Teach Yourself Logic 2020:

A Study Guide
Peter Smith
University of Cambridge

Version of December 31, 2019

 Pass it on, . . . . That’s the game I want you to learn. Pass it on.
Alan Bennett, The History Boys

Peter
c Smith 2019
The Guide’s layout is optimized for reading on-screen: try, for example, reading in
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URLs in blue are live links to external web-pages or PDF documents. Internal
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ugly red rashes internal cross-references are not coloured. If you are reading on a
computer, your cursor should change as you hover over such live links: try here.
Against the entry for a book, one star means (relatively) cheap, two stars means
(legally) free: see §2.3.
The latest version of this Guide can always be downloaded from logicmatters.net/tyl/
The cover image is Wassily Kandinsky, Circles in a Circle, 1923.
Contents

A very quick introduction iii

I Preliminaries 1
1 Using this Guide 2
1.1 Why this Guide for philosophers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Why this Guide for mathematicians too? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 A strategy for reading logic books (and
another reason why this Guide is so long) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 On the question of exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Assumed background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Philosophers: do you really need more logic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 How to prove it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 How the Guide is structured 9

2.1 Mapping the field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Three comments on the Guide’s structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Choices, choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3 ‘Intro logic’ 16

II Basic mathematical logic – and some other topics 18

4 First order logic 19
4.1 FOL: the basic topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 The main recommendations on FOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 Some parallel reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 Further into FOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.5 Other treatments? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5 Continuing Mathematical Logic 32

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 5.1 From first-order logic to elementary model theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2 Computability and Gödelian incompleteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3 Beginning set theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.4 Extras: two variant logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4.1 Second-order logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4.2 Intuitionist logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

6 Modal and other logics 53

6.1 Modal logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.2 Free logic, plural logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2.1 Free Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2.2 Plural logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3 Relevance logics (and wilder logics too) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

III Beyond the basics 62

About Part III 63

7 More advanced reading on some core topics 64

7.1 Proof theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.2 Beyond the model-theoretic basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3 Computability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3.1 Computable functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.3.2 Computational complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.4 Incompleteness and related matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.5 Theories of arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

8 Serious set theory 80

8.1 ZFC, with all the bells and whistles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.1.1 A first-rate overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.1.2 Rather more slowly, towards forcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.1.3 Pausing for problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.1.4 Pausing for more descriptive set-theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.1.5 Forcing further explored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.1.6 The higher infinite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.2 The Axiom of Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.3 Other set theories? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

9 What else? 92

Index of authors 94

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A very quick introduction

Before I retired from the University of Cambridge, it was my greatest good

fortune to have secure, decently paid, university posts for forty years in leisurely
times, with almost total freedom to follow my interests wherever they led. Like
many of my contemporaries, for most of that time I didn’t really appreciate how
very lucky I was. This Study Guide to logic textbooks is my attempt to give a
little back by way of heartfelt thanks.

As the first chapter explains, this Guide is aimed at philosophers who want to
go on beyond their first introductory logic course to learn some more serious
logic. It is also equally aimed at mathematicians wanting to get to grips with an
under-taught but exciting area of mathematics. Why not two separate Guides for
the two audiences? Mainly because it would be difficult to decide what should go
where. After all, a number of philosophers develop serious interests in more math-
ematical corners of the broad field of logic; and a number of mathematicians find
themselves becoming interested in more foundational/conceptual issues. Rather
than impose artificial divisions, I provide here a single but wide-ranging menu
for everyone to choose from as their interests dictate. So . . .

Don’t be scared off by the Guide’s length! This is due both to its breadth of
coverage and also to its starting just half a step beyond ‘baby logic’ and then
going a long way down the road towards state-of-the-art stuff. Different readers
will want to jump on and off the bus at different stops. Simply choose the sections
which are most relevant to your background and your interests, and you will be
able to cut the Guide down to more manageable proportions. There should be
enough signposting to enable you to pick your way through.

However, if you are hoping for help with very elementary logic (e.g. as typically
encountered by philosophers in their first-year courses), then let me say straight
away that this Guide is not really designed for you. The only part that directly
pertains logic at that level is the short Chapter 3; all the rest is about rather
more advanced – and eventually very much more advanced – material.

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 Part I

Preliminaries

1
Chapter 1

Using this Guide

This chapter outlines the Guide’s aims, and says something about how to use it
(noting in passing another reason why it is so long). Then the following chapter
describes the Guide’s overall structure.
I imagine readers to be mostly either philosophy students or mathematics
students, at various levels from upper undergraduate to postgraduate. (To be
sure, computer scientists and some theoretical linguists can be very interested in
logic too: but I haven’t written with them in mind.) So I’ll begin by explaining
the role of the Guide for the two main constituencies.

1.1 Why this Guide for philosophers?

It is an odd phenomenon, and a very depressing one too. Logic, beyond the
most elementary introduction, is taught less and less, at least in UK philosophy
departments. Fewer and fewer philosophers with serious logical interests seem to
get appointed to teaching posts.
Yet logic itself is, of course, no less exciting and rewarding a subject than
it ever was, and the amount of good formally-informed work in philosophy is
ever greater as time goes on – to mention just one currently very active area,
consider work on theories of truth. Moreover, logic is far too important to be left
entirely to the mercies of technicians from maths or computer science depart-
ments with different agendas (who often reveal an insouciant casualness about
basic conceptual issues that will matter to the philosophical reader).
So how is a real competence in logic to be passed on if there are not enough
courses, or indeed if there are none at all?
It seems that many beginning graduate students in philosophy – if they are

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not to be quite dismally uneducated in logic and therefore cut off from working in
some of the most exciting areas of their discipline – will need to teach themselves
from books, either solo or (better, but not always possible) by organizing their
own study groups.
In a way, that’s perhaps no real hardship; there are some wonderful books
written by great expositors out there. But what to read and work through? Logic
books can have a very long shelf life, and you shouldn’t at all dismiss older texts
when starting out on some topic area: so there’s more than a sixty year span of
publications to select from. Without having tried very hard, I have accumulated
on my own shelves well over two hundred formal logic books that might feature
somewhere in a Guide such as this – and these are still only a selection of what’s
available.
Philosophy students evidently need a Study Guide if they are to find their way
around the very large literature old and new, with the aim of teaching themselves
enjoyably and effectively. So this is my on-going attempt to provide one.

1.2 Why this Guide for mathematicians too?

The situation of logic teaching in mathematics departments can also be pretty
dire. Students will of course pick up a passing acquaintance with some very
basic notions about sets and some logical symbolism. But there are full university
maths courses in good UK universities with precisely zero courses offered on logic,
computability theory, or serious set theory. And I believe that the situation can
be equally patchy elsewhere.
So if you want to teach yourself some logic or related areas, where should you
start? What are the topics you might want to cover? What textbooks are likely
to prove accessible, engaging, and rewarding to work through? Again, this Guide
– or at least, the sections on the core mathematical logic curriculum – will give
you pointers.
True, this is written by someone who, apart from a few guest mini-courses,
has taught in philosophy departments and who has never been a research mathe-
matician. Which no doubt gives a distinctive tone to the Guide (and also explains
why it occasionally ranges into areas of logic of special interest to philosophers).
Still, mathematics remains my first love, and these days it is mathematicians
whom I mostly get to hang out with. Most of the books I recommend on core
topics are very definitely paradigm mathematics texts. So I won’t be leading you
astray!

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1.3 A strategy for reading logic books (and
another reason why this Guide is so long)
We cover a great deal of ground in this Guide then, which is one reason for its
initially daunting length. But there is another reason, connected to a point which
I now want to highlight:

I very strongly recommend tackling an area of logic by reading a series of

books which overlap in level (with the next one covering some of the same
ground and then pushing on from the previous one), rather than trying to
proceed by big leaps.

In fact, I probably can’t stress this advice too much (which, in my experience,
applies equally to getting to grips with any new area of mathematics). This ap-
proach will really help to reinforce and deepen understanding as you re-encounter
the same material at different levels, coming at it from different angles, with dif-
ferent emphases.
Exaggerating only a little, there are many instructors who say ‘This is the
textbook we are using/here is my set of notes: take it or leave it’. But you
will always gain from looking at some overlapping texts. (When responding to
student queries on a question-and-answer internet site, I’m repeatedly struck by
how much puzzlement would be quickly resolved by taking the occasional quick
look outside the course textbook/lecturer’s notes.)
The multiple overlaps in coverage in the reading lists below, which help make
the Guide as long as it is, are therefore fully intended. They also mean that
you should always be able to find options that suit your degree of mathematical
competence.
To repeat: you will certainly miss a lot if you concentrate on just one text
in a given area, especially at the outset. Yes, do very carefully read one or two
central texts, chosing books at a level that works for you. But do also cultivate
the crucial further habit of judiciously skipping and skimming through a number
of other works so that you can build up a good overall picture of an area seen
from various somewhat different angles of approach.

1.4 On the question of exercises

While we are talking about strategies for reading logic books, I should say some-
thing very briefly on the question of doing exercises.

4
 Mathematics is, as they say, not merely a spectator sport: so you should
try some of the exercises in the books as you read along to check and reinforce
comprehension. On the other hand, don’t obsess about doing exercises if you are
a philosopher – understanding proof ideas is very much the crucial thing, not
the ability to roll-your-own proofs. And even mathematicians shouldn’t get too
hung up on routine additional exercises beyond those needed to initially fix ideas
(unless you have specific exams to prepare for!): concentrate on the exercises
that look interesting and/or might deepen understanding.
Do note however that some authors have the irritating(?) habit of burying
quite important results among the exercises, mixed in with routine homework.
It is therefore always a good policy to skim through the exercises in a book even
if you don’t plan to work on answers to very many of them.

1.5 Assumed background

So what do you need to bring to the party, if you are going to tackle some of the
books recommended in the main body of this Guide?
If you are a mathematician, there is no specific assumed background you
need before tackling the entry-level books mentioned in Chs 4 and 5. They don’t
presuppose much ‘mathematical maturity’, so you can really just dive in – and
here in this Guide, now skip on to §1.7.
If, however, you are a philosopher without any significant mathematical back-
ground, then how to proceed will depend on how much logic you have already
encountered. Let’s distinguish three levels you might have reached:
L1. If you have only done an ‘informal logic’ or ‘critical reasoning course’, then
you’ll probably need to read a good introductory formal logic text before
tackling the more advanced work covered in the body of this Guide. See
Chapter 3.
L2. If you have taken a logic course with a formal element, but it was based
on some really, really, elementary text book like Sam Guttenplan’s The
Languages of Logic, Howard Kahane’s Logic and Philosophy, or Patrick
Hurley’s Concise Introduction to Logic (to mention some frequently used
texts), then you might still struggle with the initial suggestions in the main
part of the Guide which starts with Chapter 4.
But this will of course vary a lot from person to person. So the best
advice is probably just to make a start and see how you go, and if the

5
 going gets too tough, backtrack to try one of the more introductory books
I mention in Chapter 3, skipping quickly over what you already know.

L3. If you have taken an introductory formal logic course based on a more
substantial text like the ones mentioned in Chapter 3, then you should be
well prepared.

1.6 Philosophers: do you really need more logic?

This section is again for philosophers; mathematicians should skip on to the next
section.
It is perhaps worth pausing to ask whether you, as a budding philosopher,
really do want or need to pursue your logical studies much further if you have
already worked through a book like mine or Nick Smith’s. Far be it from me to
put people off doing more logic: perish the thought! But for many philosophical
purposes, you might well survive by just reading this:
Eric Steinhart, More Precisely: The Math You Need to Do Philosophy*
(Broadview, 2nd edition 2017, with companion website). The author writes:
‘The topics presented . . . include: basic set theory; relations and functions;
machines; probability; formal semantics; utilitarianism; and infinity. The
chapters on sets, relations, and functions provide you with all you need
to know to apply set theory in any branch of philosophy. The chapter of
machines includes finite state machines, networks of machines, the game of
life, and Turing machines. The chapter on formal semantics includes both
extensional semantics, Kripkean possible worlds semantics, and Lewisian
counterpart theory. The chapter on probability covers basic probability,
conditional probability, Bayes theorem, and various applications of Bayes
theorem in philosophy. . . . . The chapters on infinity cover recursive def-
initions, limits, countable infinity, Cantor’s diagonal and power set argu-
ments, uncountable infinities, the aleph and beth numbers, and definitions
by transfinite recursion. More Precisely is designed both as a text book
and reference book to meet the needs of upper level undergraduates and
graduate students. It is also useful as a reference book for any philosopher
working today.’
Steinhart’s book is admirable, and will give many philosophers a handle on some
technical ideas going well beyond ‘baby logic’ and which they really should know
just a little about, without all the hard work of doing a full mathematical logic

6
course. What’s not to like? It could be enough for you. And then, if there indeed
turns out to be some particular area (modal logic, for example) that seems es-
pecially germane to your particular philosophical interests, you always can go to
the relevant section of this Guide for more.

1.7 How to prove it

Before getting down to the main business let me mention a rather special book,
which is aimed at mathematicians though philosophers should find it very useful
too:

Daniel J. Velleman, How to Prove It: A Structured Approach* (CUP, 3rd

edition, 2019). From the Preface: ‘Students of mathematics . . . often have
trouble the first time that they’re asked to work seriously with mathematical
proofs, because they don’t know ‘the rules of the game’. What is expected
of you if you are asked to prove something? What distinguishes a correct
proof from an incorrect one? This book is intended to help students learn the
answers to these questions by spelling out the underlying principles involved
in the construction of proofs.’

There are chapters on the propositional connectives and quantifiers, and informal
proof-strategies for using them, and chapters on relations and functions, a chapter
on mathematical induction, and a final chapter on infinite sets (countable vs.
uncountable sets). This is a truly excellent student text.
Yes, if you are a mathematician who has got to the point of wanting to
find out something about mathematical logic, you will probably have already
mastered nearly all the content of Velleman’s splendidly clear book. However,
a few hours speed-reading through this text (except perhaps for the very final
section), pausing over anything that doesn’t look very comfortably familiar, could
still be time extremely well spent.
What if you are a philosophy student who (as we are now assuming) has done
some elementary logic? Well, experience shows that being able to handle e.g. nat-
ural deduction proofs in a formal system doesn’t always translate into being able
to construct good informal proofs. For example, one of the few meta-theoretic
results that might be met in a first logic course is the expressive completeness
of the set of formal connectives t^, _, u. The proof of this result is really easy,
based on a simple proof-idea. But many students who will ace the part of the end-
of-course exam asking for quite complex formal proofs inside a deductive system

7
can find themselves all at sea when asked to replicate this informal bookwork
proof about a formal system.
Another example: it is only too familiar to find philosophy students intro-
duced to set notation not even being able to make a start on giving a correct
informal proof that ttau, ta, buu “ tta1 u, ta1 , b1 uu if and only if a “ a1 and b “ b1 .
Well, if you are one of those students who jumped through the formal hoops
but were unclear about how to set out elementary mathematical proofs (e.g. from
the ‘metatheory’ of baby logic, or from very introductory set theory), then again
working through Velleman’s book from the beginning could be exactly what you
need to get you prepared for the serious study of logic. And even if you were
one of those comfortable with the informal proofs, you will probably still profit
from skipping and skimming through (perhaps paying especial attention to the
chapter on mathematical induction).

8
Chapter 2

How the Guide is structured

This chapter explains how the field of logic is being carved up into subfields in
this Guide. It also explains how many of these subfields are visited twice, once
to give entry-level readings, and then again later when we consider some more
advanced texts.

2.1 Mapping the field

‘Logic’, in the broad sense, is a big field. Its technical development is of concern
to philosophers and mathematicians, not to mention computer scientists (and
others). Different constituencies will be particularly interested in different areas
and give different emphases. Core ‘classical first-order logic’ is basic by anyone’s
lights. But after that, interests can diverge. For example, modal logic is of con-
siderable interest to some philosophers, not so much to mathematicians, though
parts of this sub-discipline are of great concern to some computer scientists. Set
theory (which falls within the purview of mathematical logic, broadly under-
stood) is an active area of research interest in mathematics, but – because of its
(supposed) foundational status – even quite advanced results can be of interest
to philosophers too. Type theory started off as a device of philosophy-minded
logicians looking to avoid the paradoxes: it has become primarily the playground
of computer scientists. The incompleteness theorems are relatively elementary
results of the theory of computable functions, but are of particular conceptual
interest to philosophers. Finite model theory is of interest to mathematicians and
computer scientists, but perhaps not so much to philosophers. And so it goes.
In this Guide, as I said, I’m going to have to let the computer scientists and
others largely look after themselves. Our main focus is going to be on the core

9
mathematical logic curriculum of most concern to philosophers and mathemati-
cians, together with some extras of particular interest to philosophers – if only
because that’s what I know a little about. Here, then, is an overview map of the
territory we cover in the Guide.
We are going to spend very little time, here in Part I of the Guide, on
• ‘Intro logic’ (Ch. 3) I mean the sort of material that is covered in ele-
mentary formal logic courses for philosophers (what is often somewhat dis-
missively labelled ‘baby logic’ !). Topics covered might include some truth-
functional propositional logic (introducing the truth-table test for validity),
a light-weight introduction to quantifiers and identity (giving perhaps little
more than a familiarity with the use of the notation). Longer introductory
courses may also have time for an introduction to a proof system (e.g.
natural deduction or ‘trees’).

Our brief Ch. 3 gives some quick pointers to books for philosophers covering
elementary material at a level that should provide an adequate background for
starting work on topics covered in the Part II of the Guide, beginning with
• First-order logic (Ch. 4) The serious study of mathematical logic al-
ways starts with a reasonably rigorous treatment of quantification theory,
covering both a proof-system for classical first-order logic (FOL), and the
standard classical semantics, getting at least as far as a soundness and com-
pleteness proof for your favourite proof system, and perhaps taking a first
look at a few easy corollaries. I will both give the headline news about the
topics that need to be covered and also suggest a number of different ways
of covering them (I’m not suggesting you read all the texts mentioned!).
This part of the Guide is therefore quite long even though it doesn’t cover
a lot of ground: it does, however, provide the essential foundation for . . .
• Continuing the basic ‘Mathematical Logic’ curriculum (Ch. 5)
Mathematical logic programmes typically comprise – in one order or an-
other and in various proportions – three or perhaps four elements in addi-
tion to a serious treatment of FOL:
1. A little model theory, i.e. a little more exploration of the fit be-
tween theories cast framed in formal languages and the structures they
are supposed to be ‘about’. This will start with the compactness theo-
rem and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems (if these aren’t already covered
in your basic FOL reading), and then will push on just a bit further.

10
 You will need to know a very little set theory as background, mainly
ideas about cardinality; so you might need to interweave beginning
model theory with the very beginnings of your work on set theory if
those cardinality ideas are new to you.
2. Computability and decidability, and proofs of epochal results
such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This is perhaps the most
readily approachable area of mathematical logic.
3. Some introductory set theory. Informal set theory, basic notions
of cardinals and ordinals, constructions in set theory, the role of the
axiom of choice, etc. The formal axiomatization of ZFC.
4. Extras: variants of standard FOL The additional material that
you could (should?) meet in a first serious encounter with mathemat-
ical logic includes:
(a) Second Order Logic (where we can quantify over properties as
well as objects — what difference does this make?), and
(b) Intuitionistic Logic (which drops the law of excluded middle, mo-
tivated by a non-classical understanding of the significance of the
logical operators).
These two variants are of both technical and philosophical interest.
• Modal and other logics (Ch. 6) In this chapter, we consider a number
of logical topics of particular concern to philosophers (many mathemati-
cians will want to skip – though perhaps you should at least know that
there is a logical literature on these topics). These topics are actually quite
approachable even if you know little other logic. So the fact that this ma-
terial is mentioned after the heavier-duty mathematical topics in Ch. 5
doesn’t mean that there is a jump in difficulty from Ch. 4. We look at:

1. Modal logic Even before encountering a full-on treatment of first-

order logic, philosophers are often introduced to modal logic (the logic
of necessity and possibility) and to its ‘possible world semantics’. You
can indeed do an amount of propositional modal logic with little more
than ‘intro logic’ as background.
2. Other classical variations and extensions of standard logic which
are of conceptual interest but still classical in spirit, e.g. free logic,
plural logic.

11
 3. Further non-classical variations The most important non-classical
logic – and the one of real interest to mathematicians too – is intu-
itionist logic which we’ve already mentioned. But here we might also
consider e.g. relevant logics which drop the classical rule that a con-
tradiction entails anything.
Part II forms the basic core of the Guide. Part III moves on to consider more
advanced treatments of many of the areas introduced in Part II, and also adds
coverage of some further topics.

