Free Will

Brown Judaic Studies
Chapter Title: Philo's Doctrine of Free Will

Chapter Author(s): D. Winston
Book Title: Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria

Book Subtitle: A Commentary on De Gigantibus and Quod Deus sit Immutabilis
Book Author(s): David Winston and John Dillon
Published by: Brown Judaic Studies. (2020)
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III. PHILOSOPHICAL THEMES IN THE BE GIGANTIBUS
AND QUOD DEUS
A. Philo's Doctrine of Free Will*
The much disputed question of free will owes much of its

notoriety to the cloud of semantic ambiguities which has envel-
oped it ever since it became an issue between competing philo-
sophical schools. When Philo dealt with it, it already had had
a checkered career and a distinctive terminology attached to
it. Most discussions of Philo's position, however, unfortu-
nately have not taken adequate account of the philosophical
matrix out of which his analysis arises and either have mis-
construed his intentions or have accused him of contradictions
of which he was not guilty. We shall therefore seek to track
the relevant Philonic texts within their immediate philosophical
context in an effort to extract their true meaning.
Philo'sideal man would be one who most nearly approaches
the Ttpoyuoc, avdpamoc, described by him in Op. 136 ff. The latter
had a mind unalloyed (dnpaxos)(150), able to receive sense im-
pressions in their true reality and encased in a body which God
molded out of the purest and most subtly refined material avail-
able in order to serve as a "sacred dwelling-place or Temple of
the reasonable soul" (137). Such a mind was in complete control
of its sense-perceptions and thus guaranteed inner harmony and
wholeness to its possessor. No warring dualities disturbed the
stillness of this unperturbed being. "But since no created
thing is constant," continues Philo, "and mortal things are
necessarily liable to chances and reverses, it could not but be
that even the first man should experience some ill-fortune. And
woman becomes for him the beginning of the blameworthy life"
(Op. 151). Overcome by desire and pleasure, "the beginning of
wrongs and violation of the law," man chose "that fleeting and
mortal life, which is not life at all, but a period of time full
of misery" (Op. 152). Having abandoned the Creator for the
created, he forfeited his immortality, and became embroiled in
the war of the passions.
*This section reproduces D. Winston, "Freedom and

Determinism in Philo of Alexandria," SP 3 (1974-75) 47-70. The
notes, however, have been considerably curtailed.
181
182 Two Treatises of Philo
Man before the "fall" thus represents for Philo an ideal

human type which unfortunately is theoretically precluded by the
actual conditions of earthly life. He therefore proceeds to
analyze man's present "fallen" condition while attempting to
lend to it an air of tragic grandeur. Though second best, it is
nevertheless a life far more elevated than that of the lower
animals. Endowed with mind, man possesses an unique, divine
gift which guarantees his relative preeminence in the scale of
2
being.
For it is the mind alone which the Father who begat it

deemed worthy of freedom, and loosening the bonds of
necessity, allowed it to range free, and of that power of
volition which constitutes his most intimate and fitting
possession presented it with such a portion as it was
capable of receiving. For the other living creatures in
whose souls the mind, the element earmarked for liberty,
has no place, have been handed over to the service of man,
as slaves to a master. But man who is possessed of spon-
taneous and self-determined judgment and performs for the
most part activities deliberately chosen, is rightly blamed
for what he does with premeditation, praised when he acts
correctly of his own will. In the others, the plants and
animals, no praise is due if they are fruitful, nor blame
if they fail to be productive: for they acquire their
movements and changes in either direction through no
deliberate choice or volition of their own. But the soul
of man alone has received from God the faculty of voluntary
movement, and in this way especially is assimilated to him,
and thus being liberated, as far as possible, from that
hard and grievous mistress, Necessity, may suitably be
charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator.
And therefore it will in all justice pay the inexorable
penalty reserved for ungrateful freedmen. [Deus 47-4 8]
The first thing to be observed is Philo's emphatic

insistence on man's culpability and responsibility for his evil
actions, thereby explicitly absolving deity from any share in
the latter. The prime motivation of Philo in this passage is
thus very similar to that of Plato when he discusses the laws
of reincarnation both in Tim. 41E ff. and in Rep. 10.614 ff.
The dominant motif is there sounded by the oft-quoted phrase:
ouxia £Xou.£vou, de6g avaixioc, (617E; cf. 379B) . An analysis
of the Platonic passages may therefore help considerably in
unraveling the meaning of Philo. It has sometimes been assumed
that Plato was somehow attempting to reconcile the laws of
destiny with the absolute autonomy of human freedom. The fact
is, however, that in the very same dialogue in which Plato seeks
to clear the gods of blame for the individual soul's destiny
{Tim. 42D), he asserts that the soul may very well be plagued
by disease due to a defective bodily constitution coupled with
Philo's Doctrine of Free Will 183
bad upbringing, and that this could lead to its being overcome
by the passions {Tim. 86B). In Laws 644DE, Plato speaks more
bluntly of the ultimately determined character of man's moral
nature:
Let us suppose [says the Athenian] that each of us living

creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether con-
trived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious pur-
p o s e — f o r as to that we know nothing; but this we do know,
that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords,
drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one
against the other to opposite actions. [Loeb ed., 1.69;
cf. Laws 732E, 804B; also Fug. 46; Op. 117; QG 3.48]
It should be abundantly clear, then, that all Plato is

asserting by insisting that the blame is that of the soul that
chooses, is that the moral career of the latter is not a product
of fatality, but a result of its participation in the complex
4
process of choice. That this process is itself ultimately
determined is part of the thorny problem of necessary evil which
Plato seeks to mitigate elsewhere {Tim. 48A, 56C; Laws 896-97;
Phaedv. 247) by pointing to an ineradicable residue of random
motion in the cosmos and an inherent ignorance within the human
soul. In any case, the attribution of moral blame or respon-
sibility to man is fully justified, as far as Plato is concerned,
as long as man's soul is not caught in the web of a fatality
which would constrain its actions arbitrarily. By participating
in the choice process, man becomes willy nilly a moral agent.
Thus, for Plato, a concept of relative free will is quite suf-
ficient to allow for the notion of moral responsibility.
Returning to Philo, it should now be clear that unless
an explicit statement of absolute free will can confidently be
extracted from the passage under consideration, the internal
logic of Philo's argumentation does not demand it and is fully
compatible with a relative free will concept. Though fully
cognizant of this fact, Wolfson has argued that
when Philo says that God gave to the human mind a portion
"of that free will which is His most peculiar possession
and most worthy of His majesty" and that by this gift of
free will the human mind "in this respect has been made
to resemble Him," it is quite evident that by man's free
will Philo means an absolutely undetermined freedom like
that enjoyed by God, who by his power to work miracles
can upset the laws of nature and the laws of causality
which He himself has established. [Philo 1.436]
The fact is, however, that Philo is only adapting here for his
own use a characteristically Stoic notion. Epictetus, for
example, writes:
But what says Zeus? "Epictetus, had it been possible I

should have made both this paltry body and this small
estate of thine free and unhampered. . . . Yet since
I could not give thee this, we have given thee a certain
portion of ourself, this faculty of choice and refusal."
[Diss. 1.1.10] 7
Now the Stoics held a relative free will theory of the causal
type, and all they meant by saying that God has given us a por-
tion of himself thereby enabling us to make choices is that
(as A. A. Long has neatly put it) "the logos, the causal prin-
ciple, is inside the individual man as well as being an external
force constraining him. . . . This is but a fragment of the
whole, however, and its powers are naturally weak, so weak that
'following1 rather than 'initiating' events is stressed as its
o
proper function." For the Stoics, man is not a mechanical link
in the causal chain, but an active though subordinate partner of
God. It is this which allows them to shift the responsibility
for evil from God to man. Cleanthes says as much in his famous
g
Hymn to Zeus. According to Long,
Cleanthes is thinking of God as an absolute power, embracing
all things and uniting good and evil. Yet evil actions are
not planned by God in his identity as one omnipotent ruler.
What he does is to unite all things in a harmonious whole.
Can we say that evil actions are ones purposed by certain
fragments of his logos? They would bear no more resemblance
to God as such than does a brick to the house it helps to
form.10
Philo's meaning, then, is that in so far as man shares
in God's Logos, he shares to some extent in God's freedom. That
this is only a relative freedom is actually emphasized by Philo
when he says that God gave man such a portion of his freedom
"as man was capable of receiving" and that he was liberated "as
far as might be." Yet this relative freedom, in Philo's view,
is sufficient for placing the onus of moral responsibility on
man and clearing God from any blame for man's sins. It is
impossible, then, to locate in our Philonic text an explicit
statement of absolute free will. For the sake of the argument,
however, let us follow up the logical consequences of an abso-
lute free will doctrine and see how these would chime with
Philo 1 s philosophical system as a whole. If absolute free will,
for Philo, means that man's will is completely autonomous and
independent of God, then he would be ascribing to God the ability
to do something involving a contradiction. It seems, however,
highly unlikely that Philo's formula TidvTa deep 6uvaxd would
include the logically absurd. For Philo (as later for Saadia),
the latter would signify nothing and it would be meaningless

