Rentetzi 2017

ENDE-619; No.
of Pages 12
Full text provided by www.sciencedirect.com

Endeavour Vol. xxx No. x
ScienceDirect
Determining Nuclear Fingerprints:

Glove Boxes, Radiation Protection, and
the International Atomic Energy
Agency
Maria Rentetzi*
National Technical University of Athens, Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, School of Applied Mathematics and
Physical Sciences, Zografou Campus, Zografou 15780, Athens, Greece
In a nuclear laboratory, a glove box is a windowed, carry out one of its core functions—providing credible
sealed container equipped with two flexible gloves that assurance that states are not diverting nuclear material
allow the user to manipulate nuclear materials from the from peaceful purposes.’’2
outside in an ostensibly safe environment. As a routine A product of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that
laboratory device, it invites neglect from historians and came into force in 1970, the first Safeguards Analytical
storytellers of science. Yet, since especially the Gulf Laboratory was established in 1967, in a facility leased by
War, glove boxes have put the interdependence of the IAEA, in order to detect the misuse of nuclear materi-
science, diplomacy, and politics into clear relief. Stand- als and technology and to ensure that member states were
ing at the intersection of history of science and inter- honoring their safeguards obligations. As provided by the
national history, technological materials and devices treaty, the IAEA had a mandate to verify that a member
such as the glove box can provide penetrating insight into state was living up to its commitment to use nuclear
the role of international diplomatic organizations to the materials for peaceful purposes and not for making nuclear
global circulation and control of scientific knowledge. weapons. As part of the verification process, nuclear sam-
The focus here is on the International Atomic Energy ples collected by IAEA safeguards inspectors from nuclear
Agency. fuel cycle processes were sent for analysis to the Safe-
guards Analytical Laboratory. Given the highly sensitive
On June 13, 2014, the front page of an International nature of samples derived from inspections in nuclear
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) news release featured Gab- facilities worldwide, each of these analyses was and is still
riele Voigt, director of the IAEA Office of Safeguards performed in a restricted and controlled area of the IAEA
Analytical Services, together with Vladimir Sucha, the laboratory specially equipped to avoid cross contamina-
European Commission Director General of the Joint Re- tion and tampering with samples. The glove box played a
search Center, in front of a large glove box. The heading key role in this process. Using state-of-the-art instru-
read, ‘‘Nuclear Material Laboratory: Meeting Milestones ments such as glove boxes allowed IAEA researchers to
Toward Full Operation.’’1 What they considered to be a accurately analyze radioactive swipe samples in a safe
milestone was the delivery of the first of twenty brand-new environment, determine minute traces of uranium or
glove boxes to the safeguards laboratory—currently the plutonium, and detect illicit uranium enrichment activity
Nuclear Material Laboratory—that would enable safe han- (Figure 1).
dling of nuclear materials. ‘‘By the end of 2014,’’ argued
Mark Scheland from the Department of Safeguards, ‘‘the As David Donohue, previously the head of the IAEA
IAEA will be operating a state-of-the art laboratory to help Clean Laboratory for Safeguards, described the process:
Analysis of samples can determine ‘nuclear finger-
prints’, and reveal indicators of past and current
*Fax: +30 210 7721618.
E-mail address: mrentetz@vt.edu activities in locations handling nuclear materials,
URL: http://mariarentetzi.weebly.com/ particularly those associated with uranium conver-
1
International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘Nuclear Material Laboratory: Meeting sion, fabrication, and enrichment. Determining such
Milestones Toward Full Operation,’’ accessed January 31, 2017, https://www.iaea.
org/newscenter/news/nuclear-material-laboratory-meeting-milestones-towards- cases, however, requires expertise and the right
full-operation. The photograph can be viewed at the link above. Its caption reads: ‘‘Ms. equipment—the fingerprints of different isotopes,
Gabriele Voigt, Director, IAEA Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, and Mr.
2
Vladimir Sucha, European Commission Director General for the Joint Research Mark Scheland, ‘‘Nuclear Material Laboratory: Meeting Milestones Wards Full
Center, inaugurate the first newly installed laboratory glove box in the IAEA Nuclear Operation,’’ IAEA News Release, June 13, 2014, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/
Material Laboratory.’’ news/nuclear-material-laboratory-meeting-milestones-towards-full-operation.
www.sciencedirect.com 0160-9327/ß 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.endeavour.2017.02.001
Please cite this article in press as: Rentetzi, M., Determining Nuclear Fingerprints: Glove Boxes, Radiation Protection, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Endeavour (2017), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.endeavour.2017.02.001
ENDE-619; No. of Pages 12
2 Endeavour Vol. xxx No. x
modernization of its laboratories, generously sponsored

by the European Union.4
But why, in 2014, did the IAEA trumpet the installation
of glove boxes, which were among the first and most
rudimentary tools of nuclear science, dating from the
mid-1940s? Standing at the intersection of history of sci-
ence and international history, technological materials
and devices can provide penetrating insight into the role
of international diplomatic organizations in the global
circulation and control of scientific knowledge. Material
objects define and contain the activities of scientific orga-
nizations. In the case of the IAEA, the glove box did not
only have actual practical necessity, as a way to provide a
safe and clean working environment. It had also symbolic
significance to a newly redefined agency. The glove box, as
a symbol, both points to major and real concerns over
international nuclear security and underlines a signifi-
cant evolution in the IAEA’s mission. From promoting
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and isotopes throughout
the second half of the twentieth century, the IAEA of the
twenty-first century has sifted focus—through elegant
diplomatic negotiations—to more oversight authority,
establishing a critical and influential policy mechanism
in order to enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
in member states.
Without a doubt, the IAEA has played a crucial role in a
number of scientific, political, and diplomatic issues rang-
ing from the establishment of nuclear industry and the
offer of technical assistance and the education of genera-
tions of scientists in nuclear matters in a number of
countries worldwide to the exercise of political power
and diplomatic influence in order to safeguard the use of
nuclear energy. Operating at the intersection of nuclear
Figure 1. Shown is a series of glove boxes, which permit gram quantities of
plutonium to be processed for analysis at the IAEA’s Safeguards Analytical science and diplomacy, the IAEA has attracted immense
Laboratory, 1985. (Courtesy of the Archives of the International Atomic Energy political attention throughout the second half of the twen-
Agency, no. A0739).
tieth century and continues to do so as we move well into
the twenty-first. The growing presence of scientific and
technical experts in IAEA’s diplomatic affairs and the
agency’s central role in settling global scientific issues
for example, can overlap, and an abundant constitu- make clear that the precondition for any scientific collabo-
ent of one element can mask a rare one. Reaching ration among nations has been their political cooperation.
conclusions can be tricky, often requiring multiple This increasing intimacy of postwar nuclear science with
dimensional analytical approaches.3 global diplomacy and the need of exhaustive diplomatic
negotiations in order to settle scientific issues on a global
scale necessitates a diplomatic turn in the history of sci-
In the mid-2000s it became obvious that IAEA could no ence: diplomacy becomes central in analyzing postwar
longer meet the high demand for its analytical services science and technology. Attention to global diplomacy
using an aged facility that did not even meet the United becomes necessary to understand how scientific knowledge
Nations safety requirements. A modernization program and technological materials have been shaped in reference
was soon put forward in order to improve IAEA’s analyti- to and shaped the course of nuclear matters. Given the
cal capabilities by completely renovating the safeguards sensitive intertwinement of science and diplomacy
laboratories. Glove boxes, as Voigt’s and Sucha’s photo- throughout the IAEA’s history, it is problematic that this
graph indicates, became the emblem of IAEA’s moderni- has been largely left to in-house historians. At the same
zation. The agency spent s0.680 million for the disposal of time, the rich material culture of IAEA’s laboratories has
older glove boxes and s77.16 million in total for the been neglected. Here I began to fill in the history of both.
