IOSJP Course Manual Spring 2025
IOSJP Course Manual Spring 2025
SPRING 2025
COURSE INSTRUCTOR:
Raabia Abuzer Shams
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CONTENTS
Particulars Page
Part I
General Information 3
Part II
A Course Description 4
B Course Aims and Intended Outcomes 5
C Course Texts 5
D Grading of Student Achievement 5
E A word of caution on Online Resources 6
Part III
A Keyword Syllabus 7
B Academic Integrity and Plagiarism 7
C Disability Support and Accommodation requirements 7
D Course Communication 8
E Weekly Course Outline 9
Part IV
Lecture Programs and Reading Materials 10-16
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PART I
General Information
The information provided herein is by the Course Coordinator. The following information
contains the official record of the details of the course.
The above information shall form part of the University database and may be uploaded to
Dspace into the KOHA Library system and catalogued and may be distributed amongst Law
students for B.A.LL.B. (Hons), B.B.A.LL.B., (Hons) B.Com. LL.B (Hons), B.A. (Hons) in Legal
Studies; B.A. (Hons) in Criminology and Criminal Justice; LL.B.; LL.M. courses if necessary.
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PART II
A. Course Description
This course is shaped by and around three key features of the legal system – the search for
meaning, the fact of disagreement and the yearning for justification. The search for meaning takes
various forms and approaches, with some looking for an appropriate meaning, while others keen
on a ‘true’ meaning. Some philosophers describe this interpretive quest as the search for the ‘right
answer’. But no matter how we describe this quest, the various presuppositions, and values we
bring to this quest leave us with more than one right answer. The plurality of meanings is a core
feature of our legal universe just as the desire to use reason, values, legal and linguistic constraints
to choose among these multiple meanings and publicly justify our choice. In any debate over
competing meanings, students should be able to justify their choice of meaning with reference to
public standards and features of reasoning, value, language, legal systems etc. The aim of the
course is to help students understand this process of choosing or ascribing meaning to a legal text
from among various choices that exist and familiarise them with the structure and standards of
legal reasoning that make it possible. In other words, this is a course about nature and limits of
interpretation and its debates and difficulties. The course engages with various judicial approaches
to interpretation and their assumptions and implications.
The course will also engage with various components of legislation. Internal and external
aids, that serve as an interpretive key to legislative text, will be studied in detail with the help of
judicial precedents. The study of legislation, and its various aids, will help students navigate the
legal text adroitly and understand the hierarchy and relationship between the various parts of a
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legislation. There are inherent limitations in language and the law-making process that are further
compounded by the uneven journey of law through a changing social and political landscape.
Aiming to develop awareness of these limitations, the course will encourage students to think
deeply about better ways of drafting legislative provisions to give better and precise guidance to
prospective litigants, lawyers, and judges.
The various theories of judicial process and interpretation will be introduced through the study
of scholarly articles. The cannons of interpretation will be taught through a case-based study.
The specific canon will be introduced followed by an examination of select cases as examples of
the application of the canon. The emphasis will be on logical and critical reasoning and the ability
to apply the canons to reach a conclusion that can be justified within the boundaries of law. In
many ways, this is in equal parts a course on philosophical debates about legal reasoning and
interpretative principles and the practice of these principles in hard cases.
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B. Course Aims and Intended Outcomes
The course seeks to:
1. Make students aware of the need for statutory interpretation given the imprecision of
language and impossibility of anticipating all future events.
2. Introduce students to various theories of interpretation and familiarize them with
assumptions and frameworks within which statutory interpretation operates.
3. Enable students to understand and apply various canons of statutory interpretation followed
in the common law legal system.
4. Encourage students to engage critically with court judgments and examine them for the
strength of their reasoning rather than the outcomes. Students will be expected to rewrite
landmark judgments to make them more coherent and persuasive.
