IOS Judicial Process Spring 2023
IOS Judicial Process Spring 2023
SPRING 2023
(AY 2022-23)
COURSE INSTRUCTORS:
Ajita Sharma, Khushboo Chauhan, Kshitij Bansal, Praggya Surana, Raabia Abuzer Shams,
Rakesh Singh, Sabina Mary Peters, Satya Prateek, Upasana Dasgupta
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CONTENTS
Particulars Page
Part I
General Information 3
Part II
A Course Description 4
B Course Aims and Intended Outcomes 5
C Course Texts 5
D Grading of Student Achievement 5
E A word of caution on Online Resources 8
Part III
A Keyword Syllabus 8
B Academic Integrity and Plagiarism 8
C Disability Support and Accommodation requirements 8
D Safe Space Pledge 8
E Course Communication 9
Part IV
A Weekly Course Outline 10
B Lecture Programs and Reading Materials 11-18
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PART I
General Information
The information provided herein is by the Course Coordinator. The following informationcontains
the official record of the details of the course.
The above information shall form part of the University database and may be uploaded to
Dspace into the KOHA Library system and catalogued and may be distributed amongst Law
students for B.A.LL.B. (Hons), B.B.A.LL.B., (Hons) B.Com. LL.B (Hons), B.A. (Hons) in Legal
Studies; B.A. (Hons) in Criminology and Criminal Justice; LL.B.; LL.M. courses if necessary.
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PART II
A. Course Description
This course introduces students to various theories of judicial process and canons of
statutory interpretation. The aim of the course is to help students understand the nature and limits
of interpretation and the structure of legal reasoning, besides applying various principles and rules
of interpretation to justify claims about law. The course engages with various judicial approaches
to canons of construction as well as the assumptions and implications of these approaches.
This course is a cross-cutting one, relevant to the understanding of statutory interpretation
and judicial process in all other law courses. As this is a course traversing different sub-fields
within the study of law, the focus will be on the standards and protocols of reasoning within the
field rather than the doctrines and precedents related to it. While we might cover cases from Labour
Law, Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Family Law and Transfer of Property Act to name a few
fields, none of these fields will be revised or examined in detail. A basic knowledge of these
subjects is a prerequisite for this course as our engagement with interpretation and reasoning will
build upon it. A significant part of the course discusses the presuppositions, frameworks and limits
of interpretation to understand its role in mediating arguments about truth, meaning and legality.
The readings also engage with the sources, kinds and possibilities of disagreement in debates about
law. The course holds relevance for legal practice by students in future as it aims to bring
coherence to legal arguments and reasoning. Students will learn how to channel their legal
arguments through the use of rules, principles and presumptions of interpretation, thus learning
how to draft good legal memos as lawyers or write sounds judgments as judges.
The course will also engage with various aspects of legislative drafting. Various legislations,
old and new, will be studied to familiarise the students with different parts of a legislation and
interpretive doctrines associated with them. A study of the canons of construction and their judicial
interpretation will reveal how ambiguities in the statute create difficulties in interpretation. There
are inherent limitations in language and the law-making process that are further compounded by
the uneven journey of law through a changing social and politicallandscape. Aiming to
develop an awareness of these limitations, the course will encourage students to think deeply about
better ways of drafting legislative provisions so as to give better and precise guidance to
prospective litigants, lawyers and judges.
The various theories of judicial process and interpretation will be introduced through the study
ofscholarly articles. The cannons of interpretation will be taught through a case-based study.
The specific canon will be introduced followed by an examination of select cases as examples of
the application of the canon. The emphasis will be on logical and critical reasoning and the ability
to apply the canons to reach a conclusion that can be justified within the boundaries of law. In
manyways, this is in equal parts a course on philosophical debates about legal reasoning and
interpretative principles as well as the practice of these principles in hard cases.
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B. Course Aims and Intended Outcomes
C. Course Texts:
There is no compulsory core text for this course. This is partly as the course combines both theory
and assumptions and frameworks within which statutory interpretation. If students would like a
more in-depth resource here are some recommendations below:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edition, 2022)
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (5th ed., 2010)
All of the core course readings will be available for download on One Drive – the hyperlink
will be shared with students separately by the respective Course Instructor.
D. Grading
To pass this course, students must obtain University mandated passing grades i.e. a minimum of
40% in the cumulative aspects of coursework and end-semester exam. Coursework for this purpose
means those ways in which students are assessed otherwise than by the end of session examination.
These could include reaction papers, class participation, presentations, group work, research
paper.