• Exploring further in core mathematical logic (Ch. 7) The intro-

ductory texts mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5 will already contain numer-
ous pointers onwards to further books, more than enough to put you in
a position to continue exploring solo. However, Chapter 7 offers my own
suggestions for more advanced reading on model theory, computability, for-
mal arithmetic, and now on proof theory too. This chapter is for specialist
graduate students (among philosophers) and for final year undergradu-
ate/beginning graduate students (among mathematicians).
• Serious set theory (Ch 8) We continue the exploration beyond the
basics of set theory covered in Ch. 5 with a chapter on more advanced set
theory. This gets seriously tough!
• Other topics (Ch. 9) The very brief final chapter mentions a number
of additional topics which, given world enough and time, this Guide might
eventually cover, with a pointer to my web-page on category theory.

Don’t be alarmed if (some of) the descriptions of topics above are at the moment
opaque to you: we will be explaining things rather more as we go through the
Guide.

2.2 Three comments on the Guide’s structure

Three comments on all this:
1. The Guide divides up the broad field of logic into subfields in a pretty con-
ventional way. But of course, even the ‘horizontal’ divisions into different
areas can in places be a little arbitrary.
And the ‘vertical’ division between the entry-level readings on mathe-
matical logic in Chapter 5 and the further explorations in Chapters 7 and 8

12
 is necessarily going to be a lot more arbitrary. I think that everyone will
agree (at least in retrospect!) that e.g. the elementary theory of ordinals
and cardinals belongs to the basics of set theory, while explorations of ‘large
cardinals’ or independence proofs via forcing are decidedly advanced. But
in most areas, there are far fewer natural demarcation lines between the
entry-level basics and more advanced work. Still, it is surely very much
better to have some such structuring than to heap everything together.
2. Within sections in the coming chapters, I have usually put the main recom-
mendations into what strikes me as a sensible reading order of increasing
difficulty (without of course supposing you will want to read everything –
those with stronger mathematical backgrounds might sometimes want to
try starting in the middle of a list). Some further books are listed in asides
or postscripts.
3. The Guide used also to have a substantial final part considering some of
‘The Big Books on mathematical logic’ (meaning typically broader-focus
books that cover first-order logic together with one or more subfields from
the further menu of mathematical logic). These books vary a lot in level
and coverage, but can provide very useful consolidating/amplifying reading.
This supplement to the main Guide is now available online as a separate
Appendix which I hope to continue adding to. Alternatively, for individual
webpages on those texts and a number of additional reviews, visit the Logic
Matters Book Notes.

2.3 Choices, choices

(a) So what has guided my choices of what to recommend within the sections
of this Guide?
Different people find different expository styles congenial. For example, what
is agreeably discursive for one reader is irritatingly verbose and slow-moving for
another. For myself, I do particularly like books that are good on conceptual de-
tails and good at explaining the motivation for the technicalities while avoiding
needless complications, excessive hacking through routine detail, or misplaced
‘rigour’. Given the choice, I tend to prefer a treatment that doesn’t rush too fast
to become too general, too abstract, and thereby obscures intuitive motivation:
this is surely what we want in books to be used for self-study. (There’s a cer-
tain tradition of masochism in older maths writing, of going for brusque formal
abstraction from the outset with little by way of explanatory chat: this is quite

13
unnecessary in other areas, and just because logic is all about formal theories,
that doesn’t make it any more necessary here.)
The selection of books in the following chapters no doubt reflects these tastes.
But overall, I don’t think that I have been very idiosyncratic: indeed, in many
respects I have probably been somewhat conservative in my choices. So nearly
all the books I recommend will very widely be agreed to have significant virtues
(even if other logicians would have different preference-orderings).
(b) Most of the books mentioned here should be held by any larger university li-
brary which has been paying reasonable attention to maintaining core collections
in mathematics and philosophy, and every book should be borrowable through
your local inter-library loans system.
Since it is assumed that you will by default be using library copies of books,
I have not made cost or being currently in print a significant consideration.
However, I have marked with one star* books that are available new at a
reasonable price (or at least are unusually good value for the length and/or
importance of the book).
I have marked with two stars** those books for which e-copies are freely
and legally available, and links are provided. Most articles, encyclopaedia
entries, etc., can also be downloaded, again with links supplied.

(We must pass over in silence the question of using the well-known copyright-
infringing PDF repositories. I could not possibly comment . . . )

(c) And yes, the references here are very largely to published books and articles
rather than to on-line lecture notes etc. Many such notes are excellent, but they
do tend to be terse, and quite often very terse (as entirely befits material intended
to support a lecture course). And so they are perhaps not as helpful as fully-
worked-out book-length treatments for students needing to teach themselves.
But I’m sure that there is an increasing number of excellent e-resources out
there which do amount, more or less, to free stand-alone textbooks: I mention a
couple of more recent arrivals, and I would be very happy to get recommendations
about others.
(d) Finally, the earliest versions of this Guide kept largely to positive recom-
mendations: I didn’t pause to explain the reasons for the then absence of some
well-known books. This was partly due to considerations of length which have
now quite gone by the wayside; but also I wanted to keep the tone enthusiastic,
rather than to start criticizing or carping.

14
 However, enough people kept asking what I think about an alternative X, or
asking why the old warhorse Y wasn’t mentioned, for me to change my mind. So I
have just occasionally added some reasons why I don’t particularly recommended
certain books.

15
Chapter 3

‘Intro logic’

This is by way of a very short prequel to the main Guide. But I keep being asked
to recommend a really introductory formal logic book – the sort of text suitable
for a first formal logic course for philosophers.
The world isn’t short of introductory logic texts, and there are a number of
very respectable options. Though some books are, frankly, just not as good as
they should be at explaining what’s going on and why; and some others are more
reliable but to my mind are likely to prove dull or off-putting. Hopefully my own
book avoids these two shortcomings! – I’ll mention it in a moment. First though,
here are two other books that I like and which can be warmly recommend:

1. Paul Teller’s A Modern Formal Logic Primer** (Prentice Hall 1989) has
been out of print for a while, but the scanned pages are freely available
online at the book’s website, which makes it unbeatable value! The book (in
fact, two slim volumes) is in many ways excellent, and had I known about
it at the time (or listened to Paul’s good advice, when I got to know him,
about how long it takes to write an intro book), I’m not sure that I’d have
ever written my own book! As well as introducing trees, Teller also covers a
version of ‘Fitch-style’ natural deduction. (He also goes significantly beyond
the really elementary, getting as far as a so-called completeness proof.)
Notably user-friendly. Answers to exercises are available at the author’s
website.
2. Nicholas Smith’s more recent Logic: The Laws of Truth (Princeton UP
2012) is again very clearly written and has many virtues (particularly if you
like your texts to go rather slowly and discursively). The first two parts of
the book focus on logic by trees. But the third part ranges wider, including
a brisk foray into natural deduction – and are there some extras too, again

16
 going well beyond ‘baby logic’. It is a particularly readable addition to
the introductory literature. I have commented further here. Answers to
exercises can be found at the book’s website.

Another book, which I am often asked about, is

3. Dave Barker-Plummer, Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy’s Language,
Proof and Logic (CSLI Publications, 1999; 2nd edition 2011). The unique
selling point for this widely used book is that it comes as part of a ‘course-
ware package’, which includes software such as a famous program called
‘Tarski’s World’ in which you build model worlds and can query whether
various first-order sentences are true of them. Some students really like it,
but at least equally many don’t find this kind of thing particularly useful.
There is an associated online course from Stanford, with video lectures by
the authors which you can watch for free, though you have to buy the
courseware package to complete the course with a ‘statement of accom-
plishment’. For more details, see the book’s website.
This is another book which is user-friendly, goes slowly, and does Fitch-
style natural deduction. It is a very respectable option. But Teller is per-
haps rather snappier, I think no less clear, and certainly wins on price!
Unsurprisingly, though, the book that I would most strongly recommend to philo-
sophical beginners wanting a way into formal logic has to be

4. Peter Smith An Introduction to Formal Logic* (CUP second edition

2020). This is intended for complete beginners, and the first edition was
the first year text in Cambridge for a decade. It was written as an accessi-
ble teach-yourself book, covering basic propositional and predicate logic.
The first edition did logic ‘by trees’. This new second edition instead
focuses on natural deduction (with an online supplement on trees). For
more details, including an extended table of contents for the new edition,
see the IFL pages, where there are also answers to the exercises.

17
 Part II

Basic mathematical logic –

and some other topics

18
Chapter 4

First order logic

So, at last, let’s get down to business! This chapter starts with a checklist of the
topics we will be treating as belonging to the basics of first-order logic (predicate
logic, quantificational logic, call it what you will: we’ll use ‘FOL’ for short). There
are then some main recommendations for texts covering these topics, followed by
some suggestions for parallel and further reading. The chapter ends with some
additional comments, mostly responding to frequently asked questions.
A note to philosophers. If you have carefully read and mastered a substantial
introductory logic text for philosophers such as Nick Smith’s, or even my own,
you will already be familiar with (versions of) much of the material covered in
this chapter. However, the big change is that you will now begin to see perhaps
familiar material being re-presented in the sort of mathematical style and with
the sort of rigorous detail that you will necessarily encounter more and more as
you progress in logic. You do need to start feeling entirely comfortable with this
mode of presentation at an early stage. So it will be well worth working through
even familiar topics again, now with more mathematical precision.

4.1 FOL: the basic topics

Without further ado, here in headline terms is what you need to get to know
about – though don’t worry, of course, if at present you don’t fully grasp the
import of every point: the next section gives recommended reading to help you
reach enlightenment!

• Starting with syntax, you need to know how first-order languages are con-
structed. If you have already encountered such languages, you should now
get to understand how to prove various things about them that might

19
 seem obvious and that you perhaps previously took for granted – for ex-
ample, that ‘bracketing works’ to avoid ambiguities, meaning that every
well-formed formula has a unique parsing.
(By the way, it is worth remarking in passing that introductory logic
courses for philosophers very often ignore functions. But given that FOL is
deployed to regiment everyday mathematical reasoning, and that functions
are of course crucial to mathematics, function expressions now become im-
portant, even if there are tricks that make them in principle eliminable.)
• On the semantic side, you need to understand the idea of a structure (a do-
main of objects equipped with some relations and/or functions, and having
some particular objects especially picked out, ready to be the denotations of
constants in the language). And, crucially, you need to grasp the idea of an
interpretation of a language in such a structure. You’ll need to understand
how such an interpretation generates a unique assignment of truth-values to
every sentence of the interpreted language – this means grasping a proper
formal semantic story with the bells and whistles required to cope with
quantifiers adequately.
With these ideas to hand, you now can define the relation of semantic
entailment, where the sentences Γ semantically entail ϕ when no interpreta-
tion in any appropriate structure can make all the sentences Γ true without
making ϕ true too. You’ll need to know some of the basic properties of this
relation.
• Back to syntax: you need to get to know a deductive proof-system for FOL
reasonably well.
Now, a variety of styles of proof-system feature in texts at various levels.
For a start, you will find
1. Old-school ‘axiomatic’ systems,
2. Natural deduction done Gentzen-style,
3. Natural deduction done Fitch-style,
4. ‘Truth trees’ or ‘semantic tableaux’,
5. Sequent calculi.
These types of proof-system have various strengthens and shortcomings.
To put it very roughly, the third and fourth are easiest for beginners to ac-
tually use to produce working formal proofs (that’s why elementary logic
books for philosophers usually introduce one or other or both systems).

20
 While the first and second types of system are rather easier to prove re-
sults about. The fifth type really comes into its own in more advanced work
about so-called proof theory.
At some point, the educated logician will want to find about all these
proof styles (at the very least, you should get a general sense of how they
respectively work, and appreciate the interrelations between them – the
book by Bostock mentioned in §4.3 is very helpful on this). However, stan-
dard mathematical logic texts concentrate on the first two systems on our
list, as in my recommendations below.

• Next – and for mathematicians this is probably the point at which things
actually start getting really interesting! – you need to know how to prove a
soundness and a completeness theorem for your favourite deductive system
for first-order logic. That is to say, you need to be able to show that there’s
a deduction in your chosen system of a conclusion from given premisses only
if the premisses do indeed semantically entail the conclusion (the system
doesn’t give false positives), and whenever an inference is semantically valid
there’s a formal deduction of the conclusion from the premisses (the system
captures all the semantical entailments).
• Depending on where you get to in the text you read, you might at this
stage catch a first glimpse of some initial results of model theory which
flow quickly from the proofs of soundness and completeness (e.g. the so-
called compactness theorem). However, let’s return to consider these results
in §5.1 when we consider model theory proper.

4.2 The main recommendations on FOL

There is, unsurprisingly, a very long list of possible texts. But the point of this
Guide is to choose! So here are four of the best:

Let’s start with a couple of stand-out books which, taken together, make
an excellent introduction to the serious study of FOL.

1. Ian Chiswell and Wilfrid Hodges, Mathematical Logic (OUP 2007). This
very nicely written text is only one notch up in actual difficulty from
some introductory texts for philosophers like mine or Paul Teller’s or
Nick Smith’s. However – as its title might suggest – it does have a notably

21
 more mathematical ‘look and feel’, being indeed written by mathemati-
cians for mathematicians. Despite that, it remains particularly friendly
and approachable and should be entirely manageable for self study by
philosophers and mathematicians alike. It is also pleasingly short. In-
deed, I’m rather tempted to say that if you don’t like this lovely book
then serious logic might not be for you!
The briefest headline news is that authors explore a (Gentzen-style)
natural deduction system. But by building things up in three stages
– so after propositional logic, they consider an interesting fragment of
first-order logic before turning to the full-strength version – they make
proofs of e.g. the completeness theorem for first-order logic quite unusu-
ally comprehensible. For a more detailed description see my book note
on C&H.
Very warmly recommended, then. For the moment, you only need read
up to and including §7.7; but having got that far, you might as well read
the final couple of sections and the Postlude too! (The book has brisk
solutions to some exercises. A demerit mark to OUP for not publishing
C&H more cheaply.)

Next, you should complement C&H by reading the first half of

2. Christopher Leary and Lars Kristiansen’s A Friendly Introduction to
Mathematical Logic** (1st edn by Leary alone, Prentice Hall 2000; inex-
pensive 2nd edn Milne Library 2015; and now freely available for down-
load).
There is a great deal to like about this book. Chs. 1–3, in either edi-
tion, do make a very friendly and helpful introduction to first-order logic,
this time done in axiomatic style. At this stage you could stop reading
after §3.2, which means you will be reading just over 100 pages. Unusu-
ally, L&K dive straight into a full treatment of FOL without spending
an introductory chapter or two on propositional logic: but that happily
means (in the present context) that you won’t feel that you are labouring
through the very beginnings of logic one more time than is really neces-
sary – so this book dovetails very nicely with C&H.
The book is again written by mathematicians for a mostly mathemati-
cal audience so some illustrations of ideas can presuppose a smattering of
elementary background mathematical knowledge; but you will miss very
little if you occasionally have to skip an example (and curious philoso-

22
 phers can always resort to Wikipedia, which is quite reliable in this area,
for explanations of some mathematical terms). I like the tone very much
indeed, and say more about this admirable book in another book note.

Next, here’s an alternative to the C&H/L&K pairing which is also wonder-

fully approachable and can be warmly recommended:
3. Derek Goldrei’s Propositional and Predicate Calculus: A Model of Argu-
ment* (Springer, 2005) is explicitly designed for self-study. Read Chs. 1
to 5 (you could skip §§4.4 and 4.5, leaving them until you turn to ele-
mentary model theory). While C&H and the first half of L&K together
cover overlapping material twice, Goldrei – in much the same total num-
ber of pages – covers very similar ground once. So this is a somewhat
more gently-paced book, allowing Goldrei to be more expansive about
fundamentals, and to give a lot of examples and exercises to test compre-
hension along the way. A very great deal of thought has gone into making
this text as helpful as possible. So if you struggle slightly with the alter-
native reading, or just want a comfortingly manageable additional text,
you should find this exceptionally accessible and useful. Or you might
just warm more to Goldrei’s style anyway.
Like L&K, Goldrei uses an axiomatic system (which is one reason why,
on balance, I still recommend starting with C&H instead). As with C&H
and L&K, I like the tone and approach a great deal.
Fourthly, even though it is giving a second bite to an author we’ve already
met, I must mention a rather different discussion of FOL:
4. Wilfrid Hodges ‘Elementary Predicate Logic’, in the Handbook of Philo-
sophical Logic, Vol. 1, ed. by D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, (Kluwer 2nd
edition 2001). This is a slightly expanded version of the essay in the
first edition of the Handbook (read that earlier version if this one isn’t
available), and is written with Hodges’s usual enviable clarity and verve.
As befits an essay aimed at philosophically minded logicians, it is full
of conceptual insights, historical asides, comparisons of different ways of
doing things, etc., so it very nicely complements the more conventional
textbook presentations of C&H, L&K and/or Goldrei.
Read at this stage the first twenty sections (70 pp.): they are wonder-
fully illuminating.

23
4.3 Some parallel reading
The material covered in the last section is so very fundamental, and the alterna-
tive options so very many, that I really do need to say at least something about
a few other books and note some different approaches.
So in this section I will list – in rough order of difficulty/sophistication – a
small handful of further texts which could well make for useful parallel reading
at different levels. Then in the following section I’ll note just three books which
push on the discussion of FOL in interestingly different ways. In the final section
of this chapter of the Guide, I will then mention some other books I’ve been
asked about.
If you’ve read C&H and L&K you will know about both natural deduction
and axiomatic approaches to logic. If you are a philosopher, you may also have
already encountered ‘truth trees’ or ‘semantic tableaux’, which are often used in
introductory logic courses. If you don’t know about tableaux, it is worth at some
point pausing to find out at least the general principle behind this approach.
The first edition of my Introduction to Formal Logic* (CUP 2003) has chap-
ters on trees for both propositional and predicate logic. For the second edition, I
am re-writing these chapters and making them available as an on-line supplement
to what is now a natural-deduction-based text. The first batch of the rewritten
trees chapters is now here:
1. Peter Smith, Propositional Truth Trees (28 pp., 2019).
Alternatively, you could jump straight to the next recommendation which
covers trees but also a considerable amount more. This is a text by a philoso-
pher, aimed at philosophers, though mathematicians interested in conceptual
foundations could still profit from a quicker browse given the excellent coverage:
2. David Bostock’s Intermediate Logic (OUP 1997) ranges more widely but
not as deeply as Goldrei, for example, and in a much more discursive style.
From the preface: ‘The book is confined to . . . what is called first-order
predicate logic, but it aims to treat this subject in very much more detail
than a standard introductory text. In particular, whereas an introductory
text will pursue just one style of semantics, just one method of proof, and
so on, this book aims to create a wider and a deeper understanding by
showing how several alternative approaches are possible, and by introduc-
ing comparisons between them.’ So Bostock does indeed usefully introduce
you to tableaux (trees) and an Hilbert-style axiomatic proof system and
natural deduction and even a so-called sequent calculus as well (as noted,

24
 it is important eventually to understand what is going on in these different
kinds of proof-system). Anyone could profit from at least a quick browse
of his Part II to pick up the headline news about the various approaches.
Bostock eventually touches on issues of philosophical interest such as free
logic which are not often dealt with in other books at this level. Still, the dis-
cussions mostly remain at much the same level of conceptual/mathematical
difficulty as the later parts of Teller’s book and my own. He proves com-
pleteness for tableaux in particular, which I always think makes the needed
construction seem particularly natural. Intermediate Logic should therefore
be, as intended, particularly accessible to philosophers who haven’t done
much formal logic before and should, if read in parallel, help ease the transi-
tion to coping with the more mathematical style of the books recommended
in the last section.
Next let me mention a freely available alternative presentation of logic via
natural deduction:
3. Neil Tennant, Natural Logic** (Edinburgh UP 1978, 1990). Now out of
print, but downloadable as a scanned PDF.
All credit to the author for writing the first textbook aimed at an intro-
ductory level which does Gentzen-style natural deduction. Tennant thinks
that this approach to logic is philosophically highly significant, and in var-
ious ways this shows through in his textbook. Although not as convention-
ally mathematical in look-and-feel as some alternatives, it is in fact very
careful about important details.
This is not always an easy read, however, despite its being intended
as a first logic text for philosophers, which is why I didn’t mention it in
Chap. 3. However the book is there to freely sample, and some may well
find it highly illuminating parallel reading on natural deduction.
Now, I recommended L&K’s A Friendly Introduction as a follow-up to C&H
which uses an axiomatic system. As an alternative, here is an older and much
used text which should certainly be very widely available:

4. Herbert Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (Academic Press

1972, 2002) also focuses on a Hilbert-style axiomatic system, and is often
regarded as a classic of exposition.
However, it does strike me as somewhat more difficult than L&K, so
I’m not surprised that some students report finding it a bit challenging if
used by itself as a first text. Still, it is an admirable and very reliable piece

25
 of work which you should be able to cope with as a second text, e.g. after
you have tackled C&H. Read up to and including §2.5 or §2.6 at this stage.
Later, you can finish the rest of that chapter to take you a bit further into
model theory. For more about this classic, see this book note.
Lastly in this section I’ll mention – though this time with some hesitation –
another much used text. This has gone through multiple editions and should also
be in any library, making it a useful natural-deduction based alternative to C&H.
Later chapters of this book are also mentioned below in the Guide as possible
reading for more advanced work, so it could be worth making early acquaintance
with . . .
5. Dirk van Dalen, Logic and Structure* (Springer, 1980; 5th edition 2012).
The chapters up to and including §3.2 provide an introduction to FOL via
natural-deduction. The treatment is often approachable and written with a
relatively light touch. However – and this explains my hesitation – it has to
be said that the book isn’t without its quirks and flaws and inconsistencies
of presentation (though perhaps you have to be an alert and pernickety
reader to notice and be bothered by them). Still, the coverage and general
approach is good.
Mathematicians should be able to cope readily. I suspect, however, that
the book would occasionally be tougher going for philosophers if taken
from a standing start – which is another reason why I have recommended
beginning with C&H instead. (See my more extended review of the whole
book.)
A final aside: The treatments of FOL I have mentioned so far here and in the
last section include exercises, of course. But for many more exercises – and this
time with extensive worked solutions in the book – you could also look at the
ends of Chs. 1, 3 and 4 of René Cori and Daniel Lascar, Mathematical Logic: A
Course with Exercises (OUP, 2000). I can’t, however, particularly recommend
the main bodies of those chapters.

