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The ‘ David and Goliath’ or from the Ruling to the Opposition Political Party:
The PDP, Crisis of Internal Democracy and 2 0 1 5 Election Outcomes in Nigeria

Research · September 2015

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4437.8083

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The ‘David and Goliath’ or from the Ruling to the Opposition Political Party: The
PDP, Crisis of Internal Democracy and 2015 Election Outcomes in Nigeria

Ernest Toochi Aniche, PhD

Department of Political Science and Strategic Studies
Federal University Otuoke (FUO), Bayelsa State
E-mail: anicheet@fuotuoke.edu.ng

Abstract
Generally, Nigerian political parties in the present republic have been hampered by crisis
of internal democracy thus undermining their political leadership recruitment function.
Also, this has negative implications for party discipline and unity. The resultant effects
are party factionalization, defection and carpet- crossing. The Peoples Democratic Party
( PDP) is a good example of one of these Nigerian political parties that lacks internal
democracy. In fact, PDP was a leviathan. The 2015 Election symbolized a contest between
David and Goliath. The electoral outcome is that PDP has transformed from a ruling party to
an opposition party. The study, by relying on the theory of relative autonomy of the state
and secondary sources, concludes that the PDP authoritarianism deepened crisis of internal
democracy in Nigeria and that this authoritarian character of the former ruling PDP was a
reflection of the authoritarian character of the Nigerian state which is currently shaping the
ruling APC. The implication being that this lack of internal party democracy in
Nigerian political parties generally undermines the credibility of the entire electoral
process thereby rendering the entire process undemocratic. The study is essentially
qualitative, historical and inductive.

Keywords: Election, State, Political Parties, Internal Democracy, PDP, and Nigeria

1
Introduction
Since 1999 when civilian rule was ushered in, there have been problems of internal party
democracy resulting in factionalization, decamping, carpet crossing and defection. Another
trend that has gradually become a feature of Nigeria’s political culture is incumbency factor.
It entails that a sitting governor, for instance, serving the first tenure, is expected to be re-
elected in order to complete the two tenures of eight years as allowed by the constitution,
irrespective of their performance in office (Egboh and Aniche, 2012).
Consequently, Odibachi (2010) notes that party politics has exhibited more crisis than
cohesion for national development such that virtually all the political parties have been
perpetually enmeshed in conflicts owing to lack of internal democracy and imposition
of party candidates and party leadership. The opposition politicians are perceived to
have suffered more political intimidation and suppression from the ruling oligarchy, and in
some cases victims of political killings and selective fight against corruption in Nigeria
under Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Perhaps, no other political party suffers from this
lack of internal cohesion in Nigeria more than the erstwhile ruling PDP. According to
Hearts-Ofoeze (2001:176):
That, this is so, is clearly evident in the fact that in spite of its huge majority in
the National Assembly and its control of the presidency, the PDP has so far
failed to run an effective, well- focused and united government especially at
the national level. Rather, the citizens are only being entertained to intra-party
conflicts and rivalry and general disagreement between the executive and
legislative organs of government.

Little wonder that the much expected “ dividend of democracy” has continued to elude the
generality of the people of Nigeria. Our contention here is that the authoritarianism of PDP
deepened crisis of internal democracy in Nigeria and that this authoritarian character of the
former ruling PDP was a reflection of the Nigerian state presently conditioning the
ruling APC. The lack of internal party democracy in Nigerian political parties generally
undermines the credibility of the entire electoral process thereby making the entire process
undemocratic. Interestingly, this lack of internal democracy costed PDP 2015 General
Elections in Nigeria transforming it into opposition political party. There is every tendency
that the ruling APC may acquire the authoritarian character of PDP. This propensity arises
as a result of the low relative autonomy and authoritarian character of the Nigerian state
and the ruling class no matter the political party in power. This may make or mar APC
in the future elections, particularly 2019 General Elections.
Theoretical Discourse

2
This study is essentially anchored on neo-Marxist social class analysis. Social class analysis
is a theory of relative autonomy of the state and derives from the orthodox Marxist analysis
of social class by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladmir Lenin, et al. For example, in their
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1977) declare: “The history of all the
hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles” .
Neo-Marxist social class analysis is rooted in materialistic foundation of the society in which
the substructure (i.e. the economy or social relations of production) conditions or determines
the superstructure (Marx, 1970). It, thus, assumes the primacy of material conditions
of existence and claims (a) relatedness/interconnectedness of social phenomena (b) the
dynamic nature of social reality, and (c) conflictual character of social forces (i.e.
dialectical materialism). The utility of neo-Marxist social class analysis in this study is that
it is better able to expose the dialectical nature and character of the Nigerian state.
According to Lenin (1976) the state is a product of society at a certain stage of development.
As Engels (1942:155) puts it:
It is in fact the admission that the society has become entangled in an insoluble
contradiction with itself and has split into irreconcilable antagonisms, which it
has found itself powerless to dispel. So, in order that these antagonisms
between classes with differing economic interest might not consume the
classes and society in a fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power
seemingly standing above society that would mediate the conflicts and keeps it
within bounds of order. This power that arose out of society, but placing
itself above it and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.