3
David Donohue, ‘‘Key Tools for Nuclear Inspections: Advances in Environmental
4
Sampling Strengthen Safeguards,’’ Bulletin of the IAEA 44, no. 2 (2002): 17–23, on Caroline Aggestan-Pontoppida and Isabell Andernack, Interpretation and Appli-
20. The Clean Laboratory provides assurance that no undeclared activities have cation of IPSAS (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2016), 267; Green Andrew and Aabha Dixit,
occurred in any member states while the Nuclear Material Laboratory provides ‘‘IAEA Safeguards Labs More Efficient and Accurate Thanks to Recent Upgrades,’’
assurance that member states are providing accurate information concerning the IAEA Press Release, June 10, 2016, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/
types and quantities of nuclear materials held on their territory. iaea-safeguards-labs-more-efficient-and-accurate-thanks-to-recent-upgrades.
www.sciencedirect.com
Endeavour Vol. xxx No. x 3
Glove Boxes: The Shift from Radiation Protection to workers engaged in measuring samples against the
Nuclear Security Bureau’s radium standard), and even the equipment man-
Throughout the early twentieth century, physicists, biol- ufacturers were members of the advisory committee. Serv-
ogists, and physicians were confronted with ionizing radi- ing as the analog of the International X-Ray and Radium
ation, a challenge that simultaneously proved hazardous Protection Committee (known after 1950 as ICRP) created
and sparked innovations. Scientists struggled to define an a year earlier, the US committee adopted the recommen-
appropriate unit of radiation, invent suitable measure- dations of its English counterpart. Yet by the end of the
ment devices, detect and agree on the effects of radiation 1920s, industrial laboratories continued to pay scant at-
on biological systems, and identify the acceptable risk of tention to the safety of their workers who were often left
radiation exposure. The evolution of standards and the alone to address issues of control and safety individually.7
scientific controversies that emerged reflect the complexity A major shift in radiation protection occurred in radium
and messiness of scientists’ collaborative production and industry in early 1930s. Among the most profitable indus-
dissemination of what eventually comes to be considered to tries in the United States, radium factories had employed
be objective and reliable knowledge. It also reveals the young women to paint the dials on watches and instru-
powerful role of those scientific institutions that took on ments with radioactive paint since the early 1910s. By the
the task of creating these standards. From the German mid-1920s, numerous dial painters from the major dial
Roentgen Society and its first recommendations to users of painting studios suffered from radium poisoning and many
X-ray technologies in 1913, to the establishment of the field of them went through painful and abhorrent deaths. Only
of ‘‘health physics’’ at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the in 1933 did the US Public Health Service suggested safe
University of Chicago during World War II, scientific practice guidelines for painting luminous watch dials.8
institutions forged new attitudes toward acceptable radiation With the outbreak of World War II, the US Army and
risks, tolerable radiation doses, and radiation protection. Navy needed a number of luminous instruments, and so
Before World War II the term radiation protection dial painters were urgently employed. The US Department
signified mainly the protection against radiation risks of Health pressed for occupational protection standards in
associated with radium and X-rays. Those working in the dial painting industry. It was the US Navy Medical
university laboratories conducting research on radioactiv- Corps who literally forced Robley Evans, a physicist at the
ity often ignored radiation hazards altogether. The California Institute of Technology and an expert in radium
Cavendish laboratory manager George Crowe disregarded poisoning, to collaborate on the project. By 1944 a committee
the only laboratory safety rule to wear rubber gloves to responsible for radiation protection standards from the Man-
protect his skin from radiation burns. In Vienna, during hattan Project consulted Evans in order to establish safety
the 1910s, when Otto Hönigschmidt carried out his atomic equipment and procedures for their own laboratories.9
weight experiments, he homogenized the radium solution Eventually, during the interwar period, radiation pro-
shaking it by hand. Stefan Meyer, director of the Vienna tection shifted from being a secondary concern of radi-
Radium Institute, assured his personnel that protective ologists and radiological physicists to becoming the
masks were not needed when opening sealed tubes with subject of a new discipline.10 That was when glove boxes
radium salts, even throughout the 1920s.5
The community of radiologists was more concerned. In 7
Daniel Powel Serwer, ‘‘The Rise of Radiation Protection’’ (PhD dissertation,
1922 George Edward Pfahler, the most prominent radiolo- Princeton University, 1977).
8
gist in the United States, took up a major concern within Clark, Claudia, Radium Girls: Women and Industrial Health Reform, 1910–1935
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Concerning the other
the community of radiologist, the safety issues of handling important group of workers related to the radium industry, the miners, research on
X-rays and radium. He was heading the American Radium their health condition came equally late. The first epidemiological studies of the lung
Society and was also president of the American College of carcinoma that often appeared as the main cause of death in uranium miners at
Joachimsthal in West Bohemia were conducted in early 1930s. Emilie Tesinska,
Radiology. He argued that ‘‘as the amount of radium used ‘‘Epidemiological Studies of Lung Carcinoma Incidence in Uranium Miners,’’ Prague
in medical practice increases, and as x-rays are being made Medical Report 110, no. 2 (2009): 165–70.
9
more powerful, we may be facing new dangers. It is better Maria Rentetzi, ‘‘Women Radium Dial Painters as Experimental Subjects or What
Counts as Human Experimentation,’’ in Twentieth Century Ethics of Human Subjects
that we investigate now.’’6 By 1929, triggered by the Research: Historical Perspectives on Values, Practices, and Regulations, ed. Roelcke
stream of deaths among laboratory workers who handled Volker and Giovanni Maio (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004) 275–91.
10
See, for example, Isaac Asimov and Theodosius Dobzhansky, The Genetic Effects of
radioactive materials, all major radiological societies in the
Radiation (US Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Technical Information, 1966);
United State joined forces in establishing the Advisory Roger Clarke and Jack Valentin, ‘‘The History of ICRP and the Evolution of its
Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection. Representa- Politics,’’ Annals of the ICRP 39, no. 3 (2009): 75–86; Catherine Caufield, Multiple
Exposures: Chronicles of the Radiation Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
tives of the American Roentgen Society, the American 1989); Bettyann Kevles, Naked to the Bone: Medical Imaging in the Twentieth Century
Medical Association, the Radiological Society of North (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997); R. Preston, ‘‘Radiation Biology:
America, the National Bureau of Standards (which, in Concepts for Radiation Protection,’’ Health Physics 88 (2005): 545–56; D. P. Serwer,
The Rise of Radiation Protection: Science, Medicine and Technology in Society 1896–
the meantime, was running its own investigations of 1935, Brookhaven National Laboratory Report BNL-22279, December 1976; Lauris-
ton Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1971);
5
Timothy Jorgensen, Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation (Princeton: Princeton Organization for Radiation Protection: The Operations of the ICRP and NCRP,
University Press, 2016), 67. Maria Rentetzi, Trafficking Materials and Gendered 1928–1974 (Washington, DC: National Technical Information Service, 1979); Samuel
Experimental Practices: Radium Research in Early 20th Century Vienna (New York: Walker and Thomas Wellock, ‘‘A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946–2009,’’ US
Columbia University Press, 2008), chapter 2, esp. 34–36, http://www.gutenberg-e.org/ Nuclear Regulatory Commission report no. NUREG/BR-0175, Revision 2, 2010, http://
rentetzi/chapter02.html#txt43. large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/baumer2/docs/ML102980443.pdf; Gilbert F.
