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UNCLASS\F\ED U.S. Oepartment of State Case No. 0-2016-16244 Doc No. C06272699 Date: 0813012018 ·:· .: , _, .. : . _. ....
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. 0-2016-16244 Doc No. C06272699 Date: 08/30/2018
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25X1
'¡.
SNIE 91-83
ARGENTINA:
A TROUBLED TRANSITION
1
Information available as of 20 May 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estímate.
SECRET
83
t.'
"'
11.
...
r
THIS ESTIMA TE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estímate:
~··
The Central lntelligence Agency, the Defense lntelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for lntelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval lntelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, lntelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of lntelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
The Department of Commerce
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83
CONTENTS
Page
PHEFACE .................................................................................................................. . 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... . 3
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. . 7
The lmpetus for Elections ................................................................................. . 7
Weakness of the Current Regime ............................................................. . 7

Support for Coup Lacking ....................................................................... .. 7
Key Transition Issues ........................................................................................ .. 8

The "Disappeared" .............................................·....................................... . 8
Corruption and the Falklands War .......................................................... . 9
Economic Mismanagement ....................................................................... . 9
Prospects ............................................................................................................. . 12
Party Politics .............................................................................................. . 13

Likely Strategies and Outcomes ............................................................... . 13
Stability of an Elected Government ........................................................ .. 14
lmplications for the United States .................................................................... . 17
25X1
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83
PREFACE
Politically exhausted and discreditéd, Argentina's armed forces

have promised restoration of civilian rule. The transition, however, is a
troubled one. Seeming}y intractable economic problems and civilian-
milítary disagreement over sensitive political issues aggravate an inher-
ently unstable sítuation. Moreover, there is sorne fear that a civilian
" government may not be able to survive.
. The Peronists, traditionally the country's dominant civilian· políti-
ca} force, are expected to win the elections scheduled for October. The
Radical Party, however, has a reasonable chance to obtain its first-ever
election victory over the followers of the late Juan Peron. In the
unlikely event that the transition process is aborted, there could be
severe consequences for US interests and bilateral relations wíth
Argentina.
· This paper explores the dynamics of the transition to civílian rule,
as well as the implications fo;r the United States of a Radical or Peronist
victory-or an aborted process.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The military in Argentina has initiated a transition process that in

all likelihood will produce a civilian, constítutional governmi:mt by 30
January 1984, as promised. The armed forces recogníze that they are
too discredited to retain power after seven years of rule that have
included human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, and loss of
the Falklands war. Even if President Bignone were ousted in a palace
e coup, the transition is not likely to be derailed.
A minority of military officers might like to halt or extend the

transition period, but we believe they lack the necessary support in the
military, and civilian sectors to do so. Any coup attempt would almost
certainly be short lived. A coup attempt that is not quickly aborted,
however, could trigger íntramilitary violence with highly unpredictable
results.
Renewed military adventurism with respect to the Falklands
would not disrupt the transition. Another full-scale Argentíne assault is
highly unlikely, anda more límited incident (such as a minor Argentine
raid or an accidental sea or. air encounter) might rekíndlé Argentine
public passions but probably would not prompt civilian leaders to
accept halting or_ delaying the transition. The armed forces would also
be unlikely to use it as a pretext for doing so.
Military-civilian harmony duríng the ·transition and after a new
civilian government is installed will depend in large part on how several
key issues-includíng corruption, thousands of dísappearances during
the antiterrorist campaign, and the política! conduct of the Falklands
war-are handled. Armed forces leaders want to prot~ct themselves
against personal or institutíonal retribution before turning over power.
Civilian leaders recognize the s·ensitivity of these issues but are wary of
the política! consequences of being perceived as having struck a deal
with the military.
The elections on 30 October 1983 will be dominated by two center-
left parties-the Peronists and the Radicals. The Peronists are expected
to win, but they suffer from serious interna! splits becau.se of the lack of
a recognized successor to the late strongman Juan Peron. Radical hopes
for winning the election lie in a uníted effort behind Raul Alfonsin-a ;
lawyer who is appealing to the labor sector in an effort to supplement
bis party's traditional middle class constituency. New voters will
3
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. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. 0-2016-16244 Doc No. C06272699 Date: 08/30/2018
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83
. account for as much as 30 percent of the electorate-a huge electoral·

imponderable. These new voters forma pool from which Alfonsin must
draw support if he is to build bis populist coalition.
Most other political parties tend to be small, provincial, and highly
personalistic organizations. None threaten the Peronists or Radicals
nationally, although sorne might provide marginal support to the majar
parties in coalition efforts. Conservative politic'al and economic interests
in Argentina lack an effective national party to articulate their views
and attract broad support. This critica! weakness accounts in part for
the historical tendency of conservatives to rely on the military to protect
their interests.
\ ;¡:
1
Economic problems will almost surely dwarf all other issues facing
¡ :¡ the new government. In 1982, inflation was about 200 percent, with the
1 trend accelerating; unemployment hovered around lO to 12 perc~nt,
.1 and the foreign debt verged on $40 billion. As the election date
'J
,,!1 approaches, economic po]icy makers are likely to become íncreasingly
¡: susceptible to pressures for expansionary policies rather than austerity.
¡:i The government probably will fall short of its IMF targets later this
í '
year, but the IMF is unlikely to cut off aid-preferring to work out re-
1 i vised terms with a newly elected government.
::
i¡ A new administration most likely would attempt to broaden its
1
support for economic recovery by incorporating key sectors-organized
¡' labor, industry, finance, agriculture-into the policymaking process.
Nevertheless, if the víctor wins less than a majority, as is likely, it will
have great difficulty abandoning the kind of populist, prote~tionist, and
redistributive policies that both parties traditionally have favored. A
civilian government also will be somewhat circumscribed by a continu-
i' ing heavy foreign debt service burden and the po]icy conditions
1·¡
¡ 1.• attached to new lending by the IMF and prívate foreign banks.
i i
'l . i·
. '
In foreign affairs, either party will continue to press for negotia-
:, 1' tions with the United Kingdom over the Falklands issue, and to seek
i'!;
l
better relations with Argentina's neighbors and Nonaligned states. The
!: Argentine-Soviet relationship-which has strengthened considerably
''
;
since 1980-will remain essentially the same under a civílian govern-
ment of eíther party. Buenos Aires will endeavor to maíntain and
perhaps expand commercial relations with Cuba, the USSR, and Soviet
Bloc ·countríes while attempting to minimize the risks of political
'¡ contamination. Leaders of both parties are anti-Communist, and la-
bor-which is sure to play an important role in the next government-
has historically opposed Communism and Soviet expansionism. Military
¡: leaders probably will continue to reject Soviet offers to sell major
4
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83
weapon systems as long as Argentina retains access to Western arms on

acceptable terms.
Bilateral contacts with the United States probably will resume their
historical pattern of correct relations, marred by intermittent periods of
tension. Under the Peronists, and even more so if Alfonsin becomes
president, Argentina is likely to become less supportive of US policies in
Central America and more critica! of US economic policy in the
hemisphere.
The continued preeminence of the Falklands issue for Buenos Aires
probably will cause problems with the United States. Argentina's
current test of faith is the willingness and ability of the United States to
"pressure the United Kingdom into negotiations. With this a highly
unlikely development in the near future, bilateral tension is nearly
assured. In its attempts to drum up Falklands support in international
forums, Argentina is likely to trade votes on issues insignificant to
Buenos Aires but important to the United States, giving rise to a series of
bilateral irritants.
Given a successful transition, US interests are not likely to be
·1
threatened directly, although US investment in the petroleum and
] financia! sectors might be exposed to sorne increased risk. In interna-
tional affairs, neither a Peronist nor a Radical administration is likely to
create threats to US security interests by aligning Argentina with the So-
viet Bloc and providing· the Soviets with access to its port and base
facilities, or by pressing for the development of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, a civilian government will be less likely to pursue adventurist
military policies that would complicate US relations with the United
Kingdom or Chile. -.
In the unlíkely event that the transition were aborted by rightwing
forces, us interests would be adversely affected. us condemnation,
mandated by US support of democracy in the region and the Argentine
transition in particular, would severely strain relations. The repressive
tactics such a regime would probably emp}oy would create serious
problems over human rights issues. An extremely hostile environment
would be created for foreign investment, given the likely termination of
the IMF program, mounting economic difficulties, and a stridently
nationalist bent in ruling circles. Finally, r~gional peace might be
threatened if a nationalistic regime indulged in saber rattlíng over the
Falklands or the Beagle Channel in an effort to rally domestic support.
5
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83
Argentina
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Boundary lepresentatoon tS
L"_•'_"_'c-es_~_"'~'"-"'_'•_"'_••_•ve--~--------------------------------------------------------------------~25)(1'
634010 5-83
6
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U.S. Department of State Case No. 0-2016-16244 Doc No. C06272699 Date: 08/30/2018
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83
DISCUSSION
The lmpetus for Elections 4. Traditional interservice rivalries. and animosities

