Tax General Principles - TAXREV
Tax General Principles - TAXREV
Tax General Principles - TAXREV
General Principles
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Taxes Debt
Nature of obligation Imposed by law Contractual in nature
Assignability Generally cannot be Assignable
assigned
Paid in what kind Generally paid in money May be paid in kind
Set off or compensation Cannot be the subject Can be the subject of set
of set off or off or compensation
compensation
Is nonpayment criminal Imprisonment is a A person cannot be
sanction for non- imprisoned for non-
payment of tax, except payment of debt
poll tax
Taxes Penalty
Violation of tax laws may give rise to Any sanction imposed as a punishment
imposition of penalty for violation of law or acts deemed
injurious
Primarily intended to raise revenue Designed to regulate conduct
May be imposed only by the May be imposed by the government or
government private individuals or entities
Cannot be a subject of set off or Can be the subject of set off or
compensation compensation
KINDS OF TAXES
1. Subject matter
1. Personal
2. Property
3. Excise
2. Burden
1. Direct - taxes wherein both the impact (liability) and the incidence
(burden) of taxation falls on the same person
2. Indirect - taxes wherein the impact(liability) of taxation falls on one
person, and the incidence(burden) of taxation falls to another, because
the former shifted it to the latter. It will be shifted not as a tax but as part
of the purchase price.
3. Purpose
1. Revenue
2. Regulatory
4. How amount is determined
1. Specific - tax of a fixed amount imposed by the head or number or piece
or by some standard of weight or measurement. The value of the article
taxed is not important. Examples are: 1) a tax of P6 per liter of sweetened
beverage/per pack of cigarette; 2) a tax of P1.75 on each kilogram of
tobacco. Both of these are excise taxes.
2. Ad valorem (Value) - tax based upon the value of the articles taxed. It
sometimes requires the intervention of assessors to estimate the value of
the property. Examples are Income tax, VAT, RPT, and even some excise
taxes. In Section 149, automobiles are subject to an “ad valorem tax”
based on the manufacturer’s selling price.” Another example is Section
145, which provides that cigars are subject to an “ad valorem tax” of 20%
of the net retail price per cigar.
3. Mixed - tax having both specific and ad valorem tax. An example is
Section 142 which states that “there shall be collected an excise tax, per
liter of volume capacity, on sparkling wines/champagnes if the net retail
price per bottle is P500 or less, the tax is P250.” The specific tax feature
here is the net retail price, which is the value of the sparkling wine taxed,
while the ad valorem tax feature here is the per liter of volume capacity.
5. Taxing authority
1. National
2. Local
6. Rate
1. Progressive - the rate of tax increases as the amount of income increases.
An example is the tax bracket of tax on individuals
2. Regressive - the rate decreases as the amount of income increases. There
is no such tax in the Philippines. However, in Tolentino v Sec. of Finance, it
categorized VAT as regressive tax, even though the rate is fixed.
3. Proportionate - the rate is a flat tax base. Examples are percentage tax
and real property tax.
(adherence to form)
3. Special laws are not repealed by general laws - RA Nos. 3247, 3570
and 6020 are special laws applicable only to CEPALCO, while P.D. No.
231 is a general tax law. The presumption is that the special statutes
are exceptions to the general law (P.D. No. 231) because they pertain
to a special charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and
circumstances. Hence, a tax exemption granted in a special law is not
repealed by a general law that is later enacted, even if the terms of
the general law are broad enough to include the cases in the special
law, UNLESS there is manifest intent by Congress to repeal or alter the
special law. (Province of Misamis Oriental v Cagayan Electric Power,
1990)
1. Another example of special law, granting a tax exemption, is
not repealed by a later general law - Firstly, a basic rule in
statutory construction is that a special law cannot be repealed or
modified by a subsequently enacted general law in the absence of
any express provision in the latter law to that effect. A special law
must be interpreted to constitute an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances warranting a contrary
conclusion. R.A. No. 7716, a general law, did not provide for the
express repeal of PAGCOR's Charter, which is a special law;
hence, the general repealing clause under Section 20 of R.A. No.
