Africa Governance Report Governance Full Report

THE
AFRICA
GOVERNANCE
REPORT
Promoting
African Union
Shared Values
2019
The Africa Governance Report
CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................. 11
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 19
1.1 The Concept of Governance ............................................................................................... 19
1.2 Background and Context of the Africa Governance Report ............................................. 19
1.3 The Purpose of the Africa Governance Report ................................................................. 21
1.4 Methodology of the Africa Governance Report ................................................................. 21
1.5 The Mandates and Purposes of the APRM as an AU Structure ........................................ 22
CHAPTER 2: THE AFRICAN GOVERNANCE POLICY FRAMEWORK ................... 24
2.1 Constitutive Act of the African Union ................................................................................ 24
2.2 African Union Shared Values .............................................................................................. 24
2.4 The Structures of African Governance .............................................................................. 26
CHAPTER 3: TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP .................................................... 27
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 27
3.2 Overview of Trends in Transformative Leadership ........................................................... 27
3.4 Characteristics of African Transformative Leadership ..................................................... 28
3.5 Assessing Governance Performance at the Continental Level ........................................ 30
3.6 Challenges in Transformative Leadership ......................................................................... 31
3.7 Recommendations on Transformative Leadership ........................................................... 31
CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW ............................. 33
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 33
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4.2 Principal African Union Instruments on Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law ........... 33
4.3 The Parameters for Measurement of Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law ................. 38
4.4 The practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Member States ......................... 38
4.5 Achievements in African Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law .................................... 44
4.6 Challenges to Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law ...................................................... 45
4.7 Recommendations for Strengthening Constitutionalism and the Rule Of Law .............. 47
CHAPTER 5: PEACE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE .......................................... 50
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 50
5.2 The Interrelationship of Peace, Security and Governance ............................................... 50
5.3 African Union Instruments Relating to Peace, Security, And Governance ..................... 50
5.4 The Measures for Assessing Peace and Security ............................................................. 51
5.5 The Causes of Conflict in Africa ......................................................................................... 51
5.6 Africa’s Conflict Zones ........................................................................................................ 52
5.7 Trends of African Conflict And Instability .......................................................................... 54
5.8 Achievements in Promoting Peace, Security and Governance ........................................ 55
5.9 Challenges Relating to African Peace, Security and Governance ................................... 57
5.10 Proposed Recommendations for Peace, Security and Governance ................................ 58
CHAPTER 6: THE NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE ................... 60
6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 60
6.2 National Development Plans: The Interface Between Governance and Development ... 61
6.3 Selected Developmental Challenges .................................................................................. 64
6.4 Proposed Recommendations for Development and Governance .................................... 72
CHAPTER 7: ROLE OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS) IN

AFRICAN GOVERNANCE.......................................................................................... 74
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 74
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7.2 The Continental Role of the RECs ...................................................................................... 74
7.3 African Union Instruments on the RECs ............................................................................ 75
7.4 The Relationship Between the RECs and Governance ..................................................... 75
7.5 The key issue for assessing the role of RECs in governance .......................................... 77
7.6 Observations on the Relationships Between the AU and RECs ...................................... 77
7.7 Regional Integration and AU Agenda 2063 ........................................................................ 79
7.8 The Status of the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs ................ 79
7.9 Proposed Recommendations Regarding the RECs and their Role in African Governance
79
ANNEXES ................................................................................................................... 80
ANNEX 1: Highlights of The Interrelationships of The Global UN and OAU/AU Principles,

Purposes and Objectives. ................................................................................................................. 80
Annex 2: Development Periods and Their Principal Focus ............................................................ 82
ANNEX 3: The Eight Regional Economic Communities Recognised by the African Union ......... 85
ANNEX 4: Consultation List, June-December 2018 ......................................................................... 86
List of Tables
Table 1: Characteristics of transformative leadership in Africa ........................................... 28
Table 2: Status of AU Instruments relating to constitutionalism and the rule of law (September
2018) .......................................................................................................................... 34
Table 3: Status of Submission of Periodic Reports Relevant to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (August 2018) ................................................................................ 40
Table 4: Status of AU Peace and Security Instruments (September 2018) .......................... 50
Table 5: Africa’s Mineral Endowments ............................................................................ 65
List of Figures
Figure 1: Overview of Africa Governance Performance .................................................... 30

Figure 2: Percentage Of Countries With NDPs And Distribution Of Growth Levels By Region
................................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 3: Poverty Headcount Ratios at National Poverty Lines by Region .......................... 63
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Figure 4: Average Human Development Index by regions ................................................. 63

Figure 5: Illicit Financial Flow Trends, 2004 to 2013 (USD) ............................................... 68
Figure 6: Net ODA as a percentage of government expenditure by region .......................... 69
Figure 7: Status of Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa ......................................................................... 72
List of Boxes
Box 1: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights ...................................................................................................... 35
Box 2: National Human Rights Institutions ....................................................................... 40
Box 3: African Union Efforts in Fighting Terrorism ............................................................ 55
Box 4: Contributions of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(ACERWC) to Peace and Security ................................................................................. 56
Box 5: The African Standby Force (ASF) ........................................................................ 58
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACBF African Capacity Building Foundation
ACDEG African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACSRT African Centre for the Study of Research on Terrorism
AEC African Economic Community
AfDB African Development Bank
AFRIPOL African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation
AGA African Governance Architecture
AGR Africa Governance Report
AMDC Africa Minerals Development Centre
AMV African Mining Vision
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism

APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA African Peace Support Trainers Association
AQIM Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF Africa Standby Force
AU African Union
AUPSC AU Peace and Security Council
CAR Central African Republic
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS Continental Early Warning System
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EASBRIG East Africa Standby Brigade
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
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ECOBRIG ECOWAS Standby Brigade

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FOMAC Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEWE Gender Equality and Women Empowerment
HDI Human Development Report
ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IFF Illicit Financial Flows
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NASBRIG North Africa Regional Standby Brigade
NDP National Development Plan
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NHRI National Human Rights Institutions
OAU Organization of African Unity
ODA Official Development Assistance
RDC Rapid Deployment Capability

RM Regional Mechanism
SADC Southern African Development Community
SASBRIG Southern Africa Standby Brigade

SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SDGEA Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa
UMA Arab Maghreb Union
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UN United Nations Organization

UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WEF World Economic Forum
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. During the 28th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, held on the 30-31 January 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Member States of
the Union (hereinafter Member States) resolved in its decision Assembly/AU/Dec.
631(XXVIII) to seize the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) with the responsibility to
“play a monitoring and evaluation role for the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals Agenda 2030”. Subsequently, the African
Governance Architecture (AGA) Platform Retreat of March 2018 agreed on a work plan and
strategic framework that identified priorities for 2018. The APRM was identified as the lead
institution for the preparation of the Africa Governance Report (AGR). The Assembly at its
11th Extraordinary Summit in November 2018 reaffirmed the need to strengthen the
capacity of the APRM to deliver on its expanded mandate and enhance its functional
autonomy, including developing a report on the state of governance in Africa in collaboration
with the AGA. It also requested the APRM to present an update on the state of governance
in Africa report to the 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly scheduled to take place in
February 2019.
2. The AGR assesses the state of governance in Africa with a view to providing Member
States with a comprehensive baseline to assist governments to enhance governance.
Whilst there already exist assessment reports on the state of governance in Africa that are
publicly available in public discourse, these reports have largely been developed by
multilateral organisations and independent think-tanks across the continent and abroad.
The AGR is commissioned by the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and
Government.
3. The imperative for the development of an African-generated governance report is three-

fold: first, this home-grown report is consistent with previous decisions of the AU Assembly
to take control of its own development agenda and accountability mechanisms; secondly,
the research methodology in this report benefits considerably from consultations with the
AU Organs and Institutions, Regional Economic Communities; and unfettered access to
Member State informants and state-held data; thirdly, the report is generated by Africans
for Africa, which improves prospects for the implementation of its recommendations.
4. This inaugural report is meant to be a foundation for future analysis of governance trends
on the continent. The report highlights shared values and how they can help galvanize
governance in the continent. It establishes a basis for measurement, analysis, and
projection of future trends.
5. The governance assessment focuses on five key thematic areas of priority, namely: (a)
transformative leadership, (b) constitutionalism and the rule of law, (c) peace, security and
governance (Silencing the Guns), (d) the nexus of development and governance, and e)
the role of the regional economic communities (RECS) in African governance.
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6. The structure of the report is as follows:
Chapter 1 is an Introduction that reflects on the concept of governance, provides a

background and context, explains the purpose and methodology of the report, and
introduces the relevant structures of the AU.
Chapter 2 outlines the African Governance Policy Framework, including the African Union
Shared Values, within the context of the AU Agenda 2063.
Chapter 3 is about Transformative Leadership.
Chapter 4 discusses Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
Chapter 5 deals with Peace, Security and governance.
Chapter 6 is on the Nexus Between Development and Governance.
Chapter 7 considers the role of the Regional economic communities in Governance.
7. Each chapter provides a comprehensive reflection and assessment of the State of
Governance in Africa by focusing on the relevant instruments, notable progress in
implementation, challenges and enablers of good governance, as well as best practices,
and proposes recommendations for improvement.
8. The state of governance in Africa has generally improved. The strongest performance has
been registered in socio-economic development, while the least gains have been recorded
in democracy and political governance. Member States have also recorded satisfactory
performance in the area of economic governance and management and corporate
governance.
Transformative Leadership
9. Transformative leadership is critical to the realization of the African Union and Member
States’ objectives. African political and administrative leadership is at various levels:
continental, regional, national and sub-national (such as that in civil society, business,
community and social organizations). The leadership at Member State level is central
because sovereignty is vested in national entities, and this leadership mediates both intra-
state and international social, political, and economic relationships.
10. Transformative leadership drives progressive change and has attributes or qualities
including vision, innovation, integrity, inclusivity, responsiveness and effectiveness.
Additionally, such leadership should be oriented toward achieving the AU Agenda 2063
aspirations and global UN 2030 (SDG) objectives.
11. African transformative leadership has made significant progress towards consolidating the
practice of democracy and formulating National Visions. In addition, the African public
appreciates democratic principles and practices, as manifested in their active participation
in civil society and through the electoral processes.
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12. The following are proposed recommendations for enhancing transformative leadership:
Member States should: (a) continue to align their National Visions with the AU Agenda 2063
and UN SDGs, their National Development Plans, and in some cases, the their National
Action Plans (from the APRM self-assessment process); (b) end all forms of discrimination
and exclusion; (c) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and
good governance; and (d) promote and protect human and peoples’ rights.
Constitutionalism and The Rule of Law

13. Constitutionalism and the rule of law refer to recognition of the supremacy of the law,
whereby the law is the basis for political decision-making and administrative action. In
concrete terms, it entails: (a) respect for law; respect for the rights of human beings; (b) the
separation of governmental powers; (c) public participation in governance; (d)
accountability of the three arms of government to the public; (e) independence of the
legislature and the judiciary; (f) accountability and effectiveness of the bureaucracy; and (g)
access to justice.
14. There are signs of progress in African constitutionalism and the rule of law, including:
a. Encouragement of democratization.
b. Generally, respect for presidential term limits.
c. Respecting human rights.
d. Introduction of institutional checks and balances, including systems of judicial
review.
15. However, some constraints and challenges still require action, such as (a) the Member
States establishing strengthening mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
integrity and anticorruption programmes and strategies; (b) incorporating local and
customary practices in their formal criminal justice systems; and (c) the Member States
consistently submitting the periodic reports required by the instruments they have
committed to.
Peace, Security and Governance

16. There are various instruments for ensuring good peace, security and good governance. At
the continental level, the AU has committed to implementing decisions and actions that
would lead to peace, security and good governance, to “Silencing the Guns” by 2020. There
have been several efforts by the AU, RECs, and Member States to prevent and mediate
conflict and establish stability.
17. Although the number of large-scale inter-state wars has declined, instances of intra-state
conflicts, violence, unrest, and terrorism appear to have increased in the last two decades.
18. Various recommendations are proposed to promote peace, security and governance. The
Member States should: (a) sign, ratify and domesticate all the crucial instruments; (b)
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improve harmonization of functions between the AU and RECs; and (c) fast-track the rapid
deployment capability of the Africa Standby Force.
Nexus of Development and Governance

19. The AU Agenda 2063 is closely related to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(UN SDGs). Many Member States formulate national development plans that aim to
translate National Visions into programmes and projects for ensuring national development
and social and human progress. However, the implementation of the plans faces several
obstacles and challenges, including that they are not adequately aligned with the AU
Agenda 2063 aspirations and objectives of the UN SDGs.
20. These are the proposed action items by Member States: (a) ensure alignment of their
National Development Plans, their National Visions, and in some cases, their National
action Plans (cf. APRM Country Review report) with the AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs;
(b) make plans and programmes that aim at inclusive human development; and (c)
formulate realistic plans that ensure prudent and sustainable utilization of scarce natural
resources.
Role of the RECs in African Governance

21. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are voluntary associates that have functions
relating to continental unity, development, economic cooperation and integration, and
promotion of democracy and peace and security. Additionally, the AU works with Regional
Mechanisms (RMs) that aim to enhance continental efforts at realising shared values.
22. Although regarded as the building blocks for continental unity and development, there is a
need to further work on the harmonization and coordination of the functions and
responsibilities of the RECs with the AU.
23. The proposed recommendations are: (a) to enhance collaboration between the AU and
RECs, in line with the decisions of the African Union Assembly, in particular the Eleventh
Extraordinary Session of November 2018, and (b) to ensure that all the RECs align
development plans with the AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
NOTE: The recommendations are not meant to be prescriptive, but to form a basis for discussions regarding the most
crucial issues for reform to enhance governance at continental, regional, and Member State levels.
TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP
The Member states should endeavour to:
1. Align their National Visions with the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs. Specifically:
a) The AU Agenda 2063 Aspiration 1 (A Prosperous Africa, based on inclusive

growth and sustainable development) and Aspiration 6 (An Africa whose
development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by people,
especially its women and youth, and caring for children).
b) The UN SDG 5 (Gender equality), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 7 (affordable

and clean energy); UN SDGs 11-15 (sustainable cities and communities;
responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life
on land).
2. End all forms of discrimination and exclusion.
3. Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good

governance.
4. Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights
instruments.
5. Establish regular National Governance reviews to assess the performance of

governance.
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Respect for the Rule of Law

6. The Member States are encouraged to ratify all the shared values and instruments,
and comply with the decisions of the legal organs.
7. The Member States are encouraged to establish mechanisms both on the national
and continental level to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of anticorruption
programmes and strategies.
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Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

8. The Member States are invited to submit periodic reports relevant to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
9. The Member States are encouraged to comply with the decisions of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights.
10. The Member States are encouraged to establish NHRIs.
Public Participation In Governance

11. The Member States are invited to ratify the African Charter on Values and
Principles of Public Service and Administration.
12. TheMember States are encouraged to adopt inclusive electoral systems, including
proportional representation.
13. TheStates are encouraged to ensure the independent administration of elections,

and fair and speedy resolution of electoral disputes, in accordance with ACDEG.
14. The commission assigned for formulating the constitution must be composed of all
categories of the society, including the marginalized groups, women and the
disabled.
Accountability of the Executive

15. The Member States are encouraged to adopt inclusive electoral systems.
16. The Member States are encouraged to ensure the independent administration of elections,
and fair and speedy resolution of electoral disputes, in accordance with African Charter om
Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Effectiveness and Accountability of the Public Service

17. TheMember States that have not ratified the African Charter on Values and Principles of
Public Service Administration are encouraged to do so.
18. The Member States are encouraged to strengthen their national integrity systems.
Independence and Accountability of the Legislature

19. The Member States are encouraged to ensure the independence and accountability of the
legislature.
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20. The Member States are encouraged to ratify the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the
African Union Relating to the Pan African Parliament.
Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary

judiciary.
Access to Justice
22. The Member States are encouraged to facilitate access to justice by adopting and
implementing continental and universal principles and guidelines.
PEACE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
23. The Member States are encouraged to ensure signature, ratification and implementation of
all relevant instruments for peace, security and stability.
24. The AU should operationalize the African Standby Force, and increase efforts to secure
sustainable funding of peace and security activities.
25. The Member States are encouraged to strengthen the Peace and Security Council (PSC)
as recommended by the Assembly of The African Union Eleventh Extraordinary Session of
November 2018 (Ext/Assembly/2(XI).
NEXUS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

26. The Member States are encouraged to formulate development plans and
programmes that aim at inclusive human development.
27. The Member States are encouraged to align their national development plans with
AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
28. The Member States are encouraged to ensure the sustainable and prudent
utilization of natural and other resources to allow for their full utilization for the
benefit of the people of the continent and future generations.
ROLE OF RECs IN AFRICAN GOVERNANCE
29. The AU and RECs should improve the coordination and harmonization of their
policies, programs and activities.
30. The Member States are encouraged to sign and ratify the Agreement Establishing
the African Continental Free Trade Area.
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31. All RECs are encouraged to align their plans with Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Concept of Governance

The concept of governance is traditionally linked to ruling and control, specifically the
manner of exercise of power. Governance refers to the exercise of economic, political
and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. “Good
governance” has the following major components: legitimacy, whereby the government
has the consent of the governed; accountability that ensures transparency and
answerability for actions; respect for law and protection of human rights; and
competence, which consists of effective policy making, policy implementation and
service delivery.1 These are the basic definitions that are utilised throughout this report.
1.2 Background and Context of the Africa Governance Report

The Africa Governance Report (AGR) a collaborative project of the African Governance
Architecture (AGA) Platform. Its development is led by the African Peer Review (APRM)
continental secretariat. The AGR assesses the implementation of the African Union (AU)
shared values by the Member States in five areas of governance: transformational
leadership; constitutionalism and the rule of law; Interrelationships of peace, security,
and governance; the nexus of development and governance; and the role of Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) in African governance. The AGR provides a baseline
for regular and continuous tracking and analysis of governance trends.
The AGA Platform is inspired by the Constitutive Act of the African Union and was
established as a mechanism composed of AU Organs, Institutions, and the Regional
Economic Communities.2 The platform functions to facilitate stakeholder dialogue for
the harmonization and coordination of instruments and initiatives for promoting good
governance, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The platform’s focus is on
implementation of the AU Shared Values, including the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance (ACDEG).3
The AGA Platform retreat of March 2018 identified several collaborative programmes,
including development of a report provisionally entitled Assessing the State of
Governance in Africa.

