Behavior Therapy Springer

William O’Donohue
Akihiko Masuda Editors
Behavior
Therapy
First, Second, and Third Waves
Behavior Therapy
William O'Donohue • Akihiko Masuda
Editors
Behavior Therapy
First, Second, and Third Waves
Editors
William O'Donohue Akihiko Masuda
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of Nevada Reno University of Hawaii at Manoa
Reno, NV, USA Honolulu, HI, USA
ISBN 978-3-031-11676-6 ISBN 978-3-031-11677-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

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Preface
Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), encompassing behavior therapy, behavior modi-

fication, applied behavior analysis, cognitive therapy (CT), and acceptance- and
mindfulness-based CBTs, has been the dominant psychotherapeutic paradigm in the
Western world, enjoying this status for a few decades. Managed care and third-party
payers have favored its emphasis on scientific validation, short-term efficient treat-
ment, and relatively easy-to-learn techniques (often in treatment manuals). In prac-
tice, CBT also attained a wide range of applicability: from childhood problems,
such as functional enuresis and oppositional defiant disorder, to problems of adults,
such as depression, anxiety, chronic pain, and so on. For this reason, it is important
to understand CBT paradigm, particularly for those entering the field. More specifi-
cally, one needs to understand waves of CBT as well as their relative strengths and
weaknesses to understand CBT and to make intelligent therapeutic choices and
research questions. While taking the agnotology of CBT into consideration, the
present volume will help readers do this by gathering experts in the field of CBT
who wrote key chapters on the key component issues in CBT.
Reno, NV, USA William O’Donohue

Honolulu, HI, USA Akihiko Masuda
v
Contents
Part I Introduction
The Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Scientific
Aspirations and Scientific Status�� 3
William O’Donohue and Akihiko Masuda
Personal Perspectives on the Development of Behavior
Therapy and Cognitive Behavior Therapy�� 17
Gerald C. Davison
Meta-science and the Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior
Therapy: Three Distinct Sets of Commitments�� 53
William O’Donohue and Fredrick T. Chin

What Is First-Wave Behavior Therapy?�� 83
Edward K. Morris

What Is Second Wave Behavior Therapy?�� 109
Daniel R. Strunk, Megan L. Whelen, and Brooklynn Bailey

What Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy?�� 127
Lance M. McCracken
Part II Assessment and Case Conceptualization

Second Wave Assessment and Case Formulation�� 153
Gary P. Brown
Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Assessment and Case
Conceptualization�� 173
Skye Fitzpatrick and Shireen L. Rizvi
Radically Open Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Theory,
Assessment and Case Conceptualization �� 195
Kirsten Gilbert and R. Trent Codd III
vii
viii Contents
Part III Comparative Issues and Controversies

The Advantages of First Wave Behavior Therapy
and Problems with the Others�� 219
Peter Sturmey
Cognitive Therapy and the Three Waves: Advantages,
Disadvantages and Rapprochement �� 243
Robert L. Leahy

Advantages of Third Wave Behavior Therapies�� 265
Akihiko Masuda and Samuel D. Spencer
Part IV Treatments for Specific Disorders

First Wave Conceptualizations of Anxiety Disorders �� 293
Cynthia L. Lancaster and Mary O. Smirnova
Third Wave Conceptualization of Anxiety, Obsessive
Compulsive Disorders, and Obsessive Compulsive Related Disorders�� 329
Michael P. Twohig, Julie M. Petersen, and Guadalupe G. San Miguel

Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization �� 351
Kyra Katte and Amy E. Naugle

Second Wave Treatment for Depressive Disorders �� 371
Adrienne K. Chong, Ali M. Molaie, and Jane E. Fisher
Depression: Third Wave Case Conceptualization�� 397
Zoey Zuo and Zindel Segal
First Wave Treatment of Obesity�� 415
Olivia H. Gratz and R. Wayne Fuqua
Obesity: Third Wave Case Conceptualization�� 437
Christina Chwyl, Margaret Sala, and Evan M. Forman
First-Wave Behavior Therapies for Schizophrenia
and Related Psychotic Disorders�� 463
Stephen E. Wong
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders:
Second Wave Case Conceptualization�� 487
Dennis R. Combs, David W. Rose III, and Michael R. Basso
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders:
Third Wave Case Conceptualization�� 505
Stacy Ellenberg and Brandon A. Gaudiano
Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders:
First Wave Case Conceptualization�� 525
Hendrik G. Roozen and Jane Ellen Smith
Contents ix

Substance Use Disorders: Second Wave Approaches �� 563
Anthony H. Ecker, Julianna B. Hogan, Darius Dawson, and Michael
A. Cucciare
Third Wave Therapies and Substance Use Disorders:
A Case Example �� 583
Angela L. Stotts, Yolanda R. Villarreal, Mackenzie Spellman, and
Thomas F. Northrup

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: First Wave Case
Conceptualization�� 609
Michele D. Wallace and Justin Han
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Second
Wave Conceptualization and Intervention�� 629
Will H. Canu and Dane C. Hilton
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Third-Wave
Behavior Therapy Conceptualization�� 649
Bridget R. Beachy, David E. Bauman, and Melissa D. Baker

Chronic Pain: Perspective on the Second Wave�� 673
Leah M. Adams and Dennis C. Turk

Chronic Pain: Third Wave Case Conceptualizations�� 697
Kevin E. Vowles
Part V CBT from International Perspectives

The History of Behavior Therapy in Brazil and Its
Relationship with the Three Waves�� 723
Jan Luiz Leonardi and Gabriel Vieira Cândido
History of Cognitive and Behavior Therapies in Japan:
A Behavior Analytic Perspective�� 743
Takashi Muto and Akihiko Masuda
Part VI Summary and Future Directions

The Future of First Wave Behavior Therapies�� 769
Bruce A. Thyer

The Future of Third Wave Cognitive Behavior Therapies�� 781
Robert D. Zettle and Akihiko Masuda
Index�� 805
About the Editors
William O’Donohue, PhD, is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University

of Nevada, Reno. He has published research on evidence-based practice in behav-
ioral health, focusing on cognitive behavior therapy. Dr. O’Donohue has published
more than 80 books and 300 journal articles and book chapters. He has served as
principle investigator on a number of grants that have focused on the transfer of
technology to practice, including a grant investigating transferring integrated care to
a variety of medical settings in Hawaii.
Akihiko Masuda, PhD, is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of

Hawai’i at Mānoa. His primary areas of interest include philosophy of science,
behaviorisms, acceptance- and mindfulness-based behavioral therapies, diversity,
and Zen Buddhism. He is the author of more than 90 peer-reviewed papers and 40
book chapters. He is the editor of the book Mindfulness and Acceptance in
Multicultural Competency (New Harbinger, 2014) and co-editor of the books
Handbook of Zen, Mindfulness, and Behavioral Health (Springer, 2017) and
Prejudice, Stigma, Privilege, and Oppression: A Behavioral Health Handbook
(Springer, 2020).
xi
Part I
Introduction
The Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior
Therapy: Scientific Aspirations
and Scientific Status
William O’Donohue and Akihiko Masuda
In its beginnings cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) was not monolithic, and cur-
rently CBT has remained not monolithic in theoretical orientation, experimental
principles relied on, specific therapy techniques employed, or even assessment
methods used (see O’Donohue et al., 2001). Behavior therapy, a more preferred
term in its beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s, immediately had two major branches;
the operant branch of Skinner and his students and colleagues (e.g., Lindsley, 1956;
Bijou, 1957) as well as a branch lead by the work of South African psychiatrist
Joseph Wolpe (1958). Wolpe emphasized Hullian learning theory and largely
focused on a technique called systematic desensitization (see Kazdin, 1978;
O’Donohue & Chin, chapter “Meta-science and the Three Waves of Cognitive
Behavior Therapy: Three Distinct Sets of Commitments”, this volume; O’Donohue
et al., 2001). When, a few decades later, cognitively oriented researchers and thera-
pists began to think of themselves as cognitive therapists or cognitive behavior
therapists, this added still additional heterogeneity to these Skinnerian and Wolpean
branches of behavior therapy. This cognitive movement also created additional het-
erogeneity as there soon became several schools of cognitive therapy within what
was now often thought of as CBT with two of the leading schools led by the rational
emotive therapy (RET) of Albert Ellis (Ellis & Harper, 1975) or cognitive therapy
(CT) of Aaron Beck (1979; see also Davison, chapter “Personal Perspectives on the
Development of Behavior Therapy and Cognitive Behavior Therapy”, this volume).
This brief historical summary does not fully reflect the full heterogeneity of con-
temporary CBTs as there was further diversity. Some of this heterogeneity was cre-
ated around the development of specific therapy approaches, such as EMDR
(Shapiro, 2017), which also created questions around whether this was an approach
W. O’Donohue (*)
Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA
e-mail: wto@unr.edu
A. Masuda
University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 3

W. O’Donohue, A. Masuda (eds.), Behavior Therapy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_1
4 W. O’Donohue and A. Masuda
with sufficient commonality to be properly subsumed under the general rubric of

CBT (Herbert et al., 2000). Another example of such heterogeneity was the devel-
opment of dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) in the 1980s (Linehan, 1993) that had
some traditional CBT components, such as skills training, but also unique compo-
nents, such as increased support for the therapist and the importance of validation to
address the complexities of a personality disorder. Still another aspect of this diver-
sity has been the incorporation of mindfulness and meditation into several behavior
therapies, including DBT, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al.,
2012), mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2013), and similar
others (see Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017). This movement came not only from the
learning laboratory or the cognitive experimental laboratory, but also from influ-
ences largely external to scientific psychology, such as Buddhism and other forms
of meditation practice.
And yet, still further diversity arose within CBT was created in that cognitive
behavior therapists focusing on a set of disorders often used a set of unique tech-
niques thought best to address these specific problems (O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008).
For example, therapists focusing mainly on children suffering from oppositional
defiant disorder focused on operant techniques to achieve improved parenting skills;
therapists mainly focusing on anxiety relied heavily on exposure techniques; thera-
pists focusing on marital therapy focused on skills training such as communication
and relationship skills; and therapists focusing on depression often were most con-
cerned with cognitive techniques, such as cognitive disputation and behavioral
activation.
History and Revolution of CBT: A Kuhnian Perspective
The historian of science Thomas Kuhn (1970) has asserted that, as a science
advances, it often evolves into what he called “microcommunities”. For example,
Kuhn stated that the perception of the scientific puzzle-solving effectiveness of
some paradigm may not be monolithic but can vary across smaller sub-groups
within a scientific discipline. Kuhn also stated that in the development of science,
“Many episodes will then be revolutionary for no communities, many others for
only a single small group, still others for several communities together, a few for all
of science” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 253). As some support for Kuhn’s assertion, many
within the Skinnerian tradition of behavior therapy did not see the so-called “cogni-
tive revolution” as a legitimate scientific revolution (see O’Donohue et al., 2003)
and were little influenced by developments within this paradigm. Kuhn also asserted
that in what he called “normal science,” it is the scientific community that judges the
problem-solving effectiveness of the proposed solutions elaborated by paradigms,
and cautioned that the unanimity or size of the community of relevant scientists
should not be overestimated. Scientific communities often split into a number of
subgroups, some numbering as few as a hundred members or less, sharing a some-
what unique, but a still reasonable version of the general paradigm (Kuhn, 1970).
The Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Scientific Aspirations and Scientific… 5
It seems that the modern enterprise of CBT can be seen to have such subgroups.
Microcommunities of cognitive behavior therapists can be defined by a number of
variables including the clinical problems of interest (e.g., autism vs. depression), the
particular cognitive behavior therapy technique of particular interest (e.g., pro-
longed exposure vs. behavioral activation), the particular characteristics of the pop-
ulation of interest (e.g., children vs. the elderly), the particular overall theoretical
orientation (e.g., radical behaviorism vs. cognitivism), the general school of therapy
(e.g., rational emotive therapy vs a Beck influenced behavior therapy), and the
modality of intervention (prevention vs treatment; e-health vs face to face therapy).
One interesting aspect of this is that it is possible that two individuals both of whom
consider themselves cognitive behavior therapists may have so little overlap in
actual interests and skills that they might find it difficult to talk to each other. Each
reads different journals, attend different conferences, is trained and skilled in dis-
tinct therapy techniques, see clients that have little overlap in demographics, and
have theoretical commitments that are even contradictory.
Some of this heterogeneity can be organized by viewing CBT has having three
generations or waves (Hayes, 2004; O’Donohue & Chin, chapter “Meta-science and
the Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Three Distinct Sets of
Commitments” this volume). The first wave of CBT is based on operant psychology
and radical behaviorism. The second wave came after this and emphasizes cogni-
tion; and the third wave emphases acceptance and values. But despite these different
points of emphasis, there are key commonalities (see Herbert & Forman, 2013;
Mennin et al., 2013).
Wittgensteinian Fibres and CBT
The early twentieth century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) warned that in
defining terms one must not necessarily find essential properties that all elements
subsumed under that category must share. Wittgenstein stated:
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these
phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—but
that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relation-
ship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language”. (§65)
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say:
“There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and
see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them
at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resem-
blances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features,
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And
I shall say: ‘games’ form a family… And we extend our concept of number as in spinning
a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that
some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. (p. 67)
There are some possible candidates of such Wittgensteinian fibres running through
CBT. These are: (a) an emphasis on science in providing evidence for a wide variety
of claims, particularly the scientific results supporting process variables from the
learning and the cognitive laboratory, (b) an emphasis on shorter term, cost effective
therapy versus longer term therapy resulting personality reconstruction, (c) a rejec-
tion of psychodynamic constructs and a consequent emphasis on measurable behav-
ior, (d) manualized treatment (perhaps at the level of principles or at the level of
specific techniques) where treatment fidelity can be measured, and (e) often more
recently the development, testing and dissemination of packages of CBT that forms
a treatment for some problem.
However, a very important thread running throughout the candidates listed above
is a reliance on science for knowledge production and evaluating the truth of claims.
It is important to note that science is running through the list of the preceding
“fibres” even at a meta-level. Behavior therapy and CBT take science as its episte-
mology (McFall, 1991). Ideally, cognitive behavior therapists use principles like
operant conditioning that have been tested scientifically in experimental psychology
laboratory, assessment instruments that have been tested (and validated) psycho-
metrically; and deliver therapies whose outcomes have been tested in randomly
controlled studies. In fact, sometimes behavioral and cognitive therapists teach what
they consider to be the scientific method to their clients so that their clients can test
their beliefs and perhaps replace these false and dysfunctional beliefs with true and
functional ones (Ellis & MacLaren, 1998). Behavioral and cognitive behavioral
therapists have traditionally been puzzled when their fellow therapists of other ori-
entations have either not put their therapies to the same scientific test and/or have
ignored or minimized the scientific results associated with CBT.
Scientific Epistemology and CBT
But if science is so important to cognitive behavior therapists perhaps a more care-

ful and detailed look of the actual scientific practice of CBT is in order. Scientific
practice can vary in its quality. Perhaps it is the case that cognitive behavior thera-
pists, or at least some of these, have been too quick to engage in self-congratulation
regarding their scientific credentials. The question of the quality of science is made
difficult in that there is no consensus by those who study science, such as philoso-
phers of science on exactly what the scientific method is, and even if there is a sci-
entific method (O’Donohue, 2013). This ambiguity seems to carry over in
CBT—Skinner’s conception of science differs very much from Ellis’s conception
(O’Donohue & Halsey, 1997). O’Donohue and Houts (1985) for example, found
that behavior therapists could be defined by their allegiance towards different
research designs: behaviorally oriented first generation behavior therapists relied on
single subject experimental designs, while second generation behavior therapists

(i.e., cognitive or cognitive behavioral therapists) relied on group designs.
Perhaps the practice of science at times has been more a rhetorical marketing
device—to attempt to persuade others that a test has been conducted when it in fact
has not (O’Donohue et al., 2016). There has been an explosion of interest in ques-
tionable research practices (QRPs) in medicine (e.g., see Ioannidis, 2005) and in
social psychology but in CBT there has been little interest in either scientific direct
replications or in the identification and elimination of QRPs (O’Donohue
et al., 2022).
Perhaps the bar was set too low by rival nonscientific therapies and there has
been a bit of complacency on the part of cognitive behavior therapists. Perhaps
cognitive behavior therapists are so intent to find therapies that work for their suf-
fering clients that more severe testing in their therapy outcome research brings
about a kind of ambivalence—negative results mean less hope for relief for clients.
The philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper’s (1972) concept of severe test can best
be captured by an example. If one wants to test the hypothesis that “My religious
leader does not lie”, a more severe test would be to observe instances after he or she
stubs a toe, or is cut off in traffic; a less severe test is to only observe them while
they preach or conduct a Sunday school class.
Perhaps cognitive biases like confirmation bias are still operative—researchers
really just want to find out they are right. Perhaps there is too much a stake person-
ally: grants, publications, promotions, workshop fees, and books sales can be jeop-
ardized by negative or disappointing results. Thus, important questions can be raised
about the quality of the science in CBT as well as more traditional questions such
as, “To what extent do cognitive behavior therapists consistently avoid making
claims that outstrip the scientific evidence?” Perhaps cognitive behavior therapists
have been quick to overlook or excuse problems, such as the paucity of replications,
the use of QRPs as well as inconsistencies of gaps in their scientific orientation.
QRPs include the use of the “file drawer” to hide negative results, p-hacking,
hypothesizing after results are known (HARKing), selective reporting of multiple
outcome variables, deciding to collect more data when the results are not signifi-
cant, and failing to disclose all experimental conditions (see O’Donohue et al.,
2022). There has been a disappointing neglect on open data and pre-registration of
studies in CBT despite strong movements toward this in experimental psychology
and particularly social psychology.
Agnotology and CBT
Perhaps a part of scientific knowledge is also a full and frank acknowledgement of

what is not known. The study of ignorance has recently become to be known as
agnotology. Agnotology also focuses on how and why some forms of knowledge do
not come to be, or are ignored or delayed. Ignorance, though, is thought to be more
complex than this. Ignorance is viewed as having a distinct and changing geography
that is viewed as an excellent indicator of the politics of knowledge. CBT may profit
from a agnotology to complement and further understand our scientific
epistemology.
What might an agnotology of CBT look like? What as a field are we often igno-
rant of? Here’s a partial list:
1. Relating to the focus of this book, the relative efficacy of therapies from the three
waves of CBT, e.g., which is generally more efficacious for some particular
problem, rational emotive therapy, behavioral activation, or acceptance and com-
mitment therapy? This ignorance may allow cognitive behavior therapy not to
choose therapies that are actually most effective for clients, but to base their
choices largely on antecedent theoretical allegiances.
2. To what extent are the positive outcomes of some therapy in any wave is due to
the use of questionable research practices? It may be the case that any outcome
study can be successful if sufficient QRPs are employed.
3. To what extent are scientific studies biased by personal motivations of the scien-
tist? It is commonly acknowledged by cognitive behavior therapists that Big
Pharma has biased results in psychopharmocology research in depression (see
for example Antonuccio et al., 2002) but similar motivations are largely ignored
for researchers in CBT. In another example, Etter et al. (2007) found in an exam-
ination of all randomized controlled trials of nicotine replacement therapy for
smoking cessation, more industry-supported trials found statistically significant
results than non-industry trials and these reported larger effect sizes as well.
Admittedly for cognitive behavior therapists the magnitude of the possible finan-
cial gain is less by order of magnitudes but financial consequences are still there.
4. Finally, there are a host of relatively orphaned questions such as actual cost
effectiveness, actual safety data, knowledge of process variables, a clear under-
standing of the error in our measurement devices, actual recidivism, actual effect
sizes, and so on.
Some have suggested that epistemic honesty and humility might be a key part of
science (Lilienfeld & Bowes, 2020; Lilienfeld et al., 2017). Intellectual humility is
well captured by the philosopher, Bertrand Russell who stated that good scientists
hold both “the passion not to be fooled and not to fool anybody else” (as accounted
by Meehl, 1993). Part of not fooling anyone is to admit ignorance where ignorance
actually exists.
For example, O’Donohue et al. (2017) have attempted to cash out the scientific
attitude with a set of epistemic virtues. Science practice in this view is seen as hav-
ing an essential ethical dimension. Virtue epistemologists examine the qualities of
the rational agent in evaluating knowledge claims (Greco, 2000). Intellectual virtues
are those cognitive and attitudinal assets that allow the inquirer to both maximize
truth and minimize error (Sosa, 1985). This represents an important shift from the
epistemologists’ previous focus on properties of beliefs/sentences (such as “justi-
fied” or “corroborated”) to the properties of agents in their epistemic activities as
the most important dimension in generating the warrant for a knowledge claim. The
core of virtue in epistemology is the condition, in which one knows P if and only
if knowledge of P is virtuously acquired true belief (DePaul & Zagzebski, 2003).
Overview of Chapters in the Present Volume
CBT has been the dominant psychotherapeutic paradigm in the Western world,
enjoying this status for a few decades. As discussed extensively elsewhere
(O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009) as well as in this volume, it emerged in the late 1950s
and after competition with psychoanalytic and humanistic paradigms it rode the
wave of “evidence-based therapies” into dominance certainly by the 1990s.
Managed care and third party payers favored its emphasis on scientific validation,
short-term efficient treatment, and relatively easy to learn techniques (often in treat-
ment manuals). In practice, CBT also attained a wide range of applicability: from
childhood problems, such as functional enuresis and oppositional defiant disorder,
to problems of adults, such as depression, anxiety disorders, chronic pain and so on.
As such, it is also fair to say that modern CBT has no direct competitor with similar
evidential credentials or the same number of adherents and none is on the immedi-
ate horizon.
So it is important to understand CBT paradigm, particularly for those entering
the field. To understand CBT and to make intelligent therapeutic choices as well as
research questions, one needs to understand waves of CBT as well as their relative
strengths and weaknesses. This book will help readers do this by having leaders in
the field write key chapters on the key component issues. More specifically, while
taking the agnotology of CBT into consideration, this book is organized into five
sections.
The first section offers a general introduction to each of the three waves of CBT,
setting these into a historical context. Following the present chapter (this chapter),
Gerald Davison of the University of Southern California presents his personal
reflections on the development and history of behavior therapy and CBT (chapter
“Personal Perspectives on the Development of Behavior Therapy and Cognitive
Behavior Therapy”). As reflected in his chapter, Davison’s earlier empirical and
clinical work brought the cognitive trend to the field of behavior therapy. His highly
cited collaborative book with Marvin Goldfried of Stony Brook University, Clinical
Behavior Therapy (1976), has continued to influence the generations of CBT schol-
ars and clinicians for almost five decades. Following Dr. Davison’s opening chapter,
William O’Donohue and Fredrick Chin of the University of Nevada, Reno, intro-
duce meta science as a fibre of CBT, which serves a guiding framework to under-
stand different waves of CBTs (chapter “Meta-science and the Three Waves of
Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Three Distinct Sets of Commitments”). O’Donohue
et al. also argue that notable pioneers of each waves of CBT (i.e., B. F. Skinner of
the first wave; Albert Ellis of the second wave; Steven Hayes of the third wave)
adhered to different meta scientific ideas for knowledge production and for evaluat-
ing the truth of claims that they made. Learning these different forms of scientific
epistemology is extremely important for both trainees and professionals as the Inter-
Organizational Task Force on Cognitive and Behavioral Psychology Doctoral
Education advocates that CBT-oriented doctoral training programs “expose students
to the philosophy of psychology, with particular emphasis on epistemology and the
role of preanalytic assumptions in defining the scope and methods of science and
practice” (Klepac et al., 2012, p. 697).
Following the explication of the historical context of CBT and the importance of
scientific epistemology in advancing CBT, the reminder of the first section covers
the overview of first-, second- and third- waves of CBT. More specifically, Edward
Morris of the University of Kansas highlights a profound impact of learning prin-
ciples (i.e., operant principles) and principles-informed practice, the heart of first
wave CBT, on contemporary CBT theory and practice even to this date (chapter
“What Is First-Wave Behavior Therapy?”). Subsequently, Daniel Strunk and his
colleagues of the Ohio State University then highlight the central premise in the
second wave of CBT in theory and practice (chapter “What Is Second Wave
Behavior Therapy?”). That is, the premise that how people interpret a situation (and
its implications) influence their emotional responses as well as any efforts they
make to cope with that situation remains the core in theory and practice, especially
for the second wave CBTs. As presented in their chapter, Albert Ellis (1913–2007)
and Aaron T. Beck (1921–2021) originated this core promise because of their dis-
satisfaction not only with their perceived limitations of the first wave behavior ther-
apy, but also with psychoanalytic thinking which dominated the field of behavioral
health at that time. Those who just entered into the field may find it intriguing that
both Ellis and Beck had been trained extensively in psychoanalysis. Finally, Lance
McCracken, Ph.D. of the Uppsala University presents his view on what third wave
of CBT is and the contribution that it has made to the field of CBT (chapter “What
Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy?”). McCracken points out its contextualistic
worldview (scientific epistemology) as a unique feature of the third wave of CBTs.
The second section of this volume presents assessment and case conceptualiza-
tion in second wave CBT (chapter “Second Wave Assessment and Case Formulation”
by Gary Brown, Ph.D. of Royal Holloway University of London), DBT (chapter
“Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Assessment and Case Conceptualization” by Skye
Fitzpatrick, Ph.D., of York University and Shireen Rizvi, Ph.D. of Rutgers
University), and radically open DBT (RO-DBT; chapter “Radically Open Dialectical
Behavior Therapy: Theory, Assessment and Case Conceptualization” by Kirsten
Gilbert, Ph.D. of Washington University in St. Louis and R. Trent Codd, III, Ph.D. of
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Center of Western North Carolina). These chapters
will deal with how these treatments conceptualize assessment and what assessment
strategies each relies on with the strengths and weaknesses of these. We have
included DBT and RO-DBT as they are often viewed as being independent from the
waves of CBT. Another important thing to note here is that we originally planned to
have chapters for first wave CBT and third wave CBT in this section, too. However,
given challenges we have faced for the past 18 months due to the global level
COVID-19 pandemics, we are not able to secure the authors for these two chapters.
That being said, the readers will see assessment and case conceptualization of the
first and third waves of CBT in depth with case examples in subsequent chapters
(e.g., see those in the fourth section of this volume).
The third section of this volume will allow major proponents of each wave to
critique the other waves—this is often done and the reader will be able to better
understand how each views the strengths and limitations of the other. In chapter
“The Advantages of First Wave Behavior Therapy and Problems with the Others”,
Peter Sturmey, Ph.D., of the City University of New York presents the advantages
of first wave CBT. He characterizes the first wave of CBT mainly in terms of oper-
ant psychology and its application to human suffering that took off in the 1960’s. He
concludes that one wave is enough, and that developments, such as cognitive behav-
ior therapy and third wave therapies, have lost their philosophical and methodologi-
cal roots. Subsequently, in chapter “Cognitive Therapy and the Three Waves:
Advantages, Disadvantages and Rapprochement”, rather than “defend” the cogni-
tive model, Robert Leahy, Ph.D. of the American Institute of Cognitive Therapy,
describes the second wave of CBT, reviews the rationale for it, the research support-
ing it, its limitations and its strengths. His contention in his chapter is that we all
have a lot to learn from each other, stating that perhaps this is the message of the
Fourth Wave. Finally, in chapter “Advantages of Third Wave Behavior Therapies”,
Akihiko Masuda, Ph.D. of the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa and his doctoral stu-
dent, Samuel Spencer, presents their thoughts on the advantages of the third wave
CBT. Masuda and Spencer argue that one major historical contribution of third
wave CBTs has been to revitalize the importance of linking evidence-based pro-
cesses/mechanisms of change to evidence-based procedure and to revitalize Gordon
Paul’s pressing question: “What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this indi-
vidual with that specific problem, under which set of circumstances, and how does
it come about” (Paul, 1969, p. 44).
The fourth section will describe how each of the waves differentially treat seven
major disorders (i.e., anxiety, depression, obesity, psychosis, substance abuse,
ADHD, and chronic pain). Presenting a clinical case example, this section provides
the reader with very concrete and detailed differences in the treatment approaches
of each; Chapters in this section also will offers research reviews so that the reader
will see which wave of CBT has the best evidential support for individuals diag-
nosed with a given particular disorder. This section is also written to be of great
interest to clinicians.
Today, CBTCognitive behavior therapy (CBT) as a family of cognitive-
behaviorally based therapies is best known as the treatment of choice for anxiety
and anxiety-related issues (e.g., Barlow et al., 2015; Nathan & Gorman, 2015). In
chapter “First Wave Conceptualizations of Anxiety Disorders”, Cynthia Lancaster,
Ph.D. of University of Nevada, Reno and her colleague present first wave conceptu-
alizations and treatments of anxiety disorder. Highlighting that a horse-race com-
parison of behavioral therapies, such as exposure therapy, to subsequent waves of
therapy, including cognitive-behavioral and mindfulness-based therapies, has
yielded an overall picture of relatively equivalent treatment effects for anxiety dis-
orders, Lancaster et al. argue that important to work with patients with anxiety dis-
orders are stepping back to the beginning of CBT (i.e., first wave CBT) and better
understanding the basic behavioral conceptualization of anxiety disorders.

Subsequently, in chapter “Third Wave Conceptualization of Anxiety, Obsessive
Compulsive Disorders, and Obsessive Compulsive Related Disorders”, Michael
Twohig, Ph.D., of Utah State University and his colleagues presents third-wave
CBT conceptualizations of anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and
obsessive compulsive and related disorders (OCRDs). They argue that the third
wave build upon the previous two by retaining the behavioral thinking of the first
wave and the focus on cognition from the second. They also argue that the third
wave takes a different stance towards language and cognition than the second wave,
which is new from their perspective. Finally, they argue that having strong technolo-
gies that can focus on first order change (second wave) and second order change
(third wave) of cognitions and other internal experiences is key, and that third wave
movement situates the important work of process-based cognitive behavioral thera-
pies (PB-CBT) at the forefront.
As with the case for anxiety and anxiety-related disorders, various forms of CBT
are known to be the treatment(s) of choice for depression (Craighead et al., 2015).
To highlight these, Amy Naugle, Ph.D. of Western Michigan University, Jane Fisher,
Ph.D. of University of Nevada, and Zindel Segal, Ph.D. of University of Toronto,
together with their coauthors, present case conceptualizations and treatments of
individuals with depression from the perspectives of the first wave (chapter
“Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization”), second wave (chapter
“Second Wave Treatment for Depressive Disorders”), and third wave (chapter
“Depression: Third Wave Case Conceptualization”), respectively. Although these
waves of CBT shared some major characteristics in theory and practice, each also
has its unique features that are differentiated from the other two waves of CBT. More
specifically, chapter “Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization”
outlines the original operant model of depression proposed by Lewinsohn (1975)
and presents behavioral activation, an operant principle-informed behavioral ther-
apy, as a notable example of first-wave CBTs for depression. In chapter “Second
Wave Treatment for Depressive Disorders”, Fisher and her colleague introduce cog-
nitive models of depression and depression treatment, and then present cognitive
therapy (CT; Beck et al., 1979) as a hallmark second wave CBT for depression.
Subsequently, in chapter “Depression: Third Wave Case Conceptualization”, Segal
and his colleague presents decentering as the overarching mechanism of change in
CBTs for depression from various waves, and argue how MBCT (Segal et al., 2013),
the most well-known third wave CBT for depression, explicitly targets this general-
ized process of change in practice.
The third major behavioral issues on which these three waves of CBT are com-
pared with one another in this section is obesity, which is now recognized as a major
public health issue across the globe (e.g., James, 2008). In chapter “First Wave
Treatment of Obesity”, R. Wayne Fuqua of Western Michigan University outlines
how a classic behavioral account conceptualizes the issues related to and causes of
obesity as well as how it informs the first wave CBT for individuals with obesity. In
chapter “Obesity: Third Wave Case Conceptualization”, Evan Forman of Drexel
University and his colleagues presents third wave CBTs for obesity in theory and
practice as well as empirical evidence of these intervention, including acceptance-

based behavior therapy (ABT; Forman et al., 2016).
The fourth behavioral issues that the three waves of CBT are compared and con-
trasted is psychosis. CBT has a long history in psychosis treatment. In chapter
“First-
Wave Behavior Therapies for Schizophrenia and Related Psychotic
Disorders”, Stephen Wong of Florida International University outlines the first-
wave conceptualization of psychosis and its treatment strategies (e.g., contingency
management for daily living skills, social skills training), which was originated in
as early as 1950s. Subsequently, Dennis Combs of University of Texas at Tyler
presents a second wave CBT for psychosis, which incorporates the role of cognitive
processes into theory and practice (chapter “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other
Psychotic Disorders: Second Wave Case Conceptualization”). Finally, in chapter
“Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders: Third Wave Case
Conceptualization”, Brandon Guadiano of Brown University proposes willingness
and acceptance as a set of alternative way that patients with psychosis relate to their
psychotic symptoms (e.g., auditory hallucination).
The fifth behavioral problem examined in this volume is substance and alcohol
misuse. This has been a notoriously difficult problem to treat with high drop-out,
and high recidivism. In chapter “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders: 1st
Wave Case Conceptualization”, Hendrik Roozen and Jane Ellen Smith of the
University of New Mexico present Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA;
Hunt & Azrin, 1973) along with Token Economy (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968) and
Contingency Management (CM; Higgins et al., 2007) as exemplars of the first wave
CBT for individuals with substance use issues. Then, Anthony Ecker of Baylor
University and Michael Cucciarre of University of Arkansas presents a second wave
CBT accounts of substance and alcohol misuse and its treatment (chapter “Substance
Use Disorders: Second Wave Approaches”). Finally, the discussion on CBT for sub-
stance and alcohol misuse is summarized by Angela Stotts of the University of
Texas (chapter “Third Wave Therapies and Substance Abuse: A Case Example”).
She and her colleagues argue that third wave approaches, such as ACT and other
mindfulness-based approaches has been built on previous generations of CBT and
at the same time have expanded the scope of treatment by targeting processes, such
as values-based behavior activation and psychological openness.
The sixth behavioral health problem to be examined in this section is attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). To date, of non-pharmacological treatment
approaches to ADHD in children, behavioral interventions (i.e., first-wave CBTs)
have the largest evidence-base (Pfiffner & Haack, 2015). In chapter “Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: First Wave Case Conceptualization”, Michelle
Wallace of California State University, Los Angeles presents the overview of the
first-wave CBT interventions for children and adolescents with ADHD. In chapter
“Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Second Wave Conceptualization and
Intervention”, Will Canu of Appalachian State University and Dane Hilton of
Wofford College outline the theory and practice of second wave CBT for
ADHD. These authors argue that CBT is promising for adults with ADHD, but not
necessarily for children and adolescents with ADHD. Finally, Bridget Beachy,
David Bauman, and Melissa Baker present the application of third-wave CBT to
adults with ADHD in theory and practice (chapter “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder: Third-Wave Behavior Therapy Conceptualization”).
The final and seventh behavioral health problem covered in this section is chronic
pain. In chapter “Chronic Pain: Perspective on the Second Wave”, Leah Adams of
George Mason University and Dennis Turk of the University of Washington present
the second wave CBT account and intervention of individuals with chronic pain.
They argue that unlike common misconception of the second wave CBT, the second
wave CBT does not have an explicit focus on reducing or eliminating the experience
of pain in and of itself, but that instead, emotional distress related to pain and pain-
interference are targets. They also note the marked similarities between the second
and third wave CBTs for chronic pain in both theory and practice. In chapter
“Chronic Pain: Third Wave Case Conceptualizations”, Kevin Vowles of Queen’s
University Belfast presents an ACT account of chronic pain and chronic pain treat-
ment as it is the most well-established third wave approach to chronic pain (e.g.,
McCracken & Vowles, 2014).
The final section will provide the history of CBT in non-Western contexts as well
as a summary of some of the key issues and the future of behavior therapy and
CBT. These chapters may be helpful for readers to see CBT from a historical and
longitudinal perspective and plan their own research and clinical careers. Regarding
the history of CBT in non-Western context, Jan Luiz Leonardi and Gabriel Vieira
Cândido presents the history and future of CBT in Brazil (chapter “The History of
Behavior Therapy in Brazil and Its Relationship with the Three Waves”), which is
followed by the history and future of behavior therapy and CBT in Japan by Takashi
Muto of Doshisha University and Akihiko Masuda of the University of Hawaii at
Manoa (chapter “History of Cognitive and Behavior Therapies in Japan: A Behavior
Analytic Perspective”). Following these chapters, Bruce Thyer of Florida State
University presents the future of first wave CBT from a behavior analytic perspec-
tive, especially in the domain of applied behavior analyst training and careers in
applied behavior analysis (chapter “The Future of First Wave Behavior Therapies”).
Finally, our volume will end with Robert Zettle of Wichita State University and his
chapter presenting his reflection on the history of the first, second, and third wave
CBTs as well as making predictions regarding the future of CBT (chapter “The
Future of Third Wave Cognitive Behavior Therapies”).
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Personal Perspectives on the Development
of Behavior Therapy and Cognitive
Behavior Therapy
Gerald C. Davison
In June 1999 I was privileged to be invited to a two-day conference at the University

of Nevada, Reno to participate in presentations by colleagues regarded by the orga-
nizing committee (William T. O’Donohue, Deborah A. Henderson, Steven C. Hayes,
Jane E. Fisher, and Linda J. Hayes) to be founders of behavior therapy. Most of the
other speakers and for those, having passed, their surrogates, were people whose
seminal writings I had learned from as a graduate student and as a young researcher,
teacher, and practitioner. The task set for each of us was to describe what we saw as
the strongest influences in our professional lives and to discuss a publication that we
believed had had some importance in the development of (cognitive) behavior ther-
apy. We were also encouraged to engage in something which occasionally happens
only in personal settings with friends and perhaps also with colleagues and students,
namely autobiographical material that each of us believed had had bearing on our
intellectual and professional development. The assumption of the conference orga-
nizers was that this framework would provide a context for a deeper understanding
of the field than is available in published materials and, if one is lucky, from direct
and extended contacts with a small handful of senior colleagues. There was laughter
and, yes, there were tears as each of us learned something hitherto unknown about
our colleagues and how these intimate details were seen by them as pivotal to their
professional achievements. Articles based on these speeches were edited and pub-
lished in O’Donohue et al. (2001).
It was similarly daunting and humbling to have been asked by the editors of the
present volume to write my reflections on behavior therapy’s past as I have experi-
enced it. I hope that the following account can place behavior therapy and cognitive
behavior therapy into a useful perspective. We all know that this kind of material is
almost never allowable in our publications. The focus in scientific writings is on
hypothesis-testing, research methodology, and statistical analysis. But where did
G. C. Davison (*)
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
e-mail: gdaviso@usc.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_2
18 G. C. Davison
the ideas come from? How did the investigators come to spend inordinate amounts
of time, energy, and grant money on asking questions in a controlled, scientific
fashion? For myself, if there’s a main theme to my story and, I believe, to the evolu-
tion of behavior therapy/modification, which is rhetorically derived from “modern
learning theory”, to cognitive behavior therapy and thence to the “third wave,” it’s
the centrality of cognition – how people construct their world and how therapeutic
efforts to alter their constructions can improve their lives as well as the human
condition.
Earliest Influences
I’ve been fortunate – damned lucky, to put it more bluntly – to have done my
Ph.D. work at Stanford in the early 1960s and to have had the opportunity to learn
from four giants in the field: Albert Bandura, Walter Mischel, Perry London, and
Arnold Lazarus. My sense of good fortune is enhanced by the fact that I went to
Stanford after college to study dissonance theory with Leon Festinger (1957). As it
turned out, he had just changed his research interests from his pioneering work in
cognitive dissonance to basic laboratory work in eye movements (and I don’t mean
EMDR). My boundless admiration of him as a leading and creative social psycholo-
gist was exceeded only by my lack of interest in his newfound research focus, and
so I wandered a bit my first year only to end up with having Bandura as my advisor.
These happy accidents are, I believe, instructive in how one might view behavior
therapy’s past (with major considerations for its present and its future). For at its
core, what we call behavior therapy, behavior modification, and more recently cog-
nitive behavior therapy has its essence in a desire to apply as rigorously as possible
various scientific methods to studying the exceedingly complex challenges in help-
ing people achieve changes in thinking, feeling, and behaving that will ease their
suffering and perhaps enrich their lives.
I entered graduate school in 1962 uncertain of what specialty I would pursue
(beyond designing clever analogue deception-laden dissonance experiments with
Festinger1), but I was certain of one thing, namely that my specialty would not be
clinical psychology. The reason was that the only kind of clinical I had been exposed
to during my undergraduate days at Harvard was psychoanalytic and its variations.
I just couldn’t accept the epistemology. When is a cigar just a good smoke? After
my disappointment at Festinger’s radical change in direction and after immersing
1
A valued colleague and good friend at Stony Brook, where I had my first academic position after
graduate school, the late Jerome E. Singer, once commented that the most interesting aspects of
dissonance theory experiments were the cover stories. This wry observation came from the co-
author of the famous Schachter-Singer study on the centrality of cognition in how people under-
stand their autonomic arousal. Talk about a cover story! Among the many classic studies pertinent
to cognitive behavior therapy that younger cohorts would enjoy and benefit from, none is more
significant for earlier generations than this article.
Personal Perspectives on the Development of Behavior Therapy and Cognitive Behavior… 19
myself for a few months in physiological psychology in J. A. Deutsch’s (Deutsch,

1960) lab (and having to confront my serious allergies to animal dander), I learned
that there was this young full professor teaching ways to help people psychologi-
cally without forsaking one’s interest in and commitment to testable theorizing and
hard-nosed experimentation. This person was the above-mentioned Albert Bandura.
In the olden days, when I had to trudge uphill in the biting cold to go to school
and then uphill in the afternoon to return home, one could actually read everything
that had been published in what was called “behavior therapy” or “behavior modifi-
cation.” One could also master the experimental animal learning literature that was
boldly asserted to be the firm foundation for these startlingly new therapeutic tech-
niques. I did just that as part of my Ph.D. qualifying exams.2
There were a handful of books that were pivotal in the early 1960s –Andrew
Salter’s “Conditioned Reflex Therapy” (1949), Hans Eysenck’s edited “Behavior
Therapy and the Neuroses (1960),” Joseph Wolpe’s “Psychotherapy by Reciprocal
Inhibition” (1958), Arthur and Carolyn Staats’s “Complex Human Behavior”
(1963), and an almost poetically crafted and little known gem by a former mentor,
Perry London (1963), “The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy.” Noteworthy as
well, of course, was B.F. Skinner’s (1953) “Science and Human Behavior”. As
Marv Goldfried and I reviewed in the first chapter of our 1976 book, “Clinical
Behavior Therapy,” (Goldfried & Davison, 1976) there were also other earlier books
and articles that are seldom cited and appreciated, most especially Julian Rotter’s
“Social Learning and Clinical Psychology” (1954), George Kelly’s “Psychology of
Personal Constructs (1955), and a 1961 Psychological Bulletin article by my
Doktorvater, Albert Bandura. The books by London, Rotter, and Kelly are rightly
seen as foundational in the evolution of behavior therapy into cognitive behavior
therapy, but the CBT literature seldom references and discusses these earlier semi-
nal writings. Of course no deep understanding of and appreciation for CBT is pos-
sible without the seminal contributions of Albert Ellis (e.g, 1962) and Aaron T. Beck
(e.g.,1967). I believe it’s useful to mention these foundational publications because,
unfortunately, they are seldom even read or taught these days in our continuing
efforts to stay abreast of the explosion of books, chapters, and articles that are gen-
erally seen as seminal.3
My exceedingly enjoyable and stimulating years at Stanford were immeasurably
enriched by the visit of Arnold Lazarus from Johannesberg, South Africa during my
second year, 1963–1964. Another totally unpredicted and unexpected bit of luck.
With a few of my fellow clinical students, I sat in on therapy sessions that Lazarus
2
There’s an old joke about a computer nerd rising from his cumbersome PC on a day in 1996 to
exclaim with great satisfaction that he had just finished viewing every website on the World Wide
Web. After completing my Ph.D. qualifying exams in the fall of 1964, I had the same feeling about
behavior therapy – I had read all that had been published plus a great deal of in press articles as
well as related material, like the aforementioned animal avoidance learning literature. I doubt that
anyone has been able to say this about behavior therapy for at least the past 50 years.
3
I’ve often considered offering an elective seminar that would involve a study of these and other
early works, but I seriously doubt that it would meet minimum enrollment.
20 G. C. Davison
had with patients from the area south of San Francisco who eagerly sought help
from a highly touted clinical psychologist who was one of the few clinicians in the
world widely acknowledged to be an expert in this new thing called behavior ther-
apy. I spent 10–15 h a week from September to May sitting in with Lazarus. It’s
hard to put into words how important that year was in my intellectual and profes-
sional development. Anticipating a theme that I will develop later in this chapter, I
came to appreciate the complexities of the clinical interaction, and gradually the
abstract concepts and experimental research that I was immersed in through courses
with Bandura and Mischel4 came to life. I had the unique and priceless opportunity
of watching how a master clinician implemented what behavior therapy was at that
time, described and explained in Wolpe and Lazarus’s 1966 book, “Behavior
Therapy Techniques”. I was stunned by the improvement of most of Lazarus’s
patients but also dumbfounded by how much more there was to actual clinical work
than was evident in the extant body of theory and research. Lazarus referred to these
factors as “non-specifics,” which I later came to appreciate as deriving largely from
Rogers’s client-centered therapy (Rogers, 1942), in particular the importance of a
trusting therapeutic relationship marked by empathy and mutual respect. The impor-
tance of the therapeutic relationship loomed much larger than was discussed in the
behavior therapy literature of the time. I had the opportunity to formalize and elabo-
rate on these factors in my book with Goldfried (Goldfried & Davison, 1976) after
I had gained some “seasoning” in the clinical world, especially in my teaching and
clinical supervision in my first job at Stony Brook beginning in 1966.
ognitive Factors in Behavior Therapy – The Development

C
of Cognitive Behavior Therapy
As Lazarus and I have written in several chapters and articles (e.g., Lazarus &
Davison, 1971; Davison & Lazarus, 1995), case studies occupy an honored place in
the developing science of clinical psychology. Their heuristic value is probably their
key importance and will be addressed throughout this chapter. I hope it will be
informative to illustrate this essential point by discussing in some detail an early
publication on what I called “cognitive restructuring” and which, for me, took me
into the hybrid field of cognitive behavior therapy (Davison, 1966b).
Context: During my postdoctoral clinical internship at the Palo Alto Veterans
Administration Hospital in 1965–1966, I treated a middle-aged patient who had
been presented at a Grand Rounds by a psychiatry resident for treatment of paranoid
4
I have found that many younger cohorts of students and colleagues are sometimes unfamiliar with
Walter Mischel. In the current context, he was what Thomas Kuhn would have called a paradigm-
buster. In a painstaking and creative analysis of how well traits assessed by personality tests pre-
dicted behavior in various situations and over time, Mischel (1968) argued that situational analyses
were more useful and valid. In this way he made seminal contributions to behavior therapy’s
emphasis on functional analysis.
delusional beliefs centering around spirits communicating through some cysts on

his forehead. He described these as “pressure points”. Though psychodynamic in
orientation, the resident had fulfilled the patient’s request by convincing the surgery
department to remove the cysts based on the belief that this would eliminate his
delusion. The delusions did not abate.5
Possessed with a nascent cognitive behavior therapy fervor, I asked the patient
during the Grand Rounds Q&A if he experienced his spirits communicating with
him at any particular times. He replied that it tended to happen when he had to make
a decision, even a very minor one. I queried the patient further, operating with the
very tentative hypothesis that he was very anxious about making mistakes and that,
for some reason, he had developed the paranoid delusion about helpful spirits as
way to cope with his decisional anxieties. This kind of situational assessment had
not been a part of his prior sessions with the psychiatry resident. The patient’s
answers prompted me to seek and obtain the approval of my clinical supervisor to
volunteer to have some sessions with the patient. I believe that it will be informative
to quote extensively from this brief publication:
Mr. B’s psychiatric problems seemed to begin 4 yr. prior to hospitalization, with the suicide
of his only brother. It was during this time that he began to be preoccupied with ‘pressure
points’ over his right eye, which he interpreted as being caused by a spirit either inside or
outside his body, helping him make decisions. His marriage of 3 yr. held, from the very
outset, little more than continuous arguments with his wife and her family. He would often
be squelched by being called a ‘mental case.’
Upon admission his speech was described as tangential, with loose associations and
grandiose schemes and persecutions by others, but centering around information from his
pressure points. There was no evidence of hallucinations.
In the first session [with me], when asked to relate as many instances as he could of their
occurrence, the patient brought up several situations which were clearly anxiety-provoking,
e.g., losing his way on the freeway [he was a truck driver], being late with a truckload of
goods, and then, along with severe anxiety, receiving ‘messages’ of which turns to take. In
every case Mr. B. volunteered that he had been extremely tense and upset in these situa-
tions. Towards the end of the hour, I suggested to him that, while he had his own ideas about
the nature of these sensations, he entertain another notion. At this point I requested him to
extend his arm, clench his fist, and slowly bend his wrist downwards so as to bring the
closed hand toward the inside of the forearm. A definite feeling of severe muscle tension
was thereby produced in the forearm, at which time he smiled slightly and muttered that it
felt very much like a ‘pressure point.’ I then suggested that perhaps these sensations [his
“pressure points”] were purely natural phenomena, a consequence of his becoming very
tense in particular kinds of situations. To appeal to his interest in philosophy and anthropol-
ogy (which may account for his construction of the sensations), I cited Malinowski’s (1948)
discussion of how Man’s need to explain phenomena probably gives rise to mystical expla-
nations in areas where scientific, naturalistic explanations are lacking. To test my hypothe-
sis, I asked him to undergo training in deep muscular relaxation, designed to reduce his
generally high level of anxiety and especially to determine the nature of the pressure points
and perhaps to control them. The first session ended with a half hour’s training in relaxation
[by means of tapes I made based on Edmund Jacobson’s original work but modified by
Lazarus to involve quick tension and release rather than Jacobson’s gradual tensing and
relaxing of muscles]. After completing the relaxation exercises, the patient reported sponta-
5
Your tax dollars at work, I thought ruefully to myself at the time.
22 G. C. Davison
neously: ‘I feel relaxed inside like I haven’t felt in a long time.’ I deemed this as a very
favorable and promising initial outcome and had the patient practice with the tape on his
own between subsequent sessions.
There were eight additional sessions over a 9-wk, period. During these meetings, Mr.
B. was instructed in differential relaxation (Davison, 1965), in order to enable him to elimi-
nate pressure points when they arose as well as to reduce his maladaptively high levels of
anxiety. He began to report on the occurrence of pressure points at the hospital, all of which
confirmed the hypothesis that we were testing; he was also succeeding in reducing them
markedly by relaxing. After 1 mo. he began to refer to them as ‘sensations,’ and his conver-
sation generally was losing its paranoid flavor.
In the fourth session I initiated a game of black-jack with him, feeling that it would
provide the occasion for a pressure point. This, indeed, turned out to be the case, and being
able actually to produce the sensation in a manner analogous to real life and then to elimi-
nate it by relaxing provided further evidence, for both of us, as to the utility of both the
hypothesis and the therapy.
During a week-long leave of absence at home, Mr. B. began to assert himself to his wife
and in-laws, as had been suggested; the favorable effects of this behavior, in terms of clari-
fying some misunderstandings, were augmented by his feeling significantly more at ease.
He also reported significant relief from the realization that his ‘crazy,’ ‘sick’ behavior in the
past could be fruitfully interpreted in terms of quantitatively different reactions to situa-
tions, rather than in terms of a ‘mental illness,’ which notion had placed him in a most
unfavorable, ‘one-down’ position at home.
For the remaining 3 wk. of his hospitalization we spoke often about the effects which
our behavior has on others; how these effects can in turn influence our own feelings; about
the advisability of asserting oneself in the appropriate situation so as to avoid the buildup of
tension and often the subsequent, sometimes ‘crazy’ outbursts; and especially about the
benefits to be derived from the control of one’s tensions through differential relaxation.
A follow-up of [only] 6 wk. was obtained by letter. Mr. B. reported that the ‘pressure
points’ (his quotation marks) were far less frequent, fairly amenable to relaxation, but most
importantly, of no concern to him. He has been far less tense generally and has managed to
complete a correspondence road-building course which he had been able to work on very
little the previous 2 yr. His marital relationship has also shown continued improvement.
It would appear that improvement was due, in greatest part, to the combination of dif-
ferential relaxation and cognitive restructuring of the pressure points. In addition, the gen-
eral use of relaxation is assumed to have made the patient less tense overall and perhaps also
to have occasioned “in vivo desensitization” of various aversive stimuli (Davison, 1965;
Lazarus et al., 1965). The reduction of tension and the shift of ideational and verbal behav-
ior from socially unacceptable to socially approved patterns seem to have consolidated the
improvement by changing the reactions of others to him, thereby setting the stage for still
further gains.
In this short report one [with very limited follow-up] can only allude to earlier work
with paranoid cases. In spite of radically different orientations, such workers as Cameron
(1959), Salzman (1960), and Schwartz (1963) seem to agree strikingly with the present
therapy to the extent that the paranoid’ s constructions of the world should be subtly chal-
lenged, with alternate explanations being offered.
Is this ‘behavior therapy?’ Surely an answer depends on one’s definitions. As techniques
derived from ‘modern learning theory’ (cf. Eysenck, 1960), especially from studies in clas-
sical and operant conditioning, this certainly is not the case. The intentional appeal to cog-
nitive processes points to this therapy as being perhaps “neobehavioristic,” in the sense used
by Peterson and London (1964), who report the first case in the behavior therapy literature
which explicitly extends the therapist’s concerns into cognition. (Davison, 1966b,
pp. 177–178)
Of course a case study is very limited in strictly scientific terms. Many other factors
were operating here, among them the nature of the trusting and respectful relation-
ship that I managed to establish, which apparently reduced the usual negative reac-
tion that paranoid people have when their delusional beliefs challenged. I was able
to encourage this hospitalized patient to question his paranoid beliefs and subject
them to experimental analysis. On the other hand, a variety of other therapeutic
interventions had been attempted without success, which is consistent with the
strong possibility that my sessions with him had specific desirable effects. Efforts to
apply variations of CBT to people with serious mental disorders have become an
active area of research and application (e.g., Beck et al., 2020).
The Person as an Active, Thinking Agent
In 1966 and in 1973 I published two articles that relate to the current conception of
people as active and thinking participants in their lives. This seems pretty unremark-
able to any sentient human being and has for years been an underlying assumption
in many specialties in our field, especially in social psychology, where choosing and
deciding and wanting and demurring have underlain decades of theory and research.
Festinger’s dissonance theory, for example (Festinger, 1957), would have no mean-
ing without the core assumption that people can freely choose and that their attribu-
tions for their choices matter. (My own work in attribution is described in a later
section.)
However, I would argue that this was not a formal part of behavior therapy in its
early days.
Recall that behavior therapy was defined in the late 1950s into the mid-1960s as
based on “modern learning theory,” which for all intents and purposes referred to
Pavlov, Skinner, and to some extent Hull. People were characterized in theory –
though doubtless not in practice – as passive objects of environmental events. In my
view, the earliest experiments and position statements in behavior therapy did not
state or imply that animals or humans played an active role in their
relearning/“reconditioning.” Like Pavlov’s dogs, Skinner’s pigeons, and Wolpe’s
cats, people were acted upon by environmental manipulations. Relax them, provide
stimuli to them, observe their responses, reward them etc. Mediating states them-
selves were viewed a la Mowrer (1939) and Miller (1948) as “little r’s” subject to
the same stimuli and reinforcing events as overt behavior.
Relaxation as an Active Cognitive Process
Radical behavioristic theorizing was exemplified by the pioneering research and

clinical work of a physician, Edmund Jacobson (1929). He published numerous
investigations of training in deep muscle relaxation, painstaking exercises to relax
24 G. C. Davison
muscles to the extent that proprioceptive stimuli were eliminated and therefore, he
asserted, all affect and ideation. Per John Watson’s radical behaviorism (Watson,
1913), it was the reduction of proprioceptive stimuli that effected a reduction in
anxiety and even thought. This led Wolpe to build systematic desensitization on
muscle relaxation as a functional substitute for the eating that Mary Cover Jones
had employed as an anxiety-inhibiting “response” in eliminating little Peter’s fear
of rabbits (Jones, 1924).
This was the context for two events, one based on clinical observation, the other
on some reading I did during my short period in Tony Deutsch’s physiological psy-
chology laboratory.
On the clinical side, recall the many hours I was fortunate to sit in with Arnie
Lazarus during his visiting year at Stanford, 1963–1964. Watching him conduct
training in muscle relaxation with anxious patients, I was struck by the emphasis on
alternate tensing and relaxing of muscles. Of particular interest was the “letting go”
part of the exercises, the softly spoken instructions to the patient that they actively
release the tension that they had just created in a group of muscles (for transcripts
of such exercises, see pp. 82–98 in Goldfried & Davison, 1976). It was a very active
process. The reduction in tension, the reduction of proprioceptive input from the
muscles, was created by the patient releasing the tension.
I saw a possible connection between Jacobson’s peripheralistic conception of
thought and feeling with research in curare, a drug that is sometimes used to prevent
anesthetized surgery patients from moving their bodies in ways that would interfere
with the surgery. Their striate muscles are rendered flaccid via a blocking of excit-
atory efferent nerve impulses at the neuromuscular junction. In plain language, mes-
sages from the brain don’t get translated into contraction of the muscle. Experiments
with curarized rats as reviewed by Solomon and Turner (1950) showed, though, that
avoidance learning is possible when the musculature is rendered flaccid by curare,
supporting the presence of anxiety under total curarization.
These animal findings were confirmed in a remarkable article by Smith, Brown,
Toman, and Goodman (1947). One of the co-authors, a biologist, had himself para-
lyzed with the drug without being rendered unconscious. He found it an absolutely
terrifying experience. Even though he was on a ventilator and in good hands medi-
cally with professionals he trusted, he found it alarming not to be able to move his
muscles. Hardly surprising! He did, though, try mightily to do so, which strongly
suggests that his cortex was sending efferent messages to his muscles to tense up.
Ergo, reduction in proprioceptive feedback from muscles is not at all inconsistent
with cognition and anxiety, contrary to the Watsonian theorizing of Edmund
Jacobson and Joseph Wolpe.
I summarized the implications of these animal and human studies as follows:
… there seems to be an important difference between relaxing one’s own muscles and hav-
ing them relaxed by a paralytic drug, quite aside from one’s subjective reactions. In both
states there is a virtual elimination of proprioceptive feedback from the muscles. If one
looks beyond the elimination of afferents, he might ask whether efferent activity offers a
clue. Quoting from Ruch et al. (1961), ‘Reduction of a skeletal muscle is accomplished by
inhibition within the spinal cord of the motorneurons which excite it (p. 221).’ Therefore, it
would seem that, in a person relaxing his own musculature, the efferent activity from his
cortex would be quite different from that during muscle contraction, i.e., it would entail
inhibitory efferents which would block activity in the actual efferents that innervate mus-
cles. (Davison, 1966a, p. 446)
And with respect to awareness or cognition, I pointed out that:

Briefly stated, if we are to suggest that letting go of one’s muscles is the crucial factor in the
use of Jacobsonian relaxation in systematic desensitization, a question to ask might be
whether, over above the afferent feedback we usually get as a result of an efferent, we can
be aware of our efferents. By means of an experiment on spatial visual localization in
humans, Festinger and Canon (1965) have been able to show that we do, in fact, make use
of ‘outflow information’. (p. 446)
Putting it all together – the clinical practice of teaching deep muscle relaxation and
the human experience of abject terror when the muscles are relaxed by a drug – led
me to conclude that awareness (cognition) and agency by the person had to be incor-
porated into behavior therapy, a self-evident truth that I’m sure was not lost on
practicing behavior therapists but was not incorporated into the “conditioning thera-
pies” behavior therapy paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. Obviously people are
active controllers and deciders rather than passive organisms being acted upon by
the environment. This fact needed to be formally integrated into behavior therapy.
Countercontrol
The other stream regarding agency and cognition arises from a paper I gave at the
annual international Banff Conference on Behavior Modification in Banff, Canada
in the spring of 1972 and published in a volume edited by the conference organizers
(Davison, 1973). I decided to talk about a topic I had been discussing with Stony
Brook colleagues for a few years, namely countercontrol (Skinner, 1953).
Of course this concept, referred to as resistance for many decades, is an integral
part of psychoanalytic thinking, indeed a very important defensive maneuver by the
patient’s unconscious to avoid examination of repressed problems that needed to be
explored to effect improvement. And the similar concept of “reactance” had been a
focus in social psychology since Brehm (1966). So the idea was nothing new. But in
spite of Skinner’s (1953) discussion, there was little if any serious attention paid to
countercontrol in the early behavior therapy literature, to the best of my knowledge.
In the Banff paper I described many ways that patients could resist behavior therapy
treatment. For example, if a patient undergoing systematic desensitization does not
generate a fearsome image when asked by the therapist to do so, there is no way that
imaginal exposure to an instantiation of the person’s fear is going to happen. And
regardless of the change mechanisms hypothesized to be operating that underlie the
efficacy of the procedure – which I explored at length with one of my first Ph.D. stu-
dents, Terry Wilson (Wilson & Davison, 1971; Davison & Wilson, 1973) – nothing
was going to happen if the patient didn’t follow some basic procedural require-
ments. Not that our clinical pioneers were unaware of the need for patients to follow
26 G. C. Davison
directions, but it took the form of what I found to be rather casual instructions like
“Have the patient lean back in a comfortable chair;” “Ask the patient to imagine
scenes that you present to her;” “Be sure to have the patient raise a finger when she
feels even the slightest degree of anxiety and then to stop imagining the aversive
image.” Nothing startling here except that words like “have” as in “have the patient
stop imagining” and other such cooperative rule-following were lightly glossed
over and not fully addressed conceptually within a behavioristic paradigm in which
the imagining of a fearsome event is the functional equivalent of sounding a tone
that had been previously associated with an electric shock in an experiment with
rats. (The example here is systematic desensitization but the principle applies across
the board.)
A few years later Marv Goldfried and I (Goldfried & Davison, 1976) elaborated
on the concept of resistance in our chapter on the therapeutic relationship, suggest-
ing various ways that clinicians might reduce the patient’s reluctance and lack of
cooperation or actually to use it to enhance therapeutic change. Many of our propos-
als can be seen in later developments in what has come to be referred to as “third
wave” behavior therapies, such as dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, 1993) and
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al., 1999).6
Attribution
You may recall that I went to Stanford primarily to work with Leon Festinger in
dissonance theory. Though I switched to clinical during my first year, social psy-
chology remained an area of great interest. And why not? Social psychologists con-
cern themselves with humans as “the social animal”, the title of Eliot Aronson’s
charming and engaging introduction to the field (Aronson, 1972). This metatheo-
retical perspective was the theme of an important book by a Arnold Goldstein,
Kenneth Heller, and Lee Sechest (1966) “Psychotherapy and the Psychology of
6
My countercontrol paper had a section aimed at behavior therapy colleagues who were enthused
primarily about operant conditioning and who interpreted Skinner as discouraging, even forbid-
ding, inferences about mediators like thoughts, feelings, and willing. While colleagues more
knowledgeable about Skinner than I regard such rejection of internal states as a misinterpretation
of Skinner, it was a guiding assumption at least during the earliest stages of what was called
“behavior modification.” But, I asked in my presentation, what if patients change their overt behav-
ior due to any manner of contingency management without changing their actual feelings and
thinking, domains which of course constitute the focus of CBT? I then semi-facetiously proposed
“the Kol Nidre Effect” to describe this possibility. For my non-Jewish colleagues: Kol Nidre is a
Jewish prayer chanted on the evening of Yom Kippur, the day of atonement. It means “all vows”
and it is believed to have originated over a thousand years ago but is usually associated with the
forced conversion of Jews to Catholicism during the Spanish Inquisition in the fifteenth century.
The prayer asks for God’s forgiveness for having behaved contrary to Jewish beliefs, that is, chang-
ing only one’s overt behavior just to keep from getting killed. So I suggested that even if one
obtained the collaboration/cooperation of the patient, a focus only on overt behavior might well not
be enough to effect meaningful and enduring change.
Behavior Change”. In this scholarly and prescient book, a strong case was made for
the emerging science of clinical behavior change to encompass theory and research
in social psychology. And an inherent part of social psychology is of course cogni-
tive in nature.
My growing interest in bringing cognition into behavior therapy, spurred on no
doubt by the Goldstein et al. book, developed further during my fledging days at
Stony Brook when I began an exhilarating collaboration with Stuart Valins, a
Stanley Schachter Ph.D. Given the very environmentalistic and openly manipulative
stance of early behavior therapy, it occurred to us that the reasons we give to why
we have changed, in other words our attributions for change, might be important in
how that change would be maintained once formal therapy sessions are terminated.
How do patients view the reasons for their improvement? The usual relapses follow-
ing the termination of drug therapies – if indeed they are ever terminated – are
consistent with the hypothesis that people who attribute their improvement to an
external source like a drug are less likely to maintain their therapeutic gains than
patients who attribute their change to something internal to themselves.
Valins and I decided to examine this issue in a laboratory analogue of drug treat-
ment. The study was described as an evaluation of a new drug7 that increased peo-
ple’s ability to tolerate pain. Subjects (a) underwent a pain threshold and shock
tolerance test, (b) ingested what they believed was a drug (really a placebo), and (c)
repeated the test with the shock intensities surreptitiously halved. All subjects were
thus led to believe that a drug had changed their tolerance for pain. Half of the sub-
jects were then told that they had actually received a placebo, whereas the other half
continued to believe that they had received a true pain-reducing drug. It was found
that subjects who attributed their behavior change to themselves (i.e., who believed
they had ingested a placebo) subsequently perceived the shocks as less painful and
tolerated significantly more than subjects who attributed their behavior change to
the drug (Davison & Valins, 1969).
I then did a conceptual replication (Davison et al., 1973). Undergraduate and
graduate students suffering from insomnia participated in a controlled field experi-
ment in which beneficial change was brought about in falling to sleep via a treat-
ment package composed of 1000 mg of chloral hydrate per night and modified
Jacobsonian (Jacobson, 1929) relaxation procedures as well as regularizing when
Ss were to get into bed for sleep. Following treatment, half of the Ss were told that
they had received an optimal dosage of the sleep aid while the others were informed
that the dosage they had received was too weak to have been responsible for any
improvement. All Ss were then instructed to discontinue the drug but to continue
with the relaxation and scheduling procedures during a post-treatment week. As
predicted, greater maintenance of therapeutic gain was achieved by those who could
not attribute their changes to the drug. Participants were also asked how often they
had continued their relaxation exercises and sleep-scheduling during the week
7
As an ode to Schachter and Singer’s “Suproxin”, we called our drug “Parataxin”.
28 G. C. Davison
following their being told whether they had received an optimal versus an inade-
quate dose of the sleep aid. No differences in their self-reports emerged.
Taken together, I concluded that these two experiments on analogue and actual
drug treatment had important practical and conceptual implications for behavior
therapy and contributed to the new field of cognitive behavior therapy. As an exten-
sion of general experimental psychology, behavior therapy was essentially environ-
mentalistic, looking to external variables for the control and alteration of “abnormal”
behavior. The literature of the time was marked by little if any concern about how
the individual so manipulated perceives the reasons for their changing. Early behav-
ior therapy – in its theorizing though probably not in its practice – seemed to be
consistent with the assumption that behavior therapy clients construe the reasons for
change to be outside themselves, that is, that therapeutic improvement is to be
attributed primarily if not entirely to external influence. It seemed to me that espe-
cially the operant approaches would pose problems for the maintenance of behavior
change once the artificially imposed contingencies are withdrawn (cf. Davison,
1969); and the difficulty of maintaining therapeutic change might be accounted for
at least in part by the notions of attribution proposed by Valins and myself. If a per-
son realizes that his behavior change is totally dependent upon an external reward
or punishment, there is no reason in the patient’s mind for his new behavior to per-
sist once the environmental contingencies change. The external contingencies
assumption, widely held in the 1960s and even for decades letter, can be seen in the
belief that maintaining desired changes had to be effected through trying to ensure
that patients would receive reinforcement from the social environment in which
they were living, rather than to working to make changes in internal processes like
beliefs, schemata, and attributions, the foci of cognitive behavior therapy. And it is
noteworthy, I believe, that this shift coincided with the psychotherapy integration
movement of the 1970s with my 1976 book with Marv Goldfried and the 1977 book
by Paul Wachtel, discussed below. But before we get to that, I’d like to discuss
another relevant theme.
Perceived Control
As part of my interest in cognitive factors is an experiment the idea for which grew
out of one of my graduate school specialty examinations. As a behavior therapy
warrior and enthusiast for all things Wolpean as well as for the animal avoidance
learning experiments and scholarly writings in the 1940s and 1950s inspired by
O. H. Mowrer and Neal Miller (Mowrer, 1939; Miller, 1948), I was intrigued by a
1948 rat experiment by Mowrer and Viek entitled “An Experimental Analogue of
Fear from a Sense of Helplessness.” Interestingly it was published in the Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, a journal that very, very seldom published studies
using non-human models. Because the concept of control and most especially per-
ceived control has become important in social psychology (Taylor, 1983) and in
CBT, I’d like to provide some background and details.
The avoidance learning literature, which was the foundation of most of early
behavior therapy’s appeal to “modern learning theory, was almost entirely with rats.
(Wolpe’s creative experiments in the early 1950s employed cats [Wolpe, 1952],
perhaps because he was using Masserman’s earlier experiments involving cats
[Masserman, 1943] as an animal model.) It was for this reason that I channeled my
youthful energies into a diligent and comprehensive study of the animal avoidance
learning literature as part of my doctoral specialty exams at Stanford in the summer
and early fall of 1964. My growing interest in and respect for Wolpe was enriched
by the increasingly cognitive interests of two of my primary instructors, Albert
Bandura and Walter Mischel, and most importantly by my “clinical apprenticeship”
with Arnold Lazarus. These cognitive influences went back a couple of years to my
undergraduate mentorship under Jerome Bruner at Harvard, to be discussed below.
For all these reasons, at least as I reflect retrospectively over the past 55+ years, I
began to chafe under the early behavior therapy constraints of “modern learning
theory” and I returned to my undergraduate appreciation that a useful understanding
of the human condition had to include explicit and careful attention to cognitive
factors. If this sounds naïve and dated, that is totally understandable. But it was dia-
metrically opposed to the foundational behavior therapy mantra against what Perry
London aptly termed “the insight therapies,” which included all that had come
before, principally psychoanalytic/psychodynamic and humanistic-existential
approaches.8
In the aforementioned experiment by Mowrer and Viek, laboratory rats were
trained in an instrumental response to obtain food. Then they were shocked when
eating the food reinforcer. Randomly selected rats were then assigned to one of two
conditions. One group was able to terminate the shock by jumping. Each member of
this “control” group was paired with/yoked to a rat in the “no control” group, for
whom the shock was terminated not by anything it was doing when shocked but
when its partner in the “control” group made the movement that terminated the
shock. Thus, nothing that the “no control” rats did had any bearing on how long they
had to endure the shock; that was determined by its yoked partner’s behavior in the
“control” group. The rats whose jumping terminated the shock later exhibited less
fear than the group that had no actual control over the shock.
These experimental findings were consistent with prior (e.g., Rotter, 1954) as
well as with subsequent clinical and anthropological observations of people’s reac-
tions to fearsome events over which they have no actual control. For example, in a
1957 anthropological report by Richter, entitled “On the Phenomenon of Sudden
Death in Animals and Man”, it was reported that “A Brazilian Indian condemned
8
The contempt for insight-oriented paradigms, in particular psychoanalysis and its variants but
also the humanistic-existential tradition of Rogers and Maslow, can be appreciated by the colorful
first paragraph of Andrew Salter’s classic Conditioned Reflex Therapy: “It is high time that psycho-
analysis, like the elephant of fable, drag itself off to some distant jungle graveyard and died.
Psychoanalysis has outlived its usefulness. Its methods are vague, its treatment is long drawn out,
and more often than not, its results are insipid and unimpressive” (Salter, 1949, p. 1). This kind of
mantra was common in the earliest behavior therapy/modification literature of the 1950s and 1960s.
30 G. C. Davison
and sentenced to death by a so-called medicine man is helpless against his own
emotional response to this pronouncement – and dies within hours…. In New
Zealand a Maori woman eats fruit that she only later learns has come from a taboo
place. Her chief has been profaned. By noon of the next day she is dead (Basedow,
1925, cited in Richter, 1957, p. 191).”
Reports like this abound in the anthropology literature. Similar observations can
be found in our own society. Bettelheim, for example, a concentration camp survi-
vor, wrote as follows (I am citing him despite the controversies that swirl around
him. The following quote is consistent with numerous other reports): “Prisoners
who came to believe the repeated statements of the guards – that there was no hope
for them, and that they would never leave the camp except as a corpse – who came
to feel that their environment was one over which they could exercise no influence
whatever… these prisoners were in effect walking corpses… they had given the
environment total power over them (Bettelheim, 1960, pp. 151–152).”
My aforementioned case study about paranoid delusions (Davison, 1966b), my
collaboration with Stu Valins on attribution (Davison & Valins, 1969), my clinical
experience and clinical supervision during my first few years at Stony Brook – I
think that all these factors underlay how I began to interpret the Mowrer-Viek study.
With a measure of unabashed anthropomorphism, I hypothesized that for humans it
might not (entirely) be the objective measure of control that was important, rather it
might be the perception of control. That is, perhaps stress can be reduced in humans
if the belief is induced that it is under their control even if it not. I began brainstorm-
ing with another Stony Brook colleague, James Geer, and, together with a promis-
ing undergraduate, Robert Gatchel, we designed an analogue experiment with
humans to address the issue.
Briefly stated, male undergraduate volunteers underwent a series of 6-s painful
electric shocks – levels set at mildly painful for each subject – at baseline while their
stress (spontaneous GSR fluctuations) and reaction times to turn off each shock
were measured. Then half the subjects were told that if their reaction times to a
second series of shocks were quick enough, the duration of the shocks would be
reduced in length from 6 s to 3 s. The other half were simply told that their second
series of shocks would be reduced to 3 s in duration. In fact, the second series of
shocks were reduced from 6 s to 3 s for all subjects, the key difference being that
“control” Ss believed that they were exerting control over the duration of the second
series of shocks. As predicted, those subjects who believed incorrectly that they
were exerting control over aversive stimulation reacted with less stress than those
who did not. We considered these findings all the more significant since other
research had shown that our perceived control Ss might have been more on edge
during the second series of shocks because they were performing a demanding task,
trying to reduce their reaction times, in order to achieve a goal, namely reducing
their discomfort. The important role of belief in control moved us to end the article
with a reference to the anthropologist Malinowski (1949) to the effect that “Man
creates his own gods to fill in gaps in his knowledge about a sometimes terrifying
environment.9 Perhaps the next best thing to being master of one’s fate is being
deluded into thinking at he is (Geer et al., 1970, pp. 737–738).”10
Of course, reality bites. Nonveridical perception, like primary process thinking a
la Freud, has its limits,11 but the concept of perceived control has become a focus of
great interest in both social and clinical psychology.
Science and Practice: A Two-Way Street
As a new assistant and then associate professor at Stony Brook, I was invited in
1968 to co-author a chapter with Arnold Lazarus entitled “Clinical Innovation in
Research and Practice.” It was to be included in the weighty “Handbook of
Psychotherapy and Behavior Change” that Allen Bergin and Sol Garfield were put-
ting together. The list of contributors was impressive and I felt almost giddy about
being asked, especially since I would be co-authoring the piece with my mentor,
teacher, and soon-to-be best friend Arnie Lazarus. It turned out to be a piece that
managed to annoy as many people as it pleased. In this chapter we tried to lay out
the intricate relationships, dialectics if you will, between applied and scientific work
in clinical psychology and other mental health disciplines. Among the unique char-
acteristics of clinical work that we deemed essential was the following:
While it is proper to guard against ex cathedra statements based upon flimsy and subjective
evidence, it is a serious mistake to discount the importance of clinical experience per se.
There is nothing mysterious about the fact that repeated exposure to any given set of condi-
tions makes the recipient aware of subtle cues and contingencies in that setting which elude
the scrutiny of those less familiar with the situation. Clinical experience enables a therapist
to recognize problems and identify trends that are usually beyond the perceptions of nov-
ices, regardless of their general expertise. It is at this level that new ideas come to the prac-
titioner and often constitute breakthroughs that could not be derived from animal analogues
or tightly controlled investigations. Different kinds of data and differing levels of informa-
tion are obtained in the laboratory and the clinic. Each is necessary, useful, and desirable.
(Lazarus & Davison, 1971, p. 199)
9
The reader may recall my using Malinowski in persuading the paranoid patient to entertain a more
naturalistic explanation of his delusional beliefs. Clearly I still am influenced by his book, which
was part of a sophomore tutorial seminar.
10
I’m sure that the later Walter Mischel, my old teacher and mentor, would not have minded my
recounting the following. When he was editor of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
I was visiting at Stanford in 1969–1970 and was officed across the hall from him. He had received
reviews of our manuscript and had decided to accept it. In what is surely the rarest of experiences,
he came into my office smiling and gave me the good news. But he then asked if I would be pre-
pared to drop the quote from Malinowski. “We don’t usually have articles that end in a poem”, he
said with that twinkle in the eye that marked his delightfully impish sense of humor. “But I really
like it,” I replied, “It makes an important point.” One of my few wins with MIschel.
11
It also has possible strengths, like enhancing a sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and encour-
aging persistence and efforts to achieve certain goals.
32 G. C. Davison
The importance we placed on clinical work was anathema to some of our behavior
therapy colleagues, who inveighed against the role that on-the-ground experience
had in developing a scientific approach to etiology, assessment, and intervention
(which included not only what community psychologists call tertiary prevention but
also primary and second prevention, efforts to prevent clinical problems in the first
place and efforts to keep developing problems from getting worse, respectively). It
may not be a controversial issue these days, but those who were not around
50-plus years ago might benefit from appreciating that it was a major kerfuffle.
Behavior therapy was trying mightily, some would say frantically, to be taken seri-
ously as a scientific approach to intervention. Arguing that the more scientific peo-
ple were limited if they were not experienced in applied settings was troublesome
and viewed as a risk to the scientific respectability of our approach.
Controlled research (as defined by a community of knowledge-generators at a
given place and time) can be informed by clinical experience about which phenom-
ena are worthy of study. In fact, as stated above by Lazarus and myself, relevant
clinical science requires such applied experiences. Clinical observations have pri-
marily heuristic value; scientific research tests the ideas and hypotheses emanating
from the applied setting. The interactions – two-way street as we put it initially and
as I renamed it later, dialectics – are mutually enriching. Both components are
essential to a clinical psychology that is both scientifically based and professionally
relevant.
Since I was a young pup in graduate school, behavior therapy was an exemplar
of this interaction between and blending of research and practice. Indeed, we were
doing “evidence-based practice” long before the term and variations thereof became
a mantra in mental health fields. But is there a gap between research and practice?
Absolutely, and this has for years been the subject of discussion in education and
training circles, though we have found an appreciation of the applied side primarily
among colleagues who are experienced in clinical work themselves and/or in clini-
cal supervision.12
The original position of behavior therapy was that it was the application of
“modern learning theory” to the modification of abnormal behavior. This definition
was, it always seemed to me, more aspirational than actual – as I learned in graduate
school, controversies abound in the field of learning and memory. But setting this
aside for the moment, Lazarus and I put the challenge this way:
The clinician… approaches his work with a given set, a framework for ordering the com-
plex data that are his [or her] domain. But frameworks [paradigms, theories, hypotheses,
hunches etc.] are insufficient. The clinician, like any other applied scientist, must fill out the
theoretical skeleton. Individual cases present problems that always call for knowledge
beyond basic psychological principles. (Lazarus & Davison, 1971, p. 203).
12
The interested reader might like to look at my analyses of APA’s report on “empirically-based
practice in psychology” published in The Clinical Psychologist during my year as president of
APA’s Division 12, The Society of Clinical Psychology (Davison, 2006a, b, c).
This dialectical interplay between theory and research, on the one hand, and prac-
tice on the other is where the rubber hits the road. This is true not only in clinical
psychology but in every specialization that employs experimental methods. Consider
the following from the esteemed Handbook of Social Psychology, a chapter by
esteemed social psychologists Eliot Aronson and Merrill Carlsmith:
In any experiment, the investigator chooses a procedure which he intuitively feels is an
empirical realization of his conceptual variable. All experimental procedures are ‘con-
trived’ in the sense that they are invented. Indeed it can be said that the art [italics added]
of experimentation rests primarily on the skill of the investigator to judge the procedure
which is the most accurate realization of his conceptual variable and has the greatest impact
and the most credibility for the subject. (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968, p. 25)
Principles of Change Not Treatment Packages
Consistent with the very beginnings of behavior therapy, my focus has always been
on principles and mechanisms rather than techniques and certainly not on treatment
packages that are often vigorously marketed in workshops and sold in books. When
Albert Bandura, my Doktorvater, published his classic and daunting tome, Principles
of Behavior Modification in 1969, my delight was surpassed only by my lack of
surprise. What was far more important than extant therapeutic procedures or thera-
pies named after their founders/promoters was the underlying mechanisms. An
example of this was my 1965 dissertation, the publication of which was entitled
“Systematic Desensitization as a Counterconditioning Process” (Davison, 1968).
But, in my view, the focus shifted in the 1980s to comparing treatment package
with each other. A landmark effort was by Sloane, Staples, Cristol, Yorkston, and
Whipple (1975), followed by the famous NIMH Treatment of Depression
Collaborative Research Program (Elkins et al., 1985) which cost many millions of
dollars and which provided material for many scores of articles, each of them seeing
in the voluminous data reasons to feel good about Beck’s version of CBT, Klerman’s
psychodynamic therapy (Klerman, 1990), and even the venerable placebo effect.13
The seeds for a welcome return to basic science can be seen in this excerpt from
Goldfried’s and my Preface to Clinical Behavior Therapy, to wit:
…. We have attempted to describe the way behavior therapists analyze clinical problems
and move from general principles to clinical applications [italics added] … We hope that
the book will serve a heuristic purpose in helping the reader generate clinical innovations
within a broad behavioral framework. (Goldfried & Davison, 1976, pp. vi–vii)
This principles-focussed conception of CBT (and of any science-based approach to

therapeutic change, which was certainly characterized by Rogers and indeed by
13
In my teaching I’ve sometimes referred to the findings as a giant Rorschach test.
34 G. C. Davison
Freud) has emerged in recent years as a more productive strategy than the treatment
package approach of comparing treatment X with Y in what some have called the
gold standard for research in psychotherapy. Obviously, I and others have never
agreed with that (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Davison, 1994, 1997, 2000; Davison et al.,
1970; Goldfried, 1980; Rosen & Davison, 2003). I went further almost 20 years ago
in proposing a research strategy that turns therapy research on its head:
Several years ago I commented on the role of basic research in clinical psychology
(Davison, 1994) and had occasion to develop the argument further during a conference
sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) concerned with untapped
opportunities to use basic research in developing clinical procedures de novo (Davison,
1997). Simply put, searching for change mechanisms in existing effective techniques is to
work after the fact, and although such process research is very important …, working in the
other direction may be even better …: Moving from experimentally established principles
of change to novel and effective clinical application … is an inadequately explored strategy
for developing new therapeutic procedures that, from the outset, will have known mecha-
nisms of change because such research begins with principles of change. (Davison,
2000, p. 581)
Abnormal Psychology Textbook
The complex and vital dialectical tension between science and practice played a role
in my collaborating in the writing of an abnormal psychology textbook with my late
Stony Brook colleague and friend, John Neale. After teaching the undergraduate
course for 5 years, I came to realize that there wasn’t a textbook whose leitmotif was
the interplay that I had come to recognize in my clinical work and teaching. I had
been using a very fine book by Brendan Maher (1966) and then for 1 year the text-
book by Leonard Ullmann and Leonard Krasner (Ullmann & Krasner, 1969).
Maher’s book was excellent in its scientific approach to the subject matter but, in
my view, didn’t emphasize enough the applied side of things. Ullmann and Krasner
appealed to my behavior therapy interests but was too extreme in trying to apply
operant conditioning to the entire gamut of psychopathology and treatment.
For these and other reasons, I began discussing with Neale in the fall of 1971
whether we could co-author a textbook that would truly integrate science and clini-
cal application. I saw it at the time as an incarnation of the Boulder Model (Raimy,
1950), with a heavy emphasis on hard-nosed analysis blended with the humanity
and complexity of intervention. Reflecting this focus, the subtitle of the first edition
was “An Experimental-Clinical Approach (Davison & Neale, 1974).”
Since I was by that time strongly identified with CBT, the book was seen by
many as a cognitive-behavioral one integrated with a strong emphasis on biological
factors. It was actually by no means limited to CBT, and, especially in succeeding
editions, the importance of non-cognitive-behavioral perspectives was explored at
length and in depth. Our primary audience was the so-called upper-tier
undergraduate market and, to some extent, beginning graduate students in the men-
tal health disciplines. For me, the book and its many succeeding editions constituted
the most intense and challenging scholarly activity of my entire career.
It is gratifying to observe that the book was well-received. I had the responsibil-
ity and the opportunity to describe and critically discuss the kinds of issues in CBT
that are covered in this chapter. In my more than 55 years of teaching, I have never
worked harder than when I had to explain the complexities of psychopathology, sci-
ence and practice, CBT and of psychotherapy generally in this book and in my
hundreds of hours in the classroom. It has been said that you never really understand
a topic until you’ve explained it adequately to (motivated) undergraduates and to
graduate students. I can attest to that simple truth.14
Clinical Complexity and Psychotherapy Integration
Based on our respective clinical supervisory experiences, Marvin Goldfried and I

began collaborating in 1972 on “Clinical Behavior Therapy” (Goldfried & Davison,
1976). I believe that this book was seminal in what was then the somewhat heretical
notion that we (cognitive) behavior therapists might have something to learn from
our non-behavioral colleagues and vice versa. Coupled with Wachtel’s classic 1977
book, “Psychoanalysis and Behavior Therapy: Toward a Rapprochement,” I believe
we helped create a fruitful dialogue with theorists, researchers, and clinicians who
began both to feel uneasy about the limitations of their respective approach and to
believe that there might be something of value in other approaches.
It seemed to us that the more hands-on actual clinical experience one had, the
less certain one was with the hegemony of one’s preferred theoretical orientation.
To be sure, one way that science progresses is for scientists to be dogged about their
paradigm or theory as a way to test the limits. Researchers seldom forsake an
hypothesis or, or a grander scale, their theory or paradigm the first time that an
experiment doesn’t work out or, in clinical settings, when one’s preferred approach
does not yield the hoped-for outcome. It’s a tricky business to know when to give up
on an idea and when to stay with it by pursuing additional research or clinical
innovations.15
Goldfried and I held then, and hold now, that when clinicians of any theoretical
persuasion engage deeply in actual practice and/or thoughtful clinical supervision,
they recognize the limits of their preferred paradigm. Sometimes techniques can be
imported and assimilated into one’s applied and conceptual efforts (cf. the technical
14
Having studied during a Fulbright year at the University of Freiburg, it was quite thrilling to be
told by German colleagues that Davison/Neale has been a staple for decades in the Staatsexamen
in psychology, required for licensure and professional recognition.
15
For careful and incisive arguments against integration, see inter alia Haaga (1986).
36 G. C. Davison
eclecticism of Arnold Lazarus and the theoretical integrative efforts of Paul

Wachtel), sometimes not. Certainly we see in the mindfulness and acceptance
approaches of the past three decades a willingness to look outside of what can rea-
sonably be regarded as a cognitive-behavioral paradigm, and to develop techniques
and theories that take us far afield from “the mother ship.” This “third wave” is
discussed in other chapters of this volume.
It may be instructive to quote from the Preface of Goldfried and Davison:
A colleague of ours [Paul Wachtel] once alluded to a ‘therapeutic underground’ among
clinical workers of various orientations. He struck a resonant chord, for we are continually
impressed by the distance between written descriptions of behavior therapy and what
occurs in practice. In Clinical Behavior Therapy, we have tried, within the constraints of the
written word, to describe in detail the complexities inherent in effective and humane inter-
vention into the lives of others.
As behavior therapists, we are ever-mindful of the importance of tying our clinical
procedures to our data base. Whenever possible, we present material that is consistent
with available research. But as any knowledgeable student of behavior therapy can appre-
ciate, more is required of the behavioral clinician than familiarity with well-established
principles and procedures. Much of what you will find in this book will necessarily be
based on clinical experience, our own and that of our students and colleagues. While some
readers may be uncomfortable with an appeal to clinical experience, for the time being
this seems to be the most straightforward way of talking about clinical behavior therapy
and, most important, communicating our thinking to others. A special virtue of the behav-
ior therapy approach is that we are answerable to data, and are prepared to alter or give up
entirely any suggestion contained in this book that is found wanting in the light of con-
trolled research.
…. We have attempted to describe the way behavior therapists analyze clinical problems
and move from general principles to clinical applications… We hope that the book will
serve a heuristic purpose in helping the reader generate clinical innovations within a broad
behavioral framework. (Goldfried & Davison, 1976, pp. vi–vii).
The foregoing is meant to convey a few things of relevance and, I hope, interest.
First and foremost, it’s the focus we had – and still have, along with many col-
leagues – on the gap between science and practice and on the exquisitely complex
challenges clinicians confront at every moment with a patient. How do I intervene
right now and in the future in a way that has the most scientific evidence behind it
while at the same time making sense for this particular patient at this particular
time? This was a question Lazarus and I had framed a few years earlier, as
described above.
This science-practice gap is hardly specific to cognitive behavior therapy, but I
think it is especially pertinent for us because our core foundational assumption is
that we can apply findings from controlled research, usually analogue in nature, to
messy real-life situations, the complexity of which are never more profound and at
times more daunting than when dealing with behavior considered to be abnormal
and at least worthy of professional change efforts.
Related to this central theme of the Goldfried/Davison book is a feature dis-
cussed next that was designed to try to make vivid the great complexity and intel-
lectual challenge of clinical work.
he Therapist’s Thoughts and Feelings During Interactions

T
with Patients
Our cognitive-behavioral perspective and our intensive involvement in both clinical

supervision and hands-on clinical work, along with my role as director of Stony
Brook’s unique postdoctoral program in behavior therapy, established in 1966, the
same year that saw the first graduate students entering our as-yet-unaccredited clini-
cal Ph.D. program – all of these factors blended into a feature that I believe Goldfried
and I innovated in Clinical Behavior Therapy (1976, 1994). We wanted to share
with the reader the reasoning behind the on-the-ground implementation of change
principles. So we included numerous transcripts throughout the book but with a
novel pedagogical device that we believe is the core of good clinical supervision.
This was basically a think-aloud strategy that for me evolved from my senior thesis
with Bruner and anticipated my development of a research paradigm to be described
below. This pedagogical technique can be seen in the following excerpt from the
third session of a course of therapy. It illustrates how a cognitive behavior therapist
worked to reconceptualize the patient’s complaints into a behavioral framework,
giving her problems what we called “a behavioral twist”, a particular conceptualiza-
tion of the patient’s complaints. The italicized text in brackets are the thoughts of
the therapist:
Therapist: I’d like now to give you an idea of the problem as I see it, and then you can tell
me whether or not I’ve missed anything, and whether or not it agrees with the situation
as you see it. [I think I’ve pretty much covered the major problem areas. It’s time for me
to present a summary statement (a la Sullivan) so that she can fill in any gaps or change
any misconceptions I may have about the presenting problem. It can also help me com-
municate to her that I’ve been listening to what has been said so far and that I’m trying
to understand her.] The primary problem that you want to have dealt with involves your
nervousness and anxiety in social situations, primarily new situations, and particularly
when you feel you are being evaluated by others. This may involve being at a party,
presenting a talk, and other similar situations. Does that sound accurate?
Client: Yes, that’s about it. The most important problem in my day-to-day life is really my
anxiety when I’m with people….
Therapist: [Based on what she said earlier, I think her problem reflects more of an inhibition
than an actual behavioral or skill deficit…I’m going to have to check it out further ….]
There was one other thing you had mentioned. You said that when you are in social situ-
ations, you know what to say, and you know what to do, but you feel too nervous to say
or do it. Is that right? You become immobilized?
Client: Well, yes, but I wouldn’t say I’m immobilized, though I think I should certainly be
much better than I am. I do know what to do. I’m just afraid. (Goldfried & Davison,
1976, pp. 68–69)
We were trying to provide a glimpse into the inner world of the therapist, the kind
of monologue that all sentient beings engage in as they negotiate their way. A com-
mon element in clinical supervision is not only observing and discussing what one’s
supervisee did with a particular patient at a particular time during a session but why
the student-clinician did it. This teaching strategy is, I opine, no different from the
general cognitive-behavioral approach, only in the present context it entails both the
supervisor and the supervisee attending carefully to the thoughts and feelings
38 G. C. Davison
coursing through the clinician’s mind and using this information to understand the
reasons for what the therapist does.
Furthermore, attending to actual problem-solving in concrete applied situations
makes one less doctrinaire, I believe. It’s necessary to have principles and a theoreti-
cal framework when doing applied work, but abstractions are not enough. As APA’s
report of “empirically based practice in psychology” (APA, 2006) suggested, idio-
graphics matter, and when one is faced with the challenge of applying abstractions,
one inevitably ventures out of one’s particular conceptual framework, however
rough and crude as it may be, to put meat on the theoretical skeleton, to use the
metaphor Lazarus set forth in our 1971 effort.
The Phenomenological Essence of CBT
In recent years I have been teaching a first year required course in University of
Southern California’s clinical science program entitled “Clinical Interviewing and
Professional Issues.” For much of the semester, we practice Rogerian interviewing,
something which, in my halcyon graduate school days at Stanford, was ignored or
even derogated as an unnecessary element of “insight therapy,” one of the betes noir
of the brave new movement. I began to see the undesirability of this extreme focus
when I spent much of my second year sitting in on numerous clinical sessions con-
ducted by Arnold Lazarus, as noted earlier. Watching him for hundreds of hours, I
noticed that what he called “the nonspecifics” were really not non-specific at all,
rather they involved the kind of empathic listening that is the foundation of Carl
Rogers’s work. I began to see these strategies as a way both to establish a trusting
working relationship with the patient and also, most importantly, as a means to get
relevant information that was essential to designing and implementing a cogni-
tive behavioral intervention. Empathic listening helps fill out the familiar functional-
analytic framework for determining what Bandura called the “controlling variables”
necessary for devising and implementing a science-based intervention.
As I have argued for many years, CBT has much in common with humanistic
perspectives because it is at its core phenomenological. As I put it 40 years ago:
All cognitive behavior therapists heed the mental processes of their clients…. They pay
attention to the world as it is perceived by the client. It is not what impinges on us from the
outside that controls our behavior, the assumption that has guided stimulus-response psy-
chology for decades. Rather our feelings and [overt] behavior are determined by how we
view the world. [As often cited by Albert Ellis] The Greek philosopher Epictetus articulated
this core feature in the first century, ‘Men are not disturbed by things, but by the views they
take of them’. Thus behavior therapy is being brought closer to the humanistic therapies. A
central thesis of therapists like Rogers and Perls is that the client must be understood from
the client’s own frame of reference, from his or her phenomenological world, for it is this
perception of the world that controls life and behavior.
From the philosophical point of view, such assumptions on the part of those who would
understand people and try to help them are profoundly important. Experimentally minded
clinicians and researchers [i.e., cognitive behavior therapists and researchers] are intrigued
by how much the new field of cognitive behavior therapy has in common with the human-
ists and their attention to the phenomenological world of their clients. To be sure, the tech-
niques used by the cognitive behavior therapists are usually quite different from those of the
followers of Rogers and of Perls. But as students of psychotherapy and human nature, these
surface differences should not blind us to the [conceptual] links between the two approaches.
(Davison & Neale, 1982, pp. 616–617)
This is an important point, so allow me to elaborate.

The phenomenological core of humanistic and existential therapies, which is
essential to CBT, is, I believe, evident in the fact that Rogers and his followers did
not restrict their empathic work to what is obvious in the client’s verbal and nonver-
bal expressions. This was spelled out more clearly in Gerald Egan’s “The Skilled
Helper” (Egan, 1975). Here’s an example I have used often in my teaching of both
undergraduates and graduate students:
Client: I don’t know what’s going on. I study hard, but I just don’t get good marks. I think
I study as hard as anyone else, but all of my efforts seem to go down the drain. I don’t
know what else I can do.
Counselor A: You feel frustrated because even when you try hard you fail [primary
empathy].
Counselor B: It’s depressing to put in as much effort as those who pass and still fail. It gets
you down and maybe even makes you feel a little sorry for yourself [advanced empa-
thy]. (Egan, 1975, p. 135)
Bear in mind that therapists operating both within a humanistic-existential frame-
work and a cognitive-behavioral one assume that the client views things in an
unproductive way, as evidenced by the psychological distress that has brought the
client into therapy. At the primary empathic level, the therapist accepts this view,
understands it, and communicates to the client that it is appreciated and respected.
But at the advanced or interpretive level, the therapist offers something new, a per-
spective that he or she hopes is more productive and implies new modes of action.
Advanced empathizing builds on the information provided over a number of ses-
sions in which the therapist concentrates on making primary-level empathic
statements.
The client-centered therapist, operating within a phenomenological perspective,
must have as the goal the movement of a client from his or her present phenomeno-
logical world to another one, hence the importance of the advanced-empathy stage.
Since the core belief of both the humanists and cognitive-behavioral clinicians is
that people’s emotions and actions are determined by how they construe themselves
and their surroundings – by their phenomenology – those who are dysfunctional or
otherwise dissatisfied with their present mode of living are in need of a new phe-
nomenology. From the very outset, then, all phenomenological therapies concen-
trate on clients adopting frameworks different from what they had when they began
treatment. Merely to reflect back to clients their current phenomenology cannot in
itself bring therapeutic change. A new phenomenology must be acquired.
Thus, the core of CBT is essentially the same as all the phenomenological thera-
pies – what matters most is how people construe their world. And I would propose
also that the essence of Freud since his second theory of anxiety has been that the
perception, the recollection that people have of their past fearsome events, is more
40 G. C. Davison
important that what may actually have happened. This is worlds away from original
behavior therapy, whereby the person responds to stimuli and is either reinforced or
not. That’s an oversimplified picture of course but it is not inaccurate. What Rotter,
Kelly, Mischel, Bandura, and even myself brought into the picture was the centrality
of how patients view the world, the meaning they attach to what is going on in and
around themselves. The defining feature of the CBT paradigm has always been that
these constructions of the world can change the person’s emotional and behavioral
reactions in enduring ways.
This refocus on the internal has not been easy fit, and I have interacted over the
years with many CBT colleagues who object to being in bed with theoreticians and
therapists whom we have actively and sometimes poetically (cf. Salter, supra at
footnote 7) vilified. But at the end of the day, I believe that is where we have found
ourselves since at least the mid-1960s, with the seeds on this paradigmatic shift
being discernible in people not usually regarded as part of the CBT family (e.g.,
George Kelly and Julian Rotter).
The foregoing is most assuredly not new to today’s cognitive behavior therapy.
And that’s the point, for these ideas and practices were either poo-pooed by behav-
ior therapy’s leading lights in the 1950s and 1960s or were assigned to the realm of
“clinical know-how” or “non-specifics”, which was intellectually honest but not
conducive to searching and sober analysis of psychosocial assessment and
intervention.
Early Involvement in Basic Cognitive Research
The “cognitive revolution” in CBT of the past 4 decades has another thread for me
that I have alluded to above and believe would be useful to describe in greater detail.
This takes us back to my undergraduate days. As I wrote in the abnormal textbook
with John Neale beginning with the first edition in 1974, CBT really represents a
return to earlier periods in experimental psychology, for example the research of
Duncker on problem-solving (Duncker, 1926). My own extended and intensive
exposure to the study of cognition was during my undergraduate years as a research
assistant to and then a senior honors thesis advisee of Jerome S. Bruner, one of the
pioneers of the so-called “new look” in perception that germinated soon after the
second world war. Together with George Miller and other colleagues, Bruner’s pro-
lific theoretical and experimental publications (e.g., Bruner et al., 1956) demon-
strated the central importance of cognition in understanding the human condition, a
general perspective which I saw at the time as a response to his Harvard colleague,
B.F. Skinner, and his behavioristic focus on reinforcement contingencies with no
inference to internal cognitive and affective processes.
Pivotal for my entry into CBT years before the concept even existed was doing
my honors thesis with Bruner in 1955–1957. The purpose of my thesis was to
explore Duncker’s concept of “functional fixedness” – familiarity with a cognitive
challenge can interfere with rather than facilitate one’s solving it if one cannot shake
an hypothesis that is not proving fruitful. Changing one’s mind is often very diffi-
cult. Under Bruner’s supervision, I adapted Jean Piaget’s (1954) recording of chil-
dren talking to themselves while they solved problems. I had undergraduate subjects
verbalize their hypotheses about what was in pictures that were shown to them
gradually coming into focus, beginning with presentations in which each picture
was so blurry that virtually no one could accurately identify it. Participants’ words
were tape-recorded, transcribed, and then content-analyzed.
For example, one of the pictures I used was of a black puppy standing in sunlight
on grass. When the photo is very much out of focus, nearly everyone sees it as some
kind of heavy dark object like a sofa, a fat pig, some other kind of heavyset thing.
But as the photo becomes clearer, the shadow underneath the puppy’s stomach
becomes discernible as separate from the animal’s stomach. There is a sliver of light
between the tummy and the shadow, thus rendering the heavy dark thing as not so
heavy and fat, leading to the “aha” experience of its being a slimmer puppy. I coined
the term “constraint set” for the underlying assumption that tied together all the pre-
recognition hypotheses. The research participants seemed to be changing their
minds as the visual information improved, but, at a more basic level, they were not.
Like scientists operating within a theory or paradigm, their perception was, I pro-
posed, constrained by their general assumption of what the dark object was. And
their hypotheses, guesses actually, were almost always wrong because the poor
focus of each picture kind of seduced them into adopting a constraint set that was
inconsistent with the actual visual stimulus. They had to free themselves from their
earlier underlying assumption as the focus improved.
When I discuss this experiment with my students as an analogue to scientific
thinking I tell them the old joke about the inebriated man crawling around under a
streetlamp at midnight. “What are you doing?” asks a suspicious police officer.
“Lookin’ for my keys,” mutters the drunken man. “Well, do you remember where
you lost them?” inquires the police officer, now trying to be helpful. “Over there,”
says the man, gesturing to a dark area several yards in the distance. “Why are you
looking for the keys here? “asks the officer incredulously. “Because there’s light
here from the lamp.” I tell students that if they get the joke, they have some under-
standing of the nature of paradigms and theories in science.
Thus, in addition to replicating earlier research that prior exposure to suboptimal
visual stimuli interferes with accurate perception, my content analysis of partici-
pants’ pre-recognition hypotheses suggested a reason for this delay. When people
are trying to understand something that is complex and murky, they usually have
unspoken (unconscious, actually) assumptions of what it could be. When the data
are poor, their initial ideas are probably wrong. And these ideas, though they may be
changing as the information improves, are usually within a restricted domain of
which they are seldom even aware. People usually get attached to these underlying
assumptions even when additional and improved data become available. This has
been a theme in psychology from its very beginnings as a science, cf. the Wurzburg
School’s concept of “unbewusste Einstellung,” or “unconscious set”, in the early
twentieth century, a concept applied mostly to perception. and more recently
42 G. C. Davison
elaborated in the study of implicit bias in social prejudice (Greenwald & Banaji,
1995, 2017).
Even as a newly minted B.A. in 1961 – or maybe because of my youth – I boldly
suggested that my analogue experiment had implications far beyond looking at
fuzzy pictures gradually being brought into focus. I ended that first publication of
mine (Davison, 1964) with the proposal that my analysis of the findings could be
viewed as the way scientific hypotheses and theories function to both facilitate dis-
covery and to discourage it. Not to be limited to scientific inquiry, my imagination
took flight to propose that a societal-cultural Weltanschauung (world view) could be
fruitfully understood as a massive constraint set that helps make sense of the world
but that can also interfere with new and possibly more useful perspectives.16
Cognitive Assessment
Over the past 40 years or so there has been increasing interest in assessing the
thoughts and feelings, both overtly expressed and implied, as people go about their
daily lives. My think-aloud work with Bruner guided me to design a procedure that
could, I thought, enable us to assess thoughts and feelings in a situational context
consistent with the functional analytic behavioral paradigm.
In my original experiment on what we (Davison et al., 1983) called the
“Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations paradigm” (ATSS), subjects are
instructed and coached into immersing themselves imaginally in audiotaped com-
plex interpersonal situations, like being criticized, and verbalizing what is going
through their minds (cf. my discussion above of my undergraduate think-aloud
research with Jerome Bruner). To facilitate accessing their thoughts and feelings in
a non-retrospective and very situational fashion, our fictional scenarios are divided
into segments of between 5 s and 10 s in length. After each seconds-long segment is
presented, there is a pause and a signal to talk out loud about what is passing through
their minds in reaction to what they have just heard. After about 30 s to permit think-
ing aloud, another signal tells them to listen to the next segment and imagine some
more, and so on through a number of segments that comprise the story. The raw data
can then be content-analyzed in an infinite number of ways depending on one’s
theoretical focus.
Since the publication of the first article in 1983, dozens of subsequent experi-
ments, both in my lab and elsewhere, have employed the research paradigm to inves-
tigate the cognitive components of a wide range of human problems such as social
anxiety, depression, hate crimes, fear of flying, marital anger and aggression, and
withdrawal from smoking (for reviews see Davison et al., 1997; Zanov & Davison,
2010). Psychometrically the ATSS has been shown to possess good content,
16
Imagine my excitement when I read Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of scientific paradigms in terms of
perceptual set (Kuhn, 1962).
concurrent, predictive, and construct validity; and a variety of coding schemes have
been applied with a very high measure of interrater reliability. The ATSS is part of
the growing interest in situational cognitive assessment, such as Ecological
Momentary Assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994) and related approaches.
Ethics and Psychotherapy of All Kinds
My doctoral education in behavior therapy, as rigorous and sophisticated as was

available at the time, eschewed careful consideration of ethical issues, specifically,
what the goals of intervention were and how they were decided upon. Not that goals
were regarded as unimportant! The very nature of behavior therapy required a clear
sense of the directions that therapy would take. Not only was this fair to the patient
but it was essential in any attempts to evaluate the success of assessments and inter-
vention – one needs a dependent variable to do experimental research, after all.
But the kinds of changes that a behavior therapist and the client focused on were
seen as separate from the theories and findings being applied in therapeutic change
efforts. And in a way the two issues are. But responsible application cannot properly
eschew ethical considerations. This issue often brings to mind what I have described
as the Will Rogers “aw shucks” model. It goes something like this: “I’m just a
simple technician. I have techniques that I can use to help you move from Point A
to Point B. Point A is where you are right now. Point B is the goal of treatment. The
latter is your choice entirely. I’m not going to make that judgment for you. Assuming
that getting you to Point B is not illegal and/or unethical – I won’t desensitize you
to any anxieties around murdering someone, for example – you can hire me to help
you get there.”
Most of the time this works, that is, there is nothing to worry about. We are usu-
ally children of the same culture; agreement on values is more the rule than the
exception. The earliest patients that Wolpe and Lazarus reported on were clearly
suffering from anxieties and depression that were unwarranted, even diagnosable in
the DSM of the period, and which, if alleviated or eliminated, would allow the
patient to live a happier, more productive life. Surely a person who avoids social
interactions because of debilitating fears of negative evaluation deserves the benefit
of the evolving behavior therapy armamentarium of techniques that have been dem-
onstrated to be effective and that, at least metaphorically and rhetorically, derive
from theory and experimental data, the essential lifeblood of behavior therapy.
I had no problems with this perspective and system of (implicit) beliefs in gradu-
ate school and in the first few years of my academic and professional life. But things
began to shift, perhaps beginning with the following experience in the small, part-
time clinical practice that I have had for most of my career. One day in the spring of
1970 I was consulted by a very accomplished professional woman who, knowing of
my expertise in anxiety-reduction via systematic desensitization, asked me to help
her eliminate the extreme anxiety she felt about her husband cheating on her.
Possible anxiety hierarchy items, it was readily determined even in the first session,
44 G. C. Davison
included sitting alone at her kitchen table, a lovingly prepared dinner for two getting
cold, with the time approaching 10:00 pm, and her husband not yet home. The anxi-
ety was usually accompanied by anger and/or feelings of hopelessness and depres-
sion. Other anxiety-provoking scenes could readily be determined as I listened to
her tearful account. However, I felt uncomfortable with her request. Running
through my mind were questions as to whether, in my system of values and ethics,
a spouse should be or has every right to be anxious and angry about their partner
showing all sorts of signs of being unfaithful. So perhaps half an hour into the initial
session, I decided to share my ethical concerns and, while allowing for people’s
intimate relationships to be highly variable, I said (gently but unequivocally) that I
would not be comfortable working toward her stated goal of being able to tolerate
her husband’s infidelity. Then I engaged her in a discussion about her own perspec-
tives on marriage. I no longer have my notes on this session of more than 50 years
ago but I do clearly recall her relief that I was not prepared to meet her stated
wishes. She was eager to schedule several more sessions to discuss the problems in
her marriage and how she might try to make changes in the relationship rather than
within herself in an effort to remain married. As things turned out, I learned a few
years after termination that the marriage had been dissolved.17
I’m certain that other therapists have had similar experiences, many of them
preceding my own. My point is that, despite what I consider to have been very good
education and training in behavior therapy in the early 1960s, I cannot recall these
issues being thoroughly explored.18
My concerns about ethics and behavior change took an unexpected and rather
cataclysmic turn when I became president-elect of the Association for Advancement
of Behavior Therapy in 1972. As may be familiar to some readers, I argued against
offering sexual reorientation therapy to gay people in my 1974 AABT presidential
address. I had been inspired by remarks of Charles Silverstein (1972).19 The core of
my speech (published 2 years later, Davison, 1976) was that the values and biases
of therapists inevitably influence the way they construe problems and which goals
they work towards; that goals are determined much more by the therapist than by
the patient; that therapists never make decisions about goals outside of a political
and moral context; and that changeof-orientation programs should be stopped, even
when gay patients request them, because prejudice and often physical attacks have
made it highly unlikely that “voluntary” change requests are in fact self-determined.
Several years later, I offered the following fantasy to try to encapsulate the situation
of gays in therapy as of the 1970s (that this argument may seem belabored and
unnecessary in the 2020s speaks to how much things have changed in many seg-
ments of North American society and indeed around the world):
17
The reader may have a different conception of marriage. It might be religious – marriage is
sacred and divorce must be avoided at all costs. This possibility proves my point.
18
The exception was Lazarus’s ethical view that sometimes efforts to “save a marriage” can be not
only unsuccessful but even destructive and demeaning.
19
A documentary film, “Conversion”, has recently been released that portrays Charles Silverstein’s
and my seminal roles in the movement against conversion therapy.
API (Apocryphal Press International).The governor recently signed into law a bill prohibit-
ing discrimination in housing and job opportunities on the basis of membership in a
Protestant Church. This new law is the result of efforts by militant Protestants, who have
lobbied extensively during the past ten years for relief from institutionalized discrimination.
In an unusual statement accompanying the signing of the bill, the governor expressed the
hope that this legislation would contribute to greater social acceptance of Protestantism as
a legitimate, albeit unconventional, religion.
At the same time, the governor authorized funding in the amount of twenty million dol-
lars for the upcoming fiscal year to be used to set up within existing mental health centers
special units devoted to research into the causes of people’s adoption of Protestantism as
their religion and into the most humane and effective procedures for helping Protestants
convert to Catholicism or Judaism. The governor was quick to point out, however, that these
efforts, and the therapy services that will derive from and accompany them, are not be
imposed on Protestants, rather are only to be made available to those who express the vol-
untary wish to change. ‘We are not in the business of forcing anything on these people. We
only want to help,’ he said (Davison, 2001).
When a lead article based on my speech was published two yea rs later in Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (Davison, 1976),20 there were invited cri-
tiques by Seymour Halleck, Hans Strupp, and Irving Bieber. You can imagine Dr.
Bieber’s paper. Since publication my article has become part of a growing and influ-
ential literature on dealing with human problems that homosexuals can have rather
than the alleged problem of homosexuality that had to be “fixed.” Beginning in the
1980s there have been far fewer requests for sexual orientation change. Indeed,
almost 20 states and several countries have made it illegal to offer sexual reorienta-
tion treatment at least for minors. I expect this will be extended to people of all ages
in the next decade or two.
It merits mention that the argument that such programs can succeed if more
effort is put into them (Sturgis & Adams, 1978) is irrelevant. In an invited response
to this article, I pointed out that the decision is an ethical and political one, not an
empirical one. “Not Can But Ought” was the title of my rejoinder to Sturgis and
Adams (Davison, 1978).Over the years, I have extended the argument against sex-
ual conversion therapies to the entire gamut of assessment and intervention. As
articulated in a behavioral medicine handbook chapter a few years ago:
Often, the most important and influential forces in our immediate world are those that we
think little about in our day-to-day life. If we are fish, our values are the water that sur-
rounds us. They guide our thoughts, our questions, and our behaviors. They inform us if we
are doing something “right” or “wrong” and can sway us in different directions, like the
waves of an ocean. While this guidance, of which we are usually unaware, can be good in
20
When I first submitted my paper to the American Psychologist, I received a brief letter from the
editor saying that he was rejecting it without sending it out for review because he did not consider
it of general enough interest to the APA membership. I was dumbfounded by this editorial gate-
keeper decision so I sent it to JCCP. As before, I received a thin envelope a week later which, I
feared, was the same negative decision. To my delight (though not surprising, knowing the editor,
Brendan Maher), the decision was also not to send it out for review but to accept it right away and,
if I agreed, to invite critiques. My first recommendation was Irving Bieber, who I knew would
assert an opposing position. I was not disappointed.
46 G. C. Davison
many ways, our values feel so natural to us – to the extent that we even think of them – that
they can sometimes be mistaken for absolute truths.
We – both scientists and non-scientists – take certain values for granted, not even con-
sidering them an issue. For example, we can safely assume that most individuals would not
tolerate a child banging her head against the wall. In fact, in certain situations such as work-
ing with children diagnosed with autism, health professionals have gone to great lengths,
including heavy sedation and/or physical restraints, to prevent this behavior. Why? Well, it
has to be because we as a society value keeping the human brain as undamaged as possible.
But why do we value this? The reason has to be that we place a high value on children
benefitting from life experiences that require as undamaged a brain as possible. These value
choices sometimes result in our being prepared to take drastic measures to protect human
brains. As social scientists and human beings, we certainly agree with this position, but it is
a values-laden position, not an empirical one. (Davison & Feng, 2018, p. 1053)21
Clinical Problems as Clinicians’ Constructions
In writings since my 1976 article, influenced importantly by my teaching and clini-

cal supervision as well as my activities as a clinician, the conversion issue evolved
into a social constructivist epistemology. What most of our patients come to us with
are vague complaints, signs, and symptoms that are subject to an infinite array of
interpretations/diagnoses. The questions we ask and the methods we use to make
our assessments are determined ahead of time by our paradigms and other biases.
Therapists, goes my argument, don’t simply do what their patients ask them to do.
Our decisions about treatment are guided both by legal constraints and, most impor-
tantly, by scientific and personal biases about what a problem is and how it might be
treated.
Most human psychological problems, then, are constructed by the clinician in
ways that are more or less useful. An example is the following discussion of hierar-
chy construction in systematic desensitization:
Another aspect to the assessment situation [in considering and designing a regimen of
desensitization] is the notion of a basic theme as a conceptualization of the therapist. We
have long ago stopped asking ourselves whether we have ‘truly’ isolated a basic anxiety
dimension of our clients. Rather, we ask ourselves how best to construe a person’s difficulty
so as to maximize his gains. In other words, rather than looking for the ‘real hierarchy,’ we
look for the most useful hierarchy. This has important implications, not the least of which is
the freedom to attempt to reconceptualize various client problems in terms amenable to
desensitization. An … example [is] how one might fruitfully construe a problem of depres-
sion in terms of an anxiety/avoidance gradient, where desensitization would be appropriate.
21
In my teaching I have tried to drive home the simple truth of “not can but ought” by telling stu-
dents that I have a cure for all human problems. It’s inexpensive, direct, and sure-fire. After getting
their attention, I announce that my cure is a bullet in the head. It’s been my experience that many
students are shocked, even scandalized, by this. I encourage that reaction and use it to make vivid
that we don’t always do what it is in our capacity to do! Health professionals swim in these waters
all the time, but like the proverbial fish who don’t know that they are swimming in water, they don’t
realize their political, legal, and moral constraints until they are brought to their attention.
The clinician must ask himself what the implications are likely to be should a particular
desensitization actually succeed. For instance, will a person depressed about her lack of
meaningful social contacts be happier if her inhibitions about talking to people are reduced
by desensitization? Looked at in this way, the clinician would seem to have both greater
freedom and greater challenge in isolating anxiety dimensions. (Goldfried & Davison,
1976, p. 115)
Put differently, and this is how my position against conversion therapy blends with
my social constructionist perspective:
… clients seldom come to mental health clinicians with problems as clearly delineated and
independently verifiable as what patients often bring to physicians. A client usually goes to
a psychologist or psychiatrist in the way described by Halleck (1971). That is, the person is
unhappy; life is going badly; nothing is meaningful; sadness and despair are out of propor-
tion to life circumstances; the mind wanders and unwanted thoughts intrude, etc. The clini-
cian transforms [italics in original] these often vague and complex complaints into a
diagnosis or functional analysis, a set of ideas of what is wrong, what the controlling vari-
ables are, and what might be done to relieve the suffering and maladaptation. My argument,
then, is that psychological problems are for the most part constructions of the clinician.
Clients come to us in pain, and they leave with a … problem or set of problems that we
assign to them. (Davison, 2001, p. 347)22
Conclusion
“Behavior therapy” used to be synonymous with “the conditioning therapies” as

articulated by our innovative and intellectually courageous pioneers – people like
Joseph Wolpe, Andrew Salter, Cyril Franks, Hans Eysenck, Arthur Staats, Albert
Bandura, Walter Mischel, and Arnold Lazarus. Most of them, in my view, evolved
in a cognitive direction in the mid- to late-1960s, some of them perhaps influenced
by the seminal writings of Albert Ellis and Tim Beck. I had the dumb luck of being
a part of this by virtue of having entered the Ph.D. program at Stanford in 1962 with
the express purpose of specializing in anything but clinical psychology. I believe I
was able to contribute to the evolving cognitive directions of behavior therapy in the
ways described in this paper – cognitive restructuring of a paranoid delusion, argu-
ing for agency in deep muscle relaxation and in countercontrol, attribution in the
maintenance of behavior change, perceived as contrasted with actual control, inte-
grating humanistic elements into CBT, the complexities of the science-practice dia-
lectic, calling attention to the essential phenomenological nature of CBT, providing
insights into therapists’ thinking through a pedagogical innovation in explaining
clinical applications, social constructivism in clinical assessment, innovating with a
laboratory-based think-aloud cognitive assessment paradigm, and the ethics and
politics of conversion therapy for gay people.
22
This social constructivist argument seems far less appropriate for psychological problems that
have or are believed to have a biological basis, cf. Paul Meehl’s (1999) “carving nature at its
joints”.
48 G. C. Davison
I conclude now by offering for your consideration, whether you are a student,
practicing professional, or an academician, some general comments about interdis-
ciplinarity, breadth within the field of psychology, and the role of the liberal arts. As
I wrote in an earlier article:
…. a liberal arts education provides undergraduate psychology majors – who account for
the vast majority of applicants to our doctoral programs – with a suitably broad historical,
social, and philosophical context for their specialty study of psychology. But … when stu-
dents apply to graduate psychology programs, the primary focus of admissions committees
is, I believe, on statistics, research methods, psychology content courses, and especially
involvement in psychological research to the virtual exclusion of non-psychology work and
intellectual interests that can provide … [a] broad context [for understanding the human
condition] ….
Once they enter a doctoral program in clinical or counseling psychology, the de-
emphasis on topics not tightly linked to psychology becomes even stronger. When Ph.D. pro-
grams required comprehensive examinations, including history and systems, there was
some assurance that students would gain a modicum of exposure to the larger historical,
social, and epistemological context of the study of the human condition. But [I believe that]
students are not being encouraged or required to appreciate the macro factors that influence
their subject matter. (Davison, 2005, p. 1062)
And with respect specifically to clinical psychology programs:

