FEATURES

Clausewitz’s
Theory of War
and Information
Operations
By W I L L I A M M . D A R L E Y

Press briefing on Exercise Combined

Endeavor 2005, world’s largest
communications and information
exercise

52d Communications Squadron (Stacy Moless)

T
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching he debate over informa- an overall plan of action that under some
act of judgment that the statesman and com- tion operations (IO) grows circumstances might be the main effort.
mander have to make is to establish . . . the more confused because IO The most essential factor for employing
kind of war on which they are embarking. . . . continues to be wrongly IO is therefore the commander’s intent
This is the first of all strategic questions and understood in its relationship to the with regard to the political objective of
the most comprehensive.1 so-called kinetic elements of military a given operation. Viewing IO in any
—Carl von Clausewitz, On War operations. Contrary to entrenched other way precludes recognition of the
perceptions, IO is not merely a family of relationship the “IO purpose” inherently
related skill sets or capabilities that in all has with other activities of war within the
cases augment “kinetic operations.” Col- universe of political conflict, and con-
lectively, they are properly understood sequently distorts thinking with regard
as a specific purpose and emphasis within to full incorporation and ­appropriate

Colonel William M. Darley, USA, is a public affairs officer and editor-in-chief of Military Review, Combined
Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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his way, ease his progress, train his judgment,

and help him to avoid pitfalls.2

In developing his theory, Clausewitz

describes war within the context of politi-
cal conflict, which is broadly dominated by
two factors: violence and “moral” (psycho-
logical) factors. The relationship these two
factors share appears to be the same one
that modern doctrine writers and military
operators are struggling less successfully to

Combat Camera Group Pacific (Edward G. Martens)

describe with the terms kinetic operations
and information operations.
The power of his IO theory results
from analyzing the relationship of two basic
factors that Clausewitz asserts undergird it:
Handing out Baghdad Now, political policy and military force expressed
distributed by 4th Psychological
in violence.3 Political policy is derived from
Operations Group to inform
Iraqi citizens of current events his famous dictum: “War is thus an act of
force to compel our enemy to do our will . . .
not merely an act of policy but a true political
employment of all tools that might elements of combat operations and the cir- instrument, a continuation of political inter-
generate a desired information effect. cumstances in which they are appropriately course, carried on with other means.”4
Thus, ­operational planning that regards applied. Application of a theory is thus essen- The first key extrapolation is that
IO as mere augmentation to operations tial to highlight the distinguishing quali- IO—as a subcategory of war operations—is a
by application of five narrowly defined ties of IO and their relationship to kinetic political activity. This may appear to belabor
“pillars,” currently revised and identi- operations. This article examines IO in the the obvious; however, this deceptively simple
fied as operations security, psychological context of Clausewitzian theory and proposes observation highlights the essential and
operations (PSYOP), deception, com- a model that shows the role of IO across the intensely political character of IO as it relates
puter network operations, and electronic spectrum of conflict.
warfare, is fatally flawed.
Information operations, unlike other A Political Instrument Clausewitz’s theory of
battlefield effects, focus on influencing per- The usefulness of a theory depends war offers ­surprising
ceptions or attitudes as opposed to destroying on how well it can explain the relationship predictive insight
things or seizing terrain. During Operation of elements not formally understood, and
into the dynamics of
Desert Storm, one of the most powerful IO predict the unknown and as yet unobserved.
instruments against Iraqi forces consisted of Clausewitz’s theory of war offers surprising information operations
pre-announced B–52 strikes that followed predictive insight into the dynamics of IO within the multidomain
leaflet drops detailing procedures for sur- within the multidomain universe of political universe of political
render, the key IO element being the B–52 conflict and a clearer understanding of the
conflict
itself. Similarly, the purpose for employing dynamics that dictate the role and situational
a weapon may be either to destroy a specific employment of elements of power to achieve
target or send threats to influence personnel IO objectives. to political conflict in general. It also points
targets, or both. Understood in this way, it As a reminder, On War was an effort to out how intertwined IO is with the purely
is apparent that almost any weapon, tool, or develop a genuine theory of war that described political machinery of what Clausewitz called
element at the commander’s disposal apart both the characteristics and relationship of “policy”— the political process he considered
from the five pillars may have potential for various dynamics within armed conflict: the third basic element of war.
achieving a specific IO objective. Though IO and kinetic operations
Part of the difficulty in distinguishing Theory will have fulfilled its main task when share the mutual purpose of achieving
information operations from kinetic opera- it is used to analyze the constituent ele- political objectives, unless the political
tions has resulted from failure to understand ments of war, to distinguish precisely what nature of IO is clearly established, the
IO within any kind of general theory on the at first sight seems fused, to explain in full dominant military culture tends to regard
relationship of the dynamics of war, such as the properties of the means employed and to rhetorical activities associated with per-
between a joint direct attack munition and show their probable effects, to define clearly suasion and influence as mere sideshow
PSYOP. Consequently, the lack of intellec- the nature of the ends in view. . . . Theory techniques adopted from civilian life into
tual discipline imposed by such a paradigm then becomes a guide to anyone who wants military operations with limited importance,
confuses the roles and relationships of the to learn about war from books; it will light rather than as intrinsic elements of political