l. Defeat in the Falklands war sealed the political also were exacerbated by the Falklands war. Interserv-
fate of Argentina's military government. The seeds of ice coordination ís slow and inefficíent, and unseemly
that demise, however, were sown long before, particu- battles between the services almost inevitably surface
larly in the form of economic mismanagement. The in the press, further undermining the military's image
Falklands debacle accelerated the move toward restor- and credibility. The Army, however, remains the
ing civilian Iule by undermining the military's prestige dominant service. It ís particularly important, there-
and its willingness to retain power in the· face of fore, that Army Commander Nicolaides now appear to
seemingly intractable economic problems and rising be in control of his troops, supportive of Bignone, and
political discontent. The postwar declaration by the committed to a successful transition.
armed forces that they would cede power to an elected
civilian government in early 1984 merely constituted Support for Coup Lacking
public recognition that they were too discredited to
5. A large majority of general officers in all three
retain power.
armed services support the transition-or at least are
Weakness of the Current Regime resigned to it-and we have no evidence that the
widespread dissatisfaction that led to pressure from
2. The fundamental dilemma of the armed forces the lower ranks for command changes after the Falk-
and the Bignone administration is one of managing a lands war has been redirected in favor of blocking the
transition from a position of pronounced weakness. transition.
With their legitimacy exhausted and their credibility
ata post-1976 nadir, the ability of the armed forces to 6. Nonetheless, support for prolonged military rule
structure a retreat that satisfies their political prefer- can be found among a minority of officers at alllevels.
ences and protects their institutional interests is ques- Their varied reasons include:
tionable. Moreover, President Bignone lacks a personal - Fear that military institutions and individuals
power base, and this makes him vulnerable and will be vulnerable to retribution under a civilian
dispensable. Both military and civilian supporters of regime.
the transition, however, are willing to retain him
because he has identified himself unambiguously with - Philosophical opposition to a democratie
the transition. government.
3. Military efforts to run the government are com- - Expectation on the part of rabid anti-Peronist~:
plicated by both intraservíce and ínterservíce rivalries. that the followers of the late Juan Peron will win
The intraservice problem remains but is less critica! again.
than it was in the ímmediate aftermath of the war
- Desire to retain the lucrative sinecures in state·
when discontent in the ranks-especially in the
companíes.
Army-prompted frequent rumors about command
shakeups. The selection of new commanders, the 7. A coup attempt by a small coterie of disgruntled
retirement of many senior officers in the Navy and the officers would be unlikely to succeed. Not only would
Air Force, and the concentration of efforts on institu- their numbers be insufficient, but other critica! ele-
tional recovery have produced 'a more settled, al- ments would be missíng, such as a liigh degree of
though far from quiescent, atmosphere within the ínterservice coordination and a receptive or passive
individual services. civilian environment. The situation would probably be
,1'
7
l '
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r ij
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1·
83
~
¡¡
,¡ reminiscent of the aborted effort by the Air Force to sensitive matters include the política! conduct of the
¡¡ oust Peron's widow from the presidency in December Falklands war, the Beagle Channel dispute, corrup-
¡j tion, and economic mismanagement, including the
":-1 1975. Such an incident would ha ve little impact on the
~~ military's commitment to the restoration of civilian staggering growth of the foreign debt.
1'ti
1: ' rule.
11. Armed forces leaders feel vulnerable on these
¡:
~
· 8. Rumors about more broadly based coup attempts issues and want them dealt with before the turnover of
u persist
1 1 power crea tes an environment in which public .2-SX 1
1) sure for investigations and punishment would be 25X
t¡ - for a civilian government to resist. Potential ch ...~ .. 1
¡¡
heirs to the presidency also have an interest in early
rl resolution. Such sensitive issues would threaten to
t~
destabilize any new government by provoking almost
immediate problems with the armed forces.
~
r:
-
The "Disappeared"
r 12. lt is on the "disappeared" issue that the armed
forces feel most exposed and least able to compromise.
Civilian and military support for such plots is lacking, The dimensions of the problem remain unclear: While
however, and they probably would have little chance estimates vary as to the number of persons missing as a
of success. result of 1975-79 counterterrorist operations, the fate
of perhaps 7,000 to 10,000 people is probably in-
9. Similarly, we do not expect that renewed adven- volved. Most of them probably died at the hands of
turism with respect to the Falklands would derail the security forces personnel.
transition. The lack of interservice <;ooperation and
coordination, along with other clear military deficien- 13. The prospect of massive, Nuremberg-style retri-
cies, makes another full-scale assault on the islands bution triggers military anxieties. Armed forces leaders
highly unlikely. Also unlikely, but more probable, refuse to apologize for their counterterrorist methods
would be a limited incident that might result from an and are committed to protecting their personnel from
il accidental encounter with UK ships or aircraft; a any sort of judicial processing for alleged abuses. To do
otherwise would not only risk interna! rebellion but
junta-approved action designed to nettle the UK de-
fense forces; or a unilateral action undertaken by a seriously blemish the only outstanding success of post-
single Argentine service-most likely the Navy. A 1976 military goverment-the triumph over terrorism.
minor incident of limited military consequence might 14. The junta document on the counterterrorist war
rekindle Argentine public passions over the Falklands released on 28 April was primarily an attempt to calm
but would not be perceived in civilian circles as fears within military ranks about possible future pun-
sufficient reason to termínate or postpone the transi- ishment. lt was issued amidst an ever-increasing
tion process. Any hint that the government might use stream of media revelations about abuses and accom-
such an incident as a pretext to do so would probably panied by an "Institutional Act" apparently intended
provoke widespread civilian protests. to assign military courts exclusive jurisdiction over
military personnel accused of "dirty war" crimes.
Key Transition lssues Although the junta stated that no further information
would be published, the document contained no de-
10. Military reticence about the transition in part
tailed data on disappearances and little new informa-
reflects anxiety over unresolved issues in which signifi-
tion on any facet of the war.
cant military interests-institutional and individual-
are at stake. Chief among them is responsibility of the 15. Predictably, the report was strongly condemned
armed forces for abuses committed during the anti- by representatives of all nonmilitary sectors. Moral
terrorist campaign, especially disappearances. Other indignation inspired much of the criticism: but a larg~
8
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83
measure of political opportunism was also present as 25X1