1 United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration Fifth session New York, 27-31 March 2006
(E/C.16/2006/4) Agenda item. 5 Compendium of basic terminology in governance and public administration.
Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration.
2 AU Assembly decision AU/Dec.1 (XVI).
3 http://www.aga-platform.org.
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The development of the Africa Governance Report was guided by the Constitutive Act
of the African Union and the AU Agenda 2063. The Act is the basis of the organization’s
establishment, objectives, and principles. It also defines the major implementing organs
and institutions. The agenda constitutes the AU’s strategic framework for socio-
economic development and transformation of the continent. The adoption of this
framework meant that the Member States agreed and committed to act collectively to
achieve the AU Vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its
own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”.4 The AGR is
also guided by the Declaration adopted by the 16th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, which committed Member States to promote the
social and economic development and integration of African economies to achieve
increased measures of self-reliance and self-sustainment.
The report focuses on four AU Agenda 2063 Aspirations, namely:

● Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and
sustainable development.
● Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for
human rights, justice and the rule of law.
● Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa.
● Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on
the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and
caring for children.
Each of the four aspirations has goals, priority areas, and targets.5

4 African Union Commission (AUC), 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. The AU Agenda 2063 has seven
aspirations: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; an integrated continent,
politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; an Africa of good
governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure Africa; an Africa
with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics; an Africa whose development is people-
driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; Africa as a
strong, united and influential global player and partner.
5 Briefly, the priorities of: Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development:
ending poverty, inequalities of income and opportunity; job creation (youth employment); resolving problems of rapid
population growth and urbanization; habitation and access to the basic necessities of water, sanitation, electricity;
social security and protection; developing Africa’s human and social capital and health care services; economic
transformation; productivity and competitiveness; food self-sufficiency; harnessing the potential of Africa’s ocean
economy; sustainable management of biodiversity, forests, land and waters and addressing climate change.
Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law: consolidating
democracy and improving the quality of governance; respect for human rights and the rule of law; institution building
for a developmental state; development-oriented and visionary leadership. Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa:
strengthening governance, accountability and transparency; strengthening mechanisms for securing peace and
reconciliation; addressing emerging threats to Africa’s peace and security; and implementing strategies for the
continent’s financing of security needs. Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the
potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children: full gender equality in all spheres
of life; and engaged and empowered youth and children.
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These aspirations resonate with the (global) United Nations Agenda 2030 for
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which constitute the UN’s universal call for
action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and
prosperity. In particular, Goal 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.6
Therefore, the AU Aspirations 1, 3, 4 and 6 and UN SDG 16 are the starting point for
the baseline report, and will be the foundation for future annual monitoring,
assessments, and reviews of the state of governance on the continent.
Therefore, this inaugural AGR focuses on five key governance assessment areas:
● Transformative leadership.
● Constitutionalism and the rule of law.
● Peace and security (Silencing the Guns).
● Development and governance.
● The role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
The decisions of the AU Assembly will determine the scope of subsequent AGRs.
1.3 The Purpose of the Africa Governance Report

The objective of the Africa Governance Report is to provide an assessment of the status
of African governance and provide a basis for tracking of governance developments and
analysing trends on the continent. It aims to be relevant for the Member States, AU
Organs, and other stakeholders. Its other purpose is to inform the public, Member
States, the RECs, AU organs and institutions on the trends of governance in the
continent. Additionally, it aims at determining recommendations for the enhancement
and/or improvement of governance in promoting African progress. The AGR is intended
to provide a foundation for regular and continuous tracking of governance, and to
underline and share best practices among Member States.
1.4 Methodology of the Africa Governance Report

This is a baseline report that relies on existing information and data that could be used
as a basis for measuring and assessing change in the selected aspects of governance.
The report presents facts, and therefore, it focuses on issues and areas that could be
quantified to allow for the measurement and assessment of changes. With the purpose
of being evidence-based and action-oriented, the AGR sought to analyse the AU shared

6 UN, 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1).
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values, and AU common decisions, declarations and agreements that were adopted for
collective actions aimed at realising the vision, goals, and objectives of the AU.
Crucial in explaining the status of the selected governance variables was the
examination of the implementation of those decisions and other expressions of AU
shared values. The proposed recommendations derive from the challenges that
constrain the implementation of shared values. These recommendations are suggested
for consideration in the quest to enhance governance in Africa.
The AGR aims to be an evidence-based report. Its development combined

complementary research methods, including: (i) examination, critical analysis, and
synthesis of existing information and data from published governance, economic
performance, human development, peace and security, and other reports; (ii)
consultations with key stakeholders in the Member States, Regional Economic
Communities (RECs), the African Union Organs and Institutions and other stakeholders
(private sector; civil society organizations, prominent persons); and (iii) supplementation
of these with targeted, selective surveys.
1.5 The Mandates and Purposes of the APRM as an AU Structure

Established in 2003, the APRM is the African Union’s primary institution responsible for
facilitating the voluntary assessment of governance in the participating Member States,
and monitoring their adherence to and conformity with the Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, and the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance (ACDEG).7
Following the AU Assembly decision to integrate the APRM into AU structures,8 its
mandate was expanded in 2017. The AU Assembly adopted an initiative to revitalise
and refocus the APRM as an innovative tool for sharing best practices. At the 28th
Ordinary Session, the Assembly decided that the APRM should have the responsibility
to oversee monitoring and evaluation in all key governance areas of the continent,
including tracking the implementation of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the UN
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).9

7 NEPAD Secretariat 6th Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, 9 March
2003, Abuja, Nigeria. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Base Document (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-
2003/APRM/mou/annex (ii); African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Thirty-Eighth Ordinary
Session of the Organization of African Unity, 8 July 2002, Durban, South Africa (AHG/235 (XXXVIII), Annex II).
8 Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 527(XXIII), 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Malabo,
Equatorial Guinea, on the Integration of the APRM into the African Union structures.
9 AU Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec. (XXVIII)Rev.1; 23rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly/AU/Dec. 527(XXIII),
Decision on the Integration of the APRM into the African Union Structures Doc. EX.CL/851(XXV); Assembly/AU/Dec.
631(XXVIII) Decision on the Revitalisation of the African Peer Review Mechanism.
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Subsequently, the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly welcomed an initiative to re-
position the APRM as a tool for early warning on conflict prevention.10 This function
would be performed through the establishment of harmony and synergy amongst the
AU structures and processes, specifically, the APRM, the African Governance
Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
The implications of these AU Assembly decisions are that: (a) the APRM function was
strengthened as a continental instrument for assessing, monitoring, and tracking
participating countries’ adherence to and conformity with the Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance. Additionally; and (b) the expanded mandate included new
roles in monitoring Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs, and contributing to the
establishment of an early warning system for conflict prevention.
Therefore, the APRM has become central to the promotion of AU shared values, as
facilitator of the implementation of agreed political, economic and corporate governance
values, codes and standards by the Member States, and tracking AU Agenda 2063
achievements and UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs in the pursuit of democracy, peace,
security, political stability, and sustainable development.

10 Assembly/AU/Dec. 686(XXX) 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, 28–29 January 2018, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Decision on The Report of The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
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CHAPTER 2: THE AFRICAN GOVERNANCE POLICY

FRAMEWORK
2.1 Constitutive Act of the African Union

The Constitutive Act of the African Union is the foundation of the governance framework.
The Act is the basis for policy and institutional arrangements; it defines the
establishment, objectives, and principles of the AU and the major implementing organs
and institutions. Reflected in the Constitutive Act are global values, principles, and
norms relating to human rights, sovereignty, peace and security, good neighbourliness,
cultural and socio-economic values and international cooperation that are also
contained in the Purposes and Principles of the UN11 as stated in the Charter of the
United Nations (UN) Organization. The Constitutive Act also calls for the promotion of
sustainable development at the economic social and cultural levels as well as the
integration of African economies (Article 3(j)).
2.2 African Union Shared Values

The African Union Vision is to achieve “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa,
driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”.12
Thus, unity, prosperity, peace, citizen empowerment, and global engagement are the
common goals that inform collective decisions and actions.
Article 3 of the Constitutive Act has the following objectives: achieve greater unity and
solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa; defend the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; accelerate the political and
socio-economic integration of the continent; encourage international cooperation, take
due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; promote
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; and
promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African
peoples.
The AU has a set of shared values which could be categorised around: democracy and
good governance; rule of law and human rights; peace and security; and continental
development and integration.

11 See Annex 1, Table 1: Highlights of the interrelationships of the Global UN and OAU/AU principles, purposes and
objectives.
12 African Union Commission (AUC), 2015. Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want.
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2.3.1 Democracy and Good Governance

The African Union aims to promote democracy and good governance among its Member
States. That serves to confirm that these ideals are critical to the attainment of
development, peace, security and governance on the continent. Apart from the
Constitutive Act, the AU commitment to these ideals manifests in various instruments,
including the Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG); OAU/AU
Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections; the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and
Corporate Governance; the (Algiers and Lomé) Declarations on Unconstitutional
Changes of Government; and African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption.
2.3.2 The Rule of Law and Human Rights

The AU seeks to promote respect for the rule of law and human rights, as expressed in
other instruments including: the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights; the
Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in Africa; the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights; the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa; the Solemn Declaration
on Gender Equality in Africa; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;
the African Youth Charter; and the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa.
2.3.3 Peace, Security and Governance

Peace and security are another major objective of the AU. Hence the Protocol Relating
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union; the African
Union Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Policy Framework; the Conference on Stability,
Security, Development and Democracy (CSSDCA); the AU Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; and the African Union Convention for
the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The Constitutive
Act mandates the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation around Peace
and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional
Standby Brigades.
2.3.4 Continental Integration, Cooperation and Security

Continental economic development and integration is the other major focus for the AU
as reiterated in the Declaration on the theme of the 2012 Summit, “Towards Greater
Unity and Integration through Shared Values”. The AU is progressing towards the
realization of the African Economic Community (AEC). Although the original purpose of
the RECs was to facilitate regional and continental integration, they have increasingly
been involved in peace and security and governance issues. Regarding these, the
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Constitutive Act mandates the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the
AU.
2.4 The Structures of African Governance

There is an elaborate institutional framework for the realization of the ideals of:
democracy and good governance; rule of law and human rights; peace and security;
and continental socio-economic sustainable development and integration. The political
institutions decide on policies and priorities whereas the administrative are the
implementers of those political choices. The political and administrative institutions are
at three levels: The Continental, Regional, and Member State. The successful
achievement of the objectives of AU collective decisions and achievement of the AU
Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs depends on the functioning of implementation
structures at all these levels.
2.4.1 Member States

The Member States have diverse constitutions that are the basis for their political,
economic, and administrative governance. These constitutions are not derived from the
AU Constitutive Act but influenced by their specificities and different cultures. The
Member States have their own varying governance systems.
2.4.2 The Regional Economic Communities

The RECs are regarded as the building blocks for achieving continental goals of the AU,
especially through regional development and integration. However, they assist in
operationalization of African Peace and Security Architecture initiatives, in collaboration
with Regional Mechanisms. Eight RECs are officially recognised by the AU: Arab
Maghreb Union (UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC);
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
2.4.3 African Union Structures

At the Continental level, there are the following principal organs of the AU: (i) the
Assembly of the Union; (ii) Executive Council; (iii) Peace and Security Council; (iv) Pan-
African Parliament; (iv) Legal organs; (v) AU Commission; (vi) Permanent
Representatives Committee; (vii) Specialised Technical Committees; (viii) Economic,
Social and Cultural Council; and the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child (ACERWC).
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CHAPTER 3: TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP
3.1 Introduction
Transformative Leadership refers to leadership that brings about radical change. It is
leadership that engenders widespread improvements in peoples’ lives.13
.
Transformative leadership may be characterised as being visionary and oriented
towards achieving goals and objectives. Such leadership is geared towards change, and
possesses certain attributes and qualities, including vision, innovation, integrity,
honesty, people-centredness (inclusiveness, responsiveness), prudence, and
effectiveness. This is “…leadership that can set visions, provide selfless and capable
leadership to turn the fortunes of the continent around”.14 Additionally, such leadership
is development-oriented, with the capacity to accelerate the realization of AU Agenda
2063 and global UN SDGs.
Therefore, transformative leadership is central to governance, because it determines

the future direction of change, the trajectory of human and social progress, and prudent
management of national resources for sustained development.
All the relevant AU instruments are an essential element for the realisation of leadership
for the transformation of Africa.
3.2 Overview of Trends in Transformative Leadership

The year 1963 when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established was
marked as a historical year due to the consensus on the adoption of African shared
values. It is also considered as a starting point for analysing trends of governance in the
African continent. The adoption of democratic systems of government gathered
momentum in the 1990s. Henceforth, there have been democratic changes, in which
African leaders presided over constitutional reforms that led to liberalization,
(re)establishment of multi-party-political systems, and regular elections for legislatures
and executives. Other progressive reforms by African leadership have included the
establishment of supreme audit authorities, offices of public protectors, independent
prosecution authorities, independent judiciaries, and legislatures with effective
countervailing powers. African leaders have also encouraged the expansion of the
private media and communications, notably through (regulated) growth of the internet
and mobile telephony.

