17.

TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS IN A METRO RAILWAY

17.1 ROLE OF SIGNALLING IN A RAILWAY SYSTEM:

Role of Signalling in any kind of Railway System be it a Main Line System or a Suburban
System or a Metro System, is to enable Safe & Speedy Movements of Trains.

Basic Principles followed in Designing of a Signalling System on a Railway are

enumerated below:

(i) No Compromise on Safety:

The Design of the Signalling System is to be essentially based on Fail-

safe Principle.

This would mean that each and every Apparatus, Component, Circuit and
Sub-system employed in the Signalling System shall be so designed that
a Failure occurring in any of its Component or Sub-system shall result in
a Safe side Failure of the System, as a whole.

(ii) Emphasis on Reliability, Availability, Maintainability &

Serviceability:

This would call for:

(a) Modular Approach in Design and Incorporation of Redundant

Modules / Systems.
 (b) Incorporation of Facility to record the Log of Events for
adequate Time duration to facilitate the Monitoring and
Predictive Maintenance.

(iii) Compatible with Traffic Demand:

Would dictate the type of Signalling to be provided and quantum of

Tolerance available for Manual Intervention. For Example, on a very
Heavy Traffic Density Section:

(a) The Signalling System has to essentially incorporate Fleet

(Automatic) Mode of Control at Stations and Automatic
Block Signalling in the Block sections.
(b) Inclusion of Dual Track Vacancy Detection System (say,
AFTCs & Digital Axle Counters working in parallel) in Block
Sections to afford for very high Availability of the System.

(iv) Seamless Integration with all other associated Systems e.g. Integration of
Station Signalling with Block Signalling & Telecommunication Systems
and with Passenger Information Display Systems (PIDS) provided for the
Benefits of Travelling Public.

(v) Incorporation of Protection Features for minimizing Interference from the

Traction Power Supply System and the Traction Propulsion System.

Principle listed at (i) above (No Compromise on Safety) is Sacrosanct in the Design of
any Signalling System. However, the way this Fail-safe Feature is incorporated, differ on
the type and quantum of Traffic to be dealt with.

Table 11.1 provides for the distinct Features of the two types of Rail Traffic obtainable
on Main Lines and Suburban / Metro Rails. These Features shall be the additional
governing Factors for the type of Signalling System to be provided on Metro Railway or
for that matter on a Main Line Railway.

Item of Comparison Main Line Railway Metro Railway

Average Speed. 50 to 75 Kmph. 30 to 35 Kmph.

Headway. In Minutes. In seconds.

5 to 7 Minutes on a Busy Of the order of 90 to 120

section. Seconds. On Conventional
Suburban section, the
Headway to be achieved
could be of the order of 180
Seconds (3 Minutes).

Inter Station 6 to 10 Kms. 0.8 to 1.5 Kms.

Distance.
Braking Distance of 800 m to 1.5 Kms. 200 to 300 m.
the Rolling Stock.

Station Yard Layouts. Simple & Complex. Simple Yard Layout.

Simple Layout on Main Line Way Stations mostly shall

Sections also shall have a not have any Points barring
number of Directional / a very few (one or Two on
Common Reception / entire controlled Section of
Departure Lines and Facilities 30 to 40 Kms.) to take care
incorporated for undertaking of certain unforeseen
Shunting Movements. situations. Even Terminal
Station Layouts shall be
significantly Simple as
compared to Simple Station
Layouts of Main Line
Railway.

Response Time / Typical 30 Seconds to 2 Typical 5 Seconds.

Operation Time of Minutes.
Route Setting /
Signal Clearance.

Stoppage Time at 2 to 5 Minutes. 20 to 30 Seconds.

Stations.
At Terminal Stations, when the Time of little higher order say
same Rake is required to be 60 to 90 Seconds or so at
reversed, this Time could be Terminal Stations (Some
up to 2 to 3 Hours or even additional Time required for
more. Rake Reversal).

Distance between Block Sections of 6 to 10 Kms. 50 to 100 m or even less.

two trains. in case of Absolute Block
System of Train Working and 1
to 1.5 Kms. in the case of
Automatic Block System.
 Distinct Features of Rail Traffic obtainable on Main
Lines and Suburban / Metro Rails

Table 11.1

As seen from the above Comparison, the Headway Requirement in a Metro System is
significantly smaller as compared to that required on a Main Line Railway or even on a
conventional Suburban Railway Section and hence Aids to be provided to Drivers shall
play an important Role in deciding the kind of Signalling and type of Train Control
System to be provided on a Metro. While Automatic Train Protection (ATP) System,
preferably with Cab Signalling, and ATS (Automatic Train Supervision) shall be the
prime Requirements for a Metro System, the Safety Objectives could, perhaps, be met
with simple Provision of Spot based Train Protection & Warning System (TPWS) or
Automatic Warning System (AWS) on a Main Line Railway. If the Headway
Requirements for the Metro are envisaged as 90 seconds or so then the Provision of
Automatic Train Operation (ATO) System and Cab Signalling shall become inescapable.

Requirements of Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability & Serviceability to be catered

for on a Metro Railway would demand Incorporation of Hot Standby Systems and
Feasibility of On-line replacement of PCBs / Modules. There shall also be a greater need
of seamless Interfacing of Signalling Systems of a Metro with Telecommunication
Systems and Passenger Information Display Systems (PIDS) to meet the Information
Requirements of the Commuter Traffic. This is because any disruption in Train Services
shall have to be automatically conveyed to the Commuters by way of Visual Displays
and Announcements in an On Line & Real Time manner.

17.2 REQUIREMENTS OF TRAIN CONTROL & SIGNALLING SYSTEM

(TCSS) ON A METRO RAILWAY:

In a Metro System, the Requirements of Headway to meet the Traffic Demands being
too stringent, Automation of the Signalling System to provide Continuous Automatic
Train Control (CATC) shall be the prime need.

Design Headway shall be of the order of 90 to 120 Seconds, as required, to meet the
Traffic Demands.

17.3 CONSTITUTING SUB-SYSTEMS OF TRAIN CONTROL &

SIGNALLING SYSTEM OF A METRO RAILWAY:

The Train Control & Signalling System for the Metro System shall comprise of following
Sub-subsystems:

(i) Automatic Train Protection (ATP) System with Cab Signalling. The
Track to Train communication shall be through Joint less Coded Audio
Frequency Track circuits (AFTCs).

(ii) Automatic Train Operation (ATO) System.

(iii) Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) System with Automatic Route

Setting (ARS) and Automatic Train Regulation (ATR).
(iv) Computer Based Interlocking (CBI) at Stations and in the
Maintenance Depots.

(v) Emergency Communication System.

While Automatic Train Protection (ATP) Sub-System & Automatic Train Supervision
(ATS) Sub-system shall be the essential for the Metro Signalling System, ATO may be
Optional. Provision of ATO shall, however, be inescapable if Headway Requirement of
90 Seconds or so is contemplated.

Train Control & Signalling Systems shall permit Manual Mode of Working viz. ‘Run on
Site (ROS)’ & ‘Cut-out’ Modes, to cater for the failure situations of CATC System. Line
side fixed Signals shall be provided for this purpose, in addition to Cab Signalling. Speed
in these Modes shall, however, be limited to 25 Kmph.

Mobile Train Radio Communication (MTRC) System shall be provided to enable the
Train Driver to contact Operations Control Centre (OCC) / Station Control Room (SCR)
in case of Emergency. The Train Radio System shall also interface with Train Control
and Signalling System to enable it to report the Alarm and Status of the Train-borne
Signalling Equipment to the OCC and for dynamic Registration of Train Identification
Number (TID) with the System.

Figure 17.1 shows the Block Schematic of a CATC System.

17.4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION (ATP) SUB-SYSTEM:

The ATP Sub-system shall be the Hub to ensure Safety of Train Operations. This
System shall perform the following Functions:

(i) Detect the exact position of Train continuously.

(ii) Transfer the Information from the Track to Train about the position
of the Train ahead.

(iii) Measure the Speed of the Train and Control its Speed in
accordance with the position of the Train ahead.

(iv) Calculate and display Maximum Permissible Speed depending

upon Target Speed / Distance, Characteristics of the Train and Terrain.

(v) Cause Brake Application, if the Train Speed exceeds the Safe
Speed.

(vi) Detect ‘Roll Back’ of the Train and cause Brake Application in
such a contingency.

(vii) Ensure that the Train Deceleration Rate used for Braking is
reached within specified time of Service Brake Application otherwise
Application of Emergency Brakes should take place.
(viii) Provide Cab Signals and needed Displays for the Driver.

(ix) Entering, Monitoring and Cancelling Speed Restriction Sections.

(x) Enable Train Doors Opening on Platform side when the Train is
Docked.

(xi) Prevent the Train from Starting if the Doors are detected ‘Not
Closed’.

17.5 AUTOMATIC TRAIN OPERATION (ATO) SUB-SYSTEM:

The ATO System shall include the following Functions:

(i) Regulation of Speed.

(ii) Accurate Station Stops.

(iii) Execution of Signal Stops.

(iv) Operate within the Parameters set by ATS Sub-system.

(v) Automatic Re-start / Advice from Station / Signal Stops.

(vi) Indication to Train Operator to Open / Close Doors.

(vii) Automatic Announcements in Trains for Next Station.

17.6 AUTOMATIC TRAIN SUPERVISION (ATS) SUB-SYSTEM:

The ATS Sub-system shall provide overall control of Operations from the Operations
Control Centre (OCC) and shall include the following Functions:

(i) Train Dispatching, as per the approved Time Schedules.

(ii) Adjustment of Station Dwell Time, to regulate Traffic under

disruptions.

(iii) Provision of Outputs to Platform Indicators and / or other

Passenger / Management Information Media.

(iv) Commands to Station Interlockings.