I have long believed in the importance of a solid liberal arts education as the foundation for
all fields of graduate and postgraduate specialization. [But the liberal arts are especially
important to clinicians, and perhaps particularly for cognitive behavior therapists.] Whether
it makes the more hard-nosed amongst us uncomfortable or not, both researchers and clini-
cians – to the extent that there are sharp differences between them – have to be
Menschenkenner, people who know and understand people, including themselves. I believe
that a broad education – in addition, no doubt, to some inborn abilities of empathy and
interpersonal sensitivity – can contribute to the ability to figure out the vagaries of human
conduct and how most effectively to devise ethically proper methods of change. (Davison,
2006b, p. 3)
I have for years disagreed with most of APA’s standards and procedures for accredi-
tation, but on one issue I have always believed they have it right, namely the impor-
tance of breadth, that is, the need for clinical psychologists (and other mental health
professionals of course) to engage in graduate level study of history and systems,
social, developmental, neuroscience, quantitative, research methods, and cognition
and learning. And that preferably they study these specialties with faculty who are
content experts, which usually means faculty who are not in clinical programs. I do
not believe, for example, that the cognition and learning requirement be satisfied by
taking a cognitive behavior therapy course with someone like myself.
As both a scientific endeavor and a profession offering effective, humane, and
morally sound interventions, cognitive behavior therapy has a heavy responsibility.
I hope that this journey of my own development will prove useful to the reader.
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Meta-science and the Three Waves
of Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Three
Distinct Sets of Commitments
William O’Donohue and Fredrick T. Chin
An Overview
Behavior therapies, which include applied behavior analysis, cognitive behavior

therapy, and third wave behavior therapies are generally thought of as “scientific”
approaches to behavioral health. For example, behavior therapies play a large role
in the evidence-based therapy movement (Chambless et al., 1996). However, it is
fair to say that, despite the fact that behavior therapy in one form or another has
been around for nearly seven decades, progress is still often frustratingly slow
(Meehl, 1978; O’Donohue, 2013). The issues are myriad, including but not
limited to:
• The field still has many clinical problems that lack established evidence-based
treatments (e.g., narcissistic personality disorder);
• Assessment measures, which play a role clinically but also in research as mea-
sures of outcome and process, have disappointing or missing psychometric data
(see O’Donohue et al., 2022);
• All the waves rely in many ways on a diagnostic system that is generally regarded
as suffering from multiple problems;
• Even many “successful” outcome studies elicit relatively small effect sizes;
• Too little is known about the relapse rates, even of these so called “evidence
based” therapies;
• Too little is known about how best to ensure treatment fidelity;
• Too little is known about how to increase access to these therapies;
• Very few treatment guidelines exist regarding how to handle complex cases with
multiple co-morbidities; and
W. O’Donohue (*) · F. T. Chin

Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA
e-mail: wto@unr.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_3
54 W. O’Donohue and F. T. Chin
• There is a dearth of literature regarding effective therapies for understudied cli-

ent populations, such as individuals belonging to more than one minority group.
More recently, there are also pressing concerns about the use of questionable
research practices (QRPs; see O’Donohue et al., 2022) as well as replicability crisis
in the field of clinical psychology as there has been too little concern about these
issues in the field of clinical psychology when compared to social psychology or
even medicine. Perhaps most alarmingly, there are no solved problems in clinical
psychology (O’Donohue, 2013). Although behavior therapies do better than other
schools of therapy in demonstrating treatment effects, even they still face many
longstanding, serious, and limiting gaps and shortcomings (Chambless et al., 1996).
Furthermore, all this slow progress may be particularly surprising given the volu-
minous nature of psychological research. For example, in 2020, there are at least
2281 (American Psychological Association [APA], 2020) psychological journals
publishing on average 111 articles per year (Bjork et al., 2009). In addition, in 2017
there were nearly 500,000 graduates of masters or doctoral programs in psychology
(Conroy et al., 2019), each having done at least a master’s project or doctoral dis-
sertation. Yet despite all of this effort, problem-solving progress in behavior therapy
has been slow.
Science and Problem Solving
Science, when applied to problems in many other fields, has generally resulted in an
unprecedented growth of knowledge, and this knowledge has lent itself to applica-
tions and related technology relevant to improving human welfare (see for example,
Popper, 1959). Most recently, one can see the productiveness of the scientific
approach in the development of tests, treatments and vaccines for the novel
coronavirus.
For centuries, humans were confronted with numerous serious and possibly life-
threatening problems relating to disease, famine, and adequate shelter as well as a
host of other desires for comfort that were not solved. Humans also wanted to
understand themselves and others and engaged in various means for obtaining
answers to these social and psychological questions. There have been a wide variety
of different kinds of attempts to gain knowledge to address these problems—con-
sulting sacred texts, attempting to understand what influential philosophers and
thinkers said, relying on astrology, and relying on one’s intuitions. However, the
problem-solving progressiveness of these kinds of procedures was underwhelming,
to say the least.
There was then a rise of science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the
early 1600s, Kepler and Galileo relied on what they conceived as the scientific
method and made important discoveries in understanding planetary motion as well
as identifying key descriptive information about planetary bodies, such as the moon.
In that same century, Boyle discovered the first gas law, Hooke used the microscope
Meta-science and the Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Three Distinct Sets… 55
to discover the cell, and Harvey made significant advances in anatomy when he
discovered the role of the heart in the circulation of blood (Daintith, 2009; Friedland,
2009; National Geographic, 2019). Furthermore, in that same century, Newton
made important advances in optics discovering that light consists of a spectrum of
many different rays, and separately discovered the force of gravitational attraction
(Cantor, 1983). In the next century, Lavoisier and other early chemists used their
understanding of the scientific method to make important discoveries regarding
oxygen, ending the notion of phlogiston (West, 2013).
Later in 1861, Louis Pasteur discovered the germ theory of disease, leading to
important gains in understanding physiology and cell biology that resulted in numer-
ous advances in medical technology (Pasteur et al., 1878). At around the same time,
Darwin made several voyages to the Galapagos islands and generated an important
evolutionary theory (Ellegård, 1990). In the early twentieth century, a host of physi-
cists, again using the scientific method, made key discoveries in understanding sub-
atomic behavior which culminated in the atomic bomb, which for some concluded
that the technologies associated with science might not all be for the good.
It is important to note that these scientific successes are only a small sample, and
scientific progress continues in fields such as computer science, material science,
and medicine. In psychology there were fewer such discoveries in that period; the
best candidates are probably Pavlov’s discovery of classical conditioning in the
1890s and Thorndike’s law of effect in 1898.
However, there are several points to note regarding the status of science. First,
the scientific methodologies often differed significantly across these scientific
accomplishments (see Gower, 1997), raising questions about what exactly is the
scientific method or even if a single method exists (Gower, 1997; Feyerabend, 2010;
O’Donohue, 2013). Second, some scholars of science found that there can be fun-
damental differences in the quality of science and, as a result, constructs like pseu-
doscience (Lilienfeld et al., 2014) were developed and used. More recently, there
has been concern about what are called questionable research practices (QRPs;
O’Donohue et al., 2022), that can result in so-called replication failures, particularly
in social psychology.1 For this reason, Altman (1994, p. 308), an observer of the
medical literature, has stated, “We need less research, better research, and research
done for the right reasons.”
Third, meta-scientists began to realize that there are human, noncognitive ele-
ments to science that go beyond the “craving to be right” to use Popper’s (1959)
colorful phrase, in which various biases that idealized conceptions of science, failed
to adequately address what might be captured best by notions of seven deadly sins
(greed, desire for fame, etc.). Critics were quick to point out the role of Big Pharma
in biasing the scientific literature (e.g., see Healy, 2012), but perhaps they are slower
in seeing how these same forces, although with fewer dollars, could affect the psy-
chotherapy literature.
1
It is worth noting that some (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005) have argued that most published research in
medicine is false; thus, these issues do not solely occur in social psychology, or in psychology as
a whole.
Fourth, some important problems (e.g., antisocial or narcissistic personality dis-

order) were increasingly seen as being refractory to science and still are (Chambless
et al., 1996). Fifth, some thought that science is fine for inanimate nature or lower
animal forms, but that it is not for humans due to some alleged special qualities of
humans, such as free will (see for example, O’Donohue et al., 2020). Sixth, there
came to be a realization that science cannot even in principle solve all problems,
particularly moral problems (Hempel, 1966), but most probably conceptual prob-
lems too--no effective methods beyond traditional philosophical argumentation and
conceptual analysis have been developed to address these. Finally, scientists them-
selves needed to understand science because they were sometimes criticized for the
quality of their science—or criticize rivals on this issue.
This last point is particularly critical. Researchers are always concerned about
the extent to which they are using the best methods to solve the problems that they
investigate. The slow progress of “soft psychology,” to use Meehl’s (1978) felici-
tous phrase, is a cause for concern, and many including Meehl have suggested that
perhaps psychologists are not using the right scientific methods. As stated above,
proponents of certain positions of science often claim that their opponents in sci-
ence are not scientific or at best poor scientists. One could see behavior in the his-
tory of behavior therapy in the initial friction of accepting single subject experiment
designs in the mid part of the last century, as well as when some therapies, such as
EMDR, were proposed (for example see Herbert et al., 2000).
One can see that many of these problems about the quality and progressiveness
of science play out in the domain of behavioral health. For example, when McFall
(1991) in his famous Manifesto called for a thoroughgoing commitment to science
in clinical psychology, there is little consensus on what science is across various
schools of therapy as we shall see within the field of behavior therapies. In his
Manifesto, McFall (1991) famously stated as the “cardinal principle”: “Scientific
clinical psychology is the only legitimate and acceptable form of clinical psychol-
ogy (p. 76).” McFall further stated,
This first principle seems clear and straightforward to me-at least as an ideal to be pursued
without compromise. After all, what is the alternative? Unscientific clinical psychology?
Would anyone openly argue that unscientific clinical psychology is a desirable goal that
should be considered seriously as an alternative to scientific clinical psychology?
(pp. 76–77)
However, understanding the specifics on what constitutes science has not been so
easy. For example, O’Donohue and Halsey (1997) argued that Sigmund Freud, Carl
Rogers, B. F. Skinner and Albert Ellis all thought their work ought to be considered
scientific, but that they each held very different conceptions of what science is.
Additionally, even within the field of behavior therapy, O’Donohue and Houts
(1985) found that the first two waves of behavior therapy constituted two distinct
scientific disciplines. That is, while the first wave or applied behavior analysis relied
mainly on single subject experimental designs, researchers within the second wave
of behavior therapy (i.e., cognitive therapy) relied on group experimental designs.
Furthermore, we shall also see that the meta-scientific influences have varied
drastically to the point of little or no overlap between the three waves of behavior
therapy. For example, B. F. Skinner (1938), who influenced many first wave behav-
ior therapists, was known to be influenced by the positivist Ernst Mach; Albert Ellis,
one of the major founders of second wave movement, by the Stoics and eventually
a neo-Popperian, W. W. Bartley (1984); and third wave behavior therapies by a
rather obscure philosopher of aesthetics, Stephen Pepper (1942) and to a significant
extent Buddhism. In the following sections, we are going to present an analysis of
the meta-scientific commitments of each wave.
irst Wave: Skinner, Behavior Therapy, and Applied

F
Behavior Analysis
It is admittedly somewhat arbitrary to settle on a date for the beginning of behavior

therapy. However, one reasonable candidate for this date would be when the phrase
“behavior therapy” occurred in a journal article. That would be in the early 1950s,
when B. F. Skinner and a few of his graduate students (Lindsley, 1956) took the
operant conditioning principles that Skinner had discovered from experimental
studies largely with pigeons and rats and applied these to patients in a state mental
health hospital who suffered from what we would now call serious mental illness.
For example, in one study these researchers used differential reinforcement to shape
the behavior of talking in a woman diagnosed with schizophrenia who was elec-
tively mute for a number of decades (Lindsley, 1956).
It is important to note that even in its birth behavior therapy was not monolithic.
In 1938, a learning researcher and a colleague at the University of Illinois,
O.H. Mowrer (Mowrer & Mowrer, 1938) published a report of the successful treat-
ment of nocturnal enuresis with institutionalized children with a urine alarm. The
treatment approach was not based on medical intervention, such as surgery, nor did
it utilize psychoanalytic principles which viewed enuresis as weeping through the
bladder. Rather, the treatment was based on classical conditioning principles,
although it is fair to say that at the time, the specific mechanisms of changes in that
treatment were not particularly clear or well-established.
Yet another major early behavior therapy stream occurred in 1958 when Joseph
Wolpe (1958), a South African psychiatrist who was influenced by the learning
theory of Clark Hull, published Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition. More spe-
cifically, this volume presented three specific treatments for three types of neuroses;
(a) systematic desensitization for phobias, (b) assertive training for problems involv-
ing self-assertion, and (c) sexual training for sexual inhibitions.
In sum, even at its inception behavior therapy was a summary term for a broad
array of treatments all with some commonalities in that learning principles formed
its basis. In this chapter and our discussion of first wave behavior therapy, we will
focus on the Skinnerian approach as it has been arguably the most influential and
prolific of the first wave behavior therapies. At first this approach was often called
“behavior modification” but today it is generally called applied behavior analysis
(see Morris, chapter “What Is First-Wave Behavior Therapy?”, this volume).
B. F. Skinner’s Views of Science
B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) had several major intellectual influences. Within psy-

chology which is broadly defined, he was influenced both by the work of Ivan
Pavlov (1849–1936) on classical conditioning and by Edward Thorndike’s
(1874–1949) work on the law of effect. Within philosophy Skinner stated that he
was influenced by Bertrand Russell2 (1872–1970), but his scientific beliefs drew
particular influence from the seventeenth century British scholar Francis Bacon
(1561–1626) and the nineteenth century physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach
(1838–1916).
Francis Bacon Francis Bacon was an early advocate of science and advanced sev-
eral proposals about what constituted proper scientific method. Bacon warned
against what he called certain “idols” that he thought were commonplace but would
lead to erroneous beliefs. One such an example was the idola fori (idol of the mar-
ketplace). Idola fori are logical fallacies that occur due to an “ill and unfit choice of
words” (Bacon, 1854, p. 49) found in everyday vernacular that functions to side-
track the potential knower. Thus for Bacon, science must often revise and refine
constructs found in common language (e.g., the vernacular term “reward” and the
scientific construct “reinforcement” are not identical).
Additionally, Bacon (1854) was an inductivist, stating that “the intellect is not fit
to judge except by induction” (p. 23). Importantly Bacon was also both an experi-
mentalist as well as someone who advocated for a utilitarian view of science, in
which science should be commanded for the uses of humans. Bacon (1854) stated,
“nature must be forced out of her natural state squeezed and molded (p. 25)” as “the
nature of things betrays itself more readily under the vexations of art [experiments]
than in its natural freedom” (p. 25). Bacon’s instrumentalism can be found in prob-
ably his most famous his quote “Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.” Bacon
(1854) thought science ought to be involved in the “production of effects” in which
the scientist is involved in “shaping nature as if on an anvil” (p. 413). Thus, through
Bacon, we can see Skinner’s emphasis on induction (which diametrically opposes
the second wave’s adoption of a neo-Popperian deductive logic of research), experi-
mentalism, revisions of the vernacular language, as well as an instrumentalism in
which a goal of science is to produce effects for the benefits of humans.
Ernst Mach Mach (1883) also shared Bacon’s notion of the practical/instrumental
value of science. Mach stated, “the ways even of science lead to the mouth” (p. 23).
2
Skinner attributed first hearing the term “behaviorism” in an article by Russell.
Mach, again similar to Bacon, was also an inductivist, experimentalist, and also
thought that it was important to purge constructs of what he regarded as their pre-
scientific meanings. Mach, for example, did exactly this with the scientific construct
of causation. Mach responded to Hume’s concern about causation as not being
directly observable—all one can see is ‘constant conjunction”—i.e., the observation
that one event reliably follows another event. Other conceptions of cause for Mach
went beyond observables and thus for him were “metaphysical.” Mach stated that
the construct of cause is demonstrated in functional relationships. A mathematically
functional relationship can be seen by the formula y = f(x) and graphically as:
The basic idea is that y—the dependent variable—consistently changes (i.e.,

concomitant variation) with the introduction or the withdrawal of x—the indepen-
dent variable. The first section of the graph shows the baseline of y when x is
absent—it is at a relatively stable level. The second section of the graph shows the
introduction of x (an experimental manipulation), and sure enough because (as it
turns out) y is indeed a function of x, the value of y immediately changes. Then x is
withdrawn (an experimental manipulation) and y returns to baseline levels. Then in
the final sect. x is again re-introduced (a replication of the experimental manipula-
tion) and y changes as a result. These steps in the language of behavior analysis are
called reversals. In principle, one can keep doing this to make sure x and y continue
to covary in this pattern. For Mach and Skinner then this functional relationship
shows that x causes y.
Finally, both Mach and Skinner rejected the notion of science as hypothesis test-
ing. For them, science ought to be a “bottom up” approach where there are no prior
hypotheses to test. This is critical in that the other two waves of behavior therapy are
much more sanguine about the view of science as hypothesis testing. Mach advo-
cated staying close to observations in order to produce the most economical descrip-
tions of data. He stated, “Economy of communication and apprehension is of the
very essence of science” (1883/1942, p. 7). We can also see these positions coming
to together in a description of science that Skinner (1938) stated in his first book,
The Behavior of Organisms:
So far as scientific method is concerned, the system set up in the preceding chapter may be
characterized as follows. It is positivistic. It confines itself to description rather than expla-
nation. Its concepts are defined in terms of immediate observations…Terms of this sort are
used merely to bring together groups of observations, to state uniformities, and to express
properties of behavior which transcend single instances. They are not hypotheses, in the
sense of things to be proved or disproved, but convenient representations of things already
known (p. 44).
Skinner and Logical Positivism It is important to note that Skinner was some-
times seen as a logical positivist, a philosopher who was concerned with eliminating
metaphysical statements by the use of a verificationist theory of meaning. However,
Skinner was not a logical positivist nor influenced by logical positivism, although
some of his detractors have made this claim to impugn him (see for example
Mahoney, 1989). Logical positivism is the debunked philosophical view that origi-
nated largely in Vienna in the early twentieth century that attempted to reject meta-
physical claims given its verifiability criterion of “if one cannot confirm a statement
empirically, it is meaningless.” On a side note, logical positivism collapsed when it
could not find a version of the verifiability criterion that was not self-contradictory.
In Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance, Laurence
D. Smith (1986) has pointed out that Skinner did have significant contact with pro-
ponents of logical positivism. However, according to Smith, Skinner’s sympathies
with logical positivism were quite limited and were restricted to those few aspects
of positivism which they had already arrived at independently, such as a careful
analysis of constructs and a heavy reliance on induction. Furthermore, the methods
which Skinner alleged to have imported from logical positivism were actually
derived from his own psychological indigenous conceptions of knowledge and sci-
ence. Finally, according to Smith, Skinner developed and embraced a behavioral
epistemology which, far from resting on logical positivist arguments, actually con-
flicted squarely with the anti-psychologism that was a part of logical positivism.
Skinner developed an indigenous, psychological analysis of epistemology and
psychology, in which knowledge was the result of conditioning processes producing
what he called “effective” behavior (see O’Donohue, 2013). Skinner never viewed
his work as subordinate to philosophical work or arguments. An anecdote is very
revealing of Skinner’s priorities: When the young Skinner was told by the philoso-
pher Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) that a psychologist should closely fol-
low developments in philosophy, Skinner replied, “it is quite the other way
around—we need a psychological epistemology” (Skinner, 2002). It was Skinner
who eventually produced such a psychological epistemology.
Skinner’s Philosophy of Science and Evolutionary Epistemology
Skinner developed his own philosophy of science. More specifically, Skinner’s

(1956) epistemic views are illustrated in the following passage from his paper, enti-
tled A Case History in Scientific Method:
But it is a mistake to identify scientific practice with the formalized constructions of statis-
tics and scientific method. These disciplines have their place, but it does not coincide with
the place of scientific research. They offer a method of science, but not- as is so often
implied- the method. As formal disciplines, they arose very late in the history of science,
and most of the facts of science have been discovered without their aid. It takes a great deal
of skill to fit Faraday with his wires and magnets into the picture which statistics gives us
of scientific thinking. And most current scientific practice would be equally refractory,
especially in the important initial stages. It is no wonder that the laboratory scientist is
puzzled and often dismayed when he discovers how his behavior has been reconstructed in
the formal analyses of scientific method. He is likely to protest that this is not at all a fair
representation of what he does (p. 221).
And further, Skinner (1982) stated that:

If we are interested in perpetuating the practices responsible for the present corpus of sci-
entific knowledge, we must keep in mind that some very important parts of the scientific
process do not lend themselves to mathematical, logical, or any other formal treatment. We
do not know enough about human behavior to know how scientists do what they do
(p. 97)… science does not progress by carefully designed steps called “experiments,” each
of which has a well-defined beginning and end. Science is continuous and often a disorderly
and accidental process…The subjects we study reinforce our behavior much more effec-
tively than we reinforce them (p.97)… I believe that my behavior is as orderly as that of the
organisms I study and that my rats and pigeons have taught me far more than I have taught
them (p. 97, Skinner, 1982).
Skinner (1956) then provides his principles of successful scientific behavior:

• “When you run onto something interesting, drop everything else and study it.
• Some ways of doing research are easier than others.
• Some people are lucky.
• Apparatuses sometimes break down.
• Serendipity happens—the art of finding one thing while looking for something
else.” Skinner also argued that there was too much of what he came to call “pre-
mature physiologizing”(Skinner, 1938)—that the Zeitgeist of psychology of his
time thought it was imperative in any discussion of perception, and that learning
must be cashed out in terms of the physiology of the nervous system (we may be
seeing the resurrection of this ideology with the emphasis on neuroscience; see
Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013).
Skinner (1956) then noted that at Harvard he found a mentor W.J. Crozier who
“resented the nervous system” (p. 223) and talked of behavior-behavior or
environment-behavior relations without going inside the skin to explain behavior.
Subsequently, his mission became to find order in “the organism as a whole” and
found important clues from Pavlov’s study of classical conditioning, namely, “con-
trol your conditions and you will see order” (p. 223). Skinner began to tinker (he
was a first-rate tinkerer) to develop new experimental apparatus that could be used
to study environment-behavior relationships in the hopes of uncovering such order.
He then noted that his early efforts were all failures (note here that even the scientist
may make proposals to the environment to see what the environment selects—evo-
lutionary epistemology).
Skinner’s Indigenous Evolutionary Epistemology
According to Skinner, natural selection gives the organism the ability to know
(Skinner, 1990). In a sense, millennia of natural selection provide the physiological
equipment to emit certain response topographies. An opposable thumb, for exam-
ple, enables humans to manipulate objects with fine motor control. Most impor-
tantly for human organisms, “when our vocal musculature came under operant
control in the production of speech sounds,” our species proceeded to soar with all
its “distinctive achievements” (e.g., art, science, literature; Skinner, 1986).
Through natural selection, the environment selected those physical characteris-
tics and behaviors that promote the survival and reproduction of species (Skinner,
1990). For example, those individuals with sensitive autonomic nervous systems
(ANS) were presumably selected by the environment because they were able to
react more quickly in response to danger. The fight-or-flight mechanism, the sym-
pathetic branch of the ANS, enabled earlier humans to quickly move out of harm’s
way when a predator was about to attack. Those individuals with a poorly developed
ANS simply became some other creature’s meal.
Selection by Consequences According to Skinner, the environment selects behav-
ior both in the life of the species as well as in the life of the individual (Skinner,
1990). He stated:
All types of variation and selection have certain faults, and one of them is especially critical
for natural selection: Classical conditioning prepares a species only for a future that resem-
bles the selecting past. Species behavior is only effective in a world that fairly closely
resembles the world in which the species evolved. If we were to wait for natural selection
to fashion a relatively simple behavioral repertoire, this would take millions of years span-
ning countless generations, as selection is contingent on genetic variation. That fault was
corrected by the evolution of a second type of variation and selection, operant conditioning,
through which variations in the behavior of the individuals are selected by features of the
environment that are not stable enough to play any part in evolution (p. 1206).
While natural selection concerns the physical embodiment of the species, selection
by consequence concerns the individual—more specifically what the individual is
likely to do (Skinner, 1981). An operant is a response that “operates” on the indi-
vidual’s immediate environment to produce certain consequences (Skinner, 1953).
It is through this mechanism of selection that an organism readily adjusts its behav-
ior to rapidly changing environmental circumstances. So-called “reinforcers” (e.g.,
food, sexual contact) increase the likelihood of the behavior that preceded them.
While operant conditioning better coordinated human behavior with a capricious

environment, a single repertoire is extremely limited outside of social influence.
Within a single individual’s lifetime, the individual would not have learned that
cooking food destroys harmful bacteria, storing food is advantageous in the event of
a drought, or that hunting big game as a group is more energy efficient than hunting
rodents alone. This limitation of operant conditioning was therefore corrected by
cultural selection, when humans began sharing each other’s repertoires by way of
imitation (Skinner, 1990).
Cultural Selection: Social Contingencies Human beings are inherently social
animals, as this tendency itself has obvious reproductive and survivalist advantages.
For millennia, humans have coexisted under mutual protection, reared young col-
laboratively, and so on. Within these collectives, cultural practices could be trans-
mitted via imitation. Imitation, of course, is not distinctly human. Japanese macaque
monkeys, for instance, have been shown to imitate unorthodox behaviors demon-
strated by other members of the collective (e.g., sweet potato washing and wheat-
washing). The direct benefit of imitation is that it brings individuals into contact
with reinforcers that are relatively remote; the more immediate contingencies of
reinforcement take over the control of the behavior afterwards (O’Donohue &
Ferguson, 2001).
Comparable to the preceding levels of selection, the environment also selects
cultural practices in which populations and their offspring have a higher probability
of survival. “A culture which raises the question of collateral or deferred effects is
most likely to discover and adopt practices which will survive or, as conditions
change, will lead to modifications which in turn will survive” (Skinner, 1961). For
example, cultures that promote the practice “safe sex” are in a better position to
control the spread of lethal sexually transmitted diseases. Cultures that do not adopt
these practices are more likely to contract such diseases and ultimately pass them to
offspring. The offspring, of course, usually die before they are able to reproduce.
The Second Wave: The Stoics and Neo-Popperians
There are many streams of cognitive therapy (O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009). For
example, there is a stream associated with Albert Ellis’s (1977) Rational Emotive
Therapy (RET), a stream associated with Aaron T. Beck’s (1984) cognitive therapy,
and a stream more associated with experimental cognitive psychology perhaps best
exemplified in the work of Steven Hollon (2011). The stream we will focus on in
this chapter will be the one of Albert Ellis (1977), which he originally called RET,
but later called Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT). Ellis will be the focus
of this chapter because historically he was the most influential during the so-called
initial era of cognitive revolution that created the second wave, and because at times,
his philosophical influences shared similarities to subsequent cognitive therapists,
such as Aaron T. Beck. For example, Both Ellis (1994) and Beck (1984) stated that
they were influenced by the Stoics. Finally, we discuss the philosophical position of
second wave through Ellis’s because he was one of the clearest regarding his philo-
sophical influences.
The Stoics
Ellis was influenced by the Stoics. In his Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy,
Ellis (1994) stated,
I inducted this principle of the ABC’s of emotional disturbance from working with hun-
dreds of clients from 1943 to 1955. But I also took it over from many philosophers I studied
from 1929 (when I was 16) onwards …. clearest of all amongst the ancients were the Greek
and Roman Stoics especially Zeno of Citium (the founder of the school) Chrysippus,
Panaetius of Rhodes, (who introduced Stoicism into Rome) Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius (p. 64).
Stoicism, initially developed by Zeno of Citium (336–264 BCE), and later modified
by the Roman philosopher Epictetus (60–120 CE), is among the better known of the
ancient Greek philosophies. We begin our review of Stoicism with two exemplary
quotes from Epictetus (numbers refer to numbered paragraphs in the Enchiridion):
Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things. Thus death is
nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our
notion of death, that it is terrible (5).
and
Demand not that events should happen as you wish; but wish them to happen as they do
happen, and your life will be serene (8).
Thus, Stoicism is a philosophy emphasizing rationality in the control of both thought

and emotion. The Stoic account of virtue is one based on control over one’s emo-
tions. This control is so radical as to include the caveat “Friendship may be fine, but
be careful that you do not become so close that the misfortunes of your friends
affect your own peace of mind”. This injunction applies also to one’s duties toward
others and society. The Stoic model of the emotions (passions) is a basic combina-
tion of positive and negative feelings organized according to time orientation:
Present Future
Positive Joy, Delight, and Hope and Desire
Pleasure
Negative Pain, Grief, and Fear and Dread
Sadness
Notice that the past is not included in this schema. According to the Stoics, it
would be irrational, after all, to worry about things in the past. Nothing can be done:
the past is simply what it is.
The basic principles of Stoicism reveal an interesting parallel to the events of
Epictetus’ life. Born a slave in a region now found in modern day Turkey, Epictetus
was a picture of Stoic detachment. According to his legend, one day while Epictetus
worked in the fields, his master decided to tighten the shackles on his legs despite
the fact that Epictetus told him that doing so was unnecessary, as he had no plans of
escaping. This resulted in a broken leg for Epictetus. Despite the pain he did not
complain. When his master asked him why he did not complain, Epictetus responded
that complaining would be pointless because his leg was already irreversibly bro-
ken, and no amount of complaining would undo this fact. The master was so
impressed, or perhaps felt guilty, with Epictetus’ composure, that he awarded him
his freedom. The Stoic virtues are intended to free humans from our passions.
At this point it is important to note that Ellis is not initially influenced by a phi-
losopher of science (as Stoicism predates the rise of science), but rather by what
might be called a pragmatic philosophy regarding the proper conduct of life.
However, next we will turn to an examination of the neo-Popperian (Bartley, 1984)
who did influence Ellis’ concept of both rational belief formation and science.
Popper and the Neo-Popperians
Ellis (1977) stated,

I abandoned even more elements of logical positivism when I later read Bartley (1962),
Mahoney (1976), and Popper (1963), all of whom hold that to be scientific a hypothesis had
better be falsifiable. In recent years I adopted Bartley’s more open-ended position, which
states that no hypothesis can be completely proven (or disproven) by empirical “evidence”
(p. 20).
What follows is an explanation of Bartley’s Pan-Critical Rationalism.
Bartley’s Pan-Critical Rationalism
Bartley (1984), a student of Popper’s, criticized what may be called justificational

or foundational accounts of rationality (note that Popper also expressed similar
criticisms). A justificational or foundational account of knowledge attempts to dis-
tinguish rational beliefs or actions from irrational beliefs or actions by the degree to
which the former is supported, confirmed, warranted, or in some way justified by
appeals to some reason or evidence. Thus, according to this view, it is rational for
me to believe that “All copper conducts electricity” because this claim is (hopefully
consistently) verified (or “supported,” “confirmed,” “warranted”, etc.) by some
(hopefully large and representative) set of prior empirical observations.
Bartley (1984) proposed an alternative epistemic approach to rationalism that he

called “pan-critical rationality” or “comprehensive critical rationality”. Bartley’s
account explicitly denies that justification must be given for some candidate belief
to be considered rational. According to Bartley, there is no such state of affairs as a
“justified” belief. Pan-critical rationalism states that all beliefs are open to criticism,
including this proposition itself (i.e., “All beliefs are open to criticism.”) --therefore
escaping the self-referential inconsistency problem of justificationism. The key
epistemic questions in this account become, “What would count against my belief?”,
“Are there alternative beliefs that better survive criticism?”, and, “How can one
maximize criticism of my beliefs so I might discover any error contained in these?”
That is, according to Bartley (1984) how can we, “... arrange our lives and institu-
tions to expose our positions, actions, opinions, beliefs, aims, conjectures, deci-
sions, standards, frameworks, ways of life, policies, traditional practices, etc. to
optimum examination, in order to counteract and eliminate as much error as possi-
ble?” (Bartley, 1988, p. 213).
For Bartley and Popper, a belief is rational to the extent that it has been subjected
to and has survived criticism, especially severe criticism. Criticism is admittedly
infinite in that one can criticize indefinitely. But this is not a logical regress since
one is not seeking a final, definitive proof or infallible foundation for one’s beliefs.
No such infallible final position is sought: inquiry and criticism are open-ended
processes. For example, in science, the Einsteinian revolution shows how Newton’s
theory, which was once an accepted set of beliefs that had survived much criticism
(i.e., experimentation), eventually succumbed to a certain type of criticism.
Bartley (1984) also has pointed out that it is important to note that not only do we
learn where our errors are, we also learn how to learn, i.e., we learn how to better
criticize and eliminate error more efficiently. We can do this both as a species, as
best seen perhaps in developments of scientific methods, but also as individuals in
which we adopt better meta-strategies to identify error. This is an important reason
why, for Bartley, glib comments about “the scientific method” are so problematic.
Scientific method is not ossified. As the philosopher of science Harold Brown
(1988) has stated, “Modern studies of the history of science indicate that science is
not just a process of learning about the world, it is also a process of learning how to
learn about the world” (p. 7).
As Radnitzky (1988) has stated, “Fallibilism entails the perennial willingness to
re-examine any position when, and if (but only if) there are good reasons for prob-
lematizing it” (1988, p. 292). Radnitzky (1988) also nicely contrasts the justifica-
tional and the pan-critical accounts of rationality:
The justificationist asks: When is it rational to accept a particular theory [or belief]?; and he
suggests and answers on the lines: When it has been verified or probabilified to a sufficient
degree. In the critical context the key question is: When is it rational (fallible) to prefer a
particular position (statement, view, standard, etc.) over its rival(s)? The answer suggested
is along the lines: ‘It is rational (fallible) to prefer a position over its rivals if and only if it
has so far withstood criticism—the criticism relevant for the sort of position at stake—bet-
ter than did its rivals’. (p. 288)
An important part of fallibilism is that alternatives to some set of beliefs also receive
a fair hearing and all competitors are considered on their own merits without con-
sideration of factors such as previous psychological attachment to the position. The
critical fallibilist is particularly critical of any move that attempts to immunize a
position against criticism.
Thus, statements such as, “There is an undetectable God whose existence shall not
be questioned” can be seen as an attempt to minimize criticism and therefore are prob-
lematic as there is little opportunity for error correction. Similar problems are encoun-
tered in any attempt to dogmatize (i.e., insulate from criticism) any belief or practice.
For a fallibilist, questionable research practices can be a particular concern because
these may give the false impression that the research put the hypothesis or theory at
risk of falsification when actually this did not happen (see O’Donohue et al., 2022).
Pan-Critical Rationality and Evolution
Similar to Skinner, Bartley (1984) sees his epistemology as part of a larger evolu-
tionary epistemology. However, as we shall see, some of the details differ in impor-
tant ways. As we have established in Skinner’s evolutionary approach to
epistemology, Darwinian biology is used to explain both the ability of organisms to
know as well as the process of knowing itself. Popper (1979) has pointed out,
Animals and even plants are problem-solvers, finding solutions by method of competitive
tentative solutions and the elimination of error. The tentative solutions which animals and
plants incorporate into their anatomy and their behavior are biological analogues of theories
and vice versa: theories correspond to endosomatic organs and their ways of functioning, as
do many exosomatic products such as honeycombs, as well as especially exosomatic tools,
such as spiders’ webs. Just like theories, organs and their functions are tentative adaptations
to the world we live in. (p. 145)
The characteristics of external objects that contain nutrients necessary for an organ-
ism’s survival pose problems that the human species has come to know how to
solve. This knowledge, for example, becomes literally embodied in the structure,
variety, and placement of teeth, and by the glands that secrete special but effective
chemicals that lead to catabolic processes, and by a critical length of intestinal tract,
and by a myriad other related physiological structures and mechanisms. In the long
evolutionary history of our species, past environments have criticized (i.e., selected
against) certain other competing problem-solving attempts. Relatively “good”
attempts have survived, but their survival does not indicate that there are not better
possible solutions or that these solutions are absolutely “justified” (i.e., better solu-
tions may be available). These solutions may in fact contain a great deal of error, as
undigested nutrients, dental cavities, and ulcers indicate.
Random variation and selective retention have not only produced embodied
knowledge in the species, but these mechanisms have also allowed the acquisition
of fallible and unjustified knowledge in the lifetime of the organism, knowledge that
can hopefully continue to respond to further criticism. According to Popper (1979),
the major difference between the problem solving of subhuman animals and humans
is that for animals, death and considerable suffering constitute the major feedback
for error elimination, but because of past selection of intelligence, humans can
advance theories and arrange experiments (error-eliminating attempts) so that our
mistaken theories and beliefs can “die in our stead”.
This evolutionary epistemological context of pan-critical rationalism has a num-
ber of implications for Ellis’ REBT and for second wave cognitive therapy in gen-
eral. First, evolutionary epistemology provides a larger context for an account of
rationality and therefore can provide answers to meta-questions of rationality (e.g.,
“What is rationality?”, “Why is rationality good?”, and, “How did rationality come
to exist?”). Second, evolutionary epistemology may be seen as using the best source
of knowledge—science—to answer an important epistemic question. Thus, this
account of rationality is seen as consistent with, and in fact, an implication of, con-
temporary biology (O’Donohue, 2013).
Pan-Critical Rationality and Rational Emotive Therapy
O’Donohue and Vass (1996) have argued that the extent to which Ellis has faithfully
followed this epistemic account is another question entirely. For example, Ellis, at
least in the majority of his writings describing his account of rationality, holds an
explicitly justificational account. For example, Ellis stated rational beliefs, “...can
be supported by empirical data...” (Ellis, 1973, p. 57). This again is puzzling given
that he has stated that he follows the views of Bartley and may be indicative of
problematic exegesis on the part of Ellis.
However, many of these strategies and methods implied by a pan-critical account
of rationality would be similar to those of existing REBT. For example, both con-
ventionally practiced RET and a pan-critical approach would emphasize the impor-
tance of identifying relevant irrational beliefs and increasing the client’s awareness
of these beliefs (however, one would concentrate on the history and quality of past
critical tests, as well as the severity of these tests). Thus, both would highlight asso-
ciated therapeutic techniques such as the therapist probing and identifying these
beliefs. Both would stress the B-C connection in the RET’s A-B-C-D-E (Activating
Event-Belief-Consequence-Dispulation0Effects) paradigm as an important point of
intervention and would emphasize rationality as the relevant critical dimension.
However, the pan-critical account of rationality would also have implications for
modifying the current practice of REBT. In a pan-critical-based cognitive therapy,
the purpose of therapy would be to teach clients how to be appropriately critical of
their beliefs. Thus, a major goal of therapy would be to teach criticism skills—as
well as the willingness to criticize one’s own beliefs. In this view, currently prac-
ticed REBT does some of this (through modeling effects and other implicit mecha-
nisms) and teaches this for circumscribed beliefs and situations, but may not do this
with optimum generality or with the explicitness that would tend to increase the
transfer of such skills to other beliefs and acts (O’Donohue & Vass, 1996). In
addition, it is fair to say that the pan-critical approach would also be critical of the
central tenets of REBT such as its reliance on empirical confirmation and other
inductivists approaches, while the conventional approach would not.
The pan-critical rational–emotive therapist also would be more systematic and
specific about the criticism process. Promoting a particular attitude toward error on
the part of the client would be of primary importance. Popper (1965, p. 281) has
stated, “The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right.” The
same holds for rationality in general and thus an attempt would be made in therapy
to understand that an uncritical attitude towards one’s own beliefs is itself problem-
atic because we are often wrong and such an uncritical outlook does not identify
erroneous beliefs nor does it produce error-eliminating attempts. Thus, a key value
of criticism is that it can help us to identify and eliminate error and successively
improve our attempts at avoiding the negative consequences of our mistaken beliefs
(for example, think of the continual quality improvement efforts of companies, such
as Toyota). The “craving to be right” of a justificational account is transformed to
“craving to identify our errors and replace these.”
The pan-critical approach would emphasize new sets of techniques and therapy
goals. For example, the pan-critical approach would emphasize the importance of
judging when and which beliefs should be problematized. This may not be a
straightforward matter but would require a fair amount of judgment and discrimina-
tion. Thus, another level of criticism becomes important: a meta-level of identifying
which object level judgements ought to be priorities for criticism as well as what are
efficient, severe tests for these (see O’Donohue et al., 2022). Finally, of utmost
importance, the pan-critical approach would stress imparting skills regarding how
to construct new and telling (i.e., potentially falsifying) tests of relevant beliefs. In
this approach, the therapist should not ask clients to support their beliefs and prac-
tices, but rather to invent and conduct tests that would efficiently criticize these.
Again, this problem can have important negative implications for clinical prac-
tice. If a goal of RET is to help clients to become independently rational, then it
would seem countertherapeutic for clients to be unable to accurately apply criteria
to evaluate the rationality of particular beliefs. To the extent that this procedure is
poorly defined, a quasi-mysterious process, an authoritarian process (“My therapist
says so,”) or a seemingly arbitrary process, then it is likely clients would have dif-
ficulty in making these key judgments in the future.
The Third Wave: Post-Modernism and Contextualism
The so-called “third wave” of cognitive behavior therapy began over 15 years ago
(Hayes, 2004), and like traditional CBT, it includes a variety of streams and distinct
interventions. Though these interventions that fall under the third-wave are arguably
disparate from one another in form (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy,
Dialectical Behavior Therapy, Functional Analytic Psychotherapy, Mindfulness
Based Cognitive Therapy), they have common elements. These common elements
include the rejection of mechanistic philosophical assumptions in favor of more

post-modern assumptions as well as the usage of therapeutic techniques tied to
these assumptions (e.g., mindfulness, acceptance, values; see McCracken, chapter
“What Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy?”, in this volume). A mechanistic assump-
tion, a philosophical framework introduced by Pepper (1942), may be defined as
pre-analytic beliefs that phenomena (in this case, behavior) can be explained in
purely physical or deterministic terms (e.g., Hayes, 2004; Herbert et al., 2013).
Though it is incorrect to say that the entirety of work that preceded the third-wave
was inherently mechanistic, it is arguably true that mechanism exists at some level
within both the first- and second-waves. For example, Thorndike’s (1898) work on
stimulus-response theory posits a lawful, orderly relationship between stimulus and
response that is strengthened by the nature and frequency of S-R pairings.
In the present day, the distinctions between the third wave and its progenitors are
somewhat ambiguous (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017). For example, the techniques orig-
inally borne from third-wave therapies (e.g., mindfulness, acceptance) have been
incorporated into some mainstream cognitive-behavioral therapies. In practice, the
difference between waves may even be somewhat arbitrary. Formally, third-wave
clinicians are said to utilize more mindfulness and acceptance techniques while
second-wave clinicians incorporate more cognitive restructuring. However, techni-
cal eclecticism of both second- and third-wave techniques among clinicians appears
to be rather common (Brown et al., 2011). Thus, the demarcation used to distinguish
third-wave CBTs from traditional CBTs is somewhat blurry.
Nonetheless, from an Pepperian account, the basic philosophical assumptions of
three waves of CBTs are relatively distinct (Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 1993). For
the purposes of this chapter, we will examine functional contextualism, the philo-
sophical standpoint of ACT, in large part due to the explicit links between the ACT
model and the philosophical assumptions of functional contextualism (e.g., Hayes
et al., 1988; Chin & Hayes, 2015). Though the specific assumptions used in ACT do
not necessarily represent those used in other third-wave approaches, they do consti-
tute an example of the general post-modernist assumptions and rebuttal of mecha-
nism (also called elemental realism) that is native to second-wave CBT. By
post-modernist, we refer primarily to “the assumption that there is no common
denominator—in ‘nature’ or ‘truth’ or ‘God’ or ‘the future’—that guarantees either
the One-ness of the world or the possibility of neutral or objective thought”
(Ermarth, 1998).
Functional Contextualism
In essence, mainstream psychology holds the view that the world exists indepen-
dently from our sensation of it, and that the goal of science is to build increasingly
accurate models that describe this world, as well as how the constituent pieces of the
world interact with one another (Hayes et al., 1988). Statements about the world are
justified, valid, true, or rational if they correspond to this underlying world. This
mechanistic assumption can be seen inside of traditional second-wave approaches,

such as Ellis’ discussed above, where clients are encouraged to engage in behavioral
experiments to test the accuracy of their assumptions and beliefs and to discard
those thoughts that are irrational or “false”. Extended further, identifying where the
distinction between the natural pieces/kinds lie and “carving nature at its joints” is
an important function of science from this perspective (i.e., DSM diagnostic criteria
and psychiatric nosology more broadly). For example, diagnoses are useful because
they demarcate discrete entities that draw a distinction between adaptive and mal-
adaptive functioning, and the extent to which they successfully do so reinforces the
validity of the disorder in the natural world (e.g., Kendler & Gardner, 1998).
In contrast, informed by the framework of Pepper (1942), ACT is built on a prag-
matic philosophy of science called functional contextualism (Hayes, 1993; Hayes
et al., 1988). From this perspective, truth and scientific validity are rooted in the
pragmatic questions of what successfully works in a given context to accomplish a
stated goal (successful working, workability; Barnes-Holmes, 2000). Unlike mech-
anism (elemental realism), defined as the assumption that “one can know the true
nature of reality, and objectively discover the elements of which it is composed”
(Ciarrochi et al., 2016), the contextualist philosophy refrains from making such
ontological claims, i.e., claims about the kinds of categories of entities that exist.
Because truthfulness is determined by workability with respect to pre-analytic goals
(that is, an arbitrarily chosen metric as a foundation on which analyses can be devel-
oped, rather than the result of such analyses), contextualists can sidestep the ques-
tion of the nature of reality instead of mapping the veracity of statements onto a
reality. This does not mean that functional contextualism is anti-ontological (e.g.,
stating that there is no reality, or that reality is subjective), but rather, that functional
contextualism is a-ontological (Barnes-Holmes, 2005).
Clarity of one’s goals is critical within functional contextualism; otherwise, any
consequence-shaped behavior would be considered successful, even behaviors that
are generally considered to not be so (e.g., suicide, throwing tantrums, polluting the
environment; Hayes, 1993). Within functional contextualism, the goal of science is
“to predict-and-influence, with precision, scope, and depth, whole organisms inter-
acting in and with a context considered historically and situationally” (Hayes et al.,
2012, p. 4). In contrast to mechanism (i.e., elemental realism), which emphasizes
the ways in which individual components interact with one another to produce the
whole, the primary unit of analysis in contextualism is the whole event and the parts
are abstracted when it is useful.
In functional contextualism, precision refers to a limited number of analytic con-
cepts [e.g., derived relational responding, mutual and combinatorial entailment in
Relational Frame Theory (RFT); Hayes et al., 2001] being relevant for a given case.
Scope refers to the capacity of an analytic concept to be applicable to multiple cases.
Finally, depth refers to the degree to which analytic concepts cohere across levels of
analysis (that is, principles that apply at the level of the individual should also be
applicable to groups of individuals) and across established fields of study (e.g.,
psychological findings should also cohere with principles in other sciences, particu-
larly evolution science and anthropology). As such, from an essentialist perspective,
disorders represent distinct demarcations between function and dysfunction (cf.

Lilienfeld & Marino, 1999); however, a contextualist might generally abandon the
notions of specific disorders and instead search for a set of principles that are
broadly applicable, and not limited to a specific diagnostic category.
As mentioned above, functional contextualism as a philosophical perspective has
its origins in the writings of Stephen Pepper (1942), who argued that scientific-
philosophical systems can be delineated into four distinct models, or “world hypoth-
eses,” derived from common sense conceptualizations (or “root metaphors”, in
Pepper’s language). Pepper further describes the root metaphor of contextualism as
“the real historic event, the event in its actuality… It is not an act conceived as alone
or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context”
(p. 232). Pepper himself did not distinguish at what point an analysis ends, which
may partially account for the differentiation of functional contextualism from other
kinds of contextualism (Hayes, 1993). Within functional contextualism, context is
included to the extent that it meaningfully improves the ability to predict-and-
influence human behavior.
The key insight tying Pepper’s writings to third-wave behavioral therapy was
that Skinner’s radical behaviorism is in essence a contextualistic system (Hayes
et al., 1988). Thus, in some ways, third-wave approaches share a philosophical sys-
tem with radical behaviorism. For example, Skinner’s (1938) concept of the operant
requires the understanding of the relationship between a given behavior and the
stimulus events surrounding the behavior within the environment. Thus, any given
behavior is devoid of meaning from a behavior analytic standpoint without also
including the historical, as well as the current environmental context in which the
behavior is emitted—the so-called “act-in-context”. These behavior-environment
relations are critical in determining the functional class of the behavior itself, as “the
consequences define the properties with respect to which responses are called simi-
lar” (Skinner, 1953).
There are notable advantages of clarifying Skinner’s philosophical assumptions,
and interpreting them through the lens of functional contextualism. First, from a
standpoint of Pepperian classification, Skinner was not always clear on his philo-
sophical stance as it pertains to radical behaviorism (e.g., Gifford & Hayes, 1999;
Parrott, 1983). This has led to inconsistencies about his philosophy of science within
the behavior-analytic community. For example, while Skinner outright rejected bio-
logical reductionism early on (e.g., Skinner, 1938), he appealed to future physiolo-
gists providing more adequate explanations for behavior (see Zilio, 2013, for a
review). For this reason, Hayes et al. (2001) argued that adopting contextualist
assumptions within behavior analysis more firmly ties it to the pragmatist wing of
psychology (e.g., James, Dewey, Pierce), emphasizing the prediction and influence
of scientific claims over an ontological truth. The explication of functional contex-
tualism as one’s own philosophical position also necessitates that a scientist states
the goal of their analyses antecedently (Hayes, 1993). This is particularly important
in behavior analysis given Skinner’s argument that a proposition is ‘true’ to the
extent that with its help the listener responds effectively to the situation it describes
(1974). Without a pre-existing goal statement to further clarify what an “effective
response” might be, any reinforced behavior would be definitionally “true”

(Vilardaga et al., 2009).
Evolutionary Epistemology
Another important implication of a functional contextualistic behavior science (and

also of Skinner’s radical behaviorism) is that the analyses must also be applicable to
knowledge claims made by the scientist (e.g., Day, 2005). Thus, any epistemologi-
cal claims made from within a functional contextual perspective should not be
judged based upon correspondence to the world as it exists. This epistemological
position of functional contextualism is in sharp contrast with that of other world-
views in the Pepperian classification, including mechanism. That is, scientific prog-
ress is often said to be only possible if theories are developed, which refer to the
world (Laudan, 1977). Put in a different way, scientific theories that are drawn from
other philosophical worldviews, such as mechanism, classify and divide the world
ontogenetically. However, the functional contextualist would argue that, although
these divisions may be useful, an effective theory is not defined by these divisions
that are purported to pre-exist in the natural world.
For many scientists and philosophers, this epistemological position of functional
contextualism does present an important limitation, however (Barnes-Holmes, 2000).
This is because, from a functional contextualist perspective, scientific endeavors are
a product of the behavioral history of the scientist. This means that, as a result of the
scientist not being able to claim ontological truths, a different behavioral history may
have produced a different “truth” (Barnes-Holmes, 2000), which is not a conven-
tional account of what the truth is for many scientists and philosophers. This notion
of referential truth is similar to evolutionary epistemology, in which Darwinian prin-
ciples are applied to verbal behavior and cognition (see Radnitzky & Bartley, 1987).
Previous evolutionary epistemologists have tried to adhere to correspondence-
based truths by claiming “no effort is made to justify ‘my own’ knowledge pro-
cesses” (Campbell, 1959, p. 157), therefore excluding the scientist from the analytic
account. However, functional contextualism takes a different approach. That is, the
account must also include an analysis of the contingencies involved in scientific
knowing itself. Rather than struggling with whether scientific theories truly refer to
and correspond to the world, the analysis also focuses on the functions of language
and cognition, rendering correspondence a moot point.
Basic and Applied Science: A Reticulated Model
Taken together, these functional contextualistic philosophical assumptions can be

utilized to form a scientific approach that explicitly lays out a coherent strategy for
knowledge development, called contextual behavioral science (CBS; Hayes et al.,
2012). CBS is defined by Hayes and colleagues as:
a principle-focused, communitarian strategy of reticulated scientific and practical develop-

ment. Grounded in contextualistic philosophical assumptions, and nested within multi-
dimensional, multi-level evolution science as a contextual view of life, it seeks the
development of basic and applied scientific concepts and methods that are useful in
predicting-and-influencing the contextually embedded actions of whole organisms, indi-
vidually and in groups, with precision, scope, and depth; and extends that approach into
knowledge development itself. (p. 2)
A key strategy utilized within CBS is a reticulated (that is, web-like) model in which
basic (i.e., principle- and theory-based science) and applied science are kept tightly
linked to, and mutually influence one another. The well-known Duhem-Quine thesis
(Quine, 1951) demonstrates that scientific hypotheses are impossible to test in isola-
tion, as any observational test requires a further set of auxiliary assumptions. As
argued by Meehl (1978), these auxiliary propositions are often blamed for failures
in theories within psychology, preventing falsification and leading to the “slow
progress of soft psychology.” However, from a functional contextual perspective,
behaviors and their contextual functions are treated as legitimate analytical concepts
of themselves, not as proxies for inferred variables (Hayes et al., 2012). Thus, for
example, an individual’s social withdrawal and reticence around peers is not a
symptom of “introversion” or “shyness”; rather the specific behaviors themselves
are the targets of analysis and intervention.
This analytic strategy requires the conditions in which concepts are studied to be
defined specifically, and contextually-bound, such that there is little room to blame
auxiliaries when a concept is not supported. Though such an approach does not
entirely invalidate the Duhem-Quine problem, in conjunction with other good sci-
entific practices (e.g., O’Donohue et al., 2017), it may address the limited progress
within the field. A further advantage of behaviors as targets of analysis is that these
can be relatively easily studied in a basic, principle-driven sense, given the existing
work in the field of behavior analysis, and these basic principles can be scaled to
applied contexts. For example, rather than targeting the content of cognitions as the
focus of intervention (i.e., cognitive restructuring), ACT explicitly addresses the
functions of cognitions as they relate to the individual’s environment, as well as the
individual’s relationship with said cognitions. However, the functional-contextual
approach also allows for advances in applied domains (i.e., the “act-in-context”),
with the caveat that basic principles be developed to explain, predict, and influence
these findings (Hayes et al., 2012; see also Barnes-Holmes et al., 2016). An example
of the fundamental basic science most relevant to third wave interventions, such as
ACT, is RFT (see Hayes et al., 2001).
Middle-Level Terms and Constructs
As discussed extensively above, the development strategy of having an applied the-

ory of psychotherapy tied to a basic, behavioral account of complex human behav-
ior seen in CBS is sensible from a philosophy of science perspective. That is, the
entire package is internally consistent (e.g., mechanisms of change in ACT are

derived from RFT-based principles), theoretically coherent (human suffering is cast
in terms of problems that arise from relational framing), and largely self-sufficient
(outside of basic behavioral principles, the ACT perspective is not reliant upon other
theories in order to be useful).
The same strategy presents a pragmatic concern for treatment delivery, however.
More specifically, it is unrealistic for all clinicians and practitioners to be well-
trained in basic behavioral principles, to the point that they can apply them in novel
clinical situations. Thus, as a dissemination strategy, ACT training deliberately uti-
lizes so-called “middle-level terms”—practically useful concepts and abstractions
designed to orient the clinician toward features and processes that may lead to better
outcomes (Hayes et al., 2012). The ACT literature incorporates several of these mid-
dle-level terms, including the six fundamental processes (acceptance, diffusion, flex-
ible attention to the present, self-as-context, values, and committed action) within
the psychological flexibility model (which itself could be considered a middle-level
term). These processes lack the precision, scope, and depth typical of behavioral
principles, and therefore should not themselves be confused with principles.
However, a significant risk of the use of middle-level terms is that they can
become reified (Vilardaga et al., 2009), and this risk may be particularly significant
for those practitioners for whom middle-level terms were designed; that is, practi-
tioners without extensive training in basic behavioral principles. For example, the
term “attention” in behavior analysis refers to a functional class of reinforcers that
can tend to maintain many different behaviors. However, laypeople and even clini-
cians may be tempted to attribute negative behaviors to attention itself (i.e., a child
acting out for attention), without attending to how reinforcement works to bring
about those negative behaviors. Absent the behavioral principles of reinforcement,
knowing that a behavior is maintained by attention does little to address the problem
behavior in question.
Indeed, there is some concern even within the functional contextual wing that
these terms are problematic, and veer dangerously close to hypothetical constructs,
which may be defined as a non-observable variable that is used to explain behavior
(e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2016). In order to remain philosophically consistent
with functional contextualism, theoretical constructs are only useful to the extent
that they orient the clinician toward problematic, manipulable behaviors. For exam-
ple, mindfulness is a middle-level term that addresses the degree to which an indi-
vidual exhibits problematic attentional rigidity toward the past (e.g., rumination) or
future (e.g., excessive worry). It should not be considered a skill to be trained up
indiscriminately, but rather a tool to address deficits in flexible attentional focus. It
may be worth careful consideration whether the risks and problems associated with
the usage of middle-level terms within ACT are beneficial and philosophically con-
sistent with the functional contextualist strategy. Nevertheless, as Dixon et al.
(2018) pointed out, ACT may be the most resoundingly successful application of
the broad research program on derived stimulus relations, and that “although ACT
is complex, it incorporates a non-technical language that the general population can
understand and that, arguably has helped to fuel its societal acceptance” (p. 251).
In sum, broadly speaking, the theories that comprise the third-wave of behavior
therapy can be characterized by their eschewal of mechanistic assumptions in favor
of post-modernist interpretations, rejecting the notion of a neutral, objective per-
spective from which one can analyze the world. These assumptions have important
implications in how therapy is conducted, distinguish third-wave interventions from
the previous waves. Rather than training clients to be more rational and to identify
irrational thoughts and beliefs, clients are asked to evaluate the utility of their behav-
iors with respect to a pre-existing target outcome (Vilardaga et al., 2009). As such,
the role of the clinician is to help clients develop more effective ways of interacting
with their environments.
Additionally, these third-wave assumptions are as applicable to scientific behav-
iors as they are to problems that arise in clinical contexts. In order to develop a more
progressive approach to science that seeks to develop successively useful models
and theories, a philosophically coherent strategy termed CBS has been developed.
This approach emphasizes identifying directly manipulable causal variables rather
than constructs (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986), with contextual factors being defined
precisely to limit the degree to which the Duhem-Quine problem can be invoked.
Though this approach has led to a productive empirical basis (e.g., nearly 350 ran-
domized controlled trials of ACT having been conducted to date; see bit.ly/
ACTRCTs), there have been some criticisms regarding the research program (e.g.,
O’Donohue et al., 2016).
Conclusions
We have seen that the three waves of behavior therapy have been influenced by, and
have adopted, three distinct sets of meta-scientific beliefs. We have argued that in
the first wave, B. F. Skinner was influenced primarily by the positivism of the physi-
cist Ernst Mach as well as the inductive philosopher of science, Francis Bacon, and
came to develop an indigenous philosophy of science (which he called radical
behaviorism) that eventuated in a naturalized, evolutionary epistemology—which,
in turn, was advanced by neither Mach or Bacon. Evolutionary epistemology looks
at the ways a natural process, evolution, studied by science, has influenced humans
to be knowledgeable—both as a species as well as individuals. Evolutionary episte-
mologists point out that epistemology then is seen as a scientific matter, not a phi-
losopher one.
On the other hand, in the second wave, Albert Ellis was influenced by the pre-
Socratic philosophers known as the Stoics, who emphasized that one’s beliefs have
more influence on one’s happiness more than events themselves, as well as by the
neo-Popperian, W.W. Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism, which emphasizes maxi-
mizing criticism to identify and root out error. Bartley’s basic idea is that clients
have erroneous beliefs as well as nonideal belief generating processes that can be
improved by adopting a more critical stance (including the stance of criticizing
one’s criticizing—hence the notion that this approach is “comprehensively
critical”). However, O’Donohue and Vass (1996) have argued that Ellis was not
actually faithful to Bartley’s epistemology. Finally, the third wave, particularly
ACT, was most influenced by a rather obscure philosopher, Stephen Pepper, who
mainly concentrated on aesthetics during his career but emphasized non-mechanistic,
root metaphors. His obscurity can be partly depicted that in The Philosopher’s Index
a database of citations (in February 2021) for philosophy books and articles, his
total citations were 190 while Popper’s during the same time period were 3023.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed evaluation of the qual-
ity of these meta-scientific commitments as well as the degree to which each of the
waves actually has been faithful to the commitments associated with their particular
wave. These are certainly important questions. It is clear that each of the waves cur-
rently face significant challenges and it will be important to see whether the waves
can draw on the insights of these meta-scientific commitments to increase their
problem-solving effectiveness. All are faced with the general challenge of develop-
ing new therapy principles, more valid assessments, as well as more efficient and
effective therapies.
However, it can also be said that each also faces unique challenges. The third
wave has developed quickly in the last few decades, a time period which it seems
fair to say the first wave has failed to develop new learning principles or new
advancements in the effectiveness of their therapies. It also seems fair to say in
recent decades that perhaps a lot of time and attention has been spent by those in the
first wave of developing a profession to meet the practical needs of delivering many
interventions to many individuals suffering from autism. In the last few decades, it
also seems fair to say that the second wave also has made few recent breakthroughs
in the varieties of cognitive therapy. Perhaps a renewed look at bringing more impli-
cations of Bartley’s epistemology to second wave therapies would be useful. Is
Popper’s concept of severe testing (see O’Donohue, 2021) something that ought
also to be taught to clients? How much criticism is ideal—what does it practically
mean to maximize criticism? How much judgement is involved in what to prob-
lematize a particular belief or subset of beliefs in a client’s web of belief?
The third wave has faced significant problems, e.g., with measurement—ACT
emphasizes functional relationships but its outcome measures by in large have not
been functional analyses but self-report questionnaires, such as the Acceptance and
Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), which has had significant valid-
ity problems (Wolgast, 2014). This of course raises serious concerns about what can
be concluded from the outcome studies of ACT that utilize such problematic ques-
tionnaires. In addition, there are concerns about whether ACT researchers have
appropriately controlled for therapeutic allegiance or even whether it has been over-
sold and relied too heavily on questionable research practice (see O’Donohue
et al., 2016).
A practical question involves how does a clinician or client currently rationally
choose among these three waves of behavior therapy? Does evidence-based practice
mean a careful look needs to be made problem by problem, where one can find bet-
ter evidence for one wave for problem a, but better evidence for another wave from
problem b? Or is one wave so generally superior that, at least at this point in time,
one can argue that wave x is generally superior and thus ought to be adopted on a
fairly widespread basis? It seems that practitioners and researchers are adopting
both approaches. However, it also seems fair to say that some seem to be adopting
their wave based on unclear sets of criteria and arguments—some seem to just have
a preference, perhaps akin to a preference to a sports team or to a political party—
often a strong one—for one wave or another. Perhaps further work on the quality
and fidelity to these meta-scientific commitments can help make these choices more
rational. However, the first step is identifying these commitments, which was the
task of the present chapter.
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What Is First-Wave Behavior Therapy?
Edward K. Morris
In 2004, Steven C. Hayes published an article in Behavior Therapy titled,

“Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Relational Frame Theory, and the Third
Wave of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies” (Hayes, 2004). It was based on his
1988 presidential address – “Human Suffering” (Hayes, 1998) – at the meeting of
the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy (AABT) (Steven C. Hayes,
personal communication, September 20, 2020).1 In it, he wrote: “Behavior therapy
can be roughly categorized into three waves or generations…a ‘wave’ is a set or
formulation of dominant assumptions, methods, and goals, some implicit, that help
organize research, theory, and practice” (p. 640).2 According to Hayes (2004,
pp. 640–645), the three waves were (as they are today) behavior therapy (ca.
1950-present), cognitive-behavior therapy (ca. 1970-present), and clinical behavior
analysis (ca. 1990-present).3 In addition to calling the first wave behavior therapy,
1
In 2005, AABT was renamed the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies. Behavior
Therapy (est. 1970) remains its flagship journal.
2
Waves and generations are different, of course. A wave is prototypic: a change in behavior thera-
py’s assumptions (e.g., philosophies), methods (e.g., research), and goals (e.g., in science and
practice). A generation is demographic: a cohort of behavior therapy’s founders (e.g., the Greatest
Generation, b. 1901–1927). More than one generation can participate in a wave; more than one
wave can appear in a generation.
3
Hayes (2004) was not the first to use a “waves” or “generations” historiography. Some behavior
therapists have used two waves or generations; others have used three waves or generations (e.g.,
O’Donohue, 1998b; Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1997); and still others have used more (e.g., O’Donohue
et al., 2001; O’Donohue & Krasner, 1995a). Most uses of the first, second, and third waves and
generations, though, are the same, but not always (e.g., Hayes was a “second generation behavior
therapist”; Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1997, p. 406).
E. K. Morris (*)
Department of Applied Behavioral Science, 4000 Dole Human Development Center,
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
e-mail: ekm@ku.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_4
84 E. K. Morris
Hayes also used the term for “the entire range of behavioral and cognitive therapies”
(p. 640). These uses are respected here: behavior therapy for the first wave, Behavior
Therapy for a range of the waves.
This chapter describes the foundations of behavior therapy, that is, the assump-
tions, methods, and goals manifest in its research, theory, and practice (hereafter, in
its systems, sciences, and practices). The first section offers a representative view of
behavior therapy – Hayes (2004) – along with some clarifications. The second sec-
tion addresses behavior therapy’s foundations, organized by its long past (ca. 500
B.C.E.–1900), short history (ca. 1900–1950), recent origins (ca. 1950–1960), and
institutional founding (ca. 1960–1970).4 The third section considers behavior ther-
apy yesterday and today, describing its differences with the clinical traditions,
within its own streams, and with the other waves of Behavior Therapy. Some of the
differences are complementary, some paradigmatic, and some contingent.
A Representative View of Behavior Therapy
In his article, Hayes (2004) described the clinical traditions in psychotherapy during
the 1940s and 1950s and then the emergence of behavior therapy as an alternative
to them. The clinical traditions were the psychoanalytic and humanistic theories and
therapies (and psychiatric theories and therapies more than a century earlier). They
were criticized for having “a very poor link to scientifically established principles,
vague specification of interventions, and weak scientific evidence in support of the
impact of the interventions” (p. 640). Hayes continued: “Early behavior therapists
believed that theories should be built upon a bedrock of scientifically well-
established basic principles, and that applied technologies should be well-specified
and rigorously tested” (p. 640). As for the basic principles: “Behavior therapy is an
orientation to understanding and ameliorating human suffering, through behavior
change, that is influenced by principles derived from experimental psychology, par-
ticularly learning research” (O’Donohue et al., 2001, p. xii). Although the bedrock
was not always the same bedrock, the principles of learning were fundamental:
…learning is experience that results in relatively enduring changes in behavior. This focus
precisely addresses the general question involved in the enterprise of psychotherapy: How
can therapists structure experience so that relatively enduring changes occur in the client’s
behavior. (O’Donohue, 1998a, p. 6)
After this, Hayes (2004) described two major streams in behavior therapy – neobe-
haviorism and behavior analysis (p. 641) – noting that they were united in their
4
The distinction between behavior therapy’s long past and short history is borrowed from Hermann
Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), who wrote: “Psychology has a long past, yet its real history is short”
(Ebbinghaus, 1908, p. 3). E. G. Boring (1886–1968) made the distinction famous as: “Psychology
has a long past, but only a short history” (Boring, 1929, p. vii).
What Is First-Wave Behavior Therapy? 85
criticisms of the clinical traditions and united in having scientific bases, but that
they were different, too. They have also been conflated, as clarified below.
Neobehaviorism
Hayes (2004) aligned neobehaviorism with associationism: “In the late 1960s,
neobehaviorists began to abandon simple associative concepts of learning in favor
of more flexible mediational principles and mechanistic computer metaphors”
(p. 642). Actually, neobehaviorists began to abandon some of behaviorism’s asso-
ciationism in the late 1920s, specifically, the stimulus-response (S-R) association-
ism of John B. Watson’s (1878–1958) classical behaviorism. In its place, most
neobehaviorists favored a behaviorism that included mediational constructs (e.g.,
attention, motivation, representations) within the organism (O) to explain the rela-
tions between stimuli (Ss) and responses (Rs) in S-O-R mediational behaviorism,
for instance, the drives, habits, and inhibitors in Clark L. Hull’s (1884–1952) theory
of learning. Although complex, the mediational constructs were still often associa-
tive and were implicitly mentalistic. What the neobehaviorists abandoned in the late
1960s was the surface structure of these constructs in favor of the explicitly mental-
istic, computational constructs in information processing (e.g., encoding, memory,
retrieval). The deep structures of mediational behaviorism and cognitivism, though,
were largely the same: their logic of explanation (Leahey, 1992).
Behavior Analysis
As for behavior analysis, Hayes (2004) aligned it with B. F. Skinner’s (1904–1990)

article, “The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms” (Skinner, 1945), and his
book, Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957). Actually, behavior analysis was also a
neobehaviorism, but not a mediational behaviorism, whose paradigm was different.
It abandoned Watson’s associative Ss and Rs, too, not in favor of mediational con-
structs, but in favor of classes of Ss and Rs and their functional relations (Skinner,
1938). As for the philosophy of his science, Skinner (1945) called it radical behav-
iorism, where radical meant basis or root: Behavior was the basis or root of psychol-
ogy (Schneider & Morris, 1987). This was a metaphysical behaviorism in which
psychological terms denoted descriptive concepts for behavior to be explained (e.g.,
feeling, thinking), not explanatory constructs that putatively explained behavior
(e.g., feelings, thoughts). In his radical behaviorism, Skinner included private events
as more behavior to be explained (e.g., covert responses). This, Hayes (2004)
averred, “overthrew the Watsonian restriction against the direct scientific analysis of
thoughts, feelings, and other private events” (p. 642). Actually, Watson’s restriction
was ultimately against them as explanatory constructs, not as descriptive concepts,
which is described later.
86 E. K. Morris
Hayes (2004, pp. 646, 659) also aligned behavior analysis with the worldview of
contextualism, that is, with John Dewey’s (1859–1952) pragmatism. He had done
this before. In a retrospective review of Stephen C. Pepper’s (1891–1972) World
Hypotheses (Pepper, 1942), he co-wrote: “Behavior analysis is a contextualistic sys-
tem” (Hayes et al., 1988, p. 110; see Morris, 1988). In particular, he aligned behav-
ior analysis with the functional contextualism of his contextual behavioral science
(see Hayes et al., 2012):
The core analytic unit of functional contextualism is the “ongoing act in context.” The core
components of functional contextualism are (a) focus on the whole event, (b) sensitivity to
the role of context in understanding the nature and function of an event, (c) emphasis on a
pragmatic truth criterion [“prediction and influence,” p. 647], and (d) specific scientific
goals against which to apply that truth criterion. (Hayes, 2004, p. 646)
In passing, Hayes (2004, p. 644) also aligned behavior analysis with mechanism
(Pepper, 1942, pp. 186–221). This may have been due (a) to variations in behavior
analysis regarding reductionism and causation (Hayes et al., 1988, pp. 104–105) or
(b) to functional contextualism’s interest in controlling behavior (Hayes et al., 1988,
p. 101), but this warrants further analysis.
Criticisms Hayes (2004) then criticized behavior analysis, some of it warranted,
some of it not, depending on variations within behavior analysis (and across behav-
ior analysts). For instance, although Skinner (1945, 1957) included private events,
Hayes demurred:
…Skinner’s analysis of language and cognition led him to conclude that while a scientifi-
cally valid study of thoughts and feelings was possible, it was not needed to understand
overt behavior. Language and cognition was [sic] conceived of as simple operant behavior
and as such added nothing fundamentally new to the contingency stream surrounding other
behavior. (p. 642)
Whether Skinner’s analysis of language and cognition added nothing fundamentally

new to Behavior Therapy is arguable. Each wave of Behavior Therapy added some-
thing fundamentally new. In the 1990s, clinical behavior analysis added a putatively
new principle of behavior from relational frame theory (RFT): the transformation of
stimulus functions (Hayes et al., 2001, pp. 31–33). In the 1970s, cognitive-behavior
therapy added new cognitive constructs (e.g., attributions; see Mahoney, 1974;
Meichenbaum, 1977), but not everything new was useful. In the late 1950s, behav-
ior analysis added a new system (i.e., radical behaviorism) and a new science (i.e.,
of operant behavior; see Skinner, 1938, 1945). Afterward, it added other things,
some of them also described later.
Hayes’s (2004) foregoing distinction between (a) language and cognition and (b)
behavior is a category mistake (Ryle, 1949). The former are behavior: a function of
behavior’s natural science and natural history. Behavior’s natural science is the prin-
ciples of behavior: a subject matter in the experimental psychologies of learning and
behavior (e.g., classical conditioning, reinforcement). They are presumably univer-
sal, general, or nomothetic. Behavior’s natural history is its biological, individual,
and cultural history whose products are the subject matter of other experimental
psychologies (e.g., language, cognition). Its “principles,” though, are not principles
of learning and behavior, but instead, are historically situated, normative, or idio-
graphic (e.g., predictable differences and regularities within and across behavior;
Gergen, 1973). Behavior therapy requires both natural science and natural history
for understanding behavioral disorders and developing interventions for them. They
are complementary.
As for neobehaviorism’s therapies, Hayes (2004) noted that mediational behav-
iorism and behavior analysis were similar, but again different. They were similar in
focusing “directly on problematic behavior and emotion” (p. 641), that is, on “‘first
order’ change” (p. 643), using “didactic” and “eliminative” (pp. 658–659) interven-
tions, as opposed to second-order or constructional interventions (i.e., changes in
behavior’s functions, not just forms; e.g., repertoires, reinforcers), but this arguable,
too (see, e.g., Ferster, 1973; Goldiamond, 1974). As for their differences, media-
tional behaviorism focused on emotions that caused problem behavior, using “neo-
behavioral principles” to modify them (e.g., “anxiety was to be replaced by
relaxation,” Hayes, 2004, p. 643), while behavior analysis focused on behavior
caused by the environment, using “conditioning principles” (Hayes, 2004, p. 641)
to modify it (e.g., eating, hoarding, isolate behavior, psychotic talk, stuttering, tan-
trums, wearing glasses). The distinction between emotion and behavior is another
category mistake.
Conclusion
This representative view of behavior therapy is accurate, except for occasional over-
sights, but this is understandable. Its purpose was to advance RFT and ACT in third-
wave Behavior Therapy. In contrast, the purpose of this chapter is to describe
behavior therapy’s foundations – the assumptions, methods, and goals manifest in
its systems, sciences, and practices – from a more historicist perspective.
Foundations of Behavior Therapy
As noted above, the foundations of behavior therapy may be organized by its long
past, short history, recent origins, and institutional founding. The foundations are so
complex, nuanced, and diverse, though, that the chapter must be selective in its
descriptions, even though a substantial literature supports them. This includes Agras
et al. (1979), Boakes (1984), Catania (2013), Cooper et al. (2007), Erwin (1978),
Kalish (1981), Kanfer and Phillips (1970), Kantor (1966, 1969), Kazdin (1978),
Krasner (1980, 1982, 1990), Krasner and Ullmann (1965), Leahey (2013), Madden
(2013), Malone (1990), Moore (2008), O’Donnell (1985), O’Donohue (1998b),
O’Donohue et al. (2001), O’Donohue and Krasner (1995b), Plaud and Eifert (1988),
Rachman (2015), Rutherford (2009), Skinner (1938, 1953, 1957, 1974), Smith
(1986), Ullmann and Krasner (1965, 1969), Ulrich et al. (1966), and Wolpe et al.
88 E. K. Morris
(1974). Where pertinent, this literature is cited, but it is also a bibliography, albeit of
mainly secondary sources. It does not include primary sources, which challenges
the chapter’s historiography. The foundations begin with the long past of behavior
therapy.
Long Past: 500 B.C.E.–1900 C.E.
Ancient Greece (500 B.C.E.–400 C.E.) Behavior therapy’s long past lies in Greek
philosophy circa 500 B.C.E. (Kantor, 1966; Leahey, 2013). When the Greek city-
states became physically, economically, and socially secure – a cultural opening –
they fostered philosophies that were among behavior therapy’s ontologies. Thales
(ca. 624–546 B.C.E.) proposed a monism that comprised the material world – mate-
rialism (i.e., physicalism). Heraclitus (535–475 B.C.E.) advanced becoming over
being, as captured in his aphorism: “No one ever steps in the same river twice” –
contextualism. Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) maintained that the world, including the
subject matter of psychology, consisted only of natural things, events, and their
relations – naturalism. Ontologies are not essentially true, though. They are “true”
because they work. These ontologies worked in the short history and recent origins
of behavior therapy.
Middle Ages (400 B.C.E.–1300 C.E.) When Greece succumbed to interstitial

wars and assimilation by the Roman Empire, life became less safe, secure, and sta-
ble (100 B.C.E.–400 C.E.), which fostered opposing ontologies (e.g., immaterial-
ism, supernaturalism). When Rome fell, natural philosophy waned for a
millennium – a cultural closing. In these Middle Ages, the Roman Empire devolved
into kingdoms of feudal societies and economies, while the Church offered physical
and metaphysical havens. No foundations of behavior therapy emerged at the time,
mainly contrasts. Scholasticism (1100–1500), for instance, averred that true knowl-
edge of nature lay in the Church’s interpretations of Aristotle, not in his actual phi-
losophy and science.
The Renaissance (1300–1600) Europe’s recovery from the Middle Ages was the
Renaissance, an intellectual and artistic reopening of culture and philosophy. In it,
the Scientific Revolution (1600–1800) offered a new epistemology for knowing
nature. Francis Bacon (1561–1626), in particular, advanced empirical-inductive
methods in technology and science. The goal was to predict and control nature to
improve the human condition (see Smith, 1986). A later outcome was Isaac Newton’s
(1642–1727) deductive, deterministic, mechanistic physics. These philosophies
would be integral to one or more major streams in behavior therapy.
Modern History (1500–1900) In early-Modern history (1500–1800), Rene

Descartes (1596–1650) proposed a philosophical construct of mind in mind-body
dualism. Mind was immaterial and independent of the body; some of its content was
innate (e.g., language). This was a rationalist philosophy of mind. In late-Modern

history (1600–1900), British philosophy advanced a psychological construct of
mind based in experience. John Locke (1632–1704) conceived of the mind as a
blank slate. David Hume (1711–1776) later proposed that simple ideas came from
experience, while complex ideas were based in their associations. This empiricist
philosophy of mind is found among behavior therapy’s major streams.
Modern Science (1600–1900) As for the body, Descartes viewed it as a machine,

which was consistent with the materialism, determinism, and empiricism in phys-
ics. Scientists thus began studying the body in these terms, too. Claude Bernard
(1813–1878) founded experimental physiology using empirical-inductive and
within-subject methods. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) founded an evolutionary
biology based in natural selection. When these were extended to mind and behavior,
the result was comparative psychology and the psychology of adaptation (Boakes,
1984). In the latter, Ivan P. Pavlov (1849–1936) conducted the first systematic anal-
yses of reflex behavior (e.g., salivation in dogs), which he explained reductionisti-
cally (i.e., neurologically), while Edward L. Thorndike (1875–1949) conducted the
first systematic analyses of instrumental behavior (e.g., cats escaping from boxes),
which he explained mentalistically (e.g., the satisfactions it produced). These pre-
saged, in part, behavior therapy’s bases in learning.
Conclusion
Although not nuanced, this historiography of behavior therapy’s long past describes
assumptions (e.g., materialism, naturalism), methods (e.g., empirical, inductive)
and goals (e.g., prediction, control) at the start of behavior therapy’s short history.
Some of them, though, conflicted with others (e.g., monism vs. dualism, induction
vs. deduction), but sometimes unnecessarily so, as described later, too.
Short History: 1900–1950
In the 1870s, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) founded experimental psychology in

Germany (Kantor, 1969; Leahey, 2013). Its methods were objective (e.g., psycho-
physical), its independent variables were material (e.g., stimuli), but its subject mat-
ter was not behavior. It was consciousness – experience – inferred through verbal
and nonverbal measures. In America, Edward B. Titchener (1867–1927) made
Wundt’s science into psychology’s first system: Structuralism. Its subject matter
was the structure of consciousness – its elements: sensations, feelings, and images –
observed introspectively. Behavior was not its subject matter either.
American psychology was more interested in the function of consciousness –
mental adaptation – than its structure. This became psychology’s second system:
90 E. K. Morris
Functionalism. Its subject matter was not conscious content (e.g., feelings, sensa-
tions), but conscious processes (e.g., feeling, sensing), still not behavior. As the
construct of consciousness was increasingly questioned, psychology was drawn
more to the function of behavior – behavioral adaptation. This was psychology’s
third system: behaviorism in many varieties (Malone, 1990; O’Donohue &
Kitchener, 1998; O’Donohue & Krasner, 1995b). It was supported by the turn-of-
the-century American culture, for example, urbanization and Social Progressivism
(1880–1920) (O’Donnell, 1985). In contrast to America’s familiar, rural folk psy-
chology, urbanization favored a psychology that fostered effectiveness in imper-
sonal urban settings. Social Progressivism favored a psychology that advanced
efficiency in business, industry, and daily life. Behavior therapy was not an acci-
dent, but then, neither was it predestined. America’s deep-seated belief in mind and
agency worked against natural philosophy, sciences of behavior, and their applica-
tions – and still works against them.
Russian Neuroscience Based on advances in nineteenth century European physi-
ology, Russian neuroscience was behavior therapy’s first major scientific stream,
although not its first major systematic stream. As noted above, its system was reduc-
tionistic, which behavior therapy was not (and is not), even as it included (and
includes) biological participation in all behavior and biological independent vari-
ables (e.g., genetic, hormonal, neural).5 In critiquing Structuralism, Ivan
M. Sechenov (1829–1905), the father of Russian physiology, contended that cere-
bral reflexes accounted for behavior better than consciousness did and that physiol-
ogy offered more objective methods than introspection did. Independent of
reductionism, Pavlov’s research was the basis of the first natural science of behav-
ior – an empirical-inductive science of reflex behavior (and a 1904 Nobel prize) –
which he used in behavioral interpretations of language and psychopathology.
Vladimir M. Bekhterev (1857–1927) conducted related research on motor reflexes
(e.g., leg flexion in dogs), critiqued psychoanalysis, and offered behavioral interpre-
tations of typical and atypical human behavior (e.g., personality).
As a science, Russian neuroscience’s unit of analysis was a two-term relation
between unconditional responses (i.e., reflexes; RR’s) and their unconditional ante-
cedents (i.e., eliciting stimuli; SE’s) (see Pavlov, 1927). The SE-RR relations were the
basic principles and processes of unconditional reflexes (e.g., habituation, potentia-
tion) and explained, in part, rudimentary emotion (e.g., feelings) and cognition
(e.g., awareness). When other stimuli entered the unit, new principles and pro-
cesses – conditional ones (e.g., conditioning, discrimination, extinction, generaliza-
tion) – and functions emerged (i.e., or were derived; e.g., conditional responses and
stimuli), while still others were derived from them (e.g., blocking, inhibition). These
explained, in part, more emotion and cognition (e.g., fear, anxiety). In addition,
5
The past tense (e.g., “was not”) indicates behavior analysis in the history of behavior therapy. The
present tense (e.g., “is not”) indicates behavior analysis today. This past-present distinction holds
for other characteristics of behavior analysis and in other streams in behavior therapy, but will be
assumed, not made, except as summary prompts (e.g., “includes”).
contextual variables affected the functional relations (e.g., conditioning history,

occasion-setting), accounting for still more emotion (e.g., anticipation) and cogni-
tion (e.g., memory) (see Bouton & Nelson, 1998).
The precursors of behavior therapy in Russian neuroscience included (and
include) naturalism, as opposed to supernaturalism; rigorous within-subject research
methods; an empirical-inductive science and theory of reflex behavior; new basic
and derived behavioral principles, processes, and functions; interpretations of lan-
guage, personality, and psychopathology; syntheses and analyses of emotional dis-
orders in nonhumans (e.g., neuroses in dogs); and applications that became
desensitization for human anxiety (see Franks, 1969).
Classical Behaviorism The first systematic and second scientific stream in behav-
ior therapy’s short history was Watson’s (1930) classical behaviorism. Its goal was
to make psychology and its applications objective. As a system, it was initially a
form of methodological behaviorism: Consciousness existed, but was unobserved in
practice or was unobservable in principle and, thus, set aside (Watson, 1913b).
Although this view of classical behaviorism remains common, Watson soon rejected
it for a metaphysical behaviorism in which only biology, environment, and behavior
existed (Watson, 1913a). Consciousness did not – not as an explanatory construct.
However, Watson included “implicit” behavior: behavior unobserved by others, for
instance, subvocal verbal behavior and private emotional reactions (e.g., fear, rage,
love). In this, consciousness was a descriptive concept.
As a science, Watson’s behaviorism included Pavlov’s two-term S-R relations,
but from a then-molecular perspective: Every R had an S and every S had an R. By
1930, though, this science began to falter. It could not account for variability in the
putatively essentialist S-R relations. Thus, although classical behaviorism was the
first systematic stream in behavior therapy’s short history, it was not also a scientific
stream. Nevertheless, it included (and includes) precursors of behavior therapy:
objectivity, as opposed to subjectivity; S-R interpretations of psychopathology;
analyses and syntheses of emotional behavior, albeit sometimes flawed (Harris,
1979); practical applications for children’s fears, for instance, systematic desensiti-
zation (e.g., Jones, 1924); and applications for adult behavior, among them, nega-
tive practice for stuttering, aversion therapy for alcoholism, and assertiveness
training for social phobias (Kazdin, 1978).
When classical behaviorism’s science faltered, neobehaviorism emerged in two
varieties, which were behavior therapy’s next major systematic and scientific
streams. They sought to account for variability in the S-R relations that Watson’s
science could not. One was mediational behaviorism, the other was operant behav-
iorism, both introduced earlier.
Mediational Behaviorism In contrast to Watson’s methodological behaviorism,
mediational behaviorism did not set unobservable constructs aside. It incorporated
them. At the time, philosophers were formalizing science as a hypothetical-deductive
method of theory construction in which the meaning of terms was paramount
(Leahey, 2013). In logical positivism, psychological terms denoted operationally,
92 E. K. Morris
but narrowly defined descriptive concepts that needed to be explained (e.g., thinking
as merely subvocal speech). In the logical empiricism that followed, the terms
denoted operationally-defined constructs within the organism (O) that explained the
S-R relations in S-O-R psychology (e.g., thought explained thinking; Moore, 2008).
This was another form of methodological behaviorism: Behavior was still what psy-
chology studied, but was not its subject matter. Its subject matter was the explana-
tory constructs, for instance, cognition and emotion. The goal was to predict
behavior based on hypotheses deduced from theories about the constructs. The truth
of the theories was their correspondence with the behavior they predicted. This
constituted, in part, explanation.
The precursors of behavior therapy in mediational behaviorism included (and
include) rigorous between-subject research methods (e.g., prediction, but not
within-subject control); operationally-defined explanatory constructs (an implicit
mentalism); hypothetical-deductive theories of the constructs (not of behavioral
concepts established empirically); interpretations of psychoanalytic theory and
therapy (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950); and applications that became behavior ther-
apy (e.g., for reducing nocturnal enuresis; Mowrer & Mowrer, 1938).
Operant Behaviorism The other major stream of neobehaviorism was Skinner’s
system and science of behavior (1930-present), which he differentiated from meth-
odological behaviorism, logical positivism, and logical empiricism (Skinner,
1945,1953; see Moore, 2008; Smith, 1986). First, he adopted Charles S. Peirce’s
(1839–1914) pragmatism whose criterion of truth was successful working (Moxley,
2001). The most common but least rigorous form of successful working was coher-
ence in descriptions of behavior and the variables that putatively controlled it (e.g.,
behavioral interpretations). A less common but more rigorous form was correspon-
dence in predictions of behavior based on variables that putatively controlled it
(e.g., correlations in between-subjects research). The least common but most rigor-
ous form was the experimental control of behavior based on variables that demon-
strably controlled it (e.g., in within-subject research). The truth of description was
correspondence: the prediction of behavior. The truth of prediction was control: the
experimental control of behavior. Experimental control was the goal of operant
behaviorism. It constituted, in part, explanation.
Second, Skinner (1947) included theory: “…behavior can only be satisfactorily
understood by going beyond the facts themselves. What is needed is a theory of
behavior” (p. 301; see Moore, 2008; O’Donohue & Krasner, 1995c). Theory was
the organization and integration of behavior’s descriptions (e.g., behavioral inter-
pretations), predictions (e.g., of the operant, everyday behavior), and control (e.g.,
behavioral principles, by the everyday environment). In turn, it generated hypothe-
ses about as-yet unanalyzed descriptions, predictions, and control. It was a theory of
behavior, not a theory of explanatory constructs (Skinner, 1956).
Third, Skinner (1945) behavioralized the meaning of psychological terms:
Meaning was a function of the variables that controlled the verbal behavior of
speakers and listeners. As such, the terms denoted concepts that described behavior.
Personality, for instance, was behavior extended in time and space, not a construct
that explained it. This is illustrated by the analogy: The climate is to the weather as
personality is to behavior. Thus, operant behaviorism did not exclude personality or
other psychological concepts, such as cognition, emotion, intelligence, language,
memory, motivation, perception, or thought, nor did it exclude clinical concepts,
such as attributions, awareness, expectancies, learned helplessness, observational
learning, and self-control. These terms denoted the products of behavior’s natural
history (e.g., self-efficacy) that needed to be explained (e.g., behaving efficaciously),
not constructs that explained them (e.g., self-efficacy). That would be circular (see
Biglan, 1987).
In Skinner’s (1938) science, his research with rats pressing bars distinguished
instrumental or operant behavior from reflex or respondent behavior. It was a then-
molar account of behavior as lawful, orderly functional relations between classes of
responses and classes of stimuli, not instances of them. In it, variability in behavior
was explained by analyzing the conditions that controlled it, not by positing explan-
atory constructs (Sidman, 1960). This was a second natural science of behavior – a
fundamentally new science – but it did not make behavioral science post-Pavlovian.
It included both sciences. They were complementary.
The science’s unit of analysis was a two-term functional relation between emit-
ted operant responses (RO) and their unconditioned consequences (i.e., reinforcers,
punishers; e.g., SRs; see Skinner, 1938). This included the basic principles and pro-
cesses of operant behavior (e.g., reinforcement, extinction, schedules of reinforce-
ment) and explained, in part, rudimentary purpose and motivation. When other
stimuli and contingencies entered the unit, new principles, processes, and functions
emerged (i.e., or were derived), among them, conditioned reinforcers and discrimi-
native stimuli (SDs). The former expanded the operant account of purpose (e.g.,
conditioned) and motivation (e.g., social). The latter was a fundamentally new prin-
ciple: It made the two-term contingency a three-term contingency – SD-RO-SR. It
accounted for even more purpose and motivation (e.g., conditional purposes), as
well as cognition (e.g., attention, perception; Nevin & Reynolds, 1973).
Contextual variables also affected these relations (Balsam & Tomie, 1985). In
the early 1930s, Skinner called them third variables, the first and second variables
being responses and stimuli. The third variables were conditioning (i.e., behavioral
history), drive (i.e., motivating operations), and emotion (i.e., emotional opera-
tions), but also biology (e.g., typical and atypical neurophysiology). They were part
of Skinner’s science, but controlled for in the three-term contingency, except when
they were analyzed, for instance, in research on deprivation, anxiety, and inheri-
tance (e.g., Estes & Skinner, 1941; Heron & Skinner, 1939). The three-term contin-
gency and its contextual variables were an integrated whole: Each constituent was a
function of the others and understandable only in relation to each other in a system
or field.
The precursors of behavior therapy in Skinner’s operant behaviorism included
(and include) naturalism and objectivity; rigorous within-subject research methods;
an empirical-inductive science and theory of operant behavior; new basic and
derived behavioral principles, processes, and functions; operant interpretations of
94 E. K. Morris
thinking and verbal behavior; the synthesis and analysis of nonhuman behavior
(e.g., emotion, superstition); conditioned human behavior (e.g., in comatose
patients); applications with nonhumans (e.g., animal training); and myriad sugges-
tions for individual, social, and cultural applications (Morris et al., 2005).
Conclusion Although the preceding historiography omitted relevant behaviorisms
(e.g., interbehaviorism; Kantor, 1959; see Delprato, 1995) and pioneering applica-
tions (e.g., Burnham, 1917; Mateer, 1918), it described the major streams in behav-
ior therapy’s short history (see Krasner, 1982, 1990). The first two were Russian
neuroscience and classical behaviorism. They opposed consciousness as a construct
and promoted objectivity. When classical behaviorism’s science faltered, neobehav-
iorism emerged in two other streams: mediational behaviorism and operant behav-
iorism. In its recent origins, then, behavior therapy comprised Russian neuroscience,
mediational behaviorism, and operant behaviorism.
Recent Origins: 1950–1960
Just as the emergence of Greek naturalism and American behaviorism were cultur-
ally influenced, so too were the recent origins of behavior therapy. After the Second
World War, America embraced science and technology, among them, clinical psy-
chology (Leahey, 2013). In this, behavior therapy had destructive and constructive
programs (Krasner, 1980; O’Donohue & Krasner, 1995b). As noted earlier, the for-
mer criticized the clinical traditions for being unscientific. When it also critiqued
the medical model of psychopathology, the program became broader. Another criti-
cism came from the experimental psychologist’s, Hans J. Eysenck’s (1916–1997),
research on psychotherapy’s effectiveness: It was not as effective as hoped for or
claimed (Eysenck, 1952). This led to advances in outcome research and then to
evidence-based practices – behavior therapies (e.g., Paul, 1966; see Strumey &
Hersen, 2012).
The constructive programs was applications of behavior therapy’s three major
streams, but this was complicated. Although the first two streams – Russian neuro-
science and mediational behaviorism – remained distinct as systems (Malone,
1990), their sciences were often combined as learning theory. The third stream was
Skinner’s behavior theory, which included learning. With the first two major streams
integrated into one, learning theory and then behavior theory became the two major
clinical streams in behavior therapy’s recent origins.
Learning Theory The first stream emerged in South Africa and England in the
early 1950s (Kazdin, 1978). Dissatisfied with psychoanalysis for treating “war neu-
roses” (i.e., post-traumatic stress disorders), the South African psychiatrist, Joseph
Wolpe (1915–1997), turned to Pavlov, Hull, and Hull’s colleague, Kenneth
W. Spence (1907–1967). He extended the research on the synthesis of neuroses in
cats and formulated the principle of reciprocal inhibition: Anxiety produced by
inhibitory stimuli (e.g., shock) could be reduced by exposure to excitatory stimuli
(e.g., food). With this, he treated cats’ neuroses. In treating military personnel, this
became systematic desensitization: muscle relaxation in the presence of an ascend-
ing hierarchy of anxiety-inducing situations (or of imagining them). The emphasis
on neuroses was principled. Neuroses were central to psychoanalytic theory and
therapy. As an alternative, behavior therapy had to address neuroses, too. Wolpe
(1958) did this in research on the effectiveness of systematic desensitization, its
comparative effectiveness, and the effectiveness of its components. As a military
psychiatrist, Wolpe made the neuroses of soldiers the initial provenance of behavior
therapy. However, the provenance – its methods and clients – was historically con-
tingent, not necessary, yet it became an identity.
At the Institute of Psychiatry at Maudsley Hospital in London, Eysenck was
establishing a clinical training program, pursuing his outcome research, and, with
the clinical psychologist, Monte B. Shapiro (1912–2000), extending psychology
from testing to include adult psychotherapy. In their research, Eysenck elaborated
on learning theory accounts of neurosis, while Shapiro conducted clinical case stud-
ies. In this, Eysenck was the first to use the term behavior therapy (Rutherford,
2003). When Stanley Rachman (1934–2021) brought systematic desensitization to
Maudsley from South Africa in 1959, Maudsley incorporated it in interventions for
phobias, while continuing its own clinical programs (e.g., assertiveness training).
Again, adult psychotherapy was historically contingent, not necessary, in behavior
therapy.
Arnold Lazarus (1932–2013) brought South African and British behavior ther-
apy to America where it took hold. It was consistent with America’s practical cul-
ture and the varieties of behaviorism, as well as with the emerging scientist-practitioner
model of clinical psychology (see Hilgard et al., 1947).
Behavior Theory In the early 1950s, Skinner’s behavior theory was not among the
recent origins of behavior therapy. It was still part of behavior therapy’s short his-
tory. Over the decade, this changed due to advances in Skinner’s behavioral inter-
pretations and science of behavior.
In his interpretations, Skinner elaborated on private events and offered accounts
of consciousness, self-control, and constructive thinking (Skinner, 1953, 1957; see
Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950). Private events were not just covert responses, but
covert respondents and operants, which included their controlling variables.
Consciousness involved describing one’s public and private respondents and oper-
ants. However, teaching people to describe and explain the private events was prob-
lematic. It could not be systematically contingent on the events because they could
not be observed by others (e.g., parents, teachers, therapists). Only public events
could be observed: (a) public behavior (e.g., crying, lethargy) that was putatively
collateral with private events (e.g., pain, boredom) and (b) public accompaniments
(i.e., a death in the family) of putative private events (e.g., feeling depressed). The
poor correspondence made reports of private events less reliable than reports of
public events, and, thus, more subjective. In self-control, public or private control-
ling responses (e.g., counting to ten, physical exercise) controlled related responses
96 E. K. Morris
that were specifiable in advance – controlled responses (e.g., managing anger,

reducing depression). In constructive thinking, public or private controlling
responses (e.g., deciding, problem-solving) controlled related responses that were
not specifiable in advance – also controlled responses (e.g., divorcing, changing
jobs). Self-control and thinking were complex behavior in which the controlling
responses were something fundamentally new in the contingencies that controlled
the controlled responses.
In Skinner’s science, behavior theorists were expanding research on the basic
behavioral principles and processes with nonhumans (e.g., chaining, conditioned
reinforcement, escape-avoidance, punishment, schedules or reinforcement, stimu-
lus control; Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; see Honig, 1966). By the mid-1950s, they
were extending the science in translational research to behavior increasingly rele-
vant to application (Kazdin, 1978; Rutherford, 2009). Some of them replicated the
basic behavioral principles and processes in humans, for instance, in children with
and without developmental disabilities (e.g., autism) and adult psychiatric patients.
In the latter, Ogden R. Lindsley (1922–2004) and Skinner first used the term behav-
ior therapy in print (Rutherford, 2003). Others demonstrated that adult verbal
behavior could be reinforced socially, leading to its use in understanding psycho-
therapy (see Cautilli et al., 2005). Still others experimentally analyzed and synthe-
sized socially important human behavior, for instance, cooperation, motor tics,
stuttering, and thumb sucking, but did not intervene on it.
By the late 1950s, behavior theory became the second major clinical stream in
the origins of behavior therapy as its research was variously consistent with what
would be the seven dimensions of applied behavior analysis (see Baer et al., 1968).
The research was behavioral: behavior was defined precisely and reliably; analytic:
experimental control was demonstrated within subjects; technological: methods
were sufficiently described for replication; and conceptually systematic: interven-
tions were based in behavioral principles and processes. When the research was also
applied (i.e., socially important) and effective (i.e., socially significant), applied
behavior analysis was founded. Identifying the founding publication, though,
depends on its consistency with the dimensions and which ones, which varied. As a
result, several publications were plausibly founding (e.g., Ayllon & Michael, 1959;
Williams, 1959; see Morris et al., 2013). As for the founding research programs,
they were likely Teodoro Ayllon’s (1929-present) work with psychiatric patients at
Saskatchewan Hospital in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, Canada (1958–1961) and
Montrose M. Wolf’s (1935–2004) work with children with and without disabilities
at the University of Washington and the Rainier State School in Washington
(1962–1964; see Altus et al., 2021).
As in South Africa and England, behavior therapy’s provenance in America was
also contingent. Behavior theorists were experimental psychologists who could cre-
ate therapeutic environments, not psychiatrists or clinical psychologists trained in
systematic desensitization. Their provenance was also historically contingent in its
methods (e.g., discrete trial training) and clients (e.g., children with autism), yet it,
too, became an identity, although not a necessary one.
Conclusion The foregoing historiography of behavior therapy’s recent origins

omitted other relevant behaviorisms (e.g., social or paradigmatic behaviorism; see
Staats, 1975) and elided the diversity and complexity of behavior therapy’s found-
ing (see O’Donohue & Krasner, 1995a). Nonetheless, it described behavior thera-
py’s major clinical streams at the time. One was based in Russian neuroscience and
American mediational behaviorism, whose sciences were combined as learning
theory. Its application was often called behavior therapy (and sometimes behavior
modification). The other major clinical stream was based in Skinner’s behavior the-
ory, which included learning. Its application was often called behavior modification
(and sometimes behavior therapy), but later, applied behavior analysis. In the
1960s, the two streams together were often called behavior therapy. This was also
when behavior therapy was founded institutionally.
Institutional Founding (1960–1970)
The institutional founding of behavior therapy included professional organizations,

among them, the American Psychological Association’s Division 25 for the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior (1964), the Association for Advancement of
Behavior Therapy (1966), the Behavior Therapy and Research Society (1970), and
the Midwest Association for Behavior Analysis (1974), now the Association for
Behavior Analysis International (ABAI; ca. 2003).6 It included journals for publish-
ing peer-refereed research, among them, Behaviour Research and Therapy (1963),
the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (1968), the Journal of Behavior Therapy
and Experimental Psychiatry (1970), and Behavior Therapy (1970). And, it included
seminal works: texts, chapters, articles, reports, and presentations (see Krasner &
Ullmann, 1965; Ullman & Krasner, 1965; Ulrich et al., 1966). By the late 1960s,
behavior therapy was not only a professional practice. It was also a cultural practice
(Rutherford, 2009).
Yesterday and Today
The chapter’s preceding section described the assumptions, methods, and goals of
behavior therapy manifest in its systems, sciences, and practices, and organized by
its long past, short history, recent origins, and institutional founding. This was
6
On November 21, 2021, I emailed ABA International (mail@abainternational.org) asking about
the year ABA became ABAI International. The ABAI Team replied: “When MABA changed to
ABA, it was technically changed to ‘Association for Behavior Analysis: An International
Organization.’ However, the first use of ‘ABAI’ is in the Inside Behavior Analysis newsletter, vol-
ume 26, issue 2, which was First [sic] printed in the fall of 2003. Use of ‘ABAI’ vs ‘ABA [sic] is a
little inconsistent for a few years after that” (Personal communication, November 24, 2021).
98 E. K. Morris
behavior therapy yesterday – and Behavior Therapy yesterday. Afterward, its foun-
dations developed and evolved internally in its systems, sciences, and practices and
externally in relation to the next two waves. This is behavior therapy today – but not
Behavior Therapy today. This section addresses the yesterday and today of behavior
therapy by considering its differences with the earlier clinical traditions (e.g., revo-
lution or evolution); within its own systems, sciences, and practices (e.g., explana-
tions); and across the other waves – cognitive-behavior therapy and clinical behavior
analysis.
Yesterday
Founded in the 1950s, behavior therapy was not distinguished as a wave until it was
differentiated from cognitive-behavior therapy in the 1970s or, again when it was
differentiated from clinical behavior analysis in the 1990s (or when the differentia-
tions were constructed). At its founding, it was distinguished only from the clinical
traditions in psychoanalysis and humanism, but it was not a wave in those traditions.
It was, though, a tsunami in psychotherapy. Whether it was revolutionary or a new
paradigm depends on context and definition.
Context Although the three major streams in behavior therapy’s short history –
Russian neuroscience, mediational behaviorism, and behavior theory – varied in
their systems, sciences, and practices, they bore family resemblances (O’Donohue
et al., 2001). As noted earlier, they opposed the clinical traditions for their “poor
link to scientifically established principles, vague specification of interventions, and
weak scientific evidence” (Hayes, 2004, p. 640). And, they developed therapies
“built upon a bedrock of scientifically well-established basic principles, and that
applied technologies [that were] well-specified and rigorously tested” (Hayes, 2004,
p. 640). In this context, behavior therapy was revolutionary in psychotherapy. In
psychology, it was not. It was part of psychology’s evolution as a science
(Leahey, 1992).
Definition The resemblances notwithstanding, the major streams within behavior

therapy differed (Kazdin, 1978). For instance, Russian neuroscience was physiolog-
ically reductionistic, mediational behaviorism tended toward it, but operant behav-
iorism opposed it. Also, Russian neuroscience and operant behaviorism were
naturalistic and monistic, while mediational behaviorism tended toward mentalism
and dualism. These differences worked against behavior therapy being a revolution.
First, the conflicting foundations made it, in part, conceptually confused. It was not
coherent, which is required of worldviews (Pepper, 1942). Second, the conflicting
foundations prevented it from being paradigmatic. It was not a new “normal” sci-
ence that replaced old “normal” traditions, which is required of revolutions in sci-
ence (Kuhn, 1962).
The foregoing criteria for and against paradigms and revolutions are, of course,
debatable. Some may be too broad, some too narrow, and some too idiosyncratic.
Further historiography is required. Nonetheless, behavior therapy was a tsunami in
psychotherapy and an undercurrent that became a sea change in clinical psychol-
ogy – Behavior Therapy.
Today
As behavior therapy was distinguishing itself from the clinical traditions, it was the
beginning of the sea change. Although it was the first wave of Behavior Therapy, it
is not behavior therapy today. After its founding, it developed and evolved, as its
major systematic, scientific, and clinical streams developed and evolved, but not
always seamlessly.
Russian Neuroscience Russian neuroscience has remained a major scientific and
clinical stream in behavior therapy (and Behavior Therapy). As a system, it is still
reductionistic in the Pavlovian tradition, but now also incorporates mediational and
cognitivist constructs. Independent of these systems, its science continues to
advance research on unconditional and conditional stimuli and responses (Kehoe &
Macrae, 1998; Lattal, 2013), even as its account of conditioning has evolved. It is
increasingly based in molar S-S contingencies rather than molecular S-S contigui-
ties (Rescorla, 1988). In its translational and applied research, Russian neuroscience
continues to address the basic science’s role in understanding emotional behavior
and developing interventions for its disorders (e.g., avoidance, fear, obsessive-
compulsivity), as well as programs for preventing them (see O’Donohue, 1998b,
pp. 36–145; Plaud & Eifert, 1998). However, clinical training in its basic behavioral
principles and processes has sometimes been displaced by training in the interven-
tions as but a technology. The interventions are thus less easily understood in terms
of the basic principles and processes on which they were founded and, thus, less
easily amended or adapted when they are wanting (O’Donohue, 1998a). In the pro-
cess, the inclusion of its science and practice in behavior therapy (and Behavior
Therapy) has become somewhat routinized, structural, and standardized than
remaining individualized, functional, and adaptive. Independent of behavior ther-
apy, of course, Russian neuroscience has burgeoned as a science unto itself, espe-
cially in behavioral neuroscience. There, it describes how the nervous system
participates in learning and behavior (e.g., in conditioning and extinction; i.e., in
memory; see Kandel et al., 2012) and, presumably, how it participates in behavior
therapy, but the latter warrants further integrative programs of research (see Corwin
& O’Donohue, 1998; Jokić-Begić, 2010).
Mediational Behaviorism Mediational behaviorism and its cognitive and emo-

tional constructs remained a major clinical stream in behavior therapy in the 1960s,
but receded as they merged with cognitive-behavior therapy in the 1970s and
100 E. K. Morris
became one of its two major clinical streams. Here, the mediational constructs
became ascendant as the cognitive in cognitive-behavior therapy, as might be
expected in a culture that prizes mind and free will. The emotional constructs were
also incorporated in this clinical stream, but not differentiated as “emotion-behavior
therapy.”
Russian neuroscience and operant behaviorism were retained as the behavior in
cognitive-behavior therapy – its second major clinical stream. In comparison to the
cognitive stream, though, the behavioral stream has been the lesser stream, even as
Russian neuroscience and operant behaviorism continued to develop and evolve.
First, both have been recast, in part, in cognitive and teleological terms (see
Mahoney, 1974), for instance, “the client perceives…,” as opposed to the client’s
behavior is under discriminative control or “the client’s purpose is…,” as opposed
to behavioral control by the client’s history of reinforcement. Given this cognitiv-
ism, the basic behavioral principles and processes seem inapplicable to understand-
ing behavioral disorders and developing interventions for them. Second, as in
Russian neuroscience, clinical training in the basic behavioral principles and pro-
cesses has sometimes been displaced by training in the interventions as but a tech-
nology. Thus, as noted above, the interventions are less easily understood in terms
of the basic principles and processes on which they were founded and less easily
amended or adapted when they are wanting (O’Donohue, 1998a). As a result, the
inclusion of behavior in cognitive-behavior therapy has also become more routin-
ized, structural, and standardized than individualized, functional, and adaptive.
As manifest in Russian neuroscience and behavior analysis, however, the natu-
ralization of psychology remained a source of tension in cognitive-behavior therapy.
Thus, when a component analysis of cognitive-behavior therapy for depression
revealed that the cognitive component added little to its effectiveness, some behav-
ior therapists turned to the behavioral component alone (see Jacobson et al., 2001).
Where this involved assessments of relative rates of reinforcement and punishment,
the interventions were referred to as behavioral activation – the activation of non-
depressed behavior. Although this was practiced earlier in behavior therapy (Ferster,
1973; Goldiamond, 1974), it has become subsumed under clinical behavior analysis
(see Layng et al., 2022).
Behavior Analysis Behavior theory grew markedly in the 1960s as a major sys-
tematic, scientific, and clinical stream in behavior therapy, and even more so as a
field unto itself (Rutherford, 2009). However, it has not always been well-integrated
with behavior therapy (and Behavior Therapy). First, after behavior theory became
behavior analysis in the 1970s, a plethora of behavior-analytic organizations and
journals were founded (e.g., ABAI’s special interest groups; Behavior Modification,
est. 1977; Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies, est. 1981; Behavior Analysis:
Research and Practice, est. 1999). Many of them were seemingly independent of
behavior therapy. The term was not used in their titles or, seemingly, was it with in
their purview, and ABAI had no special interest groups for behavior therapy. Second,
the emergence of cognitive-behavior therapy in the 1970s made Behavior Therapy
appear inhospitable to behavior analysis. Although behavior analysis was a major
systematic, scientific, and clinical stream in behavior therapy and, in part, in

cognitive-behavior therapy, its development and evolution were sometimes isolated
from them and vice-versa. Third, as in Russian neuroscience and cognitive-behavior
therapy, clinical training in the basic behavioral principles and processes was some-
times displaced by training in the interventions as technology. Thus, again, the inter-
ventions have been less easily understood in terms of the principles and processes
on which they were founded and less easily amended or adapted when the interven-
tions are wanting. As a result, again, the inclusion of behavior analysis in behavior
therapy (and Behavior Therapy) has become more routinized, structural, and stan-
dardized than individualized, functional, and adaptive (O’Donohue, 1998b). This
can be corrected, though, by integrating the advances in its system, science, and
practice over the past 60 years, for example, as follows. For the literature, see
Behavior Analysis in Practice, The Behavior Analyst (now Perspectives in Behavior
Science), the Journal for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, and the Journal of
Applied Behavior Analysis.
As a system, behavior analysis continued (and continues) to develop and evolve,
both internally and externally (Morris, 1992). This has included integrating
selection-by-consequences in behavior (e.g., reinforcement) with natural selection
in biology and cultural selection in the life sciences (e.g., evolutionary biology,
cultural anthropology); advancing the concepts and values of humanism, freedom,
and dignity in behavior analysis (e.g., without incorporating them as explanatory
constructs); describing its relations with other philosophical systems (e.g., Dewey’s
pragmatism in contextualism, Ryle’s conceptual analysis, Wittgenstein’s ordinary-
language philosophy) and philosophies of science (e.g., Giere’s scientific perspec-
tivism, Laudan’s analysis of scientific progress); examining the complementarities
between behavior analysis and neuroscience (e.g., neural networks) and develop-
mental systems theory (e.g., nature is the product of the process of nurture; see also
neural Darwinism, probabilistic epigenesis); clarifying the affinities between behav-
ior analysis and psychological theories of direct action (e.g., nonmediational eco-
logical approaches to cognition, memory, perception); pursuing cultural analyses
(e.g., macro- and meta-contingencies); and addressing myriad topics in diversity,
equity, and inclusion (e.g., advocacy, colonialism, cultural humility, feminism, mul-
ticulturalism, racism, sexism).
As a science and practice, behavior analysis also continued (and continues) to
develop and evolve, especially outside the three-term contingency (see O’Donohue,
1998b). Among these areas in basic and translational research are adjunctive behav-
ior (a third type of behavior; e.g., schedule-induced aggression), automatic rein-
forcement and punishment (as oppose to socially mediated reinforcement and
punishment), behavioral economics (e.g., non-rational, but lawful decision-making;
e.g., delay discounting), the response-deprivation hypothesis (i.e., a motivating
operation superseding the Premack Principle), the matching law (e.g., multiple
schedules, concurrent operants), and motivating operations (i.e., a fourth term for
variables controlling the effectiveness of reinforcers and punishers).
102 E. K. Morris
Because of their relation to cognitive-behavior therapy and clinical behavior

analysis, two other areas of basic and translational research warrant special mention
(see Guinther & Dougher, 2013). One is rule-governed behavior (see Hayes, 1989).
Prior to the 1960s, behavior-analytic theory and research in nonhuman and human
behavior primarily addressed contingency-shaped and maintained behavior. By
mid-decade, though, Skinner (1950) was distinguishing between contingency-
shaped and rule-governed behavior. At the same time, research with verbally-
competent children and adults was finding that the rates and patterns of behavior on
schedules of reinforcement differed from those with nonhumans and nonverbal
humans. Behavior was more variable across individuals and more susceptible to
experimenter instructions across and within them, that is, to rules regarding the
contingencies. Rule-governed behavior, though, was operant behavior, subject to
reinforcement and stimulus control, but at the same time rules were also function-
altering contingency-specifying stimuli – something new in behavior analysis
(Schlinger & Blakely, 1987). This was a forerunner of the transformation of stimu-
lus functions in relational frame theory (Hayes et al., 2001).
The other area of research was stimulus equivalence. Beginning in the 1960s,
matching-to-sample research demonstrated that arbitrary stimuli could enter the
formal and functional relations of transitivity, symmetry, and equivalence with other
arbitrary stimuli without being taught directly and that the conditional discrimina-
tive stimuli controlling these relations were another fourth term in the three-term
contingency (see Sidman, 1994). These were applied in teaching language and read-
ing to children and adults with intellectual disabilities. Relational frame theory then
expanded the research preparation to include other physical (e.g., different, more-
less) and functional relations (e.g., reinforcing, fear) and their transformation with-
out direct instruction (Hayes et al., 2001). These account for more emotion and
cognition and have been the bases for interventions with children with developmen-
tal disabilities (Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2009) and in Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy in adult psychotherapy (see Zettle et al., 2016). Given these
advances, Behavior Therapy is continuous in its upward and downward continuity
between its first and third waves, that ism between behavior therapy and Clinical
Behavior Analysis.
Both advances are also, in part, contingent. Interventions for children with autism
and other developmental disabilities have been dependent on the confluence of
behavior therapists who can provide the interventions and insurance coverage (and
to a lesser extent on APA certified clinical child psychologists who cannot provide
the interventions). In turn, interventions for adults with psychiatric disorders have
been dependent on the confluence of APA certified adult clinical behavior analysts
who can provide the interventions and insurance coverage (and to a lesser extent on
behavior therapists who are not APA certified to provide the interventions). The
waves of behavior therapy are not defined by their clients, the behavior therapists
who serve them, and insurance coverage. These are orthogonal to systems, sciences,
and practices that define behavior therapy, even if identified with them.
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the foundations of the first wave of Behavior Therapy –
behavior therapy – by describing the assumptions, methods, and goals manifest in
its systems, sciences, and practices. It was organized, first, by a representative view
of behavior therapy. This was a contemporary view, along with some clarifications.
Second, it was organized historically by behavior therapy’s long past (ca. 500
B.C.E.–1900), short history (ca. 1900–1950), recent origins (ca. 1950–1960), and
institutional founding (ca. 1960–1970). This included philosophy, science, psychol-
ogy, behaviorism, applications, and success. Third, its success was organized by the
development and evolution of behavior therapy in relation to the clinical traditions
in psychoanalysis and humanism yesterday, where it was revolutionary, and in rela-
tion to the two other waves of behavior therapy today, where its influence continues.
However, behavior therapy (and Behavior Therapy) have not achieved their full
potential due to some mutual isolation among its systems, sciences, and practices,
especially in clinical training. Behavior therapists (and Behavior Therapists) should
not be blamed for this. They and their waves were – like organisms – always right.
That is, their behavior is lawful, given their natural science and natural history, even
if not always correct. Various factors have worked against their success, some exter-
nal, some internal. The former include cultural practices (e.g., mind, agency), open-
ings and closings (e.g., social influences and needs), and contingency. The latter
include mutual isolation across the waves (e.g., in paradigms), within its waves
(e.g., training programs), and in its practices (e.g., first- and second-order change).
Thus, behavior therapy may falter, but if its system, science, and practice are
possible, it will not die. The emergence of behavior activation from cognitive-
behavior therapy suggests that effectiveness and efficiency remain powerful conse-
quences for behavior therapy as a cultural practice. Whether behavior therapy
should be called behavior therapy, though, may be a vanity. More important is its
success in improving the human condition. This will be behavior therapy (and may
be Behavior Therapy) tomorrow — a tsunami.
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What Is Second Wave Behavior Therapy?
Daniel R. Strunk, Megan L. Whelen, and Brooklynn Bailey
Cognitive therapy (CT) and cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) are the treatments
that make up what has been called the second wave of behavior therapy. These inter-
ventions are among the most well-supported and widely practiced psychosocial
interventions available today (Hollon & Beck, 2013). The major distinction between
these forms of therapy and first-wave behavioral approaches is their emphasis on
cognitive processes, particularly the content of conscious cognitions. The distinc-
tion between CT and CBT is one of emphasis, with CT more strongly emphasizing
a conceptualization that focuses on the importance of cognition in the etiology and
maintenance of psychological disorders and identifying cognitive change as a pri-
mary therapeutic target. However, both CT and CBT include cognitive and behav-
ioral strategies. Perhaps because the distinction was not ultimately believed to be
important enough to justify the difference in names, in recent years organizations
and researchers with expertise in CT have been using the term CBT to refer to both
CT and CBT (Beck Institute, 2021). In this chapter, we provide an overview of
CBT, highlighting its historical development and theoretical basis as well as the
specific therapeutic procedures used in these therapies. We also briefly comment on
the empirical status of these treatments and their larger impact on mental health
problems.
Essentials of CBT
What makes a treatment CBT? CBT involves the use of therapeutic interventions
intended to elicit cognitive and behavioral changes that in turn reduce psychopa-
thology. In more cognitively oriented variations of CBT there is a greater emphasis
D. R. Strunk (*) · M. L. Whelen · B. Bailey

Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
e-mail: strunk.20@osu.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_5
110 D. R. Strunk et al.
on the meaning of conscious thoughts and their contribution to mental health prob-
lems. A central idea in CBT is that how people interpret a situation (and its implica-
tions) determines their emotional responses and any efforts they make to cope with
that situation (Hollon, 2021). Cognitively oriented forms of CBT often include an
emphasis on testing the truth or accuracy of thoughts and beliefs. In these treat-
ments, a substantial portion of the behavioral procedures take the form of efforts to
test the clients’ beliefs. More behaviorally oriented forms of CBT place a greater
emphasis on behavioral learning theories and conceptualize change in terms of
instrumental or classical conditioning. Thus, both more cognitively oriented and
more behaviorally oriented variations of CBT use cognitive and behavioral inter-
ventions. The key difference is in the conceptualization of the mechanisms of
change of these treatments.
The Origins of CBT
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis was the dominant mode of treatment for psycho-
logical problems for a substantial portion of the twentieth century (Wolitzky, 2011).
Both of the most widely recognized seminal figures in the origin of CBT, Dr. Albert
Ellis and Dr. Aaron Beck, had psychoanalytic training. The development of their
approaches can be understood partly as a reaction to psychoanalytic ideas.
Ellis (a clinical psychologist) founded rationale emotive behavior therapy
(REBT), initially called Rational Psychotherapy, in 1950s (Ellis, 1995). In his first
book on this therapy, Ellis (1962) described difficulties treating patients with classi-
cal psychoanalysis despite extensive training and experience in its clinical practice.
He observed that many patients resisted or struggled to grasp psychoanalytic meth-
ods. Even among responders, Ellis found that treatment was often lengthy, taking
many months to years, and inadequate in achieving symptom remission. As a result,
he grew skeptical of psychoanalytic principles such as the reliance on insight and
unconscious processes.
In the 1960s, Beck (a psychiatrist) introduced another form of CBT, which he
called CT. Beck’s early work included efforts to test Freud’s anger turned inward
model of depression (DeRubeis et al., 2019). Initially, he considered psychoanalysis
to have promise and sought to validate the model through empirical research. He
conducted studies aimed at testing the psychoanalytic theory of depression, which
posited that depression was characterized by retroflected hostility. The idea of retro-
flected hostility was that symptoms of depression resulted from anger turned inward
and those with depression would therefore be expected to exhibit self-punishing
characteristics. Despite some efforts to validate this model, he found the evidence
unsatisfying and ultimately grew dissatisfied with the approach. He focused instead
on the content of the conscious thinking among those with depression.
Although Beck and Ellis were each trained in psychoanalysis and were reacting
to what they believed were problems with that approach, there were a number of
other important influences on their work. Ellis was influenced by Karen Horney,
What Is Second Wave Behavior Therapy? 111
who had described the “tyranny of the should,” an idea closely related to Ellis’ own
ideas about rigidly held, dogmatic beliefs including “musts” and “shoulds” (Dryden
et al., 2019). Alfred Adler (1958) appears to have had an important influence on
both Ellis and Beck. Adler suggested that a person’s behavior is influenced by their
ideas (i.e., their own conscious experiences). His ideas of self-perceived inferiority
to others have similarities to the negative self-views that both Beck and Ellis dis-
cussed (in somewhat different ways). He even introduced a cognitive-persuasive
form of therapy.
Another important influence was George Kelly, who developed personal con-
struct therapy (Kelly, 1955). Although quite non-directive compared to CBT, this
therapy focused on working to identify the clients’ beliefs or personal constructs.
Part of the approach included approaching the world based on assumptions not con-
sistent with one’s usual beliefs (having some similarity to what today is often called
a behavioral experiment).
Both Beck and Ellis also acknowledged important philosophical traditions that
influenced them. There is a particularly strong connection to some of the ideas of
the Stoic philosophers, who held that emotions arise from false judgements.
Epictetus wrote in The Enchiridion: “Men are disturbed not by things but by the
views which they take of them” (Epictetus & Higginson, 1955). Both Ellis and Beck
made the re-evaluation of one’s views a central task in their respective therapies.
Although both pursued very similar goals using similar methods, Ellis emphasized
reasoning in bringing about cognitive change, whereas Beck tended to place more
emphasis on empirical evidence (Hollon, 2021). Ellis (1962) suggested that a goal
of REBT therapists is to ensure patients leave therapy with a rational “philosophy of
life” and Beck suggested that a goal of CT is to help clients to be their own therapists.
Overcoming the Limits of First Wave Behavior Therapy
While Beck and Ellis framed their therapeutic approaches as reactions to psycho-
analysis, they were also well aware of the work of behaviorists, who advocated for
focusing on publicly observable behaviors and avoiding what they regarded as
unscientific explanations that appealed to cognitive processes. Nonetheless, Beck
et al. (1979) acknowledged a substantial contribution of behavior therapy to the
development of cognitive therapy partly reflected by their shared emphasis on goal
setting and achievement. Dozois et al. (2019) noted that the emergence of behav-
ioral therapy bolstered acceptance of REBT, which was originally scrutinized for
deviating so strongly from traditional (i.e., psychoanalytic) psychotherapy, but
shared commonalities with the behavioral approach.
Part of the motivation to develop CBT appears to have come from an assessment
of the limitations of a strict behavioral approach. Learning theory, with its focus on
observable behaviors, was seen as too simplistic to account for all human behavior.
Particularly, the strict behaviorism first articulated by John B. Watson (1914) was
criticized for ignoring internal processes (Eysenck, 1970). Behavioral therapists
generally focused on addressing observable behaviors, such as exaggerated fear

responses, but not all psychological problems manifest externally. Those problems
not expressed as overt behaviors, such as uncontrollable worry, were arguably being
inadequately treated by behavioral therapies (Dozois et al., 2019). Critics argued
that behavioral therapy was limited in the scope of the problems it could adequately
address and required an extension to capture the full scope of psychological
problems.
Watson (1914) and Skinner (1957) argued for a non-mediational approach to
human behavior (i.e., making no inferences about internal experiences). Over time,
such an approach was increasingly seen as inadequate (Mahoney, 1974). For exam-
ple, Breger and McGaugh (1965) asserted that behaviorists were having to rely on
the mediating role of cognition to explain behavior, as the stimulus-response rela-
tionship was simply inadequate. Moreover, the evidence for behavior therapy was
often seen as less than compelling. Much of the early evidence consisted of uncon-
trolled studies not conducted with clinical populations. Ferster (1973) had proposed
a model of depression as characterized by reductions in the frequency of positively
reinforced activities, which highlighted the ways in which avoidance might serve to
perpetuate depression. Nonetheless, clinical trials testing such approaches would
not be conducted until many years later, after Neil Jacobson et al.’s (1996) study
investigating the components of Beck’s CT renewed enthusiasm for purely behav-
ioral approaches.
The 1950s was also the time of the cognitive revolution, which involved psychol-
ogy as well as several other disciplines redefining themselves in such a way that the
study of cognition was seen as more scientifically respectable and important (Miller,
2003). Researchers began to work to understand thinking processes in a new way,
with a focus on what was called information processing psychology or cognitive
science. These changes led to a greater interest in integrating cognitive and behav-
ioral interventions in psychotherapy (Mahoney, 1977). Treatment developers varied
in the degree of emphasis they placed on each, but interventions that offered some
integration of cognitive and behavioral approaches became influential. A number of
cognitive behavioral treatment developers were more directly influenced by behav-
ioral therapy, as they were originally trained in behavior modification procedures.
They included: Donald Meichenbaum, Marvin Goldfried, and Michael Mahoney
(Dozois et al., 2019).
One important way that interventions differed was in their approach to cognition.
Meichenbaum (1972) developed cognitive-behavioral modification, a form of CBT
in which thoughts are treated more as behaviors. In contrast, REBT called for the
therapists to focus on the meaning of thoughts and make inferences about patients’
thinking errors, staying a “step ahead” of the patient. Beck’s CT called for an evalu-
ation of the meaning of thoughts but approached these meaning systems as highly
individualized and therefore requiring careful examination with the patient. Clients
were regarded as the experts on their experiences, including their thoughts and their
meaning.
REBT and CT
Albert Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy
Albert Ellis introduced what came to be called rational emotive behavior therapy
(REBT). He was the first to articulate a cognitive behavioral treatment approach that
is still practiced today. In the 1950s, he began teaching his approach to others and
founded the Institute for Rational Living in New York City. In the 1960s, he began
what became a long running weekly public demonstration of his treatment. He out-
lined the theory and application of his treatment in his first major book, Reason and
Emotion in Psychotherapy (1962). By rational, Ellis meant that which is true, logi-
cal, or aids people in achieving their goals. REBT takes the view that people are
rational in satisfying some short-term goals, but can better achieve their basic goals
when they adopt a philosophy of “long-range hedonism”. REBT is based on Ellis’
view that emotional disturbances are caused by irrational belief systems. These
beliefs are often dogmatic and absolutistic (e.g., using words such as must or
should). The tendency for people to hold rigid evaluative beliefs is a major target of
REBT. Ellis devised the highly influential “ABC” model, which posits that activat-
ing events (A) lead to beliefs (B) which cause emotional and behavioral conse-
quences (C). This framework provides a very important basis for clinical
interventions in REBT. Ellis also acknowledged more complex relationships, such
as reciprocal effects of action and emotions on one’s beliefs. Finally, Ellis identified
a list of cognitive distortions, which he posited are derived from rigid beliefs.
In practice, REBT relies heavily on the use of Socratic questioning as well as
“disputes” between therapist and patient on the validity and usefulness of irrational
beliefs (Ellis & MacLaren, 1998). Compared to others forms of CBT, REBT can
involve the therapists using a more confrontational style. Cognitive (e.g., reframing,
thought monitoring), behavioral (e.g., skill training, in vivo desensitization), and
emotive (e.g., humor, role playing) techniques are all part of REBT (Ellis &
MacLaren, 1998).
There have been a number of different forms of CBT developed (Hollon & Beck,
2013). REBT has the distinction of having the longest history of any of these treat-
ments. REBT remains a well-respected form of therapy that is promoted by ongoing
training efforts (The Albert Ellis Institute, 2021). Although there have been clinical
trials evaluating REBT, Ellis appears to have been less successful in encouraging
empirical evaluation of his approach than Beck was in encouraging research on CT
(Hollon, 2021).
Aaron Beck’s Cognitive Behavior Therapy
Cognitive therapy (now also called CBT) was developed by Aaron Beck in the
1960s. Beck had observed in his early work with patients with depression that they
often reported negative thoughts (Beck, 1967). He proposed that those with depres-
sion tended to have distorted information processing that led them to hold overly
negative views of themselves, the world, and the future (the cognitive triad). Beck
used the term “automatic thoughts” to describe the reasonably easily accessed con-
scious cognitions that patients can (or can be trained to) report. Beck suggested that
even emotional experiences that seem mysterious or difficult to explain can be
understood when one considers the thoughts one is having at the time. Although the
specific thoughts and beliefs patients reported varied considerably, Beck’s model
proposed that those with depression tend to report overly negative, inaccurate views
that served to perpetuate their depressive symptoms. Moreover, although much of
his early work focused on depression, his conceptualization was quite transdiagnos-
tic (Beck, 1979).
Beck and his colleagues worked to apply a similar cognitive approach to other
conditions. Cognitive models have now been developed for all major forms of psy-
chopathology, with cognitive models of these disorders specifying the nature of the
inaccuracies in thoughts and beliefs that patients with these conditions tend to report
(Hofman et al., 2012; Wenzel, 2021). This understanding has informed the selection
of various intervention strategies intended to bring about cognitive changes that are
posited to reduce the symptoms of various psychological disorders. As an initial
step, patients are encouraged to identify their thoughts and see them as hypotheses
or statements that may or may be true (called distancing; Beck & Dozois, 2011).
Therapists and clients work together to evaluate the accuracy of these thoughts. As
described more fully below, a thought record can be used to organize the process of
carefully considering the accuracy of one’s thoughts and beliefs.
An overarching goal of Beck’s CT is to identify thoughts and beliefs, subject
them to careful evaluation, and correct the biases or inaccuracies that are identified
(Beck & Dozois, 2011). A primary way this is achieved is through cognitive tech-
niques, such as Socratic questioning to facilitate skepticism about one’s own nega-
tive views and an openness to considering alternatives. A key tool in CT is the
thought record, which helps patients identify negative cognitions and systematically
evaluate their accuracy. Beck’s treatment has always incorporated behavioral tech-
niques as well. Given the emphasis on cognition in his treatment, behavioral inter-
ventions are often conceptualized as a method of producing cognitive change, with
this conceptualization informing the use of these strategies as much as possible
(Beck et al., 1979). For example, in the treatment of depression, therapists are to
look for opportunities to use behavioral strategies as a method for testing patients’
negative views rather than simply encouraging activities to promote positive moods.
Drawing the idea of schemas (i.e., basic cognitive structures that organize infor-
mation about our environment) from cognitive psychology, Beck proposed that
these schemas also play a key role in the emotional disorders. When combined with
congruent life stressors, such negative thinking patterns (schemas) are thought to
contribute to the development of emotional disorders (Beck, 1979, 2008). Negative
thoughts and beliefs are maintained through faulty information processing, such as
the overgeneralization of negative information and the minimization of positive
information that might otherwise disconfirms one’s belief (Beck et al., 1979).
Therapists also help patients identify underlying assumptions or beliefs associated
with their experience of negative emotions. By recognizing and working to modify
these negative views, therapists can work to help clients achieve even greater, pre-
sumably deeper forms of cognitive change.
Beck’s work has had a truly transformative impact on the treatment of psycho-
logical disorders (Hollon, 2021). Following the introduction of CT, Beck worked
with Augustus John Rush to conduct the first clinical trial testing CT versus antide-
pressant medication (Rush et al., 1977). As Beck moved on to other clinical prob-
lems, researchers including Steve Hollon (Hollon et al., 2020) and Rob DeRubeis
(DeRubeis et al., 2020) further evaluated CT for depression. Even today, Beck’s CT
of depression remains among the most effective treatments available and is the most
thoroughly studied of all psychosocial treatments for depression (Cuijpers et al.,
2013). Through a series of extended visits in the late 1970s (Hollon, 2021), Beck
also had a strong influence on psychologists at Oxford University, including John
Teasdale (Teasdale et al., 2001), David Clark (1986, 2001), and Paul Salkovskis
(1985). These researchers went on to develop cognitive models and treatments for
panic disorder, health anxiety, social anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (the last of these with Anke Ehlers; Ehlers & Clark,
2000). Chris Fairburn (Fairburn et al., 1993) developed a form of CBT for eating
disorders that was strongly influenced by Beck’s work. In recent years, Beck has
conducted impressive work on the treatment of patients at high risk of suicide
(Brown et al., 2005) and those with schizophrenia (Grant et al., 2012). Forms of
CBT that Beck developed or helped to inspire feature prominently on lists of empir-
ically supported psychosocial treatments (APA Division 12, 2021). Organizations
around the world are increasingly taking steps to make these treatments more read-
ily available (Layard & Clark, 2014).
The Relationship Between Second and Third Wave Therapies
As discussed earlier, CBT or second wave treatments can be understood more fully
by appreciating the historical influences on its developers. CBT itself had a central
influence on third wave therapies. Unlike second wave CBT, third wave treatments
generally do not try to bring about therapeutic change by eliciting changes in the
content of one’s thinking. Although second and third wave treatments share a will-
ingness to engage with conscious cognition, their interventions approaches differ
considerably. Third wave treatments place a strong emphasis on function over form
(Hayes et al., 2006). Rather than re-evaluating the validity of one’s thoughts, they
promote distancing from one’s negative views without re-evaluation. An ACT
patient might be taught to use cognitive defusion to recognize a thought as just a

thought, recognizing that is has no inherent meaning. The theory underlying ACT is
called relational frame theory (Hayes et al., 2001). According to this theory, the goal
of ACT is to promote psychological flexibility to allow patients live a valued life in
spite of their symptoms.
Rather than relying on change strategies exclusively, third wave treatments tend
to emphasize acceptance of one’s experience for what it is. As such, mindfulness is
also an important goal of many third wave treatments. Kabat-Zinn (1990) defined
mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present
moment, nonjudgmentally” (p. 4). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT;
Segal et al., 2018) is a third wave intervention that integrates cognitive strategies
from CBT with mindfulness training experiences. Dialectical behavior therapy
(DBT), another third wave treatment, incorporates a wide range of acceptance and
change strategies and has emerged as a first-line treatment for borderline personality
disorder (Robins et al., 2010). There have been only a limited number of compari-
sons of second and third wave treatments. Basic questions about the differences
between second and third wave treatments have been raised, including whether
referring the term third wave is well-suited (Hofmann, 2008). There has been some
controversy about the evidence supporting these treatments, with some suggesting
that the quality of the research lags that of second wave treatments (Öst, 2008).
There have been a limited number of adequately powered comparisons, but the
available evidence does not suggest that third wave treatments are more effective
than second wave treatments (Arch et al., 2012; Craske et al., 2014a, b; Forman
et al., 2007, 2012; Herbert et al., 2018). Even if the evidence does not suggest third
wave treatments are more effective and should supersede CBT, they have certainly
highlighted a wider variety of therapeutic approaches. A more informed under-
standing of the utility of different strategies for different patients in different con-
texts may allow us to draw on this wider variety of intervention options to provide
more personalized and therefore more effective intervention options (Cheavens
et al., 2012; Cohen & DeRubeis, 2018; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019).
CBT Strategies
Ellis and Beck were key figures in the development of CBT, but obviously a large
number of researchers and clinicians have played important roles in its development
and success. CBT includes a number of different treatments, those developed by
Ellis and Beck as well as a number of other clinical innovators. With the consider-
able variability in conceptualization as well as in the specific interventions used in
these treatments (Barlow, 2021), the overall description of these interventions we
have provided may seem a bit abstract. To illustrate the kinds of strategies used in
CBT, in this section we highlight some cognitive and behavioral strategies, drawing
primarily from strategies in the Beckian tradition. We then discuss what it is that
patients are thought to gain from the use of these strategies. Although various
possibilities have been explored, basic questions about what patients learn in CBT
have yet to be answered fully.
Different forms of CBT all share a reliance on cognitive behavioral models of the
clinical problems they treat. Prior to describing specific intervention strategies, it is
important to consider other key features of the approaches commonly taken in
CBT. Different forms of CBT can vary from one another considerably. Nevertheless,
in all forms of CBT, therapists are to be attentive to providing basic therapeutic ele-
ments, such as warmth and empathy (Beck et al., 1979; Beck, 2020). CBT is to be
practiced in a collaborative style, with therapist and client working together closely.
The therapist is the expert on the treatment model; the client is the expert on his or
her experience. To help clients foster new perspectives, therapists can make use of
Socratic questioning to encourage clients to consider alternative views and try out
new behaviors (Newman, 2013).
One important dimension on which CBT protocols differ is the extent to which
the treatment is provided in a highly structured manner or in a much more individu-
alized manner as informed by a case conceptualization (Kendall, 2021). More flex-
ible versions of CBT appear to be more frequently practiced outside of research
contexts (Gibbons et al., 2010). In using these more flexible approaches, therapists
and patients work together to plan the focus of sessions and treatment is focused on
the specific treatment goals they identify (Beck, 2020). Sessions can begin with a
brief review of the client’s current symptoms (aided by the use of appropriate mea-
sures) and a mood check (Beck, 2020). To allow for adequate discussion of key
topics, an agenda is set collaboratively at the beginning of each session. The agenda
provides a plan for how session time will be spent. To facilitate learning, sessions
include a review of previous homework as well as the planning for new homework
assignments (Beck, 2020). In such individualized approaches to CBT, conceptual-
ization plays a more pivotal role in helping to select specific interventions (Kuyken
et al., 2011). CBT therapists generally focus on the client’s current problems,
although therapists can attend to past events or the therapeutic relationship when
indicated (Hollon & Beck, 2013).
Behavioral Strategies A variety of behavioral strategies are used in different
forms of CBT. One of the most common behavioral strategies is self-monitoring
(Barlow, 2021). Self-monitoring involves regularly recording one’s activities and
experiences, typically capturing experiences relevant to the goals of treatment. For
example, in the treatment of depression, patients may be asked to record their activi-
ties each hour, along with a rating of their mood (DeRubeis et al., 2019). They may
also be asked to note occasions when they feel a sense of accomplishment or plea-
sure. Data gathered from self-monitoring provide a rich source of information to
inform the selection of behavioral interventions. For example, a review of self-
monitoring data can bolster the case for leveraging certain activities to boost one’s
mood and engaging less in unnecessary activities that are not as helpful in this
regard. Self-monitoring can also be used to help patients test beliefs they hold, such
as that there are no activities that they would enjoy (Beck et al., 1979). Furthermore,
the client and therapist can collaboratively schedule activities for the patient to
engage in to increase the patient’s sense of pleasure and mastery or otherwise aid
them in reaching their treatment goals (Beck et al., 1979).
CBT developers vary in the extent to which they view behavioral strategies as
drivers of cognitive or behavioral change (Dozois et al., 2019; Hollon & Beck,
2013). In cognitively oriented treatments, it is not uncommon for patients to indicate
that they know that their negative beliefs are inaccurate when they think about it
carefully, but those beliefs still “feel true.” Therapists can respond to this by working
with clients to plan ways that they can gather experiential evidence to corroborate
their new view (Beck et al., 1979; Beck, 2020). For example, patients might predict
that others will reject them if they invite them to socialize. Rather than merely
reviewing past evidence, clients might plan to take the risk of inviting others on a
series of occasions and obtaining evidence that might serve to bolster their new view.
Exposure interventions are another important behavioral strategy (Abramowitz
et al., 2019). There are different models of the learning that takes place during expo-
sure, with some emphasizing basic learning mechanisms (i.e., exposure to inhibit
old learning and form new associations) and others taking a more cognitive approach
(i.e., exposure to test beliefs). As an example of the latter, Adrian Wells, David
Clark, and their colleagues (Clark, 1999; Wells et al., 1995) found that those with
social anxiety often engage in safety behaviors (i.e., behaviors used to prevent or
minimize an undesirable outcome). For example, a patient may avoid eye contact to
avoid unwanted social evaluation. With these behaviors in mind, Clark developed a
safety behavior experiment, which involves patients engaging in an activity with
and without safety behaviors and then reviewing the outcome of the experiment
with the aid of a video recording allowing them to compare their predictions of what
would occur with and without safety behaviors to what actually occurs. Remarkably,
Clark found that the overwhelming majority of patients with social anxiety predict
a more positive outcome will occur with safety behaviors, but after the experiment
they conclude that the outcomes were actually more positive without these behav-
iors (Clark, 2001). Although the framework of belief testing appears to be quite
useful in some contexts, Craske and colleagues (2014a, b) have provided some com-
pelling illustrations of ways in which an inhibitory learning approach might better
guide the use of exposure to maximize the learning achieved through these activi-
ties. Drawing from learning models emphasizing the importance of surprise (i.e., a
difference between what is predicted and what occurs; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972),
Craske et al. (2014a, b) describe a number of ways that exposure exercises might be
informed by this understanding to increase their impact. For example, they propose
continuing exposure until one’s expectation of a negative outcome is very low rather
than until their anxiety is reduced. They suggest that re-evaluation of one’s view of
the probability of an anticipated aversive outcome prior to exposure may have the
undesirable effect of reducing the expectancy violation involved in exposure and
therefore the learning that takes place. In addition, they suggest the use of occa-
sional reinforced extinction (e.g., social rejection following some exposures for
social anxiety). These experiences are thought to help the patient achieve learning
that will be more resilient in the event of negative outcomes in the future. Their
work highlights the importance of developing an accurate account of the learning

that takes place during exposure, even though there are also ways that different
accounts (e.g., belief disconfirmation vs. expectancy violation) suggest similar
intervention strategies.
Cognitive Strategies Cognitive strategies involve efforts to identify, evaluate, and
respond to negative thoughts and beliefs (Strunk et al., 2017). In working with their
clients, cognitive behavioral therapists start with explaining the role of cognitive
factors in maintaining relevant clinical problems and illustrate the process of iden-
tifying and reevaluating one’s thoughts. A common starting point is to identify a
recent occasion when one experienced negative emotion (Beck, 2020). Clients are
taught to identify their automatic thoughts by asking themselves, “What is going
through my mind right now?” when they experience a negative shift in their mood.
Perhaps a patient with depression reports feeling particularly sad when he checked
his social media feed earlier in the day. He noticed that some of his friends have
more followers than he does (situation) and has the thought, “I’m a loser” (auto-
matic thought). He reports feeling sad (emotion) and decides not to go out as he had
planned earlier (compensatory behavior).
The cognitive behavioral therapist would help the client to appreciate the con-
nection between these experiences, particularly how his emotional experiences
make sense in light of his thought that he is a loser. To help this patient consider the
accuracy of his thought, the therapist may use Socratic questioning (Beck et al.,
1979; Beck, 2020) to collaboratively consider the evidence for and against his
thought. For example, the patient might be prompted to consider whether the num-
ber of followers one has on social media is a reasonable indicator of one’s worth. He
might consider how such information would influence his evaluation of a friend and
whether he would take a more limited number of followers as a clear indication that
his friend is a loser. The patient might be further prompted to try to identify any
evidence that might be inconsistent with the idea that he is a loser. Together, the
therapist and client might work to develop a specific list of evidence relevant to the
clients’ worth. The therapist might work with the client to develop a rational
response that summarizes the alternative views they considered. Identifying such
alternative views is intended to help undercut the clients’ negative emotions and any
maladaptive compensatory behaviors.
A key tool for helping patients to master these cognitive strategies is the thought
record (Beck, 2020; Greenberger & Padesky, 2015). Although various versions of
these records exist, the basic elements include three columns, one each for record-
ing the “situation,” “emotions,” and “automatic thoughts.” Following the first three
columns, two additional columns are labeled “alternative responses” and
“Outcomes.” Then, through cognitive restructuring (Strunk et al., 2017), the client
learns to evaluate automatic thoughts to determine whether they are accurate.
Several questions are useful in guiding clients through this process:
1. What is the evidence that the automatic thought is true? What is the evidence that
it is not true?
2. Are there alternative explanations for that event, or alternative ways to view the
situation?
3. What are the implications if the thought is true? What is most upsetting about it?
What is the most realistic view? What can I do about it?
4. What would I tell a friend in this situation?
In working with clients to answer such questions, the therapist and client work
toward developing an alternative, more accurate response that is recorded in the
alternative response column. In the outcome column, clients reevaluate the intensity
of their emotions following consideration of the alternative responses. Although
there are variations in the thought records used, some version of a thought record is
an important part of the cognitive strategies of a number of CBT protocols.
Another approach to reevaluating one’s automatic thoughts is to identify cogni-
tive errors (DeRubeis et al., 2019). These errors characterize faulty information pro-
cessing that leads clients to think in ways that are “extreme, negative, categorical,
absolute, and judgmental” (Beck et al., 1979, p. 14). Two examples of cognitive
errors are all-or-none thinking and overgeneralizing (Beck et al., 1979). All-or-none
thinking is an error that involves classifying something as being one extreme or
another (e.g., either I am perfect or I am a failure) without recognizing the interme-
diate positions between these extremes. Overgeneralizing involves drawing conclu-
sions based on isolated incidents and applying these conclusions to unrelated
situations (Beck et al., 1979).
Following some practice with thought records, CBT may shift focus to patterns
in a clients’ thinking, working to identify clients’ schemas or core beliefs (Beck,
2020). A client’s schema or core beliefs represent basic maladaptive views the client
holds that influence the specific thoughts he or she experiences. Life experiences
sometimes as early as childhood are thought to shape these belief systems. To help
clients identify core beliefs, therapists can begin by exploring the personal meaning
of one’s thoughts (also referred to as the downward-arrow technique), an approach
that involves asking questions such as, “If that thought is true, what does that mean
about you?” For example, a patient’s concerns about social media, friendships, and
romantic relationships may revolve around the core belief “I am not likable.” Early
experiences with being excluded as a child might be cited as factors that could have
played a role in the development of this belief. Evidence for or against this core
belief can be considered more fully as part of the effort to evaluate its accuracy.
Core beliefs are believed to be more resistant to change than automatic thoughts
(Beck, 2020). Considerable evidence and experiential learning may be required to
help a patient move from a maladaptive core belief to a more adaptive belief. Aaron
Beck’s daughter Judith Beck (2020) has made suggestions for working with such
beliefs, including the use of a Core Belief Worksheet, which summarizes evidence
relevant to the evaluation of a core belief. The client in our example might be
encouraged to utilize behavioral experiments to test the validity of his core belief on
a series of occasions. As the patient identifies core beliefs and continues to collect
evidence against their validity, those become weaker, and may be replaced by more
adaptive views.
What Do Patients Learn in CBT?
What distinguishes the second wave from the first wave is its focus on cognition,
particularly efforts to understand and modify conscious thoughts and beliefs as a
means to alleviate psychopathology. The development of CBT largely coincided
with the introduction of treatment manuals and the use of randomized clinical trials
to evaluate the therapeutic benefits of psychosocial treatments (Wilson, 1996).
These methods allow us to be quite confident about the benefits of CBT as com-
pared with alternative treatments (Hofman et al., 2012). However, they have left
important questions unanswered about what patients learn in CBT and whether
these treatments work through the mechanisms that treatment developers suggested.
In our view, the evidence is largely consistent with the possibility that at least
some forms of CBT for some clinical problems achieve their effects in a manner
consistent with cognitive change playing an important role (Lorenzo-Luaces et al.,
2015). In our own research on CT of depression, we have found evidence consistent
with the view that cognitive change procedures may produce cognitive change (see
Stone & Strunk, 2020) and that cognitive change predicts symptom change (Schmidt
et al., 2019).
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that there is disagreement in the
field, with some experts suggesting the evidence indicates cognitive change does
not play an important role (Kazdin, 2007; Longmore & Worrell, 2007). Some have
taken the evidence of comparable levels of cognitive change in behavioral and cog-
nitive behavioral treatments for depression to suggest that cognitive change is likely
a consequence of another mechanism, such as behavioral activation or the therapeu-
tic alliance, operating in both purely behavioral as well as cognitive behavioral
treatments (Jacobson et al., 1996; Dimidjian et al., 2006). Furthermore, it is possible
that the role of cognitive change in bringing about symptom reductions varies across
treatments or that cognitive change is a mechanism even in treatments that do not
explicitly target cognitive change (Lorenzo-Luaces et al., 2016).
Our understanding of the role of cognitive change has been limited by multiple
factors. One factor is that clinical trials have tended to focus on evaluating the rela-
tive benefits of different treatment approaches, with questions about the mecha-
nisms of treatment being only a secondary consideration (Cuijpers et al., 2019). In
this context, researchers have struggled to conduct investigations that use the kinds
of careful research methods that are likely to be most informative (Pfeifer & Strunk,
2015). In addition, the role of cognitive change may depend on other contextual
factors, perhaps including the clinical problem, the treatment used, and various
patient characteristics (Fitzpatrick et al., 2020). This is an area where additional
research is needed.
Conclusion
In summary, cognitive behavioral treatments for various forms of psychopathology

emerged in reaction to the psychodynamic and behavioral traditions. The develop-
ers of CBT drew from several important historical and contemporaneous influences
in generating cognitive behavioral models of psychological disorders. The hallmark
characteristics of these treatments are their integration of cognitive and behavioral
clinical strategies. Different forms of CBT vary with regard to the emphasis they
place on cognitive versus behavioral strategies. As a group, CBT researchers led the
way in the careful evaluation of their treatment packages using randomized clinical
trials. The resulting evidence base has established cognitive behavioral therapies as
among the most well studied and effective psychosocial interventions available.
Questions remain about the mechanisms of these treatments and whether they might
be made more effective when personalized through an improved understanding how
and in what contexts they work best. These questions may prove particularly impor-
tant to efforts to develop more effective psychosocial interventions. Given the state
of knowledge, many researchers today are focusing on how to facilitate CBT more
effectively reaching those who could benefit from it.
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What Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy?
Lance M. McCracken
The term “third wave” has been used surprisingly often, such as to describe femi-
nism, music, democracy, and even coffee (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_
wave). It has also been used to name a group of approaches within the cognitive and
behavioral therapies. Like any named difference, however, it can both help and hurt
to call something a “third wave.” Without going too deeply into the metaphor, it
appears undeniable that that “third” comes after first and second. To “come after,”
or follow, can mean newer or better or a replacement. Although, these are not intrin-
sic to the meaning of “third wave”– this is supplemental meaning that one can attach
to the term. What is the “third wave” of behavior therapy? Is it after, newer, better,
a replacement, or even different than the first or second wave, and how? The focus
of this chapter is to discuss whether it is any of these things.
Third Wave Behavior Therapies
The term “third generation behavior therapy” clearly appeared sometime around
or before 1998. One of the things it connoted at that time was an appeal for therapy
to maintain a link with basic science, particularly a kind of science focused on
learning, use of single subject methodology, and on practically important out-
comes (O’Donohue, 1998). It appears that the specific term “third wave” was first
applied to the behavioral and cognitive therapies, in published form and in English,
in an article by Steve Hayes (2004a) based on a presidential address to the
Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy (AABT). In this article he
named a number of therapy approaches that “do not fit easily into traditional
L. M. McCracken (*)
Division of Clinical Psychology, Department of Psychology, Uppsala University,
Uppsala, Sweden
e-mail: Lance.McCracken@psyk.uu.se

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_6
128 L. M. McCracken
categories within the field” (p. 639). These included Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999), Behavioral Activation (BA; Martell et al.,
2001), Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System of Psychotherapy (CBASP;
McCullough, 2000), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993),
Functional Analytic Psychotherapy, (FAP; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), Integrative
Behavioral Couples Therapy (IBCT; Jacobson & Christensen, 1996), Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002), and other similar approaches
specially applied to addictive behavior (Marlatt, 2002) and generalized anxiety
disorder (Borkovec & Roemer, 1994; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). When these thera-
pies were first categorized this way it was said that “no one factor unites these new
methods,” (p. 640, Hayes, 2004a) except that each of these has reached into psy-
chological territory not ordinarily addressed within the cognitive behavioral thera-
pies. This includes such matters as acceptance, compassion, mindfulness,
relationship, self, spirituality, validation, values, and others. The point being that it
is both, a failure to fit into the traditional confines of the more established cognitive
and behavior therapies and a kind of similar bold embrace of psychological pro-
cesses regarded as deep in human experience, and challenging to reach, that distin-
guish the third wave (Hayes, 2004a, b).
In the years since 2004 some confusion has surrounded the “third wave” includ-
ing questions regarding which therapies are a part of this wave and which are not.
Twelve years after the term was introduced a review was published that examined
how the term was being used (Dimidjian et al., 2016). At that time a search of
PsychINFO and PubMed using the terms “third wave AND therapy” yielded 239
published articles. After selecting only those articles addressing cognitive and
behavioral therapies and excluding those clearly addressing something else, 140
unique articles were identified published between 2003 and 2015. For about a third
of the articles reviewed (n = 47), there was no specific therapy approach directly
identified as third wave but only a more general discussion of the term. For the
remainder of the articles (n = 93), a therapy approach was clearly identified as third
wave, and a total of 17 approaches were defined as such. ACT was most frequently
identified third wave therapy (66 times), followed by DBT (22 times), MBCT (20
times), FAP (15 times), and BA (11 times). A total of eight other approaches were
named as third wave between two and nine times, including mindfulness, metacog-
nitive therapy (Wells, 2009), schema therapy (Young et al., 2003), mode deactiva-
tion therapy (Apsche & Ward, 2002), IBCT, compassionate mind training (Gilbert
& Procter, 2006), mindfulness-based stress reduction, and CBASP (McCullough,
2000). And four approaches were mentioned just once as third wave, including
“mindfulness-based training group,” positive psychotherapy (Seligman et al.,
2006), unified protocol (Barlow et al., 2011), and compassion focused therapy
(Gilbert, 2010). It was concluded that there is both consensus on inclusion of some
therapy types within the third wave and inconsistent views on others (Dimidjian
et al., 2016).
What Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy? 129
History
If there is a third wave of behavior therapy, it is only reasonable to assume that it

must sit in relation to a first and second wave. In previous chapters of this volume
these other waves will have been defined and described. The first two waves will be
discussed briefly here to provide a context for understanding the third.
Before there was a wave metaphor, perhaps the most appropriate metaphor for
the behavioral therapies would have been to refer to them as a network of many
roots and branches. Some of the oldest or deepest roots were the conditioning prin-
ciples of Pavlov, Skinner, Hull, and others, but mainly these. Over time these differ-
ing roots gave rise to differing therapy approaches, or the different branches, within
behavior therapy. Essentially these had several important characteristics in com-
mon, characteristics that distinguished them from approaches that came before
them. These first wave behavior therapies were each (a) based on conditioning prin-
ciples derived from laboratory research, (b) devoted to scientific methods as a source
of knowledge, (c) committed to links between basic and applied science, (d) defined
behavior change as outcome, and (e) looked generally to the manipulation of envi-
ronmental contingencies as the means to produce this change. The “branches,” as
we say, may have emphasized different processes of change and favored differing
specific techniques. At the same time, they were essentially grounded in the same
overarching principles.
Behavior therapy in its earliest forms as described here was born in the 1950s
and developed in the 1960s. In 1963 the first journal for behavior therapy appeared.
It was the journal Behaviour Research and Therapy founded by Hans Eysenck.
AABT was founded shortly after that, in 1966. Already at that time the seeds were
sown for new growth, and new branches were appearing, or, if you will, ripples of
the second wave were forming. Cognitive therapy soon appeared and began what
would become a dramatic reshaping of behavior therapy into something else (e.g.,
Beck, 1970).
Those studying clinical psychology during the 1970s and later may have learned
slightly different accounts of the origin of the C being added to BT. Many, however,
would have learned that what is now regarded as the second wave, was an amalga-
mation of behavior therapy added to mainly of the work of Albert Ellis (1962),
Aaron Beck (1976), and Donald Meichenbaum (1977). Their approaches were
called Rational Emotive Therapy, Cognitive Therapy, and Stress Inoculation
Training, respectively, among other terms. There are similarities and differences
between these three and they are not each equally well known today, the cognitive
therapy approach from Beck, arguably, having produced the most applications,
research, and evidence (e.g., Cuijpers et al., 2020; See also Beck, 2019 and Dryden,
2011 for personal accounts). What unifies these three is a dissatisfaction with the
then current behavior therapy, and its neglect of cognitive processes (see Davison,
chapter “Personal Perspectives on the Development of Behavior Therapy and
Cognitive Behavior Therapy”, this volume). Their response to this was, to say it
130 L. M. McCracken
simply, to emphasize the role of individual distorted or maladaptive thoughts,

beliefs, and attitudes in relation to emotional and behavior problems.
The essence of the cognitive approach was clear in its defined mechanism of
change, “… a crucial mechanism in the psychotherapeutic chain is a modification or
shift in the patient’s ideational system. As his irrational concept that he is paralyzed
(hysteria), helpless and hopeless (depression), in danger (anxiety or phobia), perse-
cuted (paranoid sate), or superhuman (mania) becomes deactivated, the abnormal
clinical picture recedes” (p. 197, Beck, 1970). Looking back over the “60-year evo-
lution of cognitive theory and therapy” the emphasis remained on identifying and
modifying negative automatic thoughts and on “…working to rewire maladaptive
beliefs and biases into more adaptive ones” (p. 19, Beck, 2019). An interesting fea-
ture was the tendency to regard different forms of psychopathology as characterized
by unique cognitive distortions or attitudes.
Notably, many of those involved at the start of what is now regarded as the sec-
ond wave maintained an affinity for first wave behavior therapy and were meaning
to simply broaden its focus while staying true to some of its primary tenets. Even
Beck called cognitive therapy “congruent with many of the assumptions of behavior
therapy” (p. 198, Beck, 1970) while at the same time regarding cognitive therapy as
broader, and providing “a greater range of concepts for explaining psychopathology
as well as the mode of action of therapy” (p. 198). What was literally proposed was
a kind of expansion and integration, an addition of cognitive concepts and tech-
niques to the current behavioral ones. It must be said, however, that cognitive pro-
cesses and methods were really very much more the headline of the cognitive
approaches, and the message of synthesis and expansion appeared at best a second-
ary concern. In fact, another agenda was hinted at some of the time, such as when it
was asked, “Can a fledgling psychotherapy challenge the giants in the field – psy-
choanalysis and behavior therapy?” (p. 333, Beck, 1976). So, it is possible to detect
two different narratives around the rise of cognitive approaches, an integration
agenda that was there for some but less so for others, and a fight to win agenda,
which was certainly in the experience of many.
Worth mentioning is that around the same time as primary variants of the cogni-
tive approach were showing up on the scene other allied approaches were also
emerging. One of these was social learning theory (Bandura, 1977a) later called
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986). From within this approach comes the
extremely well-known self-efficacy theory, proposed at the time as a “unifying the-
ory of behavior change” (Bandura, 1977b). What seemed apparent from the early
days of cognitive therapy was that methods and mechanisms of acquisition and
change in human behavior could be formulated in terms of cognitive processes,
such as cognitive restructuring or reappraisal, OR in terms of environmental manip-
ulations and overt behavioral performance, such as in exposure therapy or skills
rehearsal. Bandura therefore proposed a solution to this problem of two sets of
methods and mechanisms in the form of a process that unified them, namely self-
efficacy. This he defined essentially as the strength of a person’s conviction regard-
ing their own effectiveness, their expectation for whether they can successfully
execute the behavior required to produce an intended outcome (Bandura, 1977b).
For Bandura this was a key factor in the acquisition, regulation, and motivation of
behavior, although he continued to see a role of skills building, competency, as well
as incentives. He saw self-efficacy as potentially arising from successful perfor-
mance, vicarious learning, verbal persuasion, and emotional experiences. In a nut-
shell, he said, “people process, weigh, and integrate diverse sources of information
concerning their capability, and they regulate their choice behavior and effort
expenditure accordingly” (p. 212, Bandura, 1977b). It is worth noting that self-
efficacy is a rather transdiagnostic concept, not linked to one particular disorder or
another. It has been particularly influential in clinical health psychology and behav-
ioral medicine, where it continues to be frequently applied in both clinic settings
and research (e.g., Franks et al., 2009; Náfrádi et al., 2017).
So when did the therapies now called third wave first appear? The answer is
almost certainly that first small studies appeared in the 1980s and the first full book
length descriptions in the 1990s, now about 30 years ago. The first treatment study
of what is now called ACT was a study of what was then called “comprehensive
distancing” for depression (Zettle & Hayes, 1986). The first published book length
description of ACT did not appear until 13 years later (Hayes et al., 1999). To take
another possible member of the wave, mindfulness based approaches, sometime
called a “fellow traveler” with the third wave, early treatment studies appeared in
the 1980s (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985) but again at least one example of a popularly
applied, full length description, in the form of a book, appeared some years later
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The timeline is more or less the same for other third wave
approaches, with books for FAP (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991) and DBT (Linehan,
1993) first appearing in the early 1990s, and BA, at least in a more modern form,
shortly after that (Martell et al., 2001), and also MBCT (Segal et al., 2002).
“Anomalies” in the Context of the Second Wave
Nothing ought to stay the same in the behavioral therapies – certainly no approach
has ever claimed, or should claim, to have solved the problem of human suffering.
Research continues, showing us both what we know and what we don’t know.
Accordingly, the cognitive model was never going to be the last word. What Ellis,
Beck, Meichenbaum and others added to behavior therapy was an emphasis on the
role of cognition, on irrational beliefs, negative automatic thoughts, and information
processing biases in psychological problems. From their cognitive models, therapy
adopted a focus on the detection and correction of these through such methods as
thought records, self-statement analysis, cognitive restructuring and behavioral
experiments (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962; Meichenbaum, 1977; see also Longmore
& Worrell, 2007). Simply stated, with the advent of the second wave, a focus on
changing particularly the content of pathological thoughts and beliefs became
important for achieving improvements in the participant’s problems in therapy. At
the start of the so-called cognitive revolution in CBT the assumption was that cogni-
tive methods were uniquely suited to creating this type of cognitive change and this
132 L. M. McCracken
change was necessary for improvement to appear in therapy. This was, as some will
remember, fiercely debated from both sides of the arguments (Mahoney, 1977;
Wolpe, 1978). Only much later did results emerge that directly address these
assumptions, and with evidence came inconsistency and contradiction.
One of the earlier studies that addressed the theory of cognitive change in CBT
was a treatment component analysis of CBT for depression (Jacobson et al., 1996).
In this study 150 participants with major depression were randomly assigned to
behavioral activation (BA), BA plus methods addressing negative automatic
thoughts, or a full package of CBT. The full package here included BA, plus both
methods to address automatic thoughts and to modify core depressogenic schema.
These researchers found high adherence to treatment protocols, high allegiance of
therapists to the full package approach, and high competence in the delivery of this.
At the same time they found no evidence that the full package was more effective
than the smaller component treatments, including the single component of BA, both
immediately after treatment and at a 6-month follow-up. It was also found that BA
alone appeared equally effective to the full CBT package at altering negative think-
ing and dysfunctional attributional styles. These findings were regarded as calling
into question both the theory of therapeutic change proposed by Beck and others,
and the necessity of methods that explicitly aim to produce cognitive change
(Jacobson et al., 1996). In fact, it was proposed that perhaps “exposure to naturally
reinforcing contingencies produces change in thinking more effectively than the
explicitly cognitive interventions do” (p. 303, Jacobson et al., 1996).
Subsequent to the treatment component study by Jacobsen and colleagues fur-
ther studies in a similar vein appeared. Results from these studies could be seen to
further undermine the assumption that methods for cognitive change are necessary
to produce improvements. One of these studies showed that BA was as effective as
antidepressant medications, and better than cognitive therapy, for the treatment of
moderate to severe depression (Dimidjian et al., 2006). Yet another study, based in
the same trial, showed that there was a group of patient who showed “a pattern of
extreme nonresponse” to cognitive therapy (Coffman et al., 2007). These people
had severe depression, were highly functionally impaired, and had low social sup-
port. People with the same problems did not show the same pattern of nonresponse
in BA, suggesting that a less complex treatment focused only on behavioral engage-
ment might be a better, more effective, choice for these people.
With the new millennium, after 30 or 40 years of relative domination of the cog-
nitive model and methods in the behavioral therapies, research findings that appeared
to contradict the cognitive model continued to accumulate, again, seemingly calling
into question the fundamental role of cognitive change and methods. One of these
was led by David Burns (Burns & Spangler, 2001), a psychiatrist and earlier student
of Beck, who greatly popularized cognitive therapy with his books for non-
professional non-specialist audiences, including the bestselling Feeling Good: The
New Mood Therapy published in 1980. In his research he posed the question of
whether change in dysfunctional attitudes act as mediators of change in CBT for
depression and anxiety (Burns & Spangler, 2001). In a study of 521 people partici-
pating in CBT for 12-weeks, conducted in an actual practice setting, data included
multiple measures of depression, anxiety, and dysfunctional attitudes related to per-

fectionism and dependency. Using structural equation modelling, he and his coau-
thor found that changes in dysfunctional attitudes indeed were correlated with
changes in depression and anxiety across time. They did not find, however, that
these changes in dysfunctional attitudes were likely to have causal effects on the
changes in outcomes. The authors commented that the failure may have been
because they did not assess the right dysfunctional attitudes or that perhaps it was
not the level of dysfunctional attitudes but their impact on mood, as aspect not
assessed, that was responsible for improvement (Burns & Spangler, 2001).
In 2004 a new book appeared. It was called Mindfulness and Acceptance:
Expanding the Cognitive Behavioral Tradition (Hayes et al., 2004a). This is essen-
tially a book about the third wave, arguably the first book, including chapters on
ACT, DBT, MBCT, FAP, BA, and specific mindfulness and acceptance approaches
to trauma, generalized anxiety disorder, eating disorder, alcohol and drug use prob-
lems, and couples problems. In chapter “The Three Waves of Cognitive Behavior
Therapy: Scientific Aspirations and Scientific Status” of this volume it was pro-
posed that a particularly fertile context for the new generation of behavior therapy
was present. Part of this was a failure to reconcile several empirical anomalies in the
field. Two of these we have just addressed: that explicitly cognitive treatment meth-
ods do not appear to provide an added benefit to behavior methods, and that changes
in presumed cognitive mediators do not appear to explain the impact of CBT, and
one more not yet mentioned, that improvement in CBT seems to happen before the
presumed core cognitive methods have been implemented (Hayes, 2004a).
Shortly after the book on “expanding the cognitive behavior tradition” appeared
it was followed by a critical review of the evidence with regard to the three points it
raised. The title included the question, “Do we need to challenge thoughts in cogni-
tive behavior therapy?” (Longmore & Worrell, 2007). One approach taken in this
review was to examine component analysis studies for depression and anxiety dis-
orders. For depression there were 13 of these, including the study by Jacobson et al.
(1996) already discussed. For anxiety disorders there were similarly at least twelve
of these, including generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD, social phobia, and
OCD. Based on a review of these studies the authors concluded that in the depres-
sion studies behavioral activation alone appeared as effective as behavioral activa-
tion plus cognitive methods. From the anxiety disorders studies they concluded that
exposure-based methods appeared as effective as methods aimed at thoughts
(Longmore & Worrell, 2007).
The phenomenon of rapid early change in therapy has been interpreted support-
ively by both those claiming the importance of cognitive change and those denying
it. Those claiming it proves cognitive change in unimportant argued that this type of
change, apparently occurring before the main cognitive methods were introduced,
essentially shows those methods are not necessary. Those who support the model of
cognitive change, on the other hand, attribute the observed therapy impact to cogni-
tive change from the initial elements of therapy rationale and other early skills train-
ing. In the end it was concluded that findings in the area are equivocal, neither
supporting nor refuting the cognitive model (Longmore & Worrell, 2007).
134 L. M. McCracken
The important question raised in “expanding the tradition” and examined in the
review is the question of cognitive mediation in CBT. Briefly, in reviewing the
results of at least seven empirical studies, one of these the study by Burns & Spangler
(2001), Longmore and Worrell (2007) found that cognitive change is no more a
feature of CBT than alternative treatments, and there was limited and inconsistent
evidence for the causal role of cognitive change in relation to improvements
observed in CBT. They referred to their findings as revealing “a worrying lack of
empirical support for some of the fundamental tenets of CBT” (p. 185, Longmore
& Worrell, 2007).
It is perhaps no surprise that the dramatic conclusions reached regarding the
necessity of cognitive change in CBT would provoke a response, which they did
(Hofmann, 2008), and this in turn provoked a rebuttal (Worrell & Longmore, 2008).
Authors of both of these pieces essentially claimed errors, misconceptions, and
incorrect interpretations on the part of their opponent and that the other has essen-
tially missed the point. There is also some careless misspelling of names, accusa-
tions of wanting to be trendy, and advice to be open minded. Yet in their own way,
they agree that the fundamental question of cognitive mediation is not answered and
needs more research done with appropriate methods.
Change in Content Versus Change in Context
One point being made is that the first and second waves overlapped in some respects
as to assumptions, principles, and even methods. One point on which they appear to
hold clearly opposing views on the centrality and necessity of change in the content
of thoughts and beliefs in relation to relief from psychopathological conditions. The
respective positions on whether feelings need to change is more equivocal. Probably
both of these early waves include methods aimed to reduce unwanted emotions or
feelings, such as fear or sadness, as a way to improve behavioral performance or as
a key outcome of therapy, although their processes and methods for doing this dif-
fered. It is clear in any case that the early waves differed in the realm of content
change in psychological events. This then gives rise to a defining feature of the third
wave. The stance of the third wave is explicit in embracing both, a focus on content
change or not, and is thus a point of integration and “expansion,” as the book title
says. In fact, the stance of the third wave therapies on this point, generally speaking
does not oppose the stance held by either the first or second wave – it includes them
both (Hayes, 2004a).
The Role of Differing Assumptions
It might be worth a short discussion of the context around content changes and the
arguments waged for and against these as causes of the problems people experience.
For years the clearest division in all of behavior therapy rested on this one issue,
essentially, whether thoughts cause behavior. The two sides basically named the
other as the “cognitivists” and the “behaviorists,” the former proposing a key role of
cognition as underlying cause in human behavior problems (e.g., Bandura, 1986)
and the latter claiming with no uncertainty that they are not (e.g., Lee, 1992).
Thankfully, many people completing their training very recently may not remember
these battles, essentially between participants in the first wave of behavior therapy,
mostly behavior analytically oriented researchers and clinicians, on the one hand,
and participants in the second wave, mostly cognitive theory and therapy propo-
nents, on the other. As often happens both sides were correct. Perhaps a better way
to say this is that both sides represent entirely legitimate approaches to understand-
ing behavior. And at the same time neither side was destined to win the argument, at
least not on empirical nor theoretical grounds.
Often missed by those who fought over the causal status of cognition was that
their disagreement actually rested on fundamental differences in the nature of their
dependent variables, the nature of causation, and what constitutes knowledge, and
the goals of science. Hidden behind their disagreements the rivals were, often
unknowingly, holding differing world views and applying different scientific frame-
works (Dougher, 1995; Hayes & Hayes, 1992). Following Pepper’s (1942) notion of
root metaphors, these world views are sometimes referred to as mechanistic, or
more recently and kindly, elemental realist, on the cognitivist side, and contextual,
on the behaviorist side. Quite simply, those working within a mechanistic approach
have as their assumptions to (a) define the action alone as the subject matter, to (b)
analyze the parts, including present psychological events and action, as a way to
understand the whole, to (c) treat the parts as potential true causes of the other parts,
and to (d) allow prediction or correspondence as a basis for an adequate explana-
tion. Here a scientific statement is true to the extent that it matches or predicts
observed events. For the contextual approach each of these assumptions is a differ-
ent matter. They (a) define their subject matter as the act in context, (b) see the act
in context as an essential whole where a change in any of the elements changes the
subject under study, (c) regard only contextual elements outside of the act in context
as potential “causes,” and regard the term “cause” here to be a way of speaking that
may help reach a goal, and not true in an ontological sense, and (d) seek the joint
objectives of prediction and influence, as requirements for an adequate explanation.
Here, an explanation must include manipulable elements and, ideally, demonstrate
goal achievement as the mark of what is “true.”
For proponents of the cognitive model and cognitive therapy methods, an irratio-
nal thought is a perfectly acceptable explanation for a failed performance, if the two
are consistently correlated, and this matches a cognitive formulation of the problem.
For their rivals in the behavioral wing this is not adequate because they regard irra-
tional thoughts as inaccessible to direct manipulation, being that another person
intending to help create change can only ever operate on elements in the context
around the thought and performance (see O’Donohue). This distinction is not helped
by the fact that cognitive therapists will probably regard cognitive restructuring as a
method to directly manipulate thoughts. The behaviorist, for their part, will call this
manipulating the verbal and social context around the thought, or the context around
136 L. M. McCracken
the link between the thought and performance. Such is the difficulty in getting the
two sides to see eye to eye.
While for some, all of this has been heard before, and for others it all seems a
little complicated or beside the point, the main point is the same. Early divisions in
the behavioral therapies were not in fact battles to rightfully claim the souls of
behavior therapists. They were based in a misunderstanding, on differing back-
ground assumptions regarding subject matter, causality, and knowledge, both
equally respectable and legitimate, both choices. And, these choices that cannot
themselves be proven in evidence or theory, cannot be justified, and need no justifi-
cation (Dougher, 1995).
There is just one more point to understand in the debate over cognition as cause,
because, although this debate has shifted it has not gone away. Do remember that
those participating in the first wave of behavior therapy were diverse to a degree in
their theory, key variables, and methods, although they all shared a kind of pre-
cognitive view of behavior. At least some of them however were behavior analysts,
and for them, not only were thoughts and other private psychological experiences
out of scope for being non-manipulable, but they were also regarded as unnecessary
to the goals of their analyses. It is regarded by some as a mistake Skinner made that
while he admitted thoughts and feelings as a subject of study for psychology, he
rejected them as necessary for understanding patterns of behavior (Hayes & Hayes,
1992). For Skinnerians, all that one needed to predict and influence behavior, includ-
ing the behavior of thinking and feeling and following what one thinks and feels,
was to be found in prevailing environmental contingencies.
Enter the third wave in the battle over thoughts as cause and something different
becomes possible. In a true sense it is an expansion or synthesis of the cognitive
behavioral tradition (Hayes et al., 2004a). It is acceptance, mindfulness, and spiritu-
ality meet exposure, behavioral activation, contingency management, and cognitive
restructuring. To the repertoire of ignore the thoughts or change the thoughts is
added observe the thought, experience the thought as just a thought, open up and
allow the thought, act in ways that are literally inconsistent with the thought, and so
on. With the third wave thoughts are important and can be addressed at the level of
change in content, their form or what they say, and can be addressed at a level of
change in context and function, how they interact with relevant behavior patterns of
influence. Perhaps particularly from the mindfulness side it becomes common to
say that in order to change behavior one can change what they think or how they
experience what they think. Even more than that, while the first and second waves
both took a more or less predominant focus on control over psychological events,
the third wave included as a distinct possibility the notion that “control is the prob-
lem.” This means that for some human behavior problem the root of it is not simply
the presence of sadness, fear, pain, or distressing or misleading thoughts, but it is the
application of attempts to change these that creates the difficulties that creates inter-
ference and failures. Here thoughts and feelings become a space for acceptance or
change, and “change” becomes an attitude perhaps better directly applied to behav-
ior rather than to thoughts and feelings (Hayes et al., 2011).
Treatment Methods
As to what methods characterize the third wave behavior therapies, it is quite unam-
biguously a theme of expansion once again. Nothing is taken off the table, although
some methods may be used less than they were, or used in a more discriminated
fashion. An interesting development, however, is that the third wave appears to
embolden therapists, to empower the use of some traditional behavior therapy meth-
ods that perhaps were not implemented as widely as they could have been.
A rather ironic, and at the same time entirely understandable, phenomenon is the
occurrence of what is called “therapist drift” (Waller, 2009). Evidence clearly dem-
onstrates that behavior change in CBT comes from application of such methods as
behavioral activation, skills training, and exposure, among other methods. The
observation is made, however, that therapists often make mistakes in therapy, and do
not implement these when they could and should. They delay doing so, conclude
that is it not the right moment, or the right participant. They regard these methods as
too stressful or distressing, they “protect” the participant, and turn away from deliv-
ering them, and instead they shift from doing to talking (Waller, 2009). Therapists
fail to deliver treatment as needed, and may make problems worse, the argument
says, as a result of therapist fear, influence of unhelpful thinking, and avoidance, on
the part of the therapist. Discovery of this phenomenon cannot be attributed to the
third wave particularly, however, the third wave therapies appear well placed to
embrace it, particularly with their explicit focus on therapist stance, in ACT
(Vilardaga & Hayes, 2009), relationship and validation, in DBT (Carson-Wong
et al., 2018), and even courage and love, in FAP (Maitland et al., 2017). For exam-
ple, in ACT the therapeutic stance can be “whatever works,” based on a common set
of values and goals defined by the treatment provider and recipient, and will neces-
sarily include building the treatment recipients psychological flexibility from a con-
text of provider psychological flexibility (Vilardaga & Hayes, 2009). These aspects
in particular ought to function to lessen the impact of experiences that can lead to
drift, such as in the impact of misleading thoughts or feeling that coordinate thera-
pist avoidance.
One way to understand the methods of the third wave and to see if they have
indeed expanded the tradition or to see if they might address therapist drift, is to ask
what self-identified third wave therapist use. An internet survey published in 2011
included 55 second wave and 33 third wave therapists, all self-identified as such and
as licensed and practicing (Brown et al., 2011). The survey examined treatment
techniques and approaches used as well as a number of attitudinal issues relevant to
clinical practice. The results were just as one might expect after having followed the
discussion of this chapter so far. The two groups were remarkably the same in back-
ground and attitude, both reported the same attitudes toward evidence-based prac-
tice, for example. The two groups did differ significantly, however, in treatment
techniques used. No surprise, the third wave therapists reported greater use of
acceptance and mindfulness techniques. Similarly, second wave therapist reported
greater use of cognitive restructuring and relaxation. On the other hand, third wave
138 L. M. McCracken
therapist reported greater use of exposure, and a greater number of total techniques.
All of the difference here reflected effect sizes that were medium to large (Brown
et al., 2011). In a similar survey that we completed in 2015, except focusing only on
therapists working in the area of chronic pain we essentially replicated all of the
findings (N = 68; Scott et al., 2017). There were no background or attitudinal differ-
ences between self-identified second and third wave therapists, but the second wave
therapists reported greater use of cognitive restructuring and relaxation, and the
third wave therapists reported greater use of mindfulness, cognitive defusion, values
clarification, metaphor, experiential methods, and a wider range of methods overall.
Acceptance as Key Process
One of the terms that seems to clearly mark a difference carried in the third wave is
the focus on acceptance. It is certainly a fundamental idea at the heart of the third
wave. And, at the same time, it is remarkably prone to misunderstanding. It might
begin to sound commonplace these days to speak about acceptance, but a small
number of people in the UK will recall a conference paper session on the topic
around 2001 and the chair of the session, a prominent, international, senior clinical
psychologist and researcher in CBT and behavioral medicine referred to the topic as
“where angels fear to tread.” Such was the fluffiness and perceived inaccessibility to
research the concept reflected at that time, 50 years into the development of behav-
ior therapy and 20 years ago. So what does acceptance mean, how is it validly mea-
sured, and how is it implemented as a method in treatment?
Possibly the first publication of a measure and data addressing acceptance as it
has come to be understood within the third wave was based in a study of chronic
pain (McCracken, 1998). It was remarkably difficult at that time for researchers and
therapists from the predominant second wave to see acceptance as something other
than a belief, most particularly a belief that the experiences one wrestles with will
not change and that one should stop wrestling with them. On the surface that almost
sounds technically correct, but it is certainly not, at least is it not true to the spirit of
the third wave understanding of this term, coming mainly from ACT.
As a typical example of a kind of contextually conceived process, acceptance is
a quality of behavior in context. In a context of experiences that are undesirable or
unwanted and that can in some situations coordinate avoidance or struggling, or
attempts to limit contact, acceptance is an act of engagement, without resistance,
without attempts to eliminate or limit contact. It is simply engaging with potentially
avoidance promoting experiences and doing so openly or willingly. For example we
have come to refer to acceptance of pain as engaging with pain and refraining from
attempts to reduce the pain. Importantly, acceptance is not a cause of engagement or
a reducer of avoidance. It cannot be separated out as an event that can play that kind
of role, at least not from the typical perspective within the third wave. It is also a
process that is explicitly to support action toward goals and values – it is not in
explicit purpose a way to reduce distress or discomfort. Outside of a context of

goals and values, acceptance is not a thing to do, so to speak.
Acceptance is clearly one of the most studied processes within the third wave
and its establishment within the cognitive and behavioral therapies as an evidence-
based process is surely one of the significant achievements of this wave. Its contri-
bution sits clearly as an extension of a predominant focus on the control, reframing,
or reduction, of unwanted or misleading thoughts and feelings within behavior
therapy. In experimental studies of responses to experiences of emotional distress,
acceptance versus cognitive reappraisal appear mainly similar in their usefulness
(e.g., Wolgast et al., 2011). In meta-analyses of 30 experimental studies of accep-
tance versus other emotional regulation strategies small to medium effect sizes
favored acceptance for “pain tolerance,” which typically means voluntary exposure
time, while there were no differences with respect to pain intensity or negative
affect (Kohl et al., 2012).
What ought to be clear to any therapist, or anyone considering the matter prag-
matically, and is clear in research evidence (Ford et al., 2018), is that acceptance is
not meant to be an exclusive strategy. It is not meant to be a response applied to all
unwanted events in all situations, as a replacement for ever intending to control
anything. Acceptance is meant to be a companion for control. Acceptance is for
responding to thoughts and feelings when these cannot be controlled, cannot be use-
fully controlled, or cannot be controlled in a way that succeeds with respect to what
a person wants to achieve. After all, sometimes attempts to control our thoughts and
feelings does harm or subverts our goals. On the other hand, there is nothing healthy
in accepting unwanted situations that can be readily changed, when there is no pur-
pose or goal to achieve, and no use facing pain and distress when these can be
stopped effectively and efficiently without creating any further difficulty, and in a
way that keeps a person on track with their goals.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that measuring acceptance has been a significant
challenge. Of course the same could be said for other variables that fit within the
third wave, including the wider facets of psychological flexibility. In the wider
acceptance literature the best known measure is the seven-item Acceptance and
Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II, Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II itself was a
response to criticisms of earlier versions of the same measure on the basis of low
reliability, unstable factor structure, and difficulties with item complexity and com-
prehension (Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II is also clearly an imperfect instrument.
Certainly it does not measure acceptance as its name might suggest. At best it mea-
sures the opposite of acceptance, experiential avoidance, or psychological inflexi-
bility. As such, studies have found a lack of discriminant validity, that the items of
the AAQ-II appear more strongly related to items intended to measure psychologi-
cal distress than to measures of acceptance or avoidance per se (Ong et al., 2020;
Rochefort et al., 2018; Wolgast, 2014). The end result is that the AAQ-II seems too
strongly correlated with measures of distress and insufficiently differentiated from
these. The other problem with the AAQ-II in the context of ACT is that the item
content is insufficient to capture the full set of therapeutic processes included in the
model. Recent efforts to produce multidimensional models of psychological
140 L. M. McCracken
flexibility have remedied this and seem to have partly addressed the earlier problem
of inadequate discriminant validity (e.g., Rogge et al., 2019; Rolffs et al., 2018).
Evidence
Since even before the term third wave appeared in a published paper, the evidence
for the “new behavior therapy technologies,” particularly DBT, ACT, and FAP were
being questioned, and debated (Hayes et al., 2004b). In a review, 42 studies, includ-
ing nearly 550 participants, were included that “evaluated the impact of ACT, FAP,
or DBT interventions” (Hayes et al., 2004b). Studies that addressed only such ques-
tions as assessment, acceptability, cost-effectiveness, or processes of change were
excluded to keep the focus on clinical outcomes only. The studies included seven
RCTs of DBT and eight RCTs of ACT, and the others were quasi-experimental or
case studies. It was concluded at this early stage, essentially concurrent with the
launch of the term third wave itself, that data supported the efficacy of DBT and
ACT. It was also concluded that these data were remarkable for showing benefit in
conditions, such as in people diagnosed with psychosis, borderline personality dis-
order, or long term chronic conditions, seen as difficult and typically unresponsive
to treatment. Even if the data were preliminary or incomplete, based on the number
and range of studies found, these approaches were regarded as undeniably empirical
in orientation, particularly given their recent appearance (Hayes et al., 2004b).
The first systematic review and meta-analysis specifically focused on the effi-
cacy of third wave behavioral therapies was done by Öst (2008). In it he found 29
RCTs, including 13 for ACT and 13 for DBT, one is CBASP, and two in IBCT. Briefly,
his conclusion was that the research methods used in the third wave trials were less
stringent than those typically used in CBT, mean effect sizes were moderate for
ACT and DBT, and that none of the third wave therapies were regarded as empiri-
cally supported as conventionally defined (Öst, 2008).
One of the methods used in the Öst (2008) review was to “match” each of the
third wave therapy trials with a trial of traditional CBT selected from the same or a
similar journal at around the same publication date. This was done to see if the level
or methodological rigor applied was similar or different between the two approaches.
This comparison was the basis for the conclusion that the studies of third wave
therapies were weaker in the rigor of their methods. In a subsequent response to the
Öst review it was pointed out that a questionable assumption had been made, that
third wave and CBT studies published around the same time and in the same jour-
nals ought to have the same level or rigor. Several confounds were noted with regard
to the comparison, confounds likely to boost the apparent performance of the tradi-
tional CBT trials relative to the third wave (Gaudiano, 2009). The main points were
that the third wave studies (a) represented an earlier stage of development compared
to traditional CBT, (b) had less grant funding, (c) included more difficult to treat
diagnoses, such as psychosis, chronic medical conditions, and addiction, than the
CBT trials, which all included mainly anxiety or stress disorders, and (d) were
mainly pilot studies of newly designed and never tried treatments (Gaudiano, 2009).
In this response to the review, constructive criticism for the developing third wave
therapies was repeatedly welcomed, and readers were reminded that these criti-
cisms themselves need to be held to a high standard of evidence.
Some 6 years later Öst (2014) again produced a systematic review and meta-
analysis, this time focused just on ACT. This time 60 RCTs were found, including
4234 participants, with psychiatric or somatic disorders, and work-related stress. In
this review it was concluded that ACT was not a well-established evidence based
treatment for any disorder, that it was probably efficacious for chronic pain and tin-
nitus, possibly efficacious for depression, psychosis, OCD, anxiety, drug abuse, and
stress at work.
A systematic review of meta-analyses of third wave therapies was conducted for
the time frame between January 2004 and September 2015 (Dimidjian et al., 2016).
Results from eight meta-analyses for ACT, five for DBT, six for MBCT, and seven
for BA were narratively synthesized. ACT was deemed to have addressed a remark-
ably diverse range of problems and populations. Results were evenly split on
whether effect sizes for ACT demonstrate superiority to traditional CBT, other
behavior therapies, or established treatments more generally. While it was noted
that DBT too has found application to an increasing range of problems (see
Fitzgerald and Rivza this volume), some not yet included in meta-analyses, the
research literature includes a relatively small number of RCTs. In general the con-
clusion offered was that DBT has not yet demonstrated “incremental benefit over
first or second wave cognitive behavioral therapies” (p. 895, Dimidjian et al., 2016).
On the positive side, evidence for MBCT was regarded as showing reduced risk of
relapse in formerly depressed people of between 35% and 50%. Less clear was the
evidence for the application of MBCT in acutely depressed people. It seems to per-
form better than psychoeducation and similarly to CBT, but predominantly in trials
underpowered to detect a difference. Finally, for BA, consistent conclusions from
repeated meta-analyses of RCTs described large effects of BA for depressive symp-
tom severity in comparison to control conditions in general, and small effects in
comparison to cognitive therapy or CBT, sometimes significant and sometimes not,
depending on the particular trials reviewed. Overall these four approaches to treat-
ment, based on this review of meta-analyses, are said to have “amassed a substantial
and compelling evidence base” (p. 901, Dimidjian et al., 2016).
Shortly after the review of meta-analyses of third wave therapies a response to
Öst (2014) was published. It came in the form of an extensive examination of the
methods and data used and essentially asked that the Öst review be ignored from
that point forward with respect to evidence for ACT (Atkins et al., 2017). There are
many interesting lessons to learn in the results of this reexamination. Without going
into too great a detail, 91 factual or interpretive errors were found by Atkins and
colleagues. These included 80 of the studies reviewed. Öst’s quality ratings of the
ACT studies were found by independent checking to be unreliable, and where mis-
takes were made they were consistently against ACT. The authors recommended
that in future reviews and meta-analyses probably should be done by teams of aca-
demics and not by individuals, to avoid biased result such as those produced by Öst.
142 L. M. McCracken
Further recommendations included placing greater value on studies that apply a

transdiagnostic approach, and that demonstrate evidence for theoretically consistent
mediating processes. Finally, based on an updated review of evidence, including
nine meta-analyses, since the time of the Öst review, an accumulation of at least 171
RCTs of ACT, and nearly 50 mediational studies, ACT achieved better outcomes
than waitlists or treatment as usual, and at least as good as CBT or other evidence-
based treatments, for chronic pain, substance abuse, and anxiety disorders (Atkins
et al., 2017).
In passing it seems worth mentioning that third wave behavior therapies have
also been the subject of a systematic review of health economic outcomes (Feliu-
Soler et al., 2018). Eleven RCTs were included in this review, including MBCT,
MBSR, ACT, DBT, and BA. In summary, ACT appeared more cost effective than
applied relaxation or recommended pharmacotherapy, MBCT for depressive relapse
was not more cost effective than maintenance antidepressant medication but other
findings relating to it were inconsistent. DBT was more cost effective than usual
care in the management of self-harm, and BA was more cost effective than CBT for
adults with depression. The straightforward conclusion was that “there is economic
data supporting some of the interventions usually labelled as ‘third wave’ CBT”
(p. 144, Feliu-Soler et al., 2018).
Finally, it would be potentially misleading to not acknowledge that some of the
therapies in the third wave have generated great enthusiasm, and that belief in their
benefits can exceed the evidence. People will see and say what they want to believe.
For example, mental health care providers greatly overestimate the proportion of
their service users who benefit from their treatment and greatly underestimate the
number who worsen. In one study nearly two out of three therapists surveyed
reported believing that 80% or more of their cases improve in their care, when the
actual rate is probably something more like 40% or less (Walfish et al., 2012).
Something very much like this can happen in the narrative around third wave thera-
pies – this is human nature. Presentations of evidence for ACT have met criticism
for potentially “overselling,” claiming effectiveness when more modest statements
were appropriate (e.g., O’Donohue et al., 2016; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2016). Without
picking sides, this criticism is right, and should be welcomed, and lessons should be
taken from it.
Contextual CBT
Third wave therapies have always appeared to have something in common and this
something has been difficult to characterize – few particular features characterize
them all. What has been suggested however is that the behavioral therapies have
changed during the time of the third wave, adopting a greater focus on processes of
therapeutic change, and, it is argued, it is here that some of these therapies share
considerable common ground (Hayes et al., 2011). In a review of evidence for out-
comes, moderators, processes of change, and components, what was found is as
follows: “acceptance, mindfulness, and decentering or defusion mediate or at least

correlate with outcomes in mindfulness-based methods, DBT, ACT, and IBCT. Values
and commitment … are known to be important in ACT, BA, and MI [motivational
interviewing]. Component analyses have shown that flexible attention to the present
is important in mindfulness-based methods, MCT, and ACT. These are all contex-
tual variables that can have an impact even without and change in cognitive or emo-
tional content,” (pp. 158–159, Hayes et al. 2011) and can be summarized as “open,
aware, and engaged.” It was proposed in this review that the integration of forms of
behavior therapy around these processes constitute the heart of what could be called
“Contextual CBT.” This class of approaches is presented as a distinguishable, coher-
ent, entity with the behavioral therapies, synonymous with, and perhaps a preferred
term to, “third wave,” labelled in a way that might invite less resistance (Hayes
et al., 2011).
Third Wave and the Rise of Process Based Treatment
With some hindsight one thing that seems to have come with the third wave of
behavior therapy is a focus on processes of change. This is reflected in a focus not
just on treatment packages but on component analyses, moderators, and mediators
of treatment impact (Hayes et al., 2011). And, it is not just a focus on processes of
change in general. It appears that there has also been some integration of approaches
around a particular set of processes of interest, as just considered, in the form of
behavior that is open, aware, and engaged. It is also argued in this context that these
processes represent a focus, not on symptom reduction, but on broadly-applicable,
flexible, positive behavioral repertoires.
Possibly the appearance of the third wave will reshape the entire field of behav-
ioral and cognitive therapies, and psychotherapy in general, essentially as happened
with the second wave. Except that this time separate camps, schools of thought, or
particular brands of therapy may no longer make very much sense (Hayes &
Hofmann, 2017). In their place a couple of changes may happen. One is a focus on
human psychological prosperity and thriving rather than the elimination of psycho-
pathology, and the other is a turn toward process-based therapy (PBT). PBT
includes a focus on discovering and refining our understanding of evidence-based
processes of change, linked to evidence based treatment procedures, based on test-
able theories, all focused around the alleviation of human problems and the promo-
tion of human flourishing (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017). Perhaps the easiest way to
understand PBT is to see it as the repeated asking and answering in therapy what is
referred to as the “fundamental PBT question”… “What core biopsychosocial pro-
cesses should be targeted with this client give this goal in this situation, and how can
they most efficiently and effectively be changed?” (p. 47, Hofmann & Hayes, 2019).
If the third wave of behavior therapy led to the emergence of PBT as a next phase
in the development of behavior therapy, this has not been the end of it. With PBT
has come new conversations, renewed interests in such important topics as the “role
144 L. M. McCracken
of the individual” and ideographic methods in the science of treatment development

(Hayes et al., 2019), the need to adopt new approaches to mediation analyses
(Hofmann et al., 2020), and the emergence of the notion of a “multidimensional,
multi-level extended evolutionary meta-model” to reconcile and integrate the pro-
cesses needed as the foundation to PBT (Hayes et al., 2020). What is being imag-
ined is a return to functional analysis, the use of ideographic methods for identifying
change processes, the use of intensive longitudinal data gathering, employing mea-
sures of socially valid outcomes, analyzed with the latest methods for examining
within-person change, and including methods for dynamically tracking change over
time. The expectation is that individual analyses of process of change based on this
dynamic network approach will feed a kind of periodic table of general empirically
validated processes of change that can in turn guide treatment for individuals (Hayes
et al., 2019).
It is worth mentioning that a recent focus on mediation and processes of change
has already informed the field and built on existing knowledge. For example evi-
dence shows that cognitive defusion, a process conceived within the psychological
flexibility model, the model underlying ACT, changes significantly in both tradi-
tional CBT and ACT for anxiety disorders, and significantly mediates post treat-
ment worry, quality of life, behavioral avoidance, and depression in both CBT and
ACT (Arch et al., 2012). In this way a third wave process of change is informing our
understanding of a second wave therapy, and pointing to potentially integrating pro-
cesses of change. Similar but perhaps more limited findings with regard to other
processes of change have been shown in other studies of ACT and exposure with
response prevention for OCD (Twohig et al., 2018) and in CBT for chronic pain
(Åkerblom et al., 2016, 2020).
Summary
Behavior therapy is approaching 60 years old if the birth date is taken as the publi-
cation of the first journal devoted to the subject in 1963. The history of what has
been called behavior therapy is an extremely varied one in some respects. The few
things that have remained constant for more than 60 years include a commitment to
research evidence and science, to trying new things, to addressing an increasing
range of human behavior problems, and to doing a better job in doing this. In doing
these things behavior therapy has evolved and very likely, if we are fortunate, will
continue to do so.
This chapter is meant to define the third wave of behavior therapy. This is a dif-
ficult task as it can only be done coherently be laying out at the same time what were
the first and second waves – no easy task in itself. It is also difficult because there
is, in a sense, no such thing as the third wave. There are many constituent therapies,
each unique and different from the others in key ways, and to speak of them all as a
whole will never be uniformly true of them all. One is left off where we began, more
or less, the third wave is the expansion of CBT into historically neglected
psychological processes applied to an increasing diverse and often complex set of

human behavior problems, including a focus on acceptance, mindfulness, spiritual-
ity, intimacy, values, emotional depth, and the like.
With six decades of perspective on behavior therapy, and if one drops some of
the particular therapy types, there is some order to it. One could look at the evolu-
tion of behavior therapy as a path through the first behavior therapy, then CBT,
Contextual CBT, and now possibly the cusp of what comes next, perhaps PBT. What
one sees here up to the current day is truly an “expansion of the cognitive behavioral
tradition,” and an expansion with an important opportunity built into it, that being
the opportunity for integration, particularly around processes of change, and per-
haps away from divisive specific therapy types. The start to this seems to be found
in how selected approaches within the third wave produce the outcome they do,
largely by adopting a focus on establishing greater psychological openness, atten-
tion and awareness skills, and motivation, behavior change, and engagement.
The third wave therapies have followed the earlier waves. In evidence they gen-
erally do not appear better but their appearance has achieved new things, incorpo-
rated new processes, taken a focus on processes of change, on contextual change,
and they may be ushering in a return to a greater focus on the individual. Because
they seem to have called greater attention to mediation and mechanism they may
have spawned PBT.
Someone has said that new waves do not wash away the previous waves but they
incorporate them, and waves are generally not done when one has come – there are
always more. The inevitable effect of waves is that the shoreline is never the same
again. One could say that as the waves do this they make progress – certainly the
landscape changes. Even with some positive connotations of waves the problem
with waves is that there is typically one prominent one at a time and it passes and a
next one comes. If you align yourself with a wave there is a sense of being separate
from people aligned to the other waves. For this feature, it might be better to adopt
some more unifying kind of metaphor.
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Part II
Assessment and Case Conceptualization
Second Wave Assessment and Case
Formulation
Gary P. Brown
Any account of how assessment and formulation within behavioral therapy evolved
into a “second wave” of cognitive behavioral therapy is likely to focus on the period
during which the two perspectives diverged. Within the conventional narrative
echoed in hundreds of papers, Mahoney’s (1974) invocation of a cognitive revolu-
tion is portrayed as a discrete inflection point. However, a satisfactory understand-
ing of how assessment and formulation evolved requires moving beyond this
simplified introductory textbook account. Psychotherapy, in line with psychology as
a whole, had long been trending away from strict behaviorism by this point, and
Mahoney’s own writings at the time describe more of an evolution than a revolution.
The approach he promoted continued along the lines of Albert Bandura’s efforts
(e.g., Bandura et al., 1966) in seeking to preserve the functional framework of
behaviorism but extending it to take in inferred, non-observable (at least intersub-
jectively) mediators of observable contingencies. The focus of behaviorism was on
the contingencies between environmental events and their behavioral consequences,
and so it seemed to those working from this viewpoint to be a small concession for
a relatively large gain in explanatory scope to permit consideration of perceived
contingencies. If Mahoney had hoped these ideas would gain currency among
Skinnerians, he was disabused of this by B.F. Skinner himself. As he recounted,
“My interest in beliefs, imagery, ‘perceived’ contingencies” and other ‘inner person
processes’ …was deemed ‘misguided’ by Skinner, who insisted that there was no
evidence whatsoever to support the ‘mentalistic speculations’ of cognitive psychol-
ogy (Mahoney, 1985, p. 5). Mahoney persisted in advocating for an orderly exten-
sion of behaviorism into the cognitive domain, maintaining that cognitivism was
separable from “mentalistic speculation” and that cognitive behavior modification
(the name itself, perhaps, reflecting a desire for harmonious co-evolution) preserved
G. P. Brown (*)
Royal Holloway University of London, London, UK
e-mail: Gary.Brown@rhul.ac.uk

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_7
154 G. P. Brown
the basic procedures of behavioral therapy, differing only in emphasizing an inferred

change in cognition as a target (Mahoney & Kazdin, 1979).
In contrast, the emergence of A.T. Beck’s approach, which has come to be most
closely identified with “second wave” cognitive therapy, signaled a conscious and
definitive break from orthodox behaviorism. In the inaugural issue of the journal,
Behavior Therapy, Beck (1970) unapologetically placed introspection at the center
of the therapy he and his collaborators had been developing: “Study and analysis of
the introspective data suggest that the cognitive organization, far from being a mere
link in the stimulus response chain, is a quasiautonomous system in its own right.
Although this system generally interacts with the environment to a large extent, it
may at other times be relatively independent of the environment… Data suggest that
cognitive organizations are highly active and are much more than a simple conduit
between stimulus and response” (p. 194).
Notably, Beck’s own name for the therapy he helped originate was “cognitive
therapy,” a term free of any implied shared credit with behaviorism. Beck is forth-
right in his claims; however, although he uses scientific terminology, it is evident
that he is actually describing clinical rather than scientific investigation. The data he
cites was gained through clinical observation, the analysis was clinical formulation,
and the structures and organization were based on clinical inferences drawn from
this material. Beck’s position and scientific framing reflected confidence that empir-
ical validation of these clinically derived conclusions would inevitably follow in
due course. This was premised on a wager on progress in the science behind the
cognitive revolution within the emerging information processing paradigm and that
this knowledge could be drawn upon to explain phenomenal experience. Much of
what would unfold over the next several decades turned on whether cognitive ther-
apy could make good on this wager.
Schwartz (1982) reviewed the points of contention between the interlocking
positions from these mid-twentieth century debates centered around different views
of the status of cognitions. The typical behaviorist position would be to regard cog-
nitions as private behaviors that are subject to the same general behavioral laws
(such as reinforcement) as overt behaviors. In contrast, from the standpoint of social
learning theorists such as Bandura, cognitions mediate between antecedent stimuli
and overt responses and can have effects on learning and behavior that cannot be
explained strictly according to standard behavioral principles, although they can
still be largely accommodated within the same functional framework. The cognitiv-
ist view differed from both of the preceding positions, as reflected in Beck’s stance
that cognitions are distinct phenomena organized in a manner that is different from
how behaviors are organized and that are governed by their own set of scientific
laws. As such, distinguishing cognitivism from mediational behaviorism critically
depended on establishing knowledge of these distinct laws.
Schwartz also draws on a distinction discussed by Eysenck (1972) between
methodological and analytic behaviorism. The latter of these would include
Skinner’s radical behaviorism, which, on grounds of parsimony, objected to afford-
ing special status to private events out of concern that the unneeded postulation of
such hypothetical entities represented a conceptual slippery slope (as reflected in
Second Wave Assessment and Case Formulation 155
Skinner’s response to Mahoney’s ideas). However, the main behavioral critiques

were made by methodological behaviorists, who were less embedded in a philoso-
phy of science than the analytic behaviorists, but condemned research approaches
that did not exercise sound experimental control. Macleod (1993) put this starkly:
“…developing an acceptable formal science of cognitivism requires adherence to
rigorous methodological constraints that are at least as severe as those imposed by
behaviorism. Conversely, the endorsement of the self-report data, yielded by intro-
spection, as an acceptable source of information concerning mental processes, must
place our discipline clearly out with the boundaries of legitimate science” (p. 170).
MacLeod could be counted as one of a group of critics who might be called “cogni-
tive denialists” who argued that the cognitive revolution was not yet proven (See
O’Donohue et al., 2003). They were notably unimpressed with the idea that a new
paradigm was taking shape before their eyes. In keeping with idea that the terms
used to designate the therapies being compared were revealing, one such critique
(Beidel & Turner, 1986) suggested that the name of the approach should be hyphen-
ated as “cognitive-behavioral therapy” given the not-yet-proven status of the cogni-
tive approach meant that it did not warrant a full-fledged adjective, having not made
good on the wager that the theoretical slippage of opening the door to introspective
phenomena was justified by commensurate scientific gains.
Two Levels of Assessment
Elaborating further in his 1970 Behavior Therapy paper on what he viewed to be the
subject matter of the emerging scientific basis of cognitive therapy, Beck wrote,
“Introspective data indicate the existence of complex organizations of cognitive
structures involved in the processes of screening external stimuli, interpreting expe-
riences, storing and selectively recalling memories, and setting goal and plans…
(p. 194)”. Here, Beck echoes the four processes Bandura had set out as being
involved in social learning (attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation) but
makes a notable addition: interpretation of experiences. While the other four aspects
listed are important for anchoring the cognitive approach within the emerging infor-
mation processing paradigm and play a role in various theoretical constructions, the
interpretation of experiences, through identification and analysis of the thoughts
arising in reaction to environmental events, so called automatic thoughts, was the
central focus of cognitive therapy and the main target of early formal assessment
efforts that grew directly from therapy practices.
The emphasis of initial cognitive therapy sessions was on helping the client to
identify the reasoning errors and biases that were viewed as underpinning emotional
distress. Tools such as the Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts (DRDT; Beck
et al., 1979) came into use to aid recording and discussing these thoughts, and early
scales of depressive cognition such as the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ,
Hollon & Kendall, 1980) can be seen as a straightforward extension of therapy-
based data gathering, albeit in a more standardized form that would potentially
156 G. P. Brown
permit systematic study. Scores on scales like the ATQ afforded a summary score of
depressogenic cognition that offered the potential to compare individuals on these
dimensions and to quantify change in response to treatment as therapists raised
awareness of negative thought content and helped correct logical errors.
In working clinically with automatic thoughts, it became evident to Beck and his
colleagues that these transient appraisals of ongoing experience (e.g., “no one at this
party likes me”) were markers of more enduring, thematically relevant underlying
beliefs (e.g., “if you don’t impress people with your personality, they won’t like
you”). Beck et al., (1979) observed that the same beliefs seemed to recur over suc-
cessive symptomatic episodes and so likely persisted in some form, representing a
vulnerability for future depression (Kwon & Oei, 1994). The expression of such
beliefs was taken to reflect the operation of schemas, the central mechanisms guid-
ing information processing built up over the individual’s learning history. Similar to
the schema concept in Piagetian theory (Hollon & Kriss, 1984), these served to
store previously encoded knowledge, but, importantly, to also play a role in process-
ing new information, helping to determine which information would be attended to
and which would be ignored, how much importance to attach to stimuli, and how to
structure information (Hollon & Kriss, 1984, p. 37). Information congruent with
schematic processing would be preferentially processed relative to schema irrele-
vant information, whereas schema incongruent material would be ignored or at least
minimized (Beck, 1987; Clark et al., 1999).
Therapy typically progressed from initial focus on challenging automatic
thoughts to efforts later in therapy to bring to awareness the ongoing beliefs that
appeared to give rise to these thoughts. As a counterpart to scales such as the ATQ,
Weissman (Weissman, 1979; Weissman & Beck, 1978) constructed the Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale (DAS) to capture the corresponding level of enduring beliefs. DAS
items were written so that the operation of the sort of arbitrarily negative reasoning
patterns that Beck had identified as being at the core of depression were embedded
in the logic of the stated conditional beliefs (e.g., the item “If a person is indifferent
to me, it means he does not like me” reflecting an arbitrary inference). Endorsement
of the maladaptive beliefs were assumed to indicate a disposition to apply compa-
rable logic when the respondent encountered similar situations in the course of their
own experiences. Weissman’s stated aim was to compile a set of items that “cover
most of the essential dimensions of depressogenic cognitions, even if these were
confounded, overlapping, or otherwise not as clear-cut as later research might help
to make them.” (pp. 63–64).
Publication of Beck’s (1976) Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders
crystallized the theory first set out with reference to depression and laid the ground-
work for the extension of both the psychotherapy and the accompanying research
methods and instruments to the broad spectrum of clinical psychology phenomena.
In this book, Beck maintained that cognitive content could provide an essential
basis for distinguishing between diagnostic categories, a view formalized as the
cognitive content specificity hypothesis (Beck et al., 1987a; Clark et al., 1989;
Baranoff & Oei, 2015). The content specificity hypothesis provided the seeds for
thinking systematically about other disorders with the same approach that had been
applied to depression, and, accordingly, self-statement questionnaires similar to the

ATQ but encompassing the distinctive expressed cognitive content of other disor-
ders would soon follow (e.g., the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire; Chambless
et al., 1984). Likewise, scales measuring more enduring constructs also tracked the
extension of CBT to different disorders, with the DAS joined, for example, by the
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss et al., 1986) for panic disorder and, somewhat
later, the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions
Working Group, 2003) for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Items found on scales in
this category typically reflect beliefs concerning experiences salient to the disorder
and so often adopt an if-then (if a salient trigger occurs, then an expected conse-
quence will follow) format, as shown in the ASI item, “When my chest feels tight, I
get scared that I won’t be able to breathe properly” (indicative items from the DAS
and OBQ include “If I fail at my work, then I am a failure as a person” and “If I do
not control my thoughts, I will be punished,” respectively), hearkening back to
Mahoney’s category of self-perceived contingencies.
Targets of Self Report Assessment
The disagreement between the different behavioral and cognitive positions over the
admissibility of self report related to what evidence such reports were understood to
provide. Self-report and introspection were never categorically proscribed, and
none of the theoretical stances would take issue with the idea that a contemporane-
ous report of subjective thought was likely a report of something that seemed real to
the person providing it. Indeed, it would be mistaken to assume that self-report was
absent from behavioral approaches. This was duly noted as seemingly hypocritical
by various commentators as at odds with the professed distrust of self report among
self-identified behaviorists. For example, Bergin (1970) remarked, “It is diffi-
cult…to imagine how desensitization can be considered to be a ‘behavioral’ proce-
dure in any definitive sense. In employing the technique, the initial diagnostic
evaluation relies chiefly upon introspective reports in interviews and personality
inventories or fear surveys” (Bergin, 1970, p. 206; see also Breger & McGaugh,
1965). Behaviorists would likely fail to perceive any inconsistency as long as the
verbalization was not regarded as offering proof of any particular internal phenom-
enon. Those working more from a social learning perspective would also have con-
sidered themselves behaviorists at that time but defined their approach to assessment
mainly in contrast to the more traditional structural approaches based on personality
types and including the psychodynamic tradition. Accordingly, Goldfried and
Kent’s (1972) account of behavioral assessment echoed Mischel’s arguments for the
centrality of the situational context rather than structural fixed traits as determinants
of behavior (e.g., Mischel, 1973), “The techniques associated with behavioral
assessment include the observation of individuals in naturalistic situations, the cre-
ation of an experimental analogue of real-life situations via role playing, and the
utilization of the individual’s self-reported responses to given situations” (p. 412).
158 G. P. Brown
They go on to draw on Goodenough’s (1949) distinction between signs and samples

as targets of assessment: “The sign approach assumes that the response may best be
construed as an indirect manifestation of some underlying personality characteris-
tic. The sample approach, on the other hand, assumes that the test behavior consti-
tutes a subset of the actual behaviors of interest. Whereas traditional personality
tests have typically taken the sign approach to interpretation, behavioral procedures
approach test interpretation with the sample orientation” (p. 413).
The shift from the social learning position, consistent with Mahoney’s “self-
perceived contingencies,” to the “cognitivist” position, as stipulated in Schwartz’s
analysis, is a subtle one. It is reflected in the move from self-perceived contingen-
cies—that is, the subjective association of particular events with particular contex-
tual factors—to framing beliefs as reflective of reasoning processes, and explainable
in terms of information processing concepts instead of merely contingent co-
occurrence. This subtle shift is discernible in the wording of items, which go from
referring to the contexts within which thoughts and behaviors occur (“when my
heart races, I think I will have a heart attack”) to reflecting a particular understand-
ing of the world (“if my heart is racing, it’s a sign of a heart attack”). Concerns about
what these scales could be understood to be capturing relative to actual thought
processes can be found in the literature, although this is fairly rare relative to the
burgeoning amount of research these scales would enable. Though seldom articu-
lated in the literature, there are indirect indications that the salience of concerns
about the veridicality of self report was heightened by the publication of Nisbett and
Wilson’s (1977) “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes,” which documented in detail potential pitfalls of taking first-hand verbal
accounts of thinking at face value. Writing some years later, rather than viewing
these reports as samples as Goldfried and Kent (1972) had argued, Dobson and
Segal (1992) stated that “self report assessment procedures are commonly inter-
preted as signs of behavior or other responses; that is, although they do not directly
enable observation of real-life processes, they approximate these processes (p. 279).”
Likewise, with regard to the resemblance of questionnaire items to the targeted
mental processes, Glass and Arnkoff (1982) noted that “it is unlikely that people
have precisely the thoughts that they endorse on a questionnaire, because actual
thought processes are probably highly idiosyncratic, automatic, not in the form of
complete sentences, and heavily based in imagery and not just language (pp. 51–52).”
Finally, Glass and Arnkoff (1997) echo Nisbett and Wilson’s concerns in consider-
ing how to construe the thought frequency estimates often required on self-report
scales, suggesting that respondents might more realistically be (1) gauging the
impact, salience, or importance of the thought and on this basis inferring that a par-
ticularly pertinent thought must have occurred frequently; (2) translating from idio-
syncratic or fragmented actual thoughts to the grammatically complete sentences on
the inventories; (3) translating affective experience into a language-based self-
statement format; or (4) conveying that the item on the questionnaire matches their
self-concept, indicating ‘that’s like me’ by endorsing the item. This general under-
standing of what respondents are conveying in answering self report questions is
broadly in line with the conclusions of formal research into the cognitive underpin-
ning of questionnaire and survey responses (e.g., Schwarz, 1999).
Bolstering justification for the use of self-reports, Ericsson and Simon (1980), in
their paper “Verbal reports as data,” had offered a counterpoint to Nisbett and
Wilson and outlined the circumstances under which verbal reports could be consid-
ered more or less reliable. They contended that verbal reports are more reliable
where they are direct accounts of what can be attended to in short term memory and
less reliable the more respondents are required to attend to and report on informa-
tion that would not otherwise be attended to. The predominant endorsement format
mainly used in self report scales, which requires respondents to endorse preset items
with a fixed response format, often calling upon respondents to retrospect or to
construct hypotheticals, is clearly open to criticism from the standpoint of these
criteria. In contrast, production methods, such the Articulated Thoughts in Simulated
Situations paradigm (ATSS; Davison et al., 1983), which, would provide respon-
dents with a general prompt (e.g., a hypothetical social predicament) and ask the
respondent to think aloud, fare better relative to the Ericsson and Simon framework.
Material from such methods were encouraging to the extent that they produced
similar content to what was included on endorsement format questionnaires. Less
encouraging was the lack of concordance between production and endorsement
methods (e.g., Heimberg et al., 1990), aside from the greater practical challenges of
employing production methods compared to endorsement methods in routine prac-
tice and research.
However, predominantly, everyday use of self report largely took for granted that
reports of subjective processes, broadly speaking, were largely veridical. Indeed,
beyond the question of whether behaviorists themselves practiced what they
preached when it came to self-report, cognitivists regarded the proscription against
self report as counterproductive and an inhibitor of progress: “Where cognition has
not been demonstrated to be important, it has often not been researched. This may
be part of our behavioristic legacy. By defining cognitions as irrelevant, they have
remained unexamined (Mahoney, 1977, p. 11).” The subsequent exponential growth
in use of self-report was a testament to the resonance of this sentiment. Lawyer and
Smitherman (2004), using Lang’s (1979) three response systems framework for
anxiety (i.e., behavior, subjective report, and physiology) as a frame of reference,
traced a discernible change in assessment approach, with the appearance of studies
assessing more than one response system reaching a peak in the late 1970s and then
declining steadily, overtaken by an increase in single-system assessment with an
exclusive focus on self-report methodology. These mono-method self report studies
had always predominated, but by 2002 they represented 97.8% of research reports
of anxiety disorders, compared to 85.5% during the 1970s, a trend tracking the rise
of CBT for anxiety (e.g., Beck et al., 1985). A comprehensive review taking in the
previous two decades by a prominent researcher in the area by the late 1990s stated
that assessment had lagged behind progress in other areas and noted with concern
the nearly exclusive reliance on retrospective self report endorsement based scales
(D.A. Clark, 1997).
160 G. P. Brown
Theoretical Critiques
For their part, with the proliferation of research centered on self-report, Skinnerians
may have felt vindicated in their warnings of the slippery slope that would be set in
motion by opening the door to theories relying on hypothetical mental entities (e.g.,
Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Moreover, the fact that most of these studies assessed
only self-report and no other response modes bore out the more fundamental con-
cern that empirical findings of this sort were highly susceptible to tautological infer-
ences in the absence of corroborating or validating information ascertained through
separate response systems, emboldening claims that the cognitive revolution was a
hollow victory (e.g., Beidel & Turner, 1986; MacLeod, 1993). Whether fairly or not,
the numerical dominance of self-report research made it possible for critics to
largely overlook the more modest but steady growth of a body of experimental find-
ings using both new paradigms and also energetically adapting advances in experi-
mental cognitive psychology and social cognition. By 1988, enough experimental
evidence had accumulated to underpin an influential volume (Williams et al., 1988)
that summarized the body of evidence of laboratory research into the cognitive
approach to emotional disorders and advanced a theory synthesizing this evidence
with regard to depression and anxiety.
If the main limitation of the first wave was allegiance to an elegant but restrictive
theory with limited applicability to the problems that needed to be solved, the sec-
ond wave faced the opposite criticism, that is, that there was an abundance of appli-
cability but a lagging theoretical basis. Efforts to redress this imbalance took the
form of conceptual frameworks that sought to bridge the large body of self-report
findings with the more gradually accumulating knowledge base of experimental
data to signpost where the field was heading in anticipation of an expected conver-
gence of the two streams. Hollon and Bemis (1981) drew a parallel between the two
types of self-report constructs (automatic thoughts and enduring beliefs) and the
distinction drawn within the information processing paradigm between surface and
deep cognition. Hollon and Kriss (1984) then proposed a taxonomy of cognitive
structures, products, and processes. Products are the thoughts, images, self-
statements or internal dialogue that represent output from the information process-
ing system, and cognitive propositions that are the content of underlying beliefs or
schemas. Previously encoded enduring beliefs are considered to be reflections of
schema structure in propositional form. In contrast, cognitive products are the con-
scious outputs of the information processing system, and include momentary cogni-
tions (e.g., automatic thoughts). Enduring beliefs when they have been retrieved and
are in a person’s awareness are also considered to be cognitive products (as such,
Ingram and Kendall (1986) distinguish between stored and accessed beliefs in their
similar taxonomy).
Disagreements between cognitive and behavioral positions had settled into well-
worn avenues. When Coyne and colleagues (Coyne, 1982; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983)
ultimately succeeded in shifting the discourse in a landmark series of critiques, not
being identified with either of the established positions was likely an advantage.
Coyne (1982) began by expressing a fundamental skepticism of the possibility of

parsing psychological phenomena into discrete elements. In common with behav-
ioral critiques, Coyne went on to find fault with arbitrarily taking cognition to be the
initiating factor among mutually interacting elements of behavior, cognition, emo-
tions, and the environment: “We do not need to construct linear theoretical sequences
to understand the role of cognition in behavior. Rather, we should recognize the
arbitrariness of any punctuation of what is basically a circular sequence, and we
should reject questions about whether cognition ultimately causes affect and behav-
ior as the product of conceptual confusion (p. 8).” Coyne and Gotlib (1983) then
went on to review the relevant literature for cognitive models of depression, finding
the results commonly assumed to support the model deficient for substantiating the
strong causal claims that had been set forth. This prompted an exchange with Segal
and Shaw (1986; Coyne & Gotlib, 1986) covering a wide range of topics, but of
particular relevance to the present focus, aside from questioning the implied pri-
macy of cognition, was the argument on Coyne’s part that correlations between
depression symptom scales and scales of putative depressive cognitions which had
been taken as validity evidence regarding causality amounted instead to repeated
sampling from the same pool of negative utterances among respondents who could
have found themselves in such a position due to a complex combination of mutually
dependent psychological and environmental factors unfolding over time.
It was against this background that Segal (1988) undertook an exhaustive review
of the schema concept in cognitive therapy and its operationalization in terms of
self-report, particularly with the DAS. Echoing Coyne and colleagues and several
notable behaviorist critiques, he acknowledged that “the strategy of relying on nega-
tive self-reports to validate a construct whose operation is intended to explain these
self-reports becomes increasingly circular unless additional external referents can
be provided to demonstrate schematic processing” (p. 147). With reference to the
cognitive conceptual frameworks described above, Segal argued that self-report
scales like the DAS can only represent content, whereas structural concepts such as
schemas require a means of capturing functional relations that is not possible solely
with reference to content. Totaling scores on scales such as the DAS can only reflect
the degree to which the beliefs of interest are present. How schemas are defined in
the literature
emphasizes the functional aspects of the interrelation among self-descriptors, whereas
questionnaire data are capable, at most, of providing evidence for a descriptive definition of
schema. Such evidence is usually in the form of endorsement patterns for clusters of atti-
tudes and beliefs. Using the DAS to argue for the existence of an organized self-structure
involves assuming function on the basis of a description of interrelated attitudes and beliefs.
Although it is possible that this interrelation may reflect a type of structure or personal
organization in a broader sense, it cannot be accepted in support of the functional linkage
between elements in a self-structure. (p. 153)
Segal’s (1988) review is a reasonable candidate for marking the end of the initial
developmental arc of the second wave. The general tenor of where things stood is
probably best gleaned from the views expressed by prominent scholars who were
162 G. P. Brown
not strongly identified with either the behavioral or cognitive camps. In this connec-
tion, Bellack (1992) wrote:
The literature is filled with cognitive-sounding terms, such as attributions, schemata, and
self-efficacy, but the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of these concepts are tenuous,
at best. Moreover, in the rush to develop clinical models and techniques, basic research and
theory on information processing and cognition have all too frequently been ignored.
(Bellack, 1992, p. 384)
Similarly, Foa and Kozak (1997) would note that the central concepts of the model
were still largely underpinned by clinical data:
Interestingly, while cognitive therapy embraced some of the terms of cognitive psychology
(e.g., schemas), the theory that informed the practice of cognitive therapy was derived pri-
marily from clinical observations, not experimental psychology or research in psychopa-
thology. Indeed, the fundamental theoretical constructs of cognitive therapy, such as
self-efficacy, cognitive distortions, and automatic thoughts, are based mainly on clients’
introspections. (p. 606)
It would appear from these assessments that, at least for the time being, the wager
on a separate theoretical structure for knowledge derived from introspections had
not been fulfilled.
Second Wave Formulation
Cognitive therapy as it developed in the late 1970s and 1980s, compared to behav-
ioral therapy, which was largely headquartered in academic departments, became
much more aligned with the general mental health research and funding system
largely defined by psychiatry (see, e.g., Barlow & Carl, 2010). This promoted an
emphasis on diagnosis specific manualized treatments for putatively discrete prob-
lems geared toward conclusive testing of efficacy through large scale randomized
controlled trials (see Hallam, 2013). In parallel with theoretical critiques such as
Coyne’s (1982; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 1986), doubts about this strategic direction
began to be articulated, which, in retrospect, can be seen to be the seeds of what
grew into the third wave. Jacobson (1997) argued that the field had borne a cost in
distancing itself from smaller scale research that was amenable to testing functional
relations between variables of interest in favor of a structural approach where a
problem such as depression was viewed as being characterized by particular fea-
tures (e.g., depressogenic schemas) that are universal across people who fall into the
category defined by the problem:
Even defining the problem as ‘depression’ which unites behaviors by their topography
rather than their function, is to be guilty of formal or structural – as opposed to functional –
thinking. (p. 438)
Jacobson’s argument reiterated a frequently stated behavioral criticism of essential-

ist accounts of phenomena like depression while also strongly echoing Coyne’s
earlier analysis (Coyne, 1982): “attention to the presumptive cognitive structures
that presumably cause depression redirects our attention away from those things we
can see, hear, and influence directly: the social context of the depressed individual
(p. 440).” In Jacobson’s portrayal, CBT’s emphasis on manualization came at a
substantial cost, as it meant that it was mainly rule (i.e., technique) based rather than
circumstance based, necessitating an abrupt shift from rules to contingencies once
therapy ends if any gains are to be sustained once the client is left to continue on
their own within their normal life context.
And yet, Jacobson’s own analysis might be viewed as too categorical. While not
at the forefront of the diagnosis based manualized approaches of the time, the func-
tional elements of cognitive therapy treatment packages became more discernible
once the therapy model was no longer centered solely on depression, which, argu-
ably, lends itself less to functional analysis compared to anxiety disorders, where
manifest behavior contingencies are more salient aspects of the typical presenting
problem. For example, in D. M. Clark’s (1986) catastrophic misinterpretation model
of panic, the misinterpretation serves the function of establishing a vicious cycle
that escalates the expectancy of an imminent catastrophe; the precise content of the
misinterpretation is secondary and is not assumed to be universal to those with the
relevant diagnosis. The therapy based on this panic model and similar models of
social anxiety and PTSD call for the identification of maladaptive coping behaviors
(avoidance, safety-seeking behaviors) that are reinforcing in the short term but pre-
clude needed changes in beliefs. Here, again, it is the function of the behaviors
rather than their specific content that is the critical aspect. It is important to note that
the central role of functional elements of these models was not simply fortuitous,
but rather reflects the tradition of single case functional analysis promoted by Monte
Shapiro (e.g., Shapiro, 1957) at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, where much
of this work originated or can be traced back to (see Hallam, 2013, pp. 69–70).
At the same time, it is prudent to avoid presuming, counterfactually, that the
same or better progress would have been assured without the conceptual scaffolding
provided by the diagnostic approach had purely behavioral approaches held sway.
Indeed, it stands to reason that with non-mutually exclusive diagnostic groups, evi-
dence for cross-category transdiagnostic mechanisms, if present, will likely emerge
over the course of time. Accordingly, transdiagnostic frameworks built on the grad-
ually accumulating experimental evidence (Harvey et al., 2004) and based on psy-
chometric approaches (Brown et al., 1998) began to appear, confirming, extending,
and complementing the theories underlying the single disorder treatment models.
These included both structural and functional constructs, for example, with respect
to anxiety, overestimation of the likelihood of occurrence of negative events (biased
expectancy reasoning; Butler & Mathews, 1983; MacLeod et al., 1997; Rachman &
Hodgson, 1980), emotion-driven safety-seeking behaviors (Ferster, 1973; Salkovskis
et al., 1996), and avoidance of feared and risky stimuli (Barlow et al., 2002). Bergin
had anticipated and promoted such an approach: “There is no magic in either the
terms ‘behavior therapy’ or ‘cognitive therapy,’ but there is progress in dimensional-
izing given psychological phenomena of interest and designing interventions which
have relatively unique relevance to them” (Bergin, 1970, p. 207). The idea that
research involving non-mutually exclusive categories will naturally evolve to take
164 G. P. Brown
in transdiagnostic concepts is supported by the fact that psychiatry, without the

benefit of a particularly prominent behavioral tradition or reliance on functional
analysis, has adopted the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC; Insel et al., 2010)
framework, moving away from its longstanding emphasis on disorder-based organi-
zation of knowledge of psychological problems toward understanding basic empiri-
cal constructs conceived of as dimensions rather than categories.
Still, despite increasingly prominent elements of functional concepts within
mainstream second wave cognitive therapy, it should be acknowledged that this has
not been pursued consciously and is mainly discernible in retrospect. A more strate-
gic balance between functional and structural perspectives in training of the models
is likely to be beneficial—specifically, in areas in which the structural approach has
proven itself to be nonoptimal. One such area is case formulation. There is no doubt
that formulation, often called case conceptualization in cognitive therapy, is regarded
as being of central importance: “When one asks a novice cognitive therapist how
they would handle a specific clinical problem […] they usually can give a variety of
techniques […]. Rarely does the novice address the most important step – concep-
tualization” (Beck et al., 1985, p. 181). However, it is, perhaps, telling that formula-
tion is not included in the Cognitive Therapy Scale (Blackburn et al., 2001),
commonly used to assess treatment fidelity in both routine practice and in clinical
trials of cognitive therapy. There is a paradox at the heart of this state of affairs
stemming from the contradiction between the desire for faithfulness to a pre-
stipulated evidence based therapy approach as set against the need to adapt such
broadly defined approaches to individual circumstances, particularly where, as is
more often than not the case, an individual presenting for therapy does not resemble
the prototype implied by the manualized version of the therapy or does not belong
to the demographic of the corresponding trial sample.
The latest notable efforts to approach formulation systematically in second wave
behavior therapy recognize the need to grapple with this central conundrum.
However, deference is still by default given to the standardized protocol: “if theory
and research about a specific disorder map onto a client’s presenting issues, the
disorder- specific model has primacy due to its empirical support. Only by taking
the time to describe the presenting issues and develop simpler explanatory models
of the main presenting issues can the therapist establish which disorder specific
models fit” (Kuyken et al., 2011, p. 214). In other words, for a given problem, varia-
tion from the normative model in the form of added complexity needs to be, in
effect, partialled out so as to enable discerning the signal within the noise that cor-
responds to the embedded specific model. With regard to the complexity posed by
multiple concurrent problems, “it is not always obvious which protocol to select for
those clients with comorbid presentations or for those presentations that do not fit a
particular model. How does a cognitive therapist choose from this vast array of
choices? Case conceptualization helps the therapist select, focus, and sequence
interventions” (Kuyken et al., 2011, p. 7). Here, separate disorders are regarded as
being discrete, an idealized picture that does not correspond to comorbidity as more
typically encountered, and there is no mention of the potential of formulation iden-
tifying common threads running between problems.
Persons, who has a had a longstanding focus on case formulation (Persons &
Bertagnolli, 1999; Persons, 2008), described a similar set of assumptions with
respect to predefined treatment packages designed for different diagnostic catego-
ries. Persons explicitly distinguished the approach she recommends from others that
are based on functional assessment (Persons & Davidson, 2010, p. 173). Rather, in
Persons’ account, formulating is a process of informed pattern matching. The draw-
backs of the broad assumptions that underlie fixed diagnoses are acknowledged but
are seen to be outweighed by the benefits of matching to published protocols, which
bring with them evidence based sets of techniques and connect the presenting prob-
lem to the entirety of empirical literature. Persons and Davidson then continue:
Whenever possible, the case formulation is based on an empirically supported ‘nomothetic,’
or general formulation. The therapist’s task is to translate from nomothetic knowledge to
idiographic practice, where an ‘idiographic’ formulation and treatment plan describe the
causes of symptoms or disorders and the plan for treating them in a particular individual.
(p. 175)
Skill in formulation equates to the ability, based on knowledge of the literature, to

particularize the relevant nomothetic knowledge of etiological mechanisms so as to
craft an individualized plan. This can also include categorization based on theory
rather than solely on diagnosis. Persons offers a vignette of a client who is provided
a more fitting therapy plan when it is discovered she “holds” a “subjugation schema”
in the context of Young and colleagues’ schema therapy approach (Young et al.,
2003), in doing so applying the sort of fixed trait approach Goldfried and Kent
(1972) had argued behavior therapy was moving past.
It is instructive that when research is carried out on formulation from the main-
stream CBT approach, a common practice is to benchmark against a group of
experts (Kendjelic & Eells, 2007) or a specific expert (e.g., Judy Beck in the case
Kuyken et al., 2005). This can be seen as a resort to personifying authority as a
proxy for the authority otherwise conferred by implementing an evidence based
model. However, research into the reliability of formulations based on expertise is
uneven at best (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003). If, as previously argued, substantial ele-
ments of particular treatments are underpinned by functional mechanisms, many of
the experimental findings incorporate the logic of functional analysis, and, as
Jacobson (1997) has pointed out, functional analysis principles are often drawn
upon in preparing a client for autonomously applying knowledge gained in therapy
within their individual living context, the case for making functional analytic prin-
ciples salient within formulation seems self-evident and, in fact, should arguably be
a priority. Toward this end, Hallam has recently proposed a comprehensive approach
to implementing functional analysis within individual case formulation using a dia-
grammatic approach (Hallam, 2013).
166 G. P. Brown
Implications for the Third Wave
In this chapter, I have aimed to convey an alternative to the introductory psychology

textbook template in offering a retrospective account of the how of the first wave of
behavior therapy passed into the second wave, as a counterpoint to the familiar nar-
rative according to which the shiny new innovation sweeps away hidebound and
blinkered old ways of doing things, what the late Scott Lilienfeld called
“breakthrough-ism” (Lilienfeld, 2017).
The crosscurrents between the first and second waves are complex, with issues
of assessment and formulation prominent in the mix. From one perspective, there is
a basis for arguing that the behaviorist forebodings of unfettered proliferation of
hypothetical constructs and tautological reasoning have, to a certain extent, been
borne out, and this has led to obscuration rather than clarification. The counterargu-
ment to this boils down to an insistence that it was important to try, as it did not
appear to be that better solutions were possible within the strictures of the behavior-
ist position, and human suffering was at stake. A final quote from Mahoney (1977)
conveys this sentiment:
[O]ne can argue that the cognitive theorist has been obsessed with cognition. Virtually noth-
ing has escaped the speculation of possible cognitive influence. It may be the case that the
cognitive theorist has overgeneralized. We will not know, however, until we have
looked. (p. 11)
Having looked, we now have an idea of the terrain, and rather than a sharp boundary
between the knowable and the unknowable, the literature instead appears to form of
a gradient, marked by discernible indicators of what helps and what hinders useful
inferences. The phase of diagnosis based manualized therapy and efficacy tests,
which has not yet ended by any means, but is being supplemented by idiographic
methods, was part of an overall zeitgeist in the field. If the arguments reviewed here
have merit, the importance of identifying functional relations has been reinforced
and can be drawn upon with a renewed sense of determination to revisit some of the
gaps in the knowledge base, most obviously with regard to case formulation.
What is the introductory psychology textbook narrative taking shape for describ-
ing how the second wave is passing into the third? As was the case with the notion
of the cognitive revolution, cited thousands of times, there is tacit agreement on a
script that can be routinely resorted to for manuscript introductions. It portrays sec-
ond wave therapies as tied up in logical disputation, whereas, in contrast, the third
wave is inherently metacognitive and offers mindful respite to clients weary of
being harangued by endless debate. Those identified with the second wave might,
with considerable justification (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2015) point out that distancing
and decentering as alternatives to disputation have always been a part of cognitive
therapy and that metacognition is a logical extension to garden variety cognitive
therapy. Teasdale (1999, p. 146) made a valid distinction between metacognitive
knowledge (knowing that thoughts are not necessarily always accurate) and the
metacognitive insight gained through mindfulness (experiencing thoughts as events
in the field of awareness, rather than as direct readouts on reality). However, this
would be a rather subtle distinction on which to base a claim that a qualitative shift
has taken place.
Each wave has been called upon to substantiate this sort of theoretical claim or
be susceptible to the judgment that such distinctions are merely rhetorical devices
useful, at best, as therapeutic heuristics. We have seen that self-report is a main
focus of contention. Assessment methods and psychometrics have been key ele-
ments of the relevant academic debates, and the track record of third wave approaches
in this regard has been problematic (e.g., Doorley et al., 2020). In light of this and
of the fact that the third wave has arguably been with us for the better part of two
decades during which justification for the proliferation of concepts could have been
justified with evidence, it is not too late to take account of why perfectly reasonable
and well understood scales of metacognition, such as the Thought Action Fusion
Scale (Shafran et al., 1996), Metacognitions Questionnaire (Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004), and Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994), should
not be a starting point for assessment efforts and either incorporated or expressly
improved upon. A similar argument can be made with regard to the second main
tenet of acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2004), valued living.
Firstly, it is not clear what relationship the construct of values within ACT has to the
study of values within psychology more broadly (e.g., Schwartz, 2012). In addition,
although Schwartz argues that values are not just reducible to beliefs, it is prudent
to at least consider whether established second wave scales already tap into similar
conceptual ground. In a recent reanalysis of the dimensionality of the Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale, Brown, et al. (in preparation) reported factors reflecting the dimen-
sions of high standards, worthiness, importance of being accepted, and imperatives
(deontological morality), which would be difficult to argue are any less rooted in
values than the newer third wave scales designed to operationalize committed action.
The progression through the waves can be viewed through different lenses, one
of the most important ones being the relationship of therapy to theory. As noted,
when ambitious claims are made about the scientific basis of a therapeutic approach,
critics, in the absence of undeniable evidence to the contrary, will assert that the
claims are merely rhetorical (O’Donohue et al., 2003) and not scientifically verified.
Assessment methods are direct expressions of the mission of a therapeutic approach
and so are the natural focus of potential critics. The proliferation of self report based
research was initially regarded as a sign of the vibrancy and generativity of the sec-
ond wave but was soon subject to critical examination from both adherents and
detractors. In this regard, critics of ACT (e.g., O’Donohue et al., 2015) have noted
that the failure to conclusively demonstrate efficacy through direct tests of theoreti-
cal mechanism creates a temptation to resort to a score keeping approach, in which
theoretical validity is claimed on the basis of the sheer number of putatively sup-
portive results. Third wave advocates lay claim to Skinner’s mantle, and so would
do well to heed his admonitions against rapidly proliferating research:
That a theory generates research does not prove its value unless the research is valuable.
Much useless experimentation results from theories, and much energy and skill are absorbed
by them. Most theories are eventually overthrown, and the greater part of the associated
research is discarded. (Skinner, 1950, p. 71, as quoted in Chiesa, 1992)
168 G. P. Brown
Summary and Conclusion
The role of subjective experience is larger than what can be accommodated by any
one theoretical position. The second wave made grappling with this conundrum
central to its mission. In the short run, the prevailing judgment has been that its
ambitious goal has not been realized. However, the effort has generated a large body
of evidence that may yet bear fruit over the longer term.
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Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Assessment
and Case Conceptualization
Skye Fitzpatrick and Shireen L. Rizvi
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) was developed by Marsha Linehan throughout

the 1970s and 1980s originally as a treatment for chronically suicidal and self-
harming adults with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Since its conception,
DBT and DBT-informed interventions have been developed for a number of popula-
tions, including forensic groups such as individuals in state prisons (Shelton et al.,
2009), suicidal adolescents (McCauley et al., 2018), and people who have substance
use problems (e.g., Linehan et al., 1999, 2002), major depressive disorder (e.g.,
Lynch et al., 2003), bipolar disorder (Van Dijk et al., 2013), attention deficit and
hyperactivity disorder (Fleming et al., 2015), and eating disorders (e.g., Safer et al.,
2010; Telch et al., 2001). DBT is predicated upon three core tenets: radical behav-
iorism as a technology of change, Zen Buddhism as a technology of acceptance, and
dialectical philosophy as an underlying framework that unites and influences
the two.
The Development of DBT
Early prototypes of DBT involved applying radical behaviorist principles (e.g., con-
tingency management, skills training) to the treatment of suicidal behavior. However,
as detailed in Linehan and Wilks (2018), such a “change-heavy” intervention proved
difficult to tolerate for individuals with BPD, possibly due to their high levels of
sensitivity, emotional reactivity, and their extensive histories of invalidation by
S. Fitzpatrick (*)
York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
e-mail: skyefitz@yorku.ca
S. L. Rizvi (*)
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
e-mail: slrizvi@gsapp.rutgers.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_8
174 S. Fitzpatrick and S. L. Rizvi
caregivers and other clinical providers (e.g., Austin et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2019;
Staebler et al., 2011). Consequently, Dr. Linehan radically re-oriented DBT devel-
opment through the creation of an intervention derived from Zen Buddhism and the
principles of acceptance and mindfulness (Linehan & Wilks, 2018). Although
acceptance and empathy were germane to this new approach, it too produced sub-
optimal outcomes, as clients expressed frustration at the clinician’s lack of attempts
to help them solve their problems in meaningful ways (Linehan & Wilks, 2018).
Based on these initial attempts, it was clear that Dr. Linehan’s clients required
change, derived from radical behavioral interventions, and acceptance, derived from
Zen Buddhism. This realization led Linehan to dialectical philosophy, espoused by
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, as a way to unite these two apparently
opposing polarities (Linehan & Wilks, 2018).
Within dialectical philosophy, reality is reflected by two seemingly oppositional
polarities, both of which contain truth or wisdom. A “synthesis”, then, reflects the
unity of these two polarities– holding both sides as true–which allows individuals to
progress with a new, multifaceted understanding (Linehan, 1993). Hence, DBT:
wherein the fundamental dialectic underpinning therapy is that clients need to
simultaneously change (i.e., behavioral interventions) and accept themselves and
reality as it is (i.e., Zen Buddhist-informed interventions; Linehan, 1993) in order to
build a life worth living.
The Biosocial Model
DBT is predicated on an overarching theory of BPD etiology and maintenance

