Case Law

1. Khushwant Singh And Anr. vs Maneka Gandhi on 18 September,

2001
Equivalent citations: AIR 2002 Delhi 58
(Two competing interests of a well-known author to publish his
autobiography where references have been made to personal lives of a
public figure and the public figure's claim for protection against such
publication under her rights of privacy has given rise to interesting
questions of law in the present appeal.)

Facts:- Mr. Khushwant Singh, appellant No.1 is a well-known author. He was

desirous of publishing his autobiography and the same was proposed to be
published in a book titled "Truth, Love and a Little Malice". The book was to be
published and distributed by appellant No.2. The book is stated to contain a
chapter under heading "Gandhis and Anands". Respondent, a public figure, is
aggrieved by the contents of this chapter. The broad contents of this chapter are
claimed to be known to the respondent in view of certain advance
promotion/publication in magazines in respect of this autobiography though the
full contents are not known. "India Today" magazine, in its issue of October 31,
1995, published an authorised and exclusive extract of they said autobiography.
The said extracts purported to give an account of respondent's relationship with
the Gandhi family and relationship inter se other members of the family.

4. Respondent filed a suit for injunction and damages against the appellants in
their capacity as the author, publisher and the distributor respectively. In the
plaint the respondent stated that she is the widow of late Mr. Sanjay Gandhi and
daughter-in-law of late Mrs. Indira Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India. The
respondent claimed that she was filing the suit in order to protect the fair name
and respect of her family. It was also stated in the plaint that appellant no.1 is a
well-known and widely read journalist and has authored several books.
Respondent no.1 has been Editor in several newspapers and magazines and it
was further stated that appellant no.1 herein had allegedly written his
autobiography and intended to publish it under the titled 'Truth, Love and a
Little Malice'.

The respondent prayed in the suit for a restraint order against the defendant
form publishing, circulating or selling the said autobiography or any extract
pertaining to respondent and her family, in any manner, as reproduced in the
article in India Today and further claimed damages against appellant no.1 for
publishing the defamatory statements in India Today. The claim for damages
has been quantified at Rs. 5 lacs on which ad-valorem court fee has been affixed
but in para 12 of the plaint the respondent has stated that the court may
determine the final quantum of damages and the respondent would pay court fee
of such amount of damages as may be awarded by the court. Along with the
plaint an application for interim relief (IA NO. 12567/95) under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 CPC was also filed. The respondent was
granted an ad-interim ex parte order by the learned Single Judge on 16th
December, 1995 against the publication of the autobiography. The appellants
aggrieved by the said order have preferred the present appeal.

Held:- The previews of the proposed autobiography stated to be an authorised

version were published in the 31st October, 1995 issued of India Today. The ex-
parte injunction was granted soon thereafter and was subsequently confirmed.
Almost six years have passed. The book could have been published possibly
soon after the October edition of India Today in 1995. The appellant has been
prevented from writing and publishing his thoughts, views, personal interaction
and his perspective of life in his proposed autobiography for almost six years at
this late stage of his life. In our considered view this cannot be countenanced.
The balance of convenience lies in non-grant of injunction. Sufficient damages
has already been caused. The injunction must be vacated forthwith. The three
cardinal principle of balance of convenience, prima facie case and irreparable
loss and injury are not satisfied in the facts of the present case. The balance of
convenience is in favor of applicant rather than gag order. As discussed above
well established principles weigh in favor of the right of publication and there is
no question of any irreparable loss or injury since respondent herself has also
claimed damages which will be the remedy in case she is able to establish
defamation and the appellant is unable to defend the same as per well
established principles of law. Consequently the appeal is allowed. the impugned
order of the learned Single Judge dated 29th April, 1997 is set aside and the
injunction application of the respondent (IA 12567/95) filed under order
XXXIX rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 CPC is dismissed. The applications
of the appellants (IA No. 646/96 and 647/96) are allowed leaving the appellants
free to publish the autobiography "Truth, Love and a Little Malice". The truth
will be decide in the claim for damages and the malice whether little or more
would also be determined at the stage of trial as also the consequence thereof.
The parties will have the opportunity to substantiate their averments
determining their respective claims in the claim of damages. The appellants
shall also be entitled to costs of Rs.10,000/-

2. Indian Express Newspapers ... vs Jagmohan Mundhara And Anr.

Equivalent citations: AIR 1985 Bom 229

(It is a well settled principle of law that although the court is satisfied
that the words complained of are prima facie libellous and untrue, it will
refuse interlocutory injunction where the plaintiff has been dilatory in
making his application or has by his conduct disentitled himself to such
relief)

