 consists of all subsets of Rα+1, the set Mα+1 consists of only those
subsets of Mα that are definable over Mα.

A set is called constructible if it is a member of some Mα.

Are all sets constructible? This is a grand unsolved problem! Gödel

conjectured that this is not the case, even though he proved that it was consistent
with the axioms of ZF. The significance of the constructible sets is that the
constructability of all sets implies the generalized continuum hypothesis!
Moreover, this implication is provable in ZF. Thus if we add to the axioms of ZF
the axiom that all sets are constructible (which is known as the axiom of
constructability), the continuum hypothesis (as well as the axiom of choice)
becomes provable. And since, as Gödel showed, the axiom of constructability is
consistent with ZF, so is the generalized continuum hypothesis (as well as the
axiom of choice). This is how Gödel showed the consistency of GCH with ZF.
Some years later, Paul Cohen [1963, 1964] showed, by a completely different
method, that the negation of GCH is consistent with ZF, even with the addition
of AC. Thus GCH is undecidable in ZF.
Despite the undecidability of GCH in ZF, the question remains as to whether
or not it is really true. To many so-called “formalists", the question has no
meaning. They say that is provable in some axiom systems and disprovable in
others. To the so-called “Platonist” like Gödel, this position is most
unsatisfactory. I would liken it to the following: Suppose a bridge is built and on
the next day an army is to march over it. Will the bridge hold or not? It does no
good to say, “Well, in some axiom systems, it can be proved that the bridge will
hold, and in others, it can be proved that it won’t.” We want to know whether it
will really hold or not. And likewise with the generalized continuum hypothesis.
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It is not enough to say it is undecidable in ZF. The fact remains that for every
infinite set a, either there is a set b intermediate in size between a and or
there isn’t, and we want to know which. As already, indicated, Gödel
conjectured that there is such a set b for some infinite set a, and that when more
is known about sets, we will see that Cantor’s conjecture is wrong. [Realize that
for any non-empty finite set a, there are always sets b with more elements than a
and less elements than .]
The whole study of the independence of GCH in ZF is fascinating beyond
belief, and the reader who studies this is in for a real treat!
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References

Barendregt, Henk, The Lambda Calculus — Its Syntax and Semantics, Studies in
Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics Vol. 103, North-Holland, 1985.
Beth, Evert, The Foundations of Mathematics. A Study in the Philosophy of
Science, North-Holland, 1959.
Braithwaite, Reginald, Kestrels, Quirky Birds and Hopeless Egocentricity, ebook
published by http://leanpub.com, 2013.
Church, Alonzo, The Calculi of Lambda Conversion, Princeton Univ. Press,
1941.
Cohen, Paul J., “The independence of the continuum hypothesis,” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 50(6):
1143–1148, 1963.
Cohen, Paul J., “The independence of the continuum hypothesis, II,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 51(1): 105–110, 1964.
Craig, William, “Three uses of the Herbrand–Gentzen theorem in relating model
theory and proof theory,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 22(3): 269–285,
1957.
Davis, Martin, Computability and Unsolvability, McGraw-Hill, 1958; Dover,
1982.
Ehrenfeucht, Andrzej and Feferman, Solomon, “Representability of recursively
enumerable sets in formal theories,” Arch. Fur Math. Logick und
Grundlagenforschung 5: 37–41, 1960.
Fraenkel, Abraham Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua and Levy Azriel, Foundations of Set
Theory, North-Holland, 1973 (originally published in 1958). (Fraenkel’s
final word on ZF and ZFC, according to Wikipedia.) Frege, Gottlob,
Grundgesetze der Arithmetic, Verlag Hermann Pohle, Vol. I/II, 1893.
Partial translation of volume I, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, by M. Furth,
Univ. of California Press, 1964.
Gentzen, Gerhard, “Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen I,”
Mathematische Zeitschrift 39(2): 176–210, 1934.
Gentzen, Gerhard, “Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen II,”
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Mathematische Zeitschrift 39(3): 405–431, 1935.