6
George E. Pfahler, ‘‘The Effects of the X-Rays and Radium on the Blood and Whittemore, The National Committee on Radiation Protection, 1928–1960: From
General Health of Radiologists,’’ American Journal of Roentgenology 9 (1922): 647–56, Professional Guidelines to Government Regulation (PhD dissertation, Harvard Uni-
on 647. versity, 1986).
made their appearance. The idea behind their design and adoption of new medical technologies such as radio-
was to ensure minimum risk to workers dealing with isotope-teletherapy units and the growth of the nuclear
radioactive materials in nuclear facilities and defense power industry, posed numerous challenges in the field
laboratories during World War II. The atomic weapons of radiation protection. The rise of radiotherapy and the
program drove the development of the first such protec- introduction of medical technologies into the clinic were
tive devices.11 Early boxes were fabricated of stainless closely connected to the military strategies of the US
steel with windows of safety glass. The metal parts Atomic Energy Commission during the Cold War.14 The
inside the box were painted with a strippable plastic mass quantities and new types of radiation and radioac-
base paint. The earliest type of enclosed protective tive materials led to new approaches in the field and
equipment was actually the dust box, a closed cylinder created the space for the international regulation of
two to four feet in diameter and two to three feet tall. The radiation risks. The transition from pre- to postwar
lower part of the cylinder was closed by metal while the nuclear science and technology was marked by a shift
upper part was covered with glass, allowing a view of the in emphasis from radiation protection to nuclear safe-
interior. Two closed armholes equipped with long- ty.15 Gradually, glove boxes were introduced to all big
sleeved rubber gloves protected the workers from alpha nuclear experimental laboratories and production
emitters and allowed safe manipulation of highly dan- plants. But despite the fact that training manuals
gerous materials such as plutonium. highlighted the importance of their use for worker’s
In the experimental laboratories and the production safety, radiation protection did not always ensue. Glove
plants where nuclear fission was in operation, researchers boxes themselves proved to be a serious source of acci-
had to recognize that handling radioactive materials could dental overexposure. The following examples are illus-
have lifelong consequences; they had to be constantly trative.
aware of possible radiation risks and prevent contamina- On June 12, 1964, an employee was working in a glove
tion. The new challenge was to persuade them that unnec- box preparing plutonium triggers for hydrogen bombs at
essary exposure to radiation had biological effects and the US Rocky Flats Division, operated by the Dow
train them to handle hazardous materials properly. Those Chemical Company. When he accidentally dropped plu-
working with radioactive sources had to be shielded tonium in a chemical bath, the box exploded instantly.
against three different kinds of radiation: alpha, beta, Its window was shattered and plutonium contaminated
and gamma rays. Although shielding against alpha radia- the working area. The operator, a male chemist, seri-
tion involved simply the use of rubber gloves that pre- ously injured his gloved left hand and was exposed to a
vented contamination of the skin, beta and gamma rays high concentration of airborne plutonium. His case,
required handling distant sources by remote control. 12 among many others, contributed to the determination
The lack of medical knowledge of radiation overexpo- of acceptable radiation doses in the human body
sure led to wider use of glove boxes as a preventive (Figure 2).16
measure. The objective was clear in a 1946 classified The case most widely discussed is that of Harold
report of the Argonne National Laboratory: ‘‘Our pres- McCluskey, which occurred on August 30, 1976. McClus-
ent means of therapy of persons who are over-exposed to key, a sixty-four-year-old chemical technician, was work-
external radiations or of persons who have dangerous ing at the Plutonium Finishing Plant of the Hanford
quantities of radioactive materials deposited in their Nuclear Reservation, a major US site for the production
bodies leaves much to be desired. Practically speaking of plutonium during the Manhattan Project. The site was
there is no rational or specific treatment for the disor- established in 1949 for the production of plutonium metal
ders induced by these radiations. As a consequence, for nuclear weapons. McCluskey was responsible for pro-
protection of the worker from these substances is of ducing americium 241, a plutonium byproduct. Along with
the utmost importance.’’13 his colleagues, he had just returned to work after a suc-
In the aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and cessful five-month strike demanding increased wages. Af-
Nagasaki, conceptualization of radiation protection ter that time, the radioactive material he was working with
changed radically. The new scientific evidence of genetic had become unstable. As soon as he handled the chemicals,
and somatic effects at lower doses of radiation led the the glove box ruptured, exposing him to a massive dose of
ICRP to revise downward their prewar radiation protec- radiation. In a few seconds, he absorbed 500 times the
tion recommendations. The widespread use of radioac- allowable lifetime dose. No one had seen anything similar
tive materials in industry, the broad public concern about until then, as his physician reported. According to the
the effects of radiation, as well as the rapid development Seattle Times, McCluskey was ‘‘too hot to handle’’ and
‘‘was removed by remote control and transported to a
14
Ellen Leopold, Under the Radar: Cancer and the Cold War Critical Issues in
Health and Medicine (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009); Gerald
11
C. J. Barton, A Review of Glove Box Construction and Experimentation (Oak Ridge, Kutcher, Contested Medicine: Cancer Research and the Military (Chicago: University
TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1961); Tim Coles, Isolation Technology: A of Chicago Press, 2009).
15
Practical Guide (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2004). According to the IAEA glossary, the ways we use the two terms today are the
12
External exposure to alpha emitters presents low health risk in contrast to following: radiation protection refers to the protection of people and the environment
internal exposure, which has serious biological effects and increases the risk of cancer. against radiation risks while nuclear safety denotes the safety of facilities and
13
J. J. Nickson, ‘‘Protective Measures for Personnel,’’ Argonne National Laboratory, activities that give rise to radiation risks. IAEA Safety Glossary, Terminology Used
report received on 30 January 1947, operated by the University of Chicago under in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (Vienna: IAEA, 2007), 2.
16
contract no. W-31-109-eng-38, 1, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark%3A/67531/ E. A. Putzier et al., ‘‘Acute Internal Exposure to Plutonium,’’ in Personnel Dosim-
metadc624550/. etry for Radiation Accidents (Vienna: IAEA, 1965), 551–66.
facility. The Y-12 plant is normally closed to the public,’’ as

we are informed, but ‘‘extra security measures were taken
to make the DOE approved tour possible.’’ The event was
considered a tremendous success. ‘‘Many questions such as
‘What is it?’, ‘What’s a glovebox?’, and ‘Why can’t you. . .?’ as
well as ‘What do you do for a living, Daddy?’ were answered
by the display.’’ Needless to say, such facilities were male
dominated.18
In these early days, promoting glove boxes in the nucle-
ar industry and research laboratories served a twofold
purpose: it created what often proved to be an illusion of
a safe work environment for those involved in production
and research and at the same time eased the way to
nuclear regulations. By the end of the 1950s, the interna-
tional nuclear regulatory system started to take shape as
result of the geopolitical division of the Cold War. By the
mid-1980s, regulation had become an instrument of social
management and a matter of political dispute among UN
agencies, established international disciplinary organiza-
tions, state and non-state actors, groups of prominent
scientists, and uneasy diplomats. By early 1990s the focus
shifted once again, this time from nuclear safety to security
as the result of the Iraqi crisis and an indication of the new
IAEA safeguards systems that took shape following it.
Glove boxes proved to be central in this shift while nuclear
forensics—the analysis of nuclear material for purposes of
national security—was deployed to address cases of illegal
smuggling of nuclear materials during this period. It was
Figure 2. A worker at the Rocky Flats Plant is holding a ‘‘plutonium button’’ inside
the time that the idea of collecting and analyzing swipe
a glove box, 1973. Using the ‘‘safe’’ environment of a glove box, employees at
Rocky Flats reprocessed plutonium scraps resulting from production and samples as forensic evidence of nuclear unauthorized ac-
plutonium recovered from retired nuclear weapons into valuable pure-plutonium tivities was born.19
metal. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/
co0471.photos.316830p/).