(v) Computation of Train Schedules & Train Time Tables.

(vi) Monitoring of Train Position and Progress.

(vii) Display of Train Service Status to Traffic Controller.

(viii) Logging and Compilation of Events / Records.

(ix) Execution of Instructions received from the Traffic Controller (For

example, Station Skip, keep Doors Closed, Train Hold etc.).

(x) Interface to PAS / PIDS and Train Radio.

17.7 COMPUTER BASED INTERLOCKING (CBI):

The Main Function of Interlocking System shall be to provide the requisite Interlocking,
Control and Indication Functions as also support all the feasible Train Movements in the
Yard. The CBI shall be based on Entry-Exit System and shall have separate Controls,
upon Operation of which the Trains will be allowed to operate in Reverse Direction
except at Terminals and Turn-back Stations. The System shall interface with CATC
System.

The Interlocking System shall ensure that:

(i) Conflicting Routes can not be set.

(ii) Points are only moved, when all the Safety Conditions are met.

(iii) Signals only clear to a Proceed Aspect, when all the Safety Conditions
are fulfilled.

(iv) The System is Fail-safe and Failures shall not provoke an Unsafe
situation. Under Failure conditions, Signals shall display a Stop Aspect
and Points shall not be moved and shall remain in their last operated
position.

The Routes may be set in either Normal Mode or Automatic (Fleet) Mode. Fleet Mode
shall be applicable to Routes with Points setting restricted to Normal (Straight) position
only.

In Normal Operation, the Route shall be released by the Train movement, if the Route is
not set in the Fleet Mode. However, it shall be possible for an Operator to release the
Route with a specific Local / Remote Control, as per the Requirements of Operations as
also to meet the Emergent situations.

The Interlocking System, on receipt of a Route Remote Control from the Local ATS (the
Command either originated from the Central ATS (CATS) or the Local ATS itself (LATS),
shall permit to:

(i) Control and Lock the Points to the position required by the Route.

(ii) Set up the Route.

(iii) Lock the Sub-routes of the Route.

(iv) Lock the Route.

(v) Set Direction of Traffic (DOT).

(vi) Authorise the Route.

(vii) Set the Aspect of the Signal, at the origin of the Route, to ‘PROCEED’
Aspect.

Control-cum-Indication Panel (Domino type) with Panel Processor having Stand-by

Processor and / or a Control Terminal with VDU Display consisting of a Colour VDU
Monitor, a Keyboard & Mouse or Digitiser be provided to allow Trains to be controlled on
the Section, in case of failure of the ATS System.

17.8 Additional Features Needed to be Incorporated in Computer

Based Interlockings (CBIs) on Stations of a Metro Railway:

The Interlocking System on Stations of Metro Railway shall essentially be of Solid State
type and Computer based. Besides the usual Interlocking Functions of Route Setting,
Route Locking, Clearance of Signals and Automatic Sequential Release of Route after
the passage of Train on the envisaged Route, the Interlockings to be provided at Metro
Stations shall have to be equipped with following additional Features:

(i) The System shall interface with Continuous Automatic Train Control
(CATC) System.

(ii) Provision of Automatic Route Setting (ARS) in conjunction with Automatic

Train Supervision (ATS) System.

ATS shall have two Components Local ATS (LATS) and Centralized ATS
(CATS).

The Automatic and Manual Routes Setting shall be normally requested by

the CATS or by the LATS System if the Communications between the
LATS, the CATS and the CBI are available. In the negative, all the
Controls shall be realised in the Station from the Control cum Indication
Panel (CCIP) and / or a Control Terminal with VDU Display in the Station
Control Room (SCR).

When the links with the LATS are lost, an Emergency Switch on the
Control cum Indication Panel (CCIP) and / or a Control Terminal with
VDU Display shall transfer the Control of the Panel to CATS.

The transfer of Control from Central (CATS) to Local (LATS) Control or

from LATS to the Control cum Indication Panel and / or a Control
Terminal with VDU Display or vice versa shall not release any Locking
viz. Route Locking, Traffic Direction Setting, Point Locking and Approach
Locking, etc.

(ii) Provision of Fleet Mode of Control:

Facility of Setting of Fleet Mode of Control shall be available in all

Interlockings.
 Under Fleet Mode of Route Control / Setting, the Route does not get
released after the passage of Train and instead gets automatically set
again and again after the passage of the Train over the Route until the
this Mode of Control is withdrawn.

Fleet Mode setting is a kind of Permanent Mode setting.

Train Operated Route Release (TORR) does not cause the Route to be
Reset in this Mode of Route Control.

(iii) Cycle Setting & Un-setting:

A ‘Cycle Setting Control’ received from the ATS or the Control cum
Indication Panel / Control Terminal shall set a pre-determined Cycle of
Operations in the Interlocking. The Cycle can be simple (Control of two
Routes) or combined (Control of Multiple Routes alternately with a
preferential first Route).

This Control shall enable a series of Routes to be set sequentially in order

to perform Automatic Reversal of Trains within Terminal Stations and at
Stations with Turn-back facilities.

When the Interlocking receives such a Control, the Cycle will be set in the
Interlocking, if the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) The Routes of the Cycle must not be Blocked.

(b) The Points in the Cycle must not be Blocked.

(c) The Maintenance Block for the Cycle Routes is not Set.

(d) All Conflicting Routes to the Cycle that is being controlled

are Un-set and the considered Route Locking Sections are
free.

Conflicting Routes to the Cycle are the Routes that are

Conflicting to at least one of the Routes that are covered
by the considered Cycle

(e) All Routes covered by the Cycle are Un-set.

(f) All Conflicting Cycles to the Cycle that is being controlled

are Un-set

(g) The Overlaps in conflicting with the Cycle Routes are in

Released Status.

Route Setting by the Cycle:

A Route is Set by the Cycle when:

(a) The Route is not already Set.

(b) The Cycle is Set.,

(c) The Berthing Track circuit (s) of this Route are occupied.

(d) The Destination Track circuit of this Route is free.

(e) All other Interlocking constraints on the Route are free:

** All Points in path of the Route or for

providing Flank / Isolation Protection are set
in the correct position or are free to move.

** All conflicting Routes are not set.

** The Route locking Section (s) are not

locked in the opposite direction of the
considered Route.

** The requisite Overlap is free.

** The Route is not Blocked.

** The Maintenance Block for the Route is not

Set.

** No conflicting Cycle to the considered

Route is Set.

Cycle Un-setting:

A given Cycle will be Un-set in the Interlocking only upon a ‘Cycle

Cancellation Control’ received from the ATS or the Control cum Indication
Panel / Control Terminal.

When the Interlocking receives such a Control, the considered Cycle is

immediately cancelled. No verification need to be carried out as the
Safety of the Movements in progress shall be based upon usual Route
Locking functions - Approach Locking, Sectional Locking, TORR etc.
 If the Cycle Cancellation Control is received by the Interlocking when a
Train is turning around upon the considered Cycle, then the Interlocking
shall immediately reset the memorisation of the considered Cycle and any
further Automatic Route Controls related to this Cycle shall be stopped.
However, any Route that is set for the considered Cycle shall remain Set
until a Train runs on the considered Route or the Route is manually
cancelled.

If the Controller controls the Cancellation of a Route that is Set and that
belongs to a particular Cycle then the latter shall be Un-set immediately.

(iv) Emergency Stop Plunger (ESP):

At Stations, Emergency Stop Plungers shall be provided to prevent the

Traffic entering the specified sections of the Track. The Operation of any
one Plunger shall initiate a restrictive ATP Stopping Point on the
approach and forbid the movement of the Train beyond the Platform for a
distance of one Train length.

Emergency Stop Plungers shall be located in each Station, on the

Platform (Two Plungers per Platform - one for Track 1 and other for Track
2), and two Plungers in the SCR - one for Track 1 and the other for Track
2.

When one of ESPs from Track 1 or 2 is pressed:

(a) An Audible and Visual Alarm is generated in the OCC and

SCR with Indication of the specific Track.

(b) Trains of the Track 1 or 2 are prevented from entering or

leaving the Emergency Stop Area in ATO or ATP Modes.

It shall be possible to reset the Plungers by means of a Key.

(v) Traffic Direction:

Turn-back Tracks shall be required for Reversal of Traffic Direction.

Turn-back Tracks are characterised by the following:

(a) A Turn-back Track may cover one or several Tracks

circuits.

(b) A Turn-back Track does not include any Point.

Setting up of Traffic Direction:

The Traffic Direction is permissive Information and its set State is
memorised by the Interlocking. The Interlocking provides to the ATC
System, for each section of Track, the vital information of the Set Traffic
Direction.

Traffic Direction Variables shall Set and Un-set as follows:

(a) When a Route is set then all Traffic Direction Variables

between the Route Entrance Signal and the Route Exit
Signal shall be set.

(b) Any given Traffic Direction Variable that is Set shall Un-set
when the associated Route Locking section releases.

(c) All the Traffic Direction Variables within an Interlocking

shall also Un-set upon start-up of the Interlocking,
irrespective of the State of the associated Route Locking
sections.

Traffic Direction Reversal:

Traffic Direction Reversal will be possible without performing any specific

Controls only if appropriate Route Signals exist on either side of Turn-
back Track or a Route Signal exists on one side of the Turn-back Track
and a Fixed Red Signal on its opposite side.

The Release of the Set Traffic Direction shall be made possible if a Route
Control Command in the opposite Direction is received from the ATS or
from the Interlocking itself when a Cycle is Set in the Interlocking.

One Timer shall be used for each Turn-back Track. The Time-out for the
Timer shall be 45 - 60 sec. This Value shall be programmable.

The Timer shall be started and stopped as follows:

(a) The Timer shall be started if a Direction is set, Turn-back

Track is occupied and the Track circuit immediately
preceding to the Turn-back Track is clear.