74     JFQ  /  issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 n d upress.ndu.edu

 Darley

conflict itself. So what ultimately defines IO

as opposed to nonpolitical ­informational
activities—such as advertising or personal
engagement with key personalities—is the
purpose of application and not the instru-

LTC Reneé Puzio, USA, USSOCOM

ment used. In contrast, defining the tools for
kinetic operations, such as tanks or combat
aircraft, is relatively easy because these have
no role in civilian society and are almost
never assembled for any other end except
coercive political purposes such as war.
The second factor that Clausewitz Figure 1: A Continuum of Violence in the Universe of Political Conflict
asserted distinguished mere political conten-
tion from war is violence. Moreover, in his In depicting graphically the relationship place of policy] it would then drive policy out of
theoretical sense, the more purely violent of violence to political objectives at the heart office and rule by the laws of its own nature.10
a political contention becomes, the more of Clausewitz’s theory, a continuum emerges
closely it approximates the abstract concept (see figure 1). It is the political nature of war Levels of Violence
of an “ideal” state of “total war.”5 This is seen as reflected along this ­continuum, which If taken to the extreme that the theory
as Clausewitz equates the Platonic abstraction graduates in intensity of violence from one predicts, a war of pure violence would be
of “ideal war” with “pure violence.” extreme to another depending on political characterized by such unbridled use of
objectives, that makes Clausewitz’s theory kinetic instruments that other instruments
The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an valuable for understanding the nature of of political conflict would be reduced to
act of force, and there is no logical limit to the information operations and their relationship virtual irrelevance—a level of violence and
application of that force . . . .This is the first to kinetic operations. singleness of purpose with no other object
case of interaction and the first ‘extreme’ we The end of the spectrum approaching but the total destruction of the adversary
meet with.6 total war would mean a condition so violent and his civilization.
and frantic that it reaches the point of chaos In finding a real-world example, some
War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a and surpasses the ability of policymakers to would argue that wars approaching this
complete, untrammeled, absolute manifesta- control it. Clausewitz described this condition: level of violence have actually been fought.
tion of violence (as the pure concept would Some posit World War II with its policies of
require), war would of its own independent When whole communities go to war—whole “genocidal lebensraum” on the one side and
will usurp the place of policy. . . .7 peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the “unconditional surrender” on the other.11
reason always lies in some political situation, Also, Bernard Brodie asserts that nuclear
This conception would be ineluctable even and the occasion is always due to some political war approaches Clausewitz’s notion of pure
if war were total war, the pure element of object. . . . [Were pure violence to usurp the enmity and absolute violence.12
enmity unleashed.8

