LUZ FARMS v.

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the
No. 86889, 1990-12-04 mandate of the Constitution,... in including land devoted to the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).  Livestock or poultry raising is not
Facts: similar to crop or tree farming.  Land is not the primary... resource in this
President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment
livestock, poultry and swine... retary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under
Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper.  He cited that Webster's International
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657  (Commercial Farms) Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and "Agriculture - the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting
poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock,
be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),... Comprehensive tillage, husbandry, farming.
Agrarian Reform Law... and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking x x x.
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared Livestock - domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
unconstitutional
Issues:
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are
made to apply to it: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as
(a)   Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as...
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith.
The Constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Ruling:
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 4.  The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other... farmworkers, to receive a the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention
just share of the fruits thereof.  To this end, the State shall encourage and of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and coverage of... the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may... prescribe, taking into account Government.
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation.  In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
rights of small landowners.  The State shall... further provide incentives for Section 186 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth.  Including but not limited
voluntary land-sharing. to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and... abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its
entirety.  In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
Secretary of Agrarian Reform includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited... agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State.  There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13
and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry
raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their... landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute
from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net
profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and therefore... violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Principles:
G.R. No. L-23785 November 27, 1975 resulting in the extinction of defendant-appellee's criminal responsibility for pre-
reaping and pre-threshing under the former law. The lower court favorably
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, resolved the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
vs.
ELIAS ADILLO, defendant-appellee. Hence, the present appeal interposed by the State.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico The particular provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, subject of this litigation,
P. de Castro and Solicitor Alejandro B. Afurong for plaintiff-appellant. provides:

Ernesto S. Tengco for defendant-appellee. SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for
either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for
its threshing; ... Any violation of this section by either party shall be
treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the
MARTIN, J.:
general provisions of law applicable to the act committed,
The decisive question presented to Us in this direct appeal from the dismissal
In Beltran v. Cruz2 the Court expressed that although the tenant is given the right
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Criminal Case SC-663 is
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to determine when to reap the harvest, it is
whether or not the penal liability of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or pre-threshing
likewise provided under the Act that the reaping "shall be after due notice to the
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, enacted on August 30,
landholder" (Section 36, paragraph 1). Pre-reaping or pre-threshing is considered
1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act
a serious violation, subject to the sanction of dispossession of the tenant (Section
No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the subsequent agrarian laws.
50, subsection b) and the penalty of a "fine not exceeding Two Thousand Pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court"
The defendant-appellee Elias Adillo was a share-tenant of one Saturnino L. (Section 57). The "moving idea behind the requirement of the advance notice of
Rebong on a parcel of riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. On January 4, 1962, the reaping, and the prohibition of doing it in advance of the date set," said the
he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for violation of Court, "is to enable the landholder to witness, personally or by representative, the
Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in that: reaping and threshing operations. Pre-reaping in the absence of one party, due to
unilateral advancing of the date of the harvest, inevitably generates ill feeling and
(O)n or about October 3, 1960 in the Municipality of Victoria, strains relations between landholder and tenant due to the suspicion aroused that
Province of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines, and within the part of the harvest may have been illegally diverted. Such suspicion tends to
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named poison the tenancy relation and is inimical to agricultural peace and progress;
being then the tenant of a piece of land owned by Saturnino L. wherefore, strict compliance with the legal and contractual prescriptions as to the
Rebong under a share system, did then and there wilfully, date of reaping and threshing are of the essence of the statutory policy." This
unlawfully and feloniously reap and thresh a portion of applies particularly to rice share tenancy and may not be extended to embrace the
palay planted on said piece of land without the knowledge and agricultural leasehold. The two tenancy systems are distinct and different from
consent of Saturnino Rebong and even before a date has been each other. In sharehold, the tenant may choose to shoulder, in addition to labor,
fixed for the reaping and threshing of the palay, to the damage and any one or more of the items of contributions (such as farm implements, work
prejudice of Saturnino Rebong. animals, final harrowing, transplanting), while in leasehold, the tenant or lessee
always shoulders all items of production except the land. Under the sharehold
On August 24, 1964, the counsel for the defendant-appellee 1 moved for the system, the tenant and the landholder are co-managers, whereas in leasehold
quashal of the information on the submission that the Agricultural Tenancy Act, on system, the tenant is the sole manager of the farmholding. Finally, in sharehold
which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee was based, has been tenancy, the tenant and the landholder divide the harvest in proportion to their
repealed or abrogated by the new Agricultural Land Reform Code, thereby contributions, while in leasehold tenancy, the tenant or lessee gets the whole
produce with the mere obligation to pay a fixed rental. 3 There is thus justification the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing the said Presidential
for the view that notice for reaping or threshing is not required by the Act in Decree No. 27.8
leasehold system, because the lessee's principal obligation is to pay the rental,
which is to deliver a generic thing in the absence of any specific agreement to the It will be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic
contrary, and that the rental is supposed to be a specific amount, as fixed and Act No. 1199) which prohibited either the tenant or landholder, without mutual
limited in Section 45 of the Act. Without any legal obligation imposed on the lessee consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set
to give such notice, the lessor should take it upon himself to verify from the tenant- for its threshing and penalized any violation thereof by either party is no longer
lessee the date of reaping and threshing.4 found in the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious reason that agricultural share tenancy
On August 8, l963, the Tenancy Act of 1954 was amended by the Agricultural Land provided in the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has already been abolished by
Reform Code. Agricultural share tenancy was declared "to be contrary to public the new Code. The omission of such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural
policy and shall be abolished."5 Nonetheless, based on transitory provision in the Tenancy Act of 1954 in the new Code operates as an implied repeal of said
first proviso of Section 4 of the Code, existing share tenancy contracts were provision. It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that when
allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their express
abolition, until whichever or the following events occurs earlier: (a) the end of the An act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain,
agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation operates as repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the
declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period old act and not included in the amendatory act. (Construction of
provided in the share tenancy contracts express; or (c) the share tenant sooner Statutes, Crawford, p. 621, citing State v. Mac Cafferty, 25 Okla 2,
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.6 105 Pac. 992).