4.4 Further into FOL

In this section for enthusiasts, I mention three books, very different from each
other, which push on the story about FOL in various ways.
1. Raymond Smullyan, First-Order Logic* (Springer 1968, Dover Publications
1995) recommends itself. It is an absolute classic, packed with good things.

26
 This is the tersest, most sophisticated, book I’m mentioning in this chapter,
but those with a taste for mathematical elegance can certainly try reading
Parts I and II, just a hundred pages, after C&H. This beautiful little book
is the source and inspiration of many modern treatments of logic based on
tree/tableau systems.
Not always easy, especially as the book progresses, but a delight for the
mathematically minded.
2. Jan von Plato’s Elements of Logical Reasoning* (CUP, 2014) is based on
the author’s introductory lectures. A lot of material is touched on in a rel-
atively short compass as von Plato talks about a range of different natural
deduction and sequent calculi. I suspect that, without any classroom work
to round things out, this might not be easy as a first introduction to logic.
But suppose you have already met one system of natural deduction (e.g.,
as in C&H), and now want to know more about ‘proof-theoretic’ aspects
of this and related systems. Suppose, for example, that you want to know
about variant ways of setting up ND systems, about proof-search, about
the relation with so-called sequent calculi, etc. Then this is a very clear,
approachable and interesting book. Experts will see that there are some
novel twists, with deductive systems tweaked to have some very nice fea-
tures: beginners will be put on the road towards understanding some of
the initial concerns and issues in proof theory.
3. Don’t be put off by the title of Melvin Fitting’s First-Order Logic and
Automated Theorem Proving (Springer, 1990, 2nd end. 1996). This is a
wonderfully lucid book by a renowned expositor. (Yes, at various places
in the book there are illustrations of how to implement various algorithms
in Prolog. But either you can easily pick up the very small amount of
background knowledge about Prolog that’s needed to follow everything
that is going on (and that’s quite a fun thing to do anyway) or you can
just skip those implementation episodes.)
As anyone who has tried to work inside an axiomatic system knows,
proof-discovery for such systems is often hard. Which axiom schema should
we instantiate with which wffs at any given stage of a proof? Natural
deduction systems are nicer: but since we can, in effect, make any new
temporary assumption at any stage in a proof, again we still need to keep
our wits about us if we are to avoid going off on useless diversions. By
contrast, tableau proofs (a.k.a. tree proofs, as in my book) can pretty
much write themselves even for quite complex FOL arguments, which is
why I used to introduce formal proofs to students that way (in teaching

27
 tableaux, we can largely separate the business of getting across the idea
of formality from the task of teaching heuristics of proof-discovery). And
because tableau proofs very often write themselves, they are also good for
automated theorem proving. Fitting explores both the tableau method and
the related so-called resolution method in this exceptionally clearly written
book.
This book’s emphasis is, then, rather different from most of the other rec-
ommended books. So I initially hesitated to mention it here in this Guide.
However, I think that the fresh light thrown on first-order logic makes the
detour through this book vaut le voyage, as the Michelin guides say. (If
you don’t want to take the full tour, however, there’s a nice introduction
to proofs by resolution in Shawn Hedman, A First Course in Logic (OUP
2004): §1.8, §§3.4–3.5.)

4.5 Other treatments?

Obviously, I have still only touched on a small proportion of books that cover
first-order logic. Most of the Big Books on Mathematical Logic have treatments
of the standard material – though not so often at a level and pace that makes
them suitable for a first encounter with this area. See some of the entries in the
Guide’s Appendix for more detailed discussion of some options.
I end this chapter, however, by responding to some Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, mostly questions raised in response to earlier versions of the Guide.
A blast from the past: What about Mendelson? Somewhat to my surprise, per-
haps the most frequent question I used to get asked in response to early ver-
sions of the Guide is ‘But what about Mendelson, Chs. 1 and 2’ ? Well, Elliot
Mendelson’s Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Chapman and Hall/CRC 6th
edn 2015) was first published in 1964 when I was a student and the world was a
great deal younger. The book was I think the first modern textbook of its type
(so immense credit to Mendelson for that), and I no doubt owe my whole career
to it – it got me through tripos!
It seems that some others who learnt using the book are in their turn still
using it to teach from. But let’s not get sentimental! It has to be said that the
book in its first incarnation was often brisk to the point of unfriendliness, and
the basic look-and-feel of the book hasn’t changed a great deal as it has run
through successive editions. Mendelson’s presentation of axiomatic systems of
logic are quite tough going, and as the book progresses in later chapters through

28
formal number theory and set theory, things if anything get somewhat less reader-
friendly. Which certainly doesn’t mean the book won’t repay battling with. But
unsurprisingly, fifty years on, there are many rather more accessible and more
amiable alternatives for beginning serious logic. Mendelson’s book is a landmark
worth visiting one day, but I can’t recommend starting there. For a little more
about it, see here.
(As an aside, if you do want an old-school introduction from roughly the
same era, I’d recommend instead Geoffrey Hunter, Metalogic* (Macmillan 1971,
University of California Press 1992). This is not groundbreaking in the way e.g.
Smullyan’s First-Order Logic is, nor is it as comprehensive as Mendelson: but
it is still an exceptionally good student textbook from a time when there were
few to choose from, and I still regard it with admiration. Read Parts One to
Three at this stage. And if you are enjoying it, then do eventually finish the
book: it goes on to consider formal arithmetic and proves the undecidability of
first-order logic, topics we revisit in §5.2. Unfortunately, the typography – from
pre-LATEX days – isn’t at all pretty to look at: this can make the book’s pages
appear rather unappealing. But in fact the treatment of an axiomatic system of
logic is extremely clear and accessible. It might be worth blowing the dust off
your library’s copy!)
The very latest thing: What about the Open Logic Text? This is a collaborative,
open-source, enterprise, and very much work in progress. You can download the
latest full version from this page.
Although this is referred to as a textbook, it is perhaps better regarded as a
set of souped-up lecture notes, written at various degrees of sophistication and
with various degrees of more book-like elaboration. The chapters on propositional
and quantificational logic have expanded very considerably since the 2017 version
of this Guide. They still, however, strike me as rather idiosyncratic (why start
with the LK system of sequent calculus? doesn’t the exposition of Gentzen-style
natural deduction just go too fast for anyone new to this?).
These notes could be very useful for revision work, – and various selections
in a different order could no doubt could well work if accompanied by a lot of
lecture-room chat around and about, and more blackboard illustrations. But I do
still rather doubt that this Text would work as a purely stand-alone introduction
for initial self-study. Your mileage may vary.
Designed for philosophers: What about Sider? Theodore Sider – a very well-
known philosopher – has written a text called Logic for Philosophy* (OUP, 2010)
aimed at philosophers, which I’ve repeatedly been asked to comment on. The

29
book in fact falls into two halves. The second half (about 130 pages) is on modal
logic, and I will return to that in §6.1. The first half of the book (almost exactly
the same length) is on propositional and first-order logic, together with some
variant logics, so is very much on the topic of this chapter. But while the coverage
of modal logic is quite good, I can’t at all recommend the first half of this book:
I explain why here.
True, a potentially attractive additional feature of this part of Sider’s book is
that it does contain brief discussions about e.g. some non-classical propositional
logics, and about descriptions and free logic. But remember all this is being done
in 130 pages, which means that things are whizzing by very fast, so the breadth
of Sider’s coverage here goes with far too much superficiality. If you want some
breadth, Bostock is still much to be preferred, plus perhaps some reading from
§6.3 below.
For philosophers again: What about Bell, DeVidi and Solomon? As I’ve said
before, if you concentrate at the outset on a one-proof-style book, you would do
well to widen your focus at an early stage to look at other logical options. And
one good thing about Bostock’s book is that it tells you about different styles
of proof-system. A potential alternative to Bostock at about the same level, and
which can initially look promising, is John L. Bell, David DeVidi and Graham
Solomon’s Logical Options: An Introduction to Classical and Alternative Logics
(Broadview Press 2001). This book covers a lot pretty snappily – for the moment,
just Chapters 1 and 2 are relevant – and some years ago I used it as a text for
second-year seminar for undergraduates who had used my own tree-based book
for their first year course. But many students found it quite hard going, as the
exposition is terse, and I found myself having to write very extensive seminar
notes. If you want some breadth, you’d again do better sticking with Bostock.
Puzzles galore: What about some of Smullyan’s other books? Let’s end the chapter
on a more positive note!
I have already warmly recommended Smullyan’s terse 1968 classic First-Order
Logic. He went on to write some classic and very accessible texts on Gödel’s
theorem and on recursive functions, which we’ll be mentioning later. But as well
as these, Smullyan wrote many ‘puzzle’ based-books aimed at a wider audience,
including the justly famous 1981 What is the Name of This Book? * (Dover
Publications reprint, 2011).
More recently, he wrote Logical Labyrinths (A. K. Peters, 2009). From the
blurb: “This book features a unique approach to the teaching of mathematical
logic by putting it in the context of the puzzles and paradoxes of common lan-

30
guage and rational thought. It serves as a bridge from the author’s puzzle books
to his technical writing in the fascinating field of mathematical logic. Using the
logic of lying and truth-telling, the author introduces the readers to informal rea-
soning preparing them for the formal study of symbolic logic, from propositional
logic to first-order logic, . . . The book includes a journey through the amazing
labyrinths of infinity, which have stirred the imagination of mankind as much, if
not more, than any other subject.”
Smullyan starts, then, with puzzles of the kind where you are visiting an island
where there are Knights (truth-tellers) and Knaves (persistent liars) and then in
various scenarios you have to work out what’s true from what the inhabitants say
about each other and the world. And, without too many big leaps, he ends with
first-order logic (using tableaux), completeness, compactness and more. This is
no substitute for standard texts, but – for those with a taste for being led up
to the serious stuff via sequences of puzzles – an entertaining and illuminating
supplement.
Smullyan’s later A Beginner’s Guide to Mathematical Logic* (Dover Publi-
cations, 2014) is more conventional. The first 170 pages are relevant to FOL. A
rather uneven read, it seems to me, but again perhaps an interesting supplement
to the texts recommended above.

31
Chapter 5

Continuing Mathematical
Logic

We next press on from an initial look at first-order logic to consider other core
elements of mathematical logic. Recall from our map of the territory in §2.1 that
we’ll want to look next at:
• Some elements of the model theory for first-order theories.
• Formal arithmetic, theory of computation, Gödel’s incompleteness theo-
rems.
• Elements of set theory.
But also at some point we’ll need to touch briefly on two standard ‘extras’

• Second-order logic and second-order theories.

• Intuitionistic logic.

Now, as I explained in §1.3, I do very warmly recommend reading a series

of books on a topic which overlap in coverage and difficulty, rather than leap-
ing immediately from an ‘entry level’ text to a really advanced one. Of course,
you don’t have to follow this excellent advice! But I mention it again here to
remind you of one reason why the list of recommendations in most sections is
quite extensive and why the increments in coverage/difficulty between successive
recommendations are often quite small. So let me stress that this level of logic
really isn’t as daunting as the overall length of this chapter might superficially
suggest. Promise!

32
5.1 From first-order logic to elementary model
theory
The completeness theorem is the first high point – the first mathematically
serious result – in a course in first-order logic; and some elementary treatments
more or less stop there. Many introductory texts, however, continue just a little
further with some first steps into model theory. It is clear enough what needs
to come next: discussions of the so-called compactness theorem (also called the
‘finiteness theorem’), of the downward and upward Löwenheim-Skolem theo-
rems, and of their implications. There’s less consensus, however, about what
other introductory model-theoretic topics you should tackle at an early stage.
As you will see when you dive into the reading, you will very quickly meet
claims that involve infinite cardinalities, and there also occasional references to
the axiom of choice. Now in fact, even if you haven’t yet done an official set theory
course, you may well have picked up all you need to know at least in order to
begin model theory. If you have met Cantor’s proof that infinite collections come
in different sizes, and if you have been warned to take note when a proof involves
making an infinite series of choices, you will probably know enough. And anyway,
Goldrei’s chapter recommended in a moment in fact has a brisk section on the
‘Set theory background’ needed at this stage. (If that’s too brisk, then perhaps
do a skim read of e.g. Paul Halmos’s very short Naive Set Theory*, or one of the
other books mentioned at the beginning of §5.3 below.)
What to read on model theory, then? The very first volume in the prestigious
and immensely useful Oxford Logic Guides series is Jane Bridge’s very compact
Beginning Model Theory: The Completeness Theorem and Some Consequences
(Clarendon Press, 1977) which neatly takes the story onwards just a few steps
from the reading on FOL mentioned in our §4.2 above. The coverage strikes me
as exemplary for a short first introduction for logicians. But the writing, though
very clear, is rather terse in an old-school way; and the book looks like photo-
reproduced typescript, and which makes it rather unpleasant to read. What,
then, are the alternatives?
Two of the introductions to FOL that I mentioned in $4.3 have treatments of
some elementary model theory. Thus there are fragments of model theory in §2.6
of Herbert Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (Academic Press
1972, 2002), followed by a discussion in §2.8 of non-standard analysis: but this, for
our purposes here, is perhaps too little done too fast. Dirk van Dalen’s Logic and
Structure* (Springer, 1980; 5th edition 2012) covers rather more model-theoretic
material in more detail in his Ch. 3. You could read the first section for revision

33
on the completeness theorem, then tackle §3.2 on compactness, the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorems and their implications, before moving on to the action-packed
§3.3 which covers more model theory including non-standard analysis again, and
indeed touches on slightly more advanced topics like ‘quantifier elimination’.
However, my top votes for help with the first steps in elementary model theory
go elsewhere:

1. I have already sung the praises of Derek Goldrei’s Propositional and

Predicate Calculus: A Model of Argument* (Springer, 2005) for the ac-
cessibility of its treatment of FOL in the first five chapters. You can now
read his §§4.4 and 4.5 (which I previously said you could skip) and then
Ch. 6 on ‘Some uses of compactness’ to get a very clear introduction to
some model theoretic ideas.
In a little more detail, §4.4 introduces some axiom systems describing
various mathematical structures (partial orderings, groups, rings, etc.):
this section could be particularly useful to philosophers who haven’t re-
ally met the notions before. Then §4.5 introduces the notions of substruc-
tures and structure-preserving mappings. After proving the compactness
theorem in §6.1 (as a corollary of his completeness proof), Goldrei pro-
ceeds to use it in §§6.2 and 6.3 to show various theories can’t be finitely
axiomatized, or can’t be nicely axiomatized at all. §6.4 introduces the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems and some consequences, and the following
section introduces the notion of diagrams and puts it to work. The final
section, §6.6 considers issues about categoricity, completeness and decid-
ability. All this is done with the same admirable clarity as marked out
Goldrei’s earlier chapters.

If you then want to go just a bit further, what you probably need next is
the rather more expansive
2. Marı́a Manzano, Model Theory, Oxford Logic Guides 37 (OUP, 1999).
This book aims to be an introduction at the kind of intermediate level
we are currently concerned with. And standing back from the details,
I do very much like the way that Manzano structures her book. The
sequencing of chapters makes for a very natural path through her mate-
rial, and the coverage seems very appropriate for a book at her intended
level. After chapters about structures (and mappings between them) and
about first-order languages, she proves the completeness theorem again,

34
 and then has a sequence of chapters on core model-theoretic notions and
proofs. This is all done tolerably accessibly (just half a step up from
Goldrei, perhaps).
True, the discussions at some points would have benefitted from rather
more informal commentary, motivating various choices. And there are
some infelicities. But overall, Manzano’s text should work well and there
is no evident competitor book at this level. See this Book Note on Man-
zano for more details.

And now the path forks. Philosophers will now certainly want to tackle the
following recently published book, which strikes me as a particularly impressive
achievement:

3. Tim Button and Sean Walsh, Philosophy and Model Theory* (OUP,
2018). This both explains technical results in model theory, and also
explores the appeals to model theory in various branches of philoso-
phy, particularly philosophy of mathematics, but in metaphysics more
generally (recall ‘Putnam’s model-theoretic argument’), the philoso-
phy of science, philosophical logic and more. So that’s a very scattered
literature that is being expounded, brought together, examined, inter-
related, criticised and discussed. Button and Walsh don’t pretend to
be giving the last word on the many and varied topics they discuss; but
they are offering us a very generous helping of first words and second
thoughts. It’s a large book because it is to a significant extent self-
contained: model-theoretic notions get defined as needed, and many
of the most philosophically significant results are proved.
The expositions of the technical stuff are usually exemplary (the au-
thors have a good policy of shuffling some extended proofs into chapter
appendices), and the philosophical discussion is done with vigour and
a very engaging style. The breadth and depth of knowledge brought
to the enterprise is remarkable. Philosophical readers of this Guide
should find the book fascinating, then. And indeed, with judicious
skimming/skipping (the signposting in the book is excellent), mathe-
maticians with an interest in some foundational questions should find
much of interest here too.

And that might already be about as far as many philosophers may want or need
to go with model theory. Many mathematicians, however, will want to take the
story about model theory rather further: so the story resumes in §7.2.

35
Postscript, mostly for mathematicians The blurb of Jonathan Kirby’s recent
An Invitation to Model Theory (CUP, 2019) describes the book’s aim like this:
“[T]raditional introductions to model theory assume a graduate-level background
of the reader. In this innovative textbook, [the author] brings model theory to
an undergraduate audience. The highlights of basic model theory are illustrated
through examples from specific structures familiar from undergraduate mathe-
matics . . . .” Now, one thing that usually isn’t familiar to undergraduate math-
ematicians is any serious logic: so, as you would expect, Kirby’s book is an
introduction to model theory that doesn’t presuppose a first logic course. So he
has to start with some rather speedy explanations about first-order languages
and interpretations in structures (probably too speedy for a real newcomer).
The book is very clearly arranged – the early chapters would make very useful
revision material. But though clearly written it all goes pretty briskly, with the
first hundred pages covering much of what Manzano covers in her whole book.
So I do think that some beginning readers would struggle with parts of this short
book as a first introduction. If Kirby had slowed down a bit, giving further moti-
vating classroom asides, adding a few extra illustrative examples of key concepts,
etc., I think this could have made for a significantly more attractive text. As it
stands, however, this Invitation doesn’t supplant the previous recommendations.
(For a little more about it, see the book note here.)
Thanks to the efforts of the respective authors to write very accessibly, the
suggested path through Chiswell & Hodges Ñ (part of) Leary & Kristiansen Ñ
(excerpts from) Goldrei Ñ Manzano is not at all a hard road to follow, yet we
end up at least in the foothills of model theory. We can climb up to the same
foothills by routes involving rather tougher scrambles, taking in some additional
side-paths and new views along the way. Here are two suggestions for the more
mathematical reader:
4. Shawn Hedman’s A First Course in Logic (OUP, 2004) covers a surpris-
ing amount of model theory. Ch. 2 tells you about structures and re-
lations between structures. Ch. 4 starts with a nice presentation of a
Henkin completeness proof, and then pauses (as Goldrei does) to fill in
some background about infinite cardinals etc., before going on to prove the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems and compactness theorems. Then the rest of
Ch. 4 and the next chapter covers more introductory model theory, already
touching on some topics beyond the scope of Manzano’s book, and Hedman
so far could serve as a rather tougher alternative to her treatment. (Then
Ch. 6 takes the story on a lot further, quite a way beyond what I’d regard
as ‘entry level’ model theory.) For more, see this Book Note on Hedman.

36
 5. Peter Hinman’s weighty Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic (A. K. Peters,
2005) is not for the faint-hearted, and I wouldn’t at all recommend using
this book as your guide in your first outing into this territory. But if you
are mathematically minded and have already made a first foray along a
gentler route, you could now try reading Ch. 1 – skipping material that is
now familiar – and then carefully working through Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 (leaving
the last two sections, along with a further chapter on model theory, for
later). This should significantly deepen your knowledge of FOL, or at least
of its semantic features, and of the beginnings of model theory. For more,
see this Book Note on Hinman.

