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Names: Weitzer, Ronald, editor.
Title: Sex for sale: prostitution, pornography, and erotic dancing / edited by
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Criminalization, 16
Decriminalization,
and Legalization
Ronald Weitzer

This chapter compares alternative policy models. Rather than simply de-
claring one model superior to the others in the abstract, as many analysts
do, it is imperative that scholars and policy makers identify what works best
in practice in advancing the interests and needs of all stakeholders and
participants involved in sex for sale. In assessing the available evidence, I
will argue that only one of these models is consistent with a set of “best
practices” regarding health, safety, and rights.
Legal reform can occur through legislative action, a court ruling, or a
ballot measure presented to the public. Legislation is the most common
strategy for reform in the prostitution sphere. Legal challenges in the
courts, by contrast, have rarely been tried. Although this route has not been
successful in the United States, it has in Canada.1 In 2013 the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled, in a 9-0 decision, that the country’s three prosti-
tution laws were unconstitutional.2 At issue were statutes prohibiting
communicating for the purpose of prostitution, operating out of one’s
private premises or a brothel, and third-party profiting (“living on the
avails”) from prostitution. The applicants argued that the laws infringed on
sex workers’ safety by forcing them to work covertly, and the court agreed
that the laws were in violation of the right to “security of the person” in the
Charter of Rights. The following year, Parliament passed a law – the
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act – criminalizing those
DOI: 10.4324/9781003228639-21
376 Ronald Weitzer

who purchase sex (not the sellers) as well as advertising sexual services. The
constitutionality of this law is currently being challenged in court, and a
decision is expected in 2022.

Criminalization

All types of sexual commerce are subject to prohibition. Production, dis-

tribution, and/or possession of pornography is outlawed in most of
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Russia, and China. In some places, com-
mercial webcamming is considered a form of banned pornography, while
others (Ukraine, Russia) allow it as long as it does not involve explicit
performances. Some cities in the United States and other countries prohibit
strip clubs, and in March 2010, Iceland became the only Western country to
ban such clubs nationwide, after some members of parliament claimed that
dancers are objectified and victimized. In the United States, the Republican
Party and 16 states have passed resolutions declaring pornography a threat
to “public health.” The resolutions are examples of symbolic politics: they
do not impose additional controls but are designed to influence public
opinion and perhaps pave the way for further restrictions in the future.3 No
international health organization endorses the notion that pornography
threatens public health.
Prostitution is criminalized throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
In the 1950s, the communist authorities in China launched a massive
campaign to eradicate prostitution – closing the many brothels that had
flourished up until then and arresting thousands of workers, procurers, and
brothel owners. These individuals were sent to “re-education camps” where
they were lectured on the evils of prostitution and instilled with proper
socialist values. Today, China continues to ban all aspects of prostitution
(soliciting, sale, purchase, third-party facilitation). Until 2010, the authorities
staged mass raids where sex workers were paraded through the streets – a
degradation ceremony designed to send a message to the public and re-
affirm normative boundaries. Repeat offenders risked confinement in re-
formation centers for two years, where they were compelled to engage in
factory labor. In 2000, 18,000 people were held in 183 such camps.4 At the
end of 2019, the authorities announced that they were ending the practice,
but prostitution remains illegal and those convicted of a first offense can be
fined (up to 5,000 yuan, or $750) or incarcerated for up to 15 days. Yet
prostitution remains widespread: in streets and parks, karaoke bars and
hostess clubs, escorting, beauty parlors, and elsewhere.
 Three Policy Models 377

Criminalization also reigns supreme in the United States. All forms of

prostitution are illegal, outside of Nevada, and state laws target workers,
clients, and third parties. The latter include business owners, brokers, and
associates who “live off the earnings of a prostitute,” the typical language
for pimping in state penal codes. Solicitation is prohibited, defined as the act
of offering sex in exchange for money or something of value. In New York
State, for example, “A person is guilty of prostitution when such person
engages or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return
for a fee.” This means that both soliciting and the act of prostitution are
illegal in New York, though most arrests are for solicitation. In addition, a
third party who knowingly “permits prostitution” in his or her vehicle or
premises is liable to arrest in New York.
Prostitution was a status offense in 13 U.S. states as recently as the mid-
1970s. In addition to outlawing solicitation or the act of prostitution, these
states criminalized being a “lewd and dissolute person,” someone who
“resides in a house of ill fame,” “leads the life of a prostitute,” is a “common
prostitute,” or is a vagrant (vagrancy also being outlawed).5 Today, states
have repealed these status offenses and focus on behavior. Most outlaw
“loitering for the purpose of prostitution.” Like vagrancy laws, the offense
has been criticized for targeting people who linger in a public place without
causing nuisance or disorder. And some states define prostitution broadly.
In Oregon, prostitution is legally defined as “sexual contact or sexual con-
duct” in exchange for a fee. In California, prostitution is defined as “willfully
engaging in sexual intercourse or a lewd act with someone in exchange for
money or other compensation.” A “lewd act” is defined as “any act that
involves touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of another person,
with the specific intent to arouse or gratify someone sexually.” Touching-
with-intent-to-gratify is considered a form of prostitution, whereas in other
states (e.g., Florida) and nations it is restricted to sexual intercourse. Finally,
throughout the U.S. it is illegal to operate a business that promotes or
allows prostitution, such as a brothel or erotic massage parlor. In Virginia,
for instance, it is illegal to run or visit a “bawdy place” defined broadly as
“any place within or outside any building or structure that is used for
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.”
In the U.S., prostitution offenses are misdemeanors, and penalties vary by
state. A first conviction for solicitation may result in a fine and/or jail time,
while a second conviction triggers stiffer punishment. Moreover, some
states increase the punishment if the offense takes place in a car or in a
public place. Pimping is a felony in most states, a conviction for which can
result in a sentence of three or more years in prison and a hefty fine.
378 Ronald Weitzer

Arrests in Britain and America have declined sharply over the years.
Solicitation arrests in England and Wales fell steadily from 2002 to 2020:
from 2,111 to 300.6 Nationwide in the U.S., the figures declined from
113,800 in 1985 to 62,663 in 2005 to 26,713 in 2019, according to the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reports. (The change is even more dramatic when we con-
sider population growth during these time periods: from 59 to 68 million in
the U.K. and 238 to 328 million in the U.S.) Some states have seen even
more dramatic reductions: Illinois made 2,525 such arrests in 2010, dropping
to 187 in 2016.
How can we explain the dramatic reduction in arrests? It is partly due to
the increase in online solicitation and indoor activity, which is less visible
and harder to police than street prostitution. In the U.S. another factor is
the growing trend of making arrests under state trafficking laws instead of
prostitution law. One study documented a sharp drop in prostitution arrests
in some cities after the federal trafficking statute was enacted in 2000 and
again after the state passed its own trafficking law.7 At the same time, the
number of suspects arrested for sex trafficking has been fairly modest. For
the five-year period 2011 to 2015, an average of 450 individuals were pro-
secuted for this offense in the U.S. each year.8 More recent figures, using
arrests instead of prosecutions, show a declining trend. Whereas 880 sex
trafficking arrests took place in 2016, the figure consistently fell in the fol-
lowing years, to 301 in 2020. In that year, half of the states made between
zero and two such arrests and only two (Georgia, Texas) made 26 or more.9
This means that arrests under trafficking laws have not filled the gap re-
presented by the decline in arrests under state prostitution laws, and points
to the challenges of law enforcement against the many providers who solicit
online or by referrals and provide services privately indoors.

