1.

In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Luis C. Biraogo vs. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.
179120, 11 August 2009.

EN BANC:

Facts:

Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes was disbarred for leaking a

confidential internal document or in particular, the unpromulgated
ponencia of the Court. Consequently, in the present case, he seeks to set
aside and annul such decision on February 24, 2009 and alleged that the
rule on automatic conversion of administrative cases into disciplinary
proceedings for suspension or disbarment under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,
effective October 1, 2002, does not apply to Justices of Honorable Court.
He points out that the same pertains only to Justices of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; and to Judges of
the Regional Trial Courts and the other inferior courts.

The Court ruled that such interpretation by Justice Reyes is

erroneous because the source of authority of Code of Professional
Responsibility and its implementation lies with the Court, and included
therein is its primordial duty to regulate the practice of law. Although
Justice Reyes has already retired from the Court, he is still a member of
the Bar and, therefore, can be subjected to the disciplinary sanctions of
the Court. Evidently, the Investigating Committee recommended that
Justice Reyes be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for gross
misconduct.

Issue:

Whether or not Justice Reyes is guilty of gross misconduct when he

leaked the unpromulgated ponencia, which is violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath, and New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Ruling:

Yes, Justice Reyes is guilty of gross misconduct when he leaked the

unpromulgated ponencia, which is violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath, and New Code of Judicial Conduct,
hence should be suspended from the practice of law.

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise
provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Furthermore, The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that Court

personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential
informal ion acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether
such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of
public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet
made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to
pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and
similar papers. Thus, any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall
constitute indirect contempt of court.

Here, Justice Reyes act constitutes unlawful, dishonest, immoral

and deceitful conduct when he intentionally leaked the unpromulgated
ponencia which clearly violated the The Code of Judicial Conduct as to
prohibited disclosure of confidential information, and in effect infringed the
internal deliberations of the Court, impeded and degraded the
administration of justice.

Hence, Justice Reyes is guilty of gross misconduct when he leaked

the unpromulgated ponencia, which is violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath, and New Code of Judicial
Conduct, hence should be suspended from the practice of law.
 2.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010

DELOS REYES v. JUDGE DANILO S. CRUZ

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:

The instant administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by

complainant Delos Reyes against respondents Judge Cruz and Clerk of Court
Gundran, both of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, for
dereliction of duty. Specifically, Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the
disposition of LRC Case No. R-57401 while Clerk of Court Gundran is charged
with failure to timely transmit the records of said case.

The complainant claimed that on March 25, 2004, Judge Cruz issued an
Order giving the parties 15 days within which to file their respective
memorandum after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
parties complied; hence, on April 9, 2004 the case was deemed submitted for
decision. However, it was only on July 30, 2007, or more than three years since
the case was submitted for resolution, that a decision in the said case was
rendered. Consequently, complainant argued that Judge Cruz incurred delay in
disposing the case thus should be held administratively liable therefor.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Cruz was grossly inefficient for failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law

Ruling:

Yes, Judge Cruz was grossly inefficient for failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution succinctly provides that: All
cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

The reasons proffered by Judge Cruz for incurring delay in deciding the case
within the prescribed period fail to persuade us. He claims that his illness
primarily caused the delay in the disposition. However, it has not escaped our
attention that the case was submitted for decision as early as April 2004 while
Judge Cruz claimed to be indisposed only towards the end of 2004. There was
also no showing that respondent judge was constantly ill from the time the case
was submitted for resolution in April 2004 until the promulgation of the judgment
in July 2007. Besides, granting that his illness hindered the efficient
performance of his functions, all respondent judge had to do was to request for
an extension of time within which to decide the case. Judge Cruz, however,
made no such request.
 3.
A.M. No. P-11-3011, November 29, 2011
BANAAG v. ESPELETA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:

Olivia C. Espeleta was charged before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) with Gross Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with petitioner
Evelina’s husband, Avelino C. Banaag.

Olivia introduced herself as a court interpreter in the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82. Believing that Olivia could assist her and her
husband in their pending cases before the court, Evelina introduced Olivia to her
husband who, after learning that they both hail from Batangas, asked for Olivia's
cellphone number. Little did Evelina know that said casual meeting would
eventually blossom into an amorous relationship between Olivia and her
husband.