5.2 Computability and Gödelian incompleteness

The standard mathematical logic curriculum, as well as looking at some elemen-
tary general results about formalized theories and their models, looks at two
particular instances of non-trivial, rigorously formalized, axiomatic systems –
arithmetic (a paradigm theory about finite whatnots) and set theory (a paradigm
theory about infinite whatnots). We’ll take arithmetic first.
In more detail, there are three inter-related topics here: (a) the elementary (in-
formal) theory of arithmetic computations and of computability more generally,
(b) an introduction to formal theories of arithmetic, leading up to (c) Gödel’s
epoch-making proof of the incompleteness of any sufficiently nice formal theory
that can ‘do’ enough arithmetical computations (a result of profound interest to
philosophers).
Now, Gödel’s 1931 proof of his incompleteness theorem uses facts in partic-
ular about so-called primitive recursive functions: these functions are a subclass
(but only a subclass) of the computable numerical functions, i.e. only a subclass
of the functions which a suitably programmed computer could evaluate (ab-
stracting from practical considerations of time and available memory). A more
general treatment of the effectively computable functions (arguably capturing all
of them) was developed a few years later, and this in turn throws more light on
the incompleteness phenomenon.
So there’s a choice to be made. Do you look at things in roughly the historical
order, first introducing just the primitive recursive functions and theories of for-
mal arithmetic and learning how to prove initial versions of Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorem before moving on to look at the general treatment of computable
functions? Or do you do some of the general theory of computation first, turning
to the incompleteness theorems later?

37
 Here then to begin with are a couple of introductory books, one taking the
first route, one the other route:
1. Peter Smith, An Introduction to Gödel’s Theorems* (CUP 2007, 2nd
edition 2013) takes things in something like the historical order. (Note
to mathematicians: don’t be put off by the series title ‘Cambridge Intro-
ductions to Philosophy’ – putting it in that series was the price I happily
paid for cheap paperback publication! This is still quite a meaty logic
book, with a lot of theorems and a lot of proofs, but I hope rendered
very accessibly.)
The book starts by exploring various ideas such as effective com-
putability informally, and proving two correspondingly informal versions
of the incompleteness theorem. The next part of the book gets down to
work talking about formal arithmetics, primitive recursive functions, and
establishes more formal versions of Gödel’s theorems. The third part of
the book widens the discussion by exploring the idea of a computable
function more generally.
The book’s website is at http://godelbook.net, where there are supple-
mentary materials of various kinds, including a freely available cut-down
version of a large part of the book, Gödel Without (Too Many) Tears.
2. Richard Epstein and Walter Carnielli, Computability: Computable Func-
tions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics (Wadsworth 2nd edn.
2000: Advanced Reasoning Forum 3rd edn. 2008) does computability
theory first. This is a very nicely introductory book on the standard ba-
sics, particularly clearly and attractively done, with lots of interesting
and illuminating historical information too in Epstein’s 28 page timeline
on ‘Computability and Undecidability’ at the end of the book.

Those first two books should be very accessible to those without much mathemat-
ical background: but even more experienced mathematicians should appreciate
the careful introductory orientation which they provide. And as you’ll immedi-
ately see, this really is a delightful topic area. Elementary computability theory
is conceptually very neat and natural, and the early Big Results are proved in
quite remarkably straightforward ways. Just get the hang of the basic ‘diagonal-
ization’ construction, the idea of Gödel-style coding and one or two other tricks,
and off you go . . . .
To consolidate your understanding at this level, you might usefully look at
3. Herbert Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (Academic Press

38
 1972, 2002), Ch. 3. This is a very good short treatment of different strengths
of formal theories of arithmetic, and then proves the incompleteness the-
orem first for a formal arithmetic with exponentiation and then – after
touching on other issues – shows how to use the β-function trick to extend
the theorem to apply to arithmetic without exponentiation.
Then, going up just one step in mathematical sophistication we arrive at a beau-
tiful book:

4. George Boolos and Richard Jeffrey, Computability and Logic (CUP 3rd
edn. 1990). This is a modern classic, wonderfully lucid and engaging.
There are in fact later editions – heavily revised and considerably
expanded – with John Burgess as a third author. But I know that I am
not the only reader to think that the later versions (excellent though
they are) do lose something of the original book’s famed elegance and
individuality. Still, whichever edition comes to hand, do read it! – you
will learn a great deal in an enjoyable way.

And finally in this section, two more presentations of computability and the
incompleteness phemomenon, again particularly clear and helpful:

5. Herbert E. Enderton’s short book Computability Theory: An Introduction

to Recusion Theory (Associated Press, 2011) is written with attractive zip
and lightness of touch (this is a more relaxed book than his Logic); it
makes a nice alternative to Epstein and Carnielli, though perhaps just a
step or two more challenging/sophisticated/abstract. The first chapter is on
the informal Computability Concept. There are then chapters on general
recursive functions and on register machines (showing that the register-
computable functions are exactly the recursive ones), and a chapter on
recursive enumerability. Chapter 5 makes ‘Connections to Logic’ (includ-
ing proving Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of arithmetical truth
and a semantic incompleteness theorem). The final two chapters push on
to say something about ‘Degrees of Unsolvability’ and ‘Polynomial-time
Computability’. This is all very nicely and accessibly done, and in under
150 pages too.
6. I have already warmly recommended Christopher Leary and Lars Kris-
tiansen’s A Friendly Introduction to Mathematical Logic** for its coverage
of first-order logic. Chs. 4 to 7 now give a very illuminating double treat-
ment of matters related to incompleteness (you don’t have to have read the

39
 previous chapters, other than noting the arithmetical system N introduced
in their §2.8). In headline terms that you’ll only come fully to understand
in retrospect:
(a) L&K’s first approach doesn’t go overtly via computability. Instead of
showing that certain syntactic properties are primitive recursive and
showing that all primitive recursive properties can be ‘represented’ in
theories like N (as I do in IGT ), L&K rely on more directly showing
that some key syntactic properties can be represented. This represen-
tation result then leads to, inter alia, the incompleteness theorem.
(b) L&K follow this, however, with a general discussion of computability,
and then use the introductory results they obtain to prove various
further theorems, including incompleteness again.
This is all presented with the same admirable clarity as the first part of
the book on FOL.

Postscript There are many other introductory treatments covering aspects of

computability and/or incompleteness. Indeed there is no sharp boundary to be
drawn between the entry-level accounts mentioned in this section and some of
the more sophisticated books on computability and Gödelian incompleteness
discussed in Ch. 7. So we can mostly leave discussion of further options until
then.
Except that I will mention that there are a couple of relevant texts in the
American Mathematical Society’s ‘Student Mathematical Library’. One is Re-
becca Weber’s Computability Theory (AMA, 2012); but that strikes me as rather
too uneven. For present purposes I much prefer
7. A. Shen and N. K. Vereshchagin, Computable Functions, (AMA, 2003).
This is a lovely, elegant, little book, whose opening chapters can be recom-
mended for giving a differently-structured quick tour through some of the
Big Ideas, and hinting at ideas to come.
I should also mention
8. Craig Smoryński, Logical Number Theory I, An Introduction (Springer,
1991). There are three long chapters. Ch. I discusses pairing functions
and numerical codings, primitive recursion, the Ackermann function, com-
putability, and more. Ch. II concentrates on ‘Hilbert’s tenth problem’ –
showing that we can’t mechanically decide the solubility of certain equa-
tions. Ch. III considers Hilbert’s Programme and contains proofs of more

40
 decidability and undecidability results, leading up to a version of Gödel’s
First Incompleteness Theorem. (The promised Vol. II which would have
discussed the Second Incompleteness Theorem has never appeared.)
The level of difficult is rather varied, and there are a lot of historical
disgressions and illuminating asides. So this decidedly idiosyncratic book
is a bumpy ride, but is an enjoyable and very instructive read.
And finally, if only because I’ve been asked about it a good number of times, I
suppose I should also say something about the (in)famous

9. Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach (Penguin, first published 1979).

When students enquire about this, I helpfully say that it is the sort of
book that you might well like if you like that kind of book, and you won’t
if you don’t. It is, to say the least, quirky and distinctive. As I far as I
recall, though, the parts of the book which touch on techie logical things
are pretty reliable and won’t lead you astray. Which is a great deal more
than can be said about many popularizing treatments of Gödel’s theorems.

5.3 Beginning set theory

Let’s say that the elements of set theory – the beginnings that any logician really
ought to know about – will comprise enough to explain how numbers (natural,
rational, real) are constructed in set theory (so enough to give us a glimmer of
understanding about why it is said that set theory provides a foundation for
mathematics). The elements also include the development of ordinal numbers
and transfinite induction over ordinals, ordinal arithmetic, and something about
the role of the axiom(s) of choice and its role in the arithmetic of cardinals. These
initial ideas and constructions can (and perhaps should) be presented fairly infor-
mally: but something else that also belongs here at the beginning is an account
of the development of ZFC as the now standard way of formally encapsulating
and regimenting the key principles involved in the informal development of set
theory.
Going beyond these elements we then have e.g. the exploration of ‘large car-
dinals’, proofs of the consistency and independence of e.g. the Continuum Hy-
pothesis, and a lot more besides. But readings on these further delights are for
Ch. 8: this present section is, as advertised, about the first steps for beginners in
set theory. Even here, however, there are is a large number of books to choose
from, so an annotated Guide should (I hope!) again be particularly welcome.

41
 I’ll start by mentioning again a famous ‘bare minimum’ book (only 104 pp.
long), which could well be very useful for someone making a start on exploring
basic set-theoretic notation and some fundamental concepts.

1. Paul Halmos, Naive Set Theory* (Originally published 1960, and now avail-
able very inexpensively from Martino Fine Books). Informally written in
an unusually conversational style for a maths book – though that won’t be
a recommendation for everyone! And mostly exceptionally clear, though
sometimes (e.g. on Zorn’s Lemma) there are perhaps lapses.

However, Halmos doesn’t cover even all of what I just called the elements of set
theory, and most readers will want to look at one or more of the following equally
admirable ‘entry level’ treatments which cover a little more in a bit more depth
but still very accessibly:

2. Herbert B. Enderton’s, The Elements of Set Theory (Academic Press,

1977) forms a trilogy along with the author’s Logic and Computability
which we have already mentioned. The book has exactly the coverage we
need at this stage. But more than that, it is particularly clear in marking
off the informal development of the theory of sets, cardinals, ordinals
etc. (guided by the conception of sets as constructed in a cumulative
hierarchy) from the ensuing formal axiomatization of ZFC. It is also
particularly good and non-confusing about what is involved in (apparent)
talk of classes which are too big to be sets – something that can mystify
beginners. It is written with a certain lightness of touch and proofs are
often presented in particularly well-signposted stages. The last couple
of chapters or so perhaps do get a bit tougher, but overall this really is
quite exemplary exposition.
3. Derek Goldrei, Classic Set Theory (Chapman & Hall/CRC 1996) has
the subtitle ‘For guided independent study’. It is as you might expect –
especially if you looked at Goldrei’s FOL text mentioned in §4.2 – ex-
tremely clear, and is indeed very well-structured for independent reading.
And moreover, it is fairly attractively written (as set theory books go!).
The coverage is very similar to Enderton’s, and either book makes a fine
introduction (for what little it is worth, I slightly prefer Enderton).

Also starting from scratch, and initially only half a notch or so up in sophistica-
tion from Enderton and Goldrei, we find two more really nice books:

42
 4. Karel Hrbacek and Thomas Jech, Introduction to Set Theory (Marcel
Dekker, 3rd edition 1999). This eventually goes a bit further than En-
derton or Goldrei (more so in the 3rd edition than earlier ones), and
you could – on a first reading – skip some of the later material. Though
do look at the final chapter which gives a remarkably accessible glimpse
ahead towards large cardinal axioms and independence proofs. Again
this is a very nicely put together book, and recommended if you want to
consolidate your understanding by reading a second presentation of the
basics and want then to push on just a bit. (Jech is of course a major
author on set theory, and Hrbacek once won a AMA prize for maths
writing.)
5. Yiannis Moschovakis, Notes on Set Theory (Springer, 2nd edition 2006).
A slightly more individual path through the material than the books
previously mentioned, again with glimpses ahead and again, to my mind,
attractively written.

Of these last four books, I’d strongly advise reading one of the first pair and
then one of the second pair.
I will add two more firm recommendations at this level. The first might come
as a bit of surprise, as it is something of a ‘blast from the past’. But we shouldn’t
ignore old classics – they can have a lot to teach us even if we have read the
more recent books.
6. Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Azriel Levy, Foundations of
Set-Theory (North-Holland, originally 1958; but you want the revised 2nd
edition 1973). Both philosophers and mathematicians should appreciate the
way this puts the development of our canonical ZFC set theory into some
context, and also discusses alternative approaches. Standard textbooks can
present our canonical theory in a way that makes it seem that ZFC has to
be the One True Set Theory, so it is worth understanding from the outset
more of how it is arrived and where some choice points are. This book
really is attractively readable, and should be very largely accessible at this
early stage. I’m not myself an enthusiast for history for history’s sake: but
it is very much worth knowing the stories that unfold here.
One thing that every set-theory novice now acquires is the picture of the universe
of sets as built up in a hierarchy of stages or levels, each level containing all the
sets at previous levels plus new ones (so the levels are cumulative). It is significant
that, as the last book makes clear, the picture wasn’t firmly in place from the

43
beginning. But the hierarchical conception of the universe of sets is brought to
the foreground in

7. Michael Potter, Set Theory and Its Philosophy (OUP, 2004). For philoso-
phers (and for mathematicians concerned with foundational issues) this
surely is a ‘must read’, a unique blend of mathematical exposition (mostly
about the level of Enderton, with a few glimpses beyond) and extensive
conceptual commentary. Potter is presenting not straight ZFC but a very
attractive variant due to Dana Scott whose axioms more directly encapsu-
late the idea of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. However, it has to be said
that there are passages which are harder going, sometimes because of the
philosophical ideas involved, and just sometimes because of unnecessary
expositional compression (e.g. at p. 41 where a trick is used to define the
notion of a level). However, if you have already read a set theory from the
beginning of the list, you should have no problems.

Mathematicians who get intrigued by set theory done for its own sake will
want to continue the story in Ch. 8. But it is a nice question how much more
technical knowledge of results in set theory a philosophy student interested in
logic and the philosophy of maths needs (if they are not specializing in the
technical philosophy of set theory). But getting this far will certainly be a useful
start for both mathematicians and philosophers, so let’s pause here.
Postscript: some more options at this level There are so many good set theory
books with different virtues, many by very distinguished authors, that I should
certainly pause to mention some more.
Here then are five (!) other general introductory books, listed in order of pub-
lication; each have many things to recommend them for beginners. Two are freely
available online, and good libraries should have the others: so browse through
and see which might suit your interests and mathematical level.
8. D. van Dalen, H.C. Doets and H. de Swart, Sets: Naive, Axiomatic and
Applied (Pergamon, 1978). The first chapter covers the sort of elementary
(semi)-naive set theory that any mathematician needs to know, up to an
account of cardinal numbers, and then takes a first look at the paradox-
avoiding ZF axiomatization. This is very attractively and illuminatingly
done (or at least, the conceptual presentation is attractive – sadly, and a
sign of its time of publication, the book seems to have been photo-typeset
from original pages produced on electric typewriter, and the result is visu-
ally not attractive at all).

44
 The second chapter carries on the presentation axiomatic set theory, with
a lot about ordinals, and getting as far as talking about higher infinities,
measurable cardinals and the like. The final chapter considers some appli-
cations of various set theoretic notions and principles. Well worth seeking
out, if you don’t find the typography off-putting.
9. Keith Devlin, The Joy of Sets (Springer, 1979: 2nd edn. 1993). The opening
chapters of this book are remarkably lucid and attractively written. The
opening chapter explores ‘naive’ ideas about sets and some set-theoretic
constructions, and the next chapter introduces axioms for ZFC pretty
gently (indeed, non-mathematicians could particularly like Chs 1 and 2,
omitting §2.6). Things then speed up a bit, and by the end of Ch. 3 –
some 100 pages into the book – we are pretty much up to the coverage of
Goldrei’s much longer first six chapters, though Goldrei says more about
(re)constructing classical maths in set theory. Some will prefer Devlin’s
fast-track version. (The rest of the book then covers non-introductory top-
ics in set theory, of the kind we take up again in Ch. 8.)
10. Judith Roitman, Introduction to Modern Set Theory** (Wiley, 1990: a 2011
version is freely downloadable. This relatively short, and very engagingly
written, book manages to cover quite a bit of ground – we’ve reached the
constructible universe by p. 90 of the downloadable pdf version, and there’s
even room for a concluding chapter on ‘Semi-advanced set theory’ which
says something about large cardinals and infinite combinatorics. A few
quibbles aside, this could make excellent revision material as Roitman is
particularly good at highlighting key ideas without getting bogged down
in too many details.

11. Winfried Just and Martin Weese, Discovering Modern Set Theory I: The
Basics (American Mathematical Society, 1996). This covers overlapping
ground to Enderton, but perhaps more zestfully and with a little more
discussion of conceptually interesting issues. It is at some places more
challenging – the pace can be uneven. But this is evidently written by
enthusiastic teachers, and the book is very engaging. (The story continues
in a second volume.)
I like the style a lot, and think it works very well. I don’t mean the
occasional (slightly laboured?) jokes: I mean the in-the-classroom feel of
the way that proofs are explored and motivated, and also the way that
teach-yourself exercises are integrated into the text. For instance there are

45
 exercises that encourage you to produce proofs that are in fact not-fully-
justified, and then the discussion explores what goes wrong and how to
plug the gaps.
12. Cambridge lecture notes by Tim Button have become incorporated into
Set Theory: An Open Introduction (The Open Logic project, 2019). As a
book, this is rather somewhat patchy in level. But it starts at a similar
pace to e.g. Enderton’s book, and the earlier chapters here are particularly
good on the conceptual motivation for the iterative conception of sets and
its relation to the standard ZFC axiomatization. The later chapters on
ordinals, cardinals, and choice, get tougher, and will work better (I think)
as supplementary reading at this level rather than a first introduction to
the material.
Those five books all aim to cover the basics in some detail. The next two books
are much shorter, and are differently focused.
13. A. Shen and N. K. Vereshchagin, Basic Set Theory (American Mathemat-
ical Society, 2002). This is very short, just over 100 pages, and mostly
about ordinals. But it is very readable, with 151 ‘Problems’ as you go
along to test your understanding. Potentially very helpful by way of revi-
sion/consolidation.
14. Ernest Schimmerling, A Course on Set Theory (CUP, 2011) is perhaps
slightly mistitled, if ‘course’ suggests a comprehensive treatment. This is
just 160 pages long, starting off with a brisk introduction to ZFC, ordi-
nals, and cardinals. But then the author explores applications if set theory
to other areas of mathematics such as topology, analysis, and combina-
torics, in a way that will be particularly interesting to mathematicians. An
engaging supplementary read at this level.
Applications of set theory to mathematics are also highlighted in a book in
the LMS Student Text series, Krzysztof Ciesielski’s Set Theory for the Working
Mathematician (CUP, 1997). This eventually touches on advanced topics in the
set theory. But the earlier chapters introduce some basic set theory, which is
then put to work in e.g. constructing some strange real functions. So this might
well appeal to mathematicians who know some analysis, who could read Chs 6
to 8 on the basis of other introductions.
And yet more introductions? What else is there? There is a classic book by Azriel
Levy with the inviting title Basic Set Theory (Springer 1979, republished by

46
Dover 2002). However, while this is ‘basic’ in the sense of not dealing with topics
like forcing, this is an advanced-level treatment of the set-theoretic fundamentals.
So let’s return to it in Chapter 8.
András Hajnal and Peter Hamburger have a book Set Theory (CUP, 1999)
which is also in the LMS Student Text series. Like Enderton, they bring out how
much of the basic theory of cardinals, ordinals, and transfinite recursion can be
developed in a semi-informal way, before introducing a full-fledged axiomatised
set theory. But I think Enderton or van Dalen et al. do this better. (The second
part of this book is on more advanced topics in combinatorial set theory).
George Tourlakis’s Lectures in Logic and Set Theory, Volume 2: Set Theory
(CUP, 2003) has been recommended to me a number of times. Although this
is the second of two volumes, it is a stand-alone text. Indeed Tourlakis goes as
far as giving a 100 page outline of the logic covered in the first volume as the
long opening chapter in this volume. Assuming you have already studied FOL,
you can initially skip this chapter, consulting if/when needed. That still leaves
over 400 pages on basic set theory, with long chapters on the usual axioms, on
the Axiom of Choice, on the natural numbers, on order and ordinals, and on
cardinality. (The final chapter on forcing should be omitted at this stage, and
strikes me as less clear than what precedes it.)
As the title suggests, Tourlakis aims to retain something of the relaxed style
of the lecture room, complete with occasional asides and digressions. And as the
pae length suggests, the pace is quite gentle and expansive, with room to pause
over questions of conceptual motivation etc. However, there is a certain quite
excessive and unnecessary formalism that many will find off-putting, and which
slows things down. Simple constructions and results therefore take a very long
time to arrive. We don’t meet the von Neumann ordinals for three hundred pages,
and we don’t get to Cantor’s theorem on the uncountability of Ppωq until p. 455!
So while this book might be worth dipping into for some of the motivational
explanations, I can’t myself recommend it overall.
Finally, there is another more recent text from the same publisher, Daniel
W. Cunningham’s Set Theory: A First Course (CUP, 2016). But this doesn’t
strike me as a particularly friendly introduction. As the book progresses, it turns
into pages of old-school Definition/Lemma/Theorem/Proof with rather too little
commentary; key ideas seem often to be introduced in a phrase, without much
discursive explanation. Readers who care about the logical niceties will also raise
their eyebrows at the author’s over-causal way with use and mention (see these
remarks, or e.g. the too-typically hopeless passage about replacing variables with
values on p. 14). And this isn’t just being pernickety: what exactly are we to

47
make of the claim on p. 31 that a class is “any collection of the form tx : ϕpxqu”?
Not recommended.

