1. REPUBLIC VS. MERCADERA, G.R. NO. 186027( Dec.

08/10)

Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn
M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth -
from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048)
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction
unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office
as mandated by Republic Act 9048.

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth
under Rule 108 before the RTC of Dipolog City.
The OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material
correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a
substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. 

Whether or not the petition correctly falls under Rule 108

Yes. The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a
misspelled given name. 

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. 24 Entries in the civil register refer
to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," 25 also as enumerated in
Article 408 of the same law.26 Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in
the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned
case of Chua Wee v. Republic,27 this Court declared that,

x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of

errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial
and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil
Code."

In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate
concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues
and all types of procedures because "the provision does not say that it applies only to non-
controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge
De la Cruz,29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view:

It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the
correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify
substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the
substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous
clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the
aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the
correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x it would be reasonable and justified to
rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural
safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.

In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a
correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which
entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that
requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and
application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by
the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often
muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the
opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a
person’s registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful
evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to
determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 34 also includes
"changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical
errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status,
and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."

2. LEE VS. C.A., G.R. NO. 118387( Oct. 11, 2011)

Private respondents filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/orcorrection of
entries in the records of birth of petitioners. Both petitions sought to canceland/or correct the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitionersby deleting and/or canceling therein the
name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and bysubstituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is
allegedly the petitioners true birthmother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate
children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in
1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born
and raised in the Philippines.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners
by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners.
They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was
well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their
father, Lee Tek Sheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names
of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's
death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private
respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to conduct an investigation into the matter. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients
Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG,
but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by
these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly
to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children,
consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that
this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting
that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-
1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail
the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn
legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed

Can Rule 108 be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such asthose involving the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child?

Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude
recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in
entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be
an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register]
is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction
of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party
are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of
the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the
statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to
take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a
summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all
persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).
The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec.
5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all
the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a

seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil
register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The
more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a
reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical
or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase
substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child.

The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the
extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated
therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may
affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of
the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error
or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or
citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our substantive and
remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated
upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which
cannot cover cases involving controversial issues."

From summary:
Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register. In Republic vs. Valencia, the Court, sitting en banc, held therein that
even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. A proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register
under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an
appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with. Thus, Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to -
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to
oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought

3. GRANDE VS. ANTONIO, G.R. NO. 206248( Feb 18/14)

Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio lived together as husband and wife for a certain period of
time (notwithstanding Patricio’s previous marriage). Out of this relationship, two (illegitimate)
sons were born. Their relationship eventually turned sour and Grande left for the United States of
America, and brought the kids with her.

Antonio filed a petition for parental authority, custody, and correction/change of surname for
their minor sons before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alongside a pending
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity for the children.

The RTC granted Antonio’s petition and ordered the full custody and change of surnames (from
Grande to Antonio) for his minor sons. Grande appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
modified the decision and granted only visitorial rights for Antonio instead of full custody for the
children.
Unsatisfied with the modified decision, Grande appeals to the Supreme Court and particularly
assailed the change of surname for their 2 minor children. She contends that Article 176 of the
Family Code (as amended under Republic Act 9255) does not grant a father the right to compel
the use of his surname by his illegitimate children. 

Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father
or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law
the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again,
rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic,  for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the
18

surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is
entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,  this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
19

concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or
mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring
that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,  We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate
20

minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity,
his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child.
For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be
affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that
the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under
Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by
his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate
his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in
the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

4. REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS, G.R. NO. L-31065( Feb 15/90)

On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that
she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had
resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian
alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias
Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused
her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang

respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00
o'clock in the morning and inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the
petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and
Mountain Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as
soon as possible. The order also commanded that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of
Baguio be furnished copies of the order and petition.

On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion
of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the
evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha Quen.

Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 authorizing
the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to
Mary Pang De la Cruz.

The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that
the court's order is contrary to law.

The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha
Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of her daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:

(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;

(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap
Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29,
1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);

(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his
alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or

(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and
not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).

As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the
name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and
recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father" (p. 23, Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of
security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified
his conformity at the foot of this pleading" (p. 24, Rollo).

Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name
should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none
actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284,
April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA
789, we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not
their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name,
even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the
petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.

Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached
the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the
reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It
must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she
grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases
chosen for her by her mother.

5. REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE, G.R. NO.L- 157043( Feb.02/07)

Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N.
Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998

Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on
Giovanni’s birth certificate. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise
ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order. 7

Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her
evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial
Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.

After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8

From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a
lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.

Issue: CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name
despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties.1

We deny the petition.

"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish him
from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore, no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.14 This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking
such change because a person’s name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions.
The State must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.

