DIGEST FOR AUGUST 19, 2019

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

FACTS : Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution
providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The
Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE:Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

HELD: [The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

BONDOC VS PINEDA
ON JUDICIAL POWER

FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position
of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6
are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision
had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already
expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP
members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET
received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s
representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein.

RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach
of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s
right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal

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for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another.

YNOT VS IAC
ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE LOWER COURT TO DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS, TREATIES

QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

Facts: – 13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A – Executive Order No. 626-A
prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O.
626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National
Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This
amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age. – Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of
replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas bong of P12,000.00 – Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaos—sustained; ordered
confiscation of the bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed validity –
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC. Petitioner’s arguments: 1. E.O. is
unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. 2. Penalty is
invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. 3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.

Issue/s: – WON EO 626-A is constitutional.

Ruling: – EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond cancelled and the amount thereof is
ordered restored to petitioner.

Ratio: On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters – Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by
lower courts subject to review of the Supreme Court. “..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review
of the highest tribunal.” – Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
On the presumption of constitutionality – Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted
On due process – Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise
on their correct interpretation. – Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient; flexibility –
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing –intended as safeguard against official arbitrariness.
On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A – The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is
actually a PD issued by Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. – But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the extraordinary
power
Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A – Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the
case, but this is the same with the fit between means and objective test) – 1 = “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.” – Failed to comply with #2; there is
no reasonable connection between conservation of carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of
carabaos.

CIR VS CTA
ON COURTS APPROACH A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - THE AUTHORITY OF THE LOWER COURT TO
DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS, TREATIES

Although We sustain the respondent tax court’s finding that the constitutioned issue was squarely raised by the parties, We find merit
with the contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. The fact that constitutional question was
properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality. This is supported
by recent Supreme Court rulings which oblige every court to approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable
caution.

"It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the following requisites of a judicial inquiry
are present: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case"

Undoubtedly, the last criterion is not present. This case can be resolved based on the other available grounds obtaining in this case.
Respondent court should have avoided the issue and instead maintained the presumption of constitutionality. A law is supposed to
have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief
Executive. Accordingly, this Court gives high respect for the acts of the other departments of the government and, as much as
possible, avoids deciding the constitutional question.

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 GARCIA VS DRILON
ON JURISDICTION OF FC AND RTC TO RESOLVE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE

FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner
admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up
their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.

All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist.
Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even
told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has
not sired a child with her.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive
her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she
confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and
issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a
.9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for

1.      making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men.
2.      He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already sex-
discriminatory because it means violence by men against women. 
3.      The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women.
4.      He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to
curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5.      There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.

Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:

1.    Safeguard Human Rights,
2.    Ensure Gender Equality and
3.    Empower Women

International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by
everyone.
1.      It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is
a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties such as the
2.      Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3.      the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
4.      Convention Against Torture, and the
5.      Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.

UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the UDHR are the
following:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law.

Declaration of Policy in RA 9262

·         enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of
women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
·         The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.

HELD:

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Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction
to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369,
otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization,
admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 “this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law.”46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality
or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that
the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review
of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine
the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49  Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action
which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be
excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim
for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross- claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action
or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the
subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in
view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a
protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
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Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal
issues, among others,viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the
following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day
period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-
10-11- SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a
period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary
protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner
could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules
on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds
succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and
summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment
granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at
a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are
not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune
from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing,
however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an
injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

MIRASOL VS CA
on CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT ONLY IN THE SC BUT ALSO IN RTC

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production
venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to
be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for
an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their

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outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. 

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where
the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention
in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not
just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction.
15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at
the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 

SALONGA VS PANO
ON FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW – SYMBOLIC

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v. Benigno
Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has
been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and
the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of
the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish
a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information
for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no
prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction
his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a draft
ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions

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of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one
of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not
be required.” In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative
powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the
Reports.

TANADA VS CUENCO
ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE PALE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The
lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this
process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he,
as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the
NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official
acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is
a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the
majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even
though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply
with the Constitution.

DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA

ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day
was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate
President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him,
belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No
consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP,
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senate President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader of the Senate.

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The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator
Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.
However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate
itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted
Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.
Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws
or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.

VINUYA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ON POLITCIAL QUESTIONS

FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ,
and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for
the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women”
stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

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Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical
and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or
invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests,
and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the
Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed
between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system
has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever
extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting
consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province
of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the
crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by
States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and
can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ON LIMITATION OF POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

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The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-
sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment
of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur
Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would
make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was
then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as
to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as
CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but
only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is
a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that
the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the
LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC

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 and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s
good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29

(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD
1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

CORONA VS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ON POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW INCLUDES THE POWER OF REVIEW OVER JUSTICIABLE ISSUES IN
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and
writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case
initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the
Philippines.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment
against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the
complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one third vote required by the Constitution.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following day.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of public trust and graft and Corruption, which alleged that:

I. Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration
from the time of his appointment As Supreme Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the
present;
II. Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public
his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the 1987 Constitution;
III. Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by failing to meet and observe the
stringent standards under the constitution that provides that “[a] Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
Caused the issuance of flip-flopping Decisions in Final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs.
Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme
Court.

IV. Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution when he blatantly disregarded the
principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning
the Impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.

And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship with former Pres. Arroyo and her husband, as
well, failure to account for collections of the JDF.

Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment complaint as initiated and transferred from the
HOR to the Senate.

Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal
nor improper. He prayed for th eoutright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference revealing evidence which
supposedly support their accusations against petitioner, which was carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day.

11
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings against the
petitioner. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18,2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of
this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of
petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.

Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs and other properties. In a subsequent Resolution dated
February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks
where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the Impeachment
Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to
testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioner’s alleged foreign currency accounts,
and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing the yearend balances for the said
accounts.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator Judge shave lost the cold neutrality of impartial
judges by acting as prosecutors.

The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate sitting as impeachment court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling for the former
Chief Justice’s impeachment.

HELD: No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in
the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United
States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.

By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound
questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the
part of any Senator Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within
this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof
would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

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