5.4 Extras: two variant logics

At some fairly early point in your logical education, you ought to get to know
something about the motivation for one familiar extension of FOL, namely
second-order logic, where we now also allow generalizations which quantify into
predicate position. You also should get to know something about the motivation
for rejecting the classical understanding of negation built into standard FOL,
and then adopting a rival, so-called intuitionist, logic.

5.4.1 Second-order logic

Consider the intuitive principle of arithmetical induction. Take any property X;
if 0 has it, and for any n it is passed down from n to n ` 1, then all numbers
must have X. It is very natural to regiment this as follows:

@XrpX0 ^ @npXn Ñ Xpn ` 1qs Ñ @n Xns

where the so-called second-order quantifier @X quantifies ‘into predicate position’

and supposedly runs over all properties of numbers. But this formalization is
illegitimate in standard first-order logic, where the first-order quantifiers can
only run over objects in the relevant domain.
Important historical aside Note that the earliest presentations of quantifica-
tional logic, in Frege and in Principia Mathematica, were of logics that did allow
this kind of higher-order quantification. The now standard concentration on first-
order logic was a later development, and its historical development is a rather
tangled story.
It is, indeed, well worth exploring this history at some point. For two won-
derfully helpful guides, see first José Ferreiros, ‘The road to modern logic – an
interpretation’. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (2001): 441–484. And then for the
broader setting see also Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach and Calixto Badesa, ‘The
Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935’ in Leila
Haaparanta, ed., The History of Modern Logic (OUP, 2009, pp. 318–471).
To resume How should we handle apparent second-order quantifiers? One op-
tion is to keep your logic first-order but go set-theoretic and write the induction

48
principle instead as

@Xrp0 P X ^ @npn P X Ñ pn ` 1q P Xs Ñ @n n P Xs

where the variable ‘X’ is now a sorted first-order variable running over sets.
But arguably this changes the subject (our ordinary principle of arithmetical
induction doesn’t seem to be about sets), and there are other issues too. So
why not take things at face value and allow that the ‘natural’ logic of informal
mathematical discourse often deploys second-order quantifiers that range over
properties (expressed by predicates) as well as first-order quantifiers that range
over objects (denoted by names), i.e. why not allow quantification into predicate
position as well as into name position?

For a brief but very informative overview of second-order logic, see

1. Herbert Enderton, ‘Second-order and Higher-order Logic’, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (NB, this is the archived original SEP article
from 2007/2009, which has been replaced by a much longer and much
less ‘entry-level’ piece.)
You could then try one or both of
2. Herbert Enderton A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (Academic Press
1972, 2002), Ch. 4.
3. Dirk van Dalen, Logic and Structure*, (Springer, 1980; 5th edition 2012).
Ch. 4,

Any logician ought to know at least what these recommendations together

explain – i.e. the contrast between ‘full’ vs ‘Henkin’ semantics, why the com-
pactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems fail for second-order logic with full
semantics, and some important consequences of this.
And having got this far, philosophers in particular should want to dive into
the self-recommending

4. Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-

Order Logic, Oxford Logic Guides 17 (Clarendon Press, 1991), Chs. 3–5.

Indeed it would be a pity, while you have Shapiro’s wonderfully illuminating

book in your hands, to skip the initial philosophical/methodological discussion
in the first two chapters here. This whole book is a modern classic, remarkably
accessible, and important too for the contrasting side-light it throws on FOL.

49
 If, after tackling Shapiro, you want an up-to-the-minute sophisticated review
of second order logic with many further pointers to an extensive literature then
you can return to the Stanford Encyclopedia to look at the 2019 article on second-
order and higher-order logic by Jouko Väänänen.

5.4.2 Intuitionist logic

(a) Ask yourself: Why should we endorse the principle that ϕ _ ϕ is always
true no matter the domain? Even prescinding from issues of vagueness, does the
world have to cooperate to determine any given proposition to be true or false?
Could there perhaps be domains – mathematics, for example – where truth is in
some good sense a matter of provability-in-principle, and falsehood a matter of
refutability-in-principle? And if so, would every proposition from such a domain
be either true or false, i.e. provable-in-principle or refutable-in-principle? Why
so?
Perhaps then we shouldn’t suppose that the principle that ϕ _ ϕ always
holds true no matter the domain, as a matter of logic. Maybe the law of excluded
middle, even when it does hold for some domain, doesn’t hold as a matter of pure
logic but e.g. as a matter of metaphysics or of the specific nature of truth for
that domain.
Thoughts like this give rise to one kind of challenge to classical two-valued
logic, which of course does assume excluded middle across the board. For more
first words on this ‘intuitionist’ challenge, see e.g. the brief remarks in Theodore
Sider’s Logic for Philosophy (OUP, 2010), §3.5, or in John L. Bell, David De-
Vidi and Graham Solomon’s Logical Options: An Introduction to Classical and
Alternative Logics (Broadview Press 2001), pp. 192–196.
Then here is an introductory treatment which gives both motivation and a
first account of intuitionist logic in a natural deduction framework.
1. Richard Zach et al., Open Logic Text, §§49.1–49.4.
Now, in this natural deduction framework, the syntactic shape of intuitionist
logic is straightforward. Assuming uncontroversial background, it is easily seen
that having all instances of ϕ _ ϕ as a theorem is equivalent to allowing all
instances of the inference rule from ϕ, infer ϕ. So, putting it crudely, we just
have to drop the usual double negation rule from the rules of your favourite proof
system so as to block the derivation of excluded middle.
Things get more complicated when we turn to look at a revised semantics
apt for a non-classical understanding of the logical operators. The now-standard

50
version due to Kripke is a brand of ‘possible-world semantics’ of a kind that is also
used in modal logic. Philosophers might prefer, therefore, to cover intuitionism
after first looking at modal logic more generally. Still, you should have no great
difficulty diving straight into

2. Dirk van Dalen, Logic and Structure*, (Springer, 1980; 5th edition 2012),
§§5.1–5.3.

This might usefully be read in tandem with the first 29 pages of

3. Nick Bezhanishvili and Dick de Jongh, Intuitionistic Logic.

If, however, you want to approach intuitionistic logic after looking at some modal
logic, then you could read the appropriate chapters of the terrific
4. Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (CUP, much ex-
panded 2nd edition 2008). Chs. 6 and 20 on intuitionistic logic respectively
flow on naturally from Priest’s treatment in that book of modal logics, first
propositional and then predicate.
Oddly, Priest’s tableaux-based book seems to be one of the few introductory
texts covering modal logic which take the natural sideways step of discussing
intuitionistic logic too.
(b) One theme not highlighted in these initial readings is that intuitionistic
logic, from a more proof-theoretic point of view, seemingly has a certain natu-
ralness compared with classical logic. Suppose we think of the natural deduction
introduction rule for a logical operator as fixing the meaning of the operator
(rather than a prior semantics fixing what is the appropriate rule). Then the
corresponding elimination rule surely ought to be in harmony with the intro-
duction rule, in the sense of just ‘undoing’ its effect, i.e. giving us back from
a wff ϕ with O as its main operator no more than what an application of the
O-introduction rule to justify ϕ would have to be based on. For this idea of
harmony see e.g. Neil Tennant’s Natural Logic, §4.12. From this perspective the
characteristically classical double negation rule is seemingly an outlier, not ‘har-
monious’. There’s now a significant literature on this idea: but for some initial
discussion, and pointers to other discussions, you could still usefully start with
Peter Milne, ‘Classical harmony: rules of inference and the meaning of the logical
constants’, Synthese vol. 100 (1994), pp. 49–94.
For an introduction to intuitionistic logic in a related spirit, see

51
 5. Stephen Pollard, A Mathematical Prelude to the Philosophy of Mathematics
(Springer, 2014), Ch. 7, ‘Intuitionist Logic’.

(c) If you want to pursue things further, both of the following range widely and
have a large number of further references:
6. Joan Moschovakis, ‘Intuitionistic Logic’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy,
7. Dirk van Dalen, ‘Intuitionistic Logic’, in the Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, Vol. 5, ed. by D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, (Kluwer 2nd edition
2002). This, however, rachets up the level of difficulty, and has parts you
will probably want to/need to skip.
Note, by the way, that what we’ve been talking about is intuitionist logic not
intuitionist mathematics. For more on the relation, see both the SEP entry by
Moschovakis and
8. Rosalie Iemhoff, ‘Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
And then the stand-out recommendation is

9. Michael Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford Logic Guides 39 (OUP

2nd edn. 2000). A classic text. But (it has to be said) this is quite hard
going in parts, and some of the formal aspects are perhaps tougher than
they need be. Note though that thefinal chapter, ‘Concluding philosophical
remarks’, is very well worth looking at, even if you bale out from reading
all the formal work that precedes it.
But further investigation of intuitionistic mathematics really needs to be set in
the context of a wider engagement with varieties of constructive mathematics.

52
Chapter 6

Modal and other logics

Here’s the menu for this chapter, which is probably of particular interest to
philosophers rather than mathematicians:
6.1 We start with modal logic – like second-order logic, an extension of classical
logic – for two reasons. First, the basics of modal logic don’t involve any-
thing mathematically more sophisticated than the elementary first-order
logic covered in Chiswell and Hodges (indeed to make a start on modal
logic you don’t even need as much as that). Second, and much more impor-
tantly, philosophers working in many areas surely ought to know a little
modal logic.
6.2 Classical logic demands that all terms denote one and one thing – i.e. it
doesn’t countenance empty terms which denote nothing, or plural terms
which may denote more than one thing. In this section, we look at logics
which remain classical in spirit (retaining the usual sort of definition of
logical consequence) but which do allow empty and/or plural terms.
6.3 Among variant logics which are non-classical in spirit, we have already
mentioned intutionist logic. Here we consider some other deviations from
the classical paradigm, starting with those which require that conclusions
be related to their premisses by some connection of relevance (so the clas-
sical idea that a contradiction entails anything is dropped).

6.1 Modal logic

(a) Basic modal logic is the logic of the one-place propositional operators ‘l’
and ‘3’ (read these as ‘it is necessarily true that’ and ‘it is possibly true that’);

53
it adopts new principles like lϕ Ñ ϕ and ϕ Ñ 3ϕ, and investigates more
disputable principles like 3ϕ Ñ l 3ϕ. Different readings of the box and diamond
generate different modal logics, though initially you can concentrate on just three
main systems, known as T, S4 and S5.

There are some nice introductory texts written for philosophers, though I
think the place to start is clear:

1. Rod Girle, Modal Logics and Philosophy (Acumen 2000; 2nd edn. 2009).
Girle’s logic courses in Auckland, his enthusiasm and abilities as a teacher,
are justly famous. Part I of this book provides a particularly lucid intro-
duction, which in 136 pages explains the basics, covering both trees and
natural deduction for some propositional modal logics, and extending to
the beginnings of quantified modal logic. Philosophers may well want to
go on to read Part II of the book, on applications of modal logic.

Also introductory, though perhaps a little brisker than Girle at the outset,
is
2. Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (CUP, much ex-
panded 2nd edition 2008): read Chs 2–4 for propositional modal logics,
Chs 14–18 for quantified logics. This book – which is a terrific achieve-
ment and enviably clear and well-organized – systematically explores
logics of a wide variety of kinds, using trees throughout in a way that
can be very illuminating indeed. Although it starts from scratch, how-
ever, it would be better to come to the book with a prior familiarity with
non-modal logic via trees, as in my chapters available here. We will be
mentioning Priest’s book again in later sections for its excellent coverage
of other non-classical themes.

If you do start with Priest’s book, then at some point you will want to supplement
it by looking at a treatment of natural deduction proof systems for modal logics.
One option is to dip into Tony Roy’s comprehensive ‘Natural Derivations for
Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic’ which presents natural deduction
systems corresponding to the propositional logics presented in tree form in the
first edition of Priest (so the first half of the new edition). Another possible way
in to ND modal systems would be via the opening chapters of
3. James Garson, Modal Logic for Philosophers* (CUP, 2006; 2nd end. 2014).
This again is certainly intended as a gentle introductory book: it deals with

54
 both ND and semantic tableaux (trees), and covers quantified modal logic.
It is reasonably accessible, but not – I think – as attractive as Girle. But
that’s a judgement call.

(b) We now go a step up in sophistication (and the more mathematical might

want to start here):

4. Melvin Fitting and Richard L. Mendelsohn, First-Order Modal Logic

(Kluwer 1998). This book starts again from scratch, but then does go
rather more snappily, with greater mathematical elegance (though it
should certainly be accessible to anyone who is modestly on top of non-
modal first-order logic). It still also includes a good amount of philosoph-
ically interesting material. Recommended.

A few years ago, I would have said that getting as far as Fitting and Mendelsohn
will give most philosophers a good enough grounding in basic modal logic. But
e.g. Timothy Williamson’s book Modal Logic as Metaphysics (OUP, 2013) calls
on rather more, including e.g. second-order modal logics. If you need to sharpen
your knowledge of the technical background here, I guess there is nothing for it
but to tackle
5. Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund, Modal Logic: An Introduction
to its Syntax and Semantics (OUP, 2008). The blurb announces that “a
variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels
are developed with clarity, precision and philosophical insight”. However,
when I looked at this book with an eye to using it for a graduate semi-
nar, I confess I didn’t find it very appealing: so I do suspect that many
philosophical readers will indeed find the treatments in this book rather
relentless. However, the promised wide coverage could make the book of
particular interest to determined philosophers concerned with the kind of
issues that Williamson discusses.
Finally, I should certainly draw your attention to the classic book by Boolos
mentioned at the end of §7.4, where modal logic gets put to use in exploring
results about provability in arithmetic, Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem,
and more.

Postscript for philosophers Old hands learnt their modal logic from G. E.
Hughes and M. J. Cresswell An Introduction to Modal Logic (Methuen, 1968).
This was at the time of original publication a unique book, enormously helpfully

55
bringing together a wealth of early work on modal logic in an approachable way.
Nearly thirty years later, the authors wrote a heavily revised and updated ver-
sion, A New Introduction to Modal Logic (Routledge, 1996). This newer version
like the original one concentrates on axiomatic versions of modal logic, which
doesn’t make it always the most attractive introduction from a modern point
of view. But it is still an admirable book at an introductory level (and going
beyond), and a book that enthusiasts can still learn from.
I didn’t recommend the first part of Theodore Sider’s Logic for Philosophy*
(OUP, 2010). However, the second part of the book which is entirely devoted
to modal logic (including quantified modal logic) and related topics like Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic is significantly better. Compared with the early
chapters with their inconsistent levels of coverage and sophistication, the dis-
cussion here develops more systematically and at a reasonably steady level of
exposition. There is, however, a lot of (acknowledged) straight borrowing from
Hughes and Cresswell, and – like those earlier authors – Sider also gives ax-
iomatic systems. But if you just want a brisk and pretty clear explanation of
Kripke semantics, and want to learn e.g. how to search systematically for coun-
termodels, Sider’s treatment in his Ch. 6 could well work as a basis. And then
the later treatments of quantified modal logic in Chs 9 and 10 (and some of the
conceptual issues they raise) are also brief, lucid and approachable.

Postscript for the more mathematical Here are a couple of good introductory
modal logic books with a mathematical flavour:
6. Sally Popkorn, First Steps in Modal Logic (CUP, 1994). The author is, at
least in this possible world, identical with the late mathematician Harold
Simmons. This book, which entirely on propositional modal logics, is writ-
ten for computer scientists. The Introduction rather boldly says ‘There are
few books on this subject and even fewer books worth looking at. None
of these give an acceptable mathematically correct account of the subject.
This book is a first attempt to fill that gap.’ This considerably oversells
the case: but the result is illuminating and readable.

7. Also just on propositional logic, I’d recommend Patrick Blackburn, Maarten

de Ricke and Yde Venema’s Modal Logic (CUP, 2001). This is one of the
Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science: but again don’t let
that provenance put you off – it is (relatively) accessibly and agreeably
written, with a lot of signposting to the reader of possible routes through
the book, and interesting historical notes. I think it works pretty well, and

56
 will certainly give you an idea about how non-philosophers approach modal
logic.
Going in a different direction, if you are particularly interested in the relation
between modal logic and intuitionistic logic (see §5.4.2), then you might want to
look at
Alexander Chagrov and Michael Zakharyaschev Modal Logic (OUP, 1997).
This is a volume in the Oxford Logic Guides series and again concentrates
on propositional modal logics. Written for the more mathematically minded
reader, it tackles things in an unusual order, starting with an extended
discussion of intuitionistic logic, and is pretty demanding. But enthusiasts
should find this enlightening.
Finally, if you want to explore even more, there’s the giant Handbook of Modal
Logic, edited by van Bentham et al. (Elsevier, 2005). You can get an idea of
what’s in the volume by looking at this page of links to the opening pages of the
various contributions.

6.2 Free logic, plural logic

We next look at what happens if you stay first-order (keep your variables run-
ning over objects), stay classical in spirit (keep the same basic notion of logical
consequence) but allow terms that fail to denote (free logic) or allow terms that
refer to more than one thing (plural logic).

6.2.1 Free Logic

Classical logic assumes that any term denotes an object in the domain of quan-
tification, and in particular assumes that all functions are total, i.e. defined for
every argument – so an expression like ‘f pcq’ always denotes. But mathemat-
ics cheerfully countenances partial functions, which may lack a value for some
arguments. Should our logic accommodate this, by allowing terms to be free of
existential commitment? In which case, what would such a ‘free’ logic look like?
For some background and motivation, see the gently paced and accessible
1. David Bostock, Intermediate Logic (OUP 1997), Ch. 8.
Then for more detail, we have a helpful overview article in the ever-useful

57
 Stanford Encyclopedia:
2. John Nolt, ‘Free Logic’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

For formal treatments in, respectively, natural deduction and tableau set-
tings, see:
3. Neil Tennant, Natural Logic** (Edinburgh UP 1978, 1990), §7.10.
4. Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (CUP, 2nd edi-
tion 2008), Ch. 13.

If you want to explore further (going rather beyond the basics), you could make
a start on
5. Ermanno Bencivenga, ‘Free Logics’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.),
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. III: Alternatives to Classical Logic
(Reidel, 1986). Reprinted in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook
of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edition, vol. 5 (Kluwer, 2002).
Postscript Rolf Schock’s Logics without Existence Assumptions (Almqvist &
Wiskell, Stockholm 1968) is still well worth looking at on free logic after all
this time. And for a collection of articles of interest to philosophers, around and
about the topic of free logic, see Karel Lambert, Free Logic: Selected Essays
(CUP 2003).

6.2.2 Plural logic

In ordinary mathematical English we cheerfully use plural denoting terms such
as ‘2, 4, 6, and 8’, ‘the natural numbers’, ‘the real numbers between 0 and 1’,
‘the complex solutions of z 2 ` z ` 1 “ 0’, ‘the points where line L intersects curve
C’, ‘the sets that are not members of themselves’, and the like. Such locutions
are entirely familiar, and we use them all the time without any sense of strain or
logical impropriety. We also often generalize by using plural quantifiers like ‘any
natural numbers’ or ‘some reals’ together with linked plural pronouns such as
‘they’ and ‘them’. For example, here is a version of the Least Number Principle:
given any natural numbers, one of them must be the least. By contrast, there
are some reals – e.g. those strictly between 0 and 1 – such that no one of them
is the least.
Plural terms and plural quantifications appear all over the place in everyday
mathematical argument. It is surely a project of interest to logicians to regiment

58
and evaluate the informal modes of argument involving such constructions. This
is the business of plural logic, a topic of much recent discussion.

For an introduction, see

1. Øystein Linnebo, ‘Plural Quantification’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
And do read at least these two of the key papers listed in Linnebo’s expansive
bibliography:

2. Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley, ‘Strategies for a Logic of Plurals’,

Philosophical Quarterly (2001) pp. 289–306.
3. George Boolos, ‘To Be Is To Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some
Values of Some Variables)’, Journal of Philosophy (1984) pp. 430–50.
Reprinted in Boolos, Logic, Logic, and Logic (Harvard University Press,
1998).

