History

2. To what extent was air power decisive in the outcome of one 20th-century war?
In the Great War, pilots would “prime the bombs between their legs” and drop it themselves. The Second
World War gave birth to a new branch of the military known as the ‘air force.’ They believed that warring could
be performed solely through air crafts due to their ‘swiftness and accuracy.’ This essay aims to explore to what
extent air power was decisive in the outcome in World War 2. One side of the argument supports: the
successes of area bombing; destroying Japanese morale; preventing a Japanese land invasion; and, perhaps,
reducing the number of casualties. Adversely, the alternate argument explains: the failings of strategic
bombing; and strengthening the opposition’s morale.
The development of napalm accompanied by Curtis LeMay’s ruthlessness culminated in the Tokyo Bombing on
March 9th 1945. A survivor explained in an interview the devastating impacts, “I saw people cling onto the
Tokyo bridge and its background painted by rising flames. As the bridge’s iron got too hot, people could no
longer hanging plunging into the frostbite-inducing river below.” This was one of many aircraft attacks directed
by LeMay in 1945. 80,000 were killed. Absenteeism in factories rose to 50% in Japan. People fled to the village
in fear. Morale in Japan was broken and the country inevitable edged towards surrendering. This, perhaps,
meant that a land invasion had been avoided, which could have resulted in more casualties. Japan surrendered
following the atomic bombings. Area bombing proved devastating, on the other hand.
Army tactics like Blitzkrieg and Island Hopping were impossible without air support. Parachutists and bombs
were deployed behind enemy lines during blitzkrieg. Torpedoes aided the Navy clear the vessels guarding the
coasts. Also, before the amphibious invasions in ‘atoll hopping’ indiscriminate aircraft bombing on strategic
outposts would take place. Air power was heavily integrated in the tactics used by countries to gain an upper
hand.
Contrarily, the German move to strategic bombing was incorrect. Hitler’s restlessness meant the focus shifted
to targeting the people of Britain just when the RAF seemed to be on the verge of breaking. Hitler’s volatility
helped the RAF recover, which was later able to carry out these deadly attacks on Germany. Moreover, Speer
anticipated this would break civilian spirit. However, it only strengthened the masses. Malcolm Gladwell
explains, “There were three types of people affected by the bombings. Those ‘directly affected’ suffered from
trauma. But the ‘near misses’ felt invincible and through word of mouth mitigated the fear of the ‘distantly
missed.’” Industrial production in Britain increased even after the Blitz.
Strategic bombing, although considered more ethical, was thought to bring a faster end to the war. When
strategic bombing was being pursued to bomb Germany, the morale strengthened. There was low
absenteeism and production rose 13% in 1944 and 9% in 1945. Hence, it failed. The raid on Schweinfurt was a
failure too. The Bomber Mafia believed targeting the ball bearing factories of Germany that were concentrated
in this city would hamper engine production for aircraft, especially for the feared Messerschmitt. Only one of
the 11,000 bombs struck accurately. Thus, the introduction of Curtis LeMay who followed Arthur Harris’
dogma of area bombing.
Area bombing, the brainchild of ‘Bomber Harris’, went into action in 1943 following a meeting between
Churchill, Roosevelt, and their top military generals. Churchill, in this meeting in Casablanca, explained that the
Bomber Mafia’s strategic mafia was “proving to be futile.” The implementation of area bombing caused the
firestorm at Hamburg killing 44,000 and the firestorm at Dresden. Cities with high industrial capability were
targeted slowing armament production. Strategic bombing was not producing desired results.
Clearly, strategic bombing was a failure as it was counter-intuitive: increasing morale. Its successor, area
bombing, however, “For all the arguments over the morality or operational effectiveness was one of the
decisive elements in Allied victory. (Richard Overy)” The fact at air force was critical to other military tactics
suggests that it was the most crucial, out the army and navy too, in turning the tide of the war.

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2. To what extent was air power decisive in the outcome of one 20th-century war?

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