African Capacity Building Foundation, Africa Capacity Report 2018, page iv.
13
14Sten Rylander, 2010. Governance and transformative leadership in Africa: progress, prospects and challenges.
Harare: ACBF Development Memoirs Series (ACBFDMS/005/2010).
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As pointed out in the chapter on constitutionalism and the rule of law, African leadership
has encouraged democratization. Several leaders have made efforts to respect
presidential term limits, human rights, institutional checks and balances, and systems of
judicial review. Therefore, African countries continue to progress in consolidating the
practice of democracy. In addition, the African public appreciates democratic principles
and practices, as manifested in their participation in civil society and electoral process.
3.4 Characteristics of African Transformative Leadership

The picture is mixed regarding the varieties of African leadership and the existing styles
of government. However, some generalizations could be made from the answers to the
questions we posed above, in relation to the attributes of transformative leadership. The
table below summarises the answers obtained through desk research, for each of the
ten questions we posed above.
Table 1: Characteristics of transformative leadership in Africa
Q Question No. %
1 Countries with National Vision statements 40 73
2 Countries whose National Visions are aligned with the AU Agenda 2063 40 73
3 Countries whose National Visions are aligned with the UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs 40 73
(SDGs)
4 Countries that had initiated or implemented innovative programmes over the last 41 75
20 years
5 Countries that have official programmes that include minority groups 28 51
6 Countries that have official programmes targeted at women 38 69
7 Countries that have official programmes targeted at the youth 41 75
8 Governments that have discriminatory laws 35 64
9 Countries that have mechanisms for public participation 30 55
10 Countries with an official strategy to deal with corruption 31 56
Sources: ACBF. Africa Capacity Indicators; Africa Capacity Report; AU Member States’ official websites
(2015, 2017).
3.4.1 National Vision Statements, AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs

A significant number of Member States have National Vision statements that appear to
align with the AU Agenda 2063 and UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs (SDGs). Moreover, most
countries have programmes targeted at the youth and women.
However, a closer examination of National Visions indicates that although the majority
aim to align with AU Agenda 2063 and UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs, the degrees of
alignment differ. There is poor alignment, especially since the following aspirations
and/or goals, which are not highlighted or specifically mentioned in the National Visions:
(a) The AU Agenda 2063 Aspiration 1 (A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive

Page 28 of 87


especially its women and youth and caring for children) are particularly not
pronounced.
(b) The UN SDG 5 (Gender equality); 6 (clean water and sanitation); 7

(affordable and clean energy); and SDGs 11-15 (sustainable cities and
communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; life
below water; life on land) are all not highly featured in the National Visions
of many countries.
3.4.2 Innovativeness
Examination of data on innovativeness shows that often the implementation of
innovative programmes and projects is often supported by foreign aid, international
organisations and/or donor organisations. This raises a question on whether these are
sustainable. However, some countries have established innovative platforms for youth,
women and aspiring entrepreneurs.
3.4.3 People-centredness
Regarding discriminatory laws, there are prevailing tendencies. These relate to the
existence of customary laws and practices that undermine gender equality, or
perpetuate such inequalities, in areas such as exclusion of women from land ownership.
Also common are laws that lead to the exclusion of women from the administration of
estates of those who died without a will, whereas men are granted such powers.
There are also cases of discriminatory practices being the norm, without there being
laws to protect victims or there being discriminatory exceptions. In some countries there
are no discriminatory laws per se, however, there are rebel or terrorist groups that
perpetuate discrimination and exclusion.
About half of the Member States do not have programmes that include minority groups.
3.4.4 Public participation

As for the mechanisms for expression of people’s concerns, just over half the Member
States appear to have them. However, civil society groups often play a significant role
in mobilising and providing a platform through which citizens voice their concerns to the
Government.
3.4.5 Prudent Management

Anti-corruption strategies are only evident in just over half of the countries. Member
States that have government anti-corruption strategies often take the form of a
specialised court, agency and/or a state anti-corruption institution.
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3.5 Assessing Governance Performance at the Continental Level

Assessing performance facilitates the identification of areas for improvement. The
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument for assessing the
performance of participating states. Thirty-eight (38) of the fifty-five (55) Member States
of the AU have signed up for the APRM. Twenty-one (21) have undertaken the review.
Whereas three (3) have proceeded to complete the second review, only one country
conducts regular in-country assessment of governance performance. Meanwhile, the
AU Assembly continues to urge Member States that have not acceded to the APRM to
do so to achieve universal accession.15
3.5.1 Overall African Governance Performance

Employing a trend analysis method in analysing the Africa governance performance
based on the dataset from various databases and sources with strong Africa local
content, using the APRM Methodology and Framework to assess governance progress
of the African Union fifty-five (55) Member States including APRM participating and non-
participating Countries shows an overall improvement since 2008 to date.
This performance is due to the strong performance registered in Socio-economic

Development thematic area during the period. The analysis also registered satisfactory
performance in Economic Governance and Management as well as Corporate
Governance. Nonetheless, the analysis of the performance is showing warming signs
in Democracy and Political Governance. The following graph shows the trend since
2008 in the four (4) APRM focus areas.
Figure 1: Overview of Africa Governance Performance

15Assembly of The Union Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session, 30-31 January 2017 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Decision
Assembly/AU/Dec. 631(XXVIII).
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Source: Analysing Africa Governance Performance: APRM Perspectives
3.6 Challenges in Transformative Leadership

In summary, there are positive signs of African leaders declaring National Visions and
formulating innovative programmes. However, various challenges require resolution
among which are: the existence of discriminatory laws; the exclusion of minority groups;
inadequate mechanisms for public participation; inadequate freedom of association and
of the media; and the absence of anti-corruption strategies.
3.7 Recommendations on Transformative Leadership

Although a significant number of countries have developed National Visions, others
should be encouraged to do so.
The Member states should endeavour to:
1. Align their National Visions with the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs.
Specifically:
a) The AU Agenda 2063 Aspiration 1 (A Prosperous Africa, based on inclusive

especially its women and youth, and caring for children).
b) The UN SDG 5 (Gender equality), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 7 (affordable

and clean energy); UN SDGs 11-15 (sustainable cities and communities;
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responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life
on land).
2. End all forms of discrimination and exclusion.
3. Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good

governance.
4. Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights
instruments.
5. Establish regular National Governance reviews to assess the performance of

governance.
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF

LAW
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law in the
Member States, and the effectiveness of the efforts of the African Union to enhance the
realization of these ideals of governance on the continent.
4.2 Principal African Union Instruments on Constitutionalism and the Rule

of Law
The Constitutive Act establishes the objectives of the African Union, which include the
promotion of democracy and good governance, the protection of human rights, and the
promotion of peace, security and governance on the continent.16 Significantly, the
Constitutive Act establishes several principles meant to guide Member States in their
endeavours to realise the objectives of the Union. These principles include: sovereign
equality and interdependence among the Member States; the participation of the people
of Africa in the activities of the Union; non-interference by Member States in the internal
affairs of other Member States; the promotion of gender equality; and the condemnation
and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.17
However, even though the AU Constitutive Act respects the principles of sovereignty
and non-interference by a Member State in the internal affairs of another, it recognises
the principle of non-indifference, which is “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely:
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to
legitimate order to restore peace and stability”.18
The major instruments for promoting constitutionalism and the rule of law include: The
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; The Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa; The African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance; The Declaration on Democracy, Political,
Economic and Corporate Governance; and The African Charter on Values and
Principles of Public Service and Administration.
Table 2, below, shows the status of the principal AU instruments regarding

constitutionalism and the rule of law.

16 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3.
18 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4 (h).
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Table 2: Status of AU Instruments relating to constitutionalism and the rule of law (September
2018)
Signed Ratifie Deposited

Instrument (Out of 55) d
Constitutive Act of the African Union19 54 55 55
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 46 31 31
African Charter on Human and People's Rights 45 54 54
Protocol of the Court of Justice of The African Union 44 18 18

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 49 40 40
Corruption
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 31 6 6
Human Rights
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on The Statute of the 11 0 0
African Court of Justice and Human Rights
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 44 48 48
The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service 38 18 18
and Administration
Protocol to the Constitutive Act of The African Union Relating 19 9 9
to The Pan-African Parliament
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 49 41 41
on the Rights of Women in Africa
Source: https://au.int/en/treaties/status
The following briefly elaborates the principal instruments for promoting constitutionalism
and the rule of law.
4.2.1 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) seeks to promote and protect
human rights and basic freedoms in Africa. It requires Member States of the AU to
recognise a set of rights and freedoms, and to undertake to adopt legislative and other
measures to give effect to them.
The Charter establishes the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which
is responsible for its oversight and interpretation. A Protocol to the Charter adopted in
1998 created the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Protocol entered
into force on 25 January 2004 and the court was operationalised in 2005, with the first
judges being elected in 2006. A second Protocol adopted in 2003 created the Court of
Justice of the African Union. A third Protocol adopted in 2008 sought to merge the two
courts to form the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. However, this has yet to
materialize.

19 Some states have ratified the instruments without signing.
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4.2.2 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) arose out of concerns, among others, that
women have remained victims of discrimination and harmful practices even though
many of the Member States had ratified the Charter.
It requires Member States to respect and protect the human rights of women including
their health and reproductive rights, and to combat all forms of discrimination against
women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. It also requires
Member States to prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices against women,
such as female genital mutilation; and to ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights
in marriage, participation in the political and decision-making processes, and equality in
the enjoyment of economic and social welfare rights. The Protocol also requires Member
States to ensure its implementation at the national level and indicate (in their periodic
reports under the Charter) the measures they have taken to ensure the realization of
these rights.
Box 1: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights20
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

At the continental level, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is responsible for
promoting human and peoples’ rights, ensuring the protection of these rights, and interpreting the
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights. Its promotion mandate involves
advocacy, sensitization and norm development. It also includes promotional activities with Member
States and institutions concerned with the promotion of human and peoples’ rights, such as promotion
missions, sensitization seminars, development of soft-law instruments, and publication and
dissemination of information materials. Additionally, the Commission adopts resolutions, including those
that elaborate specific human rights themes in greater detail, and those that address pertinent human
rights concerns in the Member States.
Within its protection mandate, the Commission is tasked with receiving and examining ‘communications’
(complaints) submitted to it by Member States and individuals alleging human rights violations by any
Member State to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The mandate regarding protection
requires receiving and examination of periodic reports from Member States on the legislative or other
measures taken to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the Charter.
These reports are presented to the Commission in its public sessions, where they are tabled and
discussed. This public examination includes all the participating stakeholders. The Commission also
receives “Shadow Reports” prepared by accredited NGOs and NHRIs. The Commission takes these
reports into consideration when examining the state reports. The Commission also undertakes fact-
finding missions whenever there is an allegation of a general nature or widespread reports of human
rights violations against a State Party, usually at the request of the AU Policy Organs. The Commission
is a mechanism of last resort, and only entertains communications if the applicant has exhausted local
remedies, provided that such remedies are “available, effective and sufficient”.

20This section is a summary of a written contribution by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Secretariat, Banjul, The Gambia.
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The Commission has contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights in the continent in
various ways. For example, it has not only called upon respondent states to adopt and enforce
appropriate measures, but also recommended that those states report to it on those measures and/or
obstacles faced in implementing its recommendations. Secondly, some domestic courts have relied on
the Commission’s case law to find violations of human rights. Civil society has also relied on the
Commission’s findings to campaign for legal reform, culminating in the repeal of laws that violate rights
protected in the African Charter.21
However, state compliance or implementation of the recommendations of the Commission remains low,
due to lack of political will and inadequate monitoring. In turn, insufficient funding of the Commission
has impeded its capacity to monitor the implementation of its recommendations. Additionally, many
states do not seem to take seriously their reporting responsibilities and obligations, so consequently the
reports are delayed or not even submitted at all.22 This has hindered the ability of the Commission to
monitor state compliance with their human rights obligations under the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights.
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights complements the protection mandate of the
Commission. The Court has jurisdiction to determine “all cases and disputes” submitted to it concerning
the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and “any other
human rights instruments”, such as United Nations instruments, ratified by the states concerned.
For individuals and non-governmental organizations to access the Court directly, the state concerned
must make an “optional declaration” recognising the competence of the Court to receive such cases.
And because this declaration is optional, a state can unilaterally withdraw it. Unfortunately, most states
have not deposited the optional declaration, which has severely impeded access to the Court. The
Commission may also submit cases to the Court in certain circumstances.23
Not all Member States party to the African Charter have ratified the Protocol establishing the Court. The
remaining states need to ratify this Protocol. There also needs to be more state allowance of individuals
and NGOs to directly access the Court, as this will help to consolidate a pan-African judicial system for
the protection of human rights. Alternatively, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
should amend Article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol to allow individuals and NGOs direct access
to the Court. Further, given the limited resources of the Commission and the Court, subsidiarity needs
to be strengthened, including integrating the Court with sub-regional courts.
4.2.3 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007 arose
out of a concern, among others, that unconstitutional changes of government had
become “one of the essential causes of insecurity, instability and violent conflict in
Africa”. Therefore, the Charter underlines the determination of the Member States to
promote and strengthen good governance, by deepening and consolidating the rule of

21 Ssenyonjo, M. 2018. “Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987–2018)”, International Human Rights Law Review 1
(2018).
22 Ibid.
23 Rule 118 of the 2010 Commission’s Rules of Procedure allows the Commission to submit cases to the African
Court under four circumstances: (i) where a State has not complied or is unwilling to comply with the Commission’s
recommendations; (ii) where a State has not complied with the Commission’s request for provisional
(interim/precautionary) measures; (iii) situations involving serious or massive violations of human rights; and (iv) if
the Commission deems it necessary to refer a communication to the Court at any stage.
Page 36 of 87

law; and entrenching a political culture of change of power based on the holding of
regular, free, fair and transparent elections.
By this Charter, the Member States committed themselves to the following objectives:
promoting adherence to democracy and respect for human rights; promoting and
enhancing adherence to the rule of law; promoting the holding of regular free and fair
elections; prohibiting, rejecting and condemning unconstitutional changes of
government in Member States; promoting the fight against corruption; promoting citizen
participation in governance and accountability in the management of public affairs;
promoting gender balance and equality; promoting best practices in the management of
elections; and, enhancing cooperation between the AU, RECs, state parties and the
international community on democracy, elections and governance.
The Charter imposes various obligations on Member States. For example, it requires
state parties to: ensure transparent and accountable administration; improve public
sector management; improve efficiency and effectiveness of public services and combat
corruption; ensure separation of powers; strengthen political institutions; create
conducive conditions for civil society organizations; facilitate the participation of women
in decision-making and electoral processes; promote citizen participation (particularly
social groups with special needs such as youth and people with disabilities) in the
governance process; ensure civilian control over the armed and security forces; ensure
the independence and accountability of public institutions; promote efficient and
transparent public finance management; decentralise power to democratically elected
local authorities; and increase the integration and effectiveness of traditional authorities
in the democratic system.
On the management of elections, ACDEG requires state parties to adhere to the Union’s
Declaration on the Principles Governing Elections in Africa of 2002 (Declaration on
Elections), which sought to strengthen the role of the Union in observing elections and
advancing the democratization process.
4.2.4 The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate

Governance
The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance of 2003
(NEPAD Declaration) committed the Member States to work together to pursue the
following objectives: democracy and good political governance; economic and corporate
governance; socio-economic development. By this declaration, the Member States
reaffirmed their commitment to: promoting democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of
law; respecting human rights; ensuring good economic and corporate governance; and
pursuing socio-economic development.
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To facilitate the realization of these objectives, the Member States agreed to adopt
codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the national, sub-regional and
continental levels.
4.2.5 The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and
Administration
The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration
(2011) (Public Service Charter) reiterates the political commitment of the Member States
to strengthen professionalism and ethics in the public service. Its objectives include:
encouraging citizens and users of public services to participate in public administration
processes; promoting transparent service delivery; improving the working conditions of
public service agents and ensuring the protection of their rights; promoting gender
equality within public service and administration structures; and, encouraging the
harmonization of policies and procedures and the exchange of experiences and best
practices among Member States.
The Member States commit to pursuing these objectives in accordance with several
principles: impartiality, fairness and due process in the delivery of public services; and
the institutionalization of a culture of accountability, integrity, and transparency in public
service and administration.
4.3 The Parameters for Measurement of Constitutionalism and the Rule of

Law
The extent to which Member States are practising constitutionalism and the rule of law
is done through evaluation of their performance under eight parameters: (i) respect for
law; (ii) respect for and enforcement of human rights; (iii) public participation in
governance; (iv) accountability of the executive; (v) effectiveness of the bureaucracy;
(vi) independence and accountability of the legislature; (vii) independence and
accountability of the judiciary; and (viii) access to justice.
4.4 The practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Member States
The AU Constitutive Act establishes an institutional framework for the Member States
to utilise in realising the objectives of the Union. This framework consists of: The
Assembly of the Union; the Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of
Justice; the Commission; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialised
Technical Committee; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the Financial
Page 38 of 87

Institutions.24 The following summarises performance in the eight parameters mentioned

above (Section 4.4).
4.4.1 Respect for the Rule of Law

Respecting the rule of law means observing the requirements of the law. It means that
members of the society and its institutions should habitually comply with the legally
established principles and procedures. The following factors continue to negatively
affect the respect for law in African countries: selective application of the law; disregard
for public procurement rules and procedures; failure to respect court decisions; neglect
of local and customary practices for dealing with crime; and incumbent presidents
manipulating the law and legal processes to retain power.
4.4.2 The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

Many Member States have ratified significant human rights instruments such as the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, most have not punctually
submitted their reports on the implementation of this treaty.25 Only ten states are up to
date with their reporting obligations in terms of the Maputo Protocol.
The national human rights institutions are also facing several challenges. For example,
some NHRIs share a mandate with other state institutions, which tends to confuse
stakeholders regarding their functions, and do not have the resources they need to
discharge their mandate effectively or lack the autonomy since they are dependent on
the Executive for their budgets.
Although most Member States have established legal frameworks and institutions for
the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights, far too many individuals still
do not enjoy the rights enshrined in these frameworks. Further, the NHRIs do not have
the requisite resources and autonomy to function effectively. At the continental level, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is under-resourced. Further, state
compliance with and/or implementation of Commission recommendations and decisions
remains low.26

25 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2016. State Reports and Concluding Observations (2016).
26 Ssenyonjo, M. 2018. “Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987-2018)”, International Human Rights Law Review 1
(2018).
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Table 3: Status of Submission of Periodic Reports Relevant to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (August 2018)
Status State Party
Up to date: 14 Angola, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea,
Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and
Togo.
1 Report overdue: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique,
10 Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
2 Reports Gabon, The Sudan, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
overdue: 3
3 Reports Cameroon, Burundi and Libya.
overdue: 3
More than 3 Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Ghana,
Reports overdue: Guinea Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Seychelles, Swaziland,
18 Tanzania, The Gambia, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Never submitted Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, South
a Report: 5 Sudan and Somalia.
Source: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Information on the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights”, submitted to the APRM in October 2018.
.
National Human Rights Institutions