Decriminalization

Full decriminalization would remove criminal penalties from a particular act

(e.g., solicitation, pimping, operating a brothel) and leave the conduct un-
regulated, albeit subject to conventional laws regarding nuisances, sex in
public, disorderly conduct, or business operations. If street prostitution
were fully decriminalized, for example, it could occur on any street as long
as the workers and customers do not disturb the peace or violate other
ordinances. In 2021 and 2022, respectively, New York and California re-
pealed laws that allowed police to arrest anyone standing on the street and
“loitering for the purpose of prostitution.” Individuals now face arrest only
 Three Policy Models 379

if engaged in disorderly conduct or another type of nuisance but not simply

standing in public. Some places allow only a single type of prostitution. In
the Australian state of Tasmania and in England and Wales, only in-
dependent escorting is legal: an adult can sell sex out of his or her own
premises or at the customer’s home or a hotel. The operators are free to
advertise on escort websites and sell sex without any regulation by the state,
but they must do so alone. Third-party involvement is outlawed and if two
sex workers work in the same premises, that would legally constitute a
“brothel,” which is illegal in both places.
Partial decriminalization takes two very different forms. The first would
reduce but not eliminate penalties: the penalty might be a fine instead of
incarceration or the offense may be reduced from a felony to a mis-
demeanor or violation. The severity of the penalty is thus diluted. The
other alternative is to remove criminal penalties against only one of the
parties involved. Several countries have passed what are called “end de-
mand” laws, where the act of selling sex is permitted but the clients are
considered offenders. Sweden was the first country to do so, in 1999, fol-
lowed by Norway, Finland, France, Ireland, Fiji, Northern Ireland, and
Canada. The logic behind these laws is that attacking the demand will re-
duce the supply and, over time, shrink the entire prostitution market. The
fatal flaw in this policy is that it does not have the predicted outcomes.
Criminalizing only one party to a transaction indirectly impedes the legal
party by forcing the latter to act in more clandestine and potentially pre-
carious ways. Nor does this approach significantly reduce the number of
sexual transactions. Evidence from countries that have adopted this policy
suggests that it produces adverse outcomes: it reinforces the stigma at-
tached to both clients and sex workers; exposes both parties to police
surveillance; has the effect of rushing furtive transactions on the street and
thereby interferes with careful screening of customers; makes providers
more reluctant to contact the authorities when they have problems; reduces
access to health care, housing (i.e., evictions), and support services; and
negatively affects safety.10 Although end-demand laws are popular among
activists who subscribe to the oppression paradigm (described in Chapter 1),
they are much less popular with the general public. In a recent poll, only 7%
of Americans supported this kind of law.11 Moreover, the entire logic of
criminalizing only one party in a contractual agreement is fundamentally
bizarre. Imagine a law that legalized the sellers of marijuana but crim-
inalized the buyers! Yet one-party criminalization has its own logic: by at-
tacking demand, proponents hope that supply will shrivel, disrupting the
entire trade.
380 Ronald Weitzer

A final option is de facto decriminalization, which means that the offense

remains in the penal code but the law is not enforced. This would be an
option for a city that wishes to relax enforcement but cannot formally
decriminalize because that is the province of state or national law. In 2008,
residents of San Francisco, California voted on a ballot measure that in-
structed the authorities to discontinue making prostitution arrests. The
measure was endorsed by 41% of voters. Four years earlier, voters in
Berkeley, California were presented with a similar proposal that attracted
36% approval. Neither city had the power to formally decriminalize, but
they can opt to deprioritize enforcement of a state law.
Policymakers throughout the United States have been reluctant to even
consider alternatives to criminalization. As a Buffalo, New York, commis-
sion reasoned in 1999, “Since it is unlikely that city or state officials could
ever be convinced to decriminalize or legalize prostitution in Buffalo, there
is nothing to be gained by debating the merits of either.”12 Still, there has
been some recent movement in the direction of de facto decriminalization.
In 2021, prosecutors’ offices in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York
announced that they would no longer prosecute prostitution offenses, and
instead shift to offering services to those in need. Police retain their powers
of arrest under state law, but prosecutors will not charge arrestees. The
cities vary in whether they will continue to prosecute the customers.
Decriminalization offers some clear benefits: It reduces or eliminates
arrests, fines, and incarceration; may increase sex workers’ willingness to
report abuse to authorities; paves the way for enhanced access to health
care and other social services; and can help reduce stigmatization insofar as
the services rendered are lawful and the businesses operate in conventional
ways.
Sex work activists champion decriminalization over legalization. In 1985,
the International Committee for Prostitute’s Rights passed a Charter that
called for decriminalization, insisting that it is “essential that prostitutes can
provide their services under the conditions that are absolutely determined
by themselves and no one else.”13 Kindred advocacy groups agree, but often
mischaracterize the different policies. In a graphic posted on Twitter in May
2021, the Sex Industry Decrim Action Committee in South Australia
claimed that decriminalization “allows sex workers and police to work to-
gether to target real crimes,” whereas legalization “wastes police resources
on entrapping workers and regulating ads.” This construction distorts both
policies. It is absolutely not the case that legalization involves police “en-
trapping workers.” The logic of both decriminalization and legalization is to
improve relations between sex workers and the authorities, even if it
 Three Policy Models 381

doesn’t always turn out that way in practice. And decriminalization does
not, in itself, provide a platform for workers and police to work together.
Police need to be trained to engage professionally with sex workers. And
workers may avoid the police under any of the three systems.
The central reason why sex work rights’ groups dislike legalization is that
they wish to operate unfettered by any regulations other than those applied to
any other business because they believe such rules interfere with their work
and stigmatize them. But many are averse to any form of regulation
whatsoever. In a survey of 247 sex workers in San Francisco, two-thirds of
whom worked on the streets, 8 out of 10 felt that “sex workers should
determine their own working conditions without being taxed or regulated
by government,” and only 2% felt that sex workers should pay taxes on
their earnings. If they are accustomed to paying no tax while operating
illegally, they are likely to bristle at the idea of doing so when legal.
Regarding street soliciting, only a quarter thought that it should be re-
stricted to a particular part of the city, while a mere 13% agreed that it
should be banned near churches, hospitals, and schools.14 The vast majority
felt that street sellers should be allowed to operate anywhere they choose.
And this appears to be the view of activists and officials who endorse de-
criminalization. The government in Victoria, Australia – where legalization
was the previous policy – passed legislation in 2022 that allows prostitution
near “a place of worship, hospital, school, education, and care services
premises” or “any other facility or place regularly frequented by children for
recreational or cultural activities.” The rationale is that “separation re-
quirements are discriminatory, reinforce harmful social stigma towards sex
workers, and are a barrier to sex work taking place in safe locations.”15 This
may be true to at least some extent in any given city, but it ignores the very
purpose of such distancing policies: to minimize friction with the local
population by keeping street transactions and erotic businesses discreet.
Elsewhere, this laissez-faire approach would be anathema to the autho-
rities and the wider public. For those who are open to removing criminal
penalties, some regulation is preferred. And unfettered decriminalization
perpetuates risks to sex workers themselves: it does little to sideline bad
actors. Without some state oversight, there is little recourse for those who
are economically exploited or working under unhealthy or unsafe condi-
tions in brothels, massage parlors, bars, and other erotic businesses. They
may feel freer to report abuse but the fact that they are stigmatized, wish to
remain incognito, and have a history of alienation from the authorities
means that many of them are not inclined to take the initiative – hence, the
logic of requiring the authorities themselves to monitor worksites. While
382 Ronald Weitzer

prostitution involves work, it is generally not regarded as a “normal”

business that can easily transition to one that lacks oversight. We must
remember that, in changing the legal status of a vice, the history is often
one of insecurity, marginalization, unfavorable working conditions, and
alienation from the authorities. Legal reform of a vice with a precarious
history therefore does not occur on the same playing field as legislation that
permits, for example, alcohol sales on Sundays. The black-market history of
illicit drugs and prostitution points to the need for greater state intervention
post-decriminalization than what is necessary for most other trades.
Evidence supporting these arguments is presented below.