campaigning politícians benefited from another
chance to blast the military for its sins. There remains
a strong possibility that the junta will issue an amnesty
law befare the elections. It will probably be necessitat-
ed by a belief within the armed services that the
"final" report and "Institutional Act" do not provide
adequate protection for personnel who were involved
in the counterterrorist effort.
16. Until the last year or so, most civilian política!
leaders treated the "disappeared" issue with extreme 19. From the civilian politician's perspectíve, criti·
caution, when not avoiding it entirely. It was left to cism on these issues 'is a cheap, effective, and indis-
human rights organizatíons to demand from the armed pensable component of any politicían's antimilitary
forces an accounti~g for those allegedly missing.' As the rhetoric. Nothing need be proven. The bad política]
transition process began to unfold, demands for such judgment displayed in the Falklands invasion and in
an accounting became common coinage among critics the subsequent failure to negotiate a settlement befare
of the military from political partíes, labor unions, the humiliating military defeat is obvious. Corruption ñs
Church, and human rights groups. Most political party taken for granted by a cynical Argentine public.
spokesmen are still somewhat cautious, however. A Media revelations involving the alleged misdeeds of
position that is appropriately outraged-although prominent military officers are all the more satisfying
vague on solutions-is an essential weapon in the because of repeated military pretensions to moral
arsenal of any presídential aspirant. A candidate who superiority.
adopts an inflexible stance, however, could quickly 20. Nevertheless, civilians will be cautious about
become trapped after he is elected. If he compromises attacking specific military figures or promising specif-
he wílllose some measure of civilian support, but if he ic and dramatic reprisals that could only serve to sour
demands action and alienates the armed forces he relations with the armed forces. Criticism of the
might provoke a coup attempt. military has escalated sharply from al! quarters during
17. The cautious civilian stance probably reflects a the transition, but military tolerance is finite. Thc;
fairly accurate assessment of public attitudes. Counter- closing of severa] periodicals and an early February
terrorist excesses are not widely condoned. They are display of junta pique accompanied by threats of legal
perceived, however, as the unavoidable byproduct of a action reminded the civilians that some restraint wa:s
struggle forced on the country by subversives. Most still necessary.
Argentines probably believe that moral imperatives
dictate some form of accounting for abuses but not one Economic Mismanagement
that would involve a detailed public exposure of 21. Long befare the Falklands defeat sealed the
events or retribution against numerous military and military's political fate, armed forces rule was being
security officials. undermined by obvious economic failures. Passive
acceptance of military rule was turning into active
Corruption and the Falklands War , opposition as groups largely quiescent since 197€i
began disp}aying opposition to official economic pc2 X
5 1
,1 1 cy. So intractable did the problems appear that, evc!Jl
before the war, many officers preferred abandoning:
power to continuing an apparently fruitless struggle to·
manage difficult economic problems.
22. The early years of military rule had brought
domestic economic improvements under the guídance
9
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83
of Economy Minister ]ose Martinez de Hoz. Policy ed. 1 The Central Bank is also renegotiating pa yments
reforn:s restored growth and halved inflation. Good schedules on $6 billion of 1982 public-se.ctor principal
world markets boosted earnings from agricultura! ex- arrears and $8.7 billion in 1983 maturities. If all the
ports, thereby helping to overcome payments prob- pieces fall into place, the debt profile will be altered to
lems. After 1979, however, excessive dependence on one in which a large part of the debt that would fall
the exchange rate mechanism to dampen inflation due in 1983 would not be due untill987 or later.
produced a seriously overvalued peso, led to interna! 26. Wehbe' s task will not get easier during the
market distortions, and laid the foundation
. .
for future remaining months of the transition. Political uncer-
balance-of-payments problems. tainty and the government's weakness will inhibit
23. Since late 1979, Martinez de Hoz and his consistency in policy implementation and discourage
successors have been guilty of the kind of sharp policy foreign and domestic priva te investment. His room for
turns and reverses that have exaggerated Argentina's maneuver will also depend upon the aggressiveness
~
economic difficulties over the years. In 1982 alone, with which a renascent labor movement forces its
policy shifted from a somewhat promising stabilization wage demands. Should 'the unions threaten social
peace through massive strike activity, political consid-
,, effort before the war, toa more populist, expansionary
1 erations will take increasing priority over economic
1 thrust in the wake of defeat, to the modera te austerity
ones in the decisionmaking process. Finally, Wehbe
efforts now being implemented under Economy Min-
has no solid political base even within the armed
ister Jorge Wehbe. With these policy gyrations, the
' economic disruption occasioned by the war, and the

impact of global recession, 1982 marked a second
straight annual drop in gross domestic product
forces, where Air Force critics of his efforts ha ve been
vocal at times. His most solid leverage consists of
continued Army support and general acceptance of
the need to maintain IMF financing by making an
(GDP)-5.5 percent-coupled with accelerating infla- earnest effort to comply with agreed guidelines.
tion (about 200 percent for the calendar year). Foreign
d debt, which expanded rapidly after 1979, stood at 27. Wehbe's susceptibility to pressures from various
¡¡ quarters was evident in early 1983 when labor and
about $38.7 billion at ye~_r's end. (See charts of
fl economic indicators.) military sectors forced acceptance of Argentina's first
,¡ ¡ unemployment insurance program. Subsequently, in
i,
¡. 24. Wehbe, who took over in August 1982, gradual- March, dissatisfaction within the military and else-
l. l ]y tightened monetary policy and introduced reforms where over surprising]y high inflation figures for
designed to slow inflation without provoking an un- January (16 percent) and February (13 percent) forced
manageable political backlash. In simplest form, his Wehbe to accept a price controls scheme that features
., approach involves stibsidizing domestic industrial re- subsidized interest rates for participating businesses .
., covery through export taxes on agricultura! production
i 28. Oscillation between such ad hoc expansionary
~
~~ and a combination of rebates for industrial exports and
measures and maintenance of Wehbe's established
controls on industrial imports. This scheme is support-
~·¡ program to meet IMF requirements will probably
t ed 'by daily minidevaluations of the exchange rate
¡j persist throughout the transition. In the last quarter of
pegged to the difference between rates of interna! and the year, as the military's tenure winds clown, the
t
: externa] inflation. government will probab]y be less resistant to expan-
1
¡,
25. Wehbe's chief successes to date have been sionary measures. Given the economic consequences
·¡ r· 1 .............. ~-~ A M~ ..,~;.,,.'" tiW.,;,.,...
... of poli ti cal uncertainty, it is reasonable to exoect about
83
Argentina: Economic Indicators, 1976-82
Note change in scales

Real GDP Consumer Prices 500
Percent change Annual average !c::l
percent change
400
; ..
300
200
~o o
o
Agricultura! Production 130
-
., Manufacturing Output 110
~
-~
1970= lOO 1976=100 7-

125 .... ~~.. ·- •
105 r-"
':t b·.~
120
r
M ,,A
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~~'
- ~·:~
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100 \ ...
\ r"""
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; ~
'~ ~ < ;'1 •l!¡\'

.. """ ;..
115 '11
..:~ ""'• 1>'~ .'
,.
.,..
95 .. l•
..
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.. ~'. 1; .
-=~
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110 90 "
h >i
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;t~
1'
~-
105
~J
tt~· 85
.... .,
llr:l
~- ·~
~~ ¡, ~·
,.'! ~lt!
•' '
~~
..
~ _., ~ ·¡ :t d... '