Evelina confronted her husband right away. He was tight-lipped at first, but
he eventually admitted his romantic involvement with Olivia. Worse, Evelina
discovered that her husband, using their conjugal funds, had been depositing
substantial amounts of money to Olivia's Landbank account5 for three years.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Olivia C. Espeleta was guilty of immoral conduct.

Ruling:

Yes, Olivia C. Espeleta was guilty of immoral conduct.

Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct is defined as an act which violates the

basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the
society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the
community.

It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in

the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts
of justice." This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had
been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately resigned
from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as
an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative
sanction.

Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man

comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified
as a grave offense. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of
the official and personnel who work thereat. Court employees have been
enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently penalized court
personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they have
precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used
either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or
an administrative sanction. 
 4.
420 Phil 584 (2001)
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN v. JAVELLANA

VITUG, J.

Facts:

Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting

presiding judge of the RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave
misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of
the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-
Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before
the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in
the rendition of judgment in the criminal case, the decision that had acquitted
the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the tenth month after
the case was submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also cited for
impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic
Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would
even use at times.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics

Ruling:

Yes, Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

A judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial

duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond
reproach. This is expressly provided in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
One who occupies an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official
conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. It is
obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order
that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them
should have confidence in their impartiality.

The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent

judge in his close association with a counsel for a litigant. The Court shares the
view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be extra
prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to
avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of
course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social
intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time
and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile
endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the
noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. The respondent was
admonished to constantly be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with
lawyers who have pending cases before him.
 5.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013
TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE WACAS

VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts:

Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with

Impropriety and Partiality. Tiggangay alleged that, during the course of the
proceedings in Election Case No. 40, he learned that Judge Wacas is
Dagadag's second cousin by affinity, the former's aunt is married to an uncle of
Dagadag. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge Wacas did not inhibit himself
from hearing said electoral case in violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, after ruling in
favor of Dagadag, so Tiggangay alleged, Judge Wacas and his wife attended the
victory party of Dagadag held on August 23, 2008 at Dagadag's ranch in Spring,
Tabuk City.

Judge Wacas denied being related by affinity to Dagadag, adding that

Tiggangay made the allegation on s of "some reliable sources," not from his
personal knowledge. Moreover, Judge Wacas the basimaintained, Tiggangay
never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings in Election Case
No. 40 if, indeed, Tiggangay doubted his fairness, integrity and independence.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Wacas was disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear
the election case

Ruling:

No, Judge Wacas was not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the
election case

Under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, no judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law.

Here, the supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag,

unsubstantiated as it were by the required substantial relevant evidence,
remains a mere allegation of Tiggangay. Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the
aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge
Wacas' aunt. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas
and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other.

It cannot be overemphasized that Tiggangay, for all his protestations against

Judge Wacas' impartiality arising out of the perceived relationship by affinity
between Dagadag and Judge Wacas, never moved for the inhibition of Judge
Wacas from hearing Election Case No. 40. It is viewed as a belated attempt by
Tiggangay to get back at Judge Wacas for the latter's adverse ruling in
Tiggangay's electoral protest. There is nothing in the records to support a case
of impropriety, much less manifest bias and partiality against Tiggangay.
 6.
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010
ASST. SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICE ONG,
et al.

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:

The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint charging Justice Ong, Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan with grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service, among others.

During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a
collegial body. Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying
with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s instructions, the complainant objected to
the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside.

The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body,

respondent Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606,
but also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it
appear that they had all been present during the hearing when in truth and in
fact they were not.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Justices committed grave misconduct, conduct

unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the
service

Ruling:

Yes, respondent Justices committed grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming

a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service.

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly enjoins that:
“Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges
shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.”
 Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their
engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law
schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and
manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates.
Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking
their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the
judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial
functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each
other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to
ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they
behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their
court.
 7.
AM NO. RTJ-09-2189, February 1, 2011
SY v. OSCAR DINOPOL

REYES, J.

Facts:

Victoriano Sy filed a case against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the RTC in

South Cotabato for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for
Gross Ignorance of the Law. This is in regards to the Civil Case No. 1403-24
involving Mr. Sy wherein Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting
on the caseon the ground that he received a call, from a ranking officer of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank
and an earlier call from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf
of the plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality
either way he acted on the case. However, Sy found out that, Judge Dinopol
still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a matter closely intertwined with Civil
Case No. 1403-24.

Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24
was pending in Judge Dinopol’s sala, the judge asked him for commodity
loans in the form of construction materials to be used in the construction of
the judge’s house. Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans,
Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from him on various occasions including
the judge borrowing his multicab.

Judge Dinopol admitted the commodity loans of the construction materials

for his house however argued that it was before the case was on his sala.
Further, he denies the cash loans and the borrowing of the multicab.

Issue:

WON Judge Oscar E. Dinopol is guilty for Conduct Unbecoming a Member

of the Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Ruling:

Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of the law and of

procedure in his handling of Civil Case because he acted in accordance with
the rules and jurisprudence on the matter.

Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and

its appearance in his public office:

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.
 In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence showing that Judge
Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from Sy. By his own admissions, he
failed to observe ethical standard laid down by Section 1, Canon 4 that
mandate judges to observe impropriety in all of their activities, whether
personal or in professional dealings.

Wherefore, Judge Dinopol is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT

and is hereby DISMISSED from the service.
 8.
AM No. MTJ-11-1792, September 26, 2011
ERNEST ORBE v. JUDGE MANOLITO GUMARANG

PERALTA, J.

Facts:

It is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Ernesto Z.

Orbe (Orbe) against Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang (respondent), Pairing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Imus, Cavite for violation of the Rule
of Procedure for Small Claims Cases and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims case docketed as Civil Case

No. ICSCC 09-65 entitled E.Z. Orbe Tax Accounting Services, thru,
Ernesto Z. Orbe v. L.G.M. Silver Star Credit Corporation, represented by
Librado Montano, filed before the MTC of Imus, Cavite, presided by Judge
Emily A. Geluz.

During the hearing of the case on February 9, 2010, the parties

failed to reach an amicable settlement. On the same day, the case was
assigned to respondent Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Assisting Judge of
the MTC of Imus, Cavite, for the continuation of the trial.

Complainant alleged that the case was scheduled for hearing on

March 4, 2010, but was postponed by respondent to March 11, 2010
because of power interruption. On March 11, 2010, again the hearing was
reset by respondent Judge Gumarang to March 25, 2010 as he was due
for medical check-up. On March 25, 2010, respondent conducted another
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), and again reset the hearing to April 15,
2010 when the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement.

Complainant argued that Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of

Procedure for Small Claims Cases for failure to decide the civil case
within five (5) days from receipt of the order of reassignment.

Issue:

WON Judge Gumarang has gravely violated the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claim Cases for failure to decide the case within the prescribed
period.

Ruling:
 Yes, Judge Gumarang has gravely violated the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claim Cases for failure to decide the case within the prescribed period.
The purpose of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claim Cases is to
enhance the access to justice, especially by those who cannot afford the hight
costs of litigation particularly in cases of relatively small value and to improve
perception of justice.

Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the
creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation
of the Rule is rather misplaced. It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what
the Court sought to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases.

Therefore, Judge Gumarang has gravely violated the Rule of Procedure

for Small Claim cases and should be penalized under appropriate section of the
Rules of Court.
 9.
AM No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017
ATTY. EDDIE TAMONDONG v. JUDGE EMMANUEL PASAL

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law,

gross incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of duty filed by Atty.
Eddie U. Tamondong against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38.

This case is with regard to a Special Civil Action. Petitioner is a

counsel for parties in a case involving Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession. When their case was dismissed in the MTC for lack of
jurisdiction, they filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
before the RTC, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184.

The case was raffled to Branch 38, presided by Judge Pasal. On

December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution dismissing the
Petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether Judge Pasal is committed ignorance of the law and/or

gross incompetence.

Ruling:

No, there is no merit in Atty. Tamondong's charge of gross

ignorance of the law and/or gross incompetence against Judge Pasal.

Atty. Tamondong's sole basis for his charge is Judge Pasal's

Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which Atty.
Tamondong filed on behalf of his client, Henmar. In said Resolution,
Judge Pasal determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in
denying the motion to dismiss of Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04.
Atty. Tamondong though is adamant that the MTCC should have
dismissed the complaint of Abada's heirs against Henmar in Civil Case
No. 2012-06-04 on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person
of Henmar; (b) lack of territorial jurisdiction over the subject property; and
(c) lack of jurisdiction over a prescribed action.
 Judge Pasal issued the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in
Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions, and any errors he might have committed therein cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies.