But, while the orthodox Marxism focuses on inter-class struggle between, for example, the
bourgeois class and the proletarian class, the neo-Marxist version identifies as well the role
of intra- class struggle in shaping not just events, but also class relations and social relations
of production, and as well determining the character of the state. In a nutshell, neo-
Marxist social class analysis recognizes two forms of class contradiction, namely, (a)
internal contradiction and (b) external contradiction. Internal contradiction is a form of
contradiction that pertains to class struggle within a nation-state, which are of two kinds,
viz (i) primary contradiction and (ii) secondary contradiction (Okafor, Okeke and Aniche,
2012).
Primary contradiction depicts inter- class struggle or struggle between two classes such as
bourgeoisie and proletariate, arising as a result of the position they occupy in the historically
and economically determined social relations of production either as owners/controllers and
non-owners/non-controllers of means of production; and in which the latter produces surplus
value and the former appropriates it. Whilst, secondary contradiction depicts intra-
class struggle within the same class, or between two or more segments of the same
3
class, for

3
example, between petty bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie. External contradiction, on
the other hand, is a form of class contradiction that transcends the boundary of a nation-
state involving two or more classes from two or more nation-states, for example, the class
struggle between indigenous bourgeoisie and foreign bourgeoisie (Okafor, Okeke and
Aniche, 2012). The class contradictions have serious implication for relative autonomy of
the state. A state can exhibit low or high autonomy or as Ifesinachi (2000:265) puts it: “The
level of autonomy of state oscillates between low and high levels” . The view of Ake
(1973) is that a state can exhibit high autonomy when there is high commodification
of capital or excessive penetration of capital into the economy such that the bourgeois
class indulge in accumulation of capital through direct exploitation of the working class in
the process of production or appropriation of surplus value when they enter into social
relations of production, that is, private capitalism.
Here, the state is not interventionist, in other words, it does not intervene in the
domestic economy like participating in the productive activities (i.e. public/state
enterprises) or controlling/nationalizing means of production. The role of state here,
therefore, is to regulate or monitor. As such, the state is relatively an impartial umpire
mediating inter-class and intra- class struggles through harmonization and reconciliation of
class interests.
Conversely, according to Ake (1973) ultimately a state exhibits low autonomy when there is
low commodification of capital or lack of penetration of (private) capital into the economy in
such a way that the ruling class is constantly engaged in primitive accumulation of capital.
The point being made is that there is a predominance of state capital over private capital such
that the state becomes the major avenue for primitive accumulation of capital or indirect
appropriation of surplus value in which politics is very lucrative. A state constituted in this
way is, thus, interventionist, because it engages in productive activities (i.e. public
corporation) through nationalization of major means of production (Alavi, 1972; Ake, 2001).
Connected with the dwindling private capital penetration in the economy is intense political
competition to control the bureaucratic/administrative apparatus of the state. This
intensifying political competition for state power coincides with the socio-economic
competition. Thus, Ifesinachi ( 2 0 0 0 ) contends that the relative autonomy of the state as
well depends on the management of government institutions of the state by political
leadership. A state characterized by low autonomy does not limit itself to supervisory or
regulatory role, and is hence compromised such that instead of rising above class struggle,
is deeply immersed in it (Ake, 2003).

4
According to Ake (1981) by involving the state so intimately in the class struggle, and by
increasing the state power, the blurring of the distinction between the ruling class and the
state is reinforced. The government, thus, collapses into the ruling class reinforcing the
authoritarianism of the hegemonic faction of the bourgeoisie. Thus, elections for Adejumobi
(2000) is merely a system for political and ideological reification of the hegemony and power
of the dominant class or a system of social acculturation through which dominant ideologies,
political practices and beliefs are reproduced. Therefore, within the context of class
differentiations and inequalities, political rights as enshrined in elections present little or no
choice to the dominated class as the choice of candidates and agenda oscillates among
members of dominant class.
Consequently, Ake (1995) points out that the result or implication of this is a dissociation
of voting from choice and rights from the exercise of political power. In essence,
elections cannot facilitate or foster political accountability, responsiveness and democracy,
which is why Ogban-Iyam (2005) argues that this form of democracy, that is, electoral
democracy does not approximate to popular democracy, and thus, could only be termed
“electocracy” . Similarly, political parties are merely platforms for political and
ideological reification of the hegemony and power of the dominant class or a system of
social acculturation through which dominant ideologies; political practices and beliefs are
reproduced. This state of affairs does not permit political democracy or even liberalism,
rather it makes political authoritarianism mandatory. Under pressure of siege mentality, this
hegemonic faction is unwilling to accept liberal restraints on power which might give any
other group leverage. The implication of the above is that the Nigerian politics suffers from
lack of internal democracy in the political parties and the absence of credible polls. The
fact that a civilian as opposed to a soldier is superintending over the affairs of Nigeria does
not in itself make it democratic rule where the will of the people is sovereign (Egboh and
Aniche, 2012).
The point being made is that authoritarianism of the Nigerian state elevated the cult of
personality of the president as state power was privatized and personalized. For example,
Odibachi (2010) writes that the former ruling party, PDP encountered the muscling powers
of the presidency. The tenure of the national leadership was often short-lived the moment
the chord holding them and Obasanjo together was broken. The PDP within the eight years of
the two tenures of Obasanjo’s Administration had about four national chairmen and
other accompanying officers. Not surprisingly, the Nigerian politics between 1999 and
2015 was still characterized by lack of internal democracy, party fictionalization,
incumbency factor, lack of ideological clarity and cult of personality. This has ultimately
5
costed PDP the political