to ascribe it to God's omnipotence. Similarly Origen would
exclude from the general principle that all things are possible
to God, things that are contrary to reason (TxapdA-oya) or to
God's own character {Contra Celsum 5.24).
Moreover, if, as Wolfson believes, absolute free will
means that, contrary to the laws of nature, the mind by virtue
of its mysteriously free will can miraculously override the
effects of the warring potencies of two conflicting drives
(opuai)/ then we shall be ascribing to Philo the use of vacuous
terminology. For the term "will" in this context cannot mean
(on the assumptions made) either the predominance of the more
potent drive in man or some sort of rational process, but
remains a mysterious component never identified. But even if
we were to accept the existence of this mysterious entity, it
would be difficult to ascribe either merit or blame to man for
its inexplicable (or uncaused) inclinations now towards the
good, now towards evil. It were as if some alien force lodged
in our mind made decisions which we could not account for in
any rational manner. One could always argue, of course, that
Philo was unaware of these contradictions and difficulties,
but in the light of the fact that he was undoubtedly acquainted
with the subtle and detailed discussions of the Stoics and their
adversaries, it does not seem likely that this would be the
case.
Finally, Philo explicitly teaches that God "knoweth
well the different pieces of his own handiwork, even before he
has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties
which they are to display at a later time, in a word, their
deeds and experiences" (LA 3.88; Seneca, Ben. 4.32). It is
difficult to believe that Philo would be willing to involve him-
self in such a palpable contradiction (i.e., maintaining at the
same time both man's absolute freedom and God's complete fore-
knowledge of all man's future actions), when he had ready to
hand a relative free will theory which could serve all his needs
and which had probably already been accepted and adapted by some
Jewish Hellenistic and rabbinic writings. Still, it would
be hazardous in the extreme to draw any conclusions from this
kind of argumentation. Much depends on how one reads the central
character of Philo's thought. Wolfson sees Philo as essentially
a pious Jew who rarely allows philosophic principle to override
the self-evident teachings of Scripture, and thus finds in him
a paradigm for much that was characteristic of medieval reli-

gious philosophy. It is becoming increasingly clear, however
(at least to this writer), that there are numerous hints in
Philo's writings that indicate an ambivalence in his manner of
philosophical exposition and which would seem to place him in
the ranks of those whose philosophical convictions run con-
siderably deeper than their adhesion to religious dogma. In
any case, our main line of argumentation is in no way involved
in the larger controversy concerning Philo's philosophical per-
spective.
Since many interpreters of Philo had taken his concept
of freedom in an absolute sense, they were somewhat puzzled by
the fragment from the lost fourth book of his Legum Allegoviat
which contains the following homily on Deuteronomy 30:15 and 19:
It is a happy thing for the soul to have the power to choose

the better of the two choices put forward by the Creator,
but it is happier not for the soul to choose, but for the
Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it. For,
strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good
through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness
of God, since He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy.
For two main principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that
on the one hand God does not govern all things as a man and
that on the other hand He trains, and educates us as a man
[cf. Somn. 1.237; Deus 53 f f . ] . Accordingly, when he main-
tains the second principle, namely, that God acts as a man,
he introduces that which is in our power as the competence
to know something, will, choose, and avoid. But when he
affirms that first and better principle, namely, that God
acts not as man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all
things to God, leaving no work for a created being but
showing it to be inactive and passive.I 7 He explains this
when he says in other words that "God has known those who
are His and those who are holy and he has brought them near
to himself" (Num 16:5). But if selections and rejections
are in strictness made by the one cause, why do you advise
me, legislator, to choose life or death, as though we were
autocrats of our choice?!^ But he would answer: Of such
things hear thou a rather elementary explanation, namely,
such things are said to those who have not yet been initi-
ated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and
authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness
of the created.I 9
Having committed himself to ascribing an absolute free will

doctrine to Philo, Wolfson is constrained virtually to transform
the simple meaning of the above fragment. "In the first place,"
he writes, "the fragment deals only with man's choice of the good
but makes no mention at all of man's choice of evil." This omis-
sion, which "cannot be accidental," can be
accounted for only by the fact that the point which Philo
was going to make in this homily was that only the choice
of good was caused by God, but not choice of evil. In the

second place, with regard to the choice of good, we may say
at the very outset that such sweeping statements in this
passage about the "exceeding nothingness of the created"
. . . and about the unreality of the presentation of the
human mind as being "capable of knowing something, and
willing and choosing, and avoiding" do not in themselves
indicate that Philo denied of man the freedom to choose
good. Even with his belief in absolute human freedom he
could make these statements, in view of the fact that the
freedom, as he has said in his extant works, is a gift
bestowed upon man by God, a portion of his own proper
freedom, whereby he is made to resemble God. . . . Further-
more, God's direct causation of man's choice of good is
described as "the thoughtfulness of God, while he bestows
the fairest things upon the worthy." This quite obviously
implies that man must first do something to render himself
worthy of the bestowal upon him by God of the power to
choose good, and this must inevitably refer to some act
of free will.
Wolfson thus concludes:
The cumulative impression of all these statements then is

that, while a man is able to choose the better, he will
not have to rely upon his own power, that is to say, that
power of free will with which God will aid men, for, if
he proves himself worthy, God will aid him in making that
choice by bringing him to himself. The direct interven-
tion of God in man's choice of good dealt with in this
fragment must therefore be assumed to refer only to some
help lent by God to man in the choice of good, when man
proves himself worthy of such help. 2 1
Now Wolfson's first argument is easily countered when