To complement the continental institutions, many Member States have institutions for
the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights. These include national
human rights institutions (NHRIs) to monitor the realization of human rights and assist
citizens in seeking redress for the violation of their rights.27 The NHRIs are
complemented at continental level by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights and the Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (See Box 1). These institutions are
discussed below.
Box 2: National Human Rights Institutions
All Member States have constitutions that contain bills of rights intended to protect human rights and
establish mechanisms for their realization. Some states have established legal frameworks for the
protection of human rights defenders, while a number are in the process of doing so.
Despite these positive developments, the level of the implementation of the continental instruments and
national constitutions is not ideal, as reports of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
indicate. Thus, the promotion and protection of civil and political rights needs to be strengthened. For
example, press freedom is curtailed in many countries, while opposition politicians are constantly
threatened with arrest and detention. Many governments continue to forcefully prevent peaceful
demonstrations, even where the law does not require prior authorization. Such endeavours to prevent

27Akokpari J, 2008. “Introduction: Human Rights Actors and Institutions in Africa”, in Akokpari J and Zimbler DS
(eds.) Africa’s Human Rights Architecture 1, Centre for Conflict Resolution.
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citizens from enjoying their rights to assemble and demonstrate peacefully have in many cases included
arbitrary arrests, detention and ill-treatment of citizens by police and security forces.
However, it is encouraging that the courts of some countries have declared criminal defamation laws
unconstitutional, while others have abolished such laws. The abuse of the rights of women and children
also remains widespread, although many countries have adopted policies and laws for the promotion
and protection of women’s rights. For example, women and girls are often subjected to rape and other
sexual violence.
African countries also continue to experience internal and external conflicts, which are invariably
accompanied by massive human rights violations. However, there are also human rights abuses in
countries where there is relative peace. Common human rights violations include the forcible
displacement of populations, extrajudicial executions, torture and other forms of ill-treatment that in
some cases lead to death. No doubt, these violations constitute serious abuses of international
humanitarian and human rights law.
Social and economic rights have not fared any better, with countries doing little to ensure their
enjoyment. Thus, conditions such as poverty and social inequalities remain widespread, and have been
exacerbated by the prevalence of corruption in most countries. Corruption often deprives the state of
the resources it requires to provide its citizens with essential services such as health care, water and
education. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights estimates that Africa loses around
USD 148 billion a year to corruption. In addition, corruption creates discrimination in access to these
services, thereby particularly undermining the social and economic rights of the poor, marginalised and
disadvantaged groups. These conditions constitute sources of disaffection, revolt and even terrorism.
An increasing number of Africans have fled their countries and sought refuge in neighbouring countries
in the recent past, due to factors such as violence, insecurity, conflicts, natural disasters, major
development projects and climate change. As a result, Africa now has a large population of refugees,
asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and migrants who are exposed to human rights abuses
due to their statelessness.
Another issue is that the laws, policies and practices of many countries remain hostile towards
indigenous populations. For example, the lands of indigenous populations have, in various cases, been
expropriated without their consent or compensation. Countries also need to enhance their efforts to
promote and protect the rights of older persons and peoples with disabilities.
Many countries have also failed to incorporate social and economic rights in their constitutions, merely
including them in what are termed “directive principles of state policy”; notwithstanding the recognition
of these rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.28 This means that the courts
cannot enforce these rights.
Nevertheless, several countries have introduced free education for both primary and secondary school
age children. It is also encouraging that various countries have revised or are in the process of revising
their mineral rights regimes to ensure that citizens benefit from extractive industries, and that the
activities of these industries are environmentally sustainable.
4.4.3 Public Participation in Governance

The practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law mandate effective public
participation in governance. It is only by participating effectively in public decision-
making processes that individuals and groups can ensure that their needs and interests

28Mubangizi JC, 2006. “The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African Countries: A
Comparative Evaluation”, African Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2006.
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are addressed. Popular participation not only enhances the quality of the decisions of
government but also the prospects of their successful implementation. Government and
public officials have a duty to consult those likely to be affected by their decisions so
that the latter can, through participation, make their views known and influence the
substance of governmental decisions and actions. Effective participation requires
access to information and transparency, so that the public can see whether and how
their contributions have been considered.
Several African countries now appreciate the significance of public participation and
access to information. They have enacted freedom of information laws that give
individuals the right of access to information held by government. Local government
structures are also utilised in many countries as a mechanism for encouraging citizen
participation.
On the other hand, Citizen participation continues to be constrained by factors such as

the absence of clear procedural mechanisms, poverty, discrimination, and the failure of
government agencies to give feedback.
An example of best practice in public participation is to be found in the context of the

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM requires participating states to
establish national structures to administer the peer review process. National Governing
Councils (NGCs) constitute an important structure in this respect. The NGCs facilitate
broad-based stakeholder participation in national governance discourse.
Africa also needs to enhance the participation of its youth in governance. The Member
states are therefore encouraged to prioritize the signing, ratification, and implementation
of the African Youth Charter of 2006.
4.4.4 Accountability of the Executive

The practice of democracy requires mechanisms for holding government accountable
for the exercise of the powers of decision making and executive action that the people
delegate to it. The periodic election, which gives the people an opportunity to confirm or
change its representatives from time to time, is one such mechanism. However, the
periodic election does not offer the electorate an adequate degree of oversight over
government. A need therefore arises for additional mechanisms to facilitate the day-to-
day accountability of the executive.
Most countries in Africa practice a form of multiparty democracy. Term limits are
specified in many constitutions, leading to regular elections and reasonably peaceful
changes of power through those elections.
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On the other side, the executive remains dominant despite the implementation of far-
reaching democratic and constitutional reforms in the recent past. Many executives do
not have restraints on the use of power to control resources and appoint key state
functionaries. This has allowed executive control over electoral processes and use of
public resources for patronage or denial of benefits. Worryingly, in many countries the
electoral system is seen as an instrument for inclusion and/or exclusion in the sharing
of national resources. Additionally, the repression of opposition interests and restrictions
on non-state media continue. Attempts at manipulation of electoral results are still
evident; the incumbents still enjoy undue advantages; and elections often generate
open conflict.
4.4.5 Effectiveness and Accountability of the Public Service

The bureaucracy may not always act in the public interest, leading to the pursuance of
self-serving interests and corruption. Therefore, there need to be systems to ensure
their accountability and responsibility. Thus, there would be public trust and legitimacy
in the government.
4.4.6 Independence and accountability of the Legislature

The legislature represents society’s diverse interests in government and is an important
mechanism for achieving accountability of the government to the people. However, the
legislature can only perform these functions where it is autonomous from the executive
and exercises meaningful power.
4.4.7 Independence And Accountability of the Judiciary

The judiciary applies and interprets the laws that the legislature enacts. It also exercises
the power of judicial review, by which it validates or invalidates the actions and decisions
of government, depending on whether they conform to or violate the constitution or other
laws. Judicial review therefore functions to either check the government or legitimise its
actions, which makes it a significant instrument that the courts can use to enhance
constitutionalism and the rule of law.
The powers of the judiciary are important mechanisms for limiting the will of the majority
so that it can respect the rights of minorities. In their absence, majority rule may lead to
tyranny of the majority. The realization of the rule of law ideal requires suitable
application mechanisms, including an independent and professional judiciary, easy
access to dispute resolution forums, and reliable enforcement agencies.
4.4.8 Access to Justice

The concept of access to justice mandates the provision of dispute resolution
mechanisms that are affordable, proximate, comprehendible, responsive to users, and
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ensure speedy justice. The concept emerged out of the realization that formal judicial
processes are often costly and slow, and their complexities intimidate or confuse many
parties. Access to justice also focuses on ensuring that the justice system is responsive
to the needs of its users and commands their confidence.
Facilitating access to justice has therefore involved removing barriers such as high
monetary costs, time costs, limited knowledge of legal rules and procedures, cultural
barriers and language barriers. It is also increasingly recognised that methods such as
arbitration and mediation might work better and more justly, than the formal court
system.
To enhance access to justice, the constitutions of a few African countries have sought
to integrate formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Many countries have
also established various initiatives regarding access to justice, including: legal aid
schemes (in some cases backed by a law, including the constitutionalising of legal
assistance); small claims courts; public interest litigation; and the office of public
defender.
There have also been efforts to utilise technologies including ICTs and social media to
facilitate access to justice. Several countries have created legal information institutions
and are now using these technologies to provide accessible information on the work of
their judicial systems, including reporting the decisions of the courts. Finally, various
countries are training non-lawyers (paralegals) to assist the indigent to navigate their
formal justice systems.
Recognition of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms is one way of enhancing

access to justice. However, these non-formal methods ought to ensure respect for the
rights of those they affect or participate in. Access to justice also focuses on ensuring
that the justice system is responsive to the needs of its users and commands their
confidence. Therefore, the justice system needs to pay attention to issues such as the
language of court proceedings, including availability of interpretation services, court
fees, public involvement in the administration of justice, accessibility to persons with
disability, and access to information.
4.5 Achievements in African Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

Over the last three decades, there have been considerable achievements in
constitutionalism and the rule of law. At the continental level, the Member States have
sought to promote democracy and good governance. The Member States consider
these ideals as critical to the attainment of sustainable peace, security, and development
on the continent. It has, accordingly, spelt out its commitments to these ideals in various
Page 44 of 87

instruments, including the AU Constitutive Act, the declaration on unconstitutional

changes of government, the declaration governing democratic elections, the declaration
on observing and monitoring elections, and the more recently, the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG).
At the level of the Member States, there have been constitutional reforms relating to
democratization initiatives that have led to significant political liberalization and pluralism
in African countries. Key achievements of these initiatives include: the reintroduction of
multi-party politics; the endorsement of presidential term-limits; the execution of regular
and competitive elections for legislative chambers and presidential office; the restoration
of legislative and oversight functions to legislatures; the guarantee of judicial
independence; and the emergence and growth of private media and civil society.
Additionally, constitutional rules are taken seriously, and presidential term limits are now
widely respected. It is also noteworthy that many African constitutions now demand
respect for the rule of law, human rights, and establish mechanisms for institutional
checks and balances, including judicial review.
Therefore, African countries have made considerable progress towards consolidating

the practice of democracy. In addition, the African public is increasingly demanding and
appreciating democracy; they perceive democracy in terms of the protection of civil
liberties, participation in decision-making, voting in elections, and governance reforms.
4.6 Challenges to Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

The African Union Member States have established an elaborate institutional
framework for promoting democracy and governance on the continent. This
framework consists of the following institutions and Organs: the African Union
Commission (AUC), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Pan-African Parliament; the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; the
African Union Advisory Board on Corruption; and the Regional Economic
Communities.
Additionally, the African Union Member States established the African Governance
Architecture Platform (AGA) in 2007.29 The objective of this platform, which entered
into force in 2012, is to enhance the ratification, domestication and implementation of

29 The members of the AGA Platform are: the Peace and Security Council; the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights; the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child; the African Peer Review Mechanism; the Pan African Parliament; the African Union
Development Agency (formerly New Partnership for Africa’s Development – NEPAD); the African Commission on
International Law; the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
Regional Economic Communities; the Permanent Representatives Committee; and Specialised Technical
Committees.
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African Union norms on governance, particularly the African Charter on Democracy,

Elections and Governance (ACDEG). It is worth mentioning that the AGA is an
informal mechanism, therefore, it does not seem to have a formal positioning in the
AU’s decision-making process, and merely makes recommendations to the policy
organs.30
The African Union Member States also established the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA), which precedes the AGA. The APSA’s mandate is to prevent,
manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. Concerning the relationship of the two
frameworks, the AGA’s role is to support the APSA to address the structural root
causes and drivers of conflicts on the continent. The African Union therefore considers
the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law to be instrumental
in preventing conflicts.31
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) defines the
term “unconstitutional change of government” to mean illegal means of accessing or
maintaining power, which include coups d’état, intervention by mercenaries to replace
a democratically elected government, replacement of a democratically elected
government by armed dissidents or rebels, refusal by an incumbent government to
relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free and fair elections, and an
amendment or revision of the constitution or other law that infringes the principles of
democratic change of government.32, Accordingly this issue is currently under review
by the Member States.
The ACDEG mandates the AUC to develop benchmarks on the implementation of its
principles and commitments, and evaluates Member States’ compliance. The AUC
has therefore developed a State Reporting Questionnaire to execute this mandate.
Additionally, it requires the Member States to submit a bi-annual report to the AUC on
the measures they have taken to implement its provisions. Very few states have
submitted this report.33
The AUC observes the conduct of elections in the Member States, as part of its
responsibility to ensure the implementation of the provisions of ACDEG and the
Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (the Durban
Declaration). The AU’s Guidelines for Elections Observation Missions of 2002
requires the AUC to not only observe elections (that is, gather information and make
informed judgments about them), but also monitor elections (that is, observe the
election process and intervene if relevant laws or standard procedures are being
violated).

30 Aggad F and Apiko P, 2017. “Understanding the African Union and its Governance Agenda – African Governance
Architecture and the Charter for Democracy Elections and Good Governance”, Political Economy Dynamics of
Regional Organisations (2017).
31 African Union, Framework of the African Governance Architecture (2007).
32 ACDEG, (Article 23).
33 African Union, 2018. Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AU Institutional Reform
Pursuant to Assembly Decision Assembly/Y/AU/Dec. 635(XXVIII), Assembly/AU/2(XXXI), July 2018.
Page 46 of 87

The AU initially viewed election observation as a mechanism for preventive diplomacy,

that is, a tool for averting the possible outbreak of conflict. Increasingly, the AU now
takes a long-term view to election observation and embraces all stages of elections,
namely pre-voting, voting and post-voting. The process of election observation
therefore entails the examination of issues such as constituency demarcation, voter
and candidate registration, and post-election dispute settlement.
Thus, the AU has shifted the focus of election observation from diplomacy, by making
the missions more technical and independent.34 The observer missions make
recommendations, which the Member States are expected to implement before their
next elections. The AUC has developed a strategy for enhancing these
recommendations. This strategy could be used to advocate for institutional and
electoral reforms in the Member States in line with the ACDEG.35
4.7 Recommendations for Strengthening Constitutionalism and the Rule Of

Law
There are a number of recommendations that could be considered to enhance and/or
improve governance performance in the area of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
They are listed below.
4.7.1 Respect for the Rule of Law

6. The AMember States are encouraged to ratify all the shared values and
instruments, and comply with the decisions of the legal organs.
7. The Member States are encouraged to establish mechanisms both on the

national and continental level to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of
anticorruption programmes and strategies.
4.7.2 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

8. The Member States are invited to submit periodic reports relevant to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
9. The Member States are encouraged to comply with the decisions of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
10. The Member States are encouraged to establish NHRIs.

34 Aniekwe CC and Atuobi SM, 2016. ‘Two Decades of Election Observation by the African Union: A Review’, 15
Journal of African Elections 25 (2016).
35 Interview with representatives of the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit, Department of Political Affairs,
AUC.
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4.7.3 Public Participation In Governance

11. The African Union Member States are invited to ratify the African Charter on Values
and Principles of Public Service and Administration.
12. The African Union Member States are encouraged to ratify the African
Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration. The
African Union should encourage Member States to adopt inclusive electoral
systems, including proportional representation.
13. The Union Member States are encouraged to ensure the independent
administration of elections, and fair and speedy resolution of electoral
disputes, in accordance with ACDEG.
14. The commission assigned for formulating the constitution must be

composed of all categories of the society, including the marginalized groups,
women and the disabled.
4.7.4 Accountability of the Executive

15. The Member States are encouraged to adopt inclusive electoral systems.
16. The Member States are encouraged to ensure the independent administration of elections,
and fair and speedy resolution of electoral disputes, in accordance with African Charter om
Democracy, Elections and Governance.
4.7.5 Effectiveness and Accountability of the Public Service

17. The Member States that have not ratified the African Charter on Values and Principles of
Public Service Administration are encouraged to do so.
18. The Member States are encouraged to strengthen their national integrity systems.
4.7.6 Independence and Accountability of the Legislature

legislature.
20. The Member States are encouraged to ratify the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the
African Union Relating to the Pan African Parliament.
4.7.7 Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary

judiciary.
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4.7.8 Access to Justice

22. The Member States are encouraged to facilitate access to justice by adopting and
implementing continental and universal principles and guidelines.
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Chapter 5: PEACE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
5.1 Introduction
There are many descriptions and definitions of peace. Generally, peace is a situation
whereby wars and civil conflict are absent, but security prevails, usually in the context
of a conducive environment for sustained social and political stability. The African Union
considers that governance, peace and security are prerequisites for sustainable
development.
The assessment of peace and security focuses on progress towards “Silencing the
Guns”. The chapter presents the principal AU instruments, and identifies key decisions,
declaration, and actions aimed at realising the Africa we want. The assessment
identifies the structural causes of conflict and instability; highlights the efforts of the AU,
RECs, and Member States in peace and security initiatives; and examines the
functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
5.2 The Interrelationship of Peace, Security and Governance

Democratic governance, as well as peace and security, are complementary and
essential to social economic development. They are interrelated, interdependent, and
mutually reinforcing imperatives for continental integration and sustainable
development. Hence, the Agenda 2063 Aspiration 4, which envisages a peaceful and
secure Africa as fundamental to African progress.
5.3 African Union Instruments Relating to Peace, Security, And Governance

The crucial AU instruments relating to peace, security, and governance include the:
Constitutive Act; African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; Declaration
on Principles Governing the Conduct of Democratic Elections in Africa; Convention on
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; and the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.
The table below shows the status of selected AU instruments in terms of signature,
ratification, and deposition by the Member States.
Table 4: Status of AU Peace and Security Instruments (September 2018)
Instrument Signed Ratified Deposited

(Out of 55)
Constitutive Act of the African Union 5436 55 55
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 46 31 31

36 Some countries ratified the instrument without signing.
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Instrument Signed Ratified Deposited

(Out of 55)
Protocol to the OAU Convention on The Prevention and 45 21 21
Combating of Terrorism
African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence 44 22 22
Pact
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The 52 41 41
Treaty of Pelindaba)
OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaryism In 36 32 32
Africa
Statute of the African Union Mechanism for Police 0 0 0
Cooperation (AFRIPOL)
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 50 43 43
Terrorism
African Union Convention for the Protection and 40 27 27
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(Kampala Convention)
African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation 15 3 3
(Niamey Convention)
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 53 52 52
Security Council of the African Union
Source: https://au.int/en/treaties/status
5.4 The Measures for Assessing Peace and Security

The assessment focuses on quantification of non-peaceful occurrences: identification of
the causes of conflict, unrest and instability; continental efforts aimed at promoting
peace, security and stability; efforts of the RECs and Member States regarding conflict
prevention, resolution and management; and the progress of development of the African
Standby Force and AU peace Fund.
5.5 The Causes of Conflict in Africa

There is a close relationship between peace, security and democratic governance. The
record of the open session of the 766th Meeting of the African Peace and Security
Council states:
Council and participants acknowledged that most of the violent conflicts and crises
facing parts of the African continent are rooted in governance deficits, which include
mismanagement of diversity, manipulation of constitutions, marginalization of the youth
and mismanagement of natural resources. In this regard, Council and participants
urged all Member States to redouble their efforts and improve their governance
systems.37
The African Union identifies seven (7) major causes of conflict and instability as follows:

37 African Union Commission (2018), 766th Peace and Security Council Meeting, PSC/PR/BR. (DCCLXVI)
Page 51 of 87

First, there is a strong relationship between poverty and instability. Internal armed
violence is significantly more frequent in low-income and lower-middle-income countries
than in upper-middle-income or wealthy countries.
Second, disruptive transitions as evident in times of change, including transitions from

autocracy to democracy are often unstable and prone to violence. Similarly, adverse
regime changes are often violent.
Third, lack of democracy or democratic accountability has potential to trigger instability.