(b) The Timer shall be stopped and reset if the Turn-back

Track clears or if the Track circuit immediately preceding to
the Turn-back Track is occupied or when the Traffic
Direction Reversal actually takes place.

For reversing the Traffic Direction, the Interlocking shall carry out the
following processing:
 (a) If the Interlocking has received a Command from the LATS
to set the succeeding Route in the currently established
Direction of Traffic or if such a setting has been
automatically controlled in the Interlocking by specifying
the relevant Cycle in the Interlocking then if all the
conditions for Route Locking are satisfied then the
succeeding Route shall be set.

(b) If the succeeding Route sets then the Interlocking shall

prove that the following conditions are met before Traffic
Direction Reversal actually takes place:

** Traffic Direction is Set.

** The Timer associated to the Turn-back

Track has timed out.

(c) If all the above conditions are met then the Interlocking
shall Release the current Traffic Direction, Reset and Stop
the Timer and Set the Reverse Traffic Direction.

In a case of Train reversing Operation, the Turn-back Track section (s),

though may get physically cleared, shall remain logically occupied for
want of sequence control for their release. An in-built Command shall,
therefore, be provided in the System to simulate the necessary Controls
for their Logical Release.

17.9 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF A TRAIN CONTROL &

SIGNALLING SYSTEM:

The Train Control & Signalling System shall be based on Fail-safe Computers and
Safety-critical Software. The System shall be configured with Fibre Optic Transmission
System (FOTS) based WAN as the backbone of transmission of both vital and non-vital
information between CBIs and Trackside ATP equipments. The Track side Systems
shall be connected to the Central ATS (CATS) System at the Operation Control Centre
(OCC) again through the FOTS for performing the function of Supervision and
Regulation of Traffic on the line.

17.9.1 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION (ATP) SYSTEM:

ATP is a Vital Safety System of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) ‘4’ and is made up of a
number of Sub-systems which maintain the Safety of Train Operation including the
Separation of Trains, Enforcement of Speed Restrictions, and Safe Operation through
Interlockings.

The Interlocking and associated Sub-systems cater for the Route Protection Functions.

Track circuits are used by the Interlocking for the Track Vacancy Detection and in a
specific Variant of ATP System for the Data Transmission from Track to Train as well.
ATP System has two main Components – the Train-borne & Trackside. Important
Functions performed by these two Components in case of a typical variant of the ATP
System, the ‘Distance-to-Go’ type, are as under:

ATP On-board Equipment:

Functions of ATP On-board Equipment, in brief, are as under:

(i) Reception of Signal and Line Information from the Wayside Units (ATP
Wayside equipments, Beacons and Loops).

(ii) Track Related Speed Profile Generation:

The On-board Equipment continuously goes on computing the requisite

Track related Speed Profiles (Normal Working Profile, Full Service
Braking Profile & Emergency Braking Profile) from the Line Data and
Train Data as the Train moves along the Track.

Based on the Dynamic Track related Speed Profiles, the ATP System
monitors and enforces the changes in the Target Distance / Target
Speed, thus maintaining a safe Distance between Trains.

For maintaining Safety in Train Operations, the System automatically

initiates Braking when the Safety Limits are exceeded.

Automatic Braking of the Train is also initiated in the event of Missing or

Incorrect Information from the Wayside Equipment or a fault in On-board
Equipment.

(iii) Outputting the Basic Data for the Cab Display:

(a) Signalling Mode, namely RM, ROS, ATP, and ATO.

(b) Available Mode: Cut-out, RM, ROS, ATP, and ATO.
(c) Actual Speed.
(d) Target Distance & Speed.
(e) Advisory Speed.
(f) Advisory Warning Speed.
(g) Advisory Warning Speed Alarm.
(h) Warning for Over-speed.
(i) Full Service Braking Triggered.
(j) Emergency Braking Triggered.
(k) Station Braking Announcement.
(l) Not Docked, Manual Adjusting Required.
(m) Door Opening Right or Left.
(n) Door Closed.
(o) Train on Hold.
(p) Departure Requested.
(q) Immediate Departure Requested.
(r) Dwell Time Countdown.
(s) Keep Doors Closed.
 (t) Skip Station.
(u) Locked Axle.
(v) Alarm and Status Indications.

(v) Stopping Point Monitoring:

The System regards the Stopping Point as a Fail-Safe Stopping Point

with the Target Speed of 0 Kmph. The Stopping Point Monitoring
Function ensures that a Train does not run into the Hazard Point located
beyond. Monitoring of Train Stop in the Target Area of a Station ensures
that scheduled Trains stop at Stations.

The Train is supervised to stop within the Stopping Window (- 0.7 m to +

1.0 m) for Train Door Opening Authorisation.

(vi) Opening of Doors:

Releasing Doors on the correct side at Stations when the Train has come
to a Stop within the Stopping Window (- 0.7 m to + 1.0 m).

(vii) Closing of Doors:

The System ensures that no movement of Train is possible until all Train
Doors are detected Closed & Locked. Loss of Door Closed Signal causes
the ATP System to initiate a Brake Application.

(viii) Monitoring of Speed Restriction Sections:

The System ensures that the Train observes the permitted speed within
the Speed Restriction Section until the Tail end of the Train has passed
the end Point of the Section.

(ix) Monitoring Direction of Travel and Backward Rolling:

The unauthorised Reverse movement of Train is prevented by the

application of Emergency Brakes after a pre-determined Distance.

ATP Way side Equipment:

Functions of ATP Way side Equipment are as under:

(i) Storage of Line Parameters like Line Gradient, Curve, Track section
length, Civil Speed Restriction Sections, Temporary Speed Restriction
Sections, and Station Stopping Points etc.

(ii) Generation and Transmission of necessary Data in Fail-Safe manner to

the On-board Equipment for the Safe Train Movement.
In Execution of its functions, ATP interfaces with external Sub-systems such as CBI,
various Train-borne Equipment, ATS & ATO Sub-systems and Driver’s MMI etc.

Figure 17.2 illustrates above Interfaces of ATP System.

17.9.2 VARIANTS OF AVAILABLE AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION

(ATP) SYSTEMS:

Following are the three different Implementations of Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
System:

(i) Fixed Block ATP System.

(ii) Distance-to-Go ATP System.
(iii) Moving Block ATP System.

Fixed Block ATP System:

Block Schematic of a Fixed Block ATP System is shown in Figure 17.9. As seen from
the Figure in this version of ATP, there shall be two Red Signals protecting a Train and
an unoccupied Overlap Block between the two Trains – Train ‘1’ & Train ‘2’ to provide for
the full Safe Braking Distance.  Though the Figure 17.9 shows the Block Signals on the
Line side, many ATP equipped Systems may not have Visible Line side Signals as in
those Systems, the Signal Indications are transmitted directly to the Driver’s Cab
Console.

Each Block carries a Speed Code.  Speed Code corresponds to the Speed permitted in
that Block. If the Train tries to enter a Zero Speed Block or if it enters a section at a
Speed higher than that authorised by the Speed Code, the On-board Computer shall
cause an Emergency Brake Application.  Victoria Line of the London Underground
System is equipped with the Fixed Block ATP System. The System provided is a simple
System with only three Speed Codes - Normal, Caution and Stop (Figure 17.10). 

A modern version of Fixed Block ATP provides for two pieces of Information for the On-
board Computer, about the State of the Line ahead – (a) What Speed can it do in this
Block ? and (b) What Speed must it be doing by the time it enters the next Block?  This
Speed Data is picked up by Antenna on the Train.  The Data is coded by the Track side
electronic equipment and transmitted from the Rails to the Train. The Code Data
consists of two parts, the authorised Speed Code for this Block and the Target Speed
Code for the next Block.  The Figure 17.11 shows how this works.

A Train (Train ‘2’) in Block A5 approaching Signal A4 will receive a 40 over 40 Code
(40/40) to indicate a Permitted Speed of 40 Kmph in this Block and a Target Speed of 40
Kmph for the next.   However, when it enters Block A4, the Code will change to 40/25
because the Target Speed must be 25 Kmph when the Train enters the next Block A3. 
When the Train enters Block A3, the Code changes again to 25/0 because the next
Block (A2) is the Overlap Block and is the Forbidden Territory. Speed, therefore, must
be zero by the time Train reaches the end of Block A3.  If the Train attempts to enter
Block A2, the On-board Computer will detect the Zero Speed Code (0/0) and will cause
an Emergency Brake Application.  As mentioned above, Block A2 is acting as the
Overlap or Safe Braking Distance behind the Train (Train ‘1’) occupying the Block A1.
Fixed Block ATP System is suitable for handling Traffic Density Levels ‘Medium to Low’.

Operations with Fixed Block ATP System:

Trains operating over a line equipped with ATP can be manually or automatically driven.
To allow manual driving, the ATP Codes are displayed to the Driver on a Panel in his
Cab.  In the Example shown in Figure 17.12, Driver would begin Braking somewhere
around the Brake Point (‘#’) because he would see the 40/25 Code on his Display and
would know, from his knowledge of the Line, where he will have to stop.  If Signals are
not provided, the Signal Positions may be indicated by Trackside Block Marker Boards
to show the Drivers the entrances to Blocks.

If the Train is installed with Automatic Driving (ATO - Automatic Train Operation), Brake
Initiation for the reduced Target Speed can be by either a Track mounted Electronic
‘Patch’ or ‘Beacon’ placed at the Brake Initiation Point or, more simply, by the change in
the Coded Track circuit. Both Systems are used by different Manufacturers but, in both,
the Train passes through a series of ‘Speed Steps’ to the Signalled Stop.