one remembers that it is a basic principle with Philo not to
ascribe evil to God, a principle which he shared both with Plato
and the Stoics. Our fragment is assessing man's actions from
the perspective of God, and since in that perspective evil does
not really exist, its focus can only be on man's choice of the
good. Wolfson's second argument that since man's absolute free-
dom is itself a gift of God it is proper to speak of his "exceed-
ing nothingness," falls between two stools. For if God's gift
is real (or absolute), then man's will is truly sovereign and
independent and it would then be improper to speak of his
nothingness, and if on the other hand, it is somehow unreal (or
relative), then man does not indeed possess an absolute freedom
of the will. Finally, the third argument revolves around the
word "worthy," which according to Wolfson, must imply that man
already possesses some portion of free will. As a matter of
fact, however, it need imply no such thing. The "worthy," may
simply be those whom God in his infinite wisdom has predeter-
mined to be his chosen ones. Philo, for example, writes:
"God has not fashioned beforehand any deed of his, but produces
him [Melchizedek] to begin with as such a king, peaceable and
worthy of his own priesthood" (LA 3.79). Similarly, we read in
Ben Sira: "To fear the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and
with the faithful was she created in the womb" (1:14).
More decisive, however, for the interpretation of the
fragment from the Legum Allegoria, is that its plain meaning is
fully consonant with the rest of Philo 1 s writings and is actually
reinforced by them. The theme of man's nothingness and utter
passivity runs through much of Philo 1 s works. In Cher. 11,
for example, he writes:
What more hostile foe could there be for the soul than one
who in his boastfulness claims for himself what is proper
to God? For to act is the property of God, something which
may not be ascribed to created beings whereas it is the
property of creation to suffer. Ke who recognizes this in
advance as something fitting and necessary, will readily
endure what befalls him, however grievous it may be.2 3
Philo 1 s language is occasionally almost identical with that of

the Stoics when he wishes to emphasize the relative passivity
of man's role in the cosmos. He writes, for example, in Cher.
12 8: "For we are the instruments, now tensed now slackened,
through which particular actions take place; and it is the
Artificer who effects the percussion of both our bodily and
psychic powers, he by whom all things are moved." (Cf. Ebr.
107). The Stoics similarly say: "The movements of our minds
are nothing more than instruments for carrying out determined
decisions since it is necessary that they be performed through
24
us by the agency of Fate." More specifically, Philo insists
again and again that man's virtue is not really his own. "It is
necessary," he writes in LA 3.136, "that the soul should not
ascribe to itself its toil for virtue, but that it should take
it away from itself and refer it to God, confessing that not its
own strength or power acquired nobility, but He who freely
bestowed also the love of it." Indeed, in spite of the fact
that, according to Philo, God bestowed some of his own freedom
on man, only God, says Philo elsewhere, is E;KOUOLOV in the
absolute sense of the word, since our own existence is ruled by
necessity (Somn. 2.253). Moreover, terms such as CUJTE^OUOIOS
or auxoHpdxcop are never used by Philo to designate man's free-
dom, but refer only to God's sovereign power. Again, Philo's
constant use of medical figures in describing the various con-
ditions of the soul and his insistence that at a certain stage
its diseased state becomes incurable clearly implies a deter-

ministic scheme. For if the soul were endowed with an absolute
freedom it should be able to overcome the natural forces attempt-
ing to enslave it. Nor does Philo assert in these frequently
recurring passages that God has withdrawn our absolute free will
in punishment for our previous choices. Finally, the Stoic ter-
minology to which Philo consistently resorts in his definition
of the passions (du-expoe H O U TtA.eovd£ouaa 6pu.T*i: Spec. 4.79; cf.
1.305; 1.8), and his description of the diseased or healthy
state of the soul in terms equivalent to the Stoic axovia and
euiovta (Conf. 165-66; Virt. 1 3 ) , lead us once again to a form
of ethical determinism.
It would thus appear that the general tone of Philo's
ethical thought is evidently deterministic, inasmuch as it seems
to be tied to the notion of an all-penetrating divine Logos which
reaches into each man's mind, thus converting it into an exten-
28
sion of the divine mind, albeit a very fragmentary one. In
the light of this reading of man's psyche, it should be evident
that the relative free will doctrine which characterized much of
classical and Hellenistic Greek thought and had already left its
mark on some Jewish Hellenistic and rabbinic writings, was the
most natural option for Philo's thought to take. At any rate,
we have found nothing in Philo's writings sufficiently explicit
to warrant attributing to him an absolute free will doctrine,
and much that would seem to contradict it.
NOTES
For a brief account of the history of this question in