In the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act No. 6389), which took effect on Also,
September 10, 1971 agricultural share tenancy throughout the country was
declared contrary to public policy and was automatically converted to agricultural Where the language of the statute as amended is set out in full in
leasehold upon the effectivity of Section 4 thereof although existing share tenancy an act the old law is not repealed except as to those parts omitted
contracts were again allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect in any which are inconsistent with the amendment, the remainder of the
region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of act being a continuation of the original law. (Idem, citing People v.
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, "until the end of the agricultural year when Montgomery County, 67 N. Y. 109; Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St.
the President of the Philippines shall have organized by executive order the 324, 18 Atl. 445,5 A.L.R. 517)
Department of Agrarian, Reform in accordance with the provisions of this
amendatory Act, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant
sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system." 7 Likewise,

Immediately after the declaration of martial law, the President of the Philippines When the legislature declares that an existing statute shall be
issued Presidential Decree No. 2 on September 26, 1972, proclaiming the entire amended, the legislature thereby evinces the intention to make the
country "as a land reform area." The proclamation of the entire country "as a land new statute a substitute for the amended statute exclusively and
reform area" in accordance with the first proviso of Section 4 of the Agricultural only those portions of the amended statute repeated in the new
Land Reform Code, as amended, unqualifiedly abolished the sharehold system in one are retained (Idem, at p. 620, citing State ex rel Nagle v.
the Philippine agricultural life. To the extreme, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 Leader Co., 97 Mont. 586,37 Pac. (2) 561).
was withdrawn from the mass of living agrarian laws specifically in rice and corn
tenancy. On October 21, 1972 the President issued Presidential Decree No. 27 Thus confronted with the issue as to whether or not the penal liability of a share
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil. To safeguard this new right tenancy for pre-reaping or pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the tenancy, Presidential Decree No. 316 of October 22, 1973, was promulgate (Republic Act No. 1199) enacted on August 30, 1954, has been obliterated by the
interdicting the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389) and the subsequent Presidential Decrees and Proclamations, the
solution to the issue seems to be clear that the injunction against pre-reaping and of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 9 of Article II of the 1973
pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost its operative Constitution on the duty of the State to afford protection to labor. The challenged
force and effect, and the penal sanction therein subdued. Specifically, Section 39 penal provision, although not directly impugned as unconstitutional by the
of the Act, upon which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee is pleadings, should not escape condemnation by this Court, which has the function
predicted, is no longer carried in the subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its to enforce the constitutional guarantees of social justice and protection to labor,
violation thereof considered no longer an offense. As a result it would be illogical to including the lowly tenants, whenever the occasion demands. The constitutional
prosecute or sentence defendant-appellee for such offense which no longer issue remains inescapable despite the enactment of the 1963 Agricultural Law
exists. 9 Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844), which merely raises a doubt as to the continued
effectivity of the questioned penal provision of Republic Act No. 1199. Said penal
The whole failure of the laws and decrees subsequent to the Agricultural Tenancy provision is apparently land-owner oriented. It is cruel for the State to punish a
Act of 1954 to penalize the acts of pre-reaping and pre-threshing which constituted hungry tenant for pre-threshing or pre-harvesting without prior notice to the
the offense defined and penalized under the said Section 39 carries with it the landowner. Pre-threshing or pre-harvesting in order to enable himself and his