7716 must pertain only to franchises of electric, gas, and water
utilities, while the term other franchises in Section 102 of the NIRC
should refer only to transport, communications and utilities,
exclusive of PAGCOR's casino operations. (CIR v Secretary of
Justice and PAGCOR, 2016) Section 13 of PD 1869 (PAGCOR’s
Charter) states that payment of the 5% franchise tax by PAGCOR
and its contractees and licensees exempts the from payment of
any other taxes, including corporate income tax. (Bloomberry
Resorts and Hotels v BIR, 2016)
2. “Unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special
law” - It is next contended that, in any event, a special law
prevails over a general law and that the franchise of petitioner
giving it tax exemption, being a special law, should prevail over the
LGC, giving local governments taxing power, as the latter is a
general law. Petitioner further argues that as between two laws on
the same subject matter which are irreconcilably inconsistent,
that which is passed later prevails as it is the latest expression of
legislative will. This proposition flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence. In City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes,
this Court held that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" found in
special franchises should give way to the peremptory language of
§ 193 of the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal of such
exemption privileges. Thus, the rule that a special law must prevail
over the provisions of a later general law does not apply as the
legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under
existing laws or charters is apparent from the express
provisions of §§ 137 and 193 of the LGC. (PLDT v City of Davao
and Barcelona)
7. Tax amnesty (Clean Slate Theory)
1. A tax amnesty operates as a general pardon or intentional overlooking
by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise
guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law.
2. It is an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the government of its right to
collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance
to start with a CLEAN SLATE.
3. A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed
in law.
4. The grant of a tax amnesty is akin to a tax exemption; thus, it must be
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. (CIR v Transfield Philippines, 2019)
8. Prohibition on compensation and set-off
1. General Rule:
1. There can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the
taxpayer may have against the Government.
2. This is because taxes are not in the nature of contract. Instead, it
grows out of duty to the Government and are the positive acts of the
government.
3. Also, the lifeblood doctrine would be violated.
4. Further, a person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the
government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax
being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of the
lawsuit. (Francia v IAC, 1988)
2. Exception: “Intertwined”
1. In numerous cases, the Court allowed offsetting of taxes only because
the determination of the taxpayer's liability is intertwined with the
resolution of the claim for tax refund of erroneously or illegally
collected taxes under Section 229 of the NIRC(CIR v Toledo Power,
2015)
2. COMMENT: In other words, the taxpayer was claiming that it is
entitled to tax credits. On the other hand, the CIR was claiming that
the taxpayer has outstanding tax liabilities. That is the only scenario
where the Court granted compensation.
3. Question:
1. CIR made an assessment, stating that A owes P1M in taxes. A
1.
presented a contract to the CIR, showing that the LGU did not pay him
of his services of P1M. Is this allowed? No, it is not allowed because
there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims of the taxpayer
against the Government. Taxes grow out of a duty to and are the
positive acts of the government, whereas the services rendered by A
are in the nature of contracts.
9. Equitable recoupment
1. This doctrine states that a tax credit/refund, which has PRESCRIBED,
may be allowed to be used as PAYMENT of outstanding tax liability, if
both taxes arise from the same transaction in which overpayment is made
and underpayment is due.
2. This doctrine is not applicable in our jurisdiction because both the
collecting agency and the taxpayer might be tempted to delay and neglect
the pursuit of their respective claims within the period prescribed by law.
3. Illustration: XYZ Corporation paid its output VAT for the first quarter of
2019 on April 2019. Later, he also paid its output VAT for the fourth
quarter of 2019 on January 2020. On May 2020, the CIR made an
assessment that he underpaid his output VAT for the year 2019. As
contention, XYZ Corporation alleged that it had creditable input VAT for
the year 2019. Hence, it is seeking a set-off of its creditable input VAT and
the underpayment in output VAT. This illustrates the doctrine of equitable
recoupment because the underpayment (output VAT) is due and
demandable while the overpayment (creditable input VAT) has prescribed.
The TRAIN Law states that the taxpayer only has 90 days from the date of
submission of the official receipts or invoices and other documents to
refund creditable input VAT. At the time XYZ Corporation brought up its
claim, it has already prescribed.
4. NOTE: If you see set-off/compensation in the facts, the topic is NOT
NIRC, but GENERAL PRINCIPLES of taxation.
10. Compromise
1. It is a contract whereby the parties, by making “reciprocal concessions,”
avoid litigation or put an end one already commenced. (Art. 2028, NCC)
2. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or
Credit Taxes. (Sec. 204, NIRC)
1. The Commissioner may:
1. Compromise the payment of any internal revenue tax when:
(doubt; inability)
1. A reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the
taxpayer exists; or
2. The financial position of the taxpayer demonstrates a clear
inability to pay the assessed tax.
2. Abate or cancel a tax liability when: (excessively; collection
cost)
1. The tax or any portion thereof appears to be unjustly or
excessively assessed; or
2. The administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the amount due.
3. All criminal violations may be compromised except: (already
filed; fraud)
1. those already filed in court, or
2. those involving fraud.