Gödel, Kurt, The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized
Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory, Princeton Univ.
Press, 1940.
Henkin, Leon, “The completeness of the first-order functional calculus,” J.
Symbolic Logic, 14: 159–166, 1949.
Hintikka, Jaakko, “Form and content in quantification theory,” Acta
Philosophica Fennica, 8: 7–55. 1955.
Kleene, Stephen Cole, “Recursive predicates and quantifiers,” Trans. Amer.
Math. Soc. 53: 41–73, 1943.
Kleene, Stephen Cole, Introduction to Metamathematics, North-Holland, 1952.
Myhill, John, “Creative sets,” Z. Math. Logik Grundlagen Math. 1: 97–108,
1955.
Post, Emil Leon, “Formal reductions of the general combinatorial decision
problem,” American Journal of Mathematics 65: 197–215, 1943.
Post, Emil Leon, “Recursively enumerable sets of positive integers and their
decision problems,” Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 50(5): 284–316, 1944.
Putnam, Hilary and Smullyan, Raymond, “Exact separation of recursively
enumerable sets within theories,” Journal of the American Mathematical
Society, 11(4): 574–577, 1960.
Rice, H. Gordon, “Classes of recursively enumerable sets and their decision
problems,” Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 74(2): 358–366, 1953.
Rosser, John Barkley, “Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church,”
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1(3): 87–91, 1936.
Russell, Bertrand, “Letter to Frege,” 1902. This very interesting letter can be
found (translated from the German) in Van Heigenoort, Jean, From Frege
to Gödel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Harvard
Univ. Press, 1967. It is also available online at a Harvard website:
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1219929.files/FregeRussellCorr.pdf
Schönfinkel, Moses, “ Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik”,
Mathematische Annalen 92, 1924; translated as “On the building blocks of
mathematical logic” and included in Van Heigenoort, Jean, From Frege to
Gödel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Harvard Univ.
Press, 1967.
Shepherdson, John, “Representability of recursively enumerable sets in formal
theories,” Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung, 119–
127, 1961.
Smullyan, Raymond, Theory of Formal Systems, Princeton Univ. Press, 1961.
Smullyan, Raymond, “A unifying principle in quantification theory”,
 www.pdfgrip.com

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 49(6): 828–832, 1963.

Smullyan, Raymond, To Mock a Mockingbird, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.
Smullyan, Raymond, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Oxford Univ. Press,
1992. Smullyan, Raymond, Recursion Theory for Metamathematics,
Oxford, 1993.
Smullyan, Raymond, Diagonalization and Self-Reference, Oxford Science
Publications, 1994.
Smullyan, Raymond, First-Order Logic, Springer-Verlag, 1968; Dover, 1995.
Smullyan, Raymond, Logical Labyrinths, CRC Press, 2008; A. K. Peters,
Ltd. 2009.
Smullyan, Raymond, The Beginner’s Guide to Mathematical Logic, Dover,
2014.
Sprenger, M. and Wymann-Böni, M., “How to decide the lark,” Theoretical
Computer Science, 110: 419–432, 1993.
Statman, Richard, “The word problem for Smullyan’s lark combinator is
decidable,” Journal of Symbolic Computation, 7(2): 103–112, 1989.
Tarski, Alfred, Undecidable Theories, North-Holland, 1953.
Von Neumann, John, “On the introduction of transfinite numbers,” in Jean van
Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879–1931 (3rd ed.), Harvard Univ. Press, 1923, pp. 346–354 (English
translation of von Neumann 1923), 1973.
Whitehead, Alfred North and Russell, Bertrand, Principia Mathematica,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1910, Vol. 1. Reprinted by Rough Draft Printing,
2011.
Zermelo, Ernst, “Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I,”
Mathematische Annalen 65(2): 261–281, 1908. English translation:
Heijenoort, Jean van (1967), “Investigations in the foundations of set
theory,” From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879–1931, Source Books in the History of the Sciences, Harvard Univ.
Press, 1967, pp. 199–215.
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Index

1-1 (one-to-one) function, 97

δ(x, y), recursive pairing function, 97
δ n(x1, …, xn), recursive n-tupling function, 98
Γ-consistent set of sentences, 49–56
λ-I combinators, 192–196
ωn, 113
Φ, Φ2, Φ3, Φ4 combinators, 195, 196
Φn combinator, 196
σ, successor combinator, 234
∑0 formula of elementary arithmetic, 94, 95
∑0 set or relation, 95
∑1 formula of elementary arithmetic, 95
∑1 set or relation, 93, 95

∾ AC is consistent with ZF (Cohen), 258

A*, C*, R*, F* and V* combinators, 189
A*number set in a simple system, 151
A**, C**, R **, F** and V** combinators, 189
abstraction principle, 253
AC (Axiom of Choice), 258–260
AC is consistent with ZF (Gödel), 258
AC is undecidable in ZF (Gödel and Cohen), 258
addition combinator, 234, 235
admissible function in a simple system, 152
affirmation of a number by a register, 70
affirmation set of a register, 73
agreeable element, in combinatory logic, 175
algebraic approach to verifying tautologies, 4–7
alphabet of an elementary formal system, 89, 90
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altered tableau method, 40–43

analytic consistency property, 49–56
analytic tableau, 34–36, 40, 49–56
applications of magic sets, 27, 28
applications of Rice’s Theorem, 120
applications of simple systems, 150
arithmetic combinators, 234, 235
arithmetic set or relation, 95
arithmetic term of combinatory logic, 241
arithmetical combinator of type n, 234
associate regular set for a finite set of sentences, 53
atomic formula of an elementary formal system, 89, 90
Axiom of Choice (AC), 258–260
axiom of constructability, 259
axiom of foundation, 257
axiom of infinity, 254, 256
axiom of replacement, 256
axiom of substitution, 256
axiomatic set theory, 253–260
axioms (and axiom schemes) of an elementary formal system, 90
axioms and rules of inference for combinatory logic, 239, 243
axioms of set theory, 253–256, 258–260

