2020FHAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 10 (1): 32–40

CURRENTS: THE RISE OF BRAZILIAN FASCISM

The broken wave

Evangelicals and conservatism in the Brazilian crisis
Ronaldo de A L M E I D A , University of Campinas (UNICAMP)

The article examines the articulation between Evangelicals and conservatism in the Brazilian scenario since widespread street
demonstrations erupted in June 2013; the most significant of these events was the election of Far-Right president Jair Messias
Bolsonaro in 2018. A sizable share of this religious segment constitutes, in different ways and in varying degrees, the broader so-
cial process that in the national and international public conversation became known as the conservative wave. My argument is
that this wave is shaped as the articulation of distinct lines of force at play in the fields of economy, security, morality, and society.
Keywords: Bolsonaro, conservatism, Evangelicals, 2018 elections, Brazil

This article analyzes conservatism and the role played by Sometimes it is identified in an excessive and imprecise
Evangelicals in the Brazilian crisis triggered by the street way with fascists, in the political realm, or with funda-
protests of June 2013, polarized in the 2014 elections, mentalists, in the religious sphere. Paraphrasing Clifford
deepened with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Geertz when he wrote that in the contemporary world
2016, and whose most recent development was the elec- “there are too many things to be called ‘religious’” (Geertz
tion of a Far-Right politician to the presidency in 2018. 2001: 151), many things are called conservative or mus-
A significant part of this religious segment is part of the tered as such as part of the same encompassing gesture.
broader social process referred to in the public debate Examining what is perceived in the public debate as
as the conservative wave, which articulates, at different part of the wave, the alternatives prove to be quite di-
levels, at least four defining social lines of force: eco- verse and they seem to evolve at different speeds accord-
nomically liberal, punitive in matters of security, morally ing to the national context and the region of the world
regulatory, and socially intolerant. that is considered. Several analyses indicate the decline
Conservatism is a concept associated with specific of liberal democracy and the repressive toughening of
processes and historical contexts.1 However, in contem- political regimes chosen through democratic procedures
porary Brazilian and world public debates, the term has (Castells 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Runciman
become rather widespread and is constantly being used 2018). In the most recent elections in Europe, right-wing
in TV news, the written press, and digital social net- or Far-Right parties clearly stood out. Even in places
works based on a profusion of fairly elastic meanings. where they did not emerge victorious from the elections,
they did perform well at the polls, as for instance in
France, where the Socialist Party virtually collapsed; in
1. Conservative criticism of the French Revolution—as spe-
the United Kingdom, whose prospective departure from
cifically embodied in the reflections of Edmund Burke—
constitutes the canonical reference of modern conserva- the European Union (Brexit) translates into a protec-
tive thought (Huntington 1957). In the opposite sense tionist backlash against, above all, the influx of European
of the revolution, the preservation—or rather conserva- and non-European immigrants; as well as in the United
tion—of institutions, through prudence and in the name States, with the election of Donald Trump and the en-
of order, was and remains the core tenet of modern con- thronement of his antiglobalist discourse (Hochschild
servative political thought. 2016).
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory. Volume 10, number 1. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/708704
© 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory. All rights reserved. 2575-1433/2020/1001-0005$10.00

