Electronically Filed

05/04/2023 4:01 PM

1 ORDR

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CLARK COUNTY
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AMY TARKANIAN, an individual; ELLIOT Case No.: A-22-860198-C
6 MALIN, an individual; and, JASON D. Dept. No.: 8
GUINASSO, an individual,
7 ORDER: 1) DENYING DEFENDANT
8 Plaintiffs, BENSON’S SPECIAL ANTI-SLAPP
MOTION TO DISMISS; 2) DENYING
9 vs. DEFENDANT BENSON’S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR MOTION FOR
10 ALIDA BENSON, an individual; JAMES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND,
BLOCKEY, an individual; and, DOES I
11 through X, inclusive, 3) DENYING DEFENDANT
BLOCKEY’S MOTION TO DISMISS
12 OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY
Defendants.
13 JUDGMENT

14 Hearing Date: January 31, 2023

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
15

16 This matter came before this Court pursuant to Defendant Alida Benson’s Motion to
17 Dismiss Under NRCP 12(b)(5), or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, and

18 Defendant Benson’s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRS 41.660, as well as
19 Defendant James Blockey’s Motion to Dismiss Under NRCP 12(b)(5), or, in the Alternative

20 Motion for Summary Judgment.

21 On October 21, 2022, Plaintiffs, Amy Tarkanian, Elliot Malin, and Jason D. Guinasso
22 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint against Defendants, Alida Benson and James

23 Blockey (collectively, “Defendants”), for claims of defamation per se.

24 On December 13, Defendant Alida Benson filed a Motion to Dismiss Under NRCP
25 12(b)(5), or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Special Anti-SLAPP

26 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRS 41.660. Plaintiffs opposed both motions, and Defendant
27 Benson filed replies in support of her motions.

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 1 On December 21, Defendant James Blockey filed a Motion to Dismiss Under NRCP

2 12(b)(5), or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs opposed the motion,

3 and Defendant Blockey did not file a reply brief.

4 The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, hearing oral argument from

5 the parties, and being fully advised, and good cause appearing, finds, concludes, and orders as

6 follows:

7 FINDINGS OF FACT1
8 1. Defendant Alida Benson (“Benson”) is the Executive Director of the Nevada

9 Republican Party. See Ex. 1 (“Benson Decl.”) to Benson’s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to

10 Dismiss (“SLAPP Motion”) at ¶ 2.

11 2. Defendant James Blockey (“Blockey”) is a member of the Clark County Central

12 Committee Republican Party.

13 3. Plaintiff Amy Tarkanian (“Tarkanian”) is a political commentator who appears

14 publicly on television, and is the former Chairwoman of the Nevada Republican Party. See

15 Exhibit A (“Tarkanian Decl.”) to Opposition to SLAPP Motion at ¶ 4.

16 4. Plaintiff Jason Guinasso (“Guinasso”) is a former political candidate, having

17 previously run for the Nevada State Assembly as a Republican. See Ex. 2 to SLAPP Motion, at

18 pg. 2; see also Benson Decl. at ¶ 3.

19 a. Guinasso has committed himself “over the years to many conservative

20 causes.” See Exhibit C (“Guinasso Decl.”) to Opposition to SLAPP Motion at ¶ 4.

21 5. Plaintiff Elliot Malin (“Malin”) is a registered Republican lobbyist and

22 government affairs consultant. See Exhibit B (“Malin Decl.”) to Opposition to SLAPP Motion at

23 ¶ 4; see also Ex. 2 to SLAPP Motion at pg. 2.

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Any findings of fact which are more appropriately considered conclusions of law shall be treated as such,
27 and any conclusions of law which are more appropriately considered findings of fact shall be treated as such.

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 1 6. Tarkanian, Guinasso, and Malin are all members of the group known as

2 “Republicans for Ford.” See Ex. 2 to SLAPP Motion at pg. 2.

3 7. On September 20, 2022, the Clark County Republican Central Committee

4 (“CCRCC”), a non-profit Nevada corporation, held a meeting (the “Meeting”) that was attended

5 by 202 CCRCC members and guests.