B combinator (bluebird), 185

B, M, T, and I are a basis for all λ-I combinators, 224–226
B, M, T and I derivable combinators (λ-I combinators), 192–196
B, T and I combinators, 226, 227
B1, B2, Bn, and B+ combinators, 186
Barendregt, Henk, 233, 234
base in the universal system (U), 100
basis for a class of combinators, 224
Beth’s Definability Theorem, 46–48
Beth, Evert, 34, 46, 48, 56
block tableau, 34–39
bluebird combinator B, 185
Boolean consequence relation, 11–15
Boolean equations, verification by truth tables, 3, 4
Boolean ring, 4, 7
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Boolean truth set for first-order logic, 25

Boolean truth set for propositional logic, 7
Boolean valuation for first-order logic, 23
Boolean valuation for propositional logic, 9
bounded quantifiers, 94
Braithwaite, Reginald, 177

C and K (Post sets), 122

C combinator (cardinal), 187
C1, condition that a simple system must satisfy, 149
cancellation law, in combinatory logic, 177
cancellative combinator, 216
cancellator (kestrel) combinator K, 176
Cantor’s theorem, 258
cardinal combinator C, 187
Church, Alonzo, 187, 188, 192, 234
closure properties on representable relations in elementary formal systems, 91,
92
closure under existential quantification of representable relations in elementary
formal systems, 92
closure under explicit transformation of representable relations in elementary
formal systems, 92
closure under unions and intersections of representable relations in elementary
formal systems, 92
co-productive function for a set, 122
co-productive set, 122
Cohen, Paul, 258, 260
combinator birds table on Internet, with derivations from S and K, 222, 223
combinator B (bluebird), 185
combinator C (cardinal), 187
combinator D (dove), 186
combinator Ê, 186
combinator E (eagle), 186
combinator F (finch), 188
combinator for addition, 234
combinator for exponentiation, 235
combinator for multiplication, 234
combinator G (goldfinch), 191
combinator H (hummingbird), 193
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combinator I (identity), 179

combinator J (Rosser), 226
combinator K (kestrel, cancellator), 176
combinator L (lark), 178
combinator M (mockingbird, mocker, duplicator), 174
combinator M2, 192
combinator n, 208
combinator N (nice combinator), 208
combinator O (oracle, owl), 207
combinator Φn, 196
combinator Q (queer bird), 190
combinator Q1 (quixotic bird), 190
combinator Q2 (quizzied bird), 190
combinator Q3 (quirky bird), 191
combinator Q4 (quacky bird), 191
combinator Q5 (quintessential bird), 191
combinator Q6 (quivering bird), 191
combinator R (robin), 187
combinator S (starling), 194
combinator σ (successor), 234
combinator T (thrush), 187
combinator U (Turing combinator), 206
combinator V (vireo), 188
combinator W (warbler), 192
combinator W′ (converse warbler), 192
combinatorial completeness of a system of combinatory logic, 215–223
combinatorially complete class of combinators, 215–223
combinatorially computable number set, 236
combinatorics, 171–251
combinators, 173
combinators A*, C*, R*, F* and V*, 189
combinators A**, C**, R**, F** and V**, 189
combinators B, T and I, 226, 227
combinators B1, B2, Bn, and B+, 186
combinators D1 and D2, 186
combinators Φ, Φ2, Φ3, Φ4, 195, 196
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combinators P, P1, P2, P3, 195