(Linehan, 1993; Crowell et al., 2009). The Biosocial Model (Linehan, 1993; Crowell
et al., 2009) posits that the core deficit in BPD is one of emotion dysregulation.
Accordingly, all diagnostic criteria contained in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) for BPD are theorized to be direct consequences of, or maladap-
tive attempts to cope with, emotion dysregulation. As implied by the model name,
the origin of emotion dysregulation itself entails “Bio” and “Social” elements.
Individuals with BPD are theorized to have a biological vulnerability to emotion
dysregulation, which involves heightened emotional sensitivity (i.e., a reduced
threshold for responding to emotional stimuli), emotional reactivity (i.e., a larger
increase in emotion from baseline once provoked), and a slow return to baseline
(i.e., prolonged emotional responses following termination of an emotional stimuli),
coupled with difficulties modulating those processes (i.e., emotion regulation defi-
cits; Linehan, 1993). Emotion dysregulation is theorized to develop from a transac-
tion between this biological vulnerability and an early invalidating social
environment (Linehan, 1993). Invalidating environments are defined as ones that
punish emotional displays (e.g., a parent telling a child to “stop making such a fuss”
or “don’t be sad”), intermittently reinforce emotional escalations (e.g., meeting a
child’s needs only in response to a tantrum and not in response to lower intensity
communications), and/or oversimplify the ease of problem solving (e.g., “Nobody
Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Assessment and Case Conceptualization 175
else has trouble with this. It’s not that hard – just do it!”). Such invalidation is pro-
posed to be provoked by, and further provokes, the intense, reactive, and prolonged
emotional responses that individuals with BPD experience, transacting over time to
eventually culminate in emotion dysregulation (Crowell et al., 2009; Linehan,
1993). Although there are no published longitudinal studies that study this transac-
tional relationship exactly as specified in this model, longitudinal research suggests
that interactions between tempermental characteristics (e.g., fearful, shyness) in
adolescence and potentially invalidating parenting (i.e., maternal overprotection)
predict BPD risk over a 5 year time course (Arens et al., 2011). Consequently, DBT
assumes that a central skill deficit for those with BPD involves regulating and toler-
ating painful emotional states (Linehan, 1993).
The DBT Treatment Structure
The development of the underlying treatment philosophy substantively advanced

Linehan’s efforts of producing an efficacious treatment for chronically suicidal and
self-harming people with BPD. However, the high levels of chaos, multiple prob-
lems, and ongoing crises that this client population presented with required consid-
eration of which problems to treat and when. The DBT treatment frame was
developed in order to provide such structure and guidance, and holds that DBT has
five treatment phases (pre-treatment, then Stages 1–4). Pre-treatment is typically
1–4 sessions long and involves collaboration between the therapist and client to
identify therapy goals, gauge their motivation to work together, and obtain and
strengthen the client’s commitment to pursue DBT and develop a life worth living.
The vast majority of applications and research has been conducted with Stage 1
DBT and thus we describe it below in more detail.
Stage 1 Stage 1 is focused on a goal of achieving behavioral stability. DBT clients
often present to therapy with high levels of chaos, changing clinical presentations,
low motivation, and the emergence of new and ongoing crises. DBT in Stage 1
therefore has the following functions: (1) enhance capabilities (i.e., teach the client
skills to more effectively regulate emotions, tolerate distress, navigate interpersonal
interactions, and increase mindful awareness, among other skills necessary to learn
new effective behaviors) (2) increase motivation in clients (to practice such skills,
engage in effective patterns of behavior, refrain from ineffective patterns of behav-
ior, and structure their lives more effectively) while also helping to remove barriers
to effective behavior; (3) generalize skills to the client’s natural environments (i.e.,
not just the therapy office); and (4) structure the client’s environment to promote
new, effective learning. An example of such an environmental structure could be
helping the client find stable housing and employment, or teaching how to effec-
tively end destructive relationships and make more supportive ones. DBT clinicians,
in turn, often experienced high levels of burn out and emotion, and low levels of
motivation, all of which interfered with their capacity to effectively administer DBT
(Linehan, 1993). Clinicians thus (5) require a way to maintain their own capabili-
ties, efficacy, and motivation. Standard DBT consequently has four components
which address one or more of these five functions. Individual therapy is designed to
increase client motivation to and enhance capabilities in whichever capabilities are
required to help clients achieve their goals (e.g., emotion regulation, distress toler-
ance, structuring their environment). Clients also attend weekly DBT skills training
sessions, usually in group format, which are predominantly designed to enhance
capabilities by providing didactic education on DBT skills in four key areas: emo-
tion regulation, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and mindfulness. For
example, topics covered include what “essential ingredients” comprise mindfulness
and how to practice it (mindfulness skills), skills for decreasing painful emotions
(emotion regulation), skills for accepting and tolerating emotions (distress toler-
ance), and skills to have effective interpersonal interactions (interpersonal effective-
ness). In order to ensure that skills generalize to clients’ natural environments,
standard DBT involves phone consultation from clinicians outside of sessions,
wherein individual therapists coach clients to use skills in their daily lives, manage
emerging crises, and work with clients to repair the therapeutic relationship (if rup-
tured). Finally, DBT therapists operate on a team in which they meet regularly (i.e.,
DBT consultation team). DBT consultation team involves the application of DBT
strategies to hold clinicians within the treatment frame and promote their capabili-
ties, effectiveness, and motivation.
Clinical Targets The complex, multi-problem nature of the client population in

DBT required a method of determining which clinical targets should be prioritized
within the DBT treatment modes. In the individual therapy mode, clinical targets
are hierarchically organized, and the first priority in treatment is the elimination of
life-threatening behavior such as suicidal and self-harming behaviour (Linehan,
1993). Thus, in Stage 1, if clients exhibit life-threatening behavior, then targeting
and intervening on these behaviors is the top priority of the treatment session. The
second-highest priority in Stage 1 involves targeting and intervening upon behav-
iors of the client or therapist that interfere with the functioning of therapy (i.e.,
therapy-interfering behavior), including nonattendance, low adherence to the treat-
ment tasks, and behaviors that promote burnout in therapists (e.g., yelling at thera-
pists, calling too frequently). If neither life-threatening nor therapy-interfering
behaviors are present, then the remaining targets of Stage 1 are behaviors that gen-
erally interfere with the client having a reasonable quality of life. These “quality of
life-interfering behaviors” can include other psychological problems (e.g., depres-
sion, anxiety), vocational issues, or other social or economic stressors (e.g., repair-
ing relationships, acquiring work, going back to school). This target hierarchy
differs within DBT skills training, where the predominant targets are to teach new
skills and to decrease group-destroying behavior (i.e., behavior that would destroy
the functioning of the group, such as threatening other group members). Unlike in
individual therapy, lower level therapy-interfering behaviors that emerge in group
are not prioritized over skills training and may instead be addressed within indi-
vidual therapy.
Stages 2–4 Clients transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 following the achievement of
behavioral control and stability (Linehan, 1993). However, DBT research has heav-
ily focused on Stage 1 of treatment, and thus interventions for Stages 2–4 are less
clearly articulated and documented. Theoretically, the primary target of Stage 2 is to
treat what Linehan (1993) termed “quiet desperation.” Comorbid disorders of mod-
erate severity, particularly posttraumatic stress disorder, are targeted in this stage.
Other evidence-based treatments for these disorders may be incorporated during
this stage, and recent adaptations of DBT that blend Stage 1 DBT with evidence-
based PTSD treatments have been developed (e.g., Bohus & Pirebe, 2018; Harned
et al., 2012). Ultimately, clinicians strive to help clients experience emotions in the
absence of profound anguish within Stage 2. Stage 3 is focused on “ordinary happi-
ness”, wherein typical problems in living are addressed. This stage may involve the
application of other treatments to mild comorbid disorders, as well as problem solv-
ing general vocational or psychosocial stressors. Finally, Stage 4 is focused on
building joy and freedom, wherein spiritual fulfillment, decreased emptiness, and a
lack of fulfillment are targeted (Koons, 2021; Linehan, 1993).
Research Evidence
Several randomized controlled trials examining the efficacy of DBT have been con-
ducted across several independent research groups in both adolescent and adult
samples (e.g., Carter et al., 2010; Clarkin et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2015; Linehan
et al., 1991, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2015; McCauley et al., 2018; McMain
et al., 2009; Mehlum et al., 2014, 2016; van den Bosch et al., 2002; Verheul et al.,
2003), with a handful of effectiveness trials (e.g., Barnicot et al., 2014; Feigenbaum
et al., 2012; Goodman et al., 2016; Koons et al., 2001; Pistorello et al., 2012). The
most common outcome studied in DBT trials is the reduction of suicidal and self-
harming behavior. Extensive research suggests that DBT results in significant
reductions in suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury compared to treatment as usual
(e.g., Pistorello et al., 2012; Verheul et al., 2003), and active control conditions such
as community treatment by experts (Linehan et al., 2006), individual and group sup-
portive therapy (McCauley et al., 2018), and enhanced usual care (Melhum et al.,
2016). Effectiveness studies also suggest that DBT outperforms treatment as usual
in reducing suicidal behavior or non-suicidal self-injury (e.g., Priebe et al., 2012).
However, it is notable that some trials suggest that DBT results in comparable
reductions in suicidal behavior or non-suicidal self-injury compared to control con-
ditions including general psychiatric management (McMain et al., 2009) and treat-
ment as usual (Carter et al., 2010).
Evidence for DBT also has been culminated in multiple meta-analyses, the most
recent of which examined the efficacy of DBT in reducing suicidal behavior and
non-suicidal self-injury compared to control conditions across 18 controlled trials.
This meta-analysis revealed a small effect sized difference for suicidal behavior and
non-suicidal self-injury (d = −.324) and use of crisis services (d = −.379) between
DBT and control conditions in favor of DBT. However, this meta-analysis also indi-
cated that DBT did not outperform control conditions in reducing suicidal ideation,
suggesting that DBT could be refined to improve its capacity to target this variable
(DeCou et al., 2019).
Researchers have also examined the efficacy of DBT skills training alone for a
range of populations (e.g., Lynch et al., 2003; McMain et al., 2017; Neacsiu et al.,
2014; Soler et al., 2009; Telch et al., 2001). McMain et al. (2017) compared
20 weeks of DBT skills training for those with BPD to a waitlist control and showed
that the individuals who received skills training exhibited greater reductions in sui-
cidal and self-harming behaviors than those on the waitlist. Similarly, Soler et al.
(2009) compared 12 weeks of DBT skills training or standard group therapy for
people with BPD. Suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury outcomes were not mea-
sured in this trial, but DBT skills training outperformed the control condition in
terms of drop out, anger depression, anxiety, and emotional instability. Studies have
also examined the efficacy of DBT skills training for non-BPD populations. One
study compared DBT skills groups alone for individuals who had an anxiety or
depression disorder with high emotion dysregulation (but not BPD) to an activities-
based support group. DBT skills training outperformed the activities-based support
group in reducing emotion dysregulation and anxiety, but not depression (Neasciu
et al., 2014). These studies suggest that DBT skills training alone may be an effica-
cious intervention for BPD and related problems.
In a landmark dismantling trial, Linehan et al. (2015) randomized suicidal or
self-injuring people with BPD to either standard DBT, individual DBT without
DBT skills training but with an activities group (DBT-I), or DBT skills training
without individual therapy but with individual case management (DBT-S).
Conditions were comparable in the extent to which they decreased suicide attempts,
suicidal ideation, and the use of crisis services. However, individuals who engaged
in non-suicidal self-injury exhibited lower frequencies of non-suicidal self-injury in
standard DBT and DBT-S than in DBT-I during the treatment year, but not at the x
month follow-up period. These findings suggest that DBT skills training may be a
particularly “active ingredient” of DBT interventions, and that pairing it with other
types of individual therapy/case management may be efficacious. However, future
research in this area is needed in order to replicate and extend these findings.
The Role of Assessment in DBT
As a primarily behavioral treatment, assessment plays a critical and constant role in

the delivery of DBT (Linehan, 1993). The behavioral stance encourages the thera-
pist to regularly engage in rigorous assessment, rather than rely on inferences, and
to avoid pejorative descriptions of clients and their behavior such as “manipulative”
or “attention-seeking”. The guiding principle of “assess, don’t assume” begins in
the first pre-treatment session and remains just as relevant as treatment progresses.
It is important to note that self-report and physiological assessments of BPD are
frequently discrepant (e.g., Rosenthal et al., 2008), and evidence suggests that there
is low agreement between individuals with BPD and informant reporters on BPD
symptoms (Balsis et al., 2018). Inclusion of informant reports may therefore gener-
ally enhance the comprehensiveness of assessment.
In the first session (or even before the first session in an intake process or over the
phone), goodness of fit between the individual client and the treatment needs to be
determined through careful assessment. Since DBT was originally developed as a
treatment for BPD (and has the most supportive evidence for this disorder), deter-
mining whether the person meets DSM criteria (APA, 2013) for BPD may be indi-
cated. However, as has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Biskin & Paris, 2012;
Kopala-Sibley et al., 2012), BPD is a highly heterogenous disorder. Case in point:
there are 256 different ways to meet criteria for BPD (Biskin & Paris, 2012).
Moreover, since a person need meet only five of the nine DSM criteria, it is possible
for two people with a BPD diagnosis to only overlap on one diagnostic criterion.
Ultimately, then, a diagnosis of BPD may provide less information about goodness
of fit than a more careful assessment of areas of dysregulation within the client that
DBT can address. A reconceptualization of the BPD criteria initially proposed by
Linehan (1993) highlights that the DSM criteria for BPD can be summarized into
five categories, and this reorganization may be a more useful tool for assessment
with individuals presenting to treatment:
1. Emotion Dysregulation: individuals with BPD typically experience intense emo-
tions, have difficulty regulating emotions when they occur, and experience emo-
tions as lasting a long time (i.e., have slow return to baseline). Questions to
assess emotion dysregulation domain: What changes in your body, thoughts,
and behavior do you notice when you’re experiencing strong emotions? Do your
emotions feel more intense than other people you know? What emotions cause
the most problems for you? How long do your emotions seem to last? How fre-
quently do these emotional changes occur?
2. Interpersonal Dysregulation: individuals with BPD tend to have intense and cha-
otic relationships with others (Bouchard et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2011). These
relationships can be romantic, friendships, and/or familial. While not every sin-
gle relationship is necessarily problematic, individuals frequently experience
their relationships as unstable and fragile, and thus never feel completely com-
fortable with the status of their relationships. Questions to assess interpersonal
dysregulation domain: What are your close relationships like? How often do
you experience conflict in your close relationships? What happens when you
have conflict with loved ones? What kinds of things do you do when you feel that
relationships are under threat or are vulnerable?
3. Behavioral Dysregulation: individuals with BPD typically engage in a range of
impulsive behaviors (which frequently function to reduce intense emotions) that
cause problems for them, including self-injury and suicidal behavior, but also
substance use, sexual behavior, binge eating, etc. Questions to assess behav-
ioral dysregulation domain: Do you engage in any behaviors that cause
p roblems for you when you experience intense emotions? Do you ever intention-
ally hurt yourself? Have you ever attempted to kill yourself? How many times?
4. Cognitive Dysregulation: many times, individuals with BPD have experiences
with thought dysregulation, including transient paranoia, dissociation, and
depersonalization. Questions to assess cognitive dysregulation domain: Do
you ever feel especially “spacey” or “checked out” when you’re under a great
deal of stress? Do you ever think people are out to get you? Does this specifically
happen in response to stress or intense emotions, or does it occur more gener-
ally? Are you sober when these things are occurring?
5. Self Dysregulation: finally, individuals with BPD frequently report not knowing
who they are as people, confusion about their identity, and chronic feelings of
emptiness. Questions to assess self dysregulation domain: Have your thoughts
about who you are as a person changed a lot over time? Do you have a sense of
who you are as a person? Do you find that you act very different in one situation
versus another? Have others noticed this? Do you ever feel a sense of emptiness?
How often?
Identifying which domains of dysregulation are problematic in BPD may
yield early foundations of a case formulation that indicates which areas may require
greatest clinical attention. For example, individuals who exhibit problems in emo-
tion and behavioral dysregulation domains may be especially likely to benefit from
learning skills to tolerate distress, survive crises without making them worse, and
regulate emotions. On the other hand, those who suffer extensively from interper-
sonal dysregulation may require greater emphasis on skills designed to promote
communication, healthy relationships, and decrease isolation. However, it is impor-
tant to note that such domains are not mutually exclusive. For example, careful
assessment and case formulation may indicate that interpersonal dysregulation
occurs as a result of emotion dysregulation (e.g., intense emotions accompanied by
sense of loss of control prompts an individual to engage in behaviors that threaten
the integrity of their relationships such as yelling, attacking, or withdrawing). In
such a circumstance, enhancing emotion regulation skills will be essential to
improving interpersonal dysregulation. Thus, as we discuss below, further assess-
ment beyond the domains of dysregulation to what maintains them is imperative.
In addition to the five areas of dysregulation, it is critical at the start of, and
throughout, treatment to conduct a careful assessment of life-threatening behaviors,
including nonsuicidal self-injury. Individuals who meet criteria for BPD are at
heightened risk for suicide, with studies reporting 8–10% dying by suicide
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Leichsenring et al., 2011). In addition,
many clients who are referred for DBT have a history of engaging in self-injury
even if they don’t meet criteria for BPD. A history of non-suicidal self-injury is a
strong risk factor for eventual suicide (Franklin et al., 2017). Thus, understanding
the client’s risk factors for suicide, as well as protective factors, is necessary in order
to fulfill the first goal of DBT treatment – keeping the client alive (in order to help
them develop a life worth living).
The Linehan Risk Assessment and Management Protocol (L-RAMP; Linehan

et al., 2012) is a commonly used tool in DBT to assess suicide risk. The L-RAMP
includes assessment of acute risk and protective factors for suicide as well as strate-
gies for the assessor or clinician to use based on risk level. When confronted with a
suicide risk situation, it is easy for a clinician to be overwhelmed or frightened and
therefore forget to assess critical information. The measure then can serve as an
important tool that reminds the clinician to assess important domains (e.g., access
to lethal means, intoxication, insomnia) and also guide decision making. In DBT,
therapists are instructed to have access to the L-RAMP at all times whether it be
paper copies in one’s office or online versions so that they can use it throughout
treatment as needed. However, beyond knowing the risk factors, it is important to
develop a case conceptualizing that indicates why these behaviors are occurring in
the first place. In this way, case conceptualization, and the treatment plan that fol-
lows from it, form a critical backbone of DBT.
Case Conceptualization in DBT
The information provided by chain analyses (described below), along with other
forms of assessment, lead to a precise case conceptualization in DBT. This
assessment-driven approach to case formulation begins in the first pre-treatment
session and continues throughout therapy wherein the case formulation constantly
evolves in response to new information. Given the complex clinical presentations of
individuals in DBT, it is imperative that therapists have a roadmap for assessment.
Rizvi and Sayrs (2020) have described this case formulation approach at length and
provided such a roadmap; it is summarized here.
The first step is to determine the stage of treatment the client is to be provided.
As previously discussed, the marker of Stage 1 DBT is behavioral dyscontrol and
most clients who are referred to DBT initially engage in out-of-control behaviors,
such as suicide attempts, non-suicidal self-injury, substance use, risky sexual behav-
iors, etc. However, if it is not clear to the therapist, an assessment of the problems
that brought the client to therapy as well as the behaviors that they wish to change,
or that cause problems for them, is necessary. The second step is to assess the cli-
ent’s goals: both for treatment (i.e., what she hopes to achieve by the end of treat-
ment) and for life (i.e., “life worth living goals”). Understanding these goals is
important for many reasons, not least of which is to develop a better awareness of
the client’s experiences and hopes. However, knowing the client’s goals becomes an
important tool for the therapist as they begin to link treatment activities to these
goals. For example, a DBT therapist might (irreverently) say “the way you’re going
to find someone with whom you want to settle down and have children is to first stop
trying to kill yourself. You can’t have that relationship if you’re dead.”
The third step in case formulation, which is frequently an iterative process that
develops over many sessions, is to create a preliminary target hierarchy. As described
above, in Stage 1 DBT, the target hierarchy is to: (1) decrease (eliminate)
life-threatening behaviors, (2) decrease therapy-interfering behaviors, and (3)

decrease quality-of-life interfering behaviors. The DBT therapist must assess the
presence of behaviors in each of these domains and, in the first few sessions of DBT,
begin to organize them hierarchically. For example, if a client engages in both non-
suicidal self-injury and substance use, the DBT therapist would know (and describe
back to the client) that non-suicidal self-injury would be conceptualized as the most
important target of treatment. This hierarchy does not mean that substance use
would be completely ignored- it is often the case that the therapist can make strides
on multiple behaviors at the same time, especially if they are functionally linked.
However, the therapist is clear that non-suicidal self-injury takes priority as a behav-
ior to be changed and organizes sessions and treatment tasks accordingly.
Organizing such a treatment hierarchy is somewhat clear when a client exhibits
behavior that fall discretely into the categories of life-threatening behaviors and
therapy-interfering behaviors. It becomes less clear, however, when the client’s
engages in multiple quality-of-life interfering target behaviors. Which target is the
therapist to prioritize, for example, when the client exhibits binge eating, problem-
atic alcohol use, and shop lifting, but does not exhibit life-threatening behaviors or
therapy-interfering behaviors? To this end, Persons (2008) has delineated several
key factors to consider when determining target priorities including whether some
problems interfere with solving others (e.g., substance use, housing instability), and
which problems clients are most motivated to change. Such considerations may be
useful when therapists find themselves in the fortunate circumstances of having no
life-threatening behaviors or therapy-interfering behaviors to target.
Once developed, the target hierarchy may change as new information is gathered
or new behavior occurs. For example, a therapist and client may be working system-
atically on reducing non-suicidal self-injury when the client suddenly reports a sig-
nificant increase in urges to kill herself. This suicide risk then takes precedence and
needs to be addressed. Alternatively, the therapist may have developed a target hier-
archy based on careful assessment in the first couple of sessions but, as therapy
progresses, a number of therapy interfering behaviors may appear (e.g., chronic
lateness to session, not doing assigned tasks) that weren’t known at the beginning of
treatment. The therapist then reformulates her target hierarchy to incorporate this
new information.
Once the target hierarchy is established, the next step in the case formulation
plan is to assess and treat the highest-order target. Assessment is done via one or
many chain analyses of instances of the target behavior in order to identify control-
ling variables (described more below) and identify points of intervention (i.e.,
solutions).
Chain Analysis The primary method of assessment in DBT is the chain analysis.
Chain analysis is a form of behavioral analysis that zeroes in on one specific instance
of behavior and assesses all the variables (internal and external) immediately lead-
ing up to the behavior as well as the consequences (Koerner, 2012; Linehan, 1993;
Rizvi & Ritschel, 2014; Rizvi, 2019). Figure 1 shows an example of a chain analysis
of a suicide attempt. As a behavior therapy, DBT focuses on understanding a
b ehavior with precision in order to be able to change it effectively. Accordingly, a

chain analysis – which focuses on what often seems like an excruciating level of
detail to the client – allows for the therapist to understand the controlling variables,
develop an accurate case formulation, and then be more likely to propose and imple-
ment solutions that will actually work.
Chain analysis is described in detail elsewhere (Rizvi, 2019). However, in short:
chain analysis involves a moment-by-moment examination of the variables that led
to and followed a problem behavior, and groups them into five categories. The tar-
get behavior is, as it sounds, the behavior being analyzed. Once the target behavior
has been established, therapists work to identify its prompting event, which is the
event that precipitates the target behavior. In other words, had the prompting event
not occurred, the target behavior would likely not have occurred. Prompting events
provide essential information regarding what variables control target behaviors and
need to be addressed in therapy. In Fig. 1, the prompting event is a critical comment
from the client’s mother. Links in the chain include the events, emotions, thoughts,
and actions that link the prompting event to the target behavior. Establishing links is
critical because it provides the therapist with information regarding what clients
could do at various points to “get off the chain” that leads to a target behavior, and
onto a new chain of behaviors that is more aligned with their goals. Vulnerability
factors are variables that are more distal from the target behavior, and “give the
prompting event power” by increasing client’s vulnerability to be adversely
impacted by it. Lack of sleep, substance use, hunger, a conflictual history with
another individual, and already having a “bad day” are common vulnerability fac-
tors reported by clients in DBT. Finally, consequences provide key information
regarding whether target behaviors may be reinforced or maintained through oper-
ant conditioning principles in some way (Rizvi, 2019). In Fig. 1, a client’s suicide
attempt may be negatively reinforced by the decreased shame and anger, as well as
positively reinforced by the increase in care from her mother, that followed after it.
Based on the backbone of case formulation provided through detailed chain anal-
yses, the solution analysis that follows involves clients and therapists discussing
potential solutions to various components of the chain that, if implemented in the
future, could prevent a similar chain of behaviors from occurring. For example, in
Fig. 1, potential solutions could occur early in the chain by reducing vulnerability
factors (e.g., sleeping earlier, having regular meals), and using DBT skills designed
to modify unhelpful cognitions (e.g., working to alter unhelpful cognitions such as
“she thinks I’m a waste of space”). If the client did not implement these solutions,
or they were ineffective, they may intervene at later points including using a range
of emotion regulation skills to down-regulate shame or avoid acting on anger-related
urges (e.g., preventing throwing a mug into the sink). Another solution may involve
the client using interpersonal effectiveness skills to communicate with her mother
in a way that is more effective than throwing a mug into the sink which elicited
subsequent escalations. Finally, additional solutions may be relevant to points in the
chain that are quite proximal to the target behavior, such as calling one’s therapist
or using crisis survival skills to resist suicide urges or decrease emotional intensity
VULNERABILITY
PROMPTING EVENT
-Stayed up too late
night before -Walked into the kitchen and
-Did not have dinner mom made a comment about
how I left my dishes in the sink
“once again”
-T: She thinks I’m a waste of
space
-E: Shame
-T: She’s always harassing
me.
-E: Anger
-A: Throw mug into the sink,
accidentally breaking it. Mom
yells “what did you do that
for?!”
-T: No matter what I do I screw up

-E: Shame, anger
-T: I may as well be dead.
-A: Walk out of kitchen and run to
bathroom
TARGET BEHAVIOR
CONSEQUENCES
-Grab a bottle of
acetaminophen from -Decreased shame, anger
bathroom cupboard -Mom follows me, asks
-Swallow about 10 what’s wrong, apologizes
-Mom calls poison control
-A few minutes later, regret
for breaking commitment to
not attempt suicide
Fig. 1 Example chain analysis of a suicide attempt
(e.g., splashing cold water on one’s face, intense exercise, paced breathing). This
solution analysis informs the crux of the DBT therapist’s broader treatment plan.
For example, based on their chain analysis, the therapist of the client whose chain is
displayed in Fig. 1 now knows that emotion regulation skills training, crisis survival
skills training, and targeting negative cognitions that follow from other’s criticism
may be essential to treating suicidal behavior.
Once solutions are identified, assessment continues by monitoring outcomes (did

the solution work?) and making adjustments as needed. If a solution based on a
chain analysis does not have the intended effect, then the therapist assesses what
went wrong. The solution may have been based on an incomplete assessment and
therefore the therapist needs to look for what was missing from his initial assess-
ment. This careful re-examination can represent the “dialectical assessment” strat-
egy in DBT which is the practice of looking for “what is being left out” of our
conceptualization that contributes to lack of understanding of the problem.
Following resolution of the target behavior, chain analyses and solution implemen-
tation steps are repeated for the next target behavior. In this way, DBT reflects an
ongoing cycle of assessment, formulation, solution generation, solution implemen-
tation, and solution evaluation.
The same focus on careful assessment also extends to other target behaviors
beyond life-threatening behaviors. Chain analyses is used throughout treatment to
assess target behaviors until a thorough understanding is achieved (Rizvi, 2019) and
solutions based on assessment are effective at changing the behavior. For example,
a chain analysis might be used to address lateness to session, an episode of risky
sexual behavior, or substance use. Chain analysis is not a tool used to assess life-
threatening behaviors per se but rather a method of generating a particularly precise
behavioral case formulation to inform an equally precise treatment plan. Thus,
chain analysis strategies are virtually unchanged regardless of the topography of the
behavior being analyzed and whether it is life-threatening in nature or not.
imilarities and Differences Between DBT

S
and Other Therapies
Similarities DBT is drawn from the long and rich tradition of behavior therapy. As
such, it owes many of its core features to the earlier forms of behavioral therapy
from which it came. All “change-focused” strategies in DBT are derived from what
are now termed “first” and “second wave” behavior therapy interventions. Problem
assessment derived from older behavior therapy traditions (e.g., Kanfer & Saslow,
1965), such as macro-level behavioral assessments (e.g., examining antecedents,
behaviors, and consequences), are frequently used in DBT to guide case formula-
tion and subsequent intervention efforts. DBT expands on these behavioral assess-
ment approaches with chain analyses to provide more granular levels of detail
regarding the controlling variables of client behavior (see description of chain anal-
ysis, above).
One of the most pertinent pieces of information gleaned from behavioral or chain
analyses is identification of the controlling variables influencing problematic behav-
iors. Four types of controlling variables are theorized to be potentially involved in
clients’ problem behaviors: skills deficits, problematic conditioned emotional reac-
tions, problematic cognitions, or problematic contingencies (see Koerner, 2012).
All of these controlling variables can be targeted using standard technologies pro-
vided by first and second waves of behavior therapies. Skills deficits are frequently
addressed by training clients in the skills that they are deficient in through an itera-
tive process of skills acquisition, strengthening, and generalization. Problematic
conditioned emotional responses may be targeted through the use of exposure to
extinguish relationships between unconditioned and conditioned stimuli. For exam-
ple, clients who have developed a problematic response of shame whenever they
hear a particular song because it reminds them of a highly critical parent who played
it may listen to the song repeatedly in therapy in order to extinguish the relationship
between the song, the abusive parent, and the associated shame response. Such an
approach is highly consistent with those evident in contemporary exposure-based
therapies (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2019). Furthermore, problematic cognitions may
be targeted through cognitive intervention approaches derived from second wave
behavior therapies such as Beck’s Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Ellis’ Rational
Emotive Behavior Therapy (Beck et al., 1979; Ellis, 1962, 1973).
DBT also draws heavily on contingency management approaches to target prob-
lematic contingencies, including the use of reinforcement, extinction, and, where
appropriate, punishment. Adaptive, desirable behaviors are reinforced, while mal-
adaptive, problematic behaviors are extinguished or punished. Clinicians are also
vigilant for signs that they are reinforcing problematic behaviors and adjust their
own behavior accordingly. For example, a behavioral analysis might reveal that a
client’s yelling behavior is prompted by the clinician raising an uncomfortable sub-
ject, such as an ongoing pattern of disordered eating. The clinician may inadver-
tently reinforce the yelling behavior by withdrawing the aversive stimulus (i.e., the
discussion of disordered eating) in response to it. Given such a formulation, a DBT
clinician might therefore work to hold the aversive cue in response to the yelling
behavior (i.e., continue to discuss disordered eating), perhaps only removing it
when the client engages in alternative and adaptive behaviors (i.e., discussing the
issue calmly). Such an approach is directly aligned with contingency management
interventions.
Akin to some behavioral approaches (i.e., Functional Analytic Therapy, FAP;
Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), DBT emphasizes that behavioral principles such as con-
tingency management and observational learning shape and inform the therapeutic
relationship. Thus, just as the therapist’s behaviors can reinforce or punish the cli-
ent’s, the client’s behaviors can reinforce or punish that of the therapist’s. DBT cli-
nicians are thus attentive to psychotherapy process through a behavioral lens, and
are advised to elicit and reinforce target adaptive behaviors and avoid reinforcing
target maladaptive behaviors (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991). For example, when the
same client exhibits a willingness to discuss disordered eating without yelling, a
clinician may respond with natural reinforcers such as leaning forward, increasing
warmth, and sharing expressions of caring. This emphasis on behavioral principles
within the therapy process itself aligns DBT with Functional Analytic Approaches
(Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), and distinguishes it from other behavioral approaches
(e.g., exposure; Abramowitz et al., 2019), where it is relatively de-emphasized.
Differences Although DBT arguably has more points of overlap than divergence
with other behavior therapies, there are some key differences.
Dialectics: Integration of Acceptance and Change Most notably, the integration

of Zen Buddhism (Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017) into behavioral therapy is a sub-
stantive point of departure between DBT and other forms of behavior therapy that
have been called “first” and “second” wave interventions (Hayes et al., 2004).
Indeed, the integration of acceptance-based approaches was fomented by Linehan’s
failed initial attempts at the application of standard behavior therapy to individuals
with BPD.
It is notable that other modalities – often grouped under the heading of “third
wave approaches” – have similarly integrated mindfulness and acceptance into
behavioral therapy interventions (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy;
Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 2004). DBT is therefore not entirely unique in the syn-
thesis of acceptance and change. Where DBT is unique, however, is its use of dia-
lectical philosophy to unite and underpin the two. The dialectical philosophy
underpins virtually every element of DBT, because DBT is premised upon a dialec-
tical worldview which assumes that reality is always changing, in transaction, and
responding to itself. According to the dialectical worldview, all things are interre-
lated and in polarity with one another, and the interplay of these polarities and
consequent syntheses that arise from them allow truth to evolve in a continually
changing fashion. For example, a client may acknowledge both grief and relief at
the death of an abusive parent. From a dialectical perspective, the client may need
to recognize the inherent truth and validity at both ends of such a dialectic to allow
their understanding to evolve and give way to a new series of dialectical
polarizations.
The dialectical philosophy permeates DBT in a number of tangible ways. First,
any specific strategy applied by a DBT clinician in a particular moment in time is
informed by a dialectical approach that seeks to balance acceptance with change.
Clinicians thus regularly interrogate whether they have become overly committed to
change (e.g., pushing a client to stop self-harming, resulting in increasing refusal
from the client (polarization)) or acceptance (e.g., giving up pursuing the client’s
self-harm behavior). Second, clinicians, clients, and DBT teams are prompted to
search for “what is missing” from their understanding in order to ensure that their
perception of reality has not become rigidly attached to one end of a polarity or
another. Third, clinicians also help their clients to alter their thinking from non-
dialectical, mutually exclusive absolutes (e.g., “You say you care for me but you’re
telling me you won’t talk to me on the phone tonight”) to ones that are dialectical in
nature (e.g., “You care for me and you won’t talk to me on the phone tonight”).
Indeed, even DBT consultation teams attend to potential such polarizations within
themselves and their teams and encourage each other to search for what is missing
in order to illuminate more dialectical truths.
Principles Versus Protocols Another key difference between DBT and other
behavioral therapies reflects the use of treatment protocols. Several cognitive and
cognitive behavioral therapies involve the administration of fixed protocols that

progress in a pre-specified order (e.g., Barlow et al., 2011; Hope et al., 2019; Resick
et al., 2016). Administration of such fixed protocols are challenging in the context
of BPD because high levels of chaos, multiple problems, and rapidly changing clini-
cal presentations associated demand rapidly changing interventions and can quickly
derail a protocol. Rather than a protocol-based therapy, DBT contains protocols
(e.g., for managing suicidal, crisis, or therapy-interfering behaviors) which are flex-
ibly utilized based on a set of principles that inform what protocols and DBT strate-
gies to draw on and when. The target hierarchy in Stage 1 of DBT is an example of
one such principle. Similarly, the use of chain analysis is used to build a case formu-
lation, which guides the selection and implementation of DBT strategies throughout
the treatment, is another such example. Accordingly, the strategies observed within
an “adherent” DBT session may vary widely across clients and sessions.
DBT Assumptions Finally, working with suicidal or self-harming people with

BPD can be frightening, frustrating, and exhausting for clinicians. When burned
out, clinicians run the risk of becoming rigid, judgmental, or interpreting client
behaviors in unhelpful or therapy-interfering ways (e.g., assuming clients are “seek-
ing attention” or “do not want” to get better). In order to avoid this and maintain an
effective, compassionate, and non-judgemental stance, DBT clinicians agree to hold
to specific “assumptions” about their clients and the therapy itself. For example,
DBT clients are assumed to be doing the best they can and that they want to change.
However, dialectically, an additional assumption is that they “need to do better, try
harder, and be more motivated to change” (pp. 106, Linehan, 1993). These assump-
tions are part of the foundation of DBT and are in place to guide case formulations
and clinical decision-making throughout treatment. In this way, the DBT assump-
tions may serve as something of a “lighthouse,” guiding clinicians away from judg-
ments and conjecture and back to clarity and openness to new information. These
assumptions are unique to DBT and capture its individual “ethos.”
Training and Certification in DBT
As has been made clear in this chapter, DBT is a complex treatment for a complex
population. Learning to conduct DBT according to all the principles and using all
the strategies can take significant training, especially if one comes to DBT from a
non-behavioral background. Currently the “gold standard” approach to learning
DBT is to participate in an “intensive” training sequence with a team of fellow clini-
cians (that transitions to form a consultation team). An intensive training can take
different forms; a common version involves two 5-day trainings spaced about
6 months apart. During the months between the two trainings, therapists are expected
to do a number of homework assignments and begin implementing DBT with indi-
vidual and skills group clients. Increasingly, DBT training programs have been
established in graduate training clinics in psychology and social work (see Lungu
et al., 2012; Rizvi et al., 2017) thus creating more opportunities to learn the treat-
ment earlier in one’s developmental training.
In 2014, Linehan established the DBT- Linehan Board of Certification (DBT-
LBC; dbt-lbc.org). The board certification process in DBT was developed in order
to identify clinicians and programs that reliably offered DBT in a manner that con-
forms to the evidence-based research for the treatment. The prerequisites for certi-
fication include, among others, a minimum of 40 h of didactic training, 12-months
of participation on a DBT consultation team, at least three clients treated through
Stage 1 of DBT, experience teaching all the skills, and a regular ongoing mindful-
ness practice. Although this process may appear arduous to the aspiring DBT clini-
cian, we proffer that the impact this treatment can make in client’s lives is well
worth the effort.
Conclusion
DBT is built on a rich foundation of behavior therapy traditions and, through its
innovative blend of dialectical philosophy, Zen Buddhism, and radical behaviorism,
extends and enriches these foundations. Ultimately, DBT is a therapy that rests
heavily on precise case formulation and the treatment plans that follow from it.
Such case formulations are developed through the rigorous assessment procedures
that were developed by radical behaviorists throughout the history of behavioral
therapy. Similarly, many of the interventions that follow from these formulations
have been developed and refined by many behavioral predecessors of DBT. For
DBT clinicians, it is behavioral precision, devotion to assessing rather than infer-
ring, and a commitment to precisely targeting controlling variables, paired with
acceptance principles espoused by Zen Buddhism, that helps clients build lives
worth living. Although DBT may differ from other behavioral therapies in its inte-
gration of acceptance-based philosophies, principles over protocols, and a range of
assumptions that are central to the treatment, the underpinning emphasis on preci-
sion in formulating and targeting behaviors is a shared feature that lives in the
“DNA” of DBT, along with its behavioral therapy family members.
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Radically Open Dialectical Behavior
Therapy: Theory, Assessment and Case
Conceptualization
Kirsten Gilbert and R. Trent Codd III
Radically Open Dialectical Behavior Therapy (RO DBT; Lynch 2018a, b) is a trans-
diagnostic psychosocial treatment that emerged from the third-wave behavior ther-
apy, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). ‘Standard’ DBT focuses
on treating emotion dysregulation, impulsivity and interpersonal dysfunction that
characterizes psychiatric disorders of ‘undercontrol,’ while RO DBT is a transdiag-
nostic third-wave behavior therapy that directly targets the opposite end of the spec-
trum: maladaptive overcontrol (Lynch, 2018a).
Overcontrol Defined
Self-control deficits are associated with various forms of emotional and behavioral
difficulties, and thus, a straightforward linear relationship between self-control and
psychological health is often presumed (e.g., Moffitt et al., 2011; Wiese et al., 2018).
Although too little self-control is the focus of many psychological treatments
(including above mentioned DBT, see below for comparison with RO DBT), there
purportedly is a ceiling of adaptive self-control, such that once reached, an excess
of self-control is associated with dysfunction (e.g., Carter et al., 2016; Grant &
Schwartz, 2011). Thus, the relationship between self-control and well-being might
be better characterized as non-linear (i.e., an inverted-U shape), with too little or too
much self-control being problematic. When too much self-control becomes prob-
lematic, this is overcontrol. Overcontrol is a constellation of characteristics,
K. Gilbert (*)
Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA
e-mail: gilbertk@wustl.edu
R. T. Codd III (*)
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Center of Western North Carolina, Asheville, NC, USA
e-mail: rtcodd@behaviortherapist.com

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_9
196 K. Gilbert and R. T. Codd III
including rigid behavioral repertoires, perfectionism, low emotional expression,

high detail focused processing, and poor social functioning (Lynch, 2018a).
Theory on overcontrol is rooted in temperament and personality (Block & Block,
1980; Eisenberg, Spinrad & Eggum, 2010) and these tendencies have repeatedly
demonstrated to cluster together into an overcontrolled phenotype (Robins et al.,
1996; Specht et al., 2014). Overcontrol tends to show stability across the lifespan
from early childhood through adulthood (Asendorpf & van Aken, 1999). Multiple
characteristics of overcontrol, including high self-control, perfectionism, high
moral certitude, and low emotional displays are heuristically viewed as adaptive in
Western societies, and thus these features are often overlooked as problematic in
therapy and neglected in psychological treatments. However, overcontrol is associ-
ated with a host of maladaptive outcomes, including social isolation and social func-
tioning deficits (Eisenberg et al., 2010; Lynch, 2018a) and poor treatment-response
in anxiety (Massion et al., 2002). It is also evident in difficult-to-treat mental illness,
such as anorexia nervosa (Isaksson et al., 2021a), obsessive compulsive disorder
(OCD) and obsessive compulsive personality disorder (OCPD; Pinto et al., 2015),
and treatment-resistant depression (Lynch et al., 2003). This body of evidence
pointed to the need for a psychotherapeutic intervention that directly targets this
transdiagnostic mechanism. As such, RO DBT was the result.
evelopment of RO DBT: Similarities and Differences

D
from ‘Standard’ DBT
RO DBT was originally developed by Thomas Lynch for treatment-refractory

depression in the mid 1990s. Initially, Dr. Lynch began the work of developing RO
DBT by applying standard DBT (Linehan, 1993) to treatment resistant and chronic
forms of depression in middle-aged and older adults. He soon realized that although
standard DBT had clear protocols for improving self-control, it offered less clarity
about what might be needed for individuals characterized by excessive self-control,
high tolerance of distress and interpersonal aloofness that often characterized the
treatment-resistant clients he was treating. Indeed, the most common personality
disorders among individuals with depression include cluster A (paranoid personal-
ity disorders) and cluster C (obsessive compulsive and avoidant personality disor-
ders, e.g., see Hsu et al., 2021), which happen to also respond poorly to treatment
(Candrian et al., 2008; Fournier et al., 2009).
The above-mentioned personality disorders are commonly characterized by
overcontrolled coping. In other words, Dr. Lynch quickly recognized that his adap-
tations were targeting individuals who were essentially the dialectical opposite of
the population that standard DBT had originally been designed to treat (i.e., border-
line personality disorder). Dr. Lynch then spent the next twenty plus years concep-
tualizing the overcontrolled presentation and adapting DBT principles to psychiatric
disorders and personality disorders characterized by overcontrol. RO DBT is now
Radically Open Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Theory, Assessment and Case… 197
conceptualized as a transdiagnostic treatment that shares many structural similari-

ties with standard DBT, while the content of the treatment and treatment targets
make it drastically different.
Similarities to DBT Given RO DBT emerged from standard DBT, the two share
many similarities, including both being based in behaviorism and dialectics
(although the dialectic of acceptance and change is not central to RO DBT, the two
dialectics of nonmoving centeredness and acquiescent letting go as well as playful
irreverence and compassionate gravity are principal) and both treatments are built
upon general guiding principles rather than structured treatment protocols. Standard
DBT and RO DBT also highlight the importance of mindfulness and the therapeutic
relationship in treatment (though, see more on differences and distinct aspects of
RO DBT in these areas below). The overall treatment structure also is parallel
between standard DBT and RO DBT: they both consist of weekly outpatient indi-
vidual therapy and skills class/group, phone coaching, and team consultation (of
note, phone coaching and team consultation are not required in RO DBT, but highly
encouraged) over the course of 30 weeks.
Standard DBT and RO DBT also share similar treatment structures within the
individual therapy session: both use a treatment target hierarchy to prioritize what
to focus on in session, both employ weekly diary cards to track emotions and prob-
lematic behaviors and both incorporate the treatment target hierarchy and diary
cards in session to conduct chain analyses (for detailed explanation of chain analy-
ses, see previous chapter on standard DBT). Of note though, as detailed below, what
is targeted in therapy, tracked on diary cards, and what behaviors are chained in
session are all quite different in RO DBT.
Differences from DBT As hinted at in the above-mentioned similarities, although
the framework and structure of RO DBT is similar to standard DBT, the content of
the treatment is widely different (which is expected given standard DBT treats dis-
orders of undercontrol while RO DBT treats the opposite end of the spectrum: dis-
orders of overcontrol). Differences range from the content of skills taught in skills
class as well as the behaviors targeted in individual therapy. These vast differences
stem from RO DBT’s stance on the core problem being targeted in therapy.
Specifically, DBT focuses on targeting emotion dysregulation, impulsivity, and
tumultuous relationships by teaching emotion regulation, distress tolerance and
interpersonal effectiveness, respectively. Conversely, RO DBT defines the core
problem of overcontrol to be emotional loneliness, resulting primarily from low
openness and social-signaling deficits. A social signal is any overt behavior done in
front of another person (ranging from a yawn, an eye-roll, a tone of voice, to walk-
ing out of the room mid-conversation; Lynch, 2018a). According to the theory pos-
ited by Lynch (2018a), overcontrolled individuals perceive social, new and
unfamiliar situations as potentially dangerous (rather than rewarding), and as a con-
sequence, this impairs their capacity to signal prosocial intentions to others. As
such, this inability to signal prosocially, or, stated otherwise, their maladaptive
social signaling, is a core mechanistic target of treatment in RO DBT. Enhancing
social signaling results in increased trust from others, which thereby lends itself to
enhanced social connectedness.
Therefore, the focus of RO DBT is to help clients rejoin ‘the tribe’ (a phrase used
in RO DBT to emphasize humans tribal nature and to emphasize we are inherently
social beings) and become socially connected with others. Unlike standard DBT,
that teaches individuals how to regulate emotions or tolerate distress, the central
mechanism of change in RO DBT is to improve context-appropriate and open
expression of emotion via social signaling (see below for detail on
social-signaling).
Yet another key difference between standard DBT and RO DBT emerges from a
similarity: a focus on mindfulness. Standard DBT incorporates Zen Buddhism prac-
tices (see Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017), such as increasing awareness and accep-
tance of reality, while RO DBT integrates Malâmati Sufism. Malâmati Sufism
practices emphasize self-observation and healthy self-criticism to learn one’s true
motivations for power, recognition, or self-aggrandizement (Toussulis, 2012).
Sufism also emphasizes how our perceptual and regulatory biases influence our
perceptions of reality, and thus, rather than simply being awake and accepting to a
present reality (e.g., in standard DBT, radical acceptance), individuals are encour-
aged to foster a sense of openness to question their perceptions of reality and to lean
into the things one wants to actively avoid as a way to learn.
Cultivating openness and flexibility in overcontrolled individuals is a second
theorized primary mechanism of change. Indeed, the term “Radical Openness,”
which is the namesake of the treatment, represents the confluence of three overlap-
ping elements or capacities: openness, flexibility and social-connectedness, which
together, are the premise for emotional well-being in RO DBT. Radical openness
represents a core skill in RO DBT that challenges our perceptions of reality, posits
that we are unable to see things as they are, but instead we see things as we are, and
this openness is emphasized in in a novel and central component of RO DBT,
namely self-enquiry (detailed below).
Biosocial Model of RO DBT
Although both DBT and RO DBT ground the development of problematic tenden-
cies in a biosocial model, again, the content of the ‘bio,’ the ‘social,’ and the result-
ing coping styles are individual to each treatment. In the RO DBT framework,
overcontrolled individuals have biological temperamental dispositions that include
high threat sensitivity, high detail-focused processing, high inhibitory control and
low sensitivity to rewards (Lynch, 2018a). Stated otherwise, overcontrolled indi-
viduals have a biologically-based lower threshold for perceiving a stimulus as
threatening. They also notice the details and miss the big picture, they have high
degrees of self-control, and they have a higher threshold for detecting reward (i.e.,
stimuli must be very exciting for them to notice or appreciate it). A pattern of
maladaptive overcontrolled coping may emerge when these predispositions transact

with certain environments that value performance and achievement, emphasize that
emotional displays signal weakness, and teach that one should “always be pre-
pared,” or that “mistakes are intolerable.” When a threat-sensitive, detail-focused
individual who can tolerate high amounts of distress (biological predisposition)
interacts with an upbringing that reinforces perfection and ‘keeping it together,’(social
environment) maladaptive overcontrolled coping can follow. This resulting coping
may include behavioral responses such as masking feelings, compulsive striving, or
little to no risk taking (e.g., being highly scheduled and never trying anything new).
These behavioral responses may result in rigid patterns of responding in the face of
changing environmental conditions (i.e., low flexibility), being closed to learning
from new experiences (i.e., low openness) and difficulty forming intimate psycho-
logical connections with others (i.e., low social connectedness); the opposite of psy-
chological health from an RO DBT perspective (Lynch, 2018a).
Distinct Aspects of RO DBT Treatment
Although there is overlap of RO DBT with standard DBT in structure, guiding prin-
ciples and a biosocial theory, there are distinguishing aspects of RO DBT that
should be noted. The first is focusing on overt social signaling behaviors as a central
treatment target rather than emphasizing internal experiences of emotion and
thoughts. The second is self-enquiry, a core practice of RO DBT that increases
openness to new learning via a form of questioning.
Social Signaling as Clinical Target A central way RO DBT distinguishes itself
from other third-wave behavior therapies is its focus on social signaling as a main
treatment target. As mentioned previously, a social signal is any behavior done in
front of another person, regardless of intent or conscious awareness (i.e., a yawn is
a social signal and could occur without awareness or any intent, yet if done while
another person is talking about their day, could communicate boredom; Lynch,
2018a). Overcontrolled individuals often demonstrate indirect, masked or con-
strained social signals, and RO DBT posits that maladaptive social signaling is a
primary source of overcontrolled individuals emotional loneliness. As such, target-
ing social signaling is posited to be a main mechanism of change in RO DBT and
its’ goal is to help the client ‘re-join the tribe.’
The use of the word ‘tribe’ is intentional in RO DBT, and it is used to denote
having a strong social connection with at least one other person. This notion of tribe
refers to the fact that as humans, we are a social species, and evolutionarily, we need
human connection and human bonds. This is supported by a large body of research
demonstrating a lack of social connection is associated with poor mental and physi-
cal health outcomes, including mortality (Donovan et al., 2017; Holt-Lunstad et al.,
2015). As such, a main goal of RO DBT is to help lonely and isolated individuals,
who often feel like ‘outsiders,’ develop meaningful social connection and become
part of a tribe. A central way to do this is to target how one communicates with other
members of the tribe, or in other words, how one socially signals.
Targeting social signaling is a main focus and priority in treatment. This differs
from many other therapies that focus on internal experiences, such as targeting
thoughts in cognitive restructuring, or targeting emotions in emotion regulation
therapies (and standard DBT). This de-emphasis on internal experience directly
reflects RO DBT’s stance that what a person feels or thinks privately is considered
less important to how one communicates with others in close relationships. As such,
there is little attempt to change the content of thoughts or a client’s relationship to
their thoughts. Instead, the internal mantra of the RO DBT therapist is “How might
the clients’ social signaling impact their social connectedness?” RO DBT is one of
the first treatments to prioritize social signaling and hypothesize that social signal-
ing changes are a primary mechanism of change (Codd III & Craighead, 2018).
Self-Enquiry RO DBT assumes that we all bring perceptual and regulatory biases
into every moment (e.g., Adolphs, 2008; Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Davis
et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2004, 2006) that interfere with our ability to be open
and learn from new or disconfirming information. From this perspective, “we don’t
know what we don’t know,” things are constantly changing, and there is a great deal
of experience occurring outside of our conscious awareness.
RO DBT teaches a unique practice designed to increase openness and receptivity
to novel information, and this practice is entitled “self-enquiry.” More specifically,
self-enquiry encourages the development of a pervasive, yet healthy sense of self-
doubt (Lynch, 2018a). This healthy self-doubt is integral in first recognizing that
one is closed, and that one cannot pursue openness unless one first recognizes that
one is closed. This is challenging for most people and is particularly difficult for
maladaptively overcontrolled individuals who like structure, familiarity, and perfec-
tion (Lynch, 2018a).
From a RO DBT perspective, self-enquiry is warranted when clients recognize
triggers of closed-mindedness, including (a) when their central beliefs about the
world are challenged, (b) when they encounter novel circumstances, or (c) when
they are given critical feedback (Lynch, 2018a). Once one of the above cues suggest
they might be closed, they are encouraged to psychologically approach the experi-
ence and ask themselves “is there something here for me to learn?” This vital ques-
tion allows the individual to ‘lean into,’ and be more open to the experience (Lynch,
2018a). For example, when a feeling of frustration or anger arises for ‘always hav-
ing to do the vacuuming in the house,’ the person could lean into this frustration and
ask if there is something to learn--- maybe that they have never asked their partner
to vacuum, while all the while expecting them to do it, or that they assume it is their
responsibility and therefore will play the martyr of always having to vacuum.
An essential part of this practice is blocking any attempts at emotional or cogni-
tive regulation, as that is not the goal. The goal, rather, is learning, and it is common
to experience distress when approaching areas where growth may be needed.
Indeed, clients are encouraged to pursue their “edge” as they reflect on the questions
that come up (Lynch, 2018a). An edge may involve the presence of certain (often
distressing) emotions and is best characterized as the internal experience that occurs
when one’s worldview bumps up against the world.
During self-inquiry practice, maladaptive overcontrolled clients are asked (or
they ask themselves) “are you at your edge?” and “if you haven’t reached your edge
or you have moved away from it, what do you need to do to get to/back to your
edge?” (Lynch, 2018a). Self-enquiry practices are intentionally kept brief (roughly
5 min or less) because they tend to over-approach problems and want to ‘fix’ every-
thing immediately. The goal of self-enquiry is not to arrive at a correct answer, but
rather a good question. Thus, self-enquiry practice terminates with the specification
of a new question that brought them closest to their edge (e.g., in the above example,
“what is it about having to ask my partner to vacuum that brings me to my edge?”).
Additional goals of the practice are to build a habit of self-doubt, block automatic
regulation, orient toward places of growth and ultimately facilitate more effective
and flexible responding. Though the practice may be performed on an individual
basis (via a self-enquiry journal), public practice is encouraged. There is therapeutic
value in “outing oneself” to another person as other people can help us see our blind
spots (Lynch, 2018a).
Research Evidence
Compared with standard DBT, which was developed in the 1970s and 1980s, RO
DBT is a relatively new treatment. However, as presented by Gilbert and colleagues
(2020c), the growing research base for RO DBT is promising.
Treatment Resistant Depression
As RO DBT was originally designed for treatment resistant depression, much of the
current findings support treatment of this psychiatric presentation. Initial pilot stud-
ies with older adults with treatment resistant depression demonstrated comparable
decreases in depression between RO DBT and standard medication at post-treatment
(Lynch et al., 2003). Worth noting is the finding that at a six-month follow up, indi-
viduals receiving RO DBT demonstrated significantly lower depression compared
to those in the medication treatment condition, demonstrating longer-term impact.
Some of the subsequently conducted RCTs with chronically depressed older
adults showed similar patterns of findings. More specifically, RO DBT plus medica-
tion demonstrated no significant differences in depression compared to medication
alone immediately following treatment, but demonstrated significantly higher
remission rates at a six-month follow-up (Lynch et al., 2007). In another RCT with
older adults with comorbid treatment resistant depression and personality disorders
(who also underwent an 8-week medication trial before starting RO DBT or con-
tinuing with continued medication management), there were no significant
differences in depression between the RO DBT plus medication and medication

only conditions at post-treatment or at a six-month follow-up (Lynch et al., 2007).
However, the RO DBT plus medication group demonstrated decreases in interper-
sonal sensitivity and aggression at post-treatment and a six-month follow-up com-
pared with medication only (Lynch et al., 2007).
These pilot studies provided the initial building blocks for a meticulous investi-
gation of RO DBT. Specifically, a multi-site RCT (Lynch et al., 2020; project
RefraMED) examined RO DBT versus treatment as usual (TAU) in adults with
treatment refractory depression who had experienced at least two previous episodes
of depression and did not respond to at least 6 weeks of antidepressant medications
(Lynch et al., 2015). Participants in the study also demonstrated high comorbidities
as 96% met criteria for at least one other psychiatric disorder and 78% of those
disorders were personality disorders.
The RefraMED project demonstrated significantly greater reductions in depres-
sive symptoms post-treatment in the RO DBT group in comparison to TAU with a
large effect size (Cohens d =1.03; Lynch et al., 2020). Of note, this effect size is
currently the most robust reported in any published trial for refractory depression:
meta-analyses of treatments for chronic depression have reported Cohen’s d effect
sizes between .23 and .34 (Cuijpers et al., 2010; Negt et al., 2016), and a meta-
analysis of treatments for non-chronic depression reports an effect size of d = .90
(Cuijpers et al., 2010). Although the significant difference in depressive symptoms
was not maintained at a four-month follow-up, it trended in the same direction.
Furthermore, there were long-lasting effects in hypothesized mechanisms of change.
Specifically, participants in the RO DBT condition achieved significantly better psy-
chological flexibility than those in TAU at post-treatment (approximately 7 months),
and at 12- and 18-month follow-ups as well as statistically significant better emo-
tional coping and expressiveness post-treatment (7 months), with the difference
increasing at the 12- and 18-month follow-ups. These latter findings suggest that
clients who received RO DBT continued to use and improve their RO DBT skills
after the end of treatment.
The stringency that this multi-site RCT followed should be noted. Specifically, it
purposely accounted for or addressed nearly all 34 pitfalls outlined by O’Donohue
(2018) that purportedly characterize pseudoscientific treatments. For example, not
only did the RefraMED research team use an Independent Clinical Trials Unit with
no vested interest in the treatment to manage and analyze all data, but the trial pro-
tocol and planned analyses were published prior to the publication of results (Lynch
et al., 2015, 2020). This provided a form of trial ‘pre-registration’ to avoid p-
hacking, multiple secondary analyses, and so independent investigators could com-
pare planned analyses with published results. Second, the treatment developer did
not contribute to the treatment delivery. Third, research therapists (23 across three
sites) were naïve about RO DBT and initially skeptical about it when trained for the
RCT, providing little bias towards the therapy (and demonstrating that long-term
therapist experience was not a factor). Fourth, the TAU condition was more rigorous
than what is often available in many countries (like the USA) as it involved access
to any treatment available in the National Health Service including evidenced-based
psychotherapy and medication. Finally, the American Psychological Association

(APA) has reviewed RO DBT as a treatment for depression and concluded that it
meets the criteria for “probably efficacious” or “modest” evidence, based on the
Chambless and Hollon (1998) empirically supported treatment evaluation standards.
Anorexia Nervosa
Although originally developed for individuals with treatment resistant depression,

RO DBT has also been tested for individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN). As dis-
cussed extensively elsewhere, AN is known to exhibit the highest mortality rate of
any psychiatric disorder (Arcelus et al., 2011), and currently there is no one superior
or empirically proven treatment for AN (Watson & Bulik, 2013). AN is also known
to be a highly treatment-resistant, chronic and pernicious disorder that has recently
been conceptualized as a prototypical disorder of overcontrol (Hempel et al., 2018).
An initial feasibility study demonstrated that RO DBT can be conducted in inpa-
tient settings for anorexia, with high completion rates (i.e., 72%). For completers,
participation in RO DBT led to significant increases in BMI (Cohen’s d = 1.91),
significant decreases in eating disorder symptoms, significant improvements in
quality of life and significant decreases in psychological distress (Lynch et al., 2013).
In an outpatient eating disorder clinic uncontrolled case series pilot study, par-
ticipants with eating disorders who received RO DBT demonstrated decreased eat-
ing disorder symptoms and behaviors as well as decreased associated medical
problems (Chen et al., 2015). Additionally, in this study significant increases in
BMI found post-treatment continued at six- and twelve-month follow-ups, while
55% of the sample regained regular menses by 12 months. Furthermore, study par-
ticipants also demonstrated decreased presentation of comorbid psychiatric presen-
tations, including social anxiety, suicide attempts, and personality disorder
presentations such as obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and avoidant per-
sonality disorder.
In an uncontrolled study (i.e., case-series study), adolescents with restrictive eat-
ing disorders (mostly AN) were enrolled in a 13-week intensive outpatient treat-
ment and participated in RO DBT skills class as well as other cognitive behavioral
and cognitive remediation treatments (Baudinet et al., 2020). Following treatment,
adolescents exhibited significantly increased BMI and decreased eating disorder
and depressive symptoms. Although it is unclear whether RO DBT or other aspects
of the intensive outpatient treatment impacted these outcomes, it should be noted
that there were significant increases in emotional expression and reward responsive-
ness and decreases in cognitive inflexibility, social isolation, social withdrawal, and
discomfort in social relationships, all of which are characteristics of overcontrol and
are directly targeted in RO DBT. Lastly, in a qualitative study, female clients with
AN reported that RO DBT provided a holistic view of eating and psychiatric prob-
lems that allowed them not only to decrease eating disorder symptoms, but also
modify maladaptive overcontrol by increasing sharing, connecting with others and

living by one’s values (Isaksson et al., 2021b).
Autism Spectrum Disorder
A psychiatric disorder that has high comorbidity and shares many similarities with
anorexia (Zucker et al., 2007) is autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which may
exhibit the most extreme version of overcontrol (Lynch, 2018a). A recent investiga-
tion examined RO DBT within an adult outpatient program and identified 23 indi-
viduals who met criteria for ASD in a sample of 48 participants (Cornwall et al.,
2021). Findings indicated that across all participants, there was a decrease in global
distress, and participants with an ASD diagnosis had significantly better outcomes
than those without the diagnosis, demonstrating preliminary support of RO DBT
for ASD.
Transdiagnostic Psychiatric Conditions
Although most previous work has examined RO DBT within specific psychiatric
diagnoses, RO DBT has been conceptualized as a transdiagnostic treatment target-
ing the overcontrolled presentation that spans across psychiatric disorders. From
this conceptual and applied perspective, an initial and growing body of research on
RO DBT has focused on heterogeneous overcontrolled populations. For instance,
RO DBT skills classes have been adapted to a clinically heterogeneous psychiatric
outpatient sample that consisted of adults scoring high on overcontrol with diagno-
ses of depression, OCD, eating disorders, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress
disorder and bipolar disorder (Keogh et al., 2016). Findings demonstrated that when
compared with TAU, RO DBT participants experienced significantly greater
decreases in overall psychopathology. Moreover, RO DBT participants reported sig-
nificantly less need for structure and significant increases in coping skills and per-
ceptions of safety in social situations.
A case series study of transdiagnostic overcontrolled adolescents (86% of which
exhibited two or more diagnoses) who received RO DBT for adolescents demon-
strated significant decreases in symptoms of depression, eating disorders and self-
harm tendencies, as well as significant improvements in cognitive flexibility, risk
aversion, reward processing and emotional suppression (Baudinet et al., 2021).
Additionally, case studies exemplify that RO DBT can address perfectionism in the
overcontrolled phenotype (i.e., cognitive inflexibility, perfectionism; Little & Codd,
2020). As the body of literature is just emerging, future work will need to continue
building this evidence base in larger and more stringent RCTs, and test hypothe-
sized mechanisms of change.
Assessment in RO DBT
Overcontrol is a dimensional phenotype rooted in personality that, with undercon-

trol on the opposite end of the spectrum, varies across the population. As such,
overcontrol is not always maladaptive and this should be kept in mind for all assess-
ment procedures. When assessing for overcontrol and whether RO DBT would be a
good fit, the clinician needs to first consider whether any front-line treatments have
already been tried for specific disorders (e.g., Exposure and Response Prevention
for OCD; Hezel & Simpson, 2019). If not, in most cases these front-line treatments
should be given priority given their effectiveness and given RO DBT was designed
for treatment-resistant populations. Second, clinicians need to consider whether
overcontrol exhibited is maladaptive and appears to be a core feature of the evidenc-
ing psychiatric illness.
When assessing whether overcontrol should be targeted in treatment, four core
deficits should be considered: (1) low receptivity/openness to experience, (2) low
flexibility, (3) high emotional suppression/inhibition and (4) low social connected-
ness (Lynch, 2018a). These deficits manifest as avoiding uncertainty, new experi-
ences, and disconfirming feedback (low openness) and being high in perfectionism,
compulsive striving for order, strong moral convictions and maladaptive levels of
approach coping (i.e., maladaptive desire to immediately ‘fix’ and problem solve)
(low flexibility). Overcontrolled individuals also suppress negative (and positive)
emotions and display incongruent emotional expression (i.e., smiling when angry,
inhibited emotional expression) and they often experience loneliness, feeling differ-
ent from others, and have few intimate relationships (low social connectedness).
These four core deficits are all key to be on the look out for when assessing overcon-
trol, and can be identified in the four-session orientation.
Four Session Orientation
The orientation and commitment phase of RO DBT is comprised of four individual

sessions that were carefully designed to optimize treatment engagement (Lynch,
2018a). This was accomplished by taking overcontrolled temperamental biases into
consideration when devising the content, objectives, and means of delivery of each
session.
The first two sessions have five primary aims (Lynch, 2018a). The first is to assist
the client in recognizing that they are overcontrolled and joining with the client to
agree that their overcontrolled coping is problematic and that they are committed to
working on it in therapy. Achieving this goal is essential because treating a mal-
adaptively overcontrolled client is virtually impossible in the absence of their
acknowledging this is the core problem. This is accomplished through the delivery
of a carefully constructed script designed to take into account overcontrolled
temperamental biases (see p. 106 in Lynch, 2018a for an example of one of the
scripts used in the RO DBT orientation).
The next objective is to secure the client’s commitment to discuss any desire to
discontinue therapy in person prior to their dropping out of care. This is meant to
preemptively block the common overcontrolled interpersonal strategy of abandon-
ing relationships when they are conflictual or deemed to no longer be of importance.
It also takes advantage of their tendency to rigidly adhere to rules such as, “I must
never go against my word. I promised to discuss this in person before I drop out.”
A third objective is to secure their commitment to refrain from self-injury and
suicidal behaviors without first getting in touch with a mental health professional. A
fourth aim is to collaborate with the client to start identifying their values and how
the client can start living more in line with these values (i.e., valued goals), that will
serve as an underlying driver in treatment. This discussion continues over the third
and fourth sessions as well. Finally, the fifth objective is to orient the client to the
overall structure of treatment.
On a related note, it is important to highlight that two objectives of the third and
fourth sessions entail teaching the client the biosocial theory for overcontrol and
teaching the key mechanism of change, both of which are accomplished through the
delivery of thoughtfully constructed scripts (see p. 128–129 and 131–132 in Lynch,
2018a for scripts). When the goals of these two sessions are achieved, clients under-
stand that establishing close social bonds is important for their psychological well-
being and that their social signaling plays an important role in their ability to develop
close relationships. Lastly, another major objective in this phase of treatment is to
orient clients to the RO DBT diary card and to initiate their monitoring of important
targets.
This four-session orientation is the most structured part of RO DBT and training
on how to deliver this initial aspect of treatment is part of the larger training in
becoming an RO DBT therapist. Although expanded upon elsewhere (e.g., Gilbert
et al., 2020c), RO DBT therapists must undergo an intensive training to deliver RO
DBT to clients, currently offered either via two in-person weeklong trainings or an
online Blended Learning Programme where they complete online modules and
work with a supervisor in virtual meetings. Beyond the initial intensive training, RO
DBT therapists are highly encouraged to pursue ongoing expert supervision.
Supervision in RO DBT consists of micro-analytic supervision of videotaped ses-
sions, which is vital in noticing patient as well as therapist in-session social signal-
ing, use of dialectical strategies, alliance ruptures and repairs and the like.
Subtypes of Overcontrol
There are two theorized overcontrolled social signaling subtypes that are assessed
and taken into consideration in RO DBT treatment: the Overly agreeable and overly
disagreeable (Lynch, 2018a). They are primarily distinguished by the individual’s
desired persona or how they prefer to be perceived by others. The overly
disagreeable subtype prefers to be seen as competent but not compliant. They are
willing to sacrifice relationships to achieve various objectives, such as preferring to
be seen as “right/correct” more than being liked. In contrast, the overly agreeable
subtype is motivated to be seen as both competent and socially acceptable. Thus,
they prioritize being liked over achieving other objectives such as being “right.”
Because the social signals characteristic of each subtype differ, the factors
responsible for keeping these individuals out of the tribe differ. For instance, overly
disagreeable individuals often present with flat emotional expression or correct oth-
ers (i.e., to be right) in a condescending way, while overly agreeable individuals
often present with disingenuous ‘fake smiling’ emotional expression or agree with
others even if inside they are seething. Hence, accurate assessment and classifica-
tion of a client’s overcontrolled subtype enhances treatment targeting. Currently,
these subtype conceptualizations are grounded in theory, yet the research support-
ing the theory and expanding it to various developmental and sociocultural back-
grounds is lacking, making this a ripe area for future investigation.
Validated Questionnaires
The best way to assess overcontrol is via a clinician-administered interview and

discussion in the four-session orientation. However, the ongoing development of
questionnaires provides a complementary and quick tool to utilize in research and
clinical practice. Although not validated, the Word Pairs Checklist (WPC; Lynch,
2018a) and the Brief Overcontrol Scale (BOS; Seretis, 2017) provide simple self-
report questionnaires to gauge general tendencies towards overcontrol versus under-
control. However, the scores of the WPC or BOS do not distinguish whether these
tendencies are adaptive or maladaptive. Similarly, preliminary work in adolescents
demonstrates the Youth Over- and Under-Control (YOU-C; Lenz et al., 2021)
assesses dimensional tendencies towards overcontrol versus undercontrol. Once
again, the scores of the YOU-C do not differentiate adaptive versus maladaptive
control. Therefore, the clinician or researcher needs to also use judgment to assess
whether the overcontrol is maladaptive. It is important to note that, given these con-
cerns, there has been extensive ongoing research validating novel adult measures
that will include clinical cut-offs to assess maladaptive overcontrol.
Lastly, the Overcontrol in Youth Checklist (OCYC; Gilbert et al., 2020b) is a
parent-report measure assessing the earliest manifestations of overcontrol in chil-
dren aged 4–7 years old. Although the OCYC also does not yet have set cut-points,
higher scores have been associated with maladaptive child outcomes, including
cognitive impairment, anxiety disorders, elevated internalizing and externalizing
psychiatric symptoms and aberrant neural processing of errors (Gilbert et al., 2020a,
2020b). Although these screeners provide initial measures to quickly assess over-
controlled tendencies across the lifespan, future work would benefit from continued
investigation and the addition of clinical cut-offs.
Case Conceptualization
Treatment Hierarchy
Similar to standard DBT, RO DBT uses a treatment hierarchy to organize individual

therapy treatment targets (Lynch, 2018a). That is, the individual therapist first pri-
oritizes life-threatening behaviors, followed by repairing of alliance ruptures
between the client and the therapist and finally the remediation of social signaling
deficits that are tied to common patterns of behavior seen in maladaptively overcon-
trolled individuals. The necessity of placing life-threatening behavior at the top of
the treatment hierarchy is axiomatic and thus does not require further discussion.
RO DBT Suicidal Behavioral Protocol
At the top of the treatment hierarchy are life-threatening behaviors, which occur at
disproportionately high rates in disorders of overcontrol (e.g., Keel et al., 2003).
Consequently, if these thoughts or behaviors are identified, they are given utmost
priority. The unique temperamental biases of individuals with maladaptive overcon-
trol have important implications for the assessment and management of their sui-
cidal behavior. For example, relative to other treatment populations, overcontrolled
client suicidal behavior tends to be better planned (because of superior capacities
for planning) and conceived over time; rule-governed rather than mood-independent;
and precipitated for different reasons (e.g., as a way of punishing others).
Another way overcontrolled suicidal behavior differs from the same behavior in
other clinical populations is that it ends to be concealed to a greater degree (Lynch,
2018a). One reason for this is that overcontrolled clients do not typically emit large,
attention-capturing signals that indicate distress, and they tend to vocally understate
the magnitude of their emotional pain (Lynch, 2018a). An additional reason is that
most overcontrolled clients work hard to maintain the appearance of competence
and perceive the reporting of suicidal symptoms as undermining this preferred per-
sona (Lynch, 2018a). Further compromising the identification of suicidal thoughts
and behaviors in overcontrolled clients, many overcontrolled individuals are skillful
at inconspicuously guiding conversations away from this (and other undesirable)
subject matter (Lynch, 2018a). Therefore, overcontrolled clients are unlikely to
report suicidal symptoms without direct prompting from a clinician, and even then,
will tend to minimize their severity (Lynch, 2018a). To optimize assessment, the RO
DBT clinician must negotiate these temperamentally based barriers with direct and
frequent questions about the presence of suicidal symptoms, and they must block
overcontrolled avoidant responses that emerge during these assessment interactions.
This provides one example of the RO DBT approach to intervening on self-injurious
behavior in overcontrolled clinical populations (see RO DBT Crisis-Management
Protocol for full procedure, Lynch, 2018a).
Therapeutic Alliance: Ruptures and Repair
Directly beneath imminent and severe life-threatening behaviors falls alliance rup-
tures on the treatment hierarchy. Although therapeutic alliance is key to many psy-
chotherapies (including standard DBT), alliance ruptures are a distinct and central
focus of RO DBT that differs from standard DBT (Luoma et al., 2018; Lynch,
2018a). In RO DBT, the therapist acts as a ‘tribal ambassador’ who helps the client
rejoin the tribe and form strong social bonds by modeling kindness, cooperation and
playfulness.
Building therapeutic alliance is central to RO DBT, yet RO DBT also considers
alliance ruptures central to a strong working alliance (Lynch, 2018a). This is because
expressing conflict and disagreement is crucial to any working relationship. Thus,
alliance ruptures are building grounds for learning, are intimacy enhancing, and are
essential for overcontrolled individuals who struggle to reveal inner experiences.
For this reason, if several alliance ruptures have not occurred by the fourteenth ses-
sion, the therapeutic alliance is considered superficial (Lynch, 2018a).
Alliance ruptures can occur for any reason, but in RO DBT, they often occur
when a client feels misunderstood by the therapist or when they perceive the treat-
ment as irrelevant to their concerns. This miscommunication between the therapist
and client often results in a rift or change by the client in session, although the
overcontrolled client will rarely state the issue overtly with the therapist. For this
reason, repairing these ruptures falls solely on the therapist, and involves first notic-
ing that a rupture is occurring (which can be difficult given overcontrolled individu-
als communicate indirectly). Once a rupture is noticed, the therapist should focus on
attempting to understand the client and repairing the relationship. A protocol is
immediately used in the moment to slow down the pace of the interaction, notice a
change or shift that could be a result of the rupture, and check-in with the client by
providing space for the client to reveal what is happening in that moment. As over-
controlled individuals mask inner feelings, avoid conflict, or quickly end relation-
ships when conflict does occur, alliance ruptures and repairs teach clients that
resolving social conflict can be a productive means of enhancing psychological con-
nection with others. This is also important because high treatment dropout rates are
common in overcontrolled populations (Lynch, 2018a), and allocating attention to
ruptures and their repair improves treatment retention.
Five Behavioral Themes of Social Signaling
Following suicidal behaviors and therapeutic alliance ruptures, next in the treatment
hierarchy is the targeting of social signals. To enhance the identification of social
signaling targets, five overcontrolled social signaling behavioral themes can be used
for guidance (Lynch, 2018a). After the four-session orientation, the therapist usu-
ally has a few social signaling targets to track on a diary card and chain, yet
treatment targeting is a continual process in RO DBT. This ensures that the focus of
targeting is relevant to the core maladaptive issues the client is experiencing and to
ensure the therapist has an encompassing understanding of all areas the client may
be impaired. The five behavioral themes are individually introduced in a weekly
fashion starting in the fifth session and help provide a theme that serves as a jump-
ing off point for discussion between the therapist and client. Indeed, the themes are
not social signaling targets themselves, but allow for guided discussion with the
client of relevant individual targets.
The first theme is the prototypical and easily identifiable overcontrolled presen-
tation of ‘inhibited and disingenuous emotional expression,” that can include both
emotional inhibition (e.g., flat or blank facial expressions, lack of eye contact) and
disingenuous emotional expression (e.g., smiling when angry or nervous or “I’m
fine” when not). The second theme (although of note, these do not necessarily need
to be introduced in this order) is “overly cautious and hypervigilant behavior” that
evidences as planning and rehearsing compulsively prior to an event/interaction,
avoiding new behaviors, and repeated checking behaviors. The third theme is “rigid
and rule governed behavior,” and can exhibit as rigidity (e.g., perfectionism and
need for structure) and rule-governed behavior, such as personal rules of “always
plan ahead and work hard” or moral certitude and self-sacrifice (e.g., “my kids
always take priority over my own needs”). The fourth theme is “aloof and distant
relationships,” which is exhibited by rarely expressing desire for intimacy, low vul-
nerable self-disclosure, low trust in others, and walking away and abandoning rela-
tionships rather than dealing with conflict. The fifth and final theme is “high social
comparisons with envy and bitterness,” that manifests as high social comparisons,
harshly gossiping about rivals, sarcasm, and bitterness related to cynicism.
These themes are used to identify specific behaviors the client may exhibit that
could be targeted. It is important for the therapist to assess the relevance of each
theme to the client, as not all themes will apply equally. For those themes that seem
most impactful, there are additional RO DBT principals that can be applied, home-
work assigned, and therapeutic stances to help address prominent themes with the
individual client. These themes aid in refining case conceptualization and treatment
focus, and importantly, provide the therapist and client with potentially unexplored
opportunities to identify maladaptive social signaling that is getting in the way of
the client connecting with others and being part of the ‘tribe’.
Chain Analysis
In RO DBT the variables that control target behavior are identified through a func-
tional assessment procedure referred to as a chain analysis (Lynch, 2018a). The
theoretical underpinnings and execution of these analyses are like the functional
assessment procedures seen in most behavior therapies, and parallel chain analyses
in DBT. That is, any behavior deemed important can be the subject of analysis and
the primary goal is to identify important environmental events, thoughts, and emo-
tions that influence the behavior of interest.
However, chain analyses in RO DBT also differ from chains used in other behav-
ior therapies in several ways. First, these are primarily used to analyze social signal-
ing behavior, the primary theorized mechanism of change. Second, these are rarely
used as part of an aversive contingency with problem behavior. This is because use
of this sort might evoke more “serious” behavior from the client, a class of behavior
that is generally overabundant and in need of deceleration in overcontrolled clients.
Third, though these must be meticulous to be effective, they are kept to 20 min or
less, with 7–12 min being ideal (Lynch, 2018a). In addition to practical reasons
(e.g., allowing sufficient time to address other agenda items) these are kept brief to
provide opportunity for client self-enquiry and to block over approach-focused
problem solving and ‘fixing.’
Chain analyses facilitate both therapist and client understanding of target behav-
ior and are comprised of six steps (Lynch, 2018a). The first step is to generate a
clear behavioral definition of the social-signal being targeted and its’ context (was
the relationship it was done in an important one for treatment?), intensity and dura-
tion. This formulation is frequently optimized by asking clients to demonstrate the
behavior in session, as verbal descriptions of the social-signal are often inadequate
for capturing the important nuances of client social signaling. The next step is to
identify vulnerability factors that increased the probability of the problem social
signaling behavior’s occurrence. The third step is to identify the proximal anteced-
ents that evoked the problem behavior or the ‘prompting event.’ For example, the
client might be asked “What was the event that started this?” or “What got you on
this path?” A detailed description of events, including a depiction of their overt and
private behavior and their sequence of interactions, encompasses the next step in the
chain. This step is particularly comprehensive and involves the identification of
their actions, thoughts, feelings and sensations, and is accomplished by repeatedly
asking “what next?” until all relevant details have been captured. In the fifth step,
the focus shifts to the identification of post-cedents or positive and negative conse-
quences of the social-signaling behavior. The goal of this step is to identify main-
taining consequences, to assist the client in examining the impact of their behavior
socially, and to evaluate whether it is congruent with their valued goals.
The final step is to conduct a solution analysis. This involves generating a man-
ageable number of solutions to not using the same maladaptive social-signaling
style in a similar context. These solutions often include the use of RO DBT skills
and matching individual skills to problematic links in the chain such that they would
alter the occurrence of the problem behavior in the future. Behavioral rehearsal of
solutions in session is encouraged and the impact of identified solutions on target
behavior monitored through the client’s diary card data.
Conclusion
Treatments for clinical populations characterized by maladaptive overcontrol have

not been sufficiently emphasized in behavior therapy theorizing or research. This
may be because this client population tends to be understated in their reporting of
psychological distress and their social signaling, thus escaping the attention of clini-
cians and researchers. In contrast, undercontrolled clinical populations emit more
pronounced signals and thus they are eye catching. A severely emotionally dysregu-
lated client who publicly self-mutilates is difficult to ignore whereas a client who
barely emotes is difficult to notice.
In this chapter, we illustrated some of the overlapping components of RO DBT
compared with standard DBT as well as the defining and distinctive features of RO
DBT (Lynch, 2018a). RO DBT pulls from earlier waves of behavior therapy, such
as by closely resembling the first wave with its shared emphasis on operant and
respondent learning, yet it also shares many third wave components including a
biosocial model, dialectics and mindfulness built into the treatment. RO DBT is
distinct from most all therapies though with it’s focus on treating emotional loneli-
ness via social signaling and openness as core mechanisms of therapeutic change.
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Part III
Comparative Issues and Controversies
The Advantages of First Wave Behavior
Therapy and Problems with the Others
Peter Sturmey
Behavioral approaches to psychotherapy have a very long and honorable history

(Dollard & Miller, 1950; Kazdin, 1978; Guercio, 2018, 2020a, b; Skinner, 1953).
Founded on basic research in learning, especially the work of Pavlov in classical
conditioning and of Skinner in operant conditioning, a number of ad hoc behavioral
therapies were developed in the first part of the twentieth century. For example,
Salter (1949, pp. 105–106) successfully treated a case of blushing by instructing his
client to practice blushing as often as possible. He described the rationale as being
based on Pavlov’s work (!)These approaches were systematized and expanded by
researchers such as Wolpe et al. (1964) in therapy for neuroses and by Skinner’s
students (e.g., Lindsley, 1956) in therapy for a wide range of conditions and have
been incorporated into behavioral case formulation methods (Sturmey, 2008). The
so-called cognitive revolution (O’Donohue et al., 2003) ushered in new models of
psychopathology and new treatments referred to as cognitive behavior therapy and
more recently a third wave of behavior therapies (Kohlenberg et al., 1993; Linehan,
1993) emerged based on Skinner’s (1957) Verbal behavior and research stimulus
equivalence. This chapter provides an overview of this history and concludes that a
return to basic learning theory as the basis of behavior therapy would provide a reli-
able compass and make for plain sailing.
P. Sturmey (*)
The Graduate Center and Queens College, The City University of New York,
New York, NY, USA
e-mail: peter.sturmey@qc.cuny.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_10
220 P. Sturmey
Before the First Wave
There are many historical and cultural practices and observations that appear to
reflect behavioral conceptions of the control of behavior and behavioral technology
(Kazdin, 1978). Predating Skinner’s (1968) The technology of teaching by a few
centuries, Maimonides, the twelfth century Jewish philosopher, described how
recalcitrant students could be encouraged to study Torah first with edible and tan-
gible reinforcers; and as those reinforcers lose their potency, with money; and, as
wise people become indifferent to money, they too can be encouraged to study by
conditioned reinforcers such as obtaining esteem of their peers and job titles reflect-
ing professional and personal eminence and sagacity (Leshtz & Stemmer, 2006).
More recently in the eighteenth and nineteenth century there were precursors to the
token economy, good behavior game, peer-to-peer instruction, and pyramidal train-
ing in school settings (Kazdin & Pulaski, 1977; Stiliz, 2009). Finally, Jarius and
Wildemann (2017) described a number of informal and amusing descriptions of
classical conditioning throughout literature dating back to the seventeenth century.
Thus, many behavioral cultural practices, observations and specific forms of behav-
ioral technology were developed before the science of behavior analysis as a kind of
folk technology and wisdom.
The First Wave
First Ripples
Before there was psychology or even physiology, scientific ideas and functionalist
ideas developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Gentlemen scientists in
embryo and technocrats assembled libraries, collected cabinets of curios, conducted
experiments in their homes, and met together to learn from one another, solve busi-
ness problems using scientific methods. They addressed the problems of mining,
surveying, constructing canals, making better pottery and belt buckles, breeding
better animals and crops, and finding better cures for illnesses. In so doing they
developed what were to become engineering, geology, physics, chemistry, biology,
physiology and scientific medicine (Uglow, 2002). They also learned the value of
careful, systematic, reliable and public observation and manipulation of the envi-
ronment to produce a body of public knowledge which could be skeptically evalu-
ated independent of any specific person; be systematically applied to new problems;
and integrated into a meaningful, consistent world view (Uglow, 2002). In so doing,
they also removed the need for God and various kinds of animisms to explain natu-
ral phenomena and devalued authoritarian claims for expert status as the basis of
knowledge.
Charles Darwin was such a gentleman scholar who was related to generations of
similar people including the Wedgwoods; his own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin,
The Advantages of First Wave Behavior Therapy and Problems with the Others 221
had written a preliminary version of biological evolution in a poem. Charles Darwin

was also familiar with breeding of animals for food production, and as a hobby, and
was familiar with crop breeding and agriculture. Thus, he was exposed to rational
approaches to understanding; that: the earth had a very long history; that many
organisms produced large numbers of offspring, few of which survived to be fertile;
the physical and behavioral animal traits could be selected by people and nature;
and that the animals and plants were adapted to function well and efficiently in a
particular environment. His three main works On the Origin of Species by Means of
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life
(1858), The Descent of Man (1874), and The Expression of the Emotions in Man
and Animals all presented a functionalist view of morphology and behavior in which
the organism’s structure and behavior both served a purpose, namely they contrib-
uted to the survival of the species. Alfred Wallace also proposed this view around
the same time; Darwin and Wallace knew each other’s work and corresponded per-
haps influencing one another (McKinney, 1966). (Note that more contemporary
evolutionary biology views the unit of selection to be the gene rather than the spe-
cies and thus we can think about the function of the organism’s structure and behav-
ior to be to ensure the survival of the genes the organism carries, rather than the
survival of the species (Dawkins, 1976)). Thus, the scientific study of humans
required the scientist to ask the questions: What is that organ there for? Why does
the animal do that? What advantage is there to the organism to behavior in that way?
A Russian Wave
The continuing expansion of biological science lead to the discovery of classical

conditioning which is often attributed to Ivan Pavlov (1994b), although it seems
possible that other earlier Russian physiologists were familiar and had already stud-
ied this phenomenon systematically (Jarius & Wildemann, 2017). Thus, many intro-
ductory psychology textbooks give the traditional account of classical conditioning
which states that while studying the physiology of digestion, Ivan Pavlov serendipi-
tously noticed that dogs secreted digestive juices and salivated at the sight of food
before it was placed in their stomach or mouth and also salivated at the presence of
the person who had fed them in the past. He also observed that the quantity and
consistency of salivation depended on the stimulus properties of the items placed in
the dog’s mouth in a manner that appeared to facilitate formation of the food bolus,
swallowing, and digestion.
Subsequently, Pavlov systematically demonstrated that an arbitrary stimulus –
originally a metronome set at a certain speed – when paired with food could come
to elicit salivation alone. The effect depended on the number of pairings, and tem-
poral relationships between the metronome and food during pairings. In addition,
when the metronome was set at other speeds, it would also come to elicit salivation
even though this specific sound had not been paired with the food. This effect that
was most clear when the speed was most similar to the metronome’s original speed.
222 P. Sturmey
He referred to the initial situation as an Unconditioned stimulus (US) eliciting an

Unconditioned response (UR) and after pairings, a conditional stimulus (CR) elicit-
ing an Unconditioned Response (UR). (Today we conventionally use the mistrans-
lation conditional stimulus from the original Russian) The effect of other speeds of
the metronome on salivation was called generalization. Following the development
of animal models of classical conditioning, Pavlov became interested in psychiatry.
For example, as early as 1915, Pavlov (1915/1994a) published a paper, Experimental
Psychology and Psychopathology in Animals which drew parallels between the
apparently neurotic behavior of dogs and humans.
Pavlov’s work became known in the English-speaking world by the 1910’s.
Thus, a few years later, Watson and Rayner (1920) demonstrated that in a human
infant an arbitrary stimulus paired with a loud noise which elicited a startle response,
also eventually came to elicit both startle-like behavior such as crying and fearful
behavior and avoidance of those stimuli such as turning away. Here the loud noise
was an US and the startle was an UR. The paired stimuli, such as a Santa clause
mask, were CRs, and the fearful behavior was now a CR. This study suggested that
some human fears were caused by classical conditioning.
Pavlov also developed another experimental model of neurosis this was done by
giving the dogs an easy discrimination between a circle and ellipse and progres-
sively making the discrimination more difficult by flattening the ellipse to be closer
and closer to a circle. Following this procedure, the dogs not only failed to make the
discrimination but their behavior became erratic and agitated, urinated and defe-
cated in the cage and they attempted to avoid the experimental cage. Attempts to
reinstate the discrimination by returning to very easy discrimination were difficult
or unsuccessful (Gantt, 1944).
Pavlov began observations of psychiatric patients as early as 1918 (Pavlov,
1994b, p. 418) and in the 1930’s, Pavlov attended psychiatric clinics for humans on
a weekly to observe patients, discuss them with psychiatrists and attempt to analyze
human psychiatric problems in terms of his work on respondent conditioning, indi-
vidual differences in susceptibility to classical conditioning, and environmental fac-
tors making use of freewheeling parallels between dogs and people (Todes, 2014).
He also attended a clinic for nervous dogs. He feigned amateur status in human
psychiatry, while making numerous psychiatric diagnoses – human and canine –,
such as depth phobia in dogs. For humans, he recommended rest and sleep, if neces-
sary induced by bromides. He investigated a then popular but potentially lethal
Cloetta Mixture for humans. Treatment of neuroses in dogs included similar treat-
ments and castration (Todes, 2014). Pavlov’s methods in psychiatry were specula-
tive and included unsystematic data collection rather than true experiments on
animals and thus were loose and unscientific but promulgated the idea that classical
conditioning might be an important model for the acquisition and treatment of
psychopathology.
Russian work on classical conditioning was very active throughout the first half
of the twentieth century and much of it was not immediately readily accessible to
the West, although it did eventually permeate behaviorism through Russian-born
and native Russian-speaking researchers such as Gregory Razran, who periodically
reported back from his visits to the USSR and with Pavlov and Pavlov’s students
and colleagues (e. g., Razran, 1935). Razran went on to set up training in behavior
analysis at Colombia University and then Queens College, New York1 (Razran, 1971).
There were early several applications of classical conditioning to clinical prob-
lems during the 1920’s and 1930’s. One such example was the work of Mary Cover
Jones (1924), who demonstrated the effectiveness of behavioral methods with child-
hood fears and phobias in a case series using methods including modeling, verbal
instruction etc. The demonstration that is most commonly acknowledged was “By
the method of direct conditioning we associated the fear-object with a craving-
object, and replaced fear with a positive response” (p. 390). That is a Conditioned
Emotional Reaction (CER) (fear) could be abolished by pairing the CS which elic-
ited the CER with another stimuli that appeared to elicit incompatible behavior and
by gradually introducing the CS in very small steps closer and closer to the child
contingent upon the current distance in the presence of the craving-object, the for-
mer CS no longer elicited the CER. Next, the work of Edmund Jacobson (1934)
should be noted. He developed progressive muscle relaxation training, conducted
basic research on its effects on reflexes, developed protocols to train people to relax
and applied to a wide range of anxiety and psychophysiological disorders. A third
important study framed by classical conditioning was that by learning researchers
Mowrer and Mowrer (1938) who evaluated the effect of an alarm to wake up chil-
dren with nocturnal incontinence. They based this on what they called a “habit
model” in which prior to training the full bladder elicited the emptying reflex. The
bell was set off by initial urination and interrupted urination and the child was
required to go void in the bathroom immediately. In so doing, they suggested, the
bell through pairing came to elicit urination. They reported that they had applied
this to nocturnal incontinence in 30 children aged 3–13 years and had eliminated
nocturnal incontinence in all children within 2 months. They reported relapse in
some children in homes with emotional problems and in other children the effects
were maintained for up to two and half years, the end of their follow-ups. Similar
results were reported by several independent researchers (e.g., Davidson &
Douglass, 1950) and commercial urine alarms were marketed. Predating Wolpe’s
work, psychoanalyst Herzberg (1941) eschewed verbal therapy for an action-based
approach to neuroses involving graded tasks that resemble graduated in vivo expo-
sure focused on symptom reduction. He wrote “Of 100 cases of neuroses and per-
versions, 48 were cured or very much improved, 47 broke off treatment early (3–39)
interviews) with improvement evident for 12, while for 5 cases treatment appeared
ineffective and was terminated by the therapist after 24–68 interviews” (p. 19).
During World War II, several military physicians noted the similarity of many war
neuroses to CRs, both in terms of presentation and acquisition, although Gillespie
(1945) did not outline or report any examples of treatment based on respondent
1
I teach classes on behavior analysis in the Razran Building, Queens College, New York. At one
point we have a poem, since mysteriously disappeared, hanging on the wall of our faculty meeting
room written by Skinner on the occasion of Razran’s retirement which began “Gregory Razran/
was no has-ran”.
224 P. Sturmey
extinction. Finally, Andrew Salter’s (1949) Conditioned reflex therapy prefigured

much of Wolpe’s work. Based on a perhaps erroneous understanding of Pavlov’s
work, Salter used assertiveness training, pairing stimuli with positive imagery, hyp-
nosis as relaxation to reduce anxiety and treat insomnia, smoking and overeating. In
1964 he went on to edit The Conditioning Therapies with Wolpe and Reyna. Thus,
from the 1920’s to the 1940’s the was a gradual development of clinical applications
of classical conditioning for a number of rather different problems.
The South African and European and Wave
Today, it is hard to appreciate how strongly the psychoanalytic illness medical

model held sway almost without challenge until the 1950’s in all fields of mental
health practice both in terms of understanding the causes and treatment of mental
health issues and in terms of professional practice. Following the decline of “moral
treatment” in the middle of the nineteenth century, with its emphasis on personal
responsibility, environmental design, optimism, and exhortation of patients to
change, the medical model supervened. Medical practitioners ruled the roost in
mental institutions, and brought in microscopes to find the organic causes of these
illnesses (e.g., Turner, 1920). A mental illness was seen as an illness; problematic
behavior was a surface symptom of those illnesses; treatment of those surface symp-
toms was useless and wrong and would only lead to symptom substitution; a doc-
tor’s job was to discover the illness and give it a name (Ullmann & Krasner, 1965a).
The implications for treatment were unclear, but there were still left over nineteenth
century treatments such as bromides, hydrotherapy, spinning chairs restraint and
seclusion (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). Even if much of this was ineffective or
even dangerous to patients, at least sick and probably dangerous people could be
sequestered, prevented from passing on their contaminated genes, and the public
kept safe. Two examples illustrate this state of affairs. First, after the publication of
Mowrer and Mowrer’s (1938) paper, psychoanalytic commentator Michaels (1939)
and a note from the journal’s own editorial board doubted the results published in
their own journal, suggested that a behavioral analysis and treatment of nocturnal
enuresis must be superficial and incomplete, the results could not be true, that symp-
toms substitution must be just around the corner. Second, on my first clinical psy-
chology practicum in about 1984 my supervisor asked me to come take a look in a
filing cabinet of hundreds if not thousands of clinical psychology reports from the
preceding 20 years. Using the same format, each one thanked the physician for the
referral and reports the IQ, neuroticism and extraversion followed by a “Yours sin-
cerely”. That is what British clinical psychologist largely did until the mid-1970’s;
they were physicians’ technician handmaidens, a kind mental phlebotomist.
Much of that changed with the work of Joseph Wolpe’s (1958) Psychotherapy by
reciprocal inhibition. Wolpe was a South African physician who became frustrated
in treating trauma in veterans of World War II ineffectively with psychotherapy and
began searching for effective alternatives. His 1948 medical thesis was on
conditioning and fears based on the work of Pavlov (Poppen, 1995). From this the-
sis, the work of earlier researchers and practitioners such as Jones (1924), Herzberg
(1941), Salter (1949) and discussion of war neuroses in terms of classical condition-
ing, Wolpe used the notion of reciprocal inhibition of anxiety, that is, presenting an
alternate stimulus or engaging in other behavior that elicits a physiological state
incompatible with autonomic arousal. He noted that this could be done in numerous
ways. These included being assertive defined as talking in a loud, clear voice with
marked intonation, responding quickly, making eye contact with the conversation
partner, not acceding to other people requests immediately, expressing one’s own
opinions which sometimes disagree with those of others, contradicting others, and
accepting compliments, or even somewhat pushy with others people. Reciprocal
inhibition could also be done using role play in the office using behavioral skills
training with the therapists. It could be done using abreaction, such as deliberately
and assertively provoking a marital argument over a past injustice resulting in a
sense of relief from anxiety (Wolpe, 1952). It could sometimes be done pharmaco-
logically, through hypnosis, or Jacobsonean relaxation training. Sometimes, but not
always, the reciprocal inhibition could involve systematic desensitization by think-
ing or imagining progressively more threatening stimuli while maintaining a state
of relaxation. It is interesting to note that he commented that the first two methods
were appropriate for social fears and relaxation was appropriate for fears of inani-
mate objects, such as weather (Wolpe, 1952). Subsequently, others have also used
other procedures to induce relaxation such as massage, eating or playing in children.
Wolpe (1952) reported the application of these methods to a series of 70 cases,
mostly of anxiety and mixed anxiety/depression and found that 86% were “cured”
or “much improved”. Patients were had previously participated in psychoanalysis
fared less well, according to Wolpe due to the iatrogenic effects of psychoanalysis
training their patients to focus on their past rather than the controlling present. With
an eye to the economics of treatment, he also compared the outcomes and treatment
times and found that psychotherapy by reciprocal inhibition also took many fewer
sessions that traditional psychoanalysis which often took years rather than weeks
and quite often could not even be completed. Wolpe subsequently worked directly
with Eysenck and his group at the Maudsley clinic, and worked went on to work in
the USA alongside people such as Lazarus (Poppen, 1995), did battle with psycho-
therapists misrepresentations of his work (Wolpe, 1959), and spent considerable
efforts disseminating this approach through professional training, conferences and
more popular books (Wolpe, 1990) and combatting formulaic, non-analytic, inade-
quate behavioral practice (Wolpe, 1977). Jumping on the bandwagon in the United
Kingdom, Hans Eysenck (1952) rattled the saber in Britain and also declared psy-
choanalysis ineffective and could be applied scientifically and effectively for treat-
ment anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1960). Clinical work based on classical
conditioning expanded rapidly in the 1970’s to include a wide range of problems
and variations in specific techniques and this became the basis for many graduate
courses in clinical psychology in Britain and elsewhere to prepare new profession-
als for treatment in mental health in the 1970’s.
226 P. Sturmey
A second thread of behavioral treatment of psychopathology related to classical

conditioning is procedures based on respondent extinction (Sturmey et al., 2020).
When CS is repeatedly presented in the absent of the US after a certain number of
presentations it no longer elicits the CR. This is known as respondent extinction.
Thus, clinical applications of this procedure involve identifying the CS and present-
ing the CS until it no longer elicits the CR. Respondent extinction can be distin-
guished from habituation, a non-associative form of learning, in which an unlearned
response diminishes with repeated presentation of a stimulus, such as a startle to a
loud noise. This can be distinguished from respondent extinction because the stimu-
lus that is presented in respondent extinction is a CR and the organism has a learn-
ing history to establish that stimulus as a CR. Skinner (1953) noted a possible role
for respondent extinction in classical psychotherapy. Exposure to verbal stimuli in a
non-punitive environment might result in relief from anxiety through respondent
extinction. So, by the mid-1960’s procedures based on this principle were devel-
oped including implosion and flooding. The original implosion procedure was a
two-step hybrid of behavioral and psychodynamic models of anxiety. In the first
step patients are exposed imaginally to stimuli directly related to their fear, such as
a snake. In the second step patients are exposed imaginally to scenes based on a
psychodynamic hypothesis concerning the hidden basic problem such as scenes of
sexual conflict, guilt, shame or fear of aggression (Stampfl & Levis, 1967). In con-
trast, flooding involves maximal in vivo exposure without any form of relaxation or
reciprocal inhibitionuntil the person is calm and fearless (Boulougouris & Marks,
1969). For example, one might take a person with snake phobia and require them to
pick up a large living snake, look at it, describe it and wear it around them until the
fear undergoes respondent extinction which might take approximately 2 h and
sometimes only one session (Ost, 1996). These procedures based on respondent
extinction have been applied extensively to anxiety disorders (Wolitzky-Taylor
et al., 2008), obsessive compulsive disorder, trauma-related psychopathology
(Paunovic, 2011; Paunovic & Öst, 2001).
Today many forms of therapy are direct and explicit applications of reciprocal
inhibition and respondent extinction. Other forms of contemporary psychotherapy
may well incorporate these procedures, but may only acknowledge them indirectly,
through vernacular language or sometimes do not acknowledge them at all. For
example, a treatment package for anxiety or stress might involve journaling of
events that provoke worry and anxiety. If such as procedure is effective, one might
attribute its effectiveness to “working through one’s problems”. A more parsimoni-
ous explanation might be that through journaling the person engaged in a self-
managed form of respondent extinction. Reference to “working through one’s
problems” is a vernacular, non-scientific term and so is not readily amenable to
investigation whereas self-managed respondent extinction opens up the door to
investigate this phenomenon and maximizing its potential benefits by identifying
and using the variables that control self-control and respondent extinction.
The American Operant Deluge
A second strand of behaviorism comes from operant learning a predominantly

American intellectual heritage. Thorndike (1913) demonstrated trial and error learn-
ing in cats when he showed that hungry cats learn to exit carefully constructed
puzzle boxes to access food more and more quickly with experience and concluded
that consequences “stamped in” behavior. Around the same time, Watson’s (1913)
manifesto called for an objective account of psychology and an exclusion of men-
talistic causes of behavior. He wrote: “Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a
purely objective experimental branch of the natural science. Its theoretical goal is
the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its
methods, not is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with
which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness …” (p. 158).
It is interested to note that his early career included ethological work involving
extensive observation of the behavior of terns setting the scene for the primacy of
observational data and functionalism. He also thought that behavioral psychology
should be a pragmatic and useful science that could advise people how to teach, how
to raise children and how to make money in business foreshadowing many of the
applications of behavioral analysis in the late twentieth century.
Skinner (1938) took these strands and recognized the fundamental differences
between Pavlov’s work and what he called operant learning. He viewed classical
conditioning as limited as it could only explain a limited part of behavior based on
inherited reflexes with survival value related to unchanging aspects of the environ-
ment such as gravity or threats to the organism’s integrity. Operant conditioning,
however, was much more important as it explained the broad swath of behavior
related to organism’s adaption to an ever-changing unpredictable environment.
Skinner spent decades conducting basic research on learning in highly controlled
conditions with non-human animals identifying the environmental variables and
their parameters that did indeed control and predict behavior. The Skinner box was
a method for studying and measuring behavior objectively focusing on the cumula-
tive number of responses over time, using small N (often one subject) experimental
design and inductive methods to accumulate vast quantities of replicable data to
permit cautiously built up generalizations from individual studies and individual
organisms (Skinner, 1938). Morris (2013) identified Skinner’s (1945) The
Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms as a founding article for behavior
analysis because: (1) it named the philosophy of science as radical behaviorism,
meaning “thorough” or “root”; (2) it incorporated private verbal behavior as behav-
ior; and (3) it incorporated private events such as consciousness as verbal behavior
occasioned by behavior, such as behaving consciously, rather than consciousness
causing behavior. They also noted that it was not until the 1980’s that Skinner write
about variations and selection by consequences as common features of biological
and cultural selection and selection of operant behavior during the lifespan.
Contemporary with Skinner’s early work were two other important develop-
ments which could be considered in the operant tradition. First, Dunlap (1932,
228 P. Sturmey
1942) developed the procedure of negative practice in which a problematic response

is repeated for an extended period of time without reinforcement of that response.
Dunlap applied this to both motor behavior, such as tics, stammering, and typing
errors (Dunlap, 1932) and “affective and ideational habits” (Dunlap, 1942, p. 273).
The second is Mowrer’s (1939) classic analysis of anxiety using two factor theory
in which he wrote “anxiety is thus basically anticipatory in nature and has great
biological utility in that it adaptively motivates living organisms to deal with (pre-
pare for or flee from) traumatic events in advance of their actual occurrence, thereby
diminishing their harmful effects” (p. 563). This quote illustrates both the two fac-
tors that control anxiety – antecedent stimuli that in the past have been paired with
threats and subsequent avoidance of these antecedent stimuli. It is interesting to note
that this analysis of anxiety foreshadows Estes and Skinner’s (1941) empirical dem-
onstration of this model of anxiety.
Like Watson, Skinner always had an eye on implications for applied individual
human problems and broader social problems. At various times Skinner addressed
solutions to broad social problems such as education (Skinner, 1968), world peace,
recycling (Skinner, 1953), designing cultures (Skinner, 1966), understanding and
changing language (Skinner, 1957) and having a healthy, happy and productive old
age (Skinner & Vaughn, 1983). He designed better cribs for children and their care-
takers, proposed better missile guidance systems in World War II guided, of course,
by pigeons, and teaching machines where children learned without teachers being
present. He also used it extensively in the control and management of his own
behavior throughout his life enabling him to live a healthy, happy, long and produc-
tive life (Epstein, 1997). This intellectual heritage and the accumulation of behav-
iorally trained students resulted in a series of books on psychology and psychotherapy
as behaviorists see it (Dollard & Miller, 1950; Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950) and on
methodology of behavior analysis (Sidman, 1960).
Skinner’s early work on mental health included the seminal study on acquisition
and control of anxiety which demonstrated that stimuli that preceded aversive stim-
uli came to suppress ongoing adaptive operant behavior (Estes & Skinner, 1941).
Other behaviorists, came out of the cold of psychoanalysis and provided behavioral
accounts of psychotherapy (Dollard & Miller, 1950). Skinner (1953) expanded
these ideas placing emphasis on behavioral self-management at the center of behav-
ioral accounts of mental health issues. Namely, mental health problems reflected
society’s control of its members through positive punishment which resulted in
avoidance of the punishing environment and punishing agents and the negative side-
effects of positive punishment including anxiety and problematic behavioral inhibi-
tion (Estes & Skinner, 1941). Thus, if someone fails to learn to adapt to these
conditions by managing their own social and physical environments to tolerate aver-
sive stimulation and postpone positive reinforcement, then a person is at risk for
problematic behavior such as avoidance, drinking too much alcohol etc. to reduce
the aversive side-effects of one’s history of positive punishment. Skinner proposed
that the job of the therapist is refrain from directly instructing their clients to change
their behavior, but rather to subtly and indirectly induce a repertoire of behavioral
self-management in their clients. In so doing, clients can independently
discriminate the relationship between their own behavior and the environment and
then rearrange their physical and social environments to manage this own behavior
to reduce anxiety and depression and live in an adaptive, effective and apparently
more autonomous way (Skinner, 1953). (See Table 1 for some examples of behav-
ioral self-management and mental health).
The 1950’s saw Skinner and his colleagues begin to apply operant analysis and
interventions directly to alleviate human suffering. A possible isolated first exam-
ple, is the report of operant conditioning of arm raising in an individual with intel-
lectual disabilities considered incapable of learning by Fuller (1949). Subsequently,
Lindsley (1956), a Skinner student, set up an operant laboratory and program of
research in a mental hospital and first demonstrated control of lever pulling by
schedule effects in people with schizophrenia which formed the basis of subsequent
work on the token economy (Ayllon & Michael, 1959). Around the same time more
traditional experimental psychologists began to evaluate reinforcement procedures
Table 1 Skinner’s nine strategies of behavioral self-management and their application to mental
health issues
Strategy Example
1. Use self-restraint to decrease Fold your hands on your lap to prevent moving your
undesirable behavior and physical aid to hands around in an embarrassing manner, resulting in
increase a desired behavior. decreased social anxiety. Place your relaxation tape
next to your desk so it is easy to use and you are more
likely to engage in relaxation training.
2. Change the stimulus, such as remove Walk away from a nasty person to reduce anxious
a discriminative stimulus for a behavior behavior. Place a reminder to use relaxation training
we want to reduce and present a after work on car driving wheel making it more likely
stimulus to increase the probability of you will use relaxation training.
desired behavior.
3. Use deprivation to increase a Skip lunch to each more at a free dinner to eat more
desirable behavior and satiation to free food and save money. Drink a pint of water
decrease an undesirable behavior. before going to a party to decrease future
consumption of alcohol.
4. Manipulate emotional conditions. Use mood induction to change future behavior, for
example, rehearse one’s grudges before going to ask
for a raise.
5. Use aversive stimulation Set alarm clock across the room to wake up and get to
work on time.
6. Use drugs to change behavior Drink a big coffee to increase the probability of
working in the afternoon.
7. Operant conditioning Watch a favorite show after completing relaxation
training to increase the probability of practicing
relaxation.
8. Punishment Slap your own hand as you go to grab an extra drink
of alcohol reducing the probability of getting drunk
and saying something embarrassing.
9. Doing something else Change the topic of conversation or walk away when
someone talks about embarrassing topics that provoke
anxiety.
230 P. Sturmey
on memory in individuals with intellectual disability (Locke, 1962) and Wolf et al.
(1963) demonstrated that operant principles could be applied effectively to reduce
problem behavior such as throwing plates both in the clinic and home in an indi-
vidual with intellectual disabilities. These and many other developments took place
in pioneer academic behavioral programs such as those at the University of Kansas
(Baer, 1993), the University of Arizona (Thompson, 2017) and the University of
Manitoba, Canada (Walters & Thomson, 2013). These programs addressed many
applied issues for the first time using both basic research, such as showing operant
reinforcement and extinction of thumb sucking (Baer, 1962), and applied work
(Wolf et al., 1963). There was a close relationship between behavioral theory and
practice and this was extended to many problems including the development of typi-
cal children (Bijou & Baer, 1961).
In Europe, the first meeting of the British Experimental Analysis of Behavior
group took place around 1963 (Hughes, 2007). This group grew into the European
Association for Behavior Analysis which has spawned numerous European national
organizations. A similar group developed in Ireland in the 1970’s (Leslie & Tierney,
2013). Both groups began as primarily basic groups which, in response to the need
for effective practitioners in autism, have subsequently focused on applied work.
Morris (2013) conducted a careful analysis of basic behavior analysis publica-
tions prior to 1959 and 1967. They identified 36 ABA articles which included four
clusters. These were as follows. (1) Ayllon’s work (e.g., Ayllon & Michael, 1959.)
with psychiatric patients in Saskatchewan dealing with reducing psychotic talk,
hoarding, refusal to self-feed and teaching mealtime attendance and eating by train-
ing psychiatric hospital personnel to use reinforcement and extinction. (2) Work by
Staats (e.g., Staats et al., 1962) at Arizona State University on operant procedure to
teach reading using token economies administered by adult volunteers. (3) Wolf’s
(ref) work at the University of Washington to address problem behavior, toilet train-
ing, isolate play, regressed crawling reducing crying and increasing appropriate
speech. (4) A group of 24 other articles some of which were isolate publications.
Thus, the core start to behavior analysis was one based in the USA by a small num-
ber of geographically dispersed researchers.
By 1965, Ullmann and Krasner’s classic Case studies in behavior modification
reported many and diverse applications of this blossoming new technology to prob-
lems such as reinstating speech in a mute person with schizophrenia, several behav-
iors related to autism, restoring eating in a person with anorexia, hysterical blindness,
trauma-related anxiety, fetishes, sexual inadequacy, stuttering, tics, school phobia,
toilet training, tantrums, phobias, regressed crawling, crying, operant vomiting and
hyperactivity. In addition, research had already begun to address important applied
issues establishing people as conditioned reinforcers, group classroom procedures
and training staff to administer group token economies. The work of Ferster is also
especially notable for providing theoretical analyses of autism (Ferster, 1964) and
depression (Ferster, 1973) (along with Lazarus [1968]) and the beginning of applied
behavioral psychopharmacology using behavioral technologies (Ferster & Appel,
1963; Ferster & DeMyer, 1961). These papers went on to provide the basis for
applied work in behavioral activation (Lewinsohn, 1974) and early intensive applied
behavior analysis (ABA) for children with autism (Lovaas et al., 1965).
Nineteen fifty-eight saw the founding of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior which at first include experimental analysis but not treatment of some
applied problems such as stuttering (Flanagan et al., 1958). In 1968 the first issue of
the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis was published, which included the semi-
nal article Some current dimensions of applied behavior analysis (Baer et al., 1968).
As with Ullmann and Krasner’s volume, the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis
(JABA) published papers on a variety of mental health for the first five or so years
similar to that in Ullmann and Krasner.
The founding of an applied journal required at least five methodological changes
from the basic science. First there was a formalization of small N experimental
design to specify specific designs such as reversal and multiple baseline designs
among others (Sidman, 1960). Second, instead of collecting data mechanically on
arbitrary, convenient responded usually measured mechanically as number of
responses and presented as cumulative rate of behavior, human observers had to be
trained to observe socially important and meaningful behavior reliably in natural
settings. This required training of observers which could measure several different
response parameters such as duration, latency etc. and was typically presented ses-
sions by session, rather than as cumulative number of responses. Third, rather than
programming machines to present stimuli in contrived environments designed to
study basic learning, environmental changes were often implemented by changing
the behavior of natural behavior change agents, such as family members and staff.
These natural change agents needed training to do so. In order to present convincing
evidence of a reliable relationship between the independent and dependents vari-
ables, experimenters had to show that the behavior of the change agents also indeed
changed in the hoped-for manner and was functionally related to the behavior of the
target persons. Fourth, in order to show that socially convincing and meaning
changes had occurred, applied researchers had to show that treatment effects gener-
alized and maintained over time in socially valued ways. Finally, applied research-
ers had to ask the participants and the people around them what they thought about
the goals, methods and outcomes of applied behavioral treatment (Wolf, 1978).
Like other fields, the development of practice out of basic research has resulted in
unresolved tensions between the science and practice of behavior analysis and, even
in research let alone practice, a certain drift of application away from its basic
foundations.
Ripening and Expansion of Applied Behavior Analysis: 1980’s–2020
ABA has addressed an incredible breadth of socially significant behavior since the
founding of JABA. A description of that is not possible in this chapter. Rather, a few
major trends will be highlighted.
First, Skinner’s (1957) Verbal behavior was a behavior analytic account of what
in the vernacular we call language or communication. Skinner defined verbal
232 P. Sturmey
behavior as behavior in which reinforcement was delivered through other people

rather than directly by a nonhuman environmental event. For example, if one picks
up a glass of water and drinks, drinking is reinforced without social mediation; if
you ask someone to pass the glass of water and someone provides this then the
reinforcement is socially mediated. In defining verbal behavior in this manner
Skinner produced a radially different analysis of language. Thus, pointing, yelling,
and texting for a glass of water were now verbal behavior even though they involved
no spoken words. In contrast, someone engaging in echolalia saying “water” repeat-
edly alone in a room were not engaging in verbal behavior because the reinforcer
was not socially mediated. Verbal behavior also defined classes of verbal operants
not based on their topography or grammatical classes but on the basis of the control-
ling environmental variables. For example, a mand is controlled by the reinforcer it
specifies and its conditions of deprivation. Thus, if one has not drunk for a long time
and says “water”, and that response is reinforced by water, then this is a mand. In
contrast, a tact is a class of verbal behavior controlled by non-social antecedent
stimuli, such as objects and reinforced by generalized conditioned reinforcers, such
as praise. For example, if someone sees a glass of water and says “Water” and
another person says “that’s right” then in this example “water” may be a tact. Thus,
response topography is unimportant, but the variables controlled verbal behavior are
definitional.
Chomsky (1959) reviewed Verbal behavior negatively by from a structuralist
perspective; Skinner did not reply and some assumed that Skinner agreed with the
critique, although MacCorquodale (1970) among others did reply. Although there
were a several empirical papers showing environmental control of verbal behavior
(Krasner, 1958), ABA did immediately not take up the challenge of the implications
of Skinner’s Verbal behavior. Subsequently, Sundberg and Michael (2001) among
others developed a completely new technology of teaching verbal behavior to indi-
viduals with intellectual disabilities and with autism. Further, Barnes-Holmes et al.
(2000) used Verbal behavior as the basis of relational frame theory and acceptance
and commitment therapy (ACT). So far, and unsurprisingly, there has been no effec-
tive technology to promote language or language-based interventions based on
Chomsky’s views after more than 60 years.
A second important trends has been the development and expansion of methods
of conducting and using functional assessments and analyses for treatment of severe
problem behavior. Beginning with Carr’s (1977) conceptual analysis of the contin-
gencies controlling self-injury, empirical studies demonstrated the important of
functional analyses predicting the most effective treatment for severe problem
behavior (Carr & Durand, 1985). The development of standardized functional anal-
ysis methods (Iwata et al., 1994) resulted in an enormous literature on functional-
based treatment of severe problem behavior (Beavers et al., 2013; Hanley et al.,
2003) including psychiatric symptoms, such as psychotic speech (Froján-Parga
et al., 2019; Travis & Sturmey, 2010). It is conventional to distinguish three types of
methods to conduct functional assessments and analyses. Indirect functional assess-
ments include interviews and questionnaires completed by the clients or a relevant
third party. For example, Durand and Crimmins (1992) developed the Motivational
Assessment Scale to determine the likely contingencies maintaining problem behav-

ior. This has been extended to conduct indirect functional assessments for clinical
problems such as smoking (Burrows et al., 2020). Direct functional assessments
involve observing the behavior in the natural environment without changing the
environment systematically such as in vivo recording of antecedents, behavior and
consequences (Bijou et al., 1968) and scatterplots (1985). Finally, experimental
functional analyses involve systematic manipulation of the environment using a
small N experimental design. For example, Carr and Durand (1985) compared the
effects of presenting little or no attention and easy and difficult tasks on children’s
problem behavior using reversal designs to demonstrate experimental control of
problem behavior. Functional assessment and analysis methods have now been
applied to a wide range of problem behavior (Sturmey, 2020) and populations and
has been enshrined in special education law in the USA and professional standards.
A third major area of expansion has been work on stimulus equivalence and
transfer of stimulus functions within stimulus classes. Stimulus equivalence is dem-
onstrated when an individual learns to match stimuli from class A (written words)
to class B (photographs) and class B to C (spoken words) and the individual then
learns several untrained relationships (B→A; C→B and importantly C→A). This
training approach is not merely an example of an efficient method of training; rather,
it is a behavioral model of conceptual behavior and categorization and thus forms
the basis of important aspects of language, conceptual and intellectual skills.
Originally demonstrated in the context of teaching reading (Sidman, 1971), stimu-
lus equivalence has been used as a model for understanding classification of stimuli
such as perceptual classes and conceptual behavior such as “understanding” graphs
(Fields et al., 2009; Maffei-Almodovar et al., 2017). This approach has also been
expanded to develop novel programs to teach children with autism among others
(Dixon et al., 2017).
An important aspect of work on stimulus equivalence with direct relevance to
clinical work is transfer of function among members of a stimulus class (Dougher
et al., 1994). Once an equivalence stimulus class if formed, conditioning a function
to one member of that class, such elicitation following pairing of one member of the
stimulus class with electric shock (Dougher et al., 1994) and extinction of such
conditioned responses (Augustson et al., 2000) produces generalization to other
members of the class without direct training. Transfer of function might account to
generalization of fearful behavior shown in phobias to untrained stimuli not associ-
ated with initial classical conditioning. This phenomenon might be incorporated in
new therapy methods (Dougher, 1998).
Fourth, ABA has been active in applying the notions of delay discounting to
disorders related to the pathology of positive reinforcement. Delay discounting
refers to the preference that some people have for small immediate, low quality
reinforcers over larger, better quality delayed reinforcers. Choosing the former is
referred to as impulsivity. This framework has been useful in developing contin-
gency management programs and other procedures based on increasing tolerance
for delay of reinforcement to reduce drug use and increase vocational behavior in
drug addicts with multiple mental health problems (e.g., Higgins et al., 1994),
234 P. Sturmey
gambling (Dixon et al., 2003), ADHD (Binder et al., 2000), and health-related
behavior such as smoking and obesity (Dallery et al., 2013).
A New Profession
The expansion of the many applications of ABA has resulted in the development of
a new profession. The growing and unfulfilled need for effective therapies, espe-
cially for young children with autism spectrum disorders, resulted in a situation
where behavioral practitioners were regulated to differing degrees often by ad hoc
local regulations. Additionally, licensed professionals outside of ABA sometimes
claimed competence beyond their training due to insufficient professional training
and an incomplete understanding of ABA. This resulted in some situations where
there was concerns over: (a) the excessive and inappropriate use of positive punish-
ment; (b) practitioner competence; (c) difficulties for consumers, such as family
members to discriminate the quality of service providers and had no clear mecha-
nism to make complaints or protect themselves and family members from harm; and
(d) no clear basis for funding from health insurance or other funding mechanisms
(Michael, 1972).
Growing out of licensure for ABA in Minnesota and Florida (Shook et al., 2002)
a national USA program of licensure was established. This included detailed task
lists for professional training, required hours of supervised experience, approval of
graduate training programs, a national exam, adoption of national guidelines by
individuals state laws controlling licensure, disciplinary and complaints procedures
to protect the public, professional insurance, and requirements for continuing post
qualification education including ethics. More recently, like other professionals,
ABA training has expanded to address diversity (Beaulieu et al., 2019), women’s
issues (Baires & Koch, 2019) and cultural competence (Wright, 2019). The upshot
is that the number of licensed applied behavior analysts in the USA increased expo-
nentially from almost zero in 1999 to nearly 14,000 by 2014, about 80% of practi-
tioners being Masters-level practitioners (Deochand & Fuqua, 2016). In addition,
many countries outside the USA now have programs for licensed behavior analysts
(Martin & Shook, 2011). Today, most practice focuses on children and adolescents
with autism and other developmental disabilities, but behaviorism continues to
make an important contribution in many areas including behavioral case formula-
tion and explanations of behavior change during non-behavioral therapies (Sturmey,
2008, 2020).
Problems with Waves Two and Three
Many of us like to defy our parents; psychotherapists in the 1970’s were no excep-
tion in their willingness to defy their elder behavioral mentors by embracing the
alleged cognitive revolution (O’Donohue et al., 2003). In so doing, many
professional mental health programs and professionals abandoned the philosophical

and scientific roots of behaviorism in favor of mainstream psychological and psy-
chiatric concepts, methods and practices at great costs to themselves and their
patients.
The first sin was retreating to the office and in so doing abandoning observational
data and observing their clients in the natural environment. The retreat to the office
has meant that therapist, accepting client self-report of behavior change and of treat-
ment integrity, have built a house of sand on foundations of sand. Some of what
clients tell therapist is true, but it is often insufficient to be confident that the client’s
life is better because of the therapy. The retreat to the office has another related
problem. It is difficult or often impossible to perform a functional analysis in the
therapist’s office. Although it is conceivable that analog functional assessments and
analyses could be conducted in an office setting, the validity of such assessments
would always remain in doubt as important elements from the client’s natural envi-
ronment could always be missing from the analog assessment. The second related
sin is that by retreating to the office with their clients, therapists focus on client
thoughts and feelings as the cause of problematic and non-problematic behavior
rather than as covert behavior subject to functional analysis. Clients can readily
shape the therapists’ behavior in focusing on a search for causes in the past that are
sometimes hidden in the false hope that revealing and understanding these historical
causes will change current behavior.
Third, self-proclaimed second and third wave and cognitive therapists misrepre-
sent and/or misunderstand traditional behavioral therapies. One aspect of this phe-
nomenon is that if a therapy produces a change in behavior that is an interesting
phenomenon to be studied and understood in behavioral terms, thus, Skinner (1953)
speculated how traditional psychoanalysis might produce behavior change. A
related problem is that often the new therapies include old procedures but do not
fully admit to this. New therapies tend to highlight their new procedures and down-
play the old ones. For example, descriptions of ACT tend to highlight new accep-
tance strategies and downplay the old procedures goals setting and self-recording.
For example, ACT involves new and interesting verbal psychotherapy procedures
such as the “milk, milk, milk” exercise in which the client repeats the word for
about 45 s and reports that it loses its emotional and meaningful functions. ACT also
involves goal setting and self-recording, although less attention-grabbing that the
new procedures, this everyday component of ACT may be a key component of
ACT. Thus, dismantling studies often find first wave procedures are the effective
component of such packages and may be equivalent to the entire package. For
example, Jacobson et al. (1996) famously demonstrated that behavioral activation
alone produced the same outcomes as a cognitive behavior therapy package for
depression. Nezu and Perrin (1989) similarly demonstrated that the problem solving
protocol (a form of behavioral self-management) was responsible for change in
treatment of depression, rather than changes in attributional style. A final example
comes from a recent dismantling study of ACT compared the “engaged” compo-
nents of ACT (values-guided choices, building valued habits etc.) with the “open”
236 P. Sturmey
components (acceptance, use of metaphors and defusing judgements and rigid self-
stories), the full ACT package and a waitlist control. They found that on measures
of overall distress, all components were superior to the WLC but that the engaged
components produced significantly larger rates of reliable improvement (46%) than
the WLC (17%) and open (27%) conditions (Levin et al., 2020) perhaps because the
open components alone dot give the participants the tools needed for change that are
in the engagement condition.
A related problem is the mislabeling of therapy procedures as “cognitive” or
“behavioral.” Sometimes the mis-labelling is in plain sight, such as labeling relax-
ation training as a cognitive intervention, other times it involves labelling any strat-
egy that acknowledges private events as a cognitive therapy (Sturmey, 2005). The
radical behaviorist position is simple: If there is a reliable relationship between what
goes on in any kind of therapy – i. e., environmental events – and client behavior, it
is a good idea to go investigate the learning that underlies that change. The results
are likely to be disappointing to therapists seeking novelty as it is likely to involve
considerable demystification, everyday explanations and environmental control of
the behavior of therapists and clients (Skinner, 1953).
Sixth, many writers in mental health do not know behaviorism sufficiently to
make a good critique of radical behavioral explanations of behavior change in ther-
apy based on an accurate account of behaviorism (see O’Donohue & Kitchener,
1998). Three examples include some of the following. First, some critics have stated
that behavioral treatments have focused excessively on contingencies. For example,
Novacco (1997) wrote that “traditional behavior therapy has a tendency to neglect
attention to environmental fields by focusing primarily on contingencies …” (p.
xiii). In the same volume, Stenfert Krose (1997) proposed that traditional behavior
therapy rejected introspection and that learning was in fact cognitively mediated,
and that there were new procedures such as problem solving and self-control. This
implies that such approaches did not exist before and were new cognitive therapies,
whereas Skinner (1953) described the status of cognition as covert behavior to be
analyzed and self-control could be framed within a radical behavioral approach.
Second, some critics fail to make some basic distinctions correctly, for example, the
distinction between habituation and respondent extinction. Third, some critics make
the error of elevating and reifying thoughts and feelings to the cause of behavior or
inventing metaphors of broken computers, broken brains, faulty images etc. as the
causes of behavior.
Finally, the substitution of questionable paper and pencil psychometric self-
report measures as the outcome variable in many CBT and third wave outcomes
studies instead of actually measuring the behavior to be changed directly makes the
outcome literature for second and third wave behavior therapies highly
questionable.
Treasures from the Deep or Flotsam and Jetsam?
We are awash with a tidal wave of new therapies, including new second and third
wave behavior therapies. This is not necessarily a bad thing: There are some new
therapy techniques which gives therapists and clients a choice between different
procedures and some of the new procedures will suit some people more than the old
procedures. Some of the new procedures have already jumped the low barrier of
evidence-based practice by conducting many RCTs of third wave therapies and may
be more effective than earlier therapies.
But, is this treasure from the deep or flotsam and jetsam?
By inadvertently abandoning behavioral principles or throwing them overboard,
perhaps in the enthusiasm for some new behavioral principles, extension of existing
principles, or lack of training in behaviorism, cognitive therapist and new wave
theoreticians and practitioners have lost some three fundamental things: The phi-
losophy of the science – behaviorism – the basic science – the experimental analysis
of behavior – and the applied science – ABA. Doubtless behaviorists will continue
to paddle their canoe against the currently prevailing tides and apply the philosophy,
concepts and methods of behaviorism to all kinds of therapies. Hopefully, second
and third wave behavior therapists will remember their distant behavioral histories
and at least adopt some valuable measurement practices from the first wave such as
collecting observational data on the behavior of therapists in their natural environ-
ments. Some are indeed doing just this (e.g., Parga et al., 2017).
Psychotherapy has been at sea for more than 50 years. There is a lifeboat avail-
able and it is radical behaviorism. One wave is enough!
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Cognitive Therapy and the Three Waves:
Advantages, Disadvantages
and Rapprochement
Robert L. Leahy
It is fashionable to view the development of different cognitive behavioral therapies

as forming “waves”, as if one precedes another and another supersedes what comes
before. Although Hayes and others (e.g., Hayes & Hofmann, 2021) have denied that
waves imply progression or superiority, it is hard to escape the intuitive implication
that one wave is superior to another. I would agree with Hayes who claims that
waves are like movements of waves on the shore, one coming in, another going out,
with no “developmental” hierarchy. Let’s keep this in mind as we recognize that a
“new wave” on the horizon is that of transdiagnostic approaches such as “common
processes” (Hayes & Hofmann, 2021) and “the unified protocol” (Barlow et al.,
2017; Farchione, et al., 2012). Indeed, it very well may be that actual therapists in
the real-world pick and choose the tools or waves that they believe best fit the patient
in front of them. I know that many of my colleagues who are in clinical practice are
often eclectic and draw on all three waves depending on the presenting problem.
Nonetheless, we often find ourselves defending one wave against another, although
we may find that we all can benefit from each other.
In this chapter, I will take the position of explicating the cognitive therapy model,
reviewing its history, examining the context of its emergence, comparing it to other
approaches, and suggesting limitations and opportunities that a more expanded cog-
nitive model might provide. Rather than “defend” the cognitive model, I will
describe it, review the rationale for it, the research supporting it, its limitations and
its strengths. It is my contention that we all have a lot to learn from each other.
Perhaps that is the message of the Fourth Wave.
R. L. Leahy (*)
American Institute for Cognitive Therapy, New York City, NY, USA
e-mail: LEAHY@cognitivetherapynyc.com

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_11
244 R. L. Leahy
Historical Context of the Cognitive Therapy
Although Ellis (1962) and Beck (1967, 1979) had developed their respective cogni-
tive or rational emotive models independently and somewhat simultaneously, I will
focus on Beck’s model in this chapter for a variety of reasons. First, Beck’s model
has become identified with the cognitive approach, although it clearly overlaps with
some of Ellis’s model. For example, both models argue that biases or distortions in
thinking contribute to psychopathology and both propose specific categories of
these biases. Both models focused on what the patient is consciously thinking and
what is going on currently in the patient’s life. Second, there is considerably more
research related to the Beck model than to the model advanced by Ellis. Third,
Beck’s model has continued to evolve over the years into a more integrative and
comprehensive model of human functioning. For example, the initial model focused
on depression, while subsequent developments elaborated models of panic, social
anxiety, trauma, substance abuse, schizophrenia and personality disorders. And,
Beck’s model developed into a multi-faceted conceptualization including evolution-
ary theory, neuroscience, cultural effects, socialization, modes, and other processes
(Beck & Haigh, 2014). With these caveats, we must acknowledge the significant
and enduring contributions made by Ellis and his colleagues.
Similar to Ellis, Beck had been trained in psychodynamic therapy, which almost
completely dominated American psychiatry and clinical psychology until the 1970s
(Rosner, 2018). It may be difficult for younger clinicians to realize how pervasive
psychoanalysis was in its domination to the exclusion of biological models and
other therapeutic models. The monolithic domination of psychoanalysis and its
intolerance of alternative approaches may have had a lot to do with its prolonged
popularity in medical training and clinical psychology even though there was scarce
empirical evidence to support the model. Indeed, until Eysenck (1952) raised the
issue of lack of evidence of the effectiveness of psychodynamic treatment (no better
than spontaneous remission), there was little concern that a widespread model
lacked empirical support. Even after the issue of the lack of empirical support was
raised and questions about the reliability and validity of projective techniques had
been suggested, the psychodynamic domination of American psychology and psy-
chiatry appeared to continue unabated.
Beck was trained in psychoanalysis and was on the psychiatry faculty at the
University of Pennsylvania from the 1950s. During this period of the 1950s and
1960s psychoanalysis was undergoing significant changes, moving beyond the
model of repression, hydraulics, and stages of development to models of how the
ego (reality testing, organization of cognition and perception) functioned. Leaders
of the ego psychology movement included Anna Freud (1968) and her work on the
analysis of the ego and mechanisms of defense and Heinz Hartmann (1939/1958) in
his work on ego autonomy. Beck viewed himself as part of this emerging ego psy-
chology and viewed his new cognitive model as a natural development of this branch
of psychoanalysis.
Cognitive Therapy and the Three Waves: Advantages, Disadvantages and Rapprochement 245
Beck was interested in testing the psychodynamic idea that depression was
repressed hostility (Beck & Ward, 1961). The psychodynamic model proposed that
dreams reflected the emergence of unconscious conflicts and content. Accordingly,
Beck expected that the dreams of depressed patients would reflect the content of the
repressed hostility. Contrary to his expectations, the dreams of depressed patients
were filled with content about loss, abandonment, and failure (Beck & Hurvich,
1959; Rosner & Lyddon, 2004). Beck noted in his early work that he could identify
these negative beliefs that were consciously expressed by his patients and help them
examine their validity. Thus, he believed that one goal of therapy could be direct
access to conscious negative beliefs that could be tested by experience, collecting
evidence and challenging the logic of the depression.
Early work indicated that his patients improved more rapidly than in the more
traditional psychodynamic treatment (Beck, 1967). The role of the therapist was
more active, involved focusing on the present, and did not implicate unconscious
content that required interpretation on the part of the therapist. To Beck’s surprise,
his “neo-analytic” cognitive model was rejected by the traditional, established psy-
chodynamic community and he was cautioned that his approach indicated that he
personally needed more psychoanalytic therapy to deal with his personal issues
(Rosner, 2014). Beck took a leave of absence from the Department of Psychiatry at
the University of Pennsylvania to direct himself toward his innovative approach.
During this voluntary sabbatical Beck immersed himself in a wide-ranging read-
ing program (Rosner, 2014; personal communication with R. Leahy, February 22,
2018). He read the stoic philosopher Epictetus who placed great emphasis on the
idea that one’s interpretation of events was more important than the events them-
selves (Epictetus also had a profound influence on Ellis; see chapter “Meta-science
and the three waves of cognitive behavior therapy: Three distinct sets of commit-
ments” in this volume). Beck also read Jean Piaget whose constructivist model of
stages of knowledge appealed to Beck’s emerging constructivist model of psycho-
pathology. He found that George Kelly’s Psychology of Personal Constructs was
especially interesting (Kelly, 1955). Kelly had argued that each individual had their
own “construction of reality” and that the specific constructs (concepts) that were
dominant for the individual were often the source of difficulties. For example, one
person might focus on the “construct” of winner vs loser and view events in terms
of defeat and humiliation, whereas another individual might view events in terms of
beautiful vs. ugly, with corresponding concern about appearance where self-esteem
would be based on looks. Clearly, these constructs are relevant to Beck’s later use of
the concept of “schemas”. Kelly introduced the concept of “constructive alternativ-
ism” to reflect the idea that there is a wide range of different ways of interpreting an
event. This concept is also reflected in Beck’s model of considering alternative
interpretations of reality.
There were developments in psychodynamic theory that mirrored Beck’s alien-
ation from the fold. As Beck was developing his cognitive model during this time
John Bowlby was moving away from the drive-reduction model of psychoanalysis
to develop his model of attachment. Bowlby noted that there was considerable evi-
dence that there was an instinctive, mutually supportive behavioral system between
246 R. L. Leahy
infants and their mothers (parents), that assured proximity, nurturance and protec-
tion. Bowly arged that this system was better accounted for by evolutionary theory
than by psychodynamic models and that it was a universal pattern observable in
infants in different cultures and in different species (Bowlby, 1980). Attachment
behavior had been observed in the work by Harlow on surrogate mothers (that is,
figures that were soft and cuddly allowing clinging vs. wire-mesh figures that pro-
vided food) (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959). Work by Rene Spitz (1946) on “hospi-
talism” had previously shown that simply feeding the infant was less important than
the interaction and touch of a nurturant figure, where the latter led to thriving while
its absence led to physical and mental arrest. Bowl proposed that the attachment
process was independent of drive reduction and that problems that arose due to
separation, loss, or threats of loss resulted in cognitive models that emerged which
he referred to as internal working models. We can immediately see the relevance of
this to Beck’s concept of schemas. And, like Beck, his work was not well received
by the British psychodynamic community (Bretherton, 1992).
Kelly’s model was not focused specifically on diagnostic categories, but was
proposed as a general model of functioning that transcended diagnoses. Indeed, at
the time of Kelly’s writing in the 1950s there were few agreed-upon diagnostic sys-
tems in use, since the DSM had not been developed. Beck’s model was also offered
as a general model, but soon emerged as a model for depression in his 1967 book
(Beck, 1967) and his 1979 treatment manual (Beck, 1979). Unlike the model pro-
posed by Kelly, and certainly unlike the concurrent psychodynamic models of that
time, Beck was eager to provide empirical support for a structured cognitive model.
Thus, the 1979 book Cognitive Therapy of Depression (Beck, 1979) was a detailed
manual of how to conduct the new cognitive therapy, provided the experimental
protocol for early experiments on the effectiveness of this new approach, and cited
research supporting its effectiveness. The psychodynamic world had never seen
anything like this.
The schema concept was also part of Piaget’s constructivism, where Piaget dis-
tinguished between action concepts (schemes) and more static concepts (schemas)
(Piaget, 1955; Piaget, 1970). Piaget drew a distinction between operative (active)
and figurative (static) intelligence, where operative understanding of reality focused
on the actions or modifications of “reality” (Furth, 1968). Piaget argued that many
of the elements of thinking viewed by Immanuel Kant (Piaget, 1970, 1972) as innate
concepts (such as causality, time, space, etc.) were not innate but emerged from
interactions between the child’s actions, mental representations, and constructions
through a series of invariant developmental stages. For example, sensori-motor
intelligence reflected the understanding of how objects can be manipulated (illus-
trating primitive concepts of causality), while concrete operational intelligence
reflected the understanding that changing one dimension (e.g., height) could com-
pensate for changes in another dimension (e.g., width) so that quantity would be
conserved. Piaget also identified the process of “decentering” that emerged during
the period of concrete operations so that the individual could step away from the
perception of a static stimulus to imagine possible transformations of that stimulus.
This concept of decentering was relevant to the development of perceptions of
space, concrete operational thinking where thinking is not reducible to focusing on

one dimension, and to the ability to coordinate different aspects, perspectives, and
elements in a coordinated system (Feffer, 1967). For example, the coordination of
different perspectives in a spatial field involved imagining how a change in my posi-
tion in space to the position of someone else would lead to a different visual experi-
ence of that stimulus. Thus, the growth of these “constructions” of reality involved
moving away from being anchored by a figurative or static visual stimulus to imag-
ining possible changes and how these are related to one another within a system.
Decentering is also part of Beck’s model, but in Beck’s model the emphasis is step-
ping away from what one sees to considering possible alternatives.
The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology
Beck’s model did not emerge out of a vacuum. American academic psychology was
beginning to develop what became known as the Cognitive Revolution. In the 1960s
and 1970s simple reinforcement models or social imitation models came under
attack. One of the most effective challenges was made by MIT linguist Noam
Chomsky (1959) whose review of B. F. Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior provided a
devastating criticism of the limits of a strictly operant and behavioral model of lan-
guage. Skinner’s model of language acquisition was based on reinforcement of ver-
bal utterances and rejected the “black box” inside the child that facilitated language
acquisition. Chomsky viewed his book review as a more general criticism of behav-
iorism and argued that he would offer a reductio ad absurdum of the behavioral
model. According to Chomsky language is not reducible to a vocabulary of sounds
or words but rather entails an underlying set of rules of syntax (Chomsky, 1968,
1969). These rules of syntax are so complicated that even linguists, let alone parents
and children, can accurately describe them. Chomsky argued that children are born
with “innate ideas”—a kind of language acquisition device—that (in today’s com-
puter world) might constitute predetermined software for learning a language.
Moreover, these are universal and similar parts of this structural model of language
are found in all known languages. Rules for transformation of sentences entail these
underlying rules. Furthermore, research on how children acquire language clearly
illustrated that they did not directly copy what was heard, but rather reduced the
complexity of their imitation to a set of simpler rules that eventually developed into
the more complex language rules of the child’s community.
The cognitive model is an information processing model, that proposes that dif-
ferences in how information is processed and evaluated have implications for psy-
chopathology. Cognitive models of perception, memory and attention were gaining
considerable influence. Ulrich Neisser was one of the forerunners of this in American
psychology with the publication of his book Cognitive Psychology in 1967 (Neisser,
1967). The important work of Endel Tulving emphasized the constructive aspects of
cognition and perception in contrast to models of reinforcement or mental copies
(Tulving, 1972; Tulving & Thompson, 1973). Jerome Bruner advanced a cognitive
248 R. L. Leahy
model stressing the active interpretation of stimuli and events and the organization
of intelligence in his early book A Study of Thinking (Bruner et al., 1956).
One of the dramatic examples of the effects of cognitive mediation and the con-
struction of memory is the work on false memories, where participants in experi-
ments are given a false story about an earlier event that they later believe to be true,
and research showing that participants’ recollection of events is influenced by new
information after an event that biases their recall (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus &
Ketcham, 1996). Memory is not simply a copy of reality, as if we observe something
and take a picture and retrieve the file later. The research on schemas underlying
false recall indicates that memory is an active construction. This model is consistent
with Beck’s model of schemas that suggests that the content of depressogenic think-
ing is often established early on and that this leads to a selective focus on the nega-
tive. Similarly, the content of anxiety (threat orientation) is also set down early
leading to selective attention to potential, if not real, threats.
Another development during this period was the emergence of work in artificial
intelligence. The computer, as a rational information processing machine, became a
metaphor of how the human mind could work. Two of the leading proponents of
this—Minsky and Papert (1969) of MIT—attempted to view the development of
intelligence as analogous to computer programming) (also, see Rosenblatt, 1958).
Thus, the process of knowing could theoretically be described in terms of a set of
rules about how “facts” were evaluated and combined. During this time the field of
information processing was gaining popularity. The question addressed by this
approach is how information is accessed, combined, and evaluated. Rather than
view learning of information as a simple copy of “reality”, the new approach viewed
the mind as actively engaged in selecting information while filtering out other infor-
mation, giving greater emphasis to the temporal acquisition of information (e.g., the
primacy vs. recency effect), and viewing memory as affected by processes (such as
emotion or connections within networks).
The information processing model had a direct effect on the development of the
cognitive model of psychopathology. For example, Beck and Clark advanced an
information processing model of anxiety based on biased attention to perceived
threat accompanied by escape and avoidance (Beck & Clark, 1997). Similarly,
Davis and others have found that the self-concept is based on biased information
processing that maintains or triggers depression (Davis, 1979).
Another parallel development in the early years of the cognitive model was work
in social psychology on how people explained their behavior and the behavior of
others. Although the attribution model was later integrated into a cognitive model of
depression, Beck was also developing his cognitive model during the same period
that major contributions were being made on explanatory style and attribution pro-
cesses. Initially, drawing on the work of Fritz Heider (1958) on what eventually
became known as “naïve psychology”, or how individuals explained psychological
processes, social psychology and the social cognition branch became focused on
how individuals inferred intention and dispositions (traits) in self and others.
H. H. Kelley’s model of covariation inferences suggested that people make infer-
ences about dispositions or traits based on an individual’s response repeated over
time (high consistency), as different from others’ responses (low consensus), and as
similar across similar situations (high distinctiveness) (Kelley, 1967, 1972). In addi-
tion, Kelley argued that causal inference would include consideration of sufficient
and necessary causes. Edward Jones and Keith Davis also advanced a model of
dispositional inference in a classic paper, From Acts To Dispositions The Attribution
Process In Person Perception, which placed considerable emphasis on processes
underlying inference of intentions to reach inferences of traits or dispositions (Jones
& Davis, 1965). All of this work influenced Weiner who outlined dimensions of
attribution for success and failure—effort, ability, task difficulty, luck—that served
as a cognitive model of motivation (Weiner, 1974).
This model had a significant influence on the cognitive model of learned help-
lessness and learned hopelessness developed by Seligman, Alloy, Abramson and
colleagues (Abramson et al., 1978; Alloy, 1988). According to the earlier model of
helplessness advanced by Seligman, where “giving up” (helplessness) was viewed
as a consequence of exposure to inescapable negative consequences (that is, the
animal or human’s responses had no effect on outcome, this non-contingency of
outcome and response lead to a decrease in behavior (Seligman, 1975). However, as
elegant as the non-contingency model first appeared it could not account for the low
self-esteem and the general hopelessness across situations that was observed in
human subjects. Consequently, Alloy and Abramson (Alloy et al., 1988; Abramsonky
et al., 1989) considered how attribution processes might underly a more general
cognitive process in helplessness, hopelessness and depression resulting in the
reformulated model of learned helplessness. Thus, depression (along with helpless-
ness and hopelessness) was found to be related to attributions of failure to stable
qualities of the self—such as lack of ability—that were viewed as out of control of
the person. Moreover, these negative attributions were generalized across time and
situations, rather than being attributed to a unique situation. This reformulated
model is consistent with the general cognitive processes suggested by Beck. It is
instructive to understand that both Seligman and Beck were at the University of
Pennsylvania and Seligman received training in the cognitive model. The attribution
model that emerged has had an important influence on decades of research on the
cognitive vulnerability to depression—work that is consistent with the cognitive
model (Alloy et al., 2004, 2006).
The cognitive model derived from the attribution literature has had a significant
impact on the work of Carol Dweck on beliefs about abilities that can be seen as
either fixed or changeable (growth). Dweck refers to these as Mindsets (Dweck,
1988). For example, the mindset that your ability on something is not changeable
can quickly lead to beliefs about helplessness, hopelessness and depression and to
giving up with the first experience of failure. In series of studies over many years
with children, adults, and on corporate culture, Dweck has shown that growth views
of abilities lead children to persist after failure (try hard, find the challenge, this is
interesting) and to the ability of adults to increase efforts following failure (Dweck,
1975; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Similarly, educational systems and corporate cul-
tures that emphasize growth mindsets have higher productivity and morale (Dweck
& Yaeger, 2019). The implication of mindsets for clinical work is that some
250 R. L. Leahy
individuals believe that their abilities and emotions are fixed which contributes to
feelings of defeat and helplessness, whereas others endorse beliefs about growth
and change which encourages further effort.
Beck’s Cognitive Model
The cognitive model is a general model of psychopathology, placing emphasis on

the role of cognition in the elicitation and maintenance of emotional disorders. For
example, although depression can arise for any number of reasons (biochemical,
external stressors, lack of skills to cope) once the problematic condition has mani-
fested itself there is specific cognitive content that emerges is specifically related to
the psychological disorder. The origins of the cognitive content could be due to any
number of factors, including biochemical, genetic, early socialization, cultural fac-
tors, and other life experiences (Beck & Haigh, 2014)). For example, the genetic
predisposition toward depression for some individuals will result in a biochemical
diathesis toward depression which, along with early experiences of loss, criticism,
or threats of abandonment, will lead to vulnerability to depression. Cultural factors
that might place emphasis on achievement or perfectionism can also affect the vul-
nerability. More recent life events, such as the loss of a job or relationship, can then
precipitate a depressive episode. Personal schemas of inadequacy and incompetence
are activated that then generate a wide range of automatic thought biases such as
fortune telling (“I will fail”), personalizing (“This is all my fault”), catastrophizing
(“It’s terrible not to do well”), mind-reading (“Other people think I am a loser”), and
other beliefs. These are then filtered through conditional beliefs or maladaptive
assumptions—the rule-books that make one more vulnerable. These include rules
such as “I need to be perfect”, “I should criticize myself if I don’t do well”, “If other
people don’t like me then I am worthless”. The interacting and self-confirming
nature of the automatic thoughts, maladaptive assumptions, and schemas operate as
a closed system further escalating and maintaining the depression.
Beck describes a kind of cognitive architecture that reflects the foundation and
building blocks of cognitive content underlying psychopathology. At the very foun-
dation are schemas where are general concepts about self and others. Presumably
these schemas are established during childhood, although they can also arise at any
time during the life span. Schemas are the lens through which experiences (past,
present and future) are perceived. Examples of negative schemas for the depressed
individual are loser, incompetent, unlovable, out of control, and ugly, while schemas
about others are that they will be judgmental, controlling, superior, and rejecting.
The second layer of the architecture include maladaptive assumptions are condi-
tional beliefs, such as “If-then” or “should” beliefs. These include rules for coping
with the negative content of the schemas. For example, “If I am perfect, then I won’t
be rejected” or “If I defer to others, they won’t abandon me”. These conditional
beliefs direct the compensating strategies that the individual employs to avoid the
expected negative consequences of the personal and interpersonal schemas. On the
more immediate level is the third part of the architecture—the automatic thoughts—
that are thoughts that come spontaneously, appear plausible and reflect the biases or
distortions implicated by the schemas and conditional beliefs. Beck identifies a
number of typical biases such as mind-reading (“He thinks I am a loser”), labeling
(“I am a loser”), dichotomous thinking (“Either I succeed or fail”), over-generalizing
(“I seem to fail at so many things”), catastrophizing (“It’s awful if people don’t like
me”), discounting the positive (“It doesn’t count that I did well at that, since that
was easy”), and others. These three levels—schemas, conditional beliefs, and auto-
matic thoughts—serve to reinforce each other as the individual continues to selec-
tively attend to, remember, and evaluate experiences consistent with the content of
the negative belief system.
In addition to this systemic depressive cognitive content, Beck argues that spe-
cific modes also arise. Modes are coordinated systems of cognition, behavior, emo-
tion, and interpersonal functioning that function as a system. For example, in anger
mode the cognitive content is one of viewing events in terms of humiliation, per-
sonal insult, being blocked by others from valued goals, unfairness, and other
themes of insult, submission, and interpersonal threat. Once the anger mode is acti-
vated, events are processed through this biased lens and interpersonal behavior is
then activated to cope with the “threat”. This includes attack, defense and attempts
to dominate, accompanied by increased emotional energy to fuel the angry response.
The evolutionary model has had a significant influence on the cognitive model.
Beck and his colleagues have viewed modes as adaptations to threats in the evolu-
tionary relevant environment. For example, panic and agoraphobia may be viewed
as adaptive responses to being exposed to potential predators in an open field or,
alternatively, being trapped where exit is blocked. Social anxiety disorder may be
viewed as an adaptation to avoid offending strangers and depression as an adapta-
tion to accepting loss and defeat and ultimately pursue other goals. Once the mode
is activated the associated thoughts, behaviors and interpersonal functioning are
also activated.
Cognitive Model of Therapy
The process of therapy may differ considerably among therapists, but the general
cognitive model emphasizes the following: (1) each session has an agenda that
includes a review of the previous session, self-help assignments, and one or two
problems for the current meeting; (2) the emphasis is on current functioning rather
than the distant past, although work on the origins of schemas may include memo-
ries and interpretations from the past; (3) the emphasis is on what the patient is
consciously thinking, rather than interpretations about unconscious content; (4) the
therapist and patient collaborate using a Socratic Dialogue that emphasizes mutual
respect, questions and answers, and a tentative approach to beliefs; (5) thoughts or
beliefs are considered fair game for examination, empirical testing and refutation;
(6) a wide range of techniques are used to test, examine, and if necessary replace
252 R. L. Leahy
problematic beliefs; (7) in-session work is generalized to between session self-help

with homework assignments to see if the patient can utilize these techniques to their
advantage; and (8) feedback is elicited after each session and at the beginning of the
next session.
The cognitive model of therapy employs a wide range of techniques (Leahy,
2017). These include socialization to therapy, bibliotherapy, identifying and catego-
rizing automatic thoughts, examining the degree of belief and emotions associated
with these thoughts, evaluating the costs and benefits of believing the thought, the
semantic technique (definition of the thought), setting up behavioral experiments to
test the thought, the double-standard technique (would you apply this to a friend),
examining the implication of the thought (downward arrow), role playing for and
against the thought, using metaphors and images, and many other techniques. The
cognitive therapist also employs behavioral techniques such as activity scheduling,
tracking pleasure and mastery, assigning activities, developing a reward menu, and
setting goals in order to test beliefs. For example, the idea “I have no pleasure in my
life” is tested out by keeping track of pleasure, relating changes in pleasure ratings
with activities, time of day, people with whom the patient is interacting and anti-
pleasure thoughts (“This doesn’t count because it used to be more fun”). Cognitive
therapists increasingly employ mindfulness exercises in order to assist patients in
gaining some emotional distance from their thoughts. Exposure techniques are used
to challenge the idea that one cannot tolerate the discomfort or experience of a spe-
cific situation.
Throughout the course of therapy, the therapist and patient develop a case con-
ceptualization that guides the understanding of the origin of beliefs, consequences,
problematic coping (avoidance, compensation), effects on one’s relationships and
other aspects of life, and how the cognitive architecture (automatic thoughts, condi-
tional rules, and schemas) interact to maintain the problematic issues (Persons,
1993; Needleman, 1999; Kuyken et al., 2009). In treating individuals with personal-
ity disorders the case conceptualization begins with understanding how individual
schemas about self and others were established during childhood, how these sche-
mas resulted in problematic strategies of avoidance and compensation, and how the
self-confirming selective attention, memory, and evaluation of information further
maintained and strengthened these beliefs. Alternative realistic and adaptive beliefs
are considered and examine as to how they might lead to more beneficial outcomes.
Cognitive models for a wide range of psychopathology have been advanced,
including panic disorder (Clark, 1997), social anxiety disorder (Chambless & Hope,
1996; Clark, 1997), PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Resick, 2018), substance misuse
(Beck, 1993), psychosis (Beck & Rector, 2005), bipolar disorder (Leahy & Beck,
1988) pain (Winterowd et al., 2003), health anxiety (Salkovskis & Warwick, 2001),
bulimia (Fairburn et al., 2003), couples (Epstein & Baucom, 2002), families (Dattilio
& Epstein, 2005) and many other problems.
In addition, the cognitive model has been applied to conceptualizing and treating
personality disorders with each personality disorder reflecting specific schemas and
coping strategies (Beck et al., 2014). For example, the Avoidant Personality views
the self in terms of being Vulnerable to depreciation, rejection, as socially inept and
incompetent and views others as critical, demeaning and superior. Corresponding

beliefs include “It’s terrible to be rejected, put down”, “If people know the real me,
they will reject me” and “I can’t tolerate unpleasant feelings”. Specific coping strat-
egies include “Avoid evaluative situations” and “Avoid unpleasant feelings or
thoughts”. In contrast, the Narcissistic Personality Disorder views the self as spe-
cial, unique, superior and above the rules, views others as inferior, admirers, need-
gratifiers for exploitation, and endorses rules such as: “Since I’m special, I deserve
special rules”, “I’m above the rules” and “I should get my way”. The narcissist
copes by using others, transcending rules, manipulating, and competing. The thera-
peutic model begins with developing a case conceptualization of how these personal
and interpersonal schemas arose and how they have affected various aspects of the
patient’s life. For example, the avoidant personality individual may have been criti-
cized and humiliated during childhood and told how much more competent other
children are. This led to the development of beliefs about one’s inadequacy and the
critical nature of others. Examples of avoidance and deference to others maintained
these negative beliefs and served to avoid being criticized by others. Cognitive ther-
apy would assist the patient in identifying the typical negative automatic thoughts
that support the avoidant personality, such as mind-reading (“She thinks I am bor-
ing”), personalizing (“If other people are not having a good time it must be because
I am a drag”), and catastrophizing (“It’s awful if people don’t like me”). These
beliefs can be examine using a wide range of techniques such as examining the
advantages and disadvantages of these thoughts, evidence for and against, would
you apply these thoughts to others, can you act in opposition to the thought, set up
behavioral experiments to test out the thought, universalize not being liked by
someone, and other techniques (Leahy, 2017)
How Are Other Approaches Viewed?
Does the cognitive model reject other approaches? It is common for proponents of
models to pit one against another as if we are in a race where there is one “winner”.
Patients come to therapy with problems to be solved, not seeking a specific school
of therapy.
Does the Content of Thoughts Matter?
Behavioral and third wave adherents often suggest that focusing on the content of
thoughts is of little or no value, suggesting that patients find themselves struggling
with their thoughts. Of course, it is not simply the content of thoughts that leads to
change, but the cognitive therapist does place a value on this process. The cognitive
model does not reject behavioral or third-wave approaches, but rather places empha-
sis on specific content areas of thoughts that are open to modification. The cognitive
254 R. L. Leahy
therapist will use behavioral exposure and behavioral activation in order to test the
patient’s negative thinking. For example, activity scheduling is used to examine the
patient’s belief that nothing gives them pleasure or that they feel down all the time.
In keeping with the idea that the patient can test out beliefs through behaviors, the
ultimate goal is to change the beliefs that maintain passivity, isolation, hopelessness
and helplessness.
The cognitive therapist views the content of thoughts as important. Indeed, it was
the argument advanced by behavioral proponents and ACT that addressing the con-
tent of thoughts was not helpful and could be potentially harmful. This does not
appear to be consistent with the research showing that the cognitive model of
depression is effective in reversing depression and has long-lasting effects (Hollon
et al., 1990). Indeed, reviewing the research over the last 50 years suggests that
cognitive therapy is as effective and, in some cases, more effective than psychophar-
macology and that the positive effects of cognitive therapy are more long-lasting
than the effects of medication treatment (Hollon et al., 2021). It is difficult to see
how addressing the content of thoughts would be harmful if the therapy is so
effective.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that change in panic disorder is related
to changes in the content of panic thoughts (Hofmann et al., 2007), depressive
symptoms is related to changes in the content of negative thoughts (Garratt et al.,
2007). The cognitive mediation evidence suggests that the content of thoughts is
related to both psychopathology and the improvement in cognitive therapy.
Behavior Counts
It is unfortunate that some novices doing cognitive therapy may view the therapy as
an exercise in philosophical debate. Perhaps the idea that the cognitive model relies
on the Socratic Method of questions and answers and that the catalyst for psychopa-
thology is the content of thoughts leaves some therapists with the idea that therapy
is like a sophomore seminar in philosophy. This was not the model of cognitive
therapy of depression that Beck and his colleagues advanced, since early in therapy
behavioral activation techniques were part of the treatment protocol. Behavior
counts—and using pleasure predicting, charting pleasure and mastery, and assign-
ing pleasurable activities—are all fundamental to the cognitive model. As men-
tioned earlier, behavior is used to test out cognition. This includes testing the
thoughts that “I have no pleasure”, “I will get rejected”, and “It’s too hard”.
Behavioral advocates like to claim that if you remove the behavior the cognitive
approach is not as effective. But this misses the point: Behavior is a fundamental
component of the cognitive approach because it allows us to test the patient’s
unhelpful thoughts.
Rather than view therapy as simply the application of a lot of techniques in a robotic
and formulaic fashion, the cognitive therapist will utilize an integrative case con-
ceptualization. Indeed, the model of case conceptualization has expanded over the
last several decades to include genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary theory, cultural
and socialization factors (Beck & Haigh, 2014). A limitation of the first wave behav-
ioral models is that they do not provide the richness and depth of case conceptual-
ization that is possible with the cognitive model. For example, a cognitive model of
envy would entail a recognition of dominance hierarchies, general preferences for
higher status within groups, a range of cognitive content underlying envy (discount-
ing one’s positives, idealizing other people’s lives, resentment, competition and
undermining others) (Leahy, 2015; Leahy et al., 2021). Admittedly, one could use
the idea of reinforcement and modeling to describe how envy or jealousy are
learned, but the elaborate network of thoughts, behaviors, interpersonal strategies
and safety behaviors is better conceptualized, in my view, by an integrative cogni-
tive model. Jealousy, as an example, can be understood as the interaction of a num-
ber of systems and processes: evolution, genetics, socialization, honor culture,
attachment history, relationship history, rumination style, personality type, self and
other schemas, thought-action fusion (equating a thought with an imminent action
or reality), and conditional assumptions about relationships. It would be difficult to
put this together from a behavioral, ACT, DBT, or mindfulness approach. The con-
cepts simply are not there.
Parsimony vs. Complexity
First wave behavioral therapists will advocate for the parsimony of their concepts
and conceptualization, arguing that there is no need for the complexity of a cogni-
tive model. I believe there are several reasons to doubt this advantage. First, the very
nature of what a stimulus is that triggers a response is a better regarded as a cogni-
tive concept. What does the stimulus mean to the individual? How did it acquire this
meaning? What other meanings or implications are inferred from this one stimulus?
Why does the individual use one set of coping strategies rather than another (e.g.,
avoidance rather than approach?). The behavioral model might argue that certain
behaviors are reinforced, while the cognitive model would use a different approach
and argue that certain beliefs are confirmed.
Furthermore, if behaviorists and ACT advocates did not believe that the content
of thoughts mattered, then why would they try to convince people (patients, other
therapists) that the content does not matter. Persuasion is about changing content.
And, how does one go about persuading others? Well, it appears that they use the
usual cognitive model by examining the consequences of a thought, the evidence for
and against, and the logical implications or absurdity of a way of thinking or
256 R. L. Leahy
behaving. Indeed, the rational and pragmatic principles underlying the cognitive
model are the basis of rational discussion—and science.
Disengagement and Decentering Can Be Helpful
The Mindfulness, ACT, DBT and Metacognitive approaches have made significant
contributions in separating out how one “relates” to negative thoughts rather than
simply the content of the thoughts. ACT is especially convincing in this regard,
encouraging the patient to step away, practice mindfulness awareness, accept the
thought, and focus on valued action (Segal et al., 2002, Linehan et al., 2007; Hayes
et al., 2011; Wells, 2011). This can be liberating for patients who find themselves
with an internal dialogue that keeps them locked into their isolation and rumination.
Similarly, the metacognitive model of Adrian Wells using a technique of detach-
ment—that is, stepping back, observing, and letting go—to illustrate that one does
not need to get entangled with the content of the thought. Some of the techniques
that reflect detachment—such as treating intrusive thoughts as telemarketing calls,
trains in the station, or clouds passing in the sky—are immediately helpful to many
patients who get hijacked by their thoughts. Again, mindfulness and detachment
may be particularly helpful for patients whose problem is being hijacked by
unwanted thoughts, rather than treating these thoughts as background noise. The
work in the metacognitive model on rumination and worry suggests that this detach-
ment can be effective, even when the content of thoughts is not addressed (Wells
et al., 2010). One of the problems that arises with rumination and worry is that the
patient may acknowledge that a thought is extreme or even irrational, but insist on
“Yes, but… I could be the one”. Mindful detachment bypasses this endless loop
of doubt.
Acceptance Is Helpful—Even Necessary
Hayes and his colleagues have been instrumental in advancing the idea that accep-
tance of certain “givens”, including external conditions, emotions, sensations, and
the like, may be an important part of moving on to commitment to action toward
valued goals. Although one can argue that the cognitive model does include an
acceptance piece—“Given that this is true, what do you think about it?” or “Given
that this is true, what can you do”—the ACT and DBT models have made a compel-
ling case for acceptance as simply good reality testing. Living in the real world
means that you have to live with reality. There is a version of a cognitive model—
intolerance of uncertainty—that includes an element of acceptance. This model
suggests that it may be essential for the patient to accept some uncertainty, rather
than equate uncertainty with a bad outcome or with irresponsibility (Dugas et al., in
press; Hebert et al., 2019).
Relevance of More Complicated Problems
Learning theory owes its origins to research on laboratory animals where the condi-
tions of the experiment were well controlled. This has little similarity to what life is
like for human beings. Therapists in individual practice are not limiting themselves
to the treatment of simple phobia, panic, agoraphobia or other well specified prob-
lems. Indeed, I have been interested in expanding a modern cognitive model to
address jealousy (Leahy, 2018; Leahy & Tirch, 2008), envy (Leahy, 2021), regret
(Leahy, in press), ambivalence (Leahy, 2015) and other more complex emotional
issues that are often key elements in the lives of our patients. In fact, because of the
openness to conceptual models, the cognitive model can also be expanded to include
many of the heuristics that Kahneman and others have identified that can affect
decision making and beliefs about one’s emotions. These include heuristics about
the prediction of emotion (affect forecasting, immune neglect, durability), avail-
ability, representativeness, time discounting, and other “schemas” for information
processing biases (Kahneman, 2011; Leahy, 2004, 2015; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).
Many of these heuristics or biases in how information is processed can be the focus
of a much-expanded cognitive model of psychopathology that can help address how
psychopathology is maintained by problematic beliefs about how the world actually
functions and how one’s behavior will lead to dramatic changes in emotion. This is
an area of immense possibility that one would be hard pressed to develop from a
behaviorist, acceptance, DBT, or mindfulness approach.
Philosophical Problems with Behaviorism
Many of us will recall in college or graduate school becoming enamored with the
ideas of operational definitions, the verifiability principle and the elements of logi-
cal positivism (Ayer, 1959). Thus, we specify the terms or observations that will
define a concept, we claim that a concept is meaningful only if it can be verified by
observation, and we hold to the principles of logical positivism (Ryle, 1949). This
was the hallmark of the emergence of behaviorism in philosophy in the 1930s and
was often used as a reason to consider inferences about mental processes as mean-
ingless since they could not be directly observed or to describe thoughts as behav-
iors. The verifiability principle and logical positivism appeared to dominate
American and British philosophy for quite some time but eventually was challenged
by a number of apparently devastating arguments. For example, the reliance on the
operational definition and the verifiability principle for meaning (Ryle, 1949) does
not take into account that there are meaningful statements that are not verifiable—
such as Austin’s (1962) examples… “Please pass me the sugar”. We all know what
it means when someone makes a request, but we would not equate the meaning with
the truth of the statement. Other declarative language acts that Austin and others
identified appear to question the limited concept of the verifiability principle.
258 R. L. Leahy
Further, the verifiability principle seemed to favor a confirmation bias, while Popper
suggested that the truth value of a statement would depend on how we would dis-
confirm a statement (Popper, 1959). Is a concept open to disproof and, if so, how?
Indeed, one of the most prolific defenders of logical positivism, A. J. Ayer, eventu-
ally acknowledged that it was a failed project. In 1976 Ayer claimed “The most
important” defect of logical positivism “was that nearly all of it was false”
(Hanfling, 2003).
Other challenges to behavioral models include the issue of how we infer if some-
one understands something. Philosopher John Searle (1980) offers an example of
how an individual can follow a set of rules that appear to represent an accurate
“translation” of Chinese language and activities but that the individual carrying out
the “instructions” might appear to “know” what the messages are, but they do not.
Another example of how behaviorism is limited is its difficulty in accounting for the
experience of understanding, feeling, or what philosophers refer to as qualia. For
example, Nagel (1974), in his classic essay “What is it like to be a bat?”, argues that
a strictly behavioral model cannot account for the difficulty or impossibility for us
to understand what a bat’s experience is. We simply cannot know what it is like to
be a bat. Are we to assume that people and animals do not have these internal expe-
riences that are not reducible to behavior?
Further, as noted above in the discussion on language, behavioral approaches
cannot account for how language is acquired since the rules of syntax and the under-
lying structure or language are so complicated that linguists cannot adequately
describe them, children do not directly imitate but rather reduce the complexity of
imitation to regularized simpler levels of utterance, and the transformational nature
of language (changing the order of words and the relationship among categories)
cannot be accounted for by behavioral models.
Different Approaches for Different Problems
Many years ago, I did a lot of child behavior therapy work and it appeared to me
then—as it does now-that the best approach was parent training, contingency man-
agement, time out, rewards, and contracting with kids. The first wave behavioral
model had considerable advantages then and now. If you are working with OCD
then the best approach is exposure with response prevention, although metacogni-
tive work can also be helpful (Solem et al., 2010). In treating borderline personality,
the approach I would recommend is DBT, not cognitive therapy, although some
psychodynamic models are somewhat effective (Clarkin et al., 2007; Fonagy &
Luyten, 2009) and Young’s schema focused therapy is also effective (Giesen et al.,
2006; Sempértegui et al., 2003). Why is it that these different approaches can some-
times be preferable to a cognitive therapy model? With children and parents there
are limits in using cognitive restructuring given the developmental level and the
necessity to change the contingencies of behavior. You are not going to get very far
with a five-year-old using the semantic techniques, cost-benefit analyses, double
standard, or vertical descent cognitive techniques. All of that will fall on develop-
mentally deaf ears. With OCD cognitive disputation may feed into a rumination and
reassurance seeking response, further reinforcing the OCD doubt, without provid-
ing the patient the opportunity to face their fears. Similarly, with simple phobia
exposure therapy is the preferred treatment. You can rationalize the safety of a
behavior every session but if the patient does not enter the field of experience it will
be an empty exercise of a futile debate. In the treatment of borderline personality,
the DBT model has great advantages as a skill acquisition approach that assists in
behavior and emotion regulation. Although there is some cognitive content in DBT
(e.g., emotion myths), the emphasis is didactic, behavioral practice, and acquir-
ing skills.
The fact is that no one approach works for everyone, just as no one medicine
works for all maladies. We need to move beyond schools and more toward the com-
mon processes—or fitting the therapy to the problem—rather than trying to fit the
problem to the therapy.
Final Thoughts
We often find ourselves defending our approach while attacking others as if this is a
winner-take-all business that we are in. The only “winner” that matters should be
the patient and patients are seldom acolytes of schools of therapy. I know that my
own views of ACT and mindfulness have evolved over the years and I am happy to
say that I have benefitted from having the flexibility to embrace concepts, tech-
niques and theories that I initially opposed. On the academic horizon I see the emer-
gence of a new approach advanced by Hofmann and Hayes—the Process Based
Model—that is integrative, process and problem focused, and open to using tech-
niques and ideas from first wave behavioral, second wave cognitive, and third wave
approaches. Perhaps this is the Fourth Wave—the one that we ride together.
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Advantages of Third Wave Behavior
Therapies
Akihiko Masuda and Samuel D. Spencer
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), or simply behavior therapy, can be viewed as

a family of behaviorally and cognitively oriented interventions that include, but are
not limited to, clinical behavior analysis, applied behavior analysis, behavior modi-
fication, cognitive therapy (CT), cognitive and behavioral approaches, and accep-
tance- and mindfulness-based CBTs (Hayes, 2004b; Hayes & Hofmann, 2018;
Herbert et al., 2013; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008, 2009). Today, behavior therapy,
when viewed in this way, is widely recognized as having extensive empirical sup-
port as a class of psychosocial treatments for individuals with various behavioral
health issues. These issues include depression, anxiety, substance misuse, and
chronic pain (e.g., Dimidjian et al., 2016; Nathan & Gorman, 2015), to name
but a few.
From a historical perspective, the field of behavior therapy writ large is often said
to have three phases or waves (Dimidjian et al., 2016; Hayes, 2004b). The first his-
torical wave of this tradition came about with the advent of behavior therapy in the
late 1950s and early 1960s as an alternative to the psychodynamic approach, the
prevailing model for treating psychopathology at that time. The first historical wave
of behavior therapy was marked by the application of basic behavioral learning
principles supported by experimental research (e.g., operant conditioning, respon-
dent conditioning, and S-R learning) to well-evaluated applied methods of behav-
ioral change. Examples of first wave behavior therapy procedures include
contingency management, exposure and response prevention, and systematic desen-
sitization that were designed to target changes in discrete and specific behaviors of
an individual (see O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009). Many of these behavioral proce-
dures were designed to target changes in discrete behavior of inpatient adults with
severe mental illness, individuals with developmental or intellectual disabilities,
A. Masuda (*) · S. D. Spencer

Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, USA
e-mail: amasuda4@hawaii.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_12
266 A. Masuda and S. D. Spencer
outpatient children and adults with anxiety concerns, and children with skills defi-
cits or behavioral issues.
By the late 1970s, the tradition of behavior therapy had moved into the era of CT
(Beck, 1993; Beck et al., 1979; Hofmann et al., 2013). This second generation of
behavior therapy was characterized by a new set of methods and concepts that
emphasized the role of cognitive processes (e.g., verbal behaviors, schemas, core
beliefs, automatic thoughts) in psychological health, psychopathology, and behav-
ioral change. For example, following the philosophical worldview of elemental
realism (mechanism; Herbert et al., 2013; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; Klepac et al.,
2012), second wave behavior therapies had developed and promulgated therapeutic
techniques, such as cognitive reappraisal and Socratic questioning, to identify and
modify dysfunctional cognitions and schemas that were theorized to be at the core
of human psychopathology (Beck, 1993; Hofmann et al., 2013). In theory and prac-
tice, the second wave of behavior therapy is said to have broadened the scope and
application of evidence-based interventions to complex behavioral health issues in
adult outpatient populations that circumscribed first wave behavior therapy methods
had not fully addressed (Beck, 1993; Hofmann et al., 2013), such as problematic
core beliefs and complex cognitions (verbal behaviors) and their impact on overall
behavioral repertoires of individuals across various life domains. However, first
wave behavior therapy advocates largely disagreed with this analysis, and main-
tained that cognitions did not directly cause overt behavior, but rather that cogni-
tions were essentially verbal operants that could be explained (O’Donohue &
Szymanski, 1996). Furthermore, first wave theorists argued that verbal behavior
could be explained by the tools and methods available to the first wave behavior
therapists.
Arrival of Third Wave Behavior Therapy
As described elsewhere (Dimidjian et al., 2016; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019), the origins
of third wave behavior therapy as a collective movement can be traced back to the
volume Acceptance and change: Content and context in psychotherapy (Hayes
et al., 1994). At that time, the term “third wave behavior therapy” was not formally
used to define this movement. Instead, it was loosely referred to as a “contextual
approach” or “radical behavioral” psychotherapy (Jacobson, 1997; Kohlenberg
et al., 1993). Many proponents of this movement were clinical behavior analysts,
following radical behaviorism, a philosophical worldview subscribed to by many
first wave behavior therapy scholars and clinicians (Dougher & Hayes, 2000).
Nonetheless, the proponents of this movement had already explicated many of the
key themes of what would later be called “third wave behavior therapy” and “third
wave CBT,” including theories that reflect contextual and dialectical philosophical
assumptions (Hayes et al., 1988; Jacobson, 1997) and the reconciliation of accep-
tance and change in practice (Linehan, 1994).
Advantages of Third Wave Behavior Therapies 267
The arrival of third wave behavior therapy was officially declared by a series of
writings published in 2004. These included the volume Mindfulness and accep-
tance: Expanding the cognitive-behavioral tradition (Hayes et al., 2004a) and a
seminal paper by Steven C. Hayes (2004b), Acceptance and commitment therapy,
relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies.
These writings introduced acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al.,
2012b), dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2013), behavioral activation (BA; Martell
et al., 2013), functional analytic psychotherapy (FAP; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 2007),
metacognitive therapy (MCT; Wells, 2009), and several others (Hayes et al., 2004b,
2011; Wells, 2009), as members of the third wave of behavior therapy. Of those,
ACT, DBT, and MBCT are described in the literature most frequently as third wave
CBTs (see Dimidjian et al., 2016).
Aims of the Present Chapter
Sixteen years have passed since the arrival of third wave behavior therapy was offi-
cially declared. Over the past few years, the field of behavior therapy is said to have
progressed beyond the third wave behavior therapy movement into a new era called
process-based CBT (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017, 2018; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019).
From this historical perspective, we are now well-positioned to begin to evaluate the
contributions that the third wave behavior therapy movement has brought to the
field of behavior therapy writ large, including its additive advantages in philosophy,
theory, and practice (Herbert et al., 2013; Herbert & Forman, 2013; Masuda &
Rizvi, 2019). As such, the purpose of this chapter is to review these contributions
and additive advantages. To do so, we will first present our account of third wave
behavior therapy and the characteristics of this movement. Subsequently, we will
outline changes that this movement has brought to the field of behavior therapy.
Finally, we are going to present the incremental advantages of third wave behavior
therapies in theory and practice.
Third Wave Behavior Therapies
Like the first and second generations of behavior therapy, third wave behavior ther-
apy can be understood as a collection of philosophical, theoretical, and practical
movements within the field of behavior therapy that occurred between the early
1990s and the mid-2010s, rather than as a singular, qualitatively distinct, therapeutic
paradigm of behavior change. In our view, attempting to conceptualize it as the lat-
ter is extremely challenging, if not impossible. This is because, although various
third wave behavior therapies possess some shared features, such as inclusion of
psychological acceptance and mindfulness in theory and practice and emphasis on
empirical verification in theory/treatment development (Hayes et al., 1994, 2004a,

2011; Herbert et al., 2013), these approaches have emerged from different philo-
sophical and theoretical lineages that can be incompatible with one another on a
philosophical level (i.e., worldview and philosophical assumptions; also see below
for our detailed discussion on the importance of being clear about philosophical
assumptions in theory/treatment development). Whereas, deliberately choosing one
specific philosophical worldview from which to operate may permit the assimila-
tion of various, philosophically diverse, third wave methods in both theory and
practice (e.g., see Zettle, 2005 for a functional contextual account of cognitive
mechanisms in therapy), assimilating these approaches by haphazardly following
multiple philosophical worldviews could cause resulting theories and practices to
be disorganized and incoherent. It is also important to note that these philosophical
differences seem to be quite salient even among notable third wave behavior thera-
pies, such as ACT, DBT, and MBCT (see Masuda & Rizvi, 2019 for a detailed
account of these philisophical differences).
Treating the third wave of behavior therapy as a new paradigm that is qualita-
tively distinct from previous generations of behavior therapy is also untenable. As
discussed extensively elsewhere (Hayes, 2004b; Herbert & Forman, 2013), third
wave approaches have been built on the first and second waves of behavior therapy,
and thus share many philosophical, theoretical, and practical cores with their prede-
cessors. Consider ACT as an example. At a philosophical level, ACT is said to be
similar to some first wave behavior therapies, as its philosophical worldview- func-
tional contextualism (see below)- can be understood as an extension of radical
behaviorism, the guiding philosophical worldview through which many first wave
behavior therapies and practices have been advanced (Hayes et al., 2012a; Vilardaga
et al., 2009). At theoretical and practical levels, ACT is also said to be similar to CT
of the second wave of behavior therapy (Herbert & Forman, 2013), in part because
cognitive defusion, a behavioral repertoire of looking at a thought, rather than look-
ing from that thought, which is a salient conceptual and practical feature of ACT,
originated from cognitive distancing processes that were first presented in CT (Beck
et al., 1979; Zettle, 2005). As a result, there were some heated debates from the mid
2000s to early 2010s concerning how best to view third wave behavior therapies,
such as “whether there is anything new in third wave behavior therapies” (Arch &
Craske, 2008; Hayes, 2008; Herbert & Forman, 2013; Hofmann, 2008; Hofmann
et al., 2013; Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008).
Finally, because of their topographical features in practice, the term “third-wave
behavior therapy” and “third wave CBT” are often used synonymously with the
term “acceptance- and mindfulness-based CBT” (Hayes et al., 2004a). The latter is
often difficult to distinguish from the term “mindfulness-informed psychothera-
pies” that is used to describe a group of non-traditional psychotherapies that have
emerged outside the field of behavior therapy (e.g., Bien, 2006; Germer et al., 2013;
Pilla et al., 2020). Many of these mindfulness-informed psychotherapies have origi-
nated in contemporary psychodynamic schools of thought and other less empiri-
cally oriented traditions. Today, the field of behavioral health in Western countries
continues to exist in what has been termed the era of mindfulness revolution (Li &
Ramirez, 2017; Norcross et al., 2013). In this context, secular mindfulness and
mediation practices (e.g., brief mindful breathing exercise) permeate across many
areas of everyday behavioral health practice irrespective of practitioner therapeutic
orientation and training (Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017). As such, it may be impor-
tant to differentiate the third wave behavior therapy movement from the larger
mindfulness movement. For this reason, at least in this chapter, we view third wave
behavior therapy as a collection of philosophical, theoretical, and practical advances
that occurred between the early 1990s to the mid-2010s within the behaviorally and
cognitively oriented field of behavior therapy (Hayes & Hofmann, 2018; Herbert
et al., 2013; Hofmann & Hayes, 2018). What follows is a review of third wave
behavior therapy as a historical movement within the larger field of behavior therapy.
Characteristics of Third Wave Behavior Therapy Movement
According to Hayes (2004b), the third wave behavior therapy movement is charac-
terized as follows:
Grounded in an empirical, principle-focused approach, the third wave of behavioral and
cognitive therapy is particularly sensitive to the context and functions of psychological
phenomena, not just their form, and thus tends to emphasize contextual and experiential
change strategies in addition to more direct and didactic ones. These treatments tend to seek
the construction of broad, flexible, and effective repertoires over an eliminative approach to
narrowly defined problems, and to emphasize the relevance of the issues they examine for
clinicians as well as clients. The third wave reformulates and synthesizes previous genera-
tions of behavioral and cognitive therapy and carries them forward into questions, issues,
and domains previously addressed primarily by other traditions, in hope of improving both
understanding and outcomes… from a scientific point of view, with an interest in coherent
theory, carefully assessed processes of change, and solid empirical outcomes (p. 658–660;
italics in original).
As illustrated in this description, third wave behavior therapy as a whole tends to be

holistic, contextual, and functional in its guiding philosophical assumptions (e.g.,
worldview in terms of unit of analysis, analytic goal, and truth criteria) (Hayes
et al., 2011; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). In other words, the client’s overall function-
ing and presenting concerns are said to be understood through the behavior of a
whole person in a context (e.g., act-in-context; Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Miltenberger,
2012; Skinner, 1974; Vilardaga et al., 2009) as the fundamental unit of analysis or
how a client as an unique entity interacts with internal and external environments
(e.g., emotion regulation; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Mennin et al., 2013).
Similarly, individual difference, psychosocial, and cultural factors that are relevant
to a client’s concerns (e.g. gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion/spirituality,
social class) are translated into the framework of a contextually situated act of a
whole person (Masuda, 2014, 2016) or organism-environment interaction (Hayes
et al., 1988).
In theory, as is the case with second wave behavior therapies, third wave behav-
ior therapies seem to place greater emphasis than first wave approaches on cognitive
processes (e.g., verbal behaviors, rule-governed behaviors) in the understanding of

human conditions (Anderson et al., 1997; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019; Wilson et al.,
1997). However, the focus of third wave behavior therapies is on the contextually
shaped function of cognition and other private events, such as feelings, memories,
and bodily sensations (e.g., the way a person relates or responds to them), that can
be understood using the framework of act-in-context or the organism-environment
interaction, rather than based on the content (i.e., second wave) and frequency (i.e.,
first wave) of these private events themselves (Hayes, 2004a). For example, Segal
et al. (2004) summarize this shift in focus as follows:
…our analysis of how cognitive therapy has its lasting effects… suggests that this patient
would be less likely to relapse if, during the course of her therapy, she changed the relation-
ship to her thoughts; this is, although the explicit emphasis of cognitive therapy would be
on changing the content of her thoughts through challenging them, answering them back,
seeking evidence for and against their truth value, we suggest that changes need to take
place at another level. This level had always been present in cognitive therapy but left
implicit. Our analysis suggests that unless, through the cognitive and behavioral techniques
within cognitive therapy, the patient had begun to shift her relationship to thoughts, to rec-
ognize her thoughts as thoughts, she would remain vulnerable to relapse and recurrence
(p. 301).
Here, what Segal and colleagues meant by “changing the relationship to one’s
thought” is the development of new behavioral repertoire in response to difficult
private events (e.g., depressive thoughts). That is, a potential process of change in
CT is the acquisition of responding to one’s private events as mental events (e.g.,
I’m having a thought saying “I’m not good at anything”), rather than as the verbal
rules that are held to be literally true or to be adhered.
Contributions of Third Wave Behavioral Therapies
As articulated elsewhere (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019; Mennin
et al., 2013; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008, 2009), there is no question that many
applied third wave behavior therapy concepts and methods in theory and practice
have become central parts of the behavior therapy and CBT tradition. As described
in more detail below, examples of these concepts and methods include mindfulness,
acceptance, decentering/defusion, and value clarification/construction (also see
Hayes & Hofmann, 2018; Herbert & Forman, 2011; Klepac et al., 2012; O’Donohue
& Fisher, 2008, 2009). Today these concepts and methods co-exist with previously
established ones (e.g., contingency management, exposure, and cognitive reap-
praisal) within a unified model of CBT (Mennin et al., 2013), and within the larger
field of behavior therapy (Klepac et al., 2012; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008). This
ongoing synthesis in theory and practice is another reason why using the term
“waves of behavior therapy” to differentiate three waves of behavior therapy as
distinct schools of thought and practice may not be a useful heuristic.
larifying the Assumptions of One’s Own Philosophical

C
Worldview and Those of Others
Given this historical context, one of the most notable contributions of the third
wave behavior therapy movement is the revitalization of behavior therapy as an
interconnected network of basic scientific theory, applied theory, and practice,
which is guided by an underlying philosophical worldview (Hayes et al., 2013b;
Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). During the 2000s through the early 2010s, being
clear about one’s own philosophical worldview and acknowledging that of oth-
ers had become a central topic in the field of behavior therapy (Klepac et al.,
2012). This was mainly due to the emergence of heated debates among behavior
therapy researchers, scholars, and clinicians regarding whether third wave
behavior therapies, such as ACT, were qualitatively distinct from previous gen-
erations of behavior therapy (Hayes, 2008; Herbert & Forman, 2013;
Hofmann, 2008).
One domain of comparison involved the philosophical worldviews that these
therapies follow. As a result, the field of behavior therapy now, more so than before,
recognizes the importance of being clear about one’s own underlying philosophical
assumptions (Herbert & Forman, 2013;Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; Klepac et al.,
2012). As described in detail elsewhere (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Dougher, 1995;
Hayes et al., 1988; Reitman & Drabman, 1997), a given philosophical worldview is
said to have its own unique pre-analytically chosen assumptions that are not subject
to direct empirical verification. More specifically, the assumptions of each world-
view consist of the: (a) fundamental unit of analysis (i.e., what the subject of interest
is and how it is understood), (b) principal goal of analysis (i.e., what the researcher
ultimately seeks to accomplish), and (c) truth criteria (i.e., how the researcher eval-
uates the veracity of a given analysis).
Today, the field of behavior therapy is said to be guided by two distinct philo-
sophical worldviews, namely elemental realism and functional contextualism
(Klepac et al., 2012; Reitman & Drabman, 1997). Elemental realism, which is also
known as mechanism or methodological behaviorism, is probably the most widely
followed philosophical worldview in behavioral science communities. It assumes
that the behavioral phenomenon of interest ontologically consists of critical ele-
ments interacting with one another (i.e., unit of analysis). As a philosophy of sci-
ence, elemental realism also adopts prediction as the fundamental analytic goal of
science by focusing on operationalism in defining components that together form
the reality of interest and aims to create an accurate model of that reality. Therefore,
the truth criteria of elemental realism is correspondence of the developed model and
the reality (Hayes et al., 1988; Klepac et al., 2012). Furthermore, elemental realists
tend to employ nomothetic research methods in theory building over idiographic
research methods.
Functional contextualism views the phenomenon of interest as the manifesta-

tion of behavior-environment interactions as a whole. Unlike elemental realism,
the unit of analysis in functional contextualism is holistic, not elemental, empha-
sizing the ongoing change in the act of a whole person in context. As a philosophy
of science, the principal analytic goal of functional contextualism is the prediction-
and-influence of this ongoing change of act in context with precision and scope
(see our discussion of precision and scope in theory below). As such, theories and
practices that are based on functional contextualism tend to “insist on a stronger
version of determinism as reflected in the emphasis on idiographic research meth-
ods (Klepac et al., 2012, p. 691)”. Furthermore, unlike elemental realism, func-
tional contextualism de-emphasizes ontology and assumes that knowledge is
constructed and justified for a pre-analytically stated purpose and aim. As such the
truth criteria of functional contextualism is successful working (e.g., what is true is
what is working).
What is important to note here is that every behavior therapy researcher, cli-
nician, and theorist follows a particular philosophical worldview, but often with-
out explicit awareness (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017). For the field of behavior
therapy as a whole, clarification of one’s own philosophical worldview not only
promotes the development and refinement of clinical knowledge and technology
within that philosophical framework, but it also alleviates unnecessary tensions
among behavior therapy clinicians, researchers, and theorists who happen to
follow different worldviews (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; Klepac et al., 2012).
Each philosophical worldview (e.g., functional contextualism, elemental real-
ism) offers unique a priori criteria for the unit of analysis, analytic goal, under-
standing of causality, and truth criteria that can only be applied to theories and
practices developed and refined within that philosophical worldview, but not
applied to those guided by other worldviews (Hayes et al., 1988; Klepac
et al., 2012).
Once again, the consensus among behavioral and cognitive scholars today
seems to be that the set of assumptions derived from a given philosophical world-
view is simply chosen and assumed prior to one’s scientific and clinical work,
and thus is not subject to direct scientific debates and verification (Herbert et al.,
2013; Herbert & Forman, 2013; Klepac et al., 2012). In fact, addressing the
importance of being clear about one’s own philosophical worldview and those of
others was a crucial turning point as the field of behavior therapy progressed into
the early 2010s (Klepac et al., 2012). More specifically, as discussed extensively
elsewhere (Hayes & Hofmann, 2018; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; Ii et al., 2019),
this turning point signified the dawn of the process-based CBT era. In this new
movement, behavior therapy researchers, clinicians, and scholars with different
philosophical worldviews collectively pursue the advancement of empirically
verified procedures that are closely tied to empirically verified processes of
change (Follette & Houts, 1996; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; Rosen &
Davison, 2003).
eing Deliberate About Treatment Development and Using

B
Philosophy as a Guide
Scrutiny and clarification of underlying philosophical worldviews have naturally

led to a strong focus on developing and refining basic and applied theories of behav-
ior change and well-being (Hayes et al., 2012a; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). Third
wave behavior therapies, such as ACT, DBT, and MBCT, have focused far less than
previous generations of behavior therapy on developing and refining tightly crafted
treatment protocols for specific psychological disorders (e.g., the development of
distinct therapeutic models for each of the 350+ psychiatric disorders in the current
DSM). Instead, this movement has collectively emphasized broadly applicable
evidence-based processes of change (e.g., emotion regulation, decentering, behav-
ioral flexibility; see detailed accounts of these behavioral processes below) linked to
evidence-based procedures in treatment development (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017,
2018). This is another major contribution of third wave behavior therapy, as the
larger field of behavior therapy has now revitalized the pursuit of unified and broadly
applicable principle-informed treatment development strategies by elucidating and
examining functionally important pathways of change that cut across individuals
with various behavioral health concerns (Klepac et al., 2012; Mennin et al., 2013).
Once again, it is important to acknowledge that this principle-informed treatment
development strategy has been a hallmark of first wave and second behavior thera-
pies (Goldfried & Davison, 1994; Rosen & Davison, 2003). However, as the
U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NHMI) encouraged syndrome-focused
treatment outcome research in the period between 1980 and 2010 (Hofmann &
Hayes, 2019; Insel et al., 2010), in the field of behavior therapy, the emphasis on the
close link between empirically derived principles of behavior change and evidenced-
based intervention procedures was deemphasized during that period. What follows
is a detailed explanation of the behavioral pursuit of this type of principle-informed
treatment development.
evelopment of Pragmatic Theories High in Precision

D
and Scope: A Unified Model of Behavioral Adaptation
and Behavior Change
Historically, the field of behavior therapy has sought to develop and refine principle-
informed treatment models with sufficient precision and scope, such as ones drawn
from operant and respondent principles, that allow us to understand, predict, and
influence the behavior of a given individual that is targeted in treatment (Goldfried
& Davison, 1994; Hofmann & Hayes, 2018, 2019; Miltenberger, 2012; Rosen &
Davison, 2003). In this context, precision is referred to as the extent to which a
given treatment model allows a clinician or researcher to simultaneously under-
stand, predict, and influence a behavioral phenomenon of interest accurately and
parsimoniously. Scope denotes the extent to which such a model is applicable to a

wide range of clinical cases and behavioral issues.
It is important to note that this pursuit of developing and advancing a unified,
principle-informed treatment model is not the pursuit of a “one-size-fits-all” inter-
vention. Instead, the aim of this treatment development strategy is to reflect and
expand the ultimate question collectively posed by the field of behavior therapy that
was formulated by Gordon Paul in 1969: “What treatment, by whom, is most effec-
tive for this individual with that specific problem, under which set of circumstances,
and how does it come about” (Paul, 1969, p. 44). In the contemporary era of process-
based CBT, this important question can be rephrased as: “What core biopsychoso-
cial processes should be targeted with this client, given this goal in this situation,
and how can they most efficiently and effectively be changed?”(Hofmann & Hayes,
2019, p. 38). According to Hofmann and Hayes, this updated question “shifts atten-
tion away from identifying effective treatment for problem types, as moderated by
demographic and circumstantial characteristics, to deploying effective treatment
elements based on systems of therapeutic change processes as displayed by given
people in given situations with given goals” (Hayes et al., 2019, p. 42). For example,
instead of developing a specific treatment protocol for treating depression in indi-
viduals living with chronic pain (e.g., ACT for comorbid depression and chronic
pain), the focus of treatment development here might shift to understanding and
targeting specific, manipulatable processes of change underlying these individuals’
presenting concerns that may include depression and chronic pain, as well as
broader processes of behavioral adaptation, by deploying treatment procedures that
are empirically verified for influencing those processes.
The combination of new ideas, examination of assumptions, and a renewed
emphasis on the centrality of processes of change in treatment has begun to change
longstanding views of what behavior therapy encompasses and the processes by
which it operates (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). For example, research has indicated
that traditional, second wave, CBT methods sometimes work, in part, by changing
processes that were elucidated during the arrival of third wave methods. Specifically,
CBT-based exposure for anxiety disorders has demonstrated efficacy in part through
cognitive defusion, a major behavioral process of change in third wave behavior
therapies (Arch et al., 2012). As discussed in more detail below, cognitive defusion
or decentering is a behavioral repertoire of looking at private events (e.g., anxiety,
dysfunctional thoughts), not from them, that is targeted in many third wave behavior
therapies (e.g., Blackledge, 2007; Masuda et al., 2004). This particular way of
responding to difficult private events is known to alter the stimulus function of these
private events (Donati et al., 2019; Levin et al., 2012; Mandavia et al., 2015). Results
of Arch and colleagues suggested that the CBT-based exposure procedures fostered
this behavioral repertoire, and that this new repertoire, rather than fear reduction, a
purported mechanism of change in exposure-based interventions suggested by sec-
ond generation behavior therapies (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2008), accounted for its
treatment effects.
Additionally, process-based evidence has notably expanded the range of meth-
ods that are worthy of consideration as treatment options. Take, for example, the
data on the centrality of catastrophic thoughts in panic. Within many second genera-
tion behavior therapies for individuals with panic concerns, changing catastrophic
thoughts in form is typically the main focus of treatment (Craske & Barlow, 2014).
However, as the CBT research focus broadened, the implications turned out not to
be so clear-cut. For example, patients high in catastrophic misappraisal actually
responded more favorably to capnometry-assisted respiration training, which has
less focus on the modification of catastrophic beliefs than traditional CBT, which
deliberately targeted the modification of catastrophic thoughts (Meuret et al., 2010a,
b). This set of finding also suggests that whether a cognitive modification strategy is
an effective intervention option depends on clients and their extant behavioral rep-
ertoires (e.g., contingencies surrounding catastrophic thoughts), and that under cer-
tain circumstances, other strategies (e.g., respiration training) are viable alternative.
Similarly, research has begun to identify moderators that indicate when specific
methods, both traditional and contemporary, work best for different populations.
For example, it appears that patients with an anxiety disorder alone may do better
with traditional CBT than ACT, while those who are also comorbid with mood dis-
orders may do better with ACT than traditional CBT (Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2012).
Data of this kind suggest that evidence-based practitioners can best help their
patients by utilizing strategies from all of the generations of behavior therapy,
informed by evidence of moderation and mediation.
Continued Commitment to Empirical Verification
Despite concerns raised by critics of the third wave of behavior therapy for its
weaker commitment to empiricism (Corrigan, 2001; Öst, 2008, 2014), a large body
of literature shows that third wave behavior therapies, especially ACT, DBT, MBCT,
and BA, have continued to make a strong commitment to the empirical roots of
behavior therapy in both theory and treatment development (Dimidjian et al., 2016;
Hayes et al., 2011).
Given these concerted efforts to build and refine interventions high in both preci-
sion and scope, a large body of evidence now reveals third wave behavior therapies,
particularly MBCT, DBT, and ACT, to be notably broad in their applicability to a
wide range of behavioral and medical concerns across diverse groups of individuals
(Dimidjian et al., 2016; Hayes et al., 2011). More specifically, evidence collected in
North America and Europe demonstrates that third wave behavior therapy methods
have been applied to adolescents and adults with a wide range of behavioral and
medical conditions, including depression, anxiety, self-directed violence, substance
use problems, and chronic pain, in diverse behavioral health settings (Dimidjian
et al., 2016; Hayes et al., 2011). Regarding specific third wave interventions (e.g.,
Dimidjian et al., 2016), MBCT has been found to be particularly suitable for for-
merly depressed individuals with cognitive vulnerability to relapse (e.g., repertoires
of depressive thinking and rumination). DBT has been found to be suitable for cli-
ents with pervasive behavioral patterns of emotion dysregulation to the degree of
services that the DBT treatment team can offer. ACT is considered to be a good
treatment option for those with chronic pain, substance use problems, and a range
of anxiety-related issues. Extant evidence also indicates that MBCT, DBT, and ACT
achieve their clinical outcomes through the targeted processes of change, such as
psychological openness, mindfulness, adaptive emotion regulation, decentering,
and engagement in values-guided actions (Atkins et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2015).
Putting this large body of evidence together, Dimidjian et al. (2016) conclude the
empirical status of third wave behavior therapy as a whole as follows:
There is little doubt based on the meta-analyses reviewed that there exist a strong and grow-
ing evidence base supporting the efficacy of individual therapies commonly identified as
“third wave.” …each is supported by numerous efficacy studies, which overall attest to at
least moderate to large effect sizes for between-group comparisons, using primarily WL or
TAU conditions, or within group comparisons, although concerns have been raised about
the use of such contrasts. …it is clear that the existing evidence base supports the efficacy
of the specified therapies in the treatment of problems and populations that are of high
public health relevance, including anxiety, depression, borderline personality disorder and
suicidal behaviors, and eating disorders (p. 898).
Furthermore, as discussed briefly above, third wave behavior therapies have ven-
tured into applied themes that have traditionally been within the purview of less
empirical wings of behavioral health, such as acceptance, mindfulness, cognitive
defusion, dialectics, values, spirituality, and therapeutic common factors in theory
and practice (Hayes et al., 2004b; Qina’au & Masuda, 2020). However, unlike these
less empirically oriented traditions, third wave behavior therapies have done so
through the pursuit of empirical verification, especially in the context of examining
broadly applicable evidence-based processes of change linked to evidence-based
procedures (e.g., Arch et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2020).
Take third wave behavior therapy approaches to mindfulness as an example. The
synthesis of mindfulness into theory and practice has been identified as a novel
trend that third wave behavior therapies have brought to the field of behavior ther-
apy (Hayes et al., 2004a). As covered extensively elsewhere (Bishop et al., 2004;
Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 2003; Li & Ramirez, 2017; Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017), the
concept and practice of mindfulness originated within Buddhist traditions, and was
later adapted for use in many secular practices and settings in Western cultures.
Unlike other psychotherapy traditions that seem to eclectically incorporate mindful-
ness into their theories and practices, third wave behavior therapies have made great
efforts to adapt, construct, and refine the theory and practice of mindfulness empiri-
cally. These efforts have been pursued through investigating clinically relevant
questions, such as (a) how mindfulness is best conceptualized using behavioral
principles (e.g., Hayes et al., 2007;Hayes & Wilson, 2003; Masuda & Wilson,
2009), (b) whether mindfulness practice influences key behavioral health outcomes
(e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010), (c) what processes underly the effects of mindfulness
practice (e.g., Keng et al., 2011), and (d) who responds most optimally to mindful-
ness practice (e.g., Dimidjian & Linehan, 2008). Through this process of empirical
verification, several operationalizations of mindfulness have been derived (e.g.,
Baer et al., 2006; Chambers et al., 2009; Teasdale et al., 2002), followed by the
development of assessment tools used to conceptualize mindfulness as a key behav-

ioral process of change (e.g., Baer et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2017; Masuda &
Wilson, 2009). These empirical advances have led to further refinement of third
wave behavior therapy interventions that targets the behavioral repertoire of mind-
fulness (Baer, 2014; Hayes et al., 2003, 2006, 2011; Hayes & Wilson, 2003).
Particularly relevant to the topic of the present chapter, to be tailored to the
framework of third wave behavior therapy, the use of the term “mindfulness” has
been further clarified as referring to a behavioral process of change as well as a
therapeutic procedure or method (Hayes & Wilson, 2003; Masuda & Wilson, 2009).
As a behavioral process of change to be targeted in practice, mindfulness is concep-
tualized as the behavioral skill (i.e., operant) of becoming aware of, and open to,
whatever one is experiencing, as it is in that moment, without reacting to it or evalu-
ating it (Hayes, 2004a; Linehan, 1993, 2014). Along with this definition of mindful-
ness as a process, any therapeutic method that promotes the behavioral repertoire of
mindfulness is considered as a mindfulness procedure. Once this operational dis-
tinction between process and procedure was clarified, third wave behavior therapy
researchers began to examine whether “mindfulness practice” does, in fact, promote
the behavioral process of mindfulness in addition to the improvement of clinical
outcomes. These investigations were pursued experimentally through randomized
controlled trials (Hofmann et al., 2010) and laboratory investigations (Levin et al.,
2012). This line of research within third wave behavior therapy has made a major
contribution to the advancement of the conceptualization and implementation of
evidence-based processes of change linked to evidence-based procedures (Hofmann
& Hayes, 2018, 2019; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019).
Additive Advantages of Third Wave Behavior Therapy
When examining incremental advantages that the third wave behavior therapy
movement has brought to the field of behavior therapy writ large, it is important to
set the parameters or criteria for the events to be qualified as additive advantages. To
date, there are no well-articulated and agreed upon criteria for determining incre-
mental advantages within extant models of treatment development. However, one
way to do so is to refer to an extant guiding framework of behavioral science and its
progress. One such model is that of contextual behavioral science (CBS; Hayes
et al., 2012a, 2013a, b; Hayes & Hofmann, 2018). In a seminal article, Hayes and
his colleagues explicate CBS as follows:
Grounded in contextualistic philosophical assumptions, and nested within multidimen-
sional, multi-level evolution science as a contextual view of life, it seeks the development
of basic and applied scientific concepts and methods that are useful in predicting-and-
influencing the contextually embedded actions of whole organisms, individually and in
groups, with precision, scope, and depth; and extends that approach into knowledge devel-
opment itself so as to create a behavioral science more adequate to the challenges of the
human condition (Hayes et al., 2012a, p. 2).
What is particularly relevant to the aim of the present chapter in this statement is
“… seeks the development of basic and applied scientific concepts and methods that
are useful in predicting-and-influencing the contextually embedded actions of
whole organisms… with precision, scope, and depth.” More specifically, in this
chapter we consider any events that the third wave behavior therapy movement has
promulgated or rejuvenated for the advancement of understanding and practice of
evidence-based processes of change linked to evidence-based procedures as addi-
tive advantages of third wave behavior therapy that are now broadly shared with the
field of behavior therapy as a whole (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017; Hofmann &
Hayes, 2019).
ehaviorally-Informed Unified Models of Optimal Health

B
and Behavior Change
As discussed above, the major foci of the larger field of behavior therapy has shifted
from developing specific treatment methods (e.g., ACT, CT for depression) to build-
ing a cognitively and behaviorally informed unified model of behavior change so
that effective treatment elements are deployed based on systems of therapeutic
change processes as displayed by given individuals in given situations with given
goals (Hayes et al., 2019; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). One such unified model is
proposed by Mennin et al. (2013).
In the process of developing their unified model of behavior therapy, Mennin
et al. (2013) focused on commonalities across cognitively and behaviorally oriented
therapies, including shared goals, domains of change (i.e., “change principles”), and
therapeutic processes/procedures. More specifically, they offered a framework for
examining common characteristics of these therapeutic approaches that emphasizes
behavioral adaptation (e.g., generalized behavioral repertoire of flexibly adjusting
one’s behavior to one’s environment in order to prosper) as a unifying goal of
behavior therapy. Additionally, the model proposed three overarching domains of
change in which key behavioral processes of change are targeted by evidence-based
therapeutic procedures/techniques. These three areas are called: (a) context engage-
ment, a set of behavioral repertoires to promote adaptive imagining and enacting of
new experiences to counteract old and well-worn patterns of maladaptive associa-
tion and reinforcement; (b) attention change, a second set of behavioral repertoires
to promote adaptive sustaining, shifting, and broadening of attention to changing
context; and (c) cognitive change, a third set of behavioral repertoires to promote
adaptive perspective taking on events so as to alter verbal meanings and their emo-
tional significance. Mennin and colleagues then link specific evidence-based treat-
ment components, including behavioral exposure/activation, attention training,
acceptance/tolerance, decentering/defusion, and cognitive reframing, to behavioral
processes of change specific in each domain (e.g., repertoire of perspective taking
for changing the verbal meaning and emotional significance of verbal events to the
domain of attention change). Mennin and colleagues concluded that these interven-
tion components are emphasized to a greater or lesser degree across different cog-
nitively and behaviorally oriented treatment protocols, but that the field of behavior
therapy as a whole now considers them as evidence-based procedures to promote
fundamentally common therapeutic processes of change across a wide range of
clinical and applied cases.
Following a third wave behavior therapy unified model of behavior change and
optimal health described in detail below (Hayes et al., 2011; Masuda & Rizvi,
2019), we argue that attention training (mindfulness), acceptance, and decentering/
defusion as therapeutic procedures and behavioral processes of change linked to the
intervention procedures in Mennin et al.’ (2013) unified model are additive advan-
tages that the third wave behavior therapy movement has brought to the field of
behavior therapy. Additionally, we posit values and values-consistent behavioral
commitment (Twohig & Crosby, 2008; Wilson & Murrell, 2004) as an advancement
in the domain of behavioral exposure/activation in Mennin and colleagues’ model,
which can also be viewed as an additive advantage that the third wave behavior
therapy movement has brought to the field.
Additive Conceptual and Applied Elements
As discussed in detail below, applied models of third wave behavior therapies

emphasize the significance of attention training (mindfulness), acceptance, decen-
tering/defusion, and values and values-directed committed action (Hayes et al.,
2011; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019). Exemplars of these applied models include the psy-
chological flexibility model in ACT (Hayes et al., 2006, 2012b) and the emotion
dysregulation model along with the “hierarchy of treatment goals and targets” in
DBT (Koerner, 2012; Linehan, 1993). More specifically, these third wave models
collectively identify three interrelated domains of contextually situated (i.e.,
contingency-sensitive), generalized repertoires that are theorized to promote adap-
tive behavioral functioning. Once again, as described in more detail below, these
three generalized behavioral repertoires are called centered, open, and engaged
response styles (e.g., Hayes et al., 2011; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Masuda &
Rizvi, 2019). In these models, attention training (mindfulness), acceptance, decen-
tering/defusion, and values/values-directed committed action as treatment proce-
dures are explicated in terms of their functional relations to the centered, open, and
engaged response styles.
Attention Training and the Centered Response Style. Optimal health and well-
being require the ability to flexibly direct attention via constriction or expansion
according to changes in situational demands (Mennin et al., 2013). For third wave
behavior therapies, a set of behavioral repertoires that coincides with this adaptive
attentional ability is called the centered response style. Specifically, the centered
response style represents a cluster of behavioral skills that includes the repertoires
of: (a) intentionally becoming aware of whatever one is experiencing on a moment-

by-moment basis; (b) flexibly shifting, focusing, and expanding one’s attentional
awareness while remaining sensitive and adaptive to changes in environmental con-
tingencies; and (c) recognizing a stable sense of self as the context from which all
attended perceptual experiences unfold (Hayes et al., 2011, 2012b; Masuda & Rizvi,
2019). In practice, third wave behavior therapies deploy attention training proce-
dures, such as mindfulness exercises and meta-cognitive awareness training in
MBCT (Segal et al., 2013), MCT (Wells, 2009) and DBT (Linehan, 1993, 2014), to
promote the behavioral skill sets within the centered response style.
It is important to highlight that the field of behavior therapy has long recognized
the therapeutic effect of this centered and attentional response style (Mennin et al.,
2013; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008). For example, behavioral repertoires that are
required for effective self-monitoring, such as observing changes in one’s own
responses without strongly reacting to them, coincide with those of the centered
response style (Humphreys et al., 2008). The acts of self-awareness and -monitoring
have also been recognized as having powerful effects on other important behavioral
repertoires in clients, including: (a) the perception of their own behavior that is tar-
geted in therapy (e.g., clients with binge eating problems frequently disclose that
they did not realize, prior to self-monitoring, just how often they engage in binge
eating), (b) awareness of when and where the identified behavior is likely to occur
(i.e., antecedents, establishing operations), and (c) self-monitoring itself being part
of reinforcing or aversive continencies for the targeted behavior. These benefits of
self-monitoring have also been recognized in the context of other behavioral strate-
gies, such as urge surfing (Lloyd, 2008) and stimulus control (Poling & Gaynor,
2008). Nevertheless, previous generations of behavior therapy seemed to view these
aforementioned benefits more as byproducts of behavioral observations, rather than
as independent clinical phenomena in their own right.
The additive advantage that the third wave behavior therapy movement has
brought to the larger field of behavior therapy in this domain is the revitalization of
what has been recognized as self-monitoring as a treatment vehicle itself, and the
central emphasis on the centered response style as a generalized process of behavior
change. In fact, many third wave behavior therapies, such as ACT (Hayes et al.,
2012b), DBT (Linehan, 1993), MBCT (Segal et al., 2013), and MCT (Wells, 2009)
spend a significant amount of time in practice fostering this flexible attentional rep-
ertoire through implementing evidence-based procedures, such as attention training
and mindfulness practice (Dimidjian & Linehan, 2008). Furthermore, the field of
behavior therapy as a whole now views this centered response style as prerequisite
behavioral repertoires for optimal behavior change and behavior adaption (Masuda
& Rizvi, 2019). An extant body of evidence also points to the conceptual and applied
relevance of the centered response style to diverse individuals with a broad range of
clinical and applied issues (Baer, 2014; Herbert & Forman, 2011). Finally, a grow-
ing body of evidence has alluded to improvements in behavioral repertoires within
the centered response style as part of the underlying process of change in some
second- and third-generation behavior therapies (see Hayes et al., 2011; Segal
et al., 2004).
Acceptance, Decentering/Defusion, and the Open Response Style. In addition
to intervention procedures that centrally train attentional direction, third wave
behavior therapies use evidence-based procedures to promote emotional accep-
tance, which is characterized as a behavioral repertoire of sustained contact with
affective content without being dissuaded by elaborated thought processes that pro-
mote disengagement and avoidance (Mennin et al., 2013). Within third wave behav-
ior therapies, therapeutic procedures of acceptance and decentering/defusion in
Mennin and colleagues’ unified model are explicated within the domain of the open
response style. The applied concept of the open response style points to a particular
functional quality of responding to one’s own internal and external environments
(Masuda & Rizvi, 2019). Specifically, it refers to the extent to which an individual
is willing to contact their own present moment experience fully and openly, as it is,
without reacting to, or impulsively acting on, that experience (Hayes et al., 2011).
Within this definition of the open response style, the applied concept of acceptance
refers to a repertoire of contacting the present moment experience openly while
becoming aware of any reactions that occur in that moment without needless efforts
to regulate them (Herbert et al., 2008). The concept of decentering/defusion refers
to the behavior repertoire of contacting the present moment experience as it is
(Luoma & Hayes, 2008). More specifically, in the context of verbal events (thoughts
and verbally evaluated emotional experiences), decentering/defusion involves expe-
riencing these events simply as mental events that are fundamentally separate from
a larger sense of self, instead of holding these mental events as literal truth. Finally,
any applied techniques that promote these aspects of the open response style are
called acceptance and decentering/defusion procedures, respectively.
Once again, in the field of behavior therapy, the significance of the open response
style for the promotion of optimal health and well-being had not been explicitly
addressed until the third wave behavior therapy movement (Herbert et al., 2008),
although some aspects of it were peripherally addressed in previous generations of
behavior therapies (Zettle, 2005). In fact, the legitimacy of pursuing the concept and
practice of acceptance had been questioned by many behavioral therapy researchers
and clinicians particularly from early 1990s to the mid 2010s (e.g., Hofmann, 2008).
Furthermore, whereas some facets of the open response style (i.e., decentering/
defusion from one’s thoughts) originated in CT, they were not necessarily viewed as
central behavioral processes of change in the previous generations of behavior ther-
apy (Beck et al., 1979; Zettle, 2005).
The additive advantage that third wave behavior therapy has contributed to the
larger field of behavior therapy regarding the open response style is that it offers an
alternative therapeutic avenue when direct change efforts in practice are not suc-
cessful or tenable (Herbert et al., 2008). As discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g.,
Goldfried & Davison, 1994; Miltenberger, 2012), directly targeting changes in emo-
tion, cognition, and behavior is a hallmark of the behavioral tradition. The third
wave behavior therapy movement does not negate the conceptual and applied value
of direct change efforts (e.g., changes in core beliefs, cognitive restructuring, dis-
traction, thought suppression), especially when doing so results in greater behav-
ioral adaptation in clients. Similarly, third wave behavior therapies choose to target
the open response style in particular contexts only if doing so is likely to foster a
client’s behavioral adaptation and vital living. Extant evidence suggests that the
promotion of the open response style through acceptance and decentering/defusion
strategies, together with the promotion of the centered response style, is especially
indicated when a client’s overall behavioral repertoire is restricted by: (a) unwork-
able, yet persistent efforts to control and avoid one’s own unwanted thoughts, affect,
and memories, or (b) cognitive entanglement with one’s own self-narrative (Hayes
et al., 2012b; Herbert et al., 2008).
Values, Values-Directed Committed Action, and the Engaged Response
Style. For third wave behavior therapies, strengthening contingencies that create
meaning in life involves cultivating connections with closely held values through
engaging in daily activities that promote vital and meaningful living (e.g., values-
based living; Twohig & Crosby, 2008; Wilson & Murrell, 2004). Values in this con-
text can be understood as “freely chosen, verbally constructed consequences of
ongoing, dynamic, and evolving patterns of activity, which establish predominant
reinforcers that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioral pattern itself”
(Wilson & Dufrene, 2008, p. 64). For example, wholeheartedness is a value for
many adult clients; this personally chosen value can serve as a verbal antecedent as
well as consequence, and augment any activities that reflect it (e.g., listening to a
loved one, cooking, working, and socializing with colleagues) as intrinsically rein-
forcing (Hayes & Wilson, 1994; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019). In this way, values may
serve as a potent reinforcer for engaging in adaptive behavioral repertoires aligned
with those values, even when such actions may inevitably lead to contact with dis-
tressing internal or external experiences. In these situations, repertoires within the
open and centered response styles may effectively be integrated with the action-
oriented engaged response style to promote flexible and adaptive behavioral
responding (Hayes et al., 2011).
Explicit focus on values work has not only been incorporated into specific third
wave behavior therapies, such as ACT, but has also been more broadly integrated
into a number of traditional behavior change interventions, including behavioral
activation, exposure therapy, CBT, and motivational interviewing. For example,
ACT, which emphasizes values-based living, has been effectively used to augment
exposure and response prevention for obsessive-compulsive disorder (Twohig et al.,
2018). Additionally, values-based interventions are often incorporated into behav-
ioral activation for depression so that clients can increasingly contact positive rein-
forcement through engagement in activities that they value and find personally
meaningful (Martell et al., 2013). Furthermore, the behavior change effect of moti-
vational interviewing can be enhanced further with values work by helping clients
contact discrepancies between their current behavioral choices and desired ones
aligned with their values, and harness the motivational potential from this discrep-
ancy to instantiate willingness to make adaptive behavioral changes (Villarreal
et al., 2020). These approaches all exemplify how values, within an engaged
response style, can serve as a motivator for engagement in health-promoting activi-
ties and behaviors, despite barriers presented by distressing inner experiences
(Hayes et al., 2012b). Augmenting empirically supported behavior change princi-
ples, such as exposure therapy and behavioral activation, with values is an example
of the additive benefits of the third wave behavior therapy movement, and how this
integration of processes has led to an effective synthesis of techniques across mul-
tiple generations of behavior therapy.
In sum, from a third wave behavior therapy perspective, greater behavioral adap-
tation or psychological flexibility characterized by the combination of centered,
open, and engaged response styles may be viewed as an ideal state of well-being
and optimal health. These behavioral skills do not eliminate psychological strug-
gles, but rather help individuals to navigate themselves through the joys and sorrows
that are an inevitable result of complex human conditions. The behavioral skills
subsumed within these three response styles also dynamically interact to aid in pro-
moting adaptive behavioral functioning in important life domains (engaged) while
bolstering attentional (aware) and cognitive (open) processes to promote the ulti-
mate goal of increased behavioral adaptation (Hayes et al., 2011; Masuda & Rizvi,
2019; Mennin et al., 2013). In a review of third wave behavior therapy methods,
Hayes et al. (2011) summarize the unification of centered, open, and engaged
response styles as follows:
Like the legs of a stool, when a person is open, aware, and active, a steady foundation is
created for more flexible thinking, feeling, and behaving. Metaphorically, it is as if there is
greater life space in which the person can experiment and grow and can be moved by expe-
riences. Although not all of the approaches target all of the processes, it seems as though
contextual forms of CBT are designed to increase the psychological flexibility of the par-
ticipants by fostering a more open, aware, and active approach to living (p. 160).
Reflection and Conclusion
Over a decade has passed since the official declaration of third wave behavior ther-
apy. As the tradition of behavior therapy moves into the era of process-based CBT
(Hayes & Hofmann, 2018; Hofmann et al., 2019), a unique context arises in which
to reflect on the additive advantages that the third wave behavior therapy movement
has contributed to behavior therapy writ large. Despite some heated debates and
mischaracterizations of the third wave as “washing away” previous “waves” of
behavior therapy, many third wave applied concepts and methods, such as psycho-
logical acceptance, mindfulness, and decentering, coexist with those from previous
generations of behavior therapy as defining features of our tradition (Hofmann &
Hayes, 2018; Mennin et al., 2013). As discussed in this chapter, one major historical
contribution of third wave behavior therapies has been to revitalize the ultimate
questions the field of clinical psychology has been seeking to address since Gordon
Paul’s pressing question: “What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this
individual with that specific problem, under which set of circumstances, and how
does it come about” (Paul, 1969, p. 44). Today, the field of behavior therapy is well
positioned to move forward into the future of intervention science by integrating
strategies and methods from diverse perspectives and generations. This approach is
furthered through the advancement of a reticular system of knowledge and technol-
ogy development, which has placed greater emphasis on broadly applicable
evidence-based processes of change linked to evidence-based procedures (Hayes &
Hofmann, 2017, 2018). Through this framework, the field of behavior therapy is
well suited to continue to instantiate behavioral science as a platform to meet the
challenges that human conditions have brought to us.
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Part IV
Treatments for Specific Disorders
First Wave Conceptualizations of Anxiety
Disorders
Cynthia L. Lancaster and Mary O. Smirnova
The shift from insight-oriented to behavioral conceptualizations of anxiety spurred

one of the most dramatic improvements in treatment efficacy in the history of anxi-
ety research (Eysenck, 1987). Further developments in psychotherapy have pro-
duced relatively smaller shifts in the efficacy of anxiety treatments since this time.
The movement from first to second wave psychotherapies marked the addition of
cognitive change strategies to behavioral change strategies.1 Although the added
focus on cognition improved outcomes in a few studies, in several studies, it did not
(for review, see Telch et al., 2014). A recent meta-analysis even suggests that treat-
ments that primarily emphasize the behavioral technique of exposure may have
slightly larger effect sizes than those that use cognitive and/or cognitive-behavioral
techniques for anxiety (although this difference did not reach statistical signifi-
cance; Carpenter et al., 2018). The shift from second to third wave psychotherapies
marked a movement toward the goal of accepting, rather than changing, anxiety-
related thoughts and emotions. Similarly, third wave therapies for anxiety are fairly
comparable in efficacy to their predecessors (e.g., Arch et al., 2012). Together, these
data highlight that behavioral conceptualizations of anxiety produced one of the
most important leaps forward for the field of anxiety treatment. How did this happen?
1
There is some nuance here, which will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Cognitive-
behaivoral therapy (CBT) includes a focus on automatic thoughts, which as the name suggests,
may not be initially explicit. However, during the course of therapy, the client is asked to use their
insight to identify and make explicit thoughts which might have initially been ‘automatic,’ suggest-
ing that these cognitions may have perhaps initially been below the client’s level of conscious
awareness. Because these thoughts are brought up to the level of ‘explicit’ cognition and focused
on as a key point for intervention in CBT, the treatment model implies the causal role of con-
sciously accessible cognition in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety.
C. L. Lancaster (*) · M. O. Smirnova

e-mail: cynthialancaster@unr.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_13
294 C. L. Lancaster and M. O. Smirnova
In part, the development of behavioral therapy initiated a movement toward

experimental methodology, with a focus on testing the efficacy of therapeutic
approaches using falsifiable hypotheses with clearly operationalized independent
and dependent variables, and a focus on the use of controlled experimental methods
to better identify causal influences (i.e., methodological behaviorism; Day, 1983).
This produced a lasting ripple of change in the science of psychotherapy, with its
resonance seen throughout all waves of psychotherapy to this day. Indeed, research
on first, second, and third wave treatments for anxiety are all marked the influences
of experimental methodology (e.g., the reliance on randomized controlled trials as
a gold-standard in initial efficacy studies). It is perhaps the empirical component of
the behavioral movement, with a reliance on experimental evaluations of falsifiable
theories, which initially allowed for such rapid improvement in our models for
understanding and treating anxiety disorders. However, because this reliance on
experimental empiricism is interwoven throughout all three waves of psychotherapy
development, this part of the behavioral movement is not particularly helpful for
distinguishing between them.
Instead, behavioral models can be better distinguished from second and third
wave models due to their reliance on learning models as explanations for the mecha-
nisms of the onset, maintenance, and treatment of anxiety-related disorders.
Specifically, behavioral theories of anxiety disorders generally emphasize the asso-
ciation of environmental stimuli and behavior-related contingences in the develop-
ment and maintenance of anxiety-related behaviors. The constitution of
anxiety-related behaviors was well defined in a model developed first proposed by
Lang (1968), which is still widely used today. Lang divided fear responses into
three, separate components, including motoric behaviors, physiological responses,
and verbal reports. Motoric behaviors, for example, might involve avoidance or
escape from a feared situation. Physiological responses could include increases in
heart rate, respiration, and perspiration. Verbal reports of anxiety could include a
spoken or written statement endorsing the presence of fear.2 Thus, behavioral con-
ceptualizations of anxiety disorders use learning models to help explain the onset,
maintenance, and treatment of the motoric behaviors, physiological reactions, and
verbal reports associated with anxiety. Therefore, first wave models of anxiety can
best be distinguished from second and third wave models due to their emphasis on
changing the environment (e.g., stimuli associations and behavioral contingencies)
to produce changes in anxiety-related behaviors.
In this chapter we will provide an overview of key behavioral models of anxiety-
related disorders. To this day, behavioral models are true to their empirical roots;
2
It is important to note that these three components of anxiety are not always highly correlated.
Indeed, studies have found that they often do not change synchronously (e.g., Allen et al., 2015).
One of the benefits of the behavioral model of anxiety is that it does not necessarily assume one
underlying latent characteristic explaining these phenomena. On the other hand, the cognitive
model, in its focus on the causal role of explicit cognition in producing changes in physiological
response and (motoric) behavior, seems to imply that they should all be highly correlated. For more
information about the cognitive model, see the section Challenges from the Second Wave.
First Wave Conceptualizations of Anxiety Disorders 295
they are typically well defined, and thus, easier to falsify. As a result, new behav-
ioral models have rapidly emerged over time to account for theory-conflicting data.
In this chapter we will provide a brief tour of several key behavioral models of anxi-
ety, occasionally stopping to highlight how new findings emerged to spur changes
in models over time. We will include a review of both early and contemporary
behavioral models. Whereas early behavioral models carefully restrain their focus
to the directly observable phenomena that were the subject of early behavioral
research (e.g., stimuli associations and behavioral contingencies), more contempo-
rary models often move beyond the focus of directly observable phenomena, and
tend to be more cross-disciplinary. For example, they incorporate into behavioral
models findings from other branches of psychology, such as evolutionary psychol-
ogy and neuroscience (see for example, the theories of biological preparedness and
inhibitory learning). After an overview of several of the most influential behavioral
models of anxiety, we will conclude by comparing and contrasting these models
with second and third wave approaches, and describing a case example to provide a
more concrete demonstration of behavioral therapy in action.
Early Behavioral Models
Classical Conditioning and Generalization
The discovery of classical conditioning was a major breakthrough in understanding

the acquisition and treatment of anxiety related disorders. Foundations of classical
conditioning were formulated by Ivan Pavlov’s (1927) iconic experiments with
dogs. Pavlov found that when dogs were repeatedly presented with food alongside
a metronome sound, dogs began salivating in the presence of the metronome sound,
even without food. In this example, food is called an unconditioned stimulus (US)
because it provokes an automatic response of salivating, and the metronome sound
is called a conditioned stimulus (CS) because this neutral stimulus becomes associ-
ated with food through conditioning. In the classical conditioning model, learning
occurs on a trial-by-trial basis, and as pairings accrue, the conditioned association
becomes stronger.
This classical conditioning paradigm readily extends to the development of anxi-
ety, and was exemplified by Watson and Rayner’s (1920) seminal study with an
infant named Little Albert. In this study, they paired a previously neutral stimulus (a
rat) with a loud sound, which led Albert to startle and cry. After repeated pairings,
Little Albert cried and showed avoidance behaviors, such as turning away, just at the
sight of the rat, even without the loud noise. This indicated that Albert had acquired
a conditioned fear response to the rat. Further, Albert’s fear response also translated
to stimuli that were perceptually similar to the rat, such as a rabbit, a dog, and a fur
coat. This latter response is now known as generalization. Generalization occurs
when there is a fearful reaction to a stimulus that is similar to the conditioned
stimulus (such as the rat), although there has been no direct fear conditioning to this
new stimulus. The more perceptually similar the stimuli are to one another, the more
likely the anxiety response will generalize (Lissek et al., 2008).
Watson and Rayner’s (1920) research spurred Mary Cover Jones’ (1924) early
work, in which she applied the basic principles of classical conditioning to extin-
guish fear responding. In this study, Jones worked with a three year old named Peter
to extinguish his fear of rabbits. A rabbit was presented repeatedly in the absence of
aversive outcomes (i.e., no unconditioned stimulus), until the fear response to the
rabbit was extinguished. This fear extinction generalized; Peter was no longer afraid
of stimuli that were perceptually similar to the rabbit, such as a piece of cotton, a fur
coat, and feathers. Interestingly, Jones used a graduated extinction approach, in
which she slowly increased the difficulty of the practice by bringing the rabbit suc-
cessively closer over time. Although we now know that graduated procedures are
not necessary for achieving fear extinction (Gelder et al., 1973; Kircanski et al.,
2012), this practice is still widely used by clinicians because of its practical appeal
for helping patients to get started with the challenging task of confronting feared
stimuli. Interestingly, recent findings suggest that non-graduated procedures might
also elicit more anxiety for therapists (Schumacher et al., 2015), potentially contrib-
uting to their relatively less frequent use.
The fear extinction procedure initially used by Jones (1924) is now commonly
referred to as exposure therapy, describing the therapeutic practice of approaching a
feared (but non-dangerous) stimulus until fear subsides. Although it has been
tweaked and adapted over time based on updates in behavioral models of anxiety,
the general technique of exposure therapy is still a cornerstone of nearly all evidence-
based treatments for anxiety (e.g., Craske & Barlow, 2006; Foa et al., 2007, 2012;
Robichaud, 2013). It was the initial understanding of the classical conditioning and
generalization of fear responses that gave rise to this treatment approach. Thus, the
model of classical conditioning and generalization provided a foundational step for-
ward in our understanding of the development and treatment of anxiety disorders.
Counter-Conditioning and Reciprocal Inhibition
Counter-conditioning represents an interesting tweak to traditional classical condi-

tioning procedures. Essentially, a pleasurable stimulus is added to traditional extinc-
tion training. The goal is not just to extinguish the fear association, but also to pair
the previously-feared stimulus with antagonistic reaction of pleasure to strengthen
the inhibition of fear responding. Jones (1924) applied this principle in her early
treatment paper focused on extinguishing the toddler, Peter’s, fear of rabbits.
Specifically, in some of the extinction trials, she presented Peter with candy along-
side the rabbit in order to facilitate fear reduction.
Echoing the mechanism of counter-conditioning, Wolpe (1958) developed sys-
tematic desensitization based on a similar principle called reciprocal inhibition.
Specifically, the principle of reciprocal inhibition suggests that fear extinction could
be achieved by pairing the presentation of a feared stimulus with a response that is

physiologically incompatible with fear, such as relaxation. Therefore, in systematic
desensitization, patients approached a feared stimulus while in a state of relaxation.
During treatment, patients first learned relaxation techniques (e.g., progressive mus-
cle relaxation) without the presentation of feared stimuli. Then, patients progressed
through a hierarchy of graduated exposure therapy exercises while simultaneously
maintaining a relaxed physiological state. Patients were then gradually exposed to
feared stimuli while simultaneously using relaxation techniques until they were
fully desensitized to the stimulus. In other words, the fear response was extin-
guished. The intended outcome of this treatment is for client to learn to associate the
previously feared stimulus with relaxation, a physiological response incompatible
with fear. In later years, likely because it made treatment easier to deliver within a
therapy office, Wolpe’s systematic desensitization treatment focused primarily on
using imaginal rather than situational (in vivo) exposures (Rachman, 2015).
However, it turns out that several procedures used in systematic desensitization
are not optimal for fear extinction. Specifically, researchers have struck down the
ideas that extinction training can always be imaginal, should be gradual, and should
include relaxation (e.g., Foa et al., 1985, 2012, Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008; Gelder
et al., 1973; Cooke, 1968; Schmidt et al., 2000). Rather than always being imaginal,
it may better if the modality of exposure therapy is matched to the clinical presenta-
tion. For example, some researchers have found that treatment with imaginal expo-
sure alone was equally effective as in vivo (situational) exposure alone for
obsessive-compulsive checkers (although neither alone was as effective as com-
bined in vivo and imaginal; Foa et al., 1985, 2012). On the other hand, data suggest
that situational (in vivo) exposures may be more potent than imaginal exposures for
the treatment of specific phobia (e.g., showing better post-treatment outcomes in a
meta-analysis; Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008). Perhaps this is because specific phobia
presentations often involve distressing and impairing reactivity to situational cues
related to the phobic target. Thus, in contrast to traditional systematic desensitiza-
tion procedures, it has become clear that exposure therapy outcomes cannot always
be optimized by presenting cues in an imaginal modality alone (e.g., Wolitzky-
Taylor et al., 2008; Foa et al., 1985, 2012).
Furthermore, graduated procedures do not seem to be necessary to achieve suc-
cessful outcomes from exposure therapy for anxiety. Researchers quickly discov-
ered that there may not be any reliable differences in efficacy between graduated
and flooding procedures (Gelder et al., 1973). Flooding involved prolonged con-
frontation with a highly feared stimulus right from the start of treatment. Interestingly,
more recent research suggests that graduated exposure may be less effective than
varying the difficulty of exposure throughout the course of treatment (Kircanski
et al., 2012). The suggested explanation is that exposure therapy that is more vari-
able in its intensity may produce better generalization of fear extinction (Craske
et al., 2014).
After the advent of systematic desensitization, researchers also discovered that
adding relaxation to exposure therapy does not necessarily facilitate fear reduction
(Cooke, 1968). In specific cases, such as when there is a fear of the fear response
itself (such as in panic disorder), the addition of relaxation training can even be
detrimental (Schmidt et al., 2000). Thus, because of this accumulating evidence,
systematic desensitization is no longer the exposure therapy treatment of choice and
the reciprocal inhibition model has fallen out of fashion.
Perhaps because of these historical events regarding reciprocal inhibition,
research on more traditional counterconditioning procedures was largely neglected
for several decades. However, renewed interest has produced some additional infor-
mation regarding the efficacy of counterconditioning procedures. In regard to the
extinction of fear responding, findings have been mixed (e.g., Hendrikx et al., 2021;
Kang et al., 2018; Keller & Dunsmoor, 2020; van Dis et al., 2019). However, results
thus far seem more promising in regard to the extinction of disgust-related responses,
which are more resistant to extinction than fear-related responses (Olatunji et al.,
2007). Disgust responses are common in a number of anxiety and related disorders,3
such as small animal phobias; blood, injury injection phobias; contamination-
related obsessive-compulsive disorder; and even posttraumatic stress disorder
related to sexual assault (Cisler et al., 2009). In study of lab-conditioned disgust and
extinction, Engelhard et al. (2014) found that exposure therapy on its own was not
sufficient in reducing disgust-related evaluative learning, but counterconditioning
was. In a study of individuals with elevated contamination-related fears, Leburn and
colleagues (2020) found that counterconditioning can be effective in addressing
disgust-sensitivity in individuals with elevated contamination-related fears. Thus,
research on counterconditioning has come full circle. Cutting edge studies on extin-
guishing disgust-related responses in anxiety disorders are now drawing on the
same counterconditioning principle applied by Jones (1924) in one of the first stud-
ies of exposure therapy in the 1920s.
Two-Factor Theory
One critical downfall of the behavioral models for anxiety we have reviewed so far
is that they do not address how anxiety disorders are maintained. Anxiety-related
behaviors, such as pervasive and life-interfering avoidance, are not adaptive and
often come with several detrimental consequences. This raises the question (often
called the neurotic paradox; Mowrer, 1948), why do anxiety-related behaviors per-
sist? In other words, what maintains anxiety-related behaviors such as pervasive
avoidance? Mower’s two-factor theory (1947) attempted to resolve this paradox by
combining two early learning theories: classical and operant conditioning. The first
factor in two-factor theory describes acquisition of fear through classical condition-
ing. The second factor refers to the operant conditioning of avoidance, which serves
3
For the purposes of this paper, anxiety related disorders are conceptualized as going beyond the
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) category, including posttraumatic stress disor-
der and obsessive compulsive disorder, which can also be described using the same behavioral
conceptualizations as disorders categorized under the header of anxiety in the DSM-5.
to maintain fear. Specifically, the model posits that avoidance of the feared stimulus
results in fear reduction, and fear reduction, in turn, reinforces avoidance. This
removes the opportunity for fear extinction, thereby maintaining fear. For example,
a fear response towards dogs might be classically conditioned by experiencing a
dog bite. Later, if an approaching dog elicits fear, then crossing the street to avoid
the dog would reduce fear, negatively reinforcing avoidance. Avoidance would be a
more likely response in the future, given that it resulted in the removal of the uncom-
fortable emotional state of fear.4 Persistent avoidance would then remove the oppor-
tunity for exposure to dogs in the absence of aversive outcomes (e.g., no dog bites),
thereby preventing fear extinction. Thus, operantly conditioned avoidance prevents
fear extinction because opportunities to interact with the feared stimulus are
eliminated.
Two-factor theory has received ample criticism over the past several decades.
Although a full review of criticisms of two-factor theory is beyond the scope of this
chapter (for overview, see Krypotos et al., 2015), we will highlight two. First, the
theory could not account for cases in which fear was acquired though pathways
other than classical conditioning, such as observational (or vicarious) learning.
Second, the model did not account for blocking (see below; Kamin, 1969) and con-
ditioned inhibition (see below; Rescorla & Lolordo, 1965), which have important
implications for the acquisition and treatment of anxiety disorders.
Rescorla-Wagner Model
The Rescorla-Wagner model (RW model; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) represented
another breakthrough in behavioral models of anxiety in that it provided an explana-
tion for conditioned inhibition and blocking effects. Put simply, this model suggests
that learning is governed by surprise. More surprise results in more rapid learning,
including more rapid fear conditioning and extinction. In other words, the degree of
mismatch between predicted and actual events governs new learning. Few behav-
ioral models have had such a lasting and broad impact as the RW model (Siegel &
Allan, 1996), and its rippling effects are still evident in contemporary behavioral
models of anxiety (Craske et al., 2014).
Importantly, the RW model accounts for the phenomena of blocking and condi-
tioned inhibition, which have important implications for fear learning. In blocking,
when one conditioned stimulus (CS 1) has been established as a reliable predictor
of an aversive outcome, pairing CS 1 with another stimulus (CS 2) will not result in
learning because there is no prediction error. For example, imagine that a red light
(CS 1) is associated with a shock through classical conditioning procedures, and
then a tone (CS 2) is presented alongside the red light just before the shock. The
4
The two-factor model echoes elements of Hullian drive reduction theory (Hull, 1943). Specifically,
the two-factor model implies that the drive to reduce the unpleasant experience of anxiety moti-
vates avoidance, and the reduction in this drive negatively reinforces avoidance.
tone will not become associated with the shock because the shock is already
expected due to the red light. In other words, there was no surprise when the shock
occurred, so there was no new learning. The presence of the light (CS 1) alone pre-
dicted the shock, so blocked any associative learning with the tone (CS 2). Thus,
new fear learning is blocked by a competing stimulus. In the context of the acquisi-
tion of fears, this model can help explain cases in which the generation of new fear
associations may be prevented or attenuated.
The Rescorla-Wagner equation also accounts for negative prediction errors. For
example, negative surprises (i.e., no aversive outcome when one was expected) can
produce conditioned inhibition (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). To illustrate, imagine
again that a red light is repeatedly paired with a shock. However, whenever the light
is presented alongside a tone, there is no shock. This unexpected event (absence of
the shock) produces learning. In the RW model, the light takes on a positive predic-
tive value for the shock, and the tone takes on a negative predictive value; the light
perfectly predicts the shock (association of +1) and the tone perfectly predicts the
absence of the shock (association of −1). Thus, when presented together, the
summed associations are zero, predicting no shock. At first this might seem like a
highly intellectualized exploration of fear extinction parameters, but it has critical
implications for anxiety treatment. If a conditioned inhibitor is present during expo-
sure therapy, it prevents extinction. Sticking with our earlier example, lets discuss
this in application to dog phobia. Imagine that a fear of dogs was generated from an
instance in which a person was bitten by a dog while on a neighborhood walk.
Afterward, they always carry a large stick with them whenever they go outside in
their neighborhood, even when they are just walking to the car. They are not bitten
on any of these occasions, so the stick becomes a conditioned inhibitor. However,
the persistent fear is quite distressing, so the client seeks out the help of a therapist.
The unwitting exposure therapist recommends practiced walks in which the patient
encounters neighborhood dogs, and is perplexed to find that these exposures gener-
ate little to no fear extinction. However, it turns out that the client is carrying the
stick on all these walks, and that the conditioned inhibitor of the stick has prevented
new learning (i.e., fear extinction). The conditioned inhibitor, the stimulus of the
stick, must be removed to extinguish fear. In this case, therapeutic progress is greatly
informed by a clear understanding of the manner in which conditioning inhibition
influences fear extinction.
The RW model produced an important leap forward in models for understanding
the acquisition and treatment of anxiety and related disorders. It explained observa-
tions in fear learning research, such as blocking and conditioned inhibition, which
other models could not explain. The RW model, however, is not without flaws (for
a full review of its successes and failures, see Miller et al., 1995). For example, the
RW model cannot account for spontaneous recovery or renewal of fear, in which
fear re-emerges after the passage of time or after a change in context, respectively
(Bouton, 2002). This has been accounted for by the inhibitory learning model, a
contemporary model of fear learning that folds in components of the RW model.
Safety Signal Theory
In contrast to the RW model, safety signal theory accounts for the persistence of
avoidance behaviors in conditioned inhibition paradigms through a slightly differ-
ent mechanism (e.g., Lolordo, 1969; Weisman & Litner, 1969). Whereas the RW
model suggests that fear responses are maintained through expectancy violation
mechanisms, safety signal theory suggests that fear responses (such as avoidance)
are maintained through the positive reinforcement of safety signals (Lovibond,
2006). Safety signal theory posits that avoidant behaviors produce feedback (i.e.,
safety signals) in the form of contextual or interoceptive cues. For example, a rat
might avoid a shock by moving to the other side of the cage (producing a shift in
context), or by pressing a lever (producing an interoceptive cue such as tactile sen-
sation; (Lovibond, 2006; Weisman & Litner, 1969). More akin to traditional operant
conditioning models, these safety cues are seen as positively reinforcing avoidant
behavior.
Although some have called safety signal theory a variant of two-factor theory
(e.g., Mineka, 1979), it accounts for a number of phenomena that could not be
explained by Mowrer’s two-factor theory. For example, avoidant behavior can be
acquired even when the warning cue is not terminated after performing the avoidant
behavior (Avcu et al., 2014; Soltysik et al., 1983), and avoidant behavior can be
maintained even when the warning cue no longer predicts the occurrence of an
unconditioned stimulus such as a shock (Solomon et al., 1953). Either of these
should undermine instrumental learning of avoidance through negative reinforce-
ment as described in two-factor theory. However, safety signal theory accounts for
how avoidance is maintained even in these circumstances, through the presence of
positively reinforcing feedback cues or safety signals.
Although the RW model and safety signal theory describe different mechanisms
for the maintenance of avoidance behavior in the context of safety signals, both
models underscore the importance of eliminating safety signals during exposure
therapy. In the context of exposure therapy, patients often engage in a number of
covert and overt avoidance behaviors, which can undermine the efficacy of treat-
ment (e.g., Salkovskis et al., 1999; Wells et al., 1995). For example, individuals with
panic disorder may carry anxiolytic medications (overt safety behavior) and subse-
quent exposure to physiological sensations does not extinguish the fear because the
presence of the medication signals safety. They might also engage in distraction
during exposure therapy (a covert safety behavior), which could similarly act as a
safety cue and prevent extinction. The RW model and safety signal theory both
highlight the importance of carefully identifying and fading out the presence of
safety cues during exposure therapy.
Safety signal theory resulted in the development of a procedure commonly called
exposure and response prevention. This protocol name is often associated with the
treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Foa et al., 2012), perhaps because
safety-seeking behaviors (i.e., compulsions) are highlighted in the disorder name
and criteria. However, the use of safety-seeking behaviors is pervasive across
anxiety-related disorders, so the reduction of safety-seeking behaviors during expo-

sure therapy has become standard practice. Findings across a number of studies
support the idea that incorporating safety behavior fading into exposure therapy
procedures increases its efficacy (for review, see Telch & Lancaster, 2012).
Vicarious Conditioning
The models discussed up until this point cannot account for the fact that fear can be
acquired without any history of classical conditioning (Öst & Hugdahl, 1981;
Rachman, 1991). For example, fear can be acquired vicariously or though observa-
tion. Specifically, vicarious fear learning occurs when fear responses are acquired
through observation of others and the consequences of their behaviors (Bandura,
1965). For instance, a child might acquire a fear of spiders by seeing another child
receive a painful spider bite, or by observing a parent exhibit fearful and avoidant
reactions toward a spider. In order to better test the theory of vicarious conditioning
of fear, it has been examined in rhesus monkeys, in order to rule out any possibility
of prior learning history with the conditioned stimulus. Specifically, research in
rhesus monkeys has shown that fear of snakes can be acquired by watching other
monkeys react fearfully to real and toy snakes (Cook et al., 1985). In human
research, toddlers acquired fear of rubber snakes and spiders after seeing their
mothers respond to the toy with fearful or disgusted expressions (Gerull & Rapee,
2002). Experimental research in human adults has also demonstrated vicarious
acquisition of fear from watching a confederate receive a shock after a buzzer sound.
These participants then showed elevated physiological responses to the buzzer (i.e.,
galvanic skin response; Berger, 1962). In follow-up studies, experimenters found
that the emotional reaction of the confederate, which was operationalized by arm
movement when shocked, increased anxiety in observing participants, providing
further evidence for fear acquisition through vicarious learning.
Vicarious learning principles can also be harnessed to facilitate fear reduction. In
the context of exposure therapy, the procedure is typically called modeling, and
involves the therapist demonstrating successful coping with the feared stimulus. For
example, the therapist might show a patient with agoraphobia that they are able to
enter and maneuver about a crowded mall without harm; they might show a patient
with spider phobia how to successfully trap a spider in their home; or they might
demonstrate for a patient with social anxiety how to start conversations with strang-
ers. Interestingly, Jones (1924) seemed to anticipate this psychotherapy develop-
ment as well; in her treatment of Peter’s rabbit phobia, she used modeling on some
trials, and found that it was effective for reducing his fear. More controlled studies
later confirmed the benefits of modeling observed in this initial test. For example,
modeling has been found to facilitate extinction of dog phobia and to promote the
generalization of extinction to other dogs (Bandura et al., 1967). Experimental stud-
ies suggested that modeling accelerated fear extinction for phobia (Bandura et al.,
1969), and surpassed systematic desensitization in increasing approach behaviors in
dental phobia (Shaw & Thoresen, 1974). Modeling is now often incorporated in the
practice of exposure therapy.
Some would quite reasonably argue that vicarious learning could fall more
within the bounds of second wave (cognitive-behavioral) models, as opposed to
first-wave models. After all, Bandura, who authored seminal research on vicarious
learning (Bandura et al., 1963), suggested social cognitive theory as an explanation
for these effects (Bandura, 1989). This theory highlighted the critical role of explicit
cognitions in governing fear-related responses, such as whether one will approach
or avoid a feared stimulus. He focused in particular on cognitions related to self-
efficacy, which he defined as “the conviction that one can successfully execute the
behavior required to produce the [desired] outcomes,” (p. 193; Bandura, 1977).
Bandura suggests that vicarious learning impacts self-efficacy beliefs, which in turn
impact fear responding. This model was supported by research showing that higher
self-efficacy beliefs are associated with lower avoidance, subjective and physiologi-
cal fear response toward a feared stimulus (Bandura et al., 1982). However, behav-
iorists have argued that just because explicit cognition co-varied with other
indicators of fear response, does not necessarily mean that it caused the fear response
(e.g., Delprato & McGlynn, 1984).
In contrast to more explicit cognitive processes, more recent research seems to
support the notion that implicit associative learning plays a role in vicarious fear
learning. For example, researchers have found that fear which is vicariously condi-
tioned in the laboratory can later be provoked by masked presentations of the feared
stimulus (Olsson & Phelps, 2004). Masked stimulus presentations are so rapid that
they are not consciously processed and cannot be explicitly reported upon. Similarly,
masked stimuli also provoked fear responses after classical (Pavlovian) condition-
ing, but not after instructed conditioning, in which the participant receives verbal
instructions about the association between the stimulus and the shock (Olsson &
Phelps, 2004). Together, these findings support the notion that vicarious learning
may operate through more implicit associative processes, akin to the mechanisms of
classical Pavlovian conditioning. Further research has even demonstrated that fear
responses can be generated through the masked presentation of social cues associ-
ated with a fearful expression. Specifically, there is evidence that masked presenta-
tions of fearful facial cues can produce fear-related neural (amygdala) activation
(Whalen et al., 2004). The implicit response to social cues of fear, as well as the
implicit response to vicariously conditioned fear, support the notion that vicarious
learning procedures may operate though a more implicit associative learning pro-
cess than previously thought. Thus, vicarious learning might be more closely tied to
behavioral, rather than cognitive-behavioral models of fear learning. The mecha-
nisms of vicarious learning remain an active field of study and debate. Whatever its
mechanisms may be, decades of research have affirmed that vicarious learning pro-
cedures are a robust method for influencing the acquisition and treatment of patho-
logical fear.
Contemporary Learning Models
Early behavioral models laid the groundwork for our understanding of fear acquisi-
tion, maintenance, and extinction. The general principles outlined by these models
have been incorporated into a number of more contemporary learning theories.
However, more contemporary learning theories go beyond the traditional focus of
behavioral psychology, expanding beyond the exclusive focus on directly observ-
able events. These learning models have helped explain a number of phenomena
that early behavioral models were unable to explain.
I nfluence of Symbolic Generalization on Models

of Fear Learning
Although early behavioral models cannot account for the fact that some fear and
avoidance responses develop in the absence of classical or vicarious conditioning, a
contemporary behavioral theory called symbolic generalization offers one possible
explanation of this phenomenon (Dymond & Roche, 2009). The theory suggests
that fear can be acquired through symbolic generalization, which occurs when stim-
uli are not perceptually, but arbitrarily related. Principles of symbolic generalization
suggest fear can be learned from derived relational responding, and avoidance
behavior can occur due to transformation of functions. Derived relational respond-
ing (Hayes et al., 2001) occurs when relationships are made between interconnected
stimuli that are not classically or vicariously conditioned. Transformation of func-
tions is evident when behavior occurs toward a stimulus that has been relationally
derived.
For example, Augustson and Dougher (1997) trained participants with unfamil-
iar stimulus relations (A1-B1-C1-D1 and A2-B2-C2-D2), and then conditioned
them to avoid shocks that were paired with stimulus B1. Interestingly, participants
also avoided when they saw stimuli C1 and D1, but not C2 and D2. This suggests
that B1 was associated with C1 and D1 and transferred its fear properties, in the
absence of any direct conditioning of fear associations for C1 and D1. This study
demonstrated that stimuli can evoke anxiety and avoidance behaviors because of
derived relations to stimuli that have been conditioned through associative learning
(Dymond & Roche, 2009). Additionally, Vervoort and colleagues (2014) found that
both generalization and extinction of fear responses occurred among symbolically
related stimuli (i.e., arbitrary line drawings).
Symbolic generalization is particularly relevant to human learning because we
can make arbitrary categories based on language (see relational frame theory;
Dymond et al., 2013). Fear and avoidance can be generalized to semantically related
synonyms (Boyle et al., 2016). In one experiment, participants were differentially
conditioned to associate a certain words (e.g., “broth”) with a shock, while another
word was not paired with shock (e.g., “assist”). Participants later showed fear
(measured by skin conductance and behavioral avoidance) to other words that were
semantically related but not directly conditioned (e.g., “soup”). Work on symbolic
generalization can explain how certain words (such as snake, or a parent saying the
word careful) can elicit fear. Words can become conceptually related to actual feared
stimuli though derived relations. Bennett and colleagues (2015) introduced groups
of derived relations with sounds, non-sense words, and novel animal-like objects.
After fear was conditioned to words from of the groups, the fear response general-
ized to the animal-like objects that were symbolically related to the words.
Symbolic generalization is often associated more closely with third wave than
first wave therapies, and is particularly associated with relational frame theory,
which provides the foundation for acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT;
Hayes et al., 1999). However, ACT has been described as ‘rigorously behavioral’
(p. 3, Hayes, 2004) and many components of its theoretical framework are built on
the foundation of contemporary behavioral models. Thus, a review of more recent
findings related to symbolic generalization is relevant to a broad understanding of
contemporary behavioral models of anxiety. Symbolic generalization provides an
interesting behavioral account of fear learning in the absence of classical or vicari-
ous conditioning.
However, it is important to note that recent research suggests some potential
boundary conditions on these effects. Fear learning though the use of language may
be limited to particular types of stimuli that are less relevant to the evolutionary
adaptation of early humans (see overview of instructed conditioning and extinction
findings, under Challenges from the Second Wave).
I nfluence of Personality and Latent Inhibition on Models

of Fear Learning
In isolation, early theories of fear acquisition, such as classical and vicarious condi-
tioning, do not explain individual differences in response to conditioning events.
For example, why do some people, when exposed to a painful experience at the
dentist’s office, develop a fear of visiting the dentist, while others do not? These
individual differences might be explained in part by the influence of personality
traits and prior experiences in setting the stage for fear conditioning.
For example, heritable personality traits, such as neuroticism (Jang et al., 1996)
and trait anxiety (Legrand et al., 1999), have been found to facilitate fear condition-
ing. Heritable personality traits are attributes that are associated with genetic dispo-
sition that are relatively stable throughout the lifespan (Power & Pluess, 2015;
Steunenberg et al., 2005). Neuroticism can be described as a stable tendency to
experience negative affective states in general, whereas trait anxiety can be described
as a stable tendency to experience anxiety. Conditioning studies have demonstrated
that both neuroticism and trait anxiety facilitate the acquisition of anxious responses
as a result of conditioning events (Hur et al., 2016; Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998).
Furthermore, both result in overgeneralized fear responses to non-threatening stim-

uli (Gazendam et al., 2013), such as avoidance (Lommen et al., 2010), which con-
tributes to the maintenance of anxiety.
Prior learning history also impacts the acquisition of anxiety. For example, a his-
tory of non-traumatic experiences at the dentist’s office helps to inoculate children
against the development of dental anxiety after a traumatic experience at the den-
tist’s office (Kent, 1997). Vicarious learning can also facilitate inoculation against
fear conditioning. For instance, a history of watching a monkey interacting with a
snake non-fearfully inoculates it against developing a fear of snakes after watching
another monkey interact with a snake fearfully (Mineka & Cook, 1986). This phe-
nomenon has been called latent inhibition, and it refers to the fact that prior, safe
experiences with the conditioned stimulus help to inhibit the development of condi-
tioned fear responses.
This summary provides a sampling of key studies to demonstrate the importance
of accounting for the influence of temperament and prior experiences on fear learn-
ing. Together, they suggest the potential benefits of identifying individuals display-
ing at-risk temperaments, such as heightened neuroticism or trait anxiety, and
considering the application of anxiety-inoculation techniques, such as latent inhibi-
tion (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).
I nfluence of Evolutionary Factors on Models of Fear Learning:

Biological Preparedness and Species-Specific Defense
Reactions (SSDRs)
Early behavioral models also had difficulty accounting for the fact that particular
phobic targets and certain types of avoidance behaviors are more common than oth-
ers. For example, fear of snakes is more common than fear of dental treatment,
injections, and blood (Oosterink et al., 2009), even though individuals are more
likely to be exposed to the latter stimuli in modern daily life. This poses problems
for prior learning theories because this means that not all stimuli are equivalent in
their ability to be fear-conditioned. This suggests that humans and animals may be
biologically prepared to acquire fear to certain stimuli that were dangerous in early
stages of the evolution of a species; these stimuli have been called fear-relevant
stimuli (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The underlying
assumption is that a species-shared (phylogenetic) predisposition for faster acquisi-
tion of fear associations with these stimuli was evolved through natural selection
because it offered a survival advantage for members of the species (Seligman, 1971).
For example, Öhman and Mineka (2001) found that humans acquire fear towards
fear relevant stimuli like snakes much faster than they do towards fear-irrelevant
stimuli like flowers. Additional compelling evidence comes from masking studies,
in which stimuli are presented so quickly that they are beyond conscious awareness.
Fear can be conditioned and extinguished to fear-relevant stimuli that are masked,
like snakes and faces, but not to fear-irrelevant stimuli that are masked, such as
flowers and mushrooms (Esteves et al., 1994; Öhman & Soares, 1998). These stud-
ies suggest the role of biological preparedness in explaining why some phobias,
such as snake phobia, are more prevalent than others, such as dental phobia
(Oosterink et al., 2009).
Biological preparedness is evident not only in differences in associative fear
learning across stimuli, but also differences in the acquisition of different types of
avoidant behavior. Specifically, there is evidence that certain classes of avoidant
behavior are acquired more readily than others. These classes include behaviors that
are more likely to avert threats under naturalistic conditions, such as fleeing, freez-
ing, or fighting. For example, in order to avoid an aversive outcome such as a shock,
rats will learn to enact defensive responses more common to those seen in a natural
habitat (e.g., running on a wheel or jumping to a new location) more quickly than
they will learn to enact defensive responses that are not often seen in a natural habi-
tat (e.g., rearing up on their hind legs on a wheel, or pressing a lever; Bolles, 1970;
Bolles & Grossen, 1969).
Parallel to biologically prepared fear acquisition, Bolles (1970) suggested that
there are species-specific defense reactions (SSDRs), which are essentially biologi-
cally prepared avoidance responses. According to this theory, fear elicits certain
types of defensive behaviors that are innate to the specific organism. Non-SSDRs
tend to emerge only after SSDRs have been ineffective in averting a negative out-
come. Non-SSDRs can be trained, but this typically only happens after SSDRs have
failed. This helps to explain why certain classes of avoidance responses are easier to
acquire than others. Together, the theories of biological preparedness and species-
specific defense reactions, rooted in evolutionary psychology principles, explain the
relatively higher frequency of certain fear associations and types of avoidance
behaviors.
I nfluence of Neuroscience on Models of Fear Extinction:

Inhibitory Learning
Another challenge to classic learning models of fear lies in understanding how fear
can re-emerge, even after successful fear extinction training (Pavlov, 1927).
Behavior therapists, for simplicity’s sake, may present the model of exposure ther-
apy as a procedure to ‘unlearn’ a conditioned fear association. However, scientists
as early as Pavlov (1927) posited that, rather than unlearning a fear association,
Pavlovian fear extinction procedures instead result in the formation of a new inhibi-
tory association. The new inhibitory association encodes the information that the
feared stimulus is safe in some contexts, such as the contexts similar to the one in
which extinction learning took place. Thus, the original fear association may persist
in some contexts, even after completing fear extinction procedures. Colloquially,
each time a feared stimulus is encountered after fear extinction training has been
completed, there is a sort of battle between the new inhibitory association and the
original fear association. When the context is more similar to the context of safety
learning (i.e., exposure therapy), the inhibitory association prevails and prevents the
expression of fear. However, under certain conditions, such as contexts that are very
different from exposure therapy, the original fear association may prevail, and fear
expression might return. In other words, the model of inhibitory learning helps to
explain why relapse can occur even after a marked reduction of fear during the
course of exposure therapy: the original fear association persists, and can lead to a
return of the fear response, whenever the fear-inhibiting association is not triggered.
Current data lend support to this model of new inhibitory learning. Inhibitory
memories are context-dependent, and thus, they are less likely to be activated after
a change in context. Failure of the inhibitory memory to activate produces the re-
emergence of an extinguished fear response. For example, extinguished fear
responses tend to be more likely to return after the passage of time (i.e., spontaneous
recovery) or after a change to a new context that differs from the fear extinction
context, such as a change in olfactory or visual cues (i.e., renewal; Bouton, 2002).
True to the rich history of behaviorism, these theories were originally developed and
tested using animal models (Bouton, 2002), and then translated and corroborated in
human models of fear conditioning and extinction using both behavioral observa-
tions and neural imaging (Björkstrand et al., 2017; Kredlow et al., 2016; Schiller
et al., 2013).
Drawing from the inhibitory learning model, Craske and her colleagues (2008,
2014; Sewart & Craske, 2020) have suggested that exposure therapy procedures
should be optimized to increase the likelihood of inhibitory memory activation. This
can be accomplished in several ways. First, one could improve the generalization of
the new inhibitory memory by increasing variability during extinction training, in
terms of both external and internal cues. External cues might include varying the
features of the feared stimulus, such as presenting small and large spiders during
spider phobia treatment. It could also include varying the features of the surround-
ing environment, such as practicing encountering spiders inside and outside, and
with and without the therapist present. The context of time could also be varied,
such as gradually spacing out exposure therapy sessions across time to offset the
spontaneous recovery of fear. Variability can also be introduced for internal contex-
tual cues, such as encountering stimuli that elicit differing levels of fear response, or
encountering stimuli under different physiological baseline states, such as with dif-
ferent levels of caffeine. Thus, a number of techniques fall under the general strat-
egy of facilitating variability during exposure to promote generalization of the
fear memory.
In addition to improving generalization of the inhibitory memory, the inhibitory
memory could also be cued using reminders present during extinction training. For
example, the presence of a wristband that was used during extinction training, or
even asking a patient to mentally rehearse a prior extinction training session, can
facilitate recall of fear extinction, and thus, activation of the inhibitory memory.
However, some have suggested that this strategy requires caution because retrieval
cues could run the risk of functioning as safety signals, potentially blocking fear
extinction.
Furthermore, one could also improve the robustness of inhibitory learning
through the general principles of prediction error, as set forth by the Rescorla-
Wagner prediction error model. This generally includes adapting the exposure situ-
ation to maximize ‘surprisingness’ of the outcome, and could also include the use
of procedures such as removal of safety signals, occasionally reinforcing extinction
trials, and deepened extinction to facilitate prediction error. For example, fears
about the consequences of having a panic attack would better extinguish in the
absence of anxiolytic medications; this would facilitate prediction error by remov-
ing the conditioned inhibitor. Someone with a fear of negative feedback during pub-
lic speaking could be occasionally provided with negative feedback on speaking
performance. This would serve to increase the expectancy of the threat on future
extinction trials, and therefore enhance prediction error when it does not occur.
Finally, one could use deepened extinction to boost prediction error. In this proce-
dure the fear response to two stimuli are extinguished one at a time, and then the
fear response is extinguished to both stimuli presented simultaneously. Simultaneous
(compound) presentation of the stimuli may boost the threat prediction, thereby
boosting prediction error. For example, an individual with spider phobia might
encounter two spiders at one time. Alternatively, an individual with panic disorder
might practice walking through a crowded mall shortly after ingesting caffeine, to
facilitate exposure to the sensation of a racing heart alongside the situation of being
in a crowd. Because each of these techniques is designed to facilitate prediction
error, they are consistent with treatment recommendations derived from the Rescorla
and Wagner model (1972). However, the arguments for the importance of context
variability and retrieval cues represent a notable departure from prior models.5 In
the contemporary clinical science of exposure therapy for anxiety, inhibitory learn-
ing theory is currently among the most influential theories. It has generated a num-
ber of empirically supported and practical suggestions for improving exposure
therapy outcomes (for full review, see Craske et al., 2008, 2014).
5
Craske et al. (2014) also suggest leveraging the reconsolidation-update mechanism by providing
new information about the safety of the feared stimulus (i.e., exposure therapy) during a period of
time in which the fear memory is labile and susceptible to updating (within a six hour window after
retrieval of the fear memory; Nader et al., 2000). However, translational studies in human clinical
trials of exposure therapy have resulted in promising, but heterogeneous results, which are chal-
lenging to interpret at this point (Walsh et al., 2018).
hallenges from the Second and Third Waves

C
of Psychotherapy
Challenges from the Second Wave
The second wave of psychotherapy marked the development of the cognitive model
(e.g., Clark & Beck, 2011). The cognitive model posits that cognitions play a central
role in causing emotional, physiological, and behavioral responses. During the
course of therapy, maladaptive or inaccurate cognitions are identified, and the thera-
pist uses various techniques to challenge and modify these cognitions. Once modi-
fied, the new cognition is posited to produce new responses (emotional, physiological,
and behavioral) that are more adaptive in the environmental context.
Strict behaviorists might criticize this view of cognition by labeling it as ‘mental-
ism’ (Day, 1983). As a rough summary, this strict behavioral view suggests that it
would be more appropriate to view cognition as an intermediary between the envi-
ronmental input (stimulus) and behavioral output (response), but that explicit cogni-
tion, on its own, should not be considered a sufficient causal, explanatory factor.
One might argue that the difference in theories is therefore only a matter of empha-
sis on the importance of the role of cognition. This, however, would be inaccurate.
The practice of cognitive(-behavioral) therapy for anxiety disorders, and its sup-
porting theories (e.g., Lovibond, 2006), demonstrate a strong emphasis on the role
of explicit cognition in governing fear learning. On the other hand, when behavioral
theories for anxiety acknowledge cognition at all, they emphasize more implicit,
automatic, and associative processes as governing fear learning (e.g., Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972).
A close examination of the practice of second-wave, cognitive(-behavioral) ther-
apy quickly demonstrates its strong focus on explicit cognition. In the case of
anxiety-related disorders, these explicit cognitions are often reported in the form of
propositional knowledge about the level of threat (or safety) associated with a given
stimulus (Lovibond, 2006). In the practice of second-wave therapies, patients report
their threat-related cognitions, and therapists help them see the connection between
these cognitions and maladaptive fear and avoidance responses. Once identified,
threat-related cognitions are challenged through the combination of rhetorical strat-
egies and behavioral experiments (akin to exposure therapy, but with the stated goal
of testing the accuracy of propositional knowledge related to threat/safety). For
example, a patient with spider phobia might report the cognition, “If a spider is in
the same room as me, it will probably bite me.” This cognition could be challenged
with rhetorical strategies, such as asking the patient to weigh evidence for and
against this belief by drawing on past experiences and other available information.
It might also be tested by asking the patient to stand in the same room as a spider
and observe the spider’s behavior, to gather more evidence for or against the reported
prediction about a spider bite.
An analysis of the theoretical foundations of cognitive therapy also emphasizes
its reliance on explicit cognition. For example, in his paper introducing expectancy
theory, Lovibond (2006) notes the concordance of this cognitive theory of anxiety
with the practice of cognitive(-behavioral) therapy for anxiety6. More specifically,
Lovibond’s expectancy model (Lovibond, 2006) posits that higher-order (explicit
and consciously accessible) cognitive processes govern fear learning, as fear is
acquired when humans learn to expect an aversive stimulus (i.e., the unconditioned
stimulus; US) shortly after a particular environmental cue is presented (i.e., the
conditioned stimulus; CS). The model further suggests that humans acquire avoid-
ant behavior when they expect that avoidance in response to the CS will prevent the
occurrence of an aversive outcome (US). Importantly, in the expectancy model,
Lovibond specifies that expectancies are acquired in the form of propositional
knowledge, a type of explicit cognition amendable to self-report. Relatedly,
Lovibond also specifies that expectancy theory applies to human models specifi-
cally, as opposed to non-human animal models. This assertion sets it apart from
behavioral models, such as the Rescorla-Wagner prediction error model (RW
model), which makes no such assertion that associations between the US and CS
occur in the form of explicit cognition. On the contrary, the RW model was devel-
oped in the context of non-human animal research, which implies a reliance on
more implicit, associative processes to explain fear learning.
At first glance, Lovibond’s expectancy model seems to have some explanatory
benefits over behavioral model. For example, this model has been used to explain
the correlation between self-reported threat expectancies and electrodermal reactiv-
ity to fear-conditioned stimuli (Lovibond, 2006). The assertion has been that the
(conscious) expectancy causes physiological reactivity. However, causality could
easily run in the opposite direction, and literature from masked conditioning studies
suggests that it might. Masked conditioning studies involve backward masking of
the conditioned stimulus. In the backward masking procedure, the conditioned stim-
ulus is presented very rapidly and immediately followed by a different image (the
‘mask’), which prevents the participant from registering conscious awareness of the
conditioned stimulus itself. In masked (shock) conditioning experiments, the pre-
sentation of a masked conditioned stimulus influenced self-reported shock-
expectancy ratings (Katkin et al., 2001; Öhman & Soares, 1998). In one study,
researchers have also found that expectancy ratings after masked stimulus presenta-
tion were associated with the participant’s ability to detect their own heartbeats
(Katkin et al., 2001). These data support the notion that propositional knowledge is
6
We have focused primarily on Lovibond’s expectancy model an example of cognitive-behavioral
models given its unique emphasis on explicit, consciously accessible cognition. This model is
makes a clean and complete departure from the more implicit, associative mechanisms of behav-
ioral models. Yet there are also other well-known expectancy theories, such as Seligman and
Johnson’s cognitive theory (1973); this model relies on a blend of behavioral mechanisms (e.g.,
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning) with cognitive mechanisms. Lovibond’s expectancy
model differs in that it truly places explicit cognition (in the form of propositional knowledge) at
the center of the learning process, including as the mechanism governing Pavlovian and instrumen-
tal conditioning (Krypotos et al., 2015). Thus, it was selected for the sake of better highlighting
contrasts between more purely cognitive and more purely behavioral models. In reality, many
models of anxiety are a combination of both.
not necessary to produce fear learning, and in fact, propositional knowledge about
threat can result from fear responses produced by more implicit, associative learning.
Importantly, this pattern of findings highlighting the role of implicit, associative
processes in governing fear processing, extends beyond lab-conditioned fears to
individuals who have naturally-acquired phobias. For example, in experimental
studies of people with phobias, masked presentation of a feared stimulus has been
shown to elevate neural (Lipka et al., 2011; Siegel et al., 2017), physiological
(Öhman & Soares, 1998), and self-reported (Öhman & Soares, 1993) indices of fear
reactivity. Furthermore, repeated masked presentations of phobic stimuli have also
been show to produce fear extinction learning (Siegel et al., 2018, 2020).7 Although
the level of extinction achieved in these masked extinction studies does not equate
to that of more traditional exposure therapy procedures, these experiments still pro-
vide a compelling challenge to cognitive theories as an all-encompassing explana-
tion of fear learning. In sum, masked conditioning and extinction studies demonstrate
that these fear learning processes can occur completely outside the bounds of con-
scious awareness. This presents a major challenge to cognitive theories, such as
expectancy theory, which rely entirely on conscious, cognitive mechanisms
of change.
Another potential argument in favor of the cognitive model of anxiety comes
from the growing literature on instructed fear extinction. The expectancy model
would help explain the relatively consistent observation that fear extinction can be
facilitated by verbal communication of threat-related information (e.g., verbal
information about stimulus-shock associations; Luck & Lipp, 2016). However,
there are some important boundary conditions of the effects of instructed extinction.
For example, certain stimuli (i.e., snakes and spiders) seem resistant to instructed
extinction (Ohman et al., 1975; Hugdahl & Ohman, 1977; Hugdahl, 1978; Soares &
Ohman, 1993; Lipp & Edwards, 2002). Additionally, instructed fear extinction does
not seem to be effective when the unconditioned stimulus used in the lab is more
intense, such as a more uncomfortable shock (Mandel & Bridger, 1967, 1973). In
terms of clinical translation, this boundary condition is critical in that it suggests
that the effects of verbal instruction might not translate to cases of anxiety associ-
ated with relatively stronger unconditioned stimuli, which could include many cases
of posttraumatic stress disorder, for example.
Finally, a review of the literature suggests that rather than producing changes on
its own (which would be visible in the first extinction trial), researchers more con-
sistently find that instructed extinction facilitates learning across fear extinction tri-
als (Luck & Lipp, 2016). This suggests that the instructions facilitate associative
extinction learning processes, working in tandem with them, rather than replacing
them. There are some interesting parallels to these basic science findings in the
anxiety treatment literature. Instructed extinction is often viewed as an analogue for
7
Whereas early research suggested that masked fear learning might be limited to fear-relevant
(biologically prepared) stimuli only (Öhman & Soares, 1998), more recent studies suggest that it
might be possible to achieve masked fear conditioning with both fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant
stimuli (Lipp et al., 2014).
cognitive restructuring by basic science researchers (Luck & Lipp, 2016), and a
small subset of studies has found that cognitive restructuring can facilitate the
effects of exposure therapy (e.g., Bryant et al., 2003, 2008; Michelson et al., 1996;
Mattick & Peters, 1988; Mattick et al., 1989). Further treatment research, identify-
ing the boundary conditions of these synergistic effects, may help clinicians identify
specific cases or conditions in which supplementing exposure with cognitive
restructuring will be helpful.
In this section, we have raised challenges to the cognitive model of anxiety. The
cognitive model emphasizes the causal role of threat-related propositional knowl-
edge for producing changes in behavior, physiological, and emotional responses.
Emerging evidence from studies using backward masking and instructed extinction
provide evidence for fear learning in the absence of conscious cognitive processes.
Furthermore, some research suggests that self-reports of threat ratings may be an
emergent property of physiological fear responses, rather than the cause of them.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most second-wave cognitive behavioral therapists rely on
models that incorporate a combination of behavioral mechanisms and cognitive
mechanisms. Yet the data reviewed here provide a fascinating challenge to the cog-
nitive component of the model. As the field moves forward, developing a more clear
understanding of the boundaries and interactions of more bottom-up behavioral
mechanisms with more top-down cognitive mechanisms is essential to refining our
models for the etiology and treatment of anxiety.
Challenges from the Third Wave
Third wave therapies are best distinguished from first and second wave therapies by
their emphasis on acceptance as opposed to change. Behavioral and cognitive(-
behavioral) therapies focus on changing behaviors and/or cognitions. On the other
hand, third wave therapies, or acceptance-based therapies, involve targeting treat-
ment goals related to acceptance. Although at first glance these differences seem
striking, we will argue here that there may be surprising levels of compatibility and
overlap, particularly between first and third wave therapies.
The emergence of acceptance-based therapies was quite remarkable in that it
marked the development of treatments that showed success with previously more
illusive treatment targets, such as chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985) and border-
line personality disorder (Lynch et al., 2007). An underlying assertion of most of
these therapies is the futility of attempting to alter aversive internal experiences,
such as thoughts, emotions, and physiological sensations. The more these are
‘pushed away,’ the more they are amplified (Wegner et al., 1987; Sloan, 2004). For
example, when thoughts are actively suppressed, they actually increase in frequency
(Wegner et al., 1987). Similarly, avoidance may amplify negative emotional experi-
ence; individuals who are avoidant of unpleasant internal states (i.e., high in experi-
ential avoidance), self-report higher levels of emotional reactivity to aversive stimuli
(Sloan, 2004).
Third wave therapies act to reverse these amplifying cycles of thought and feel-
ing suppression by targeting the acceptance of aversive internal states (see Twohig
et al. in this volume). In the case of anxiety, these therapies would target the accep-
tance of uncomfortable emotional states (e.g., fear/anxiety) and physiological states
associated with anxiety (e.g., racing heart, sweating, breathlessness), and it would
assist patients in accepting the presence of anxiety-related thoughts such as predic-
tions about danger. It is important to note, however, that accepting the presence of
aversive thoughts is not equated with believing them. It is more akin to accepting
that your least favorite song is playing in the background of your mind.
In contrast to the acceptance of aversive thoughts and emotions, third wave ther-
apies do not target the acceptance of maladaptive behaviors (see Twohig et al. in this
volume). In fact, these therapies often harness acceptance of aversive internal states
for the function of generating behavior change. In the case of anxiety disorders, the
aim is often to act in accordance with one’s own value system, while accepting that
this might generate uncomfortable thoughts and feelings. For example, someone
with spider phobia might wish to go on a hike with their family in a place where
they fear they may encounter spiders. This person might practice going on the hike
to spend time with their family, while accepting the presence of uncomfortable,
anxiety-related thoughts and feelings about spiders. This explicit focus on behavior
change may help explain why prominent developers of third wave therapies often
describe a strong influence of behaviorism in their work (e.g., Hayes, 2004; Linehan
& Wilks, 2015).
More contemporary behavioral models of anxiety demonstrate a clear parallel to
these third-wave models (e.g., contemporary models of panic disorder; Bouton
et al., 2001). In these models, aversive internal states have been described as condi-
tioned stimuli that become associated with aversive outcomes over time. For exam-
ple, during a procedure called interoceptive conditioning (Razran, 1961), researchers
have found that Pavlovian associations can be formed in which the conditioned and/
or unconditioned stimulus are internal cues such as bodily sensations. This phenom-
enon of interoceptive conditioning has been incorporated into more contemporary
learning theories of panic disorder (Bouton et al., 2001). Experimental studies sug-
gest that more mild internal sensations associated anxiety can be paired through
Pavlovian conditioning procedures with the stronger internal sensations of a full-
blown panic attack (Acheson et al., 2007, 2012). As applied to panic disorder, inter-
nal/interoceptive cues related to fear (e.g., heart racing, shortness of breath) become
conditioned through repeated association with full-blown panic attacks. This asso-
ciative learning phenomenon contributes to the frequency of panic attacks in indi-
viduals with panic disorder, and a part of exposure therapy is then to extinguish the
interoceptive conditioning by triggering the interoceptive cue repeatedly, until the
association with aversive outcomes can be extinguished. As such, a primary goal of
the treatment is to dissociate aversive internal cues with dangerous or threatening
outcomes, and as such, this process somewhat echoes third-wave goals of accepting
the presence of aversive internal states.
It is also possible that third wave therapy procedures, such as mindfulness medi-
tation, act in a way that is parallel to the extinction of interoceptively-conditioned
fear responding. For patients with anxiety, particularly in its more pervasive forms
such as generalized anxiety, focus on the present moment during meditation prac-
tice can involve direct confrontation with aversive internal states (i.e., aversive
thoughts and feelings; Lomas et al., 2015). Through repeated confrontation with
these states, without engaging in strategies to alter or change them in any way,
patients may begin to dissociate these internal cues with aversive outcomes. This
procedure would be highly consistent with a behavioral model in which interocep-
tively conditioned associations were extinguished. With very minor adaptations,
which have already been made in the context of more contemporary learning theo-
ries, first and third wave approaches become surprisingly compatible. Therefore,
rather than offering a challenge to first wave models and practices, third wave mod-
els might suggest novel strategies for targeting behavioral change that are could be
viewed as fairly consistent with behavioral models, such as harnessing meditation
as a strategy for exposure to uncomfortable internal states (i.e., extinction of intero-
ceptively conditioned responses), in service of the goal of reducing maladaptive
behaviors, such as anxiety-related avoidance.
Thus far, the compatibility between first and third wave approaches has been
emphasized. However, this is not to make the false claim that these therapies are the
same; a review of the procedures included in their manuals reveals fairly quickly
that they are not (Chapman et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 2013). For
example, first-wave behavior therapists do not typically incorporate meditation
practice into treatment. And, although both first and third wave psychotherapies
promote behavior change, the proposed mechanisms of change clearly differ.
Whereas third wave models focus on the mindful acceptance of uncomfortable
internal states, more contemporary first-wave models focus on the extinction of the
association between these internal states and an aversive outcome.
A critical question third wave models raise is how to best define the mechanism
of their effects, the construct of mindfulness itself (Bishop et al., 2004; Shapiro
et al., 2006). Perhaps because of the inherent challenges involved in adapting ancient
Eastern traditions to the western world of empirical clinical medicine, defining
mindfulness has been fraught with challenges, and has produced a wide variety of
construct definitions and operationalizations (Grossman, 2019; Quaglia et al.,
2015). There is almost an inherent conflict in wrangling an operational definition
out of a construct deemed to be primarily experiential in nature. Behavioral models,
on the other hand, have had relatively fewer challenges in operationalization of their
mechanisms. This is particularly true for earlier behavioral theories, which defined
mechanism in terms of directly observable events, as opposed to mindfulness, which
is deemed to be a multi-faceted, latent construct adapted to clinical science from
Eastern cultural traditions (Baer et al., 2008; Grossman, 2019).
In sum, first and third wave therapies are compatible some ways, and incompat-
ible in others. They align in that they both focus on behavior change, and to some
extent, third wave therapy procedures like meditation might even tap into some of
the same mechanisms as traditional exposure therapy procedures (e.g., interoceptive
exposure). Despite these areas of compatibility, the procedures used to reduce reac-
tivity to aversive internal cues are different, as are the posited mechanisms of
change. Highlighting areas of convergence and divergence between first and third
wave therapies is essential for a critical evaluation of both approaches. This can help
delineate potential areas of overlap, where different terminology might be used to
describe similar phenomena, and it can help highlight areas of divergence ripe for
further research.
Thus far, we have described behavioral models of anxiety disorders, and com-
pared and contrasted them with second and third wave models. We will now present
a case example to demonstrate first wave principles in action.
A Case Example
Julia was a 34-year-old, married, Latinx mother of one who presented to the clinic
seeking treatment for a fear of spiders. She described that in the prior week she was
unable to get out of her car because she thought she saw something on the ground
that looked like a spider, and that is when she decided that she needed to seek out
help. She knew that she would soon need to be able to go hiking and camping to
chaperone her daughter’s girl-scout troop, and that her fear of spiders might get in
the way of this.
Julia reported that she had been afraid of spiders ever since she was a child. She
explained that she lived near a desert area growing up, and had gone on a camping
trip with her parents. She remembered reaching down to grab her toy when there
was suddenly a piercing pain in her hand. She saw a small black spider run into a
corner. She developed a painful spider bite that swelled, became infected, and
required a visit to the doctor. The bite eventually healed, but ever since this time, she
had refused to go camping or hiking. She removes her covers each night before get-
ting into bed to check for spiders, and when she finds a spider (or another insect that
could be a spider) in her home, she has to leave the room until someone else can
remove it. She describes that she quickly scans the floor of most rooms that she
enters just to make sure there are not any spider around. She reported that her goals
in therapy were to (a) be able to get rid of spiders herself when they are in her home,
and (b) be able to go on hiking and camping trips with her daughter.
During her intake interview, Julia’s clinician diagnosed her with the animal sub-
type of specific phobia. Her phobia onset was attributed to Pavlovian fear condition-
ing that occurred during the spider bite she described during her childhood camping
trip. Although the spider that bit her was small and black, her fear had generalized
to all spiders and even insects that look like they might be spiders. Her clinician
noted that her pervasive avoidance of opportunities in which she might encounter a
spider helps to maintain her fear of spiders by circumventing any opportunities for
additional fear extinction to occur. Her clinician notes that Julia also performs a
number of unnecessary protective actions (i.e., safety behaviors) whenever she
encounters spiders or thinks that she might encounter them. This prevents her from
experiencing prediction error, which in turn prevents fear extinction (see Rescorla-
Wagner prediction error model). For example, checking her bed in the evening is
associated with protection from the possibility of a spider bite. Thus, when a spider
does not bite her during the night, there is no prediction error, and so no fear extinc-
tion learning occurs. Therefore, she continues to check her bed each evening. Her
other safety behaviors, such as scanning the floor for spiders when entering a new
room, similarly serve to maintain her fear of spiders.
For further behavioral assessment after the intake interview, Julia’s clinician con-
ducted what is called a behavioral avoidance test (BAT). The BAT allowed Julia’s
clinician to observe her behavioral, verbal, and physiological responses to fear, con-
sistent with Lang’s (1968) tripartite model of fear responding. Julia’s clinician pre-
sented her with a series of potential steps she could complete, with each progressive
step involving closer contact with a spider. Tasks included: saying the word ‘spider,’
seeing photographs of spiders, watching a video of a spider, entering a room in
which a (non-poisonous) spider was in a closed tank, walking up to the tank, remov-
ing the lid, reaching a hand into the tank, and allowing the spider to crawl on her
hand. Julia was asked to wear a heart rate monitor during the task to assess her
physiological responding, and she was asked to report her fear level on a scale from
0 (no fear at all) to 10 (highest fear) at each step of the task. On the first step of the
BAT, Julia was able to say the word ‘spider’ with no hesitation, reported a fear level
of one out of ten, and showed no evidence of increased physiological activity (i.e.,
no increased heart rate). On the next step of the BAT, seeing a picture of a spider,
her clinician noticed that she quickly looked away from the spider (showing some
avoidance), and her heart rate increased slightly, but that she still reported subjec-
tively low levels of fear (two out of ten). On the third step, seeing a video of a spider,
Julia was only able to watch for a couple seconds before she quickly looked away
and turned off the video, showing higher avoidance. Her heart rate spiked, and she
reported significant fear (eight out of ten). From this assessment, Julia’s clinician
learned that her fear response has generalized beyond spiders themselves to images
and videos of spiders. Furthermore, she learned that Julia has a tendency to look
away quickly when in the presence of spider related stimuli, which may also be
functioning as a safety behavior. She additionally observed that Julia sometimes has
verbal reports of fear that are asynchronous with her behavioral and physiological
responses; for example, when looking at the picture of a spider, she showed behav-
ioral avoidance and physiological reactivity at the same time as reporting lower
levels of fear. In moderately feared situations, Julia’s verbal reports might underes-
timate her behavioral and physiological levels of fear reactivity.
After the assessment was completed, Julia’s clinician recommended a course of
exposure therapy, in which Julia would encounter spider-related stimuli for the pur-
pose of promoting fear extinction learning. She began by educating Julia about the
roles of avoidance and safety behaviors in maintaining unhelpful/maladaptive fear
responses, and then described how exposure therapy will help to correct Julia’s
overgeneralized fear reactions by producing new safety learning (i.e., inhibitory
learning). At first, Julia showed some trepidation and reluctance to agree to this
mode of treatment. However, her clinician described with confidence that this treat-
ment, although challenging, would be the most effective way to help her achieve her
goals of being able to capture spiders in her home and go on hiking and camping
trips with her daughter (Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 2018). Her
clinician’s confidence in this approach helped convince Julia to agree to give expo-
sure therapy a try.
They began exposure therapy by working together to generate a list of activities
that would provoke Julia’s fear, including watching different spider videos, walking
into a room with a spider in an enclosed tank, walking into a room with a spider out
on the floor, and holding a spider. They also generated some activities that would
take place outside the therapy office to increase the variability of her exposure ther-
apy exercises to help inoculate her against the possibility of a post-treatment relapse
in symptoms. This recommendation for increasing variability during exposures was
based on the inhibitory learning model, and both clinical and basic science research,
suggesting that contextual variability during fear extinction practice can help to
promote extinction learning that is more robust against relapse (for review see
Craske et al., 2014). Exposure activities planned for outside the office included tak-
ing a short hike (with and without the therapist), getting into bed without first check-
ing under her covers for spiders, and visiting a pet shop in which she would practice
capturing and holding different (non-poisonous) spiders. Julia was resistant to even
putting this last item (pet shop) on this list, but her therapist encouraged her to
‘dream big,’ once again voiced her confidence that Julia would improve during
exposure therapy, and reminded her that treatment targets would be selected col-
laboratively as they progressed (i.e., her therapist will never ‘force’ her to do any-
thing). Feeling reassured that all exposure exercises would be decided upon
collaboratively, Julia agreed to add the pet shop to her list of planned exposure
therapy exercises.
Julia’s first session of exposure therapy involved looking at pictures of spiders,
the same task in which she began to show some fear response during her BAT at
intake. Julia’s fear response was monitored throughout each exposure exercise, sim-
ilarly to how it had been monitored during her BAT. Her therapist asked for periodic
verbal reports of fear on a 0–10 scale, monitored heart rate with an exercise watch,
and observed her behavioral approach/avoidance. At first, Julia reported a fear level
of zero, no heart rate reactivity, and no avoidance. Julia’s therapist knew that this
stimulus was not provoking a fear response, so would not be helpful for producing
new safety learning (i.e., inhibitory learning). After discussion with Julia, the thera-
pist realized that Julia only responded fearfully to pictures if they matched the per-
ceptual properties of the original spider she encountered, which was small and
black. They switched the image to a small black spider, and although her fear spiked
in the initial first couple minutes, to her great surprise, Julia soon began to have no
trouble at all with looking at this image for 5 min at a time. She became bored, and
soon began noticing new features on the spider, such as the tiny hairs on its legs.
With this initial success, they then began practicing with images of black spiders
that were closer up. A very close-up image of black spider initially spiked her anxi-
ety, and Julia took a short break from exposure. Julia reported that this spider looked
exactly like the one that had bitten her as a child, and that she could see the spider’s
fangs in the image. Julia’s therapist reminded her of her success with prior spider
images, and they applied similar strategies here, slowly increasing the duration of
looking at the picture, until she could look at it for 5 min at a time without turning
away. Julia was instructed to go home and practice once a day with a power point
slide show that the therapist put together for her. The slide show was of a wide vari-
ety of images of black spiders in different locations and with different levels of
zooming in, and the slide show included the large black one that had provoked the
largest fear response in the session. She was asked to record her subjective fear
levels before, during, and after each practice.
At the next session, they reviewed Julia’s homework. She completed about half
of the planned exposure therapy practices. Her therapist reinforced her excellent
progress in completing some exposures on her own at home, and then they spent a
few minutes troubleshooting the barriers that got in the way of completing all her
practices, including not having access to the computer when she had planned to
practice. Her therapist then proposed moving from pictures of spiders to videos of
spiders, and feeling fortified by her initial successes with the pictures, Julia agreed.
Over the next sessions, they used similar techniques to progress through the remain-
ing activities. They ran into a plateau in Julia’s progress when she began practicing
standing in the room with a spider out of the tank. Julia did not seem to be experi-
encing much reduction in her fear responding. After observing her closely, Julia’s
therapist noted that she was crossing her arms and hiding her hands in her armpit
area. She reflected on this behavior to Julia, and suggested the possibility Julia
might be doing this to protect her hands, which is where she had been bitten as a
child. Julia reported that she had not noticed doing this, but agreed that it was pos-
sible that hiding her hands might be making her feel more protected (i.e., acting as
a safety cue; see safety signal theory and the RW prediction error model). After she
stopped hiding her hands, her fear responses began to reduce again across trials.
Julia eventually progressed to more challenging exercises, including capturing and
even holding a non-poisonous spider, and hiking with and without the therapist. As
sessions progressed, her therapist increased the variability in the exercises, mixing
up easier exercises such as close up videos, with more challenging exercises, such
as capturing or holding the non-poisonous spider. Toward the end of treatment, her
therapist began spacing her sessions further apart. Varying the difficulty and spacing
of sessions were each strategies for introducing other types of variability into the
exposure therapy exercises, to promote more robust inhibitory learning and protect
against relapse (Kircanski et al., 2012; Tsao & Craske, 2000). By the end of treat-
ment, Julia had proudly showed her daughter a picture of herself at her final treat-
ment session, holding two different tarantulas in her hands at a pet shop, and she
was also able to chaperone one of her daughter’s hiking trips. She reported that
although she felt afraid when they first set out on the hiking trip, she soon noticed
that she was crossing her arms and tucking her hands away and deliberately stopped
hiding her hands away. As she began engaging with the children on the hike, she
soon found that she was able to enjoy herself. She planned to continue her progress
by chaperoning a camping trip with her daughter’s girl scout troop. During the last
session, Julia and her therapist reviewed her progress and strategies she could use
on this trip, and during other activities, so that she could continue to design her own
exposure therapy exercises to continue to overcome her fear of spiders.
Conclusions
A horse-race comparison of behavioral therapies to subsequent waves of therapy,

including cognitive-behavioral and mindfulness-based therapies, has yielded an
overall picture of relatively equivalent treatment effects for anxiety disorders (e.g.,
Arch et al., 2012; Foa et al., 2005). Thus, to continue to make progress in this area
of research, it is essential to step back to the beginning and to better understand the
behavioral conceptualization of anxiety disorders, the advent of which produced a
dramatic leap forward in the efficacy of anxiety treatment. The behavioral concep-
tualization of anxiety disorders is not uniform, and new behavioral models have
emerged over time to account for new data. Rather than suggesting a weakness of
this approach, the many changes and refinements of these models highlight its vital-
ity. As a whole, behavioral theories of anxiety are very much alive in that they are
very much falsifiable, which helps to move the field forward at a brisk pace.
Comparing and contrasting behavioral models with newer, second and third wave
approaches, energizes the dialogue, helping to generate new ideas and hypotheses,
so that we may further refine our understanding of the nature and treatment of anxi-
ety disorders.
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Third Wave Conceptualization of Anxiety,
Obsessive Compulsive Disorders,
and Obsessive Compulsive Related
Disorders
Michael P. Twohig, Julie M. Petersen, and Guadalupe G. San Miguel
As reviewed elsewhere in this book, the line between these three waves is difficult
to draw (see earlier chapters of this volume). Arguably, this line is even harder to
draw for the treatment of anxiety disorders, OCD, and OCRDs because the behav-
ioral principles of habituation to bodily states (e.g., anxiety, fear) and extinction of
avoidance responses are an important aspect of the treatment across all three waves
(Twohig et al., 2013). This commonality is seen in the centrality of exposure exer-
cises to all three waves, although the proposed process of change in each one of
these phases varies (Twohig et al., 2015). Still, we believe it would be remiss to
write that these three waves did not occur in the treatment of anxiety, OCD, and
OCRDs. We will argue that there have been slow but notable refinements in behav-
ior therapy’s conceptualization of anxiety disorders, as well as notable modifica-
tions to treatments within each wave.
While each treatment that falls under the “third wave” category differs, the fol-
lowing are a set of key features that may distinguish this third wave from the first
and second, especially as the third wave applies to anxiety disorders. First, while
many of the third wave therapies have a focus on symptom reduction, they also have
a strong focus on increased general functioning. Some could argue that symptom
reduction obviously leads to increased functioning. While that view is reasonable,
the focus on symptoms versus functioning will alter the measures used in therapy,
determining when the client reaches the end of therapy, and how sessions are struc-
tured. As a simple example, a therapist who is focused on symptom reduction might
track levels of anxiety and avoidance per week, whereas a third wave therapist
might choose to ask about increases in the frequency of engaging in meaningful
activities instead.
M. P. Twohig (*) · J. M. Petersen · G. G. San Miguel

Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA
e-mail: michael.twohig@usu.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_14
330 M. P. Twohig et al.
A second broad difference is a focus on first versus second order change of inter-
nal experiences—in other words, whether the therapy aims to change the target
private event or instead alter how the client responds to them. A very simple exam-
ple is the use of subjective units of distress (SUDS) in many exposure therapies. To
those who have done traditional exposure therapy (e.g., Foa et al., 2012), the main
goal is to see within and between session decreases in SUDS. In many of the third
wave therapies, the focus is on metacognition, mindfulness, and acceptance of the
internal experience. We do not seek to increase or decrease any internal experience
per se, but to alter its effect on behavior. For example, in traditional ERP, the aim is
to decrease OCD symptoms (i.e., obsessions and compulsions) while in ACT, the
aim would be to increase valued behaviors that OCD symptoms may interfere with.
Additionally, there are a number of procedures that are more central to the third
wave of therapies for anxiety. Emotional acceptance or tolerance has found its way
into the vernacular of most therapies for anxiety disorders (e.g., Abramowitz &
Arch, 2014). Still, emotional acceptance and tolerance are central to most third
wave therapies and are seen as the end outcome and not a step toward habituation as
typically described by second wave cognitive behavioral treatments for anxiety
(Arch & Craske, 2008). A second notable procedural difference is cognitive chal-
lenging as compared to stepping back from thinking. This difference is very consis-
tent with the concept of first vs second order change (i.e., change the content versus
change the function). In much of the work we will describe here, third wave
approaches will use strategies to step back from and/or instruct the client to simply
notice inner experiences. Most third wave therapies will aim to help the client take
a metacognitive stance (i.e., thinking about thinking) toward their obsessions, fears,
or anxieties versus actively engaging with them. Third, the concept of being present
and mindful is central, or at least a notable part, of most of these third wave thera-
pies. As a way to challenge the power of anxiety or fear-provoking stimuli (that
occasion avoidance and meaningless action), a third wave therapist may help the
client to mindfully notice all the stimuli in the environment—including the other
private thoughts and emotions. Mindfully noticing may be defined as nonjudgmen-
tal awareness of internal experiences without trying to remove or change them and
can be measured through a variety of questionnaires or through personal observa-
tions of behavior (e.g., noticing that avoidance is not chosen). This approach can
open the response options to all stimuli available instead of the few that are trigger-
ing (e.g., the Choice Point exercise; Harris, 2019); in other words, the client is made
aware of potential actions beyond avoidance. Several third wave therapies thereby
have a strong focus on valued action over actions that are about emotional avoid-
ance. For example, choosing to visit a family member with a dog instead of asking
the person to meet at a restaurant in order to avoid the feared dog. We would hope
for a client to shift their daily behaviors from regulating inner experiences to living
a meaningful life.
Third Wave Conceptualization of Anxiety, Obsessive Compulsive Disorders… 331
Overview of Exposure Therapy in the Third Wave
These distinctions all play into the concept of exposure therapy in a meaningful
way. Exposure therapy in third wave therapies is still the core of useful treatment for
almost all anxiety, OCD, and OCRDs (e.g., Twohig et al., 2015). In Foa and Kozak’s
(1986) seminal paper on traditional exposure therapy, the authors discuss emotional
processing theory and the idea that a cognitive “fear structure” is activated when
confronting a feared stimulus, leading to typical responses such as escape or avoid-
ance. Their theory suggests that exposure exercises bring on this cognitive and
behavioral fear response, but if the client does not engage in escape or avoidance
then the avoidance response will habituate to the feared stimulus and in addition
they will gain have corrective knowledge (e.g., the feared outcome does not occur,
the anxiety/fear is tolerable). Within and between session habituation is a key indi-
cator of this process. However, after many years of research, we have found that
within and between session habituation is not related at all or notably related to
improvements in anxiety disorders (Asnaani et al., 2016).
Interestingly, while traditional exposure therapy was largely based on operant
and classical research on learning and extinction (Mowrer, 1960), basic behavioral
research since then has shown us that any learned response cannot be unlearned
(Bouton et al., 2001). Basic behavioral principles on extinction show that it just
takes the right context for a response to re-occur: spontaneous recovery (through
passage of time), disinhibition (through renewed responding to a novel stimulus),
reinstatement (through presentation of an unconditioned stimulus or reinforcer),
renewal (through change in context), or resurgence (through a new behavior intro-
duced during extinction). The difficulty in completely stopping a fear or anxiety
response from continuing to occur has been written about by leaders in the treat-
ment of anxiety disorders (Bouton et al., 2001).
Relatedly, behavioral research on language and cognition has found the same
parameters with extinction to cognitive responses, where once a cognitive response
is trained it simply takes the right context to bring it back (Wilson & Hayes, 1996).
Recent research has found that the same is true with avoidance responding condi-
tioned through stimulus equivalence or relational responding (Dymond et al., 2018).
Thus, it is not just the traditional fear or anxiety response that is difficult to unlearn,
but all cognitive activity surrounding the fear response and associated behavioral
avoidance.
This all flows logically into the most supported cognitive behavioral understand-
ing of exposure therapy to date: inhibitory learning (Craske et al., 2014b). In inhibi-
tory learning, the link between the unconditioned response and the conditioned
response is never unlearned. Even if habituation occurs, the right context will bring
that response back. Instead, there is competing learning with the original learning,
inhibiting the initial fear response and associated avoidance. Thus, a key feature of
inhibitory learning are exposure exercises that focus on building “tolerance” to anx-
iety and fear throughout the course of treatment.
To us, this is a notable step towards a second order approach (altering function)
to the treatment of inner experiences in anxiety, OCD, OCRDs. Exposure exercises
from the third wave approach are therefore not about habituating to internal experi-
ences—they are chances to practice being mindful and creating distance from
thoughts so that this is easier to do in important extra-therapy situations (Twohig
et al., 2015). For example, in acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) we might
approach a stimulus and stay in contact with it while it provokes emotion, but the
function is to practice feeling rather than waiting until it decreases. Instead of focus-
ing on therapy techniques that will result in a first order reduction in a cognitive or
physiological response, acceptance and mindfulness procedures seek to promote
stepping back from and just noticing the occurrence anxiety or fear. Therefore, we
look at exposure exercises more so as an opportunity to see inner experiences for
what they are (just thoughts, feelings, and sensations) and as chances to practice
living meaningful lives and moving towards values. We seek to teach the client how
to live with those behavioral and emotional responses and not be affected by them.
Similar to a tolerance model, we seek to teach acceptance as a lifelong approach to
internal experiences, rather than tolerate the moment to a future that has less
difficulty.
Research Overview
A formal vote regarding who wants their treatment to be considered part of the third
wave of behavior therapy never occurred; relatedly, we were not unanimous on
using the terms “first, second, or third wave.” Nonetheless, following the previous
guidelines on elements that are consistent with third wave therapies we are choosing
to review: mindfulness-based therapies (MBT; mindfulness-based stress reduction
[MBSR] and mindfulness based cognitive therapy [MBCT], Dialectical Behavior
Therapy [DBT], and ACT).
Mindfulness Based Therapies for Adult Anxiety Disorders
While MBCT and MBSR are different treatments, to be consistent with most large
meta-analyses, we will combine them in our review. As is well-known, MBSR was
largely developed for chronic medical conditions (Kabat-Zinn, 2003) and MBCT
was mostly focused on reducing relapse in depression (Kuyken et al., 2008). Both
therapies include mindfulness practice with the hope of providing clients with skills
to effectively respond to their distressing internal experiences. Specifically, in the
treatment of anxiety, mindfulness is used to help the client be aware of all bodily
states and take an open and accepting stance towards those experiences. This pro-
cess could combat ruminations or worry, common themes in anxiety disorders
(Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Mathews, 1990). In addition, several authors have proposed the
varied function mindfulness plays in the reduction of symptom related distress; for
example, the cognitive shift to a non-judgmental perspective towards thoughts
(Kabat-Zinn, 1982) or mindful exposure to distressing states may provide healthy
alternatives to worry (Hayes, 2002).
As reviewed in the following meta-analyses, there are randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) for heterogeneous anxiety problems: social anxiety disorder, general-
ized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and health anxi-
ety. The largest meta-analysis of mindfulness for anxiety disorders to date reported
a within condition (pre-post) Hedges’ g of 0.63 for mindfulness in participants who
were not seeking services for anxiety disorders (e.g., seeking services for a different
issue but had high anxiety scores), and a Hedges’ g of 0.97 on anxiety in those seek-
ing treatment for anxiety disorders (Hofmann et al., 2010). These results indicate
that there is moderate support for the use of MBTs as treatments for anxiety disor-
ders. The same team found MBTs had a medium effect size when compared to
waitlist, a small effect size compared to active treatment comparisons, but these
were not more effective than traditional CBT or behavioral therapies (Khoury
et al., 2013).
Another notable meta-analysis analyzed MBTs for anxiety and stress across 47
studies (Goyal et al., 2014). While their review included MBTs and transcendental
meditation programs, the results demonstrated moderate between-group effect sizes
for anxiety. However, another meta-analysis found that MBT for anxiety disorders
was effective when compared to a waitlist condition, but not more effective than
another active or evidence-based treatment, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, as
recommended by the American Psychological Association (Goldberg et al., 2018).
Overall, these results indicate that MBTs are useful, but have not been shown to be
more useful than existing treatments for anxiety disorders. Also, these more general
meta-analyses found that MBTs have some of their strongest outcomes with anxiety
(Goldberg et al., 2018; Goyal et al., 2014).
Dialectical Behavior Therapy for Adult Anxiety Disorders
Evolved from cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and composed of individual ses-
sions, phone consultation, and weekly group skills training, DBT was originally
developed as a treatment for borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 1993).
Among the skills taught in the weekly group trainings are mindfulness, distress
tolerance, emotion regulation, and interpersonal effectiveness.
DBT has been shown to reduce anxiety in heterogeneous clinical samples of an
intensive outpatient program (e.g., Lothes II et al., 2016). Another mixed clinical
sample of undergraduates reported reductions in general and specific anxiety disor-
der symptoms (e.g., OCD, specific phobia) following an adapted DBT treatment
protocol (Panepinto et al., 2015). DBT has also been investigated as a specific treat-
ment adjunct for anxiety. Residential DBT for posttraumatic stress disorder (DBT-
PTSD) demonstrated promising results as a treatment for PTSD associated with
childhood sexual abuse in two studies (Bohus et al., 2013; Steil et al., 2018).
Researchers have also investigated a skills-only intervention for test anxiety, noting
reduced symptoms of test anxiety after receiving only mindfulness DBT skills
(Lothes II & Mochrie, 2017) and reduced overall anxiety using DBT as a whole
(Neacsiu et al., 2014). On the whole, DBT shows some feasibility as a treatment for
anxiety, even when treatment has been slightly remodeled from the original format.
cceptance and Commitment Therapy for Adult

A
Anxiety Disorders
ACT aims to increase psychological flexibility, the ability to live in the present
moment, regardless of distress, while engaging in behavior based on one’s values.
To date there has been one meta-analysis showing small to large correlations
between psychological inflexibility and different forms of anxiety (Bluett
et al., 2014).
There is a wide range of evidence supporting ACT as a treatment for mixed anxi-
ety disorders in a diverse set of delivery methods (e.g., individual, group, biblio-
therapy, web-based) and settings (e.g., outpatient, college, residential; Gloster et al.,
2020). In a recent a meta-analysis of ACT meta-analyses, 6 of 7 meta-analyses
reported small to medium between condition effect sizes for ACT as a treatment for
anxiety; the remaining one favored active control conditions with a negligible non-
significant effect size (Gloster et al., 2020). As covered in several other meta-
analyses (Bluett et al., 2014) and systematic reviews of ACT for anxiety disorders
(Twohig & Levin, 2017), multiple RCTs have been completed for every anxiety
disorder. Across all meta-analyses the effect size was at least medium in favor of
ACT. Most notably, ACT performed better than other active control conditions, but
only equivalent to CBT.
Mindfulness Based Therapies for Anxiety Disorders in Youth
A recent meta-analysis found five RCTs comparing MBTs to a control condition

(e.g., waitlist, narrative exposure therapy) for youth (Borquist-Conlon et al., 2019).
One study used ACT and the remaining four were not traditional MBT but were
manualized mindfulness-oriented treatments. The investigators found a medium
effect size (Hedges’ g = 0.62) on anxiety measures. When excluding ACT and DBT,
another meta-analysis found mindfulness-based interventions to be efficacious for
treating anxiety in youth (Kallapiran et al., 2015). They analyzed 11 randomized
trials of MBSR and MBCT, finding large effect sizes when compared against nonac-
tive treatments. Thus, there is limited support for MBCT and MBSR for youth with
anxiety disorders as RCTs are mostly limited to nonactive controls.
Dialectical Behavior Therapy for Anxiety Disorders in Youth
In a meta-analysis of DBT-Adolescent, the authors analyzed three randomized con-

trolled trials with a total of 146 participants with heterogenous diagnoses (Hunnicutt
Hollenbaugh & Lenz, 2018). Each study showed a small to medium between-
conditions effect size favoring DBT-A as compared to TAU or multimodal therapy.
The overall effect size for DBT-A for anxiety was .47.
cceptance and Commitment Therapy for Anxiety Disorders

A
in Youth
ACT for youth has not been thoroughly investigated as it has for adults. In a review
from 2015, there were ACT outcome studies with positive results for children or
adolescents who were diagnosed with OCD, learning disability and anxiety, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (Swain et al., 2015). A recent meta-analysis of 14
RCTs (N = 1189) of ACT for youth combined outcomes across depression, anxiety,
and problem behavior (Fang & Ding, 2020). Much like the adult data, ACT showed
medium to large effect sizes against treatment as usual and waitlist, but there was no
significant difference from traditional CBT. When analyzing depression and anxiety
alone, the same outcomes were found.
Mindfulness Based Therapies for OCD and OCRDs in Adults
Mindfulness is thought to be helpful with avoidance of and/or rigidity towards inter-

nal experiences (including reassurance-seeking or rituals), interrupting internal
OCD processes (e.g., mental rituals), and attentional biases common in OCD
(Didonna, 2009). Indeed, individuals diagnosed with OCD report lower mindful-
ness qualities (e.g. nonjudgmentalness, awareness) as compared to a nonclinical
group (Didonna, 2009). Mindfulness has demonstrated potential as a way to cope
with difficult obsessions (Fairfax, 2008).
Studies looking at more structured mindfulness treatments (e.g., MBSR or
MBCT) found promising results. One multiple baseline study found that MBCT
reduced OCD, depression, and anxiety symptoms (Liu et al., 2011). The use of
MBCT was also supported by a recent pilot trial looking at the effectiveness of
group MBCT for OCD; results indicated significantly decreased OCD and increased
mindfulness abilities (Didonna et al., 2019). Larger RCTs of mindfulness treat-
ments for OCD show inconsistent findings. One study found that biweekly MBCT
for “pure O” OCD left 67% of participants in remission, as determined by a 55%
reduction in Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS) scores (Kumar
et al., 2016). On the other hand, mindfulness-based exposure and response
prevention (ERP) did not differ from ERP-only outcomes, beyond increased levels
of mindfulness (Strauss et al., 2018). Several RCTs have reported that
MBCT following CBT in patients with lingering OCD symptoms ultimately reduced
OCD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms while increasing mindfulness and self-
compassion (Key et al., 2017). However, no differences in OCD symptoms were
found following MBCT or psychoeducation groups after receiving a full course of
CBT (Külz et al., 2019). The data on mindfulness for OCRDs are limited, with only
one pilot study demonstrating improvements in tic-related symptoms after MBSR
(Reese et al., 2015).
Dialectical Behavior Therapy for OCD and OCRDs in Adults
There is some evidence that patients with OCD have difficulty identifying and regu-
lating a variety of emotions (Stern et al., 2014). However, there is only one pub-
lished study looking at DBT as a treatment for OCD. Ahovan et al. (2016) assessed
the effectiveness of eight, 90-min DBT sessions covering all four DBT modules for
OCD resulting in reduced OCD severity and increased emotion regulation as com-
pared to a control group.
Some theories suggest that hair pulling is utilized as an emotion regulation tool,
particularly in response to negative emotions, thoughts, or urges (MacPherson et al.,
2013). The focus of this research illustrates that, if hair pulling is functioning as an
emotion regulation strategy, then DBT combined with habit reversal training (HRT)
may provide the best outcomes over other treatments (Welch & Kim, 2012). DBT,
as compared to a control group, resulted in greater improvement in hair pulling
symptoms and emotion regulation difficulties (Keuthen et al., 2012). Hair pulling
severity was reduced and gains were maintained at follow-up (Keuthen &
Sprich, 2012).
cceptance and Commitment Therapy for OCD and OCRDs

A
in Adults
The amount of research on ACT for OCD is quite substantial (Bluett et al., 2014).
In addition to many single subject designs on ACT for OCD, there have been at least
six RCTs on ACT for OCD with two completed in the USA and the remaining in
Iran. ACT outperformed progressive relaxation training in 79 adults with OCD
showing response rates of 55–65% compared to 13–18% at post-treatment and
3-month follow-up (Twohig et al., 2010). In a follow-up to that study, ACT was
combined with traditional ERP and compared to traditional ERP alone (Twohig
et al., 2018). Treatments were equivalent and successful with response rates of 70%
for ACT+ ERP and 68% of ERP at posttreatment, and 60% and 64% at follow-up.
In the four trials of ACT for OCD in Iran, all followed the same brief protocol used
in Twohig et al. (2010) that does not emphasize exposure exercises. Consistent with
Iranian medical system and culture, participants were often on stable doses of SSRIs
and group therapy was often female only. Pretreatment YBOCS scores were in the
22–28 range, posttreatment was in the 13–17 range, and follow-up was in 6–15
range. ACT was always found to be superior to waitlist and never stronger than
traditional CBT, although multiple trials found process of change differences
between the treatments with psychological flexibility being involved in ACT more
so than SSRIs alone (Baghooli et al., 2014; Esfahani et al., 2015; Rohani et al.,
2018; Vakili et al., 2015).
In addition to multiple single subject studies and one open trial on ACT alone or
ACT+HRT for adult trichotillomania (Haaland et al., 2017; Twohig & Woods,
2004), three randomized trials have tested ACT or ACT+HRT for adults with tricho-
tillomania. In a RCT examining ACT enhanced HRT as compared to waitlist, the
ACT condition had a 66% response rate compared to 8% of the waitlist (Woods
et al., 2006). The same ACT+HRT protocol was tested when delivered over tele-
therapy, with similar results; 58% responders in the treatment group compared to
17.7% in the waitlist (Lee et al., 2018). Finally, ACT alone was tested as treatment
for trichotillomania in adults and adolescents as compared to a waitlist; results sup-
ported the use of ACT alone for trichotillomania (Lee et al., 2020). The treatment
group showed a 77% decrease in pulling versus a 10% decrease in the waitlist. In
addition to hair pulling, one multiple baseline testing ACT for skin picking found
four out of five participants reporting reduced skin picking at posttreatment, as well
as increased psychological flexibility (Twohig et al., 2006). However, only one par-
ticipant maintained these gains at follow-up.
Third Wave Therapies for Youth with OCD and OCRDs
Few studies have found evidence supporting the use of mindfulness and acceptance-
based treatments in youth and teens with OCD and related disorders. In a multiple
baseline for ACT for OCD in adolescents, 44% reported a decrease in symptoms
(using the CYBOCS) at follow-up (Armstrong et al., 2013). In another study, ado-
lescents with OCD already taking SSRIs were randomly assigned to group ACT,
group CBT, or SSRI alone (Shabani et al., 2019). Both ACT and CBT groups had
significant reductions in OCD severity at post and follow-up (Shabani et al., 2019).
Lastly, one study of tic disorders in adolescents found no differences between ACT
enhanced HRT as compared to ACT alone (Franklin et al., 2011).
Thoughts on the Three Waves
At an outcome level, third wave therapies do not appear to be more beneficial than
first or second wave treatments for anxiety disorders and OCD (Bluett et al., 2014).
Interestingly, researchers have not found benefits for the second wave over the third
in terms of outcomes for these disorders, especially since exposure-based therapies
are one of the most beneficial treatments for anxiety (Tolin, 2009). Again, no matter
how exposures are done in the trials, we have not greatly increased its effectiveness
(Tolin, 2009). The data on OCRDs are a little different because the work is much
less advanced than with anxiety and OCD. A small amount of work was conducted
during the first phase of behavior therapy (Azrin & Nunn, 1973) and even less for
second wave procedures for trichotillomania and skin picking. A moderate amount
of work has occurred testing a traditional CBT procedure for body dysmorphic dis-
order (BDD) showing large effect sizes for CBT over waitlist or credible placebo
controls (Harrison et al., 2016). There has been a fairly steady stream of work on
ACT and DBT for trichotillomania and skin picking (Bluett et al., 2014).
One thing that stands out regarding the third wave work on anxiety disorders and
OCD is that the sample sizes of the studies are often fairly small and very few are
federally funded. While there is not an exact date for when the third wave started,
we can generally say around 2000. At that time, there was a notable shift in the
funding priorities of the National Institute of Health (NIH) away from general effi-
cacy trials for diagnosable mental disorders (Wilson, 2022). The real bulk of the
efficacy work occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, when traditional CBT was devel-
oped for most anxiety disorders and OCD. The efficacy rates of CBT for anxiety
disorders and OCD are high enough—around 50% response rate (Loerinc et al.,
2015)—that NIH shifted priorities away from RCTs and towards neurobiological
understanding of psychopathology (Goldfried, 2016). Thus, much of the third wave
missed the opportunity to do the larger well-controlled RCTs supported by federal
funding. Nowadays, most of the large funding for third wave research is in medical
conditions or substance use (e.g., Vilardaga et al., 2020)
Process of Change Research
One notable shift that occurred from the first to third wave was an increased focus
on processes of change and moderators (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). We do not think
that the third wave therapies deserve the credit for helping shift a focus to why treat-
ments work and for whom. That was likely a natural progression in psychotherapy
over time. First wave therapies for anxiety were largely based off traditional behav-
ioral principles. With time, these procedures developed a more cognitive orienta-
tion. They shifted from focusing on extinction and habituation to elements of
cognitive change (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Many of the second wave protocols for
anxiety were more logical than process of change focused. For example, Barlow’s
work on panic disorder cut down a larger treatment package to focus on the ele-
ments that were most helpful by excluding muscle relaxation (Pompoli et al., 2018).
However, the steps to engage in that dismantling were less process based and more
technique based.
More recently, a large focus has shifted to the processes that underlie disorders
and processes and techniques that can successfully alter those processes (Hofmann
& Hayes, 2019). Even more so with more modern statistical methods, we can track
temporality of when a process change occurs and how that affects overt actions.
Relatedly, we are finding through single and multiple mediation studies that one
process of change can affect another in a useful way, such that a decrease in a poten-
tial mediator occurs with the support of another mediator (e.g. Ong et al., 2020;
Arch et al., 2012; Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2012). For example, in a larger trial
(N = 120 adults with an anxiety disorder) comparing ACT to traditional CBT, both
groups showed strong improvements at posttreatment, but ACT showed stronger
improvements at follow-up. While there were greater improvements in psychologi-
cal flexibility in the ACT condition at follow-up, second wave CBT showed better
quality of life. In a secondary mediation analyses, changes in cognitive defusion
were stronger in ACT, but cognitive defusion predicted worry reductions in CBT
over ACT (Arch et al., 2012). In moderation analyses conducted on this trial, CBT
was more effective for those with moderate anxiety sensitivity and no comorbid
condition whereas ACT was more effective for those with comorbid mood condi-
tions (Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2012). Finally, they investigated physiological and
behavioral moderators of treatment outcome (Davies et al., 2015), finding that ACT
did better than CBT for those with high behavioral avoidance. Thus, these overall
results show that ACT and CBT are both effective treatments, one may show stron-
ger follow-up, some treatment matching can occur, and they are associated with
different processes of change.
Another larger RCT (N = 87 adults with social anxiety disorder) compared ACT,
CBT, and a waitlist (Craske et al., 2014a), finding that ACT and CBT outperformed
the waitlist, with no differences between ACT and CBT. Lower psychological flex-
ibility was associated with better outcomes in CBT at follow-up. Low and high fear
of negative evaluation was also associated with better outcomes in CBT over
ACT. In terms of mediators, ACT showed steeper initial declines in session-by-
session negative cognitions and psychological flexibility, whereas CBT showed
steeper declines towards the end of treatment (Niles et al., 2014). Psychological
flexibility also predicted outcomes in ACT but not CBT. In this study no outcome
differences were found, but some process and moderator differences were noted.
Finally, secondary analyses from a recent multisite RCT comparing ACT-based
ERP to traditional ERP in 58 adults with OCD (Twohig et al., 2018; reviewed in the
ACT for OCD and OCRDs in Adults section) found sudden gains occurred in 27%
of the sample and were most common in contamination OCD (Buchholz et al.,
2019). While sudden gains were not associated with changes in cognitive distortions
or psychological flexibility, there were only 2 (6%) participants with sudden gains
in the ACT+ERP condition as compared to 10 (35%) in the ERP condition. Relatedly,
we also found that cognitive fusion predicted the symmetry-related OCD symptoms
beyond obsessive beliefs, suggesting that addressing obsessive beliefs versus buy-
ing into thoughts might be moderated by OCD type (Hellberg et al., 2020). Again,
looking at the entire sample, we found that those with less dysfunctional appraisals
did better in ERP over ACT+ERP (Ong et al., 2020). At the process of change level,
increases in psychological flexibility predicted improvements in both conditions,
whereas change in dysfunctional appraisals was only relevant in ERP. Finally, in a
review of video recorded therapy sessions, our team found that the number one
predictor of outcomes—beyond minutes of exposure exercises—was experiential
delivery of an acceptance/tolerance rationale (Ong et al., 2022). While these are
results of just one RCT, it is visible that it is more complicated than the similar out-
comes of ERP and ACT+ERP. Elements from each intervention were predictive at a
moderating and mediating level.
Therefore, third wave treatments seem to have their place in CBT, not just
because they theoretically fit and there is some empirical evidence that their pro-
cesses of change might be specific to them, but because they might be offering some
elements to therapy that had either been minorly present or not present at all in the
first two waves. Concepts such as mindfulness, cognitive defusion, and a clear focus
on linking treatment goals, values have arguable been built out by the third wave
treatments. These methods have been brought into other versions of CBT and are
key in process-based approaches to CBT (See chapter “Advantages of Third Wave
Behavior Therapies” of this volume).
Clinical Example Using ACT
We are not going to present a real case, rather we will present information gleaned
largely from the following trial comparing ACT+ERP to ERP alone in the treatment
of adult OCD (Twohig et al., 2015, 2018). Even though this information is based on
ACT many of the general principles would apply across the therapies reviewed; and
even though it is on OCD, very similar assessment, conceptualization, and treat-
ment strategies would apply.
When conducting assessment from a third wave point of view, we would want to
assess OCD severity. It is worth noting that assessment of OCD severity from a
second order change standpoint can have complications. Specifically, outcome mea-
sures usually have questions on the severity and frequency of internal experiences
such as obsessions, along with content area (e.g., fears about germs, violent intru-
sive thoughts). For example, the YBOCS asks about frequency of obsessions and
compulsions. These types of questions can confuse the client and assessor alike
because we might literally work with the client on the idea that obsessions cannot
be controlled. Therefore, assessment should also include measure on quality of life
and general functioning, such as the Quality of Life Scale (Burckhardt & Anderson,
2003), the Mental Health Continuum short form (Lamers et al., 2011) or the Work
and Social Adjustment Scale (Mundt et al., 2002). Questionnaires on daily function-
ing seem to work better than global quality of life measures because lager quality of
life issues (e.g., work, relationships) can be slow to change, but smaller daily func-
tioning issues can change quickly.
Of course, it is important to assess process of change constructs that are consis-
tent with the treatment model one is working from. There are standard measures of
psychological flexibility (e.g., Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II; Bond et al.,
2011) and disorder specific assessments of psychological flexibility exist for OCD,
trichotillomania, and hoarding disorder are available: AAQ for Obsessions and
Compulsions (AAQ-OC), AAQ for trichotillomania (AAQ-TTM), AAQ for hoard-
ing (AAQ-H; Ong et al., 2019). Finally, in addition to the larger battery of assess-
ments given at the beginning of treatment, after treatment, and at reasonable intervals
throughout treatment, we suggest self-monitoring of a clear overt action (e.g., com-
pulsions). This monitoring allows for day to day tracking of treatment progress.
In terms of case conceptualization, we look at disorder severity data and other
standardized assessments of important psychological processes (e.g., psychological
inflexibility around obsessions). Those assessments can provide us with a nomo-
thetic view of the clinical presentation. For idiographic information, the ACT
Advisor, a short questionnaire, provides a form with scales for the six processes of
change that are addressed in ACT (i.e., acceptance, cognitive defusion, self-as-
context, present moment awareness, values, committed action). This assessment
allows us to determine where the client is on the six processes we will address in
therapy. For example, if a client with OCD is low on present moment awareness, we
would expect them to have trouble staying mindful, often thinking about the past/
future or about their current obsession (e.g., Thoughts during a dinner party such as
“Is this table clean enough?” or “Are there germs on this knife?”, rather than paying
attention to their meal and company), and have general difficulty flexibly using their
attention. Alternatively, a client who scores high on present moment awareness may
easily stay in the present moment and direct their attention to what is most impor-
tant to them in that moment (e.g., noticing the mind’s concern about cleanliness and
choosing to pay attention to the dinner party instead). Thus, low scores often indi-
cate greater psychological inflexibility (e.g., fusion). We find that clients are either
low on all six processes, or they are low on the more “acceptance and mindfulness”
processes but high on the values and behavior change processes. We often find that
there is a notable subset of those with OCD who are “white knuckling” through
their disorder. For example, a person with obsessions around driving (e.g., fears
about hitting someone) may be able to drive, but only enduring shorter distances
with great difficulty and reliance on compulsive behaviors (e.g., checking their rear-
view mirror to see if they hit a person). Someone who knows what they want and
has been trying to do it—although in a nonfunctional way—is in a different spot
than someone who is cognitively fused and not having success in pushing through
the OCD either (e.g., a person who completely refuses to drive due to intrusive
thoughts around driving). We complete the ACT Advisor, or something similar, at
most sessions.
In terms of actual therapy, the main focus is to teach the client how to be psycho-
logically flexible around their obsessions by utilizing and engaging them with the
six ACT processes. Once the client begins to score on the higher end of the ACT
Advisor, we then move into ACT-based exposure exercises (e.g., engaging in activi-
ties that provoke anxiety/fear and are meaningful) as an opportunity to (1) pursue
their values, and (2) practice interacting with their obsessions in a new, more func-
tional way. The amount of time in therapy needed to develop psychological flexibil-
ity is hard to predict. Thus, spend as much or as little time needed to get to that place
and keep the appropriate cut-off scores in mind (e.g., below 24–28 on the AAQ-II;
Bond et al., 2011). We have seen it as fast as the first session (if the client has experi-
ence with these topics) or as long as maybe eight sessions. To teach psychological
flexibility, we spend time with the client discussing whether attempts to regulate or
control obsessions (e.g., compulsions like hand-washing, mental rituals, self-talk,
medication) increase its power or decrease it. We use examples from their own lives
where attempts to control, suppress, or otherwise regulate things has actually back-
fired. For example, a client with trichotillomania may pull their hair in order to
satisfy an urge for symmetry in their eyebrows—not only does the urge return
repeatedly despite these efforts, but the pulling also results in bald spots.
We then use acceptance, defusion, and mindfulness strategies to help the client
see their obsessions for what they are—thoughts, images, and feelings. An example
of a common acceptance and defusion strategy used in the treatment of anxiety and
OCRDs is the “tug of war with a monster” metaphor. Clients are asked to consider
their obsessions as a monster they are currently playing tug of war with. Whenever
the monster calls out to them (e.g., what if I did something sacrilegious?), clients
often pick up the rope and fight or bargain with the monster (e.g., praying exces-
sively, re-assuring oneself that it was not a sin). We would instead encourage the
client to drop the rope and continue about their lives—sometimes the monster will
call out to them and they do not have to respond or pick up the rope.
“The movie theater” exercise utilizes mindfulness and defusion to aid clients in
viewing obsessions for what they are. In this exercise, clients are guided through a
visualization where they imagine themselves entering a movie theater with a blank
screen. Clients imagine themselves sitting in the audience and then view their
thoughts as passing images or words on the screen. In this way, clients practice that
they are not their urges or obsessions, but an observer of each thought or feeling as
it passes by. After seeing the obsession (e.g., I fear I might harm my child), they can
choose to observe it and not respond.
In sum, we are aiding the client to understand that obsessions are about events
but are not the events themselves. For example, a client who has an obsession about
sexually abusing their child would work towards an understanding that having these
thoughts is not the same as engaging in the feared behavior. One way to illustrate
this concept is to have the client pretend to bite into a half a lemon and imagine the
reaction their body has. We might then compare that reaction to the one the client
has when they picture their obsession. It can be a strong reaction, but it is a thought
about a thing, not that thing (e.g., a thought about sickness, not actually sickness).
The difference is really important—we may want to avoid the real thing, but we do
not have to avoid thoughts about something if it is not functional.
We also bring in values discussions early on in therapy. Therapy is never primar-
ily about OCD reduction but about moving toward valued goals in life. It is always
about building relationships, growing in work or school, or whatever else they care
about. We link the distress obsessions bring on as an indicator that something
important is happening and then to use that moment as an opportunity to go towards
their values. For example, if a client feels fear around harming their child in some
way, instead of avoiding that feeling (e.g., refusing to be alone with the child), we
aim to approach that feeling in the service of the value of being a parent (e.g., taking
time to intentionally be present with the child). Finally, every session has a behav-
ioral commitment to go towards their values in some specific way while practicing
psychological flexibility. Again, these exercises are always about building openness
to obsessions while pursuing values.
Once psychological flexibility is present, we like to engage in longer in-session
exposure exercises and assign larger out of session ones. These exercises follow
much of the functional principles that have already been described. Specifically, the
exposure exercises are seen as opportunities to follow one’s values and practice
developing a new relationship to one’s obsessions—a more psychologically flexible
one. Each exposure session begins by asking the client how their exercises (i.e.,
exposures or behavioral commitments) went from the past week. We are interested
in how open they were to the anxiety/obsessions that occurred during those exer-
cises and whether they completely engaged anyway. Based on an assessment (e.g.,
ACT advisor), we would spend some time building up the needed ACT process of
change. Once we felt the client was in touch with that ACT process, we would work
with the client to develop an exposure exercise that they thought they could be fully
open to for a specific, agreed upon time period. We do not usually build a hierarchy,
but if we were to (because it can be wise to have needed stimuli ready) we would
base exercises on the client’s willingness to do the exercise instead of how much
distress it would cause.
Staring the ACT-based exposure involves reminding the client to get in touch
with the value they are pursuing and coaching them to engage with the process of
change that was discussed earlier in the session. The exposure is seen as an oppor-
tunity to interact with their obsession in a different way (e.g., accepting, distanced,
defused) while pursuing values. Because it can be hard to see whether the client is
practicing defusion or acceptance, we check in and coach the client along during the
session. We might ask, “how are you treating the obsession?,” or “how open are you
to the obsession right now?,” or “are you connected with why it is worth doing this
exercise?” We do not ask for SUDS, but we have asked about “willingness.” We end
the exposure when we complete the agreed upon task. Because we are practicing
building a new relationship to the obsession, it really does not matter if the obses-
sion or anxiety increases or decreases—we want the way the client relates to that
feeling to change. We would plan homework that matches the skills we practiced in
session.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Arguably, the discussion about the role of the three waves of therapy in anxiety,
OCD, and OCRDs is an example of the discussion of the three waves in general.
The first wave of behavior therapy was groundbreaking in its ability to successfully
treat disorders that seemed overwhelming at the time. The second wave added a
logical and scientific approach to dealing with cognitions. We feel the third wave
build upon the previous two by retaining the behavioral thinking of the first wave
and the focus on cognition from the second. The third wave takes a different stance
towards language and cognition than the second wave. We feel confident it is new.
Having strong technologies that can focus on first order change (second wave) and
second order change (third wave) of cognitions and other internal experiences is
key. Many disorders fall under the anxiety, OCD, and OCRD umbrella, and while
they share many functions, they have their own features. In OCD alone, we can have
strong fears (e.g., an obsession around killing someone) or a feeling that something
is not right, but not dangerous. We have urges that a hair needs to be removed in
trichotillomania and a fear of dying in in a panic attack. We need many methods of
conceptualization and treatment for the myriad of internal experiences that occur in
anxiety, OCD, and OCRDs, to be built within the behavioral theory put forth in the
first wave.
This situates the important work of process based cognitive behavioral therapies
(PB-CBT) at the forefront. Process based CBT has been proposed within our field
for a long time (Hayes et al., 1996), but more formal writing on the topic has
increased lately (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009). At the core
of PB-CBT is the notion that while we have a method to categorize disorders (e.g.,
the DSM, or ICD-10), those methods do not capture the complexity of the individu-
als we work with. PB-CBT also proposes that there are transdiagnostic psychologi-
cal processes and certain empirically supported techniques are helpful at addressing
those processes to produce good clinical outcomes. Thus, it is possible that the best
therapeutic practices are not from any wave of CBT, but from all waves. Each wave
of CBT has offered unique and important processes and procedures that likely
match with certain clinical presentations. Thus, while it is important to recognize
new developments in our field, we should also recognize that we have all been help-
ing understand the treatment of anxiety, OCD, and OCRDs.
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Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case
Conceptualization
Kyra Katte and Amy E. Naugle
Description and Diagnosis
The prevalence and debilitation of depression makes it one of the most significant
mental health concerns and most impairing psychiatric disorders for individuals,
their family members, and society as a whole. Lifetime prevalence of depression is
estimated to be 10–15%, with a 12-month prevalence of 9% in the United States
(Lépine & Briley, 2011). Men and women with depression are respectively 20.9 and
27 times more likely to die by suicide than the general population (Ösby et al.,
2001). When investigating all causes of death, individuals with depression are twice
as likely to die prematurely in comparison to those without a diagnosis of depres-
sion (Ösby et al., 2001). In a 40-year longitudinal study, children or adults with
depression worked 7 fewer weeks per year, had a 20% decrease in potential income,
and contributed to a lifetime loss of $300,000 for each family (Smith & Smith, 2010).
Age of onset is typically between mid-adolescence and mid-40s, with the median
age of the first episode of major depression occurring before 20 years of age
(Nihalani et al., 2009; Moffitt et al., 2010). The debilitating effects of depression are
further intensified by relapse and recurrence, with 50–85% of individuals with
depression experiencing multiple episodes of depression in their lifetimes (Coyne
et al., 1999). Women are twice as likely to receive a diagnosis of depression in com-
parison to men and this gender gap is thought to be related to biological (e.g., hor-
monal changes during puberty) and environmental factors (e.g., women’s greater
hours of housework, tendency to care for more stressful/demanding situations at
home, exposure to sexual abuse, use of ruminative coping, body image concerns,
increased chances of widowhood/bereavement and lower pay compared to men)
(Hyde et al., 2008; Mirowsky, 1996).
K. Katte · A. E. Naugle (*)

Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA
e-mail: kyra.katte@wmich.edu; amy.naugle@wmich.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_15
352 K. Katte and A. E. Naugle
Depression can be defined by a number of symptoms that cause functional

impairment for an individual and form a syndrome (Malhi & Mann, 2018).
Symptoms of depression include depressed mood, anhedonia (i.e., a decreased
inability to feel pleasure), neurovegetative symptoms (e.g., loss of appetite or
weight, fatigue, insomnia), suicidal ideation, and difficulty with concentration. A
diagnosis of depression for an individual is warranted after experiencing five of nine
depressive symptoms nearly every day for a two-week period, as dictated by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Behavioral Model of Depression
Operant Conditioning
Before one can fully understand the theory behind the behavioral model of depres-
sion, it may be helpful to provide a brief description of the principles of operant
conditioning and its implications on the frequency of behavior. Skinner (1957) pro-
posed that behaviors that operate on the environment lead to consequences that in
turn affect the frequency of the occurrence of the functional class of behaviors in the
future (hence the name operant). Therefore, the frequency of a behavior is con-
trolled by its consequences. Specifically, positive reinforcement (i.e., the addition of
a stimulus to the environment that leads to an increase in future frequency of behav-
ior), negative reinforcement (i.e., the withdrawal of a stimulus from the environ-
ment that leads to an increase in future frequency of behavior), positive punishment
(i.e., the addition of a stimulus to the environment that leads to a decrease in future
frequency of behavior) and negative punishment (i.e., the removal of a stimulus
from the environment that leads to a decrease in future frequency of behavior) affect
the rate at which an organism responds (Skinner, 1957). Following these principles,
extinction occurs when emitting a behavior no longer leads to reinforcement, so the
frequency of the behavior decreases over time (Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2012).
In addition, Skinner (1958) wrote that the organism often has emotional reac-
tions to these operations, typically a more positive reaction to reinforcement than to
punishment. Similarly, a behavior can be more likely to occur if it is followed by the
removal of an aversive stimulus in the environment. An individual can either avoid
contacting the aversive stimulus or escape it once it has been contacted (Fantino &
Stolarz-Fantino, 2012). With this knowledge, a clinician can begin to understand
which variables in their client’s environment may be maintaining their depressive
symptoms by completing a functional analysis or a descriptive functional assess-
ment of the depressive behavior (Murphy & Lupfer, 2014). A functional analysis or
assessment identifies the idiographic antecedents and consequences that are causal
and controllable in terms of their effects on the target behavior (Haynes &
O’Brien, 1990).
Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization 353
With a better understanding of operant conditioning and the application of func-

tional analyses for clients with depression, the knowledgeable clinician may begin
to realize that there are two critical aspects of their client to be aware of. First, cli-
ents appear to be experiencing an emotional reaction to positive/negative reinforce-
ment/punishment. Second, there is a certain amount of positive reinforcement in
one’s life that feels good and must be achieved in order to continue to feel good.
Therefore, it stands to reason that increasing positive reinforcement in one’s life is
likely to reduce their depressive symptoms.
History of Development
Skinner (1965) was the first to offer a functional description of depression. In

Science and Human Behavior, Skinner (1965) conceptualized depression as an
extinction phenomenon in which behaviors that were formerly socially positively
reinforced are later interrupted. This interruption in an established sequence of
behavior was hypothesized to lead to feelings of loneliness (Skinner, 1965).
Skinner’s (1965) functional analysis of depression served as the foundation upon
which the first-wave treatment for depression (i.e., behavioral activation) was devel-
oped. Although some have argued against the conceptualization of behavioral acti-
vation as a first-wave behavioral treatment, it is considered to be a part of the first
generation of behavior therapy because it directly applies operant conditioning to
change overt behavior (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017). By contrast, the second wave
focused on both behavior and cognitions, whilst the third and final wave of behav-
ioral therapies included the addition of mindfulness techniques to change behavior
(Hayes & Hofmann, 2017).
Ferster (1965, 1966) further behaviorally characterized the defining characteris-
tic of depression as the reduced frequency of a positively reinforced behavior. He
viewed most behaviors of a person with depression as passive and reactive, rather
than active and freely emitted (Ferster, 1973). Ferster (1973) also identified escape
and avoidance from aversive social consequences as potential antecedents for
depression.
Similarly, Lazarus (1968) viewed depression as a lack of adequate or sufficient
reinforcers in one’s environment. He proposed that an individual with depression is
on an extinction schedule which results in a weakened repertoire. Initially, a signifi-
cant reinforcer in one’s environment is withdrawn. The individual then either grieves
the loss of the significant reinforcer or utilizes other reinforcers in their environment
(Lazarus, 1968). If an individual lacks the capacity or opportunity to utilize other
reinforcers at their disposal, then a chronic condition arises in which the individual
is unaffected by most stimuli in their environment and then enters a depressive state
(Lazarus, 1968).
Following the aforementioned behavioral views of depression, Lewinsohn and
Atwood (1969) hypothesized that the depressive syndrome could be explained by a
low rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement, which acts as an
unconditioned stimulus for dysphoria, fatigue and some somatic symptoms. The
social environment also maintains depressive symptoms by providing sympathy for
depressive verbal behaviors (e.g., expressions of pessimism, fatigue, self-blame,
and low self-esteem). The social environment can lead to a further decrease in posi-
tive reinforcement in one’s environment because an individual’s social supports
may begin to avoid the aversive depressive verbal behaviors of the individual, fur-
ther exacerbating their depressive symptoms.
Lewinsohn (1975) postulated that three variables affect response-contingent
positive reinforcement that an individual can experience: (a) the number of activi-
ties that may be reinforcing for an individual, which is determined by one’s personal
characteristics and experiences, (b) the availability of potentially reinforcing events
in one’s environment, and (c) the extent to which the individual emits behaviors that
increase the likelihood of contact with potentially reinforcing events in one’s envi-
ronment. With these three tenets of Lewinsohn’s (1975) behavioral model estab-
lished, clinicians can begin to identify how their clients with depression enter a
depressive downward cycle in which they begin to engage in less activity, which
leads to a decrease in positive reinforcement from their environment, and then
become progressively more passive and depressed over time as the cycle continues
(Kaiser et al., 2016).
To better understand our clients’ downward spiral of depression, it is helpful to
acknowledge that there are many examples of reinforcing and punishing relations
that affect mood. For example, putting on a coat when it is cold is negatively rein-
forcing and feels good because it removes the aversive chill. Going on vacation with
friends in Hawaii is positively reinforcing and feels amazing because it adds enjoy-
able activities in one’s life. Eating gross food is a form of positive punishment and
leads to a foul mood because it adds a horrible taste in our mouth. Finally, a friend
canceling dinner plans is negatively punishing and leads to upset feelings because it
removes the opportunity to have an enjoyable evening. With this context, it is easy
to understand why people with depressive symptoms report engaging in fewer
pleasant and more unpleasant events compared to those without depressive symp-
toms (Lewinsohn & Amenson, 1978).
Empirical Evidence in Support
Although no studies were able to clearly accept or reject the claims of the behavioral
model of depression at its conception, there were a number of studies that were
consistent with the model. First, given that people with depression emit fewer
behaviors than those without depression (due to lower levels of behavior emission
in general) (Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973; Libet et al., 1973), and that it is presumably
reinforcing to be attended to, we can postulate that people with depression receive
less social reinforcement from their environment than those without depression.
Second, the number of pleasant activities that an individual engages in is signifi-
cantly associated with their mood (Lewinsohn & Graf, 1973; Lewinsohn & Libet,
1972). In this way, engagement in pleasant activities acts as a reinforcer such that
the probability of future engagement in pleasant activities increases. Third, indi-
viduals with depression obtain less positive reinforcement in their lives than nonde-
pressed psychiatric and normal control groups and the subjective enjoyability of
engaging in pleasant events for individuals with depression is rated lower
(MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1973). Fourth, individuals with depression appear to
be more sensitive to social and painful aversive stimuli than nondepressed subjects
and rate unpleasant events (i.e., punishers) as significantly more unpleasant
(Lewinsohn et al., 1973; Libet et al., 1973; Schless et al., 1974). Therefore, we can
expect that individuals with depression are more likely to avoid or escape unpleas-
ant situations to provide short-term relief from the heightened aversiveness of
unpleasant events, which leads to isolation and further exacerbation of depressive
symptoms in the long-term, creating a positive feedback loop. Fifth, the incidence
of aversive life events (e.g., marital conflict, work changes, death, and illness) in the
6 months prior to a depressive episode was shown to be three times higher than in a
nondepressed group during the same period of time (Paykel et al., 1969). Therefore,
we can deduce that a dramatic decrease in pleasant events (i.e., positive reinforce-
ment) in one’s environment may be a critical antecedent for developing depression.
Since its conception in the 1970s, a number of studies concerning the behavioral
model of depression continue to provide support for the model. Hopko and Mullane
(2008) demonstrated that students with depression engage in fewer social, physical,
and academic activities than nondepressed students. In addition, participants with
depression exhibited higher negative affect, lower activity level, and a significant
relationship between each activity and its corresponding reward value when behav-
ior and mood were tracked every 2 h (Hopko et al., 2003a). These findings provide
further support for the notion that changes in reinforcement correspond highly with
mood in the moment and across time. Furthermore, individuals with depression
experience less pleasure from engaging in daily activities and also expect future
behaviors to be less rewarding (Hopko et al., 2003a, b; Hopko & Mullane, 2008).
This pessimistic view follows Lewinsohn’s (1975) assumption that individuals with
depression are essentially on an extinction schedule in which behaviors that are no
longer rewarding are removed from their repertoire with time due to a weaker asso-
ciation between behavior and reinforcement. Furthermore, those with depressive
symptoms experience more unpleasant events (i.e., punishers) in their lives and per-
ceive them to be more aversive than those without depressive symptoms (Lewinsohn
& Amenson, 1978).
Empirical Evidence Against
Although a number of studies provided support for the behavioral model of depres-
sion, some research conducted during its inception demonstrated inconsistent
results. Contrary to the researcher’s predictions, individuals with depression
appeared to encounter unpleasant events during a 30-day period with the same
frequency as those who did not have depression, which does not align with the
model’s assumptions concerning the low rate of positive reinforcement for those
with depressive symptoms (Lewinsohn & Talkington, 1979). The same study found
that those with depression only rated some, but not all, unpleasant events as more
aversive than the control group, which directly conflicts with the behavioral model
of depression and the findings of Schless et al. (1974). Costello (1972) also ques-
tioned if the behavioral model of depression can be simplified by hypothesizing that
it is the loss of a reinforcer’s effectiveness (via biochemical or neurological changes
or the disruption of a chain of behavior), rather than the loss of overall reinforce-
ment, that accounts for the development of depressive symptoms. His support for
this argument, however, is more anecdotal in nature and related to the depressive
symptoms that follow death, rather than chronic symptoms of depression. He goes
on to acknowledge that “there is no experimental evidence to support or embarrass
this” (Costello, 1972, p. 597).
More recent research has also questioned the behavioral model of depression for
a number of reasons. Theoretically, it does not account for depression onset without
an apparent environmental cause and the strictly behavioral view does not consider
the impact of cognition, relaxation, and values-consistent or inconsistent behaviors,
which was viewed as a significant limitation in comparison to the second and third
wave behavioral theories by some, but not all, behaviorists (Hayes, 2004).
Additionally, the model neglects to acknowledge aversive control (i.e., negatively
reinforcing and punishing contingencies) as a possible factor in impacting the onset
and maintenance of depression (Kanter et al., 2008). For example, choosing to not
attend a yoga class may help one avoid the possibility of humiliation, but it may also
prevent positive social engagement opportunities as well. Studies indicate that
depression is more typically characterized by the accrual of multiple chronic mild
aversive situations (e.g., financial trouble, work-related stress, and homemaking
demands) than by a decrease in positive reinforcement (e.g., job loss, divorce;
Kanter et al., 2008). Although, it is important to recognize that the avoidance and
escape of aversive stimuli can often lead to a decrease in positive reinforcement
opportunities (e.g., calling in sick to work can be a form of avoidance that disallows
one to contact possible reinforcers at work or on the way to and from work), so these
two concepts are intricately related (Kanter et al., 2008).
Behavioral Activation
Description
As the evidence base for the behavioral theory of depression grew, so did interest in
applying the model to treating depression. Based on the propositions of the behav-
ioral model, the main objective of the behavioral treatment of depression is to
achieve a satisfactory level of positive reinforcement in the lives of clients with
depression by impacting the level, quality, and range of activities that one engages
in (Lewinsohn, 1975). The singularly behavioral component of this type of therapy
came to be known as behavioral activation. Unlike the psychodynamic treatments
that were popular during its establishment, behavioral activation is derived from
empirical research and applies a pragmatic approach. Prior to implementing behav-
ioral activation treatment, however, it is essential to first complete a functional
assessment in order to achieve five critical components: (1) evaluate the severity of
the depressive symptoms, including suicide riski (2) identify any and all relevant
behavioral deficits and excesses as these are thought to interfere with gaining rein-
forcers, (3) understand the variables that maintain the depressive symptoms such as
partners reinforcing lower response rates, (4) develop a treatment plan by applying
specific behavioral goals, and (5) enhance the client’s buy-in to treatment
(Lewinsohn, 1975). Because clients are asked to commit fairly extensive work out-
side of session in behavioral activation treatment, it is crucial that buy-in to treat-
ment is maximized while presenting the treatment rationale and developing
treatment goals with clients in order to enhance motivation and treatment adher-
ence. In practice, typical strategies to increase buy-in with clients include providing
psychoeducation (e.g., stating that “behavioral activation is an evidence-based treat-
ment known to improve the wellbeing of people with similar concerns to yours”),
building rapport and enhancing the therapeutic alliance, and applying motivational
interviewing techniques (e.g., utilizing decisional balances and increasing
change talk).
Engaging in activity can be incredibly arduous for clients with depression, so the
application of basic clinical skills is essential when implementing behavioral activa-
tion with clients (Martell, 2018). One manner in which to enhance collaboration and
treatment adherence with clients is to deliberately put yourself in their shoes and
clearly demonstrate an empathic and genuine concern for their unique situation.
Therapists might also enhance clients’ treatment outcomes by actively attending to
the present moment with clients so that examples of improvements in behavior
offered by the client can be emphasized. Validating a client’s experience is a third
clinical skill that can help clients engage in activities in a new way by demonstrating
that the therapist truly understands that even basic activity engagement can feel
insurmountable when living a life that feels absent of pleasurable experiences
(Martell, 2018). Validating a client’s struggle can also be advantageous in strength-
ening the therapeutic alliance because an overly positive “cheerleading” therapist
can lead some clients with depression to believe that the therapist is far too different
from them to be of any value (Dozois & Bieling, 2010).
After completing a functional analysis with a client and whilst implementing
clinical skills, a clinician is prepared to implement behavioral activation treatment
with their client. Although researchers and clinicians have implemented behavioral
activation in a multitude of forms across the past several decades, research indicates
that it is effective when implemented as a structured and brief format or in a less
formal manner, when a clear behavioral formulation has been achieved (Martell,
2018). Despite the proposal of many behavioral therapies for depression, the behav-
ioral activation approach outlined by Lewinsohn et al. (1980) was the most
influential during the first wave therapy movement and will therefore be discussed
in the most detail (Kaiser et al., 2016).
Use of the Pleasant Events Schedule (PES; MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1975)
and the Unpleasant Events Schedule (UES; Lewinsohn et al., 1985) is helpful at the
start of treatment to identify specific events in a client’s life that may be affecting
their depressive symptoms (Lewinsohn et al., 1980). Each list consists of 320 items
that one may find pleasant or unpleasant. The client’s ratings of the frequency of
pleasant and unpleasant activities across the past month is thought to reflect the rate
of positive reinforcement and aversiveness experienced by the client. The 80 most
frequent pleasant and unpleasant items are then combined to form an individualized
Activity Schedule, which clients use to track their daily activity engagement and
mood throughout treatment. The main objective of tracking mood and activity is to
demonstrate the covariation between these two variables for the client, which can be
easily demonstrated via a visual graph depiction. The daily and continuous feed-
back during treatment allows the therapist and client to make adjustments as neces-
sary to treatment procedures and goals (Lewinsohn et al., 1980).
Empirical Evidence in Support
Since its development in the 1970s and 1980s, a wealth of empirical support has
demonstrated that behavioral activation is a promising treatment intervention for
depression. Early research on treatment effectiveness primarily consisted of case
studies which indicated that behavioral activation can be effective in treating depres-
sion, but more rigorous research was later completed (Lewinsohn, 1975). In a meta-
analysis of 16 studies consisting of 780 subjects on behavioral activation, a
difference between behavioral activation and control conditions revealed a pooled
effect size of 0.87 at posttest (Cuijpers et al., 2007). A larger meta-analysis of 34
studies consisting of 2055 participants also demonstrated a difference between
behavioral activation and control conditions at posttest with a large pooled effect
size of 0.78 (Mazzucchelli et al., 2009). The authors of both meta-analyses did not
find a significant difference between behavioral activation and cognitive therapies at
posttest or follow-up. Taken together, these results indicate that behavioral activa-
tion is a parsimonious and effective treatment intervention for adults with depression.
The transition into the second wave of behavioral therapies led to the integration
of behavioral activation with cognitive therapies, but it became apparent that a com-
ponent analysis of cognitive behavioral therapies for depression was necessary to
delineate the active components of the increasingly more complex interventions.
Jacobson et al. (1996) compared the following three groups: behavioral activation
alone, behavioral activation and automatic thought modification, and full cognitive
therapy treatment. Behavioral activation alone was found to be equal in efficacy in
comparison to the other two groups and demonstrated similar relapse rates at a two-
year follow-up (Gortner et al., 1998). Given that behavioral activation is a more
parsimonious intervention technique, it may be more accessible to less experienced
clinicians or paraprofessionals, and therefore better able to benefit more clients

(Jacobson et al., 1996).
In addition, behavioral activation may be more effective than cognitive behav-
ioral therapies because clients have a lower attrition rate in behavioral activation
treatment and it is known to be useful for clients that do not respond to cognitive
therapies (e.g., individuals with severe depression, substance use, and dementia;
Sturmey, 2009). Compared to medication, behavioral activation is also a cheaper
option that results in lower relapse rates and fewer side effects (Sturmey, 2009).
Given what we now know about behavioral activation, there is adequate evidence to
conclude that it is an evidence-based therapy for depression (Sturmey, 2009).
Furthermore, the first wave of behavior therapy for depression (i.e., behavioral acti-
vation) appears to be as effective as the second wave (i.e., cognitive therapies) in
treating depressive symptoms and is a more parsimonious treatment intervention.
Empirical Evidence Against
Although behavioral activation is supported by evidence in numerous studies, some

studies do not shed as favorable of a light upon behavioral activation as an effective
treatment for depression. For example, Martell et al. (2004) proposed that it seems
unlikely that arbitrary behavioral prescriptions (e.g., riding a bike for a certain
amount of time) will alleviate the symptoms of depression, which is supported by
the fact that busy people can experience severe symptoms of depression. They addi-
tionally recognize the following criticisms: (a) support for behavioral activation
treatment does not equate support for the behavioral theory of depression, (b) the
practical and parsimonious dissemination of treatment has yet to be determined, (c)
we do not know the mechanisms of change in behavioral activation, and (d) it is
unclear if behavioral activation can be dismantled further.
Less specific criticisms include a common argument in treatment outcome
research that participants in controlled trials tend to be less severe and are not
affected by comorbid conditions, which does not accurately reflect clients in real-
world settings (Dozois & Bieling, 2010). There is also a desperate need for research
on treatment outcomes for racial/ethnic minorities as this is a neglected area in
research on treatments for depression (Hu et al., 2020).
Use with Different Clients
Because behavioral activation is contextualistic (i.e., idiographic) in nature, its

application may be well suited for treating depression in culturally diverse popula-
tions. Behavioral activation treatment manual adaptations have been formed for
Latinos (BA-L; Kanter et al., 2014), Muslims (BA-M; Mir et al., 2016) and African
Americans (Bowe, 2013). To date, 17 studies have culturally adapted behavioral
activation to fit culturally diverse populations and ethnic minorities, with the fol-
lowing target populations: seven for Latin Americans, four for African Americans,
one for Muslim patients in the United Kingdom, two for adults in Indian primary
health centers, one for victims of systematic violence in Iraq, one for locals in Iran,
and one for older adults living alone in China (Lehmann & Bördlein, 2020). Access
to services was amplified by providing treatment via phone or in clients’ homes, by
providing treatment in clients’ native language, and by treatment being delivered
effectively by less experienced practitioners. A systematic review of the 17 studies
claimed that behavioral activation is an “effective, cost-efficient, and well-fitting
treatment for depression in these target groups” because it allows clients and prac-
titioners to consider cultural, social, environmental, and psychological factors that
may be impacting the maintenance of depression and the course of treatment
(Lehmann & Bördlein, 2020, p. 700). As advocated by Hu et al. (2020), there is a
clear need for continued research on treatments for depression in culturally diverse
populations and ethnic minorities, with a specific focus on evaluating the compo-
nents of culturally adapted treatment interventions that impact outcomes being par-
ticularly important (Lehmann & Bördlein, 2020).
The majority of the research on behavioral activation investigates individual
therapy formats, despite groups having greater therapeutic efficiency with a greater
capacity to benefit more clients (Porter et al., 2004; Raines et al., 2020). Porter et al.
(2004) addressed this by developing the Behavioral Activation Group Therapy
(BAGT) manual which led to significant decreases in depressive symptoms at post-
test and three-month follow-up after only 10 weeks of group therapy. Similarly, Chu
et al. (2009) developed a transdiagnostic Group Behavioral Activation Therapy
(GBAT) for youth in a school setting which evidenced superior posttreatment and
four-month follow-up outcomes for adolescents in comparison to a waitlist control
(Chu et al., 2016). It is important to continue to consider the implementation of
group therapy formats because providing effective treatment to more clients in a
shorter amount of time is cost-effective for clinicians and their clients and allows
services to be delivered to a greater number of clients, which is particularly essential
in regions where access to healthcare is limited (Porter et al., 2004).
A key issue to consider is how much one needs to increase reinforcers, which is
largely unknown at a group (i.e., nomothetic) level. For this reason, the individual
(i.e., idiographic) nature of behavioral activation is an immense strength that the
astute clinician would be wise to utilize effectively. For example, it may be impor-
tant to consider if your client finds social reinforcers (e.g., being complimented) to
be more impactful than solitary reinforcers (e.g., putting on make-up) so that the
stronger reinforcer can be emphasized in the treatment process.
Clinical Case Example
Description
Behavioral activation is appropriate for clients with the following characteristics:

(a) experience depressive symptoms, (b) believe that changing behavior can impact
mood, (c) willingness to work towards changing behavior, and (d) concerned about
the side effects and cost of medications (Lejuez et al., 2001). Behavioral activation
can also be customized for individuals with a diagnosis of depression and a comor-
bid mental health and/or physical health disorder (Cannity & Hopko, 2017).
Therefore, it seems that anyone with depressive symptoms will likely benefit from
the implementation of behavioral activation treatment. The following fictional clini-
cal case description matches these qualities and will serve as a representative client
for behavioral activation treatment.
Jane Doe is a 33-year-old Caucasian cisgender woman who meets criteria for
major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate. Jane is married, has a 2-year-old
daughter, and teaches third grade at her local public school. She experienced two
prior depressive episodes which persisted for approximately 12 months at ages 19
and 27. Her current depressive episode began shortly after she returned to teaching
for the fall semester, approximately 2 months ago. She is not currently taking any
medications and does not match criteria for any other mental health diagnoses,
though she does express feeling anxious about work and home duties at times.
Jane’s primary complaints include general anhedonia, frequent bouts of crying,
depressed mood, hypersomnia, and lethargy. Jane reports that spending time with
her daughter and husband is incredibly rewarding, but that she is so tired after work
that she does not have the energy to spend time with them. She also expresses that
she is too tired to keep up with household tasks (e.g., cooking, cleaning dishes, and
laundry), so her husband completes all domestic duties in the home. Jane sleeps
approximately 10–12 h per day, which further limits the time that she can spend
engaging in rewarding activities (e.g., socializing with friends and family, exercis-
ing, and engaging in preferred hobbies). Jane reports that she used to enjoy reading,
hiking, and walking her dog, but that these activities no longer bring her a sense of
enjoyment, so she no longer participates in these behaviors.
Jane’s weekly activity log shows that she wakes up at 6:30 am, works 8 am–6 pm,
and then sleeps 7:30 pm–6:30 am Monday through Friday. On the weekends, she
tends to wake up at 9 am and lies in bed watching TV until noon, grades papers until
5 pm, goes back to bed at 5:30 pm and watches TV in bed until she falls asleep
around 9 pm. Her husband brings her breakfast, lunch and dinner in bed because she
reports that she is too tired from the week to cook or leave her bed to eat. Jane
reports that working is important to her, but that she does not have energy left to
engage in other activities that are meaningful.
Application
Because it can be quite challenging for a client with depression to increase their
activity levels, providing a reasonable treatment rationale is a critical first step in
behavioral activation treatment. Jane’s clinician might provide the following treat-
ment rationale (adapted from Lejuez et al., 2001), which implements idiographic
characteristics specific to Jane’s case and promotes collaboration with Jane:
Jane, it seems that you may be waiting to feel better before engaging in some of your more
enjoyable activities, such as spending time with your family, reading, hiking, and walking
your dog. As you are aware, it can be hard to wait to feel better, so I am proposing we try a
different method together. Based on an abundance of prior research, which I am happy to
share with you if you would like, we believe that the first step to feeling better is engaging
in more positive situations in your life. We theorize that if you are engaging in activities that
bring you a sense of joy and accomplishment, then it is challenging to feel depressed. It can
be difficult to start, but it tends to get easier with the more positive experiences you encoun-
ter. The treatment can be hard at times, but I am here to help you through this process, and
we will work together at a pace that feels best for you.
With Jane’s buy-in and active collaboration, her clinician can next create a func-
tional analysis in order to identify the controllable variables in her environment that
are maintaining her depressive behaviors. For example, we can theorize that Jane’s
husband may be negatively reinforcing her depressive symptoms by completing all
the required domestic duties.
Following Lewinsohn et al.’s (1980) treatment protocol, the next step for Jane’s
treatment involves completing a Pleasant and Unpleasant Events Schedule to iden-
tify the 80 most pleasant and unpleasant items to place on Jane’s activity log. Jane’s
top ten most pleasant and unpleasant items are displayed in Table 1. Upon careful
review, Jane’s clinician can understand that the majority of her pleasant and unpleas-
ant activities are related to time spent with her husband and daughter, so emphasiz-
ing engagement in pleasant activities with her family will be Jane’s primary
treatment focus with her clinician. Jane and her clinician can collaboratively iden-
tify enjoyable family-focused activities and begin to schedule these during the times
that are most reasonable for Jane.
Jane’s therapist can ask her to track her daily mood on a scale from 1–10
(1 = poor, 10 = very good) and to track the number of pleasant and unpleasant events
that Jane engages in each day, based on her top 10 pleasant and unpleasant activi-
ties. With this valuable information, her clinician can create a graph to depict
changes in her mood and activity engagement over time (see Fig. 1). The visual
depiction allows Jane and her clinician to easily observe how engaging in less
unpleasant events and more pleasant events correlates with an increase in mood for
Jane over time.
Depressive symptoms have a high propensity for relapse, so it is essential to form
a relapse prevention plan with Jane prior to treatment termination. Helping Jane to
understand how her behaviors affect her mood, with significant help from the graph
depicted in Fig. 1, is a critical component of Jane’s therapeutic process and will
significantly decrease the chance of relapse. At this stage, it is also helpful for Jane’s
Table 1 Jane’s top ten pleasant and unpleasant events most highly correlated with mood
Type Specific event
Pleasant 1. Reading stories, novels, poems or plays
2. Exploring (hiking away from known routes, spelunking,
etc.)
3. Seeing good things happen to my family or friends
4. Listening to the sounds of nature
5. Doing a job well
6. Being with someone I love
7. Teaching someone
8. Being with my husband
9. Taking a walk
10. Being with my daughter
Unpleasant 1. Being dissatisfied with my husband
2. Arguments with husband
3. Disciplining a child
4. Being near unpleasant people
5. Not having enough time to be with people I care about
(husband, daughter)
6. Having my husband dissatisfied with me
7. Displeasing others (parents, employer, teachers, friends,
etc.)
8. Learning that someone is angry with me or wants to hurt me
9. Seeing someone in pain (bleeding, unconscious)
10. Leaving a task uncompleted
Daily Monitoring of Unpleasant and Pleasant Events with Mood

10
9
8
Events and Mood
7
6
5 Unpleasant
4 Pleasant
3
Mood
2
1
0
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Days
Fig. 1 Case presentation: daily monitoring of unpleasant and pleasant events with mood
clinician to review the purpose of a functional analysis and clarify how Jane may
understand the influence of the environment on her mood in order to manipulate the
relevant controlling variables in the future. For example, Jane’s clinician may query
Jane on how excessive sleeping negatively reinforced her depressive symptoms. By
collaboratively creating a functional analysis of her own behavior with her clinician,
Jane will be more effective at manipulating the controlling variables in her environ-
ment in the future and preventing the onset of an additional depressive episode.
Additionally, Jane’s clinician can review normal fluctuations in mood with Jane so
as to not pathologize increases or decreases in Jane’s future disposition.
Potential Difficulties
Ambivalence
Fewer than 20% of individuals who seek treatment are prepared to take action to
change their mental health problem, so clinicians must be prepared to address
ambivalence with their clients (Prochaska, 2000). For individuals with depressive
symptoms, it can be particularly challenging to enhance motivation for change
because avoidance is a common behavioral response to their depressive mood
(Dozois & Bieling, 2010). In these instances, motivational interviewing can be par-
ticularly helpful for clinicians to meet clients where they are by simply validating,
exploring, and genuinely understanding a client’s perspective regarding their
ambivalence to change (Hettema et al., 2005). In so doing, a client may begin to
engage in change talk (i.e., statements related to a client’s desire, need, and ability
to change), which can be selectively reflected back by their clinician. With this
back-and-forth process, clients can hear their own motivations for change which can
enhance client’s commitment to change. In fact, the commitment strength of change
talk stated during the final moments of a session by clients are the strongest predic-
tor for future behavior change (Amrhein et al., 2003).
Homework Compliance
Although homework completion is known to enhance therapy outcomes (Kazantzis

et al., 2010), clinicians report issues with homework compliance and out-of-session
tasks with 50% of their cases (Helbig & Fehm, 2004). Because homework comple-
tion is a vital part of behavioral activation treatment, it is important for clinicians to
be prepared to address issues with homework completion when implementing
behavioral activation treatment. Clinicians can revisit the treatment rationale, pro-
vide additional psychoeducation, break tasks into simpler and more manageable
steps, and reinforce the importance of homework with clients in order to enhance
homework completion with their clients (Dozois & Bieling, 2010).
Arguably one of the most effective ways to address homework noncompliance in
behavioral activation treatment is by completing a functional assessment with a cli-
ent. With careful consideration of the client’s antecedent-behavior-consequence
(ABC) sequence, clinicians can identify potential barriers to activation and/or
homework completion for clients (Martell, 2018). Given that the purpose of a func-
tional analysis or descriptive functional assessment is to understand the variables
that increase/decrease the frequency of a behavior over time, clinicians can work
with their client to identify and manipulate the relevant variables that may contrib-
ute to increasing homework completion. For example, in our clinical case example,
Jane struggled to spend time with her family because she was tired at the end of her
workday. In this example, we can conceptualize lethargy as the antecedent, isolation
as the behavior, and the lack of increase in mood or time spent with her family as
the consequence. Via an exploratory discussion with Jane, a number of potential
ideas could be proposed that directly affect the ABC sequence such as spending
time with her family before work, working fewer hours during the day, drinking
coffee when she got home, or planning activities with her family after work that she
could not cancel. Based on Jane’s preferences, she can select the preferred activity,
which is likely to increase Jane’s chances of completing the activity. Asking Jane to
formally commit to engaging in her preferred activity at the end of session is an
additional strategy to increase the chances that she will complete it (Amrhein et al.,
2003). By completing this process collaboratively and openly with Jane, she is addi-
tionally more likely to be able to complete her own functional analyses in the future,
which will assist with relapse prevention post-treatment termination.
Resistance
Some clients may also resist scheduling activities with their clinician. If the resis-
tance appears to stem from ambivalence about change, similar tactics (e.g., revisit-
ing treatment rationale, providing additional psychoeducation, breaking tasks into
smaller steps, and utilizing motivational interviewing techniques) may be applied
that were discussed above. A functional analysis may also be helpful to identify the
variables that may be contributing to the resistance. If the resistance stems from a
client’s desire to be spontaneous and unconstrained, however, it may be beneficial
to ask clients how this technique has been working for them so far (Leahy et al.,
2011). Clients that are resisting activity scheduling may also benefit from hearing
their clinician describe activity scheduling as an exercise analogy (Leahy et al.,
2011). For example, Jane’s therapist might ask questions such as “If you want to get
in shape, would you only exercise when you feel like it,” “What might be the out-
comes of approaching fitness in this way,” or “Have you ever exercised even though
you didn’t feel like it?”. These types of questions might help Jane and similar clients
think about how activity scheduling can be a vital aspect of enhancing their mental
health and hence increase treatment adherence and outcomes.
Summary
Depressive symptoms have a debilitating impact on self, family and society.