Fourth, population imbalance and social and economic exclusion could also influence
violence and instability. This has been observed in poor countries with relatively large
youthful populations that are economically and socially excluded. The exclusion factor
becomes particularly acute if education levels, rates of urbanisation and unemployment
are comparatively high.
Fifth, continuous violence, whereby a country that has experienced large-scale violence
is susceptible to more of the same. Sixth, there is the ‘bad-neighbourhood’ effect when
countries that are close to or bordering on other countries that are experiencing conflict
are exposed to it.
Finally, many of these factors are associated with the prevalence of poor governance,
as evident in self-serving leadership. Exacerbating these is the impact of excessive
dependence on commodity exports, and the associated implications such as
dependence on external funding for running the state and managing the economy.
There are long-standing relationships amongst these factors.
5.6 Africa’s Conflict Zones

The AU has identified 21 current conflicts in the 55 African Union Member States (as of
July 2018). There are a number of countries with internal conflicts and other forms of
unrest, and there are violent disturbances involving economic issues, race, religion,
political divisions, violent extremism, terrorism, and so forth.
A recent analysis commissioned by the African Union locates the major conflict zones
and discusses conflict-resolution dynamics. Four major conflict zones are identified: the
Mano River Region, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel/Maghreb
Region.38

Aboagye F (ed) 2016. A Comprehensive Review of African Conflicts and Regional Interventions. Addis Ababa: AU
38
Commission and African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).
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5.6.1 The Mano River Region

This geopolitical region covers the Manu River Union, which is a political and economic
structure consisting of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. These countries
have since 1990 faced serious security challenges, including military coups and civil
wars. Leaders of these countries tended to exploit cross-border ethnic linkages to further
their own domestic political and security advantages, at the expense of peace and
stability of the region. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has
played a significant role in conflict prevention and management (peacekeeping and
peace enforcement) in this region.
5.6.2 The Great Lakes Region

Straddling eastern and central Africa, the membership of the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) includes central, eastern and southern African
countries, namely, Angola, Burundi, CAR, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda,
Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Instability and intractable
conflicts have plagued the region since the 1990s, including the so-called “Africa’s World
War” in the DRC in the late 1990s and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Although these
conflicts have been within countries, they have had regional ramifications. The region is
characterised by alliances among states and non-state actors who seek to ensure their
security, survival and interest through armed activities. An apparent contributing factor
in the conflicts is the role of “outsiders”, whose interests are economic, political, or even
criminal.
The ICGLR, ECCAS, SADC and the AU play active roles of pacification, with one of the
most important regional initiative being the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
for the DRC and the Region negotiated by the AU, ICGLR Secretariat and SADC, with
active support from the UN. This was signed at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa in
early 2013. At the behest of these organizations, an Intervention Brigade was
established within its peacekeeping mission in the DRC.
5.6.3 The Horn of Africa Region

This geographically strategic region covers Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and
Sudan, which together with South Sudan constitute the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD). This region has one of the world’s highest occurrences of conflict,
featuring eight clusters of distinct but interrelated conflict systems, involving (i) Eritrea
and Ethiopia, (ii) Somalia, (iii) Sudan and South Sudan, (iv) South Sudan, (v) Sudan,
(vi) Ethiopia, (vii) the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and (viii) armed cattle-raiding in
the border areas between Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan.
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5.6.4 The Sahel and Maghreb Regions

The (broader) Maghreb region is composed of the countries of north, west and east
Africa: Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali,
Niger, Chad, and Sudan. A number of conflict systems and dynamics occur in these
regions, comprising civil wars, crime and terror, and demands for democratic reforms.
Another conflict dynamic relates to the behaviour of Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram is particularly active in the northern Nigerian
states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, bordering Cameroon and Chad.
A unique characteristic of the security environment of this region has been the
increasing number and constant occurrences of political violence and even criminal
activities with radicalized misuse of religion. This feature of the region has fast been
internationalised through the American “war on terror” and more recently, the open
identification of Boko Haram with the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) based in the Iraq/Syria
conflict system.
The fight against Boko Haram has led to sustained and concerted efforts to neutralise it
by the countries directly affected by its atrocities, as well as by regional organisations
like the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Benin, and other members of the AU.
5.7 Trends of African Conflict And Instability

Africa’s experience with conflict reveals four macro-trends that require different and
complex responses. First, Africa’s peace and security terrain has a historical dimension
since many conflicts are prolonged and intractable. Second, conflicts increasingly take
on a regional and/or international character, with interconnected socio-economic,
political, identity and criminal drivers. The agents of conflict and violence intersect, and
hence the problem needs to be addressed from a regional, continental and global
perspective. Third, interventions increasingly prioritise “stabilisation” activities to the
detriment of conflict prevention or addressing deep-seated causes of the conflict and
instability. Fourth, Africa is expected to provide robust conflict management skills and
expertise, albeit with limited capacity and reliance on external donors who continue to
influence the continent’s conflict management agenda.39
The general trends are that the period from 2001 has witnessed change in the scope,
scale and nature of armed conflict and violence in Africa. Whereas large-scale wars
have declined in proportion to the growth in population, political violence such as riots

39 Van Nieuwkerk A, 2016. “Learning lessons from Africa’s responses to conflict” in Aboagye, F (ed) A Comprehensive
Review of African Conflicts and Regional Interventions. Addis Ababa: AU Commission and APSTA.
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and violence against civilians has increased.40 Intra-state occurrences are more
prevalent than conflicts between different countries. Fewer countries are involved in
inter-state conflicts now than they were 20-30 years ago; notably some have declared
the end of hostilities (most recently Ethiopia and Eritrea).
The AU response to these trends is illustrated in its approach to terrorism, which is one
of the most problematic security threats across Africa.
Box 3: African Union Efforts in Fighting Terrorism41
The AU framework for prevention and combating of terrorism has roots in the adoption of the 1992
(OAU) Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African
States [AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII)]; 1994 Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African
Relations [AHG/Dec. (XXX)]; 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism;
2001 Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism; 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism.
These meant to combat extremism and terrorism, and its manifestations in sectarianism, tribalism,
ethnicity or religion. Terrorism was declared a criminal act. African countries were urged to cooperate
in fighting such acts through extradition, extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance.
The Plan of Action adopted practical counter-terrorism measures, including police and border control,
legislative and judicial measures, financing of terrorism, and exchange of information.
The implementation of the 2002 Plan of Acton introduced the African Centre for the Study of
Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in 2004. The ACSRT is an AU forum for interaction and cooperation
among Member States and Regional Mechanisms. Its functions are to research and analyse terrorism
and its organization, and to develop counter-terrorism capacity building programmes.
Additionally, there is from 2010 the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
(2010). The AU Commission developed the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism, endorsed by
the decision of the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, held in Malabo, in
July 2011 [Assembly/AU/Dec. 369(XVII)]. The purpose of the model law is to assist the Member
States to implement the continental and international counter-terrorism instruments, including the
1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocol.
5.8 Achievements in Promoting Peace, Security and Governance

The African Union has, in terms of policy and practice, established overarching
mechanisms to attain peace and security and strengthen democratic governance. The
AU has adopted a significant set of instruments for promoting and safeguarding peace,
security and governance. The principal ones are listed above.
There is also an elaborate institutional framework for achieving the objectives of a

peaceful and prosperous Africa. The principal institutions for promoting peace, security,

40 African Union, 2018. Concept Note on the Peace and Security Council Open Session on Africa’s Peace and
Security Landscape by 2023 (End of First Ten-Year Plan of the AU Agenda 2063): A Prospective Analysis of Peace
and Security Challenges.
41 http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.
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and development are the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African
Governance Architecture (AGA), and the RECs
The APSA addresses the continent’s peace and security agenda. It is structured around
the following pillars: the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC); AU Commission
(AUC); Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force (ASF); Continental Early Warning
System (CEWS); and the Peace Fund.
In terms of decision-making, the AU Peace and Security Council is the key element of
APSA’s functioning. It is a standing organ for decision-making, with the roles of:
preventing conflict through an early warning system and diplomacy; managing conflicts
through peace-making and peace-support operations; supporting peace-building and
post-conflict reconstruction; and recommending interventions in Member States to
promote peace, security, and stability.42
The AGA was established in recognition of the centrality of democratic governance in

addressing structural causes of conflict and crises, including curbing unconstitutional
changes of government. Therefore, the AGA was designed to complement APSA in a
bid to address structural or root causes and drivers of conflicts. The institutional
complementarity of the AGA and APSA is affirmation that democratic governance,
peace and security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing imperatives. `
The RECs have also been increasingly involved in peace and security issues, including
mediation, peace building and management. The engagement of the RECs in AU peace
efforts is through implementation of the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs
and the AU, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area
of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the
Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and northern Africa.
Box 4: Contributions of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(ACERWC) to Peace and Security
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) was established
in 2001. Its mandate derives from the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Articles
32-46). The main roles are promoting, protecting, and respecting the rights of children. The
committee’s functions include: interpretation of the Charter; monitoring its implementation; receiving
and considering individual complaints about violations of children’s rights; investigating measures
adopted by Member States to implement the Charter; collection of information; and providing
recommendations to governments and child rights organisations in promoting and protecting the
rights of children.

42 https://au.int/en/organs/psc.
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Forty-eight of the 55 Member States had ratified the Charter by July 2018. The Member States are
required to submit reports on implementation of the Charter every three years. Civil society
organizations also present shadow reports.
The ACERWC has been very influential in addressing issues relating to the impact of conflicts and
crises on child rights. It’s investigations and recommendations have included children on the move;
attacks on schools during conflict; issues of nationality and statelessness of migrant children; children
and slavery; and laws about the age of adulthood. In collaboration with some RECs, the ACERWC
is working on regional child rights policies.
The ACERWC developed the Africa Agenda for Children 2040: Fostering an Africa Fit for Children,
which was adopted by the AU Assembly and is currently being popularised. The agenda, which was
developed on the basis of the Children’s Charter, also draws on other relevant legal and political
documents, to develop an effective framework for the advancement of children’s rights; their access
to nourishment and basic necessities; right to benefit from education; protection of children from
abuse; and efforts to develop a child-sensitive criminal justice system, and so forth.
Sources: https://au.int/en/sa/acerwc; ACERWC, Africa’s Agenda for Children 2040: Fostering an Africa
Fit for Children
5.9 Challenges Relating to African Peace, Security and Governance

Despite the existence of the policy and institutional frameworks for peace and security,
there are several challenges that limit effectiveness. These relate mainly to the
implementation of the instruments and the functioning of institutions.
5.9.1 Implementation of the AU Shared Values Instruments

The AU Peace and Security Council has noted that there are available requisite
normative instruments for preventing conflicts and crises, and for promoting sustainable
peace, security and governance on the continent. However, there is a need to
encourage more Member States to sign, ratify and implement all AU instruments. Hence
the Open Session of the AUPSC in April 2018 noted there still were governance deficits,
which no doubt could be attributed to the apparent lack of commitment by Member
States to implement the shared values instruments.
5.9.2 Functioning of The Institutions in The Implementation of Objectives of

Silencing the Guns
Despite the existence of the APSA framework to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts
in Africa, the continent continues to grapple with pockets of intractable, violent conflict.43.
The functional relationship of the APSA and AGA requires strengthening. In particular,
this relationship AGA needs nurturing and proactive support, particularly in pursuing the
strategic objective of conflict prevention, and where necessary, conflict management
interventions such as peace-making, peace keeping and peace building.

43 ACCORD (2015) Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future: realising a conflict-free Africa.
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The establishment of the African Standby Force, highlighted below, illustrates some of
the constraints facing the AU in the area of peace, security and governance.
Box 5: The African Standby Force (ASF)
The ASF is one of five efforts of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that allows the
AU to intervene within Member States. This is only under severe conditions, namely war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. The other four efforts that support this structure are (i) the
Peace and Security Council; (ii) Panel of the Wise; (iii) Continental Early Warning System, and (iv)
the African Union Peace Fund.44
The establishment of the ASF was directed by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was signed in July 2002 and entered into
force in December 2003.45
The key document explicitly recognised the roles of RECs in promoting peace and security in Africa.
For that reason, the final concept for the ASF, presented in the Maputo Report of July 2003, at the
time provided for five regional Standby Brigade Forces: North Africa Regional Standby Brigade
(NASBRIG), East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale
(FOMAC); Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); and ECOWAS Standby Brigade
(ECOBRIG).
The same document defined six ASF deployment scenarios. The organization at that time agreed on
force levels of about 15,000 soldiers continent-wide. Regarding funding arrangements, it is expected
that the AU will contribute 25% and the remaining 75% will be contributed by the UN, EU and bilateral
support.46
The ASF Policy Framework and the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF called for the
establishment of a "Rapid Deployment Capability" (RDC) capable of intervening, within fourteen days,
in cases of genocide and gross human rights abuses under Scenario 6. The RDC became an integral
part of the regional Standby Forces to be deployed at the entry point, as a precursor to the
deployment of a larger mission. At the end of 2013, the Expert Panel of the AU stated that the goal,
recommended in Roadmap III, to test, evaluate and operationalise the RDC by 2012, was not met.47
5.10 Proposed Recommendations for Peace, Security and Governance

There have been major achievements in achieving peace and security in the
governance of Africa. For example, inter-state conflicts have declined in the last
generation. However, there is a need to increase the levels of Member State signature,
ratification, domestication and compliance with the relevant instruments. There are
limitations in the harmonization and coordination of the functioning of the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The
AU has recorded progress in the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical
Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020. The cooperation and collaboration

44 Institute of Security Studies (2015) ISS: Understanding the African Standby Force, Rapid Deployment and Amani
Africa II (Media Toolkit).
45 "Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union" (PDF). peaceau.org.
African Union.
46 Ibid.
47 African Union Independent Panel of Experts, October 2013. Assessment of the African Standby Force and Plan of
Action for Achieving Full Operational Capability by 2015.
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between the AU and the RECs and Regional Mechanisms, the AU and the United
Nations, and between the AU and other international entities also need enhancement.
The following recommendations are proposed for peace and security:

23. The Member States are encouraged to ensure signature, ratification and implementation of
all relevant instruments for peace, security and stability.
24. The AU should operationalize the African Standby Force, and increase efforts to secure
sustainable funding of peace and security activities.
25. The Member States are encouraged to strengthen the Peace and Security Council
(PSC) as recommended by the Assembly of The African Union Eleventh Extraordinary
Session of November 2018 (Ext/Assembly/2(XI).
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CHAPTER 6: THE NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENT AND