Greek philosophy, see D. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon (N.Y. 1979)
51-55.
Cf. Plotinus 3.2.9.30: "In this way man is a noble

creation, as far as he can be noble, and, being woven into the
All, has a part which is better than that of other living things,
of all, that is, which live on the earth" (cf. 3.1.8; Speo.
3.83; 4.14).
Cf. Plotinus, 3.2.7; Corpus Hermetioum (ed. Nock,

Festugiere) 1.52. According to Justin Martyr {Apologia 1.44.
1-8 [81B-E]), this dictum was taken by Plato directly from Moses.
A
This process is clearly described in Laws 733B: "We
desire that pleasure should be ours, but pain we neither choose
nor desire; and the neutral state we do not desire in place of
pleasure, but we do desire it in exchange for pain; and we
desire less pain with more pleasure, but we do not desire less
pleasure with more pain; and when the two are evenly balanced,
we are unable to state any clear preference" (Loeb ed., 1.343;

cf. Aristotle, Be Caelo 295b31). For the Socratic paradox that
no one voluntarily does what is wrong, and its distinctively
Platonic formulation (Gorgias 509E; Laws 731C, 860C f f . ) , see
the excellent discussion of Norman Gulley, The Philosophy of
Socrates (London 1968) 75-204. Plato's widening of the class
of involuntary actions by defining voluntary as that which one
"really" desires, i.e., what one rationally desires, involves
him only in a semantic dispute with both Socrates and Aristotle,
and as Plato himself notes {Laws 864B) : f)\±Zv &t oux S O I L T6L
vuv OVOU&TCOV rc£pi 6uoepi£ XdyoQ ("we are not now concerned with
a semantic dispute").
Cf. H. Cherniss, "The Sources of Evil According to

Plato," Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. G. Vlastos
(Garden City 1971) 2.244-58. Plato, moreover, indicates (Tim.
41B-C) that mortal creatures came into being so that the Heaven
be not imperfect, which it would be if it did not contain all
the kinds of living being. Cf. Conf. 179; Spinoza, Ethics (New
York: Hafner, 1953) 1, Appendix, ad fin.: But to those who ask
why God has not created all men in such a manner that they might
be controlled by the dictates of reason alone, I give but this
answer: because to Him material was not wanting for the crea-
tion of everything down to the very lowest grade of perfection:
or to speak more properly, because the laws of His nature were
so ample that they sufficed for the production of everything
which can be conceived by an infinite intellect." Similarly,
Jalal al-Din Rumi writes: "Could He not evil make, He would
lack skill" (R. A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam [London 1963]
99) .
Plato,, however, makes a sharpp distinction between

dyvoia and duadia. The former designates a lack of
"a kind of emptiness of habit of the soul" (Rep. 585B), which
can be filled by voOc, and xpocpn (reason and training) . The
latter, on the other hand, is a condition of fundamental ignor-
ance produced by dTiai6euTOQ xpocpT*i or improper training, and a
Ttovnpdv 2E|iv T O O QWUCXTOQ or a faulty habit of body due to a
physiological defect. It is a psychic disorder caused by a
pathological condition of the body, as, for example, when the
seed in the marrow is copious with overflowing moisture, it
causes states of frenzy in which one experiences excessive
pleasures and pains (e.g., a state of sexual licentiousness)
(Tim. 86B f f . ) . In short, Plato is referring here to biological
drives whose normal intensities have been rendered abnormal by
diseased neurophysiological conditions. In the Sophist (228 ff.)
Plato adds that a state of duadia can be produced by duexpia by
which he apparently means a disproportion between the three
parts of the soul. In this case, we have an CLZOXOQ or deformity
(rather than a V 6 O O Q or disease), i.e., a structural defect in
the soul itself. Cf. Philo, Virt. 13 (in Laws 731E-732B, he
speaks of an excessive love of self as cause of duadia). Pre-
sumably this may be the result of either vooos or OLZOXOQ. Dia-
lectic is a useful treatment both for dyvoia and duadia, but is
obviously most effective in the former case, least effective in
the latter (Sophist 228 f f . ) . In any case, Plato would apply
punishment as a deterrent and rewards as positive reinforcement
in all cases that are judged to be curable to some extent (Laws
862D, 934A; cf. Protagoras 324B), but when neither dialectic,
nor deterrent punishment, nor the rewards of positive reinforce-
ment prove effective (i.e., incurable conditions), then the
only recourse is execution. (Cf. Protagoras 325B; Rep. 410A,
Politicus 309A). Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational

(Boston 1957) 207-35; J. J. Walsh, Aristotle's Conception of
Moral Weakness (New York 1963) 4-59; A. A. Long, "Freedom and
Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action," Problems in
Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long; London 1971) 174; R. Hackforth, "Moral
Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics," Classical Quarterly 40
(19 46) 118-20; P. W. Gooch, "Vice is Ignorance: the Interpre-
tation of Sophist 226A-231B," Phoenix 25 (1971) 124-33; J.
Stenzel, "Das Problem der Willensfreiheit im Platonismus," Die
Antike 4 (1928) 293-313; F. Guglielmino, "II problema del libero
arbitrio nel sistema platonico," Archivio di Storia delta Filo-
sofia Italiana 4 (1935) 197-223; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and
Responsibility (Oxford 1960) 302-8; I. M. Crombie, An Examination
of Plato's Doctrines (London 1962) 1.275-80. J. V. B. Gosling,
Plato (London 1973) 82-99.
Cf. Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.17.27; 2.8.11 (Loeb

ed., 1.261): "But you are a being of primary importance; you
are a fragment (&n6aTiaaua) of God; you have within you a part
of Him" (cf. Her. 283; Op. 146; Somn. 1.34).
o
A. A. Long (cited n. 6) 178-79. Long also correctly
notes: "In fact, though he is not explicit on the point, Epic-
1
tetus freedom of the Logos seems to be subject to the same
qualifications as Chrysippus 1 , and for the same reasons."
o
Nothing occurs on the earth apart from you, O God,
nor in the heavenly regions nor on the sea,
except what bad men do in their folly;
but you know how to make the odd even,
and to harmonize what is dissonant; to you the alien
is akin.
And so you have wrought together into one all things
that are good and bad,
So that there arises one eternal "logos" of all
things. . . .
The translation is that of A. A. Long in his Hellenistic Philos-
ophy (London 1974) 181. For the Greek text, see J. U. Powell,
Collectanea Alexandrina (Oxford 1924) 227-31 {SVF 1.537). For
a detailed discussion, see A. J. Festugiere, La Revelation
d'HermZs Trismegiste (Paris 1944-54) 2.310-30.
10
Long (cited n. 6) 179. Cf. W. Theiler, "Tacitus und
die antike Schicksalslehre," Phyllobolia fur Peter von der M'uhll
(Basel 1946) 54-55 (reprinted in Theiler 1 s Forschungen zum Neu-
platonismus (Berlin 1966) 46-103. Cf. Epictetus, Dissertationes
1.12.
Briefly stated, the contradiction consists in asserting

that God, who alone is self-caused, can create a human will whose
moral choices are all self-caused. It is therefore equivalent
to saying that God can create another God. Maimonides 1 comment
on this was: "We do not attribute to God incapacity because he
is unable to corporify his essence or to create someone like him
or to create a square whose diagonal is commensurate with its
side" {Guide 1.75).
See D. Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cos-

mogony," History of Religions 11 (1971) 197, n. 33; cf. Philo,
Abr. 268: "Though he can do all things, he wills only what is
best" (cf. Op. 46; QG IV 5 1 ) .
Epicurus had already cautioned against the use of

K E V O L CP06YYOL or words devoid of meaning (Epistula ad Herodotum
1.38; K.D. 37; Cicero, Fin. 2.48; Tusc. 5.26.73) Epiot. 2.6.19;
2.17.6. Cf. Aristotle, Ethioa Eudemia 1.8.1217b, 22; Cicero,
Tuso. 1.10.21; Aristotle, Metaphysioa 991a, 20 (KevoXoyeiv);
Alexander Aphrodisiensis Be Fato chap. 2; Philo, Spec. 1.327;
Seneca Ben. 5.12.4; Corpus Hermeticum 11.5.15; Plotinus 2.4.11;
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. A. R. Waller; Cambridge 1935) pt.
1, 23-25: "And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound,
are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And
therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle, or
accidents of Bread in Cheese, or Immateriall Substances, or of
A free Subject; A free-Will; of any Free, but free from being
hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour;
but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.
. . . The seventh [cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe] to
names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by
rote from the Schooles, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, con-
substantiate, eternal-Bow, and the like canting of Schoolemen."
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. 2,
in English Philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Cen-
turies (Harvard Classics 37; New York 1910) 320: "When we enter-
tain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent),
we need but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea
derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve
to confirm our suspicion."
Wolfson {Philo 1.432) writes: "This power with which

the human mind was endowed to choose or not to choose refers not
only to the choice of good, but also to the choice of evil, even
though the mind is by its very nature rational, for, as says
Philo, there are in our mind 'voluntary inclinations ( G H O U O L O U C
xpoTi&e) to what is wrong.' Det. 122). The essential rationality
of the mind does not preclude the possibility of its acting, by
the mere power of its free will, against the dictates of reason."
15
See Winston (cited n. 1 ) .
See D. Winston, "Philo's Theory of Cosmogony," in

