Evanston V Monsanto
Evanston V Monsanto
Evanston V Monsanto
ZOOM. Jury
For more information and Zoom Meeting IDs go to https://www.cookcountycourt.org/HOME/Zoom-Links/Agg4906_SelectTab/12
Remote Court date: 5/30/2023 10:00 AM
FILED
3/24/2023 3:04 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
COOK COUNTY, IL
2023L002929
Calendar, D
22015300
CITY OF EVANSTON, CITY OF LAKE )
FOREST, CITY OF NORTH CHICAGO, CITY )
OF ZION, VILLAGE OF BEACH PARK, )
VILLAGE OF GLENCOE, VILLAGE OF ) Case No. 2023L002929
LAKE BLUFF, VILLAGE OF WINNETKA, )
and VILLAGE OF WINTHROP HARBOR, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
)
v. )
)
)
)
MONSANTO CO., SOLUTIA INC., )
PHARMACIA LLC, and UNIVAR )
SOLUTIONS INC., )
)
)
Defendants.
Zion, the Village of Beach Park, the Village of Glencoe, the Village of Lake Bluff, the Village of
Winnetka, and the Village of Winthrop Harbor (collectively, “the Municipalities” or “Plaintiffs”)
file this complaint seeking monetary damages to address pollution of these jurisdictions by
I. INTRODUCTION
Lake Michigan. Although PCBs were banned in the late 1970s, they continue to exist in the
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environment due to releases from products manufactured before the ban. PCBs released from
such products continue to drain into Lake Michigan through municipal separate storm sewer
systems (“MS4s”), including the Municipalities’ MS4s. The accumulation of PCBs in natural
resources, and fish in particular, poses a public health threat, including to residents of the
Municipalities.
Monsanto”), which was the corporate predecessor to Defendants Monsanto Co. (sometimes
referred to herein as “New Monsanto”), Solutia Inc. (“Solutia”) and Pharmacia LLC
referred to herein as the “Monsanto Defendants,” and together with Old Monsanto, as
“Monsanto.” The remaining Defendant is Univar Solutions Inc. (“Univar”), which distributed
3. For decades, Monsanto knew that its commercial PCB formulations were highly
toxic and would inevitably produce precisely the contamination and human health risks that have
occurred. Yet Monsanto intentionally misled the public about these key facts, maintaining that
its PCB formulations were safe, were not environmentally hazardous, and did not require any
4. Similarly, Univar knew or should have known that the PCB products it sold in the
Chicago area would inevitably cause widespread contamination, yet it continued selling these
5. By marketing and selling PCBs in this way, Defendants created a vast public
nuisance in the Municipalities. This action seeks to require Defendants to pay for efforts by the
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6. As a result of Defendants’ sales of PCB products in and/or around the
including Lake Michigan. As a result of the contamination in Lake Michigan in particular, the
Municipalities must reduce PCB contamination in stormwater they discharge to Lake Michigan.
regulatory requirement, known as a “Total Maximum Daily Load,” for PCBs for the portion of
Lake Michigan that abuts Illinois (“Lake Michigan TMDL”). To comply with this TMDL and
with the stormwater discharge permit issued by IEPA, the Municipalities must reduce their PCB
7. This lawsuit seeks to shift the costs associated with reducing or eliminating PCB
II. JURISDICTION
8. The Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Article VI, Section
9. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants under 735 ILCS 5/2-209
because Defendants have conducted continuous, systematic, and substantial business in Illinois
and have entered into contracts or made promises that are substantially connected to Illinois.
10. Venue for this action lies in Cook County, Illinois, pursuant to section 2-101 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-101, in that this action arises out of transactions and
activities that occurred in part in Cook County. About 40% of all PCB mixtures sold and used in
Illinois were sold to customers in Cook County. These PCBs now contaminate Lake Michigan, as
described herein.
11. The Municipalities do not seek, and hereby disclaim, any relief with respect to
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any federal lands, federal enclaves, or any federal interests in any property or resources.
III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
12. The Municipalities are municipal corporations capable of suing and being sued
under Illinois law. Each of the Municipalities owns and operates a storm sewer system that
discharges stormwater to Lake Michigan. Complying with the Lake Michigan TMDL and
corporation with its principal place of business at 800 North Lindbergh Blvd., St. Louis,
Missouri 63167. Following a merger transaction that closed in 2018, New Monsanto is a
14. Defendant Solutia Inc. (Solutia, as defined above) is a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business at 575 Maryville Centre Drive, St. Louis, Missouri, 63166. Solutia
Pharmacia Corporation, is the successor to the original Monsanto Company (Old Monsanto, as
defined above). Pharmacia LLC is a Delaware company with its principal place of business at
100 Route 206 N, Peapack, New Jersey 07977. Pharmacia is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Pfizer, Inc.
nutrition business, and a chemical products business. Old Monsanto began manufacturing PCBs
in 1935 after acquiring Swann Chemical Company, which manufactured PCBs from 1929 to
1935. Old Monsanto continued to manufacture commercial PCBs until the late 1970s.
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17. Through a series of transactions beginning in approximately 1997, Old
18. The corporation now known as Monsanto Company (and referred to herein as
21. Solutia was organized by Old Monsanto to own and operate its chemical
manufacturing business. Solutia assumed the operations, assets, and liabilities of Old
22. Although Solutia assumed and agreed to indemnify Pharmacia for certain
liabilities related to the chemicals business, Defendants have also entered into agreements to
share or apportion liabilities, and/or to indemnify one or more entities, for claims arising from
Old Monsanto’s chemical business, including the manufacture and sale of PCBs.