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33 THE BROKEN WAVE

It is also worth mentioning the collapse of the left and tute in recent years, projections for the next few years,
center-left governments in Latin America, where during if current trends are maintained, are that Catholics will
the 2000s some countries, acting as a bloc and with Bra- account for less than 50 percent of the Brazilian pop-
zil somewhat in the role of regional leader, sought to ulation by 2022 and there will be more Evangelicals
build a position that would be less aligned with US for- than Catholics in Brazil by 2032.3 It is worth noting
eign policy. The left-wing governments that dominated that Pentecostalism is what is in fact producing a con-
the South American political scene began to decline in tinuous and upward demographic change in terms of
the 2010s due to corruption and also as a consequence religious affiliation. In the 2010 census, Pentecostals cor-
of ruptures with the social, economic, and cultural status responded to about three fourths of the Evangelicals, with
quo through the adoption of more inclusive policies and higher prevalence among women, nonwhites, the young
the promotion of diversity. This generated regressive re- and middle aged, and less well-off living in urban out-
actions mobilizing eroding social distinctions, especially lying neighborhoods.
among the middle classes, similar to what was observed This growth affected the political system and had as
in other countries. According to Joshua Kurlantzick (2013), its benchmark the 1986 electoral process, which eventu-
in an analysis of the global context, social protection pol- ally integrated these groups and led them to take an ac-
icies have revealed a tendency to empower the poorest, tive part in the democratic pact enshrined in the 1988
generating pressure and revolt from the middle classes. Constitution. From “Believers don’t engage in politics,”
Ultimately, I understand conservatism as the main out- they moved on to the motto “Brother votes for brother.”
come from the clash among different political forces at Evangelical political activism is one of the outcomes of
play in the Brazilian crisis, among them the Christian re- the redemocratization process. Looking back, there have
ligions, and particularly some Evangelical sectors. Not all not been a great many changes in the themes mobiliz-
conservatives are Evangelical, just as not all Evangelicals ing the vote of Evangelicals in comparison to the present
are conservative. Among these religious groups, there moment, but there has been greater intensity, reach, and
are progressive and conservative members, liberal and so- efficiency.
cialist, moderate and fundamentalist. They are active in all Resorting to a moral agenda, Bolsonaro’s presiden-
political parties. However, their most hegemonic sections tial campaign was articulated with an Evangelical par-
are constituted—and, at the same time, are constituent— liamentary basis on the one hand, and with the Evan-
of the ongoing wave in Brazil (Burity 2018; Machado gelical average voter, who has always been sensitive to
2018). That being said, how were conservatism and Evan- issues related to the body, behavior, and family ties, on
gelicalism articulated in the contemporary Brazilian crisis, another hand. The candidate’s gestures were strongly
whose major consequence was the election of Jair Messias directed toward the Evangelical segment, which, apart
Bolsonaro as President of the Republic? from being demographically expressive, can also be, to
a good extent, vigorously aligned in electoral terms. In
Circumscribing the Evangelicals short, Bolsonaro has signaled to this group making use
of the great “Christian” code, which did not include spe-
One of the most frequent questions asked among schol- cific references to Afro-Brazilian or Spiritualist religions
ars dedicated to the analysis of religions in Brazil is about but rather incorporated Judaism as painted with the typi-
when the two main curves, shown in the graph below, cally North American Evangelical fundamentalist shades.
are expected to meet (see fig. 1). In other words, Christian without accentuating the Cath-
The general trend is clear: a continuous decline (not olic colors, and always indicating to the Evangelicals that
at all moderate) of Catholicism and an (accelerating) he could be, appear, or become an Evangelical. And all
growth of the Evangelicals. Non-Catholics (including this had a strong electoral effect (Almeida 2019).
those without religion) accounted for 35.5 percent of The result can be seen in Table 1, which contrasts vote
the population in 2010.2 Based on opinion polls con- intentions against the total number of voters in the coun-
ducted by DataFolha, IBOPE, and Pew Research Insti- try, according to their religious affiliations.

2. Two Brazilian states no longer have a Catholic majority: 3. https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2016/07/25/a-transicao

Rondonia and Rio de Janeiro, where Catholics were 47.9 per- -religiosa-no-brasil-1872-2050-artigo-de-jose-eustaquio
cent and 46.3 percent of the population, respectively, in 2010. -diniz-alves/.

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 Ronaldo de ALMEIDA 34

Figure 1: Distribution of the population according to declared religions (%); Brazil, 1960–2010. Source: IBGE (Brazilian In-
stitute of Geography and Statistics). Demographic Censuses, 1960–2010.

In general terms, the balance in absolute numbers people, many Evangelicals voted for Bolsonaro. Further
within the Catholic religion is impressive. In view of the issues were also raised along the campaign and matched
general average of the candidates, the Catholic universe an already vivid interest among the population: the eco-
represented a slight countercurrent to the more generally nomic crisis, the demand for something “new” and a “new
widespread pro-Bolsonaro opinion, even though Catho- politics,” the anti–Workers’ Party sentiment, whose roots
lics also cast slightly more votes for him. Catholicism is precede the crisis,4 and insecurity in the face of growing
still, despite its continuous decline, the great cultural me- violence are some examples. Still, Table 1 suggests that a
diator in the country.
It was the Evangelicals, however, who made the dif- 4. The Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT)
ference in favor of Bolsonaro in absolute numbers. En- was the party that held the presidency for the previous
ergized by moral issues, the fear of a Communist threat, thirteen years, from the first election of Lula da Silva in
and the stringent call for honesty typical of well-meaning 2003 to the impeachment of Dilma Roussef in 2016.