GOVERNANCE
6.1 Introduction
Development is a process associated with growth or change to become more advanced,
more recent, or new. The definition of development, its measures, and the strategies for
its attainment have evolved.
The 2000s saw development debates arguing that identity and culture were crucial to
allow people to choose what they want to be. People should be free to utilise their
ethnicity, religion, language, or culture to realise their futures. The implication here being
that there must be adopted multicultural policies that recognise human differences, and
that promote diversity and cultural freedom, in addition to democracy and equitable
growth.48
Attempts to address the rather disjointed and fragmented approaches to development

culminated in the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). The MDGs sought to address three dimensions of development: the economic,
social, and environmental. The UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) serve to reinforce the convergence of the development agenda, by
strengthening emphasis on equity, human rights, and non-discrimination.49
Therefore, the concept of development is broad, but for the purposes of the AGR, we
emphasise the aspects that are focused on by the AU Agenda Aspirations 1, 3, 4 and
6, and the (global) UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs SDG 16.50
Annex 1 summarises the transitions in global development thinking over the past 60
years, culminating in the 2015 UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs).
The table also provides the evolution of Africa’s development from the post-
independence period up to the launch in 2013 of the (continental) long-term aspirational

48 UNDP, 2004. Human Development Report 2004 – Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World.
49 UN General Assembly Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/55/L.2)] 55/2. United Nations Millennium
Declaration (18 September 2000); UN, 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (A/RES/70/1); Kumar, S, et.al. 2016. “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs): Addressing Unfinished Agenda and Strengthening Sustainable Development and
Partnership”. February 2016.
50 UN 2030 Agenda for SDGs: SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, and AU Vision
2063. Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; Aspiration 3: An
Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; and Aspiration 4: A
peaceful and secure Africa.
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development framework, the African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. The
continental framework is widely acknowledged as having had significant influence on
the UN’s 2030 Agenda SDGs.
6.2 National Development Plans: The Interface Between Governance and

Development
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to
manage a country’s affairs. Through National Visions, countries articulate political and
developmental objectives for citizens. NDPs translate these visions into programmes
and projects. National development plans detail the strategies, ways and means by
which National Visions will be realised. Subsequent national budget allocations specify
the resources for implementing NDPs. In a number of instances, National Visions and
NDPs are consolidated into a single framework.
Development planning therefore provides “a systematic approach to identifying,

articulating, prioritising, and satisfying the economic and social needs and aspirations
of a country within a given (often limited) resource envelope”.51 By examining NDPs,
and the budgets allocated for implementation, we can determine a connection between
governance and national and human developments.
The domestication and alignment of the UN SDGs and AU Agenda 2063 entails that
each Member State to first decide how Agenda 2063/SDGs should be incorporated into
national planning processes, policies and strategies in addition to setting national
targets guided by the continental and global level of ambition, but taking into
consideration national circumstances and peculiarities in a process of “mainstreaming”.
6.2.1 Existence of National Development Plans

In general, most countries in Africa have both long-term National Visions and medium-
term development plans, reflecting each country’s aspirations to improve the welfare of
citizens. Country data from UNDP Country Offices and research on various country
websites reveals that 88 per cent have a national vision or long-term development
strategy/plan while 86 per cent have NDPs. The countries that are not reporting the
existence of a National Vision or a national development plan are either in conflict or
recovering from it.
There is a positive correlation between growth and national development planning,

implying that, at a minimum, countries with clearly articulated NDPs should exhibit some
level of growth in real GDP. This may not be so apparent at the regional level, given the

51 ECA, 2015, p. 3.
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margin of error in aggregation. Nonetheless, when the fifty-five-year (1963-1918)

average growth of real GDP is plotted against the existence of national development
planning frameworks at the regional level, a picture emerges that in all regions except
northern Africa, the regions with high prevalence of NDPs post higher real GDP growth
patterns than those with low prevalence of NDPs. However, it is also noteworthy to point
out that high prevalence of medium and high GDP growth does not necessarily imply
high development outcomes.
Figure 2: Percentage Of Countries With NDPs And Distribution Of Growth Levels By Region
Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (2000, 2008, 2016 and
2018 Statistical Update)
World Bank, 2018.
Tracing the pattern of growth of real GDP over time shows how countries have managed
to cope given the various developmental challenges the continent has faced since the
dawn of independence. Each period in the evolution of development over time has
yielded varying degrees of economic performance.
Recent economic performance on the continent shows mixed results. The global
financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 affected growth negatively for countries that
were exposed to external shocks. Africa rebounded from the 2009 slowdown to regain
a high growth rate of 5.4 per cent in 2010. Recent movements in commodity prices have
had mixed fortunes, with non-oil exporting countries recording increases in GDP growth
rates while the reduced commodity prices have negatively impacted the economy of oil-
exporters.
6.2.2 National Development Planning and Poverty

The World Bank and the United Nations define people living in poverty as those whose
daily expenditure equivalence is less than USD 1.25. In this report however, the poverty
headcount measure is derived from national poverty lines.
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On this basis, regional aggregate data reveals that north Africa, which posts low to
medium GDP growth, also has the lowest incidence of poverty as measured through the
Poverty Headcount Ratio. On the other hand, the south, which has a 100 per cent
occurrence of NDPs and a reasonably high prevalence of medium and high real GDP
growth rates posts very high levels of poverty, with 88 per cent of countries posting
poverty levels of 50 per cent or greater. Similarly, the central region has a high
prevalence of poverty, although this is commensurate with low to medium GDP growth
rates. The distribution of poverty incidence in the eastern region matches the levels of
real GDP growth, with 67 per cent of countries posting moderate levels of poverty. In
west Africa, 64 per cent of countries have moderate levels of poverty of between 20 and
50 per cent and only 36 per cent have poverty levels exceeding 50 per cent, which is in
tandem with the distribution of real GDP growth across the region. This means that on
average, real GDP growth for countries in the south and central regions of Africa is not
as inclusive as that of the north and the east of Africa.
Figure 3: Poverty Headcount Ratios at National Poverty Lines by Region
The Africa Union Agenda 2063 explicitly expresses development in two of its seven
aspirations: Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable
development, and Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying
on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for
children.
The figure below provides a snapshot of the levels of Human Development, averaged
over ten years by country, for each region in Africa.
Figure 4: Average Human Development Index by regions
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Source: UNDP Human Development Reports (Various years)
Similar to real GDP per capita and poverty headcount data, north Africa has the highest
average human development of 0.69 (medium human development) while the HDI for
rest of Africa is hovering between 0.4 and slightly over 0.5 in value terms. While medium
to low HDI alludes to low performance in some aspect of the combined dimensions of
the index, it is crucial to identify, and bring to the fore, some key challenges which might
be responsible for compromising the value of the HDI and ultimately, the overall
development trajectory of a particular country.
6.3 Selected Developmental Challenges

The key to the successful implementation of a national development agenda as
articulated through the development plans is the availability of adequate resources,
governance structures and institutional capacities requires to realise the objectives
stated therein. Although there are various challenges to Africa’s development, this
inaugural report will only examine five of them, namely Natural Resource Governance,
Illicit Financial Flows, Dependency on ODA, Corporate Governance and Unemployment
and Gender Equality.
6.3.1 Natural Resource Governance in Africa

Africa is abundantly endowed with vast amounts of natural resources. However, that
does not adequately translate into improved prosperity, broad-based development,
resource-based industrialization and decent development outcomes.
The continent has 30 per cent of all global minerals, including more than half of the
world’s rare minerals. It is rich in both renewable and non-renewable natural resources.
Its geography includes the world’s largest arable landmass, the second largest and
longest rivers (the Congo and Nile, respectively), and the second largest tropical forests.
The continent’s proven oil reserves constitute eight per cent of the world’s stock, while
those of natural gas amount to seven per cent. Minerals account for an average of 70
per cent of total African exports and about 28 per cent of the gross domestic product.
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Recent discoveries of oil, gas and minerals in some countries could significantly boost
government revenues in future.
Table 5: Africa’s Mineral Endowments
Mineral Production Rank Reserves Rank

Platinum group metals (PGMs) 54% 1 60%+ 1
Phosphate 27% 1 66% 1
Gold 20% 1 42% 1
Chromium 40% 1 44% 1
Manganese 28% 2 82% 1
Vanadium 51% 1 95% 1
Cobalt 18% 1 55+% 1
Diamonds 78% 1 88% 1
Aluminium 4% 7 45% 1
Also, Titanium (20%), Uranium (20%), Iron (17%), Copper (13%), etc.
Source: African Mining Vision 2009.
Despite the natural resource endowments, social statistics lag. Evidence from several
institutions and studies point out poor governance as being a major obstacle preventing
Africa from realising its development potential. In other words, the proper management
of Africa’s natural resource endowments could provide a unique opportunity to foster
human and economic development.
The lack of adequate implementation of natural resource governance across the

continent, due to weak institutions and policies in this sector, results in short-term gains
rather than at long-term development.52
Additionally, a further problem that impedes development benefits from natural resource
wealth is the status and structure of Africa’s extractive industries. Most countries on the
continent remain exporters of unprocessed or lightly processed commodities53, which is
reflective of the lack of natural resources management and the inadequate prioritisation
of environmental policies and implementation.
In searching for a solution, Africa’s own response to tackling the paradox of great
mineral wealth existing side by side with pervasive poverty has been articulated in the
AMV, which was adopted at an AU Summit of Heads of State in February 2009. The
mining vision called for “Transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral
resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic

52 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Extractive Industries: Optimising Value
Retention in Host Countries (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2012),
53United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Sub-regional Office South Africa, ‘Report of the ad-hoc
expert group meeting (AEGM) on industrialisation for economic transformation and sustainable development in
southern Africa: addressing the gaps’, Addis Ababa, March 2013.
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development”.54 If implemented, the potential for African countries to finance the AU

Agenda 2063 and UN Sustainable Development Goals could be significantly boosted.
If managed prudently, extractive industry investments can catalyse economic
development and diversification, skills development and technology transfer. In these
cases, extractive industries have emerged as a powerful engine of economic growth
and means financing development.
Apart from building manufacturing industries, the exploitation of natural resources could
provide the revenues needed for investment in social service provision, including health
and education If on the other hand extractives are mishandled, they have the potential
to generate enormous risks, including, but not limited to: volatile economic growth;
violent conflicts; corruption; environmental degradation and linked social harms; human
rights violations; and gender-based violence. In a conflict/fragile environment, if not
managed properly, extractive industries may increase the risk of conflict or deepen
existing conflict.
The AMV is to be implemented in phases, the idea being to integrate the mineral sector
into the economy of each country. To support the realization of the AMV, the AU
established the Africa Minerals Development Centre (AMDC) in 2013, to support
Member States in providing strategic operational support for the Vision and its Action
Plan. A core function of the AMDC is to support Member States to enhance their
capacities for effective mineral policy and regulatory design and implementation.
Member States have also been encouraged to review and align their national mineral
policies and regulatory frameworks with the AMV. Thus far, many Member States have
not yet aligned their mining regimes with the AMV, although their mining policies and
laws address the goals of the AMV in various respects.
6.3.2 Illicit Financial Flows

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) have an impact on good governance and Africa’s
development priorities. The High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa
defines IFF as “Money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds

54 The AMV has seven pillars: A knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses and contributes to the broad-
based growth and development of, and is fully integrated into, a single African market; sustainable and well-governed
mining sector that effectively garners and deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender and ethnically
inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by surrounding communities; A mining sector
that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant and globally competitive industrialising African economy;
A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive African infrastructure platform, through the maximisation of
its propulsive local and regional economic linkages; A mining sector that optimises and husbands Africa’s finite
mineral resource endowments and that is diversified, incorporating both high value metals and lower value industrial
minerals at both commercial and small-scale levels; A mining sector that harnesses the potential of artisanal and
small-scale mining to stimulate local/national entrepreneurship, improve livelihoods and advance integrated rural
social and economic development; and A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national,
continental and international capital and commodity markets (AU, 2009).
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typically originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade mis-invoicing and
abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking,
illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; and bribery and theft by corrupt
government officials”.55
The drivers of IFFs include the desire to hide illicit wealth, weak regulatory structures,
unnecessary tax incentives and poor governance. Central to all those is governments’
capabilities, which undermine Africa’s goals of self-sustainability, and domestically
financing its development priorities at the continental, regional and national levels.
A major finding of the High-Level Panel was that Africa is inadvertently a net creditor to
the rest of the world. The implication is that despite the inflows of ODA, the continent
suffers from a continuous crisis of insufficient resources for its own development,
provision of social services, infrastructure and investment. In brief, the resource needs
of African countries are such that they fail to domestically mobilise domestic resources
for the implementation of development goals. Therefore, the requirement to promote
development makes tracking, stopping and reversing IFFs an imperative.
The High-Level Panel observed that the increasing trend of illicit financial outflows
coincided with a period of relatively high economic growth in Africa, and that IFFs are
therefore negating the expected positive impact of increased growth on the continent.
The panel also noted that corrupt practices in Africa are not necessarily the source of
these outflows but rather facilitate them, apart from, and in addition to, the related
problem of weak governance capacity. Apart from technical capacity, undermining the
struggle to end illicit financial flows is a critical ingredient, the political will of
governments.
Estimating the exact level of IFFs from Africa is a challenge to ascertain, due to the
absence of clear data and because IFFs are hidden and difficult to track. So far, only
indirect methods have been used by the United Nations, think tanks and non-profit
organisations to determine the volumes of outflows from the continent. The fact is the
IFFs are a growing phenomenon. The table below shows the trends.

55AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2015. “Illicit Financial Flow
Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa”.
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Figure 5: Illicit Financial Flow Trends, 2004 to 2013 (USD)
Source: Global Financial Integrity, 2017, Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005-
2014
The development impacts of illicit financial flows from Africa are numerous. They erode
the tax base for public investment and social spending, hence weakening governance
and its capabilities. They curb domestic savings and perpetuate dependence on official
development assistance, thus deepening reliance on donors. Significantly, by
discouraging value creation, illicit financial flows also negatively impact African
aspirations for structural transformation. This means they subvert the implementation of
NDPs, the AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
Therefore, African governments should address IFFs in order to maximise their tax
revenues, keep investible resources within their countries, and impede criminal and
corrupting activities. At the continental level, the recommendations of the panel that the
AUC, UNECA, AfDB and RECs follow up the development and implementation of a
systematic and coherent implementation plan (Anti-IFF Project) should be taken
seriously.
6.3.3 Dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Although Africa is a net contributor to the wealth of developed countries and others
through IFFs, and through legal channels, the continent is highly dependent on ODA
from developed nations. The dependency ratio varies significantly across different
countries, and more importantly, some countries that have reasonably high levels of
domestic resources from economic activity remain highly dependent on resources from
outside their borders. The table below illustrates the proportion of ODA to total
government expenditure averaged over a ten-year period between 2007 and 2017. It is
evident that those countries that are in conflict, or are recovering from previous conflicts
Page 68 of 87

display a higher proportion of ODA to total government expenditures, pointing to the

prevalence of resource mobilisation and institutional challenges at the country level.
Figure 6: Net ODA as a percentage of government expenditure by region
Source: World Bank Group
At the regional level, the contribution of ODA to total government expenditure is

insignificant in north Africa. However, the South has a high dependency ratio on ODA,
followed by the west and Central regions. Strengthening domestic resource mobilisation
efforts, as well as resource use efficiencies in these regions, could yield lower rates of
dependency on ODA, with attendant gains in sovereign policy decision-making and
implementation.
6.3.4 Corporate Governance and Development

Both the AU Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
emphasize the importance of rapid economic growth that is inclusive and underpinned
by structural economic transformation. To achieve this, the private sector should be the
key driver.
Good corporate governance aims to boost the development and sustenance of

corporations in a manner that serves both businesses and citizens. As such, it
contributes to the development of the economy and society through increased job
creation, better socio-economic conditions, and contribution to the fiscus. Principles of
good corporate governance, which include transparency and accountability, primarily
promote the efficient use of natural, financial and human resources.
The link between good corporate governance and development is premised on the need
to balance economic, social and environmental factors. Adherence to these principles
also boosts investor confidence. Equally, there is a need to ensure effective regulatory
frameworks to achieve the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs.
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The goal of inclusive growth implies that the benefits of growth generated within African
economies is distributed more equitably to prevent rising inequality or reduce
inequalities in economies where it is high. To this end, economic diversification remains
an important priority given Africa’s continued reliance on the primary sector and could
be achieved through industrialization and greater diversity in economic endeavors which
exploit the potential for increasing cross-frontier value chains as well as forward and
backward linkages.
The Member States are encouraged to establish regulatory and legal frameworks that
seek to address fundamental and structural economic challenges beyond the confines
of corporate social responsibility, including environmental management and the
preservation of social cultural heritage.
Nineteen Member States have established a collaborative network called the Corporate
Governance Network that aims to enhance the institutional capacity of Member States
towards the sustainable development of public and private owned corporations.
6.3.5 Gender Equality, Gender Mainstreaming and Development

Gender equality has long been recognised as a key element to unlocking and
unleashing the development potential of the continent. While significant progress has
been made across numerous fronts in most countries, gender equality for African
women and girls is still far from satisfactory. According to the Africa Human
Development Report 2016, gender inequality is costing sub-Saharan Africa on average
six per cent of the region’s GDP, thereby jeopardising the continent’s efforts for inclusive
human development and economic growth.56
The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN
Women) contends that gender inequality is a governance failure. National plans,
policies, institutions and budgets reflect how governments translate commitments to
gender equality into results for women. Too often, however, there is a gap between
policy and practice.
At the global level, gender inequality has assumed a central position in development
discourse, as demonstrated by having gender-specific goals and targets in both the
MDGs (MDG 3) and the SDGs (SDG 5) that both promulgate women’s empowerment
and the promotion of gender equality as a cross-cutting component in NDPs, in addition
to ending violence against women. The AU Agenda 2063 places gender equality at the
core of all development efforts stating that “African women and youth shall play an

56 UNDP, 2016.
Page 70 of 87

important role as drivers of change” and that “the African woman will be fully empowered
in all spheres, with equal social, political and economic rights, including the rights to own
and inherit property, sign a contract, register and manage a business. Rural women will
have access to productive assets, including land, credit, inputs and financial services”.
Progress in achieving gender equality has been slower than hoped and is inconsistent
in many African countries. The implementation of the African Union Agenda 2063
provisions on gender, as well as the UN resolutions and multiple legal frameworks for
realization of gender equality, have not been successfully accomplished in various
countries, attributable to lack of structural policies, political will, and cultural
inclusiveness to promote women’s rights and empowerment.
A recent evaluation of the MDG’s implementation demonstrates that some countries are
still struggling to enhance gender equality. A further conclusion infers that ending the
gender gap may need up to 100 years in some countries in Africa.57 Nevertheless, it is
rather deceptive to address gender equality in Africa at a continental level without
considering the sub-regional and national efforts to empower women, particularly at the
sectoral level. African countries are progressing gradually towards gender equality and
gender mainstreaming in NDPs. Forty-nine countries have signed and 40 have ratified
the protocol.
Sub-Saharan Africa registered the most impressive progress in Women’s access to paid
employment in the non-Agriculture sector from 24 to 34 per cent from 1994 to 2015.58
At the regional fora, the adoption of the African Women Decade (AWD) (2010-2020) in
2009, with the overall theme Grassroots Approach to Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment (GEWE), the Maputo Protocol, the African Youth Charter, and the
Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) lay down the baseline for
governmental obligations on women’s rights and, most importantly, reporting on
progress towards the implementation of various instruments that make provisions for
the rights of young women.