This last part of the history of radiation protection
transcends national borders. It enters into a broader con-
text of international politics and diplomatic negotiations
where centralized global institutions and science diplo-
steel-and-concrete isolation tank.’’ He made medical histo- mats played significant roles. The IAEA, the only United
ry, surviving the accident and living eleven more years.17 Nations body with specific statutory responsibilities for
Despite the postwar emphasis on nuclear safety, acci- radiation protection and safety in all sectors, features
dents continued well into the 1980s. In order to further prominently in this story.
promote safety and quality of glove box systems and to
develop standards and guidelines for glove box technology, The Establishment of the IAEA and Its Safeguards
a group of nuclear engineers formed the American Glove System
Box Society in 1986. Three years later, the Society’s news- Immediately after the end of Word War II, Clement
letter reported extensively on the Family Day Glove Box Richard Attlee, England’s Prime Minister, urged US Pres-
Display that took place at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. ident Harry Truman and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie
During World War II, the plant was part of the Manhattan
Project, where uranium was enriched for the first atomic 18
‘‘Y-12 Family Day Glove Box Display . . . A Big Success,’’ The Enclosure, American
bombs. Throughout the 1980s, however, it attracted the Glove Box Society 3, no. 2 (1989): 5. The few women who were employed by nuclear
interest of anti-nuclear protesters. Thus, it is not by chance industries to operate glove boxes were seen as intruders by their male colleagues.
According to one of them, Jacqueline Brever, who was hired at Rocky Flats in 1982 and
that in 1989 the plant opened its doors providing ‘‘a rare worked as chemical operator, ‘‘back in those days, very few women did that job. And
opportunity to educate the public about glove boxes. Fami- the men did not like it AT ALL; they had a little club going on in there for, what,
ly members of employees were given a four-hour tour of the 30 years? So, here come all these women, and a lot of them did not like it.’’ See
Jacqueline Brever, interview with LeRoy Moore, June 4, 1999, Boudler Library, Maria
Rogers Oral History Program at the Carnegie Library for Local History, http://
17
James Mahaffey, Atomic Accidents: A History of Meltdowns and Disasters (New oralhistory.boulderlibrary.org/transcript/oh1498t.pdf.
19
York: Pegasus 2014). The room where the accident took place was named after Vitaly Fedchenko, ed., The New Nuclear Forensics: Analysis of Nuclear Materials
McCluskey and remained closed since then. Operating for over forty years, the for Security Purposes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Today nuclear forensics
Plutonium Finishing Plant has been characterized by the US Department of Energy denotes ‘‘the technical means by which nuclear materials, whether intercepted intact
(DOE) as the most complex and hazardous facility in the country. Since 2009, DOE has or retrieved from post-explosion debris, are characterized (as to composition, physical
been working on cleaning up the site and demolishing the buildings. By July 2014, at condition, age, provenance, history) and interpreted (as to provenance, industrial
least 213 out of 238 glove boxes were cleaned out and removed. ‘‘The McCluskey history and implications for nuclear device design).’’ Nuclear forensics is necessarily
Room,’’ as the DOE representative argued, ‘‘is going to be the toughest work ahead of combined with law enforcements and intelligence data. Joint Working Group of the
us as we finish cleaning the plant and getting it ready for demolition by the end of American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of
September 2016.’’ See Nicholas Geranios, ‘‘Feds to Clean Site of Hanford’s 1976 ‘Atom- Science, Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs (APS & AAAS, 2008),
ic Man’ Accident,’’ The Seattle Times, July 2, 2014. 9.
King to meet in Washington to discuss their wartime development authority,’’ and some form of preliminary
atomic agreements and the control of atomic energy. On safeguard system, which, by means of inspection and
November 15, 1945, they issued a ‘‘Three State Declaration control of nuclear materials, could protect complying states
on Atomic Energy’’ aiming at international control of against those that violated the agreement.23
atomic energy. They were aware that the only protection The Baruch plan was rejected by the Soviet Union and
from the misuse of nuclear energy was the prevention of remained the official American policy only until 1953.24
war and that no system of safeguards could be devised to Given the frozen positions of the United States and the
provide an effective guarantee against production of atom- Soviet Union, the UNAEC in 1948 reported that there was
ic weapons. ‘‘We are, however, prepared to share, on a no obvious reason to carry on further negotiations in the
reciprocal basis with others of the United Nations, detailed General Assembly. The committee was formally abolished
information concerning the practical industrial application in 1952. Concerning safeguards, the United States re-
of atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safe- quired their application only to those bilateral agreements
guards against its use for destructive purposes can be that the country signed with other nations when providing
devised,’’ they declared. It was the first time that the idea nuclear technologies, radioactive materials, and expertise.
of safeguarding nuclear energy was clearly on the table. By the end of 1959, the United States had indeed signed
The real fear was that, without control, the international forty-two bilateral agreements for the establishment of
nuclear trade could lead to nuclear proliferation.20 experimental reactors worldwide. The same safeguards
Soon thereafter, Vannevar Bush, former science advisor system was in effect for the British and Canadian agree-
to President Roosevelt and overall an ‘‘engineer of the ments.
American century,’’ suggested a study committee to Secre- In the midst of the Cold War, the Eisenhower Adminis-
tary of State James Byrnes ‘‘to study the subject of controls tration proposed a plan more modest than the Baruch plan,
and safeguards necessary to protect this Government . . . which led to the creation of the International Atomic
anticipating favorable action by the United Nations Orga- Energy Agency in 1957. Eisenhower told the General
nization on the proposal for the establishment of a com- Assembly on December 8, 1953: ‘‘We would expect that
mission to consider the problems arising as to the control of such an agency would be set under the aegis of the United
atomic energy and other weapons of possible mass destruc- Nations.’’ The most important responsibility of the agency
tion.’’21 Bush suggested bringing the Soviet Union into the would be to devise appropriate methods for the available
negotiations. Finally, in December 1945, the Soviet Union fissionable material to serve only the peaceful uses of
accepted the proposal. As a result, in January 1946, the atomic energy. The second objective was to develop the
first session of the United Nations General Assembly nuclear industry so as to provide electrical energy in the
approved the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission ‘‘power-starved areas of the world.’’ Finally, the third major
(UNAEC) that aimed to elevate the control of atomic objective was related to the issue of disarmament, al-
energy to an international level. though was not presented clearly as such. Eisenhower’s
Meanwhile, two documents shaped Americans’ attitude plan was to ‘‘begin to diminish the potential destructive
toward nuclear energy. The first, One World or None, an power of the world’s atomic stockpiles.’’25
eighty-six-page paperback published by the Federation of Bernhard Bechhoefer, an attorney who acted as a spe-
American Scientists, promised to be ‘‘a report to the public cial assistant to the US representative during the negotia-
on the full meaning of the atomic bomb.’’22 Forwarded by tions that followed Eisenhower’s proposal, characterized it
Niels Bohr and with an extended introduction by Arthur as a ‘‘splendid performance,’’ a speech that revealed the
Compton, the book was written by a number of prominent president’s decision to shift the emphasis from the destruc-
scientists to promote ‘‘the peaceful atom’’ and described the tive potentials of nuclear weapons to the peaceful uses of
potential horrors of atomic bombs. The second, the Ache- the atom.26 According to John Hall, Deputy Director of the
son-Lilienthal Report, represented the scientists’ most IAEA from 1961 to 1964, Eisenhower’s success was based
coherent view of what the international control of atomic rather on his limited nuclear disarmament plan and mod-
energy could mean. Major elements of the report were later est regulatory proposal.27 Despite the different interpreta-
incorporated to the Baruch plan, named by Bernard Ba- tions, what is peculiar about this proposal is that it actually
ruch, the first US representative to the United Nations. As worked out. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations
an early instance of nuclear non-proliferation, the plan James Wadsworth claimed in 1956 the negotiations for
asked for the establishment of an ‘‘international atomic the establishment of the IAEA were the most successful
East-West negotiations since the end of World War II.