6 8. The Meeting was also live-streamed on social media, although the Court is not

7 aware of how many individuals signed in to watch it online.

8 9. At the Meeting, a proposed resolution was introduced for the CCRCC to censure

9 certain individuals, including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs Tarkanian, Malin, and Guinasso (the

10 “Resolution”). The Resolution, if passed, would indefinitely censure these certain individuals,

11 including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs, and bar them from any and all involvement in the

12 CCRCC including membership, standard or honorary, guest, or proxy, among other such

13 supposed penalties.

14 10. At the Meeting, and during discussion or debate of a motion to amend the

15 Resolution, after the reading of a full list of the individuals the Resolution sought to censure,

16 Defendant Benson made the following statement:

17 “I know most of us have read Chuck’s email. I do not agree with what he said, a
vote for an IEP is a vote for a Democrat but that is because it is a very tight race.
18 However, Chuck Muth is not fundraising for Democrats unlike Amy Tarkanian and
Elliot Malin who are personally profiting by supporting Aaron Ford. This is
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different he expressed an opinion he didn’t endorse anyone it’s an opinion I
20 disagree with but the people who are mentioned in the original censure are actively
making money and campaigning for democrats. I do not think that is the same thing
21 as expressing an opinion but that’s just my two cents.”
22 11. A few minutes after Defendant Benson spoke, and during discussion or debate of
23 the Resolution, Defendant Blockey made the following statement:

24 “these people [named in the Resolution] are paying to get Democrats [elected] . .
. they are working for Democrats, getting paid . . . it’s like being a campaign
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manager for [Democrats].”
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 1 12. Plaintiffs allege that the foregoing statements by Ms. Benson specifically the

2 statements that (1) “Chuck Muth is not fundraising for Democrats, like Amy Tarkanian and

3 Elliot Malin, who are personally profiting by supporting Aaron Ford”, and (2) “the people who

4 are mentioned in the [Resolution] are actively making money and campaigning for

5 Democrats[.]” are both false and defamatory.

6 13. Plaintiffs sued Benson for defamation on October 21, 2022.

7 14. Benson timely filed the SLAPP Motion in response to Plaintiffs’ suit on

8 December 13, 2022, and additionally filed a Motion to Dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), or, in the

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Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on that same day (“12(b)(5) Motion”).
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15. Plaintiffs also sued Blockey for defamation.
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16. Blockey did not file a SLAPP Motion and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss or in
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the alternative Motion for Summary Judgement.
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14 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

15 A. Defendant’s SLAPP Motion

16 17. A SLAPP suit is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates primarily to chill a
defendant’s exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights. Stubbs v. Strickland, 129
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Nev. 146, 150, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (2013). Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes provide defendants with
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a procedural mechanism whereby they may file a special motion to dismiss the meritless lawsuit
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before incurring significant costs of litigation. Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342,
20 345 (2020); see also Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748 (2019); Stubbs, 129

21 Nev. at 150, 297 P.3d at 329.

22 18. Under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, [a] person who engages in a good faith

23 communication . . . is immune from any civil action for claims based upon the communication.
Williams v. Lazer, 476 P.3d 928 (Nev. App. 2020); see NRS 41.650.
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19. Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes posit a two-prong analysis to determine the
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viability of a special motion to dismiss. First, the district court must “[d]etermine whether the
26 moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a
27 good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in

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 1 direct connection with an issue of public concern.” Second, if the district court finds the

2 defendant has met his or her burden, the court must then “determine whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Stark, 136
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Nev. at 40, 458 P.3d at 345 (internal citations omitted). See NRS 41.660(3)(a)-(b).
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20. Under the first prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis, the party moving for dismissal
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must show, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the moving party’s claim is based upon a
6 good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in

7 direct connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). This requires the moving

8 party to show that the comments at issue fall into one of four categories of protected
communications enumerated in NRS 41.637. Stark, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020).
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19. Although both parties seem to agree that the only category at issue here is NRS
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41.637(4) which pertains to a “communication made in direct connection with an issue of public
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interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum”, The Court would note that NRS
12 41.637(3) may also be applicable.2