Lewinsohn’s (1975) behavioral model of depression proposes that depressive symp-
toms are maintained by a low rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement in
which individuals with depression engage in less activity which diminishes their
contact with positive reinforcement and further decreases their overall activity
engagement and mood. From the behavioral theory emerged the first wave behav-
ioral treatment for depression (i.e., behavioral activation) designed to achieve satis-
factory levels of positive reinforcement in one’s life by affecting the quality, level,
and range of positive reinforcement that individuals contact in their environment
(Lewinsohn, 1975).
Functional assessment that identifies the antecedent-behavior-consequence
(ABC) sequence of behaviors are an essential first step to treatment and basic clini-
cal skills are beneficial for clinicians to apply throughout treatment. Lewinsohn
et al.’s (1980) treatment approach advocates for the application of the Pleasant and
Unpleasant Event Schedules to form clients’ Activity Logs and encourages daily
activity and mood monitoring for clinicians to graph and share with their clients.
Behavioral activation has demonstrated impressive clinical utility with ethnic
minorities and in group format and continues to gain empirical support. When faced
with challenges in treatment, clinicians will benefit from revisiting the treatment
rationale and utilizing functional analyses to address and resolve barriers. Future
research should work to identify the mechanisms of change in behavioral activation,
with a particular focus on the aspects of culturally adapted treatment interventions
that impact outcomes for culturally diverse populations and ethnic minorities.
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Second Wave Treatment for Depressive
Disorders
Adrienne K. Chong, Ali M. Molaie, and Jane E. Fisher
Cognitive behavior therapy for depressive disorders began with the application of
operant conditioning principles (e.g., reinforcement) to increase the rate of active
(versus passive) behavior in depressed clients (Ferster, 1973; Lewinsohn, 1974).
This can be considered the first wave of treatment of depressive disorders (see
Naugle, chapter “Depressive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization”, in this
volume). The second wave of behavior therapy incorporated behavioral techniques
from predecessors, while providing an entirely new set of assumptions and thera-
peutic strategies focused on the phenomenological, subjective aspects of depression
(Beck, 1967). Most prominent of the theorists elaborating the second wave of
behavior therapy for depression were Aaron T. Beck (1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw &
Emery, 1979) and Albert Ellis (1957, 1962, 1987, 1995), whose cognitive models
provided an initial scaffolding for addressing cognitive processes (e.g., information
processing biases) and content (e.g., negative beliefs) in treatment for depressed
persons.
In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of two primary second wave cognitive
theories of depressive disorders: Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT; Ellis,
1957, 1991, 1996) and Cognitive Therapy (CT; Beck, 1963, 1967; Beck &
Alford, 2009) followed by overviews of case conceptualization and treatment strate-
gies for depression that are based on these theories. Finally, we review findings from
outcome and process studies addressing REBT and CT for depression.
A. K. Chong · A. M. Molaie · J. E. Fisher (*)

e-mail: fisher@unr.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_16
372 A. K. Chong et al.
Cognitive Theories of Depression
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy
REBT has undergone several changes in name since its conception, from Rational
Therapy (RT) in 1955 to Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) in 1961, and finally end-
ing with Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy in 1993 (Ellis, 1996). REBT’s model
of psychopathology is in many respects consistent with that of CT (Ellis, 1995).
That is, Ellis specifically intended REBT to be a brief, intensive intervention (Ellis,
1996). Central to REBT is what Ellis labeled the “ABC” model of emotional distur-
bance (Ellis, 1991). Ellis asserted that individuals have several main goals in life
that are often related to health and safety, relationships, meaning, and pleasure.
When individuals encounter an Activating Event or Adversity (A) that prevents or
hinders them from reaching their goals, their Beliefs (B) about the Activating Event
lead to Consequences (C) of either healthy and adaptive, or unhealthy and maladap-
tive responses (Ellis, 1991, 1996).
Within an REBT framework, rational beliefs (rB’s) allow individuals to respond
to Activating Events adaptively, and often include preferences, wishes, and hopes.
For instance, an individual might think, “I would have preferred to get the promo-
tion at work, but I can apply again in the future.” Irrational beliefs (iB’s), on the
other hand, are often comprised of “shoulds,” “oughts,” and “musts.” These absolu-
tistic and dogmatic demands upon the self, others, the world, and the future lead to
thwarting of goals and healthy preferences. DiGuiseppe et al. (2014) discuss three
levels of cognitions within REBT, of which automatic thoughts, perceptions, and
attributions constitute the first level (e.g., “They do not like me.”). They identify
three second-tier irrational beliefs, each with a rational counterpart: (1) Awfulizing,
assigning catastrophic consequences to thwarted desires, (2) Low frustration toler-
ance, perceiving that one is unable to bear having unmet demands, and (3)
Depreciation/self-downing, global, negative evaluations of self, others, and/or the
world (DiGuiseppe et al., 2014). The deepest, third, level reflects the core irrational
belief of demandingness, an insistence that perceptions of the self, others, and the
world absolutely must be in accord with their preferences (Ellis, 1997). Ellis (1987)
argued that independent of characteristics identified by other cognitive models of
depression (e.g., Beck’s cognitive triad, Seligman’s internal, stable, and global attri-
butions), demandingness plays a central role in the onset and maintenance of
depression.
Cognitive Therapy
Within Beck’s cognitive framework, the way an individual views and organizes the
world impacts their emotions and behavior (Beck, 1967). The cognitive model of
depression posits that three overlapping concepts account for the development and
Second Wave Treatment for Depressive Disorders 373
maintenance of depression: Schemas, the cognitive triad, and cognitive distortions

(Beck et al., 1979). Schemas refer to cognitive structures that are used to organize,
interpret, and evaluate stimuli and events (Beck & Alford, 2009). Depressogenic
cognitive schemas, or core beliefs, develop as a result of past experiences wherein
private responses to events (e.g., thoughts, emotions) were not subject to corrective
feedback that may have resulted in more accurate interpretations of those experi-
ences (Beck et al., 1979). Beck (1963) described core beliefs as specific content that
is embedded within the schema, although Judith Beck (2011) acknowledged that
some authors use the terms “core beliefs” and “schemas” synonymously.
Beck argued that persons at risk for depression experience “automatic” cognitive
errors or distortions comprised of negative views of three areas (labeled the cogni-
tive triad): The world, the self, and the future (Beck et al., 1979; Beck & Alford,
2009). Beck considered automatic thoughts to be quickly occurring representations
of larger, more complex thoughts, which Ellis (1962) referred to as internalized
verbalizations. Judith Beck (2011) later posited that intermediate beliefs, which
include attitudes, rules, and assumptions, link core beliefs and automatic thoughts.
Cognitive distortions refer to inaccuracies between the reality of a situation and
an individual’s perception of the situation. Individuals vary on the degree of the
inconsistencies between objective events and the perception of events, and some
level of divergence is expected for any individual (Beck & Alford, 2009). However,
individuals who experience depression differ from their non-depressed counterparts
in the systemic nature of their cognitive distortions. More specifically, Beck catego-
rized cognitive distortions as stylistic, semantic, or paralogical. Stylistic distortions
refer to magnification or minimization, semantic distortions refer to inexact label-
ing, and paralogical distortions refer to arbitrary inference, selective abstraction,
and overgeneralization (Beck & Alford, 2009). Now we consider cognitive distor-
tions in more detail.
Stylistic Distortions: Magnification or Minimization Magnification, also some-
times referred to as catastrophizing, presents as an exaggeration of the importance,
impact, or intensity of a specific event (Beck, 1963). Depressed individuals may
view a relatively small event as a catastrophe. For instance, a client might tell you
that they were in a car accident that will cost them thousands of dollars, which they
cannot afford. Upon receiving an estimate for damages, the client learns that the
damage was superficial; repairs are optional and will cost a more manageable $200.
Minimization involves underestimating one’s ability, competence, or performance
(Beck, 1963). A student might always believe she performed terribly on exams,
despite almost always performing well. A nurse might think that he is not competent
enough to handle the responsibilities of his job despite consistently positive reviews.
Semantic Distortions: Inexact Labeling It is often the case that an individual’s

cognitive and emotional responses are consistent with the way they interpret and
label the experience (Beck, 1963). Inexact labeling can also lead to other distorted
thinking, such as magnification. For example, a client might initially report that her
partner was critical and demeaning the previous night. After discussing the event
with her therapist, the client shares that she and her partner had a discussion about
their finances and disagreed on several issues. Importantly, the client is able to accu-
rately report that her partner remained respectful and open during the conversation,
and they were ultimately able to compromise.
Paralogical Distortions: Arbitrary Inference, Selective Abstraction, and

Overgeneralization Arbitrary inferences, sometimes more specifically referred to
as either “mind reading” or “fortune telling,” occur when an individual forms a
conclusion about something without corroborating evidence or despite contrary evi-
dence (Beck, 1963). Mind reading entails making assumptions about what another
person is thinking, while fortune telling refers to making predictions about the
future. At the first day of work at a new job, an individual might demonstrate mind
reading and think, “My coworkers all hate me,” without any evidence to support the
cognition.
Selective abstraction, also referred to as “mental filtering,” is the process of
focusing on one detail or event to the exclusion of other, often more salient or
important details or events (Beck 1963). A father forgets to pack his child lunch
once and thinks, “I’m an incompetent parent.” In this case, the father selectively
focused on one event, based his conclusion on that event, and ignored other events
that demonstrated evidence contrary to his conclusion.
Overgeneralization refers to the formation of a broad conclusion based on a sin-
gle event. Beck typically talked about overgeneralization as occurring when indi-
viduals form a conclusion about themselves (e.g., about their worth or ability) based
on a single incident (Beck, 1963; Beck & Alford, 2009). For example, an individual
who has never been late to work is caught in traffic one day and thinks, “I’m a use-
less employee.” Individuals with depression also often form a conclusion about
their lives or the state of the world based on a single occurrence.
According to Beck (e.g., Beck & Alford, 2009), clients typically evidence mul-
tiple cognitive distortions. For example, a student receives a B+ on a paper and
thinks, “My teacher must view me as incompetent” (arbitrary inference). The pro-
fessor had praised numerous things about the student’s paper, and also suggested
including additional references for the next paper. This leads the student to think,
“My work is unsatisfactory” (selective abstraction). The student returns home and
tells his roommate that his professor “hated” his paper and “reprimanded” him for
the quality of his work (inexact labeling). This in turn leads the student to think that
he has ruined any chance of doing well in the class (magnification).
The Cognitive Triad in Detail
Negative View of the World
The first element, negative view of the world, presents as a pattern of selectively or
inaccurately interpreting experiences as overwhelmingly negative. Individuals con-
strue their experiences as defeating or denying them in some way, and view their life
as a pattern of these experiences (Beck & Alford, 2009). Inaccurate interpretations
can range from mild to severe distortions, and typically include overgeneralization,
catastrophization, arbitrary inferences, and selective abstraction (Beck &
Alford, 2009).
Perceptions of Defeat Within Beck’s cognitive model, individuals at risk for
depression are highly sensitive to defeat or any stimulus perceived as a barrier to
their goal. What may seem like a small obstacle to others may appear to be an insur-
mountable obstacle for an individual with a history a of depression (Beck & Alford,
2009). For instance, a student who forgets their pencil for an exam may think, “I’ll
never be able to finish this test,” or, “I’ll fail no matter what I do.” For individuals at
risk for depression, situations in which a goal is not met are likely to be interpreted
in a highly negative manner and viewed as a complete failure. A high performing
individual who does not receive a promotion at work may think, “I completely
failed. I should quit my job.”
Perceptions of Deprivation Individuals at risk for depression often view a variety

of events—regardless of the magnitude—as a significant loss of something impor-
tant (Beck & Alford, 2009). Waiting 5 min for a coworker to arrive to a meeting may
seem like a substantial loss of valuable time. A college student walking alone to
class may think, “I’m missing out on spending time with friends.” Witnessing class-
mates walking together may further exacerbate these feelings of deprivation. Social
comparison often evokes thoughts about deficits and deprivation. A very wealthy
individual may think, “I have nothing,” when they learn that their colleague recently
purchased a new car.
Perceptions of Deprecation Another common feature of the private experience of

persons with a history of depression is the interpretation of neutral statements or
events as disparaging (Beck & Alford, 2009). For instance, while telling a friend
about their day, an individual with a history of depression may think, “they’re
bored,” or, “I’m not very interesting.” These attributions of derogatory judgment
may be limited to certain contexts (e.g., work, school), or they may be generalized
to all contexts. In severe cases, an individual may perceive negative judgments from
all social contacts, even interpreting positive comments as critical and unfavorable.
For example, while receiving positive remarks from a professor, a student may
think, “she’s mocking me,” or, “she really thinks I’m incapable.”
Negative View of the Self
The second component of the cognitive triad is negative view of the self (Beck et al.,
1979). In addition to negative interpretations about their experiences of the world
and with others, individuals with depression also negatively evaluate themselves.
This is a tendency to overgeneralize a specific behavior or occurrence, such that a
single negative instance leads to a conclusion about their overall character (Beck &
Alford, 2009). For example, a student might not perform as well as they hoped on a
test and think, “I’m a failure.” A parent might forget their child’s favorite blanket at
home and think, “I’m a terrible parent.” In these cases, the individuals not only view
their behavior as highly negative, but also draw overarching conclusions about
themselves based on these events. Moreover, individuals with depression often
focus on their perceived deficiency to the exclusion of other positive behaviors and
traits. With a negative view of the self also comes self-rejection: Individuals with
depression tend to be highly critical of themselves and their perceived inferiority
(Beck & Alford, 2009). Individuals can range from mild to severe with regard to
negative self-evaluations. Those with mild symptoms demonstrate a heightened
sensitivity to their mistakes or difficulties and tend to view themselves as inade-
quate. Individuals who present as severe may view themselves as completely
worthless.
Self-Criticism According to Beck and Alford (2009), persons experiencing depres-
sion are disposed to blaming and criticizing themselves for negative outcomes,
viewing events as a result of their perceived inadequacies or deficiencies. In mild
cases, this may present as blaming oneself for relatively small, inconsequential, or
neutral occurrences. For example, an individual may think, “I’m incompetent,” after
taking longer to run errands one day. As severity increases, an individual’s scope of
blame may also escalate. Individuals with depression may blame themselves for
accidents or misfortunes that are very clearly and objectively not their fault (e.g.,
engaging in self-blame for a friend’s poor performance on an exam or a parent’s
failure to secure a job promotion). In very severe cases, individuals experienc-
ing depression may blame themselves for very large, even global incidents (e.g.,
believing that they are responsible for wars or other violence and suffering).
Negative View of the Future
The final component of the cognitive triad is a negative view of the future (Beck
et al., 1979). In addition to a negative view of current experiences and self, individu-
als with depression tend to view their future as a continuation of their current nega-
tive state (Beck & Alford, 2009). They may feel hopeless about the future, as they
do not see any chance of improvement. This view of the future applies to both long-
term and specific, short-term predictions. For instance, an individual
experiencing depression might consider calling or texting a friend but think, “they
probably won’t answer,” and thus decide not to make contact. A long-term view of
the future as irreversibly negative can lead to feelings of hopelessness. In more
severe cases, this can lead to suicidal ideation or behavior.
Treatment of Depressive Disorders
Conducting REBT
REBT can be delivered in individual or group format, and in clinical studies of

depression it typically ranges from 12 to 20 weekly sessions (e.g., David et al.,
2008; Iftene et al., 2015). A number of strategies and techniques can be derived
from the “ABC” model, from which Ellis highlighted the importance of Disputing
(D) unhelpful beliefs. Ellis (2005) then identified multiple types of disputation
methods to promote what he termed effective “philosophies,” such as logical disput-
ing of inaccuracies and the rationale underlying irrational beliefs, and functional
disputing of the effectiveness or consequences of irrational beliefs. As part of treat-
ment, Ellis (1987) advocated the use of disputation techniques against irrational
beliefs common to cognitive therapies, but also explicitly emphasized the need to
challenge what he termed “musturbatory” assumptions. For instance, a depressed
client struggling with thoughts of incompetence may be asked to examine evidence
for and against unrealistic perceptions, while questioning the validity and/or useful-
ness of the “underlying musts.” In therapy, a therapist may inquire: “‘Let us suppose
the worst...Why must you always perform well?’” (Ellis, 1987, p. 132). Targeting
the implicit commands embedded within cognitive distortions is posited to lead to
lasting change and promote effective (E) new philosophies and responses to inevi-
table life difficulties (Ellis, 1987). In this vein, Ellis (1987) proffers the following
advice to REBT therapists: “Look for the absolutistic should! Look for the uncon-
ditional must!” (Ellis, 1987, p. 135).
Ellis noted that although Disputing may be primarily a cognitive response, both
emotive and behavioral Disputing are also necessary (Ellis, 1995). Emotive
Disputing can help clients to challenge irrational beliefs with adaptive coping state-
ments. Further emotive techniques in REBT including shame-attacking, rational
emotive imagery, role playing, use of parables, and therapist embodiment of uncon-
ditional acceptance promote change via development of functional emotions (David
et al., 2019; Ellis, 1995). Behavioral Disputing allows clients to act in contradiction
to irrational beliefs with techniques such as activity planning, distraction, and stim-
ulus control. An active, directive, and even forceful therapeutic stance is often taken
in REBT, to provide functional alternatives to irrational beliefs, namely: (1) Realistic
evaluations of ‘badness,” (2) High frustration tolerance, (3) Unconditional accep-
tance of self, others, and the world, and ultimately, preferences that permit the pos-
sibility of failure (David et al., 2019; Dryden & Bernard, 2019).
Conducting CT
The term “cognitive therapy” is often used interchangeably with “cognitive behav-
ior therapy” (CBT; Beck, 2011). CT, or CBT, for depression began as an individual
therapeutic intervention and has since been delivered and tested in a number of dif-
ferent modalities, including individual format, group format, telephone-
administered, and self-help (Cuijpers et al., 2019). CT is goal oriented,
problem-focused, structured, and aims to be time limited. However, treatment dura-
tion can range from several sessions to multiple years (Beck, 2011). Straightforward
cases of depression may be completed in six to 14 weekly individual sessions (Beck,
2011). For an example of individual CT, please see the case illustration below.
Cognitive Techniques
Cognitive techniques work at both the micro and macro level in that they attend to
smaller, proximal events such as identifying and challenging specific cognitions,
and also examine larger patterns such as determining an individual’s sensitivities
and identifying cause and effect relationships (Beck & Alford, 2009). Initially, the
client and therapist focus on examining and challenging current cognitions in order
to provide a short-term decrease in distress. Unhelpful beliefs about the self, the
world, and the future (i.e., the cognitive triad) are examined next in order to main-
tain relief and prevent relapse.
Understanding Maladaptive Patterns Through a review of the client’s relevant
life history, the therapist can begin to identify significant patterns. The therapist can
start to conceptualize the development of the client’s depression by considering the
cognitive triad and examining the formation of maladaptive beliefs about the self,
the world, and the future, in addition to sensitivity to specific stressors (Beck &
Alford, 2009). Common themes observed among individuals with depression
include failing to meet a goal, not receiving approval or desired attention, percep-
tions of rejection, and perceptions of exclusion. These occurrences are often experi-
enced as highly distressing, and the individual may feel completely overwhelmed or
hopeless about the future. By determining the origins of unhelpful patterns and
being primed to notice such responses, individuals may be more prepared to recog-
nize these maladaptive patterns as they occur.
Identifying Specific Depressive Cognitions Sometimes, clients are able to imme-

diately identify the specific thoughts that occur following an event, which elicits
unpleasant emotions. However, it is more often the case that clients are unaware of
the private experience that Beck characterizes as automatic thoughts (Beck et al.,
1979). Clients who are unaware of these thoughts tend to perceive a direct relation-
ship between the event or stimulus and their affect. In these situations, it can be
helpful to ask clients to direct attention to thoughts that occur in the moment in
order to examine the specific cognitions that arise between the occurrence of an
event and the experience of unpleasant emotions (Beck & Alford, 2009). Once a
client is aware of their automatic thoughts, the therapist can help the client to better
recognize and distance themselves from such thoughts.
It can also be extremely helpful to identify common themes that arise from these
automatic thoughts, which are typically related to depressive themes, such as depri-
vation, deprivation, and self-criticism (Beck & Alford, 2009). In therapy, the thera-
pist can guide the client to recognize specific cognitive distortions and consider
alternative, more objective, explanations.
Challenging Automatic Thoughts and Depressive Cognitions According to
Beck (Beck et al., 1979), the content of automatic thoughts for individuals with
depression demonstrate the various cognitive distortions that occur. The importance
of recognizing automatic thoughts lies in the ability to identify and challenge spe-
cific cognitive distortions. In practice, it is often helpful to label the cognitive distor-
tion that resulted in an inaccurate thought. After a client identifies an inaccurate
interpretation, the next step is to describe why or how it is inaccurate (Beck &
Alford, 2009). Listing the reasons for the inaccuracy can reduce the intensity of the
resulting affective response.
Differentiating Thoughts and Facts Clients often believe automatic thoughts are
true and thus these thoughts are treated as factual. Clients often benefit from learn-
ing that they can have a thought without believing its validity (Beck & Alford,
2009). For example, having the thought, “I am incompetent,” does not mean it
is valid.
Identifying Alternative Explanations One method of challenging invalid negative

cognitions is identifying alternative interpretations (Beck & Alford, 2009).
Therapists can help clients to develop a more accurate interpretation by encouraging
the client to consider other explanations for what happened. Helping clients attend
to all of the relevant information can lead to a more accurate interpretation.
Looking at the Evidence Automatic thoughts typically contain some amount of

truth, and clients are often able to easily identify evidence that supports the accuracy
of their thought (Beck, 2011). In addition to identifying evidence in support of a
client’s automatic thought, the therapist can also help the client to examine evidence
that does not support the automatic thought or that supports an alternative
explanation.
Decatastrophizing Clients often expect the worst-case scenario or have negatively

skewed predictions about what might happen. These worst-case scenarios are often
unrealistic, and therapists can help clients to identify a more realistic outcome
(Beck, 2011). If a client has a difficult time identifying a realistic outcome, the
therapist can begin by asking the client about the best-case scenario (Beck, 2011).
Sometimes, a client’s negative prediction is likely to happen or does occur. In these
cases, the therapist can help the client learn that they can cope with the outcome.
The therapist may also want to assist with problem-solving or teach the client cop-
ing skills if they perceive a skills deficit that would impede the client’s ability to
effectively cope with the outcome.
Other Aspects of Beck’s CT for Depression
Behavioral Aspects While there are many cognitive techniques to help clients
examine the facts of a situation and determine alternative interpretations, it is gener-
ally helpful to test negative expectations through behavioral experiments (Beck &
Alford, 2009). Beck’s CT has included behavioral principles and techniques since
its inception (Beck et al., 1979).
Activity Scheduling Creating activity schedules can help clients come into contact
with pleasant, valued activities (Beck et al., 1979). Specifically, scheduling activi-
ties can help clients to counter low motivation. Before engaging in activity schedul-
ing, clients are first encouraged to be aware of several considerations (Beck &
Alford, 2009). First is the fact that no one can achieve every single plan in life.
Second, goals are described in terms of actions to engage in instead of a quantity of
something to accomplish. Third, there are sometimes uncontrollable factors that
impede our ability to engage in activities, such as changes in the weather or can-
celed events. Additionally, subjective factors such as fatigue and loss of energy can
also hamper progress. Finally, Beck suggested allowing time to plan the fol-
lowing day.
Graded Task Assignment Graded task assignment allows clients to recognize

smaller successes of engaging in activities, which are assessed on dimensions of
mastery or pleasure (Beck & Alford, 2009). Beck describes a series of features of
graded task assignment (Beck et al., 1979; Beck & Alford, 2009). First, the client
and therapist define the problem. Next is the determination of a task, along with the
assignment of tasks moving from simple to complex. It is also imperative for the
client to immediately and directly observe successful outcomes. It is helpful for the
therapist to also acknowledge the client’s doubts or cognitive distortions, such as
minimization of successful outcomes or selective abstraction. The therapist can help
to facilitate an accurate, valid evaluation of outcomes and a focus on the client’s
work toward achieving their goals. Finally, the client and therapist create new goals.
Interpersonal Aspects A healthy, collaborative therapeutic relationship is essen-

tial to consider when conducting CT for depression (Beck et al., 1979). This is
particularly important since the way the client views the world may be dissimilar to
the way the therapist views the world (Beck & Alford, 2009). Interpersonal behavior
may also play a key role in the development and maintenance of depressive disor-
ders, as an individual’s behavior impacts how others behave toward them. The rela-
tionship between interpersonal dysfunctions and cognitions may not apply to all
clients. With clients for whom this is applicable, it is important to help the client
recognize the reciprocal relationship between their interpersonal behavior and their
cognitions. Next, behavioral experiments are designed to test their beliefs, and the
therapist can help the client to develop adaptive conceptualizations of their
experiences.
CT Case Illustration
Initial Evaluation
Assessment is an ongoing process, and as therapy progresses, it is important for a

therapist’s case conceptualization and treatment targets to evolve to match and meet
the client’s current difficulties. During the initial evaluation, the therapist typically
focuses on building rapport with the client, determining appropriate dose and type
of treatment, and creating an initial cognitive conceptualization (Beck, 2011).
Mr. Garcia identified as a 45-year-old, divorced, heterosexual, Latino male who
presented to an outpatient therapy clinic due to low mood, loss of motivation, feel-
ings of hopelessness, and passive suicidal ideation (e.g., “Everything would be
easier if I just didn’t wake up in the morning.”). Mr. Garcia endorsed that he lived
with his two adolescent children. He endorsed recent difficulties at his office job
and stated, “Things that used to take me 10 minutes now take me several hours.” Mr.
Garcia also endorsed feelings of inadequacy and stated that these changes occurred
following a reduction in his salary. He met diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive
Disorder, single episode, moderate severity, with mild anxious distress.
Mr. Garcia reported low levels of social support from friends and family, stating
that he had previously been too busy with his job to maintain close relationships. He
also shared that he had recently started to feel disconnected from his children.
Specifically, Mr. Garcia disclosed that he lacked motivation to engage in activities
with them and that even when he did, he was unable to remain present and maintain
concentration.
Upon further discussion, the therapist learned that Mr. Garcia had thoughts about
being an inadequate parent as well as being an inadequate provider for his children
following the reduction in his salary. Additionally, he began to question his job
security and had worries about becoming houseless. Mr. Garcia denied any signifi-
cant medical history, previous psychiatric diagnoses, or mental health treatment. He
endorsed previous experiences of intense sadness following acute events, such as
the death of a family member, but denied significant impairment.
Mr. Garcia indicated that his goals for therapy were to improve his engagement
and relationship with his children, to decrease feelings of sadness and low mood,
and to improve his motivation and productivity at work. The therapist proposed an
initial treatment plan involving eight to 12 weekly sessions of cognitive therapy for
depression, to which Mr. Garcia agreed.
Mr. Garcia evidenced negative views in the three domains that comprise the cogni-
tive triad: Negative views about the self, negative views about the world, and nega-
tive views about the future. He also demonstrated distorted thinking in both family
and work domains. Specific to his family, Mr. Garcia endorsed thoughts such as, “I
can’t provide for my children, so I’m a useless father,” and, “I can’t do anything
right; I’ll never be a good parent again.” Mr. Garcia also evidenced cognitive distor-
tions in his thoughts about work and his future, such as, “I’m a terrible employee.
My supervisors hate me and they’re going to fire me. I won’t be able to find another
job. I won’t be able to pay our rent and we’ll be homeless. My children will be taken
away from me.”
The therapist tentatively hypothesized that the precipitating event for the client’s
depressive episode was his salary reduction, which primed the core belief, “I am a
failure,” or, “I am incompetent.” The therapist also learned that Mr. Garcia’s ex-
wife, to whom he was married for 22 years, would often berate him for not doing
things correctly and constantly pointed out flaws that she perceived. Mr. Garcia
stated that although this bothered him at the time, he was always able to remind
himself that he had a good job and was able to provide for his family.
Mr. Garcia’s belief, “I am incompetent,” appeared to drive many of the unhelpful
thoughts that arose in various situations throughout his day. For instance, when he
could not buy his son an expensive birthday present, Mr. Garcia had the thought, “I
am no good as a father.” When his supervisor sent a report back with some minor
revisions, Mr. Garcia had the thought, “I’m a terrible employee. I can’t do anything
right.” These thoughts also resulted in mild anxiety and distress, and Mr. Garcia
found that he was so worried about his performance at work that he was unable to
concentrate on his job. When he returned home, he ruminated about his work per-
formance and worried about being able to be a good father for his children, which
prevented him from engaging with his children.
First Session
The therapist began the first session by setting an agenda that included providing
feedback on Mr. Garcia’s diagnosis, conducting a mood check, confirming Mr.
Garcia’s therapy goals, educating Mr. Garcia about the cognitive model, discussing
a homework assignment, and inviting feedback from Mr. Garcia.
The therapist provided psychoeducation about the cognitive model by eliciting a
specific instance over the past week during which Mr. Garcia felt particularly sad,
down, or hopeless. Mr. Garcia shared an experience at home during which one of
his children exclaimed, “Are we having leftovers again?!” at the dinner table. The
therapist elicited Mr. Garcia’s thoughts during the situation and Mr. Garcia reported
that he thought he was a bad father for feeding his children leftovers for the second
night in a row. Mr. Garcia thought, “Other parents can provide more for their chil-
dren. My children are unlucky to have me as a father.” The therapist then elicited
Mr. Garcia’s feelings in that situation, and Mr. Garcia reported that he felt sad and
helpless.
The therapist elicited several additional examples from Mr. Garcia and drew a
diagram demonstrating the progression from the situation to the automatic thoughts,
and the automatic thoughts to the emotional reaction. The therapist helped Mr.
Garcia observe the relationship between his thoughts and emotions.
Consistent with the CT approach (Beck & Alford, 2009; Beck et al., 1979), the
client and therapist collaboratively determined the homework assignment for the
upcoming week. Mr. Garcia stated that he was typically unaware of his thoughts in
the moment and agreed that it might be helpful to write down his thoughts whenever
he noticed himself feeling particularly sad, down, depressed, or hopeless. The thera-
pist then elicited feedback from Mr. Garcia about the session. Mr. Garcia stated that
it was not as difficult as he expected and that he hoped he would benefit from
therapy.
Second Session
The therapist began the second session with a mood check and then set the agenda,
which included reviewing the homework, helping Mr. Garcia respond to automatic
thoughts, setting the next homework assignment, and inviting feedback from
Mr. Garcia.
To help Mr. Garcia respond more adaptively to automatic thoughts, the therapist
elicited an example over the past week during which Mr. Garcia felt sad, down, or
hopeless. Mr. Garcia stated that his supervisor asked him to revise a recent report.
Mr. Garcia then disclosed that he thought, “I can never do anything right at this job.
I’m probably the worst employee here. They’re probably going to fire me if I don’t
get my act together.” The therapist introduced Mr. Garcia to unhelpful thinking
styles (also called cognitive distortions). Mr. Garcia identified that he engaged in
arbitrary inferences, overgeneralization, and catastrophization. After identifying
unhelpful thinking styles, Mr. Garcia and the therapist collaboratively examined the
evidence for and against his automatic thoughts. For example, looking at Mr.
Garcia’s thought, “I can never do anything right at this job,” Mr. Garcia reported that
feedback and revisions were a normative part of his job and that he rarely received
feedback that he did something incorrectly. The therapist then inquired whether
there was a thought that was more accurate or appropriate to the situation. Mr.
Garcia stated, “This feedback is a normal part of my job. My coworkers are also
getting the same feedback.”
Subsequently, the therapist inquired whether Mr. Garcia might find it helpful to
examine the evidence for and against his automatic thoughts throughout the week
and to identify alternative, adaptive thoughts. Mr. Garcia agreed but expressed some
concern about the length of the homework assignment. The therapist and Mr. Garcia
agreed that he would attempt to document three instances during the week. The
therapist provided Mr. Garcia with a thought record (see Beck et al., 1979, p. 403)
for Mr. Garcia to record the situation, automatic thoughts, emotions, adaptive
responses, and the outcome.
Third Through Ninth Sessions
As therapy progressed, the therapist continued to promote the client’s autonomy by

having the client set the agenda for the session. Over the third through ninth ses-
sions, the therapist helped the client continue to generate adaptive responses and
also helped the client shift to identifying and modifying intermediate and core
beliefs.
Several cognitive techniques were employed during these sessions. First the
downward arrow technique (Beck, 2011) was used to help the therapist and Mr.
Garcia identify his core beliefs reflected in his automatic thoughts. More specifi-
cally, in this exercise, Mr. Garcia was asked to identify a situation which provoked
a difficult emotion, such as sadness or guilt. Mr. Garcia then identified a time that
he was unable to take his children on an annual family trip they had taken in previ-
ous years. Mr. Garcia had the thought, “I can’t make my children happy.” After
inquiring about the emotional experience that resulted from that thought, the thera-
pist probed, “If that thought is true, what does that mean about you?” Mr. Garcia
answered, “That I’m a terrible father.” The therapist continued, “And if that thought
is true, that you’re a terrible father, what does that mean about you?” Mr. Garcia
answered, “Well if I’m a terrible father, what would be the point of anything I’m
doing? My kids are the most important thing in my life. I’m supposed to provide for
them and make sure they’re happy.” The therapist validated Mr. Garcia’s response
and continued, “So what does it mean about you if you’re a terrible father?” Mr.
Garcia answered, “That I’ve failed. I’m a complete failure.”
The therapist and Mr. Garcia also designed behavioral experiments to test Mr.
Garcia’s expectations or predictions in specific situations. For instance, Mr. Garcia
endorsed the fear that if he asked his supervisor for help, his supervisor would know
Mr. Garcia was incompetent and he would be fired. Mr. Garcia stated that he was
85% certain that asking his supervisor for assistance would lead to this outcome.
When Mr. Garcia tested his predication, his supervisor was friendly and assisted Mr.
Garcia with his problem. Following this first behavioral experiment, Mr. Garcia’s
belief that he would be fired for asking for help dropped to 40%. After additional
experiments, his belief dropped to 5%.
At the end of each session, Mr. Garcia and the therapist collaboratively deter-
mined homework assignments for the upcoming week. As Mr. Garcia progressed
through therapy, he increasingly took charge of planning his own homework assign-
ments. Later sessions focused on strengthening more adaptive core beliefs such as,
“I am competent,” by shifting the focus of sessions to positive experiences and
successes.
Termination Session
During the termination session, Mr. Garcia and the therapist reviewed techniques
that Mr. Garcia learned from therapy and discussed potential setbacks that Mr.
Garcia might encounter and how he might respond. At termination, Mr. Garcia no
longer met criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and endorsed improved mood,
increased productivity at work, decreased stress, and improved relationships with
his children.
Empirical Research
Outcome Research
REBT
Outcome research in REBT is primarily characterized by measurement of changes

in transdiagnostic forms of emotional distress (David, 2014). Clinical studies that
have examined the effect of REBT on depression specifically are generally support-
ive (David et al., 2018). David et al. (2008) conducted an RCT comparing 14 weeks
of REBT, CT, or pharmacotherapy (fluoxetine) in outpatients presenting with non-
psychotic MDD. In this study, REBT and CT consisted of twenty 50-minute indi-
vidual treatment sessions. The authors reported equivalent efficacy among the three
conditions, with REBT and CT demonstrating slightly greater improvement than
pharmacotherapy at 6-month follow-up (David et al., 2008). More recently, Iftene
et al. (2015) found 16 weekly group sessions of REBT equally efficacious to sertra-
line in a sample of depressed adolescents. Several trials have further documented
additive effects for REBT in combination with pharmacotherapy (e.g., Macaskill &
Macaskill, 1996).
A number of studies support the generalizability of REBT across cultures and
populations. For example, Onuigbo et al. (2019) reported significant reduction in
depressive symptoms among Nigerian university students with blindness receiving
12 weeks of 60-minute, group-based REBT (with intermittent follow-up sessions)
compared to a no-intervention control. REBT-based group coaching programs uti-
lizing twice-weekly, 50-minute sessions varying in length also improved depressive
symptoms in a sample of prison inmates (Eseadi et al., 2018) and inpatients living
with Type 2 diabetes (Eseadi et al., 2017) in Nigeria. Six 60-minute sessions of
REBT also reduced symptoms of depression among HIV-infected women in India
(Mangayarkarasi & Sellakumar, 2017). REBT has been further applied to children
and adolescents (Anyanwu et al., 2019; Zhaleh et al., 2014), and continues to be
refined for problems comorbid with and secondary to depression (Dryden &
Bernard, 2019).
CT
Acute Treatment CT is the most widely studied psychotherapy for depression,

and over the span of several decades has become established as an evidence-based
treatment modality (Cuijpers et al., 2013). Meta-analyses that pool data across mul-
tiple randomized clinical trials (RCTs) support the efficacy of CT relative to active
and placebo controls for depressive disorders (Barth et al., 2013; Cuijpers et al.,
2020). Investigations comparing CT and pharmacotherapy have demonstrated com-
parable outcomes between CT and antidepressant medication (ADM; DeRubeis
et al., 1999). The combination of CT and ADM appears to improve acute outcomes
for depressive disorders (Cuijpers et al., 2009; de Maat et al., 2007). Notwithstanding
findings from several trials (Dimidjian et al., 2006; Elkin et al., 1989, 1995), the
majority of the literature also comports with the conclusion that CT is as effective
as medication in the treatment of severe depression, given adequate training and
provision of CT (Driessen & Hollon, 2010).
Relapse and Recurrence Studies assessing longer-term outcomes including

relapse (return of a treated depressive episode) and recurrence (onset of a new
depressive episode) have demonstrated similarly efficacious results (Biesheuvel-
Leliefeld et al., 2015; Bockting et al., 2015). Continuation phase CT following dis-
continuation of acute phase treatment of depression appears to provide additional
benefit to higher risk clients (Bockting et al., 2015). There is also evidence for pre-
vention of depressive relapse with CT and ADM combined treatment for clients
who do not achieve remission with monotherapy (Dunlop et al., 2019). In contrast,
trials of relapse or recurrence combining CT with ADM have demonstrated mixed
results (Blackburn et al., 1986; DeRubeis et al., 2020; Evans et al., 1992). A 3-year
follow-up of clients who recovered from either combined CT and ADM or ADM
alone found reduced rates of depressive recurrence for those receiving maintenance
doses of ADM compared to withdrawal of ADM, regardless of whether they had
achieved recovery with combined CT and ADM or ADM alone (DeRubeis et al.,
2020). DeRubeis et al. (2020) interpret this finding to suggest that ADM may inter-
fere with CT’s enduring effect on depressive relapse, given prior studies showing
such a preventive effect for CT in the absence of ADM and after initial recovery
from ADM monotherapy (Hollon et al., 2005; Paykel et al., 1999).
Moderators of Outcome Nomothetic findings demonstrating the efficacy of CT

for depression have been supplemented with research examining predictors and
moderators of treatment response (DeRubeis et al., 2014). Improved symptom relief
in CT has been demonstrated for patients with briefer duration of current depressive
episode, later age of onset, absence of family history of affective disorder, and his-
tory of more prior depressive episodes (Sotsky et al., 1991). Further, several pre-
treatment variables have been shown to predict superior response to CT relative to
comparison pharmacological and psychotherapeutic approaches. These variables
include externalizing coping style (Beutler et al., 1991), attachment avoidance
(McBride et al., 2006), learned resourcefulness (Simons et al., 1985), unemployment,
recent life events, married or cohabiting status (Fournier et al., 2009), childhood
maltreatment (van Bronswijk et al., 2021), elevated distress and anhedonia
(Khazanov et al., 2020), lower levels of dysfunctional cognitions (Sotsky et al.,
1991) and personal growth (Lopez-Gomez et al., 2019), endorsement of existential
reasons for depression (Addis & Jacobson, 1996), somatic complaints, paranoid
symptoms, interpersonal self-sacrificing, attributional style focused on achievement
goals (Huibers et al., 2015), and even neuroimaging findings (i.e., insula hypome-
tabolism; McGrath et al., 2013).
Development of sophisticated methods such as machine learning that combine
sets of moderators hold promise for targeted prescription of CT alone or combined
with other treatments such as ADM (Lorenzo-Luaces et al., 2020). Bruijniks et al.
(2019) argue that what they call learning capacity, an overarching moderator, may
further address inconsistencies found within the literature on the proposed media-
tors of CT (i.e., changes in dysfunctional thinking) by identifying for whom CT
procedures are likely to affect hypothesized processes and outcome. Indeed, such
patient characteristics have been found to moderate the relation between cognitive
change and outcome (Fitzpatrick et al., 2020) as well as therapist adherence to
cognitive-specific interventions and outcome (Sasso et al., 2015). Furthermore,
extant evidence suggests an array of moderators that predict differential response to
CT versus comparison interventions, such as ADM and interpersonal psychother-
apy (e.g., Fournier et al., 2009; McBride et al., 2006). As such, advances in statisti-
cal modeling that link individual differences to mechanisms are likely to further
clarify subgroups that benefit most from CT.
esearch Examining Treatment Models and Processes/

R
Mechanisms of Change
REBT
The REBT model of depression received broad support in several early investiga-
tions (David et al., 2019). Depression is often associated with endorsement of irra-
tional beliefs measured using self-report instruments (McDermut et al., 1997;
Prud’Homme & Baron, 1992), although equivocal findings have been reported
(Lewinsohn et al., 1982). In a study comparing endorsement of irrational beliefs in
remitted-depressed patients with never-depressed participants, Solomon et al.
(2003) found that participants with remitted depression endorsed higher levels of
self-demandingness than did their never-depressed counterparts. The inclusion of
remitted depressed (versus currently depressed) participants allowed for a more
stringent test of the REBT hypothesis that demandingness beliefs pose risk for indi-
viduals with a history of depression, and may not be a consequence of the negative
depressed mood state (Solomon et al., 2003).
A recent meta-analysis reported a medium effect size (r = 0.33, p < 0.001)

between irrational beliefs and depression, with the association higher when a stress-
ful event was present (r = 0.67, p < 0.001; Vîslă et al., 2016). A separate meta-
analysis found a comparably sized inverse effect for the relation between rational
beliefs and depression (Oltean & David, 2018). Oltean et al. (2017) demonstrated
adequate fit for an expanded REBT model, which proposes that irrational beliefs
precede the onset of negative automatic thoughts that contribute to greater anxiety
and depression. The authors also note that demandingness beliefs predicted all other
irrational beliefs, and that catastrophizing and self-downing beliefs were associated
with more negative evaluations of satisfaction with life (Oltean et al., 2017).
Fewer studies have examined the mechanism of change of REBT on depression.
In an RCT comparing REBT, CT, and pharmacotherapy, Szentagotai et al. (2008)
found that irrational beliefs, negative automatic thoughts, and dysfunctional atti-
tudes changed similarly across all three conditions. Importantly, change on one
measure of irrational beliefs, assessed via content analysis of participants’ thoughts
in two negative hypothetical scenarios, uniquely mediated the effect of REBT on
depressive symptoms. Additionally, clients who relapsed at 6-month follow-up dis-
played higher levels of irrational beliefs on the same measure at post-treatment than
did participants who did not relapse (Szentagotai et al., 2008). Thus, burgeoning
research is consistent with Ellis’ (1987) model of depression, and alongside use of
more rigorous methods, can begin to examine causal hypotheses of the REBT con-
ceptualization of depression (David et al., 2019).
CT
An extensive corpus of research has emerged investigating the role of cognitive

change procedures in depression, and to a lesser extent, the purported mechanisms
and mediational hypotheses of CT (Lorenzo-Luaces et al., 2015; Moreno-Peral
et al., 2020). While consensus has not yet emerged regarding the empirical status of
cognitive change as a mechanism within CT (Kazdin, 2007; Longmore & Worrell,
2007), available data are largely consistent with central tenets of the cognitive
model (Lorenzo-Luaces et al., 2015). A number of studies report that therapist
adherence to, and competence in, CT techniques accounts for significant variance in
symptom change. Theory-specified actions of cognitive therapists, such as Socratic
questioning, labeling cognitive errors, and examining evidence for and against
beliefs, have been shown to precede reduction in depressive symptoms in CT, com-
pared with other aspects of treatment (e.g., therapeutic alliance; Braun et al., 2015;
Strunk et al., 2010a). Competence ratings, to varying degrees, also predict outcomes
of CT for depression (Strunk et al., 2010b, 2014).
Reviews of treatment studies confirm increases in the frequency and quality of
hypothesized cognitive content (e.g., adaptive beliefs) and compensatory skills
(e.g., cognitive restructuring) following CT, although these changes may not be
specific to CT (Cristea et al., 2015; Garratt et al., 2007; Hundt et al., 2013). Several
trials conducted by Dozois et al. (2009, 2014) showed that changes in deeper
cognitive structures (i.e. depressive schemas) also accompany CT when combined

with pharmacotherapy, although specificity to CT has not been consistently reported
(Quilty et al., 2014).
Numerous studies further demonstrate that cognitive changes covary with and
precede depressive symptom reduction (Garratt et al., 2007; Hundt et al., 2013;
Sasso et al., 2015), including “sudden gains” (Tang & DeRubeis, 1999; Tang et al.,
2005) and relapse/recurrence (Brouwer et al., 2019; Ezawa et al., 2020). For exam-
ple, Adler et al. (2015) found that CT skills, specifically identifying alternative
interpretations and responding adaptively to maladaptive beliefs and stressful life
events, improved over the course of CT and was positively related to depressive
symptom change. In contrast, implicitly-assessed maladaptive beliefs did not
change or account for symptom improvement (Adler et al., 2015). This latter finding
is tempered by the possibility that endorsement of maladaptive beliefs by depressed
clients varies as a function of measurement strategy. In an RCT comparing CT with
antidepressant medication, Segal et al. (2006) found that remitted depressed clients
who received pharmacological treatment endorsed greater dysfunctional cognitions
following a sad mood induction than did clients who recovered through
CT. Importantly, clients with heightened cognitive reactivity evidenced significantly
increased risk of relapse 18 months post-treatment (Segal et al., 2006).
Researchers have conducted dismantling studies to isolate the impact of cogni-
tive procedures on outcome in depression, as well as examine hypotheses about
cognitive mediation. An influential dismantling study conducted by Jacobson et al.
(1996) found the full CT package comparable in efficacy to the BA and partial cog-
nitive (i.e., monitoring and challenging of automatic thoughts) components at post-
treatment and relapse (Gortner et al., 1998; Jacobson et al., 1996). In this study, all
three conditions were equally effective in decreasing negative thinking and dysfunc-
tional attributional styles. Contrary to predictions, attributional styles predicted
reduced depressive symptoms only in the BA condition, while frequency of pleasant
events was associated with later change for clients who received CT, and not BA.
Studies employing formal tests of statistical mediation between cognitive proce-
dures, cognitive change, and depressive outcomes have provided relatively mixed
findings regarding the hypotheses within the cognitive model (Forman et al., 2012;
Lemmens et al., 2017; Quigley et al., 2019; Schmidt et al., 2019). Forman et al.
(2012) found that self-reported changes in dysfunctional thinking and cognitive
defusion mediated outcomes in both CT and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
(ACT) in a sample of depressed and anxious outpatients. Additionally, moderator
analyses revealed that cognitive (e.g., cognitive restructuring) and affective (e.g.,
distraction) change strategies specifically facilitated outcomes for clients receiving
CT, whereas acceptance was positively related to outcome for those in the ACT
condition.
In a particularly comprehensive intensive longitudinal design, Schmidt et al.
(2019) found that out-of-session rehearsal of CT skills mediated the relation
between in-session cognitive change and depressive symptom improvement.
Further, in-session cognitive change was predicted by therapists’ use of cognitive
procedures. In their sample, neither therapeutic alliance nor behavioral methods
emerged as significant predictors of in-session cognitive change. Other studies have

not found an effect of cognitive mediation in trials comparing CT with pharmaco-
therapy (Quigley et al., 2019) or psychotherapy (Lemmens et al., 2017).
Evidence of the association between CT skills and outcomes has emerged across
various populations, including adolescents (Webb et al., 2012), and individuals with
varied presentations beyond those categorized as major depressive disorder, such as
seasonal affective disorder (Evans et al., 2013) and premenstrual dysphoric disorder
(Hunter et al., 2002). The hypothesized mechanisms of the cognitive model are
additionally supported by research verifying an association between depression and
cognitive variables, such as attentional biases toward negative information, mood
dependent endorsement of negative beliefs, and mood-congruent recall effects
(LeMoult & Gotlib, 2019). Developments in neuroimaging also suggest that CT
affects clinical recovery via hypothesized mechanisms of “top-down” information
processing (DeRubeis et al., 2008). Finally, additional process variables, such as the
therapeutic alliance, may influence the process-outcome relation of CT for depres-
sion, although not all investigations find that alliance precedes subsequent improve-
ment (Cameron et al., 2018).
Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the theory and technique of REBT and CT,
both interventions emblematic of second wave CBT approaches to treating depres-
sion. The efficacy of CT, and to an extent REBT, is supported by decades of out-
come studies supplemented by burgeoning research designed to identify moderators
and theoretically congruent mediators that may optimize dissemination and imple-
mentation of these treatments. The foundational belief upon which these treatments
are based—that cognition must be identified, addressed, and understood for effec-
tive change in depression to occur—continues to be a central tenet carried forward
into the contemporary evidence-based armamentaria of CBT practitioners.
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Depression: Third Wave Case
Conceptualization
Zoey Zuo and Zindel Segal
Current Standard of Care for Depression
Despite recent developments in biological and psychological interventions, depres-

sion remains a leading cause of disability worldwide, affecting an estimated 4.4%
of the global population (approximately 322 million), with an 18.4% increase
between 2005 and 2015 (World Health Organization, 2017). In addition to its high
global prevalence, depression tends to have a highly recurrent course, and individu-
als’ risk of recurrence increases by 16% with each successive recurrent episode
(Judd et al., 2000; Solomon et al., 2000).
In recognition of the fact that major depressive disorder (MDD) is often charac-
terized by multiple phases, including an acute phase, treatment response, episode
relapse, and episode recurrent, Frank et al. (1991) and others have suggested the
need to match interventions to the specific phase of disorder that patients find them-
selves in. Indeed, interventions used to attain initial treatment response and remis-
sion may be different from those used to maintain longer term recovery (Guidi
et al., 2016). To date, antidepressant medication (ADM) and psychotherapy (e.g.,
Cognitive Therapy [CT]) have proven to be the standard of care for MDD with
approximately 40–50% recovery rates (Hollon et al., 2006); the most common inter-
vention for prevention of episode return is maintenance antidepressant medication
(mADM) (Geddes et al., 2003). Cognitive therapy has also demonstrated protective
benefits against depression’s return (Garber et al., 2009; Hollon et al., 2005).
Z. Zuo · Z. Segal (*)

Graduate Department of Psychological Clinical Science, University of Toronto Scarborough,
Toronto, Canada
e-mail: zindel.segal@utoronto.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_17
398 Z. Zuo and Z. Segal
ationale for Adapting Mindfulness Meditation to Prevent

R
Depression Relapse
While mADM is largely effective for prevention, a number of drawbacks have been
associated with reliance on antidepressant medication. Chief among these draw-
backs is the low rates of treatment compliance over time. In a national survey, 22%
participants reported discontinuing ADM prematurely (Samples & Mojtabai, 2015).
In another study, 42.4% of patients discontinued ADM during the first 30 days, and
only 27.6% continued to take the medication for more than 90 days (Olfson et al.,
2006). A literature search of antidepressant nonadherence between 2001 and 2011
revealed that approximately 50% of psychiatric patients and 50% of primary care
patients are nonadherent six months after the start of the antidepressant treatment
(Sansone & Sansone, 2012). What are some reasons for this low treatment compli-
ance consistently observed across studies? Once the initial symptoms have abated,
patients may consider themselves as “feeling well” or “recovered” and may view
long-term mADM as unnecessary, especially since the medications tend to be costly
and can lead to many side effects (for a review, see Sansone & Sansone, 2012).
Another challenge is “tachyphlaxis”, a phenomenon in which antidepressants lose
their potency over time (Kinrys et al., 2019). Furthermore, women who are pregnant
may have additional concerns about these medications. On top of these patient-
related factors, clinicians also play a role in nonadherence: clinicians might not have
provided sufficient instruction about the medication or followed up with their
patients (Masand, 2003; Woolley et al., 2010). When considered collectively, these
factors may end up leaving a sizable number of formerly depressed patients “uncov-
ered” during a period in which their risk of relapse or recurrence continues to rise.
Against this backdrop, Teasdale et al. (1995) sought to develop a psychotherapeutic
alternative to mADM to prevent the relapse and recurrence of depression.
The development of this psychotherapy was informed by Beck’s model of cogni-
tive vulnerability (Beck, 1967) and the experimental literature on mood-related cog-
nitive changes in remitted depressed patients (Segal et al., 1996). Based on
Teasdale’s differential activation hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1983, 1988), during
dysphoric states, the content and degree of the activation of one’s negative informa-
tion processing biases can determine whether one’s momentary sadness becomes
maintained or escalated. The DAH model argues that during an individual’s early
depressive episodes, a connection becomes established between sad moods and
negative information processing patterns. Subsequent temporary dysphoric states
can re-activate these negative thinking patterns, which then preserve or even aggra-
vate the dysphoric states into new episodes of depression. As a result, compared to
individuals who have never experienced depressive episodes, recovered depressed
patients have higher cognitive vulnerability and are at a higher risk of re-experiencing
more depressive episodes. For example, when a previously depressed individual is
in a momentary sad mood, a thought that they are underperforming at work can
linger all day and be over-generalized into a belief that they are a failure in every
Depression: Third Wave Case Conceptualization 399
aspect of life. With continued rumination and worrying, this downward spiral can
eventually lead to a full-blown depressive episode. We can say that this individual
has a high level of mood-linked cognitive reactivity, meaning that sad moods trigger
large increases in their dysfunctional attitudes. Segal et al. (2006) reported that over
an 18-month follow up, formerly depressed patients who showed high levels of
mood-linked cognitive reactivity had a 69% relapse rate, whereas those with mini-
mal or decreased reactivity relapsed at lower rates of 30% and 32% respectively.
These findings underscore the importance of targeting mood-linked changes in cog-
nitive processing among formerly depressed patients as one potential mechanism
for reducing their risk of relapse/recurrence.
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT)
MBCT is considered a third-wave psychotherapy primarily due to its emphasis on

changing one’s relationship to thoughts and emotions, rather than changing their
content. Coming out of first-wave behavioral therapies which focused on the mea-
surement of observable behaviors, second wave therapies such as Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Beck et al., 1979) rigorously focused on cognition as
the driver of mood and behavior. These models highlighted the importance of chal-
lenging the content of maladaptive thoughts with evidence and changing these
thoughts in order to change mood and behavior. This type of content change is
referred to as a “first-order change”. Unlike second-wave therapies, third-wave ther-
apies focus on a “second-order change” by aiming to change one’s relationship with
one’s thoughts, emotions, and sensations. The common factors of third-wave thera-
pies are summarized as follows: “No one factor unites these new methods, but all
have ventured into areas traditionally reserved for the less empirical wings of clini-
cal intervention and analysis, emphasizing such issues as acceptance, mindfulness,
cognitive defusion, dialectics, values, spirituality, and relationship. Their methods
are often more experiential than didactic; their underlying philosophies are more
contextualistic than mechanistic” (Hayes, 2004, p. 640). For example, MBCT
teaches metacognitive skills to help reduce participants’ mood-related cognitive
reactivity to prevent relapse/recurrence. Participants learn to become mindful
through “paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally
to things as they are” (Williams et al., 2007, p. 47). By building up present-moment
awareness, the ability to sustain attention, and the ability to observe thoughts and
feelings without reacting to them, participants learn to view their negative thoughts
and sad moods as transient mental events rather than facts or the reality. Table 1
compares third-wave MBCT to second-wave CBT in an imaginary scenario, in
which a previously depressed individual responds to his situation according to prin-
ciples of MBCT and CBT respectively.
Table 1 CBT vs. MBCT approaches

Scenario: Alan has a history of depression and was successfully treated for his most recent
depressive episode two years ago. He recently moved to a new city during the COVID-19
pandemic and had to work remotely from his small apartment which has a nice view
overlooking the city. It has been 4 months and he has not made many new friends, except one
co-worker who was friendly to him. He started to feel isolated, sad, and worried that he may
never integrate into his new company. This table compares how CBT and MBCT may help him
address thoughts related to his low mood.
CBT Approach MBCT Approach
Focus is on the content of thoughts, e.g., “I will never integrate Focus is on the process of
into my new company.” thinking, and less on the
content, e.g., adopting a
decentered perspective on
thinking: “I notice that I am
having the thought that I will
never integrate into my new
company.”
Primarily focused on negative thoughts and beliefs, e.g., “I Negative and positive thoughts
will never integrate into my new company.” and beliefs are not particularly
differentiated, as they are both
treated as mental events. E.g.,
“I will never integrate into my
new company.” “I like the view
from my apartment.”
Focused on identifying negative thoughts as they occur. Focused on noticing any
thoughts / emotions / sensations
in the present moment,
regardless of their affective
content.
Gathering evidence that support or refuse the content of Engaging less with whether
negative thoughts to change the degree of belief. E.g., the thoughts are true or false, and
evidence that one co-worker was friendly to Alan does not more emphasis on how
support the thought that he will never integrate into his new watching them come and go in
company. the mind may reduce their
urgency. E.g., noticing the
thought that “I will never
integrate into my new
company” arise and dissipate
just like any other thoughts that
come and go.
Learning to address stressful situations by reducing stress Learning to address stressful
through action steps, e.g., by making a concrete plan to situations by first giving oneself
socialize at work. some space to breathe or
explore what stress feels like,
e.g., by taking a 3-minute
breathing space before
considering an action step.
Structure of MBCT
MBCT draws elements from CBT and Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction pro-
gram (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 2013). Some of the MBSR-based techniques include the
body scan (i.e., paying attention to different parts of the body and bodily sensations
systematically, for example, from head to toe), mindful stretching (i.e., stretching
the body in a slow and focused manner), mindfulness of breath/body/sounds (i.e.,
selectively attending to the sensations of breathing, body, and sounds), and open
monitoring of the present-moment experience (i.e., observing present-moment
thoughts, emotions, or sensations without selectively focusing on any specific
object). These techniques are designed to train participants to become aware of their
body sensations and mental events, maintain attention on them, and observe them
without judgement (Kabat-Zinn, 2013). Some CT-based techniques include ques-
tioning automatic thoughts and identifying sources of pleasure and social support.
These techniques help to bring participants’ automatic thoughts and emotions to
their conscious awareness, so that they can work on developing a healthier relation-
ship with their thoughts and emotions. Through a combination of techniques and
exercises, participants learn to approach their present-moment experiences with an
attitude of open-minded curiosity and non-judgement and view their thoughts and
feelings as transient mental events, rather than facts. Participants also learn to
become more aware of their unique depression-related warning signals so that they
can make an action plan in advance, and respond to these signals with flexibility
(e.g., letting a problem be, instead of attempting to fix it). By training participants
to notice their negative thoughts and feelings and move on without ruminating over
them, MBCT equips participants with important relapse prevention skills.
MBCT was originally developed for individuals with residual depression (Segal
et al., 2002, 2013). Participants are eligible for the intervention if they are: previ-
ously depressed, able to meet the demands of program (45 min home practice per
day), not at high risk of suicide, no substance abuse, no untreated trauma, nor a BPD
diagnosis (advised to seek alternate treatment). To become an MBCT instructor,
individuals need to fulfill the following qualification requirements: (1) trained as
mental health professional, experience with evidence based treatments for
Table 2 MBCT session content

Session 1 Beyond automatic pilot
Session 2 Another way of knowing
Session 3 Coming home to the present – Gathering the scattered
mind
Session 4 Recognizing aversion
Session 5 Allowing things to be as they already are
Session 6 Seeing thoughts as thoughts
Session 7 Kindness in action
Session 8 What now?
Teasdale et al. (2014)
depression, (2) have attended MBCT teacher development course, (3) have partici-
pated in MBCT as a participant, (4) have led MBCT groups and received supervi-
sion, and (5) have an ongoing personal mindfulness meditation practice.
There are eight 2.5-h weekly sessions in total (see Table 2 for the topic of each
session; Teasdale et al., 2014). The first phase (Sessions 1–4) teaches the basics of
mindfulness, and the second phase (Sessions 5–8) teaches ways to handle mood
shifts. In the first phase, participants learn to become more aware of how much the
mind wanders, how the wandering mind can maintain or escalate negative thoughts
and emotions without one’s knowledge, and how to bring one’s attention back to
readily accessible reference points (e.g., body, breath). Once participants have
become more aware of their moment-to-moment thoughts and feelings, they enter
the second phase of MBCT to develop skills to flexibly respond to these thoughts
and feelings. Starting from Session 2, each session begins with a meditation exer-
cise (e.g., body scan, sitting meditation) to bring participants’ attention to the pres-
ent moment. Participants’ meditation experiences are discussed, homework will be
reviewed, and new homework will be assigned. The discussion on noticing and
regulating thoughts and feelings will be thoroughly explored.
The core skill to be learned in MBCT is how to step out of automatic negative
thinking patterns and stop them from escalating temporary negative moods into full-
blown depressive episodes. To achieve this goal, participants learn a set of skills that
include: concentration, awareness of thoughts, emotions, and sensations, being in
the moment, decentering, acceptance, letting go, being in a state of non-achievement,
and attending to the bodily manifestation of a problem (see Table 3; Segal
et al., 2013).
Table 3 MBCT skill set

Concentration The ability to pay sustained and quality attention to a reference
point.
Awareness of thoughts, The ability to detect automatic negative thinking patterns so that
emotions, and sensations one can let them go and free up the mental resources used to
automatically process these thoughts.
Being in the moment The ability to stay focused on experiences in the present moment,
rather than ruminating about the past or worrying about the future.
Decentering The ability to view thoughts, emotions, and sensations as passing
events.
Acceptance The ability to accept mental and bodily events as they are, while
being kind to ourselves.
Letting go The ability to let go of thoughts, emotions, and sensations to
prevent getting into negative thinking patterns.
“Being” rather than The ability to switch from getting things done to being in a state of
“doing” having no immediate need to achieve anything or go anywhere.
Attending to the bodily The ability to attend to the body’s response to a problem, so that
manifestation of a problem one is neither avoiding the problem nor letting it be escalated by
automatic negative thinking patterns.
Segal et al. (2013)
Efficacy of MBCT
An initial evaluation of MBCT found that among patients with 3 or more previous
depressive episodes, only 37% in the MBCT group relapsed, compared to 77% in
the treatment as usual (TAU) group, in which patients were instructed to seek help
from their family doctor or other sources as they normally would, if their symptoms
worsened (Teasdale et al., 2000). For patients with 2 previous episodes, MBCT
provided no statistically significant additional benefits than TAU: 54% relapse in
MBCT group compared to 31% relapse in TAU group. Teasdale et al. suggest that
different processes might be mediating relapse/recurrence in patients with different
numbers of previous episodes. With each additional episode, mood-induced auto-
matic negative thinking patterns are more likely to play a larger role in relapse/
recurrence. Since MBCT was designed to reduce these negative thinking patterns,
its larger effect in individuals more vulnerable to these negative thinking patterns
(i.e., patients with more than 3 previous episodes) might reflect this proposed mech-
anism of change. Similar to Teasdale et al.’s (2000) findings, Ma and Teasdale
(2004) showed that among previously depressed patients with 3 or more depressive
episodes, MBCT was more effective than TAU (i.e., seeking help from family doc-
tor or other sources as per usual if symptoms worsened) and reduced the rate of
relapse/recurrence from 78% to 36%. Patients with 4 or more previous episodes
benefitted the most from MBCT: 38% of patients in the MBCT group relapsed as
compared to 100% in TAU.
Empirical evidence also suggests that the effect of MBCT is comparable to that
of mADM. Segal et al. (2010) showed that for previously depressed patients in
stable or unstable remission, MBCT is as protective as mADM against relapse/
recurrence: MBCT and mADM both achieved a 73% reduction in relapse/recur-
rence rate compared to placebo among unstable remitters; MBCT, mADM, and
placebo did not differ among stable remitters. Kuyken et al. (2015) randomly
assigned patients with three or more major depressive episodes who were on mADM
to continue receiving mADM or to receive MBCT with support to taper/discontinue
mADM (MBCT-TS), and measured their time to depressive relapse/recurrence,
residual symptoms, and quality of life over 2 years. The authors found that the out-
comes of mADM and MBCT-TS were comparably good, as both interventions were
associated with lasting positive outcomes. An individual patient data meta-analysis
of 9 RCTs suggested that MBCT appears efficacious in preventing relapse among
individuals with recurrent depression, especially those with more notable residual
symptoms (Kuyken et al., 2016). Compared to usual care or mADM treatment,
MBCT was associated with a significant reduction in the risk of relapse/recurrence.
Furthermore, MBCT had comparable effects on demographically diverse patients
treated in different European and North American countries by different clinicians,
which suggests that MBCT is a generalizable intervention.
In addition to the evidence supporting the efficacy of in-person MBCT, a more
recent RCT found that an online version of MBCT provided additional improve-
ment in residual depressive symptoms and relapse rate on top of usual depression
care (Segal et al., 2020). Online MBCT offers a promising scalable approach for the
prevention of depressive relapse/recurrence.
A randomized clinical trial compared the relapse prophylaxis following MBCT
and CT (Farb et al., 2018). Participants were randomly assigned to receive either an
8-week MBCT (N = 82) or CT (N = 84), followed by assessments every 3 months
over a 24-month period. No difference was found in terms of rates of relapse or time
to relapse between the two groups. Both groups acquired an important metacogni-
tive skill, decentering, which is associated with protection against relapse. These
findings suggest that MBCT and CT are equally effective and develop similar meta-
cognitive skills to regulate thoughts and emotions despite their differences in tech-
niques. It is also worth to note that no study to date has directly compared the
efficacy between MBCT and other third-wave psychotherapies, such as ACT, in
preventing depressive relapse or recurrence.
Since MBCT has been shown to protect against the return of depressive symp-
toms, how much dosage is needed to bring about such changes? To date, there have
been mixed findings for MBCT and mindfulness-based programs in general. A
recent meta-analysis suggests that increased practice of mindfulness meditation was
associated with greater treatment benefits, such as lower depressive symptoms, but
the actual dosage ranges have yet to be specified (Parsons et al., 2017).
Therapeutic Change Mechanisms of MBCT
Three recent review papers summarized the mechanisms and mediators of change
for MBCT for depression (Alsubaie et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2015; van der Velden
et al., 2015). Gu et al. (2015) statistically synthesised 15 RCTs and 5 quasi-
experimental mindfulness-based intervention studies, combining results from 11
MBCT and 9 MBSR studies. The authors found strong, consistent evidence for the
mediating role of cognitive and emotional reactivity, and moderate, consistent evi-
dence for the mediating role of mindfulness and repetitive negative thinking. This
finding supports the theoretical underpinnings of MBCT: acquiring mindfulness
skills improves insight and non-judgemental acceptance of thoughts and experi-
ences, and potentially alleviates depressive symptoms by reducing the recurrent
maladaptive thinking about these symptoms (Segal et al., 2002). The authors also
found preliminary although insufficient evidence for the mediating roles of psycho-
logical flexibility and self-compassion. It is important to note that these findings
reveal the collective effects of MBCT and MBSR, and that the studies were con-
ducted in both clinical (depression, cancer, anxiety, distress) and non-clinical
samples.
A systematic review by van der Velden et al. (2015) examined the change mecha-
nisms in 23 MBCT studies in individuals with recurrent MDD. The study found that
changes in mindfulness, rumination, worry, compassion, and meta-awareness were
all associated with, predicted, or mediated the effects of MBCT on treatment out-
come. Preliminary evidence also identifies attention, memory specificity,
self-discrepancy, emotional reactivity, and momentary positive and negative affect

as potential contributors to MBCT’s effects. Taken together, this review suggests
that MBCT may prevent relapse by improving participants’ abilities to view their
present moment thoughts, emotions, and experiences as transient mental events, and
attend to them without engaging in automatic cognitive evaluation processes (e.g.,
rumination and worry).
In Alsubaie et al.’s (2017) systematic review, 10 studies evaluated MBCT’s
change mechanisms in treating or preventing depression, compared against active or
non-active control groups. Mindfulness, rumination, worry, affect, self-compassion,
cognitive and emotional reactivity, and attention have been identified as mecha-
nisms that lead to improvements in current or recurrent depression, although some
mixed results exist among these studies. The authors note that there is a need to
strengthen the methodological rigour in process RCTs before more definitive con-
clusions can be drawn about how MBCT brings about changes.
Cost-Effectiveness of MBCT
In an RCT conducted in the UK (Kuyken et al., 2008), MBCT was compared to

mADM over a 15-month follow-up period. MBCT was found to be more effective
than mADM in alleviating residual depressive symptoms and improving the quality
of life, but no difference was found in the average annual cost between the two
interventions. A cost-utility analysis was conducted to measure the difference in the
mean costs of the two interventions divided by the difference in their mean effects.
It revealed that MBCT has a 42% probability of being the more cost-effective treat-
ment option compared to 58% for mADM, assuming that society is unwilling to pay
additional amounts on relapse prevention. As society’s willingness to pay increases,
the probability of MBCT being the more cost-effective treatment increases; if soci-
ety is willing to pay more than $1,000, MBCT has a higher probability of being
more cost-effective than mADM. The authors also found that the cost differences
between the two treatments converged over time, and MBCT cost less than mADM
toward the end of the study. Due to the short follow-up period, it remains unclear if
MBCT would be more cost-effective in the long term overall. In another study by
Kuyken et al. (2015) with a larger sample, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of MBCT was compared to that of mADM over a 24-month period in adults with a
history of MDD. Unlike their previous study, this study revealed no significant dif-
ference in effectiveness or cost-effectiveness between these two interventions.
In an Australian context (Shawyer et al., 2016), combined MBCT and depressive
relapse active monitoring (DRAM) intervention demonstrated a high probability of
being less costly and more effective than DRAM alone, as measured by the incre-
mental cost-utility ratio (difference in mean costs between the two interventions
divided by the difference in mean disability-adjusted life years). MBCT participants
experienced significantly fewer days and shorter durations of depressive episodes
than controls; the cost of MBCT was also lower from the perspectives of mental
health care, overall health care, and society as a whole. In a Canadian economic and
healthcare context, Pahlevan et al. (2020) conducted a model-based cost-utility
analysis comparing MBCT to ADM and found that MBCT was less costly and was
associated with a larger gain in health effect than ADM. In all three studies, the side
effect profiles of MBCT and antidepressant differed and may have contributed to
the neutral or somewhat small cost advantage for MBCT. Difficulties reported by
MBCT patients were laregely psychological in nature, such as reliving difficult situ-
ations or experiencing strong negative affect, whereas for patients receiving ADM,
side effects were mostly physiological in nature, e.g. nausea, fatigue, reduced sexual
drive, dry mouth, insomnia.
Emergent Themes from Qualitative and Case Studies of MBCT
Eisendrath et al. (2011) presented the case study of Jean, who had struggled with
depression all her life. Jean was hopeless and withdrawn from pleasurable activities,
believing that nothing would make her feel better. MBCT taught her to stop resist-
ing and start accepting her depression. Through increased awareness of body sensa-
tions and thoughts, Jean became more aware of the positive and negative experiences
related to depression. She learned to notice when she began to feel more depressed
than normal and respond to it by doing things differently. She learned to change her
relationship with depression, from seeing it as a daunting enemy to seeing it as a
signal about something in her life at that moment, and even as something she could
live with. Jean came to see thoughts as thoughts, rather than facts. Breath-focused
sitting helped her observe how her thoughts develop in her head without having to
believe in what the thoughts were telling her. Being in a group also had its benefits:
other MBCT participants appeared normal to Jean, which made her realize that she
might also appear more normal to others than she had thought. Jean became better
able to sustain attention on his work; her BDI dropped from 28 to 9 after the
treatment.
Tickell et al. (2020) identified the common themes in participants’ accounts
about their experience with MBCT, which include their beliefs about the causes of
depression, personal agency, acceptance, quality of life, ADM tapering/discontinu-
ation, and interactions with their doctors. Mason and Hargreaves (2001) identified
some trajectories that MBCT participants go through. Some participants start the
intervention with their own expectations, encounter some initial setbacks (e.g., not
being able to complete homework or not doing it “correctly”), and then come to
terms with MBCT as their mindfulness skills develop and their relationship with
their thoughts change. They start to detect early warning signs of depressive relapse
and learn to apply mindfulness skills to everyday life.
Some core elements can be extracted from these quantitative analyses and case
studies. Some participants have initial doubts about how a psychological interven-
tion can fix problems that they believe are caused by neurochemical disruption.
Through psychoeducation, they might change their beliefs about the cause of
depression and start to recognize the psychological component of it. MBCT focuses
on training metacognitive skills, which help improve participants’ sense of agency
and control over their depression, especially when they are no longer actively in
treatment. It appears that different techniques might work differently for each par-
ticipant. Many participants benefit from being able to see thoughts and emotions as
mental events, rather than facts, and being able to stop avoiding depression and
accepting it as a part of their life. It is also critical that participants learn to detect
early warning signs for the return of depressive episodes and respond to them by
engaging in mindfulness practices that they learned from MBCT. On top of these
specific curative factors, many participants acknowledge the benefits of having a
social support structure from MBCT group members, therapist, and their general
physician.
MBCT Case Illustration
To further illustrate the process of MBCT, we will use Rushil’s case as an example.
Rushil is a 48-year-old male who immigrated from India eight years ago and works
as a logistics manager for a global shipping company. He has a history of recur-
rent MDD complicated by asthma and osteoarthritis in his right knee. He is married
with two children, one of whom is studying in university and the other is pursuing
HVAC training at a community college. Rushil has struggled with recurrent depres-
sion with obsessive features since his early adulthood. His episodes of depression
are associated with irritability, hypersomnia, hyperphagia and social isolation as
well as intense worry. He received little treatment for depression in India because
his condition was not properly diagnosed until his mid 30s. He showed a moderate
response to SSRI antidepressant medication managed by his GP, which was helpful
because, once he recognized that he was becoming depressed, starting on an antide-
pressant allowed him to return to work without taking large amounts of sick leave.
Even thought he experienced periods of drowsiness at work and constipation, he felt
that the primary objective was to reduce his depressive symptoms and he was will-
ing to tolerate these side-effects. Rushil is very committed to his work and receives
a good deal of personal validation from his workplace. Once his more severe symp-
toms had remitted, Rushil’s GP advised him to stay on his medication for an addi-
tional 3 to 6 months to ensure that the episode was fully treated. Typically, Rushil’s
mood would stabilize within 3 months of starting on medication and he would often
wonder why he needs to continue with the medication when he is not experiencing
active symptoms of depression. More recently, Rushil’s depressive episodes have
become more severe and he had had one short-term hospitalization for suicidal ide-
ation, although he admitted that he would not harm himself because of his wife and
children.
Over the past six months, Rushil became depressed again following cutbacks at
this workplace that required him to let go of two staff members and left him feeling
uncertain about his own position. His wife pointed out that he had been sleeping
more on weekends and turning down social engagements with friends. At his wife’s
urging he booked an appointment with his GP who asked him to complete a PHQ-9
(Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002). Rushil scored 21 on this measure, leading his GP to
suggest that he re-start Celexa, the same antidepressant that was prescribed two
years ago for his last episode of depression. Rushil stayed on Celexa for a full year
and found that while his energy, appetite and concentration returned within
2–3 months, his sleep was still impaired and he frequently worried about his health
and future. His GP felt that given his initial symptom picture, Rushil had in fact
responded quite well to Celexa and that the residual symptoms he continued to
report could be addressed through attending an MBCT program. He provided Rushil
with links to studies on MBCT’s efficacy in the treatment of longer-term manage-
ment of his depression and described how this program could be utilized if Rushil
stayed on or decided to discontinue his Celexa.
Rushil attended an MBCT program that was offered at a local health clinic.
During his first meeting with the MBCT instructor, Rushil learned about the 8-week
group structure and requirements for home practice. When asked how the program
could be helpful, Rushil replied that, in addition to help with his insomnia, he would
like to “worry less” and “be less sensitive to criticism at work”. With these goals in
mind, Rushil started the 8-week program.
In Session 1, the instructor repeatedly referenced the difference between auto-
matic pilot and mindfulness. These concepts were conveyed through a combination
of group discussion and mindfulness practices. In Rushil’s first mindfulness prac-
tice, the group leader guided him to direct his attention to the sensations of sight,
texture, smell, sound, and taste of eating a raisin. Rushil was interested in the
answers that other participants provided as the group discussed what was noticed
during the practice and how mindful eating might be related to preventing depres-
sion and staying well. At the end of the session, the group leader assigned home
practice for the week and Rushil was provided with mindfulness recordings that he
downloaded as mp3 files to his phone, so that he could listen to these recordings at
his convenience between sessions.
In Session 2, Rushil participated in a 30-min Body Scan practice, during which
he moved his attention to specific foci in his body. After the practice, he was invited
to describe what he noticed during the Body Scan, and to reflect on how intentional
deployment of attention contrasted to automatic pilot. By listening to how other
participants responded to the same question, Rushil found it reassuring that group
members experienced many of the same challenges as he did during the practice,
such as feeling sleepy or judging himself when his mind wandered from the practice
to thinking about what to make for dinner that night. Next, Rushil completed an
exercise that highlighted the relationship between thoughts and feelings. He was
asked to imagine a scenario in which he saw a friend walking down the street, wav-
ing at his friend, while his friend simply didn’t respond. Rushil said that a number
of thoughts quickly came into his mind, including “he’s mad at me” and “did I do
something wrong?” which led to some sadness. Other group members reported
thinking “I wonder why he is so stuck up today?” or “he probably has a lot on his
mind” which led to feelings of annoyance or concern. The variety of interpretations
provided by the group suggested that there was no single correct way of explaining
why the friend didn’t wave and that the first thoughts that pop into their minds can
often determine the moods we feel. This practice was reinforced with a home prac-
tice assignment that involved noting one pleasant event each day and the accompa-
nying thoughts, feelings, and sensations. The following week, Rushil reported that
he enjoyed bringing his attention to pleasant events because he noticed many things
he would usually miss, such as the smell of coffee in the morning and it helped him
to stay more present. Although this practice was not assigned again, Rushil planned
to continue doing it in his own time.
In Session 3, Rushil reported feeling connected to the group leader, who he
described as being patient and understanding. In this session, he was guided through
a sitting meditation. He noted the physical sensations that were present during this
practice, and how busy his mind was the entire time. He participated in two addi-
tional mindfulness practices, including a number of mindful stretches and an infor-
mal practice called the 3 Minute Breathing Space (3MBS). The 3MBS was described
as a “mini-meditation” to be used at any point during the day, and as a first step in
dealing with difficult situations. While reviewing the previous week’s home prac-
tice, Rushil noted that it was difficult to make time to complete the Body Scan every
day and that he was looking forward to having a briefer meditation option. In
addressing the whole on the topic of home practice, the group leader noted that
participants may encounter obstacles to daily home practice, especially in the first
few sessions of the program. Together, Rushil and the group leader identified some
ideas to support his practice, including protecting his practice time by adding it to
his calendar and ‘cutting himself some slack’ when unexpected challenges get in the
way. Determined considered a plan where he could complete briefer practices dur-
ing busy workdays and longer practices on the weekends.
In Session 4, “Exploring the Landscape of Depression”, Rushil learned about the
neurovegetative symptoms and cognitive features that comprise the syndrome of
depression. Seeing these signs early on plays a vital role in prevent depression from
gathering momentum because it supports earlier intervention. He reviewed a list of
frequent negative automatic thoughts and created a personalized list of thoughts that
accompany his depressive episodes, such as “I’m a loser” or “others don’t respect
me”. He noticed that the mindfulness practices helped increase his ability to observe
the presence of these thoughts without getting pulled into disputing them.
In Session 5, Rushil practiced bringing his mindfulness skills of awareness, curi-
osity and investigation to more emotionally challenging situations. During a sitting
meditation Rushil brought to mind an argument he had with a co-worker and noticed
that while strong feelings or anger arose along with tightness in his chest, these did
not last the entire time and actually gave way to feelings of regret and sensations of
relaxation around his eyes. At first, Rushil was worried that focusing on negative
events in this way might even hasten the onset of depression but with time, he found
by allowing and simply attending to these moments of negative affect, they changed
in intensity or provided him with new ideas for how to cope with them. For exam-
ple, there were moments when he was able to stand back a bit and watch his thoughts
instead of reacting to them. At other times he could simply label his emotions, say-
ing, “Oh, sadness is here” or “there is fear”.
Session 6 extended these concepts by showing how mindful attention can be
linked to effective action when responding to emotional difficulties. Following a
3MBS practice, the instructor outlined “Four Doors” for taking mindful action
when negative thoughts, emotions, or sensations are present. The first door,
“Re-entry”, suggests that participants act by simply bringing their awareness to a
difficulty. The second “Body Door” invites participants to attend to the ways in
which difficult emotions can present themselves as physical sensations. The third
“Thought Door” suggests bringing awareness to observing negative thoughts com-
ing and going in the mind, rather than getting pulled into their content. The fourth
“Door of Skillful Action” highlights the option of asking what is needed right now
to help one take best care of oneself and then going ahead and doing that. Rushil
told the group leader that over the past two weeks, he was surprised at how taking a
3MBS allowed him to face emotional challenges both at work and at home without
resorting to automatically blaming himself or others.
In Sessions 7 (“Building Your Plan of Action”) and 8 (“Supporting Your Practice
in the World”), Rushil reflected on which self-care activities he could engage in to
make himself feel happier, more active, and engaged in his life. He identified his
personal relapse signature as composed of hypersomnia and social withdrawal and
wrote a letter to himself to itemize the strategies he learned in the program. This
letter was intended to be read if he became depressed in the future and it outlined a
customized wellness plan that included activities such as: “Call your sister if you
notice your mood is starting to drop. Do one nice thing for yourself each day like
buying a magazine you’ll enjoy reading during lunch, or make plans to go for dinner
after work with a friend.” Rushil reviewed his wellness plan with his spouse so that
she could act as an additional support in putting his plan into action. He kept the
letter in his closet and another copy on his computer so that it would be easy to find
if and when it was needed. Towards the end of the program, Rushil told the group
that he really enjoying the practical suggestions for staying well that were provided
in the last two sessions of the program. When asked what practices he saw himself
sticking with after the group, he said he could see himself using the 3MBS pretty
regularly and going to a Yoga class on the weekend. Overall, he felt he had more of
a plan for addressing his low moods and felt good that there was a role he could play
in looking after himself over the long term.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we compared third-wave psychotherapeutic approaches to earlier

approaches, using MBCT as a primary example. A wealth of research shows that
MBCT is an efficacious and cost-effective alternative to CBT and antidepressants in
preventing depression relapse and recurrence among people who have a history of
depression. From a combination of quantitative and qualitative studies, we are start-
ing to better understand how MBCT brings about its therapeutic effects, for
example, by training people to see thoughts and emotions as mental events instead
of facts and to respond to these mental events with an attitude of acceptance and
non-judgement.
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First Wave Treatment of Obesity
Olivia H. Gratz and R. Wayne Fuqua
Although more operational definitions of obesity are available (and will be reviewed
herein), obesity has been defined as excessive fat accumulation that impacts one’s
health. Since 1975, the prevalence of obesity has tripled worldwide (World Health
Organization, 2020). In the United States, the prevalence of obesity has increased
from 30.5% in 1999 to 42.4% in 2018 (Hales et al., 2020). As obesity rates increase,
the consideration of health and psychological risks linked to obesity comes into
greater focus. As summarized in Pulgarón (2013), a number of health conditions are
associated with the development of obesity, ranging from mild health concerns to
more severe medical conditions. Relatively mild health symptoms include difficulty
breathing, snoring, increased sweating, difficulties engaging in strenuous physical
activity, fatigue, as well as joint and back pain. More serious health symptoms
include: high blood pressure, high cholesterol, atherosclerosis, gastro-esophageal
reflux disease, gallstones, infertility, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, liver disease, kid-
ney disease, pregnancy complications, heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and
specific cancers (e.g., Visscher & Seidell, 2001).
In addition to this extensive list of health correlates of obesity, there are also
significant psychological and social impacts. Psychologically, individuals who are
overweight may experience low confidence, low self-esteem, depression, and feel-
ings of isolation (Wardle & Cooke, 2005). Additionally, folks who are overweight
often encounter sizeism (discrimination based upon one’s body shape and size) and
may struggle with internalized sizeism (Chrisler & Barney, 2017). Furthermore, a
number of interpersonal problems are associated with obesity, such as social stigma
(Pont et al., 2017), bullying, and discrimination (Beck, 2016). Employers often
assume individuals who are obese to be “lazy”, “less competent”, “lacking self-
discipline”, and “emotionally unstable” (Puhl & Brownell, 2003). Individuals who
are obese tend to receive less pay for the same quality work, are less likely to be
O. H. Gratz · R. W. Fuqua (*)

Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA
e-mail: wayne.fuqua@wmich.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_18
416 O. H. Gratz and R. W. Fuqua
promoted, and are placed in high-level positions at a lower rate as compared to

individuals of average weight (Loh, 1993; Puhl & Brownell, 2001).
Finally, the medical cost of obesity and its health correlates in 2008 was esti-
mated to be $147 billion, a figure that has increased with the growing prevalence of
obesity and escalation of medical costs (Finkelstein et al., 2009). According to
D’Angelo (2018), medical expenditures in the U.S. for obesity-related illness in
adults has increased from 6.13% in 2001 to 7.91% of national medical expenditures
in 2015. Clearly, obesity is a major health concern with far reaching impacts.
Biology of Obesity
At its most basic level, weight management involves a balance of energy ingested
and energy expended. Energy ingested constitutes the number of calories someone
consumes in foods and liquids throughout the day while energy expended is the
active utilization of calories for body metabolism and physical activity (Hall et al.,
2012). The basal metabolic rate is the minimum number of calories one requires to
maintain bodily functions while at rest (McNab, 1997). In other words, an individ-
ual maintains a stable weight if the calories absorbed from food are equal to those
expended both in terms of body metabolism and physical activity. On the other
hand, if people ingest more calories than they expend, then they will gain weight.
Importantly, caloric content differs by food type (e.g., protein, fat, or carbohydrate).
Furthermore, the absorption of nutrients depends on how fast the organic material
moves through the digestive tract as well as its respective nutrient composition.
While caloric restriction and an increase in physical activity are more likely to result
in weight loss, this is not always the case; genetic, metabolic, and hormonal factors
also play a role in weight management (Comuzzie et al., 2001; Snyder et al., 2004).
According to set-point theory, body weight is maintained within a stable range
labeled the “set-point” (e.g., Mrosovsky & Powley, 1977; Wirtshafter & Davis,
1977). Not only does the body typically maintain its weight within that range,
despite variability in energy ingested and expended, but the body also appears to
protect itself against weight loss during periods of caloric deprivation with a variety
of metabolic adjustments (Farias et al., 2011). This phenomenon may serve as a
barrier to those who attempt to lose weight via caloric restriction.
Basic Factors Related to Obesity
Food consumption is directly related to the development and maintenance of weight

gain and is measured in a variety of ways. Researchers and clinicians assess quan-
tity and quality of food ingested via self-report, direct observation, laboratory mea-
sures, and psychological assessments. Dietary self-report may involve the
representation of the “average” food consumed (e.g., frequency questionnaires for
First Wave Treatment of Obesity 417
food consumed over the past few months) or detailed assessments of food intake on
a small sample of days, though the most accurate of self-report data currently appear
to be an automated multiple-pass method (e.g., Moshfegh et al., 2008) in which an
automated system evokes recall for food and beverage consumption. Laboratory
measures, on the other hand, may involve an initial semi-structured clinical inter-
view followed by the presentation of a multi-item food array with possible instruc-
tions, such as “eat normally” or “binge.” Food consumption in the laboratory setting
is quantified by direct observation and/or physical measures (e.g., weight of food
consumed). While laboratory measures produce precise quantification of food con-
sumption, they also suffer from “ecological validity” challenges and may not truly
represent food consumption in daily activities outside the lab setting (e.g., Walsh &
Boudreau, 2003). Finally, some psychological assessments that evaluate food con-
sumption include but are not limited to: The Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy,
1975), the Three-Factor Eating Questionnaire (Stunkard & Messick, 1985), and the
Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (van Strien et al., 1986).
As previously mentioned, physical activity is one method of energy expenditure
and therefore an important factor related to weight management. Exercise is helpful
for weight management not only because it burns calories but because it also tem-
porarily increases one’s metabolism (e.g., Koay et al., 2020). Researchers can mea-
sure exercise engagement via direct observation, self-report, and device or
measurement systems. There are a variety of direct observation methods used to
code the engagement of physical activity, including real-time observations or view-
ing of recordings taken from body cameras and wearable movement sensors
(McKenzie, 2002). Observational data can capture activity pattern, frequency, dura-
tion, and intensity, as well as exercise context. Finally, self-report measures include
questionnaires, diaries/logs, and devices.
Biopsychosocial Factors Related to Obesity
Although energy ingested and energy expended is the basis for understanding
weight management, there are physiological factors that impact one’s eating and
exercise behavior, as well. Cohen (2008) identified 10 neurophysiological pathways
that alter food choices. First, when humans see images of food, they secrete dopa-
mine in the dorsal striatum which then increases their motivation to eat. Second,
research indicates that humans have innate preferences for foods that are higher in
sugar and fat content, a genetically programmed preference that is a product of natu-
ral selection. In prehistoric times when food supplies were neither plentiful nor safe,
individuals who ingested high sugar and high fat substances and returned to ingest
more of those substances (in other words, their foraging and consummatory behav-
ior was reinforced by ingestion of these foods) were more likely to obtain sufficient
calories to survive in and pass along their genes to the next generation. Third, due to
the human evolution as a species of hunter-gatherers, humans gather food in abun-
dance when available. Additionally, due to its impact on survival, humans selected
varieties of food rather than depending on a single source. Consequently, in modern

society, people who go to the grocery stores that are stocked with abundant quanti-
ties and varieties of food may be more likely to purchase larger quantities of food as
well as more high-calorie foods, commonly without significant nutritional value
(Cohen, 2008). Fourth, humans tend to exhibit difficulties estimating the volume
and the caloric content of food. Therefore, many people unwittingly consume excess
calories. Fifth, humans have a natural tendency to conserve energy. This means that
people are more likely to consume food that is either already prepared or easy to
prepare (Cohen, 2008) or are more likely to live a sedentary lifestyle. Sixth, people
also have a tendency to imitate others and this mimicking applies to food consump-
tion, as well. In other words, people are more likely to make the same food and
portion choices, as others. One hypothesis behind this phenomenon is the firing of
mirror neurons when either observing others making food selections or eating, or
engaging in those actions themselves (Cohen, 2008). Seventh, there is a phenome-
non called “automatic stereotype activation” where humans unconsciously respond
to others based on stereotypes. In other words, particular characteristics of others or
stimuli in the environment may evoke specific responses. Marketers have used this
phenomenon to appeal to target audiences when advertising food. Eighth, marketers
have utilized classical conditioning through their use of brands or symbols. Ninth,
marketers use priming to evoke associations that will make consumers more likely
to purchase their food products (Cohen, 2008). Finally, due to human’s limited con-
scious awareness (i.e., 40–60 bits per second) compared to the overall cognitive
processing capacity (i.e., 11 million bits per second) many human “decisions” are
automatic, based upon cues or heuristics (Cohen, 2008). Cohen suggested that the
small percentage of conscious awareness involved in decision-making may impact
the human deliberation of food choice when people are already overwhelmed with
demands. In summary, not only are there are neurophysiological pathways that alter
food consumption but these phenomena have been taken advantage of for consum-
erism in modern society.
Physiological Measurement of Obesity
Obesity is typically defined and quantified by anthropometric measures of body

weight, size, and composition. The assessment and quantification of eating and
exercise patterns as well as the major behavioral contributors to obesity will be
discussed in the next section. There is a number of ways that clinicians and research-
ers measure obesity, including: body mass index (BMI), skinfold thickness, waist
circumference, waist-to-hip ratio, bioelectric impedance, densitometry, air-
displacement plethysmography, hydrometry, and dual energy x-ray absorptiometry
(Hu, 2008). Each of these methods used for the measurement of obesity carry their
own strengths and weaknesses and their utilization depends on the purpose of the
clinical practice or research as well as relative cost.
Behavior Analysis and Obesity
Behavior analysis is the scientific study of individual behavior (Journal of the

Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1957 to present). When the focus is on under-
standing and improving socially relevant human behavior, that discipline is known
as “applied behavior analysis” (Baer et al., 1968; Deitz, 1978; Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis, 1968-present). Applied behavior analysis strategies and princi-
ples have proven effective in affecting meaningful change across a spectrum of
human behaviors. These methods and principles have also been applied to both the
assessment and management of eating and exercise behavior for years (e.g.,
Cinciripini, 1984; Wysocki et al., 1979). The ways in which both researchers and
clinicians might assess and treat obesity are discussed below.
To date, there is an extensive body of research on behavior analysis and behavior
therapy approaches to obesity (e.g., Bennett, 1986; Brownell, 1982; Brownell &
Wadden, 1986; Wing, 2002). An exhaustive and comprehensive review of this
research literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. What follows is an explana-
tion of the major conceptual and clinical strategies emanating from First Wave
Behavior Therapy as applied to the management of eating and exercise, as related to
obesity.
Behavioral Assessment of Obesity
The behavioral interventions for obesity focus on the identification and quantifica-
tion of the environmental and behavioral factors that contribute to weight gain.
Many of the early behavioral interventions for obesity focused on self-recording
and self-reports of food consumption (e.g., Romanczyk, 1974), often with a focus
on caloric intake. In spite of their limitations, these early behavioral measures were
characterized by clear operational definitions, objective quantification, and repeated
assessment over time of food consumption and exercise, both key contributors to
obesity. These measures also allowed for the evaluation of behavioral interventions
to manage eating and exercise. As a corollary, repeated assessments (e.g., often
daily assessments) of food consumption and physical activity were often incorpo-
rated into clinical services in a manner that allowed for continuous assessment of
the impact of behavioral interventions on eating. This form of ongoing assessment
has been characterized as part of high quality clinical behavioral interventions for
decades, and it is captured in contemporary versions of the Ethics Code for Behavior
Analysts (Behavior Analyst Certification Board, 2020).
By the early 1980s, behavioral researchers and practitioners began to adopt an
assessment strategy that came to be known as functional behavior assessment and/
or functional behavior analysis (e.g., Iwata et al., 1982). These methods focus on the
identification of the behavioral processes (e.g., social reinforcement, tangible rein-
forcement, sensory reinforcement, and avoidance/escape contingencies) that
maintain clinically relevant behavior. Functional assessment typically refers to

descriptive methodologies (either descriptive observation or questionnaire strate-
gies) whereas the use of term functional analysis is restricted to methods that
involve the experimental manipulation of suspected maintaining/controlling vari-
ables (Cone, 1997). Pioneered initially with self-injurious behavior in children diag-
nosed with autism (Iwata et al., 1982), functional behavior assessments have proven
helpful in determining variables that influence the development and maintenance of
disordered eating behavior (e.g., Johnson et al., 1995; McManus & Waller, 1995;
Schlundt et al., 1985) and the development of interventions that are informed by
identification of the controlling variables for unhealthy eating patterns.
There are a number of commonly identified antecedent and consequent events
(i.e., controlling variables) that are particularly relevant to food consumption. For
example, the availability of healthy food options as antecedents appears to be cru-
cial for successful weight management. People with limited resources, whether they
are financially burdened or live within a “food desert,” often attend to more person-
ally salient factors (e.g., financial resources and/or physical access to food) out of
necessity rather than to the nutritional value or quality of food when grocery shop-
ping (Whelan et al., 2002).
Not only do such environmental factors (e.g., financial resources, availability of
food choice) play a role, but emotional states serve as antecedent variables as well.
Feelings of ineffectiveness may evoke less controlled eating behavior (e.g., Wagner
et al., 1987). Similarly, the experience of negative emotions or unwanted thoughts
may evoke unhealthy eating behavior. Furthermore, additional research argues that
overeating can also reduce the awareness of other aversive emotional states, such as
sadness, anxiety, and guilt (e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). Under these cir-
cumstances, the consumption of food can produce desired affective changes imme-
diately and temporarily (e.g., reduction of negative emotions or the presentation of
feelings of contentment), serving the function of moderating these emotional states.
Finally, individuals with lower distress tolerance tend to report higher levels of
food addiction symptoms (Kozak et al., 2017). From a behavior analytic account,
distress tolerance can be understood as skills within one’s behavioral repertoire of
engaging in behavior(s) that reduce physiological arousal, and/or attending to the
stimuli within one’s internal and external environment openly. Because there are
both antecedent and consequent events related to the development and maintenance
of unhealthy food consumption (i.e., quality or quantity of food), interventions can
manipulate these controlling variables to promote behavioral change.
Behavioral Interventions for Obesity
To date, all three waves of behavioral interventions are relevant to weight manage-
ment. Each wave of behavioral interventions takes a unique approach and may vary
in terms of treatment goals, while originating from common theoretical
underpinnings. The first wave of behavioral treatments for obesity will be discussed
in greater depth in this chapter.
First Wave Behavioral Treatments of Obesity
First wave behavior therapy is based in both classical and operant conditioning
(Cooper et al., 2020; Hayes, 2004). Classical conditioning is an associative learning
procedure in which originally neutral stimuli gain the eliciting properties of uncon-
ditioned stimuli with which they are paired repeatedly (e.g., Gormezano & Moore,
1966; Michael, 2004; Watson et al., 2016). On the other hand, operant conditioning,
or instrumental learning, is a method of learning that occurs through the reinforce-
ment or punishment of behavior via naturally-occurring or socially-mediated conse-
quences (e.g., Skinner, 1937, 1966; Michael, 2004).
Many of the first wave intervention strategies were emphasized in early research
and clinical applications of behavioral interventions to obesity (e.g., Brownell,
1982; Stuart, 1972). To this day, many of these intervention strategies have proven
durable and are still represented in obesity management interventions, along with
second and third wave behavioral strategies.
Stimulus Control, Classical Conditioning, and Motivational Operations: A Basic
Account Operant behavior, including food consumption and physical activity, is
controlled largely by the consequence of that behavior (e.g., reinforcement or pun-
ishment). However, the strength of an operant behavior is also influenced by ante-
cedent stimuli that signal the availability of reinforcement (called discriminative
stimuli or SD; Cooper et al., 2020, Chapter 17).
Furthermore, an additional set of antecedent variables also influence operant
behavior, more specifically behavioral processes that alter the value of food as a
reinforcer (e.g., Laraway et al., 2003). Among the behavioral processes that alter the
value of food as a reinforcer (either establishing or abolishing the value of food) are
classical conditioning and motivational operations (MO’s), including biologically-
based MO’s such as food deprivation, satiation and illness.
As described above, classical conditioning involves the pairing of two stimulus
events and is illustrated by the classical Pavlovian experiments. Relevant to the
present topic, classical conditioning processes are thought to be involved in estab-
lishing physiological and emotional reactions to stimuli that are consistently paired
with food (e.g., the open sign at a favorite bakery may come to elicit salivation and
other hunger sensations). Classical conditioning processes are also involved in
establishing food aversions (e.g., avoidance of foods that have been paired with
nausea) through a temporal pairing mechanism and alters the stimulus value of the
conditioned stimulus. Oftentimes, this process is theorized to be involved in altering
the reinforcing value of stimuli, including food and exercise related stimuli.
In a similar manner, a number of motivational operations (MOs) have been iden-
tified that enhance or abolish the reinforcing value of stimuli, including food (e.g.,
Laraway et al., 2003; Tapper, 2005). In fact, in research MOs as a behavioral
process have been found to alter the effectiveness of stimuli or events as reinforcers
(Michael, 1982, 1993, 2000; Miguel, 2013). In the context of food consumption,
many of these MOs are based on biological processes, such as food deprivation and
satiation, that alter, at least temporarily, the reinforcing value of foods. These MOs
are referred to as unconditioned motivational operations because the organism does
not require a learning history to be impacted by such factors (Michael, 1982).
However, other MOs operate through behavioral processes that are independent of
biological processes, often called conditioned motivational operations (Michael,
1982, 1993, 2000). These include a range of verbal influences. For example, hearing
a credible report that certain food additives are linked to cancer may alter the rein-
forcing value of those food substances and produce a shift in behavior to other food
substances. Once again, the defining feature of MOs is that they enhance or abolish
the reinforcing value of other stimuli (e.g., food) and in so doing alter the strength
of behavior that has been reinforced (or punished) by those stimuli. Therefore,
whereas discriminative stimuli signal the availability of a potential reinforcer (e.g.,
seeing an “open” sign on a favorite restaurant), MOs (e.g., a person who has just
ingested large meal) determine whether the putative reinforcers signaled by the dis-
criminative stimulus will indeed function as reinforcers. As such, the reinforcing
value of food at a favorite restaurant will depend on whether a person has recently
eaten a large meal or maybe made a commitment to meet a friend for some exercise.
Antecedent Interventions Informed by the basic-theory accounts of stimulus con-
trol, classical conditioning, and MO, antecedent interventions are first-wave behav-
ioral interventions that are designed to alter relevant aspects of a person’s
environment prior to their engagement in the target behavior. To date, there is a
number of antecedent interventions that have been implemented in an effort to influ-
ence food consumption and engagement in physical activity. A brief review of ante-
cedent interventions for healthy eating and physical activity can be found below.
Stimulus Control Strategies As previously described, environmental stimuli can

impact human eating and exercise behavior (Weingarten, 1985). While the authors
described stimulus control at a theory level in the above section, this theory can be
utilized to inform applied strategies which will now be discussed. When food has
been paired with environmental cues, those stimuli then occasion food-seeking
behaviors upon subsequent presentations. Previous research has illustrated via
associative-learning paradigms food seeking behavior can be triggered by indirect
or direct exposure to food rewards (e.g., Watson et al., 2014, 2016).
Watson et al. (2017) elaborates that responding for food can be primed. The
direct outcome-response priming effects, as described by Watson, involves the pre-
sentation of contextual stimuli that generate expectancy of the outcome preceding
the response. For example, if someone smells freshly baked cookies, they may then
head to the kitchen to consume a cookie. On the other hand, Watson et al. (2017)
also describes stimulus-outcome-response priming effects which involves the pres-
ence of a discriminative stimulus that signaled the availability of the outcome, then
priming the engagement in food seeking behavior. An example of the
stimulus-outcome-response might be if, whenever one’s family watched a movie a

parent baked cookies, the child then goes to the kitchen to find a cookie when the
movie begins.
A common stimulus control strategy for weight loss is limiting portion size,
whether using household measures (e.g., Byrd-Bredbenner & Schwartz, 2004) or
serving food on plates that indicate appropriate proportions (Pedersen et al., 2007).
Previous research indicates that the availability of larger portions often leads to
excess food consumption (Wing et al., 1996). Therefore, another applied example
of portion control strategy is to reduce the availability of larger portions (or increase
the response effort to obtain larger food portions). For instance, if someone only
buys one piece of cake at the store instead of an entire cake, they can then influence
how much cake they consume throughout the week. All of these examples illustrate
that people can make incremental changes in their environment that then impact
their engagement in healthy eating or exercise.
Access On a larger scale, the availability of healthy food options in one’s commu-
nity greatly impacts one’s ability to engage in healthy eating. Unfortunately, healthy
food options are not always available or affordable (Whelan et al., 2002). People
who experience these types of environmental barriers to quality foods would likely
benefit from public policy that ensures the availability of high-quality, healthy food
at affordable prices. For instance, if there is only one store that carries food products
in a specific town, then the citizens are confined to the options carried there. If the
market stocks lower cost food options like instant ramen noodles or chef Boyardee
and either does not carry fresh produce or marks such items significantly higher,
then customers either cannot purchase healthier foods or are much more likely to
purchase more affordable options.
Modeling Modeling involves the arrangement of a teaching situation in which a

person, (the “model”) performs the target behavior that the observer or learner then
imitates. Modeling can occur in-vivo (performed by the model in person) or via a
filmed demonstration. This strategy is one of many observed in marketing and
advertising, where a high prestige model (a celebrity) endorses or is shown consum-
ing a particular product. According to Vartanian et al. (2013) modeling impacts
one’s perception of the “appropriate” amount of food to consume. Modeling has
also been used to increase self-efficacy and improve exercise performance (Yee Ng
et al., 1999; Winett et al., 1988).
Modeling appropriate food portions or healthy food choices can occur across a
variety of contexts, notably by caregivers within the home. For instance, a parent
may cook fresh plant-based meals and then serve healthy portions to members of
the family. Children or other members of the family can then imitate such meal
preparation and determination of healthy serving sizes, as well.
Self-Monitoring Self-monitoring in the context of weight management involves
recording one’s weight, food consumption, and engagement in exercise (Romanczyk,
1974). It is a crucial component of assessment efforts, but also known to have a
well-documented impact on the behavior being monitored. Recording one’s own

engagement in healthy eating and exercise provides information about those health-
related behaviors. Individuals can then compare their engagement based upon the
recorded data to the goals that they had set for themselves and thereby notice per-
ceptible changes in their behavior closer to real-time. Self-monitoring one’s eating
and exercise behavior can serve as an antecedent intervention because the journal
itself can serve as an environmental stimulus that prompts engagement in the target
behavior.
Sperduto et al. (1986) argued that self-monitoring was a necessary, if not central,
component of behavioral weight management strategies. In fact, evidence has con-
tinued to support the use of self-monitoring for weight management (e.g., Burke
et al., 2011). Not only has the research supported the short-term benefit of self-
monitoring for weight reduction but there is also evidence to suggest that self-
monitoring is an important strategy that increases the long-term maintenance of
weight loss (e.g., Artinian et al., 2010; Wing & Phelan, 2005). While self-monitoring
appears to be a critical component of behavioral weight management strategies,
treatment adherence can be difficult as it often requires high levels of response
effort and consistent completion for self-monitoring to be accurate.
Consequent Interventions Consequent interventions often focus on arranging
contrived consequences for desirable behaviors (often conditioned reinforcers such
as praise or money) and, more rarely, for undesirable behavior (such as conditioned
punishers such as the loss of money or social censure). First wave behavioral inter-
ventions for weight management have featured a range of response consequences to
increase one’s engagement in exercise and/or healthy eating.
Behavior Contracts A behavioral contract is a formal agreement that stipulates an

objective behavioral goal (e.g., increase the daily duration of exercise). It is consid-
ered as a consequent intervention as it arranges for reinforcing consequences to be
delivered contingent on achieving the stipulated behavioral goal, and sometimes
arranges punitive consequences for failing to achieve a behavioral goal (e.g., Quale,
1975). Behavioral contracts have been applied successfully to a wide range of
behaviors, such as exercise, studying, medication adherence, that are have impor-
tant deferred consequences, but often have immediate consequences that make
long-term adherence challenging, a behavioral process known as “delay discount-
ing” (Odum, 2013; Rachlin, 2006). Sometimes the immediate consequences are
punitive (as in effort and muscle soreness for exercise) or of such small magnitude
as to be ineffective in motivating the desirable behavior, especially when competing
behaviors that produce more immediate reinforcement (e.g., eating snacks while
watching TV, versus going to the gym for a workout).
Although they are typically classified as consequent intervention strategies,
behavioral contracts typically use a combination of antecedent and consequent
interventions to help people change and maintain behaviors that produce deferred
consequences (e.g., lowering body weight, getting in shape, obtaining a degree). At
minimum, a contract relies on goal setting, rule-governed behavior and some level
of commitment, often public in nature (see Cooper et al., 2020, Chapter 28 for
description of behavioral contracting, also known as contingency contracting).
Rule-governed behavior is defined as behavior that is under the control of a verbally
mediated rule rather than immediate consequences. People are coached to identify
an objective and attainable goal, that can be gradually adjusted to more ambitious
goals over time (e.g., Cullen et al., 2001). Importantly, the person whom the con-
tract serves should be involved in the creation of the contract and selection of rein-
forcers so that they are more motivated to engage in the target behavior. This person
is typically required to make a commitment (often in the form of a signed formal
contract) to obtain that goal, and many contracts arrange for specific contrived con-
sequences for attaining or for failing to attain the agreed upon goal. The terms of the
contract can be adjusted periodically to adopt easier or more challenging goals and
to incorporate different forms of contrived reinforcement. For example, monetary
deposits that can be returned, destroyed or even sent to a “most hated” political
group have been used with behavioral contracts but any form of reinforcement (a
favorite photo or article of clothing) can be arranged as the contrived consequence
in a behavioral contract.
Behavior specified in a behavior contract may include behavior to increase (e.g.,
exercise duration; Neale et al., 1990) and behavior to reduce or eliminated (e.g.,
number of twinkies eaten in a given week). The behavior contract should also
clearly indicate the conditions under which the person will earn and redeem rein-
forcers. For example, Wysocki et al. (1979) utilized behavioral contracting in order
to increase physical exercise among college students. In their study, participants
relinquished access to personal items that they were required to “earn” back via
aerobic exercise as well as observing and recording the exercise of other partici-
pants. The vast majority of participants not only increased their physical activity
throughout the study but also maintained this increase at the 12-month follow-up.
Reinforcement Contingent reinforcement increases the future frequency or inten-
sity of a specific behavior (Michael, 1982). Reinforcement may be positive or nega-
tive in nature. Positive reinforcement involves the presentation of a conditioned or
unconditioned stimulus following one’s engagement in a target behavior that results
in an increase in the future frequency of that behavior. In contrast, negative rein-
forcement involves the removal, delay or reduction of an aversive stimulus follow-
ing one’s engagement in the target behavior and results in an increase in the future
frequency of the behavior. Previous research indicates that both positive and nega-
tive reinforcement increased exercise behavior (e.g., Coleman et al., 1997) and
assisted with weight loss (Manno & Marston, 1972).
It is important to also consider the temporal proximity of the contingent rein-
forcement to the person’s engagement in the target behavior. According to previous
research, immediate reinforcers tend to exert greater control over human behavior
than delayed reinforcers (e.g., Lattal, 2013). Often, natural reinforcers for exercise
or healthy eating are delayed and, as a result relatively ineffective when compared
to more immediate consequences (a delay discounting phenomenon, Rachlin,
2006). In the case of exercise, an example of a delayed positive reinforcer might be

the additional strength or muscle tone that is gained from repeated exercise. Other
examples of positive reinforcement for exercise or healthy eating might be compli-
ments received from others when noticing the physical differences in one’s body
composition and the doctor relaying that one’s heart is functioning well after eating
healthfully for a few years. Behavior can also be reinforced by the removal or reduc-
tion of a stimulus condition as a consequence for engaging in a behavior, a process
known as “negative reinforcement.” Colloquially speaking, the stimulus that is
being removed or otherwise diminished (in intensity or its presentation delayed) is
often portrayed as an “aversive” stimulus. For example, if taking an asprin is fol-
lowed by the reduction or elimination of headache pain, and asprin-taking was
observed to be more probable in future situations where a headache was experi-
enced, then we would conclude that asprin-taking was negatively reinforced by the
termination/reduction of headache pain.
An example of negative reinforcement for healthy eating might be the reduction
of excess body weight, if the person desires to lose weight. However, these conse-
quences are temporally delayed from the behaviors that produce these physiological
changes. Furthermore, some behaviors produce only a change in the probability of
a stimulus consequence, as is the case when taking a vaccine shot reduces but does
not fully eliminate the risk of infection and serious illness. Finally, the stimulus
changes are often incremental over time, in that weight loss accumulates gradually
to the point where changes are noticeable.
As a result, these delayed, incremental and probabilistic consequences are often
relatively ineffective when compared to more immediate consequences (e.g., the
physical effort involved in exercise “wins out” over the long term impact of health
and weight; the immediate reinforcing effect of a sugary food “wins out” over the
delayed and cumulative effects of foregoing sweets). In other words, the desirable/
healthy behavior is often supplanted with the less healthy alternative (that produces
more immediate reinforcers). Under these circumstances, people might consider
determining immediate reinforcers (e.g., appetitive tangible, social, or edible ones)
that they can only receive after engaging in physical activity or eating healthfully.
For instance, someone might work out with an accountability partner who only
praises them after they have completed the designated exercise.
Premack Principle The Premack principle is a theory of reinforcement that posits
that low probability (sometimes referred to as less desired) behavior can be rein-
forced by the opportunity to engage in higher probability (sometimes referred to as
more “desired”) behavior (Premack, 1959). Said another way, there is something
about the “more desired behavior” either inherent in the behavior or produced by the
behavior, that functions as a reinforcer when it is available in a contingent relation-
ship with the less desired behavior.
For example, Mitchell (1973) demonstrated that it was possible to increase activ-
ity levels via contingent access to a high-frequency response. It is important to note
that when this high-probability response was no longer contingent on the engage-
ment in the lower-probability response, or activity, then the frequency of the
low-probability response greatly reduced. Other researchers have found support for
the use of the Premack principle with weight reduction (e.g., Horan & Johnson,
1971) and exercise engagement (e.g., Allen & Iwata, 1980).
Goal Setting and Feedback Goal setting involves the identification of a benchmark
or goal for desired target behaviors (Locke & Latham, 1984) and the monitoring of
behavior relative that that benchmark. Here, goal setting and feedback are consid-
ered as consequent interventions because the individual is determining the behav-
ioral requirement necessary to result in reinforcement; once that person engages in
the target behavior, they then obtain reinforcing information about their perfor-
mance (feedback) which will influence the future frequency and intensity of that
behavior.
According to Locke and Latham (1994) the four steps of successful goal setting
includes identifying the need for behavioral change, determining the goal, monitor-
ing one’s progress towards that goal, and then obtaining reinforcement for achieving
that goal. Effective goal setting typically uses smart goals. Smart goals are specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound (Doran, 1981). Consider the fol-
lowing example. John recently decided that he needs to exercise more frequently.
Therefore, he has determined that he will walk on the treadmill for 30 min, 4 days
per week. He will then need to monitor his progress towards that goal for exercise
engagement. If he successfully completes the predetermined exercise goal, then he
will gain access to reinforcement. Often, the setting of an intention is not sufficient
to initiate or maintain behavior change. Thus, the provision of feedback may be
beneficial to bolster the efficacy of goal setting and stimulate motivation.
Avoidance Contingencies There are both long-term and short-term avoidance con-
tingencies at play with regards to weight management, exercise, and food consump-
tion. In the short-term, exercise and eating healthfully often require additional
response effort and access to resources. For instance, people who work out often
require the financial resources to afford either a gym membership or the equipment
necessary to exercise at home. If someone does have a gym membership, then they
also have to put forth the effort to commute to the gym. Consequently, many people
do not engage in these health-related behaviors. In the long-term, people who live a
sedentary lifestyle and do not eat healthfully are at risk for the development of
numerous medical conditions described earlier in this chapter.
On the other hand, people who are sensitive to these risks or who are attending
to long-term consequences, may be more likely to eat healthfully and engage in
regular physical activity (Dassen et al., 2015). Interventions that focus on avoidance
contingencies might increase the saliency of the detrimental delayed consequences
of a sedentary lifestyle and unhealthy eating, while removing the barriers or reduc-
ing the response effort required to engage in those health-related behaviors.
Public Commitments A commitment is an expression of one’s intention to take
action. Public commitments tend to be longer lasting and more effective than private
commitments (McKenzie-Mohr & Schultz, 2014). It involves making those
intentions known to an audience, possibly by announcement or posting (Kulendran

et al., 2016). While public commitments have antecedent elements (public state-
ment of goals), they also activate a number of response consequences in the form of
social praise or social censure for adhering to a public commitment as well as natu-
rally occurring feedback as a person monitors their performance relative to the goal
that they stipulated in the public commitment. It is also worth noting that many
people have a history of reinforcement for keeping their promises and a history of
punishment for “breaking promises.”
Public commitments can vary in terms of the degree to which the person’s posi-
tion is known by others and the degree to which a person to whom the commitment
is made controls effective reinforcers and/or punishers for the person making the
commitment. For instance, one might say that they are going to commit to living a
healthier lifestyle without providing any additional information. Alternatively, if
someone states that they are going to live a healthier lifestyle by attending Zumba
class four times per week and abstaining from eating fast food, then the disclosure
of their commitment is greater. When people make such commitments publicly,
they are more likely to follow through with the stated behavior in order to ensure
that the commitment is maintained (Hui & Molden, 2014).
Social Support Social support appears to significantly influence the success of
weight loss programs. In applied behavior analysis (behavior modification), social
support is viewed as a consequent intervention because significant others can influ-
ence the frequency or intensity with which others engage in health-related behav-
iors, specifically by providing contingent consequences such as encouragement or
praise following the emission of the target behavior. In reality, social support may
also involve some antecedent behavioral processes, as a person’s social support
group provides reminders, prompts and invitations to engage in healthy behavior.
Social support for weight management comes in a variety of forms. Support may
be formal (e.g., a clinic-based group) or informal (via one’s friends and family).
Clinic-based groups are often run by psychologists, nutritionists, or another weight-
loss professional. Support can be emotional (e.g., encouragement when feeling dis-
couraged), practical (e.g., caring for one’s children while they workout), or
contingent (e.g., provision of positive reinforcement [praise for engaging in physi-
cal activity]) in nature.
Wing and Jeffrey (1999) evaluated the effect of significant others and their
involvement as well as structured social support on weight loss program completion
and maintenance of progress. They recruited participants either alone or with three
friends or family members. These participants were then randomly assigned to
either (a) a standard behavioral treatment or (b) the standard behavioral treatment
plus structured social support. The study found that when participants were recruited
with three friends or family members and were provided standard behavioral treat-
ment plus social support, they completed treatment and maintained their weight loss
more so than those in the comparison groups.
Behavioral Packages Behavioral packages involve the combination of multiple

treatment components, both antecedent and consequent interventions, in an attempt
to increase the magnitude of behavioral change. With regard to weight management,
food consumption, and physical activity, behavioral packages commonly include
some combination of the following treatment components: rule-governed behavior,
goal setting, reinforcement, self-monitoring, behavioral contracts, and/or feedback
(e.g., Normand, 2008; Stock & Milan, 1993).
ecommendations from First Wave Behavioral Treatments