20
Atomic Energy, Agreed declaration signed at Washington, November 15,1945.
Bechhoefer and Eric Stein, professor of law at the Univer-
Entered into force November 15, 1945, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/ sity of Michigan and an advisor to the US representative,
bevans/m-ust000003-1304.pdf. See also The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, Interna-
tional Nuclear Verification Series 2 (Vienna: IAEA, 1998), http://www-pub.iaea.org/
23
MTCD/Publications/PDF/NVS2_web.pdf. The Baruch Plan speech is reprinted in: Bernard M. Baruch, ‘‘The American
21
Joseph Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: Unabated Nations, UN Proposal for International Control,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2, nos. 1 and 2
Reform, Atomic Control (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); John Hall, ‘‘The International (1946): 3–5, 10.
24
Atomic Energy Agency: Origins and Early Years,’’ IAEA Bulletin 2 (1987): 47–54; Bertrand Goldschmidt, ‘‘A Forerunner of the NPT? The Soviet Proposals of 1947,’’
Zachary Pascal, Endless Frontier: Engineer of the American Century (Cambridge, MA: IAEA Bulletin, 28, no. 1 (1986.): 58–64.
25
MIT Press, 1999). See also the Acheson-Lilienthal Report: Committee on Atomic Eisenhower’s speech is available online at: http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/
Energy, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Department of State research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.
26
Publication 2498 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946). Bernhard Bechhoefer, ‘‘Negotiating the Statue of the International Atomic Energy
22
Dexter Masters and Katharine Way, One World or None: a Report to the Public on Agency,’’ International Organization, 13, no. 1 (1959): 38–59, 40.
27
the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb (New York: McGraw Hill, 1946). Hall, ‘‘International Atomic Energy Agency’’ (ref. 21).
carefully documented the six separate stages of the nego- mattered a great deal. In the widely circulated IAEA
tiation process: (1) the secretive bilateral exchanges be- Bulletin, Cole described the establishment of the agency
tween the United States and the Soviet Union throughout in a triumphal way: ‘‘Thanks to the forceful initiative of the
1954 and 1955, which came to a futile end while the Soviets scientists of the world, the atom has been taken from its
insisted on their own disarmament suggestions; (2) the fictional black box of secrecy and placed in the sum of
discussion of the issue during the ninth United Nations human enlightenment. Tremendous progress has been
assembly in 1954 wherein the United States determined to made. Close your eyes for a moment and think back to
go ahead even without Soviet agreement; (3) the initiative the atomic world of 1953 then open them to the world of
of the Americans to include eight states in an informal today. The contrast is the difference between darkness
discussion about the establishment of the agency;28 and (4) light.’’32
the discussion of the draft of the agency’s statue that came The enthusiasm and great expectations of the IAEA’s
from the previous year’s General Assembly. In the mean- first years have been demonstrated in several cases. For
time, the negotiating group had been enlarged to include example, in 1960, Gunnar Randers, then member of
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil. By the IAEA’s Board of Governors, pointed out what he believed
end of the Assembly, the Statue had been transmitted to was the most peculiar feature of the new organization:
eighty-four member states. ‘‘The IAEA is generally considered to be a technical agency.
The fifth stage, known as the ‘‘working level meeting’’ That means it is supposed to center its activities around
among the twelve negotiating states, secured an agree- certain specialized technical problems. . . Solving technical
ment and submitted a final text of the IAEA statue to the problems should be possible without stumbling over politi-
International United Nations Conference of eighty-one cal obstacles.’’33 A Norwegian physicist and director of the
states met in October 1956. That meeting marked the final Norwegian Atomic Energy Institute, Randers had been
stage of the negotiations process when it reached unani- asked that year to chair a committee of experts on the
mous agreement and adopted the IAEA statue on 23 Octo- application of safeguards to reactors smaller than 100 MW,
ber. Sterling Cole, a lawyer and US Republican which were chiefly research and experimental reactors.
congressman, attended the meeting as a member of the Yet, in an article at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in
Congress and advisor to the American delegation. ‘‘While I 1961, Randers declared: ‘‘I now believe that the question is
was there’’ Cole recalled, ‘‘I had a letter from [Lewis] not as simple as that. . . The IAEA cannot be considered a
Strauss saying that he had talked with Eisenhower and purely technical organization—rather, one could call it a
with [John Foster] Dulles about the director generalship of techno-political organization. . . When a technical matter
IAEA and they both agreed that I should be nominated for has left the laboratories of purely academic research and,
it by the U.S.’’29 Yet, there had been the understanding begins to touch upon these questions [meaning future
that the first Director General of such a scientifically industry, armament, and technical assistance] it can no
specialized international agency ought to be a scientist longer be dealt with on an international scale without
from a neutral country. Cole’s candidacy announced at a taking political problems into consideration.’’34
New York Times article in August 1957 reinforced Cold Randers was not the only one who recognized the close
War strains. It also signaled a shift toward diplomacy as interrelation of science and politics; or, to be more specific,
means in settling scientific issues on a global scale.30 of science and international diplomacy. Sterling Cole, the
As a next step, a preparatory commission came into first Director General of the IAEA was astonished to find
existence after the IAEA statute was opened for signature. out that he was not going to be reelected in 1961, ‘‘having
Composed by an enlarged group of member states, it been assured by my government before I agreed to serve as
remained in existence until the United Nations General director general that this job was not a political plum,
Conference of 1957, when the statute was ratified by subject to rules of patronage when there was change in the
twenty-six member states and entered into force on July administration. I was very disturbed because I thought, of
29, 1957. As Cole later described in an interview: ‘‘In course, until there was some criticism of the work—and I
September of 1957 the agency started. On October 4 I had heard none—I went along thinking that I would be
was elected unanimously by all of the ountry members. reelected. Never before had the U.S. considered interna-
Also on October 4 was the announcement of the first tional service to be a political plum.’’35
successful Sputnik. I chided the Russians for deliberately Nations welcomed the establishment of the agency for
using this date to demonstrate their terrific accomplish- diverse political reasons, but almost all shared the expec-
ments in science technology, thereby putting news of my tation of acquiring nuclear energy in order to bolster
election as director general on the ack page.’’31 Diplomacy industrial development. Yet the IAEA’s application of a
centralized safeguards system was not equally welcomed.
28
The eight states were, in addition to the Untied States, Australia, Belgium, According to David Fischer, Director General of IAEA’s
Canada, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa. For the
explanation of the reasoning for such a selection see Bechhoefer, ‘‘Negotiating the
External Relations and also its internal historian, ‘‘the
Statue’’ (ref. 26), 45. Agency’s safeguards initially encountered mistrust and
29
Sterling Cole, interview with C. Morrissey, August 24, 1978. W. Sterling Cole
32
papers, col. no. 2081, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Sterling Cole, ‘‘Humanity Demands no Less,’’ IAEA Bulletin 0–1 (September
Library, page 11. 1958): 2.
30 33
David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: IAEA, Gunnar Randers, ‘‘International Atomic Energy Agency: The Scientist’s View,’’
1997), 59; Kathleen McLaughlin, ‘‘U.S. Chief Foreseen for World Atom Unit; U.S. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 15, no. 4 (1959): 163–67.
34
Likely to Get World Atom Post Agency Established in July.’’ The New York Gunnar Randers, ‘‘What About Vienna?,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 17, no.1
Times. August 16,1. 1957. (1961): 20–23.