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35 THE BROKEN WAVE

Table 1. Distribution of the electorate by type of religion, with correction of the data released by DataFolha.5
Source: DataFolha survey published on October 25, 2018.

Religion Votes for Bolsonaro Votes for Haddad Difference

Catholic 29,795,232 29,630,786 164,446

Evangelical 21,595,284 10,042,504 11,552,780
Afro-Brazilian 312,975 755,887 2 442,912
Spiritualist 1,721,363 1,457,783 263,580
Other religion 709,410 345,549 363,862
No religion 3,286,239 4,157,381 2 871,142
Atheist and Agnostic 375,570 691,097 2 315,527
Total votes 57,796,074 47,080,987 10,715,087

“gospel vote” was galvanized around Bolsonaro—that is, tide of opinion that vigorously opposed compensatory
mobilized around identities, interests, actors, and agen- policies aimed at alleviating poverty or investing in the
das belonging to congregations of believers/voters. human capital of young people with low social and eco-
It should be noted that many Evangelicals also deviate nomic capital. The basic income program called Bolsa
from the conservative mainstream (whose political ac- Família and racial quotas in public universities are ma-
tion is largely performed electorally) and tend to favor jor negative symbols in the eyes of those who favor this
political activism within civil society (movements, asso- rhetoric: the former would reward idleness on the part
ciations, NGOs, the third sector, and so on), adopting a of the recipients, while the latter would be unfair to
more progressive stance. One third of the Evangelicals those who are qualified but do not possess the attrib-
voted for Fernando Haddad, which reflects a religious utes of a socially vulnerable person.
universe with internal diversity, despite the predomi- The primary tension here revolves around the role the
nant vectors. His candidacy mobilized the discourse state should play in the economy. The appointment of an
for democracy in the face of a threat of military interven- ultraliberal minister of the economy already at the be-
tion, the defense of human rights and diversity, the re- ginning of the campaign was meant not only to over-
duction of social inequality, the importance of the state come the presidential candidate’s economic ignorance
to boost the economy and provide social protection, but also to signal a more structural economic gamble.
among others. However, the articulation of these cur- What is especially noteworthy is the insistence on dis-
rents of opinion by the PT candidate—particularly on cursive elements that emphasize personal merit and
account of the criminal liabilities of the political repre- individual effort, as opposed to a state that offers too
sentatives that tended to voice them—was defeated by much protection so as to discourage private initiative.
the ballot, and Bolsonaro eventually became president Introduced to Brazil by neo-Pentecostalism, the the-
of Brazil (Mariano and Gerardi 2019). ology of prosperity has been an incentive factor for
In what follows, I would like to address four lines of the faithful to act with resolve in their financial lives
social forces that cut across the Brazilian conjuncture in in order to generate economic stability to weather the
which conservatism and Evangelicals are implicated— storms, in addition to acquiring and consuming mate-
namely, economic, moral, security, and societal forces. rial goods. The theology of prosperity preaches a world-
I do not regard them as the underlying causes of Bolso- oriented economic ethic, in which possessing and ascend-
naro’s election but as a sort of “broken wave” around ing are signs that God, and not the devil, is operating in
which many Evangelicals are aligned and that have found your life. Such ascension is not anchored specifically in
in the Bolsonaro candidacy a political representation. discipline and dedication to work but rather in an entrepre-
neurial attitude of someone who aspires to become the

Economically liberal
5. https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2016/07/25/a-transicao
The first line of force is what I designate as economically -religiosa-no-brasil-1872-2050-artigo-de-jose-eustaquio
liberal. The Bolsonaro candidacy has captured the rising -diniz-alves/.