In contrast, the less violent a political

conflict is, the less reflective it is of a condi-
tion that would define it as war:

The more powerful and inspiring the motives

for war . . . the closer will war approach its
abstract concept [pure violence], the more
important will be the destruction of the
enemy, the more closely will the military
aims and the political objects of war coin-
cide, and the more military and less political
will war appear to be. On the other hand, the
1st Combat Camera Group (Cherie A. Thurlby)

less intense the motives, the less will the mili-

tary element’s natural tendency to violence
coincide with political directives. As a result,
war will be driven further from its natural
course, the political object will be more and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
and Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for
more at variance with the aim of ideal war,
Public Affairs Lawrence Di Rita review speech to
and the conflict will seem increasingly politi- be delivered to World Affairs Council
cal in character.9

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c l ausewit z A N D I N F O R M A T I O N O P E R A T I O N S

without the benefit of mature democratic

institutions and a tradition of peaceful hand­
over of power are often accompanied by
some measure of violence.
The extremes on the continuum predict
something that looks like thermonuclear war
at one end (where the persuasive elements

LTC Reneé Puzio, USA, USSOCOM

associated with IO would have little influence
or role) and something like democratic politi-
cal elections on the other (where IO wholly
dominates political conflict).
What the above suggests may initially
be somewhat surprising: in contrast to total
Figure 2: The Universe of Political Conflict war, which is characterized by pure violence,
an information operations conflict without
What would be the role of IO in such a Are there real-world examples of violence should be viewed as “pure politics.”
conflict? At the extreme end of the spectrum, purely political conflicts devoid of violence, In fact, Clausewitz appears to have antici-
information operations—if they existed at as the theory predicts? Practical examples pated a need for a nuanced second definition
all—might include activities associated with in our own time include elections in stable of politics and has provided a somewhat
computer attack, signals intelligence, decep- democratic societies. A 19th-century senator unflattering description to explain the dif-
tion, or PSYOP measures. However, there from Kansas provides insight into such ference between politics as a broad activity
would be little concern for cultivating through bloodless struggles: within which war operates, as opposed to
political rhetoric (PSYOP or public diplomacy) specific characteristics of politics as the busi-
some grounds for hope of political reconcilia- The purification of politics is an irridescent ness of diplomatic wrangling and chicanery:
tion or postconflict cooperation, as the politi- dream. Government is force. Politics is a battle
cal objective would be total destruction of the for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The while policy is apparently effaced in the one kind
enemy—a war of annihilation (see figure 2). decalogue and the golden rule have no place of war [conflicts tending toward extreme force
In contrast, what does the theoretical in a political campaign. The object is success. and violence] and yet is strongly evident in the
model of political violence predict at the To defeat the antagonist and expel the party other, both kinds are equally political. If the
opposite end of the continuum? In the in power is the purpose. The Republicans and state is thought of as a person, and policy as the
abstract, the theory predicts a political con- Democrats are as irreconcilably opposed to product of its brain, then among the contingen-
flict that would be contested in a manner each other as were Grant and Lee in the Wil- cies for which the state must be prepared is a
completely devoid of violence. derness. They use ballots instead of guns, but war in which every element calls for policy to be
Such a conflict would be characterized the struggle is as unrelenting and desperate, eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded
as totally ideological, a political clash decided and the result sought for the same.14 not as resulting from a just appreciation of
exclusively by ideas, words, and symbols—in affairs, but—as it conventionally is—as cau-
other words, a contest between pure informa- Understanding elections as a form of tious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from
tion operation campaigns. war as deduced from Clausewitz’s theory force, could the second type of war appear to be
Clausewitz’s theory appears to spe- helps explain why elections held in countries more “political” than the first.15
cifically predict contests settled mainly
by ­political rhetoric without violence. He
obliquely refers to them while observing that
when a graduated recession of military force
and ­violence accompanies a change in com-
mitment to political objectives, the conflict
decreasingly displays the characteristics of
war and becomes primarily political:
Fleet Combat Camera Group Atlantic (Michael Sandberg)