31 35
Cole, interview with Morrissey (ref. 29), 12. Cole, interview with Morrissey (ref. 29), p. 13.
resistance, especially from its developing country mem- to apply a limited system of safeguards that covered only
bers, but also from its Soviet bloc and some West European the research and experimental reactors of the day.
states intent on protecting Euratom.’’ The European Atom- The reluctance of nations to place their programs under
ic Energy Community (Euratom) was actually the first that international control was smoothen only when the Unite
institutionalized safeguards at a regional level in States decided to transfer to the IAEA responsibility for
1957. Some European countries saw the IAEA’s attempt safeguarding its nuclear exports to non-European coun-
to establish a safeguards system as a direct threat to tries. The fact that the Soviets gave full support to the
Euratom.36 But the international scenery was more com- IAEA safeguards system in 1963 also leveled debates.
plex than this. From 1965 to 1967, the IAEA was able to review its
The US favored bilateral atomic agreements made di- safeguard system and establish a more rigorous one cov-
rectly with other countries or organizations and not ering reactors of all sizes, reprocessing plants, and fuel
through the IAEA. Cole was relentless on his attracts on fabrication plants. A major turning point was the
the philosophy of bilateralism, arguing that bilateral 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
agreements undermined IAEA’s authority. According to (NPT) that allowed the application of safeguards to all
him the US was ‘‘dangerously and foolishly letting all the nuclear material in the states that had not acquired
supplying countries of nuclear materials making their nuclear weapons. The treaty entered into force in 1970 and
own rules.’’37 Cole’s opposition to the US strategy created the Board of Governors approved the IAEA safeguards
tensions within his own country. In the US Congress, his system a year later. Although limited, the safeguards
fellow Republicans felt uneasy with his insistence to grant system focused on nuclear sites that each member state
more power to the IAEA, while his previous enemies, the declared as such and willingly placed under the IAEA
Democrats, saw in it a great opportunity to attack Eisen- inspection. The possibility that undeclared plants might
hower’s foreign policies. Being isolated in Vienna, Cole exist remained, but the IAEA safeguards had no power to
found himself unable to strengthen IAEA’s international inspect them. The architects of the system assumed that
role in regulating the circulation of fissionable materials clandestine nuclear programs and undeclared plants
and, in the long run, to get reelected as Director General. would be detected by other means. It took them two
In 1957 the Russians supported the Indian position in decades to realize that only a stronger safeguards system
opposing effective safeguards. In 1958 the US made clear had the chance to unmask illicit nuclear activities.
that they did not want to allow the IAEA to implement any
kind of safeguards to its NATO allies. The same year, the Transforming Safeguards
Soviet Union opposed any supervision and inspection of As David Donohue argues, ‘‘For the international commu-
countries that received Soviet atomic aid. During the nity, the summer of 1991 was a turning point of scientific
1958 General Conference, Soviets and Indians together discovery, one that set the stage for stronger nuclear safe-
opposed any provision in IAEA’s budget for staffing the guards.’’ He continues, ‘‘IAEA and United Nations and
Department of Safeguards. The argument was that there inspectors were combining the rubble of Iraq’s nuclear
were no IAEA projects in the area of safeguards that installations looking for evidence for a secret program to
demanded funding. Having first excluding the possibility produce atomic bombs, something expressively forbade by
of applying safeguards, they were now alleging that there Iraq’s ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
was no such demand. The representative from Japan was Nuclear Weapons (NTP).’’39
among the very few who strongly supported the idea of Chief Inspector Demetrius Perricos headed the first
creating and staffing the Department. As he argued ‘‘one team that landed in Baghdad. Despite their persistent
must open shop before one can expect to have costumers.’’38 attempts, inspectors were not able to find any evidence
When the first safeguards agreement to cover a small of a nuclear weapons program. According to Leslie Thorne,
Japanese reactor and its fuel came before the agency’s a member of the team, the sites were stripped of equipment
Board of Governors in 1959, a fierce debate ensued once and the Iraqis did not facilitate the inspection in any way.
again. It was indicative of the Cold War tensions apparent Subsequent intelligent information after the first visit
in the new global geopolitical order. In 1960 Cole circulated proved that Iraqis uncovered and removed buried disc-
a proposed safeguards agreement to the seventy govern- shape objects from their previously major nuclear research
ments belonging to the IAEA at the time. The plan was site. The interesting piece in this story is that, during its
modest. It demanded on-the-spot inspection visits to coun- second inspection mission, the IAEA team decided to follow
tries operated installations with nuclear material obtained a more aggressive strategy. Giving no warning on where
through the agency and the agency’s approval of reactor the inspection was going to take place, the team appeared
design of the recipient nations. Those countries that did not one day at the gates of a large military camp. Admission
obtain their nuclear material from the agency were not was refused. ‘‘While this was going on,’’ Thorne explained,
obliged to accept safeguards inspections. By the end of the ‘‘two members of the team climbed to the top of a nearby
day and after sharp diplomatic debates, the IAEA was able water tower and spotted a convoy moving off through a rear
exit. Two other team members drove off at high speed to
36
On the diplomatic background to Euratom see John Krige. Sharing Knowledge,
intercept the convoy. This was not simple since the convoy
Shaping Europe: US Technological Collaboration and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, was several miles away and the only way to bypass the
MA: MIT Press, 2016). camp was by a tortuous route through local village markets
37
H. L. Nieburg, ‘‘Atoms for Peace: Hopes Deferred,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
20, no. 1 (1964): 35–40.
38 39
Ibid., 38. Donohue, ‘‘Key Tools for Nuclear Inspections’’ (ref. 3).
and cutting onto a motorway.’’ The trucks were loaded with at hand. Only later did a commercial consortium from two
the missing equipment and ‘‘the evidence was obtained.’’40 member states enter contract negotiations that lasted
In retrospect, as Mohamed ElBaradei argues, ‘‘far from several months.44
encouraging cooperation in Iraq, the inspector’s invasive Aside from removing all nuclear material from Iraq, the
‘cowboy’ behavior naturally caused a buildup of resent- UN Security Council devolved the IAEA to destroy all
ment on the part of the Iraqi’s, particularly since these significant equipment as well. According to the IAEA plan,
arbitrary intrusions never yielded any results.’’ It was priority was given to the Electromagnetic Isotope Separa-
around that time when David Kay, a political scientist tion (EMIS) equipment, whose destruction involved cut-
from the United States and former mid-level manager in ting the magnetic pole pieces, the vacuum chambers, and
the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program, was assigned all associated equipment. In addition, they destroyed hot
as safeguards inspector and joined the Iraq mission. cells and glove boxes on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Center. A
According to ElBaradei, Kay and his fellow Americans nuclear complex south of Baghdad, Tuwaitha was
established a culture that was foreign to the IAEA inspec- equipped with hot cells and glove boxes for handling
tions. The predominantly American nuclear inspection radioactive material. The first extraction cycle of nuclear
team in Iraq was highly qualified in technical matters. repossessing, a highly active cycle, took place in hot cells,
Most of the scientists were coming from the top US nation- chambers equipped with tongs for remotely handling high-
al laboratories but ‘‘had no clue how to conduct interna- ly radioactive material. The second cycle, a lower radiation
tional inspections or, for that matter, about the nuances of process, was done in glove boxes. During the seventh
how to behave in different cultures.’’41 Trained as technical inspection, the IAEA team destroyed the hot cells by
experts and being qualified scientists, international diplo- cutting the manipulator arms and control wires. To ensure
macy was definitely not their strength. that no further use of the glove boxes could be possible,
IAEA inspectors were allowed to collect conventional inspectors poured cement into them (Figure 3).