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 Ronaldo de ALMEIDA 36

boss in labor relations. This is a disposition like the and so forth) and social security (retirement and labor
one outlined by Clifford Geertz in his definition of re- rules). The discourse in favor of a smaller state is actu-
ligion as a symbolic system: it is not only a matter of ally anchored in the rejection of corruption and public
imparting meaning to actions but also of motivating sector privileges rather than in the preference for neo-
the faithful, awakening them, animating them, and gen- liberal agendas, which tend to garner very little popular
erating in them specific moods and attitudes. This is cer- appeal. It is not by chance that strategic alliances ensue
tainly one of the most concrete impacts of the Evangelical between ultraliberals and those associated with the law
churches: encouragement and incentive. Faced with the and order and moral agendas as a means of improving
adversities of life, there is no such thing as giving up or electoral performance.
feeling discouraged. The ultimate achievement is always The Lulaist governments have been more effective in
projected as an overcoming, as long as the principles of promoting harmony between consumption and prosper-
prosperity are embraced and practiced: faith and resolve. ity rather than between equality and protection. Not by
In order to foster such a disposition among the be- chance was the Universal Church of the Kingdom of
lievers, the preaching invariably invokes the passage in God (IURD), represented by its political wing, the Bra-
the Bible according to which God will make them “the zilian Republican Party (PRB), part of the coalition sup-
head and not the tail.” Prosperity, therefore, does not porting successive PT governments from 2003 onward,
oppose the conceptions of inequality as something in- until a few weeks before Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment,
herent to collective life. Social equality is not on its uto- in 2016. Marcelo Crivella, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, a
pian horizon as it is in the formulation of Catholic liber- licensed bishop of the Universal Church and nephew of
ation theology, for which “God’s kingdom” of equality its supreme leader, Bishop Edir Macedo, served as Dil-
must be initiated on Earth. The utopia of prosperity, ma’s minister of fisheries between 2012 and 2014. But
in turn, lies in the possibility of the individual to ascend with the ensuing economic crisis and mounting accusa-
materially amid the prevailing conditions of inequality. tions of corruption against PT cadres, issues related to se-
Liberation theology and prosperity theology, hence, are curity and political order, on the one hand, and morals,
two this-worldly religious orientations: one rejecting the on the other hand, were brought to the forefront by the
rules of this world, the other inducing adherence to it. Evangelical segment of the electorate in the 2018 polls.
This conception is spreading more and more through-
out the Evangelical milieu and beyond. It has forged an
affinity of meaning with labor informality and the precar-
Punitive and repressive
iousness of work, as these circumstances became preva-
lent in Brazil during the years of economic recession in The second line of social force refers to a series of po-
the 1980s and 1990s, but also at times of booming con- litical mobilizations, collective demands, and govern-
sumption, such as in the 2000s (during the PT govern- ment measures that point toward more repressive and
ments). In both situations, religious doctrine was able punitive approaches and policies by the state security
to engender individualistic entrepreneurial attitudes. This apparatus. Reductions in the legal majority age, loosen-
does not mean that neo-Pentecostal Evangelicals did not ing restrictions to the legal possession of firearms, adop-
benefit from the social programs instituted by the PT gov- tion of antiterror legislation, the policy of widespread
ernments but rather that the discourse of material pros- incarceration, among others, are pressing issues, whose
perity, expected to derive from monetary ritual sacrifices combined effect is to increase state violence against the
(tithes and offerings) and an entrepreneurial individual population, regardless of criminal activity, targeting
attitude, is praised by religion and embraced as an eco- particularly those who are furthest removed from the
nomic ethic. It is frequent that in qualitative surveys the sphere of legal rights.
interviewees attribute to themselves or to God any suc- To a large extent, this is a line that tends to command
cess in life and to the governments all the difficulties and considerable popular support, as becomes all the more
setbacks. evident in regard to incarceration policies. The election
Evangelicals, especially Pentecostals, are more con- of Bolsonaro as president was the most prominent—
centrated among the popular and middle classes of but by no means the only—expression of this political
Brazilian society. Therefore, theirs is a kind of economic moment. In Congress, the number of deputies and sen-
liberalism that does not dispense with the demands of ators linked to professional careers in the security sector
public services (health, education, security, sanitation, jumped from eighteen to seventy-three (including military