23. In 2003, Solutia filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Solutia’s reorganization was completed in 2008. In connection with
Solutia’s Plan of Reorganization, Solutia, Pharmacia, and New Monsanto entered into several
agreements under which New Monsanto continues to manage and assume financial responsibility
for certain tort litigation and environmental remediation related to the chemicals business.
24. Eastman Chemical Co. (Solutia’s parent) reported in its 2020 Form 10-K that it
“has been named as a defendant in several [legacy tort] proceedings, and has submitted the
matters to [New] Monsanto, which was acquired by Bayer AG in June 2018, as Legacy Tort
Claims [as defined in a settlement agreement with Monsanto arising out of Solutia’s bankruptcy
proceedings]. To the extent these matters are not within the meaning of Legacy Tort Claims,
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Solutia could potentially be liable thereunder. In connection with the completion of its
acquisition of Solutia, Eastman guaranteed the obligations of Solutia and Eastman was added as
25. In its Form 10-K for the period ending August 31, 2017, filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the last such filing before Bayer AG acquired New
remediation and legal proceedings to which Monsanto is a party in its own name and
proceedings to which its former parent, Pharmacia LLC or its former subsidiary, Solutia, Inc. is a
party but that Monsanto manages and for which Monsanto is responsible pursuant to certain
indemnification agreements. In addition, Monsanto has liabilities established for various product
claims. With respect to certain of these proceedings, Monsanto has established a reserve for the
estimated liabilities.” The filing specifies that the company held $277 million in that reserve as
C. Univar
26. Defendant Univar Solutions Inc. (“Univar”) is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business at 3075 Highland Parkway, Suite 200, Downers Grove, Illinois
60515. Including through its predecessor Central Solvents & Chemical Co. (“Central
Solvents”), Univar distributed products containing Monsanto’s PCBs to customers in the greater
Chicago area. Central Solvents was at all relevant times one of the largest and most
27. PCBs are a class of chemical compounds in which a minimum of two and a
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maximum of ten chlorine atoms are attached to the biphenyl molecule.
29. There are 209 distinct PCB compounds (known as congeners) with from 2 to 10
chlorine atoms on a biphenyl molecule. The number and placement of the chlorine atoms on the
biphenyl molecule determines how the congener is named and dictates its environmental fate and
30. Old Monsanto manufactured PCB mixtures primarily under the “Aroclor” trade
name. Aroclors are differentiated principally by the composition of chlorine by weight, so, for
example, “Aroclor 1254” means the mixture contains approximately 54% chlorine by weight.
Generally, the higher the chlorine content of a PCB mixture, the higher its persistence and
toxicity.
31. PCBs do not burn easily, are hydrophobic (i.e., they do not dissolve in water but
32. PCBs are semi-volatile. Small amounts of PCBs vaporize from PCB-containing
products and PCB-contaminated sites, resulting in long-range transport of PCB vapors, at normal
more PCBs are released to the atmosphere from PCB-containing products or PCB-contaminated
sites as temperature increases. Once released into the atmosphere, PCBs are eventually deposited
into other media nearby, such as soil, sediment, and water bodies.
33. PCBs entered the air, water, sediments, and soils during their ordinary and
prescribed uses. Indeed, PCBs gradually escaped and dispersed from their common applications,
e.g., in road paint or caulking, into the natural environment due to the chemical compounds’
inherent tendency to volatilize, that is to emit PCB vapors, particularly when exposed to heat
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(such as when road paint or building materials are exposed to the sun over time). As vapors,
PCBs travel through the air, eventually settling in nearby soil, sediment, or water bodies.
34. Similarly, PCBs can be released by the grinding, scraping, and removal of
caulking and other construction materials that include PCBs, resulting in the contamination of
nearby soil.
35. PCBs entered the environment from spills or leaks, for example through transport
of the chemicals, from leaks or fires in transformers, capacitors, or other products containing
PCBs, and from the burning of wastes in some municipal or industrial incinerators. PCB
transformers release PCB vapors or fluids in the ordinary course of use, e.g., by venting or
releasing pressure.
36. In addition, Old Monsanto prescribed that PCBs and PCB-contaminated wastes
should be disposed of in the ordinary course in landfills, from where they easily escaped,
37. Old Monsanto advised customers to discharge liquid PCB wastes into sewers
when it knew that this would directly introduce PCBs into surface waters, and to vent PCB
vapors to the atmosphere when it knew that this would directly introduce PCBs into the
38. Once in the environment, PCBs do not break down readily and may remain for
39. In water, PCBs travel along currents and attach to bottom sediment or particles in
the water and evaporate into air or settle into sediment. Sediments contaminated with PCBs
release PCBs into surrounding water. In soil, PCBs combine with soil organic matter and remain
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40. PCBs are taken up into the bodies of small organisms and fish in water. They are
also taken up by other animals that eat these aquatic animals as food, and eventually by humans.
PCBs especially accumulate in fish and marine animals, reaching levels that may be many
thousands of times higher than in water because PCBs are soluble in lipids (including body fat)
and bio-accumulate and bio-magnify over time in living tissue. Indeed, PCB levels are highest
41. Humans are exposed to PCBs primarily from eating contaminated food, breathing
contaminated air, or drinking or swimming in contaminated water. The major dietary sources of
PCBs are fish (especially sportfish caught in contaminated water bodies), meat, and dairy
products. PCBs collect in milk fat and can enter the bodies of infants through breast-feeding.