The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the
appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, 15 a separate and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on
mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or
clerical errors thereon).16

When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read:

Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)

Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from birth. The records
do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative father to actually recognize him.
Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis
ours)

Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of
Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang20 is enlightening:

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames
of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless
their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of
the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged child. 21
1awphi1.net

6. RE: FOR CHANGE OF NAME / CORRECTION OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG, G.R.NO.L-
159966( March 30/05)

A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang before the RTC of Cebu City.

Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet married to
each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got married, the
latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Reason: Since the family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names
or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipated
that Julian will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which
carries a middle name. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might get confused if they
are really brothers and sisters because they have different surnames. Lastly, Carulasan
sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if
there is, they pronounce it as “L”. It is for these reasons why the name of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname?

DENIED PETITION

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and
reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.16

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the
sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. 17

IN THE CASE AT BAR

1. The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That
the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name.
2. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on
which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the
age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

7. ONDE VS. LCR OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R.NO.197174( Sept. 10/14)

Petitioner filed a petition  for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
2

named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan,
but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. 

 RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and
substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in
nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction
in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9048

RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were
not married on December 23, 1983.

 whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can
be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048;

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We
note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point.  Indeed, under Section 1  of
4 5

R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and
changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to
Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Silverio v. Republic,  we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of
6

first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In
Republic v. Cagandahan,  we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
7

typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of
clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother’s first name.

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical
or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between
petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of
such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valenciaprovided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must
implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the
dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the correction. 

In Eleosida,  we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
11

procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary.
In Republic v. Uy,  we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
12

entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least
implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.

8. LASAM VS. RAMOLETE, G.R.NO.159132( Dec. 18/08)

9. REPUBLIC VS. COSETENG MAGPAYO, G.R.NO. 189476( Feb 02/11)

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr.
and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent's certificate of live birth...
laiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. . He alleged that his parents were never married but
his certificate of live birth shows that his parents contracted marriage. To support his petition,
respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his mother "does not appear in
[its] National Indices of Marriage”, academic records from elementary up to college showing that
he carried the surname "Coseteng" and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng"
appears as his surname. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and ordered the Civil Registrar
to delete respondent’s certificate of live birth the date of marriage of his parents, his father’s
name and to change his name to surname Coseteng.
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding.
WON Rule 103 is the applicable remedy where a change in name involves change in civil status
of a person.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous
to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the
Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since
childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought
to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of
confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation
to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not
suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

10. REPUBLIC VS. LUGSANAY UY, G.R.NO. 198010( August 12/13

Is the petition dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties? YES

Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

  It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect
the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as
passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full
blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead
of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s
filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to
"Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate
to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights
and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.

It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 2.

In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v.
Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties
was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the
petition for correction of entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an
indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it
opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the
entries in her children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27
Other notes:

SPECIAL OCEEDINGS TRANS

DOWNLOADED 2 FILED FOR 2 NEW LAW 9255 AND 10172

Comparative:
REPUBLIC vs. VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-32181
March 5, 1986
FACTS:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the
Court of FirstInstance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth of BernardoGo and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of
Cebu. The case was docketed as SpecialProceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition
for correctionof entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines inrelation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
contemplates a summary proceeding andcorrection of mere clerical errors, those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correctionof a name that is merely
mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or correctionsinvolving
civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an
orderdirecting the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the
Cebu Advocate, anewspaper of general circulation in the city and province of
Cebu, once a week for three (3)consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served
on the Solicitor General, the Local CivilRegistrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she
admitted that thepresent petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil
status and nationality or citizenshipof respondents, but alleged that substantial
changes in the civil registry records involving thecivil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit isfiled, and (2)
evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to
disprovethe same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by
filing the present specialproceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 ofhe Revised Rules of Court and that they have
caused reasonable notice to be given to thepersons named in the petition and have
also caused the order for the hearings of their petition tobe published for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground thatsince the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Gofrom "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from
"Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changingalso the status of the mother from
"married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merelyclerical but substantial,
involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minorsand the
status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper suit or appropriate action was filed by the respondent?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by
the respondent
in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in
the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded
proceedings that
actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate
action.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction
of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot
be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court
adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General
dated February
20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to
Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Goand Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent LeonorValencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the
trial court dated February 4, 1970,the said petition was published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in the, CebuAdvocate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly servedon the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the casefor
hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any
person claimingany interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to
file their opposition to the saidpetition. An opposition to the petition was
consequently filed by the Republic on February 26,1970. Thereafter a full blown
trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying andpresenting her
documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other
handcross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ATTY. TY KONG TIN TO