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37 THE BROKEN WAVE

firefighters, civilian and military police, and retired mil- fro, Brazil has experienced several transformations that
itary officers). Within this line of force, Bolsonaro has the may be considered progressive in terms of rights (civil,
home-field advantage, while the Left is perceived to be social, reproductive, sexual, etc.). In contrast, there has
stuck in the human rights discourse and lacking the ca- been a growing reaction, largely prompted by religious
pacity to offer adequate responses to the most pressing beliefs, asserting the need to contain the advances of sec-
demands of the population. ularism and the spread of conducts and values deemed
Many of those who speak on behalf of the Evangelicals too liberal. Genetics, sex, abortion, euthanasia, marriage,
also advocate for further repressive action by the state se- and child adoption are all contemplated by the “tradi-
curity apparatus. They have been part of a broader move- tional family” sacrament: issues related to the reproduc-
ment, which operates in favor of conduct restrictions and tion of life and to primary ties, which Christian religions
even the criminalization of wide traits of the population do not hesitate to regulate. All of them are deemed to be
(women who had abortions, juvenile offenders, or mari- interdependent, as if they would concern not only the
juana users, for example). The bill to reduce the age of le- faithful Christian, but also public morality in general,
gal majority, approved by the House of Representatives, and thus should apply to everyone and be enforced by
was heavily driven and lobbied by its president at the time, the authorities.
Congressman Eduardo Cunha, from Assembleia de Deus The most visible protagonists of this conservatism of
Ministério Madureira, who pulled a regimental maneuver customs in recent years have been large segments of
to redo a lost vote. The project served as a unifying force Pentecostal and non-Pentecostal Evangelicals, who
for several conservative segments, including the Evangel- have entered—more than at any other time—the dis-
ical Parliamentary Front, which had as its president a po- pute over public morality with the aim of regulating
lice delegate representing the interests of the corporation bodies, behaviors, and family ties (same-sex marriage
and the private security industry. More than 80 percent of and adoption of children by gay couples, for example).
the Evangelical deputies voted in favor of reducing the age The propositions related to the sphere of customs do
of majority. It is not possible to say that the Evangelical not stem solely from a traditionalism that is resistant
parliamentary activity in this area is equally expressive to change. The Pentecostal Evangelicals are promoters
as their mobilization in regard to moral issues. But it has of a proactive brand of conservatism, not only a reac-
served, at the very least, as an auxiliary line for the inter- tive one. They are interested in the dispute for public
ests of the public security apparatus (police and military cor- morality, as José Casanova (1994) defined it: that is,
porations) and the private sector (security companies). not only protecting the morality of the Evangelicals
Whereas this line of force was at first predominantly themselves, but rather striving to have it inscribed in
restricted to public security, it came to be expanded once the legal order of the country. And since Brazilian so-
the military began to operate in a more conspicuous ciety is predominantly founded on Christian traditions,
manner in the political sphere. In the inaugural compo- there is an expectation that it ought to assume them as the
sition of the new government, including the president reference for the legal discipline of individual conduct.
and the vice president and the first-rank cadres, there Bolsonaro’s discourse is contrary to virtually all the
was a significant presence of military personnel, which developments in the last decades concerning sexuality,
further accentuated the ongoing concerns about the gender, and reproduction. He took up the fight against
prospects of preserving democracy in Brazil. The burn- the so-called “gender ideology,” a specter that haunts
ing political question is to know how to precisely define some of the most fervent Christians, especially those
the distinction between a military government and a on the right ends of the political spectrum, but also
government made up of military personnel, especially some centrists, which sparked a kind of moral panic
considering that they have been actively working toward during the campaign over an alleged “threat to the tra-
rewriting the official historical version of what happened ditional family.” In view of the corruption practiced dur-
during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. ing the PT governments and the supposed immorality
of some of its proposals, it was often said by Evangelical
voters that “PT was a threat, a danger.”
Much of the contention of proponents of the conser-
Morally regulatory
vatism of customs appeals to the acknowledgment, which
The third line of force is morally regulatory. During the they never fail to reiterate, that “the state is secular, but
most recent democratic period and after much to-and- society is religious,” or else “the state is secular, but not