42. Fetuses in the womb are exposed to PCBs through their mothers. Studies show
that babies born to mothers exposed to high concentrations of PCBs in the workplace or from
eating PCB-contaminated fish suffer from lower birth weight than other babies. Babies born to
women exposed to PCBs before and during pregnancy showed abnormal responses to infant
behavioral tests, including motor skills, and experienced short-term memory deficiencies.
43. Many studies have examined how PCBs affect human health. Human health
effects associated with PCB exposure include liver, thyroid, dermal, and ocular changes,
44. Due to the importance of the thyroid to brain development, PCBs’ effects on the
exposure include abnormal reflexes and deficits in memory, learning, impulse control, and IQ.
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Such changes affect infants and children more severely than adults.
disturbances in women and effects on sperm morphology and production in men, all of which
46. PCBs are associated with a number of cancers, including cancer of the liver,
47. In 1996, EPA assessed PCB carcinogenicity based on data related to Aroclors
1016, 1242, 1254, and 1260. EPA’s cancer assessment was peer-reviewed by 15 experts on
PCBs, including scientists from government, academia, and industry. All experts agreed that
PCBs are probable human carcinogens. Similarly, the International Agency for Research on
Cancer, an intergovernmental agency that is part of the World Health Organization of the United
Nations, concluded in March 2013 that PCBs are known human carcinogens.
mixtures are highly toxic to fish and wildlife. For example, toxicity studies have demonstrated
50. In 1936, many workers at a New York facility using PCBs and operated by
Halowax Corporation were afflicted with severe chloracne. Three workers died and autopsies
investigate the issue, and Dr. Drinker’s analysis was presented at a 1937 meeting attended by
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high-level personnel employed by Old Monsanto.
52. Dr. Drinker’s investigation revealed that rats exposed to PCBs suffered severe
liver damage. Dr. Drinker’s results were published in a September 1937 issue of the Journal of
53. That same year, Old Monsanto admitted in an internal report that PCBs produce
“systemic toxic effects” as a result of prolonged exposure to PCB vapors or oral ingestion, and
that bodily contact with PCBs produces “an acne-form skin eruption.”
54. Old Monsanto subsequently retained Dr. Drinker to conduct further animal
studies. In September 1938, Dr. Drinker confirmed liver damage in rats exposed to various
55. Other studies explored and confirmed the toxicity of chlorinated hydrocarbons
like PCBs. A 1939 study published in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, for
example, referred to the worker fatalities investigated by Drinker and went on to conclude that
pregnant women and persons previously affected by liver disease are particularly susceptible to
56. In February 1950, Old Monsanto Medical Director Dr. R. Emmet Kelly
acknowledged that when workers fell ill at an Indiana factory that used PCBs in the
manufacturing process, he immediately “suspected the possibility that the Aroclor fumes may
acknowledged that in the “early days of development,” workers at a plant in Anniston, Alabama
58. In 1955, Dr. Kelly further documented the company’s clear understanding: “We
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know Aroclors are toxic[.]” Dr. Kelly appeared to recognize the scope of Old Monsanto’s
potential legal liability, explaining that “our main worry is what will happen if an individual
develop[s] any type of liver disease and gives a history of Aroclor exposure. I am sure the juries
would not pay a great deal of attention to [maximum allowable concentration levels].”
59. Old Monsanto’s Medical Department prohibited workers from eating lunch in the
Aroclor department in November 1955. The Department memorandum explained that “Aroclor
vapors and other process vapors could contaminate the lunches unless they were properly
protected” and that “[w]hen working with this material, the chance of contaminating hands and
60. In January 1957, Dr. Kelly reported that the U.S. Navy had refused to use
Monsanto’s PCB products in submarines: “No matter how we discussed the situation, it was
impossible to change their thinking that Pydraul 150 [a PCB product marketed by Old Monsanto]
61. Notably, at the same time it was manufacturing PCBs, Old Monsanto also
62. By the late 1940s, Old Monsanto had already researched and compiled an
extensive toxicological profile of DDT, showing that it is extremely toxic to human and
environmental health. Indeed, by then, scientific researchers had established that DDT and other
chlorinated hydrocarbons are absorbed and stored in fatty tissue of living organisms exposed to
63. The American Journal of Public Health published a 1950 report warning that
“chlorinated hydrocarbons, such as DDT and chlordane, are soluble in fats and are stored in the
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fatty tissues of the body. These compounds possess a high order of toxicity, and their
uncontrolled or unwise use is not desirable.” As Old Monsanto knew, the same was and is true
64. Extensive scientific research establishing the toxicity and bio-accumulative and
bio-persistent nature of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons was published from the 1940s
to the 1960s. Old Monsanto produced DDT and was acutely aware of this research, and of the
65. In 1966, the New Scientist published a short article (“Report of a New Chemical
University’s Institution of Analytical Chemistry, which estimated that PCBs may be spreading
66. Søren Jensen had accidentally found enormous quantities of PCB compounds in
wildlife while analyzing DDT accumulations. Dr. Jensen presented his findings to the scientific
community in 1966, including that PCBs “appear[] to be the most injurious chlorinated
compounds of all tested.” Dr. Jensen reported that the “main characteristic[s]” of PCBs include
their “very high stability,” lack of “metaboliz[ation] in living organism[s],” and their non-
flammability.
67. Old Monsanto’s Medical Director, Dr. Kelly, was aware of Dr. Jensen’s findings
at the time.
the University of California entitled, “Polychlorinated Biphenyls in the Global Ecosystem.” The
article assessed PCB presence in marine wildlife and reports high concentrations of PCBs
detected in peregrine falcons and 34 other bird species, drawing a connection between PCBs and
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the catastrophic decline of peregrine falcon populations in the United States.