57 WEF, 2017.
58 UNDP, 2016.
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Figure 7: Status of Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
Source: African Union, 2018, List of countries which have signed; ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the
African charter on Human and people’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
(https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7783-sl-
rotocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_on_the_rights_of_women_in_africa_7.
pdfSource: African Union, 2018.
6.4 Proposed Recommendations for Development and Governance

The major issues in development and governance revolve around inclusive
development, management of natural resources and combating threats to
implementation of development agendas, such as illicit financial flows and corruption.
Therefore, the following are proposed recommendations:
Page 72 of 87

26. The Member States are encouraged to formulate development plans and
programmes that aim at inclusive human development.
27. The Member States are encouraged to align their national development plans
with AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
28. The Member States are encouraged to ensure the sustainable and prudent
utilization of natural and other resources to allow for their full utilization for the
benefit of the people of the continent and future generations.
Page 73 of 87

CHAPTER 7: ROLE OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC

COMMUNITIES (RECs) IN AFRICAN GOVERNANCE
7.1 Introduction
The chapter considers the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in
African governance, specifically, in advancing AU shared values, norms, and standards
regarding continental unity, development, democracy and elections, and peace and
security.
RECs are voluntary associations of independent African states whose origins differ, with
some dating back to the colonial era. They were formed for different reasons, but are
mostly rooted in the desire for economic and political cooperation. Generally, their
objectives are to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance, and
regional integration.
7.2 The Continental Role of the RECs

The quest for African continental unity resulted in the formation of the OAU, which
evolved into the AU. The OAU Treaty of 1963, the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and
the Final Act of Lagos elaborate the principles of African continental unity, dignity, and
status in global affairs. These principles are further expounded in the African Union
Agenda 2063, a pan-African reform initiative that confirms the vision of an integrated,
prosperous, and peaceful African continent that is independent and internationally
recognised.59
The Abuja Treaty of 1991 sought to establish an African Economic Community (AEC).
The treaty emphasised the desirability of solidarity and collective self-reliance, a self-
sustained and endogenous development strategy, and a policy of self-sufficiency in
basic needs.60 The RECs are regarded as the building blocks of the AEC.
The AU acknowledges the significant roles of the RECs in bolstering the efforts of
continental integration, and officially recognises eight. These are the Arab Maghreb
Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Common Market for

59 The African Union Vision is to “build an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its
own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. African leaders, at the celebration of the
fiftieth anniversary of the OAU, declared Eight Priorities of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration: African Identity
and Renaissance; Continue the Struggle against Colonialism and the Right to Self-determination; The Integration
Agenda; Agenda for Social and Economic Development; Peace and Security Agenda; Democratic Governance;
Determining Africa’s Destiny; Africa’s Place in the World (AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want).
60 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1991. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June 1991,
Abuja, Nigeria
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Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern
African Development Community (SADC).
7.3 African Union Instruments on the RECs

In addition to regional cooperation and integration, and contributing to the establishment
of the AEC, the RECs perform additional functions, including coordination of the Member
States’ interests in peace and security, governance, and development. The relationship
of the AU and RECs is mandated by the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the
African Union. The functional relationship between the AU and the RECs is guided by
the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU, and the Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the
AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of
Eastern and northern Africa.
7.4 The Relationship Between the RECs and Governance

The RECs bring together Member States of the African Union. The RECs are considered
to have various comparative advantages, especially better understanding of the socio-
cultural and political nuances in their respective regions. Hence, the AU’s recognition of
the significant roles of the RECs and Regional Mechanisms in bolstering efforts at
continental integration, and in maintaining peace and security on the continent.
A number of RECs have enacted instruments that complement the instruments of the
AU and are important in the promotion of constitutionalism and the rule of law on the
continent. These instruments include protocols to the REC treaties, guidelines, plans of
action and model laws. They deal with democracy, good governance, the conduct of
elections, and the promotion and protection of human rights.
Consequently, some of these instruments authorise the RECs to intervene in Member

States where there are “serious and massive” violations of human rights and the rule of
law. The RECs have also incorporated the promotion and protection of human rights
into their constitutive treaties, recognising that human rights play an essential role in
economic development.
These regional instruments also establish mechanisms, such as courts, that are making
a significant contribution to the protection of human rights in the continent. 61 These

61 Ruppel OC, 2009. “Regional Economic Communities and Human Rights in East and Southern Africa”, in Human
Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection and Promotion 275 (Bosl A and Diescho J, eds., 2009); Abebe
D, 2016. “Does International Human Rights Law in African Courts Make a Difference?”, Virginia Journal of
International Law 527 (2016).
Page 75 of 87

courts are applying the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights as their
normative framework. In some cases, these courts have established sub-registries in
the Member States, which bring the courts closer to their potential users, thereby
enhancing access to justice. Some courts also move their sessions to different parts of
the REC to enable easier access for citizens.62
These courts do not require the exhaustion of local remedies, which also enhances
access to justice. Thus, citizens of Member States can approach the courts even where
national courts have issued unfavourable decisions. Various RECs have also sought to
promote transitional justice by extending the jurisdiction of these courts to cover
international crimes.63
A major drawback for these courts is that Member States have not shown great
commitment to enforcing their decisions. Further, it is unhelpful that only a few states
permit domestic courts to enforce the decisions of international or regional courts.
Overlapping memberships also means that there will be instances where the
jurisdictions of the regional courts conflict.
Another challenge is that the regional courts suffer from resources constraints that result
in shortages of personnel, which hinders their efforts in being accessible to users.
Therefore, the courts have depended on foreign donors, which makes it difficult for them
to demonstrate their independence and neutrality. Resource constraints (in terms of
information, access, money and time) have also made it difficult for victims of human
rights violations to pursue their claims before these courts. These constraints serve to
limit the capacity of these courts to influence human rights outcomes on the ground.
There is also a need to clarify the relationship between the African Court of Human and
Peoples’ Rights and these regional courts. 64
The RECs also deploy teams to observe elections in their Member States, a process
that in some cases entails sending fact-finding teams ahead of the missions to study
and assess the general environment prior to the elections. However, the election
observation initiatives of the RECs and the African Union are not adequately
coordinated, even if there is ad hoc cooperation between them that includes the
exchange of information and joint evaluation of the pre-election environment. A need

62 Ebobrah ST, 2013. “Human Rights Developments in African Sub-Regional Economic Communities During 2012”,
13 African Human Rights Law Journal 178 (2013); Nwauche ES, 2009. “Regional Economic Communities and Human
Rights in West Africa and the African Arabic Countries”, in Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their
Protection and Promotion 319 (Bosl A and Diescho J, eds, 2009).
63 Ibid.
64 Nwauche 2009; Abebe 2016; Ruppel 2009.
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therefore arises for these institutions to establish a framework for cooperation in this
important area of governance.65
7.5 The key issue for assessing the role of RECs in governance
The main areas of examination are: (i) is there alignment of the REC Treaties with the
Constitutive Act of the African Union? (ii) what is the division of labour between the AU
and RECs in observation of elections and do the REC guidelines for the conduct of
elections align with those of the AU? (iv) what is the division of labour between the AU
and the RECs’ peace and security activities; what are the harmonization mechanisms
and how are they coordinated? (v) what are the approaches of the RECs to the
realization of the AU Agenda 2063? (vi) are there mechanisms for monitoring the REC
implementation of AU shared values instruments?
7.6 Observations on the Relationships Between the AU and RECs

Four issues are crucial in the relationships of the AU with the RECs: alignment of the
REC treaties with the Constitutive Act; division of labour; the implementation of the AU
Agenda 2016; and monitoring of implementation of the AU shared values instruments.
7.6.1 Alignment of REC Treaties with the Constitutive Act of the AU

The varying origins and histories of the RECs mean that their treaties are not based on
the Constitutive Act.
7.6.2 Division of Labour Between the AU and RECs

The RECs consider that there is clear division of labour between the AU and RECs
regarding promotion of democracy and observation of elections. Both the AU and RECs
send election observers, and they communicate on arrangements of the observation
teams. Sometimes there are even more complex arrangements involving observation
teams from the AU, the REC in which the Member State conducting the election
belongs, and observers from other RECs Regarding peace and security, the AU has
agreements with the RECs and regional mechanisms to operationalise their objectives.
However, operational harmonization and coordination are constrained by various
factors, including limited capacities and financial resources. Some RECs or countries
within RECs have made own arrangements that have by-passed the official structures.
In practice, the AU–RECs partnership has been characterised by challenges such as

lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities, which have made it ineffective. The “RECs
are not well integrated into the policy and decision-making processes of the Union”, in

65 UNISA (University of South Africa), Management of Democratic Elections in Africa, 2014; Nwauche, 2013; Ruppel,
2009.
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which they therefore play only a marginal role. It is also acknowledged that “there is no
coherence in the decisions and activities of the AU as they relate to the RECs”.66
The RECs have played an important role in facilitating the enforcement of the AU’s
shared values, particularly in situations involving unconstitutional changes of
government. However, the AU and the RECs have taken differing approaches and
actions in such situations in a number of cases, which has hindered the effectiveness of
their interventions. Further, these approaches and actions have not been well
coordinated.
This lack of coordination can in part be explained by the absence of a clear definition or
shared understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, to which the AU and the RECs
therefore give varied or opposing interpretations. In addition, the RECs face
considerable challenges that hinder their effectiveness. For example, they are
characterised by overlapping memberships and mandates. The fact that several states
belong to more than one REC hinders coherence and coordination of approaches and
responses. It also causes ambiguity and confusion over leadership and responsibilities.
Accordingly, a key priority of the AU Assembly is to clarify the division of labour and
collaboration between the Union and the RECs, in line with the principle of subsidiarity
and complementarity.67
7.6.3 REC Approaches to the AU Agenda 2063

The AU Agenda was a result of consultations and consensus that culminated in the
Common African Position in negotiations for the post-2015 global agenda. Therefore,
the RECs endorse the vision and aspirations in the Agenda 2063. Although the RECs
intend to harmonise their strategies and implementation plans with the First Ten-Year
Implementation Plan of the AU Agenda 2063, this is not entirely successful at this stage
as they are in the process of reconciling existing frameworks with the Agenda.
7.6.4 Mechanism for monitoring implementation of shared value instruments

There areno systematic attempts in each REC to monitor the RECs’ and REC Member
States’ implementation of AU shared values instruments.

66 African Union, 2018. Ibid, Annex 1.
67 Ibid.
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7.7 Regional Integration and AU Agenda 2063

Regional integration is one of the seven aspirations of Agenda 2063. In particular,
Aspiration 2 of Agenda 2063 calls for an integrated, politically united prosperous and
peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens. It is therefore encouraging that all the eight
RECs are pursuing regional integration, which is also consistent with the ideals of the
Abuja Treaty.
The RECs are encouraged to adopt AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten-Year Plan as the
basis for developing their regional visions and plans. Agenda 2063 also mandates them:
to serve as focal points for the adoption, implementation, reviewing, monitoring and
evaluation of all continental frameworks related to Agenda 2063 by Members States of
the AU; to report annually to the AU Assembly on the same; and to facilitate resource
mobilisation and capacity development initiatives of Member States for the
implementation of the Ten-Year Plan.
7.8 The Status of the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the AU and the
RECs
The existence and implementation of this Protocol has led to some improvement in the
working relationship between the AU and RECs. But more needs to be done to enhance
collaboration and partnership.
7.9 Proposed Recommendations Regarding the RECs and their Role in

African Governance
The following are proposed recommendations:

29. The AU and RECs should improve the coordination and harmonization of their
policies, programs and activities.
30. The Member States are encouraged to sign and ratify the Agreement
Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area
31. All RECs are encouraged to align their plans with Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: Highlights of The Interrelationships of The Global UN and OAU/AU Principles,
Purposes and Objectives.
NOTE: The bold highlights similar or directly reflected purposes, principles, and objectives in the UN,
OAU/AU founding documents.
Charter of the United Nations Organization
(UN) (1945)68
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 1. The Organization is based on the principle
Article 1 of the sovereign equality of all its
The Purposes of the United Nations are: Members.
1. To maintain international peace and 2. All Members, to ensure to all of them the
security, and to that end: to take effective rights and benefits resulting from
collective measures for the prevention and membership, shall fulfil in good faith the
removal of threats to the peace, and for the obligations assumed by them in accordance
suppression of acts of aggression or other with the present Charter.
breaches of the peace, and to bring about 3. All Members shall settle their
by peaceful means, and in conformity with international disputes by peaceful means
the principles of justice and international in such a manner that international peace
law, adjustment or settlement of and security, and justice, are not
international disputes or situations which endangered.
might lead to a breach of the peace; 4. All Members shall refrain in their
2. To develop friendly relations among international relations from the threat or
nations based on respect for the principle use of force against the territorial
of equal rights and self-determination of integrity or political independence of any
peoples, and to take other appropriate state, or in any other manner inconsistent
measures to strengthen universal peace; with the Purposes of the United Nations.
3. To achieve international cooperation in 5. All Members shall give the United Nations
solving international problems of an every assistance in any action it takes in
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian accordance with the present Charter, and
character, and in promoting and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
encouraging respect for human rights, and state against which the United Nations is
for fundamental freedoms for all without taking preventive or enforcement action.
distinction as to race, sex, language, or 6. The Organization shall ensure that states
religion; and which are not Members of the United Nations
4. To be a centre for harmonising the act in accordance with these Principles so far
actions of nations in the attainment of as may be necessary for the maintenance of
these common ends. international peace and security.
Article 2 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of shall authorise the United Nations to
the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in intervene in matters which are essentially
accordance with the following Principles. within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII.
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (1963)69 African Union (AU) (2001)70

68 Charter of the United Nations (1945). http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
69 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter (1963). https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-
oau_charter_1963.pdf
70 Constitutive Act of The African Union (2002). https://au.int/en/constitutive-act
Page 80 of 87