Religious Syncretism in Antiquity, ed. B. A. Pearson; Missoula
1975) 157-71. Cf. Isaak Heinemann, Philons griechische und
judische Bildung (Breslau 1932) 542-74; S. Sandmel, Philo 's
Place in Judaism (Cincinnati 1956) 1-29; Walther Volker,
Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien (Leipzig
1938) 1-47; H. Thyen, "Die Probleme der neueren Philoforschung,"
Theologische Rundschau, N.F. 23 (1955-56) 230-46.
Cf. R. Mordechai Joseph Leiner of Izbica (d. 1854; a

disciple of R. Menahem Mendel [Morgenstern] of Kotzk [1787-
1859], according to whose view the signal characteristic of the
future world is that in it the illusion of free choice will
vanish, and that acts will no longer be ascribed to their human
agents but to God, their true author. To substantiate his view,
he quotes the following passage from BT Pesahim 50a: "the
future world is unlike our present world, for in our present
world I (God) am written as YHWH but am called Adonai, but in
the future world, I shall both be written as YHWH and be called
YHWH" {[Mei ha-Shiloah] pt. 1:14b). "Know and understand," he
writes elsewhere, "that everything you do is from God and save
for him, no one may lift hand or foot to do aught, and you should
not boast about your actions. . . . for all the good which you do
you may refer to God, but all the evil you must attribute to
yourselves" (55b). See Joseph Weiss "The Religious Determinism
of Joseph Mordecai Lerner [sio] of Izbica," Yitzhak F. Baer
Jubilee Volume (eds. S. W. Baron, S. Ettinger, et al.; Jerusalem
1960) 447-53.
18
C f . Plato, Laws 9.860E (Loeb ed., 2.223, 225): "If
this is the state of the case, Stranger (i.e., that all bad men
are in all respects unwillingly b a d ) , what counsel do you give
us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we
legislate or shall we not? 1 'Legislate by all means' I shall
reply."
19
Fragments of Philo Judaeus (ed. James Rendel Harris;
Cambridge 1886) 8. (I have quoted the Drummond-Wolfson transla-
tion of this fragment, but have made a number of modifications.)
For the two principles "God is as a man, God is not as a man,"
cf. Deus 60-68.
Drummond observes that this fragment "reduces the
belief in free will to a useful delusion of the less educated."
He concludes, however, that "if this passage has been correctly
preserved, it stands alone among Philo's utterances, though not
without important points of contact with them, and I must be
content to leave it without attempting a reconciliation" (James
Drummond, Philo Judaeus [reprint, Amsterdam 1969] 1.347, note).
E. Goodenough, on the other hand, has correctly understood
Philo's intent (see his The Theology of Justin Martyr [reprint,
Amsterdam 1968] 229).
21
H . Wolfson, Philo 1.442-46 (I have somewhat abbrevi-
ated his remarks).
Those commentators who find an inconsistency in Plato's

ethical determinism naturally find the same inconsistency in
Philo's. Billings, for example, writes: "Such passages (which
ascribe all human activity to God, including moral progress) are
in flat contradiction to the group in which man's freedom and
responsibility are asserted, but this inconsistency is one that
Philo shares with most determinists. It is in Plato. . . .
There is a similar inconsistency in Stoicism" (Thomas H. Billings,
The Platonism of Philo Judaeus [Chicago 1919] 71).
23
C f . Cleanthes, SVF 1.52 7: "Guide me, O Zeus, and thou
Fate, whither I have been appointed by you. For I will follow
freely; and if, grown evil, I prove unwilling I shall follow no
less." Chrysippus and Zeno illustrated this as follows: "Just
as a dog tied to a cart follows while being pulled, if it is
willing to follow, making its own self-determination comply with
necessity; yet it will be in all respects subject to compulsion
if it is unwilling to follow. So it is too with men" (SVF
2.975). Epictetus quotes Chrysippus: "As long as the conse-
quences are unknown to me, I always hold fast to what is better-
adapted to secure preferred value, for God himself created me
with a faculty of choosing them. Yet if I really knew that it
was ordained for me now to be ill, I should wish to be ill; for
the foot too, if it had a mind, would wish to get muddy" (SVF
3.191). Cf. Epictetus, Dissertationes 2.10; 3.5.8 ff.; 4.1.
89 ff.; 4.7.19 ff.; Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes 5.8; 4.34;
6.39; 3.16; 7.57; 12.1; 4.23; "All that is in tune with thee,
O Universe, is in tune with me! Nothing that is in due time
for thee is too early or too late for me!" Seneca, De Providentia
5.4 ff.: "Good men labor, spend, and are spent, and withall
willingly. Fortune does not drag them--they follow her, and
match her pace. If they had known how, they would have out-
stripped her. Here is another spirited utterance which, I
remember, I heard that most valiant man, Demetrius, make:
'Immortal gods, 1 he said, 'I have this one complaint to make
against you, that you did not earlier make known your will to
me; for I should have reached the sooner that condition in which
after being summoned, I now am. Do you wish to take my chil-
d r e n ? - - ^ was for you that I fathered them. Do you wish to take
some member of my body?—take it; no great thing am I offering
you; very soon I shall leave the whole. . . . What, then, is
my trouble? I should have preferred to offer than to relin-
quish. What was the need to take it by force? You might have
had it as a gift. Yet even now you will not take it by force,
because nothing can be wrenched away from a man unless he with-
holds it. '"
SVF 2.943: Animorum vero nostrorum motus nihil aliud