69. Old Monsanto personnel took note of Dr. Risebrough’s article, recognizing the
public-relations disaster it portended. W.R. Richard, manager of Old Monsanto’s Research and
Development of Organics Division, wrote in early 1969 that the article shows not only that PCBs
are “toxic substance[s]” but also because they are easily and broadly distributed in air and water,
they are “an uncontrollable pollutant … causing [the] extinction of [the] peregrine falcon …
70. In 1969, Dr. Jensen published the formal results of his years-long research into
PCBs in the environment. Dr. Jensen’s research demonstrated very high PCB concentrations in
Baltic Sea fauna such as white-tailed sea eagles. As a recent commentator observed,
summarizing the implications of Dr. Jensen’s results, “PCBs had entered the environment in
large quantities for more than 37 years and were bio-accumulating along the food chain.”
Aroclor.” Richard’s memo notes that critics of PCBs have raised a multitude of different issues
with the compounds, so “[w]e can’t defend vs. everything. Some animals or fish or insects will
be harmed. Aroclor degradation rate will be slow. Tough to defend against. Higher chlorination
compounds will be worse [than] lower chlorine compounds. Therefore, we will have to restrict
uses and clean-up as much as we can, starting immediately.” In the same document, Richard
admitted that PCBs will leak from virtually all applications, including such “closed” applications
72. That same month, Old Monsanto formed what it dubbed the “Aroclor Ad Hoc
Committee” to strategize about defending its PCB business against a growing public outcry and
growing evidence of PCBs’ toxicity and environmental harms. The minutes of the Committee’s
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first meeting observed that PCBs had been found in fish, oysters, shrimp, and birds, along the
coasts of industrialized areas including Great Britain, Sweden, the Rhine River, Lake Michigan,
73. The Committee acknowledged that normal and intended uses of PCB-containing
products were the cause of the contamination: “In one application alone (highway paints), one
million lbs/year are used. Through abrasion and leaching we can assume that nearly all of this
74. The Committee worked to formulate a response to growing concerns over PCBs,
including those reflected by the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service
(which found PCBs in dead eagles and marine birds), the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
(which found PCBs in the river below Monsanto’s Pensacola plant), and the U.S. Food and Drug
75. The Committee’s constitutive agenda was to: “1. Protect continued sales and
profits of Aroclors; 2. Permit continued development of new uses and sales; and 3. Protect the
image of the Organic Division and the Corporation as members of the business community
ecosystem.”
76. As the minutes reflect, “there is little probability that any action that can be taken
will prevent the growing incrimination of specific polychlorinated biphenyls … as nearly global
killing of some marine species (shrimp), and the possible extinction of several species of fish-
eating birds.” However, while “there is no practical course of action that can so effectively
police the uses of these products as to prevent environmental contamination … [t]here are … a
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number of actions which must be undertaken to prolong the manufacture, sale and use of these
particular Aroclors as well as to protect the continued use of other members of the Aroclor
series.”
77. In keeping with the corporate strategy reflected in the Aroclor Ad Hoc Committee
meeting minutes and elsewhere, Old Monsanto not only continued producing Aroclors through
1969, but increased production that year and in 1970, which were the highest volume production
reports discussing results of animal studies in January 1970, in which Dr. Wheeler noted that
79. Old Monsanto knew that the PCBs they produced were used in “household
products” and aggressively promoted this use of PCBs. For example, in a 1960 brochure, Old
Monsanto promoted the use of Aroclors in a wide variety of household and personal products
including home appliances, food cookers, potato chip fryers, thermostats, automotive
transmission oil, insecticides, waxes used in dental casting, jewelry, lubricants, adhesives,
moisture-proof coatings, printing inks, papers, sealants and caulking compounds, tack coatings,
asphalt, paints, varnishes, lacquers, masonry coatings for swimming pools, stucco homes, and
80. A 1961 brochure published by Old Monsanto explained that Aroclors are used in
“lacquers for women’s shoes,” as a “wax for the flame proofing of Christmas trees,” as “floor
wax,” as an adhesive for bookbinding, leather, and shoes, and as invisible marking ink used to
81. Old Monsanto knew that PCBs were used in products certain to directly result in
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contamination of the environment, such as highway paints and other exterior applications.
points memorandum to be used in engaging with customers raising concerns over PCB toxicity.
Although Old Monsanto had reformulated certain high-chlorine congeners (Aroclor 1254 and
1260) to lower the chlorine content, it instructed employees to resist product returns of the more
toxic congener formulations, explaining that Old Monsanto “can’t afford to lose one dollar of
business.” The memo instructed employees to advise customers to use up their existing Aroclor
1254 and 1260 stock before topping up with new fluids: “We don’t want to take fluid back.”
83. As described above, Old Monsanto knew that PCBs are toxic to human and
environmental health, and that their commercial PCB products would leach, leak, off-gas, and
escape their ordinary and intended applications and from disposal sites—regardless of the nature
of the application—to contaminate waters, soils, and air. Even with this knowledge, Old
Monsanto issued no public warning or instruction about PCBs or the health and environmental
84. On the contrary, Old Monsanto lied, expressly denying the harmfulness and
environmental toxicity of PCBs. Old Monsanto made no public disclosure of the high risk that
PCBs posed to the environment and continued to recommend disposal of PCB waste materials in
local landfills. For example, Old Monsanto executive William Papageorge acknowledged in
testimony provided in 1975 to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources that Old
85. As government investigations and formal inquiries into the dangers of PCBs
amplified in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Old Monsanto doubled down on its campaign of
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86. For example, Howard S. Bergen, from Old Monsanto’s Functional Fluids
division, sent a letter dated March 27, 1969, to the Regional Water Quality Control Board of the
San Francisco Bay Region, in which he claimed that PCBs are associated with “no special health
problems,” and that due to PCBs’ chemical inertness, “we would anticipate no problems
associated with the environment from refuse dumps.” Both of those statements were false and
87. Dr. Wheeler, Assistant Director of Old Monsanto’s Medical Department, told a
representative of the National Air Pollution Control Administration in May 1969 that Old
Monsanto “cannot conceive how the PCBs can be getting into the environment in a widespread
fashion.”
