POLICYBRIEF

REDEEM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN UGANDA BY TAKLING

THE POLITICAL QUESTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For many poor countries, especially in Africa, decision-making and Multiple agencies and taskforces have been created in the name of
policy formulation appear to be the easier job. Moving from policy monitoring government programs, improving service delivery, fighting
making to policy execution and providing public goods and services is poverty and graft and ensuring accountability of public resources. The
the tougher task. Many African countries, including Uganda, have made cost implication of these institutional changes outweighs the benefits to
modest but significant advances in entrenching participatory politics, the nation e.g. Local media reports indicate that President Museveni has
election management and institutionalizing the power to make close to 100 advisers whose monthly wage bill amounts to about 3
decisions. However, there has been little progress in attaining billion in addition to other benefits and privileges like cars, armed
socioeconomic transformation and improving the material conditions of security personnel and office costs. The many posts, bodies and
the majority poor. Indeed some indicators of Uganda’ economy display agencies created seem to have created more inefficiency, avenues of
improvement, though, the improvements do not tally with the actual, influence peddling and bribe solicitation, more red tapes; and enabled
lived conditions of the wider Ugandan society. Many observers have theft. Despite the inefficiency in service delivery the people who work
lamented the poor record of policy implementation in a robust and in these agencies are paid their monthly salaries and allowances.
thorough manner as the key reason for the continued dire socioeconomic
conditions of Ugandans. Why has the modest progress in
institutionalizing decision-making power and producing excellent
policies not matched with the capacity to execute policies? What can be METHODOLOGY
done to redeem policy implementation? This policy brief attempts to
provide alternatives to this question.
These policy recommendations are based on a comprehensive review of
This Policy brief proposes the following policy options: the various documents relating to the political economy of Uganda and
the policy implementation practices worldwide. The policy
          implementation in Uganda was compared to that of Ghana, Rwanda,
      Ethiopia and thereafter lessons were drawn. The brief is also informed
by views and ideas developed during the public policy dialogue held on
         17th March 2014 under the auspices of Uganda Development Policy
 Management Forum-held at Uganda Management Institute.

       

      

RECOMMENDATIONS

THE RATIONALE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE

INCENTIVE SYSTEM THAT REWARDS Adopt a developmentalist route as opposed to cooptation and
PERFORMANCE patronage

Regimes that fail to attain legitimacy through cooptation and patronage

stand a higher risk of losing power power. In Uganda the ruling regime
Politicians do not necessarily behave out of good will and has engaged in the politics of “broad-base” which inevitably has
well-intentions; they respond to the challenges they face by deploying reintroduced the old modes of rule where political legitimacy is
strategies that assure their hold to state power. As such any ruling regime achieved through elite political inclusion and cooptation at the expense
will create position, institutions/structures, policies and strategies to of all-round socioeconomic transformation.There are examples of
bring elite political power brokers on board rather than building capacity co-optation such as the implementation of NAADS through private
to execute critical government programs and transform the country. For service provision which saw co-optation of elite extension workers.
instance the incumbent ruling government has created a number of Supervision and monitoring the implementation of government policies
cabinet positions, Presidential Advisers and Assistants. Numerous by the Resident District Administrators-elites and politicians co-opted
constitutional bodies under the agenda of curbing corruption have been to oversee implementation of government business.
set up.
POLICYBRIEF
In the end programmes are not effectively implemented or corrective Capacity building for policy implementation
actions are not undertaken for the benefit of the poor. The other
alternative to winning legitimacy could have been attempting a Limited capacity is a major cause or effect of a number of prevailing
developmentalist route that has worked in the late industrializers and challenges including poor coordination, poor staff motivation,
developers of Southeast Asia, the so called Asian Tigers. Therefore corruption, donor dependence, limited citizen participation and
government needs to focus on building systems that ensure a degree of involvement and limited evaluation of policies/ programs (Box 1,
state autonomy that shields the state from particularistic and selfish capacity gaps). Limited capacity of policy makers, implementers and
interests of individuals and groups of individuals. Government need to users render implementation ineffective. Government needs to increase
create and manages a system that balances various interests and seeks to capacity of citizens to participate and engage development processes
appeal and appease different sections of the private sector and society through the popular participation avenues such as “Barazas”. Localizing
generally. This is important for Uganda that requires neoclassical policy implementation for greater policy outcomes needs reorienting
“trickle-down” approach to transform society and accelerate economic technical staff at local government level in local economic development.
growth and development. Government needs to pursue targeted Systematically handle the coordination and institutional overlap issues
manipulation of the productive forces, especially financial resources, that thwart policy implementation. Build capacity in policy making,
and deploying them for the sole purpose of propelling sustained growth implementation and monitoring and evaluation among the young
and accelerated development. Government needs to gather its political generation through schools.
muscles towards a single-minded pursuit of accelerated development.