lOO 80
Public Sector Deficit O Externa! Debl 40
Percent ofGDP Bi!Uon US S
30
20
::g-. - - - - - - - -
11
--,~2---------------~
10
o
Curren! Account lnterest Payments on 70
......
Million US $ Externa! Debt
Percent of exports 60 ...
~
50
o ~ J
,,
40
-1
30
t't ¡•
-2 7 • •
-
20 } ,~,
-3
In
-- n~
............... -
.....
83
should permit a reduction in the current account out the year. Elements opposed to elections may
defic~t to about $1 billion, a shortfall that can be become increasingly anxious and desperate as the date
covered if the projected debt refinancing package is approaches, but they will find it increasing}y difficult
completed. to generate widespread support for stopping a process
so near completion. (See inset.)
. 29. Argentina complied with agreed guidelines for
the first quarter of its IMF agreement (see inset) and
may do the same for the second-quarter review in
June · but will probably fall short of sorne interna!
targets as the election approaches. If for any reason the Implica tions of a Coup Attempt
government should feel forced to cancel the accord, it
could trígger a highly negative series of events. A While we judge the possibility of a success-
likely withdrawal of new foreign lending would force ful coup to be low, a coup attempt that is not
a sharp 6rop in imports and economic activity, further swiftly put clown could produce severa! high-
stimulating inflatíon. Eventually Argentina would ly undesirable situations. Among them:
probably be forced to declare at least a temporary
- An all-out struggle for control in the
moratorium on all debt servicing, including interest.
armed forces, including violent con-
frontatíons, during which the civilians
would remain on the sidelines.
Argentina's IMF Agreement
- An apparent victory by antielection
Buenos Aires concluded a 15-month stand- military sectors that would provoke ac-
by agreement with the IMF in February. In tive and eventually violent civilian
return for $1.65 billion in IMF assistance and resistance.
commercial bank lending support, the Ar- - In the highly unlikely and worst case
gentines promised to implement the reforms event, a violent intramilitary clash in
to improve the country's economic perfor- which civilian sectors would choose
mance. Under the terms of the agreement, sides, leading to a complete breakdown
Buenos Aires promised to reduce the public- of law and order.
sector deficít from 14 percent of GDP in
1982 to 8 percent this year and limit credit In all these cases the outcome would be
expansion to 170 percent. The government highly unpredictable. Particularly in the
also agreed to raise interest rates, public- worst case, opportunities might be created
sector tariffs, and wages and to devalue in for the emergence of a new military strong-
line with the rate of inflation. The stabiliza- man, for decísive action by well-prepared
tion program hoped to achieve 5-percent extremists of the right or left, and for med-
real growth this year, while reducíng infla- dling by foreign interests.
tion to 160 percent and halving the current
Üpportunities for Soviet interference
account deficit to $1 billion, but they are
would increase given the collapse of law and
incompatible targets.
order, but Moscow's in-country resources
would be limited. The Argentine Communist
Party (about 50,000 members) has no work-
ing-class base and is not violence prone. It
Prospects
repudfated those involved in the subversive
30. The chances that Argentina will reach elections violence of the 1970s and, as far as we.know,
on 30 October and a restoration of civilian rule on 30 has no clandestine cache of weapons. It is
January 1984 are perhaps 85 percent at this point. viewed as nonthreatening by' the military,
With the election timetable established, momentum in which excluded the Communists from a
favor of the transition will continue to build through 1976 han on parties advocating the violent
12
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overthrow of the government. Few of the with three small parties. The coalition serves the
violence-prone revolutionaries wh6 fled the interests of its members by emphasizing their common
country in the 1970s ha ve returned to Argen- opposition to military rule and providing a vehicle for
tina, and the labor movement's staunch anti- authoritative expressions of dissent.. However, the im-
Communism makes it an unlikely Soviet portance of the Multipartidaria has faded in recent
proxy. Perhaps the best Soviet hope, there- months and will continue to do so as the electoral
fore, would lie in the possible emergence of a campaign sets the coalition members against one
leftist or reformist military clique from another.
among young officers, something akin to the 34. At stake in the intraparty battles is control over
group that led Peru in the early 1970s. To the reorganized parties and nominations for offices
our knowledge, however, such a group cur- from the presidency clown to provincial and local
rently does not exist. posts. These battles are particularly intense within the
Peronist and Radical camps, in part because of the
deaths of Peron and Balbin. Personality conflicts and
ideological tensions long held in check by their domi-
31. Argentina's civilians are returning to power by nating paternalism have bee~ unleashed in the inter-
default. The popular mood is clearly antimilitary, but na! struggles in both parties.
the arra y of civilian alternatives provokes only limited
public enthusiasm. Despite the deaths of the nation's Likely Strategies and Outcomes 2
dominating civilian caudillos, Juan Peron and Ricardo
35. The elections will be a Peronist-Radical affair
Balbin, poli ti cal parties are offering little that is new in
with the Peronists the favorite if they patch up their
terms of personalities or rhetoric. Thus, there is little to interna! differences. A united Peronist effort should
allay the cynicism of an Argentine electorate inured to elicit strong support in traditional Peronist constituen-
repeated civilian as well as military failures in govern- cies such as urban labor, small and middle-size busi-
ment. In 1973, at the clase of the previous military ness, the bureaucracy, and proponents of strongly
government (1966-73), many Argentines entertained nationalist economic and international policies. For
hopes that an older and wiser Peron might somehow good measure, the Per9nists will probably work out
mold a consensus that would permit political stability deals with small parties such as the Movement for
and. economic growth. The Peronist debacle of 1973- Integration and Development, the Popular Conserva-
76 smashed those illusions. Today Argentines prefer Uve Party, and the Christian Democrats. None are
civilian to military rule, but they yiew the transition important enough to be labeled swing groups, but each
without exaggerated expectation. could provide marginal support for the Peronist presi-
dential ticket.
Party Pplitics
36. Radical hopes for defeating the Peronists lie in a
32. The contest among political parties for the united effort behind Raul Alfonsin. He alone among
presidency and control of lesser seats of power will Radical aspirants has the potential to appeal beyond
soon begin in earnest, once interna! party reorganiza- historical Radical constituencies and make a dent in
tions and the process of selecting candidates for the 30 Peronist domination of the labor vote. Alfonsin pro-
October elections are completed. To date, the political jects a populist image domestically. His outlook on
game has been played on two levels. On one leve!, the international affairs is skewed by a pronounced anti-
contest pits al! civilians against the military as all US bias. He views "imperialism" as responsible for
many of the hemisohere's er.onomifl ~~"inl¡3ó/ "'61:8
aspirants to office seek to validate their antimilitary
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37. To have a chance, an Alfonsin campaign will 40. The presidential contest will be governed by
have to be extremely well organized and financed. He procedures established in the 1853 Constitution-that
must court the labor vote in the _industrial suburbs of is, a single vote with an electoral college system. This
the Federal Capital that fall into the Buenos Aires would appear to favor the party most likely to gain a
Province voting area, even though he will surely lose plurality, the Peronists. At present, an electoral law
to the Peronists there by a wide margin. He will have governing the apportionment of congressional seats has
.to make up the difference in the other three key yet to be decreed. Both the Peronists and Radicals
voting areas, the Federal Capital itself, Cordoba Prov- favc;¡r granting the victorious party an autorp.atic ma-
ince, and Santa Fe Province (see map on page 6). It is joríty in the Congress. The smaller parties, of course,
more ímportant to Alfonsin than to the Peronists to are insisting upon proportional representation
seek extraparty alliances. Dozens of small parties will formulas.
eventually ,prowd the ballot, and many will seek a
deal, offering to support the Radical or Peronist
Stability of an Elected Government
presidential ticket in exchange for major party support 41. The stability of a civilian regime is already a
for their provincial slates. matter of discussion in civilian and military circles. ·
lmplicit in the concern being voiced is the fear that
38. Parties on the right and left of the political
any civilian government's chances will be undermined
spectrum cannot mount a serious national challenge to
by the absence of fundamental change in the country's
the Peronists and Radicals (see table). Although a
political structure, behavior, and attitudes. This con-
conservative coalition was able to capture 15 percent
cero is well placed, particularly given the difficult, íf
1 of the vote in the 1973 elections, the absence of a not crippling, economic situation a civilian administra-
national conservative party to give institutionalized tion is likel y to inheri t.
expression to conservative political and economíc
42. Relations With the Military. The armed
1 víew~ remains a critica! weakness in Argentina's party
forces will not abandon their self-arrogated mission as
l system. In' the October contests, center-right aspirants
will be further handicapped by the support lent to the nation's ultimate política! arbiter. Under the best
~ post-1976 military governments by prominent civilian of circumstances, they would reconcile themselves to
conservatives. The nonviolent left is equally divided constitutional subordination to civilian authority, andl
the civilians would avoid gratuitous and demagogic
1
•• 1
and doomed by íts inability to shake Peronism's grasp
on labor's vote. Revolutionary groups ha ve no constitu-
antimilitary rhetoric that would inhibit cooperatiorn
with the armed forces after the elections. Neither of
ency, and parties advocating violence are outlawed.
these conditions will be fulfilled entirely. However,
39. If there is a true swing group in the elections, it the stability of the new civilian government will be
may be those who have come of age since 1973 and improved to the degree that they are met.
will be voting for the first time. New voters may make
43. Civilian-military tension will persist, with po-
up as much as 30 percent of an electorate roughly 18
tential flashpoints in the form of issues that might still
million strong. It is dífficult to gauge the impact of the be pending such as the "disappeared," corruption, and
1973-76 Peronist period or the ensuing years of mil!- mismanagement of the Falklands war. Barring an
tary rule and repression on the política! perceptions immediate and egregious challenge to military inter-
and preferences of new voters. If to this group are ests, however, the new civilian authorities should enjoy
added those who ha ve had only one opportunity (1973) at least a temporary respite from coup pressure.
to vote in a presidential contest sínce 1964, the sector Conspirators will find it 'difficult to muster support
of the electorate for whích we have no reliable voting until the civilians have had a chance to succeed.
history iumps to well over half. The new voter pool Likewise, given the current leve} of military disrepute,
may open avenues for Alfonsin and the Radicals in potential coup plotters will probably see•the wisdom of
traditional Peroníst constituencíes, and it should at a low military profile for a time while military leaders
least íncrease the "undecíded" vote from which Alfon- attend to professional tasks and the resurrection of the
sin must draw to bliild bis new coalition. military's public image.
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Argentina: The Political Spectrum ·

Parties (1983} Performance in March 1973 Election Organized Support Groups 8
Grouping Vote(%} - - - - - - - -
Right of center Popular Federalist Forces (FUFEPO) Conservatíve coalition headed 14.9 Argentine Industrial
Confederation of the Republican by Federal Party leader Man· Union (UIA): particular
Center (including Alsogaray's rique. representatives of businesses
Center Democratic Union). Three other conser~ative 5. 75 with international
Federal Party candidates connections and markets
Oemocratic Party Argentine Rural Society
Conservative Party
Progressive Democrats (POP)-
Oemocratic Socialists (PSD)
alliance
Center to center left Peronists Peronist coalition (FREJULI) . 49.59 Peronists. vast majority of
Christian Democratic Federation b including MIO, PCP, and unionízed labor, including
Popular Conserva ti ves (PCP) part of Christian Democra ts CGT·A, CGT-RA, "62 Or·
Movement for Integration ganízations"; small and medi-
and Development (MID) um-size businessmen once
represented by defunct Gen·
eral Economíc Confederation
(CGE)
Radicals (UCR) UCR 21.3 UCR: small minority of
organized labor; university
students
Left Intransigent Party (PI) Coalition headed by PI leader 7.43