Distance-to-Go ATP System:

Drawback in the Fixed Block ATP System is the space lost by the Empty Overlap Block
behind each Train.  If this could be eliminated, the Line Capacity could be significantly
increased, depending on the Block Lengths and Line Speed.  In the Figure 17.13, the
Train in Block A1 causes a series of Speed Reduction Steps behind it so that, if a
following Train enters Block A6, it will get a reduced Target Speed.  As it continues
towards the Zero Speed Block A2, it gets a further Target Speed Reduction at each new
Block until it stops at the end of Block A3.  It will stop before entering Block A2, the
Overlap Block.  This Braking Curve is shown as the Braking Curve ‘1’.

To remove the Overlap section, it is simply a question of moving the above Braking
Curve forward by one Block.  The Train will now be able to proceed at Normal Speed a
Block closer (A5 instead of A6) to the Occupied Block, before it gets a Target Speed
Reduction.  However, to get this close to the Occupied Block requires accurate and
constant checking of the Braking by the Train. The On-board Computer calculates the
Braking Curve required, based on the ‘Distance to Go’ to the Stopping Point and using a
Line Map contained in the On-board Computer’s Memory.  The New Curve is shown as
‘Distance to Go’ Braking Curve.  A Safety Margin of 25 m or so is allowed for error so
that the Train will always stop before it reaches the critical boundary between Blocks A2
and A1.  Note that the Braking Curve should reduce (or flare out’) at the final Stopping
Point in order to give the Passengers a comfortable stop.

Speed Monitoring:

Both the older, ‘Speed Step’ Method and ‘Distance-to-Go’ Method require the Train
speed to be monitored.   In Figure 17.13, we can see the Braking Curve ‘1’ of the Speed
Step System always remains inside the Profile of the Speed Steps.  The Train’s ATP
equipment only monitors the Train’s Speed against the Permitted Speed limit within that
Block.   If the Train goes above that Speed, an Emergency Brake Application will be
invoked. The Braking Curve ‘1’, as such, is not monitored. 
In the ‘Distance-to-Go’ System, the Braking Curve is monitored continuously so that the
Speed Steps become unnecessary.  When it enters the first Block with a Speed
Restriction in the Code, the Train is also told how far ahead the Stopping Point is.   The
On-board Computer knows where the Train is now, using the Line Map embedded in its
Memory, and it calculates the required Braking Curve accordingly.  As the Train brakes,
the Computer checks the progress down the Curve to check the Train never goes
outside it.  To ensure that the Wheel Revolutions used to count the Train’s progression
along the Line have not drifted due to wear, skidding or sliding, the On-board Map of the
Line is updated regularly during the trip by fixed, Track-mounted Beacons (called
Location Beacons) laid between the Rails.

Distance-to-Go ATP System is suitable for handling High Traffic Density Level.

Operation with Distance-to-Go ATP System:

‘Distance-to-Go’ ATP System has a number of advantages over the Speed Step
System.  It can increase the Line Capacity and can also reduce the number of Track
circuits required, since frequent changes of steps to keep adjusting the Braking Distance
are not needed.   The Blocks are now just the spaces to be occupied by Trains and are
not used as Overlaps as well.  ‘Distance-to-Go’ can be used for Manual Driving as well
as for Automatic Operation.

Systems may vary in configuration but usually, several Curves are provided for the Train
Braking Profile.  Figure 17.14 shows three: One is the Normal Braking Curve within
which the Train should brake, the second is a Warning Braking Curve, which provides a
Warning to the Driver (a Service Brake Application Alarm) and the third is the
Emergency Braking Curve which will force an Emergency Brake if the Driver does not
reduce Speed to within the Normal Braking Curve.

Moving Block ATP System:

As the Signalling Technology has developed, there have been many Refinements to the
Block System but, in recent years, the Emphasis has been on attempts to get rid of
Fixed Blocks altogether.  Getting rid of Fixed Blocks has the advantage that we can vary
the distances between Trains according to their Actual Speeds and according to their
Speeds in relation to each other.  It’s rather like applying the Freeway (Highway) Rules
for Speed Separation. One does not need to be a Full Speed Braking Distance from the
Car in front because that Car won’t stop dead.  If the following Car is moving at the same
Speed as the Car ahead, the second Car, in theory, can travel immediately behind the
first Car and, when the first Car brakes, the second Car also does the Braking.  If a few
metres are allowed for Reaction Time to the Brake Lights and Variations in Braking
Performance of the First Car, the System should work well.  
In the Figure 17.15, as long as each Train is travelling at the same Speed as the one in
front and they all have the same Braking Capabilities, they can, in theory, run as close
together as a few metres.  Allowing some room for Reaction Time and small errors and
Trains could run as close together, say as 50 m or so.  In practical Implementation,
however, it is essential to maintain a Safe Braking Distance between Trains at all times.
The System so implemented is termed as Moving Block ATP System. The Block
Locations and Lengths in this System are in consonance with Train Locations and
Speeds, i.e.  the Blocks are Movable rather than Fixed.  This flexibility usually requires
Radio Transmission, sometimes called Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) or
Transmission Based Signalling (TBS) rather than Track circuit Transmission, to detect
the Location, Speed and Direction of Trains and to tell the Trains their Permitted
Operating Speed.

Moving Block and Radio Transmission:

On a Moving Block equipped ATP, the Line is usually divided into Areas or Regions,
each Area under the control of a Computer and each with its own Radio Transmission
System.  Each Train transmits its Identity, Location, Direction and Speed to the Area
Computer which makes the necessary calculations for Safe Train Separation and
transmits this to the following Train (Figure 17.16).

The Radio Link between each Train and the Area Computer is continuous so the
Computer knows the Location of all the Trains in its Area all the time.  It transmits to
each Train the location of the Train in front and gives it a Braking Curve to enable it to
stop before it reaches that Train.  In effect, it is a dynamic ‘Distance-to-Go’ System. 

One Fixed Block Feature has been retained - the requirement for a Full Speed Braking
Distance between Trains.  This ensures that, if the Radio Link is lost, the latest Data
retained On-board will cause the following Train to stop before it reaches the preceding
Train.  

In a Moving Block System, each Train also confirms its own position on the Ground from
Beacons, located at Intervals along the Track, which recalibrate the Train’s position
compared with the On-board Computerised Line Map (Figure 17.16).  

Transferring a Train from one Area to another is also carried out by using the Radio
Links and, additionally by a Link between the two adjacent Area Computers.  The Areas
overlap each other so, when a Train first reaches the boundary of a new Area, the
Computer of the first Area contacts the Computer of the second Area and alerts it to
listen for the new Train’s Signal.  It also tells the Train to change its Radio Codes to
match the new Area.  When the new Area picks up the ID of the Train it acknowledges
the handover from the first Area and the Transfer is complete.

Another version of the Moving Block System has the Location Computers on the Trains. 
Each Train knows where it is in relation to all the other Trains and sets its Safe Speeds
using this Data.  It has the advantage that there is less wayside equipment required than
with the Area Computer System but the amount of Transmissions is much greater.

Moving Block ATP System is used for handling Very High Level of Traffic Density.
Moving Block System, besides catering for Very High Levels of Traffic Density offers
following distinct advantages in comparison over other two Systems:

(i) Moving Block System with Radio Transmission requires less Wayside
Equipment than the Fixed Block & Distance-to-Go Systems. Reduced
Wayside Equipment leads to reduced Installation & Maintenance Costs.

(ii) Better Reliability and quicker Fault Location is possible with the Moving
Block Technology. 

Comparative Analysis:

Comparative Analysis of the three Variants of ATP Systems viz. Fixed Block, Distance-
to-Go & Moving Block in respect of the built-in Protective Features and Capacity for
handling Low / Medium / High Traffic Density Levels is given in following Table:

Types Minimum Train Separation Traffic Density

Fixed Block Always one Block in between Medium to Low

two occupied Blocks.

Refer to Figure 17.17.

Distance-to-Go Head of Train is at fixed Safety High

Distance from occupied Block
ahead.

Refer to Figure 17.18.

Moving Block Head of Train is at a fixed Safety Very High

Distance from Tail of the Train
ahead.

Refer to Figure 17.19.

 Characteristics of different Variants of ATP System

Table 17.4

METHODOLOGIES USED FOR DATA TRANSMISSION BETWEEN

TRACK SIDE & ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT OF AN AUTOMATIC TRAIN
PROTECTION (ATP) SYSTEM:

Data Transmission between Track side & On-board Equipment of an Automatic Train
Protection (ATP) System can be handled in two ways:

(i) Using Coded Track circuits (Figure 17.20).

(ii) Using Beacons (Figure 17.21).

The System using Coded Track circuits is known as the ‘Continuous’ Transmission
System because Data is passing to the Train all the time.  However, it does have its
limitations.  There are Transmission Losses over longer Blocks and this reduces the
effective length of a Track circuit to about 350 m.  The Equipment is also expensive and
vulnerable to bad weather, electronic interference, damage, vandalism and theft.  To
overcome some of these drawbacks, a solution using Intermittent Transmission of Data
is employed.  It uses Electronic Beacons placed at Intervals along the Track.

In a typical System employing Beacons for Data Transmission (Figure 17.21), there are
two Beacons, a Location Beacon to tell the Train where it is and a Signalling Beacon to
give the Status of the Sections ahead.  The Beacons are sometimes referred to as
‘Balises’.  Data Processing and the other ATP Functions are similar to the Continuous
Transmission System.

The Operation of Beacon System is shown in Figures 17.22 to 17.24.

In Figure 17.22, the Beacon for Red Signal A2 is located before Signal A1 to give the
Approaching Train ‘2’ room to stop.  Train ‘2’ will get its Stopping Command here so that
it stops before it reaches the Beacon for Signal A3.

In Figure 17.23, the Train has stopped in front of Signal A2 and will wait until Train ‘1’
clears Block A2 and the Signal changes to Green.