(Oliver and Smiley give reasons why there is indeed a real subject here: you can’t
readily eliminate all plural talk in favour e.g. of singular talk about sets. Boolos’s
classic will tell you something about the possible relation between plural logic
and second-order logic.) Then, for much more about plurals, you can follow up
more of Linnebo’s bibliography, or could look at
4. Thomas McKay, Plural Predication (OUP 2006),
which is clear and approachable. However:

Real enthusiasts for plural logic will want to dive into the philosophically
argumentative and formally rich
5. Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley, Plural Logic (OUP 2013: revised and
expanded second edition, 2016).

6.3 Relevance logics (and wilder logics too)

(a) Classically, if ϕ $ ψ, then ϕ, χ $ ψ (read ‘$’ as ‘entails’: irrelevant pre-
misses can be added without making a valid entailment invalid). And if ϕ, χ $ ψ
then ϕ $ χ Ñ ψ (that’s the Conditional Proof rule in action, a rule that seems

59
to capture something essential to our understanding of the conditional). Presum-
ably we have P $ P . So we have P, Q $ P . Whence P $ Q Ñ P . It seems then
that classical logic’s carefree attitude to questions of relevance in deduction and
its dubious version of the conditional are tied closely together.
Classically, we also have ϕ, ϕ $ ψ. But doesn’t the inference from P and
P to Q commit another fallacy of relevance? And again, if we allow it and also
allow conditional proof, we will have P $ P Ñ Q, another seemingly unhappy
result about the conditional.
Can we do better? What does a more relevance-aware logic look like?

For useful introductory reading, see

1. Edwin Mares, ‘Relevance Logic’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo-
sophy.
2. Graham Priest, Koji Tanaka, Zach Weber, ‘Paraconsistent logic’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
These two articles have many pointers for further reading across a range of
topics, so I can be brief here. But I will mention two wide-ranging introduc-
tory texts:
3. Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (CUP, much
expanded 2nd edition 2008). Look now at Chs. 7–10 for a treatment of
propositional logics of various deviant kinds. Priest starts with relevance
logic and goes on to also treat logics where there are truth-value gaps,
and – more wildly – logics where a proposition can be both true and
false (there’s a truth-value glut), Then, if this excites you, carry on to
look at Chs. 21–24 where the corresponding quantificational logics are
presented. This book really is a wonderful resource.
4. J. C. Beall and Bas van Fraassen’s Possibilities and Paradox (OUP 2003),
also covers a range of logics. In particular, Part III of the book covers
relevance logic and also non-standard logics involving truth-value gaps
and truth-value gluts. (It is worth looking too at the earlier parts of the
book on logical frameworks generally and on modal logic.)

The obvious next place to go is then the very lucid

5. Edwin Mares, Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation (CUP 2004).
As the title suggests, this book has very extensive conceptual discussion

60
 alongside the more formal parts elaborating what might be called the main-
stream tradition in relevance logics.

(b) Note, however, that although they get discussed in close proximity in the
books by Priest and by Beall and van Fraasen, there’s no tight connection be-
tween (i) the reasonable desire to have a more relevance-aware logic (e.g. without
the principle that a contradiction implies everything) and (ii) the highly revi-
sionary proposal that there can be propositions which are both true and false at
the same time.

At the risk of corrupting the youth, if you are interested in exploring the
latter immodest proposal further, then I can point you to
6. Graham Priest, ‘Dialetheism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

(c) There is however a minority tradition on relevance that I myself find ex-
tremely appealing, developed by Neil Tennant, initially in scattered papers.
Classically, we can unrestrictedly paste proofs together – so can e.g. paste
together an uncontroversial proof that for the inference P 6 P _ Q and a proof
for the inference P, P _ Q 6 Q to give us a proof for the (dubious) inference
P, P 6 Q. But maybe what is getting us into trouble is pasting together proofs
with premisses which explicitly contradict each other. What if we restrict that?
You will need to know a little proof theory to appreciate how Tennant handles
this thought – though you can get a flavour of the approach from the early
programmatic paper
6. Neil Tennant, ‘Entailment and proofs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian So-
ciety LXXIX (1979) 167–189.
Tennant wrote a sequence of interesting follow-up papers over the next decades,
but he has now brought everything neatly together in his argumentative and
technically engaging
7. Neil Tennant, Core Logic (OUP, 2017).

61
 Part III

Beyond the basics

62
About Part III

In this third part of the Guide there are suggestions for more advanced reading
on the various areas of logic we have already touched on in Part II. As noted in
Chapter 9, there are yet further areas of logic which the Guide does not (yet!)
cover: e.g. type theory, the lambda calculus, infinitary logics. But sufficient unto
the day!
Three points before we begin:
• Before tackling the more difficult material in the next two chapters, it could
be very well worth first taking the time to look at one or two of the wider-
ranging Big Books on mathematical logic which will help consolidate your
grip on the basics at the level of Chapter 5 and/or push things on just a
bit. See the slowly growing set of Book Notes for some guidance on what’s
available.
• I did try to be fairly systematic in Chapter 5, aiming to cover the different
core areas at comparable levels of detail, depth and difficulty. The coverage
of various topics from here on is more varied: the recommendations can be
many or few (or non-existent!) depending on my own personal interests
and knowledge.
• I do, however, still aim to cluster suggestions within sections or subsections
in rough order of difficulty. In this Part, boxes are used set off a number
of acknowledged classics that perhaps any logician ought to read one day,
whatever their speciality.
And a warning to those philosophers still reading: some of the material I point
to is inevitably mathematically quite demanding!

63
Chapter 7

More advanced reading on

some core topics

In this chapter, there are some suggestions for more advanced reading on a
selection of topics in and around the core mathematical logic curriculum we
looked at in Chs. 4 and 5 – other than set theory, which we return to at length
in the next chapter.

7.1 Proof theory

Proof theory has been (and continues to be) something of a poor relation in the
standard Mathematical Logic curriculum: the usual survey textbooks don’t dis-
cuss it. Yet this is a fascinating area, of interest to philosophers, mathematicians,
and computer scientists who all ought to be concerned with the notion of proof!
So let’s start to fill this gap next.
(a) I mentioned in §4.3 the introductory book by Jan von Plato, Elements of
Logical Reasoning* (CUP, 2014), which approaches elementary logic with more
of an eye on proof theory than is at all usual: you might want to take a look at
that book if you didn’t before. However, you should start serious work by reading
the same author’s extremely useful encyclopaedia entry:
1. Jan von Plato, ‘The development of proof theory’, The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy.
This will give you orientation and introduce you to some main ideas: there is
also an excellent bibliography which you can use to guide further exploration.

64
 That biblio perhaps makes the rest of this section a bit redundant; but for
what they are worth, here are my less informed suggestions. Everyone will agree
that you should certainly read the little hundred-page classic

2. Dag Prawitz, Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretic Study* (Originally

published in 1965: reprinted Dover Publications 2006).

And if you want to follow up in more depth Prawitz’s investigations of the proof
theory of various systems of logic, the next place to look is surely
3. Sara Negri and Jan von Plato, Structural Proof Theory (CUP 2001). This is
a modern text which is neither too terse, nor too laboured, and is generally
very clear. When we read it in a graduate-level reading group, we did find
we needed to pause sometimes to stand back and think a little about the
motivations for various technical developments. So perhaps a few more
‘classroom asides’ in the text would have made a rather good text even
better. But this is still extremely helpful.
Then in a more mathematical style, there is the editor’s own first contribution
to
4. Samuel R. Buss, ed., Handbook of Proof Theory (North-Holland, 1998).
Later chapters of this very substantial handbook do get pretty hard-core;
but the 78 pp. opening chapter by Buss himself, a ‘Introduction to Proof
Theory’**, is readable, and freely downloadable. (Student health warning:
there are, I am told, some confusing misprints in the cut-elimination proof.)
(b) And now the path through proof theory forks. In one direction, the path
cleaves to what we might call classical themes (I don’t mean themes simply
concerning classical logic, as intuitionistic logic was also treated as central from
the start: I mean themes explicit in the early classic papers in proof theory, in
particular in Gentzen’s work). It is along this path that we find e.g. Gentzen’s
famous proof of the consistency of first-order Peano Arithmetic using proof-
theoretic ideas. One obvious text on these themes remains
5. Gaisi Takeuti, Proof Theory* (North-Holland 1975, 2nd edn. 1987: re-
printed Dover Publications 2013). This is a true classic – if only be-
cause for a while it was about the only available book on most of its
topics. Later chapters won’t really be accessible to beginners. But you
could/should try reading Ch. 1 on logic, §§1–7 (and perhaps the begin-
nings of §8, pp. 40–45, which is easier than it looks if you compare how

65
 you prove the completeness of a tree system of logic). Then on Gentzen’s
proof, read Ch. 2, §§9–11 and §12 up to at least p. 114. This isn’t exactly
plain sailing – but if you skip and skim over some of the more tedious
proof-details you can pick up a very good basic sense of what happens
in the consistency proof.

Gentzen’s proof of the consistency of depends on transfinite induction along

ordinals up to ε0 ; and the fact that it requires just so much transfinite induction
to prove the consistency of first-order PA is an important characterization of the
strength of the theory. The project of ‘ordinal analysis’ in proof theory aims to
provide comparable characterizations of other theories in terms of the amount
of transfinite induction that is needed to prove their consistency. Things do get
quite hairy quite quickly, however.
6. For a glimpse ahead, you could look at (initial segments of) these use-
ful notes for mini-courses by Michael Rathjen, on ‘The Realm of Ordinal
Analysis’ and ‘Proof Theory: From Arithmetic to Set Theory’.
Turning back from these complications, however, let’s now glance down the
other path from the fork, where we investigate not the proof theory of the-
ories constructed in familiar logics but rather investigate non-standard logics
themselves. Reflection on the structural rules of classical and intuitionistic proof
systems naturally raises the question of what happens when we tinker with these
rules. We noted before the inference which takes us from the trivial P $ P by
‘weakening’ to P, Q $ P and on, via ‘conditional proof’, to P $ Q Ñ P . If
we want a conditional that conforms better to intuitive constraints of relevance,
then we need to block that proof: is ‘weakening’ the culprit? The investigation
of what happens if we tinker with standard structural rules such as weakening
belongs to substructural logic, outlined in
7. Greg Restall, ‘Substructural Logics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy.
(which again has an admirable bibliography). And the place to continue exploring
these themes at length is the same author’s splendid
8. Greg Restall, An Introduction to Substructural Logics (Routledge, 2000),
which will also teach you a lot more about proof theory generally in a very
accessible way. Do read at least the first seven chapters.
(You could note again here the work on Neil Tennant mentioned at the very end
of §6.3.)

66
(c) For the more mathematically minded, here are a few more books of con-
siderable interest. I’ll start with a couple that in fact aim to be accessible to
beginners. They wouldn’t be my recommendations of texts to start from, but
they could be very useful if you already know a bit of proof theory.
9. Jean-Yves Girard, Proof Theory and Logical Complexity. Vol. I (Bibliopo-
lis, 1987) is intended as an introduction]. With judicious skipping, which
I’ll signpost, this is readable and insightful, though some proofs are a bit
arm-waving.
So: skip the ‘Foreword’, but do pause to glance over ‘Background and
Notations’ as Girard’s symbolic choices need a little explanation. Then the
long Ch. 1 is by way of an introduction, proving Gödel’s two incomplete-
ness theorems and explaining ‘The Fall of Hilbert’s Program’: if you’ve
read some of the recommendations in §5.2 above, you can probably skim
this fairly quickly, though noting Girard’s highlighting of the notion of 1-
consistency.
Ch. 2 is on the sequent calculus, proving Gentzen’s Hauptsatz, i.e. the
crucial cut-elimination theorem, and then deriving some first consequences
(you can probably initially omit the forty pages of annexes to this chap-
ter). Then also omit Ch. 3 whose content isn’t relied on later. But Ch. 4 on
‘Applications of the Hauptsatz ’ is crucial (again, however, at a first pass
you can skip almost 60 pages of annexes to the chapter). Take the story
up again with the first two sections of Ch. 6, and then tackle the opening
sections of Ch. 7. A rather bumpy ride but very illuminating.
(Vol. II of this book was never published: though there are some draft
materials here.)

10. A. S. Troelstra and H. Schwichtenberg’s Basic Proof Theory (CUP 2nd

ed. 2000) is a volume in the series Cambridge Tracts in Computer Science.
Now, one theme that runs through the book indeed concerns the computer-
science idea of formulas-as-types and invokes the lambda calculus: however,
it is in fact possible to skip over those episodes in you aren’t familiar with
the idea. The book, as the title indicates, is intended as a first foray into
proof theory, and it is reasonably approachable. However it is perhaps a
little cluttered for my tastes because it spends quite a bit of time looking
at slightly different ways of doing natural deduction and slightly different
ways of doing the sequent calculus, and the differences may matter more
for computer scientists with implementation concerns than for others. You
could, however, with a bit of skipping, very usefully read just Chs. 1–3, the

67
 first halves of Chs. 4 and 6, and then Ch. 10 on arithmetic again.
And now for three more advanced offerings, worth commenting on:

11. I have already mentioned the compendium edited by Samuel R. Buss,

Handbook of Proof Theory (North-Holland, 1998), and the fact that you
can download its substantial first chapter. You can also freely access Ch. 2
on ‘First-Order Proof-Theory of Arithmetic’. Later chapters of the Hand-
book are of varying degrees of difficulty, and cover a range of topics (though
there isn’t much on ordinal analysis).

12. Wolfram Pohlers, Proof Theory: The First Step into Impredicativity (Sprin-
ger 2009). This book has introductory ambitions, to say something about
so-called ordinal analysis in proof theory as initiated by Gentzen. But in
fact I would judge that it requires quite an amount of mathematical so-
phistication from its reader. From the blurb: “As a ‘warm up’ Gentzen’s
classical analysis of pure number theory is presented in a more modern
terminology, followed by an explanation and proof of the famous result of
Feferman and Schütte on the limits of predicativity.” The first half of the
book is probably manageable if (but only if) you already have done some
of the other reading. But then the going indeed gets pretty tough.

13. H. Schwichtenberg and S. Wainer, Proofs and Computations (Association

of Symbolic Logic/CUP 2012) “studies fundamental interactions between
proof-theory and computability”. The first four chapters, at any rate, will
be of wide interest, giving another take on some basic material and should
be manageable given enough background. Sadly, I found the book to be
not particularly well written and it sometimes makes heavier weather of its
material than seems really necessary. Still worth the effort though.
There is a recent more introductory text by Katalin Bimbó, Proof Theory: Se-
quent Calculi and Related Formalisms (CRC Press, 2014); but having looked at
it, I’m not minded to recommend this.

7.2 Beyond the model-theoretic basics

(a) If you want to explore model theory beyond the entry-level material in §5.1,
why not start with a quick warm-up, with some reminders of headlines and some
useful pointers to the road ahead:

68
 1. Wilfrid Hodges, ‘First-order model theory’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Now, we noted before that e.g. the wide-ranging texts by Hedman and Hinman
eventually cover a substantial amount of model theory. But you will do even
better with two classic stand-alone treatments of the area which really choose
themselves. Both in order of first publication and of eventual difficulty we have:

2. C. Chang and H. J. Keisler, Model Theory* (originally North Holland

1973: the third edition has been inexpensively republished by Dover
Books in 2012). This is the Old Testament, the first systematic text on
model theory. Over 550 pages long, it proceeds at an engagingly leisurely
pace. It is particularly lucid and is extremely nicely constructed with
different chapters on different methods of model-building. A really fine
achievement that still remains a good route in to the serious study of
model theory.
3. Wilfrid Hodges, A Shorter Model Theory (CUP, 1997). The New Testa-
ment is Hodges’s encyclopedic original Model Theory (CUP 1993). This
shorter version is half the size but still really full of good things. It
does get tougher as the book progresses, but the earlier chapters of this
modern classic, written with this author’s characteristic lucidity, should
certainly be readily manageable.

My suggestion would be to read the first three long chapters of Chang and
Keisler, and then perhaps pause to make a start on
4. J. L. Bell and A. B. Slomson, Models and Ultraproducts* (North-Holland
1969; Dover reprint 2006). Very elegantly put together: as the title suggests,
the book focuses particularly on the ultra-product construction. At this
point read the first five chapters for a particularly clear introduction.
You could then return to Ch. 4 of C&K to look at (some of) their treatment of
the ultra-product construction, before perhaps putting the rest of their book on
hold and turning to Hodges.
(b) A level up again, here are two more books. The first has been around long
enough to have become regarded as a modern standard text. The second is more
recent but also comes well recommended. Their coverage is significantly different
– so those wanting to get seriously into model theory should probably take a
look at both:

69
 5. David Marker, Model Theory: An Introduction (Springer 2002). Despite its
title, this book would surely be hard going if you haven’t already tackled
some model theory (at least read Manzano first). But despite being some-
times a rather bumpy ride, this highly regarded text will teach you a great
deal. Later chapters, however, probably go far over the horizon for all ex-
cept those most enthusiastic readers of this Guide who are beginning to
think about specializing in model theory – it isn’t published in the series
‘Graduate Texts in Mathematics’ for nothing!

6. Katrin Tent and Martin Ziegler, A Course in Model Theory (CUP, 2012).
From the blurb: “This concise introduction to model theory begins with
standard notions and takes the reader through to more advanced topics
such as stability, simplicity and Hrushovski constructions. The authors in-
troduce the classic results, as well as more recent developments in this
vibrant area of mathematical logic. Concrete mathematical examples are
included throughout to make the concepts easier to follow.” Again, al-
though it starts from the beginning, it could be a bit of challenge to readers
without any prior exposure to the elements of model theory – though I, for
one, find it more approachable than Marker’s book.
(c) So much for my principal suggestions. Now for an assortment of addi-
tional/alternative texts. Here are two more books which aim to give general
introductions:
7. Philipp Rothmaler’s Introduction to Model Theory (Taylor and Francis
2000) is, overall, comparable in level of difficulty with, say, the first half of
Hodges. As the blurb puts it: “This text introduces the model theory of
first-order logic, avoiding syntactical issues not too relevant to model the-
ory. In this spirit, the compactness theorem is proved via the algebraically
useful ultraproduct technique (rather than via the completeness theorem
of first-order logic). This leads fairly quickly to algebraic applications, ... .”
Now, the opening chapters are indeed very clear: but oddly the introduc-
tion of the crucial ultraproduct construction in Ch. 4 is done very briskly
(compared, say, with Bell and Slomson). And thereafter it seems to me that
there is some unevenness in the accessibility of the book. But others have
recommended this text, so I mentioned it as a possibility worth checking
out.
8. Bruno Poizat’s A Course in Model Theory (English edition, Springer 2000)
starts from scratch and the early chapters give an interesting and helpful

70
 account of the model-theoretic basics, and the later chapters form a rather
comprehensive introduction to stability theory. This often-recommended
book is written in a rather distinctive style, with rather more expansive
class-room commentary than usual: so an unusually engaging read at this
sort of level.
Another book which is often mentioned in the same breath as Poizat, Marker,
and now Tent and Ziegler as a modern introduction to model theory is A Guide
to Classical and Modern Model Theory, by Annalisa Marcja and Carlo Toffalori
(Kluwer, 2003) which also covers a lot: but I prefer the previously mentioned
books.
(d) The next two suggestions are of books which are helpful on particular as-
pects of model theory:
9. Kees Doets’s short Basic Model Theory* (CSLI 1996) highlights so-called
Ehrenfeucht games. This is enjoyable and very instructive.
10. Chs. 2 and 3 of Alexander Prestel and Charles N. Delzell’s Mathematical
Logic and Model Theory: A Brief Introduction (Springer 1986, 2011) are
brisk but clear, and can be recommended if you wanting a speedy review
of model theoretic basics. The key feature of the book, however, is the
sophisticated final chapter on applications to algebra, which might appeal
to mathematicians with special interests in that area. For a very little more
on this book, see my Book Note.