2. Can the Commissioner delegate the power to compromise?
1. Yes.
2. The National Evaluation Board (NEB), when:
1. the basic tax exceeds P1,000,000, or
2. the settlement offered is less than the prescribed minimum
rates [Sec. 204(A), NIRC]
3. The Regional Evaluation Board (REB), in case of:
1. assessments issued by regional offices involving basic taxes
of P500,000 or less; and
2. minor criminal violations discovered by regional and district
officials [Sec. 7(C), NIRC]
tax.
2. Constitutional Limitation of Taxation
1. Indirect or General (DENRS - PPJ)
1. Due process
2. Equal protection
1. Homeless Poor and Homeless Less Poor are different classes
1. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor"
and the "homeless less poor" in the example given by
petitioner, because the second group or middle class can
afford to rent houses in the meantime that they cannot yet
buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus
differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax
that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.
148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil.
912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984);
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 [1988]).||| (Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754,
115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931 (Resolution), [October 30,
1995], 319 PHIL 755-803)
3. Non-impairment of contracts
1. Increase of tax expenses in particular contracts; Not
impairment of contracts
1. The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an
early case: "Authorities from numerous sources are cited by
the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a
new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with
a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the
Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular
contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and
lessen the security of another, or may impose additional
burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another,
still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of
any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v.
Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574
[1919]) Indeed not only existing laws but also "the
reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty,
is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General,
22 SCRA 135, 147 [1968]) Contracts must be understood as
having been made in reference to the possible exercise of
the rightful authority of the government and no obligation of
contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman
v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 [1935]) cd|||
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525,
115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931
(Resolution), [October 30, 1995], 319 PHIL 755-803)
1. Even in the field of taxation, authorities are numerous to
the effect that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an
increased tax on an old one, interferes not with a contract
or impairs its obligation within the meaning of the
Constitution, even though such taxation may affect
particular contracts so as to increase the debt of one
party or lessen the security of another, or impose
additional burdens upon one class and release the
burdens of the other class (La Insular v. Machuca Go-
Tauco, 39 Phil. 567, and authorities cited therein). Thus,
the imposition of a tax under a statute passed after a
contract has been entered into was held not an
impairment of the obligation of contract even if the
immediate consequence of the tax is to make the contract
less profitable to one of the parties (Kehrer v. Stewart,
197 U.S. 60, 49 L. ed. 663; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369,
60 L. ed. 691; La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco, supra), the
reason being that all contracts are made subject to the
taxing powers of the government (Clement National Bank
v. State of Vermont, 231 U.S. 120, 58 L. ed. 148)."
1. The inherent powers of the State are read into
every contracts.
2. The fundamental powers prevail over obligations
and contracts
4. Religious freedom
1. License Fees; License tax; Not allowed if it impairs religious
freedom
1. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it
the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent." (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar, plaintiff
is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious
articles. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff
that it was conducting the business of general merchandise
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and
municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and required
plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license.
Plaintiff protested against this requirement and claimed that it
never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Held: It is
true the price asked for the religious articles was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same,
but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for
profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee
for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot
be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.||| (American Bible Society v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
L-9637, [April 30, 1957], 101 PHIL 386-402) The Court was
speaking in American Bible Society case of a license tax,
which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a
prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although
its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its
application to the press or to religious groups, such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on
income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to
exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."||| (Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543,
115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931
(Resolution), [October 30, 1995], 319 PHIL 755-803)
2. VAT; Freedom of Religion is not violated
1. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not
a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease
or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange
of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not
to violate its freedom under the Constitution.||| (Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543,
115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931
(Resolution), [October 30, 1995], 319 PHIL 755-803)
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that
although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales
are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are
given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the
sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the
volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting
burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental
as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate
religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's
argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would
be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher
to make a sermon. On the other hand the registration fee of
P1,000.00 imposed by § 107 of the NIRC, as amended by § 7
of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay
for the expenses of registration and enforcement of
provisions such as those relating to accounting in § 108 of
the NIRC. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos.
115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852,
115873 & 115931 (Resolution), [October 30, 1995], 319 PHIL
755-803)
5. Freedom of Speech or expression or the press
1. VAT; Freedom of the Press is not violated
1. As a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the
taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out
the press or target a group belonging to the press for special
treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press
on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No.
7716 is none of these. Since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime
without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple:
by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing
the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same
tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been
subject. And VAT is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It
is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods
or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the
lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject
the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom
under the Constitution.||| (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781,
115852, 115873 & 115931 (Resolution), [October 30, 1995],
319 PHIL 755-803)
2. COMMENT: 3 reasons: 1) it does not single out the press. It
merely subjects the press to the same tax burden as other
businesses, 2) since the tax exemption in favor of the press
was a mere privilege, the State could take back the privilege
anytime without violating the Constitution, and 3) VAT is not a
license tax. It does not tax the exercise of a right or privilege.