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Grading of Student Achievement
The details of the grades, as well as the criteria for awarding such grades, are provided below:
Online sources can be classified into reliable, unreliable and outright bogus. Therefore, caution
must be exercised before relying on online resources. Academic journals are reliable for arguments
whereas newspapersand magazines might exhaust their utility beyond facts. Websites such as
Wikipedia are not always reliable. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is a credible online
resource for conceptual debates on law, language, interpretivism and meaning. Students should
always consult with the instructors about the veracity and authenticity of a particular website and
its suitability for researching topics covered in this syllabus.
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PART III
A. Keyword Syllabus:
Statutory Interpretation, Making Sense, Coherence, Truth, Meaning, Intent, Discretion, Bias,
Consequences of Interpretation, Hermeneutic Circle, Web of Beliefs, Part and Whole Dynamic,
Aharon Barak, Originalism, Separation of Powers, Statutory Purpose, Golden Rule, Constitutional
Interpretation, Mischief Rule, Ronald Dworkin, Ejusdem Generis, Presumptions, Internal Aids,
External Aids, Foreign Precedents, Disagreement in Interpretation, Chain Novel, Definitions,
Provisos, Practical Reasoning, William Eskridge, Comparative Borrowing
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All faculty members are requested to refer students with any of the above-mentioned conditions
to the Disability Support Committee for getting them disability-related accommodation. Faculty
members are also requested to be sensitive to the needs of such students and cooperate with the
Disability Support Committee and the School, extending students the necessary support by
maintaining utmost confidentiality of the matter.
It is incumbent upon all within the classroom to pledge to maintain respect towards our peers.
This does not mean that you need to feel restrained about what you feel and what you want to say.
Conversely, this is about creating a safe space where everyone can speak and learn without
inhibitions and fear. This responsibility lies not only with students, but also with the instructor.
E. Course Communication
We are happy to meet with students during our office hours, which will be set in the first week
of the course. We are available to discuss issues relating to the course, as well as your academic
career more generally.
Please feel free to write to us to schedule meetings on MS Teams outside of office hours; please
address emails to the course instructor(s) for your class only. Mention your batch and section in all
emails addressed to the instructor.
If getting in touch by email, please note that we will try to respond within two business days.
Students should check the course One Drive on a regular basis, as items such as the following may
be posted throughout the year: additional tutorial readings, grading rubrics for essays, further
instructions for assignments, notifications of any changes in lecture or tutorial schedules, etc.
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PART IV
A. Weekly Course Outline
Week 9 Presumptions
Week 14 Review
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B. Detailed Readings
Essential Readings:
Case Discussion from Chapter 5 of Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire – Elmer’s Case, Snail
Darter’s Case and McLoughlin Case.
Andrew Morisson Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything,44
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 649 (Spring 2013).
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer debate the Constitution (15 May 2012)
Questions:
1. What is meant by ‘interpretation’?
2. Is there a difference between the interpretation of ‘statutes’ and ‘law’?
3. Do we have the same ideas about how we should be interpreting statutes?
4. How do Scalia J. and Breyer J. justify their positions on resolving disputes of interpreting
statutes? What are their criteria/tools for resolving such disputes?
5. Why does A. Stumpff argue that law in many senses is fractal? What is a fractal?
6. Based on the readings, what are some ways to think about ‘rule-specificity’?
7. Is the role of judges and ideas about justice relevant in the exercise of interpretation?
8. What is Dworkin’s critique of legal pragmatism? and what is the relevance of chain novel in
interpretation?
Essential Readings:
Paul Armstrong, The Conflict of Interpretations and the Limits of Pluralism, PMLA, Volume
98, No. 3, (May 1983), pp 341-52.
Arie Rosen, Statutory Interpretation and the Many Virtues of Legislation, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, (2017) 37 (1), pp 134-62.
Further reading:
Richard A. Posner, 'Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution' (1986) 37 Case Western Reserve Law Review 179
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Questions:
1. Is there such a thing as one true or correct meaning of any written text?
2. What do radical relativists and monists say on one true or correct meaning of any written
text?
3. How should one deal with disagreements in interpretation? Is there a workable set of criteria
for legitimizing divergent interpretations?
4. Whether dissenting opinions have any value?
5. How does P. Armstrong respond to the question of disagreements in interpretation, utility
and futility of dialogue?
6. What are the different approaches/frameworks to statutory interpretation that give deference
to statutes?
7. Why is A. Rosen making a case for a correctness-oriented approach? What standards does he
give for ‘correctness’? Do you think there are problems with this approach?
Essential Reading:
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9, No 1, (The Politics of
Interpretation), September 1982, pp 179-200.
Further Reading:
William Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 3,
pp 609-81.
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Ronald Dworkin, Is There Truth in Interpretation? Law, Literature and History (22
December 2013).
Discussion: The Evolution of Basic Structure Doctrine and Substantive Due Process in Indian
Constitutional Law
Questions:
1. Why do we need to find the true and correct meaning in interpretation of law? Are the existing
frameworks meeting this objective?