88. Old Monsanto similarly claimed ignorance of how PCBs could be entering the
environment in large quantities to a number of other public entities, regulators, and authorities,
including the New Jersey Department of Conservation. In July 1969, the company claimed that,
“[b]ased on the available data, manufacturing and use experience, we do not believe PCBs to be
seriously toxic,” adding that, “we are unable at this time to conceive of how the PCBs can
become widespread in the environment. It is certain that no applications to our knowledge have
been made where the PCB’s would be broadcast in the same fashion as the chlorinated
hydrocarbon pesticides have been.” Those statements were false, as Old Monsanto knew at the
time.
89. At the same time that it was internally acknowledging that PCBs are “about the
same” as DDT, in January 1970, the journal Environment published a note authored by Old
Monsanto: “Monsanto Statement on PCB.” The company note acknowledged that recent studies,
including Dr. Jensen’s studies, indicated PCBs’ widespread presence in the natural environment,
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and expressed the company’s “concern[] over the situation.”
90. However, the note defended PCBs by deploying a variety of false statements that
Old Monsanto used on multiple occasions in the late 1960s and early 1970s to minimize the
91. In particular, Old Monsanto claimed that (a) PCBs cannot escape so-called
“closed applications” where PCBs are “completely sealed in metal containers”; (b) PCBs cannot
escape applications such as adhesives, elastomers, and surface coatings; (c) PCBs are not “to our
knowledge” used in “household products”; and (d) it is simply “not true” that PCBs are “highly
toxic.”
92. Old Monsanto knew that all of these statements were untrue and would mislead
93. Similarly, Old Monsanto falsely asserted in the note that research it conducted
into PCB toxicity in fish and mammals and PCB presence in waters and soils provided “[v]ery
94. Contrary to their published claims, Old Monsanto knew PCBs would leach, leak,
off-gas, and escape their ordinary and intended applications, including closed applications, and
95. Old Monsanto’s Dr. Kelly communicated with the Ohio State Board of Health in
March 1970 regarding the detection of PCBs, particularly Aroclor 1254, in samples of milk from
at least three herds in Ohio. The Board traced this contamination back to Aroclor-containing
paint flaking off and possibly leaching from the interior walls of the silos in which the milk was
stored. The Board reported to Old Monsanto that it would have to destroy about 150 tons of
milk, valued at about $30 per ton. The Board reported that there may be 50 other silos similarly
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contaminated in the state that were painted with the same formulation. In response, Dr. Kelly
communicated to other Old Monsanto officials: “All in all, this could be quite a serious problem,
having legal and publicity overtones. This brings us to a very serious point. When are we going
to tell our customers not to use any Aroclor in any paint formulation that contacts food, feed, or
water for animals or humans? I think it is very important that this be done.”
96. Old Monsanto refused to heed Dr. Kelly’s admonition to warn of the dangers of
similar applications of Aroclors, and instead continue to mislead customers and the public.
97. An internal memorandum prepared by Dr. Kelly dated February 10, 1967,
continued to express his concern about PCB contamination: “We are very worried about what is
liable to happen in the [United States] when the various technical and lay news media pick up the
subject [of PCB contamination]. This is especially critical at this time because air pollution is
getting a tremendous amount of publicity in the United States.” The memo noted that some of
Monsanto’s largest PCB customers, such as NCR (National Cash Register), had been pressing
Monsanto to furnish more information on PCB safety, but that Monsanto had dodged their
inquiries.
98. Old Monsanto’s misrepresentations and omissions to public entities and others
were designed to conceal the toxicity and hazardousness of its PCB formulations to humans and
the natural environment in order to salvage what Monsanto repeatedly emphasized was “one of
revenues.
around 1969 advised against exiting the Aroclor market despite clear knowledge of its dangers
because “there is too much customer/market need and selfishly too much Monsanto profit to go
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out.” Another internal Monsanto memorandum remarked, “There can not [sic] be too much
emphasis given to the threat of curtailment or outright discontinuance of the manufacture and
100. In short, though Old Monsanto had a complete and comprehensive record of all
PCB-related scientific research and general reportage during the relevant time period (an August
6, 1971 internal memorandum noted that the company “ha[s] probably the world’s best reference
file on the PCB situation”), the company failed to timely alert regulators and the public of the
dangers of its PCBs, and did not take adequate steps to stave off the impending environmental
disaster—a course of conduct aimed at shielding the company’s sales, profits, and reputation.