5
leadership of the Nigerian state. There is strong tendency that the ruling APC may acquire the
authoritarian character of PDP. This propensity arises as a result of the low relative autonomy
and authoritarian character of the Nigerian state and the ruling class irrespective the political
party in power. This may make or mar APC in the future elections, particularly 2019 General
Elections.
Evolution of Political Parties and Elections in Nigeria
Although, elections and formation of political parties in Nigeria dated back to 1923 (i.e. a
year after elective principle was introduced by Clifford Constitution of 1922); the post-
independence elections results in Nigeria had generally been disputed by political parties
usually leading to post-elections crises (Coleman, 1958; Sklar, 1963; Aniche, 2009). The
implication being that the post-independence elections in Nigeria had been generally
characterized by electoral malpractices, violence, emasculation and intimidation
of opposition parties, post-elections carpet-crossing and incumbency factor.
However, the nature or character of post-independence elections in Nigeria can be classified
into two which are, one, elections of transition from civilian rule to civilian rule, and two,
elections of transition from military rule to civilian rule. The elections of transition from
civilian rule to civilian rule in 1964/1965, 1983, 2003 and 2007 were generally characterized
by electoral malpractices, violence, inter-party conflicts, electoral petitions, emasculation
of opposition parties, post-elections carpet-crossing/defections and incumbency
factor sometimes leading to intervention of the military into Nigerian politics.
For example, Ikejiani-Clark (2004) notes that the 1964 federal elections and 1965 elections in
Western Nigeria were marked by major crisis leading to demise of first republic and
emergence of military government in Nigeria. The 1964 federal elections, particularly, were
boycotted by the opposition parties. Similarly, Ofoeze (2001) writes that the 1983 general
elections like 1964 federal elections and 1965 Western region elections were characterized
by high level of electoral malpractices, violence, post- elections petitions, inter- party
conflicts and electoral crises which ultimately terminated the second republic.
Whilst, elections of transition from military rule to civilian rule in 1979, 1993 and 1999
according to Ofoeze (2001) were keenly disputed and contested in courts even when there
was no significant electoral violence probably owing to the fact that these elections were
conducted under the military regime. But it is more or less elections stage-managed by the
military to hand power over to their preferred candidates(s). Thus, Adejumobi (2000)
points out that the military often unduly interfere with the electoral process to determine
electoral outcomes during the transition programme. For example, the emergence of
Olusegun
6
Obasanjo as a civilian president in 1999 was widely believed to have been masterminded
by the military that manipulated the election to his favour.
For example, Nigeria successfully completed transition from military rule to civilian rule
for the second time when the military head of state General Abdulsalami Abubakar handed
over power to the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo of Peoples Democratic Party
( PDP) on May 29, 1999 (i.e. after more than fifteen years of military misrule from 1983
to 1999) without much electoral violence but seriously disputed and contested in courts by
opposition parties.
Odibachi (2010) writes that subsequently in between 1999 and 2010, two elections of
transition from civilian rule to civilian rule were successfully conducted in 2003 and 2007. In
2003, erstwhile president, Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded himself in a second tenure, and in
2007, he transferred the mantle of leadership to the late president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.
But the monumental protests, condemnation and legal suits that trailed the elections at all
levels overheated the polity. Consequently, in all the elections conducted in 1999, 2003 and
2 007, the then ruling PDP dominated the political landscape of Nigeria at all levels of
governance even at the discontent of many Nigerians, and amid widespread allegations of
electoral fraud. As such, the nascent democracy so-called remains fragile.
Thus, even in spite of the fact that various provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Federal
Republic of Nigeria make political parties the only legitimate organ of leadership choice in
Nigeria, the principal actors in the formation of political parties and maintenance
of government are not active in performing the functions of educating and mobilizing the
voters. It seems apparent, however, that some of the political parties exist only on paper and
for the purposes of collecting subventions from Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC). Thus, Nwankwo (2005) observes that the political parties in Nigeria are highly
centralized, little institutionalized, very unstable and ridden with internal crisis. These
characteristics are as a result of the fact that political parties in Nigeria did not originate
from socio- political changes in the society, but through institutional manipulation of
electoral laws.
In the same vein, Ofoeze (2001) rightly states that the political parties in Nigeria, especially
the PDP have all failed to fulfil those generally recognized roles and functions which their
counterparts in the Western societies perform; and which guarantee the sustenance
of democracy and democratic principles. Similarly, Adeyemo (2009) submits that
Nigeria’s nascent democracy cannot engender a greater popular participation in politics
necessary for institutionalization of democratic culture if the political parties,
particularly, the PDP
7
continue to subscribe to the current undemocratic culture of imposing candidates rather
than allowing them to emerge through appropriate party leadership recruitment process.
The Emergence of PDP from the Ruling to the Opposition Political Party in
Nigeria’s ‘Fourth Republic’

Section 221 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that “No
association, other than political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election
or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at
an election” . Whilst, section 222 of the same constitution provides the condition under which
an association can be registered or function as a political party. Also, sections 225 and 226
require Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to regulate the political parties
while Part I under the Third Schedule, Paragraph F, section 15 subsection b empowers
the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to register political parties. It states
that the Commission shall have power to – ( b) register political parties in accordance
with the provisions of this constitution and an Act of the National Assembly.
However, section 229 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines
political party in following words:
Political party includes any association whose activities include canvassing for
votes in support of a candidate for election to the office of President, Vice
President, Governor, Deputy Governor or member of a legislative house or
of a local government council.