combinators W 1, W2, W2, 193
combinators derivable from B, M, T and I (λ-I combinators), 192–196
combinators derived from the B combinator alone, 186
combinators for t and f and for the logical connectives, 233, 234
combinatory logic, 171–251
compact property of sets, 12
Compactness Theorem (denumerable), 12, 49, 52
compatible pair of elements, in combinatory logic, 175
complete infinite regular set of sentences, 26
complete mathematical system , 74
complete representation of a number set by a number in a simple system, 151
complete set K, 122
complete simple system, 150
complete system for combinatory logic, 215–223
completely creative function for a set, 123
completely creative set, 122
completely effective inseparability of two sets, 137, 139
completely effectively inseparable pair of sets, 137–139
completely productive function for a set, 122
completely productive set, 122
completeness of a first-order axiom system, 49, 52
completeness of the altered tableau method, 43
completeness of the analytic tableau method, 49, 51
completeness of the block tableau method for propositional logic, 36, 37
completeness of the Gentzen axiom system for first-order logic G1, 39
completeness of the Gentzen system G0, 34–38
completeness of the (symmetric)
Gentzen system for first-order logic GG, 40–43
completeness proof for propositional logic based on maximal consistency, 7–15
components of a base in the universal system (U), 100
composition condition for a combinatory logic, 174
compositor combinator, 186
computation of a number set by a property combinator, 236
concatenation in base 10 combinator, 238
consequence relation, 10–15
consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) with ZF (shown by Gödel), 258
consistency of the Generalized
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Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) with ZF (shown by Gödel), 258, 259

consistency of the negation of the Axiom of Choice (AC) with ZF(shown by
Cohen), 258
consistency of the negation of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH)
with ZF (shown by Cohen), 258
consistent/inconsistent set of formulas, 10
consistent mathematical system , 73
constant term of an elementary formal system, 89
constructible set, 258, 259
construction of the universal system (U), 99–101
continuum hypothesis, 258–260
contra-representation of a number set by a number in a simple system, 151
contra-universal number in a synthesis system, 81
contra-universal R-set, 77
contra-universal register, 71
converse warbler combinator W′, 192
correctness of the altered tableau method, 43
correctness of the Gentzen system G0 for propositional logic, 32, 33
Craig’s Interpolation Lemma (Craig’s Lemma), 43–46, 49, 53
Craig, William, 29, 31, 43–46, 49, 53
creative function for a set, 122
creative number in a synthesis system, 81
creative predicate in a mathematical system , 75
creative R-set, 77
creative register, 71
creative set, 122
critical parameter of a regular set, 52
cross point of a pair of compatible elements, in combinatory logic, 175
Curry’s sage, 206

D combinator (dove), 186

D1 and D2 combinators, 186
Davis, Martin, 113
decidable number in a synthesis system, 80
decidable number of a simple system, 150
decidable sentence in a mathematical system , 73
decidable simple system, 155
decision (calculating) machine, 69–73
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deduction in an axiom system, 13

deduction property of an axiom system, 13
Deduction Theorem, 13, 14
definable function, 160
defining equation (defining condition) of an element of a combinatory system,
215
definition of a number set by a number in a simple system, 151
degree of a predicate of an elementary formal system, 89
denial of a number by a register, 70
derivatives of the combinator B alone, 186
designation of a number by an S, K term, 241
diagonal function d(x) in a simple system, 152
diagonalization of a number in a simple system, 151
diagonalizer of a sentence H in a mathematical system , 74
diagonalizer of a register R, 70
domination of one number by another in a synthesis system, 83
domination of one predicate by another in a mathematical system , 76
domination of one R-set by another, 78
domination of one register over another, 72
double diagonal function, 133, 134
double fixed point of a pair of elements, 207, 208
double oracle, 209
double recursion theorems, 133–135
double sage (double sage pair), 207, 208
doubly co-productive ordered pair of sets, 135, 140
doubly generative ordered pair of sets, 135, 138–141
doubly universal ordered pair of sets, 135, 139–141
dove combinator D, 186
duplicator (mockingbird, mocker) combinator M, 174
dyadic (elementary formal) system, 93
dyadic numeral, 93
dyadically representable set or relation, 93

Ê combinator, 186
E combinator (eagle), 186
E-complete set of sentences, 54–56
eagle combinator E, 186
effective (and recursively enumerable) sequence of simple systems, each of
which is an extension of the preceding system, 159
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effective inseparability of two sets, 136–139, 141

effective method of finding a set, 115
effective Rosser system (as a simple system), 158, 159, 161
egocentric element, in combinatory logic, 174
Ehrenfeucht, Andrzej, 157, 160
elementary formal systems and recursive enumerability, 89–103
enumeration and iteration theorems, 113–117
Enumeration Theorem, 113, 114
equivalence of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma for first-order logic and for the
Gentzen system GG, 44
equivalence of provability and truth in elementary formal systems, 90
equivalence of representability in an arbitrary dyadic system and representability
in a transcribed dyadic system, 100
equivalence of valuations and interpretations, 9, 10, 27
equivalent numbers of a simple system, 150
equivalent sentences in a mathematical system , 74
exact Rosser (first-order) system for sets, 160
exact Rosser system (as a simple system), 157–161
exact separation of a disjoint pair of number sets in a simple system, 153
explicit definition of a predicate with respect to a set of sentences, 46, 47
explicit definition of a relation from another relation in an elementary formal
system, 92
explicit transformation of a relation into another relation in an elementary formal
system, 92
exponential combinator, 235
extension of a simple system, 159
extensional number set, 119