101. Rather than admit the hazards associated with widespread PCB usage and take
appropriate corrective action, Old Monsanto elected to finally withdraw from certain markets in
around 1972. Old Monsanto continued producing and marketing PCB products for limited
102. Even after Old Monsanto stopped manufacturing and selling its PCB products, it
continued to deceive the public about PCBs. For example, in 1980, Old Monsanto publicly and
falsely stated that “PCBs are considered only mildly toxic on an acute basis when ingested by
humans – about on the same order as common table salt” and that “[t]here has never been a
single documented case in this country where PCBs ever caused serious human health
problems.” In 2009, New Monsanto issued a public statement falsely downplaying the toxicity
of PCBs: “Scientific studies have been undertaken for more than three decades on the health
issues involving PCBs. They are continuing today. There is no scientific consensus on the health
effects. The weight of scientific evidence does not support any causal link between exposure to
PCBs and cancer or other significant human illnesses.” Similarly, New Monsanto’s director of
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environmental communications acknowledged in 2004 the “perception” that PCBs were toxic,
but told a newspaper that (in the reporter’s paraphrase) “no data ever has confirmed a connection
103. Univar is the successor to Central Solvents & Chemical Co. (“Central Solvents”).
For years, Univar (including through Central Solvents) distributed Monsanto’s PCB products,
and sold vast quantities of Monsanto’s PCB products each year, including to at least a dozen
firms (and possibly many more) within the greater Chicago area.
104. As one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical distributors in the country,
Central Solvents knew or should have known at all relevant times about the published research
on PCBs described above—and accordingly knew or should have known that the PCB products
it was distributing would cause widespread contamination, including in and around the
Municipalities. On information and belief, neither Univar nor Central Solvents ever provided
any warning to the Municipalities, customers, end-users, or the public about these dangers.
E. The ordinary and intended use of PCBs has resulted in widespread contamination.
105. The ordinary and intended application of Defendants’ commercial and household
PCB products (in, for instance, paints, papers, caulks, lubricants, hydraulic and heat-transfer
fluids, transistor and capacitor fluids, and so on) has resulted in the release of PCBs into air,
waters, and soils, due principally to the chemical compound’s tendency to volatilize or
another—soil to water, water to air, air to water, sediment to water—so PCBs in the air, for
example, results in substantial part from volatilization of PCBs from soil and water.
22
107. PCBs may be released to the atmosphere from landfills and hazardous waste sites,
incineration of PCB wastes, or leakage and runoff from older electrical equipment in use.
108. PCBs may also be released to water from spillage of PCB-containing hydraulic
fluids, historic disposal, combined sewer overflows or storm water runoff, from organic
petroleum products used as dust suppressants (e.g., on dirt roads), and from runoff and leachate
109. PCBs may further be released to soil from leaks and spills, releases from
contaminated soils in landfills and hazardous waste sites, deposition of vehicular emissions near
continued to increase their production of PCBs and to conceal or deny any association of adverse
was particularly outrageous because, as Monsanto recognized, these PCB mixtures were not
necessary for many of the uses for which Monsanto marketed them and were not superior to
alternative products.
fluids never offered any real advantage to non-PCB fluids. For example, a document concerning
the company’s product strategy for dielectric PCBs fluids marketed under the name “askarel”
reports: “[T]he incidence of explosion with mineral oil was actually lower than with askarel!
This in addition to the economic disadvantage of askarel leads to the embarrassing question of
why bother to use askarel, and lends an ear to complaints from the workers who dislike the odor,
23
irritating and toxic qualities of our material.”
113. Likewise, many chemicals could perform the function of PCBs in various “open
use” applications, such as adhesives, caulks, or varnishes, such that there was never any need to
introduce environmentally hazardous PCBs for these types of uses, except for the purpose of
enriching Monsanto.
114. Between 1929 and 1977, Defendants sold a large volume of commercial PCBs
and PCB-containing products to various customers in and/or around the Municipalities. PCBs
made and/or distributed by the Defendants were also included in innumerable products sold
throughout the United States, including in each of the Municipalities. As a result of Defendants’
practices (including Defendants’ misleading acts and omissions), PCBs remain present to this
115. Defendants never advised the Municipalities or the public that Defendants’ PCB
mixtures are toxic to human and environmental health and that those PCBs would leach, leak,
off-gas, and escape their ordinary and intended applications, regardless of the nature of the
surface waters, sediments, soils, air, fish, and/or other resources. Defendants issued no public
warning or instruction about PCBs or the health and environmental safety hazards they present.
Monsanto denied that such hazards exist in their communications with public entities and the
general public.
116. When Monsanto provided any information concerning the use and disposal of
PCBs, Monsanto denied toxicity concerns and adverse human and environmental health effects,
and advised that PCBs were safe for their intended uses and wastes should be deposited in
landfills, despite knowing this would result in environmental contamination and human and
24
ecological hazards.
117. Defendants’ PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were used in countless
applications within each of the Municipalities’ geographic boundaries and leached, leaked, off-
gassed, and escaped their ordinary and intended applications to contaminate the Municipalities’
stormwater and stormwater systems, surface waters, sediments, soils, air, fish, and/or other
resources. Because PCBs are environmentally persistent, they continue to circulate within each
118. The harm caused by PCB contamination can be redressed, but doing so will be
expensive. The Municipalities seek recovery of their costs to address such contamination.
119. In particular, the portion of Lake Michigan near the Municipalities is so heavily
polluted with PCBs that these waters are subject to a PCBs TMDL approved in 2019 (“Lake
Michigan TMDL”). The Lake Michigan TMDL lists some 20 public entities that have a permit
to discharge stormwater to these waters, including each of the Municipalities, and estimates that
these public entities discharge some 0.62 kilograms of PCBs to Lake Michigan each year—a
mass that exceeds the maximum amount allowed under the TMDL by 99.6%. The Lake
Michigan TMDL states that these reductions are to be achieved primarily through the
PCBs entering stormwater and to capture flows of unfiltered stormwater before this stormwater
reaches the Lake. This TMDL is enforceable through the stormwater discharge permits that
IEPA issues to the Municipalities. These permits require the Municipalities to implement
Municipalities’ efforts to comply with the recent Lake Michigan TMDL are only just beginning,
the Municipalities will incur significant costs to reduce PCB concentrations in their stormwater.