Facts:- The first plaintiff company publishes several newspapers, including

the daily 'Indian Express'. The Indian Express is published from several
cities in India, including Delhi and is claimed to nave largest combined
circulation amongst all the daily newspapers in the country. The second
plaintiff is a journalist working for the first plaintiff company. He did some
extensive research and investigation into the flesh trade that flourished in
Madhya Pradesh (M.P.) and purchased a woman by name Kamla from
village Shivpuri in M.P. for Rs. 2,300/-. He then wrote series of articles
which were published by the first plaintiff in the issue of Indian Express Dt.
27th, 29th and 30th April, 1981 and 2nd May 1981. The article Dt. 25th was
published in the issue of 27th April, 1981 under the heading 'Buying girls
from circuit house' and was described as express special. It narrated in detail
the efforts of the second plaintiff in approaching the right persons, resistance
faced by him, the circumstances under which he decided to buy a woman so
as to expose the flesh trade, the manner in which the deal was struck, as to
how the woman Kamla was brought to New Delhi and as to how the second
plaintiff escorted the woman to his residence at New Delhi. The publication
of the said article created sensation all over the country. In M.P. the official
spokesman for the Government addressed a press conference, the police
swung into action to check trafficking in women in the Dholpur area and a
furore was created amongst various organisations, including women's
organisations. The second news report appeared in the issue of Indian
Express Dt. 29-4-1981 under the head line 'M.P. Government orders probe'.
As per the report the M.P. Government ordered inquiry into the flesh
trafficking racket in the northern parts of the State exposed by the Indian
Express correspondent Ashwini Sarin. The Government also directed the
police to register offence under the relevant provisions of law for the
purchase of a woman for Rs. 2,300/- from the flesh market of M.P. and
asked the Commissioner of Chambal division to make an inquiry for finding
out the full facts of the story published in the Indian Express. The official
spokesman of the Government, however, clarified that it was not the
intention of the Government to arrest the reporter or harass him in any way.
It was also mentioned in the said news report that when asked to comment
on the move of the M.P. Government, the Executive Director of the Indian
Express, In charge of investigation, stated that the Government of M.P. had
reacted in the most predictable manner and that a petition was already filed
in the Supreme Court praying the Court to initiate remedial measures of
several kinds. It was also mentioned that it was anticipated that the
government concerned will attempt to cover up their past inaction by
launching a case against the concerned journalist and hence the Executive
Director had written to five eminent persons, including Judges, informing
them about the investigation and the intention to purchase a woman so that
the facts could be placed before the public in sufficient details to spur it to
force the authorities to take corrective action. On 29th April, 1981 itself the
M.P. Government issued a clarification stating that the offence registered by
the police in connection with the flesh trade was not directed against Aswini
Sarin. However, on 29th itself the Delhi Police went to Arya Samaj Home
where Kamala was admitted to arrest her. On learning this, the second
plaintiff and two others viz. Coomi Kapoor and Arun Shourie of the Indian
Express filed a Writ petition in the Supreme Court for various reliefs,
including a direction to the authorities to take steps to check the racket in
sale and purchase of girls. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court
consisting of Justice P. N. Bhagawati and justice K. Varadarajan, while
issuing notice to the Union of India and the Governments of M.P.,U.P.,
Rajasthan and Delhi directed that Kamla should not be removed from Arya
Samaj Home till disposal of the case or till another suitable home was found
for her. Efforts to find out a suitable home for Kamla continued till
November 1981, but before she could be transferred to another home, she
was found missing from Pataudi House, Daryaganj Orphanage, as stated in
the news report Dt. 24-11-1981published in the Indian Express. As per news
report Dt. 25-11-1981, Kamla remained untraced. As per the news report Dt.
1-2-1982, the Supreme Court directed the Commissioner of police Delhi to
try his best to trace Kamla and report to the Supreme Court by March 15 the
the progress of the investigation into the disappearance of Kamla from the
orphanage. But Kamla was not traced. The first defendant refused to oblige
and gave a detailed reply to the plaintiffs notice. the plaintiffs, therefore,
filed the suit for permanent injunction and claimed a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-
as damages as per the particulars given in Ex. H annexed to the plaint and
took out the present Notice of Motion for the aforesaid reliefs.

Held:- It was well selected that although the court is satisfied that the words
complained of are prima facie libellous and untrue, it will refuse
interlocutory injunction where the plaintiff has been dilatory in making his
application or has by his conduct disentitled himself to such relief, e.g. has
expressly or impliedly encouraged, acquiesced in or assented in or assented
to the publication of which he complains. Prima facie it is difficult to accept
the contention that the plaintiffs were not aware that the play 'Kamla' is
based on the real life story involving Kamla and the second plaintiff. As
claimed by the defendants, the play was also very well received , ran to
packed houses and staged in seven languages in 32 major cities. The first
plaintiff publishes the newspaper 'Loksatta' which is very widely circulated
Marathi Newspaper and which devotes substantial space for the stage as the
Indian Express itself. As mentioned above, it was known to the public that
the first defendant has embarked upon producing a film Kamala on the real
life story of a woman purchased by a journalist and based on a play of that
name. Prima facie, therefore, it can be said that the plaintiffs who did protest
against the play indirectly and impliedly consented to, or acquiesced in, the
production of a film is faithful cinematographically adapted version of the
play, its release cannot be restrained.
3. Fraser v Evans: CA 1969

The law of confidence is based on the moral principles of loyalty and fair dealing. An
injunction was sought to restrain an intended publication: ‘The court will not restrain the
publication of an article, even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says he
intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That has been
established for many years ever since Bonnard v. Perryman. The reason sometimes given is
that the defences of justification and fair comment are for the jury, which is the constitutional
tribunal, and not for a judge. But a better reason is the importance in the public interest that
the truth should out. There is no wrong done if it is true, or if [the alleged libel] is fair
comment on a matter of public interest. The court will not prejudice the issue by granting an
injunction in advance of publication.’ and iniquity] is merely an instance of just cause or
excuse for breaking confidence.’