5. Develop among students the skills to analyze labyrinthine legislations and court judgments
and distinguish precedents from similar cases, ratio decidendi from obiter dicta etc.
C. Course Texts:
There is no compulsory core text for this course. This is partly as the course combines both theory
and assumptions and frameworks within which statutory interpretation. If students would like a
more in-depth resource here are some recommendations below:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edition, 2022)
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (5th ed., 2010)
D. Grading
To pass this course, students must obtain University mandated passing grades i.e. a minimum of
40% in the cumulative aspects of coursework and end-semester exam. Coursework for this purpose
means those ways in which students are assessed otherwise than by the end of session examination.
These could include reaction papers, class participation, presentations, group work, research paper.
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Letter Percentage Grade Definitions
Grade Of marks
O 80% and above Outstanding Outstanding work with strong evidence of
knowledge of the subject matter, excellent
organizational capacity, ability to synthesize and
critically analyse and originality in thinking and
presentation.
A+ 75 to 79.75% Excellent Sound knowledge of the subject matter, thorough
understanding of issues; ability to synthesize
critically and analyse
A 70 to 74.75% Good Good understanding of the subject matter, ability
to identify issues and provide balanced solutions
to problems and good critical and analytical skills.
A- 65 to 69.75% Adequate Adequate knowledge of the subject matter to go to
the next level of study and reasonable critical and
analytical skills.
B+ 60 to 64.75% Marginal Limited knowledge of the subject matter,
irrelevant use of materials and poor critical and
analytical skills.
B 55 to 59.75% Poor Poor comprehension of the subject matter; poor
critical and analytical skills and marginal use of
the relevant materials.
B- 50 to 54.75% Pass “Pass” in a pass-fail course. “P” indicative of at
least the basic understanding of the subject
matter.
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Online sources can be classified as reliable, unreliable, and outright bogus. Therefore, caution must
be exercised before relying on online resources. Academic journals are reliable for arguments
whereas newspapers and magazines might exhaust their utility beyond facts. Websites such as
Wikipedia are not always reliable. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a credible online
resource for conceptual debates on law, language, interpretivism and meaning. Students should
always consult with the instructors about the veracity and authenticity of a particular website and
its suitability for researching topics covered in this syllabus.
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PART III
A. Keyword Syllabus:
Statutory Interpretation, Making Sense, Coherence, Truth, Meaning, Intent, Discretion, Bias,
Consequences of Interpretation, Hermeneutic Circle, Web of Beliefs, Part and Whole Dynamic,
Aharon Barak, Originalism, Separation of Powers, Statutory Purpose, Golden Rule, Constitutional
Interpretation, Mischief Rule, Ronald Dworkin, Ejusdem Generis, Presumptions, Internal Aids,
External Aids, Foreign Precedents, Disagreement in Interpretation, Chain Novel, Definitions,
Provisos, Practical Reasoning, William Eskridge, Comparative Borrowing
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All faculty members are requested to refer students with any of the above-mentioned conditions
to the Disability Support Committee for getting them disability-related accommodation. Faculty
members are also requested to be sensitive to the needs of such students and cooperate with the
Disability Support Committee and the School, extending students the necessary support by
maintaining utmost confidentiality of the matter.
D. Course Communication
The course instructor will be available to meet with students during office hours, which are
between 6.00PM- 8.00PM on Mondays. Please feel free to email the instructor to schedule
meetings to discuss issues related to the course. Mention your batch and section in all emails
addressed to the instructor. If getting in touch by email, please note that we will try to respond
within two business days.
Students should check the course One Drive on a regular basis, as items such as the following
may be posted throughout the year: additional tutorial readings, grading rubrics for essays, further
instructions for assignments, notifications of any changes in lecture or tutorial schedules, etc.
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E. Weekly Course Outline
Week 9 Presumptions
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PART IV: Detailed Readings
Essential Readings:
Case Discussion from Chapter 5 of Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire – Elmer’s Case,
Snail Darter’s Case and McLoughlin Case.