Communist Party (PCA) Alende and unofficially
Socialists (severa! splinters) including proscribed PCA
Popular Leftist Front (FIP) FIP 0.4
Radicalleft Socialist Workers Party (banned) Coalitíon headed by 0.6 No organized in-country
Montonero Peronist Movement Socialist Workers support groups.C
(banned) Party
Revolutionary Communist
Party (banned}
8 The elections are too far off to have.prompted declarations of support for candidates or parties from most existing organizations or from
those that will be founded to assist campaigns.

b An uneasy alliance, sorne factions of which belong closer to the center or center right of the political spectrum.
e Although we have few details·on their numbers and intentions, sorne Montonero exiles have returned to Argentina in recent months
Sorne of these have been captured or killed.
Secret Noforn
,,
44. Economic Policy. Economic problems will al- analysis is based on the assumption Argentina is an
most surely dwarf all other issues facing the new extraordinarily wealthy country whose potential re-
government aS the cjyjJianS inherit the military's lega• mo:1Ín~ 11nr<>oli7~,j hAf'\'lm<> "f ... al-~- •L '"1 8
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83
ence. There are variatíons on thís theme, reflecting the

49. Neither the Peronísts nor the Radicals questio·n
sophistícatíon, experíence, and general política} out-
the positíve role of the domestic prívate sector or
look ef various proponents. The basic assumptions
foreign investment "properly" controlled. Neverthe-
remaín unchanged, however, and will manifest them-
less, foreígn financia! and petroleum interests will
selves in the policies of a Peronist or Radical
probab}y take a rhetorical beating in the electiOJrl
administration.
campaign and would be the most likely targets for
46. The options available to a new administration punitive action íf a civilía~ government felt the need
will depend in part upon the dimensions of the to validate its nationalist credentials. Otherwise, the
winner's victory margin. A Peronist or Radical govern- most probable development is a new foreign invest-
ment inaugurated after winning less than a majority of ment law that would be a compromise between the
the/ popular vote, as is likely to be the case, will have unrealistic restraints contained in the 1973 Peronist
great difficu]ty abandoning the kind of populist, pro- legislation and the very relaxed conditions established
tectionist ..volicies which,. despíte specífíc varíations, pv the milítary since 1976.
both parties favor. There is a small chance that the
Peronísts might win a majority of the popular vote. 50. Foreign AJfairs. In international affaírs, the
Peronists and Radicals would probably pursue verv
The strength of the resulting mandate would op{ln
more policy options, and in the past Peronist adminis- similar paths:
trations have implemented austerity programs when - Concentration on the Falklands íssue with a •
forced by economic realities to do so. stance little changed from that of the currenft
47. A civilian government's options will also be government.
somewhat circumscribed by the contínuíng heavy debt - An emphasis upon connections with Nonalígnedl
1 service burden and the policy conditions attached to Movement countries and relations with Latint
·new lending by the IMF and prívate foreign banks. American neighbors.
1 These constraints could be circumvented by an i~defí
- Correct relations with the United States, but with
l
níte moratorium on all debt principal and interest
a tendency to adopt the role of critica! Latín
payments. Such a course, however, would risk default
American spokesmen on matters such as us:
actions by creditors and would cut off Argentina from
policy in Central Ameríca and US ínternational
any foreign credits for sorne time. We do not believe
economic policy.
that economic conditions will.be so bad in January
1 i 1984 as to make such a dramatic ínitiatíve appealíng - The maintenance of commercial relations with
except toan extraordinarily weak civilian government Cuba, the Soviet Uníon, and Soviet Bloc coun-
denied access to foreign financia} support. tries. The tendency wíth the Soyiets will be to
protect Argentina's trade interests by expanding
r 48. The more likely scenario envísions a Radical or
Peronist administration entering office on the basis of
bilateral relations in peripheral areas (for ín-
stance, civil aviation, technical asSi$tance) where.
an electoral p}urality and attempting to broaden sup-
the Argentines believe they can minimize the
port for economic recovery by incorporating key
risks of política} contamination.
1
,,
sectors-organized labor, industry, finance, agricul-
ture-into the policymaking process. Policy directions 51. Leaders of both major parties are anti-Commu-
are likely to reflect the populist, statist, distributíonist nist and wíll be wary of Soviet intentions toward
tendencíes these parties ha ve demonstrated in the past. Argentina. Peronists are always quick to point to their
The current IMF agreement will expire soon after the historical dominatíon of the labor movement as the ~
'\
new government takes office. We would expect that key to preventing Communist inroads in Argentina.
the civilians' effort to negotiate a new agreement Elected civilians, along with armed forces leaders, will
might curb somewhat their temptation to rely heavi]y remain resistant to Soviet offers to sell 'arms. Only if
upon import restrictions, export subsidies, exchange Argentina is denied access to desired Western arms is
controls, and generally protectionist policies. the military liable to purchase major Soviet weapon
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systems. The Argentines will, however, continue to on the Falklands, winning or maintaining commercial
"play the Soviet card"-that is, hint at the availability advantages, and being perceived as independent from
of Soviet weapons in order to broaden their access to the United States.
Western materiel on acceptable terms. 3
56. Immediate disagreement with the United
States, especially if Alfonsin becomes president, is
lmplications for the United States likely to arise over:
52. US interests in Argentina are not likely to be
- Central America, with Argentina probably as-
significantly affected by the installation of a new
suming a stance ~imilar to that of the Socialist
civilian government whether it be Peronist or Radical.
International.
However, prívate US investment in the petroleum and
financia! sectors might be exposed to sorne increased - Hemispheric economic affairs, on which Argenti-
risk, and troublesome differences are likely to arise on na will probably become a more outspoken critic
sorne issues. Q
of alleged US misdeeds.
53. In international affaírs and forums, a civilian 57. From the US perspective, bilateral relations will
government's likely policy direction will produce dis- be complicated by ·the Iack of leverage with which to
agreements with the United States, but neither Peron- influence Argentine policies and policymakers. None
ists nor Radicals are liable to create direct threats to of the likely civilian successors will feel partícularly
US security interests by aligning Argentina wíth the obligated toward the United States, and US influence
Soviet Bloc and providing the Soviet military with with the Argentine military ís likely td remain mini-
access to its port and base facilities. mal because of the Falklands war and the prolonged
54. The Falklands war added new and important prohibition on US military assistance and sales.
elements of uncertainty regarding Argentina's long-
58. The Falklands will remain the crucial issue for
range nuclear plans. Suspicions aoout its ongoing
Argentina, and there would appear to be little the
research notwithstanding, the existence of a dedicated
United States can do to satisfy Argentine desires. US
nuclear weapons program has not been confirmed.
support for resolutions in the UN and OAS in late 1982
Any civilian government will probably continue Ar-
gentina's efforts to develop a complete nuclear fuel improved the acrimonious postwar atmosphere. How-
cycle independent of safeguards and to exploit the ever, Argentina's new test of faith is .the willingness
country's nuclear achievements for international and and ability of the United States to pressure the United
domestic política! gain.• Kingdom into negotiations. With this a highly unlikely
development in the near future, the Falklands issue
55. Bilateral affairs will probably resume their his- will continue to be a source of bilateral tension. In the
torical pattern of correct relations, marred by inter- meantime, it will cause peripheral problems as Argen-
mittent periods of tension. Policymakers will profess tina drums up Falklands support in international
allegiance to Argentina's W estern, Christian traditions forums by trading votes on issues insignificant to
and acknowledge the need for good relations with the Argentina but perhaps important to the United States.
United States. However, Argentine actions will often
Votes running counter to US interests could produce a
reflect more immediate concern for gaining support
series of bilateral irrítants.
• For a more detailed treatment of the Argentine-Soviet relation-
59. The US ability to influence the lending prac-
ship, see CIA Intelligence Assessment ALA 83-10087C, Prospects
for Argentine-Sovlet Relations (TS Codeword NF NC OC), June tices of ínternational financia! institutions and US
1983, and SNIE 90/91-3-82, lmplicatíons o/ the Falklands Con/líct commercíal banks provides sorne leverage over Argen-
for Territorial Disputes ín Latín Ameríca (S NF NC), lO August tine policymakers. Recognition of this fact tempers
1982 anti-US sentiments in sorne civilian circles, although it
• F or a more detailed discussion of Argentine nuclear policy, see is not likely to be a policy determinant on.internation-
SNIE 91-2-82, Argentina's Nuclear Policytn Light of the Falklands
Defeat (S Codeword NF NC OC), 3 September 1982, and ALA 83-
al matters considered important by the' Argentines.
l0046C, Argentina: Resisting International Nuclear Sa/eguards (S Perceived US influence in this area can also become a
Codeword NF NC OC), Aprill983. liability should it become necessary to urge compli-
17
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83
'1¡ US support for democracy in the region and the
ance with international obligations on a besieged
Argentine Government. Anti-US sentiment could be Argentine transition in particular.
aroused easily if the United States were portrayed or Repressive tactics likely to be employed by such
perceived as the lobbyist of the international bankers, a regime would probably bríng renewed prob-
'·
¡; ;·¡.
j\ , 1 '
encouraging austerity measures at the expense of the lems over human rights.
Argentine working class. - Peace could be threatened because a nationalist
¡1
" ' 60. In the unlikely event that the transition process government might turn to saber rattling against
'
were aborted by a rightwing military coup, the effect Chile or the United Kingdom to rally popular
on US interests would be adverse and substantial: support.
Bilateral relations would be severely strained by Opportunities for meddling by the Soviets would
a strongly negatíve US reactíon to termination of increase if there were asevere breakdown of law
.
the electoral process that would be dictated by and order .
18
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ANNEX
MAJOR PARTICIPANTS IN E TRANSITION
The Peronists 1974-March 1976). They continue to to