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons family to eat, strikes at the very lives of the tenant and his family, thus at their basic
charged with its human right to survive. On the other hand, the risk on the part of the landowner
violations. 10 when his tenant does not give him prior advice as to threshing or harvesting,
involves merely loss at most of a couple of sacks or cavans of palay or rice, which
to the landowner is merely a loss of property rights, which does not impinge upon
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the information against defendant-
his right to live. It has been axiomatic and sanctified by decisions of this Court that
appellee for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act
human right must always prevail over property right.
No. 1199) is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.

A penalty of a "fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding one

SO ORDERED.
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court" for pre-threshing or pre-reaping without
prior notice to the landowner (Sec. 57, R.A. 1199), is greater than the penalty for
Castro (Chairman), Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur. theft of not exceeding P200.00 under paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Article 309
of the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, a tenant cannot be convicted of theft for
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result. such pre-threshing or pre-reaping for his family consumption a portion of the palay
produced by him because the same is merely chargeable against his share under
  Republic Act No. 1199.

  As aforestated, the penalty thus prescribed by Republic Act No. 1199 for pre-
threshing or pre-reaping without prior notice to the landlord can be characterized
  as a cruel and unjust punishment when applied to an impoverished tenant for
whose welfare the constitutional provision on social justice has been designed in
order to remove ancient inequities which have spawned violent and bloody
Separate Opinions
internecine strife in our country for decades.

 
Hence, my vote for the acquittal of the accused herein, since the penal provision in
Republic Act No. 1199 nullifies his right to live.
MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring:
 
The basic reason for this concurrence is that the penal provision in Section 57 in
relation to Sections 39 and 50 (b) of Republic Act No. 1199 does violence to the
 
constitutional guarantee of social justice enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the
Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, as well as Section 6
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring:

The basic reason for this concurrence is that the penal provision in Section 57 in
relation to Sections 39 and 50 (b) of Republic Act No. 1199 does violence to the
constitutional guarantee of social justice enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the
Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, as well as Section 6
of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution on the duty of the State to afford protection to labor. The challenged
penal provision, although not directly impugned as unconstitutional by the
pleadings, should not escape condemnation by this Court, which has the function
to enforce the constitutional guarantees of social justice and protection to labor,
including the lowly tenants, whenever the occasion demands. The constitutional
issue remains inescapable despite the enactment of the 1963 Agricultural Law
Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844), which merely raises a doubt as to the continued
effectivity of the questioned penal provision of Republic Act No. 1199. Said penal
provision is apparently land-owner oriented. It is cruel for the State to punish a
hungry tenant for pre-threshing or pre-harvesting without prior notice to the
landowner. Pre-threshing or pre-harvesting in order to enable himself and his
family to eat, strikes at the very lives of the tenant and his family, thus at their basic
human right to survive. On the other hand, the risk on the part of the landowner
when his tenant does not give him prior advice as to threshing or harvesting,
involves merely loss at most of a couple of sacks or cavans of palay or rice, which
to the landowner is merely a loss of property rights, which does not impinge upon
his right to live. It has been axiomatic and sanctified by decisions of this Court that
human right must always prevail over property right.