A disadvantage of the above variant of Beacon System is that once a Train has received
a Message indicating a Reduced Speed or Stop, it will retain that Message until it has
passed another Beacon or has stopped.  This means that if the Block ahead is cleared
before Train ‘2’ reaches its Stopping Point and the Signal changes to Green, the Train
will still have the Stop Message and will stop, even though it doesn't have to.  To avoid
the situation of an unnecessary stop, an Intermediate Beacon is provided (Figure
17.24). This updates the Train as it approaches the Stopping Point and will revoke the
Stop Command if the Signal has cleared.  More than one Intermediate Beacon can be
provided, if required.

17.9.3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE & PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION OF A

TYPICAL ATP SYSTEM:
System Architecture:

(i) The Architecture of the ATP Wayside equipment and On-board

equipment is based on Fail-Safe Microcomputers and Safety-critical
Software.

(ii) The Wayside ATP equipment and On-board ATP equipment shall have a
Fault-Tolerant equipment Design using Redundancies or other Design
Features to ensure that a High Level of Train Service is maintained in the
presence of Single Point Failure and also ensure achievement of the
Availability, as specified. Availability is enhanced by employing
Redundant Systems.

(iii) The wayside ATP equipment and On-board ATP equipment are
configured in a Fail-Safe arrangement with suitable Redundancies
conforming to Safety Integrity Level ‘4’ (SIL - 4), as defined in CENELEC
Standard EN50129.

(iv) Wayside ATP equipment:

(a) Single Electronic Structure based on Reactive Fail-Safety

with Diverse Software and On-line & Hot Stand-by
Configuration, or
(b) Dual or Triple Electronic Structure based on Composite
Fail-Safety with Fail-Safe Comparison (2 out of 2 or 2 out
of 3) and Common or Diverse Software.

On-board ATP equipment:

(a) Single Electronic Structure based on Reactive Fail-Safety

with Diverse Software and On-line & Hot Stand-by
Configuration, or
(b) Dual Electronic Structure based on Composite Fail-Safety
with Fail-Safe Comparison (2 out of 2 or 2 out of 3) and
Common or Diverse Software.

Figures 17.3 & 17.4 provide the Block Schematics for ‘2-out-of-2’ and ‘2-
out-of-3’ Configurations.
 In a typical ‘2-out-of-2’ Configuration (Figure 17.3), two independent,
Instruction-synchronised and Identically Programmed Microcomputers
with the same Structure are used. The Process Data is read into each
Channel in Parallel and processed synchronously. The Statuses after
sequences of Process Steps and the Test and Output Data generated
during the Process Steps are checked to ensure that they are the same.
Two Comparators, which are independent of each other and of the
Microcomputers, permit the Output to the Process if the Information from
two Computers tallies. If the Comparators detect an error, either one can
initiate a safety Shut down of the System. The Design of the System
ensures that a Shut down always blocks the Process and a Fail-safe
State is reached.

In a ‘2-out-of-2’ Configuration, the Outputs of both the Channels are used

in series.

In a ‘2-out-of-3’ Arrangement, an additional 3rd Microcomputer with

additional Comparators, as shown in Figure 17.4, are used. The 3rd
Microcomputer is actively involved in Operation. The Processing Results
of two of the three Computer Channels must be the same. Only then do
the Output Instructions become effective. If the result from one of the
three Computer Channels differs from the other two, this Channel is shut
down. Following the Shut down of a Computer Channel, a ‘2-out-of-3’
configured System shall continue to operate as a Fail-safe ‘2-out-of-2’
Machine.

In a ‘2-out-of-3’ Configuration, out of 3 Channels, Outputs of any 2

Channels (1&2 or 2&3 or 1&3) are used in series with the help of a
Logical Series-Parallel Circuit Combination.

As also explained above, a ‘2-out-of-3’ Configuration, in comparison to ‘2-

out-of-2’, provides for high-availability of the System as a ‘2-out-of-3’
configured System can continue to operate without any reduction in
Safety or Functional impairment in the event of a failure of one of the
three Microcomputers.

(v) Redundancy for the On-board ATP Equipment is catered for to provide
for Enhanced Availability. It can be done in either the same Cab or
between the Front and Rear Cabs so that the failure of one On-board
ATP equipment does not prevent the Train from being run in Revenue
Service. There will be Dynamic Data Exchange between the two Units
either in the same Cab or in the Front and Rear Cabs, with Automatic
Changeover without Driver’s Intervention in the event of failure of one
Unit with an Indication in the Cab.

(vi) Software:

The Software of the On-board and Track side ATP equipment comprises
of:
 (a) System Programs for the internal working of the
Microcomputers and the Communication between them,
providing Fail-safe processing of all Data.
(b) Application Programs, which implement the Functions
of the ATP System. Application Programs have to be
Modular in Structure and required to be approved for Fail-
safe Operation by an Independent Authority. The
associated Compiler is also needed to be checked to
ensure its error-free Operation and Validated by an
Independent Authority.

Principle of Operation:

Refer to Figure 17.5 for the Block Schematic of the ATP System, which illustrates the
constituting Components / Sub-systems and their inter-relationship.

The ATP Trackside Units extract Driving Instructions from the Data of the Interlocking &
Track Vacancy Detection System and from the Planning Data and transmit it to the ATP
On-board Unit. Driving Instructions in the Distance-to-Go ATP System consist of Target
Coordinates – the Target Distance & Target Speed, the Maximum permitted Line Speed
and the Line Gradient.

The On-board ATP System has the Information of the Train Data (Characteristics of the
Rolling Stock) & Route Map in the form of Invariants, stored in its Memory. Armed with
the State of Route and Movement Authority in the form of Variants (Status of Track
circuits, Route Set, Points etc) as received from Trackside Units, the On-board ATP
calculates the Speed-Distance Profile with Supervision to a fixed Target Point.

The Speed-Distance Profile is computed continuously along the Line, enabling a

minimum safety Distance to be maintained between the two Trains.

The Actual Speed of the Train and Distance covered are continuously measured with the
aid of Odometer Pulse Generators (OPG).

If the Train exceeds the permitted Speed at the current position, the ATP On-borne Unit
initiates irrevocable application of Emergency Brakes, after issuing a Warning, which
brings the Train to a Stop before the Emergency Brakes are released and Service can
be continued ahead.

Figure 17.6 shows a Speed-Distance Profile governing the Movement of Trains in a

‘Distance-to-Go’ ATP System.
On Delhi Metro, the Automatic Application of Brakes in the event of over speeding or
protecting the Target Point (which could also be the Station Stopping Point) has been
implemented in two Levels. The first level of Intervention by the System is through the
Application of Service Brakes with the Option of Release of Service Brakes by the Driver
when the Actual Speed of the Train is brought below the Maximum Safe Speed.
Application of Emergency Brakes is the second Level of Intervention when it is
anticipated that the Application of Full Service Brakes (FSB) shall not be in a position to
bring the Train to halt before the Target Point. Figure 17.7 shows the three Speed-
Distance Profiles. Profile ‘I’ refers to the Normal Behaviour of the Driver wherein Driver’s
Braking (based on the Indications on the MMI) brings the Train to Stop at the ‘Point to
Protect’, which happens to be in rear of the Signalling Stop Point (the Danger Point) by a
Margin called ‘Safety Margin. Profile ‘II’ refers to the Full Service Braking Curve and
Profile ‘III’ to the Emergency Braking Curve.

Track-to-Train Transmission:

On Delhi Metro, Track-to-Train Transmission of Data (Called Telegrams) is

accomplished using Coded Audio Frequency Track circuits (AFTCs). Once a Track
circuit is occupied, a Level-controlled Changeover Switch (CS) switches from Modulation
with AFTC Bit Patterns to Modulation with ATC Telegrams (Transmitter Keying). The
ATC Telegrams are transmitted to the Train via the Running Rails. Once the Track
section is Clear again, it switches back to Modulation with AFTC Bit Patterns (Figure
17.8).

17.9.4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN OPERATION (ATO) SYSTEM:

ATO (Automatic Train Operation) is the non-vital part of Train Operation, related to
Station Stops, Starts and running from Station to Station.

The Functions of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) System are:

(i) Automatic Control of Train running from Station to Station (without the
Intervention of Train Driver), while remaining within the Safety Envelope
calculated by the ATP. The ATO System generates the Speed Control to
the Traction and Braking System of the Train with respect to the
computed Speed Profile. The System ensures that the Train achieves
timely, accurate and smooth Station Stops or stops ahead of a Restrictive
Point.

(ii) Automatic Opening of Train Doors during Station Stops under the
Supervision of the ATP System, without the Intervention of Train Driver.

(iii) Automatic Closing of Train Doors after the lapse of Station Dwell Time
under the Supervision of the ATS System, again without the Intervention
of Train Driver.

Implementation of Doors Opening / Closing Function is at variant in Delhi Metro. Closing

of the Doors in Delhi Metro is activated by the Driver, on receipt of a Command from the
ATS System to leave the Station. When the Doors are closed, the Train Driver starts the
Train. The ATO System then operates the Train to the next Station.
Depending upon the Configuration of the ATO System, following Functions can also be
included in the gambit of ATO System:

(i) Transmission of Train Data (Train Identification) to the ATS System.

(ii) Control, in conjunction with ATS System, of Dwell Times in accordance

with the Time Table / Headway.

(iii) Supplying Information for a Passenger Information System (PIS),

comprising of PIDS & PAS.

(iv) Controlling Driver-less Reversal at Terminals or at pre-determined

intermediate Points on the Section.

Station Stopping by ATO:

ATO System tells the Train approaching a Station where to stop so that the complete
Train is in the Platform.  This is assuming that the ATP has confirmed that the Line is
Clear.  The Sequence of Station Stopping operates as shown in Figure 17.25.