13 20. Whether something equates to an issue of public concern is decided by reference to

14 the following five guiding principles:

15 (1) ‘public interest’ does not equate with mere curiosity;

(2) a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of
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people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a
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matter of public interest;
18 (3) there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the
19 asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not
20 sufficient;

21 (4) the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere
effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy; and
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NRS 41.637(3) involves a “written or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue under
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consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”
Although the Court agrees that the meeting was not an oral statement made in direct connection with an issue
26 under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, the Court does not know and was not provided
with evidence of whether this was “any other official proceeding authorized by law.”
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 1 (5) a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public interest

2 simply by communicating it to a large number of people.”

Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 13, 432 P.3d 746, 750 (2019); citing Shapiro v. Welt, 133
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Nev. 35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017) (quoting Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner
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Assocs., Inc., 946 F.Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).
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21. The Court finds Benson’s Statement was made in direct connection with an issue
6 of public interest. Activities that involve private persons and entities, especially when they

7 involve large powerful organizations which may impact the lives of many individuals are

8 certainly matters of public interest. See Fennell v. California Republican Party, No. A129558,
2011 WL 4402104, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2011); citing Church of Scientology v.
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Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 633 (1996). Moreover, where
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“allegedly defamatory statements [are] made not only in connection with an issue of interest to
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the members of [a] particular community, but also in the context of an ongoing controversy,
12 debate or discussion within that community [such as] a decision about future association

13 governance [or] an election of officers[,] ... protection of the statements at issue ... serves the

14 anti-SLAPP statute's purpose of encouraging participation in an ongoing controversy, debate or

15 discussion.” Fennell, 2011 WL 4402104 at *6. It is evident that at the time the allegedly
defamatory statements were made, Plaintiffs were involved in “an ongoing controversy, debate
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or discussion” within the state Republican Party “community” concerning their present and
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potential future service within that party. Moreover, the statements made by Ms. Benson related
18 to the censure for those party members who openly and publicly endorsed the Attorney General
19 candidate for the opposing political party. Benson’s statements were made in the context of an

20 inherently political matter (Republican support of Democrat candidates). The ability for political

21 parties to censure (or not censure) its members for supporting members of another political party
is critical to a political party’s ability to self-govern. Thus, Benson’s accusations against
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Plaintiffs were made in connection with an issue of public interest.
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22. Benson’s statement was made in a place open to the public or in a public forum.
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Although Plaintiffs argue that this was a private association and thus the CCRCC could limit
25 attendance, requiring a finding by this Court that it was not a place open to the public or in a

26 public forum, the Court disagrees. NRS 41.637(4), as evidenced by the disjunctive use of “or,”
27 does not limit “good faith communications” to only events in which any member of the public

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 1 can access said event. NRS 41.637(4) clearly allows for good faith communications made “in a

2 public forum” separate from statements made in a place “open to the public.” On this basis alone,
even if the September 20, 2022 meeting was limited to just members of the Republican Party and
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their guests, this would still constitute a “public forum.” Putting aside the issue of whether any
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member of the public could physically attend the meeting and participate in person, this Court
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finds that the September 20, 2022 meeting was accessible to the public, regardless of whether
6 they were registered Republicans or not. Plaintiffs have conceded in their Complaint that the