samples from the Iraqi sites under investigation. ‘‘Inspec- In the aftermath of the unmasking of Iraq’s clandestine
tors innovated,’’ an IAEA representative explained. ‘‘They nuclear program, critical questions arose. Why over the
used cotton towels to ‘swipe’ items from the damaged years—Iraq had begun the program as early as 1982 short-
facility to check whether there were any traces of the kind ly after Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s research reactor at
of elements used in the facility prior to its destruction. An Osirak, south of Baghdad—had the IAEA missed this
entire spectrum of uranium—from depleted to highly undeclared nuclear program? The need for additional legal
enriched—was identified.’’42 The contaminated towels and oversight authority, in short, a stronger safeguards
were sent to Vienna and analyzed with the use of glove boxes system, became obvious to the IAEA. ‘‘The deliberate
at the safeguards laboratory. Through this process, glove deception carried out by Iraq had made clear that conduct-
boxes were turned into a major instrument of IAEA’s inter- ing international safeguards by ‘honor code’ was no longer
national policy and diplomatic negotiations and into an em- adequate,’’ admitted ElBaradei, ‘‘nor was it enough to
blem of scientific authority assuring the agency’s credibility. inspect only what a country declared; nor was IAEA au-
As a next step, and in between the second and third thority sufficient.’’45
inspection, IAEA Director General Hans Blix visited Bagh- IAEA’s experience with Iraq revealed a serious short-
dad trying to persuade the government to make a full coming of the safeguard system. Throughout the 1980s,
declaration of its uranium enrichment program. Under IAEA experts, based on the existing safeguards system,
the pressure of the international community and further had the right to inspect those facilities that Iraq had
developments based on information received from intelli- declared them to the IAEA and they were therefore offi-
gence sources, the Iraqi authorities presented a detailed cially under its regulatory juristiction. They missed those
list of relevant equipment and its location. It became that had been secretively developed for the production of
obvious that uranium enrichment and reprocessing activi- nuclear weapons. As Deputy Director General of Safe-
ties for plutonium separation were among Iraq’s clandes- guards Bruno Pellaud stressed, ‘‘The effectiveness of the
tine activities.43 IAEA safeguards system depends on what the agency
Finally, on November 15 and 17, 1991, the IAEA team knows about nuclear-related activities. With a broad
removed from Iraq all the strategically most significant knowledge of such activities and a good understanding
material, leaving behind 400 grams of irradiated high- of their relationships, the IAEA can with a fair degree of
enriched uranium. On the top of the diplomatic and politi- confidence assess the non-proliferation credentials of a
cal entanglements, a practical problem emerged: no fuel country.’’ So instead of ‘‘pilling up controls vertically on
handling organization was willing to sign a contract to existing nuclear facilities’’ the IAEA was aiming to ‘‘broad-
remove the fuel from Iraq, given the legal and safety issues en its horizontal view.’’46
The safeguards system needed to become stricter in
40
Leslie Thorne, ‘‘IAEA Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,’’ IAEA Bulletin 1 (1992): 16–24,
order to reduce the risk that other states might develop
on 20. clandestine nuclear programs. Technology was called on to
41
Mohamed ElBaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous play a crucial role in this change of worldview. But as
Times (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011), 14–15.
42
Aabha Dixit, ‘‘Swipe Check: Collecting and Analyzing Environmental Samples for
Pellaud explained, the IAEA was not planning to install
Nuclear Verification,’’ IAEA News Release, January 19, 2016, https://www.iaea.org/
44
newscenter/news/ United Nations Security Council, S/23295, December 17, 1991.
45
swipe-check-collecting-and-analysing-environmental-samples-nuclear-verification. ElBaradei, Age of Deception (ref. 41), 28.
43 46
For a detailed description of the IAEA inspections and related documents see Bruno Pellaud, ‘‘Safeguards: The Evolving Picture,’’ IAEA Bulletin, 4, no. 2 (1996):
INVO and Iraq Chronology: https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/chronology.html. 2–6.
Figure 3. Under supervision of the IAEA team, Iraqi workers pour concrete into glove boxes so they can no longer be used for proscribed activities at Tuwaitha, October
1991, 7th United Nations inspection in Iraq. (Courtesy of the Archives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, no. 4954).
traditional safeguards equipment for nuclear materials. Yet, ten year later, in 2007, it had become obvious that
Inspectors were supposed to walk freely around for visual the agency’s safeguards laboratory did not meet the UN
observations. When they judged it appropriate, they safety requirements because of its aging technical infra-
should be allowed to take an environmental swipe sample. structure and analytical equipment. The Board of Gover-
What was now distinctive was that the analysis did not nors was informed that the ability of the Safeguards
take place at the site. Instead, the IAEA primarily assessed Analytical Laboratories, known as SAL at the time, to
such information in its own facilities and, when necessary, provide independent and timely analysis of nuclear sam-
asked questions to check its consistency. This is known as ples collected by the safeguards inspectors was indeed at
‘‘environmental sampling for safeguards’’ or ESS. The risk. An international workshop held in 2006 and a follow-
IAEA developed what is called the ‘‘Clean Laboratory,’’ up study group of internal IAEA experts verified the need
part of the Safeguards Nuclear Material Laboratory. By to renovate the existing facilities and brought up the wider
1995 the IAEA had put in place a new safeguards agree- issue of the construction of new laboratory space. The
ment guided by a totally different philosophy. recommendations stirred a heated discussion among the
As a result, on May 13, 1997, the IAEA Board of Gov- delegates who met in Vienna on November 23, 2007, to
ernors adopted the Model Additional Protocol, a legal discuss ‘‘sustaining credible safeguards.’’
instrument and a milestone in the agency’s history that The issue at hand was whether the IAEA ought to
had the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the perform all sample analysis in its own laboratories or share
NPT safeguards system. The collection of environmental it among a network of verified national safeguards labora-
samples from the sites under inspection—and the technol- tories. As Eldin Elamin, Sudan’s delegate representing the
ogy for analyzing them—became central for the agency to Group 77—a loose coalition of developing countries at the
assure the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and United Nations that acted together in order to increase
activities.47 their negotiating capacity within the UN agencies—and
China argued, independence of the agency’s statuary ac-
47
IAEA Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540, 1997, https://www.iaea.org/ tivities was a precondition for its credibility. But instead of
safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol. arguing for the renovation of the agency’s laboratories,
Elamin favored the development of such laboratory facili- pervasive way.50 As routine material objects, I find boxes—
ties in IAEA member states so as to share SAL’s work glove boxes in this case—playing an additional yet unap-
burden. The Portuguese ambassador Joaquim Duarte, preciated role. They define and contain the activities of
speaking on behalf of the European Union, instead favored international organization and work as signs of multiple
the modernization plan so as the agency could perform transformations. They help the transformation of nuclear
analyses in a ‘‘cost-effective, accurate, confidential, and materials into parts of nuclear weapons, provide evidence
timely manner.’’48 Duarte had an additional reason to align of certain nuclear activities (authorized or not), guide
with the agency. Two months earlier Mohamed ElBaradei international nuclear policies, generate classified reports,
walked out on Duarte, who then represented the EU, frame political arguments. Scientific knowledge meets
during his speech as a protest because Duarte did not fully politics inside a glove box. In the early days, glove boxes
support ElBaradei’s deal for new inspections in Iran. It was allowed non-scientists to manipulate hazardous materials
now Duarte’s chance to offer the diplomatic backing ElBar- and participate in industrial production of nuclear weap-
adei had expected on a different issue a couple of months ons. Although often claimed otherwise, they proved to be
earlier. In an interesting intersection of nuclear science hazardous, raising questions about institutional radiation
and diplomacy, the Director General underlined the fact protection efforts. Gradually they became the emblem of
that the issue opened up Pandora’s box. The question was nuclear safety in US national laboratories, nuclear industries,
what kind of agency the member states wished to have in and nuclear international organizations such as the IAEA.