A penalty of a "fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding one

year, or both, in the discretion of the Court" for pre-threshing or pre-reaping without
prior notice to the landowner (Sec. 57, R.A. 1199), is greater than the penalty for
theft of not exceeding P200.00 under paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Article 309
of the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, a tenant cannot be convicted of theft for
such pre-threshing or pre-reaping for his family consumption a portion of the palay
produced by him because the same is merely chargeable against his share under
Republic Act No. 1199.

As aforestated, the penalty thus prescribed by Republic Act No. 1199 for pre-
threshing or pre-reaping without prior notice to the landlord can be characterized
as a cruel and unjust punishment when applied to an impoverished tenant for
whose welfare the constitutional provision on social justice has been designed in
order to remove ancient inequities which have spawned violent and bloody
internecine strife in our country for decades.

Hence, my vote for the acquittal of the accused herein, since the penal provision in
Republic Act No. 1199 nullifies his right to live.
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974 On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee, that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in barrio Sta. Ursula,
vs. Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square meters;
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant. that sometime during the last war she entered into an oral contract
of lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e.,
from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in the month of
January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant. herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957
that she was terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957;
Armando M. Laki for movant. that upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for
another year; that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote the
defendant that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on
January 1, 1959, which demand he however ignored. Plaintiff
ZALDIVAR, J.:p accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the
possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the
amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First
costs.
Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972,
properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties.
this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his
Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan,
defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging,
Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the
inter alia, that the land in question was originally leased to him,
purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by
also verbally, by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano Gabriel in 1923
his heirs herein named.
for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the condition that
he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense which
Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, termination of the lease for whatever cause; that when the plaintiff
married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to became the owner of the property through inheritance, she told the
Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O. defendant that she would honor her father's contract with the
Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue
herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for leasing the property, whose original rental of P400.00 a year had
substitution was granted. been progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he
wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of As a special defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of
Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt: jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the case.
On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease
quoted in full: governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the
fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the
The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
described in the complaint which is under lease to the said Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of
defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that the persons
impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the action named above are not members of the immediate farm household
should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which of the defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship
has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by
of leasehold tenancy. Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.

After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is
allegations of the complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order
evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take has become final, the plaintiff may request for the setting of the
cognizance of the case. initial trial.

It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made
defendant, who originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. by the trial court.
Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by
the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits,
in her name. It contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The decision was rendered wherein the trial court Pursuant to Article
rental is on a yearly basis. 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the period of the low up to June 30,
1964, the defendant on said date to surrender possession of the
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The
with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of on to her, to
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the
over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure
leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano by either party to pay the amount due the other, the same would
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers
who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he
nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived appealed to this Court and assigned the following errors:
separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is
residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are 1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee
all professions; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in and appellant as that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil
Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the Code of the Philippines and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep.
fishpond. Act No. 1199 as amended.

The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we 2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First
enter this order. Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian
relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. NO. 1199 as amended.
After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the
Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and
9, as amended. it seems clear that his case does not fall within the
 3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
appellant particularly the basis for the expenditure for the The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil
development of the fishpond in question. law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the
4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
appellant in them easily amount of one thousand pesos for the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
reimbursement and for seven hundred pesos for the cost of the agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
floodgate. pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil
Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3
Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the
fishpond to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the
the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It following requisites must concur.
is likewise undisputed that the work in the fishpond consisted in letting out the
water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow, getting some from 1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
the river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh
water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to 2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
them; that these were done by defendant, with some help; that he personally members of his immediate farm household;
attended to the fishpond until 1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew
Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the 3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of
fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
4. That the land belongs to another; and
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the
parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case 5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
is therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian money or in produce or in both.4
Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in effect that since defendant has
ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy
relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and
become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
over the case. mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar
It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled that
aid of the members of his immediate farm household. 1 "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land."5 The mere fact,
however, that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals leasehold tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may
which, as a general rule, bind this Court.2 still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship
between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease? Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an
area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question
of whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the
appellant's family or not has not been raised, and We see no need of tarrying on members of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by,
this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.
personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore,
leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; 8 and he who hires
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections
immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of the 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, privileges of one.
who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the
farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household" 6 The record We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship
shows who helped work the land in question, and We quote: between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a
leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. 9
with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took 2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the Court of
over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar, this being a case
leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano of civil law lease.
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of
Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers 3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as
who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a these are issues involving findings of facts which have been settled by the lower
nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived court, and unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the
separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is record of the case, We shall not venture to discuss the merits of the factual
residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are findings of the court a quo.
all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest — all residing
in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the
fishpond.7 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs
against the appellants.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land.
Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a
person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower
latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder court, the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in deliver the possession of the fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs and successors-in-interest of
same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals. From January 1, 1960, at the rate of
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as
Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his herein ordered, with interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists
when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available from IT IS SO ORDERED.
members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of
agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
G.R. No. L-28609 January 17, 1974 allegation that the true intention of respondent as landholder was to utilize the
same for pasture and for the raising of sorghum. The Court of Agrarian Relations
ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, petitioner, dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting such an intent to mechanize and at
vs. the same time holding that mechanization during rainy season of the year was not
ENRIQUE ZOBEL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such petition for ejectment.
Hence this petition for review.
G.R. No. L-28610 January 17, 1974