F combinator (finch), 188

Feferman, Solomon, 157, 160
fidelity (faithfulness) to modus ponens, 13
finch combinator F, 188
finitary proof, 30
finite character property, 54–56
finite existential quantification of a relation R, 94
finite quantifications of relations, 94
finite universal quantification of a relation R, 94
First Double Fixed Point Theorem for combinators, 224
First Fixed Point Theorem for combinators, 223
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first-order logic, 23–66

first-order satisfiable sentence, 24
first-order truth set, 25
first-order valuation, 23
fixation of one element on another, in combinatory logic, 175
fixed point combinator, 179, 205–208
fixed point of a number in a simple system, 153
fixed point of a number in a synthesis system, 81
fixed point of a pair of R-sets, 77
fixed point of a predicate in a mathematical system , 75
fixed point of a register, 72
fixed point of an element, in combinatory logic, 174
fixed point theorems (recursion theorems) in recursion theory, 117–121
formally representable set or relation, 91
formula of an elementary formal system, 89, 90
Fraenkel, Abraham, 254, 256–260
Frege, Gotttlob, 253, 254
functional combinator, 237

∼GCH is consistent with ZF(Cohen), 258, 260

G combinator (goldfinch), 191
G0, 31–38
G0 in uniform notation, 33
G1, 38, 39
GCH (Generalized Continuum Hypothesis), 258–260
GCH is consistent with ZF (Gödel), 258, 259
GCH is undecidable in Z (Gödel and Cohen), 258
Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH), 258–260
generative function for a set, 123
generative set, 123
Gentzen axiom system (symmetric) for first-order logic GG, 39–46
Gentzen axiom system for first-order logic G1, 38, 39
Gentzen axiom system for propositional logic G0, 31–38
Gentzen sequent, 29–46
Gentzen type axiom systems, 31–46
Gentzen, Gerhard, 29–46, 56
GG, 39–46
Gödel, Kurt, 73–76, 96, 102, 103, 156, 240–242, 258, 259
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Gödel numbering using dyadic numerals, 96

Gödel numeral of an S, K term of combinatory logic, 241
Gödel sentence (equation of combinatorial logic) of a number set, 242
Gödel sentence of the universal system U for a number set A, 102
goldfinch combinator G, 191
grand problem: Is there a systematic way to decide whether two S, K
combinators are equal?, 239–243

H combinator (hummingbird), 193

H′, negation of a sentence H in a mathematical system , 74
, diagonalizer of a sentence H in a mathematical system , 74
halting of a decision machine, 72
Henkin, Leon, 54–56
Henkin-style completeness proof for first-order logic, 54–56
Hintikka set, 50, 51, 55, 56
Hintikka, Jaakko, 34, 50, 51, 55, 56
hummingbird combinator H, 193

I combinator (identity), 179

identity combinator I, 179
implication sign of an elementary formal system, 89
implicit definition of a predicate with respect to a set of sentences, 46, 47
incomplete simple system, 150, 155
inconsistency of Frege’s system of set theory, 254
independent elementary formal systems, 91
index of a predicate in a mathematical system , 73
index of a recursively enumerable set, 114
index of a register, 69
index of a sentence in a mathematical system , 73
index of a sentence in a simple system, 150
indexing method for verification of tautologies by way of Boolean equations, 3,
4
inductive set, 255
instance of a formula of an elementary formal system, 90
interpolant for a first-order sentence X ⊃ Y, 43
interpolant for a first-order sequent X →Y, 44
interpolant for a propositional sequent X → Y, 44
Interpolation Lemma (Craig’ Interpolation Lemma), 43–46, 49, 53
interpretation, 8–11, 24, 27, 28, 46, 47
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interpretation of first-order sentences in the domain of the parameters, 24

inverse functions K and L, 98
inverse functions , 99
inverse of a binary relation, 115
iteration and enumeration theorems, 113–117
Iteration Theorem, 116
iterative function for a relation R(x, y), 124

J and I are a basis for all λ-I combinators, 226

J combinator (Rosser), 226

K combinator (kestrel, cancellator), 176
kestrel (cancellator) combinator K, 176
Kestrels, Quirky Birds and Hopeless Egocentricity, 177
Kleene function for a disjoint pair of sets, 137, 138
Kleene pair of disjoint sets, 137–139
Kleene’s construction of a completely effectively inseparable pair of recursively
enumerable sets, 137, 138
Kleene’s symmetric form of Gödel’s Theorem, 156
Kleene, Stephen, 113, 137–139, 156, 157