The Train approaches the Station under Clear Signals to do a normal run in.  When it
reaches the first Beacon - either a Looped Cable or a fixed Transponder, a Station Brake
Command is received by the Train. The On-board Computer calculates the Braking
Curve to enable it to stop at the correct point and, as the Train runs in towards the
Platform, the Curve is updated a number of times (it varies from System to System) to
ensure Accuracy of Stop.

London’s Victoria Line, has up to 13 points checking for the Train Speed as it brakes into
a Station. This high number of Checks is needed because the On-board Braking Control
gives only three fixed Rates of Deceleration.  Even then, Stopping Accuracy obtainable
is ± 2 m.   Modern Metro Systems require less wayside Checking because of the
Dynamic and more accurate On-board Braking Curve calculations.  Modern Installations
can achieve ± 0.15 m Stopping Accuracy, which is 14 times better than achievable on
London’s Victoria Line.

Operation (Opening & Closing) of Doors:

The ATO caters for correct Docking of the Train at Platform as explained above.  

When the Train has stopped, it verifies that its Brakes are applied and checks that it has
stopped within the Door Enabling Loops (Figure 17.26).  These Loops verify the position
of the Train relative to the Platform and which side the Doors should open.  Once all this
is complete, the ATO will open the Doors. 

After a set time, predetermined or varied by the Control Centre as required, the ATO will
close the Doors and automatically restart the Train if the Door Closed Proving Circuit is
complete.  ATO will then accelerate the Train to its Cruising Speed, allow it to coast to
the next Station Brake Command Beacon and then brake into the next Station,
assuming no Intervention by the ATP System.
In some Systems like that in Delhi Metro, the Job of Opening and Closing the Train
Doors at a Station and restarting the Train when all Doors are detected Closed is
entrusted to the Driver.  Such Systems are, however, designed to prevent Doors being
opened until the Train is ‘Docked’ in the right place. 

OPERATIONAL MODES OF TRAINS ON A METRO RAILWAY:

Following are the possible Operational Modes of Trains on a Metro Railway, equipped
with Automatic Train Control (ATC) System, encompassing Automatic Train Protection
(ATP) System, Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) System and Automatic Train
Operation (ATO) System:

(i) ATO Mode:

Normal Mode of Operation is ATO, where ATO System is functional. In

this Mode, the Trains shall operate automatically between Stations, while
remaining within the Safety Envelope calculated and enforced by the ATP
and open its Doors at the next Station.

(ii) ATP Mode:

This Mode is the usual Mode where ATO is not provided. This Mode is
also used when ATO fails in case the ATO has been provided on the
section.

In this Mode, the Train Driver shall operate the Train manually.
Indications shall be provided in the Cab of the Train with On-board
Displays for Maximum Safe Speed (MSS), Current Speed, Target
Distance / Speed as deduced from the most restricting ATP condition and
the Signalling Mode etc. Interlockings shall establish and protect the Set
Route. The Braking Curve shall be computed continuously along the Line
and acted upon so as to enable a minimum Safety Distance (Safety
Margin in Figure 17.6) to be maintained.

The Computation of the Braking Curve is based on Line Characteristics

as well as the Parameters of the Train with Dynamic Monitoring and
Enforcement of the change of Target Distance & Speed. The Maximum
Speed shown in the Cab shall be enforced by the ATP Equipment. The
ATP Equipment shall also indicate which side Doors may be opened
when a Train enters a Station. The ATP Equipment shall not allow the
Doors to be opened on the wrong side, unless an Emergency Override
Control is activated.

ATP Mode is only possible when the Mode Selector is in the ATP
Position.

(iii) Cut-out Mode:

The Cut-out Mode shall be used when the On-board ATP Equipment or
both the On-board ATO & On-board ATP equipment fail.
 In the Cut-out Mode, Line side Signals are used to provide Information to
the Train Driver that the Route is Clear to the next Interlocking.
Accordingly, the Train Driver shall operate from Interlocking to
Interlocking following the Aspects of the Line side Signals. In this Mode,
the Train Driver shall operate the Train at a maximum of 25 Kmph and
this Speed Enforcement shall be ensured by On-board Rolling Stock
Equipment.

(iv) RM (Restricted Manual) Mode (Special Mode in Depot Area):

RM Mode allows running a Train under the sole Responsibility of the

Driver. It is used:

(a) Immediately after unlocking the Cab and pressing the ROS
Button inside the Depot Area (ATP Supervision not
possible).
(b) To drive the Train within the Depot (No Trackside ATP
Equipment).

ROS Mode is available in all positions of the Mode Selector depending

upon the location of the Train.

Immediately after unlocking the Cab and pressing the ROS Button, the
Train can be run under RM Mode. In case of Emergency Brake because
of the Speed Limit, the driver can release the Emergency Brake by
pressing the ROS Button.

(v) ROS (Run on Sight) Mode:

ROS Mode allows running a Train under the sole Responsibility of the
Driver. It is used:

(a) Immediately after unlocking the Cab and pressing the ROS
Button outside the Depot Area (ATP Supervision not yet
possible).

(b) After Emergency Braking.

(c) To pass Stopping Points or failed Track circuits.

The ATP Train-borne Unit only supervises a constant maximum ROS

Speed, which is 25 Kmph. Beyond 25 Kmph, the Emergency Braking is
triggered by the ATP System. The ATP shall give Cab Signal Indications
as soon as the Train reaches a Track position where Normal Running can
be resumed.

ROS Mode is available in all positions of the Mode Selector depending

upon the location of the Train.
 Immediately after unlocking the Cab and pressing the ROS Button, the
Train can be run under ROS Mode, whereas for running after Emergency
Braking or to force the ATP from ATP Mode into ROS Mode in order to
pass a stopping Point the Driver has to operate the ROS Button at
Standstill.

Mode Selector:

Following are the Positions of the Mode Selector on Sections equipped with ATP
system:

(i) OFF / Reverse / Standby / Forward Positions:

After ‘Switch On’ of the Cab, the ATP starts up and waits in Readiness
Mode until the Driver presses the ROS Button. After pressing the ROS
Button the ATP changes the Mode to RM / ROS depending upon the
Location of Train (Depot / Main Line).

If the Mode Selector is in one of the above named Positions, a change

into ATP Mode will be prevented by the ATP. In any of the above four
named Positions, the Operation Mode can only be RM / ROS.

(ii) ATP Position:

Mode Selector has to be essentially in ATP Position to affect the change

to ATP Mode. The change to ATP Mode shall, however, happen only
when all requisite conditions (Receipt of necessary Telegrams /
Messages from Trackside ATP Unit) are fulfilled.

In ATP Position of the Mode Selector, RM & ROS Modes are also
possible.

A change of the Mode Selector Position is allowed only in Standstill. The Train shall
initiate a Brake when the Driver uses the Mode Selector during the Run.

ROS Button:

ROS Button is used for the following:

(i) After ‘Switching On’ the Cab to allow a change from Readiness to one of
other Modes including ATP, depending upon the conditions.

(ii) To release Emergency Brakes (EB) in Standstill.

(iii) To change from ATP Mode into ROS Mode, for example to drive over a
Stopping Point in front of a failed Track circuit.

Figure 17.27 provides for the different Positions of the Mode Selector and ensuing
changes to the Operational Modes for the Train.
Degradation of Operating Mode:

In the event of failure of ATO, there shall be Automatic graceful Degradation of Mode
from ATO to ATP in a Safe manner such that speed of the Train is brought below the
Maximum Safe Speed of the ATP Mode. In case of failure of ATP, the Degradation to
Rolling Stock Mode (Cut-out Mode) shall not be Automatic. The Train will automatically
come to a Stop and the Driver shall change over to Cut-out Mode by operating a Manual
sealed Switch.

The Train Driver shall also have the facility to place the Train into Manual ATP
Operation, at any time. In this Operation, the Driver shall operate the Train manually with
ATP Enforcement of Speed Restrictions. The ATP System shall also prevent the Train
Driver from opening the Doors unless the Train is properly berthed (within the Stopping
Window) and there is a Platform on the side, he wants to open. In case of emergencies,
however, the Train Driver shall be able to open the Doors at other locations than the
Platforms.

Transfer from ATP to ATO Mode:

Transfer from ATP to ATO back shall only be possible at Standstill, usually at a Station
Stopping Point.

Transitions amongst various Operational Modes of ATP:

Figure 17.28 details all the Transactions between various Operational Modes of the ATP
System as also the circumstances under which these Transitions are affected from one
Mode to the other.

17.9.5 AUTOMATIC TRAIN SUPERVISION (ATS) SYSTEM:

ATS is that Subsystem within the Automatic Train Control System, which monitors the
System Status continuously and provides the appropriate Controls to direct the
Operation of Trains in order to maintain intended Traffic Patterns and minimise the effect
of Train Delays on the Operating Schedule. The System also has the capability to
organize the Train Movements in an optimum manner in case of Abnormalities.

Using Networked Computers and Automated Functions, ATS ensures efficient Rail
Operation, Automatic Monitoring and Control of Interlockings through Automatic Train
Tracking to Automatic Route Setting.

ATS assigns Identification Numbers to Trains and provides all necessary Real Time
Train Information to the Operator.

ATS also caters for Tools for Time Table Generation & Modification as also for the
Management of Signalling Equipment.

Key Functionalities of ATS include:

(i) Automatic Train Tracking and Monitoring.

(ii) Automatic Route Setting (ARS).

(iii) Automatic Train Regulation (ATR).

(iv) Timetable Compilation & Management.

(v) Reporting - Logging and Compilation of Events / Records.

(vi) Driving of the Passenger Information System (i.e. PIDS & PAS).

(vii) Planning Support – Training & Simulation and Archiving Functions.