There is no question as to the tenancy relationship well as to the areas occupied

BARTOLOME DIMAALA, RUFO GARCIA, PAULINO ESGUERRA, FERNANDO
by petitioners as tenants. For the decision of the Court of Appeals now sought to
VEROYA, WILSON ZAPATERO, RUFINO ZAPATERO, ALMARIO ALAB,
reviewed did clearly specify: "At the hearing of these cases on July 15, 1963, the
ROMAN BEROYA, and ROMANA VIZCONDE, petitioners,
litigants, through their counsels, entered into the following stipulation of facts: 1.
vs.
That the relation of landholder and tenant between the petitioner and the
ENRIQUE ZOBEL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
respondents is admitted; 2. That the respective area cultivated by each of the
respondents is as indicated ... follows: Bartolome
Pedro N. Belmi for petitioners. Dimaala — 1 lot with an approximate area of 1.1440 hectare; Rufo Garcia — area
of lot is more or less one (1) hectare; Paulino Esguerra — two (2) lots with an
Salvador J. Lorayes for private respondent. aggregate area of about two (2) hectares; Fernando Veroya — one (1) lot with an
area of about ½ hectare; Wilson Zapatero — one(1) lot with an area of about less
than 1-½ hectares; Rufino Zapatero — one (1) lot with an area of about one (1)
hectare; Almario Alab — three (3) lots with an area of about 3 hectares; Roman
FERNANDO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët Veroya — one (1) lot of about ½ hectare; Romana Vizconde — one (1) lot with an
area of about ½ hectare and Zoila de Chavez — four (4) lots with an aggregate
area of about 6 hectares."6 That is why, as set forth at the outset, the applicability
These two petitions1 for the review of a joint decision of respondent Court of
of Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
Appeals, sustaining the right of respondent-landholder, Enrique Zobel to
bondage of the soil and transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and
eject petitioner-tenants and thus reversing a judgment in their favor by the
providing the instruments and mechanism therefor is unavoidable. 7 Hence, again,
Court of Agrarian Relations, present the crucial issue of how far this Tribunal
as was made mention of at the outset, the decision of the Court of Appeals cannot
is bound by the cardinal policy set forth in a presidential decree 2 that ordains
be sustained.
the emancipation of tenants and confers on them ownership of the lands
they till, upheld as part of the law of the land under the Revised
Constitution.3 This too, in the face of its avowed primordial objective: "The State 1. The tenancy problem in the Philippines is of ancient vintage. The opinion of
shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating Justice Tuason in the leading case of Guido v. Rural Progress
the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Administration8 made reference to the concern shown by our great patriot and hero
Constitution."4 As thus posed, its resolution is rather obvious. We cannot sustain Jose Rizal, one arising from first-hand knowledge and bitter personal experience of
respondent Court of Appeals. his family. As was so vividly expressed by Justice Labrador, speaking for this
Court, in De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations:9 "The history of land tenancy,
especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the
Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad
Calatagan, Batangas, known Hacienda Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more
Santos, acting as a saviour of the tenant class, which generations has been
than five hundred hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a
relegated to a life of bondage, without hope of salvation or improvement,
portion thereof, relying on the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would
enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful condition of the tenants
justify such a move where the land is suited for mechanization. 5 Petitioners, as
forming the PKM organization of tenants and, during the war, the Hukbalahap,
tenants, vigorously objected to such petition not only on the ground that the small
rose in arms against the constituted authority as their only salvation from
areas they are occupying were not suited for mechanization, but likewise on the
permanent thralldom. According to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the respondent Enrique Zobel is reinstated and given full force and effect. Costs
century we had only 19% of the people belonging to the tenant class, after 60 against respondent Enrique Zobel.
years, the prevailing percentage has reached 39%." 10 Such situation calls to mind
this apt observation of Laski, "of the normal life of the poor, their perpetual fear of Zaldivar (Chairman) and Aquino, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
the morrow, their haunting sense of impending disaster, their fitful search for
beauty which perpetually eludes." 11 The 1935 delegates to the Constitutional  
Convention were not unaware of the gravity of the problem. Under the
Commonwealth and under the Republic therefore, the appropriate legislation was
enacted. 12 Progress in the solution of this serious social malady, while  
considerable, did not supply the necessary corrective.
 