L combinator (lark), 178

lark combinator L, 178
Lemma K, 96
length measurer combinator, for a base 10 number, 238
less than relation on ordinals, 257
limit ordinal, 257
limited abstraction principle, 254
Lindenbaum’s method of extending a consistent set S to a maximally consistent
set M when consistency is of finite character, 54–56
Lindenbaum, Adolf, 15, 54–56
logical (propositional) combinators, 233, 234
logical connectives and Boolean equations on sets, correspondence between, 3, 4

M combinator (mockingbird, mocker, duplicator), 174

M2 combinator, 192
magic set, 23–28
many-one reducible set, 123
many-one reduction of one set to another, 123
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mathematical system (variations on a theme of Gödel), 73–76

maximal indexing (recursively enumerable) of all recursively enumerable sets,
117
maximally consistent set of formulas, 11, 12
mechanical procedure, 90
metamathematical applications, 149–161
method of eliminates required to obtain a combinator derived from S and K, 219
method of eliminates required to obtain a combinator derived from S, B, C and I,
225
minimization principle, 237, 238
minimizer of a regular relational combinator, 238
mocker (mockingbird, duplicator) combinator M, 174
mockingbird (mocker, duplicator) combinator M, 174
modus ponens, 7
multiplication combinator, 234, 235
Myhill’s Fixed Point Theorem, 120, 121
Myhill, John, 120, 121, 123, 125–127, 134

n combinator, 208
N combinator (nice combinator), 208
n-tupling function δn (x1, …, xn), 98
narcissistic element, in combinatory logic, 176
natural number (numerical) combinators, 234
neg(x), requisite function of a simple system, 149
negated form of an iff statement, 7, 8
negation H′ of a sentence H in a mathematical system , 74
negation of Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is consistent with ZF
(Cohen), 258, 260
nice combinator N, 208
non-cancellative (λ-I) combinator, 216
non-denumerable ordinal, 257
non-standard formula, 44
norm of a string of symbols of the alphabet of the universal system U, 102
norm of an S, K term, 241
normal simple system, 153
normalizer of a natural number combinator, 241
numerical (natural number) combinators, 234, 235
numerical relation A(x, y) in a synthesis system, 79
numerical relation B(x, y) in a synthesis system, 79
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O combinator (oracle owl), 207

one-to-one (1-1) function, 97
onto function, 97
opposer R′ of a register, 70
oracle (owl) combinator O, 207
order of a combinator, 194
order of elimination of variables in the method of eliminates, 221
ordinal, 255–257
owl (oracle) combinator O, 207

P, P1, P2, P3 combinators, 195

(P, R), pair of disjoint number sets, making up a simple system, 149
parentheses conventions for logical formulas including set inclusion/exclusion, 7
partial system for λ-I non-cancellative)combinators, 224–226
partial systems for combinatory logic, 224–227
partition interpolant between two sets, 53
partition of a set, 53
Peano Postulates, 255
permuting combinator (permuter), 187–191
Platonists versus formalists on the undecidability of the Generalized Continuum
Hypothesis, 260
positive integers, as defined in set theory, 254, 255
Post’s sets C and K, 122
Post, Emil, 113, 122–125, 244
predecessor combinator, 235
predicate of a mathematical system , 73
predicate of an elementary formal system, 89
predicate of the universal system U, 100
principal part (P, R) of a simple system, 159
Principia Mathematica, 254
productive function for a set, 121, 122
productive set, 121
proof of a sentence of an elementary formal system, 90
proof of a sequent in Gentzen type system, 34
proof of Beth’s Definability Theorem by using Craig’s Lemma, 47, 48
proof of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma by use of the Unification Theorem, 53
proof of Craig’s Interpolation Lemma for the Gentzen first-order system GG,
44–46
proof of the Compactness Theorem by use of the Unification Theorem, 52
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proof of the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic using magic sets, 28
proof of the completeness of an axiom system for first-order logic by use of the
Unification Theorem, 52
proof of the completeness of propositional logic based on maximal consistency,
7–15
proof of the completeness of standard axiom systems for first-order logic by
Henkin’s method, 54–56
proof of the completeness of the method of analytic tableaux by use of the
Unification Theorem, 51
proof of the efficacy of the method of eliminates required to obtain a combinator
derived from S and K, 220, 221
proof of the efficacy of the method of eliminates required to obtain a combinator
derived from S, B, C and I, 225, 226
proof of the Regularity Theorem by use of the Unification Theorem, 52, 53
proof of the Regularity Theorem using magic sets, 28
proof of the Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem by use of the Unification Theorem,
51
proof of the Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem using magic sets, 28
proof of the Unification Theorem by means other than tableaux or König’s
Lemma, 50, 51
proof of the Unification Theorem using tableaux, 50
proof that the set of Gödel numbers of trecursively separable pair of setshe true
sentences of U is not recursive, 102, 103
proof that the set of true sentences T of the universal system U is formally
representable and that the set T0 is recursively enumerable, 101, 102
property combinator, 236
propositional logic, 3–22, 35–38
propositional logic combinators, 233, 234
provability predicate in a mathematical system , 74
provable number of a simple system, 150
provable sentence of a mathematical system , 73
provable sentence of an elementary formal system, 90
punctuation sign of an elementary formal system, 89
pure sentence of first-order logic, 25
Putnam, Hillary, 157, 160
Putnam–Smullyan Theorem, 160