2. What are the principles Dworkin lays down to address complexities that arise in interpretation
of the text of the statute and lawmakers’ intention?
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WEEK 5: Judges and Judicial reasoning and Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes
Essential Readings:
William Eskridge Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,Yale
Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, January, 1990
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. Hist. 33 (1994).
Aharon Barak, “What is Interpretation About?” & “Purpose in Law” in Purposive
Interpretation in Law, Universal Publishing (2008)
Further Reading:
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 'Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes' (1950) 3
Vand L Rev 470
Questions:
1. How do theories of statutory interpretation restrict judicial and administrative discretion?
2. Which one ofthese theories provides the most satisfactory account of discretion?
Essential Reading:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 64-120 (15th ed., 2022)
Further Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 44-45, 137-152 (2006 ed.)
Illustrative cases:
Literal Rule
- B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, (1979) 1 SCC 361
- Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1325
- Motipur Zamindary Co. (Private) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660
- State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed, (1977) 2 SCC 246
Golden Rule
- G. Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
- S.R. Batra v. Smt. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 (overruled)
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Mischief Rule and Purposive Interpretation
- Heydon’s case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7
- R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628
- Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 30-236 (5th ed. 2010). Some of the
illustrative cases are also mentioned here.
Illustrative cases:
Statute must be read as a whole
- Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing
Co., AIR 1962 SC 1536
- Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369
- Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274
Rule of harmonious construction
- Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044
A statute must be construed to make it effective and workable/Presumption of constitutional
validity/Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
- Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666
- Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
- Khemka & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) 2 SCC 22
- Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444
Noscitur a sociis
- State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610
- Pandit Ram Narain v. State of UP, AIR 1957 SC 18
- Raghubans Narain Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1967 SC 465
- State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 903
- Gammon India Ltd. v. UOI, (1974) 1 SCC 596
- Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Savoy Hotel Ltd., (1966) 2 All ER 299
- Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordan, (1976) 3 All ER 775
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Ejusdem generis
- Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (1989) 2SCC 458
- Hamdard Dawakhana v. UOI, AIR 1965 SC 1167
- Smt Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521
- Attorney General v. Brown, (1920) 1 KB 773
WEEK 9: Presumptions
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 237-331 (5th ed. 2010)
Retrospective Operation of statutes will be discussed using G.P. Singh’s textbook.
Further Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (2006), pages 44-45, 137-152
Illustrative cases:
Words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely
- Mayor, Councillors & Burgesses ... v. Taranaki Electric Power Board, AIR 1933 PC 216
Mens Rea is generally required for a criminal act
- Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. State, AIR 1951 SC 204
- Sarjoo Prasad v. State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 631
- Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881
Vested Rights are not taken away without express words, necessary implication or
compensation.
- Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier, AIR 1922 PC 257
Retrospective operation
- Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, J&K Industries Ltd., (1989) 3 SCC 448
Statutes are not intended to be inconsistent with international law
- ADM, Jabalpur v. Shiva Kant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521
The legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions
- Nalinakhya v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, AIR 1953 SC 148
- G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
Presumptions relating to jurisdiction of courts
- Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, (1960) AC 260 (HL)
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Legislature knows the existing law and does not intend to alter it except by express
enactment
- Abdur Rahim v. Mahomad Barkat Ali, AIR 1928 PC 16
Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient and unreasonable
This part of the course will discuss Internal aids (that include Title, Preamble, Headings, Marginal
notes, Punctuation, Illustrations, Definitions, Proviso, Explanation, Schedule)
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 121-170 (15thedition 2022)
This part of the course will discuss some of the external aids that may be used to aid the
interpretation of a statute as listed below:
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 171-276 (15th edition 2022)
Sujit Choudhry, Globalisation in Search of Justification: Towards a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 74 (3), 1999
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Illustrative cases:
Parliamentary history
- R v. Allen
- Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2007(6) Bom CR 294
Historical facts and surrounding circumstances
Later social, political, scientific and economic developments
- R v. R, (1991) 4 All ER 481
Dictionaries
Foreign decisions
- MV Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433
Reference to other statutes (Statutes in pari materia)
- Thiru Manickam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 1 SCC 199
Effect of Usage and Practice; Contemporanea Expositio
- N. Suresh Nathan v. UOI, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 584
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 637-712 (15th edition 2022)
BB Pande, Limits on Objective Liability for Murder, JILI, Vol 16 (4), 1974, pp 469-482.
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WEEK 13: Re-Imagining Precedents
Essential reading:
Upendra Baxi, “The Travails of Stare Decisis in India”, in Legal Change: Essays inhonour
of Julius Stone (A.R. Blackshield ed.)
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