Legalization

Unlike decriminalization, legalization implies some government regula-

tion: screening and licensing business owners, registering workers, zoning
street prostitution, health requirements, special business taxes, or official
inspections of legal establishments. Decriminalization and legalization are
often presented as alternatives. Yet, most of the jurisdictions that have
decriminalized prostitution have also legalized it by imposing specific
regulations on the participants. The rules vary widely, from limited to
excessive, but the trajectory is usually a two-step process: removal of ex-
isting criminal penalties and replacement with certain controls: decrimi-
nalization → legalization.
In the United States, prostitution is legal only in Nevada (since 1971) and
only for brothels located in rural areas; all types of prostitution are outlawed
in the counties that host Las Vegas and Reno. About 22 legal brothels are
scattered around the state’s rural counties. Some regulations are imposed by
the state, while others are specific to each county – resulting in a very
comprehensive regime.16
Many writers and sex worker advocates are under the mistaken im-
pression that New Zealand and the Australian state of New South Wales
have decriminalized prostitution. A close reading of the law reveals that
they instead have a minimalist form of legalization. In New South Wales, a
city council must give consent for a brothel to open; a city may designate
zones where brothels are prohibited, and some have restricted them to
industrial areas; and street prostitution is prohibited where it is within sight
of schools, churches, hospitals, and residences. Given these regulations, it is
therefore mistaken to classify New South Wales as a pure decriminalized
system.
 Three Policy Models 383

In 2003, New Zealand repealed laws that had prohibited selling sex,
operating a sex business, advertising, and living off the income of a sex
worker.17 Regulations were then imposed:

• Local governments are empowered to determine the location of sex

businesses.
• Owners of sex businesses must obtain an operator’s certificate from the
court, under penalty of a $7,250 fine. Certificates must be renewed
annually. Anyone who has been convicted of a drug offense, weapons
offense, or serious crime is ineligible.
• Individuals who work alone or in a collective of no more than four
providers and have total control over their earnings (i.e., no manager) –
called “owner-operated brothels” – require no certification under the
law. A business with five or more workers is assumed to have a
manager or operator who must be certified.
• Clients are regulated: the law gives providers the right to refuse clients’
requests for a sex act for any reason at any stage of the encounter.
• STI testing is not mandated, but sex workers and clients are required to
protect themselves, taking “all reasonable steps” to use condoms.18 A
person can be fined (up to NZ$2,000, US$1,350) for failure to do so. In
2005, the first person to be fined was convicted of removing a condom
during sex. Since then, several others have been punished for condom
violations.
• Sex workers and brothels are restricted in where they can publicize
their services. They may not advertise on television, newspapers, or
radio. Brothel owners are prohibited from advertising jobs for sex
workers on conventional job-listing sites, but they can advertise on
other websites. Under §12, city councils regulate signage and can
prohibit displays that are “likely to cause nuisance or serious offense to
ordinary members of the public using the area” or are “incompatible
with the existing character or use of that area.”
• Migrants may be refused entry into the country if the authorities
suspect that the person intends to sell sex, and they may be deported if
they are discovered selling sex.
• Government oversight: the authorities periodically monitor sex busi-
nesses to ensure health and safety, that no migrants are working there,
and that businesses and workers adopt safe-sex practices.19

It is clear that pure decriminalization does not apply to New Zealand or New
South Wales, yet many analysts continue to categorize them in this way.
384 Ronald Weitzer

The Different Models in Practice

A fruitful method for categorizing government policies is to identify their

underlying intentions. Petra Östergren identifies three such goals regarding
sexual commerce: repress, restrict, or integrate it into the existing socio-
legal structure. Repression is based on the idea that sexual commerce is
universally harmful to participants and to the larger society, and the ulti-
mate goal is to eradicate sex work entirely. Under ideal conditions, the law
and criminal justice system would be fully mobilized to suppress all such
conduct. Punishment can be severe, as in Saudi Arabia where prostitution is
punishable by flogging. Under the restrictive type, sex-for-sale is also seen as
undesirable, but the goal is to minimize problems, what is called “harm
reduction.” The assumption that prostitution cannot be eradicated results in
laws that control participants or limit the locations where sex can be sold,
and the scope of the restrictions varies from mild to extreme. The third
model, integration, seeks to avoid the marginalization inherent in the other
two policies. The goal is to assimilate commercial sex into conventional
social, economic, and regulatory frameworks – to normalize it as an oc-
cupation and ensure that participants have the same rights and obligations
as every other worker or business owner. The integrative approach can be
compatible with legalization as long as the rules do not impose undue
obligations on the participants. For Östergren, the norms should be geared
toward “ensuring that there are legally binding contracts that regulate
agreements between parties, but also legislation ensuring the interests of
the surrounding community, such as some restrictions on advertisement.”20
To facilitate societal acceptance, she also advocates educational campaigns
to reduce stigmatization. Normalization can also be advanced when the
media stop representing sex work in lurid and sensationalized ways and
when politicians stop promoting claims based on the oppression paradigm
described in Chapter 1.21
Criminalization exemplifies the repressive type. It is guaranteed to pro-
duce a cluster of harms. With the risk of arrest, participants are forced to
operate in a clandestine, potentially precarious manner and, like the pro-
hibition of alcohol and drugs, criminalization is a magnet for bad actors,
whether freelance or part of an organized crime ring. As an analysis of
surveys administered to 4,559 sex trafficking victims in Europe concluded,

These results confirm results of many other studies that have looked
at the consequences of criminalization policies. Whenever sex work
has been criminalized, sex workers have been moved to more
 Three Policy Models 385

secluded places with the consequences of being more exposed to

different kinds of risks: assault, fraud, control, and lack of freedom.22

Some studies focus on criminalization’s effect on health outcomes. A recent

literature review concluded that those who work in decriminalized or le-
galized systems demonstrated a range of positive health practices and
outcomes compared to those working where prostitution is criminalized.23
And a unique study in East Java, Indonesia, investigated outcomes after
brothels in one district were criminalized in November 2014. Police raids
were conducted, but sexual transactions continued at many of the sites,
now discreetly underground. Local health workers stopped conducting
health exams and providing free condoms at the brothels, as they had in the
past. To determine the effects of illegality, researchers conducted both a
longitudinal and geographical comparison: a before-and-after analysis and a
comparison with a bordering district where prostitution had not been
criminalized. In comparison with the tolerant district, criminalization in the
other locale was associated with a marked increase in the prevalence of
sexually transmitted infections, largely due to the lack of condoms (STI
prevalence was stable in the other district); lower weekly earnings, in-
sufficient to meet workers’ needs; greater numbers of children working to
support the household; a decrease in sex workers’ happiness quotient; and
an increase in the amount of street prostitution.24 This study demonstrates
the myriad ways in which criminalization can produce or exacerbate risks
and harms.
It is therefore clear that criminalization is a failed policy. The material
presented below will also show that a properly configured regulatory system can
benefit those involved in sexual commerce, as well as the wider society in terms of
improved public health and lower criminal justice expenditures. Other
vices, like organized gambling and illicit drug markets, have been heavily
regulated after they were decriminalized, precisely to facilitate their con-
version to conventional businesses.
Gambling offers a case in point. In order to generate revenue for the
state, Nevada decriminalized organized gambling in 1931 (prior to that,
such operations were a felony). After 1931, organized crime became heavily
involved. Mobsters funded and ran some of the casinos, while elsewhere
they operated behind the scenes, skimming millions of dollars each year and
occasionally using violence to intimate owners. This Wild West state of
affairs continued for three decades until the state began to intervene. In
1959 the Nevada Gaming Commission was created to clean up the industry:
licensing operators, conducting inspections of casinos, monitoring security
386 Ronald Weitzer