Indeed, as we explore model theory, we quickly get entangled with algebraic

questions. And as well as going (so to speak) in the direction from logic to
algebra, we can make connections the other way about, starting from algebra.
For something on this approach, see the following short, relatively accessible,
and illuminating book:

11. Donald W. Barnes and John M. Mack, An Algebraic Introduction to Math-

ematical Logic (Springer, 1975).
(e) As an aside, let me also briefly allude to the sub-area of Finite Model
Theory which arises particularly from consideration of problems in the theory of
computation (where, of course, we are interested in finite structures – e.g. finite
databases and finite computations over them). What happens, then, to model
theory if we restrict our attention to finite models? Trakhtenbrot’s theorem,
for example, tells that the class of sentences true in any finite model is not

71
recursively enumerable. So there is no deductive theory for capturing such finitely
valid sentences (that’s a surprise, given that there’s a complete deductive system
for the valid sentences!). It turns out, then, that the study of finite models is
surprisingly rich and interesting (at least for enthusiasts!). So why not dip into
one or other of
12. Leonard Libkin, Elements of Finite Model Theory (Springer 2004).
13. Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus and Jörg Flum, Finite Model Theory (Springer
2nd edn. 1999).
Either is a very good standard text to explore the area with, though I prefer
Libkin’s.
(f) Three afterthoughts. First, it is illuminating to read something about the
history of model theory: there’s a good, and characteristically lucid, unpublished
piece by a now-familiar author here:
14. W. Hodges, ‘Model Theory’.
Second, one thing you will have noticed if you tackle a few texts beyond the
level of Manzano’s is that the absolutely key compactness theorem (for example)
can be proved in a variety of ways – indirectly via the completeness proof, via
a more direct Henkin construction, via ultraproducts, etc. How do these proofs
inter-relate? Do they generalize in different ways? Do they differ in explanatory
power? For a quite excellent essay on this – on the borders of mathematics and
philosophy (and illustrating that there is indeed very interesting work to be done
in that border territory), see
15. Alexander Paseau, ‘Proofs of the Compactness Theorem’, History and Phi-
losophy of Logic 31 (2001): 73–98.
Finally, I suppose that I should mention John T. Baldwin’s Model Theory
and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (CUP, 2018). This presupposes a
lot more background than the excellent book by Button and Walsh mentioned in
§5.1. A few philosophers might be able to excavate more out of this than I did:
but – as far as I read into it – I found this book badly written and unnecessarily
hard work.

7.3 Computability
In §5.2 we took a first look at the related topics of computability, Gödelian
incompleteness, and theories of arithmetic. In this and the next two main sec-

72
tions, we return to these topics, taking them separately (though this division is
necessarily somewhat artificial).

7.3.1 Computable functions

(a) Among the Big Books on mathematical logic, the one with the most useful
treatment of computability is probably
1. Peter G. Hinman, Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic (A. K. Peters, 2005).
Chs. 4 and 5 on recursive functions, incompleteness etc. strike me as the
best written, most accessible (and hence most successful) chapters in this
very substantial book. The chapters could well be read after my IGT as
somewhat terse revision for mathematicians, and then as sharpening the
story in various ways. Ch. 8 then takes up the story of recursion theory
(the author’s home territory).
However, good those these chapters are, I’d still recommend starting your more
advanced work on computability with

2. Nigel Cutland, Computability: An Introduction to Recursive Function

Theory (CUP 1980). This is a rightly much-reprinted classic and is beau-
tifully lucid and well-organized. This does have the look-and-feel of a
traditional maths text book of its time (so with fewer of the classroom
asides we find in some modern, more discursive books). However, if you
got through most of e.g. Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey without too much
difficulty, you ought certainly to be able to tackle this as the next step.
Very warmly recommended.

And of more recent books covering computability this level (i.e. a step up from
the books mentioned in §5.2, I also particularly like
3. S. Barry Cooper, Computability Theory (Chapman & Hall/CRC 2003).
This is a very nicely done modern textbook. Read at least Part I of the
book (about the same level of sophistication as Cutland, but with some
extra topics), and then you can press on as far as your curiosity takes you,
and get to excitements like the Friedberg-Muchnik theorem.
(b) The inherited literature on computability is huge. But, being very selective,
let me mention three classics from different generations:

73
 4. Rósza Péter, Recursive Functions (originally published 1950: English trans-
lation Academic Press 1967). This is by one of those logicians who was
‘there at the beginning’. It has that old-school slow-and-steady un-flashy
lucidity that makes it still a considerable pleasure to read. It remains very
worth looking at.
5. Hartley Rogers, Jr., Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Com-
putability (McGraw-Hill 1967) is a heavy-weight state-of-the-art-then clas-
sic, written at the end of the glory days of the initial development of the
logical theory of computation. It quite speedily gets advanced. But the
opening chapters are still excellent reading and are action-packed. At least
take it out of the library, read a few chapters, and admire!
6. Piergiorgio Odifreddi, Classical Recursion Theory, Vol. 1 (North Holland,
1989) is well-written and discursive, with numerous interesting asides. It’s
over 650 pages long, so it goes further and deeper than other books on
the main list above (and then there is Vol. 2). But it certainly starts off
quite gently paced and very accessible and can be warmly recommended
for consolidating and extending your knowledge.

(c) A number of books we’ve already mentioned say something about the fas-
cinating historical development of the idea of computability: as we noted before,
Richard Epstein offers a very helpful 28 page timeline on ‘Computability and Un-
decidability’ at the end of the 2nd edn. of Epstein/Carnielli (see §5.2). Cooper’s
short first chapter on ‘Hilbert and the Origins of Computability Theory’ also
gives some of the headlines. Odifreddi too has many historical details. But here
are two more good essays on the history:

7. Robert I. Soare, ‘The History and Concept of Computability’, in E. Griffor,

ed., Handbook of Computability Theory (Elsevier 1999).
8. Robin Gandy, ‘The Confluence of Ideas in 1936’ in R. Herken, ed., The
Universal Turing Machine: A Half-century Survey (OUP 1988). Seeks to
explain why so many of the absolutely key notions all got formed in the
mid-thirties.

7.3.2 Computational complexity

Computer scientists are – surprise, surprise! – interested in the theory of feasible
computation, and any logician should be interested in finding out at least a little

74
about the topic of computational complexity.
1. Shawn Hedman A First Course in Logic (OUP 2004): Ch. 7 on ‘Com-
putability and complexity’ has a nice review of basic computability theory
before some lucid sections discussing computational complexity.
2. Michael Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation (Thomson, 2nd
edn. 2006) is a standard and very well regarded text on computation aimed
at computer scientists. It aims to be very accessible and to take its time
giving clear explanations of key concepts and proof ideas. I think this is
very successful as a general introduction and I could well have mentioned
the book before. But I’m highlighting the book in this subsection because
its last third is on computational complexity.
3. Ofed Goldreich, P, NP, and NP-Completeness (CUP, 2010). Short, clear,
and introductory stand-alone treatment of computational complexity.

4. Ashley Montanaro, Computational Complexity. Excellent 2012 lecture notes,

lucid and detailed and over 100 pages (also include a useful quick guide to
further reading).
5. You could also look at the opening chapters of the pretty encyclopaedic
Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak Computational Complexity: A Modern Ap-
proach** (CUP, 2009). The authors say ‘Requiring essentially no back-
ground apart from mathematical maturity, the book can be used as a refer-
ence for self-study for anyone interested in complexity, including physicists,
mathematicians, and other scientists, as well as a textbook for a variety of
courses and seminars.’ And it at least starts very readably. A late draft of
the book can be freely downloaded.

7.4 Incompleteness and related matters

(a) If you have looked at my book and/or Boolos and Jeffrey you should now
be in a position to appreciate the terse elegance of

1. Raymond Smullyan, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Oxford Logic

Guides 19 (Clarendon Press, 1992). This is delightully short – under
140 pages – proving some beautiful, slightly abstract, versions of the in-

75
 completeness theorems. This is a modern classic which anyone with a
taste for mathematical elegance will find rewarding.

2. Equally short and equally elegant is Melvin Fitting’s, Incompleteness in

the Land of Sets* (College Publications, 2007). This approaches things
from a slightly different angle, relying on the fact that there is a simple
correspondence between natural numbers and ‘hereditarily finite sets’ (i.e.
sets which have a finite number of members which in turn have a finite
number of members which in turn . . . where all downward membership
chains bottom out with the empty set).

In terms of difficulty, these two lovely brief books could easily have appeared
among our introductory readings in Chapter 5. I have put them here because
(as I see it) the simpler, more abstract, stories they tell can probably only be
fully appreciated if you’ve first met the basics of computability theory and the
incompleteness theorems in a more conventional treatment.
You ought also at some stage read an even briefer, and still officially intro-
ductory, treatment of the incompleteness theorems,
3. Craig Smoryński, ‘The incompleteness theorems’ in J. Barwise, editor,
Handbook of Mathematical Logic, pp. 821–865 (North-Holland, 1977), which
covers a lot very compactly.
After these, where should you go if you want to know more about matters
more or less directly to do with the incompleteness theorems?
4. Raymond Smullyan’s Diagonalization and Self-Reference, Oxford Logic
Guides 27 (Clarendon Press 1994) is an investigation-in-depth around and
about the idea of diagonalization that figures so prominently in proofs of
limitative results like the unsolvability of the halting problem, the arith-
metical undefinability of arithmetical truth, and the incompleteness of
arithmetic. Read at least Part I.
5. Torkel Franzén, Inexaustibility: A Non-exhaustive Treatment (Association
for Symbolic Logic/A. K. Peters, 2004). The first two-thirds of the book
gives another take on logic, arithmetic, computability and incompleteness.
The last third notes that Gödel’s incompleteness results have a positive
consequence: ‘any system of axioms for mathematics that we recognize as
correct can be properly extended by adding as a new axiom a formal state-
ment expressing that the original system is consistent. This suggests that

76
 our mathematical knowledge is inexhaustible, an essentially philosophical
topic to which this book is devoted.’ Not always easy (you will need to know
something about ordinals before you read this), but very illuminating.

6. Per Lindström, Aspects of Incompleteness (Association for Symbolic Logic/

A. K. Peters, 2nd edn., 2003). This is probably for enthusiasts. A terse
book, not always reader-friendly in its choices of notation and the brevity
of its argument, but the more mathematical reader will find that it again
repays the effort.

(b) Going in a rather different direction, you will recall from my IGT2 or other
reading on the second incompleteness theorem that we introduced the so-called
derivability conditions on lϕ where this is an abbreviation for (or at any rate, is
closely tied to) Provpxϕyq, which expresses the claim that the wff ϕ, whose Gödel
number is xϕy, is provable in some given theory. The ‘l’ here functions rather
like a modal operator: so what is its modal logic? This is investigated in:

7. George Boolos, The Logic of Provability (CUP, 1993). From the blurb:
“What [the author] does is to show how the concepts, techniques, and
methods of modal logic shed brilliant light on the most important logical
discovery of the twentieth century: the incompleteness theorems of Kurt
Gödel and the ‘self-referential’ sentences constructed in their proof. The
book explores the effects of reinterpreting the notions of necessity and
possibility to mean provability and consistency.” This is a wonderful
modern classic.

7.5 Theories of arithmetic

The readings in §5.2 will have introduced you to the canonical first-order theory
of arithmetic, first-order Peano Arithmetic, as well as to some subsystems of
PA (in particular, Robinson Arithmetic) and second-order extensions. And you
will already know that first-order PA has non-standard models (in fact, it even
has uncountably many non-isomorphic models which can be built out of natural
numbers!).
So what to read next? You should get to more about models of PA. For a
taster, you could look at these nice lecture notes:

1. Jaap van Oosten, ‘Introduction to Peano Arithmetic: Gödel Incompleteness

and Nonstandard Models’. (1999)

77
But for a fuller story, you need

2. Richard Kaye’s Models of Peano Arithmetic (Oxford Logic Guides, OUP,

1991) which tells us a great deal about non-standard models of PA. This
will reveal more about what PA can and can’t prove, and will introduce
you to some non-Gödelian examples of incompleteness. This does get
pretty challenging in places, and it is probably best if you’ve already
done a little model theory. Still, this is a terrific book, and deservedly a
modern classic.
(There’s also another volume in the Oxford Logic Guides series which can be
thought of as a sequel to Kaye’s for real enthusiasts with more background in
model theory, namely Roman Kossak and James Schmerl, The Structure of Mod-
els of Peano Arithmetic, OUP, 2006. But this is much tougher.)
Next, going in a rather different direction, and explaining a lot about arith-
metics weaker than full PA, here’s another modern classic:
3. Petr Hájek and Pavel Pudlák, Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic**
(Springer 1993). Now freely available from projecteuclid.org. This is pretty
encyclopaedic, but the long first three chapters, say, actually do remain
surprisingly accessible for such a work. This is, eventually, a must-read if
you have a serious interest in theories of arithmetic and incompleteness.
And what about going beyond first-order PA? We know that full second-
order PA (where the second-order quantifiers are constrained to run over all
possible sets of numbers) is unaxiomatizable, because the underlying second-
order logic is unaxiomatiable. But there are axiomatizable subsystems of second
order arithmetic. These are wonderfully investigated in another encyclopaedic
modern classic:
4. Stephen Simpson, Subsystems of Second-Order Logic (Springer 1999; 2nd
edn CUP 2009). The focus of this book is the project of ‘reverse mathe-
matics’ (as it has become known): that is to say, the project of identifying
the weakest theories of numbers-and-sets-of-numbers that are required
for proving various characteristic theorems of classical mathematics.
We know that we can reconstruct classical analysis in pure set theory,
and rather more neatly in set theory with natural numbers as unanal-
ysed ‘urelemente’. But just how much set theory is needed to do the
job, once we have the natural numbers? The answer is: stunningly little.
The project of exploring what’s needed is introduced very clearly and

78
accessibly in the first chapter, which is a must-read for anyone interested
in the foundations of mathematics. This introduction is freely available
at the book’s website.

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Chapter 8

Serious set theory

In §5.3, we gave suggestions for readings on the elements of set theory. These will
have introduced you to the standard set theory ZFC, and the iterative hierarchy it
seeks to describe. They also explained e.g. how we can construct the real number
system in set theoretic terms (so giving you a sense of what might be involved
in saying that set theory can be used as a ‘foundation’ for another mathematical
theory). You will have in addition learnt something about the role of the axiom
of choice, and about the arithmetic of infinite cardinal and ordinal numbers.
If you looked at the books by Fraenkel/Bar-Hillel/Levy or by Potter, however,
you will also have noted that while standard ZFC is the market leader, it is
certainly not the only set theory on the market.
So where do we go next? We’ll divide the discussion into three.
• We start by focusing again on our canonical theory, ZFC. The exploration
eventually becomes seriously hard mathematics – and, to be honest, it
becomes of pretty specialist interest (very well beyond ‘what every logician
ought to know’). But it isn’t clear where to stop in a Guide like this, even
if I have no doubt overdone it!
• Next we backtrack from those excursions towards the frontiers to consider
old questions about the Axiom of Choice (as this is of particular conceptual
and mathematical interest).
• Then we will say something about non-standard set theories, rivals to ZFC
(again, the long-recognised possibility of different accounts, with different
degrees of departure from the canonical theory, is of considerable con-
ceptual interest and you don’t need a huge mathematical background to
understand some of the options).

80
8.1 ZFC, with all the bells and whistles
8.1.1 A first-rate overview
One option is immediately to go for broke and dive in to the modern bible, which
is highly impressive not just for its size:

1. Thomas Jech, Set Theory, The Third Millennium Edition, Revised and
Expanded (Springer, 2003). The book is in three parts: the first, Jech
says, every student should know; the second part every budding set-
theorist should master; and the third consists of various results reflecting
‘the state of the art of set theory at the turn of the new millennium’.
Start at page 1 and keep going to page 705 (or until you feel glutted with
set theory, whichever comes first).
This is indeed a masterly achievement by a great expositor. And if
you’ve happily read e.g. the introductory books by Enderton and then
Moschovakis mentioned earlier in the Guide, then you should be able to
cope pretty well with Part I of the book while it pushes on the story
a little with some material on small large cardinals and other topics.
Part II of the book starts by telling you about independence proofs. The
Axiom of Choice is consistent with ZF and the Continuum Hypothesis is
consistent with ZFC, as proved by Gödel using the idea of ‘constructible’
sets. And the Axiom of Choice is independent of ZF, and the Continuum
Hypothesis is independent with ZFC, as proved by Cohen using the much
more tricky idea of ‘forcing’. The rest of Part II tells you more about
large cardinals, and about descriptive set theory. Part III is indeed for
enthusiasts.

Now, Jech’s book is wonderful, but let’s face it, the sheer size makes it a trifle
daunting. It goes quite a bit further than many will need, and to get there it
does in places speed along a bit faster than some will feel comfortable with. So
what other options are there for if you want to take things more slowly?

8.1.2 Rather more slowly, towards forcing

(a) Why not start with some preliminary historical orientation. If you looked
at the old book by Fraenkel/Bar-Hillel/Levy which was recommended earlier in
the Guide, then you will already know something of the early days. Alternatively,
there is a nice short introductory overview

81
 2. José Ferreirós, ‘The early development of set theory’, The Stanford En-
cycl. of Philosophy. (Ferreirós has also written a terrific book Labyrinth
of Thought: A History of Set Theory and its Role in Modern Mathematics
(Birkhäuser 1999), which at some stage in the future you might well want
to read.)

You could also browse through the substantial article

3. Akhiro Kanamori, ‘The Mathematical Development of Set Theory from

Cantor to Cohen’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic (1996) pp. 1-71, a revised
version of which is downloadable here. (You will very probably need to skip
chunks of this at a first pass: but even a partial grasp will help give you a
good sense of the lie of the land for when you work on the technicalities.)

(b) The divide between the ‘entry level’ books on set theory discussed in §5.3
and the more advanced books we are considering in this chapter is rather artifi-
cial, of course. Where, for example, should we place this classic?
4. Azriel Levy, Basic Set Theory (Springer 1979, republished by Dover 2002).
This is ‘basic’ in the sense of not dealing with topics like forcing. However
it is a quite advanced-level treatment of the set-theoretic fundamentals at
least in its mathematical style, and even the earlier parts are I think best
tackled once you know some set theory (they could be very useful, though,
as a rigorous treatment consolidating the basics – a reader comments that
Levy’s is his “go to” book when he needs to check set theoretical facts that
don’t involve forcing or large cardinals.). The last part of the book starts
on some more advanced topics, including various real spaces, and finally
treats some infinite combinatorics and ‘large cardinals’.
However, a much admired older book remains the recommended first treatment
of its topic:
5. Frank R. Drake, Set Theory: An Introduction to Large Cardinals (North-
Holland, 1974). This overlaps with Part I of Jech’s bible, though at perhaps
a gentler pace. But it also will tell you about Gödel’s Constructible Universe
and then some more about large cardinals. Very lucid.
(c) But now the crucial next step – that perhaps marks the point where set
theory gets really challenging – is to get your head around Cohen’s idea of forcing
used in independence proofs. However, there is not getting away from it, this is
tough. In the admirable

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 6. Timothy Y. Chow, ‘A beginner’s guide to forcing’,
(and don’t worry if initially even this beginner’s guide looks puzzling), Chow
writes
All mathematicians are familiar with the concept of an open research
problem. I propose the less familiar concept of an open exposition
problem. Solving an open exposition problem means explaining a
mathematical subject in a way that renders it totally perspicuous.
Every step should be motivated and clear; ideally, students should
feel that they could have arrived at the results themselves. The proofs
should be ‘natural’ . . . [i.e., lack] any ad hoc constructions or brillian-
cies. I believe that it is an open exposition problem to explain forcing.
In short: if you find that expositions of forcing tend to be hard going, then join
the club.
Here though is a very widely used and much reprinted textbook, which nicely
complements Drake’s book and which has (inter alia) a pretty good first presen-
tation of forcing:

7. Kenneth Kunen, Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs

(North-Holland, 1980). If you have read (some of) the introductory set
theory books mentioned in the Guide, you should actually find much of
this text now pretty accessible, and can probably speed through some of
the earlier chapters, slowing down later, until you get to the penultimate
chapter on forcing which you’ll need to take slowly and carefully. This is
a rightly admired classic text.

Kunen has since published another, totally rewritten, version of this book as
Set Theory* (College Publications, 2011). This later book is quite significantly
longer, covering an amount of more difficult material that has come to promi-
nence since 1980. Not just because of the additional material, my current sense
is that the earlier book may remain the slightly more approachable read.

8.1.3 Pausing for problems

At this point mathematicians could very usefully dip into the problem sets in
the excellent
8. Péver Komjáte and Vilmos Totik, Problems and Theorems in Classical Set
Theory (Springer, 2006). From the blurb: “Most of classical set theory is

83
 covered, classical in the sense that independence methods are not used, but
classical also in the sense that most results come from the period between
1920–1970. Many problems are also related to other fields of mathematics
. . . . Rather than using drill exercises, most problems are challenging and
require work, wit, and inspiration.” Look at the problems that pique your
interest: the authors give answers, often very detailed.

8.1.4 Pausing for more descriptive set-theory

Early on, it was discovered that the Axiom of Choice implied the existence of
‘pathological’ subsets of the reals, sets lacking desirable properties like being
measurable. In reaction, there developed the study of nice, well-behaved, ‘defin-
able’ sets – the topic of descriptive set theory. This has already been touched on
in e.g. Kunen’s book. For more see e.g.

9. Yiannis Moschovakis, Descriptive Set Theory (North Holland, 1980: second

edition AMS, 2009, freely available from the author’s website).
10. Alexander Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory (Springer-Verlag, 1994).