lwr as Juan Peron's heir
1. On the basis o[ past pedc•m><n>ce, the Peronists control rnost of what still exists ol the tradítional party
cnter the campaíg:n f:avored over tht'-'ir maenmc'ry. Since l976 the verticalü.:tas h_ave consist~
the Juan Peron's heirs, are bur- op:pos:ed accomrnodatíon \YHh the militarv gov-
~:>Y of thc Hl7:3-713 Peronist ernment and someti.mes opted for confrontation. In
failure ami the absence of a recognized successor tn the labor sector, verticalistas control the so-called
the late strongman. Under Jl'eron's Pcron- Argentino Itepublíc faclion of the General Confedera-
ism \vas a rather than a tíon of Workers and the "'62 Organízu-
styled party. It was a collection of tions,'' a poJitical caucus of orthodox union bosses.
dcments that obeisauce to Pen:m and a va.•n•c!v or sclf.stylcd moderates
delined tha! wel· are the ¡f not linear descendants of the so~
fare and and economic natiomo~lisin. ln facL called Neo-Peronisls of the 1960s. While Peron was
f.leronism was what Peron it to lie at an·v still wcre attempting to structute a move--
time. a hierarchical or verticalista mcnt that would advocate traditional Pt>ronist pol:ici•es
shucture, Peron m.aintained a secure grip on the but without the suffocating dornínation of Peron, who
movement and the emergence was then in exile. rnoderates the
of competitors lo lcE>dETSilíP. need to ínstitutionalize and democratize Peronism, to
resnoru1 to the wiil of the rank and file. Sim:e 1976. the
2. líttle role in thc bat!le among tht> moderates have been Ie•ss stddent than thelr orthodox
pn,ten<l•ers to Peron 's mantle. Small groups at the counterparts in critki:zing the In
and left extremes of the movement are unimportant their labor wing. the faction of the CGT-A,
have little influeuce in the contest has eollaborated with armed forces lcaders
and may or mav not choose to remain under the
6. Then; is no dear f.avorHe among eontenders for
Peronist thc elcetions.
the Peronist presidential nomination. Nor is there
3- The real contest is a power among much in terms of or prograrns that dlstin·
aspiranls vvho represent mainstn:;·~~un of one from the othec Antonio Cafkro is the bcst
the movement but are divide:d into two
encies over issues that have historically
Peronisrn: Antonio Cafiero
Democraey versus autt)Cracy in interna! parly
._._ Confrontation versus cooperation with a sitt.ing

govern:mcnt.
4 The t'crticalista or orthodox wing is com¡>osed

of those who stuek n:wst dosely with Peron's wido\v,
!sabe! Peron. during hcr abhrevíated (J uly
19
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Italo Luder
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12. The Peronists' foreign policy planks vviH

indude Fernando De La Rua
u:von St.:mdard b;!arer of
Peron 's vaunted third Radical factian the
ism and Comrnunism. Natúmal Litte
upon doser relations wilh !\r~
Latin American ne.ighbors.
Continuatlon of the drive for favorable diploma\:~

ie ~,]ntions to thc Falkland lslonds ami
Channel disputes
Need for restructuríng the intenwtlonal econom- 14. The most charismatic of a lackluster crowd of
ie pn,suJetltl:ll ll•:opc,Juls. Alfonsin is a middlc dass
who tried to rnove the Hadicals to a more ponulist
Maintenance of the strategy of e''"'"""'~ stance -while B8lbin was alive_ He with a
Bloc commerdal Ol)l.'lDrtunities we·ll·•or~mniZ<"l and financed campaign that his Na-
contamination. tional I.Ane competitors ha ve not been able to rnatch or
Good relatíons with the Unitt•d Statcs. bhmt. Janu.::-t.:ry nnd polls t'ommissioncd hy a
Buenos Aires ne\vs rnagnzine attested to Alfonsin 's fast
start [1t teast in greater B1wnos /\ires. Not was he
Rodicols the favoritc candídate among those pollcd, but the
!él. The l\adi(cal Cívic Uníon the resuhs also showed the Radical Pa1!Y the
only seríoos nationa1 comt'.letition fnr Peronism. A.s the Peronist PHrty.
self-styled option to Peronlst and conserva~ 15. The traditional pa rt y·
tivt>military haud and renre-s.sion, Hadicu[bm is going the b:mds üf the National Une
through a process of redefinition as inttc:rnal scctors vie\v A.lfonsin :1!'- of ;Ul interlopec Alfonsin,
compete to inherit tht.~ influenct~ !orrm·rlv therdorf\ is the t.raditional. UCR
f'JWrted Ricardo Halbin. Püted against one another conslituencv, atternpting to molda nevi populist coaH-
are the partics· twn main factíons-the Alovemen.t tion through an to centcr-left dements in aH
Renoeatiort and and the Nalíonal JA'ru:·-~~ partie:>, young those for
and the tv... o men \vho have as their restx~c anyorw ,,.-ho heat the Pcroni:;ts, most
tlve ~tandard lwarers. Raul Alfonsin and Fernando De th~ Peronist bailiwick of industrial labor. Ad
La Rua. Srna1ler party faelíom; u1ust look for oppnrtu- hoc alliances with snull provincial parties also forr.n
uities lo thcir limHed suppott into influence on part of lhe strate~;J-". \:Vithin tJCJ\ A.lfonsin has
eme side or the nther, inereased bis chanct'5 by <:t<:cfpting Victor l\·1artinez as
bis rurming mate ami thereby securing support from
lhe Cordoba Line, the \Ving.
Hi Alfonsin's crcch:ntials are impecc;:-t"