measures, collecting taxes, and investigating consumer complaints.25 The

commission had the authority to deny or revoke licenses, and in 1960 it
banned from casinos 11 individuals with ties to organized crime. However,
it took many years to fully reform the industry, and it wasn’t until the mid-
1970s that the involvement of organized crime became negligible.26 When
New Jersey legalized casinos in Atlantic City in 1978, it had learned from
Nevada’s experience and imposed many of the same regulations, as have all
subsequent states in the U.S. and the six European nations that permit
casino gambling.
Nevada’s casino history shows that decriminalization, by itself, was not
suited to the normalization of a previously shady business. And this explains
why marijuana legalization, not decriminalization, is the universal policy in
Canada, the Netherlands, the U.S., and most other countries where trans-
actions are now permitted. Legal marijuana businesses are heavily regulated
at the state and city level.
Although these “vices” differ, a similar logic can be applied to sex work:
In an occupation where participants remain subject to multiple risks, there
remains a need for mechanisms that screen out bad actors (e.g., abusive or
exploitative recruiters and managers) and help to ensure workers’ health
and safety. In response to the standard demand of decriminalization ad-
vocates that sex work businesses be treated identically to other businesses,
the International Committee for Prostitutes’ Rights (a leading decriminali-
zation advocate) acknowledges that, “Existing standard business codes
allow abuse of prostitutes. Therefore, special clauses must be included to
prevent the abuse and stigmatization of prostitutes (self-employed and
others).”27
In places where prostitution has been legalized, what do we know about
the outcomes? Do working conditions improve, becoming safer and more
worker-friendly? Are bad actors squeezed out of the trade? Does prostitu-
tion proliferate in the area where it is allowed? The short answer relates
back to the polymorphous paradigm described in Chapter 1. Legal regimes
differ tremendously from one place to another, making it difficult to gen-
eralize. The criticisms of legalization made by sex work advocates, noted
above, are based on a highly selective caricature of legal systems. Some
compelling counterevidence is presented below and in my book Legalizing
Prostitution, and I will argue that we can identify a set of “best practices” by
evaluating the kinds of rules that have been imposed in the past. Readers
can evaluate the merits of the regulations described in the following cases.
Prior to the communist takeover in China in 1949, each city imposed its
own rules on brothels – the only type of prostitution that was allowed.
 Three Policy Models 387

Taking the example of Hangzhou, readers will probably find some of the
city’s regulations, imposed in 1914, reasonable and others quite intrusive:

It stipulated that the provincial police department would decide where

brothels could be located, and police also had to approve applications to
open or move brothels. Once approved, a brothel would receive a
license from the police … . The rules forbade owners from abusing
prostitutes, forcing them to service clients overnight, confiscating their
personal goods, [or] preventing them from marrying … . They were
also required to send prostitutes ill with venereal disease or other
communicable diseases for medical attention and to report such
incidents to the police … . The regulations stipulated that police could
revoke licenses and arrest brothel owners for harboring criminals,
supplying guests with opium, or providing gambling on the premises …
or forcing or luring “good” women into prostitution. In addition, all
guests spending the night were required to sign in, and the registration
book was to be turned over the police daily. Police were to have access
to the brothels at any time. Finally, owners were required to post the
names, classes, and photos of all the prostitutes in the brothel outside
the front door.28

Girls under 15 years old or who had not yet attained puberty were pro-
hibited, and customers had to be at least 19. Brothel workers were required
to have health inspections twice a month.
Since 1971 the state of Nevada has imposed a comprehensive set of rules
on the legal brothels in rural counties. Brothel owners are thoroughly
screened by county or town officials; they cannot have a previous felony
conviction. Workers must be at least 21 years old. State law makes condom
use mandatory and requires workers to undergo testing for STI’s and
HIV,29 a practice that it is “widely accepted” among brothel workers.30
Local governments impose additional rules on the location of brothels, li-
censing procedures, and providers’ freedom. One universal norm is that
workers live at the brothel for the duration of their contract, usually three
weeks at a time. If she has a husband or children, they are not allowed to
reside in the same town in which she is working. Each brothel enforces its
own set of rules as well. In most cases, women split half their earnings with
the house, are expected to tip staff, and pay for their own health care.
Nevada’s legal brothels employ several safety precautions (panic buttons,
listening devices, surveillance) designed to preempt or respond to an al-
tercation. These safeguards pay off. Interviews with the women reveal that
388 Ronald Weitzer

the safety provided by the brothels makes them superior to other types of
worksites for selling sex. None of the women interviewed had ever felt the
need to press a panic button; and the police are rarely called to deal with
problem customers.31 These brothels also clash with the image presented in
the oppression paradigm: they are not associated with drug use, violence,
underage workers, disease, or trafficking.32 And the workers themselves are
generally satisfied with the working conditions.
These highly regulated brothels are not for everyone; many sex workers
would find them too confining, and some quit after just a few days in a
house. In the abstract, the restrictions may appear onerous, but the studies
just cited indicate that they are not experienced negatively by those workers
who are willing to abide by the rules.
Prostitution has been legal in Germany since 1927, but prior to 2002,
pimping was illegal, owners of erotic businesses were unregulated, and
the criminal law defined prostitution as “contrary to public decency and
morality.” A 2001 court case ruled that prostitution was not immoral,
which prompted the legislature to remove moral language from the law.
The 2002 law defined sex work as an occupation; gave workers the right
to health care, social security, and unemployment benefits; and revised
the offense of promoting prostitution (pimping) to apply only to in-
dividuals who infringe on a worker’s “personal or financial in-
dependence.” Otherwise, the federal government left the regulatory
decisions to each state and municipality. This led to a patchwork of
prostitution laws, ranging from Munich (banned within city limits) to
Berlin (pervasive and virtually unregulated).
A 2004 survey of 305 sex workers and 22 brothel owners found that the
majority of workers were aware of their new rights under the 2002 law, and
43% believed that they could now assert these rights. Asked whether they
thought the law was “a good thing,” 86% of the workers and 91% of brothel
owners felt that it was beneficial. One-third of the sex workers and two-
thirds of the owners thought that the new law had already brought about
some improvements, two years after its enactment.33 One improvement
was a drastic reduction in the number of arrests of intermediaries after the
law came into effect. Whereas in 2000 there were 1,888 state-certified
victims of third-party “exploitation of prostitutes,” the number steadily
declined after the 2002 law passed, to 19 in 2020; for the same time span, the
number of victims of pimping/procuring/promotion fell from 1,304 to 146
and of sex trafficking from 1,197 to 201.34 Official figures also show a
parallel decline in the number of suspects prosecuted and convicted for
these offenses.35 One possible explanation for the decline is that legalization
 Three Policy Models 389

may have reduced the involvement of bad actors in the prostitution arena.
The fact that some individuals are still arrested under these three statutes
suggests a more sophisticated assessment of the ways in which third parties
and employers interact with sex workers, compared to the past. Instead of
being liable for pimping/promoting prostitution, the law now prohibits
specific acts that curtail a worker’s autonomy by, for instance, dictating the
type of services that must be provided, forcing someone to service a par-
ticular client, preventing someone from leaving prostitution, or restricting
freedom in other ways. Similarly for employers: “exploitation” is now re-
stricted to keeping someone “personally or financially dependent” on their
business operation; this is where we see the greatest decline in arrests since
the law was passed.
Despite the improvements post-legalization, activists on both the right
and left mobilized to either repeal the law or lobby for tighter restrictions,
and they eventually succeeded. The German Parliament passed new legis-
lation in 2016, with the following key provisions:

• mandatory condom usage and prohibition on advertising unpro-

tected sex
• compulsory registration of all sex workers, who are now required to
carry a special registration card while working
• prohibiting workers from living in the room in which they work
(viewed as an indicator of trafficking), unless it is a single worker living
alone
• requiring each worker to meet regularly with counselors from the
health department
• prohibition on certain business practices, such as multi-person orgies
for a fee and flat-rate brothels where the customer pays a fee and can
have sex with as many providers as he wishes
• licensing of sex businesses and those who operate them (including
those who rent rooms to workers but do not manage them); licenses
can be withdrawn if it is determined that the operator is not in
compliance with the other requirements listed here
• minimum standards for all prostitution venues regarding amenities,
hygiene, health, and security; business owners must provide condoms
and lubricant
• brothel operators must document their business transactions, including
written contracts with and payments to staff
• if two or more sex workers operate in the same premises, they must
obtain a brothel license36
390 Ronald Weitzer

Some of these measures seem sensible in terms of health, safety, and rights,
while others are inappropriate or burdensome. Registration of sex workers
has been a failed policy in almost every country that has experimented with
it, and mandatory condom usage is impossible to enforce unless the au-
thorities conduct undercover visits and request unprotected sex, which they
do in the state of Bavaria.
The Australian state of Queensland legalized brothels and independent
escorts in the 1990s, with all other types of prostitution remaining illegal. A
study comparing the two legal sectors with illegal street work reported
consistently superior outcomes for those who work legally. Legal sex
workers profiled better on mental health indicators and were much less
likely to have experienced sexual abuse as children. A minority had a history
of injecting drug use (16% of brothel workers and 17% of escorts vs. 75% of
street sellers) and they were less likely to have experienced assault or rape
by a client (3%, 15%, and 52%, respectively).37 The findings suggest that
legal prostitution offers a range of advantages in Queensland. A government
study agreed: “There is no doubt that licensed brothels provide the safest
working environment for sex workers in Queensland. Legal brothels now
operating in Queensland provide a sustainable model for a healthy, crime-
free, and safe legal licensed brothel industry” and are a “state of the art
model for the sex industry in Australia.” Official corruption and organized
crime “are not of significant concern for the legal prostitution industry in
Queensland.”38
But Queensland’s system is problematic in other respects. For one thing,
the number of licensed brothels is restricted by both state and local au-
thorities. More than 200 towns prohibit brothels in their jurisdictions. In
2009 there were only 23 licensed brothels in Queensland, declining to 20 at
the end of 2020 (the state’s population is 5.2 million). This contrasts starkly
with the 340 brothels operating in New South Wales and 85 in the city of
Melbourne, Victoria.39 While an unknown number of independents sell sex
legally in Queensland, there is a much larger market of illegal providers
who work (1) in unlicensed brothels, (2) cooperatively (two or more pro-
viders), or (3) for escort agencies, brokers, and other third parties.40 The
latter operate illegally because third-party involvement outside a licensed
brothel is outlawed and legal brothels are not permitted to provide out-call
services. An assessment by a government agency concluded that “the in-
ability of legal brothels to provide an escort or out-call service is the most
crucial impediment to the success of the Act.”41 It is estimated that three-
quarters of prostitution in Queensland involves in-call or out-call services,
including both the legal freelance operators and those illegally employed by
 Three Policy Models 391

third parties.42 A contrasting case is Australia’s Northern Territory, where

both independent and agency-based escorting are allowed by law.43
Coupled with Queensland’s reluctance to offer brothel licenses is the ex-
orbitant cost of operating a legal brothel in the state. The start-up costs alone
are staggering: a $5,500 application fee, a $7,165 license fee, and $2,867 for
each room in the brothel; this puts the total start-up cost for a standard five-
room brothel at $27,000.44 (Brothels are limited by law to a maximum of five
sexual service rooms and no more than eight sex workers are allowed on the
premises at any one time.) On top of the start-up costs, there is an annual
license fee of $20,555 for a five-room brothel, and every three years the license
must be renewed at an additional cost of $12,665 plus $2,867 for each room.45
The flip side of this is that illegal brothel operators typically receive only a
$2,000 fine if and when they are caught, which means that they would have to
be caught several times a year to bear the same costs as a legal operator.46
Queensland’s highly restrictive approach is further confirmed in some
other policies. In addition to reviewing applications for licenses as well as
complaints against existing brothels, the Prostitution Licensing Authority is
also required to advise the government on ways of helping “prostitutes to
leave prostitution,” arguably an inappropriate function for a licensing
board.47 In sum, the Queensland government seems committed to con-
straining the legal sex industry, even as those who work within it are
generally happy with their working conditions.
Finally, one of the standard questions raised whenever a jurisdiction is
considering legal reform is whether the amount of “vice” will increase. The
number of sex workers is partly affected by demand, which will limit the
growth of the trade, though it is possible that greater supply might increase
demand to some extent, especially when buying services is legal. Were legal
prostitution limited to one or a few cities, it would undoubtedly attract an
influx of workers and clients into that locale. Were it more widespread,
each locale would hold less attraction to outside workers and customers,
reducing migration. In New Zealand, nationwide legalization in 2003 has
not increased the size of the market, but prostitution has increased in some
Australian states post-legalization.48

Comparing Different Systems

The best way to assess the value of different policy regimes is to compare them
directly, ideally within the same country.49 Such real-world comparisons are
crucial for determining which type of system is superior to the others.
392 Ronald Weitzer

In Belgium, a 1948 law abolished existing municipal regulations and out-

lawed third-party involvement (e.g., pimping, operating a brothel), but not
prostitution itself. Local governments responded in different ways. Some
continued to tolerate third parties and others imposed rules on them. In the
cities of Antwerp (1999-2007) and Ghent (2015–2017), local officials imposed a
stringent set of extralegal norms on owners of sex businesses – an example of
what can be called de facto legalization because operators are regulated locally
yet their involvement remains prohibited under federal law. Brussels, by
contrast, represents the alternative practice of de facto decriminalization. Those
who run sex businesses there operate virtually free of any government con-
trol. Like Antwerp and Ghent and a few other Belgian cities, Brussels’ red-
light district contains window-prostitution rooms where women are visible
from outside and sell sex inside. But unlike Antwerp and Ghent, the autho-
rities in Brussels take a radically laissez-faire approach. Police rarely enter the
area; security cameras are absent; officials do not conduct background checks
on third parties or site visits to monitor working conditions; some men harass
or attack the window workers, crimes that the police largely disregard; and
madams exercise total control over the sex workers. Many of the madams are
connected to organized-crime networks based outside Belgium. Almost all of
the women are from Eastern Europe or Africa.50
By contrast, the red-light districts in Antwerp and Ghent impose strict rules
on those who own the window units rented by sex workers, and the workers
are periodically interviewed by social workers and health providers to
monitor their health and safety and ensure that they are working voluntarily.
Security cameras are visible, and each district has its own designated health
center, offering free services. Uniformed and undercover police officers patrol
each district. These factors explain why, in 2006, Antwerp’s city government
won a prize from a national urban planning association for the successful
remodeling and operation of its red-light district, and a national newspaper
declared the city’s red-light district the “best” in the country.51 The authorities
in Brussels, by contrast, do little to control business operators, combat bad
actors, or support the window workers. This three-city comparison suggests
that there can be serious problems with a totally unregulated approach.
Tijuana, Mexico allows us to compare outcomes for workers who work
legally versus illegally. Some forms of prostitution are legal in the sense that
certain areas of the city are designated for prostitution; sex businesses are
licensed and the authorities conduct site visits; and legal sex workers are
registered and carry health cards that show they have been tested for STIs.
Research shows that the legal sector is associated with several advantages.
First, those working illegally were twice as likely as the legal workers to have
 Three Policy Models 393

been assaulted, robbed, or kidnapped and three times more likely to have
experienced extortion or violence by police officers. Second, the legal workers
had superior health profiles. Third, there were several intangible advantages:

Though this system is intrusive, it does benefit those who work legally
in that their legal status allows them access to the safest and most
profitable venues, affords protection from the police, and facilitates the
professionalization process … . [They enjoy] better working conditions
and job satisfaction, less fear about the nature of their work, a higher
degree of sophistication and confidence with regard to their speaking
skills, appearance, and demeanor. Registration and monthly checkups
appear to encourage behaviors that are protective of health as well as
provide a barrier against police harassment. Registration increases the
sense of legitimacy and community and is correlated with much lower
levels of depression and mental stress.52

Another major study compared different regimes in three Australian cities:

criminalization in Perth, Western Australia, decriminalization in Sydney, New
South Wales, and legalization in Melbourne, Victoria. Table 16.1 displays the

Table 16.1 Brothel Conditions in Three Australian States

Criminalization Legalization
(Perth, W. Decriminalization (Melbourne,
Australia) (Sydney, NSW) Victoria)
Room alarm 26% 36% 72%
Security guard 16 22 12
Security camera 66 61 78
Condoms 12 39 88
provided free
Lubricant 61 44 83
provided
Overall Rating Overall Rating Overall Rating
5-star rating ∗ 0% 3% 20%
3-4-star rating 71 60 50
1-star rating 18 33 11

Source: Harcourt et al. 2010.

∗
Field researchers’ rating of brothel as worker-friendly based on security measures (alarms,
front security, external lighting), cleanliness, lighting, rest areas, and supportive staff.
Perth criminalizes all types of prostitution; Sydney decriminalizes and does not reg-
ulate brothels; Melbourne licenses, inspects, and otherwise regulates brothels. Interviews
were conducted with 175 brothel workers in Perth, 201 in Sydney, and 229 in Melbourne.
394 Ronald Weitzer

key findings. On almost all measures, legalization outperformed both crim-

inalization and decriminalization. The legalized system in Melbourne was
associated with more security measures, on-site provision of condoms and
lubricant, and a greater proportion of brothels awarded a 5-star rating by re-
searchers who visited each site.53 Interestingly, only 3% of the decriminalized
brothels in Sydney earned a 5-star rating and fully one-third of them received a
1-star rating, about twice as many as the criminalized system in Perth.54 The
findings suggest that legalization can be far preferable to both criminalization
and decriminalization. I say can be because much depends on the kinds of
regulation associated with a legal regime.

Toward Best Practices

The question of whether it is possible to identify “gold standards” applicable

to all systems of legal prostitution has rarely been raised. As is clear from
the cases described above, each legal system differs to some extent from
others. This raises the question of “what works best” and what the proper
criteria are for evaluating a regulatory system. Some writers focus ex-
clusively on the demands of sex workers, whose compliance is absolutely
central to the success of any new regime. But it is also important that
reforms incorporate and balance the interests and preferences of all relevant
parties – sex workers and their employers, local residents, business owners,
and state officials responsible for public order, health, and safety. This may
require some compromise on the part of each stakeholder.
Drawing on the prevailing norms associated with legalized gambling and
drugs as well as my analysis of various prostitution regimes, I propose the
following set of standards.55 Many of them apply specifically to business
owners, fewer to the workers themselves. The list may not be fully ex-
haustive but does address the central pillars: eligibility, visibility, health,
rights, safety, and oversight:

Eligibility

• Restrict participation to consenting adults, and create programs that

support the exit of minors.
• Workers should not be forced to register with or be licensed by the
authorities. This has been problematic almost everywhere it has been
tried. Concerns include how the personal information will be used,
 Three Policy Models 395

how secure it will be, who will have access to it, and whether the
records will be expunged after a person stops selling sex.
• Businesses should be licensed, like other businesses. This applies to
erotic bars, brothels, massage parlors, and escort agencies. The license
or an official stamp of approval should be visibly displayed on the
premises so that clients know they are in a legal business.
• Prospective operators of sex businesses should be subjected to back-
ground checks to determine whether they have ever been arrested for a
serious crime (e.g., assault, money laundering, trafficking). A conviction
shall be grounds for denial of a license. However, prostitution-related
convictions that occurred prior to legalization will not be held against
operators.
• If a licensing board exists, its role should be limited to reviewing
applications, conducting background checks on applicants, and re-
voking licenses in the event that a business fails to comply with the
rules. The criteria for granting an application should be transparent.

Visibility

• Minimize public visibility and encroachment on nonparticipants.

Keeping it as discreet as possible is a worthy goal in light of the risk
of community backlash, including efforts to recriminalize. Another
advantage is that it reduces workers’ exposure to verbal or physical
altercations with nonparticipants. The logic best applies to newly legal
systems in places where there is no pre-existing identifiable red-light
area. It is less relevant to a setting where prostitution has long existed in
a particular geographical area prior to legalization. Many red-light
zones, featuring indoor prostitution, existed in Europe for decades prior
to becoming legal.
• Municipal officials should have the power to restrict advertising on
billboards and signage on businesses. The general rule is that
advertising and signage be sensitive to what the local community
will tolerate. But advertising on the Internet should be permitted, so
long as this does not take the form of unwelcome pop-up ads and
instead requires consumers to take the initiative in searching for online
services.
• In line with the preference for invisibility, one to three providers should
be allowed to operate in a private residence, subject only to existing
laws regarding public nuisance and a prohibition on signage on the
396 Ronald Weitzer

premises. More than three providers in a house or apartment increases

the number of clients and, hence, the chances of nuisance and public
disquiet.
• In places where street prostitution is associated with social problems
(crime, disorderly conduct, drug markets, infringement on local
residents, victimization of street sellers), it should be discouraged in
line with harm-reduction and minimum-visibility principles.56 In places
where the street market is not linked to these problems, it can be
permitted and the workers should be offered support by social service
agencies if they are in need. It is no accident that most of the states that
have legalized prostitution continue to ban street markets. Street selling
in New Zealand and New South Wales is allowed subject to public
nuisance laws, but it continues to be contentious in both places and the
workers continue to face greater risks than their indoor counterparts.
The underlying logic is a distinction between public and private
behavior. The distinction dates back to the landmark Wolfenden
Committee in Britain 60 years ago, which argued for tolerance of
indoor prostitution only. More recently, a Canadian commission
concurred: “The concern with the law is not what takes place in
private, but the public manifestation of prostitution.”57 (Likewise,
where cannabis has been legalized, sales and use in public are banned.)
Still, in places where a street market poses none of the problems just
mentioned, it may be tolerated by the authorities. Research worldwide
shows, however, that the vast majority of street markets are indeed
problematic, in myriad ways,58 and that laissez-faire decriminalization
in such contexts will leave these problems largely unresolved.

Health

• The authorities should promote safe-sex practices. It serves the interests

of all parties involved as well as public health generally. Making safe sex
mandatory, however, as in Bavaria and New Zealand, is impractical
and unenforceable.
• Regular health examinations should be encouraged and incentivized by
being free of charge to sex workers (as is the practice today in several
countries). Compulsory testing for STIs stigmatizes sex workers; tests are
not always accurate; and testing clean on a certain day may give the false
impression that a person is sexually healthy afterwards. Still, both
providers and customers should be encouraged to be tested periodically.
 Three Policy Models 397

Rights

• Guarantee the worker’s right-of-refusal with regard to particular sex

acts or customers. These rights supersede those of clients and business
owners.
• Prohibit discrimination against sex workers and business operators.
They should have the same rights to housing, banking, and health care
as everyone else. Banks in the Netherlands refuse to loan money to
persons involved in the sex industry, forcing them to seek other
(perhaps questionable) sources of funding for their businesses.
• Expunge the criminal records of those with prostitution-related arrests
and convictions prior to legalization, freeing them of the stigma of a
criminal record.