It merely taxes the sale or exchange of goods or services.
6. Presidential power to grant reprieves, commutations, and Pardons,
and remit fins and forfeiture after conviction by final judgment
7. Law-making Process; and
8. No taking of private property without Just compensation
3. Direct or Specific (PPUTO-SERV-JAIL)
1. Prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of Poll tax
2. Progressive system of taxation
1. Regressive taxes are not prohibited by the Constitution
1. The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect
taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides
is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply
that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as
possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 Second ed. [1977])
Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to
evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which
perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been
prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, § 17 (1) of the 1973
Constitution from which the present Art. VI, § 28 (1) was taken.
Sales taxes are also regressive. Resort to indirect taxes
should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes
according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT,
the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by
providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §
3, amending § 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to
other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, § 4, amending § 103 of the
NIRC)||| (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455,
115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 &
115931 (Resolution), [October 30, 1995], 319 PHIL 755-803)
3. Uniformity and equitability of taxation
1. Meaning of Uniformity and Equitability
1. Uniformity/Equality - Equality and uniformity of taxation means
that all taxable articles of the same class be taxed at the same
rate. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
2. Equitability - It means taxes must be proportionate to one’s
ability to pay.
1. A tax may be uniform but still inequitable.
2. As example, all persons below P250,000 annual income have
an income tax rate of 50%. The provision is uniform because
all persons below P250,000 annual income are taxed at the
same rate. However, it is inequitable because the tax rate is
not proportionate to their ability to pay.
2. VAT is uniform and equitable
1. It is uniform. The sales tax adopted is applied similarly on all
goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at
the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
2. It is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate
gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-
sari stores are consequently exempt from its application.
Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities,
spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to
be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
4. Delegated authority of the President to impose Tariff rates, import, and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues (Flexible Tariff Clause)
5. Origin of revenue and tariff bills and appropriations
6. Votes required to grant tax Exemptions
1. (4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art. VI,
Section 28(4), Constitution)
7. Tax exemptions to Religious, charitable, and educational entities (CCP-
CMC); (ADE-Used-RCE)
1. (3) Charitable institutions, Churches and parsonages or Convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit Cemeteries, and
2. All lands, buildings, and improvements, Actually, Directly, and
2.
Exclusively used for Religious, Charitable, or Educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxation. (Art. VI, Section 28(3), Constitution)
1. Test of Exemption: it is the USE of the property, and not the
ownership of the same. (Abra Valley College v Aquino, 1988) Not
who owns, not who uses. It is the USE ITSELF.
2. NOTE: The income of the real property is not important. The
owner of the real property is not important. The user is not
important. What is only important is how it is used.
3. If real property is also used for one or more commercial purposes,
it is not “exclusively” used for the exempted purposes under the
Constitution. (Lung Center v Quezon City, 2000)
1. DIMAAMPAO: The rule enunciated in Herrera v Quezon City,
1961, that the exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary to accomplish the
RCE purposes is ABANDONED.
2. DLSU v CIR, 2016: Those facilities incidental to and
reasonably necessary to accomplish the RCE purposes are
still EXEMPT from real property tax.
4. As illustrations:
1. XYZ Corporation leased its building to the INC Church. The
latter used it for their weekly religious worship. The Local
Government, however, assessed XYZ Corporation for RPT. Is
the property exempt from RPT? Yes, because the property is
ADE used for religious purposes.
2. The INC Church leased its vacant building to XYZ Mining Co.
The latter used the same as office of its employees. The Local
Government assessed the INC Church for RPT. Is the property
exempt from RPT? No, because the property is NOT ADE used
for religious purposes. It was used for commercial purposes.
3. The INC Church leased its vacant building to AAA University, a
nonstock nonprofit institution. The latter used the same as
classrooms for its K-12 Program. The Local Government
assessed the INC Church for RPT. Further, the BIR assessed
the INC Church for lease income. Lastly, the BIR assessed
AAA University for its income from the K-12 Program. The
income from the k-12 program was used to invest in treasury
bonds.
1. Is the INC Church exempt from RPT? Yes, because the
property is ADE used for educational purposes.
2. Is the INC Church exempt from income tax? No. Under
Section 30, nonstock nonprofit corporations organized
exclusively for religious purposes, where no part of its
income inure to its members, shall not be taxed for
2.