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 Ronaldo de ALMEIDA 38

atheist.” As mentioned in the prayer held by pastor and The frequent recourse in recent years, most notably
former senator Magno Malta on the day of Bolsonaro’s in 2015, to the term intolerance to describe situations of
victory, Brazil is overwhelmingly Christian. Therefore, social conflict is one of the indicators of how political
Christianity (or the different versions of it) must provide tensions have descended into day-to-day relations. In-
the moral and legal parameters of behavior. This reason- tolerance is referenced in the field of religions,7 but its use
ing based on the predominance of the majority has often has been expanded. Just as the term traditional family
punctuated speeches made by political players to justify came to encompass various themes in a broad moral
the imposition of curbs on progressive agendas. field, intolerance has evolved into a rather generic term
Interestingly enough, the consolidation of Evangeli- that comprises social affections that became all the more
cals in Brazil took place with frequent resort to the dis- pronounced during the crisis Brazil is currently facing,
course that portrayed them as in acute need of freedom such as revenge, phobia, and hatred.
and protections, given their vulnerable condition as a The term revenge, exacted against juvenile offenders,
religious minority. The separation between the state was raised in the public debate surrounding the bill that
and the Catholic Church entailed the protection of prac- aimed to reduce the age of legal majority, the legitimacy
ticing minority religions. However, even though the orig- of which was overly based on the temperature of public
inal purpose of religious freedom as a further consequence opinion.8 Phobia relates to something that produces a
of the advent of the Republic was to protect diversity and disguised repulsion toward sexual and gender diversity,
freedom of conscience, it is interpreted among these and can reach levels of moral panic, delving upon
stakeholders as the subordination of minorities. Judging themes such as the alleged “erotization of our children”
by the signs emanating from the presidency, Bolsonaro that must be fought by and on behalf of “decent peo-
has not adopted a postsecularist position—that is, one ple.” Finally, political hatred has found expression in
that admits and deals with the diversity of religions in the stigmatization of any level of affiliation to the
the public space as long as they operate within the logic Workers’ Party (from leaders to simple voters), of pro-
of public reasons. On the contrary, he has aligned with gressives of any hue, or of the Left in general, and is also
the majority sections of the growing Christian pluralism bent on the criminalization of social movements.
in the country in its most conservative aspect—both po- These are some of the current affections that are
litically and morally. As they have grown demographi- harnessed by the logic of social enemies: the juvenile
cally and reached positions of political power, the more offender, the gay, and the leftist. And the purveyors of
conservative sectors of Brazilian Evangelicalism have up- those tropes are hardly open to any kind of differences,
held an understanding of democracy that is geared more they tend to be highly geared to themselves as a measure
to the will of the majority than to the protection of minor-
ities or differences.
6. After the elections, I heard many people commenting
that their main expectations and anxieties were about
what Christmas celebrations with their extended families
Socially intolerant would look like.

Finally, the last line of force refers to the quality and 7. Relatório sobre intolerância e violência religiosa no Brasil
(2011–15): resultados preliminares. Ministério das Mulhe-
intensity of social interactions in situations of height-
res, da Igualdade Racial, da Juventude, Direitos Humanos;
ened political antagonism. The crisis that the country organização Alexandre Brasil Fonseca, Clara Jane Adad—
is enduring is developing simultaneously at the level Brasília: Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos, SDH/
of the political system and has also spilled over into in- PR, 2016.
terpersonal relations, especially among the most polit-
8. https://www.revistaforum.com.br/reducao-da-maioridade
ically committed sectors of the population. In the cur-
-penal-justica-ou-vinganca/; http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com
rent situation, many Brazilians—at least among those .br/direitos-humanos/noticia/2015-04/boff-reducao
who follow national politics more closely—have long -da-maioridade-penal-seria-uma-especie-de-vinganca
experienced political and moral differences that have -da; https://facesdaviolencia.blogfolha.uol.com.br/2018
strained bonds of friendship, work, and family. Digital /11/30/no-debate-sobre-reducao-da-maioridade-penal-e
social networks, in particular, have devolved into an arena -falso-dizer-os-adolescentes-que-cometem-crimes-ficam
where interpersonal conflicts are further exacerbated.6 -impunes/.