Safety and Oversight

• Intensify sanctions against those who abuse sex workers. This pertains
to abuse by clients, parasitical pimping, sexual harassment by managers,
and human trafficking. Regarding pimping, punishment should be
restricted to those who are violent or exploitative, as per a German law
discussed earlier.
• Facilitate the reporting of abuse by training police and other authorities
to treat sex workers as persons with rights. The case of New Zealand
suggests that legalization can create the conditions for a “very positive
relationship” between police and sex workers.59
• Create a hotline where clients and others can anonymously report
suspected abuse of a sex worker to the authorities, as in the Netherlands.
• The authorities should conduct periodic, unannounced site visits to sex
businesses to ensure that they are complying with the rules. In most
places where prostitution has been legalized, site visits are conducted
by social workers, health officials, the police, and/or a building-code
agency.60
• The government should sponsor periodic, independent review of the
implementation of relevant laws and policies, and rectify any problems
identified in the review.
• If a separate, policy-oriented prostitution agency exists, it must include
representatives of erotic business operators and sex workers. This helps
to ensure that their interests are taken into account in deliberations
regarding administration and enforcement. New Zealand’s Prostitution
398 Ronald Weitzer

Law Review Committee includes government officials, operators of sex

businesses, and representatives of the New Zealand Prostitutes’
Collective.
• In a newly legal system it is important that authorities inform workers
and their employers of their rights and obligations under the law.
• Regulations are one thing; enforcement is another. It is crucial that the
authorities enforce all regulations and are given the resources to do so.

As in drug markets, some illegal operators are likely to continue to operate

outside the legal system, but their number is partly influenced by the kinds
of regulations adopted. The less onerous and costly the regulations, the
greater the erosion of the illegal sector.61 Regulations that are extensive,
expensive, stigmatizing, and discriminatory (compared to other businesses)
incentivize individuals to opt out and operate in the shadows. I noted that
in Queensland the costs of complying with licensing rules has been a huge
problem. These fees should be comparable to those imposed on other
service providers: there should be no added “sin tax.” At the same time, an
overly minimalist system can be a problem. In 2007 the German govern-
ment concluded that legal reform in 2002 had “only to a limited degree”
achieved its stated goals and that “a more broad-based approach to reg-
ulating prostitution is required.”62 A laissez-faire approach can result in
insufficient safeguards, disempowering sex workers.

Table 16.2 The Three Models

Criminalization Decriminalization Legalization
Core Objective suppression unrestricted tolerance regulated
tolerance
Advantages support from freedom from state enhanced health,
majority of the involvement and safety, rights,
public in most impingement on and working
countries rights conditions
Disadvantages victimization lack of protections potential over-
stigmatization for participants; regulation;
marginalization encroachment on potential
incarceration local community; noncompliance
little impact on bad by some or
actors; many
public and political participants
opposition
 Three Policy Models 399

More generally, legalization requires a paradigm shift away from viewing

sex workers as deviants and prostitution as a shady enterprise. The process
will take time, given the long history of marginalization and stigmatization.
We should expect some “cultural lag” – i.e., societal toleration and accep-
tance lagging behind legal reform – but where prostitution is legal it is
imperative that state policy and practice treat it as a conventional en-
terprise, to the extent possible given the above list of best practices. In the
long term, legal liberalization can foster at least some degree of normal-
ization: “It is imaginable that prostitution could always be practiced, as it
occasionally is even now, in circumstances of relative safety, security,
freedom, hygiene, and personal control.”63

Notes
1 A 2018 court case challenged the constitutionality of California’s prostitution laws –
asserting that such laws violate rights to freedom of speech, freedom to associate,
and sexual privacy. The district and appeals courts rejected each claim. United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 16-15927, January 17, 2018.
2 Canada v. Bedford 2013 SCC 72. December 20, 2013.
3 Ronald Weitzer, “The Campaign Against Sex Work in the United States: A
Successful Moral Crusade,” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 17 (2020): 399–414.
4 Human Rights Watch, Swept Away: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China, New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2013.
5 Charles Rosenbleet and Barbara Pariente, “The Prostitution of the Criminal Law,”
American Criminal Law Review 11 (1973): 373–428.
6 Statista, Number of Soliciting for Prostitution Offences Recorded in England and Wales from
2002/03 to 2020/21. https://www.statista.com/statistics/283114/recorded-soliciting-
for-prostitution-offences-in-england-and-wales-uk/
7 Amy Farrell and Sean Cronin, “Policing Prostitution in An Era of Human Trafficking
Enforcement,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 64 (2015): 211–228.
8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Prosecution of Human-Trafficking Cases, 2015, U.S.
Department of Justice, June 2018.
9 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Human Trafficking Data Collection Activities, 2021, U.S.
Department of Justice, October 2021.
10 Jay Levy and Pye Jakobsson, “Sweden’s Abolitionist Discourse and Law,” Criminology
& Criminal Justice 14 (2014) 593–607; Sebastian Kohn, “The False Promise of ‘End
Demand’ Laws,” New York: Open Society Foundation, June 2, 2017; Elena Argento
et al., “The Impact of End-Demand Legislation on Sex Workers’ Access to Health
and Sex Worker-Led Services,” PLOS One 15 (2020): e0225783.
11 42% favored legalization. Public Policy Polling, September 30–October 1, 2021.
N=758 registered voters.
12 Prostitution Task Force, Workable Solutions to the Problem of Street Prostitution in
Buffalo, New York, Buffalo, October 1999.
13 International Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights, World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights,
Amsterdam: First World Whores’ Congress, 1985.
400 Ronald Weitzer

14 90% felt there should be laws protecting the rights of sex workers but, surprisingly,
83% endorsed the idea that sex workers should be “required to undergo health
screenings to be able to do sex work.” Alexandra Lutnick and Deborah Cohan,
“Criminalization, Legalization, or Decriminalization of Sex Work,” Reproductive
Health Matters 17 (2009): 38–46.
15 Victoria State Government, Decriminalizing Sex Work, Discussion paper, 2020, p. 5.
16 Barbara Brents, Crystal Jackson, and Kathryn Hausbeck, The State of Sex: Tourism,
Sex, and Sin in the New American Heartland, New York: Routledge, 2010.
17 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, Public Act 2003 No. 28.
18 §9.1 of the law requires that “he or she has taken all reasonable steps to ensure a
prophylactic sheath or other appropriate barrier is used if those services involve
vaginal, anal, or oral penetration or another activity with a similar or greater risk of
acquiring or transmitting sexually transmissible infections.”
19 §26.1 of the law states, “An inspector may, at any reasonable time, enter premises for
the purpose of carrying out an inspection if he or she has reasonable grounds to
believe that a business of prostitution is being carried on in the premises.” The
inspection may include interviews with personnel, photographs and measurements,
or “seizing and retaining” anything that may be evidence of an offense.
20 Petra Östergren, “From Zero Tolerance to Full Integration: Rethinking Prostitution
Policies,” in Z. Davy et al., eds., The Sage Handbook of Global Sexualities, London:
Sage, 2020, p. 584.
21 For other ways of combatting stigma, see Ronald Weitzer, “Resistance to Sex Work
Stigma,” Sexualities 21 (2018): 717–729.
22 The victims were interviewed as they sought assistance from field missions run by
the International Office for Migration. Maria Di Tommaso, Isilda Shima, Steinar
Strøm, and Francesca Bettio, “As Bad as It Gets: Well-Being Deprivation of Sexually
Exploited Trafficked Women,” European Journal of Political Economy 25 (2009):
143–162, at p. 155.
23 Jessica McCann, Gemma Crawford, and Jonathan Hallett, “Sex Worker Health
Outcomes in High-Income Countries of Varied Regulatory Environments: A
Systematic Review,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
18 (2021): 1–16.
24 Lisa Cameron, Jennifer Seager, and Manisha Shaw, “Crimes Against Morality:
Unintended Consequences of Criminalizing Sex Work,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
136 (2021): 427–469.
25 Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling, Gambling in
America, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976.
26 Jay Albanese, “Creating Legal Versus Illegal Gambling Businesses: How Proper
Government Regulation Makes a Difference,” in E. Savona, M. Kleiman, and F.
Calderoni, eds., Dual Markets: Comparative Approaches to Regulation, New York:
Springer, 2017.
27 International Committee for Prostitutes’ Rights, World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights,
Amsterdam, 1985.
28 Elizabeth Remick, Regulating Prostitution in China, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2014, pp. 77–79.
29 In Austria, those involved in prostitution are required to register with local autho-
rities and to undergo periodic medical checks – weekly for STIs and quarterly for
HIV. They must carry a card that indicates the results of the checkups and must
show the card to police officers on request.
30 Brents et al., State of Sex, p. 234.
31 Brents et al., State of Sex, pp. 129, 130, 227.
 Three Policy Models 401