llaul Alfonsin
ble. H'is message on domestic issnes is populist and
Stmulard benrrr o} slwrt on alt hough he fíts well within the
Hadicaf faction tlw rnainstn::am of Latin American social democracy. His
out!ook on intematlorw.l economic and affair.;;
and Change b skt-•wed by a pronounced anli~ US bias and a ten den
<.:.'Y tu set' consvír.ades Hl:' views :-1s
respon~ihle for marn-· nf the hcmispht::"re's econornic
and politiet.l and firm\y belwves
Argentina has becn vidiin.Lcv:d by dnmt'"Stil: """eua:Hu"
21
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and foreign bankers who have drained the natio:rí's expected of the Peronists. Alfonsin's nomination
wealth with the connivance of the military-conserva'- would, however, probably mean a rhetorically more
tive governing alliance. Thus, while Alfonsin professes aggressive and perhaps more anti-US tone than that of
to welcome multinational activity in what he terms any of the likely Peronist candidates.
productive sectors, he would almost surely place se-
vere restríctions on financia! firms. On the debt Other Contestants
question, Alfonsin's perceptions have resulted in a
pledge to pay public-sector foreign debt and prívate- 20. The remainder of the política! landscape is
sector obligations which debtors can prove were con- dotted with small parties whose numbers attest to the
tracted legitimately. schismatic, personalistic, and parochial nature of Ar-
gentine politics.
17. The National Line is the Balbin wing of the
UCR, but bis death left his líeutenants in disarray and 21. The' Movement for Integration and Develov-
Alfonsin o free to seize the initiative. Only in the ment (MID) is among the more signíficant small
January-February period did De La Rua emerge as parties because of the quality of its people and the
the National Line's alternative. A former national leadership of ex-President (1958-62) Arturo Frondizi.
senator and vice presídential candidate, De La Rua Its support stems from domestic business and profes-
was the UCR's rising young star during the 1973 sional groups attracted by the MID's emphasis on
elections. The beneficiary of youth (46) anda carefully development of an infrastructure of heavy industry.
cultivated Kennedy-like image, De La Rua represents The MID ran with the Peronist coalítion in 1973 and
the traditional UCR moderate, middle class interests. may do so again. If it offers its own ticket, Rogelio
Although he is an attractive public figure and will Fríegerio, Frondizi's chief lieutenant and MID theo-
enjoy whatéver grassroots support the traditional party rist, will head it. If Cafiero wins the Peronist nomina-
machinery can engender, it is doubtful that he can tion, an alliance is less likely bec~use of .longstanding
overcome Alfonsin's lead. De La Rua's challenge, differences between Cafiero and the MID.
however, has slowed Alfonsin's momentum and kept 22. The outlook of the volítical right is as bleak as
him embroiled in intraparty struggle when bis energies ever. The absence of an effective national Conserva-
might be more profita~ly spent on building bis new Uve Party has always been a critica! weakness in the
coalitíon.
political system. It has deprived conservative political
18. An Alfonsin-De La Rua ticket would seem the and economic interests of an institutionalized mecha-
L
' most promising route for the UCR, but Alfonsin insists nism for influencing national policy formulation and
that he is not interested. Given the intramural str.uggle, thereby encouraged conservatives to depend upon the
the UCR's history of schismatic behavior again clouds military's willingness to disrupt the constitutional sys-
its electoral chances. Alfonsin believes he deserves the tem. Conservative parties tend to be small, provincial,
nomination. If the party machinery is somehow ma- highly personalistic organizations given to forming ad
nipulated to deny bis bid, he might bolt, despite hoc electoral alliances in a feeble attempt to present a
repeated denials that he would do so. With Alfonsin as third alternative to the historical domination of the
' the candidate of a united party, the UCR could make Peronists and Radicals. Such an alliance, under the
the elections a contest. With Alfonsin outside the fold, leadership of venerable Federal Party chief Francisco
\ both he and the UCR would lose bad]y to the Manrique, won a respectable 15 percent of the March
l Peronists.
19. There is little to chóose between the UCR and
the Peronists in programmatic terms. Both are center-
1973 presidential vote. This time, however, the right is
seriously handicapped by its identification in the
public mind with the post-1976 military regime; sever-
a! of its prominent figures have held official posts
left on the domestic political spectrum, although the
1
1
UCR is generally Iess disposed toward statist economic
under the military.
11 policies or attempts at income redistribution. With 23. Under ideal circumstances, partles on the right
respect to foreign policy, the UCR will probably would coalesce behind an attractive public figure and
\
~
assume a stance not marked)y different from that win 15 percent of the vote or a bit more. It would help
¡
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if the UCR would run Alfonsin and move to the left in Democratic Party; a half dozen proponents of social-
its efforts to cut into Peronist working-class support. ism, all small and ineffectual; and Osear Alende's
By default; the conservatives would pick up disaffect- Intransigent Party. Alende unofficially represents the
ed UCR voters and independents from the middle of left in the multiparty group and drew 7 percent of the
the political spectrum who often vote Radical because March 1973 vote as the presidential standard bearer
of distaste for Peronism. The next step would be for a left coalition. His politics over the years have
translation of the electoral alliance into a stable parlia- blended welfare statism with often shrill anti-US, anti·
mentary opposition group that would be the basis for UK rhetoric. In recent years, he has cultivated contacts
development of a truly national conservative alterna- with the Socialist International. An experienced practi-
tive in future elections. tioner at moldíng left-of-center coalitions, Alende ha.s
in the past worked with the Communist Party, the
24. This scenario seems high]y unlikely, however.
Peronist left (including the Montoneros), and a number
The lack of a promising coalition candidate is evident
of smaller parties. He has denied rumors about Intran·
in the efforts <llf sorne to push forward Nicanor Costa
sigent Party contacts with the Communist Party con-
Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister during the
cerning coalition possibilities, but they are probably
Falklands war. An ad hoc coalition is stilllikely, but
correct, along with reported discussions with Peronist
the squabbling that has surrounded efforts to mold the
representatives. Alende probably cannot match his
Popular Federalist Forces into an effective vehicle for
1973 vote total if he runs on an Intransigent Party
electoral participation suggests a repeat of past
ticket. If, however, he could demonstrate even half bis
conservative disappointments. Dissatisfied groups most 1973 drawing power (that is, 3 to 4 percent), he might
likely would run independently or fashíon deals with prove a useful ally in a close Peronist-Radical contest.
the UCR. Names likely to emerge as presidential
candidates from the right along with Manríque in- 28. The Communíst Party, with perhaps 50,000
elude Rafael Martinez Raymonda, of the Progressive ' members, poses no electoral threat. While reputedly
Democratic Party in Santa Fe Province, and Alvaro well financed and organized, it is totally subservient to
Alsogaray, respected and contentious free market Moscow's line and without prospects for challenging
economíst, who has formed a small party to promote the Peronist grip on its self-arrogated natural constitu-
his fortunes. ency-the working class. The Communist Party does
not advocate violent revolution. In 1976 it was not
25. The prospects of the left are at least as dismal as among the radical parties banned by the military,
those of the right. Revolutionary groups have no partíally because it consistently opposed terrorism and
constituency. Partíes that advocate violence are out- probab}y also because of the importance of Argentine
lawed, and vivid memories of the terrorism of the trade with the Soviet Union. The Communist Party
1970s will deny anything but a neglígible vote to has dutifully complemented Soviet efforts to court the
parties suspected of radical intentions. The nonvíolent Argentíne military in recent years by proposing a
left is fatally handicapped by its continuing inabilíty cívilian-military convergence and criticizing the gov-
to shake Peronism's grasp on the working-class vote. ernment in language no more severe than that of other
26. The left also suffers from the lack of a single- parties.
party mechanism that could aggregate and magnify íts 29. The Communist Party has undertaken an ag- .:¡
voíce and influence. Segments of the left exist in both gressive campaign to sign up 200,000 members, and its
Peronism and the Radical Party. In the former, Vicen- presidential ticket has been proclaimed. Nevertheless,
te Saadi's Intransigents are few and isolated but still spokesmen have made clear the Communíst party's
better off politically than they would be as an inde- eagerness to participate in an electoral coalition, as ít
pendent party or part of any foreseeable coalition. díd unoffícially in, 1973. Thus far, the Peronists and
Alfonsin ís reportedly doing well attractíng unat- Radicals are not responding.
tached, left-leaning voters to his Radical bandwagon. i
30. Moscow and Havana undoubtedly would be
27. Outside the Argentine Communist Party, the delighted by anything approaching a respectable na-
left is represented by one faction of th~ small Christian tional Communíst Party showing at the polls. Very
23
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'uNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. 0-2016-16244 Doc No. C06272699 Date: 08/30/2018
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little is known of party financing, but it is reasonable The verticalista-antiverticalista dichotomy and, per-
to assume that Moscow will find a way to subsidize its haps more importantly, personal rivalries and power
campaign. Additional efforts-especially covert activi- .struggles ha ve divided the labor movement along lines
ty-by the Cubans and Soviets on the party's behalf that roughly approximate the divisions among Peronist
1
seem unlikely. Both ha ve important bilateral commer- political leaders. The Cafiero-Bittell-Luder troika
!' cial links with Buenos Aires that they have been (Deolindo Bittel, as vice president of the Peronist
fostering through attempts to develop closer state-to- Party, is its acting chief during the exile of Isabel
state ties. It is unlikely that Havana and Moscow Peron), draws its labor support from CGT-RA, while
· would risk these interests by clandestine support for a the Robledo-Matera group is associated with the CGT-
Communist Party that has little chance for significant Azopardo.
electoral gains. There is no evidence that Moscow or 34. Neither CGT faction has any legal standing
Havana would view incitement of violence or termi- because the military's labor legislation does not recog-
nation of the transition process as in their interests. nize such national federations. Their very existence,
however, and the fact that the government deals with
Organized Labor them provide testimony to the government's weakness
31. Organized labor is the most significant nonparty and acknowledgment of labor's potential política! and
political force. Since the mid-1940s when Juan Peron economic clout.
· mobilized and politicized the country's work force, 35. The CGT-RA is the smaller of the two groups,
[
unionized labor has remained predominantly Peronist despite having absorbed a group of nonaligned unions í'
and played a crucial role in the formulation of in earl,y...,1983. 6 In recent years, it has maintained a
national economic and social policies under both consistently hardline, confrontational posture toward
civilian and military governments. The country's the military government. It supports traditional Peron-
roughly 4 million union members could be the decisive ist economic and social polides and has frequently
electoral factor if they vote as a bloc. indulged in demagogic demands for immediate work-
1 er benefits as a means to build support:
¡ 32. Sharing with many civilians the perception that
organized labor exerted an excessive and unhealthy 36. Among the key assets of the CGT-RA is the
l'¡ political influence, the armed forces government set leadership of Lorenzo Miguel, labor's kingpin from the
,
out in 1976 to depoliticize the unions. The General pre-1976 period. Although currently proscribed from
Confederation of Workers (CGT) was banned. Most office holding, Miguel is extremely active. He controls
large unions were placed under military overseers, and the "62 Organizations," a remnant of the pre-1976
al! unions were strictly limited to nonpolitical activi- days that acts as something of a política! caucus for
ties. Many union leaders were arrested, sorne disap- affiliated unions. Miguel, as much as anyone, is awate
peared,, and labor laws were rewritten to deprive of the political power of a unified labor front, but he
union leaders of the funds and organizational base to wants unification on his terms and under his control.
become maior political actors. These tactics, backed by He epitomizes the kind of tough, conspiratorial, pow-
the ever-present threat of repression, succeeded to the er-conscious bosses that survive Argentina's interne-
point of creating considerable disarray within the cine labor battles. It is typical that rumors have
labor movement. They did not, however, depoliticize surfaced concerning secret talks between Miguel and
labor or apparently undermine its overwhelmingly military sectors on a military-labor alliance and that
Peronist complexion. Cafiero, the supposed beneficiary of CGT-RA support,
remains unsure about Miguel's intentions.
~~ A• mith th .. P.. rrmit~ f.lt'llitifl!l] wina nni()n pf.
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unions once military overseers are withdrawn. Because civilian restoration will again leave these interest
of its negotiating tactics, the Azopardo sector is under groups without institutionalized channels for influenc-
more public pressure to obtain results from the gov- ing national decisionmaking. As in the past, they will
ernment. The seriousness of the RA-Azopardo split ha veto rely upon personal relationships, their capacity
was emphasized in January when it was further to undermine government policies through passive or
institutionalized by the Azopardo group's creation of active resistance, and ultimately on their links to
its own version of Miguel's "62 Organizations." military sectors that share their views. Groups that
find themselves in this position include maior financia!
38. Military manipulation looms ever larger as a
and commercial interests, large industrial concerns
potential determinant in the intralabor struggle. Act-
that produce primarily for export and/or have links to
ing on the assumptions that the Peronists will win in
multinational firms, and large agricultura! producers.
October and labor will remain a powerful institutional
factor, military representatives have been holding 41. A candidate with the free-market orientation of
discreet discAissions with union leaders from both Alvaro Alsogaray would be appealing to such groups,
factions. The government retains the power to deter- but no amount of financia! backing will enable such a
mine which labor faction will inherit control of major candidate to challenge the Peronists and the UCR.
unions still under military intervention. Armed forces Funding might be provided to either of the two major
spokesmen are probably using this leverage in search parties in the hope of garnering postelectoral influ-
of acceptable Peronist treatment of key issues in the ence. While such an investment might produce sorne
postelectoral period. Alfonsin touched off a minor favors from the new government, it would not lead to
política! storm in May with public accusations con- basic policy changes.
cerning a labor-military deal. Few Argentine advo- 42. Small and medium-size domestic industrialists
cates of democracy are encouraged by the prospect of will find a comfortable política! niche with either the
an agreement between the two groups that are not Peronists or the UCR. Both parties are likely to
on}y the most powerful but also the most autocratic support nationalist, protectionist policies appealing to
and hierarchical política! groups in the country. this group which in the past had an institutionalized
39. Restoration of at Ieast superficial labor unity is voice in the Peronist-controlled General Economic
important not only for the Peronists' electoral pros- Confederation (CGE). Something similar to the CGE
pects but for labor's institutional interests. A unified could well emerge as part of the Peronist campaign
movement could well have sufficient leverage to gain organization.
for labor the second slot on the Peronist presidential
J
1
ticket as well as a significant number of candidacies to The Catholic Church .
~-
national congressional seats. Labor bosses are also 43. The Argentine Catholic Church is bedeviled by
aware that failure to solidify their interna! ranks might the same theological disputes that have characterized
leave the Peronists' key constituency vulnerable to the the Church's activities throughout Latín America. The
appeals from a Radical party headed by Alfonsin. conservative hierarchy protested only cautiously and
1,
1 1
quietly the post-1976 military abuses, and carefully
The Private Sector avoiding the advocacy role assumed at the time by the
1 40. Maior economic interest groups that have peri- Church in Chile.
i odically suffered at the hands of Peronist statist- 44. With the postwar political liberalization, the
1 distributionist economic policies since 1946 face a Church has emerged as a more strident human rights
familiar política! dilemma. They are the wealthiest advocate and a potential mediator between civilian
groups in the society, controlling economic activities and military sectors on sensitive issues, especially
vital to its growth and stability. Yet, there is no party disappearances. In late 1982, when both civilian and
mechanism that articulates their economic views and military leaders toyed with the notion of a¡ preelection
integrates them into a broader social and política! agreement, the initiative was stymied by their seem-
message that has any popular appeal. In short, the ingly rigid and irreconcilable positions. The Church's
25
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:•
!'
1
l ' 83
¡
1
¡',
i
moral authority equipped it for the role of mediator, outspoken advocate of reconciliation through the dis-
but Church officials were wary about becoming deep· closure of information on disappeai:ances and other
}y enmeshed in politics. Painfully contrived public human rights· abuses.
statetnef1ts distínguished between the political task of
mediator, which the Church rejected, and the act of 45. Despite historical differences between the
offering the Church's "services" in search of national Church and the Peronísts and Radicals, neíther party
moral reconciliation. If efforts to reach ·a cívilían- now represents a threat to Church interests. Thus, the
military accord are rf:!newed, the Church may again· institutional Church will obey papal proscriptions on
be thrust somewhat unwillingly into the role of politícal activity and not actively campaign for or
pseudomediator. In any event, it. will remain an against parties or candidates.
1
·'
26
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THIS ESTIMA TE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The Director of Naval lntelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, lntelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of lntelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