Lord Denning MR
[1969] 1 QB 349, [1969] 1 All ER 8, [1968] 3 WLR 1172
England and Wales

4. Charanjit Singh vs Arun Purie And Ors. on 5 November, 1982

Equivalent citations: 1983 (4) DRJ 86, 1983 RLR 48
(The observation in the said judgment were made in respect of the
proposition that the court would not restrain defamatory when the
defendants said that they are intending to plead justification or fair
comments.)
Facts:- The plaintiff-petitioner alleges that he is a citizen of India, that he is the
Managing Director of Pure Drinks (New Delhi) Ltd., that he was elected in
1980 as Member of Parliament and has very high status, associated with social,
political, cultural and financial institutions, that defendant- respondent No. 7
'India Today' is a magazine of which defendant-respondent No. 1 is the Editor.
Defendants-respondents 2 to 6 are the Managing Editor, Senior Editor,
Correspondent and Publisher respectively of the magazine, that the defendants
and vested interests were trying to throw mud on him in one way or the other,
that on 21st January, 1982 defendant No. 4, a correspondent of the said
magazine wrote a letter to his Secretary requiring him to furnish answeis to
certain questions designed to malign, defame and to downgrade his financial,
social, political and moral esteem in the eyes of the general public. He pleads
that the said questionnarie is mala fide and has been framed with a view to
mislead the general public and to malign and defame him, that he Was not
under a duty to send reply, that on 2nd February, 1982 defendant-respondent
No. 3 sent another letter asking him to send his comments by 4 P.M. on 5th
February, 1982 falling which the defendants threatened to print their own story
about him. The plaintiff further pleads that the two letters require him to reveal
his business interests/secrets to the public, that the publication of any story on
the basis of the said questionnaire would defame him and cause serious damage
to his reputation. He also pleads his reply to the said questionnaire dated 21st
January, 1982 in para 9 of the plaint and says that the threatened article would
be outside the scope of lair comment as envisaged by the freedom of press. He,
therefore, prays for the grant of a decree for perpetual injunction and for interim
injunction till the decision of the suit restraining the defendants from printing
and publishing the threatend article about him alleging that he has a prima facie
case, that he would suffer irreparable injury and the balance of convenience is in
his favor.

Held:- The defendants intend to publish an article preferably after obtaining the
views and comments of the plaintiff on the questionnaire dated 21st January,
1982. The difficulty in dealing with this case is that I do not know what the
article when published will contain. It is not known what facts will be stated and
what comments will be made. It is therefore not possible at this stage to
determine whether the propased article would be defamatory or not. But as the
defendants state that they would plead justification and fair comment for
publishing the article pertaining to the plaintiff, I am of the opinion that
injunction should not issue. None of the questions asked by the defendants
relate to the private life of the plaintiff. All questions are directly connected
with his public life. defense of fair comment and justification has been raised by
the defendants and therefore injunction is not to be issued.

5. Woodward v Hutchins: CA (1977) 2 All ER 751, [1977 1 WLR 760

n injunction was sought to restrain publication of confidential information about

a well-known pop group, starring Tom Jones and Engelbert Humperdinck. As
the group’s press agent, the defendant’s role had been to see that the group
received favourable publicity. However, after parting company, amicably, with
the group, the defendant disclosed ‘no doubt, for a very considerable reward’ to
the Daily Mirror ‘secrets’ about the group, including episodes of allegedly
discreditable nature involving drink, sex and other matters.
Held: (ex tempore) The injunction was discharged. The group had sought
publicity, giving one view of themselves. Where justification is to be pleaded to
a defamation claim then an interim injunction to restrain publication will not be
granted.

Lord Denning MR said: ‘If a group of this kind seek publicity which is to their
advantage, it seems to me that they cannot complain if a servant or employee of
theirs afterwards discloses the truth about them. If the image which they
fostered was not a true image, it is in the public interest that it should be
corrected. In these cases of confidentaial information it is a question of
balancing the public interest in maintaining the confidence agaiinst the public
nterest in knowing the truth.’
and ‘There is a parallel to be drawn with libel cases. Just as in libel, the courts
do not grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of the truth or of
fair comment. So also with confidential information. If there is a legitimate
ground for supposing that it is in the public interest for it to be disclosed,
the courts should not restrain it by an interlocutory injunction, but should
leave the complainant to his remedy in damages. Suppose that this case were
tried out and the plaintiffs failed in their claim for libel on the ground that all
that was said was true. It would seem unlikely that there would be much
damages awarded for breach of confidentiality. I cannot help feeling that the
plaintiffs’ real complaint here is that the words are defamatory: and as they
cannot get an interlocutory injunction on that ground, nor should they on
confidential information.’