In Execution of its functions, ATS interfaces with external Sub-systems such as CBI,
ATC, Master Clock, PIDS / PAS, Train Radio and NP-SCADA etc.

17.9.6 System Architecture:

ATS System is divided in a Central and a Local Part, called CATS & LATS. Both are
independent and use Redundant Systems. All ATS Functions are available in both the
Systems. Servers for CATS are located at the Operations Control Centre (OCC) and for
LATS at a number of Strategic Locations on the Section, one LATS Server controlling a
number of contiguous Stations.

In case that both CATS & LATS are not available, VDU provided at the Station provides
for Off-line Operations.

MMIs of the Stations are connected to the COM server of the concerned LATS System.
COM Server runs the specific ATS Functions such as Automatic Route Setting (ARS),
Automatic Train Regulation (ATR) and Train Monitoring & Tracking etc. They provide the
incoming Information and the result of the Automatic Functions to the MMIs.

Interlockings (CBIs) of the Stations are connected to the Central Ethernet LAN via
Redundant FEP Units. Ethernet can be based on the Standard Twisted Pair Cable or
OFC.

Interlockings work in two Modes – Remote Mode through ATS and in Local Mode
through the VDU, the MMI. A Service & Diagnostic (S&D) Computer is provided at all
Interlockings and in the OCC.

A Central Interface Computer connects the ATS with External Systems, such as PIDS,
PAS, NPSCADA and Train Radio.

A Back-up Depot Control System is provided at the Control Centre within the Depot.
Depot ATS need not be equipped with Automatic Train Describer Sub-system for Trains
coming from Main Line.

Depot Controller and Crew Controller Workstations connected to CATS System are
available in the Depot Station.
Crew Controller Work Stations are also provided at each Terminal Station.

Training & Simulation System is located in the OCC as well as in the Depot Station.

Block Schematics of Network Structure in OCC and that of LATS at the Station are
shown in Figures 17.29 & 17.30.

17.9.6.1 User Interface:

The ergonomically designed Train Control Workstation with GUI (Graphical User
Interface) is provided for easy Operation. All Dialogues are pre-programmed and can be
minimized to an Icon for fast Access.

Main principles of the User Interface are:

(i) Graphic Information Representation.

(ii) Multiple Windows Techniques.

(iii) Warning State is displayed immediately. This Indication is made

possible in Audio-visual Form.

(iv) Each Action of the Operator (Operation / Command) has a Reaction

(Display) as a result.

(v) For Operating Sequences which comprise several Single Operations,

Resetting Operations are provided. A Resetting Operation can lead to a
complete or partial withdrawal of the initiated Operation Procedure.

(vi) Possible Operations depend upon the Access Authorisation.

Access Authorisation is provided through the Entry Procedure and

depends upon the Operator’s Name and the Password assigned to him.

Authorisations are usually combined in various User Groups, each Group

having specifically assigned Access Levels.

(vii) Messages for the System are passed to all Workstations, which are
responsible for their Evaluation.

(viii) Dialogues are based on the principle of context-sensitive Operator

guidance. That means that only such Functions are made available to the
Operator during his handling Operations, which are meaningful for the
momentary Situation of the Operation.

(ix) System Operation is through Mouse and / or Key-board. All Key-board

inputs are checked for syntactical correctness on the MMI side.

17.9.6.2 Automatic Train Tracking & Monitoring:

This Function is based on Track Occupied and Signal Messages from the Interlocking.
Supervision of Trains is through the representation of Train Movements on the Visual
Display. Every Train is identified uniquely by its Train Identification Number (TID). The
TID Assignment at the Entry Section can be carried out Manually or Automatically by the
On-line Time Table Management System.

The Train Supervision gets the ‘Track Occupied’ Messages from the Interlockings, which
enable the Section-wise stepping of the Train Identification Number on the Display and
its Indication in the Display Sections.

Train Identification Information is used to update and control the Internal Database.

17.9.6.3 Automatic Route Setting (ARS):

The Automatic Setting of Train Routes releases the Line Controller of regular
Operations. Its Function is to generate Interlocking Commands in order to set Train
Routes based on current Train Locations and issue those Route Commands to the
Interlocking System.

Interlocking Messages and their corresponding Train Identification Number provided by

the ATS triggers the Route Setting. Once the Train Route is determined, the Route
Command is passed on to the corresponding Interlocking.

ARS can also provide for Functions of Automatic Train Reversing (Terminal Mode of
Operation) as well as other Operating Modes for each Route such as Fleet Mode,
Manual Mode and Sequence Mode (Applicable at Terminal Stations only).

17.9.6.4 Automatic Train Regulation (ATR):

ATR performs the Regulation of Train Trips, according to Delays calculated from the
given Time Table.

Other Tasks of ATR are:

(i) To provide the PIDS in the Stations, with the Expected Arrival Times.

(ii) To supply other Systems, for example the Automatic Route Setting
System, with the relevant Data.

(iii) To check the Stopping Points set by ATP and ordering their Cancellation,
if necessary.

Modes of Operation for ATR System:

The ATR offers following Modes of Operation:

(i) Timetable Regulation:

 This is the Default Mode of Operation. Here the ATR Algorithm shall
regulate Trains to minimize the overall Delay according to the Timetable.

In Default Mode, ATR shall change the Dwell Time at the current Station
or the Traveling Time to the next Station and send this Data to the Train,
if a Deviation has been detected. With the received Dwell Time, the Train
MMI shall inform the Driver to close the Train Doors and to depart the
Station in time.

After transmitting the Dwell Time to the Train, ATR starts to decrement
the Dwell Time and send it to the MMIs. If the Dwell Time reaches zero,
the ATR releases the Halt Point. Besides this, a Stopping Point is
released when an Empty Train is approaching a Station or when a Skip
Command is active for a Station.

With the received Traveling Time, the Train MMI shall inform the Driver to
accelerate or slow down the Train.

(ii) Headway Regulation:

ATR Algorithm shall regulate Trains to a selected Headway, aiming to

produce a balanced Headway throughout the Section.

(iii) Manual Regulation:

Here each Train shall be dispatched from the Platform by the Manual
Interference of the Controller.

ATR can also provide for pre-programmed Application / Removal of Temporary Speed
Restrictions (TSRs). Here it shall be possible to specify Days & Times during which the
Speed Restrictions are to be applied / removed.

ATR can be switched off manually.

When the ATR is inactive, the Dwell Times & Traveling Times read from the Timetable
shall not be adjusted based on the Timetable Deviations. The Operator has to enter
Dwell Times & Traveling Times manually, and these values shall be used instead.

In both cases, when the ATR is active or inactive, the Estimated Arrival Times in the
successive Stations are transmitted to the PIDS Process according to the current
Timetable Deviation.

ATR has Interfaces to:

(i) Timetable Comparison.

(ii) ATP via the Central Interface computer.
(iii) Operating Interface on MMI.
(iv) PIDS / PAS.
17.9.6.5 Timetable Compilation & Management:

Timetable Compiler:

It is a Program for Off-line Construction and Validation of Operative Timetables.

Timetable Construction Component is used to build up complete Daily Timetables in a
graphical manner. Using Automated Generation Functions, it shall optimise Vehicle
Schedules and generate an Operative Timetable.

Applying an Event-based Simulator:

(i) The resulting behaviour of the Railway System due to the Constructed
Timetable can be imitated realistically.

(ii) The Operability of the Regular or Alternative Timetables with respect to all
important Technical & Operational Constraints can be verified.

The Simulator can also imitate disturbed Operational Situations.

Timetables can be visualised by Time Distance Graphs, where the Position of a Train,
as a function of Time, is displayed as a continuous Curve.

After Evaluation & Verification, the created Timetables can be exported to the Internal
Database of the ATS System.

Once a Timetable is created and exported to the Running System, an On-line Program
can be used, to modify a Train Schedule, if required. Modifications could be applied
temporarily and when no more needed, the originally imported Timetable can be loaded
again.

Timetable Management:

Timetable Management Function consists of Timetable Comparison, Automatic Train

Regulation and Automatic Route Setting according to the Timetable Data.

Timetable Management works with a Periodic Timetable. This Periodic Timetable

contains Information about the Trains traveling during the defined Traffic Period. Within a
Traffic Period, there are different Operation Days – Monday to Friday, Saturday, Sunday
& Holidays. For every Operation Day, a specific Timetable exists – the Daily Timetable.

An Operation Day is assigned to every Calendar Day in the Traffic Period. The valid
Daily Timetable for a Calendar Day is determined from the Operation Day assigned to it.
The Calendar File (describing the Traffic Period) and the Daily Timetable are stored in
the External Timetable System and on the COM Server. Figure 17.31 shows the
Overview of the Database of Time Table Management (TTM) System.

Using pre-formatted Dialogues, the Operator at the OCC can perform the following
Tasks related to Timetable Management:
(i) Activate a Daily Timetable as Operational Timetable on the COM
Server in OCC for a Day.

(ii) Release the Operation Timetable for On-line Modification, if required

and Activate the Modified Timetable.

(iii) To specify the Timetable to be loaded for the next Day.

Timetable Comparison:

Main Functions of the Timetable Comparison are:

(i) The Timetable Comparison for Trains on the basis of Messages giving
their current Locations.

(ii) Monitor the Delays of Trains.

(iii) Supplying the present Timetable Deviation Information to Automatic

Train Tracking & Monitoring System.

(iv) Triggering the ATR for Regulation of Train Movements.

All Timetable Deviations are archived for the Delay Statistics.

Train Graphs:

The Train Graphs are displayed in Route vs Time Co-ordinate System. The Route Axis
is Horizontal and the Time Axis is Vertical.

Following Configurations for Train Graphs are possible:

(i) Scheduled Trains.

(ii) Running Trains.
(iii) Prediction of Running Trains.
(iv) Multiple Train Graphs (using different Windows).
(v) Details of each Line graph (TID, Crew ID, Deviation etc.).
(vi) Non Timetable / Un-scheduled Movements.