esse3 quam ministeria decretorum fatalium, siquidem neoesse sit
agi per nos agente fato. Cf. Her. 120; Cher, 64, 71: "But, if
you reform and obtain a portion of the wisdom that you need,
you will say that all are God's possessions and not yours, your
reflections, your knowledge of every kind, your arts, your con-
clusions, perceptions, in fact the activities of your soul,
whether carried on through the senses or without them." Cf. LA
2.46; 1.4 8 ff. ("when God sows and plants noble qualities in the
soul, the mind that says 'I plant' is guilty of impiety"); Cher,
40-52; LA 2.32; Mos. 2.147 (sin is congenital to every created
being); Conf. 125.
See M. Harl, "Adam et les deux arbres de Paradis,"

Rech SR 50 (1962) 377. Cf. Her. 201; Conf. 125; LA 3.198; Somn.
2.29 3. auTeEooaios, referring to man's freedom, does occur,
however, in a fragment printed in C. E. Richter's edition of
Philo (Leipzig, 1829) 6.219.
26
S e e , for example, Post. 73; Bet. 178; Somn. 2.195;
Abr. 115; Ebr. 140; Mut. 144; Speo. 1.281, 2.17, 3.11; Virt. 4;
Deus 89; Spec. 4.82; Decal. 142; Virt. 13; Billings, Platonism
(cited n. 22) 93-95; Volker, Fortschritt (cited n. 16) 47-95,
115-22.
27
For the Stoic doctrine of ciTOvia see SVF 3.473, 2.531;
J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 87-95. Conf. 166:
"For when the bonds of the soul which held it fast are loosened,
there follows the greatest of disasters, even to be abandoned by
God who has encircled all things with the adamantine chains of
His potencies and willed that thus bound tight and fast they
should never be unloosed." See Volker, Fortschritt, 93; cf.
Sacr. 81; Ebr. 95, 122 (here he implies that when the T 6 V O Q of
the soul is loosened, man can no longer act voluntarily).
28
See, for example, Bet. 90: "How, then, was it likely
that the mind of man being so small (cf. Aristotle, EN 10.7.7),
contained in such small bulks as a brain or a heart, should have
room for all the vastness of sky and universe, had it not been
an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed soul? For no
part of that which is divine cuts itself off and becomes sepa-
rate, but does but extend itself. The mind, then, having
obtained a share of the perfection which is in the whole, when
it conceives of the universe, reaches out as widely as the bounds
of the whole, and undergoes no severance; for its force is
expansive (6XH6Q)." Cf. Gig. 27; LA 1.37; Corpus Hermetioum

12.1; Manilius 2.117 ff.; Plotinus 5.2; 1.7.1.25: "for the
light is everywhere with it [the sun] and is not cut off from
it": O U K dTtOT^xuriTai; 5.3.12.
D. Winston

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Brown Judaic Studies

Chapter Title: Philo's Doctrine of Free Will

Book Title: Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-

AND QUOD DEUS

The much disputed question of free will owes much of its

*This section reproduces D. Winston, "Freedom and

Man before the "fall" thus represents for Philo an ideal

For it is the mind alone which the Father who begat it

The first thing to be observed is Philo's emphatic

Let us suppose [says the Athenian] that each of us living

It should be abundantly clear, then, that all Plato is

But what says Zeus? "Epictetus, had it been possible I

the latter would signify nothing and it would be meaningless

a paradigm for much that was characteristic of medieval reli-

It is a happy thing for the soul to have the power to choose

Having committed himself to ascribing an absolute free will

of good was caused by God, but not choice of evil. In the

Wolfson thus concludes:

The cumulative impression of all these statements then is

Now Wolfson's first argument is easily countered when

Philo 1 s language is occasionally almost identical with that of

its diseased state becomes incurable clearly implies a deter-

For a brief account of the history of this question in

Cf. Plotinus 3.2.9.30: "In this way man is a noble

Cf. Plotinus, 3.2.7; Corpus Hermetioum (ed. Nock,

we are unable to state any clear preference" (Loeb ed., 1.343;

Cf. H. Cherniss, "The Sources of Evil According to

Plato,, however, makes a sharpp distinction between

Politicus 309A). Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational

Cf. Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.17.27; 2.8.11 (Loeb

Briefly stated, the contradiction consists in asserting

See D. Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cos-

Epicurus had already cautioned against the use of

Wolfson {Philo 1.432) writes: "This power with which

See D. Winston, "Philo's Theory of Cosmogony," in

Cf. R. Mordechai Joseph Leiner of Izbica (d. 1854; a

Those commentators who find an inconsistency in Plato's

SVF 2.943: Animorum vero nostrorum motus nihil aliud

See M. Harl, "Adam et les deux arbres de Paradis,"

expansive (6XH6Q)." Cf. Gig. 27; LA 1.37; Corpus Hermetioum

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