the years to come. Since its establishment, the IAEA has emerged as a
After much diplomatic maneuvering, in 2010 the Board powerful political, international organization closely con-
of Governors approved and signed the contract for the nected to the United Nations. Its member states are sup-
construction of a new laboratory for the analysis of nuclear posed to comply with IAEA’s guidelines and directives in
material samples, known now as the Safeguards Nuclear key issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, safety, and
Material Laboratory, or NML. The decision was based on health. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s trans-
the IAEA’s ambitious plan to address key international formed the global geopolitical map, allowing the IAEA to
security concerns in an independent way. In 2012, the fifty- play an even more powerful role in nuclear politics. But
sixth regular session of the General Conference, the high- what really affected the IAEA policies regarding safe-
est policy-making body of the IAEA, urged the Secretariat guards was the Iraqi crisis. At the turn of the twenty-first
to develop a strategic overarching plan of action for the century, public understanding of the IAEA’s role as nuclear
modernization of the laboratory at Seibersdorf and invited watchdog—often a biased one—was well established.
the member states to support the project financially. In- Shifting its emphasis from promoting peaceful uses of
deed, the modernization plan was generously supported by atomic energy to guarding nuclear security, the IAEA
individual member states and the European Union and has been perceived as irreplaceable in fostering nuclear
included, among other renovations, new laboratory build- security worldwide. At the same time, its credibility has
ings to host the NML. At the time, the Deputy Director been often questioned. Not by chance did Director General
General Herman Nackaerts argued that the new NML Yukiya Amano argue against this view in the Sustainable
building would ‘‘provide reliable, expandable, flexible work Development Summit in New York in 2015. ‘‘The IAEA
spaces for staff conducting analytical work at Seibers- delivers. We are much more than just the world’s nuclear
dorf—and do so within a coherent, safe, and secure Agency watchdog.’’51 A year later, at the Nuclear Industry Summit
complex.’’49 Since then, the agency’s safeguards system in Washington, DC, Amano clearly described the agency’s
has been radically strengthened by improving, not only role: ‘‘We provide guidance covering key aspects of nuclear
its legal and political mechanisms, but also by modern- security. We help to make borders more secure by instal-
izing its laboratories. This is why, in 2014, the IAEA ling radiation monitors at ports and border crossings. We
trumpeted the installation of the new glove boxes along help countries to improve physical protection at nuclear
with the renovation of the Safeguards Nuclear Material installations and hospitals, so that radioactive material is
Laboratory. not stolen. We provide training and equipment to law
Why Glove Boxes Matter

Science and technology studies scholars have shown that
boxes, although ordinary objects, define their content and 50
See for example, Alexander Klose, The Container Principle: How a Box Changes
by so doing produce knowledge about it. Especially in the Way We Think (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015); Maria Rentetzi, ‘‘Packaging
Radium, Selling Science: Boxes, Bottles, and Other Mundane Things in the World of
laboratory studies, boxes and all kinds of containers clas- Science,’’ Annals of Science 68, no. 3 (2011): 375–99; ‘‘The Box: Commonplace Artifacts
sify, tag, preserve, transport, and organize knowledge in a in the Production of Scientific Knowledge,’’ Backchannels, April 18, 2016, http://www.
4sonline.org/blog/post/the_box_commonplace_artifacts_in_the_production_of_
scientific_knowledge; Maria Rentetzi, ‘‘From Pyxis to Box: An Hymn to Pandora’’ in
48
Board of Governors, General Conference GOV/OR.1199, November 23, Boxes: A Fieldguide Susanne Bauer, Martina Schlünder, Maria Rentetzi (eds) (Manche-
2007. China never joined Group 77, but supported it in several occasions. ster: Mattering Press, 2017); Anke te Heesen, The World in a Box (Chicago: University of
49
Board of Governors, General Conference, GOV/INF/2013/11-GC(57)/INF/11, Au- Chicago Press, 2002); Sherry Turkle, Evocative Objects: Things We Think With (Cam-
gust 29, 2013; Board of Governors, GOV/OR.1199, November 23, 2007; Board of bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); The Inner History of Devices (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
Governors, General Conference, GOV/INF/2013/11-GC(57)/INF/11, 2August 29, 2011); Falling for Science: Objects in Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
51
2013; General Conference GC(56)/RES/12.5., September 2012; ‘‘Senior European Miklos Gaspar, ‘‘IAEA ‘much more than just the world’s nuclear watchdog’: >Di-
Officials Visit IAEA Labs in Seibersdorf,’’ IAEA News Release, May 15, 2013, rector General at Sustainable Development Summit,’’ IAEA Press Release, September
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/senior-european-officials-visit-iaea-labs- 29, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-much-more-than-
seibersdorf; ‘‘The IAEA Reviews its Trust to JACOMEX,’’ http://www.jacomex.fr/en/ just-the-worlds-nuclear-watchdog-director-general-at-sustainable-development-
all-news/news/detail/the-iaea-renews-its-trust-to-jacomex/. summit.
enforcement personnel to help them identify and intercept Proliferation Treaty within UN member states. The pic-
illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive mate- ture of Gabriele Voigt and Vadimir Sucha in front of the
rial.’’52 newly delivered glove boxes to the IAEA now makes more
The understanding of the IAEA as the global platform sense. As Sucha declared: ‘‘The IAEA laboratories have to
for nuclear security efforts gave rise to the transformation be world class. The international community relies on the
of glove boxes from routine laboratory devices for radiation conclusions of the IAEA Department of Safeguards con-
protection to key technologies for ensuring nuclear securi- cerning the non-diversion of nuclear material, and we have
ty. The case of Iraq illustrated the shift. Glove boxes were to give the IAEA the tools it needs to do the job.’’53
used to protect analysts working at IAEA’s safeguard
laboratory with samples of materials and swipes of dust Acknowledgments
that IAEA inspectors took from within and near a number This work was supported by a Lise Meitner Fellowship from the Austrian
of nuclear facilities in Iraq. Glove boxes were also used to Science Fund (FWF): project number M 1727 – G16. A version of this
paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Social
protect Iraqi scientists who worked on the country’s clan- Studies of Science in Denver, 11–14 November 2015. I would like to thank
destine nuclear program and separated plutonium. Their Richard Rich for his insightful comments and editorial help as well as the
destruction was understood as a critical step in under- two Endeavor referees for their crucial suggestions. Joseph Martin was
mining Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. Glove boxes acquired a instrumental in helping me shape the paper and clarify my argument. To
symbolic significance to a newly redefined agency as it Crissy Willson from the American Glove Box Society I am thankful for
sharing several of the Society’s older newsletters. I am also indebted to
moved into the twenty-first century. They served as indi- the University of Vienna, Institute for Philosophy, and especially to
cations of the agency’s ability to detect unauthorized nu- Professor Martin Kusch, for their general support of my overall project on
clear programs and signs of deception, build rationale for the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its dosimetry
military invasion, and eventually to enforce of the Non- projects.
52
Aabha Dixit, ‘‘IAEA Plays Central Role in Global Efforts to Strengthen Nuclear
Security, Says IAEA Director General,’’ IAEA Press Release, March 30, 2016, https://
www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-plays-central-role-in-global-efforts-to-
53
strengthen-nuclear-security-says-iaea-director-general. Scheland, ‘‘Nuclear Material Laboratory’’ (ref. 2).

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ENDE-619; No.

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Determining Nuclear Fingerprints:

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modernization of its laboratories, generously sponsored

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facility. The Y-12 plant is normally closed to the public,’’ as

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Why Glove Boxes Matter

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