Q combinator (queer bird), 190

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Q1 combinator (quixotic bird), 190

Q2 combinator (quizzied bird), 190
Q3 combinator (quirky bird), 191
Q4 combinator (quacky bird), 191
Q5 combinator (quintessential bird), 191
Q6 combinator (quivering bird), 191
quacky bird combinator Q4, 191
queer bird combinator Q, 190
quintessential bird combinator Q5, 191
quirky bird combinator Q3, 191
quivering bird combinator Q6, 191
quixotic bird combinator Q1, 190
quizzied bird combinator Q2, 190

R combinator (robin), 187

r(h, n), in the simple system associated with a first-order system of arithmetic,
150
r(x, y), for recursion theory, 113
r(x, y), requisite (representation) function of a simple system, 149, 150
R-separable pair of R-sets, 78
R-set, 76
R-system, 76–78
R′, opposer of a register R, 70
R#, diagonalizer of a register R, 70
rank of a set, 257
realization of a function by a combinator, 237
realization of a term by a combinator, 216
Recursion Property for Combinatory Logic, 236
recursion theorems (fixed point theorems) in recursion theory, 117–121
recursion theory, 67–170
recursive inseparability of two number sets in a simple system, 156
recursive inseparability of two sets, 136, 156
recursive isomorphism between two sets, 127
recursive pairing function δ (x, y), 97
recursive set, 93
recursive unsolvability of the universal system U, 102, 103
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recursively enumerable (effective) sequence of simple systems, each of which is

an extension of the preceding system, 159
recursively enumerable indexing of all recursively enumerable sets, 117
recursively enumerable set or relation, 93–103
recursively separable pair of sets, 136, 156
reducibility of one ordered pair of sets to another ordered pair of sets, 135, 139
reducible set, 123
reduction of one set to another, 123
refutability predicate in a mathematical system 74
refutable number of a simple system, 150
refutable sentence of a mathematical system , 73
register of a decision (calculating) machine, 69
regular relational combinator, 237, 238
regular set of sentences of first-order logic, 26
Regularity Theorem, 23, 28, 49, 52, 53
relational combinator, 237
representability in a transcribed dyadic system, 100
representability in an arbitrary dyadic system, 93
representability in the universal system U, 100
representation function r(x, y) for number sets with respect to a simple system,
149, 150
representation of a natural number by a combinator, 234
representation of a number set by a combinator, 242
representation of a set by a number in a simple system, 150
representation of a set by a number in a synthesis system, 83
representation of a set in a mathematical system 74
representation of a set or relation by a predicate in an elementary formal system,
91
Rice’s Theorem, 119, 120
Rice, H. G., 119, 120
robin combinator R, 187
Rosenbloom, Paul, 244
Rosser system (as a simple system), 157–161
Rosser (first-order) system for binary relations, 160
Rosser (first-order) system for sets, 159, 160
Rosser fixed point property in a simple Rossor system, 158
Rosser function in an effective Rosser(simple) system, 158
Rosser system (as a simple system), 157–161
Rosser, J. Barkley, 75, 152, 157–161, 192, 226
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Russell, Bertrand, 254