By 1998, nine political associations had already fulfilled the above laid down conditions for
registration of political parties by the constitution. But the Guidelines for the Formation and
Registration of Political Parties (GFRPP) were issued by INEC to prune down the number
of political parties. Thus, according to Nwankwo (2005:205-228) “although, the
constitution allows the free formation of political parties, it gives the INEC an enormous
power to receive and process applications of intending parties and register those that
fulfil laid down conditions” Consequently, of the 26 political associations that picked up
application form and applied to INEC, only 9 political associations scaled thorough
verification exercise (Stage II), and therefore, qualified for the local government election
held on the December 5, 19 9 8 which include Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples
Party (APP), Democratic Advance Movement (DAM), Movement for Democracy and
Justice (MDJ), National Solidarity Movement (NSM), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP),
Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), United Democratic Party (UDP) and United Peoples
Party (UPP).

8
In order to prune down the number of political parties out of these nine, mentioned above,
INEC issued Guidelines for the Formation and Registration of Political Parties ( GFRPP)
composed of three stages. For example, paragraph 10 (3) of the Guideline (GFRPP 10(3))
provides that for a party with provisional registration to become a full fledged political party
in Nigeria, it must win “at least 5 percent of the total number of votes cast in each of at least
2 4 states of the Federation including Federal Capital Territory Abuja, at the Local
Government Council election” (Nwankwo, 2005).
However, only two political parties, namely, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All
Peoples Party (APP), were able to meet the criteria for full registration. By invoking
paragraph 12 (2) of the Guidelines for Formation and Registration of Political Parties
( GFRPP Par. 12(2)) the Alliance for Democracy, which came a distant third was equally
granted final registration as political party. The paragraph empowers the INEC in the event
of only one political association satisfying the requirements under paragraph 10 (3) to
register one other political association that scored the five percent of the total votes in the
highest number of states of the Federation including FCT. For details of the distribution of
votes of December 5, 1998 Local Government Chairmen/Councillors Election see Table 1
below.
Table 1: December 5, 1998 Local Government Chairmen/Councillors Election
Political No. of No. of Councillors No. of States + FCT with
Parties Chairmen 5% Votes
AD 103 1, 071 14
APP 192 2, 589 36
DAM - 4 -
MDJ 3 61 3
NSM 2 8 1
PDP 470 4, 650 37
PRP 2 21 -
UDP - 12 -
UPP 1 26 1
Source: INEC Report, 1999 culled from Nwankwo (2005:205-228).

Following from the above, only three political parties, namely, PDP, APP and AD were
fully registered by INEC to contest 1999 Presidential, Gubernatorial, National
Assembly and States Assembly elections in Nigeria. Thus, according to Nwankwo
(2005) other political parties that failed to meet the criteria were advised to fuse into any
of these three political parties that were fully registered.
As a result, these three political parties are more or less conglomerates of units that do not
share a common view, but come together for opportunistic reasons. For example, Nwankwo
(2005) notes that the PDP is a conglomerate in which two different groups are dominant, viz,

9
the All Nigeria Congress ( ANC) and the Peoples Democratic Movement ( PDM) . Even as
Ofoeze (2001:152) observes that Group of 34 (G. 34) comprising persons which not
only refused to serve under Abacha’ s regime, but opposed the self- succession bid
formed the nucleus of what later became PDP.
Nwankwo (2005) writes that the ANC was dominated by persons who belong to the
conservative elements that have been active in the civilian and military governments
of Nigeria since independence. But the PDM grew out of the political disagreements of
the second republic, and was dominated by economic and administrative elites from all
parts of Nigeria oriented toward modernization. The nation-wide representation of
the PDM accounted for the emergence of the PDP as a quasi-national party.
Nwankwo ( 2 0 0 5 ) further states that the only shared interest that brought ANC and PDM
together was the removal of military, and as soon as this was achieved, the tension between
the two groups became apparent. A tension that has continued to engulf not only the party
organization, but also the legislative and the executive arms of the government, which
they control. According to him:
Another important group in the PDP is the National Solidarity Association
(NSA) encapsulating economic barons and former military officers of the
Babangida and Abacha regimes. Due to the overriding loyalty to the subgroup,
the core group, political preferences are not defined along party times, but
depend on different perceptions with own rule systems and sets of strategies in
the subgroups.

Similarly, Ofoeze ( 2 0 0 1 ) observes that, the PDP as it is today, is simply an amalgam of

motley of strange bedfellows, individuals and factions who do not only lack consensus on
fundamental issues of socio- economic and political life, but also have nothing in common
with one another except in terms of their commitment to capture and retain state power,
possibly ad infinitum. The party not only lacks internal cohesion, but also does not really
possess any concrete systematic programme of action. As he puts it:
… in the course of transforming itself into a political party, the group simply
threw its door open and allowed itself to be invaded by large number of people
and group most of whom were/are neither committed to the original ideals
of the group nor the country’ s overall socio- political and economic
wellbeing. Indeed, some of these invaders were/are those persons/groups
who either assiduously worked for the Abacha’ s self- succession bid
and/ or those who had, in the past, created or immensely contributed to the
country’s socio- political and economic miasma. Given the huge
financial and numerical strength of these invaders, the original patriots
and founders of the group easily got overwhelmed and side-lined in the
affairs of the party…

10
Little wonder that despite the provision of section 223 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria as amended in 2011 and provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the
Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party ( PDP) as amended in 2 0 0 9 as well as the
provisions of relevant sections of Electoral Act 2002 as amended in 2003 and 2006, PDP
lacks internal democracy in election of party executive committees and nomination
of candidates. PDP primaries have always been characterized by brigandage and
shenanigans, which include substitution of candidates even few days before election
(Egboh and Aniche, 2012).
Consequently, PDP was fractured in August 2013, when seven state governors, former Vice
President Atiku Abubakar and some other senior members formed a parallel national
executive committee. The seven governors were Aliyu Wamakko (Sokoto), Babangida Aliyu
(Niger), Rabiu Kwankwanso (Kano), Murtala Nyako (Adamawa), Abdulfatah Ahmed
(Kwara), Sule Lamido (Jigawa) and Rotimi Amaechi (Rivers).The breakaway faction, which
named itself the new PDP (nPDP), alleged increasing repression, restrictions of freedom of
association, arbitrary suspension of members and serial violation of the party’s constitution
by the chairman, Bamanga Tukur. The faction also claimed that the party chairman was
backed by President Goodluck Jonathan whose only calculations are geared towards side-
lining or shutting out any real or imagined opposition ahead of the party’s presidential
primaries for the 2015 elections. According to International Crisis Group (2014:8-9):
Following an 18 October, 2013 court order, which stopped the nPDP
from establishing offices and barred the INEC from recognizing it as a
political party, five of the seven dissident governors joined the APC. Those
defections boosted the number of states controlled by the opposition to
sixteen, leaving the PDP with eighteen. Furthermore, 49 House of
Representatives members and eleven senators (all elected on the PDP
platform) also defected, meaning, for the first time ever, that the opposition
had assumed parity in the National Assembly.

PDP Authoritarianism and Deepening Crisis of Internal Democracy in Nigeria

Political parties in Nigeria are merely platforms for political and ideological reification of the
hegemony and power of the dominant class or a system of social acculturation through
which dominant ideologies; political practices and beliefs are reproduced. This state of
affairs does not permit political democracy or even liberalism, rather it makes political
authoritarianism mandatory. Under pressure of siege mentality, this hegemonic faction is
unwilling to accept liberal restraints on power which might give any other group leverage.
The implication of the above is that the Nigerian politics suffers from lack of internal
democracy in the political parties and the absence of credible polls. The fact that a
civilian as opposed to a soldier is
11
superintending over the affairs of Nigeria does not in itself make it democratic rule where
the will of the people is sovereign.
The low autonomy of the Nigerian state means that the state is authoritarian such that the
outcome of the transition programme was that it transited from military authoritarianism to
civilian authoritarianism, more specifically, PDP authoritarianism in 1999. One implication
of this is that it blurred the distinction between the Nigerian state, the Nigerian government
and all the other agencies of the state, the Nigerian ruling class (i.e. the hegemonic faction)
and the former ruling PDP. It, therefore, created a situation where PDP was the state and the
state was PDP or a situation where the head of state, the head of government and
commander-in-chief of Nigeria was as well the defacto leader of the ruling party, PDP which
is euphemistically referred to as incumbency factor. The authoritarianism of the PDP has,
therefore, inhibited internal party democracy.
The point being made is that authoritarianism of the Nigerian state elevated the cult of
personality of the president as state power was privatized and personalized. Not surprisingly,
the Nigerian politics since 1999 is still characterized by lack of internal democracy, party
fictionalization, incumbency factor, lack of ideological clarity and cult of personality. Thus,
despite the provision of section 2 2 3 of the 1 9 9 9 Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria as amended in 2011 and provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Constitution of
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as amended in 2009 as well as the provisions of
relevant sections of Electoral Act 2002 as amended in 2003 and 2006, PDP lacks internal
democracy in election of party executive committees and nomination of candidates. PDP
primaries have always been characterized by brigandage and shenanigans, which include
substitution of candidates even few days before election.
According to Ofuebe and Anierobi (2005) the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)
a coalition of 170 human rights and civil society organizations in 2003 notes:
That the electoral process was undermined by the conduct of the primaries of
many of the political parties since “godfathers” foisted their preferred
candidates on the parties through undemocratic processes… the President and
all Governors of the 3 6 states schemed to get second terms, and used their
incumbency to intimidate any opposition through deploying state resources to
win.

This is in spite of the fact that the constitution rules generally that the internal workings
and decisions of the political parties must conform to democratic precepts declaring INEC
as the umpire. Even the respective constitutions of the political parties also contain
rules,

12
procedures and formalized structures within which internal power struggles in the
political parties may take place (Nwankwo, 2005).
This is why Omeje (2010) submits that internal party democracy is one issue that has
consistently eluded Nigerian democracy because political parties have always been hijacked
at all levels by powerful individuals who impose loyalist or sycophants as candidates for
election. Lack of internal democracy, therefore, has been the bane of Nigeria democracy. It is
a blatant rape of democracy to foist or impose candidates on political parties whereas the
delegates have better choice or aspirant they could have chosen as candidates in general
election. Democracy is about choice and to, in anyway subvert the will of the people is
criminal. The internal wrangling in most of the political parties is due to no other reason but
lack of internal democracy within the party framework.
A good indication of lack of internal party democracy in PDP is that tenure of the national
leadership was often short lived the moment the chord holding them and the
presidency together was broken. The PDP within the eight years of Obasanjo’s two terms
had about four national chairman of average two years each office man they are suppose
stay four years in office (Odibachi, 2010). Lack of internal party democracy is sustained
through incumbency factor in situations where sitting executive are given automatic ticket by
PDP to run under the party platform. Diamond (2002) in Aluko (2010:7) defines
incumbency factor as “various instruments of modern and traditional authority being
deployed with a heavy hand to intimidate and repress opposition” .
Closely related to the above definition is the definition by Tilde (2003) in Aluko (2010:7)
who sees incumbency factor as “the total of all advantages that a sitting executive contestant
has by virtue of using government resources at his disposal to achieve re-election for
himself or for another candidate of his party of his choice” . The point being made is
that lack of internal party democracy, incumbency syndrome, imposition of party
executives and candidates, factionalization, intra-party crisis, ideological vacuum and
electoral rigging, all depict the authoritarian character of the erstwhile ruling PDP.
One important fallout of authoritarianism of PDP in the form of lack of intra-party
democracy and incumbency factor is defection or carpet crossing ( mainly, pre- election)
owing to the internal wrangling in PDP. The spate of carpet crossing or defection to other
political parties that has been witnessed in the country in the past few years has become a
source of concern to political observers. Therefore, Nigerian politicians merely see political
parties as platforms for contesting and winning elections and not ideological platforms
where they can constitute responsible opposition. Every one of them wants to join the
bandwagon or more specifically
13
the ruling party, rather than to wait patiently to topple the ruling party through years of
responsible and consistent opposition. Perhaps, the attraction of joining in the primitive
accumulation of capital is too tempting for them to resist (Mbah, 2011).
This is the reason why most of the politicians defect to other political parties once they are
not given the opportunity to contest under the platform of the ruling party, only to come back
to the ruling party in the post-election period, win or lose. In the event of winning, in order to
consolidate in power or seek re-election, while in the case of losing in order to partake in the
primitive accumulation of capital. Thus, most members of other political parties are at one
time members of PDP, and at other times, members of another political party, and vice versa.
Another important outcome of PDP authoritarianism coupled with liberalization of political
parties by 2003 is proliferation of political parties from three political parties in 1999 to 30
political parties in 2003 to 51 political parties in 2007 and over 60 political parties in 2011.
For example, according to report of P.M. News Nigeria, September 6, 2010, the lack of
internal democracy has also led to the proliferation of political parties. The result is that there
is “no real opposition and the party with the majority has continued to bestride the political
landscape without actually making life better for the people” . No wonder, the “dividend
of democracy” is yet to trickle down to the generality of people of Nigeria. Nigerians have
not seen or enjoyed the “dividends of democracy” but only suffers from its hypocrisy.
Lack of internal democracy is a form of internal incumbency factor within the ruling party,
which enables it to impose a candidate by given incumbents automatic tickets or foist party
executives upon the party. In other words, it prevents the PDP from conducting credible
primary elections, and such deepens intra-party crisis. The implication being that PDP is not
able to perform the role of widening or broadening the radius of political leadership
recruitment within the party leading to defection in pre-election period.
The point being made is that PDP authoritarianism nay state authoritarianism in the form
of lack of internal democracy, imposition of candidates and party executives, and
incumbency factor have a number of consequences which include party factionalization,
internal crisis, defection/ carpet crossing, etc. These situations have coupled with
liberalization of political parties by 2003 led to proliferation of political parties, weakening
party ‘opposition’, fragile ‘ opposition’ coalition, and transforming the polity from
multiparty system to de facto one- party system; and ultimately shrinking or contracting
democratic political space in Nigeria. In 2007 and 2011 elections, for examples, there
were many intra-party petitions in election tribunals. As fallout of 2007 gubernatorial
election in Rivers State the Supreme Court in a unanimous judgment sacked Celestine
Omehia as Governor and ordered that Rotimi Amechi
14
be sworn in as governor, on the grounds that substitution by the PDP of Rotimi Amechi was
not in compliance with Section 34 (2) of the Electoral Act 2006. We, therefore, conclude that
the authoritarian character of the erstwhile ruling PDP deepened crisis of internal democracy
in Nigeria, and that this authoritarianism of the ruling PDP was a reflection of the Nigerian
state currently haunting the ruling APC. The implication is that this lack of internal party
democracy in Nigerian political parties generally undermines the credibility of the entire
electoral process thereby making the entire process undemocratic (Egboh and Aniche, 2012).
The David and Goliath: The Aftermath of 2015 Elections and the Emergence of APC
as the Dominant Political Party in Nigeria

The Biblical David and Goliath played out in the just concluded 2015 General Elections in
Nigeria, in which All Progressives Congress (APC) was the David while PDP was the
Goliath. PDP, the self-acclaimed largest political party in Africa, boasted that it will dominate
Nigerian political landscape for 6 0 years. But its aspiration of ruling Nigeria for 60 years
ended in 16 years with the outcomes of 2015 General Elections. The APC presidential
candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari, won the PDP presidential candidate, the former
President of Nigeria, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, in the 2015 Presidential Election. For detailed
information on the results of the 2015 Presidential Election, see Table 2 below.
Table 2: 2015 Presidential General Election Result in Nigeria
Candidates Political Parties Votes (%) Votes
Muhammadu Buhari All Progressives Congress 15,424,921 53.96
Goodluck Jonathan Peoples Democratic Party 12,853,162 44.96
Adebayo Ayeni African Peoples Alliance 53,537 0.19
Ganiyu Galadima Allied Congress Party of Nigeria 40,311 0.14
Sam Eke Citizens Popular Party 36,300 0.13
Rufus Salau Alliance for Democracy 30,673 0.11
Mani Ahmad African Democratic Congress 29,665 0.10
Allagoa Chinedu Peoples Party of Nigeria 24,475 0.09
Martin Onovo National Conscience Party 24,455 0.09
Tunde Anifowose-Kelani Accord Alliance 22,125 0.08
Chekwas Okorie United Progressive Party 18,220 0.06
Comfort Sonaiya KOWA Party 13,076 0.05
Godson Okoye United Democratic Party 9,208 0.03
Ambrose Albert Owuru Hope Party 7,435 0.03
Invalid/blank votes 844,519 -
Total 29,432,083 100
Registered voters/turnout 67,422,005 43.65
Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 2015.

Also, APC secured the majority legislative seats in the 2015 National Assembly Elections in
Nigeria. Thus, APC secured 60 seats in the Senate out of the total of 109 senatorial seats
and

15
225 seats out of the total of 360 seats in the House of Representatives to become the majority
party turning PDP which won 49 seats in the Senate out of the total of 109 senatorial seats
and 125 seats out of the total of 360 seats in the House of Representatives into minority party.
Moreover, out of 29 states where gubernatorial elections were conducted in 2015, APC won

20 states while PDP won 9 states. In the remaining seven states where gubernatorial elections
were not conducted in 2015 (due to staggered gubernatorial elections), APC controls 2 states;
PDP controls 4 states; and APGA has one state. In summary, APC has a total of 22 states out
of the 36 states while PDP has a total of 13 states out of the 36 states of the Federation. For
detailed information on the results of the 2015 National Assembly Elections, see Tables 3 &

4 below.
Table 3: Senatorial Seats Won by Nigerian Political Parties in 2015 Elections
Political Parties Number of Seat
All Progressives Congress (APC) 60
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 49
Total 109
Source: Naijaonpoint, 2015.
Table 4: House of Representatives Seats Secured by Nigerian Political Parties in 2015
Elections

Political Parties Number of Seat

All Progressives Congress (APC) 225
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 125
Other Political Parties 10
Total 360
Source: Reuters Nigeria Tribune, 2015.

The information on Tables 2, 3 and 4 above shows how from being ruling party, PDP became
an opposition political party while conversely from opposition party, APC became the ruling
political party in Nigeria. But prior to the 2015 General Elections, APC, though short-lived,
secured majority seats in the National Assembly (NASS) through the mass carpet-crossing
of PDP legislators to APC. At a point, the then Speaker of House of Representatives
carpet- crossed from PDP to APC and remained the Speaker. All these were
attributable to authoritarianism, lack of internal democracy and party discipline in PDP.
However, APC’s journey to becoming the dominant political party in Nigeria was not an easy
one. APC emerged in February 2013, as a product of the merger by Nigeria’s three
biggest opposition parties comprising the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and a
faction or a splinter group of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) of Gov. Rochas
Okorocha and Senator

16
Annie Okonkwo. The resolution was signed by Tom Ikimi, the then spokesman for the party,
who represented the ACN; Senator Annie Okonkwo on behalf of the APGA; former
governor of Kano State, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, the Chairman of ANPP’s Merger
Committee; and Garba Sadi, the Chairman of CPC’s Merger Committee.
In March 2013, it was reported that two other political associations - African Peoples
Congress and All Patriotic Citizens - also applied for INEC registration, adopting APC as an
acronym as well, reportedly “a development interpreted to be a move to thwart the successful
coalition of the opposition parties, ahead of the 2015 general elections” . It was reported in
April 2013 that the party was considering changing their name to the All Progressive
Congress of Nigeria (APCN) to avoid further complications. The party eventually received
approval from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on July 31, 2013 to
become a political party and subsequently withdrew the operating licenses of the three
previous and merging parties (the ACN, CPC and ANPP). Later the five governors out of the
seven governors who formed the new PDP (nPDP) joined APC together with large number of
senators, members of Federal House of Representatives and state Houses of Assembly loyal
to the five defected PDP governors rendering PDP a minority party in the National Assembly
(Thurson, 2015).
The five governors who defected were Aliyu Wamakko (Sokoto), Rabiu Kwankwanso
(Kano), Murtala Nyako (Adamawa), Abdulfatah Ahmed (Kwara), and Rotimi Amaechi
( Rivers) while the two who did not defect were Babangida Aliyu (Niger) and Sule Lamido
(Jigawa). In December 2013, 37 members of House of Representatives left the PDP for the
APC which gave the APC a numerical majority of 174 members; PDP a slight minority of
171 members; and 15 other party members. This was reversed in February 2014, when five
APC members of House of Representatives defected to the PDP. In October 2014, Speaker
of
the House of Representatives, Aminu Tambuwal, joined the APC. Some PDP senators also
joined the APC, including 11 who defected in January 2014 (Thurson, 2015).
The APC also faces serious internal challenges, problems and factionalization. By drawing
its membership from four political parties now known as the “legacy parties”, it was, from
the onset, a marriage of strange bedfellows and bound to be a difficult union. For instance,
the provision in the APC’ s constitution that governors would be the party’ s leaders in
their respective states deepened its internal problems. It gave pre-eminence to those
governors who came from the PDP at the expense of other politicians who had laboured
and sacrificed to build the party from scratch. Some of the aggrieved members like
former Kano State
17
Governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, and former Sokoto State Governor, Attahiru Bafarawa, left
in anger, taking their supporters with them to PDP (International Crisis Group, 2014).
Other aggrieved members complained of dictatorial tendencies by party leaders accusing
them of plotting to handpick candidates for the elections in the name of “consensus
candidates” rather than allowing candidates to emerge democratically in the party primaries.
In many states, politicians from the smaller parties in the merger complained
of marginalization and demanded that their members be nominated as the APC’s candidates
for some of the elective offices regardless of their political weight. According to
International Crisis Group (2014:11- 12):
In both PDP and APC states, tensions have been aggravated by the dearth of
internal democracy. This is particularly a problem in the nineteen states where
governors are completing their second, and final, four-year terms. Attempts by
them to handpick their successors, instead of allowing state party members to
nominate the candidate, and differences between the governors and national
party leaders over the choice of the successors, have created multiple sources
of friction. As most of these departing governors are also seeking election to
the Senate, a “retirement home” for former governors, their schemes to shut
out all other senatorial aspirants from their constituencies are adding to local
tensions. In most states, the situation is further complicated by sectional
agitation that the gubernatorial ticket must be rotated between all major zones
of the state, with various constituencies simultaneously claiming they had
been “ marginalised” over the years and insisting on their “ right to produce”
the next governor.

However, from what transpired so far, it seems as if APC is heading the direction of PDP in
the name of party supremacy. For example, few days to the inauguration of the Eight
National Assembly, APC organized a sham mock internal party election electing Ahmed
Lawan and Femi Gbajabiamila as their preferred candidates for the Senate President and
House of Representatives Speaker, respectively. But against all odds, and defying party
arrangements, Abubakar Bukola Saraki and Yakubu Dogara emerged the Senate President
and House of Representatives Speaker, respectively. Worst still, in a melodramatic fashion, a
minority PDP senator, Ike Ekweremadu, emerged the Deputy Senate President in a legislative
leadership election in which most of the APC senators were absent. The crisis occasioned by
this is still reverberating in the selection of other legislative leadership positions in the both
chambers of the National Assembly. There is strong tendency that the ruling APC
may acquire the authoritarian character of PDP. This propensity arises as a result of
the low relative autonomy and authoritarian character of the Nigerian state and the ruling
class no matter the political party in power. This may make or mar APC in the future
elections, particularly 2019 General Elections.

18
Conclusion and Recommendations
The conclusion, at which we arrived, therefore, is that the authoritarian character of the
former ruling PDP deepened crisis of internal democracy in Nigeria. The implication being
that this lack of internal party democracy in Nigerian political parties generally undermines
the credibility of the entire electoral process thereby making the entire process undemocratic.
The point being made is that the authoritarianism of the erstwhile ruling PDP was generally
attributed to the low autonomy of the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, as we demonstrated
earlier, the level of autonomy of the Nigerian state has generally been low right from colonial
era. The transition from military rule to civilian rule on May 29, 1999 did not
significantly impact on the autonomy of the Nigerian state given the continuous
militarization of Nigerian society making political authoritarianism mandatory.
The low autonomy of the Nigerian state means that the state is authoritarian such that the
outcome of the transition programme was that it transited from military authoritarianism to
civilian authoritarianism, more specifically, PDP authoritarianism in 1999 (Okafor, Okeke
and Aniche, 2012). One implication of this was that it blurred the distinction between the
Nigerian state, the Nigerian government and all the other agencies of the state, the Nigerian
ruling class (i.e. the hegemonic faction) and the former ruling PDP. It, therefore, created a
situation where PDP was the state and the state was PDP or a situation where the head of
state, the head of government and commander-in-chief of Nigeria was as well the de facto
leader of the former ruling party, PDP, which was euphemistically referred to as incumbency
factor.
The authoritarianism of the PDP had, therefore, inhibited internal party democracy. The
authoritarian character of the Nigerian state and former ruling PDP in the form of lack of
internal party democracy, incumbency factor and electoral malpractices had created a number
of consequences which include intra-party crisis, party factionalization and frequent
defection/carpet crossing; and coupled with the liberalization of political parties in 2003 led
to proliferation of political parties, weakening party ‘opposition’, fragile ‘opposition’
coalition, shrinking democratic political space, and ultimately, ineffective participation of
other political parties in polls prior to 2015 Elections (Egboh and Aniche, 2012).
However, there is every tendency that the ruling APC may acquire the authoritarian character
of PDP. This propensity arises as a result of the low relative autonomy and authoritarian
character of the Nigerian state and the ruling class irrespective of the political party in power.
This may make or mar APC in the future elections, particularly 2019 General Elections. What
is to be done? The fundamental thing to do is to create a political environment necessary for

19
evolving a political leadership that can manage the Nigerian state in such a way that it can
rise or float above inter-class and intra-class struggles for socio-economic and
political competitions. By so doing limits the involvement of the state in economy
necessary for ensuring internal democracy in all political parties.
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