8.1.5 Forcing further explored

To return, though, to the central theme of independence proofs and other results
that can be obtained be forcing: Kunen’s classic text takes a ‘straight down the
middle’ approach, starting with what is basically Cohen’s original treatment of
forcing, though he does relate this to some variant approaches. Here are two of
them:

11. Raymond Smullyan and Melvin Fitting, Set Theory and the Continuum
Problem (OUP 1996, Dover Publications 2010). This medium-sized book
is divided into three parts. Part I is a nice introduction to axiomatic set
theory (in fact, officially in its NBG version – see §8.3). The shorter Part II
concerns matters round and about Gödel’s consistency proofs via the idea
of constructible sets. Part III gives a different take on forcing (a variant of
the approach taken in Fitting’s earlier Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory,
and Forcing, North Holland, 1969). This is beautifully done, as you might
expect from two writers with a quite enviable knack for wonderfully clear
explanations and an eye for elegance.

84
 12. Keith Devlin, The Joy of Sets (Springer 1979, 2nd edn. 1993) Ch. 6 in-
troduces the idea of Boolean-Valued Models and their use in independence
proofs. The basic idea is fairly easily grasped, but details perhaps get hairy.
For more on this theme, see John L. Bell’s classic Set Theory: Boolean-
Valued Models and Independence Proofs (Oxford Logic Guides, OUP, 3rd
edn. 2005). The relation between this approach and other approaches to
forcing is discussed e.g. in Chow’s paper and the last chapter of Smullyan
and Fitting.
Here are three further, more recent, books which highlight forcing ideas, one very
short, the others much more wide-ranging:
10. Nik Weaver, Forcing for Mathematicians (World Scientific, 2014) is less
than 150 pages (and the first applications of the forcing idea appear after
just 40 pages: you don’t have to read the whole book to get the basics).
From the blurb: “Ever since Paul Cohen’s spectacular use of the forcing
concept to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the
standard axioms of set theory, forcing has been seen by the general math-
ematical community as a subject of great intrinsic interest but one that
is technically so forbidding that it is only accessible to specialists ... This
is the first book aimed at explaining forcing to general mathematicians. It
simultaneously makes the subject broadly accessible by explaining it in a
clear, simple manner, and surveys advanced applications of set theory to
mainstream topics.” And this does strike me as a clear and very helpful
attempt to solve Chow’s basic exposition problem.
11. Lorenz J. Halbeisen, Combinatorial Set Theory, With a Gentle Introduction
to Forcing (Springer 2011, with a late draft freely downloadable from the
author’s website). This is particularly attractively written for a set theory
book. From the blurb “This book provides a self-contained introduction to
modern set theory and also opens up some more advanced areas of current
research in this field. The first part offers an overview of classical set theory
wherein the focus lies on the axiom of choice and Ramsey theory. In the
second part, the sophisticated technique of forcing, originally developed
by Paul Cohen, is explained in great detail. With this technique, one can
show that certain statements, like the continuum hypothesis, are neither
provable nor disprovable from the axioms of set theory. In the last part,
some topics of classical set theory are revisited and further developed in
the light of forcing.” True, this book gets quite hairy towards the end: but
the first two parts of the book (‘Topics in Combinatorial Set Theory’ and

85
 ‘From Martin’s Axiom to Cohen Forcing’) should be within reach to any
mathematician. I can well imagine this book being spoken of as a modern
classic of exposition to put alongside Kunen’s and Jech’s books: certainly,
it has also been strongly recommended by much more reliable judges than
me.
12. Ralf Schindler, Set Theory: Exploring Independence and Truth (Springer,
2014). The book’s theme is “the interplay of large cardinals, inner mod-
els, forcing, and descriptive set theory”. It doesn’t presume you already
know any set theory, though it does proceed at a cracking pace in a brisk
style. But, if you already have some knowledge of set theory, this seems a
clear and interesting exploration of some themes highly relevant to current
research.

8.1.6 The higher infinite

And then what next? You want more?? Back to finish Jech’s doorstep of a
book, perhaps. And then – oh heavens! – there is another older blockbuster still
awaiting you:
13. Akihiro Kanamori, The Higher Infinite: Large Cardinals in Set Theory from
Their Beginnings (Springer, 1997, 2nd edn. 2003).

8.2 The Axiom of Choice

But now let’s leave the Higher Infinite and get back down to earth, or at least to
less exotic mathematics! In fact, to return to the beginning, we might wonder:
is ZFC the ‘right’ set theory?
Start by thinking about the Axiom of Choice in particular. It is comforting
to know from Gödel that AC is consistent with ZF (so adding it doesn’t lead
to contradiction). But we also know from Cohen’s forcing argument that AC is
independent with ZF (so accepting ZF doesn’t commit you to accepting AC too).
So why buy AC? Is it an optional extra?
Quite a few of the readings already mentioned will have touched on the
question of AC’s status and role. But for an overview/revision of some basics,
see

1. John L. Bell, ‘The Axiom of Choice’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-

ophy.

86
And for a short book also explaining some of the consequences of AC (and some
of the results that you need AC to prove), see

2. Horst Herrlich, Axiom of Choice (Springer 2006), which has chapters rather
tantalisingly entitled ‘Disasters without Choice’, ‘Disasters with Choice’
and ‘Disasters either way’.

Herrlich perhaps already tells you more than enough about the impact of AC:
but there’s also a famous book by H. Rubin and J.E. Rubin, Equivalents of the
Axiom of Choice (North-Holland 1963; 2nd edn. 1985) worth browsing through:
it gives over two hundred equivalents of AC! Then next there is the nice short
classic

3. Thomas Jech, The Axiom of Choice* (North-Holland 1973, Dover Publi-

cations 2008). This proves the Gödel and Cohen consistency and indepen-
dence results about AC (without bringing into play everything needed to
prove the parallel results about the Continuum Hypothesis). In particular,
there is a nice presentation of the so-called Fraenkel-Mostowski method of
using ‘permutation models’. Then later parts of the book tell us something
about mathematics without choice, and about alternative axioms that are
inconsistent with choice.

And for a more recent short book, taking you into new territories (e.g. making
links with category theory), enthusiasts might enjoy

4. John L. Bell, The Axiom of Choice* (College Publications, 2009).

8.3 Other set theories?

From earlier reading you should have picked up the idea that, although ZFC
is the canonical modern set theory, there are other theories on the market. I
mention just a selection here (I’m not suggesting you follow up all these – the
point is to stress that set theory is not quite the monolithic edifice that some
presentations might suggest).
For a brisk overview, putting many of the various set theories we’ll consider
below into some sort of order (and mentioning yet further alternatives) see

1. M. Randall Holmes, ‘Alternative axiomatic set theories’, The Stanford En-

cyclopedia of Philosophy.

87
At this stage, you might well find this too brisk and allusive, but it is useful to
give you a preliminary sense of the range of possibilities here.

NBG You will have come across mention of this already (e.g. even in the early
pages of Enderton’s set theory book). And in fact – in many of the respects that
matter – it isn’t really an ‘alternative’ set theory. So let’s get it out of the way
first. We know that the universe of sets in ZFC is not itself a set. But we might
think that this universe is a sort of big collection. Should we explicitly recognize,
then, two sorts of collection, sets and (as they are called in the trade) proper
classes which are too big to be sets? NBG (named for von Neumann, Bernays,
Gödel: some say VBG) is one such theory of collections. So NBG in some sense
recognizes proper classes, objects having ‘members’ but that cannot be members
of other entities: but in some sense, these classes are merely virtual objects.
NBG’s principle of class comprehension is predicative; i.e. quantified variables
in the defining formula can’t range over proper classes but range only over sets,
and we get a conservative extension of ZFC (nothing in the language of sets can
be proved in NBG which can’t already be proved in ZFC).

1. Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Azriel Levy, Foundations of

Set-Theory (North-Holland, 2nd edition 1973), Ch. II §7 remains a classic
general discussion of the role of classes in set theory.
2. Michael Potter, Set Theory and Its Philosophy (OUP 2004) Appendix C
is a brisker account of NBG and on other theories with classes as well as
sets.

For detailed presentations of set-theory via NBG, you can see either or both of
3. Elliott Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (CRC, 4th edition
1997), Ch.4. is a classic and influential textbook presentation.
4. Raymond Smullyan and Melvin Fitting, Set Theory and the Continuum
Problem (OUP 1996, Dover Publications 2010), Part I is another develop-
ment of set theory in its NBG version.
SP This again is by way of reminder. Recall, earlier in the Guide, we very
warmly recommended Michael Potter’s book which we just mentioned again.
This presents a version of an axiomatization of set theory due to Dana Scott
(hence ‘Scott-Potter set theory’). This axiomatization is consciously guided by
the conception of the set theoretic universe as built up in levels (the conception
that, supposedly, also warrants the axioms of ZF). What Potter’s book aims to

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reveal is that we can get a rich hierarchy of sets, more than enough for mathe-
matical purposes, without committing ourselves to all of ZFC (whose extreme
richness comes from the full Axiom of Replacement). If you haven’t read Potter’s
book before, now is the time to look at it.
ZFA (i.e. ZF ´ AF + AFA) Here again is the now-familiar hierarchical concep-
tion of the set universe: We start with some non-sets (maybe zero of them in
the case of pure set theory). We collect them into sets (as many different ways
as we can). Now we collect what we’ve already formed into sets (as many as we
can). Keep on going, as far as we can. On this ‘bottom-up’ picture, the Axiom
of Foundation is compelling (any downward chain linked by set-membership will
bottom out, and won’t go round in a circle). But now here’s another alternative
conception of the set universe. Think of a set as a gadget that points you at some
some things, its members. And those members, if sets, point to their members.
And so on and so forth. On this ‘top-down’ picture, the Axiom of Foundation
is not so compelling. As we follow the pointers, can’t we for example come back
to where we started? It is well known that in much of the usual development of
ZFC the Axiom of Foundation AF does little work. So what about considering
a theory of sets which drops AF and instead has an Anti-Foundation Axiom
(AFA), which allows self-membered sets? To explore this idea,
1. Start with Lawrence S. Moss, ‘Non-wellfounded set theory’, The Stanford
Encycl. of Philosophy.
2. Keith Devlin, The Joy of Sets (Springer, 2nd edn. 1993), Ch. 7. The last
chapter of Devlin’s book, added in the second edition of his book, starts
with a very lucid introduction, and develops some of the theory.
3. Peter Aczel’s, Non-well-founded sets, (CSLI Lecture Notes 1988) is a very
readable short classic book.
4. Luca Incurvati, ‘The graph conception of set’ Journal of Philosophical Logic
(2014) pp. 181-208, very illuminatingly explores the motivation for such set
theories.
NF Now for a much more radical departure from ZF. Standard set theory lacks
a universal set because, together with other standard assumptions, the idea that
there is a set of all sets leads to contradiction. But by tinkering with those other
assumptions, there are coherent theories with universal sets. For very readable
presentations concentrating on Quine’s NF (‘New Foundations’), and explaining
motivations as well as technical details, see

89
 1. T. F. Forster, Set Theory with a Universal Set Oxford Logic Guides 31
(Clarendon Press, 2nd edn. 1995). A classic: very worth reading even if
you are a committed ZF-iste.
2. M. Randall Holmes, Elementary Set Theory with a Universal Set** (Cahiers
du Centre de Logique No. 10, Louvain, 1998). Now freely available here.

ETCS Famously, Zermelo constructed his theory of sets by gathering together

some principles of set-theoretic reasoning that seemed actually to be used by
working mathematicians (engaged in e.g. the rigorization of analysis or the de-
velopment of point set topology), hoping to get a theory strong enough for math-
ematical use while weak enough to avoid paradox. The later Axiom of Replace-
ment was added in much the same spirit. But does the result overshoot? We’ve
already noted that SP is a weaker theory which may suffice. For a more radical
approach, see

1. Tom Leinster, ‘Rethinking set theory’, gives an advertising pitch for the
merits of Lawvere’s Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets, and . . .
2. F. William Lawvere and Robert Rosebrugh, Sets for Mathematicians (CUP
2003) gives a presentation which in principle doesn’t require that you have
already done any category theory. But I suspect that it won’t be an easy
ride if you know no category theory (and philosophers will find it concep-
tually puzzling too – what are these ‘abstract sets’ that we are supposedly
theorizing about?). In my judgement, to really appreciate what’s going on,
you will have to start engaging with more category theory.

IZF, CZF ZF/ZFC has a classical logic: what if we change the logic to intu-
itionistic logic? what if we have more general constructivist scruples? The place
to start exploring is

1. Laura Crosilla, ‘Set Theory: Constructive and Intuitionistic ZF’, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Then for one interesting possibility, look at the version of constructive ZF in

2. Peter Aczel and Michael Rathjen, Constructive Set Theory (Draft, 2010).

IST Leibniz and Newton invented infinitesimal calculus in the 1660s: a century
and a half later we learnt how to rigorize the calculus without invoking infinitely

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small quantities. Still, the idea of infinitesimals retains a certain intuitive appeal,
and in the 1960s, Abraham Robinson created a theory of hyperreal numbers: this
yields a rigorous formal treatment of infinitesimal calculus (you will have seen
this mentioned in e.g. Enderton’s Mathematical Introduction to Logic, §2.8, or
van Dalen’s Logic and Structure, p. 123). Later, a simpler and arguably more
natural approach, based on so-called Internal Set Theory, was invented by Ed-
ward Nelson. As put it, ‘IST is an extension of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in
that alongside the basic binary membership relation, it introduces a new unary
predicate ‘standard’ which can be applied to elements of the mathematical uni-
verse together with some axioms for reasoning with this new predicate.’ Starting
in this way we can recover features of Robinson’s theory in a simpler framework.

1. Edward Nelson, ‘Internal set theory: a new approach to nonstandard anal-

ysis’ Bulletin of The American Mathematical Society 83 (1977), pp. 1165–
1198.
2. Nader Vakin, Real Analysis through Modern Infinitesimals (CUP, 2011).
A monograph developing Nelson’s ideas whose early chapters are quite
approachable and may well appeal to some.

Yet more? Well yes, we can keep on going. Take a look, for example, at SEAR.
But we must call a halt! Though you could round things out by taking a look
at a piece that could be thought of as an expanded version of Randall Holmes’s
Stanford Encyclopedia piece that we mentioned at the the beginning of this
section:

2. M. Randall Holmes, Thomas Forster and Thierry Libert. ‘Alternative Set

Theories’. In Dov Gabbay, Akihiro Kanamori, and John Woods, eds. Hand-
book of the History of Logic, vol. 6, Sets and Extensions in the Twentieth
Century, pp. 559-632. (Elsevier/North-Holland 2012).

91
Chapter 9

What else?

Mathematical logicians and philosophers interested in the philosophy of maths

will want to know about yet more areas that fall outside the traditional math
logic curriculum. For example:

• It is worth knowing about at least core aspects of type theory;

• Relatedly, we should explore something of the the lambda calculus.
• Even in elementary model theory we relax the notion of a language to
allow e.g. for uncountably many names: what if we further relax and allow
for e.g. sentences which are infinite conjunctions? Pursuing such questions
leads us to consider infinitary logics.
These areas may or may not get a section in a later version of this Guide. But
there is one more topic which does get its own supplementary webpage, including
a reading list for philosophers, and links to a lot of freely available material,
including my own notes:

• If set theory traditionally counts as part of mathematical logic, because of

its generality, breadth and foundational interest, then there is an argument
for including some category theory too.
Meanwhile, those who feel that – even with the Big Books mentioned in the
Appendix – they haven’t got enough to read or think that the mainstream diet
so far is a bit restricted can always consult the long, wide-ranging, articles in the
seventeen(!) volume Handbook of Philosophical Logic. This collection, edited by
the indefatigable Dov Gabbay together with F. Guenthner, is arguably mistitled.
A lot of the articles are straight mathematics, which might be of interest to

92
some technically minded philosophers but could be of at least equal interest to
mathematicians too.
But enough already!

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Index of authors

Aczel, P., 89, 90 Creswell, M., 55–56

Arora, S., 75 Crosilla, L., 90
Cunningham, D., 47
Badesa, C., 48 Cutland, N., 73
Baldwin, J., 72
Bar-Hillel, Y., 43, 88 Dalen, D. van, 26, 33, 44, 49, 52
Barak, B., 75 de Jongh, D,, 51
Barker-Plummer, D., 17 Delzell, C., 71
Barnes, D., 71 DeVidi, D., 30, 50
Barwise, J., 17 Devlin, K., 45, 85, 89
Beall, J., 60 Doets, H., 44
Bell, J., 30, 50, 69, 86, 87 Doets, K., 71
Bencivenga, E., 58 Drake, F., 82
Bezhanishvili, N., 51
Blackburn, P., 56 Ebbinghaus, H., 72
Boolos, G., 39, 55, 59, 77 Enderton, H., 25–26, 33, 38, 39, 42, 49
Bostock, D., 21, 24–25, 57 Epstein, R., 38, 74
Bridge, J., 33 Etchemendy, J., 17
Burgess, J., 39
Buss, S., 65, 68 Ferreirós, J., 82
Button, T., 35, 46 Ferreiros, J., 48
Fitting, M., 27–28, 55, 76, 84, 88
Carnielli, W., 38 Flum, J., 72
Chagrov, A., 57 Forster, T., 90, 91
Chang, C., 69 Fraassen, B. van, 60
Chiswell, I., 21–22 Fraenkel, A., 43, 88
Chow, T., 83 Franzén, T., 76
Ciesielski, K., 46 Freund, M., 55
Cocchiarella, N., 55
Cooper, S. B., 73, 74 Gabbay, D., 92
Core, R., 26 Gandy, R., 74

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Garson, J., 54 Kristiansen, L., 22, 39
Girard, J-Y., 67 Kunen, K., 83
Girle. R., 54
Goldrei, D., 23, 34, 42 Lambert, K., 58
Goldreich, O., 75 Lascar, D., 26
Guenthner, F., 92 Lawvere, F. W., 90
Guttenplan, S., 5 Leary, C., 22, 39
Leinster, T., 90
Hájek, P., 78 Levy, A., 43, 46, 82, 88
Hajnal, A., 47 Libert, T., 91
Halbeisen, L., 85 Libkin, L., 72
Halmos, P., 33, 42 Lindström, P., 77
Hamburger, P., 47 Linnebo, Ø., 59
Hedman, S., 28, 36, 69, 75
Herrlich, H., 87 Mack, J., 71
Hinman, P., 37, 69, 73 Mancosu, P., 48
Hodges, W., 21–23, 69, 72 Manzano, M., 34–35
Hofstadter, D., 41 Mares, E., 60
Holmes, M. R., 87, 90, 91 Marker, D., 70
Hrbacek, K., 43 McKay, T., 59
Hughes, G., 55–56 Mendelsohn, R., 55
Hunter, G., 29 Mendelson, E., 28–29, 88
Hurley, P., 5 Milne, P., 51
Montanaro, A., 75
Iemhoff, R., 52 Moschovakis, J., 52
Incurvati, L., 89 Moschovakis, Y., 43, 84
Moss, L., 89
Jech, T., 43, 81, 87
Jeffrey, R., 39 Negri, J., 65
Just, W., 45–46 Nelson, E., 91
Nolt, J., 58
Kahane, H., 5
Kanamori, A., 82, 86 Odifreddi, P., 74
Kaye, R., 78 Oliver, A., 59
Kechris, A., 84
Keisler, H., 69 Péter, R., 74
Kirby, J., 36 Paseau, A., 72
Komjáte, P., 83 Plato, J. von, 27, 64, 65
Kossak, K., 78 Pohlers, W., 68

95
Poizat, B., 70 Steinhart, E., 6
Pollard, S., 52 Swart, H. de, 44
Popkorn, S., 56
Potter, M., 44, 88 Takeuti, G., 65
Prawitz. D., 65 Tanaka, K., 60
Prestel, A., 71 Teller, P., 16
Priest, G., 51, 54, 58, 60, 61 Tennant, N., 25, 51, 58, 61, 66
Pudlák, P., 78 Tent, K., 70
Totik, V., 83
Rathjen, M., 66, 90 Tourlakis, G., 47
Restall, G., 66 Troelstra, A., 67
Ricke, M. de, 56
Rogers, H., 74 Väänänen, J., 50
Rosebrugh, R., 90 Vakin, N., 91
Rothmaler, P., 70 Velleman, D., 7–8
Roy, T., 54 Venema, Y., 56
Rubin, H., 87 Vereshchagin, N., 40, 46
Rubin, J., 87
Wainer, S., 68
Schimmerling, E., 46 Walsh, S., 35
Schindler, Ralf, 86 Weaver, N., 85
Schmerl, J., 78 Weber, R., 40
Schock, R., 58 Weber, Z., 60
Schwichtenberg, H., 67, 68 Weese, M., 45–46
Shapiro, S., 49 Williamson, T., 55
Shen, A., 40, 46
Sider, T., 29–30, 50, 56 Zach, R., 29, 48, 50
Simmons, H., 56 Zakharyaschev, M., 57
Simpson, S., 78–79 Ziegler, M., 70
Sipser, M., 75
Slomson, A., 69
Smiley, T., 59
Smith, N., 16
Smith, P., 17, 24, 38
Smoryński, C., 40, 76
Smullyan, R., 26–27, 30–31, 75, 76, 84,
88
Soare, R., 74
Solomon, G., 30, 50

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