S combinator (starling), 194
S(n, x, y), in the simple system
associated with a first-order system of arithmetic, 150

s and K as constants from which all other combinators can be derived, 215–223
S, B, C, and I are a basis for all λ-I combinators, 224–226
S, K term, 239
sage constructions, 205–208
sage element, in a combinatory logic, 179
satisfaction of a set of sentences by a valuation, 25
satisfiability of first-order sentences in the domain of the parameters, 24
Schöfinkel, Moses, 173
Second Fixed Point Theorem, for combinators, 242
semi-doubly universal ordered pair of sets, 135, 138
semi-reducibility of one ordered pair of sets to another ordered pair of sets, 135,
138, 139
sentence of a mathematical system , 73
sentence of an elementary formal system, 90
sentence of the universal system U, 100
separability of a pair of R-sets, 78
separation of a disjoint pair of number sets in a simple system, 153
separation of two binary relations by a formula in a first-order system, 160
Separation Principle, 136, 138
sequent (Gentzen), 29–46
sequent corresponding to a set of signed formulas, 33
set A in synthesis system, 79
set B in synthesis system, 79
set operations, similarity with logical connectives, 3, 4
Shepherdson’s Theorem, 161
Shepherdson, John, 161
similar registers, 70
Simple Iteration Theorem, 115, 116
simple system, 149–161
simple system associated with a system of first-order arithmetic, 150
simple term, in an S, K combinatorial system, 218
skew diagonalization of a number in a simple system, 151
Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem, 23, 27, 28, 49, 51
smug element, in a combinatory logic, 175
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solvable property P, 119

solvable set or relation, 93
Sprenger, M., 179
standard axiom system for propositional logic, 13
standard simple system, 154–161
starling combinator S, 194
Statman, Richard, 179
strong double fixed point property, 208
Strong Double Myhill Theorem, 134
Strong Double Recursion Theorem, 133–135, 137, 140
Strong Recursion Theorem, 120, 121
stump detector register, 72
stumping of a machine by a number, 70
subformula principle, 30
successor combinator σ, 234
successor ordinal, 256, 257
successor set, 256
symmetric Gentzen axiom system for first-order logic GG, 39–46
synthesis of results from three fields (special topics), 69–83
Synthesis System, 79–83
synthetic consistency property, 54–56

T combinator (thrush), 187

tableau proof of a sequent, 34
Tarski, Alfred, 159
tautological consequence of a set of formulas, 11, 12
tautological implication of a sentence by a set of sentences, 26
tautological sequent, 30
tautologically complete consequence relation, 11, 12
term induction principle, 218
term of a combinatory system, 215
term of an elementary formal system, 89
thrush combinator T, 187
To Mock a Mockingbird, 175–226
transcribed dyadic system (TDS), 99, 100
transcribed predicate (TS predicate), 99
transcribed variable (TS variable), 99
transitive rescursion theorem, 257
transitive set, 256
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true sentence of an elementary formal system, 90

true sentence of the universal system U, 100
truth set in first-order logic, 25
truth table verification of Boolean equations, 3, 4
truth-functional basis for first-order logic, 26
truth-functional implication of a sentence by a set of sentences, 26
truth-functionally satisfiable, of first-order sentences, 24
TS predicate (transcribed predicate), 99
TS variable (transcribed variable), 99
Turing combinator U, 206
Turing, Alan, 206, 207, 236

U combinator (Turing combinator), 206

U system, universal system for recursively enumerable sets and relations,
99–103
undecidability of the Axiom of Choice (AC) with ZF (shown by Gödel and
Cohen), 258
undecidability of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) with ZF
(shown by Gödel and Cohen), 258, 260
undecidable number of a simple system, 150
undecidable number of a synthesis system, 80
undecidable sentence in a mathematical system , 73
undecidable simple system, 155
Unification Theorem, 48–56
uniform incompleteness (for a simple system), 159
Uniform Iteration Theorem, 117
uniformly incompletable simple system, 159
uniformly universal set, 124
universal number in a synthesis system, 80
universal R-set, 77
universal register, 71
universal relation, 114
universal set, 124
universal system U for recursively enumerable sets and relations, 99–103
unlimited abstraction principle, 253
unsolvable problems and Rice’s Theorem, 119, 120

V combinator (vireo), 188

valid sequent, 30
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valuation, 9, 10, 23–27

valuation for first-order logic, 23
variable of an elementary formal system, 89
variations on a theme of Gödel (a mathematical system ), 73–76
vireo combinator V, 188
Von Neumann’s positive integers as sets, 255
Von Neumann, John, 255

W combinator (warbler), 192

W′ combinator (converse warbler), 192
W1, W2, W3 combinators, 193
warbler combinator W, 192
weak double fixed point property, 207
Weak Double Recursion Theorem, 133, 134
Weak Recursion Theorem, 118
weakly co-productive set, 125, 126
weakly doubly co-productive ordered pair of sets, 140
well-founded ∈ relation, 257
Whitehead, Alfred North, 254
word problem for Smullyan’s combinatorial lark is decidable, 179
Wymann-Böni, M., 179

x-eliminate of a combinatorial term, 219

x1, …, xn eliminate of a combinatorial term, 221

Zermelo’s positive integers as sets, 254, 255

Zermelo, Ernst, 254–260
zero tester combinator, 235
ZF, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, 254–260