[the political object of the war] has been

rather overshadowed by the law of extremes,
the will to overcome the enemy and make him
powerless [by military force and violence].
But as this law begins to lose its force and as
Seamen aboard USS Thomas S.
this determination wanes, the political aim
Gates plot helicopter operations
will reassert itself. . . . Situations can thus course during anti-submarine
exist in which the political object will almost training, Exercise Unitas 46–05
be the sole determinant.13

76     JFQ  /  issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 n d upress.ndu.edu

 Darley

Politics as a negotiating activity that

Official of the Independent Electoral
characteristically is “cautious, devious, even Commission of Iraq during lottery to
dishonest, shying away from force” describes determine order of political parties
the basic nature of information operations on the ballot for January elections
fairly accurately. This supports the conclu-
sion that IO in its most extreme form would
be a manifestation of “pure politics.” Such
an observation has far-reaching implications
that lead to another surprising conclusion
supported by the theory: IO is not only the

1st Combat Camera Group (Michael E. Best)

outward communication of information
impacting policy, but also a participant in
policy formation itself, shaping the overall
political character of the conflict. Informa-
tion operations are involved in the policy
formation process along the entire spectrum
of conflict, with an increasingly significant
role as conflict approaches the “devoid of
violence” extreme. The graduated progres-
sion away from violence leads to a situation political objectives but with less actual actions to control geography—for example,
in which the development and formation of violence and potential for violence, such as decisively destroying military formations or
policy and the public expression of policy elections in Indonesia or the occupation of infrastructure for the ultimate purpose of
increasingly become one and the same. The Bosnia, have been inserted near the devoid– seizing terrain.
emphasis on daily press briefings by Secretary of–violence extreme. A graduated scale of In contrast, the conflicts that populate
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the early conflicts based on content of violence in the devoid–of–violence area focus on obtain-
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, where relation to political objective appears to be ing political objectives by influencing the
policy adjustments seemed to be made from specifically what Clausewitz had in mind as opinions and behavior of specific people
the dais in response to news reporting, illus- he developed his theory: or population groups. This suggests that a
trates this predicted theoretical tendency. working definition for kinetic operations is
The two polar extremes established, the a military objective that matches the accomplishing political objectives through
next step in developing this theory is to insert political object in scale will, if the latter is seizing terrain, while information operations
types of conflicts along the continuum, cate- amount to achieving political objectives by
gorized by the relative similarity each bears to influencing people. This further suggests that
one extreme or the other. The order reflects total war would mean a what we understand today as the specialties
a logical sequencing of conflicts according to condition so violent that and disciplines of IO are in orientation and
estimates of the proportional dominance of it surpasses the ability of principle what Clausewitz may have had in
two factors within each: intensity of violence mind when prescribing measures to deal with
policymakers to control it
relative to clarity and strength, and duration the “moral” dimension of war:
of political objective.
reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will the moral elements are among the most
A Vaguely Defined Threshold be all the more so as the political object important in war. They constitute the spirit
Conflicts characterized by high levels increases its predominance. Thus it follows that permeates war as a whole, and at an
of focused violence over lengthy periods, that without any inconsistency wars can early stage they establish a close affinity
and having broad political purposes, occur have all degrees of importance and intensity, with the will that moves and leads the whole
near the polar extreme of total war, as for ranging from a war of extermination down mass of force. . . . The effects of physical and
example, the First and Second World Wars, to simple armed observation.16 psychological factors form an organic whole,
due to the amount of extreme violence each Admittedly this is a subjective process, which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable
generated relative to the expansiveness but with a range of conflicts inserted in a by chemical processes. In formulating any
and clarity of their political objectives and more or less logical order along the contin- rule concerning physical factors, the theorist
comparatively long duration (see figure 3). uum, the pattern that emerges confirms that must bear in mind the part that moral factors
In contrast, shorter conflicts involving less IO-related factors are infused throughout may play in it. . . . Hence most of the matters
violence, and having either less focus or the universe of political conflict and along dealt with in this book are composed in equal
more limited political objectives, tend to the entire spectrum of violence associated parts of physical and of moral causes and
occur nearer the center of the continuum with it. On further inspection of the pattern effects. One might say that the physical seem
and include such conflicts as Operation Just emerging, the conflicts that populate the area little more than the wooden hilt, while the
Cause and the Kosovo bombing campaign. nearer the total war extreme are character- moral factors are the precious metal, the real
Similarly, events with important regional ized by achieving political objectives through weapon, the finely-honed blade.17