25
120. PCBs drive key limits on human consumption of many fish species in and around
the Municipalities, including in Lake Michigan and the North Shore Channel (a canal that flows
through Evanston and connects Lake Michigan to the North Branch of the Chicago River). For
example, in Lake Michigan alone, the Illinois Department of Public Health advises limited
consumption of lake trout, rainbow trout, lake whitefish, smelt, coho salmon, common carp,
channel catfish, brown trout, and chinook salmon—all due to PCB contamination in these fish.
For some types of fish contaminated by PCBs, IDPH has issued a “do not eat” recommendation,
121. PCBs in fish are taken up by other animals that consume aquatic animals as food,
posing a threat to aquatic and other wildlife higher up in the food chain, including birds and a
host of other fish-eating species. PCB contamination of fish and other aquatic animals and
wildlife adversely affects not only the health of such animals and residents’ ability to enjoy their
consumption, but also limits recreational opportunities available within the Municipalities, and
introduce additional risks of PCB contamination, e.g., by transporting PCBs to new and
previously uncontaminated areas. Contamination of these water bodies and aquatic life
attributable to Defendants’ PCB products has significantly curtailed (and will continue to curtail)
the ability of residents to collect and consume local fish and enjoy recreation at and near the
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V. CAUSES OF ACTION
122. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
123. At all relevant times, Defendants were in the business of designing, engineering,
124. Defendants’ PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were not reasonably
safe as designed at the time they left Defendants’ control. Defendants’ PCB mixtures’ toxicity,
solvents or other components in which PCBs are soluble, such products were additionally
defective in that their formulations enhanced the environmental risk posed by PCBs as they
allowed PCBs to more easily escape their applications to cause environmental contamination.
126. Defendants knew or should have known their PCB mixtures and PCB-containing
products were not safe and were likely to contaminate natural resources within the Municipalities
and cause toxic contamination in the Municipalities. Defendants knew or should have known
their PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were unsafe to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by an ordinary person because of the information and evidence available
to them associating PCB exposure with adverse human and animal health effects as well as the
27
overwhelming seriousness of creating widespread environmental contamination.
127. These risks were not obvious to the Municipalities or the public.
129. The seriousness of the environmental and human health risk posed by
Defendants’ products far outweighs any purported social utility of Defendants’ conduct in
manufacturing and distributing their commercial PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products.
The rights, interests, and inconvenience to the Municipalities and general public far outweigh the
rights, interests, and inconvenience to Defendants, which profited heavily from the manufacture,
sale, and/or distribution of their commercial PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products.
130. Practical and feasible alternative designs capable of reducing the Municipalities’
injuries were available. Such alternatives include alternative chemical formulations and/or
additional chemical processing measures Defendants could have taken to enhance the safety of
their PCB mixtures. Alternative chemical formulations that would have reduced the
Municipalities’ injuries include a reduction of chlorine content in all PCB products, which would
have materially decreased the environmental persistence and toxicity of PCBs without
eliminating their typical applications or utilities. Moreover, products combining PCBs and
hydrocarbon solvents in which PCBs are soluble could have been designed with components in
which PCBs are not soluble, mitigating the risk of environmental harm. Viable and readily
available alternatives to PCBs vary by application, and include non-chlorinated plasticizers and
mineral oils, silicone fluids, vegetable oils, esters, and nonfluid insulating chemicals for
electrical applications, as evidenced by the rapid replacement of PCBs by such alternatives upon
28
the prohibition of PCBs.
131. Defendants’ conduct caused the presence of PCBs in the Municipalities and
subsequent injury to the public interest, including the physical and economic health and well-
being of residents, contamination of the Municipalities’ stormwater, and the public’s free use and
132. The Municipalities have suffered and/or will suffer injuries and damages to their
public treasuries as a result of Defendants’ conduct and the presence of PCBs within the
Municipalities. Defendants are under a continuing duty to act to correct and remediate the
injuries their conduct has introduced and to warn the Municipalities, their customers, and the
public about the human and environmental risks posed by its PCBs. Defendants are strictly
liable for all damages arising out of their defectively designed PCB mixtures and PCB-
containing products.
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
29
COUNT II – Against All Defendants
133. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
134. At all relevant times, the Defendants were in the business of designing,
than the Municipalities, end-users, and other members of the public about the dangers these
formulations and products posed. At the time Defendants manufactured, distributed, marketed,
promoted, sold, and/or distributed PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products, they knew or
should have known their PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were not safe and were
likely to contaminate property and resources in the Municipalities. The Municipalities and the
135. Defendants had a duty to provide reasonable instructions and adequate warnings
136. Despite their greater knowledge and expertise, the Defendants failed to provide
adequate warnings that their PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were toxic and would
cause this contamination, and to provide adequate instructions to minimize, mitigate, reduce,
control, or eliminate such risks. Defendants’ PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products were
not reasonably safe at the time they left the Defendants’ control because they lacked adequate
137. The Defendants continued to conceal the dangers of PCBs after they
30
manufactured, distributed, marketed, promoted, and/or sold PCBs and PCB-containing products.
138. An adequate warning would have diminished the volume of PCBs entering the
Defendants’ conduct caused and continues to cause injury to the Municipalities and their
residents. The Municipalities have suffered and/or will suffer injuries and damages to their
public treasuries as a result of Defendants’ conduct and the presence of PCBs within the
Municipalities.