On this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some
is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Separate Opinions
Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. It was issued in October of 1972.
The very next month, the 1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming  
approval. There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. 13 What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the BARREDO, J.,  concurring:
land according to the revised Constitution itself. 14 Ejectment therefore of
petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express
I fully concur, except as to all references made by Justice Fernando to a "revised
mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
constitution", it being my unequivocal position that the constitution now in force and
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of
effect, which I am sure is the one being cited, is indeed a new constitution, as
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any
contra-distinguished from another that is merely amended, which would be what
other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do
could be termed as "revised". The new charter should always be called simply as
away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope
the New Constitution of the Philippines or the Philippine Constitution of 1973. This
associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in
nomenclature does away with any question as to whether or not its ratification was
the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and
accomplished in accordance with the provision on amendments of the old charter.
precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to
perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave
social problems thereby created.<äre||anº•1àw> There can be no justification for In the language of its Section 16, Article XVII, "this Constitution ... shall supersede
any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty five and all amendments thereto."
role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy In other words, the replacement is integral, and, accordingly, the ratification and
goals. approval of the new one should be determined by its own effectivity clause, it being
undeniable that the previous constitution, while it provides for an amending
process, is completely silent as to how an integral replacement thereof may be
2. With the disposition of these petitions for review thus so clearly indicated by the
effected. Which is how it ought to be, for it is to me but logical, if it cannot be
controlling constitutional provisions, a discussion of the errors assigned by
deemed axiomatic, that as a new fundamental law is ordained precisely in
petitioners would be fruitless. Nonetheless, insofar as they would stress the basic
disregard, if not in repudiation, of its predecessor, it is incongruous that the latter
doctrine that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by
should in any way bind the hands of the people in enacting the former. I have said
substantial evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal, is undeniable
once before that a constitution is by its very nature always self-born or comes into
that such a submission is supported and butressed by a host of our decisions
effect by the force of its own authority, expressive of the people's sovereignty, 1 and
dating back to 1958. 15
I have not yet been shown any reason why I should believe otherwise. Actually, if
one must be accurate, the innovations introduced by the new constitution in its
WHEREFORE, the joint decision in these two petition of respondent Court of underlying principles as well as in the provisions regarding the form and theory of
Appeals of November 23, 1967 is reversed and set aside, and the joint decision of our government, the rights and obligations of the citizens, the conditions of
the Court of Agrarian Relations of October 1, 1964 dismissing the actions filed by citizenship, the voting age, the national economy and society in general, but more
particularly, the eradication of social injustice, the judicial set up, the accountability
of public officers, the autonomy local governments, the preservation and protection
of national patrimony and the reorientation of the educational system, to mention
only some of them, are so substantial and far reaching that only blind loyalty to the
old could make anyone insist that the former charter has merely suffered
amendments of form and language and the Philippine Constitution of 1973 is not a
new one. Withal, having taken a sacred oath on October 29, 1973 that "aking
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang bagong Saligang-Batas", I am as solemnly bound
not to ever consider the present charter as anything less than new.

Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët