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SECOND EDITION
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SECOND EDITION
EDITED BY
LONDON
2010
Lloyd’s List
Telephone House
69-77 Paul Street
London EC2A 4LQ
An Informa business
Lloyd’s and the Lloyd’s crest are the registered trade mark of the society incorporated
by the Lloyd’s Act 1871 by the name of Lloyd’s.
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the information
contained in this book is correct, neither the authors nor
Lloyd’s List can accept any responsibility for any
errors or omissions or for any consequences
resulting therefrom.
Dedicated to:
Professor Ernst G Frankel, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Professor Richard O Goss, of University of Cardiff
Professor Arnljot Stromme Svendsen, of the Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration
All these Professors have shown in their published texts a pioneering insight
on various aspects of the maritime industry and thus command our respect
and warm thanks.
In the seven years that have passed since 2002, when the first edition of this Handbook
was published, each one of us would have noticed major events or conditions that have
strongly impacted the shipping markets and produced results that we would include in
our lectures – often we categorise these as extraordinary.
I have in mind the explosive rate of growth in China; the almost unstoppable increase
in seaborne trade and in investments in new vessels; in the expansion in number and
size of Chinese shipyards; in the continuation of bank finance as the strong source of
funds for shipping companies; in the mergers or acquisitions of shipping companies
and, generally, in the increase of their size; and in the emergence of capital markets as a
serious means of raising funds for a sizeable number of shipping companies.
All this activity was abruptly shaken in 2007 when the world recession shyly emerged
and the subprime crisis of US residential mortgages, and the toxic products based on
them, hit the international financial system and froze the liquidity in it.
It seems we have not seen the end of the mega drama that we have witnessed in these
seven years.
Our Handbook has been directly or indirectly influenced by events of the first decade
of the 21st century which have been embodied in our data analysis. The structure of
this volume remains the same as the edition published in 2002. However, in addition
to the rewriting or updating of the chapters, some new topics have been included in the
volume, such as the historical analysis of freight rates fluctuations in chapter 10; meas-
ures for global control of air pollution from ships in chapter 16; measures for business
performance in shipping in chapter 22; while capital markets as a source in shipping
finance and a holistic survey in strategy literature relevant to shipping are discussed in
chapters 28 and 29 respectively.
The first edition established the Handbook as an authoritative source of academic
research that is useful for university students and researchers and, at the same time, it
satisfies the curiosity of the well-informed practitioner and widens its knowledge horizon.
It is a pleasure to know that the Handbook is now called “The Maritime Bible” in more
than 30 countries.
I want to thank all my colleagues for their enthusiasm to participate in the 2002 and
2010 editions and to thank them profoundly for the high quality of their contributions.
Finally, I want to thank my Personal Assistant, Chrysoula Zevgolatakou, for controlling
the logistics of incoming and outgoing chapters and the Informa editorial and printing
staff, in particular Liz Lewis and Leigh Stutter, for their cooperation and patience in
meeting tight deadlines.
Needless to report that as contributors we again gave up our royalties in favour of
the International Association of Maritime Economies (IAME) and continue to be loyal
members.
vii
Page Intentionally Left Blank
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
In the late 1960s, when I started focusing on shipping finance, there were only a
limited number of publications on Maritime Economics which mainly analysed the
broader theoretical topics. Now, after almost thirty-five years, this unique volume
is published, covering for the first time a wide variety of maritime issues and sec-
tors, written by fifty-one members of the International Association of Maritime
Economists (IAME). Over forty of the contributors are well-known academics,
with the remaining younger ones already showing recognisable academic presence,
all teaching and conducting research at thirty universities, in seventeen countries.
IAME was established in 1992 with an aim to promote the development of maritime
economics as a distinct discipline, to encourage rational and reasoned discussion within
it, and to facilitate the international exchange of ideas and research. Throughout this
decade, IAME has worked towards these aims most successfully, and here one should
mention the organisation of international conferences, on an annual basis; this year (on
its tenth anniversary), members will meet in Panama.
The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business contains thirty-nine refereed
chapters which are, primarily, based on research carried out over a number of years,
covering eleven broad areas of Maritime Economics, viz: Maritime Economics
and Globalisation; International Seaborne Trade; Economics of Shipping Markets
and Cycles; Economics of Shipping Sectors; Issues in Liner Shipping; Maritime
Safety and Labour Markets; National and International Shipping Policies; Aspects
of Shipping Management and Operations; Shipping Investment and Finance; Port
Economics and Management; and Aspects of International Logistics.
As I was studying these chapters, not only did I recall the questions that arose
when I was collecting data for my study in Bank Shipping Finance, all those years
ago, when so many answers were not readily available in published paper form or any
other publication, I also found myself smiling many times, with great satisfaction, as
I measured the width and depth of research presented here, in the wider spectrum
of Maritime Economics. Indeed, The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business is
unique as it demonstrates the immeasurable progress, since the 1960s, in this area of
research and teaching.
Because of its high quality output and its relevance to real life business, it will
serve as a very valuable instrument for the stakeholders of the broader maritime
world, including: university undergraduate and postgraduate students; shipowners;
shipbrokers; shipmanagers and operators; bankers; underwriters; lawyers; shipping
consultants; international logistics companies; port authorities; governmental maritime
agencies; and official international organisations.
Over the last six months, I have worked closely with all the contributors and I thank
them de profundis for the spontaneous acceptance of my invitation and the prompt
delivery of what they promised. I am also grateful to them for agreeing, like myself,
to waive their royalties in favour of IAME. My sincere thanks go to David Gilbertson,
ix
x Preface to the First Edition
Chief Executive of Informa Group, who from the early days has strongly supported the
idea of this volume; also to the LLP editorial and printing staff, in particular Vanessa
Larkin and Tony Lansbury, for their cooperation and patience in meeting the tight
deadlines. Finally, I thank very warmly two members of my staff: Dr Amir Alizadeh,
also a contributor to this volume, and my Personal Assistant, Mrs Gladys Parish, for
their enthusiasm and valuable assistance in the preparation of this Handbook.
xi
xii Table of Contents
Chapter 12 The Tanker Market: Current Structure and Economic Analysis 355
DAVID GLEN & STEVE CHRISTY
Index 1033
Page Intentionally Left Blank
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
DR AMIR H. ALIZADEH
Amir Alizadeh is a Reader in “Shipping Economics and Finance” at Cass Business
School, City University London, and a visiting professor at Copenhagen Business
School and University of Geneva. He has first degree in Nautical Studies from Iran
and worked as a ship officer for a short time. He then joined Cass Business School
where he finished his MSc in Shipping, Trade and Finance and a PhD in Finance. He
teaches different topics including Quantitative Methods, Oil & Energy Transportation
and Logistics, Shipping Investment and Finance, Econometric Modelling, Energy and
Weather Derivatives, and Shipping Risk Management. His research interest includes,
modelling freight markets and markets for ships, derivatives and risk management in
financial and commodity markets, and econometrics and forecasting. He has published
in several academic journals in the area of transportation, finance and economics. Apart
from academic research, he has been in close contact with the industry both as an
advisor and as a consultant. He is involved in running the Baltic Exchange courses in
“Freight Derivatives & Shipping Risk Management” and “Advanced Freight Modelling
and Trading” which are offered in maritime centres worldwide.
STEVE CHRISTY
Steve Christy is Head of Consultancy & Research at Gibson Shipbrokers, based in
London. He has more than 25 years’ experience in the tanker and oil industries, cover-
ing oil supply and transportation developments. He is now responsible for Gibson’s
analysis of all the shipping markets. This includes research into market and industry
developments impacting on the tanker industry, the implications for future supply and
demand of tankers and forecast analysis of charter rates and earnings.
He has worked on a number of major projects, including various tanker market
forecasts for different shipowners, charterers and investment clients. He is also
involved in cost analysis, transportation options and shipping economics, and tanker
investment appraisal, as well as acting as an expert witness in legal cases.
DR DAVID GLEN
David Glen is Reader in Transport in the Business School, London Metropolitan
University, having joined the Centre for International Transport Management in 1995,
as a Research Fellow. He obtained his PhD from London Business School in 1987,
which examined differentiation in the tanker market. He has published in a number of
journals, including the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy and Maritime Policy
and Management. He is presently on the editorial board of the latter. Dr Glen served
on the Council of IAME for a number of years, and was Secretary from 2000 to 2003.
He is also a member of the International Maritime Statistics Forum. His research
interests include shipping market structures and dynamics, seafarer statistics,
maritime pollution and international trade flows. Since 1997, he has been involved
UK Department for Transport projects on monitoring and improving the quality
of UK seafarer numbers.
DR STEPHEN X. H. GONG
Stephen X. H. Gong is with the School of Accounting and Finance at the Hong Kong
Polytechnic University. He was initially trained in Shipping, Trade and Finance at Cass
Business School, City University London and subsequently completed a PhD in Finance
at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. His research interests span the areas of
corporate finance, corporate governance, financial reporting, industrial organisation, and
transportation economics. He has consulted with international as well as local organisations
in the areas of logistics development and transportation investment and finance.
DR JAN HOFFMAN
Jan Hoffmann works as trade facilitation, port and shipping specialist at UNCTAD’s
Trade Logistics Branch since 2003 and is currently chief of the Trade Facilitation
section. He is in charge of a trade facilitation project on WTO negotiations, as well
as national projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He edits the UNCTAD Transport
Newsletter and is co-author of the annual Review of Maritime Transport.
Previously, he spent six years with the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile, and two years with the IMO,
London. Prior to this, he held part-time positions as assistant professor, import-export
agent, translator, consultant and seafarer for a tramp shipping company.
Jan has studied in Germany, the UK and Spain, and holds a doctorate degree in
Economics from the University of Hamburg. His work has resulted in numerous UN
and peer-reviewed publications, lectures and technical missions, as well as the internet
Maritime Profile, the International Transport Data Base, the Liner Shipping Connectivity
Index, and various electronic newsletters.
MR WILLIAM HOMAN-RUSSELL
William Homan-Russell received an MSc in Finance from London Business School in
2007 and an MA in Mathematics from Oxford University in 2002. He joined Tufton
Oceanic Ltd in 2003 as a financial analyst to work on credit and market analysis of
the shipping sector for the company’s leasing and corporate advisory departments.
William subsequently joined Tufton’s Oceanic Hedge Fund in 2006 to work within the
shipping team; he focuses on the modelling of global publicly listed shipping equities
and shipping market models as well as developing quantitative portfolio optimisation
procedures. His MSc in Finance was completed whilst with Tufton Oceanic Ltd.
DR GORDON HUI
Gordon Hui graduated as a MPhil in Physics in 2006. He specialised in computer
simulations for condensed matter systems by matrix & Monte Carlo algorithms.
He started his career in financial industry as a quantitative researcher in a Commodity
Trading Advisor; his areas of expertise being Monte Carlo simulations in risk manage-
ment and rebalancing portfolios, volatility modelling in various time frame, backtest-
ing in Market-On-Close, day-trading strategies & HK index arbitrage. Afterwards, he
worked as a quantitative day-trader in a propriety trading house. In 2009, Gordon
joined Tufton as an analyst.
XX List of Contributors
DR NEOPHYTOS LAMBERTIDES
Neophytos Lambertides received a BSc in Mathematics and Statistics from the University
of Cyprus in 2000 and an MSc in Financial Mathematics from the University of Warwick
in 2001. He took a PhD in Finance from the University of Cyprus in 2006. Thereafter,
List of Contributors xxi
DR SHUO MA
Shuo Ma is a professor of shipping and port economics and policy at the World
Maritime University in Malmö. He is also Vice-President (Academic) at WMU.
Dr Ma is an active researcher and consultant in the area of shipping and port eco-
nomics and policy. For the last couple of years, he has been actively involved in
maritime research and education in China. He has been associated with numerous
research projects and activities in the field of maritime transport in China both
at national and regional levels. He is the Director of two joint MSc programmes,
which he created in 2004, between WMU and two Chinese Maritime Universities
in Shanghai and Dalian.
with considerable expertise in maritime and land transport as well as logistics. From
1998 to 2001 he was President of NEPTUNE, an EU-based network of universities
and research institutions and is currently President of the International Association
of Maritime Economists and Visiting Professor at Dalian Maritime University. His
research interests include the fiscal treatment of shipping; the choice of flag in interna-
tional shipping; the value added by transport in logistics supply chains; short sea ship-
ping; port economics and logistics; maritime clusters; and inter-modal transport.
DR KYRIAKI MITROUSSI
Kyriaki Mitroussi was awarded her PhD in Management and Business at Cardiff
Business School, Cardiff University in 2001 as a scholar of the Greek State Foundation
of Scholarships. She also holds an MSc in Marine Policy from Cardiff University,
Department of Maritime Studies and International Transport. She joined Cardiff
Business School as a lecturer in September 2005, and prior to her current post she
served as a lecturer at the University of Piraeus, Department of Maritime Studies
List of Contributors xxiii
in undergraduate and postgraduate schemes. She has worked with shipping compa-
nies and has also been involved in consultancy services. Her research work has been
published in international academic journals while articles have also appeared in the
international commercial and economic press. Her broad research interests include:
shipping management, third-party ship management, safety and quality in shipping
and shipping policy. She is a member of the International Association of Maritime
Economists.
DR LAURI OJALA
Lauri Ojala is Professor of Logistics at the Turku School of Economics, Finland. His
research interests include international logistics and transport markets. Since the mid-
1990s, he has also worked as an expert for several international agencies on develop-
ment projects in for example, the Baltic States, Albania, and several CIS states. From
2006 to 2008, he was in charge of two EU part-funded logistics projects in the Baltic
Sea Region.
He is currently Project Director of another EU part-funded project on safety and
security of international road freight transport (CASH).
He is the founder and co-author of the Logistics Performance Index first launched by
The World Bank in November 2007. LPI 2010 was published in January.
DR PHOTIS M. PANAYIDES
Photis M. Panayides is Associate Professor in Shipping Economics at the Department
of Commerce, Finance and Shipping, Cyprus University of Technology. He holds a
first class Honours degree and a PhD in Shipping Economics and Management (1998)
from the University of Plymouth, UK. Photis held academic appointments among
others at the University of Plymouth, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the
Copenhagen Business School, and the National University of Singapore to the level of
Associate Professor.
Photis has authored three books and over 30 scientific journal papers in the fields of
shipping economics, logistics and transportation. He reviews for major journals and has
contributed several conference papers. He pioneered the development of academic and
professional programmes in shipping and logistics and has also consulted for several
companies. Photis is an elected member of the Board of the International Association
of Maritime Economists and serves on the Board of Directors of the Cyprus Ports
Authority.
DR MERV ROWLINSON
Merv Rowlinson has served in towage and merchant shipping and has nearly
30 years’ teaching experience in shipping and logistics experience at the Merchant
Navy College,Warsash School of Navigation (Southampton) and London Metropolitan
University. He has successfully supervised five PhD programmes. He has an M.Phil
from Liverpool Polytechnic and a PhD from the City of London Polytechnic both
in maritime business. He currently divides his time between Copenhagen Business
School, Hamburg School of Shipping & Transportation, Lloyd’s Maritime Academy
and the European College of Business Management (London & Aachen). His research
interests are inter-modal transport, particularly short sea shipping and its potential for
delivering sustainable transport.
DR WILLIAM SJOSTROM
William Sjostrom is senior lecturer in economics at the Centre for Policy Studies of
the National University of Ireland, Cork, where he also served as dean of the Faculty
of Commerce and director of the Executive MBA programme. He previously taught
economics at Northern Illinois University and the University of Washington, was a
staff economist at the Port of Seattle, and has consulted for the Port of Cork, the
European Commission, and private law firms. He serves on the editorial boards of
Maritime Economics and Logistics and the International Journal of Transport Economics.
His maritime research focuses primarily on competition policy in liner shipping. He
has also published papers on crime, unemployment, competition law, and oligopoly in
the lumber industry. He received his PhD in 1986 from the University of Washington,
Seattle, supervised by Keith Leffler, a specialist in the economics of competition policy,
and Douglas Fleming, a maritime geographer.
DR MARTIN STOPFORD
Martin Stopford is a graduate of Oxford University and holds a PhD in International
Economics from London University. During his 30-year career in the maritime
industry he has held positions as Director of Business Development with British
Shipbuilders, Global Shipping Economist with Chase Manhattan Bank NA, Chief
Executive of Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services and currently Managing
Director of Clarkson Research. He is a Visiting Professor at Cass Business School,
City University London, and is a regular lecturer and course leader at Cambridge
Academy of Transport. His publications include Maritime Economics, the widely used
shipping text, and many published papers on shipping economics and ship finance.
XXVI List of Contributors
DR IOANNIS THEOTOKAS
Ioannis Theotokas is Associate Professor at the Department of Shipping, Trade and
Transport of the University of the Aegean. He has a background of economics specialising
in Shipping Management. He received his PhD from the University of Piraeus (1997).
His research interests include topics in Management, Human Resource Management
and Strategic Management applied to shipping business. He has participated as prin-
cipal researcher in research projects and consultancy studies. He is the co-author (with
G. Harlaftis) of the book Leadership in World Shipping. Greek Family Firms in International
Business (2009). He has published 23 papers in academic journals and books and has
presented over 25 peer-reviewed papers at international scientific conferences.
DR ANDREAS VERGOTTIS
Andreas Vergottis was awarded his MSc Econometrics from the London School of
Economics in 1984 and his PhD in Business Administration from City University
Business School in 1988. In 1989 he joined Tufton Oceanic Ltd as shipping ana-
lyst, responsible for screening various projects involving debt, mezzanine and equity
financing of shipping transactions. In 1996 he was recruited by Warburg (subsequently
acquired by UBS) as sector coordinator for global shipping analysis. In addition to
regular research coverage on 30 listed shipping companies, he participated in several
IPO and M&A transactions within the shipping industry. In 2002 he rejoined Tufton
Oceanic Ltd as Head of Research. He assisted in launching the Oceanic Hedge Fund
with $5m starting capital which currently has grown to $1.8bn assets under manage-
ment. He is presently based in Hong Kong, where Tufton Oceanic Ltd have recently
opened a new representative office. He is a visiting professor at Cass Business School,
City University London.
MR KURT J. VERMEULEN
Kurt Vermeulen is a Visiting Lecturer on Shipping Strategy at Cass Business School,
City University London. He provides consultancy services in this area. Assignments
focus on multidisciplinary approaches involving issues pertaining to strategy, business
intelligence, competitive intelligence and corporate finance. Prior to this, Kurt was a
Vice President in Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) at a predecessor bank of JP Morgan
Chase. His transactional experience focused on the transport, chemicals and finan-
cial services industries. He was a Guest Lecturer on M&A to MSc Shipping, Trade &
Finance students at Cass Business School. Previous to that, Kurt worked as a solicitor
on corporate and commercial law matters. He has a Lic. Iuris. (LLM) cum laude in
commercial and financial law from the University of Gent (Belgium) and also studied
German and EU competition law (Wettbewerbsrecht, Kartellrecht) and law and eco-
nomics at the Law Faculties of the University Hamburg (Germany) and the University
Osnabrück (Germany). He subsequently obtained, whilst employed, a Spec. Lic. (MSc)
Port & Marine Sciences magna cum laude from the University of Gent, a MA in Eastern
European Studies cum laude from the University of Gent and a MSc in Shipping, Trade
and Finance from Cass Business School. He is a member of the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals (SCIP).
List of Contributors xxix
DR MICHALIS VOUTSINAS
Michalis Voutsinas works as an independent researcher with particular interests in
shipping financial history and risk management of shipping companies. He was
awarded with an MSc in Shipping, Trade and Finance from Cass Business School,
City University London, an MSc in Applied Economics and Finance from Athens
University of Economics and Business and a BSc in Economics from the same institu-
tion. Michalis was honoured with a prize, from Athens University of Economics and
Business and a scholarship from Greek Shipowners’ Association.
1. INTRODUCTION
The historical process is dynamic, and the changes that occurred during the course of
world shipping in the past century, embedded some of the structures of the nineteenth
century. The methodological tools of a historian and an economist will be used in this
chapter, tracing continuity and change in the twentieth century shipping by examining
maritime business at a macro- and micro level. At the core of the analysis lies the ship-
ping firm, the micro-level, which helps us understand the changes in world shipping,
the macro-level.
The shipping firm functions in a specific market, and the shipping market can only
be understood as an international market, in a multiethnic environment. The first part
of this chapter follows the developments in world shipping, analysing briefly the main
fleets, the routes and cargoes carried, the ships and the main technological innovations.
The second part provides an insight on the main structural changes in the shipping
markets by focusing on the division of liner and tramp shipping. The third part reveals
from inside the shipowning structure and its changes in time in the main twentieth
century fleets: the British, the Norwegians, the Greeks and the Japanese; it is remark-
able how similar their organisation and structure proves to be.1 Maritime business has
always been an internationalised business. In the last five centuries of capitalist devel-
opment, European colonial expansion was only made possible with the sea and ships;
the sea being but a route of communication and strength rather than of isolation and
weakness. Wasn’t it Sir Walter Raleigh in the late sixteenth century, one of Elizabeth’s
main consultants who had set some of the first rules for the British expansion? “He who
commands the sea commands the trade routes of the world. He who commands the
trade routes, commands the trade. He who commands the trade, commands the riches of
the world, and hence the world itself.” The real truths are tested in history and time.
∗
Department of History, Ionian University, Corfu, Greece. Email: gelina@ionio.gr
†
Department of Shipping, Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, Chios, Greece.
Email: gtheotokas@aegean.gr
3
4 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
There were two main developments in the nineteenth century that pre-determined
the path of the world economies: an incredible industrialisation of the West and its
dominance in the rest of the world. During that period the world witnessed an unprec-
edented boom in world exchange of goods and services, an unprecedented boom of
international sea-trade. The basis of the world trade system of the twentieth century
was consolidated in the nineteenth century: it was the flow of industrial goods from
Europe to the rest of the world and the flow of raw materials to Europe from the rest of
the world. In this way, deep-sea going trade became increasingly dominated by a small
number of bulk commodities in all the world’s oceans and seas; in the last third of the
nineteenth century, grain, cotton and coal were the main bulk cargoes that filled the
holds of the world fleet. At the same time, the transition from sail to steam, apart from
increasing the availability of cargo space at sea, caused a revolutionary decline in freight
rates, contributing further to the increase of international sea-borne trade. Europe,
however, remained at the core of the world sea-trade system: until the eve of the World
War I, three quarters of world exports in value and almost two thirds of world imports
concerned the old continent.2
It does not come as a surprise then, that European countries owned the largest part
of the ocean-going world fleet during this period. Due to technological innovations,
the international merchant fleet was able to carry an increasing volume of cargoes
between continents with greater speed and lower cost. By the turn of the twentieth
century Great Britain was still the undisputable world maritime power owning 45% of
the world fleet, followed by the United States, Germany, Norway, France and Japan,
(see Table 1). Over 95% of the world fleet belonged to 15 countries that formed the so-
called “Atlantic economy”; what is today called the “developed” nations of the OECD
countries. Meanwhile, at the rival Pacific Ocean, Japan was preparing to be the rising
star of world shipping in the twentieth century.
Pax Brittanica and the incredible increase of world economic prosperity of more
than one hundred years closed abruptly with the beginning of World War I. The main
cause was the conflict of the big industrial European nations for the expansion of
their economic and political influence in the non-European world. It was the result
of the competition of western European nations for new markets and raw materials
that determined the nineteenth century and peaked in the beginning of the twentieth
century as the influence of the industrialisation of western European nations became
more distinct. At the beginning of the twentieth century almost all of Asia and Africa
were in one way or another under European colonial control.
The factors that created the international economy of the nineteenth century proved
detrimental during the two destructive world wars of the twentieth century by multi-
plying their effects. Firstly, the formation of gigantic national enterprises in Europe and
the United States and their concentration in vast industrial complexes with continuous
amalgamations of small and medium companies resulted in an exponential increase of
world production. Second, the search for markets beyond Europe that would absorb the
excessive industrial production, resulted in the fierce competition of British, German,
French and American capital in international capital investments worldwide. The result
was the creation of multinational companies and banks that led to the development
of monopolies on a national and international level. Within this framework, the great
expansion of the United States and German fleets took place, along with the multiple
Developments in World Shipping 5
mergers and acquisitions in the northern European liner shipping business and the
gradual destruction of small tramp shipping companies, particularly in Great Britain.
The interwar economy never recovered from the shock of World War I that influ-
enced the whole structure of the international economy resulting in the worst economic
crisis that the industrial world had seen in 1929. During the interwar period world
shipping faced severe problems stemming from a contracting world sea-trade, decreas-
ing world immigration and increasing protectionism. The economic crisis did not affect
the main national fleets in the same way. The impact was particularly felt in Britain.
This is the period of the economic downhill of mighty old Albion. It was World War I
that weakened Britain and allowed competitors to challenge its maritime hegemony. The
withdrawal of British ships from trades not directly related to the Allied Cause opened
the Pacific trades to the Japanese. Moreover, both Norway and Greece were neutrals,
6 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
which meant that their fleets were able to profit from high wartime freight rates (Greece
entered the war in 1917). Norwegian and Greek ships were able to trade at market rates
for three years while most of the British fleet was requisitioned and forced to work for
low, fixed remunerations. Freight rates in the free market remained high until 1920, after
which they plummeted; while there was a brief recovery in the mid-1920s, the nadir was
reached in the early 1930s.
Table 1 records the development of the world fleets of the main maritime nations
from 1914 to 1937. During this period the world fleet increased at one third of its pre-
war size. The British fleet remained at the same level with a slight decrease of its reg-
istered tonnage, but its percentage of the ownership of the world fleet decreased from
43% to 31% due to the increase of the fleets of other nations. The interwar period was
characterised by the unsuccessful attempt of the United States to keep a large national
fleet with large and costly subsidies to shipping entrepreneurs. Most of the increase of
the world fleet in the interwar period apart from the US was due to the Japanese, the
Norwegians and the Greeks, who proved to be the owners of the most dynamic fleets
of the century. Their growth was interconnected with the carriage of energy sources.
The most important change in the world trade of the interwar period was the gradual
decrease of the coal trade and the growing importance of oil.
The main coal producer (and exporter) in 1900 was the UK, with 225 million metric
tons or 51% of Europe’s production. By 1937 Britain was still Europe’s main produc-
ing country with 42% of European output. In 1870 the production of oil was less
than 1 million tons and in 1900 oil was still an insignificant source of energy; world
production of 20 million tons met only 2.5% of world energy consumption. Because
production was so limited there was little need for specialised vessels; tankers, mostly
owned by Europeans, accounted for a tiny 1.5% of world merchant tonnage. But all
this changed in the interwar period: by 1938 oil production had increased more than
15 times; it was 273 million tons and accounted for 26% of world energy consump-
tion.3 The tanker fleet, had grown to 16% of world tonnage, and although it was mostly
state-owned, independent tanker owners started to appear in the 1920s. The largest
independent owners of the interwar period were the Norwegians.4
Technological innovations continued in the twentieth century; the choices and
exploitation of technological advances by shipping entrepreneurs determined the path
of world shipping. The first half of the twentieth century was characterised on the one
hand by the use of diesel engines and the replacement of steam engines and on the
other, by the massive standard shipbuilding projects during the two world wars. Diesel
engines that appeared in 1890 were only used in a more massive scale on motor ships
during the interwar period particularly in Germany and the Scandinavian countries;
the cost of fuel being 30% to 50% lower than that of the steam engines. Standardisation
of ship types and shipbuilding programmes were introduced in World War I when
Germans sunk the allied fleets in an unprecedented submarine war. The world had not
yet realised what industrialisation and massive production of weapons for destruction
could do. The convoy system had been abandoned and naval battleships with their
complex weapons were ready to confront the enemy. But it was the allied merchant
steamships that were the artery of the war, transporting war supplies. And this armless
merchant fleet became an easy target to the new menace of the seas: the German sub-
marines. From 1914 to 1918, 5,861 ships or 50% of the allied fleet was sunk.
Replacement of the sunken fleet took place between 1918 to 1921 in US and British
shipyards. It was the first time that standard types of cargo ships, the “standards” as
Developments in World Shipping 7
they came to be called, were built on a large scale. The “standard” ships became the
main type of cargo ship during the interwar period; they were steamships of 5,500 grt.
It was these “standard” ships that Greeks, Japanese and Norwegian tramp operators
purchased en masse from the British second hand market and expanded their fleets
amongst the world economic crises. For similar reasons during World War II the United
States and Canada launched the most massive shipbuilding programmes the world had
known, using new and far quicker methods of building ships: welding. During four
years they managed to build 3,000 ships, the well-known Liberty ships, that formed the
standard dry-bulk cargo vessel for the next 25 years.5 Greek, Norwegian, British and
Japanese tramp operators all came to own Liberty ships, in one way or another up to
the late 1960s.
The second half of the twentieth century was characterised by an incredible increase
of world trade that towards the end of the century was described as the globalisation of
the world economy. The period of acceleration was up to 1970s; world trade from about
500 million metric tons in the 1940s climbed up to more than three billion metric tons
in the mid-1970s. If the history of world maritime transport in the first half of the twen-
tieth century was written by coal and tramp ships, in the second half the main players
were oil and tankers. During this period, sea-trade was divided into two categories: liq-
uid and dry cargo. Almost 60% of the exponential growth of world sea trade was due to
the incredible growth of the carriage of liquid cargo at sea, oil and oil products. There
was also impressive growth in the five main bulk cargoes: ore, bauxite, coal, phosphates
and grain. To carry the enormous volumes required to feed the industries of the West
and East Asia, the size of ships carrying liquid and dry cargoes had to be increased. The
second half of the twentieth century was characterised by the gigantic sizes of ships and
their specialisation according to the type of cargoes. The last third of the century was
marked by the introduction of container ships. The new “ugly” ships revolutionised the
transport system for industrial goods.
Up to the 1960s the main carriers of the world fleet remained the same with the
US and Britain continuing to hold their decreasing shares in world shipping, followed
by the continually rising Greece, Japan and Norway (Table 1). Flags of convenience
were used informally by all maritime nations but in the immediate post-war years more
extensively by Greek and American shipowners. Flags of convenience that were later to
be called open registries became a key manifestation of the American maritime policy
and a determining feature of post war shipping that guaranteed economical bulk ship-
ping.6 By using flags of convenience, shipowners of traditional maritime countries were
able to maintain control of their fleets benefiting from low cost labour. Sletmo relates
the third wave of shipping with the transnationalisation of shipping through flagging
out and dependence upon manpower from low-cost countries.7 After the repetitive
freight rates crises of the 1980s flag of convenience were extensively used by all western
and eastern maritime nations.
The 1970s marked a new era: this period was characterised by the final loss of the
pre-dominance of European maritime nations, with the exception of the Greeks that
continue to keep their first position to the present day, and of the Norwegians that
despite the great slump of the 1980s, kept their share of the market in the 1990s.
During the last third of the twentieth century the increase of the size of the world fleet
shipping continued but slowed down. The United States has kept, mostly under flags
of convenience, a much lower percentage, while Japan remains steadily in the second
position (Table1). The rise of new maritime nations from Asia was evident; by 1992
8 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
China owned more tonnage than Great Britain, while South Korea was close. The
world division of labour in world shipping had changed dramatically.8 The booming
markets of the period 2004–2008 contributed to the sharp increase in the world fleet,
and to the slight change in the hierarchy of world maritime powers. Great Britain and
Norway decreased their fleet and share in the world shipping, while Greece and Japan
followed the opposite direction and increased both their tonnage and share. Germany
made a very impressive comeback rapidly increasing its tonnage, especially of contain-
erships. A remarkable change was that of China. Being the driving force of the world
economy, China is continually developing its fleet. The conditions that prevail in the
world shipping and shipbuilding markets after the collapse of the freight markets in
2008, make safe the forecast that sooner or later, China will become the driving force
in world shipping.
3. SHIPPING MARKETS
Following world shipping developments, the shipping markets had taken its twentieth
century form since the last third of the nineteenth century. Before the 1870s the ship-
ping market was unified. By the last third of the nineteenth century the distinction of
the shipping market into two categories, liner and tramp shipping started gradually
to adapt. Liner ships carried general cargoes (finished or semi-finished manufactured
goods) and tramp shipping carried bulk cargoes (like coal, ore, grain, fertilisers, etc.)
For the next 100 years, until the 1970s, liner and tramp shipping markets continued
more or less on the same lines. This one century of shipping operations can be distin-
guished into two sub-periods (Figure 1).
During the first period, from the 1870s to the 1940s, the cargoes carried by liner and
tramp shipping were not always clearly defined: liner ships could carry tramp cargoes
and vice-versa. Although there was a substitution between the two distinct markets, the
main structures of each one were diametrically different: oligopoly and protectionism
for the liner market with the formation of the shipping cartels from the 1880s, the
conferences, and almost perfect competition for tramp ships.
The unprecedented increase of world production and trade in the first post-World
War II era brought more distinct changes in the structure of the markets that led to
a gradual decrease of substitution between the markets.9 In tramp/bulk shipping, the
introduction of new liquid bulk cargoes on a massive scale, like oil, and of the main
dry bulk cargoes as mentioned above (coal, ore, fertilisers and grain) led to the cre-
ation of specialised bulk markets and to the building of ships to carry specific cargoes
(Figure 1). The liner market continued along the same lines of oligopoly but witnessed
increased competition into their protected markets from competitors from developing
and socialist countries.
The 1970s were the landmark decade for the liner industry; unitisation of the cargoes,
called also containerisation, had been introduced during the 1960s but became wide-
spread during the 1970s, brought a revolution in the transport of liner cargoes (Figure
2).While in 1970 the world container fleet was of 500,000 TEU by 1980 this had increased
by more than six times to reach 3,150,000 TEU.10 The new organisation of liner ship-
ping that demanded excessive investments in infrastructure (terminals, cargo handling
facilities, ships, equipment and agencies), led to an increase in ship and port productiv-
ity, an increase in ship size,11 and economies of scale and decrease of transport cost.12
Shipping Markets 9
• Conferences
General Liner
cargoes ships
General cargoes
Bulk cargoes
Finished and
Coal, grain, semi-finished
iron ore manufactured
fertilisers etc. goods
• Conferences
• 40-40-20
10 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
• Economies of scale -
resources specificity and
frequency of transactions
lead to
• Internal development
• Vertical integration
• Mergers and
acquisitions
• Strategic alliances
• Vertically and horizontally
integrated global
companies that cover the
transport needs of
global customers
Containerisation included radically new designs for vessels and cargo-handling facilities,
global door-to-door traffic, early use of information technology, and structural change
of the industry through the formation of consortia, alliances and international mega-
mergers.13 The above led to a total transformation of the liner shipping companies that
became the archetype of a globalised multinational shipping company. The high capital
investments required to operate a unitized general cargo transport system led to con-
solidation in liner shipping.14 This transformation was further provoked by the continu-
ous trend to globalisation. Liner companies ought to serve the transport needs of their
customer on a global basis. Although consolidation in liner shipping was increasing from
the 1970s, during the 1990s it progressed faster. Liner companies were enforced to
establish global networks in order to meet their customers’ needs. The enlargement of
the companies’ size through mergers and acquisitions and the formation of global alli-
ances were the necessary steps toward this. Strategic alliances between competitors have
become the dominant form of cooperation in liner shipping.15 Alliances allow competing
liner operators to exploit economies of scope and to offer to shippers global geographical
coverage.16 It has been stated that increased complexity and intra-alliance competition
among partners undermine the stability of strategic alliances.17 Indeed, many changes
have been noted over the years. For example, the Grand Alliance in 1995 had as mem-
bers the Hapag Lloyd, NYK, NOL, and P&O. A few years later MISC entered the alli-
ance while NOL left to follow the New World Alliance. Recently MISC withdraw and
today the alliance includes the Hapag-Lloyd, the NYK and the OOCL, the seventh,
ninth and twelfth biggest liner companies.18
In parallel, strategies of internal development, merger and acquisitions have led to
an increase in the concentration of the supply of liner services. The combined market
share of the top four liner companies increased by 7% in a period of three years, i.e.
from 31% in 2004 to 38.4% in 2007, while the Herfindahl–Hirschmann Index of the
top four players (HHI–4) increased by 182%, from 268 in 2004 to 449 in 2007.19
For example, the biggest liner shipping company in the world, the Danish Maersk,
which has a market share of 15%, operates more than 500 containerships ((two millions
TEU) of which 211 are owned by the company) and more than 50 terminals worldwide,
while its network includes more than 150 local offices worldwide. In 1999 Maersk
acquired Sealand, the biggest American liner shipping company, the first company in
the world to introduce innovative container technology, while in 2005 it acquired P&O
Nedlloyd, then the third biggest liner company. It is thus evident that such a multina-
tional company is a global network by itself and offers global services to its clients. This
kind of development resulted in a total re-structuring in the port systems of the various
regions and created the need for minor shipping lines to serve regional transport needs
or offer feeder services for global liner companies. The major liner companies approach
main international ports, from which minor shipping lines distribute the products to
regional ports through the so-called feedering services.20 These two groups of compa-
nies, the big and minor container companies are not in competition with each other,
rather they complement each other.
On the contrary, the development of tramp shipping did not involve such innovative
technological developments and no dramatic changes took place in the organisation
and structure of markets. The general pattern has not changed over the last 140 years.
However, since the 1970s we are not talking of tramp shipping, but of bulk shipping
since the type of ship does not characterise the market anymore, but instead the cargoes
that are transported. Four main categories of bulk cargo are distinguished:21 the liquid
12 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
bulk (crude oil, oil products and liquid chemicals), the five major bulk (iron ore, grain,
coal, phosphates and bauxite), minor bulk (steel products, cement, sugar forest products
etc) and specialist bulk cargoes with specific handling or storage requirements (motor
vehicles, refrigerated cargo, special cargoes). Gradually need adapted to demand, and
the “tramp” ship was replaced by specialised ships that were built according to the
bulk cargoes and the specialised bulk shipping markets; reefer ships for the refrigerated
cargo, chemical tankers for chemical gases, lpg and lng for liquefied petroleum and
natural gas, heavy lift vessels for specific cargoes etc.
Globalised bulk shipping, even to the present day, is an industry based on trust.
Companies form networks of collaborating competitors on the basis of common
national cultures of traditional maritime nations such as Britain, Greece, Norway and
Japan (Figure 2). Even members of the same network compete with each other and
competitiveness is based on cost. During the twentieth century size did not play an
important role in the competitiveness of the company.22 Bulk shipping consists of com-
panies of various sizes – these vary from large companies of more than 50 large ships
to single-ship companies that directly compete with each other. For example in 1970,
the Greek-owned shipping company of Stavros Niarchos and the Norwegian shipping
company of Wilhem Wilhelmsen which operated more than 60 ships co-existed and
competed with the British Turnballs that operated five ships and the various Bergen-
based and Piraeus-based small companies that operated ships of similar characteristics.
Tramp shipping was mainly formed by groups of family enterprises which retained
many characteristics of a multinational enterprise.23 No matter what the size of these
enterprises, their organisation, structure and strategies had a lot in common.24
4. SHIPPING COMPANIES
Overall analysis of the main trends in world shipping fleets and their markets throughout
the twentieth century does not provide us with an understanding of the structure of the
maritime industry. The core of the economy is the firm; the core of the maritime industry
is the shipping company. In this section we will briefly review the actual players, the ship-
ping companies of the four main twentieth century nations: the British, the Norwegians,
the Greeks and the Japanese. In the first three European nations, we can distinguish
similar patterns of organisation and structure in the shipping companies worldwide that
concerned both liner and tramp shipping. First an important aspect of shipping com-
panies was their connection with a specific home port; second was the ownership and
management of the company by distinct families for multiple generations; third was the
use of a regional network for drawing investment funds, and fourth was the existence
of an international network of overseas agencies that collaborated closely with trading
houses on a particular oceanic region, or on a particular commodity trade.25
committee reported that “at the outbreak of war, the British Mercantile Marine was
the largest, the most up-to-date and the most efficient of all the merchant navies of the
world”.26 The fleet was particularly hit during the interwar period, where it saw some
of its leading shipping companies like the Royal Mail disintegrate and some of its main
tramp-shipping owners leave the stage. It has been argued that British performance has
been affected by the “unfair competition” of countries that subsidised their liner fleets
like France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, or the low-cost tramp opera-
tors like the Greeks that took large portions of its share in the Atlantic trade, and by the
reluctance of British shipowners to invest in the new technology of diesel engines and
tankers during the interwar period.27
World War II did not really affect the British share in world shipping which by 1948
had reached its pre-war level. Until 1967, Britain despite its decreasing share, remained
world’s maritime leader and UK fleet continued to grow until 1975. Part of its 1975
tonnage, however, the year when the British fleet reached its peak, was foreign-owned
and this “masked the extent to which British interest in merchant shipping had already
declined before the downward plunge after 1975”.28 From 1975 to the beginning of
the twenty-first century there was a continuous decrease in the UK register due to the
“flagging-out” of the British-owned fleet. By 2007 British shipping under all flags was
in tenth position with only 2.35% of world tonnage.29
The regional dimension in maritime Britain has played an important role in the organ-
isation of both tramp and liner business. The main poles of liner shipping have tradition-
ally been Liverpool and London followed by Glasgow and Hull. The newly emerging
liner shipping companies from the mid-nineteenth century onwards were very strongly
connected with a big home port, like London, Liverpool, Glasgow and Hull, where strong
shipping elites were formed.30 For example, the Peninsular and Oriental (P&O), based in
London, was established by Wilcox and Anderson in 1837 and specialised in trade with
India and Australia; the Cunard Company, established by Samuel Cunard, Burns and
the MacIvers in 1839 specialised in the north Atlantic; the British India (BI) shipping
company, based in Glasgow, was established in 1856 by the MacKinnon shipping group
and specialised in the Indian ocean; the Ocean Steam Ship Company known as the Blue
Funnel Line, based in Liverpool, was established by the Holt family in 1865 and special-
ised in trade with southeastern Asia. The Union-Castle Line, was established in the 1850s
and run by Donald Currie, specialised in South Africa by the 1870s, the Elder-Dempster
based in Liverpool, was formed by Alexander Elder and John Dempster in 1868 and spe-
cialised in African trade; Lleyland, Moss, McIver and Papayanni, all based in Liverpool,
were established in the 1840s and 1850s and were involved in the Mediterranean. Hull
was the home port of the Wilson Line, established by the Wilson family – “Wilson’s are
Hull and Hull is Wilson’s” –, that traded in all oceans and seas.31 In 1910 there were
65 liner companies that owned 45% of the British fleet. And all, during the previous
30 years, had organised themselves in closed cartels of the sea, the conferences, according
to the oceanic region they traded, securing their share in the world market.32
The five largest liner companies in 1910 were British India, White Star Line, Blue
Funnel Line, P&O and Elder Dempster (see Table 2). Low freight rates and a wide-
spread depression in the late 1910s led to intense competition and a wave of merg-
ers that produced giant lines in the five years before World War I. The most notorious
example is the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co that from 1903 to 1931 was led by Owen
Philipps (later Lord Kylsant). Within 30 years Royal Mail reached its peak, owning 11%
of British fleet, and its nadir in 1931 when it was liquidified, producing a major crisis
Table 2: The largest British shipowning groups of the twentieth century (in thousand grt)
Ismay Imrie 232 Ellerman Group 651 Furness group 1420 Cayzer, Irvine & 610
(White Star Line) of companies Co. Ltd
Holt A. (Blue 219 Holt A. (Blue 562 Blue Funnel 971 P&O Steam 396
Funnel Line) Funnel Lines) group Navigation Co.
Peninsular 203 Cunard Group of 461 Cunard group 947 Houlder Brothers 366
& Oriental Companies & Co. Ltd
Elder Dempster 202 Furness Lines 426 British and 872
Group of Commonwealth
Companies
Note: For the years 1914 and 1939 ships above 500 grt, for the years 1970 and 1998 ships above 1000 grt.
* Joint-venture of British and Dutch interests.
Sources: Processed data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1910, 1939, 1970, Shipwatch Directory, 1998. For 1960 data from Sturmey, S.G. (1962): British
Shipping and World Competition (Athlone Press), Table 50.
Shipping Companies 15
Liner shipping companies are associated with the most glorious part of British ship-
ping. Liner companies owned the most famous, luxurious steamships of the latest
technology. British liner steamships carried millions of passengers, and became widely
known as the proud manifestation of power of the mighty British Empire which ruled
the waves. Most of the owners of British liner companies, among Britain’s most pow-
erful capitalists, were commoners who became Lords or were knighted: Lord Kylsant
of Royal Mail, Lord Inchcape of British India, Sir Alfred Jones of Elder Dempster, to
mention only a few. British historians have told the stories of the main British liner busi-
ness.35 But liner shipping throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries formed
less than half of the large British fleet.
In fact, it was the less glorious ships of less technological achievement that formed
more than half of the British fleet which fed the industries of the Empire. Tramp ship-
ping formed the largest part of the British mercantile marine up to the Great War with
462 companies owning 55% of the fleet. The Industrial Revolution determined the
areas in which British tramp operators developed in close connection with deep-sea
export coal trade: The Northeast ports and Wales became the main hubs of British
tramp-operators in combination with those of the Clyde in Scotland who were tradi-
tionally connected with the trading worldwide networks of the Scottish merchants.
In 1910 the shipping companies of the Northeast ports, namely Newcastle,
Sunderland, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Whitby, Scarborough and Hull handled
almost one third of British tramp shipping tonnage.36 Some of the most powerful
British shipping families came from this area: the Furnesses, Turnballs, Ropners and
Runcimans. The next most dynamic group in tramp shipping were Scottish tramp
operators who handled 18% of British tramp shipping in 1910. Some of the best
known Scottish tramp shipowning families were the Burrells and the Hoggarths. Wales
also emerged as a generator of tramp companies. Wales drew human capital from
the West Country as well and shipping companies established in Wales operated 9%
of the British tramp fleet in 1910. With Cardiff as the central port, tramp shipping
thrived in the Welsh ports from Chester to Llanelli.37 The best known Cardiff tramp
operators were the Hains, Morells, Tatems and Corys. London and Liverpool drew
branch offices from almost all these tramp operators and both cities handled 42% of
the British tramp fleet in 1910.
Table 2 indicates the evident importance of tankers and the non-existence of inde-
pendent tanker owners; one of the great failures of British tramp owners was that they
did not enter the tanker business. The main big tanker owners remain the petroleum
companies like the Anglo-American Oil Co in 1910, British Tanker Co and Anglo-
Saxon Petroleum in 1939 and British Petroleum in the post-World War II period. The
new structure in the organisation of tramp/bulk shipping, were the management com-
panies under which one finds some of the traditional British tramp owners. Denholm
Management is a good example of a management company. In 1970 it managed
38 ships for 17 shipping companies including Turnbull Scott Shipping.38
Contrary to the beliefs that want family capitalism to belong only to the Mediterranean,
family prevailed in both the British liner and tramp maritime business. Big liner compa-
nies might have been joint-stock companies, but ownership was usually spread among
a select circle of family and friends; families like the Cayzers, Ellermans, Brocklebanks,
Holts, Furnesses and Swires retained their command over major British lines.39 The
case was stronger in British tramp companies, that were family-owned companies that
kept ownership and management of the companies and used intermarriages to expand
Shipping Companies 17
and keep the business within closed circles. From the most prominent ones like the
Runcimans, the Turnbulls, the Ropners, to the medium and smaller ones, kept business
in the family for several generations. One of the great handicaps of British shipping,
however, has been the loss of the importance of the regional dimension of maritime
Britain; regions and ports that reproduced shipping entrepreneurship.
of the fleet.46 Norwegians invested heavily in bulk shipping and especially in tankers
and have been major players in this sector since the 1920s. The high share of tankers
in Norwegian fleet, along with the high share of motorships and the low average age of
the vessels, are considered as the main features of Norwegian shipping’s rapid expan-
sion during the interwar period.47 The business strategy of expanding the market share
in tanker shipping proved to be a source of strength as well as of weakness. Norway
prospered during the expansion of the tanker market until the 1970s when it was hit
hard during the crisis of 1973.48 Its massive orders for supertankers along with their low
ratio of liquid to fixed asset made them highly vulnerable.49 Despite its diversification to
offshore activities and its exploitation of the know-how in managing ships to enter the
market of third party ship management, it remains a major power in the bulk shipping
industry. However, its leading position in the world fleet is very much down to the inno-
vative strategies of the many shipping companies which from the 1960s onwards entered
specialised bulk shipping markers like those of gas, and chemicals. They are now consid-
ered to be the leading group50 of these markets or that of open-hatch bulk carriers.51
Norwegian shipping is characterised by rivalry and cooperation and a strong empha-
sis on competence and networking.52 A large percentage of shipping companies can be
considered as network firms whose relationships with partners rely on trust.53 In this
context, the role of families in the establishment and development of shipping compa-
nies was crucial. Companies are family owned enterprises of family owned conglomer-
ates.54 Various families, tied to particular ports, established their companies during the
end of the nineteenth century or the first decades of the twentieth century, and most
of them continue to be active to the present day. Bergesen, Olsen, Knutsen, Naess,
Reksten, Odfjell, Rasmussen, Wilhelmsen, Stolt Nielsen, Fredriksen, Westfal-Larsen,
Hoegh and Uglands are only a few of the families that ran the leading companies of
the Norwegian shipping during the twentieth century. Representative cases of family
businesses with a long tradition in shipping are Wilh. Wilhemsen and Odfjell, as both
remained at the forefront of world shipping for the whole of their history.
The company of Wilhelm Wilhemsen was founded in 1861 in Tonsberg by Morten
Wilhelm Wilhelmsen who was also a successful shipbroker. As early as 1870 he started
to invest in steamships acquiring shares in various ships and in 1887 he made his
first steamship purchase.55 By 1910, when the founder of the company died, the fleet
consisted of 31 steamships. In 1911, the company, after several years of scepticism,
finally entered the liner trades in cooperation with Fearnley and Eger operating the
Norwegian Africa and the Australia Line. At approximately the same time Wilhelmsen
entered the tanker market. In 1912 the first two tankers were ordered and a fleet of
this type of ships was created. In the forthcoming years Wilhelmsen’s involvement in
liner trades became stronger while the tanker operation was abandoned. After World
War II, Wilhelmsen focused again on tanker business and in expanding in the liner
trades. Although during 2000 it was still active in the bulk sector, its core activity was
in liners and it was considered as the leader of Ro-Ro and Car Carriers sector.56 In
1999 the Wilhelmsen Lines merged with the Swedish Wallenius Lines creating a world-
wide network, which was further expanded with the acquisition of the car carrier divi-
sion of Hyundai Merchant Marine in 2002. Today, the Wilhelmsen group is involved
in many sectors of international shipping. Operating a fleet of 166 car cariers and
Ro-Ro through three different operating companies (Wallenius-Wilhelmsen Logistics,
EUKOR Car Carriers and American Roll-on-Roll off Carrier) controls 27% of the
global car carrier fleet.57 The Group is also active in the third-party management sector
Shipping Companies 19
as well as in maritime services and logistics. After more than 140 years, Wilhelmsen is
still a dynamic globalised shipping group, which remains family controlled.
Odfjell was established in 1916 in Bergen by Abraham and Frederik Odfjell, both
captains. During its early years the company was active in tramp shipping, operat-
ing dry cargo ships, while during the late 1930s it expanded to specialised tankers
which carried different liquid cargoes. During the late 1950s the Odfjell family decided
to increase involvement in the specialised market for chemical cargoes. The company
gradually reduced its involvement in bulk markets focusing on chemicals.58 During
the late 1960s Odfjell entered the tank storage business. This shift to specialisation
included certain innovative strategic decisions that gave Odfjell a clear head in the
chemical market and made the company the leading Norwegian chemical tanker opera-
tor. Cooperation with other companies, (for example the Westfal-Larsen & Co and
Christian Haaland of Haugesund), technological innovation and vertical integration
contributed to Odfjell’s dominance in the chemical market.59
In 1986 the company was listed on Oslo Stock Exchange but the control remained
with the Odfjell family. In 1990s Odfjell implemented a strategy of expansion with
sophisticated new ships as well as with second-hand purchases.60 In 2000 following
the consolidation trends in the chemical market it merged with the chemical branch of
Greek-owned company Ceres which owned a fleet of 17 chemical tankers operating in
the Seachem pool. After the merger the Odfjell family owns 28% of the shares and the
Livanos family 18.5%. This merger brought together two traditional families and cre-
ated synergies not only on the tangibles, but even more importantly on the intangibles.
Odfjell cooperates mainly on a 50–50% basis with companies that are active in regional
trades. Its fleet consists of 93 parcel tankers (March 2009). It owns and operates tank
terminals in Europe, America and Asia, while it is also active in the tank container busi-
ness. Odfjell considers itself as a “leading logistics service provider of specialty bulk
liquids” on a worldwide basis,61 which continues to operate its businesses from Bergen.
Norwegian shipping also consists of leading entrepreneurs like E.D. Naess and
H. Reksten, whose lives were constantly compared with the Greeks Onassis and
Niarchos. The Norwegian US citizen Erling Dekke Naess became active in shipping
after having studied and worked in the UK. Having invested extensively in whaling in
the 1920s, he entered the tanker business in the 1930s. With the outbreak of World War
II Naess moved to New York and there he became head of Nortraship, the governmen-
tal organisation that administered Norway’s requisitioned merchant fleet to the Allies.
Naess became one of the major shipping players in the newly emerging America’s eco-
nomic capital New York. His relations with American oil companies and his involve-
ment in the tanker business and flags of convenience made him among world’s largest
cosmopolitan shipowners. Involved both in dry and liquid bulk shipping, like his Greek
counterparts, in the 1950s he turned to the cheap and efficient Japanese shipyards
to order his bulk carriers and tankers. Using Bermuda as his official base, he really
administered his fleet from London with his Anglo-American Shipping company. This
eventually became Anglo-Norness and collaborated closely with the British P&O.
But it was his decision to sell his fleet for $208 million a few months before the first
oil boom and the great depression in the tanker freight markets that made him known
as the shipowner who predicted the oncoming crisis. Naess attributed this decision
to his study of the business cycles.62 It is very probable, however, that at that point in
time Naess was not the owner of “his” fleet which belonged to the company Zapata
Norness, but was only “an honorary chairman of the board” as it was reported that he
20 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
had already sold his fleet for a much lower price in the 1960s.63 Whatever the truth,
his exodus remained glamorous, and he never stopped his interests in shipowning. In
collaboration with the Greek tanker owners he established the Intertanko in the mid-
1970s of which he became President, while he returned to business again in the early
1980s. His use of various nationalities to shelter his companies, of various flags on his
ships, and of crews of various nationalities mean that most Norwegian analysts not
regard him as a Norwegian shipowner, and not to include his ships in the Norwegian
fleet. A nation that prided itself on its maritime infrastructure only accepted the term
Norwegian-owned after the 1980s crisis and the formation of NIS.
Hilmar Reksten followed a path similar to that of Naess – his ending however was dif-
ferent, as he was hardly hit by the depressed freight rates of the 1970s. In his case, the
strong involvement in tanker business functioned both as strength and weakness in the
different phases of the downfalls and upheavals in the shipping business. Reksten ordered
his first tanker in 1938 and expanded into the tanker sector after World War II. He was
convinced about the high profits to be made from tankers, so he focused on the market for
oil transport, created a fleet of large tankers and operated them in the spot market.64 This
strategy proved extremely successful in the period before 1973, when the freight rates were
continuously rising. Reksten became one of the biggest tanker owners worldwide, but this
strategy proved unsuccessful in the depressed freight markets after 1974 and finally led to
bankruptcy in the late 1970s. His chartering strategy made him the shipowner who “had
more tonnage available for assignments in the red-hot spot market” than any other, but a
few years later made him the one who “had more tonnage laid up than any other”. Thus,
his “spectacular rise was overshadowed by his even more spectacular downfall”.65
But Norway is a maritime nation, and apart from the above mentioned well-known
shipowning families, the backbone of the fleet still rests in the hundreds of small shipping
companies active in shipping for shorter or longer periods, which although not as innova-
tive and dynamic as the larger companies, have contributed to making Norway among
the top maritime nations worldwide. The shipping companies are at the core of the
Norwegian Maritime Cluster which consists of various internationally competitive sec-
tors (shipping, ship brokers, ship consultants, yards, equipment, other shipping services,
shipbuilding, shipbrokering, classification etc) located along the Norwegian coast.66
fleet in Europe, which consisted almost exclusively of ocean-going vessels for the trans-
port of bulk cargoes and tramp ships engaged in the international cross trades. By com-
parison, the fleets of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, France and Spain consisted mostly
of liners operating on regular routes and owned by large, often subsidised, shipping
companies which essentially carried passengers and industrial or package products.68
During the interwar period world shipping faced severe problems stemming from a
contraction of seaborne trade, decreased world migration and increasing protection-
ism. World War I weakened Britain and allowed competitors to challenge its maritime
hegemony. The Greeks took advantage of the disposal of tonnage at extremely low prices
and were able to expand during the worst period of the crisis. The fleet, which suffered
severe losses during World War II not only reconstructed itself after the War, but also
grew at an unprecedented rate. Until the 1960s the main maritime nations remained
the same, with Britain and the US clinging to their decreasing share of world shipping,
followed by Greece, Japan and Norway. Although flags of convenience were widely used,
in the immediate postwar years they were resorted to more extensively by Greek owners.
The 1970s marked the start of a new era; this was characterised by the final loss of the
pre-dominance of European maritime nations, with the exception of the Greeks who
have maintained their leadership to the present day.
Timely adjustments to changes of world trade and to technological shifts kept Greek
shipowners in the forefront of world shipping. The spectacular growth of Black Sea
grain exports in which the Greek sailing ship fleet was involved, provided the capital for
the subsequent transition from sail to steam by Greek shipowners that was completed
at the turn of the twentieth century. After World War I the lost steamships were replaced
by the “standard” type of cargo ships that were built during the war while after World
War II, the lost ships were replaced by the war-built “Liberty ships” which became the
standard dry-bulk cargo vessels for the next 25 years.
Part of the Greeks’ success during the postwar period was due to their entry into
the tanker market in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The first shipowners to do so were
Aristotle Onassis and Stavros Niarchos, both of whom benefited from the Norwegian
experience in tankers at this propitious international conjuncture. Niarchos’ and
Onassis’ expansion strategy was quickly followed by many of the successful “tradi-
tional” shipowners, primarily those who had settled in New York during the World
War II. The trailblazers’ success also created access to the American financial market
for other Greek shipowners. By 1974 the Greek-owned tanker fleet had become the
largest in the world, comprising 17% of the global fleet. Starting from scratch in 1945,
this fleet reached 8.2 million grt in 1965; 14.7 million grt in 1970; and 21.8 million grt
in 1974. Tankers represented between 40 and 48% of the overall capacity of the Greek-
owned fleet in the years 1958–1975.
Family capitalism that prevailed in the structure of Greek-owned maritime business
was also pivotal in the success of the fleet. At the beginning of the twentieth century
there were about 200 families, all specialised now in shipping, running 250 shipping
firms. By the end of the twentieth century about 700 families were running more than
1,000 shipping firms. After a short interval in New York, in the 1940s and 1950s, by
the last third of the twentieth century the Greek-owned fleet had the same operational
centres (Piraeus and London) as at its beginning, but its entrepreneurial network was
not now confined to European waters but extended to all oceans of the world.
The management, and all the branch offices of Greek shipping companies through-
out the twentieth century continued to be in the hands of members of the same family
Table 3: The largest Greek shipowning groups of the twentieth century (in thousands )
Name Nrt Name Grt Name Grt Name Grt Name Dwt
1914 1938 1958 1975 2008
Embiricos 92.5 Kulukundis Group 145.3 Goulandris 1,176 Goulandris 2,578 Angelicoussis I. 9,130
Group P. sons P. sons (Maran Tankers-
Maran Gas)
Scaramanga 24.2 Goulandris Bros 74.5 Onassis A. 1,098 Onassis A. 2,562 Economou G. 8,754
Bros (Cardiff-Dryships)
Dracoulis Bros 20.4 Livanos S.G. 57 Niarchos 1,033 Lemos C.M. 2,274 Tsakos P. 6,639
(Theofano) Stavros (Tsakos–TEN)
Svoronos 20.1 Nomikos Petros 39.9 Livanos S.G. 785 Niarchos 1,786 Prokopiou G. 5,911
Stavros (Dynacom)
Michalinos 19.3 Chandris I.D. 37.7 Kulukundis 730 Kolokotronis 1,581 Diamantidis D. 5,082
Group M. (Marmaras-Delta)
Vagliano A.S. 18.1 Lykiardopoulos 36.3 Lemos C.M. 530 Goulandris 1,333 Restis 4,904
N.D. N. sons V.(Enterprises-
Golden Energy)
Panellinios 17.8 Kassos Navigation 35.4 Goulandris 420 Livanos G.S. 1,219 Georgiopoulos P. 4,620
Atmoploia (Rethymnis, N.G. sons (Genmar-Genko)
Pneumaticos)
Lykiardopoulos 14.4 Nikolaou 34.7 Goulandris 320 Coulouthros 817 Haji-ioannou P. 3,932
22 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
Bros N. (Polyar)
Greek 12.8 Yannoulatos Bros 31.7 Embiricos 280 Chandris 791 Martinos C. 3,816
Transatlantic (ELMES) S.G. Bros (Thenamaris)
Steamship Co
Yannoulatos 11.9 Embirikos S.G. 27.6 Chandris 200 Kulukundis 712 Panayiotides G. 3,615
Bros Bros Bros (Excel-Quintana)
Total of ten 251.5 520.1 6,572 15,653 56,223
companies
Total of Greek- 822.9 1,889 10,425 45,392 174,570
owned fleet
Share of ten 31% 28% 53% 34.5% 32.2%
largest
Source: Gelina Harlaftis (2001). A History of Greek-owned Shipping, 19–20th centuries, Nefeli, Athens, Table 11.5, (in Greek), Naftiliaki, Summer 2008.
Shipping Companies 23
or co-islanders. In this way kinship, island and ethnic ties ensured the cohesion of
the international Greek maritime network. The unofficial but exclusive international
“club” was extremely important for their economic survival. It provided access to all
the expertise of shipping: market information, chartering, sales and purchase, ship-
building, repairing, scrapping, financing, insurance and P & I clubs. It also provided
consultancy from older and wiser members and information about the activities of the
most successful members of the group. Imitation proved an extremely useful “rule-of-
thumb”. The main strength of the Greeks then, has been the formation of an exclusive
“Greek” transnational network of family enterprises that interacted with local, national
and international shipping networks and organisations, local, national and international
financial institutions and organisations.
The regional dimension has also proved extremely important in Greek-owned ship-
ping. During the first two thirds of the twentieth century the so-called traditional ship-
ping families, all involved for multiple generations in shipping activities, predominate
and came from the islands of the Ionian and the Aegean. On the eve of World War I the
biggest shipowning groups came almost exclusively from the islands of the Ionian sea,
as a continuity of the entrepreneurial networks of the nineteenth century. Apart from
the Embiricos family that originated from the Aegean island of Andros, and formed the
most powerful shipowning group of the first third of the century, the rest, Dracoulis
Bros, Svoronos, Lykiardopoulos, Yannoulatos and Vaglianos came from the Ionian
islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca (see Table 3). The importance of shipowners from
Chios did not begin but later; in 1914 only the shipowning groups of Scaramanga and
Michalinos stemmed from Chios.
If the Ionian Sea dominates in the first third of the century, in the last two thirds
the Aegean took over. It is in the interwar period that the family groups of the mari-
time islands of the Ionian were replaced by the family groups of the Aegean islands.
In this way, the five brothers of Ioannis Goulandris from Andros, the five sons of Elias
G. Kulukundis from Kasos, the sons of the Embiricos from Andros, the four sons of
George Livanos, the two sons of the Ioannis Chandris and those of the large family of
Laimos, all from Chios, served as officers on their fathers’ steamships and eventually
became directors in the offices in Piraeus and London and shipowners themselves.
For more than 60 years, as Table 3 indicates, the same names of the above men-
tioned families figure in the top ten positions of Greek shipping. The only “foreigners”
that broke into the tightly knit shipowning circle were Aristotle Onassis and Stavros
Niarchos, both of whom, however, followed the rules. They married within the tradi-
tional shipowning circle – the daughters of Stavros Livanos. The importance of the
old traditional families, most of them active for at least three generations, eventually
started to fade and give way to new shipowners; the new blood in Greek-owned ship-
ping came from masters, first engineers and employees of shipping companies. In the
list of the top shipowners of 2008 as it appears in Table 3, none of them came from
traditional families. They were new, post-war shipowners: Angelicoussis, Economou,
Tsakos, Prokopiou, Diamantidis, Restis, Georgiopoulos, Haji-ioannou, Martinos and
Panayiotides. The strength of Greek-owned shipping was that it managed to reproduce
itself and provide new and dynamic entrepreneurs that enlarged the fleet to unprec-
edented size at the beginning of the twenty first century. And as in the Norwegian
case, apart from those found in the top, it is the hundreds of medium- and small-scale
shipowning companies who form the backbone and the seedbed for the expansion of
Greek-owned shipping.
24 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
government subsidy, their ships were called shasen (company ships), while all the others
were called shagaishen (non-company ships). These terms roughly indicated the differ-
ence between liner and tramp shipping. Numerous shagaishen firms stemmed from
the traditional shipowners or operators that traded in the coastal trade and Japanese
seas. They were mainly tramp operators who, particularly during and after World War I,
extended their activities in overseas trade to Korean and Chinese coasts.
Being able to operate more freely and flexibly during World War I Japanese ship-
ping was one of the primary beneficiaries of the war, in terms of profitability.76 The
limited loss of Japanese fleet during World War I (7% of its tonnage) meant that in the
interwar period, Japanese shipping expanded and its network of routes was extended
to all regions of Southeast Asian, to India, Africa and South America. NYK and OSK
were able to become part of the British system of conferences and opened their path
to the City of London and the Baltic Exchange. During the shipping boom of World
War I a large number of capitalists invested in ships and the tonnage of shaigasen
companies increased impressively. Most of the shaigasen shipowners were not opera-
tors themselves but chartered their ships to foreign and Japanese trading companies
as well as to the NYK and OSK. In the 1930s five large-scale shaigasen operators,
Yamashita, Mitsui, Kawasaki, Kokusai and Daido came to dominate Japanese shipping
along with the NYK and OSK. Yamashita, based in Kobe, specialised in long-distance
ocean-going shipping, while Kawasaki profited from its connection with its production
in its shipyards. All shaigasen Japanese companies had access in the London maritime
market and were involved in the British second-hand sales and purchase market.
The third forerunner of Japan’s steam shipping, and different from the above started
from the Mitsui family, who had prospered in Japan as merchants and financiers since
the late seventeenth century, and who were the prime financiers of the new Meiji gov-
ernment. They established in 1876 the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (MBK, Mitsui Trading
Co) that with branch offices in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Paris, New York, London and
Singapore was oriented in foreign trade, dealing with both bulk trade (coal, rice, cot-
ton) and general manufactured goods.77 Mitsui, that was part of the sogoshosha (gen-
eral trading company) system, operated a large fleet to cover its transport needs. This
company proved to be the pioneer in the eventual expansion of Japanese firms on a
global basis. It was the first Japanese firm to penetrate global commercial networks, as
it opened its London branch in 1879.78 In the post-war era, the company expanded and
eventually became the main competitor of NYK by merging with OSK – what came
to be called MOL (Mitsui-OSK Lines).79 The merger was the result of the consolida-
tion process of Japanese shipping, which, apart from it, resulted also to the merge of
Nitto Shoshen and Daido Kaiun to form the Japan Line and the Yamashita Kisen and
Shinnihon Kisen to form the Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co.
If the first half of the twentieth century formed the base for the development of
Japanese shipping, the second half created the conditions for its proliferation. The ships
lost during the World War II were quickly replaced by new, technologically advanced
ships. Demand conditions and the existence of related and supporting industries are
considered to be among the features that can define the prospects of a national indus-
try to compete in the world markets.80 During its modern history, but especially in the
second half of the twentieth century, Japanese shipping developed to respond on the
needs of a high volume internal demand. In 2001 the import dependency of Japan in
major resources accounted 97.9% for coal, 99.7% for crude oil, 96.9% for natural gas,
100% for iron ore, wool and raw cotton, 94.7% for soy beans, 88.8% for wheat and
26 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
84.6% for salt.81 Japan’s dependency on seaborne trade led the shipping industry in
search of technological and managerial innovations that, on the one hand would increase
the effectiveness of shipping companies, while on the other would decrease the transport
cost of both the raw materials and the final products of the industries. These innovations
have allowed, for example, the Japanese steel firms to be competitive in world markets,
although they have to import very much of their needed raw materials.82
The internationally competitive shipbuilding industry of Japan played a crucial role
in this effort and continues to do so. Its development however, was not depended on
the development of shipping industry. Of course, it offered the demand conditions
that defined the prospects of shipbuilding industry to become competitive and pen-
etrate the export market and to attract orders by shipowners of new dynamic fleets, like
the Greeks, who became the main customers of the Japanese shipbuilders from 1960s
onwards. This self-contained path of shipbuilding industry explains why its market
share achieved the 50% (the late 1960s) while the respective of the shipping industry
did not exceed the 15.5% (in 2008).83
Japanese shipping continues to be dominated by a few number of giant shipping
groups, who manage a great number of owned ships, as well as an even greater number
of chartered ships, many of them owned by other Japanese companies. For example,
Mitsui OSK Lines operates a diversified fleet of more than 800 ships, the NYK a fleet
of almost 800 ships and the K-Line a fleet of almost 500 ships. In parallel, a great num-
ber of medium sized operators, active mainly in bulk shipping add to the dynamism of
Japanese shipping industry.
The analysis of the shipping industry and of the main markets has revealed the structural
transformations and changes that occurred during the twentieth century. The hierarchy
of maritime powers changed, as new maritime nations emerged and most traditional
maritime countries lost their competitiveness and decreased their market share. The
changing patterns of development in the international trade along with the technologi-
cal advances determined the path of the industry. Shipping markets have followed the
path to globalisation and specialisation has become the drive for their development.
In this context, shipping companies have moved towards the necessary organisational
adaptations. Liner shipping companies expanded to the newly developed markets and
served almost any destination worldwide. The need for efficiency and effectiveness led
them to adapt to unitisation investing in containerships and terminals and gradually
turned to become transport providers that cover the needs of their customers in a
global basis. The main drive for the achievement of both the critical size and the global
coverage are new forms of cooperation that is, the consortia and the strategic alliances.
Either through cooperation, internal development or mergers and acquisitions, liner
operators strive to become the global players of a global market. In a rather playful
game of fate, the beginning and the end of the twentieth century were marked by the
same trends.
Bulk shipping continues to be a sum of markets that are organised along the needs
of the cargoes they transport. Contrary to the liner sector, bulk shipping continues to
be characterised by volatility, which increased the risk for the companies. Decisions
regarding the choice of the type of ship, the timing of the investment and chartering
Endnotes 27
determine the long-term survival of the companies. Information remains one of the
most critical factors for success. Dry, liquid and specialised markets like gas and chemi-
cals create a mosaic that incorporates many distinct organisational forms. For the more
recently created specialised markets, concentration of tonnage and consolidation of
companies were the means for companies who seek to cover the transport needs of
global customers. For the dry and liquid markets on the other hand, the tramp char-
acter continued to exist throughout the past century, although certain transformations
have diminished its presence.
Structural changes on the demand side have provoked the introduction and disparity
of cooperation of the commercial side of their operation, mainly through the formation
of pools. Trust continues to be at the core of the business: for the main players it is the
factor that allows the formation of networks of collaborating competitors. Bulk ship-
ping has traditionally been a sector that rewarded the entrepreneurial spirit, adaptation
and flexibility. The business environment for bulk shipping companies during the past
century became more regulated and shipping operation more formalised. To a certain
extent however, these changes diminished the entrepreneurial character and created
the need to balance between the necessity to conform to the business’s environment
requirements and the necessity to adapt for competitiveness. Still, the beginning and
the end of the past century saw the largest part of world’s main tramp operators work
more or less on similar lines.
ENDNOTES
6. For an insightful analysis see Cafruny, A.W. (1987): Ruling the Waves. The Political
Economy of International Shipping (University of California Press). For a classic
on flags of convenience, see Metaxas, B.N. (1985): Flags of Convenience (London,
Gower Press). For the resort of the Greeks to flags of convenience see Harlaftis, G.
(1989): “Greek Shipowners and State Intervention in the 1940s: A Formal
Justification for the Resort to Flags-of-Convenience?”, International Journal of
Maritime History, Vol. I, No. 2, 37–63.
7. Sletmo, G.K. (1989): “Shipping’s fourth wave: ship management and Vernon’s
trade cycles”, Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 14, No. 4, 293–303.
8. See Thanopoulou, H. (1995): “The growth of fleets registered in the newly-emerging
maritime countries and maritime crises”, in Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 22,
No. 1, 51–62.
9. More on the substitution relationship of the tramp with the liner see Metaxas,
B.N. (1981): The Economics of Tramp Shipping (2nd edn) (London, Athlone Press),
pp. 111–116.
10. Data contained in Stopford, M. (1997): Maritime Economics (2nd edn) (London,
Routledge), p. 341.
11. According to data of AXS-Alphaliner, in 1 July 2009 the 38 ships in range of 10,000
to 15,500 TEU consisted of the 0.9% of the the world liner fleet while the same
percentage of the orderbook was 18.1% (173 out of 955). Data available at www.
axs-alphaliner.com (accessed on 15 July 2009).
12. For an analysis of the evolutions in the liner shipping, see Haralambides, H. (2007):
“Structure and Operations in the Liner Shipping Industry”, in Hensher, D.A. and
Button, K.J. (eds.) Handbook of Transport Modelling (Elsevier), pp. 607–621.
13. See the excellent analysis of Broeze, F. (2003): The Globalisation of the Oceans.
Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present, Research in Maritime History,
(St. John’s, Newfoundland).
14. Stopford, M. (1997): op. cit., p. 377.
15. Ryoo, D.K. and Thanopoulou, H.A. (1999): “Liner alliances in the globalization
era: a strategic tool for Asian container carriers”, Maritime Policy and Management,
Vol. 26, No. 4, 349–367.
16. Haralambides, H. (2007): op. cit.
17. Midoro, R. and Pitto, A. (2000): “A critical evaluation of strategic alliances in liner
shipping”, Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, 31–40.
18. According to data of AXS-Alphaliner available at www.axs-alphaliner.com/top100/
index.php (accessed 21 July 2009).
19. UNCTAD (2007): Transport Newsletter, No. 36, Second Quarter (Geneva,
UNCTAD). The following data for the bulk shipping could be mentioned as an evi-
dence of the different ownership structure of Liner and Bulk shipping. According
to data of Clarkson Rersearch Studies, during 2003, there were five companies
operating more than 100 ships, whose fleet percentage of the bulk carrier fleet
was 14.3%. See Clarkson (2004): The Tramp Shipping Market, Clarkson Research
Studies, p. 37.
20. Broeze, F. (1996): “The ports and port system of the Asian Seas: an overview with
historical perspective from the 1750” The Great Circle, Vol. 18, No 2, 73–96.
21. Stopford, M. (1997): op. cit, pp.16–17.
22. However, regulations imposed on the shipping industry during the 1990s are
among the factors that have contributed to the increase of the importance of the
Endnotes 29
company size to the competitiveness of bulk shipping companies. For more on the
subject see Theotokas, I.N. and Katarelos, E.D. (2001): “Strategic choices for small
bulk shipping companies in the post ISM Code period”, Proceedings of WCTR,
Seoul, Korea.
23. Carvounis, C.C. (1979): “Efficiency contradictions of multinational activity: the
case of Greek shipping”, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (New School of Social Research),
p. 81.
24. Harlaftis, G. and Theotokas, I. (2004); op. cit.
25. Op. cit.
26. Cited in Palmer S. (2009): “British Shipping from the Late Nineteenth Century
to the Present”, in Fischer, L.R. and Lange, E., International Merchant Shipping
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. The Comparative Dimension, Research in
Maritime History No. 37 (St John’s, International Maritime Economic History
Association), pp. 125–141, 129.
27. Thornton, R.H. (1959): British Shipping; Sturmey St. (1962): British Shipping and
World Competition. See also Palmer, S. (2009): op. cit. for an overall view of these
arguments and the counterarguments.
28. Palmer, S. (2009): op. cit. Figure 4, 135.
29. Op. cit.
30. There is a large bibliography on the liner shipping companies; leading role was played
by the so-called “Liverpool School” founded by Professor Francis Hyde, main fac-
tor also in the creation of Business History. See Hyde, F.E. (1956): Blue Funnel: A
History of Alfred Holt & Company of Liverpool 1865–1914 (Liverpool); Hyde, F.E.
(1967): Shipping Enterprise and Management, 1830–1939: Harrisons of Liverpool,
(Liverpool); Marriner, S. and Hyde, F.E. (1967): The Senior: John Samuel Swire
1825–98. Management in Far Eastern Shipping Trades (Liverpool); Hyde, F.E. (1975):
Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840–1914 (Liverpool); Davies, P.N. (1973): The Trade
Markets: Elder Dempster inWest Africa (London); Sir Alfred Jones: Shipping Entrepreneur
par Excellence (London). For P&O see Cable, B. (1937): A Hundred Year History of
the P&O 1837–1937 (London); Howarth, D. and Howarth, S. (1986): The Story of
P&O (London) and Rabson, S. and O’Donoghue, K. (1988): P&O. A Fleet History
(Kendal); Napier, C.J. (1997): “Allies or Subsidiaries? Inter-Company Relations in
the P&O Group, 1914-39”, Business History, Vol. 39, 67–93. For British India (BI)
see Munro, Forbes J. (1988), “Scottish Overseas Enterprise and the Lure of London:
The Mackinnon Shipping Group, 1847–1893”, Scottish Economic and Social History,
Vol. 8, 73–87. “Sir William Mackinnon” in Slaven, A. and Chekland, S. G. (ed.)
Scottish Dictionary of Business Biography (Glasgow, 1990), Vol. 2, pp. 279–301. “Suez
and the Shipowner: The Response of the Mackinnon Shipping Group to the Opening
of the Canal, 1869–84” in Fischer L. and Nordvik, H. (1990): Shipping & Trade,
pp. 97–118; Munro, Forbes J. (2003): Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William
Mackinnon and his Business Network, 1823–93 (Woodbridge, Boydell Press 2003).
31. Starkey, D.J. (1996): “Ownership Structures in the British shipping industry:
the case of Hull, 1820–1916”, International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. VIII,
No. 2, December, 71–95.
32. More on conferences in also Sturmey, S.G. (1962): op. cit. and Cafruny, A.W.
(1987): op. cit.
33. For the story of Royal Mail see Green, E. and Moss, M.S. (1962): A Business of National
Importance. The Royal Mail Shipping Group, 1902–1937 (London, Methuen).
30 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
34. See also Sturmey, S.G. (1962): op. cit., chapt. IVX; and Boyce, G. (1995):
Information, Mediation and Institutional Development. The Rise of large-scale Enterprise
in British Shipping, 1870–1919 (Manchester University Press).
35. See fn 29.
36. Harlaftis, G. and Theotokas, I. (2004): op. cit.
37. There has been remarkably little research on British tramp shipping in the last
25 years with an important exception of Gordon Boyce (1995). Information,
Mediation and Institutional Development. The Rise of Large-scale Enterprise in British
Shipping, 1870–1919 (Manchester University Press) and Forbes Munro, J. and
Slaven, T. (2001): “Networks and Markets in Clyde Shipping: The Donaldsons
and the Hogarths, 1870–1939”, Business History, Vol. 43, No. 2, April, 19–50.
But it has been the work of the ground-breaking maritime historian Robin Craig
that has revealed the main aspects of tramp shipping. See Craig, R. (1980): The
Ship. Steam Tramps and Cargo Liners, 1850–1950 (London, HMSO); (1973):
“Shipowning in the South-West in its National Context, 1800–1914” in Fisher,
H.E.S. and Minchinton, W.E. (eds.) Transport and Shipowning in the West country
(University of Exeter); “Capital formation in Shipping”, in Higgins, J.P.P. and
Pollard, S., Aspects of Capital Investment in Great Britain (1750–1850) (Methuen);
(1986): “Trade and Shipping in South Wales – The Radcliffe Company, 1882–
1921”, in Baber, C. and Williams, L.J. (eds.) Modern SouthWales: Essays in Economic
History (Cardiff, University of Wales Press), pp. 171–191. Craig, Robin (2003):
British Tramp Shipping, 1750–1914, Research in Maritime History No. 24, No. 3
(St John’s, International Maritime Economic History Association).
38. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1970.
39. For the expansion and re-invention of some of these companies see Jones, G.
(2000): Merchants to Multinationals. British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
40. Tenold S., “Norwegian Shipping in the Twentieth Century” in Fischer L.R. and
Lange E., International Merchant Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.
The Comparative Dimension, Research in Maritime History No. 37 (St John’s,
International Maritime Economic History Association), pp. 57–77.
41. Ojala, L. (1994): “A transaction cost analysis of Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian
shipping”, Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 21, No. 4, 273–294.
42. Nordvik, H.W. (1985): “The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries,
1850–1914”, in Fischer, L.R. and Panting, G.E. (eds.) Change and Adaptation in
Maritime History, the North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (St John’s,
Newfoundland, Maritime History Group), pp. 117–148.
43. Wicken, O. (2007): “The Layers of National Innovation Systems: The Historical
Evolution of the National Innovation System in Norway”, TIK Working Paper of
Innovation Studies No. 20070601.
44. Johnsen, B.E. (2001): “Cooperation across the North Sea: the strategy behind the
purchase of second-hand British iron and steel sailing ships by Norwegian ship
owners, 1875–1925”, Paper presented in the International Conference “Maritime
History: Visions of shore and sea”, Freemantle, Australia, December.
45. Wicken, O. (2007): op. cit.
46. Tenold, S. (2000): The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implications
for Norwegian Shipping (Bergen, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration), p. 29.
Endnotes 31
47. Tenold, S. (2005): “Crisis? What crisis? The expansion of Norwegian ship-
ping in the interwar period”, Discussion Paper 10/05 (Economic History Session,
Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration).
48. For an analysis of the Norwegian shipping during the crisis of the 1970s see Tenold,
S. (2000): op. cit.
49. Drury, C. and Stokes, P. (1983): Ship Finance: The Credit Crisis – Can the Debt/
Equity Balance be Restored? (London, Lloyd’s of London Press), p. 37.
50. Ostensjo, P. (1992): A Competitive Norway: Chemical Shipping (Bergen, SNF, NHH).
51. Stokseth, B. (1992): A Competitive Norway: Open-Hatch Bulk Shipping (Bergen,
SNF, NHH).
52. Jenssen, J.I. (2003): “Innovation, Capabilities and Competitive Advantage in
Norwegian Shipping”, Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 30, No. 2, 93–106.
53. Solberg, C.A. (2001): “Market information and the role of networks in inter-
national markets”, IMP 2001 (Norwegian School of Management BI).
54. Ojala, L. (1994): op. cit.
55. Bland, A.L. and Crowdy, M. (1961): Wilh.Wilhelmsen, 1861–1961. The Firm and the
Fleet (Kendal, World Ship Society).
56. Wil. Wilhelmsen ASA, Annual Report 2000.
57. Wil. Wilhelmsen ASA, Annual Report 2008.
58. For more on the Odfjell’s history, see Thowsen, A. and Tenold, S. (2006): Odfjell – The
History of a Shipping Company (Bergen, Odfjell ASA); Tenold S. (2006): “Steaming
ahead with stainless steel – Odfjell’s expansion in the chemical tanker market
1960–75”, International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 179–198.
59. Tenold, S. (2008): “So nice in niches – Specialization strategies in Norwegian
Shipping, 1960–1977”, Fifth International Conference of Maritime History, University
of Greenwich.
60. Trygve, S. (2000): “Entry barriers and concentration in chemical shipping”, SNF
Report No 07/00 (Bergen, Foundation for Research in Economics and Business
Administration).
61. Odjfell (2008): Annual Report 2008 (Bergen).
62. Naess, E.D. (1977): Autobiography of a Shipping Man (Colchester) (1990): “61 Years
in the Shipping Business”, in Strandenes, S.P., Svendsen, A.S. and Wergeland, T.
(eds.) Shipping Strategies and Bulk Shipping in the 1990s (Institute for Shipping
Research, Center for International Business), p. 1.
63. Tenold, S. (2000): op. cit., p. 15.
64. Op. cit., pp. 231–2.
65. Tenold, S. (2001): “The harder they come … Hilmar Reksten from boom to bank-
ruptcy”, The Northern Mariner, Vol. XI, No. 3, 41–53.
66. Benito, G.R.G., Berger, E., de la Forest, M. and Shum, J. (2003): “A cluster analysis
of the maritime sector in Norway”, International Journal of Transport Management,
Vol. 1, No. 4, 203–215.
67. For an English-speaking bibliography on Greek shipping, see Metaxas, B. (1981):
op. cit.; (1985): op. cit.; Harlaftis, G. (1993): Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945–75.
From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence (London, Athlone Press);
(1996): op. cit.; Theotokas, I. (1998): “Organisational and Managerial Patterns
of Greek-Owned Shipping Enterprises and the Internationalization Process
from the Interwar Period to 1990”, in Starkey, D.J. and Harlaftis, G. (eds.)
32 Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century
Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850,
Research in Maritime History No. 14, IMEHA (St John’s, Newfoundland);
Serafetinides, M., Serafetinides, G., Lambrinides, M. and Demathas, Z. (1981):
“The development of Greek shipping capital and its implications for the political
economy of Greece”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, September; Carvounis, C.
(1979): op. cit.; Grammenos, C.T. and Choi, J.C. (1999): “The Greek shipping
industry: Regulatory change and evolving organizational forms”, International
Studies of Management and Organization, Vol. 29, No.1, 34–52; Theotokas, I.
(2007): “On Top of World Shipping: Greek Shipping Companies Organization
and Management” in Pallis, A.A. (ed.) Maritime Transport: The Greek Paradigm
(Elsevier); Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. 21, 63–93; Lagoudis, I.
and Theotokas, I. (2007): “The Competitive Advantage in the Greek Shipping
Industry” in Pallis, A.A (ed.) op. cit. pp. 95–120; Thanopoulou, H.A. (2007): “A
Fleet for the 21st Century: Modern Greek Shipping”, in Pallis, A.A. (ed.), op. cit.,
pp. 23–61; Theotokas, I. and Harlaftis, G. (2009): Leadership in World Shipping.
Greek Family Firms in International Business (Palgrave).
68. Gelina, Harlaftis, (2009): “The Greek Shipping Sector, c. 1850–2000” in Fischer
L.R. and Lange E., International Merchant Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. The Comparative Dimension, Research in Maritime History No. 37
(St John’s, International Maritime Economic History Association), pp. 79–104.
69. Bibliography in English on Japanese maritime business is rather limited with the
exception of its two main shipping companies. Exceptions to this rule are: Yui,
T. (1985): “Introduction”, in Yui, T. and Nakagawa, K. (eds.) Business History of
Shipping, Proceedings of the Fuji Conference (University of Tokyo Press); Nagakawa,
K. (1985): “Japanese Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries:
Strategies and Organization”, in Yui, T. and Nakagawa, K. (eds.) Business History
of Shipping, Proceedings of the Fuji Conference (University of Tokyo Press); Miwa,
R. (1985): “Maritime Policy in Japan: 1868–1937” in Yui, T. and Nakagawa, K.
(eds.) Business History of Shipping, Proceedings of the Fuji Conference (University of
Tokyo Press). Otherwise there is extensive bibliography on the leading compa-
nies. See Wray, W.D. (1984): Mitsubishi and the NYK, 1870–1914: Business Strategy
in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Cambridge, MA); (1985): “NYK and the
Commercial Diplomacy of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896–1956” in
Yui, T. and Nakagawa, K. (eds.) Business History of Shipping, Proceedings of the Fuji
Conference (University of Tokyo Press); (1990): “The Mitsui Fight”, in Fischer L.E.
and Nordvik, H. Shipping & Trade 1750–1950 (Lofthouse Publications); (1993):
“The NYK and World War I: Patterns of discrimination in freight rates and cargo
space allocation”, International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. 5, No. 1, 41–63;
Goto, S. (1998): “Globalization and International Competitiveness – An Historical
Perspective of Globalization of Japanese Merchant Shipping” in Starkey, D.J. and
Harlaftis, G. (eds.), Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport
Industries since 1850, Research in Maritime History No. 14, IMEHA (St John’s,
Newfoundland); On shipbuilding, Chida, T. and Davies, P.N. (1990): The Japanese
Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries. A History of their Modern Growth (London, The
Athlone Press). Is invaluable.
70. Wray, W.D. (2005): “Nodes in the Global Webs of Japanese Shipping”, Business
History, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1–22.
Endnotes 33
71. Davies, P.N. and Katayama, K. (1999): “Aspects of Japanese shipping history”,
Discussion Paper JS, 376. (Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics
and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science).
72. Wray, W.D. (2005): op. cit.
73. Davies, P.N. and Katayama, K. (1999): op. cit.
74. Wray, W.D. (2005): op. cit.
75. Wray, W. (2000): “Opportunity vs Control: The Diplomacy of Japanese Shipping
in the First World War”, in Kennedy, G. (ed.), The Merchant Marine in International
Affairs, 1850–1950 (London, Frank Cass), pp 59–83, p. 60.
76. See Wray, W.D. (2000): op. cit.
77. Nagakawa, K. (1985): “Japanese Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries: Strategies and Organization”, in Yui, T. and Nakagawa, K. (eds.),
Business History of Shipping, Proceedings of the Fuji Conference (Tokyo, University of
Tokyo Press), p. 5.
78. Wray, W.D. (2005): op. cit.
79. Japan Business History Institute (1985): The First Century of Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd
(Osaka).
80. Along with factors such as the role of other factors, such as the governmental poli-
cies, the related and supporting industries, the firm strategy, structure and rivalry.
See Porter, M. (1990): The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London, Mcmillan).
81. JSA (2004): The Current State of Japanese Shipping, Japanese Shipowners’
Association.
82. The dependency of shipbuilding and steel industry by the shipping industry is
obvious: In the period of its apogee the shipbuilding industry absorbed 35% of
steel output. See Bunker, S.G. and Ciccantell, P.S. (1995): “Restructuring markets,
reorganizing nature: An examination of Japanese strategies for access to raw
materials”, Journal of World Systems Research ,Vol. 1, No. 3, 1–63.
83. See Stopford, M. (1997), op. cit.
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