CORRECT THE MISTAKE AS APPEARING IN THE CIVIL REGISTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA. TY KONG TIN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,
VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition filed by Ty Kong Tin to correct certain mistakes which had
allegedly been committed in the civil register of the Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila concerning his citizenship.
On May 9, 1951, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition alleging that he is a Filipino citizen duly licensed to practice law in
the Philippines; that all his children were born in the City of Manila whose
births were duly reported to the civil registrar by the midwife or doctor who
had attended their births but in submitting the report it was made to
appear therein that the citizenship of petitioner was "Chinese" instead of
"Filipino" ; that the aforesaid mistakes were committed by the midwife or
doctor without the knowledge or consent of petitioner who became aware
thereof only when he asked for a certified copy of the birth certificates of his
children; and, therefore, he prays that an order be issued directing the civil
registrar to correct the pertinent portion of the civil register by making it
appear therein that petitioner as well as his children are Filipino citizens
and not Chinese citizens, as authorized by article 412 of the new Civil Code.
The Civil Registrar of Manila, in his answer, states that he has no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained in the petition but he has no objection to making the
required correction provided he is so ordered by the court.
The court set the petition for hearing not after ordering petitioner to serve a
copy thereof on the Solicitor General for whatever action he may deem
proper to take in the premises. After the hearing was held, the Solicitor
General submitted a written opposition wherein he asks that the petition be
denied on the ground that petitioner has failed to present satisfactory and
convincing evidence in support of his claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
Issues having been joined, the court rendered decision overruling the
opposition of the Solicitor General and holding that the evidence presented
by petitioner sufficiently establishes the claim that he and. his children are
Filipino citizens, and, consequently, it ordered the Civil Registrar of Manila
to make the necessary correction in his register as prayed for in the
petition. From this decision the Solicitor General has appealed.
When the case came up for discussion before the members of this Court,
the issue that became the center of controversy revolved around the
interpretation of the provisions of article 412 of the new Civil Code under
which the petition under consideration was filed. This article provides that
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial
order." The bone of contention was the extent or scope of the matters that
may be changed or corrected as contemplated in said legal provision. After
a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated
therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not
those which may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of
the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a
clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or
mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects
the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action
can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the
implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion
is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article
412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial
issues.
It is our opinion that the petition under consideration does not merely call
for a correction of a clerical error. It involves a matter which concerns the
citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children. It is therefore an
important controversial matter which can and should only be threshed out
in an appropriate action. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in
the fact that "the books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts thereon contained" (Article 410, new Civil Code),
and if the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through
a mere summary proceeding, and not through an appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, we would set wide open the door to fraud or other mischief the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. It is for these
reasons that the law has placed the necessary safeguards to forestall such
eventuality that even on matters which call for a correction of clerical
mistakes the intervention of the courts was found necessary. This is an
innovation not originally found in the law which placed this matter
exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil registrars.
This was found by Congress unwise and risky in view of the far reaching
importance of the subjects covered by the civil register. And under the
present innovation the law even exacts civil liability from the civil registrar
for any unauthorized alteration, which shows the concern of Congress in
maintaining the integrity and genuineness of the entries contained in our
civil registers (Article 411, new Civil Code).
CASE DIGEST: ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174689, October 22,
2007
FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of

his first name  to “Mely” and sex (gender) in his birth certificate be
changed to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery.
The OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the live birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment
surgery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change

of name and sex appearing in the live birth certificate to reflect
the result of a sex reassignment surgery.

RULING:

No. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the
civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. Presently, there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries,

including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary. A law has to be enacted by
the legislative body laying down the guidelines governing the
change of entries in birth certificate due to sex reassignment in
order to enter the same in civil registry.

No. The petition lacks merit. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.

Jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily

lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 now
governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, form, and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.

It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.

Words employed in a statute are presumed to have been used in that

sense unless the context says otherwise. When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female”
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between
male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and
male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.”
Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
“sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category “female.”

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging

legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found
that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions,
is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities
under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or
amend it. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or 
insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. Statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. In our system of government, it is for
the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-based. It might be theoretically possible for this
Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where
no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.

Republic vs Cagandahan

The plaintiff was registered at birth as female, but developed secondary male characteristics over time. He
was diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia and displayed both male and female characteristics. At
age six the plaintiff was diagnosed with clitoral hypertrophy and small ovaries; at age thirteen the ovaries
had minimised, he had no breasts and no menstrual cycle. He stated that in his mind, appearance,
emotions and interests he was a male person, and therefore asked that his birth certificate sex be changed
to male, and that his name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. A medical expert testified that the plaintiff
was genetically female but that, because the plaintiff’s body secreted male hormones, his female organs
had not developed normally. He further testified that the plaintiff’s condition was permanent and
recommended the change of gender because the plaintiff had adjusted to his chosen role as male and the
gender change would be advantageous to him.

Whether the court should recognise a new name and gender identity to reflect the chosen gender
of an intersex person who was raised as the opposite gender.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. x x x
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name