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c l ausewit z A N D I N F O R M A T I O N O P E R A T I O N S

Additionally, further consideration of

the pattern reveals a curious phenomenon.
Conflicts grouped nearer the total war
extreme are uniformly kinetic operations
clearly claiming the dominant/supported role
in relation to IO. However, conflicts grouped
toward the devoid–of–violence extreme
appear to have an equally legitimate claim
on being the dominant/supported activity
according to the internal logic of their own
particular circumstances and place on the
continuum of political conflict. This predicts
the existence of a vaguely defined threshold
somewhere in the middle of the continuum,
the crossing of which signals a seminal
change in the relationship between informa-
tion operations and kinetic operations—a
line separating areas on the continuum
in which either IO or kinetic operations
dominate according to their similarity to the
characteristics of the nearest “ideal” conflict

LTC Reneé Puzio, USA, USSOCOM

at the polar extremes
This dichotomy would predict the need
for not only different leadership and manage-
ment skills, but also units and personnel with
different skill sets, training, and equipment
for different types of conflicts depending on
where they fell on the continuum. Figure 3: A Line of Demarcation between Kinetic– and IO–dominated Factors
Operations grouped nearer the pure
violence extreme in figure 3 would reflect a obliquely implies an increasing need for The long-term effects of this attitude
requirement for leadership, skill sets, train- cultural and human intelligence as opposed have been under resourcing IO core capabili-
ing, and equipment of the kind traditionally to technical intelligence for operations to ties and inculcating a tendency into the mili-
associated with operations characterized by achieve political objectives through persua- tary culture that invariably causes it to under-
great violence and destructive activity for the sion and influence of people and popula- estimate the depth, resilience, and ferocity of
purpose of seizing terrain. As positioned on tions rather than violence. In addition, the the moral dimension of conflicts that would
the spectrum, IO stand in a supporting role. pattern suggests that conflicts along this prudently be regarded as predominantly IO
As conflicts approach the other end of sector of the continuum would properly be conflicts by nature, especially in unconven-
the spectrum, however, the model predicts conducted as IO supported by kinetic opera- tional or constabulary environments. Under
tions rather than the reverse. such circumstances, policymakers and mili-
tary operators who lack this understanding or
IO is not only the Practical Utility of the appreciation can be counted on to make the
outward communication Theoretical Model wrong decisions at the wrong times in ways
What has been missing in the IO that actually undermine the political objec-
of information
debate—and the root of confusion—is rec- tives they are flailing to achieve.
­impacting policy, but ognition that information operations are not The model in figure 3, extrapolated
also a participant in artifices of military culture, but comprise from Clausewitz’s theory, provides an intel-
policy formation itself necessary answers to natural dynamics of lectual framework in which the military
war that exist in some proportion side by community can consider an appropriate mix
side with the dynamics of violence that are of kinetic operations and IO tools for con-
an increasing requirement for significantly generated by political violence. Policymakers templated military campaigns as envisioned
different kinds of leadership training and and military operators must understand this along the spectrum of political violence. It
experience, different skill set requirements because, all too often, the dominant influ- demonstrates that IO are intrinsic elements
from the units involved, and different equip- ence of kinetic thinking creates a tendency of political policy formulation that will
ment and training. Moreover, as one consid- to dismiss the relevance of information permeate the environment in which conflict
ers the environment within which political operations even where the circumstances of is occurring—at times becoming more domi-
conflicts aimed at influencing rather than conflict might make IO not only essential but nant in influence than kinetic operations,
destroying are likely to take place, the theory also predominant. which are better understood as primarily