PURPOSES OBJECTIVES
Article II Article 3
1. The Organization shall have the following The objectives of the Union shall be to:
purposes: (a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
African States; (b) defend the sovereignty, territorial
(b) To coordinate and intensify their integrity and independence of its Member
cooperation and efforts to achieve a States;
better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) accelerate the political and socio-economic
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their integration of the continent;
territorial integrity and independence; (d) promote and defend African common
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from positions on issues of interest to the
Africa; and continent and its peoples;
(e) To promote international cooperation, (e) encourage international cooperation,
having due regard to the Charter of the taking due account of the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Declaration of Human Rights;
2. To these ends, the Member States shall (f) promote peace, security, and stability on
coordinate and harmonize their general the continent;
policies, especially in the following fields: (g) promote democratic principles and
(a) Political and diplomatic cooperation; institutions, popular participation and
(b) Economic cooperation, including transport good governance;
and communications; (h) promote and protect human and peoples’
(c) Educational and cultural cooperation; rights in accordance with the African
(d) Health, sanitation and nutritional Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
cooperation; and other relevant human rights
(e) Scientific and technical cooperation; and instruments;
(f) Cooperation for defence and security. (i) establish the necessary conditions which
enable the continent to play its rightful role in
the Global economy and in international
negotiations;
(j) promote sustainable development at the
economic, social and cultural levels as well
as the integration of African economies;
(k) promote cooperation in all fields of
human activity to raise the living
standards of African peoples;
(l) coordinate and harmonize the policies
between the existing and future Regional
Economic Communities for the gradual
attainment of the objectives of the Union;
(m) advance the development of the continent by
promoting research in all fields, in science
and technology;
(n) work with relevant international partners in
the eradication of preventable diseases and
the promotion of good health on the
continent.
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Annex 2: Development Periods and Their Principal Focus
Period Global Development Africa’s Development Characteristics

Characteristics
Post WWII – Development largely Africa remained colonised and a reservoir for free
Marshall Plan synonymous with natural resources to colonial powers. Populations were
industrialisation and post- marginalised and served only as free, cheap or
war recovery in Europe. indentured labour in extractive sectors serving colonial
Enhance country’s powers. Liberation activities intensified – few gain their
capacity to manufacture independence.
finished goods through the
transfer of public capital
and technical expertise.
1961 – 1970: Developing countries to Independent African States emerge: raise the dignity of
The First set their own targets and Africans
United Nations achieve a minimum annual A time to eradicate colonialism, speed up economic
Development growth rate of five per cent growth and improve living standards of the people. Role
Decade of aggregate national of the state is central in building social and economic
income. Also, call for infrastructure and providing social services to citizens.
accelerated measures to A key feature was the import substitution strategy (ISI)
eliminate illiteracy, hunger that was intended to ensure protection of local
and disease. industries and employment. This poses a threat to
Limited progress made traditional economic discourse: extract natural
after ten years, with resources from Africa and import most manufactured
ultimate goals still very goods from the rest of the world. The OAU is formed.
distant. This is
exacerbated by the cold
war being played out
between the West led by
the USA and the East led
by the USSR
1971 – 1980: Features included the call De-emphasis on social and human development
The Second for a major part of financial policies and entry into the debt crisis
United Nations resource transfers to In the late 1960s, the momentum of Africa’s
Development developing countries to be development had slowed down considerably usually
Decade provided in the form of attributed to “over-investment” in the social sector and
official development corruption; through the World Bank and the IMF; cash-
assistance (ODA); strapped African Countries are enticed into massive
developed countries to borrowing for infrastructure. By 1970, many African
provide such assistance to states had been seriously weakened, a situation
a minimum level of 0.7 per worsened by the oil price shock of 1973 that left African
cent of their gross countries becoming crushed under huge foreign debt.
domestic product (GDP) The result was a sharp drop in overall investment in
by the middle of the social services leading to sharp declines in living
Decade, and the provision standards. Some African economies started recording
of special measures for the negative economic growth rates and the incidence of
least developed among poverty started rising again after some remarkable
developing countries. improvements in the 1960s. It was during this period
Implementation severely that African countries, unable to manage on their own,
compromised by the global were ‘handed-over’ to international financial institutions
economic crisis caused by to manage, and donor dependency became the norm.
the collapse of the Gold
Standard to which several
Page 82 of 87

currencies were pegged.

Lack of political will by
developed countries to
take urgent action on ODA
and the development of a
new world economic order.
1981 - 1990: Address the unfinished Privatisation, liberalisation and fiscal austerity:
The Third business of the Second High levels of debt
United Nations Development Decade. The IMF, through its Article 4 consultations, provided a
Development Targets to be reached by cue for other ‘donors’ to provide resources to African
Decade 1990 included growth rates countries – usually recommending extreme austerity
for developing countries of measures that left a trail of social devastation across
7.5 per cent of GDP the continent. At the beginning of the1980s, the West
among other economic forced Africa to follow World Bank /IMF structural
targets; concessional adjustment programmes by tying all their grants and
financing to reach and loans to strict adherence to IMF and World Bank
surpass 0.7 per cent of conditionalities. Mass poverty, starvation, diseases and
GDP of developing ignorance were widespread in Africa which during the
countries; the reduction course of the decade became a platform for
and elimination of poverty; experimentation of the Washington Consensus with
a significant reduction of official development assistance (ODA) as the main tool
mortality rates; - the IFIs initiated a policy-based lending and tied
international structural development assistance to structural adjustment
change, including the early policies with the focus on macroeconomic policies. With
establishment of the new the shift of emphasis from social development to
international economic macroeconomic stability, Governments were forced to
order; and changes in focus on fiscal and monetary policy at the expense of
international institutions sectors such as local government, rural development,
and mechanisms. education, health and employment and infrastructural
Ten years after the call for development.
a new international
economic order, no
progress made towards its
establishment. Most
targets set for the Third
Decade had not been met.
1991 – 2000: Address the shortcomings Poverty Reduction Strategies and HIPC Initiative.
The Fourth in implementing provisions Conflict had beset Africa – one in every five Africans
United Nations of the Third Development lived in a conflict zone and the HIV pandemic had
Development Decade and redirect established itself as a massive killer and drain on the
decade development towards human resource capacity base, worsening an already
previously abandoned dire situation. Most countries had accumulated foreign
social sectors. The 1990s debt of well over 150% of their GDP over the two past
would witness the decades of structural adjustment – many were forced to
accelerated development spend over a third of their export earnings on foreign
of developing countries – debt servicing. Intense pressure from the United
ushering in the decade of Nations and international civil society organisations to
“Development with a forgive Africa of its huge debt. the World Bank and the
Human face” IMF came up with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Progress mixed, with many (HIPC) initiative. This initiative required African
challenges remaining. countries to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
Economic growth no (PRSPs) as a condition for debt relief and access to the
longer a sufficient factor of IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the
development. The focus World Bank concessional loans and grants. The period
had shifted to institutional
Page 83 of 87

preconditions for from 1971 up until the end of the 1990s is often referred
development, including to as the ‘lost decades.
good governance,
transparency and
accountability,
decentralization and
participation, and social
security.
2000 – 2015: The 2000 Millennium The return of Development Planning, the MDGs and the
Millennium Declaration sought to AU Agenda 2063.
Declaration combine past efforts to To augment the poverty-reducing provisions in PRSPs,
and the address poverty and countries reinvigorated the notion of planning –
Millennium economic and social specifically, MDG-based National Development Plans to
Development development in a holistic respond to the new challenges advanced by the
Goals (MDGs) fashion. The MDGs Millennium Declaration and the MDGs. Further, at the
launched in 2001, later continental level, the Omega Plan and the Millennium
complemented by the Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) were combined to
Monterey Consensus on form the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Financing for Development (NEPAD) which provided a blueprint for Africa’s
that recognised that the recovery using home-grown solutions. A peer review
0.7 target for ODA set in mechanism to respond to the challenges of governance
1970 had not been met, in all areas was established as another home-grown
and called on developed solution to the challenges experienced over the past
countries that had not ‘lost decades. In 2013, during the occasion of
done so to redouble their celebrating the 50th anniversary of the formation of the
efforts in that regard if the Organisation of African Unity, the AU Agenda 2063:
MDGs were to be The Africa We Want was launched to plot Africa’s
achieved. hopes and aspirations for the next 50 years. The
The idea of ‘Development primary goal of this “African Agenda” is to integrate the
Decades’ has been continent into the global economy based on “mutual
abandoned indicating that responsibility” and “mutual accountability”.
development is a complex
activity with results coming
in small incremental and
often unnoticed steps.
2016–2030: Address the unfinished Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for SD/SDGs.
Agenda 2030 business of the MDGs and This period builds upon the progress made in the era of
for Sustainable tackle long-standing issues MDGs, including continuing to tackle the unfinished
Development which had not been business of the MDGs. Recognising that the successor
and the achieved as above with global development strategy – the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable five guiding imperatives: (i) Sustainable Development has a 90 per cent
Development Leave no one behind; (ii) congruence with the AU Agenda 2063. The African
Goals (SDGs) Put sustainable Union urges its Member States to implement the two
development at the core – Agendas in tandem. At the continental level, Agenda
integrate social, economic 2063 is being implemented through five ten-year
and environmental implementation plans, with the African Development
dimensions of Bank’s High Fives as the vehicle through which this is
sustainability in all to be achieved.
programmes; (iii)
Transform economies for
jobs and inclusive growth;
(iv) Build peace and
effective, open and
accountable institutions for
Page 84 of 87

all; and (v) forge a new

global partnership.
Implementation is
underway in tandem with
Africa Union Agenda 2063
covering the fifty-year
period from 2013 – 2063
ANNEX 3: The Eight Regional Economic Communities Recognised by the African Union
Regional Economic Community Member States

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), established in 1989 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia
Population 91.2 million, Per capita GDP USD 4,518
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central
established in 1998, Population 535.0 million, Per African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire,
capita GDP USD 1,363 Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya,
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the
(COMESA), first established as Preferential Trade Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini,
Area in 1981, became COMESA in 1994 Population Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
492.5 million, Per capita GDP USD 1,335 Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Seychelles,
Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
East African Community (EAC), established in 1967 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, United
with roots going back to 1917, Population 168.5 Republic of Tanzania, South Sudan
million, Per capita GDP USD 918
Economic Community of Central African States Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
(ECCAS), established in 1983, Population 158.3 Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic of the
million, Per capita GDP USD 1,631 Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Principe
Economic Community of West African States Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire,
(ECOWAS), established in 1975, Population 339.8 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
million, Per capita GDP USD 2,130 Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo
Intergovernmental Authority on Development Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
(IGAD), first established in 1986 as South Sudan, Uganda
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and
Development, became IGAD in 1996, Population
247.4 million, Per capita GDP USD 874
Southern African Development Community (SADC), Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic
first established as Southern African Development Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho,
Coordination Conference in 1980, became SADC in Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
1992, Population 312.7 million, Per capita GDP Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United
USD 2,255 Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Source: African Union, African Development Bank Group and UN Economic Commission for Africa, Africa
Regional Integration Index Report 2016.
Page 85 of 87

ANNEX 4: Consultation List, June-December 2018
Organisation Name
African Union Organs and Institutions
ACERWC Mme Cisse Mariama Mohamed
Mr Philippe Sekone Wendyam
Mr Ayalew Getachew Asseffa
ACHPR Dr Mary Maboreke
Ms Irene Desiree Mbengue
AfCHPR Dr Robert Eno
Mr Nouhou Diallo
Mr Victor Lowilla
AGA Secretariat Amb Salah Siddig Hammad
Mr Ibraheem Sanusi
Ms Rizzan Nassuna
Dr Nelson Magbagbeola
AU CIDO & ECOSOCC Mr Kyeretwie Osei
Ms Hazel Maureen Danetta Dixon
Mr William Carew
Sarah Abdel-Mohsen
AUABC Ms Charity Hanene Nchimunya
Mr Selemani Kinyunyu
AUC Bureau of the Chairperson Amb Lindiwe Khumalo
Amb Jean Mfasoni
Amb Hadiza Mustapha
AUC Conflict Prevention & Early Warning Mr Charles Mwaura
AUC Department of Political Affairs Dr Khabele Matlosa
Mr Issaka Garba Abdou
Mr Ahmed Mokhtar Awed
AUC Economic Affairs Amb. Fred Ngoga
AUC Gender Directorate Ms Elizabeth Maloka
Mr Abdul Matundu
AUC Institutional Reforms Unit Ms Ciru Mwaura
AUC Leadership Academy Ms Mounna Hamdok
AUC Office of the Legal Counsel Mr. Adewale Iyanda.
AUC Strategic Planning, Policy, Monitoring, Dr Kassim M. Khamis
Evaluation &Resource Mobilisation
AUPSC Dr Admore Mupoki Kambudzi
ECOSOCC Mr. Abozer Elmana Mohammed Elligai
Ms Thandile Nhlengethwa
AU Develolpment Agency / NEPAD Ms Florence Nazare
Mr Bob Kalanzi
PAP Mr Vipya Harawa
Mr Galal Nassir
PAPU Mr Younouss Djibrine
Mr Amadou
Mr Mkandawire
Regional Economic Communities
CEN-SAD Amb. Youssouf Sangare
COMESA Mr Dev Haman
Page 86 of 87

Mr Thierry Mutombo Kalonji

Amb. Salvator Matata
Ms Elizabeth Mutunga
EAC Dr David Onen
Ms Ethel Sirengo
ECCAS Amb. Njikam Theodore
ECOWAS Dr Nelson Magbabeola
Ms Valentine Atonde
IGAD Amb. Abuzeid Ellhassan
Ms Helen Hailu
Mr Kagwe Mutahi
SADC Mr Kondwani Chirambo
Mr Maxwell Mkumba
Ms Nomatamsanga Sopazi
Policy Research and Academic Institutions
ESRF Dr Bohela Lunogelo
HARDR Mr Olabise Dare
HSRC Dr Greg Houston
Dr Yule Davids
OECD Ms Eva Beuselinck
Mr Marcos Bonturi
SAIIA Mr Steven Gruszd
SaSHA Ms Marie Laberge
University of Cape Town Prof Shameel Jappie
University of Johannesburg Prof Chris Landsberg
Prof Adekeye Adebajo
Prof Shadrack Gutto
University of the Witwatersrand Prof Gilbert Khadiagala
Ms Luanda Mpungose
Independent Advisor Prof Adele Jinadu
Page 87 of 87

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
230 15th Road Ranjespark Midrand
Johannesburg
Gauteng, South Africa info@aprm-au.org
1687 www.aprm-au.org

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THE

LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... 6

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................... 15

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 19

1.1 The Concept of Governance ............................................................................................... 19

1.2 Background and Context of the Africa Governance Report ............................................. 19

1.3 The Purpose of the Africa Governance Report ................................................................. 21

1.4 Methodology of the Africa Governance Report ................................................................. 21

1.5 The Mandates and Purposes of the APRM as an AU Structure ........................................ 22

CHAPTER 2: THE AFRICAN GOVERNANCE POLICY FRAMEWORK ................... 24

2.1 Constitutive Act of the African Union ................................................................................ 24

2.2 African Union Shared Values .............................................................................................. 24

2.4 The Structures of African Governance .............................................................................. 26

CHAPTER 3: TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP .................................................... 27

3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 27

3.2 Overview of Trends in Transformative Leadership ........................................................... 27

3.4 Characteristics of African Transformative Leadership ..................................................... 28

3.5 Assessing Governance Performance at the Continental Level ........................................ 30

3.6 Challenges in Transformative Leadership ......................................................................... 31

3.7 Recommendations on Transformative Leadership ........................................................... 31

CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW ............................. 33

4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 33

4.5 Achievements in African Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law .................................... 44

4.6 Challenges to Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law ...................................................... 45

CHAPTER 5: PEACE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE .......................................... 50

5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 50

5.2 The Interrelationship of Peace, Security and Governance ............................................... 50

5.4 The Measures for Assessing Peace and Security ............................................................. 51

5.5 The Causes of Conflict in Africa ......................................................................................... 51

5.6 Africa’s Conflict Zones ........................................................................................................ 52

5.7 Trends of African Conflict And Instability .......................................................................... 54

5.8 Achievements in Promoting Peace, Security and Governance ........................................ 55

5.9 Challenges Relating to African Peace, Security and Governance ................................... 57

5.10 Proposed Recommendations for Peace, Security and Governance ................................ 58

CHAPTER 6: THE NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE ................... 60

6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 60

6.3 Selected Developmental Challenges .................................................................................. 64

6.4 Proposed Recommendations for Development and Governance .................................... 72

CHAPTER 7: ROLE OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS) IN

7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 74

7.2 The Continental Role of the RECs ...................................................................................... 74

7.3 African Union Instruments on the RECs ............................................................................ 75

7.4 The Relationship Between the RECs and Governance ..................................................... 75

7.6 Observations on the Relationships Between the AU and RECs ...................................... 77

7.7 Regional Integration and AU Agenda 2063 ........................................................................ 79

ANNEX 1: Highlights of The Interrelationships of The Global UN and OAU/AU Principles,

Annex 2: Development Periods and Their Principal Focus ............................................................ 82

ANNEX 4: Consultation List, June-December 2018 ......................................................................... 86

Figure 1: Overview of Africa Governance Performance .................................................... 30

Figure 4: Average Human Development Index by regions ................................................. 63

APRM African Peer Review Mechanism

ECOBRIG ECOWAS Standby Brigade

RDC Rapid Deployment Capability

SASBRIG Southern Africa Standby Brigade

UN United Nations Organization

3. The imperative for the development of an African-generated governance report is three-

6. The structure of the report is as follows:

Chapter 1 is an Introduction that reflects on the concept of governance, provides a

Constitutionalism and The Rule of Law