Also different points of Interest on the Graphs can be marked with Overlay Icons. For
Example, in a Train Graph, all the points where the Deviation exceeds certain Limits can
be indicated with a special Icon.

17.9.6.6 Mimic Overview System:

A Mimic Overview Display Panel is provided in the OCC to display the following:

(i) Real Time Train Movements using Track circuits Status.

(ii) Train ID of the Moving Train.

(iii) Position of Points (Locking & Detection) & Status of Routes.

(iv) Status of Track circuits.

(v) Blocking / Unblocking of Points, Routes, Signals and Maintenance

Blocks.

(vi) Cycles in the Terminal Stations and Intermediate Turn-back Station.

(v) Alarms:

(a) Station Equipment Failure - CBI, ATC & Communication

Link etc.

(b) Power Failure (No Power Supply to SER Equipment).

(c) UPS Failure.

(d) Train Ready.

(e) Train Door Status.

The Mimic Display is positioned and so sized such that it presents an unobstructed view
to all Control Room Staff, when seated at their Consoles.

On the Mimic Display, Train Progression is displayed by Train ID in the Train ID Box.
Train ID Box shall be provided at all Platform lines, Sidings and in section between any
two Stations for each line.

Report Server:

A separate Report Server is usually catered for to log all relevant Timetable Data - the
Planned & Actual Arrival Times, Reporting Data – Train Report & Trip Report (Train
Movements & related Events), System Commands, Alarms & Acknowledgements and
Failure Data etc. in a Structured Database.

Each Item logged shall be Date and Time stamped.

The Data Logs can be Retrieved, Filtered, Viewed and Managed for On-line and Off-line
Analysis and for Incident investigation at both OCC as well as Local Station. For this
purpose, Database Specific Structured Query Language (SQL) is used.

Facility of Train-borne Log is also provided to record & retrieve all Train-borne Train
Control and Signalling System Faults.

17.9.7 SIGNALLING FACILITIES REQUIRED IN A MAINTENANCE

DEPOT OF A METRO RAILWAY:

Following Signalling Facilities shall be provided in the Depot:

(i) Signalling for movement of Rakes for various Maintenance facilities within
the Depots and also between non-Interlocked Area to Interlocked Area.

(ii) ATS link having a separate duplicated ATS Server System.

(iii) Transfer Tracks or Cut-in / Cut-out Tracks, of suitable lengths in between

the Depot and Main line, for switching in to and out of RM / ROS Mode
from Normal Operation Modes, while entering or leaving the Depot.

(iv) Test Track to dynamically test the Train-borne ATC System.

17.9.7.1 Depot Signalling:

(i) Movements within the Depots beyond the entrance Interlockings, shall be
controlled by Line side Shunt Signals and Stop Signals.

(ii) Stop Signals shall be provided at the Entry to and Exit from the Depot.

(iii) Position Light type Shunt Signals shall be provided for every Route
leaving the Stabling Lines.

(iv) Signals shall also be provided for movement of Rakes for various
Maintenance facilities within the Depot and also between Non-interlocked
Area and Interlocked Area within the Depot.

(v) The Points shall be operated by 380 V, AC, 3-Phase or 110 V DC

Trailable / non-Trailable Pont Machines. The Points shall be Track
Locked so as to prevent the Point Machines from being operated
whenever a Vehicle is detected to be on the Turnout or within Fouling
Distance of it.

(vi) The Track circuits shall be of Remote-fed AFTC type. For any Stabling
Track that can hold more than one 8-Car Rake, The Track circuits shall
be provided in such a way so as to detect the presence of Rakes
individually.

(vii) Suitable Fail-safe Interface with minimum manual intervention shall be

provided between Depot Interlocking (CBI) and the concerned Main line
Station Interlocking (CBI) to provide for movement of Rakes from / to the
Depot.

(viii) The relevant Track circuit, Signal and Point Indications of the concerned
Main line Station Interlocking shall be made available at the Depot
Interlocking and the relevant Track circuit, Signal and Point Indications of
the Depot Interlocking shall be made available at the concerned Main line
Station Interlocking.
(ix) The Interlocking at the concerned Main line Station shall not allow any
Signal to display ‘Proceed’ Aspect in to the Depot unless the Interlocking
in the Depot has been lined up with a Route. Similarly, the Interlocking at
the Depot shall not allow any Signal to display ‘Proceed’ Aspect in to the
Main line Track, unless the Interlocking at the Main line Station has been
lined up with a Route for exit of a Rake from the Depot.

(x) Change Operating Mode Marker Board shall be provided at the Transfer
Berth from the Running line to the Depots. This is to facilitate the Train
Driver to change to Restricted Manual Mode, prior to entry to the Depot.

(xi) Buffer Stop Signals shall be provided at the ends of the Stabling lines &
Sidings in the Depots. Buffer Stop Signals shall also be provided at both
ends of the Test Track in the Depots.

(xii) The Train Control and Signalling System shall be designed to allow for
the extension of the Depot in future. This shall include consideration of
the Interfaces required for the extension.

(xiii) All movements of equipped Trains in the Depots shall be in RM Mode.

(xiv) ATR shall not be provided in the Depot.

17.9.7.2 ATS for the Depot:

(i) At Depot Control Centre ATS link having a separate duplicated ATS
Server System with a Master Slave configuration shall be provided with
Automatic & Manual switchover of Control. Failure of this ATS Monitoring
& Recording System shall not affect the operation of ATS Monitoring and
Recording System at OCC and vice - versa.

(ii) Time displayed on various Depot ATS Display and Reporting equipment
shall be synchronised with the Master Clock.

(iii) The System shall be protected from unauthorised access by using User
Name & Password protection.

(iv) The System shall comprise a Depot Controller’s Workstation and Crew
Controller’s Workstation, a Dual Server Data Processing System and
Communication link with the OCC ATS System for Control, Indication and
Train Information transfer.

(v) The ATS System at Depot shall continuously present dynamic and static
overview of Train movement & Signalling Information within the Depot
Control Area and for the connecting Tracks to Main line.
(vi) It shall display current status of Track side Signalling equipment,
Signalling Controls, Train description at Arrival and Departure Tracks.
Rake ID, Crew ID and Radio ID of static as well as moving Trains and
Real Time Train movement using Track circuit status etc.

(vii) Track circuit failure or Track circuit ‘Put out of Service’ shall allow the
progression of Train movement to be followed on the Line Overview
Diagram on the Workstation (s) without the loss of Train description using
Train Trekking Algorithm.

(viii) The Depot ATS System shall provide interfacing with the Main line
Signalling Control System for Trains entering and leaving Mainline
Service.

(ix) Rake Number, and Train Consists etc. for each Train / Vehicles leaving
the Depot for Main line Service shall be automatically generated by ATS
System, and the same shall be available in both OCC and Depot ATS
System. The Depot Controller / Crew Controller at the Control screen
shall have the facility of entering the Crew Number for each Train and
Rake ID & Train Consists etc., where required. The System shall permit
at least 10 entries to be kept in advance of Train dispatching.

(x) Train Identification and Train Consists, Crew Number and other Train
details shall be automatically transferred (through Cut-in Track TWC) to
the OCC ATS System for display on the Signalling Control Screen and
the Signalling Line Overview Screen after the Train has entered into the
Main line. When a train is returning to the Depot, a Train Approaching
Alarm shall be raised on the Depot Controller’s Signalling Control Panel.
Train Identification shall be transferred (through Cut-out Track TWC) to
OCC & Depot ATS System for display.

(xi) Provision shall be made for the Depot Controller to:

(a) Interpose, Modify or Cancel Train Identification, Train

description and Train Consists and Crew Number onto the
Trains while it is berthing on the Departure / Arrival Tracks.

(b) Send Message to the Traffic Controller.

(xii) The Depot ATS System shall initiate a Message for the Depot Controller
and sound an Audible Alarm at OCC & Depot each time a Train leaves
the Main line for the Depot or vice-versa. The Audible Alarm shall cease,
when acknowledged.

17.9.7.3 Signalling Control Tests in the Depot:

ATP Tests shall be performed by the Driver on the Stabling lines. After completion of
these Tests, Train shall be signalled to depart to Main line via the Transfer Track, as and
when required. The Train shall receive a train ID on the Transfer Track in the Depot,
which shall be verified by the Train Control System before allowing entry to the Main
line. Only on positive identification of Train ID, the OCC shall line up a Route to enter the
Main line. The Train shall start in the RM / ROS Mode and automatically change over to
ATP / ATO Mode, before entry to Main line.

Depot Test Tracks:

(i) The Test Track shall be equipped with full Trackside ATP / ATO Systems
for Train Tests to be conducted within the limitations of the Test Track
length. Test Track Tests shall be essentially required, whenever certain
modifications - Hardware or Software, are done in the Train-borne
equipment.

(ii) The Depot Test Track shall provide the ability to dynamically Test the
Train-borne System.

(iii) It shall be possible to simulate two Stations, one at each end of the Test
Track.

(iv) The Test Track shall be connected to the Interlocking of the Depot.

(v) The Test Track shall provide the following facilities:

(a) Testing of the Train-borne System.

(b) Checking Calibration of the Speed and Positioning Sub-

systems.

(c) Testing Stopping Accuracy.

(d) Testing of the Transmission and Reception of Signals

between Trackside and Train-borne equipment and vice-
versa.

(e) Testing of the Train Driver MMI.

(vi) The Tests shall include testing the following functions:

(a) Reception of Telegrams.

(b) Speed Trajectory Determination and Regulation.

(c) Train to Trackside Communication Reception and

Transmission.

(d) Train Speed and Speed Limit Detection.

(e) ATP Braking and Propulsion Control.

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