Andrew Morisson Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything,44
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 649 (Spring 2013).
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer debate the Constitution (15 May, 2012)
Questions:
1. What is meant by ‘interpretation’?
2. Is there a difference between interpretation of ‘statutes’ and ‘law’?
3. Do we have the same ideas about how we should be interpreting statutes?
4. How do Scalia J. and Breyer J. justify their positions on resolving disputes of interpreting
statutes? What are their criteria/tools to resolving such disputes?
5. Why does A. Stumpff argue that law in many senses is fractal? What is a fractal?
6. Based on the readings, what are some ways to think about ‘rule-specificity’?
7. Is the role of judges and ideas about justice relevant in the exercise of interpretation?
8. What is Dworkin’s critique of legal pragmatism? and what is the relevance of chain novel
in interpretation?
Essential Readings:
Paul Armstrong, The Conflict of Interpretations and the Limits of Pluralism, PMLA, Volume
98, No. 3, (May 1983), pp 341-52.
Arie Rosen, Statutory Interpretation and the Many Virtues of Legislation, Oxford Journalof
Legal Studies, (2017) 37 (1), pp 134-62.
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Questions:
1. Is there such a thing as one true or correct meaning of any written text?
2. What do radical relativists and monists say on one true or correct meaning of any written
text?
3. How should one deal with disagreements in interpretation? Is there a workable set of criteria
for legitimizing divergent interpretations?
4. Whether dissenting opinions have any value?
5. How does P. Armstrong respond to the question of disagreements in interpretation, utility
and futility of dialogue?
6. What are the different approaches/frameworks to statutory interpretation that give deference
to statutes?
7. Why is A. Rosen making a case for a correctness-oriented approach? What standards does he
give for ‘correctness’? Do you think there are problems with his approach?
Essential Reading:
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9, No 1, (The Politics of
Interpretation), September 1982, pp 179-200.
Further Reading:
William Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 3,
pp 609-81.
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Ronald Dworkin, Is There Truth in Interpretation? Law, Literature and History (22
December 2013).
Discussion: The Evolution of Basic Structure Doctrine and Substantive Due Process in Indian
Constitutional Law
Questions:
1. Why do we need to find the true and correct meaning in interpretation of law? Are the existing
frameworks meeting this objective?
2. What are the principles Dworkin lays down to address complexities that arise in interpretation
of the text of the statute and lawmakers’ intention?
WEEK 5: Judges and Judicial reasoning and Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes
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Essential Readings:
William Eskridge Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,Yale
Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, January, 1990
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. Hist. 33 (1994).
F u rt he r Reading:
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 'Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes' (1950) 3
Vand L Rev 470
Questions:
1. How do theories of statutory interpretation restrict judicial and administrative discretion?
2. Which one ofthese theories provides the most satisfactory account of discretion?
Essential Reading:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 64-120 (15th ed. 2022)
F u rt he r Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 44-45, 137-152 (2006
edition)
Illustrative cases:
Literal Rule
- B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, (1979) 1 SCC 361
- Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1325
- Motipur Zamindary Co. (Private) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660
- State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed, (1977) 2 SCC 246
Golden Rule
- Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61
- G. Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
- S.R. Batra & Anr. v. Smt. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 (overruled)
Mischief Rule and Purposive Interpretation
- Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7
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- R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628
- Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 30-236 (5th ed. 2010). Some of the
illustrative cases are also mentioned here.