The Department of Commerce

KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... . 3

The lmpetus for Elections ................................................................................. . 7

Weakness of the Current Regime ............................................................. . 7

Key Transition Issues ........................................................................................ .. 8

Party Politics .............................................................................................. . 13

lmplications for the United States .................................................................... . 17

Politically exhausted and discreditéd, Argentina's armed forces

The military in Argentina has initiated a transition process that in

A minority of military officers might like to halt or extend the

. account for as much as 30 percent of the electorate-a huge electoral·

weapon systems as long as Argentina retains access to Western arms on

\Tierra del -·-Provmcia boundary

• !.~fi..{.,Beagle OhiJnne! Kllometers

The lmpetus for Elections 4. Traditional interservice rivalries. and animosities

measure of political opportunism was also present as 25X1

' economic disruption occasioned by the war, and the

Argentina: Economic Indicators, 1976-82

Note change in scales

1970= lOO 1976=100 7-

'~ ~ < ;'1 •l!¡\'

~ _., ~ ·¡ :t d... '

Argentina: The Political Spectrum ·

Left Intransigent Party (PI) Coalition headed by PI leader 7.43

Popular Leftist Front (FIP) FIP 0.4

those that will be founded to assist campaigns.

ence. There are variatíons on thís theme, reflecting the

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS IN E TRANSITION

The Peronists 1974-March 1976). They continue to to

._._ Confrontation versus cooperation with a sitt.ing

4 The t'crticalista or orthodox wing is com¡>osed

12. The Peronists' foreign policy planks vviH

Continuatlon of the drive for favorable diploma\:~

Hi Alfonsin's crcch:ntials are impecc;:-t"

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