The issues of jurisdiction being argued by Atty. Tamondong are

judicial matters, which again can only be decided upon through judicial
remedies. A party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the
course of a trial, is with the proper reviewing court and not with the OCA,
through an administrative complaint.

The Court also expounded in Flores v. Abesamis that everyone knows, the
law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a
judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The
extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Moreover, Atty. Tamondong failed to offer proof that in issuing the

Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184,
Judge Pasal was acting in bad faith and unduly favoring Abada's heirs.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient
because bias and partiality can never be presumed. Also, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a
party.

Therefore, Judge Pasal did not committed ignorance of the law

and/or gross incompetence.
 10.
AM No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017
JUDGE MARTONINO MARCOS v. JUDGE PERLA CABRERA-FALLER

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint against the

respondent filed by the complainant, for ignorance of the law, misconduct,
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment/order.

The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's

grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos (Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of
Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex Leonum) held on July 29, 2012 at the Veluz
Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the

Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued its Resolution, dated May 8,
2013, recommending the prosecution of several members of Lex Leonum
for Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, otherwise known as The
Anti-Hazing Law. In the same resolution, the OCP also recommended that
Cornelio Marcelo (Marcelo), the person assigned to be the buddy or
"angel" of Marc Andrei during the initiation rites, be discharged as a state
witness pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981.

Thereafter, the Information for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed
against Jenno Antonio Villanueva (Villanueva), Emmanuel Jefferson
Santiago, Richard Rosales (Rosales), Mohamad Fyzee Alim (Alim), Chino
Daniel Amante (Amante), Julius Arsenio Alcancia, Edrich Gomez, Dexter
Circa, Gian Angelo Veluz, Glenn Meduen, alias Tanton, alias Fidel, alias
E.R., and alias Paulo, before the RTC. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11862-13.

Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused,

Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Order,5 dated June 3, 2013, directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the
entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused.

On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales,

Alim and Amante, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another Order directing the
recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused which she claimed
were issued inadvertently.

On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the

determination of probable cause and to withhold issuance of warrants of
arrest7 and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest8 filed by
the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order,9 quashing,
lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and ultimately
dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.

According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to

indict the accused for violation of R.A. No. 8049 as the statement of
Marcelo and those of the other accused "were not put in juxtaposition with
each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their respective weight and
substance." To her, "there were nagging questions left unanswered by the
testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that boggle the
mind and disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and
credence." In her view, "the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the
stages of initiation rites" and failed to show that the accused conspired to
inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei.

She found the statements of the prosecution witnesses, Marcelo

Cabansag (Cabansag) and Jan Marcel V. Ragaza (Ragaza) either
untruthful, immaterial and incompetent or brimming with flip flopping
testimonies. She brushed aside the admission of the accused that
initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were
allegedly present in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply
believed the version of the accused that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and
"angel'' of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on him, causing his
death.

Issue:

Whether or not the recall of the warrants of arrest that were

allegedly issued inadvertently and hasty dismissal of the case constitute
gross ignorance of the law and incompetence

Ruling:

Yes. The actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly

demonstrate her incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and
jurisprudence.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest."

When she issued the Order dated June 3, 2013, she certified that
she personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence and ruled that there was probable cause so she
directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused. A
judge who issues a warrant of arrest INADVERTENTLY has no place in
the judiciary because such actuation clearly shows her incompetence and
gross ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws.

Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not

gross ignorance of the law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order
recalling the warrants of arrest against accused Alim, Amante and
Rosales claiming that they were issued inadvertently.

It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional
mandate to personally determine the existence of probable cause before
ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. As the presiding judge, it
was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused. It was incumbent upon her to assess the resolution,
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to
satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a warrant of arrest
could be issued against the accused. If she did find the evidence
submitted by the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could order the
dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to
submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary
investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the witness to
answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty.

Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon.

Her utter disregard of the laws and rules of procedure, to wit: the
immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall of the
warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued inadvertently and the
hasty dismissal of the case displayed her lack of competence and probity,
and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority. All these
constitute gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.