Illustrative cases:
Statute must be read as a whole
- Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing
Co., AIR 1962 SC 1536
- Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369
- Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274
Rule of harmonious construction
- Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044
A statute must be construed to make it effective and workable/ Presumption of constitutional
validity/ Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
- Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666
- Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
- Khemka & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) 2 SCC 22
- Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444
Noscitur a sociis
- State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610
- Pandit Ram Narain v. State of UP, AIR 1957 SC 18
- Raghubans Narain Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 465
- State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad AIR 1967 SC 903
- Gammon India Ltd. v. UOI (1974) 1 SCC 596
- Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Savoy Hotel Ltd., (1966) 2 All ER 299
- Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordan, (1976) 3 All ER 775
Ejusdem generis
- Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (1989) 2SCC 458
- Hamdard Dawakhana v. UOI, AIR 1965 SC 1167
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- Smt Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521
- Attorney General v. Brown, (1920) 1 KB 773
WEEK 9: Presumptions
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 237-331 (5th ed. 2010)
Retrospective Operation of statutes will be discussed using GP Singh’s textbook.
Additional Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 44-45, 137-152 (2006
edition)
Illustrative cases:
Words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely
- Mayor, Councillors & Burgesses ... v. Taranaki Electric Power Board, AIR 1933 PC 216
Mens Rea is generally required for a criminal act
- Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. State, AIR 1951 SC 204
- Sarjoo Prasad v. State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 631
- Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881
Vested Rights are not taken away without express words, necessary implication or
compensation.
- Gordhan Das Baldev v Governor-General in Council, AIR 1952 Punj 103
Retrospective operation
- Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, J&K Industries Ltd., (1989) 3 SCC 448
Statutes are not intended to be inconsistent with international law
- ADM, Jabalpur v. Shiva Kant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521
The legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions
- Nalinakhya v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, AIR 1953 SC 148
- G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
Presumptions relating to jurisdiction of courts
- Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, (1960) AC 260 (HL)
Legislature knows the existing law and does not intend to alter it except by express
enactment
- Abdur Rahim v. Mahomad Barkat Ali, AIR 1928 PC 16
Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient and unreasonable
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WEEK 10: Internal Aids to Construction
Internal aids include Title, Preamble, Headings, Marginal notes, Punctuation, Illustrations,
Definitions, Proviso, Explanation, Schedule
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 121-170 (15thedition 2022)
Illustrative Cases:
Preamble
- Keshavananda Bharti v State of Kerala 1973 (4) SCC 225
Non obstante clause
- Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A Irani, AIR 1954 SC 596 (S.3 DoI Act, 1939)
- P.E.K. Kalliani Amma v. K Devi, (1996) 4 SCC 76 (Ss. 16, 11 of HMA,1955)
Legal fiction
- Dargah Committee, Ajmer v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 574 (Ss. 93,222(4) Ajmer
Merwara Municipalities Reg, 1925)
- CIT, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroff, AIR 1963 SC 1448 (S.24B(1) of Income Tax Act,
1922)
Mandatory and directory provisions (may and shall)
- T.V. Usman v. Food Inspector, (1994) 1 SCC 754
Conjunctive and disjunctive words (or, and)
- Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v. Dept. of Trade & Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 97 (HL)
- R v. Oakes, (1959) 2 All ER 92
This part of the course will discuss some of the external aids that may be used to aid interpretation
of a statute as listed below.
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15thedition 2022)
Sujit Choudhry, Globalisation in Search of Justification: Towards a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 74 (3), 1999
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Illustrative cases:
Parliamentary history
- Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2007(6) Bom CR 294
Legislative history
- Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3
Historical facts and surrounding circumstances
Later social, political, scientific, and economic developments
Dictionaries
- Motipur Zamindary Co. Pvt Ltd v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 660
Foreign decisions
- MV Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433
- Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. 1955 AIR 558
Reference to other statutes (Statutes in pari materia)
- Thiru Manickam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 1 SCC 199
Effect of Usage and Practice; Contemporanea Expositio
- N. Suresh Nathan v. UOI, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 584
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation 637-712 (15th edition 2022)
BB Pande, Limits on Objective Liability for Murder, JILI, Vol 16 (4), 1974, pp 469-482.
Essential reading:
Upendra Baxi, “The Travails of Stare Decisis in India”, in Legal Change: Essays in
honour of Julius Stone (A.R. Blackshield ed.)
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