7 Statement, as well as the entirety of the September 20, 2022 CCRCC meeting, was livestreamed

8 in real time. Additionally, the Court notes that the meeting was indeed livestreamed on at least
one public Facebook page (the Johnny Bru Show). See Ex. 6 to SLAPP Motion. Accordingly, the
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Court finds that the statement was made in a public forum.
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23. However, Benson must also establish that her statement was truthful or made
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without knowledge of its falsehood, and this is where Benson’s Motion fails. Benson has the
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burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her statements were “truthful or
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… made without knowledge of [their] falsehood.” Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436, 439, 453
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P.3d 1220, 1223 (2019); NRS 41.637.
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Benson only provided the Court with Aaron Ford’s webpage and an article in the Review
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Journal to support that she knew at the time she made the statement that it was truthful or made
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without knowledge of its falsehood. However, those documents only provide that Tarkanian,
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Malin, and Guinasso were “endorsing” Aaron Ford. Nowhere in any of those documents does it
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state that Amy Tarkanian, Jason Guinasso, or Elliot Malin were “fundraising, making money, or
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personally profiting” from campaigning for Democrats.” Therefore, there is simply no evidence
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for this Court to conclude at this juncture that Ms. Benson knew at the time that she made the
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statement of “Amy Tarkanian and Elliot Malin are personally profiting by supporting Aaron
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Ford [or] the people who are mentioned in the original censure are actively making money and
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campaigning for democrats.” was true or made without knowledge of its falsehood. Moreover,
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Benson’s declaration does not state that at the time she made the statement that she believed it to
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be true or that she made it without knowledge of its falsehood. Benson’s declaration merely
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 1 states what certain exhibits represent. Her declaration does not state that she read these

2 documents and believed them to be true prior to making her statement. Additionally, some of

3 those documents were after the statement was made and thus do not support what she knew at

4 the time she made the statement. The Court simply does not have any admissible evidence to

5 support that Benson knew at the time she made the statement that it was true or made without

6 knowledge of it being false.

7 24. Because Benson has failed to provide the Court with any evidence establishing

8 that at the time she made the statement she either believed it to be true or she made it without

9 knowledge that it was false, the Court must deny the Special Motion to Dismiss. See Coker, 135

10 Nev. at 12-13, 432 P.3d at 750 (holding that a defendant who made no reference whatsoever in

11 his declaration as to whether his statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their

12 falsehood did not meet his burden under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis); Delucchi v.

13 Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 300, 396 P.3d 826, 833 (2017) (holding that a defendant demonstrated

14 that his communication was true or made without knowledge of its falsehood when, in a

15 declaration, he stated that the information contained in his communication “was truthful to the

16 best of his knowledge, and he made no statements he knew to be false”); see also Taylor v.

17 Colon, 136 Nev. 434, 440-41, 482 P.3d 1212, 1218 (2020) (holding that a declarant’s assertion

18 that he made a communication he believed to be true and accurate constituted a showing of good
19 faith).

20 25. Benson did not meet her burden pursuant to step one and as such the Court

21 declines to analyze step two. See Spirtos v Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 714, 499 P.3d 611, 616

22 (2021) (If the defendant fails to satisfy step one, the court need not evaluate step two.).

23 B. Defendant Benson and Blockey’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for

24 Summary Judgment
26. A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) tests the legal sufficiency of
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the claim set out against the moving party. See Zalk-Josephs Co. v. Wells-Cargo, Inc., 81 Nev.
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163, 170, 400 P.2d 621, 625 (1965). The court must accept all factual allegations in the
27 complaint as true, and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of Las

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 1 Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). Dismissal is proper if it appears beyond a

2 doubt that [plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief. Id.
27. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, Nevada courts use a burden-
3
shifting approach to determine whether the standard for summary judgment has been met. Cuzze
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v. Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 602-03, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (2007). The
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initial burden rests with the moving party. Id. at 602, 172 P.3d at 134. The moving party must
6 show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which would entitle it to judgment on the

7 claims at issue. Id. If such a showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, to

8 show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. A party resisting summary judgment
must do more than raise speculative or conclusory arguments to show that a genuine issue of
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material fact exists; it must “transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible
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evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.” See Id. at 603, 172
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P.3d at 134. If the nonmoving party satisfies this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate;
12 if it fails to do so, summary judgment must be granted. See NRCP 56(a).

13 28. When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence, and any
14 reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

15 party.” Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). “Where an
essential element of a claim for relief is absent, the facts, disputed or otherwise, as to other
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elements are rendered immaterial and summary judgment is proper.” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada
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Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 111, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992). Additionally, where a Defendant can negate
18 one of the essential elements of the Plaintiffs claim for relief summary judgment is appropriate.
19 Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 134. Accordingly, if Plaintiffs cannot provide a legally

20 sufficient basis to support an element of its defamation claim, or if Defendant can negate an

21 essential element of the defamation claim summary judgment on that claim is appropriate.
29. In Nevada, to establish a prima facie case of defamation, a plaintiff must prove:
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(1) a false and defamatory statement by defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged
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publication to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or
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presumed damages. Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 483, 851 P.2d 459, 462 (1993);
25 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 (1977).

26 30. Whether a statement is capable of a defamatory construction is a question of law.

27 If a statement is capable of different meanings one of which is defamatory and the other which is

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 1 not, a jury question arises. Chowdhry, 109 Nev. at 484, 851 P.2d at 463; citing Branda v.

2 Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1981). But in a defamation action, “it is not the
literal truth of ‘each word or detail used in a statement which determines whether or not it is
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defamatory; rather, the determinative question is whether the “gist or sting” of the statement is
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true or false.’” Rosen, 135 Nev. at 440, 453 P.3d at 1224.
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31. The Court finds that the parties allege different conclusions as to what the “gist”
6 or “sting” of both Benson and Blockey’s statements are. Defendant proffers that the gist of the

7 statements relate to the fact that Plaintiffs were fundamentally different than Chuck Muth,

8 whereas Plaintiff alleges that the gist or sting was that the Plaintiffs were “personally profiting
and making money off of supporting Aaron Ford.” Plaintiff alleges that this statement imputes
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some sort of bribery or nefarious conduct to the Plaintiffs which have harmed them in their
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professions.
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32. As is clear, the statements are capable of two different meanings one of which
12 would be defamatory, the other not. Therefore, it is a question of fact for the jury.

13 33. Because the Court cannot decide as a matter of law whether Benson’s or Blockey’s
14 statements are false or defamatory the question must be left for the finder of fact and thus

15 summary judgment is inappropriate.

34. Additionally, there are issues of fact as to whether there was an unprivileged
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publication and whether Plaintiffs are public figures, limited public figures, or private figures,
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which would impact whether Plaintiff must only prove fault, amounting to negligence, or actual
18 malice.
19 35. As shown above, if Plaintiff is required to prove actual malice there is a question
20 of fact as to what Benson believed at the time she made the statement.

21 36. As it pertains to Blockey’s statement, he failed to include any admissible evidence

22 establishing what he believed at the time he made the statement.

23 ///

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25 ///

26 ///
27 ///

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 1 ORDER
2 NOW THEREFORE, based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
3 the Court DENIES Defendant Alida Benson’s Motion to Dismiss Under NRCP 12(b)(5), or, in

4 the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.

5 FURTHERMORE, the Court DENIES Defendant Benson’s Special Anti-SLAPP

6 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRS 41.660.

7 FURTHERMORE, the Court DENIES Defendant James Blockey’s Motion to Dismiss

8 Under NRCP 12(b)(5), or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
19 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the
preceding Order filed in District Court case number
20 A860198 DOES NOT contain the social security
number of any person.
21 __ /s/ Jessica K Peterson _
_________________
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 1
CSERV
2
DISTRICT COURT
3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
4

6 Amy Tarkanian, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-22-860198-C

7 vs. DEPT. NO. Department 8

8 Alida Benson, Defendant(s)

10 AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11
This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
12 Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court’s electronic eFile system to all
recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:
13
Service Date: 5/4/2023
14

15
Bradley Schrager bschrager@wrslawyers.com

16 Dannielle Fresquez dfresquez@wrslawyers.com

17 Daniel Bravo dbravo@wrslawyers.com

18 Cally Hatfield chatfield@maclaw.com
19
Timothy Treffinger AttorneyTreffinger@gmail.com
20
Nathalie Martinez TreffingerLawOffice@gmail.com
21
Melissa Shield mshield@wrslawyers.com
22

23 Michelle Monkarsh mmonkarsh@maclaw.com

24 Brian Hardy bhardy@maclaw.com

25 Harry Arnold harnold@maclaw.com

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