32 Brents et al., State of Sex, p. 233.

33 Barbara Kavemann and Heike Rabe, “The Act Regulating the Legal Situation of
Prostitutes: Implementation, Impact, Current Developments.” Research Institute for
Social Science and Women’s Studies, Berlin, 2007.
34 Juanita Henning, Ina Hunecke, and Gerhard Walentowitz, “Das Prostituierten-
schutzgesetz im Lichte der Kriminalitätsstatistik,” Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und
Strafrechtsreform 104 (2021): 359–374.
35 Federal Ministry of the Interior, Polizei Kriminalstatistik, Berlin: Federal Ministry of
the Interior, 2015.
36 Prostituiertenschutzgesetz (“Prostitutes Protection Act”), ProstSchG, 2016.
37 Charlotte Seib, Jane Fischer, and Jackob Najman, “The Health of Female Sex
Workers from Three Industry Sectors in Queensland, Australia,” Social Science and
Medicine 68 (2009): 473–478.
38 Crime and Misconduct Commission, Regulating Prostitution: An Evaluation of the
Prostitution Act 1999, Queensland, Brisbane: CMC, 2004.
39 Prostitution Licensing Authority, 2019-2020 Annual Report, Brisbane: PLA, 2020;
Andrew Taylor, “Sex in The Suburbs: Where Are Sydney’s Red Light Districts?”
Sydney Morning Herald, June 23, 2019.
40 The illegal market accounts for an estimated 90% of prostitution in Queensland. Kate
Dennehy, “Queensland Sex Industry Still Largely Illegitimate,” Brisbane Times,
August 16, 2009.
41 Crime and Misconduct Commission, Regulating Prostitution, p. 111.
42 Andreas Schloenhardt and Lachlan Cameron, “Happy Birthday, Brothels! Ten Years
of Prostitution Regulation in Queensland,” Queensland Lawyer 29 (2009): 194–220.
43 Prostitution Regulation Act, 2004, Northern Territory, §6.
44 Schloenhardt and Cameron, “Happy Birthday, Brothels,” p. 201.
45 Schloenhardt and Cameron, “Happy Birthday, Brothels.”
46 Dennehy, “Queensland Sex Industry.”
47 Prostitution Act, 1999, Queensland, §101.
48 Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003, Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Justice, 2008.
49 Ronald Weitzer, “Researching Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Comparatively,”
Sexuality Research and Social Policy 12 (2015): 81–91.
50 Sarah Adeyinka, Sophie Samyn, Sami Zemni, and Ilse Derluyn, Nigerian and
Ghanaian Women Working in the Brussels Red-Light District, New York: Routledge,
2021; Ronald Weitzer, “The Social Ecology of Red-Light Districts: A Comparison of
Antwerp and Brussels,” Urban Affairs Review 50 (2014): 702–730; Ronald Weitzer and
Dominique Boels, “Ghent’s Red-light District in Comparative Perspective,” Sexuality
Research and Social Policy 12 (2015): 248–260.
51 A documentary describing the upgrading, Skippers Quarter, presents it as “Antwerp’s
Prize-Winning Approach to Urban Renewal in Its Red-Light District.” The film was
commissioned by the Flemish Association for Space and Planning.
52 Yasmina Katsulis, Sex Work and The City, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009,
pp. 72, 77.
53 There are many brothels operating outside the legal system in Victoria. The state
government has proposed decriminalizing all types of prostitution, repeal of manda-
tory health testing, and removal of advertising restrictions on the grounds that the
current two-tiered system “perpetuates harm, stigmatization, and discrimination” to-
ward those working illegally. The reforms would repeal the brothel licensing system,
the very regulations that make the legal brothels operate well, as discussed in the text.
Victoria State Government, Decriminalizing Sex Work, Discussion paper, 2020.
402 Ronald Weitzer

54 Christine Harcourt et al., “The Decriminalization of Prostitution Is Associated with

Better Coverage of Health Promotion Programs for Sex Workers,” Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Public Health 34 (2010): 482-486. Note that the title of the
article is contradicted by the study findings: as Table 16.1 shows, the legalized system in
Melbourne is rated superior to the decriminalized system in Sydney.
55 The list of best practices is a somewhat revised version of what appeared in Ronald
Weitzer, Legalizing Prostitution: From Illicit Vice to Lawful Business, New York: New
York University Press, 2012.
56 Although some local residents and merchants are sympathetic to or tolerant of street
sellers, others cite a litany of grievances toward street prostitution in or near their
communities. See Maggie O’Neill and Rosie Campbell, “Street Sex Work and Local
Communities,” in R. Campbell and M. O’Neill, eds., Sex Work Now, Cullompton:
Willan, 2006; Sarah Kingston, Prostitution in the Community: Attitudes, Action, and
Resistance, London: Routledge, 2014; and Ronald Weitzer, “The Politics of
Prostitution in America,” in R. Weitzer, ed., Sex for Sale, 1st edn. New York:
Routledge, 2000.
57 Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Pornography and Prostitution in
Canada. Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services, 1985, p. 515.
58 See Chapters 1, 10, and 11.
59 Lynzi Armstrong, “From Law Enforcement to Protection? Interactions Between Sex
Workers and Police in a Decriminalized Street-Based Sex Industry,” British Journal of
Criminology 57 (2017): 570–588.
60 In the Netherlands police and health officials conduct periodic site visits to ensure
compliance with the law. According to the Ministry of Justice, “Few instances of
abuse are found during these inspections. The high frequency of the inspections and
the consequences of the sanctions for operational management are major
contributing factors in compliance by operators, as well as the operators’ own sector-
wide standards.” Dutch authorities also monitor non-licensed actors, such as free-
lance escorts or home-based providers, making appointments online and then con-
ducting an in-person interview. Of the 190 cases where sanctions (usually warnings)
were imposed between 2010 and 2015, most of these were for working illegally
without a license. This monitoring ensures that minors are not involved in the li-
censed sector and “very rarely” working as freelance escorts. Annelies Daalder,
Prostitution in the Netherlands in 2014, The Hague: Ministry of Justice, 2015.
61 Illegal operators are virtually nonexistent in New Zealand. Prostitution Law Review
Committee, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the
Prostitution Reform Act 2003, Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2008.
62 Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth, Report by
the Federal Government on the Impact of the Act Regulating the Legal Situation of Prostitutes
(Prostitution Act), Berlin: Ministry, 2007, pp. 79, 80.
63 Christine Overall, “What’s Wrong with Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work,” Signs 17
(1992): 705–724, at p. 716.