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
NEGLIGENCE
139. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
140. Defendants had a duty to the Municipalities and their residents to exercise due
care in the design, manufacture, formulation, marketing, sale, distribution, and/or labeling of
31
their products. Defendants had a duty not to contaminate or cause the contamination of the
Municipalities’ environment.
141. Defendants breached their duties when they designed, manufactured, formulated,
marketed, sold, distributed, and/or labeled their commercial PCB mixtures and PCB-containing
products in a manner that they knew or should have known would result in injury to Lake
142. Defendants knew or should have known that their PCB mixtures and PCB-
containing products were not safe and were likely to contaminate stormwater and other property
and resources within the Municipalities. Defendants knew or should have known their PCB
mixtures and PCB-containing products were unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by an ordinary person because of the information and evidence available to them
associating PCB exposure with adverse human and animal health effects as well as the
143. Defendants failed to exercise ordinary care because a reasonably careful company
would not manufacture or distribute those products, would warn of these products’ toxic and
environmentally hazardous properties and instruct on the proper use and disposal thereof to
minimize or mitigate such risks, and/or would take steps to enhance the safety and/or reduce the
144. Defendants were grossly negligent because they failed to exercise even slight
care, placing profit generation above human and environmental health and safety.
145. The seriousness of the environmental and human health risk posed by
Defendants’ conduct and products far outweighs any purported social utility of Defendants’
conduct in manufacturing and/or distributing their commercial PCB mixtures and PCB-
32
containing products without disclosing the dangers posed by these products. The rights, interests,
and inconvenience to the Municipalities and general public far outweigh the rights, interests, and
inconvenience to Defendants, which profited from the manufacture, sale, and/or distribution of
146. Defendants’ negligent conduct caused and continues to cause injury to the
Municipalities and their residents, including but not limited to contamination of the
Municipalities’ stormwater. The Municipalities have suffered and/or will suffer injuries and
147. Defendants are under a continuing duty to act to correct and remediate the injuries
their conduct has introduced and to warn the Municipalities, their customers, and the public
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
33
COUNT IV – Against All Defendants
PUBLIC NUISANCE
148. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
149. The Defendants’ sale, promotion and/or distribution of their PCB products caused
150. The Monsanto Defendants were substantially certain that that their sale and
promotion of PCB products would cause this contamination to occur, even when Monsanto’s
151. Univar negligently engaged in conduct that created an unreasonable risk of this
contamination.
152. This contamination has entered the Municipalities’ stormwater system and has
contaminated resources that would otherwise be used and enjoyed by the public, including sport
fish.
localities are required to reduce PCB contamination in their stormwater by an estimated 99.6%.
with rights enjoyed by the public, including rights under Article XI of the Illinois constitution.
This contamination has caused harm that is severe and greater than the Municipalities and the
public should bear without compensation and that outweighs any utility of the Defendants’
conduct. This PCB contamination obstructs the public’s free use and comfortable enjoyment of
property and natural resources, and an ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or
34
155. The Municipalities will incur costs to monitor and address PCB contamination
stormwater and/or other media, and have suffered and/or will suffer other injuries as a direct and
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
PRIVATE NUISANCE
156. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
157. The Defendants’ sale, promotion and/or distribution of their PCB products caused
the contamination of stormwater systems in the Municipalities, as alleged above, and thereby
invaded the Municipalities’ interest in the use and enjoyment of their property.
158. The Monsanto Defendants were substantially certain that that their sale and
promotion of PCB products would cause this contamination to occur, even when Monsanto’s
35
159. Univar negligently engaged in conduct that created an unreasonable risk of this
contamination.
160. This PCB contamination has caused harm that is severe and greater than the
Municipalities should bear without compensation and that outweighs any utility of the
161. The Municipalities will incur costs to address PCB contamination on their
property, and have suffered and/or will suffer other injuries as a direct and proximate result of
Defendants’ conduct.
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
TRESPASS
162. The Municipalities incorporate all preceding allegations as if they were set forth
herein.
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163. The Monsanto Defendants designed, manufactured, formulated, marketed, sold,
distributed, and labeled their commercial PCB mixtures and PCB-containing products in a
manner that they knew or were substantially certain would wrongfully cause PCBs to intrude
upon and injure and contaminate property owned by the Municipalities. As alleged in detail
above, Monsanto instructed PCB users to dispose of PCB-containing wastes in a manner that
would certainly cause their PCBs to enter into this property, including by venting PCB vapors to
the atmosphere, sewering PCB wastes, dumping PCB fluids from PCB-filled heat transfer and
other systems, and disposing of PCB wastes in unlined landfills or pits, among others.
164. Univar negligently engaged in conduct that caused PCBs to enter upon and injure
165. As a direct result of Defendants’ conduct, the Municipalities have suffered and/or
will suffer damages, including the cost to remove PCBs from stormwater systems and/or other
follows:
described herein;
and
E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
37
JURY DEMAND
38
FILED
3/24/2023 3:04 PM
IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
2023L002929
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS Calendar, D
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
AFFIDAVIT
Now comes affiant Michael T. Layden and being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
states:
1. I am one of the attorneys representing plaintiffs City of Lake Forest, Village of Glencoe,
Village of Lake Bluff and Village of Winnetka in this action.
2. I am familiar with the facts in this action.
3. I have reviewed the available information relating to the money damages this action.
4. On information and belief, the total money damages sought in this action by all plaintiffs
are in excess of $50,000.
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and
correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters
the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
Date: March 24, 2023 /s/ Michael T. Layden
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