Adopt the Performance based rule orientation

Despite the existence of decentralization, the power to execute decisions

in Uganda is weakly institutionalized and open to particularistic interests
Box 1: Capacity bottlenecks
of individual political players, civil servants and economic elites.
Limited powers to execute decisions leaves fertile ground for grand
There are weaknesses in priotization and target settings
corruption, exposes the public sector to systemic inefficiency and
institutionalized incompetence. This is because of the consistent pursuit
Budgets are not well aligned with national priorities
of patronage politics or neo-patrimonial rule which has no incentive
system that rewards excellent performance and punishes
Poor coordination and cooperation between
non-performance. Deriving legitimacy to rule from patronage rather
government agencies and limited appreciation of the
than from provision of critical public goods and services for the wider
value of strategic coordination.
public creates a network of elite supporters and their followers who
profiteer from the system but at the same time it creates a culture of none
Overlaps in institutional mandate (institutional
accountability among public servants who are in charge of policy
conflict).
implementation. Therefore government needs break through the yoke of
patronage. Shift its orientation to focus on performance based rule for
The motivation of staff is low due to low salaries
long term legitimacy and institutionalization of powers to implement
leading to poor attitude
policy. Create positive incentive systems for those who deliver services
to the communities and punish those who are ineffective. This increases
Civil servants have competence gaps in management
levels of accountability not through the ritual of elections but through
and are not innovative
scrutiny and public ownership of public policies.
Acts of corruption are evident in Uganda’s civil
Make corruption a high risk and low-reward activity
services that hurt service delivery and limited value for
money.
One of the challenges facing policy implementation is when the
implementers know what is to be done but choose to selfishly do nothing
Government is highly dependent on donor funding
and or miss use the resources allocated for implementation. It is
which is unpredictable and hence impact negatively on
estimated that corruption that has become both ‘pervasive and
budget execution.
institutionalized’ robs approximately 7.5% of the annual national
budget. Therefore two policy alternatives are available for policy
Limited participation of citizens in policy
makers. First, corruption must be shifted from being a low-risk, high
implementation and monitoring
reward activity to a high-risk, low-reward activity. This can only be
attained through deploying a sophisticated state agency with the
The missing evaluation component imply that there is
capacity to go after the “big fish.” It has to start with the legalframework.
limited understanding of why policies fail. Reference
But even more importantly, there is need for something akin to
was made to the liberation and privatization policies
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau, totally shielded
that are yet to be evaluated though could have realized
from politicians and economic lobbyists. Second, the myriad policy
negative consequences along implementation.
monitoring agencies, anti-corruption bodies, government commissions,
parliamentary committees and presidential initiatives should be
consolidated into few and focused robust institutions founded on
meritocracy and not ethno-regional balancing or short-term political
calculations. The fewer the agencies and bodies that impose red-tape, the
fewer the opportunities of using public office for personal gain.
POLICYBRIEF
Policy education aimed at making policies relevant to users Lindemann, S. (2011). “Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma
of Unproductive Peace: a Zambian Case Study,”  
Policy implementation in Uganda has so many stakeholders including
 Vol. 32, No. 10.
researchers, politicians, consumers-the public (internal and external
publics to the policy), development workers, technocrats and many
more. These stakeholders always have different levels of understanding Mkandawire, T. (2001). “Thinking About Development State in
of specific government policies. Policy has meaning to each of the Africa,”     Vol 25, No. 3.
stakeholders and the policy will bring in force both negative and positive
incentives for stakeholders, who will react by resisting or embracing the Mwanguhya, C. (2013). “Museveni’s 98 Advisors,” 
policy. Government should make it a requirement that every approved  October 27, Kampala.
policy should have an education programme, a mechanism that includes
leaders, media, and champions of policy among the users. Use already
existing decentralized mechanism of public servants to transfer the Mwenda, A. M. (2007). “Personalizing Power in Uganda,” 
information. Use of ICT in popularizing the policy, SMS, TV, and radio  , Vol. 18.
should be encouraged to mobilize people to implement the policy.
Policy education messages should be scrutinized to avoid politicizing Plummer, J. (Ed). (2012).    
the policy or promising what the policy may not do.       Washington DC: The
World Bank.

CONCLUSION Posner, D. N. and Daniel J. Y. (2007). “The Institutionalization of

Political Power in Africa,”    Vol. 18, No. 3.

The path of popular, participatory and ultimately patronage politics Rubongoya, J. B. (2007).    
currently undertaken by Uganda will continue to yield little   , New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
socioeconomic progress unless the country moves to a stage where
participation and performance can converge.
Tripp, A. M. (2010). ’      
  Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

READING LIST
Young, C. (2012).        
  Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Bayart, J. (2009).          Press.
(Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Booth, D. and Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2012). “Developmental

READING LIST
Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda,”  , Vol. No.
444. No.111.

Moses Khisa - Department of Political Science, Northwestern

Gerschenkron, A. (1962).    
University, Chicago
, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Sansa Mugyenyi - Director of Coordination of Public Policy

Joseph, R. (1987).      
implementation
        (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Victoria Ssekitoleko - Former Minister of Agriculture, Uganda - OPM

Kaaya, S. K. (2014). “Museveni’s 100 Advisors Revealed,” 

UDMPF Steering Committee Members – William Kaberuka, Yasin
 January 6, Kampala.
Olum, Wilson Mande, Sam Ibanda, Opio Lukone, Ndebesa
Mwambustya, Rose Namara, Sylvester Kugonza & Gerald Karyaija,
Khisa, M. (2013). “The Making of the Informal State in Uganda,”
Alfred Kiiza, Stella Kyohairwe, and Christine Rebecca Mubiru.
     

Besigye, K. (1999). “An Insider’s View of How NRM Lost the

‘Broad-base,’”  , November 7, Kampala.

Kuteesa, F., Tumusiime-Mutebile, E., Whitworth, A. and

Williamson, T. (Eds). (2010). ’  
     
POLICYBRIEF

                 
        