78     JFQ  /  issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 n d upress.ndu.edu

 Darley

tools of destruction directed by policy. It

further suggests that IO and kinetic opera- the model demonstrates that IO are intrinsic elements
tions are inseparably linked, like strands of of political policy formulation that will permeate the
a DNA molecule in a gene, and in the same
way have a dominant/recessive relationship
environment in which conflict is occurring
(for example, one exercising dominance over
the other depending on where the conflict establish their own local operational or even intensity of violence from one extreme to
falls on the continuum relative to the polar tactical political objectives in the absence of another depending on political objectives,
extremes). Thus, among the important issues specific policy guidance for which informa- makes Clausewitz’s theory valuable for
it highlights, the theory shows the absolute tion operations may be the key instrument. understanding information operations and
need to refine both the specific political Clausewitz appears to allude to these pre- their relationship to kinetic operations. What
objectives of a campaign as well as their dicted needs: would the role of IO be at various points? The
nature in order to determine whether the pattern that emerges confirms that IO-related
campaign is predominantly kinetic or infor- Political considerations do not determine factors are infused throughout the universe
mational. This suggests that neglecting con- the posting of guards or the employment of of political conflict and along the entire spec-
sideration of the role of IO and its integration patrols. But they are the more influential in trum of violence associated with it. JFQ
with kinetic operations imperils the entire the planning of war, of the campaign, and
campaign plan. often even of the battle. . . . The only ques- NOTES
Consequently, information operations tion, therefore, is whether, when war is being
cannot be prudently conceived as merely planned, the political point of view should 1
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
added value to an operation, but rather give way to the purely military . . . or should by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
as essential activities that address specific the political point of view remain dominant Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
2
Ibid., 141.
needs associated with the nature of political and the military [military force and vio- 3
Ibid., 88.
conflict itself. Perhaps most importantly, the lence] be subordinated to it?18 4
Ibid., 75, 87.
theory points out the potential for defining 5
Ibid., 86–88.
IO as the main effort of a campaign, sug- The political nature of war as reflected 6
Ibid., 77.
gesting the absolute imperative of a refined along a continuum which graduates in 7
Ibid., 87
commander’s intent that identifies 8
Ibid., 605.
from the outset the main effort 9
Ibid., 87–88.
of the operation as either kinetic 10
Ibid., 86–87.
or IO, as well as describing how 11
Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A
one should support and comple- Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Carlisle Bar-
ment the other. This may urge, racks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1982), 8.
12
Clausewitz, 645.
for example, introducing such 13
Ibid., 80–81.
previously inconceivable measures 14
O. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism, Ideas,
as subsuming the functions of a
and Men (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,
J–3/C–3 entirely beneath an IO- 1969), 57.
oriented staff element headed by 15
Clausewitz, 88.
a general officer uniquely trained 16
Ibid., 81.
and experienced with IO, or the 17
Ibid., 184–185.
establishment of linguistically 18
Ibid., 606–607.
capable and culturally experienced
staff elements of political ­advisers
at much lower levels of command
than has previously been regarded
as appropriate—perhaps to brigade
or even battalion level. It also
highlights a theoretical basis for
increasing reliance on policing
skills as opposed to maneuver
combat skills the closer one
3d Marine Division (James L. Yarboro)

approaches the devoid–of–vio-

lence end of the spectrum.
Additionally, the model
Soldiers fire 155mm
implies that the political dimen-
M198 howitzer while
sion of conflict is so essential that training in Afghanistan
commanders must be prepared to

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 40, 1st quarter 2006  /  JFQ        79