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39 THE BROKEN WAVE

for all aspects of public life and, at times, they are both nections among themselves, either by affinity or by strat-
symbolically and tangibly aggressive toward everything egy, but all of them converge toward the same beach.
(and everyone) they seek to deny, as though the logic of
the enemy would override the logic of the opponent.
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Almeida, Ronaldo de. 2019. “Bolsonaro presidente: conser-
vadorismo, evangélicos e a crise brasileira.” Novos Estudos
Final remarks 38 (1): 185–213.
The metaphor of the wave implies a kind of movement Burity, Joanildo. 2018. “A onda conservadora na política
that drags the historical flow in a certain direction, but, brasileira traz o fundamentalismo ao poder?” In Conserva-
clearly, it cannot be accomplished without counterforces dorismos, fascismos e fundamentalismos: análises conjun-
and undertows, to the extent that the Brazilian political turais, edited by Ronaldo de Almeida and Rodrigo Toniol,
situation has been one of persistent and reified polariza- 1–27. Campinas: Unicamp.
tion, intensified in recent times both within the political Casanova, José. 1994. Public religions in the modern world.
system and among the population as a whole. Due to its Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
own inherent traits and further elements eventually
adopted during the electoral process, the Bolsonaro can- Castells, Manuel. 2018. Ruptura: a crise da democracia lib-
didacy has unevenly articulated these lines of force: the eral. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
demand for security, the morality of customs, the dis- Geertz, Clifford. 2001. “O beliscão do destino: a religião como
qualification of the state for being corrupt and paternal- experiência, sentido, identidade e poder.” In Uma nova luz
istic, and interpersonal intolerance. His opponent’s can- sobre a antropologia, 149–65. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
didacy, in turn, also managed to establish a number of Hochschild, Arlie Russel. 2016. Strangers in their own land:
connections with parts of society, based on invoking the Anger and mourning on the American Right. New York:
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But between the narrative of confronting the economic
and moral corruption promoted by PT during its thirteen Huntington, Samuel. 1957. “Conservatism as an ideology.”
American Political Science Review 51 (2): 454–73.
years in power and the narrative informed by the values of
liberal democracy, the ballot boxes chose the former in Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2013. Democracy in retreat: The revolt of
detriment to the latter. the middle class and the worldwide decline of representa-
In short, the conservative wave is an entanglement of tive government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
multiple players, active on different boards crossed by Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. Como as demo-
several social vectors. Hence the suggestion to consider cracias morrem. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
it “broken” along the four lines of social forces examined
Machado, Maria das Dores C. 2018. “Religion and moral
above. They result from social processes that are unequal,
conservatism in Brazilian politics.” Politics and Religion
asymmetric, and subject to different temporalities, but in
Journal 12 (1): 55–77.
the present juncture have found common ground and
united politically around common enemies: the Left, hu- Mariano, Ricardo, and Dirceu André Gerardi. 2019. “Eleições
man rights, the protective state, secular morality, among presidenciais na América Latina em 2018 e ativismo polit-
others. The country is undergoing significant transfor- ico de evangélicos conservadores.” Revista USP 120: 61–
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 Ronaldo de ALMEIDA 40

Ronaldo R. M. de ALMEIDA is a Professor of Anthropology at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil.
He is director of the Laboratory of the Anthropology of Religion Unicamp. He is a researcher at the National Council
for Research and Development and at the Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning (Cebrap). He was a postdoctorate
fellow at École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and has experience in the fields of Anthropology of
Religion and Urban Anthropology, working mainly with the following themes: religion, Pentecostalism, politics, cit-
ies, and poverty. His publications include A Igreja Universal e seus demônios [The Universal Church and its Demons]
(Terceiro Nome, 2009) and the edited volume (with Rodrigo Toniol) Conservadorismos, fascimos e fundamentalismos:
análises conjunturais [Conservativisms, fascisms, and fundamentalisms: Conjunctural analyses] (Unicamp, 2018).
Ronaldo de Almeida
Department of Anthropology
University of Campinas
100, Cora Coralina St., Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz
Campinas, São Paulo, 13083-896
Brasil
ronaldormalmeida@gmail.com

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