R
of Obesity
Based upon a review of the literature, there are multiple first wave behavioral inter-
ventions that stand out as more effective for producing long-term changes in one’s
food consumption and physical activity. The use of stimulus control strategies and
MOs appear to be particularly helpful for setting up environmental contexts which
support healthy eating and/or physical activity. From a first wave behavior therapy
perspective, it is also crucial to arrange for reinforcement (social, monetary, sensory
or other forms of reinforcement) to promote and maintain changes in eating and
exercise behavior. Often times, the reinforcers are artificially arranged (e.g., a
behavioral contract) to support behavior in hopes that the behavior will eventually
contact and be maintained by the naturally occurring consequences of that behavior
(e.g., changes in body weight and appearance, feeling stronger and more physically
fit). It is important that any effective behavioral treatment for obesity utilize effec-
tive reinforcement strategies, often with an initial focus on contrived reinforcers but
shifting to more naturalistic sources of reinforcement (e.g., focusing on physical
changes in body composition or functioning and naturally occurring social rein-
forcement) as the impact of sustained behavior change accrues over time.
Additionally, as discussed in detail earlier, self-monitoring as well as goal setting
(with feedback) appear to be particularly beneficial treatment options for weight
loss. Finally, social support across levels of formality and types appears to be a
necessary supplement to behavioral treatment packages due to the impact on both
short-term and long-term changes in food consumption and exercise.
imitations of First Wave Behavior Analytic Approaches

L
in the Treatment of Obesity
While there are a number of strengths of first wave behavioral interventions for
weight management, there are several weaknesses, as well. First, weight manage-
ment via multiple first wave behavioral interventions indicates a lack of
maintenance or generalization (e.g., Stunkard, 1977; Coupe et al., 2019). All too
often, behavioral and health gains were lost when active interventions were
terminated.
Second, there is still an ongoing need for research on strategies to sustain
improvements over time, including the shift in control to more naturalistic but
deferred reinforcers (e.g., feeling better as a result of weight loss and exercise). On
a related note, first wave behavioral researchers often report changes in participants’
weight or BMI, rather than effect sizes, which may not reflect the true clinical sig-
nificance of the intervention. Third, first wave behavioral interventions tend to lack
attention to important contextual factors, such as the detrimental impact of food
deserts or the interplay of cultural factors. For example, while first wave behavioral
interventions may focus on increasing physical activity while reducing caloric
intent with a goal of weight loss, there is less attention paid to the resources avail-
able in individual communities. An increased awareness of and resolution for barri-
ers to accessibility of high quality, nutritious foods could greatly impact one’s
engagement in healthy eating behaviors. Finally, first wave interventions often do
not attend to socially significant issues, such as stigma or bias that greatly impact
one’s self-concept and day-to-day life choices.
Second and Third Wave Behavioral Treatments
Second and third wave behavioral interventions of obesity involve different inter-
ventions and processes, but most of the later interventions build on and do not inval-
idate the contributions of first wave behavior treatments. The premise to many
second wave interventions is the assumption that cognitions, emotions, and physi-
ological states evoke maladaptive behavior. Consequently, modifying one’s internal
experiences can result in changes in behavior. These intervention strategies are
often designed to assist a person who is interested in losing weight to identify both
cognitive and emotional triggers for their eating and sedentary behavior, learn how
to change their maladaptive thoughts, and modify their difficult emotional states so
that they can more easily engage in behavior that is consistent with their goal of
losing weight.
Alternatively, third wave behavioral treatments emphasize one’s context and
often utilize experiential change strategies to behavior change (Hayes, 2004). More
specifically, third wave interventions tend to focus on using acceptance, mindful-
ness, and values strategies in order to increase one’s ability and willingness to
engage in values-based actions (i.e., proper levels of exercise, diet), even while
experiencing challenging thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations. Another nota-
ble difference between third wave behavioral interventions and earlier behavioral
methods may be the goal of treatment. While the treatment goals of first and second
wave behavioral treatments are likely to include weight loss and/or the modification
of difficult internal experiences, third wave behavioral treatments are more focused
on effective, meaningful living, and weight loss may be the by-product of commit-
ting to such a living. In other words, third wave behavior interventions tend to focus
on how weight management can support one’s engagement in meaningful activity

(e.g., playing with one’s child), therefore emphasizing the person’s values-based
functioning rather than on the person’s weight or under which category their BMI
falls. Finally, the quality of life for someone who is overweight can be significantly
impaired due to stigma, bullying, discrimination, and experienced weight bias (Puhl
& Brownell, 2001). Unfortunately, many earlier behavioral interventions did not
address these concerns. A number of third wave behavioral interventions acknowl-
edge the significance and impact of such concerns and involve those issues and the
person’s relationship to them as foci of treatment.
From our perspective, each wave of behavior therapy has contributed helpful and
effective tools to promote healthy food consumption and exercise practices. In many
ways, the intervention components are not incompatible with each other but provide
a selection of effective interventions that allow for the tailoring of interventions to
the unique challenges and controlling variables for each individual (e.g., Brownell
& Wadden, 2016). One of the unique features of a science-based clinical practice
that all waves of behavior therapy follow is that research clarifies and refines prior
knowledge (and on rare occasion corrects faulty conclusions). New research find-
ings are incorporated into clinical practice and, on occasion, and challenges encoun-
tered in clinical practice form the gist of new waves of research. This reciprocal
interaction of research and clinical practice fuels the evolution of more effective
clinical practice and allows interventions to be refined and matched to unique client
and contextual situations. We fully expect that additional “waves” of behavior ther-
apy beyond the three covered in this book will occur and contribute to the develop-
ment of increasingly effective and efficient strategies to promote sustained changes
in those eating and exercise behaviors that contribute to obesity (and to other behav-
iors that have an impact on physical and mental health).
Conclusion
Obesity has been known to affect one’s physical and mental health. These concerns
are particularly problematic due to the increasing prevalence of obesity in the United
States. Because weight management involves a balance of energy ingested and
energy expended, researchers have focused on eating and exercise behavior. The
behavioral methods of assessment and intervention for exercise and eating behavior
have evolved over time but have remained founded in basic behavioral principles.
For writing this chapter, we reviewed various first wave antecedent and consequent
interventions, attending to both theory and applied strategies. Based upon the
research findings, we highlighted specific interventions that appear to be the most
beneficial for producing immediate and long-lasting change. While there are vari-
ous strengths of first wave behavioral approaches to the assessment and intervention
for weight management, they have served as the catalyst and foundation for subse-
quent research and the development of new and effective interventions for obesity-
related behaviors. Like all interventions, these first wave interventions have
weaknesses and limitations, including the lack of treatment specificity to allow for
replication, limits on the maintenance and generalization of treatment effects
(Brownell et al., 1986), and failure to attend to idiosyncratic contextual factors and
social issues that contribute to obesity (Brownell & Wadden, 2016). It is hoped that
clinical practice in managing obesity and exercise will continue to evolve as research
identifies and refines interventions and the underlying behavioral processes on
which effective interventions are based.
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Obesity: Third Wave Case
Conceptualization
Christina Chwyl, Margaret Sala, and Evan M. Forman
The obesity epidemic presents an unprecedented challenge to public health. Over

two billion adults are currently overweight, and prevalence rates are at epidemic
levels in most industrialized countries including Chile (74%), Mexico (73%), the
United States (70%), Portugal (68%), Australia (67%), the United Kingdom (64%),
Hungary (62%), Germany (60%), Canada (59%), Spain (53%) and France (49%)
(OECD, 2019). Excess weight is a leading cause of death and it contributes to a
wide range of health issues, including cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, risk
of certain cancers and early mortality (Al-Goblan et al., 2014; Di Angelantonio
et al., 2016; Katzmarzyk et al., 2001; Lavie et al., 2009; Ortega et al., 2016; Renehan
et al., 2008; Vucenik & Stains, 2012).
Lifestyle modification interventions are considered the current gold-standard
treatment for obesity. Such programs prescribe calorie and physical activity goals
and teach various behavioral skills, such as stimulus control, self-monitoring,
problem-solving, and relapse prevention, in the service of adhering to these goals
and obtaining negative energy balance. These programs produce significant weight
loss (between 5% and 10%) over year-long intervention periods if delivered inten-
sively (i.e. 16–30 sessions over 1–2 year) (Butryn et al., 2011; Wadden et al., 2020).
Importantly, weight losses ≥5% are considered clinically significant given their
association with health benefits and reduction of chronic disease symptoms
(Blackburn, 1995; Pasanisi et al., 2001).
However, the outcomes of traditional lifestyle modification interventions are
suboptimal—a significant proportion of participants (approximately one third) do
not lose clinically significant amounts of weight, and rates of weight regain in the
absence of weight maintenance therapy are high, with nearly one-half of partici-
pants returning to their original weight within 5-years (Butryn et al., 2011). Thus,
C. Chwyl · M. Sala · E. M. Forman (*)

Center for Weight, Eating, and Lifestyle Sciences (WELL Center), Drexel University,
Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: emf27@drexel.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_19
438 C. Chwyl et al.
despite the short-term efficacy of lifestyle modification programs for weight loss,
long-term weight maintenance remains poor and of critical importance to address.
Partly in response to the suboptimal outcomes of current gold-standard lifestyle
modification approaches, new treatments for weight loss that incorporate mindful-
ness and/or acceptance-based principles have been developed over the past
10–15 years. Third Wave treatments for obesity emphasize metacognitive aware-
ness of thoughts, feelings, and decision-making and incorporate mindfulness- and/
or acceptance-based strategies. Broadly speaking, these treatments can be catego-
rized into two types: those that focus primarily on cultivating mindfulness through
meditation and mindfulness practices (mindfulness-based interventions; MBIs),
and those that synthesize cognitive, behavioral, and Third Wave treatment compo-
nents (e.g., acceptance-based behavioral treatments; ABTs). While these two treat-
ment approaches have some overlap, we will discuss each approach separately
given their distinct theoretical underpinnings and treatment approaches.
Theoretical Rationale
Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs)
There has been growing interest in the application of mindfulness techniques to

issues of eating and weight, and a variety of treatment approaches now incorporate
mindfulness in some capacity. Mindfulness is often defined as “the awareness that
arises from paying attention, on purpose, in the present moment and non-
judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003a, b). Mindfulness is considered to be a trait (Baer
et al., 2006), but can also be cultivated through the practice of mindfulness medita-
tion. Though mindfulness principles have philosophical, spiritual, and contempla-
tive origins, mindfulness practices and techniques have been incorporated into a
variety of psychological treatments, and have been found to produce clinical bene-
fits for a range of conditions, including anxiety, depression, borderline personality
disorder, somatization disorders and chronic pain (Baer, 2003; Hofmann et al.,
2010; Lakhan & Schofield, 2013; Zeidan et al., 2011). More recently, mindfulness
has been used to target problematic eating behaviors (e.g., Alberts et al., 2010;
Daubenmier et al., 2011; Kearney et al., 2012; Kristeller et al., 2014; Tapper et al.,
2009; Timmerman & Brown, 2012).
Various theoretical models suggest that obesity and overweight are related to
dysregulation of eating behaviours as well as maladaptive responses to internal and
external cues. The dysregulation model of obesity, for example, posits that the
inability to self-regulate eating behaviors results from poor recognition of physical
hunger and satiety cues (Dalen et al., 2010). Recently, mindfulness has gained atten-
tion as an avenue through which problematic eating could be targeted by improving
awareness of internal and external cues (Dalen et al., 2010; Kristeller & Wolever,
2011). Additionally, mindfulness cultivates the skill of self-regulation by
Obesity: Third Wave Case Conceptualization 439
encouraging non-judgmental awareness (Baer, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2006), which

may also be beneficial in discouraging overeating.
Eating in response to cues other than hunger is a key factor proposed to disrupt
weight maintenance efforts. For example, a significant proportion of adults with
overweight or obesity (an estimated 57–90%) vs. approximately 15–45% of non-
overweight individuals report eating in response to their emotions (Ganley, 1989;
Gibson, 2012; Péneau et al., 2013), and greater emotional eating predicts poorer
weight loss outcomes (Frayn & Knäuper, 2018). Similarly, stress is associated with
hedonic hunger (Lemmens et al., 2011) and preference for high fat, high calorie
foods (Oliver et al., 2000), which if experienced chronically, may contribute to obe-
sity (Dallman et al., 2003). Mindfulness training cultivates the ability to attend to
one’s emotional experiences and accept them (rather than attempt to suppress them
by eating) by enhancing awareness of cravings, physical sensations, emotions, and
thoughts in a non-judgmental and curious way (Kristeller & Wolever, 2011).
Mindfulness may then attenuate the relationship between emotions/stress and the
non-hunger-related eating that is proposed to disrupt weight regulation.
Individuals also frequently eat in response to various external cues, such as the
presence of highly palatable foods or locations/events associated with eating (e.g. a
movie theatre). Mindfulness can counteract eating due to external factors by increas-
ing awareness of the factors that may cue eating, and by promoting nonreactive
responses to immediate desire and impulses. For example, MBIs teach people to
“tune in” to their internal experiences, including hunger and fullness signals, and to
mindfully observe moment-by-moment sensations while eating (Kristeller &
Wolever, 2011). Individuals can then utilize an awareness of these signals to guide
eating, rather than eat from a place of habit, automaticity, or reactivity. The cultiva-
tion of internal awareness (sometimes called “inner wisdom”) may be particularly
key given the ubiquity of highly palatable foods and the prevalence of reward-driven
eating. Reward-driven eating, characterized by loss of control over eating, a lack of
fullness or satisfaction when eating, and a preoccupation with food (Epel et al.,
2014), can overwhelm natural homeostatic mechanisms that govern hunger and
satiety (Berthoud, 2006), resulting in weight loss difficulties (Mason et al., 2016).
Through increasing awareness of thoughts, feelings, sensations, and external
cues, mindfulness enhances self-awareness. Self-awareness can in turn allow indi-
viduals to notice maladaptive eating behaviors and their triggers (Brewer et al.,
2018), and to notice the consequences of maladaptive eating behaviors, such as the
emotional and physical effects of eating past satiety or in the absence of hunger.
This same awareness also allows individuals to notice and appreciate the physical
and emotional consequences of more adaptive eating behaviors, such as eating in
response to hunger and fullness cues (Brewer et al., 2018).
In addition to increasing moment-by-moment awareness, mindfulness is thought
to strengthen higher level processes more generally, such as dispositional atten-
tional control (de Bruin et al., 2016; Chambers et al., 2008; Rodriguez Vega, 2014),
working memory (Zeidan et al., 2010), visuo-spatial processing (Zeidan et al.,
2010), and executive function (Zeidan et al., 2010). Meditative practices enhance
attentional control, for example, by instructing individuals to focus attention on the
440 C. Chwyl et al.
breath or the body and continually bring attention back to the object of focus when
the mind wanders. Attentional control can then be used to target weight-control
related behaviours, such as through enhancing enjoyment of physical activity and
healthy foods (e.g., by increasing taste satisfaction), and by reducing overconsump-
tion of certain foods (Loucks et al., 2019). The continued attentional refocusing
involved in mindfulness may train self-regulatory skills (Tang et al., 2007), which
are thought to be critical to successful weight management (Wing et al., 2006).
Of note, mindfulness may constitute an “effortless awareness” form of self-
regulation, which is different than self-regulation that comes from deliberate effort
(e.g., using cognitive control to distract or resist experiences) (Friese et al., 2012;
Garrison et al., 2013; Kabat-Zinn, 1982). Indeed, brain imaging work suggests that
mindfulness-based treatments do not rely upon the recruitment of prefrontal brain
regions associated with cognitive control, unlike cognitive-based treatments (Kober
et al., 2017).
Mindfulness practices also promote acceptance, both of in-the-moment thoughts,
feelings, and sensations, and of oneself and one’s body more generally. An attitude
of acceptance could in turn reduce avoidant or inflexible patterns of behavior
thought to maintain a variety of disorders, including binge eating (Lillis et al., 2011).
Given that mindfulness targets core processes implicated in issues of eating
(such as automatic or reactive patterns of eating, dysregulation of affect and behav-
ior, and self-judgment), it follows that mindfulness has been drawn upon in efforts
to enhance the treatment of disordered and dysregulated eating. In this chapter, we
define MBIs as skill-based interventions that focus upon (i.e. target in each session)
cultivating greater mindfulness through either traditional meditation practice
(Kabat-Zinn, 2003a, b), or through exercises aimed at increasing present moment
awareness in daily life, such as through increased awareness of thoughts and feel-
ings, or hunger and satiety cues (Craighead & Allen, 1995; Kristeller & Hallett,
1999). We contrast such approaches in which mindfulness is the primary treatment
component to interventions that include mindfulness as one of many treatment com-
ponents, such as ABTs, ACT, and Dialectical Behavioral Therapy for binge eating
(Telch et al., 2001).
Acceptance-Based Behavioral Treatments (ABTs)
According to ABT, obesity is an expected consequence of living in an obesogenic

environment—that is, an environment in which highly palatable, calorie dense
foods are in over-abundance, and the need for physical activity in daily living is low.
Instead, human beings evolved to prefer high calorie foods and to conserve energy—
in our distant evolutionary history, it was to our advantage to consume high calorie
foods when available, and to limit energy expenditure through staying sedentary
when possible.
This mismatch between our modern-day obesogenic environment and our
evolved preferences is thought to give rise a variety of internal experiences, such as
thoughts, emotions, and physiological experiences (e.g., urges), that pull people
away from weight control goals, such as calorie reduction and physical activity
promotion. The provision of strategies to manage these challenging internal experi-
ences is considered a critical “puzzle piece” that is missing within current gold-
standard weight loss approaches. For example, even if individuals modify their
home environment so as to only include healthy, lower calorie food options, they
may still experience cravings and preferences for higher-calorie foods passing by
restaurants and fast-food chains on their way to work. As such, ABTs provide par-
ticipants with additional psychological skills, based upon principles of mindfulness
and/or acceptance, to manage challenging internal experiences that inevitably arise.
Behavioral weight loss strategies are conceptualized as a core foundation for
weight control. Participants are thought to be successful in ABTs in so far as they
adhere to the prescribed calorie and physical activity goals, which produce a nega-
tive energy balance, and thus weight loss. Key behavioral strategies such as self-
monitoring dietary intake and weight, problem-solving, stimulus control (i.e.
adjusting one’s immediate environment such that higher calorie foods are less read-
ily available, and lower calorie foods are more readily available), and goal setting
are considered essential to meeting calorie and physical activity goals. Yet, it is
tremendously difficult to adhere to calorie and physical activity prescriptions in a
modern-day obesogenic environment. Thus, traditional lifestyle modification inter-
ventions based upon these principles often produce suboptimal outcomes.
To counteract the biological, social and environmental challenges of sustained
weight control, ABTs supplement behavioral strategies from traditional lifestyle
modification interventions with acceptance- and mindfulness-based skills from
Third Wave therapies, in particular Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT;
Hayes et al., 1999), but also Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993),
and techniques, such as urge surfing, from Marlatt’s relapse prevention model
(Marlatt & George, 1984).
Treatment Overviews
Mindfulness-based treatments were originally developed for non weight loss seek-
ing populations (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Teasdale et al., 2000), but have since been
adapted and built upon to target issues of weight and eating. Given the conceptual
fit of mindfulness skills and weight management, a growing number of studies of
mindfulness-based treatments include weight as an outcome measure (Alberts et al.,
2010; Kearney et al., 2012) and some mindfulness-based treatments have been
adapted so as to target issues of eating and weight.
Mindfulness-Based Eating Awareness Training (MB-EAT; Kristeller & Hallett,
1999; Kristeller & Wolever, 2011; Kristeller et al., 2014), for example, is a 12-week
442 C. Chwyl et al.
manualized group-based intervention originally developed to normalize patterns of

eating amongst samples with binge eating. MB-EAT incorporates some traditional
mindfulness meditation (e.g. on breath or general awareness) with the goal of
increasing attentional and self-regulatory abilities. In addition, MB-EAT incorpo-
rates content specific to mindful eating with the goal of disrupting automatic or
habitual patterns of eating. The overarching aim of MB-EAT is to enhance self-
regulation related to eating, emotions, and behavior. While MB-EAT was originally
developed for binge eating, elements of MB-EAT have since been adapted and
incorporated into treatments focused upon increasing healthy eating or promoting
weight management or weight loss. Below, we describe the core elements of
MB-EAT (see Kristeller & Wolever, 2011 for an overview of the conceptual founda-
tion of MB-EAT), and then discuss how adaptations of MB-EAT have been applied
to weight loss and related outcomes.
Training Mindfulness MB-EAT draws inspiration from traditional mindfulness-
based treatments, such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn,
1990) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Teasdale et al., 2000).
Such interventions systematically train mindfulness through mindfulness medita-
tions that guide participants to at first focus attention on a target (e.g. the breath),
and nonjudgmentally observe when attention has shifted before gently reorienting
to the attentional target. Then, participants are invited to openly observe any
thoughts, feelings or sensations that arise as transient mental states. MB-EAT incor-
porates various mindfulness meditations and exercises, such as body scans, sitting
meditations and walking meditations (Baer, 2015), from such traditional mindful-
ness programs. In MB-EAT, certain adaptations to traditional mindfulness programs
are made to make the program more accessible to individuals with overweight, such
as teaching chair yoga instead of hatha yoga.
As in traditional mindfulness programs (e.g. MBSR), in MB-EAT participants
are encouraged to maintain a regular meditation practice (10–20 min daily) outside
of sessions. Participants are encouraged to practice mindfulness not only through
formal meditations, but also in the midst of daily activities with “mini-meditations.”
Mini-meditations involve taking a moment to pause and observe one’s internal sen-
sations throughout the day, and especially before meals or in moments of stress.
Cultivating Mindful Eating Several exercises in MB-EAT involve developing the
ability to tune in to biological hunger and satiety signals, which individuals with
eating issues are often proposed to be disconnected from (Kristeller & Wolever,
2011). To aid in this ability, individuals are taught to distinguish between, and accu-
rately label, internal experiences, such as physical/biological hunger and emotional/
hedonic hunger. A variety of guided mindful eating meditations are conducted
throughout the program. For example, the MB-EAT program introduces mindful
eating with a raisin, and then incorporates foods that are increasingly difficult to
mindfully eat (e.g., sweet high fat food) during the remainder of the program due to
their hedonic or caloric properties. Following guided meditations that introduce and
train these abilities, group discussions prompt individuals to reflect upon their
e xperiences. Near the end of the program, to simulate the challenges of mindfully
eating at a buffet or party, participants are guided to mindfully eat a potluck-style
meal consisting of a “healthier” dish and a favorite dish.
MB-EAT teaches participants not only to tune into hunger and satiety signals but
also to notice and increase enjoyment of food, for example, through observing fla-
vor and texture preferences, and through savoring each morsel of food. A distinction
is made between “wanting and liking” (Finlayson et al., 2007) based upon “sensory-
specific satiety” or taste satiety, the phenomenon by which taste buds adapt to the
flavor of a food after eating a small quantity of it, and thus the subjective taste of a
food decreases (Hetherington & Rolls, 1996). Participants are taught to derive plea-
sure from eating based upon the quality of the eating experience, as opposed to the
quantity of the food ingested. Emphasis is placed on making food choices not only
based upon calorie or nutritional considerations, but also based upon what foods
one enjoys.
Disrupting Emotional Eating In MB-EAT, emotional eating is considered to be a
common driver of overeating. Participants are thus taught to increase their aware-
ness of emotions, thoughts, and self-judgments that often cue eating, and to inter-
rupt patterns in which such cues prompt reactive eating. Cognitive distortions (e.g.
permission-giving thoughts such as, “I already ate too much, I may as well keep
eating now”) are addressed, and individuals are encouraged to find healthier ways
of meeting their emotional needs.
Cultivating Self-Acceptance MB-EAT also focuses upon cultivating a stance of

self-acceptance, given that many people with binge eating struggle with self-
criticism and feelings of guilt or shame. A body scan exercise, for example, teaches
individuals to distinguish between judging the body and experiencing it (Kristeller
& Wolever, 2011). Individuals are taught self-acceptance skills in relation to not
only their body, but also themselves more generally. A general stance of acceptance
towards the self is cultivated through various exercises such as a self-acceptance
meditation in which participants are guided to let go of self-blaming or self-critical
thoughts while focusing on the breath, and through practicing non-judgmental
awareness of thoughts, feelings and sensations.
Treatment Adaptations for Weight Loss and Related Behaviors Since MB-EAT
was originally developed for populations with binge eating, its focus has histori-
cally been the normalization of patterns of eating, as opposed to weight loss.
Iterations of MB-EAT have presented calorie and nutrition information in the con-
text of physical hunger and calorie balance, as opposed to weight loss (Kristeller
et al., 2014). Certain MB-EAT programs have framed external calorie and nutrition
information as “outer wisdom,” in contrast to the inner wisdom of tuning into one’s
internal experiences and mindfully eating. Individuals can utilize this outer wisdom,
paired with inner wisdom, to flexibly inform their personal weight management
efforts (Kristeller & Lieberstein, 2016).
444 C. Chwyl et al.
Interventions based upon MB-EAT have since been implemented into treatments
explicitly targeting healthy eating, weight loss or weight management. Timmerman
and Brown (2012), for example, evaluated a 6-week group-based mindful restaurant
eating program for participants who frequently eat out. The aim of the program was
to help participants select lower fat, lower calorie options when eating at restau-
rants. The program provided a combination of nutrition psychoeducation, goal set-
ting (a core standard lifestyle modification skill), and mindful eating meditations
promoting awareness of hunger and satiation signals and cues of mindless eating.
Weight and dietary intake were included as primary outcome measures.
The Mindful Eating and Living program (MEAL; Dalen et al., 2010), was devel-
oped specifically for people with obesity, based upon past mindful eating interven-
tions. Dalen et al. (2010) conducted a pilot study of the 6-week group-based MEAL
curriculum, which incorporated mindfulness meditation, mindful eating, and group
discussion. Eating exercises included a variety of foods and contexts in which eat-
ing occurs (e.g. when hungry full, alone, or with others). Participants were provided
with basic nutrition and calorie information, though were encouraged to utilize
mindfulness as opposed to external information to guide eating decisions. As with
MB-EAT, MEAL incorporated a gradual physical activity promotion component of
around 5–10% each week. Similarly, Daubenmier et al. (2016) evaluated a weight
loss MBI for adults with obesity in the Supporting Health by Integrating Nutrition
and Exercise clinical trial (“SHINE”). The treatment incorporated mindful eating
exercises, self-acceptance and loving kindness meditation, home meditations, and
mini-meditations. In addition, the treatment involved a modest calorie reduction
(500 calories) and gradual physical activity promotion. Participants were given gen-
eral nutrition psychoeducation on the benefits of increasing intake of fruits, vegeta-
bles and proteins, and decreasing calorie-dense foods that lacked in nutritional value.
Certain MBIs have also been adapted to focus on stress eating specifically, given
the known effect of stress on visceral adiposity, and the negative health effects of
visceral adiposity. Daubenmier et al. (2011) evaluated a 9-class MBI based upon
MBSR, MBCT, and MB-EAT that targeted stress eating (and thus cortisol awaken-
ing response and abdominal fat). Overall weight loss was not a goal of the treat-
ment. As such, participants were provided with 2-h of psychoeducation on nutrition
and exercise; guidelines for reducing caloric intake or increasing exercise were not
emphasized. Similarly, Corsica et al. (2014) developed a 6-week MBI for stress eat-
ing based upon MBSR and cognitive and behavioral strategies for stress eating. In
addition to MBSR content, the intervention incorporated a variety of cognitive and
behavioral techniques, such as stress education, cognitive restructuring, exposure
and response prevention, alternate activities, and relapse prevention. Overall weight
loss was again not the goal of the program, and calorie and physical activity pre-
scriptions were not provided.
More recently, Loucks et al. (2019) conducted a Stage 1 single-arm clinical trial
of a Mindfulness-Based Blood Pressure Reduction program (MB-BP). MB-BP
retained the MBSR curriculum, and also included education on hypertension risk
factors and health effects, as well as specific mindfulness modules focused on
awareness of diet, physical activity, medication adherence, alcohol consumption,

stress, and social support for behavior change.
Overall, there is significant heterogeneity in MBIs in terms of duration (e.g.,
6–12 weeks), intensity (e.g., the amount of daily mindfulness meditation practice
encouraged) and focus (e.g., the normalization of eating behaviors, stress eating and
weight loss). Critically, MBIs for eating and weight also vary in the degree to which
traditional nutrition and weight loss psychoeducation is incorporated and empha-
sized. For example, in a systematic review of MBIs for eating and weight loss,
Katterman et al. (2014) found that six of ten studies that measured weight as an
outcome provided psychoeducation around nutrition, exercise, or energy balance.
While most MBIs do not include behavioral weight loss strategies, a couple of more
recent studies have, such as through incorporating goal setting (Timmerman &
Brown, 2012) or by encouraging calorie reduction (Daubenmier et al., 2016). Thus,
while MBIs target dysregulated or maladaptive patterns of eating, few explicitly
focus upon weight loss and fewer incorporate strategies from traditional weight loss
approaches (e.g.,specific calorie prescriptions, goal setting, and self-monitoring).
Future research would benefit from examining whether weight loss and mainte-
nance outcomes could be improved by combining mindfulness strategies with
established behavioral strategies.
One of the most widely researched treatments for weight loss that incorporates both
mindfulness- and acceptance-based strategies is acceptance-based behavioral
weight loss (ABT) (Roche et al., 2019). ABT represents a synthesis of behavioral
weight loss and mindfulness and acceptance-based components. In contrast to
MBIs, which generally do not emphasize behavioral strategies from traditional life-
style modification interventions, in ABTs, behavioral weight loss strategies (e.g.
stimulus control, self-monitoring, goal setting, problem solving, and increasing
social support) are conceptualized as a core foundation for treatment success.
Yet, behavioral strategies are considered, on their own, to be insufficient for the
tremendous challenges of living in an obesogenic environment. As such, ABT sup-
plements behavioral strategies from traditional behavioral lifestyle modification
interventions with acceptance-based skills, and sometimes mindfulness-based
skills, from Third Wave therapies, in particular Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999), but also Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT;
Linehan, 1993), and parts of Marlatt’s relapse prevention model, such as urge surf-
ing (Marlatt & George, 1984). As with standard lifestyle modification programs,
treatments are typically conducted via 20–31 group sessions over a year long period,
with groups meeting weekly at first, and then tapering in frequency over time.
Broadly speaking, ABTs can be conceptualized as including three interrelated core
components: mindful decision-making, willingness, and valued living.
446 C. Chwyl et al.
Mindful Decision Making As in MBIs, mindful decision making in ABTs involves

training individuals to increase awareness of the perceptual, cognitive, and affective
experiences that influence eating and physical activity decision-making. Mindful
decision making applies to a wide range of behaviors, including what foods to buy
and eat, when to start and stop eating, when to start and stop physical activity, and
decisions relevant to one’s personal food or physical activity environment. The
overarching goal of mindfulness in ABT is to help individuals move from “mind-
less” eating/physical activity decision-making to mindful and deliberate decision-
making in line with specific weight control goals.
Whereas many MBIs focus upon improving the self-management and normal-
ization of eating (e.g. Kristeller et al., 2014), ABTs employ mindfulness as a strat-
egy to meet specific prescribed calorie and physical goals. In ABTs, mindfulness
serves to create a space between cues and automatic reactions, thus allowing people
to intentionally select behaviors that may be more in line with their health goals. In
this way, mindfulness in ABTs is distinct from mindfulness in MBIs, in which par-
ticipants learn to tune into their body and use those cues, at least in part, to guide
what and how much to eat (e.g., MB-EAT; Kristeller & Wolever, 2011).
Willingness Another core component of ABT is willingness, or choosing to engage
in weight-control behaviors, such as calorie reduction, calorie tracking, and physi-
cal activity regardless of what one’s internal experiences are pulling one to do.
Willingness involves having a stance of acceptance towards internal experiences
that will inevitably arise during weight control efforts, tolerating those difficult
experiences and then choosing to engage in weight-control behaviors (e.g., choos-
ing a smaller portion) that are consistent with long-term goals and values (e.g.,
being a healthy and engaged community member) rather than short-term desires
(e.g., going back for a second helping). Willingness incorporates various cognitive
defusion techniques aimed at creating distance from internal experiences, such as
thoughts and feelings, and viewing these internal experiences as separate from the
self. Cognitive defusion can be defined as “looking at thoughts rather than from
thoughts” (Harris, 2009). In cognitive defusion exercises, participants are taught to
view their thoughts and feelings as simply that—thoughts and feelings that the mind
continually and automatically provides—as opposed to absolute truths that one
must act upon.
In order to introduce cognitive defusion, various ACT metaphors are utilized,
such as “hands over face,” or “yellow sunglasses,” which illustrate how it is easier
to observe the world and one’s mind at work at a distance (e.g. when one’s hand is
not directly in front of one’s face, or when one’s tinted sunglasses are taken off)
(Blackledge & Hayes, 2001; Harris, 2009). Participants are taught to create distance
and objectivity from their thoughts by utilizing the phrase “I’m having the thought
that…” For instance, the phrase “I will never keep this weight off” would become
“I am having the thought that I will never keep this weight off” (Kohlenberg et al.,
1993, p. 588).
In ABT, the core goal of willingness is to help participants separate (“uncouple”)

internal experiences (e.g., thoughts, feelings, cravings, and urges) from behaviors.
Uncoupling is introduced, for instance, with the “pick up the pen” exercise which
guides participants to pick up a pen or pencil while telling themselves that they can-
not do so. Various strategies are then taught to help participants implement uncou-
pling into daily life, such as replacing the phrase “only if” with “even if.” For
instance, the phrase “I would go grocery shopping for healthy ingredients tonight
only if I wasn’t so tired” would become “I will go grocery shopping for healthy
ingredients tonight even if I am tired.”
In addition, the willingness component of treatment incorporates the relapse pre-
vention technique of “urge surfing” in which participants are taught to view their
urges or cravings as ocean waves (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). Just like ocean waves
which gradually grow, crest, then fall, participants are taught that while urges can
feel strong, they are always temporary. In ABT, emphasis is placed on a willingness
to experience urges and cravings without judging them or acting upon them. In
other words, a person could have a strong craving for chips, and still choose to eat
an apple. Participants are taught that delaying an urge for even a few minutes is a
success, and that urge surfing will become easier with practice.
Together, these willingness strategies promote the stance of accepting any inter-
nal experiences that arise (even uncomfortable or unwanted ones) and engaging in
behaviors consistent with weight-control goals or values regardless of which way
those internal experiences are pulling. Earlier iterations of ABT emphasized tolerat-
ing aversive experiences, such as hunger, cravings and “negative” emotions (Forman
et al., 2013; Lillis et al., 2015), while later iterations focused upon tolerating reduc-
tions in pleasure, such as choosing a neutral or mildly pleasant food option in lieu
of a highly pleasurable one (Forman et al., 2016). Of note, this later ABT iteration
has found larger effects, perhaps because tolerating reductions in pleasure is related
to hedonically driven overeating, which may be a more prevailing than distress-
driven overeating.
Valued Living Finally, the valued living component in ABT is premised on the idea
that commitment to weight control is exceptionally difficult due to environmental,
biological, and motivational challenges and thus will only be maintained in the
long-term if weight control efforts are connected to an individual’s big-picture life
values. Values can be defined as freely chosen qualities of a desired life to continu-
ally guide purposive action (Hayes et al., 2006). In ABT, values are conceptualized
as a way to “supercharge” motivation—with an awareness of values, participants
have autonomously generated, personally meaningful reasons to make the tremen-
dous challenge of weight loss worthwhile.
Values work in ABT begins with a structured process for identifying and clarify-
ing life values. Values are described as “what we want our life to be about” and are
illustrated through metaphors, such as a compass. While people can continually use
a compass to move in a desired direction, they can never “reach” East. In this way,
values are distinct from goals, which are discrete and accomplishable (e.g., a 10%
weight loss). To begin clarifying values, participants are prompted to consider
448 C. Chwyl et al.
values in various life domains (e.g. work, family, spirituality). Then, they are guided
to connect these values to weight control. Values that connect to weight control
include taking care of one’s body, being a good role model for one’s community,
being there for one’s family in the long-term, engaging in meaningful hobbies and
interests to the fullest extent possible, and being a lifelong learner. In later sessions,
participants are encouraged to consider how their values may have shifted over time.
Participants are then taught strategies to make decisions guided by their cher-
ished values, as opposed to more immediate desires or states. Values awareness
involves bringing values to mind when making eating and physical activity deci-
sions, and may entail utilizing visual and written reminders (e.g. a picture in a wal-
let, or post-it-notes) to remind participants about their values, even in the day-to-day
bustle of life. An awareness of one’s values is considered to be particularly key
during weight control decision points, such as when deciding whether to exercise,
or when deciding whether to have a second helping. Participants are taught to evalu-
ate when a decision is consistent with their values (i.e., an “up vote”) or is inconsis-
tent with their values (i.e., a “down vote”). Values work may comprise various
additional topics, such as how to integrate multiple values (e.g., spending time with
loved ones and eating healthfully), prioritize multiple values (e.g., valuing work but
leaving work early some days in order to exercise), or make values-consistent deci-
sions in the face of challenges (e.g. social pressures).
Weight Loss Focused ABTs Within acceptance-based interventions, there is het-
erogeneity in the emphasis of these three components and the strategies utilized. In
certain ABTs, the core components of mindful decision making, willingness and
valued living serve to help people implement core behavioral strategies (e.g. self-
monitoring) and adhere to the calorie and physical activity goals of standard life-
style modification therapy (Forman et al., 2013, 2016). According to such “weight
loss focused ABTs,” if participants are able to adhere to calorie and physical activity
goals, treatment would be effective. Yet, these behaviors are tremendously challeng-
ing to implement in daily life and necessitate additional acceptance- and mindfulness-
based strategies.
For instance, in standard behavioral lifestyle modification interventions, self-
monitoring calorie intake is considered a cornerstone of treatment success. Yet,
many people struggle to do so consistently and accurately, and self-monitoring non-
adherence is robustly associated with poorer treatment outcomes. A milieu of inter-
nal experiences may pull people away from self-monitoring, making compliance
difficult. For example, people may have thoughts such as “this will take too much
time,” or “I’d feel terrible if I knew exactly how much I ate.” People may also need
to tolerate unpleasant emotions (e.g., boredom) and reductions in pleasure (e.g.,
taking the time to track calories rather than watching more of an enjoyable movie).
In this example, mindful decision making would entail observing and accepting all
thoughts and emotions that arise. Willingness would entail choosing to track calo-
ries, regardless of these thoughts and feelings. And valued living would entail
remembering the “why” behind weight loss—that is, viewing calorie tracking as in
the service of personally meaningful health-related value, such as being a vivacious
and energetic grandparent. In this way, weight loss focused ABT would enable peo-
ple to implement this core behavioral strategy (self-monitoring), and thus benefit
from treatment.
Values Focused ABTs Alternative versions of ABT place greater focus on valued
living, and lesser focus on weight loss per se (e.g., Lillis et al., 2020; Lillis &
Kendra, 2014). These “values focused ABTs,” sometimes called Values-Based
Healthy Living (VHL; Lillis et al., 2020), view a laser focus on weight loss as prob-
lematic because such a focus could impede psychological flexibility through avoid-
ance (e.g., avoidance of weight-related criticism from self or others, or feelings of
guilt). In values-focused ABTs, the source of motivation matters, and weight-control
behaviors are encouraged in so far as they are in-line with an individual’s values.
The same behavior (e.g. refusing a second helping of cake at a party) could be mal-
adaptive for one individual, yet adaptive for another. For instance, this decision
could be maladaptive if motivated by self-hatred or disgust, yet adaptive if per-
ceived as a step towards an important personal value (e.g., a long-lived life with
loved ones). Values are conceptualized as flexible, long-term sources of motivation,
while avoidance is conceptualized as a potentially effective motivator in the short-
term, yet detrimental in the long-term.
As in weight loss focused ABTs, values focused ABTs aim to help participants
identify and clarify their values, and have an awareness of those values when mak-
ing decisions (Lillis et al., 2020). Values are clarified through a variety of exercises,
including writing, group discussion, guided visualizations, and reflection.
Participants are encouraged to identify ways in which their health-related decisions
can empower important personal values, such as being a present and energetic
grandmother, or being a role model in one’s community. Through connecting weight
control and health decisions to important personal values, health behaviors are pro-
posed to become more satisfying and sustainable in the long-term. As in weight loss
focused ABTs, the connection between various weight control behaviors (e.g.,
healthy eating and physical activity) and valued living is emphasized and serves as
a deep source of motivation which individuals can draw upon to brave the inevitable
challenges of weight control. Yet, in contrast to weight loss focused ABTs, values
focused ABTs place great emphasis on valued living more broadly. In this way,
ACT features more prominently in values focused ABTs, and ACT exercises unre-
lated to health are included. For example, individuals are encouraged to explore
values in their life more generally and monitor even values-consistent behaviors
unrelated to weight loss.
450 C. Chwyl et al.
Research Support and Future Directions
MBIs have consistently been found to decrease problematic eating behaviors related
to obesity, such as emotional or stress eating, impulsive eating and binge eating
(Carrière et al., 2018; Daubenmier et al., 2011; Katterman et al., 2014; Levoy et al.,
2017; O’Reilly et al., 2014). A 2017 meta-analysis, for example, found that MBIs
had a negative effect on impulsive eating (d = −1.13) and binge eating (d = −.90)
(Ruffault et al., 2017). More limited research suggests that MBIs promote healthy
behaviors conducive to weight control, such as reduced caloric intake, healthier eat-
ing choices, and increased physical activity (Barnes & Kristeller, 2016; Loucks
et al., 2019; Marchiori & Papies, 2014; Ruffault et al., 2017; Seguias & Tapper,
2018). In a laboratory study, for example, participants who ate lunch while cued to
focus on the sensory properties of the meal, as opposed to those in the control condi-
tion who ate in silence, subsequently ate more calories from snacks (d = 1.14)
(Seguias & Tapper, 2018), and a 2017 meta-analysis found that MBIs had a positive
effect on levels of physical activity (d = .42) (Ruffault et al., 2017). Yet, the effects
of MBIs on weight loss itself have been mixed (Loucks et al., 2019; Olson & Emery,
2015; O’Reilly et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2017).
For example, in a systematic review of mindfulness meditation-focused interven-
tions for binge eating, emotional eating and weight loss, Katterman et al. (2014)
identified ten studies that assessed weight as an outcome. Statistically significant
changes in BMI were observed in the mindfulness intervention group in three of the
studies (Cohen’s ds between −0.09 and − 3.29). Statistically significant weight
losses were only observed in studies in which weight was a primary outcome mea-
sure, indicating that MBIs may only affect weight if it is explicitly targeted within
treatment. The greatest weight loss (1.7 kg over 6-weeks) was observed in
Timmerman and Brown (2012), potentially because mindfulness training was paired
with behavioral goal setting—a strategy known to promote weight loss within the
current gold-standard behavioral weight loss treatments (Ammerman et al., 2002).
However, no studies showed a move from obese to normal weight (Katterman
et al., 2014).
A recent meta-analysis of MBIs for weight loss and eating behaviors (Carrière
et al., 2018), identified 18 studies that included weight as an outcome. At post-
treatment, average weight loss was 3.1 kg (3.3% of initial body weight), and at
follow-up, which occurred, on average, 16.26 weeks following treatment, average
weight loss was 3.4 kg (3.5% of initial body weight). The authors found a moderate
effect of MBI on weight loss in pre-post analyses (Hedge’s g = .42), and a low-to-
moderate effect of MBIs on weight loss in between-group analyses comparing
MBIs to control conditions, though heterogeneity in control conditions precludes
definitive conclusions. Seven studies compared MBI to an active control condition.
Overall, the MBI condition produced low weight losses (on average, 3% of initial
body weight), and these were less than the weight losses of the relatively weak
comparison conditions (on average, 5%). However, weight loss was maintained at
follow-up (12–48 weeks) in the MBI conditions, whereas some weight regain was
observed (approximately 0.4%) in the control conditions. Similarly, Loucks et al.
(2019) found that a mindfulness-based blood pressure reduction program produced
a significant BMI reduction (0.3 kg/m2) at 3-month follow-up in individuals with
overweight/obesity. Future research is needed to investigate the possibility that
MBIs could produce longer-term weight loss or maintenance, and a major limitation
of existing trials of MBIs is their short follow-up durations.
Overall, while MBIs for binge eating have an established research base (Godfrey
et al., 2015; Ruffault et al., 2017), less is known about how MBIs might produce
weight loss amongst individuals with obesity, potentially due to the high levels of
heterogeneity with regards to target population, target outcomes (e.g., eating dys-
regulation, stress eating, weight loss), intervention duration (6–12 weeks), intensity
(e.g., the amount of daily mindfulness meditation practice encouraged). A better
understanding of active treatment ingredients, the needed intensity/duration of
treatment, and optimal target outcomes could increase the effectiveness, precision,
and scalability of MBIs.
Of note, while the role of MBIs on total weight loss is unclear, MBIs improve
outcomes related to overweight, such as blood pressure (15.1 mm Hg reduction in
SBP among individuals with hypertension at 1-year follow-up), and the health of
foods selected (e.g., eating according to the DASH diet, Loucks et al., 2019). Thus,
there is preliminary evidence that MBIs are efficacious interventions for health pro-
motion, or adjunct interventions to weight loss. However, larger randomized trials
need to be conducted. Many standard lifestyle modification interventions are dis-
tinct from MBIs in that they teach participants to override cravings and overeating
by adhering to external guidelines (e.g., calorie targets), and a challenge of MBIs
for weight loss is the integration of content on tuning into one’s inner wisdom (e.g.,
hunger, fullness, taste satiety), with outer wisdom, or an awareness of calorie con-
tent and nutrition. Future research should determine whether some components of
MBIs are more effective than others, and whether these components would engage
the effects of other treatment approaches, such as standard lifestyle modification. In
addition, future research would benefit from further examination of whether MBIs
are especially effective for certain subgroups of participants, such as those who
engage in binge eating or have higher levels of impulsivity.
Research on MBIs for weight loss is relatively new. In addition to being limited
by smaller sample sizes and shorter follow-up periods, there are a paucity of studies
examining potential process measures. MBIs appear to be effective to the extent to
which they increase levels of mindfulness (Carrière et al., 2018). However, many
studies do not include validated mindfulness measures, making it difficult to ascer-
tain whether mindfulness (as opposed to a related or complementary skill, such as
emotion regulation) accounts for intervention effects. Recent research suggests that
MBIs target various processes related to problematic eating, including emotion-
regulation, self-control, and self-awareness (Loucks et al., 2019). Additionally,
because most MBIs incorporate several different strategies (e.g., general mindful-
ness meditation, mindful eating exercises, and sometimes behavioral and cognitive
452 C. Chwyl et al.
skills, such as instruction in weight management approaches and relapse preven-

tion), it remains unclear which components of treatment are active treatment ingre-
dients. For example, it is not clear the extent to which formal mindfulness meditation
practice vs. mindful eating is important for MBIs. Future research would benefit
from examining process measures, moderators of treatment outcomes, and evaluat-
ing which components of treatments are active ingredients for weight loss over lon-
ger follow-up periods.
Additionally, the generalizability of findings remains unknown. To-date, study
participants have primarily been women and members of non-minority racial/ethnic
groups (e.g., Kristeller et al., 2014; Loucks et al., 2019), and practitioners are typi-
cally highly trained. Relatedly, future research would benefit from examining how
interventions could be scaled to reach a larger population.
ABTs have been established as an efficacious treatment, capable of producing clini-

cally significant levels of weight loss (Butryn et al., 2017a, 2021; Forman et al.,
2013, 2016; Lillis et al., 2016). Whereas MBIs produce no weight loss or modest
levels of weight loss (e.g. Katterman et al., 2014), ABTs have been shown to be
capable of producing clinically significant levels of weight loss of approximately
12–14% of initial body weight after year-long intervention periods (Butryn et al.,
2017a; Forman et al., 2013, 2016).
Over the past 10 years, accumulating research has compared the efficacy of ABT
and standard lifestyle modification interventions for weight-control, and five ran-
domized controlled trials have compared intensive ABTs to active control condi-
tions, such as standard behavioral treatment. Results have been mixed. In one trial
that focused upon providing participants with skills to tolerate aversive experiences
(e.g., cravings, and negative emotions and thoughts), ABT was found to produce
superior weight loss over the course of treatment, but only under certain conditions.
That is, when delivered by expert as opposed to novice interventionists, ABT pro-
duced greater weight loss (13.2%) than the standard lifestyle modification condition
(7.5%) (Forman et al., 2013). In a later iteration of the manual that focused upon
providing participants with skills to tolerate reductions in pleasure (e.g., choosing
the lower calorie option even if less delicious) ABT produced greater weight loss
(13.3% of initial body weight) than a standard lifestyle modification condition
(9.8% of initial body weight) after a 1 year intervention period (Forman et al., 2016).
Yet in other studies that combine ABT with other intervention materials, ABT
and standard lifestyle modification interventions produced equivalent levels of
weight loss (Butryn et al., 2021; Butryn et al., 2017a). In one trial, ABT was com-
bined with skills to help participants modify their home food environment and more
easily navigate the obesogenic environment (Butryn et al., 2017a). In another trial,
ABT was paired with additional materials emphasizing physical activity promotion
(Butryn et al., 2021). In both trials, weight losses observed in the combined ABT
conditions did not differ from that observed in the standard lifestyle modification
conditions, potentially because the overall amount of ABT content delivered was
decreased, or because content focused on willingness and values clarity to the
exclusion of mindfulness. Together, this research suggests that ABT may only out-
perform standard lifestyle modification treatments when mindfulness- and
acceptance-based components are delivered with sufficient intensity, although the
exact dosage remains unknown. Future research would benefit from examining the
intensity and duration of treatment needed to produce effects. Additionally, future
research would benefit from examining the components of ABT needed to produce
effects.
Despite these successes, a remaining challenge with treatments for obesity is
their long-term effectiveness. In a trial by Forman et al. (2016), ABT produced
greater percent weight loss than the standard lifestyle modification interventions
during the intervention period (13.3 vs. 9.8%), though differences between condi-
tions were not maintained at the 1 year follow-up (7.5% vs. 5.6%) or 2 year follow-
up (4.7% vs. 3.3%) (Forman et al., 2019). ABT did, however, produce sustained
improvements in subjective quality of life at follow-up, as measured by the Quality
of Life Inventory (QOLI, Frisch et al., 1992), such that 50.5% of participants in the
ABT condition vs. 27.8% in the standard lifestyle condition achieved clinically sig-
nificant improvements in quality of life from baseline to 2-year follow-up, as opera-
tionalized by Frisch et al. (2005). This indicates that while ABT may not have
enduring effects on weight loss, it may have enduring benefits outside of weight
loss. Lillis et al. (2016) similarly found no significant weight loss advantage of ABT
over a standard lifestyle modification condition at 1-year follow-up. However, a
greater proportion of those in the ABT condition achieved the 5% benchmark of
clinically significant weight loss (38% vs. 25%), suggesting a potential long-term
advantage of ABT.
Some, though limited, research has explored potential moderators of treatment
effects (Butryn et al., 2017a, 2021; Forman et al., 2013, 2016; Manasse et al., 2017).
Due to ABT’s focus on increasing acceptance of and willingness to experience
unwanted internal experiences and decreasing automatic responses to internal and
external cues, some researchers have hypothesized that ABTs would be especially
effective for those with overall heightened reactivity to cues (e.g., cravings and
emotions). Support for this hypothesis has been mixed. Some research has sup-
ported this hypothesis (Forman et al., 2013), for example finding that participants
with higher levels of depressive symptoms, emotional eating, disinhibited eating,
and reactivity to the presence of highly palatable foods lost a greater amount of
weight (1.94–6.55%) in an ABT condition as opposed to a standard lifestyle modi-
fication condition. Of note, the ABT condition in this trial focused upon building
distress tolerance skills, and in a later version of the treatment that focused more
generally upon tolerating reductions in pleasure, no significant moderating effects
for these variables was found; instead ABT was equivalently effective for all partici-
pants (Forman et al., 2016). These differences in findings are likely attributable to
differences in treatment focus: whereas the ABT condition in the earlier trial focused
upon increasing tolerance of aversive states (e.g., sadness), the ABT condition in the
454 C. Chwyl et al.
latter trial focused more generally upon increasing tolerance of reduction in plea-
sure or comfort (e.g., selecting a less pleasurable food).
One related study found support for the moderating role of impulsivity (Manasse
et al., 2017). Participants with greater levels of impulsivity experienced greater
weight loss (approximately 4–7% less, depending on the measure of impulsivity) in
the ABT condition than in the standard lifestyle modification condition, potentially
because certain ABT strategies (e.g., urge surfing) enable people to observe and
tolerate negative states (e.g., cravings and urges) rather than act upon immediate
impulses (e.g., to eat high calorie foods).
In three of our trials (Butryn et al., 2017a, 2021; Forman et al., 2016) we have
observed that ABT helps address the usual health disparity in efficacy of weight loss
treatments for White versus Black participants. Trials of behavioral weight loss con-
sistently find that weight losses are lower for African American/Black participants
compared to non-Hispanic White participants (Goode et al., 2017). For example, in
two of the largest and most rigorous behavioral weight loss trials, weight losses in
White participants were found to be 40–50% higher than amongst Black partici-
pants (Diabetes Prevention Program Research Group, 2004; West et al., 2008). In
contrast, ABT appears to improve weight loss outcomes for Black participants. For
example, in a trial in which adults with overweight or obesity were assigned to a
condition combining ABT with skills to modify the home environment, or to non-
ABT conditions, Black participants lost more weight in the ABT condition than in
the non-ABT conditions at post-treatment (9.4% vs. approximately 6%) and
24-month follow-up (6.3% vs. approximately 4%) (Butryn et al., 2017a, b).
Similarly, in a trial targeting physical activity promotion, Black participants in the
ABT condition lost more weight (14.1% of initial body weight) than in the standard
behavioral weight loss condition (9.4% of initial body weight) (Butryn et al., 2021).
Finally, in a trial comparing ABT to a standard lifestyle modification intervention,
Black participants in the ABT condition as opposed to the standard lifestyle change
condition lost more weight at follow-up (11.3% vs. 8.6% of initial body weight) and
at 24-month follow-up (6.0% vs. 3.6%) (Forman et al., 2016, 2019).
These preliminary findings warrant further investigation, and the mechanism
behind it is unclear. Potentially, these effects are due in part to the valued living
component of ABTs, given that this component allows participants to personalize
their motivation for weight control, and African Americans often report lower pre-
existing desires to be thin (Vaughan et al., 2008). Additionally, the willingness com-
ponent of ABT may be especially pertinent to African Americans, who face
challenges above and beyond an obesogenic environment. For example, African
Americans encounter stress due to interpersonal and systemic racism (Mays et al.,
2007), and may face additional cultural (Hall et al., 2013) or environmental chal-
lenges (James et al., 2012; Lynch et al., 2007) related to health and weight control.
A general limitation of ABTs, is that it is unclear which components of treatment
are active treatment ingredients, given that components are typically administered
in comprehensive treatment packages. Future work would benefit from disentan-
gling this, which could aid in the disseminability and cost-effectiveness of future
interventions. Additionally, more work is needed to examine a greater variety of
process measures. Limited work has examined mechanisms of change, and the work
that has largely relies upon self-report measures. Process measures examined to-
date include experiential avoidance, or unwillingness to experience internal experi-
ences, such as thoughts, feelings and sensations (Forman et al., 2013, 2016; Lillis
et al., 2017; Niemeier et al., 2012; Schumacher et al., 2019), internal disinhibition
(Lillis et al., 2016; Niemeier et al., 2012), physical activity intentions (Godfrey
et al., 2019) and values-linked mediators, such as autonomous motivation (Forman
et al., 2016; Lillis et al., 2017).
At present, the greatest body of research has examined experiential avoidance as
a mechanism of change. Research has not supported general experiential avoidance,
assessed with the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Bond et al., 2011;
Hayes et al., 2006), or weight-related experiential avoidance, assessed with the
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire for Weight-Related Difficulties (AAQW;
Lillis & Hayes, 2007), as mediators of treatment effects (Lillis et al., 2017; Niemeier
et al., 2012; Schumacher et al., 2019). On the other hand, support has been found for
the mediating role of food-related experiential avoidance (i.e., an unwillingness to
experience internal experiences such as cravings) as assessed with the Food Craving
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (FAAQ; Juarascio et al., 2011; Forman et al.,
2013, 2016; Schumacher et al., 2019).
Further work into potential predictors, maintenance factors, and process mea-
sures could inform the development of ABT and establish precise treatment
approaches tailored to different subsets of people seeking weight loss. In addition,
the generalizability of ABTs for weight loss is unknown, since participants are typi-
cally highly motivated, and clinicians administering the treatment are generally
highly trained and from a limited number of research groups in the U.S.
Of critical importance, weight regain occurs following existing treatments,
including ABTs. ABTs may only be effective in the long-term if treatment is contin-
ued, such as with booster sessions. Further research into how (e.g., in-person,
through smart phones) and in what dose, to continue ABT treatment so as to main-
tain weight loss gains long-term is needed. Additionally, novel approaches to weight
loss capable of producing enduring effects are needed.
Conclusions
While weight loss treatments can produce short-term weight losses, little is known
about how to produce long-lasting weight change. Traditional lifestyle modification
interventions for weight loss teach people how to modify their food intake, environ-
ment, and thoughts. Third Wave treatments for obesity propose that these modifica-
tions are insufficient, and that challenging internal experiences, environmental
barriers, and poor recognition of physical hunger, taste satisfaction and satiety cues
will remain given the tremendous difficulty of living in an environment with easy
access to hyper-palatable, calorie dense foods, and with a biological preference for
such foods. Third Wave treatments for obesity thus equip individuals with
456 C. Chwyl et al.
mindfulness and acceptance-based strategies to observe, rather than react to or

change, internal experiences (e.g. thoughts, feelings, cravings and urges), and to
intentionally choose behaviors in line with biological hunger signals, goals or val-
ues, even in the face of challenging internal experiences.
In this chapter, we reviewed two main types of Third Wave treatments for obe-
sity. The first, MBIs, focus on cultivating a general nonjudgmental, open awareness
of the present moment, as well as an ability to distinguish, label and observe specific
eating-related experiences, such as hunger, fullness, and taste satiety. The overarch-
ing goal of MBIs is to disrupt automatic or habitual patterns of eating, and enhance
self-regulation related to eating, emotions, and behavior. ABTs teach individuals to
be aware of factors that influence eating and physical activity decision-making, and
then to select behaviorally based weight control strategies (e.g., calorie reduction
and physical activity promotion) that are consistent with personally meaningful val-
ues, as opposed to desires to reduce or avoid unwanted experiences (e.g. cravings,
negative emotions, discomfort).
Mixed research supports the efficacy of MBIs for weight loss; however, MBIs
produce various eating-related benefits, including reduced stress and more regular
eating patterns, suggesting that mindfulness could be a valuable component to inte-
grate into treatments. ABTs are a viable alternate to traditional lifestyle modifica-
tion, producing equivalent or superior levels of weight loss as current gold-standard
weight loss treatments over intervention periods, though weight regain occurs in the
absence of weight maintenance treatment. For both MBIs and ABTs, much remains
to be learned regarding what exact treatment components are effective, and the pro-
cess mechanisms underlying observed effects. Such research is important in increas-
ing the effectiveness, precision, and scalability of treatments.
Of critical importance, while Third Wave treatments for obesity contribute to the
field by offering novel applications of strategies for weight loss and related issues
(e.g., emotional eating), little is still known about how to produce sustained, long-
term weight loss. Only by attending to the complicated interplay of social, environ-
mental, biological, and internal experiences, and by precisely examining active
treatment ingredients, process measures and contextual factors, will progress on this
front be made. Given the numerous and complex contributors to overweight, cre-
ative solutions to the obesity epidemic capable of producing lasting change
are needed.
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First-Wave Behavior Therapies
for Schizophrenia and Related Psychotic
Disorders
Stephen E. Wong
If principles and techniques in this chapter can be described as the “first-wave of

behavior therapy” for schizophrenia and psychotic disorders, then innovations of
psychologists and other scientists leading to the development of behavioral psychol-
ogy were impulses powering that wave. The roots of behavior therapy go back to
twentieth century psychology and behaviorism. In A History of Experimental
Psychology, Edwin G. Boring recounts that behaviorism emerged as an offshoot of
American functional psychology, “… which has to do with success in living, with
the adaptation of the organism to its environment, and with the organism’s adapta-
tion of its environment to itself…” (Boring, 1950, p. 551).
The intellectual forebearers of this movement were illustrious. A profound influ-
ence was Darwin, whose theory of evolution explained animals’ anatomical struc-
tures by the function they served in improving organisms’ chances of survival and
reproduction (Kimble, 1961). Behavior, an extension of an organism’s anatomy and
nervous system, might be similarly analyzed by looking at how it facilitated ani-
mals’ successful adaption to their environment. This analysis would later provide
invaluable clinical insights into how abnormal behavior could have formed and been
functional in adverse or perverse environments.
The leader of this new movement within psychology was John B. Watson (Keller
& Schoenfeld, 1995), the nominal father of behaviorism. Watson rebelled against
prevailing German structural psychology and its preoccupation with consciousness,
sensation, imagery and other mental states. Structural psychology relied on intro-
spection to study sensory processes and mental content, which were its primary
subject matter. Watson criticized this approach as relying on subjective information
that was beyond any means of independent verification. Watson also noted that dur-
ing the preceding 50 years this approach had failed to produce a body of usable data
or a related technology for improving human affairs. Watson argued that to become
S. E. Wong (*)
Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
e-mail: Stephen.Wong@fiu.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_20
464 S. E. Wong
a scientific discipline psychology needed analyses that led to prediction and control
of its subject matter, which he asserted should be objective measures of overt behav-
ior. He promised that analyses revealing lawful relationships between behavior and
its surrounding environmental stimuli were at hand, and such knowledge would
allow psychology to join the ranks of the other natural sciences (Watson, 1913).
Following the model of physics and other basic sciences that were making
remarkable discoveries and rapid technological advances in the early twentieth cen-
tury, psychologists sought to refine their research data by operationalizing their
measures. B. F. Skinner laid the cornerstone for such operational measures through
his invention of an electromechanical apparatus (the “Skinner Box”) that precisely
recorded response frequencies and rates in his animal subjects (Skinner, 1938,
1979) Skinner’s experimental data was obtained mainly from rats and pigeons; but,
like Watson, Skinner was intensely interested in human conduct and in finding uni-
versal laws of behavior that applied both to non-humans and humans. Contrary to
common belief, Skinner never questioned the existence of complex thought and
feelings in human beings, a seeming division between humans and the rest of the
animal kingdom. However, Skinner examined how external stimuli and history
shaped these subjective experiences and thereby refuted an ancient fallacy that
attributed personal agency to these private events (Skinner, 1953).
Students of Skinner who sought to ameliorate behavior problems in humans did
not yet have electromechanical devices suitable for their clinical work, so they
devised objective measures of behavior in the form of response definitions.
Investigators wrote response definitions that clearly specified the typography of the
behavior of interest (e.g., “Self-talk is defined as any vocalization not directed at
another person, excluding singing, humming, and physiological functions (e.g.,
coughing).”). Trained observers then used these response definitions to record fre-
quencies, durations, and other quantifiable measures of socially significant behav-
ior, and verified the trustworthiness of this data through interobserver reliability
checks (Baer et al., 1968, 1987; Cooper et al., 2007).
Early Behavioral Research with Psychotic Disorders
Reading research from the 1960s that led to behavior therapy for schizophrenia and
other psychotic disorders is like taking a trip in a time machine back to a strange
world without established psychological models or guidelines for professional prac-
tice with persons exhibiting severe behavior problems. These early studies sought
both to prove that learning principles applied to humans and to find effective inter-
ventions for vexing clinical conditions. By today’s standards, some of the proce-
dures used in these studies would be morally objectionable and unethical, such as
delaying or withholding patients’ meals, using punishment or highly restrictive pro-
cedures for nonharmful actions, teaching arbitrary responses with minimal utility
for the patient, or using cigarettes as positive reinforcers (e.g., Ayllon & Haughton,
1962; Ayllon et al., 1965).
First-Wave Behavior Therapies for Schizophrenia and Related Psychotic Disorders 465
When considered within their proper historical context, however, these were pio-
neering studies that demonstrated the behavior of supposedly incurable mental
patients could be altered by manipulating environmental contingencies, and that this
could be a practical approach for reducing patients’ psychotic responses and restor-
ing their appropriate behavior. These studies also revealed how traditional hospital
practices, especially nursing staff’s customary reactions to patients’ behavior, could
be a direct cause or reinforcing consequence maintaining problematic patient
responses. These findings highlighted psychiatry’s faulty conceptualization of psy-
chotic behavior and how psychiatric hospitals were ill-suited for rehabilitating cli-
ents or preparing them for independent life in their communities. This corresponded
with a growing awareness of how long-term exposure to the regimentation and cus-
todial care of psychiatric institutions could have iatrogenic effects, leading to a
social breakdown syndrome of, “…dependency, apathy or troublesome behavior,
withdrawal, (and) lack of responsibility…” (Paul, 1969).
These early studies and current research also differed in their methodology. Most
of the earlier studies involved small numbers of subjects and were uncontrolled case
studies or controlled single-case experiments. Because of their small n’s, the gener-
alizability of results from such studies to other patients were limited. However,
when controlled single-case experimental designs (e.g., reversal designs or multiple-
baseline designs) were used, their direct replication of treatment effects more clearly
demonstrated the intervention’s impact on individual patient behavior than could
controlled between-groups designs (i.e., randomized clinical trials).
andmark Studies of Teodoro Ayllon and Colleagues in the State

L
Mental Hospitals
As a doctoral student, Teodoro Ayllon was inspired by Ogden Lindsley’s

research on free-operant conditioning of chronic psychotic patients in a 6-ft square
experimental room (Ayllon, 2021; Lindsley, 1956, 1960; Lindsley & Skinner, 1954).
Ayllon subsequently conducted his dissertation project on engineering the social
consequences of nursing staff to reduce problematic responses of chronic patients in
a mental hospital in Saskatchewan, Canada. This resulted in one of the first system-
atic applications of operant learning principles to behavior problems in
humans (Ayllon & Michael, 1959). In one experiment of this study, the investigators
obtained moderate success in reducing a female patient’s psychotic talk (i.e., con-
cerning her illegitimate child and men pursuing her) by withholding attention for
psychotic talk and only attending to sensible talk. Ayllon and Haughton (1964)
would later decrease delusional statements and incessant somatic complaints in two
female patients, both with diagnoses of chronic schizophrenia and lengthy hospital-
izations. Delusional claims (“I’m the Queen.”) by one patient and somatic com-
plaints (“… my nerves are shot. I can’t hear anymore… for weeks I don’t have any
sleep and I’m scared to go to bed at night.”) in a second patient were substantially
466 S. E. Wong
reduced by ignoring inappropriate speech and reinforcing neutral (appropriate) ver-

balizations with attention and occasional consumable reinforcement. The frequency
of neutral verbalizations was also recorded for first patient, showing that as the
number of psychotic verbalizations lessened the number of neutral verbaliza-
tions rose.
Other problematic behaviors of schizophrenic patients treated by Ayllon and
his colleagues fell outside of the schizophrenia profile. Ayllon and Michael (1959)
reported on two female patients, probably classified with schizophrenia and with
lengthy psychiatric hospitalizations, who refused to eat and were spoon-fed by nurs-
ing staff during each meal. The patients’ eating disorders (one refusing to eat
because her food was “poisoned”) were long standing problems within this institu-
tion. Interestingly, both patients valued their neat and clean appearance. This per-
sonal preference was utilized in an escape/avoidance conditioning program that
involved directing the nurses to intentionally drop a small amount of food on the
patient’s clothing while feeding them. Patients could avoid having food spilt on
them by initiating self-feeding at any point in the meal. Avoidance conditioning was
combined with reinforcement for appropriate behavior by having nursing staff sit
and converse with the patients for a few minutes if they fed themselves. Within
several weeks, this program resulted in a shift from dependence on nursing staff to
complete self-feeding for both patients that maintained for the next 10 months.
Ayllon (1963) also described programs to modify towel hoarding and wearing
excessive clothing in a 47-year-old female patient who had been diagnosed with
chronic schizophrenia and hospitalized for 9 years. During a baseline phase, the
patient was observed to have between 19 and 29 towels in her room, despite nursing
staff removing towels from her possession throughout the day. Towel hoarding was
treated with stimulus satiation, which began by giving the patient 7 towels each day
and then increasing this number to 60 towels per day. As the number of towels in her
room rose to over 600, the patient’s verbalizations about towels changed from
attraction (“Oh, you found it for me, thank you.”) to revulsion (“Get these dirty
towels out of here.”). By the time 625 towels had accumulated in patient’s room, she
began removing them herself and no more towels were given to her. At the end of
the program the patient kept only 1–5 towels in her room, and this behavior change
maintained during a 1-year follow-up period.
The above schizophrenic patient also dressed bizarrely wearing several layers of
sweaters, shawls, dresses, undergarments, and up to two dozen pairs of stockings.
The patient also wrapped sheets and towels around her head and body, carried two
to three cups and a bundle of clothing in one hand and a large purse in the other. The
program to reduce excessive clothing consisted of contingent food reinforcement.
The patient was weighed before each meal and was only allowed to enter the dining
room if she weighed 2 lbs. less than her previous recorded weight (i.e., if she dis-
carded an additional 2 lbs. of clothing or personal items at each weigh-in). Results
of the program were that the 23 lbs. of excess clothing and personal items that the
patient had been carrying rapidly declined until the she was wearing only 3 lbs. of
clothing. At the beginning of the program the patient missed a few meals and exhib-
ited some emotional behavior (i.e., crying, shouting, and throwing chairs), which
subsided when these responses were ignored. No longer burdened by large amounts
clothing and a strange appearance, the patient began participating in social events
on the ward. She was later taken by her family for a home visit for the first time in
9 years (Ayllon, 1963).
By 1961, Dr. Ayllon had moved to Anna State Hospital in Illinois and had begun
collaborating with Dr. Nathan Azrin, a former student of B. F. Skinner. The most
significant product of this union was the token economy, a revolutionary ward-wide
program for chronic mental patients (Ayllon, 2014; Ayllon & Azrin, 1965, 1968).
Instead of focusing on individual patients’ response excesses or deficits and apply-
ing various procedures to modify those responses, the entire hospital ward was reor-
ganized to prompt and reinforce a wide range of adaptive behavior in all patients
residing on the ward. This therapeutic milieu harnessed the motivational power of
all available desired items and activities in the ward – making access to these items
contingent on the performance of productive tasks, and thereby utilizing them as
tangible, positive reinforcement for productive behavior. Tokens were delivered
immediately after jobs were completed and later could be redeemed for desired
items at a token store, thus bridging the delay between task performance and pri-
mary reinforcement. While the system for earning, delivering, and redeeming tokens
was the most obvious difference between units with a token economy and a standard
hospital wards, the social climate within token economies also contrasted sharply
with traditional psychiatric programs. Token economies “…downplay the “illness”
model and “patient” role…” and communicated staff expectations for the patients’
behavioral improvements, adaptive functioning, and personal responsibility (Paul &
Menditto, 1992).
Ayllon and Azrin (1965, 1968) devised a multitude of small jobs within the hos-
pital setting (e.g., light janitorial work, assistance of other patients, setting-up of
recreational equipment) and self-care tasks (e.g., personal grooming, exercising)
whereby patients could earn tokens. Although these jobs were cleverly contrived,
the investigators acknowledged inherent limitations in trying to create opportunities
for reinforcement of functional behavior within a total institution that provided all
the necessities of life, including food, shelter, and even recreational pastimes,
merely for being present within the setting (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968, p. 3). Token
economies could only simulate the complex contingencies of real economic sys-
tems in open society where skilled labor is exchanged for money to buy essential
goods and services.
Numerous studies independently evaluated the effectiveness of token economies
for rehabilitating chronic mental patients and reported their benefits (for example,
Atthowe & Krasner, 1968; Hofmeister et al., 1979; Lloyd & Garlington, 1968;
Nelson & Cone, 1979; Winkler, 1970). However, no study rivaled the precision and
rigor of Paul and Lentz’s (1977), which randomly assigned an initial 28 matched,
schizophrenia-diagnosed patients to either a social learning/token economy pro-
gram, a milieu therapy program, or a standard hospital program and intensively
monitored them over a 6-year period. Outcome measures included the Inpatient
Assessment Battery (IAB) Functioning Score, direct observations of patient behav-
ior and staff-resident interactions with fine-grain response definitions tailored for
468 S. E. Wong
this population and setting, and global status reports at long-term follow-ups.
Results were that the social learning/token economy produced significantly higher
IAB scores, greater increases in functional behavior and decreases in bizarre behav-
ior, and a higher rate of release from the hospital without rehospitalization than the
two comparison programs. The social learning/token economy program was also
the least costly and administered less psychotropic medications to its patients (Paul
& Lentz, 1977; Paul & Menditto, 1992; Paul et al., 1997; Paul, 2000). The resound-
ing superiority of this behavioral program championed by an eminent researcher
and its subsequent dwindling usage (Boudewyns et al., 1986; Glynn, 1990) should
raise doubts as to whether modern mental health practices are guided by scientific
evidence. Nevertheless, the token economy remains one of only a handful of recom-
mended, evidence-supported psychological treatments for schizophrenia (Dickerson
et al., 2005; Dixon et al., 2010).
Following the path carved by Ayllon and his colleagues, early behavior therapy
for schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders consisted of either group or ward
programs simultaneously treating many or all patients on the unit or individual pro-
grams addressing idiosyncratic behavior problems (Stahl & Leitenberg, 1976). In
the subsequent sections, we will review the work of researchers in developing and
evaluating the latter category of behavioral interventions. Finally, we will discuss
more recent research utilizing functional analyses that evolved directly from first-
wave behavior therapies.
irst-Wave Behavior Therapies for Specific Problems

F
and Their Derivatives
Delusional Speech
Delusional verbalizations are a key symptom and quintessential feature of schizo-

phrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and they often have been the
focus of behavioral interventions. As mentioned above, Ayllon and associates
(Ayllon & Michael, 1959; Ayllon & Haughton, 1964) demonstrated that delusional
speech was affected by its social consequences and successfully reduced psychotic
responses in three patients by curtailing nursing staff’s attention for delusional ver-
balizations. Wincze et al. (1972) extended Ayllon’s work in a rigorously designed
study with 10 patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, many of whom had
long histories of psychiatric hospitalizations. These investigators recorded delu-
sional responses in therapy sessions and on the ward, and then applied verbal feed-
back or token reinforcement for nondelusional responses in both settings within a
series of counter-balanced reversal designs. Results showed that feedback reduced
delusional verbalizations in half of the 10 subjects, but also evoked some hostility
in 3 of these patients. By comparison, for the 9 subjects with whom token
reinforcement was applied, token reinforcement was substantially more effective

than feedback in reducing delusional responses for 4 patients, slightly more effec-
tive than feedback for 1 patient, and about equally effective as feedback for another
2 patients. Neither feedback nor token reinforcement reduced delusional verbaliza-
tions in two of the patients.
Robert P. Liberman, a research psychiatrist, and his associates replicated the
efficacy of contingent staff attention, token reinforcement, and other consumable
reinforcement in reducing delusional talk in a series of experiments at the Clinical
Research Unit of Camarillo State Hospital in California. Liberman et al. (1973)
monitored delusional speech during: 10-min daily interviews; 30-min evening chats
(in which coffee and snacks were served); and, impromptu on-ward conversations
with nursing staff. Their intervention consisted of the immediate termination of
daily interviews at the onset of delusional speech plus making the length of the
evening chat directly proportional to the duration of rational talk in the daily inter-
views. As the four patients were successively exposed to the intervention within a
multiple-baseline design their rational speech increased and modest generalization
of behavioral improvement to evening chats and impromptu conversations was
reported. Patterson and Teigen (1973), working with one patient from the Liberman
et al. (1973) study whose delusional statements persisted despite an increase in
rational speech, used token reinforcement for correct responses to direct questions
about delusional claims to successfully replace this patient’s psychotic speech with
factual statements.
Wallace et al. (1974) compared visual feedback (a red light signaling inappropri-
ate speech) versus token plus consumable reinforcement for reducing two forms of
repetitive inappropriate speech (“sick” and “acting” talk) in 20-year-old man diag-
nosed with schizophrenia. Feedback had a partial and temporary effect in reducing
sick and acting talk. Token plus consumable reinforcement for appropriate speech
eliminated inappropriate talk, which was replicated with both sick talk and acting
talk within a reversal design. Lastly, Moss and Liberman (1975) reproduced the
therapeutic effects of simple contingent attention with a 39-year-old housewife and
mother of two diagnosed with schizoaffective psychosis who had undergone four
psychiatric hospitalizations. The study was conducted in a day treatment unit where
the patient engaged in almost continuous delusional speech concerning supernatural
happenings, reincarnation, and possessing several souls. The intervention involved
conversations with a therapist lasting up to 15 min that were immediately termi-
nated when the client began speaking irrationally. Duration of appropriate speech
showed large and clear gains when staff attention was only given to appropriate
speech. The patient also displayed completely rational speech in the final three fol-
low-up sessions. The previous behavioral studies demonstrated that delusional
speech is much more malleable than characterized in the psychiatric literature and
it can be influenced by its immediate social consequences.
470 S. E. Wong
Hallucinatory Behavior
Hallucinations are another defining symptom of schizophrenia (American

Psychiatric Association, 2013) and have been the subject of multiple behavior ther-
apy studies. Presence of hallucinations can be inferred from either verbal self-report
or from overt behavior suggesting that a person is experiencing hallucinations (e.g.,
talking to oneself, gesturing at empty space). Self-report is the most common source
of data on hallucinatory behavior, so self-monitoring has often been employed in
conjunction with self-management procedures to reduce hallucinations.
A few early studies extended Ayllon & Haughton’s approach to treating halluci-
natory behavior by applying positive reinforcement for appropriate speech and
extinction (e.g., ignoring, looking away) for psychotic speech. Rutner and Bugle
(1969) instructed a 47-year-old female resident of a state hospital to privately record
her “voices” and to later publicly post this record in highly visible place on the
ward. The woman was then given praise, attention, and encouragement for reduc-
tions in reported hallucinatory behavior. Results showed the daily frequency of hal-
lucinations dropped precipitously during private recording (from 180 to 11 per day),
and then diminished to zero during public posting plus social reinforcement, remain-
ing at that level for the next 6 months.
Nydegger (1972) described the treatment of a 20-year-old male patient in a psy-
chiatric unit who reported auditory and visual hallucinations about God. Deducing
that this patient’s hallucinatory behavior functioned as a means of avoiding unde-
sired social situations, the therapist prompted and praised the patient for making
assertive decisions regarding these situations (e.g., telling his family that he did not
want a home visit) and ignored or appeared disinterested whenever the patient
talked about his voices. Staff on the hospital unit were also encouraged to act in a
similar way when the patient exhibited hallucinatory behavior. Results showed a
steady decline in outward signs of visual hallucinations from 3 to zero per day and
a more variable decrease in reports of auditory hallucinations from 7 to zero per day.
Follow-up contacts with this patient 2½ years after treatment indicated that he was
attending college, had friends and was dating, and was no longer troubled by psy-
chotic symptoms.
Another behavioral procedure tested during this era, but yielding minimal suc-
cess were forms of punishment. Bucher and Fabricatore (1970) taught a 47-year-old
man diagnosed with schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, and 7 hospitalizations in
the past 5 years to use self-shocking devices to control his auditory hallucinations.
After employing a second device that administered a more powerful shock, the cli-
ent reported a complete cessation of hallucinatory voices and only the persistence of
non-disturbing background murmurings. Unfortunately, at a 2-week follow-up
meeting after discharge the patient appeared disheveled and inebriated, and his
voices seemed to have returned. Anderson and Alpert (1974) used positive rein-
forcement plus self-administered electric shock to reduce visual hallucinations that
precipitated ritualistic hyperventilation and hand movements in a 26-year-old man

diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia. The patient received 5 days of remote-
controlled shock applied contingent on hyperventilation and ritual hand movements,
in addition he earned token reinforcement for completing daily living activities in a
timely manner that competed with his performance of compulsive rituals. Results
showed that hallucinatory behavior was substantially reduced during phases in
which token reinforcement was delivered.
Effects of another punishing consequence, timeout from reinforcement (TO), on
hallucinatory behavior was tested in two studies. Haynes and Geddy (1973) applied
TO for hallucinatory/nondirected verbalizations (ranging in volume from mumbling
to loud yelling) in a 45-year-old woman diagnosed with schizophrenia who been
hospitalized for 22 years. TO involved being told to enter an empty room for a mini-
mum of 10 min (with a requirement of 30-s of quiet before leaving the room). Data
from an ABAB reversal design showed that nondirected verbalizations decreased
substantially during the TO condition, but still appeared in all experimental phases.
Using a sophisticated with-subject design with multiple reversal phases, Davis et al.
(1976) evaluated effects of a 15-min TO on delusional and hallucinatory speech in
a 33-year-old woman diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia with a
6-year history of psychiatric treatment. Delusional speech was defined as vocalizing
any one of 30 previously catalogued false statements; hallucinatory speech was
defined as any audible verbalization to an unobservable stimulus. Delusional and
hallucinatory speech were recorded during 5-min sessions in a therapy room and
1-min random encounters anywhere on the unit. Results were that delusional and
hallucinatory speech were suppressed by application of TO, but effects neither
maintained when TO was faded to an intermittent schedule nor generalized to situ-
ations in which TO was absent.
One study with profound implications for the nature of hallucinatory behavior
was conducted relatively early during this period yet had little impact on subsequent
research. Weingaertner (1971) conducted a randomized controlled study involving
45 hospitalized veterans who reported experiencing auditory hallucinations. The
veterans were randomly assigned to three groups: (1) a self-shock group that carried
a box on a belt that delivered a shock when the switch pressed; (2) a placebo group
that carried a box that delivered no shock; and, (3) a no-treatment group that only
completed the pre- and post-evaluations given to all subjects. Results were that all
three groups reported significant decreases in the frequency of hallucinations over a
2-week period, with no significant differences between the groups. Data from this
controlled study, involving a greater number of subjects than all the previously
reviewed small-n studies combined, but probably from a less impaired population,
showed that self-report of hallucinations can be a fragile and ethereal condition that
dissipates with minimal intervention. These findings undercut whatever previous
justification might have existed for using aversive or highly restrictive procedures
on this usually covert problem.
472 S. E. Wong
Social Skills
Although it is not a primary criterion for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, some

behavioral researchers have proposed that impaired social functioning is a pivotal
feature of the disorder (Brady, 1984; Liberman et al., 1985; Morrison & Bellack,
1984). Adopting the role-playing techniques of psychodrama, Wolpe and Lazarus
were among the first behavior therapists to use modeling, rehearsal, and coaching to
remediate lack of assertiveness and other interpersonal skill deficits in uncontrolled
case studies (McFall & Marston, 1970; McFall & Lillesand, 1971). Goldsmith and
McFall (1975) conducted an early controlled evaluation of these social skills train-
ing (SST) procedures with a group of 36 male psychiatric inpatients, roughly half of
whom were diagnosed schizophrenic. Their investigation showed that SST was
superior to pseudotherapy and assessment-only conditions for raising subjects’
social competence and comfort during interpersonal encounters.
Like in its initial uses with non-psychotic clients, early applications of SST with
psychiatric patients focused on teaching appropriate assertiveness (Hersen &
Bellack, 1976; Hersen et al., 1975). However, SST was soon being used to teach a
variety of response typographies for diverse social situations. Persons diagnosed
with schizophrenia have been taught micro- and meso-interactive skills, including:
eye contact and facial expression (Eisler et al., 1978), loudness and latency of
speech (Finch & Wallace, 1977), simple greetings (Kale et al., 1968; Wong &
Woolsey, 1989), initiating and maintaining conversations (Kelly et al., 1980; Urey
et al., 1979; Wong et al., 1993; Wilder et al., 2002), and more.
Although the above studies demonstrated the effectiveness of SST for teaching
schizophrenic patients a wide range of targeted skills, the behavior change produced
by this training was narrow and localized. One limitation of SST was regularly evi-
denced in every study employing multiple-baseline-across-behavior designs,
wherein untrained behaviors served as control baselines until they became trained
baselines. The lack carryover from trained responses to untrained responses demon-
strated the specificity of SST. Another shortcoming in SST methodology was that
training effectiveness was usually evaluated in role-played interactions. A crucial
facet of behavior change and a paramount clinical outcome – generalization of
trained skills to more naturalistic social encounters – was often not measured. When
generalization to more naturalistic encounters was assessed, some studies reported
spontaneous carryover of trained skills (Goldsmith & McFall, 1975; Urey et al.,
1979) while others did not (Gutride et al., 1973; Hersen et al., 1974; Wong et al.,
1993). When trained skills did not automatically generalize to novel situations,
Wong et al. (1993) intermittently prompted and reinforced trained skills in previous
extra-therapy settings (i.e., in-vivo training) to effectively increase social skills per-
formed in those contexts. This partial programming of social interactions emulated
token economies by engineering reinforcement contingencies in the clients’ envi-
ronment to generate and maintain desired social behavior.
Personal Grooming and Hygiene
Persons with schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders often show a deteriora-
tion in personal care routines, such as bathing, grooming, and dressing. A dishev-
eled appearance and lack of cleanliness can adversely affect social relationships,
jeopardize employment, and raise health risks. First-generation behavioral pro-
grams often aimed at restoring self-care skills as one of their rehabilitation goals.
Procedures to improve clients’ grooming and hygiene have been a component of
token economies in psychiatric hospitals (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968; Liberman et al.,
1974; Paul & Lentz, 1977) and community mental health centers (Liberman et al.,
1976). As part of a token economy program, nursing staff would deliver tokens or
points to patients for the completion of self-care tasks or contingent on patients’
appearance during periodic visual inspections. Evaluating a token economy in a
psychiatric hospital unit, Nelson and Cone (1979) found significant improvements
in grooming and room care tasks as these behaviors were sequentially trained with
verbal instructions, modeling, posters, and token reinforcement in a multiple-
baseline-across-behaviors design. Consulting with a hospital unit for chronic men-
tal patients that lacked a token economy, Wong et al. (1988a) reported sizable
improvements in hand and face washing, hair cleaning, toothbrushing, and proper
dressing using a training protocol similar to Nelson and Cone’s (1979), but incorpo-
rating coffee and snacks as consumable reinforcement. The above studies demon-
strated that systematic behavioral training could improve grooming and self-care
skills, even in clients believed to be severely debilitated.
Vocational Skills
Work is another critical area of human functioning in which persons with schizo-
phrenia and related psychotic disorders have impairments and need assistance.
Unemployment among persons with “severe mental illness” has been reported to be
as high as 80% (Bond & McDonel, 1991). The shaping and strengthening of prevo-
cational skills and daily work routines in persons with severe behavior problems
were integral to the token economy (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968). The first token econ-
omy provided a range of well-defined hospital jobs, such as kitchen, personal care,
clerical, and housekeeping aides, requiring from 10 min to 6 h of work per day
(Ayllon & Azrin, 1965, 1968). As clients showed better responsiveness to instruc-
tions, work endurance, and responsibility they were given more demanding and
higher paying assignments.
In two studies preparing formerly hospitalized patients for regular employment
in the community, Kelly and associates (Furman et al., 1979; Kelly et al., 1979) used
SST techniques to improve the job-interviewing skills of 9 clients, 7 of whom were
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Clients were taught to give positive information
about their education and previous work experience, to ask questions, to use
474 S. E. Wong
gestures, and to express enthusiasm during interviews. Training incorporated expo-

sure to videotaped models, behavioral rehearsal during simulated interviews, coach-
ing to improve performance, and praise or corrective feedback. Data from these
two, multiple-baseline-across-behaviors design studies showed that training signifi-
cantly increased participants’ skills and raised employability ratings given by an
actual personnel manager.
Finding employment is a challenging endeavor of which job-interviewing is only
one component. Recognizing this, Azrin and associates developed the “job club”
(Azrin & Besalel, 1980; Azrin et al., 1975) as a comprehensive program to assist
persons with various handicaps in this multi-faceted task. A job club provides sup-
port groups and training in preparing a resume, conducting a systematic job search,
proper dressing and grooming, job interviewing, and following up on job leads.
Jacobs et al. (1984) adapted the job club for persons with serious mental disorders
by adding instruction in community survival skills of personal goal setting, problem
solving, coping with daily problems, and maintaining one’s employment. Job seek-
ing and community survival skills were taught through lecture, programmed read-
ing materials, role playing, and in-vivo exercises. After completing this expanded
job club, 76% of their participants had found jobs or started full-time vocational
training and 6 months later 67% were still employed.
In contrast to the above, Brey et al. (1989) trimmed the Azrin et al. (1975) proto-
col, providing a job-club without assigned “buddies,” shorter job-search sessions
lasting only 2 h per day, and minimal contact with families or friends for letters of
recommendation. Brey et al. (1989) serviced a mixed group of 167 clients (48 with
a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a psychotic disorder) including former patients from
locked wards of a state hospital, residents of half-way houses, and outpatients, 95
(78%) of whom found jobs by the end of the program. Although both Jacobs et al.
(1984) and Brey et al. (1989) were uncontrolled studies, the relatively high employ-
ment rates achieved by their participants were impressive outcomes.
Despite behavioral programs’ success in teaching job-seeking and job-related
skills, this preparatory training has been eclipsed by supported employment pro-
grams (SEPs) that help clients immediately find jobs and only provide training and
follow-up support as needed. In a series of controlled, multi-site studies, SEPs were
shown to be more effective in assisting clients with severe mental disorders to secure
and to maintain regular, competitive employment than comparably resourced skills-
training or psychosocial rehabilitation programs (Drake et al., 1996; Drake et al.,
1999; Mueser et al., 2004). Designers of the SEPs theorized that their programs
obtained superior outcomes because they were specifically organized and staffed to
place clients in competitive jobs, and they did not rely on a high degree of inter-
agency coordination needed to prevent clients from getting caught in transitions
between training, sheltered employment, and competitive employment. Another
inherent shortcoming in skills training approaches was the difficulty in predicting,
training, and promoting the generalization of relevant skills to the naturalistic set-
ting – problems parallel to those of social skills training.
Recreational Behavior
Recreation provides people with opportunities to pursue diverse personal goals,

including socialization, physical fitness, relaxation, and constructive use of leisure
time (Nesbitt, 1980). A secondary clinical benefit of recreational activities is that
they can displace a variety of odd, repetitive behaviors such as rituals, pacing, pos-
turing, and self-talk that are often exhibited by persons with psychotic disorders
(Alevizos et al., 1978; Luchins et al., 1992; Paul & Lentz, 1977). Ayllon and Azrin
(1968) reported anecdotally that many bizarre behaviors of chronic psychiatric
patients vanished when they were engaged in work, self-care, and leisure activities
scheduled in their token economy program. Paul and Lentz (1977) further quanti-
fied long-term reductions of bizarre behavior in chronic psychiatric patients who
participated in a token program that arranged daily self-care, social, and educa-
tional tasks.
Ayllon and Roberts (1974) would later reproduce this clinical benefit in an exper-
iment with youth exhibiting disruptive behavior, and McDowell (1982, 1988) would
explain these data with the Matching Law. Matching Law was discovered in labora-
tory research with animals (Herrnstein, 1961, 1970) and refers to behavior main-
tained on concurrent schedules of reinforcement, that is, responding to two or more
simultaneously present manipulanda each programmed with its own schedule of
reinforcement. In such a situation, organisms will “match” or allocate their responses
proportional to the amount of reinforcement that is available through each manipu-
landum (or response alternative). The clinical significance of this law is the predic-
tion that a problem behavior can be reduced by raising the reinforcement density for
any simultaneously available alternative behavior. This would account for reported
reductions in psychotic behavior during participation in token economy programs
(Ayllon & Azrin, 1968, p. 23; O’Brien & Azrin, 1972; Paul & Lentz, 1977) even in
the absence of reinforcement contingencies directly connected with psychotic
behavior.
Recreational behavior is commonly engaged in for lengthy periods of time with-
out extrinsic reinforcement and therefore might exist as a self-reinforcing response.
If so, then simply providing preferred recreational activities might be an effective
means of displacing different types of undesirable or psychotic behavior. In a series
of studies using alternating treatment designs (Barlow & Hayes, 1979), Wong and
colleagues demonstrated that recreational activities, both with and without extrinsic
token reinforcement, reduced a variety of bizarre, repetitive behavior in patients
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Wong et al. (1987) found that psychotic self-talk and
mumbling in two patients diagnosed as schizophrenic decreased 60–70% when the
patients were engaged in preferred recreational activities (reading, handicrafts,
assembling models). Similar clinical improvements were obtained for grotesque
posturing by a patient diagnosed as schizophrenic and for ruminating (searching for
dirt and feces) by a patient with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Corrigan
et al., 1993).
476 S. E. Wong
Another study (Wong et al., 1988c) showed a 70% reduction in a variety of

bizarre behaviors in 10 chronic psychiatric patients, 9 of whom were diagnosed
with some form of schizophrenia, when they were engaged in structured leisure and
work activities (e.g., team sports, art projects, housework). Results of this third
study also showed large increases in socially appropriate behavior during recreation
sessions – rising from less than 15% in the baseline sessions to more than 80% in
the recreation sessions. Subsequent investigations have shown that physically active
and passive recreation produce similar gains in appropriate behavior (Morris et al.,
1997), and that recreational sessions generate more appropriate behavior than voca-
tional rehabilitation sessions (Finnell et al., 1997). These studies suggested humane
and efficient interventions for reducing bizarre responses and increasing prosocial
behavior, as well as highlighting ecological factors impacting psychotic behavior.
The next section describes an intervention for problematic behavior in persons
with schizophrenia and related psychoses derived from operant learning principles
(therefore closely aligned with first-wave behavioral programs), but one appearing
in recently published research. This is the functional analysis and treatment of
bizarre and delusional speech.
Functional Analysis of Psychotic Behavior
Functional analysis (Carr, 1977; Iwata et al., 1982/1994) begins by identifying ante-
cedent and consequential environmental stimuli that control a problem behavior,
and then rearranges or modifies those stimuli to reduce the problem behavior and
instead to produce appropriate responses. Functional analysis differs from first-
generation behavioral interventions that used arbitrary, clinician-determined conse-
quences to override whatever reinforcement was maintaining the problem response.
For example, early behavior therapy programs applied tokens or timeout from rein-
forcement to reduce delusional speech with no attempt to determine what reinforc-
ing consequences had been maintaining those delusional statements. Because
preexisting reinforcement contingencies that supported psychotic speech in those
settings were neither identified nor altered, these contingencies might cause recov-
ery of the problem behavior when the program was faded or removed. In contrast, a
functional analysis starts by pinpointing the specific reinforcers currently maintain-
ing a problem behavior. The social environment is then rearranged to remove or
block those reinforcers for problem behavior, and instead makes them contingent on
appropriate behavior. In theory, this approach should produce better outcomes and
a higher probability of long-term maintenance.
A functional analysis begins with an empirical test involving a series of brief (5-
to 15-min) sessions during which various contingencies hypothesized to maintain
the problem behavior are simulated and the client’s behavior is recorded. These
conditions are randomly alternated and the amount of problem behavior occurring
in each condition is then compared. Wilder et al. (2001) assessed the contingencies
maintaining bizarre, off-topic speech (e.g., about karate, God, and the FBI) in a
middle-aged man with schizophrenia by presenting four alternating conditions: (1)

escape from demands (the therapist asked the client to work on a task, e.g., a simple
household chore, until the client made a bizarre statement, after which the therapist
allowed the client to take a 30-s break from the task); (2) attention (the therapist
pretended to be preoccupied and ignored the client until the client made a bizarre
statement, after which the therapist made eye contact and told the client that he
“shouldn’t talk” like that); (3) alone (the client was left alone in the room and
observed to see if bizarre statements would occur without any social consequences);
(4) control (the therapist interacted with the client until he made a bizarre statement,
after which the therapist broke eye contact and terminated all conversation for 10 s).
Because these four conditions were presented in random order and the only differ-
ence between them was the social consequences, variation in the amount of psy-
chotic behavior observed in the four conditions should have been due to the type of
reinforcement delivered for bizarre speech.
In the study by Wilder et al. (2001) bizarre speech occurred in a substantially
greater percentage of the scored intervals with attention (mean 26%) as compared
to escape from demands (mean 2%), alone (mean 0%), and control (mean 5%) con-
ditions. Utilizing these data, an intervention was designed consisting of differential
reinforcement of appropriate verbalizations (attention for appropriate speech) plus
extinction for bizarre verbalizations. When this invention was applied and evaluated
within a reversal design, it was shown to nearly eliminate the client’s psychotic
speech. Results of this study were later replicated with a second client also diag-
nosed with schizophrenia who displayed bizarre vocalizations in the form of tan-
gential remarks (Wilder et al., 2003).
More recently, Wilder et al. (2020) reported on a functional analysis successfully
applied with a 45-year-old man who was diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid
type. This client talked non-stop throughout the day, verbalizing delusional state-
ments (e.g., he was in the car with President John F. Kennedy before his assassina-
tion, he was a spiritual advisor to the Pope) interspersed between accurate historical
facts and solitary self-talk. A functional analysis was conducted using 10-min ses-
sions that alternated between the same four conditions: escape from demands, atten-
tion, alone, and control. Data from the functional analysis showed that the client
engaged in delusional speech most often during the attention condition. Based on
these results, an intervention was developed that consisted of conversational skills
training, differential reinforcement of accurate speech, and extinction of delusional
speech. The client was taught how to appropriately initiate a conversation, ask ques-
tions about recent events (e.g., “How was your day?”), and transition to new conver-
sational topics (e.g., “That reminds me of …”). During conversational training
therapists attended to the client’s appropriate statements, but broke eye contact and
did not ask follow-up questions to the client’s delusional statements. Training ses-
sion data showed that during baseline the client’s speech was almost entirely delu-
sional and appropriate speech was near zero; however, by the end of the training this
pattern had reversed, and the client’s speech was almost completely appropriate
with nearly zero delusional speech. The client’s family members were then taught
to implement the treatment procedures, and they reported similar improvements at
478 S. E. Wong
home and satisfaction with the program. The previous studies illustrate the clinical
applications and potential benefits of functional analyses of psychotic behavior.
ummary and Conclusions: Past and Present Contexts

S
of First-Wave Behavior Therapies
A twentieth century revolution attempting to transform psychology into a scientific

discipline like physics and other natural sciences led to the development of operant
and social learning theories that were the foundation for first-wave behavior thera-
pies for schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders. Severe and intractable
behavior problems of patients in state mental hospitals and Veterans Administration
psychiatric centers offered early opportunities to apply these psychological theories
to pressing social concerns. Many innovative behavioral treatments for psychotic
behavior of this era were straightforward applications of learning theory using ver-
bal instructions, modeling, and tangible and social reinforcement for appropriate
behavior, in tandem with extinction or termination of suspected reinforcement for
inappropriate and psychotic behavior.
Combinations of verbal prompts and positive reinforcement for desired responses
plus extinction of undesired responses proved to be an effective strategy for dealing
with a wide range of psychotic behavior. These and other procedures were shown to
be efficacious in reducing delusional speech and other bizarre behavior, and in
teaching and increasing performance of social skills, personal grooming and
hygiene, and prevocational tasks. This approach was optimized in the token econ-
omy, which restructured the entire hospital ward to require, teach, and reinforce
productive behavior during all waking hours in this residential setting. These proce-
dures had documented successes, but they also had limitations in sporadic general-
ization to and maintenance within extra-therapy situations. One factor probably
contributing to these limited gains was the difficulty in formulating training curri-
cula that matched naturalistic conditions, but a more likely obstacle was that real-
world contingencies did not adequately support clients’ recently trained behavior. A
model for future behavioral programs perhaps can be found in supported employ-
ment programs (Mueser et al., 2004), which follow clients into their work settings
providing immediate, relevant, and ongoing assistance for desired performances.
A line of research substantially less promising than the above and representing a
dead end for behavior therapy was use of various punishment procedures for reduc-
ing hallucinatory behavior. Application of electric shock and timeout for hallucina-
tory behavior occurred prior to the existence of modern ethical standards and human
rights review committees. Viewed through the lens of current guidelines and safe-
guards, these procedures likely would be judged as the unjustifiable use of highly
aversive and restrictive procedures to control self-report of covert stimuli or rela-
tively harmless overt behavior (e.g., talking to oneself). A more sophisticated clini-
cal understanding of hallucinatory behavior would also weigh against using
punishment to suppress these psychotic responses. There is growing recognition

that hallucinatory and other bizarre behavior can have varied motives, including
communicative (e.g., expressing a need for attention, material goods or professional
assistance, or the desire to be left alone) and self-stimulatory/self-reinforcing func-
tions (Froján-Parga et al., 2019; Schock et al., 1998; Wilder et al., 2020; Wong,
1996). Rather than punish hallucinatory or other aberrant responses, functional
analysis would seek to identify controlling reinforcers and then teach clients appro-
priate responses to obtain those same reinforcers. A complementary technique
would apply Matching Law and provide additional reinforcement for alternative
appropriate behavior or offer alternative self-reinforcing responses to displace aber-
rant behavior, as described in the section on Recreational behavior.
When comparing the behavior problems treated by first-wave behavior therapies
for schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders with those of subsequent waves,
the separate waves seem to have faced different client populations and types of
behavioral problems. First-wave behavior researchers dealt with a broader range of
problem behaviors and adaptive skills, and treated more severely impaired, bizarre,
and oppositional clients than their successors. For example, first-wave behavior
therapists taught and motivated elementary skills such as simple verbal greetings
and personal grooming, and managed dangerous behavior such as physical aggres-
sion and property destruction (Liberman & Wong, 1984, 1985; Wong et al., 1985;
Wong et al., 1988b), issues rarely mentioned by second and third-wave behavior
therapists. The first generation of behavior therapists often worked with clients
whose speech and conduct were not amenable to calm and rational discussions
about their cognitions, beliefs, covert sensations, or procedures that might be used
to modify these inferred internal states.
The entry of behaviorally oriented psychologists into the state mental hospitals
presented unique opportunities for the development of behavior therapy, but prac-
tice within these settings had major obstacles and a dim future. Mental hospitals
have always been medical institutions organized to provide somatic treatments and
within those facilities psychology is an ancillary profession. Given that state mental
hospitals did not have the goals, administrative structure, physical layout, or person-
nel trained for educative and rehabilitative programming, first-wave behavior thera-
pists’ accomplishments in those settings were remarkable. However, in retrospect,
most first-wave behavior therapies for schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders
now appear more like pilot studies or short-lived demonstration projects showing
only that learning principles could be successfully applied to improve the function-
ing of persons with severe mental disorders. Unfortunately, those advances in
behavior therapy coincided with the demise of the state mental hospitals and the rise
of drug treatment. A convergence of factors including state budgetary crises, psychi-
atric hospitalization’s poor outcomes, advocacy of patients’ civil rights, provision of
Social Security Insurance benefits for the mentally disabled, and aggressive market-
ing of psychotropic drugs all drove a deinstitutionalization movement that would
downsize and close state mental hospitals across the nation. Despite their many
hazards and limited efficacy, so-called “antipsychotic” medications became and
remain the prevailing societal response to severe and persistent behavioral problems
480 S. E. Wong
(Breggin, 1997; Whitaker, 2004, 2010; Wong, 2006a, b). Although it was challeng-
ing to conduct behavioral programs within inpatient psychiatric institutions, it
would be even harder to conduct them in the underfunded and undeveloped com-
munity mental health systems that assumed the burden of the state mental hospitals.
Presently, outside of mental hospitals there is minimal psychosocial rehabilitation
and heavy reliance on psychotropic drugs (Hogan, 2010).
Pertinent to this discussion is a rapidly expanding body of psychiatric research
concerning the etiology of psychoses. This research has shown increased risk of
psychoses associated with a variety of traumatic experiences and adverse environ-
mental conditions. Painful ordeals correlated with psychoses include poverty, phys-
ical abuse, bullying, domestic violence, and rape (Hudson, 2005; Shevlin et al.,
2007; Wicks et al., 2005; Wong, 2014). Ironically, while research is accumulating to
show that physical and psychological trauma contribute to the genesis of psychoses,
the living conditions of persons with psychotic disorders within the United States
has become increasingly brutal and bleak. One of the consequences of deinstitution-
alization is that more persons with severe mental problems now reside in jails and
prisons than in mental hospitals (Torrey et al., 2010; Torrey et al., 2014), and many
homeless persons (an estimated 26%) have severe mental illness (SAMHSA, 2011).
Since the decline of the state mental hospitals the circumstances of persons with
psychoses has worsened, so the need to provide humane and effective therapeutic
environments for these individuals is more critical than ever.
If Boring (1927) was right that in science new schools of thought build their
foundations upon the older ideas they discredit and supplant, then in the case of
first-wave behavior therapy this would not be progress. What will be lost is a proven
psychology grounded in the natural sciences that focuses on socially significant
behavior, uses objective and precise measures, and strives to restructure clients’
environments to foster their adaptive functioning.
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Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other
Psychotic Disorders: Second Wave Case
Conceptualization
Dennis R. Combs, David W. Rose III, and Michael R. Basso
The treatment of schizophrenia and psychosis is complex, fraught with challenges,

and requires the involvement of a multidisciplinary team of professionals (Combs
et al., 2018). The current best practice for the treatment of psychosis is the combina-
tion of antipsychotic medications and evidence-based psychosocial therapies (APA,
2004). Antipsychotic medications are considered the first line of treatment for most
individuals with psychosis, and this is often followed by one or more psychological
treatments. However, the consensus is that about half of persons continue to have
persistent positive (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech and behav-
iors) and negative (anhedonia, poverty of speech, withdrawal) symptoms despite
medication management (Rector, 2006). Thus, medications are not a cure all for
schizophrenia, but only part of a comprehensive treatment approach needed for
recovery. Individuals with schizophrenia and psychosis are often non-compliant
with medication which reduces their overall effectiveness (Buchanan, 1992). In
addition, there are concerns about the health consequences of long-term use of
many antipsychotic medications (Stroup & Gray, 2018). Thus, in the treatment of
psychosis there is a clear role for evidence-based psychological therapies. It is
within this framework that Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp)
arose and gained traction among researchers and clinicians. CBTp is currently
viewed as second wave treatment following the behavioral methods of the 1950-
and 1960’s.
D. R. Combs (*) · D. W. RoseIII

Department of Psychology, The University of Texas at Tyler, Tyler, TX, USA
e-mail: Dcombs@uttyler.edu
M. R. Basso
Division of Neurocognitive Disorders, Department of Psychiatry and Psychology, The Mayo
Clinic, Rochester, MN, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_21
488 D. R. Combs et al.
Overview of CBT for Psychosis
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp) is currently considered a well-

established or evidence-based treatment for schizophrenia based on the strength of
research support for the intervention (American Psychological Association, 2006;
Combs & Mueser, 2017; Freeman & Garety, 2006; Guadiano, 2005; Rector & Beck,
2001; Wykes et al., 2008; Zimmerman et al., 2005). In fact, In the United Kingdom,
CBTp is considered a front-line treatment that is routinely offered to all persons
with schizophrenia (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2009). The goal of
CBTp is to reduce the symptoms of schizophrenia by targeting the underlying defi-
cits and biases in information processing, which lead to the formation and mainte-
nance of delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia (Chadwick et al., 1996). In addition,
secondary goals are to reduce emotional distress such as anxiety and depression
associated with psychosis, and to improve social and community functioning at
large (Cather et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2004). CBTp is considered both a compre-
hensive and symptom-focused treatment.
Clinical Methods and Indications
Early in its development, CBTp was comprised of a loose set of techniques devel-
oped for psychosis that came from work with depressed and anxious individuals.
Thus, there was great variability in what a clinician used to reduce psychosis, which
made standardization a problem. However, at present there are some well written
and comprehensive guides on how to conduct CBTp that have a number of practical
strategies and educational materials (Chadwick et al., 1996; Combs, 2010; Kingdon
& Turkington, 2005).
CBTp can be delivered in both individual and group formats with more research
supporting individual CBTp (Pinkham et al., 2004). CBTp appears to be more use-
ful in (1) adults with schizophrenia, (2) inpatient clients with both acute (onset
within 2 weeks) and stabilized symptoms (no significant changes in a 72 h period)
(with concurrent medication treatment), (3) outpatient clients with persistent delu-
sions and hallucinations, and (4) individuals with paranoia and persecutory delu-
sions (Combs, 2010). More evidence is needed for persons with prominent negative
symptoms such as anhedonia, poverty of speech, and social withdrawal, first epi-
sode psychosis, unmedicated psychosis, and with the use of briefer formats of the
treatment. A limiting factor in CBTp is the presence of neurocognitive deficits in
attention, reasoning, language processing, and memory but their overall effect on
treatment outcome is unclear (Haddock et al., 2004; Oathamshaw & Haddock,
2006). Time to complete CBTp can take between 4 months and 1 year, depending
on the client’s readiness to change and the type of delusion (research studies aver-
age 4–6 months in duration; see Sharp et al., 1996). Persons with paranoia and
persecutory delusions can take longer to complete treatment due to the initial levels
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders: Second Wave Case… 489
of resistance encountered, and the amount of time needed to develop rapport

(Combs, 2010; Chadwick et al., 1996).
Training in CBTp is often accomplished in a number of ways. First, there are
many excellent resources available which provide detail on how to conduct CBTp
(see Chadwick et al., 1996; Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). Also, conferences such
as Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies (ABCT) provides work-
shops and consultation activities on CBTp annually. Of course, in person supervi-
sion is the probably the best way to learn the ins and outs of the treatment. The cost
and financing of CBTp is a challenge as many persons with schizophrenia do not
have health insurance and are considered low income or indigent which means their
treatment usually falls to the community mental health system.
Review of Research
Research on CBTp has been taking place since the early 2000’s (Beck & Rector,
2002; Rector & Beck, 2001; Wykes et al., 2008), and has consistently demonstrated
broad and robust research support (Cather et al., 2005; Guadiano, 2005). Since then,
there have been a number of meta-analyses conducted to assess the efficacy of
CBTp. Recently, more research is focused on special cases of CBTp (medication-
resistant psychosis, first episode, or low intensity) (Burns et al., 2014; Hazell et al.,
2016; van der Gaag et al., 2014). For this chapter, we will review some general
research on CBTp and them move to more recent studies on modifications of the
general CBTp approach. Most of the studies in this section are based on traditional
CBTp approaches thus reflecting second wave treatment methods.
Wykes et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of thirty-four studies on the effi-
cacy of CBTp for schizophrenia. Regarding individual CBTp trials aimed at reduc-
ing positive symptoms, the results showed that there was a statistically significant
effect on this treatment outcome, with a modest estimated overall effect size of
R = .399 (Wykes et al., 2008) for changes in positive symptoms. Interestingly, this
outcome was significantly correlated with improvements in negative symptoms
(R = .83), and perhaps in improved functioning (Wykes et al., 2008). Surprisingly,
CBTp treatment outcomes were also correlated with worsening hopelessness
(Wykes et al., 2008). These data suggest that, in the act of targeting one treatment
outcome, other treatment outcomes that were not intended targets may be positively
or negatively affected as well (Wykes et al., 2008). Given that there were modest
effects for all outcomes besides hopelessness (psychosis, positive and negative
symptoms, functioning, and mood), the authors suggest that, regardless of the spe-
cific target of intervention, CBTp might have a more generalized impact on psy-
chotic symptoms (Wykes et al., 2008).
Sarin et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis involving twenty-two randomized
controlled trials (RCT’s) of CBTp with a focus on outcomes ranging from 3 to
15 months (Sarin et al., 2011). Outcomes of interest were (a) symptoms, (b) medica-
tion use, (c) relapse, and (d) clinically important improvement (Sarin et al., 2011).
At 3-month follow-up, CBTp showed significant but small effect sizes on change in
positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and general symptoms (Sarin et al., 2011).
However, immediately after treatment, although there was a trend observed that
appeared to favor CBT, it was not statistically significant (Sarin et al., 2011); this
finding was also supported by a recent meta-analysis of CBTp compared to sup-
portive therapies (Newton-Howes & Wood, 2013).
Turner et al. (2014) performed a comparative analysis of 48 outcome studies that
assessed psychotherapeutic improvement in psychiatric symptoms of psychosis fol-
lowing treatment. Studies included were a mixture of individual and group-based
treatments which included CBTp, social skills training, cognitive remediation,
befriending, and supportive counseling (Turner et al., 2014). Using a pooled symp-
tom outcome measure across studies, CBT was shown to be more efficacious when
compared to the other treatments in reducing positive symptoms (Turner et al.,
2014). Social skills training led to more improvement in negative symptoms com-
pared to CBTp (Turner et al., 2014).
In addition to the effectiveness of CBTp for psychosis in general, research has
also been conducted assessing CBTp effectiveness for psychosis over time (Sitko
et al., 2020). In this most recent meta-analysis, a systematic review of the effective-
ness of CBTp across time was conducted, with additional and separate analyses for
positive symptoms, delusions, hallucinations, and negative symptoms (Sitko et al.,
2020). Of the 28 studies looking at positive symptoms, the pooled effect size was
between −.24 and −.26 (negative signifies improvement) (Sitko et al., 2020). With
the pooled effect size of −.24, CBTp was favored over TAU in the treatment of posi-
tive symptoms, even when this effect was reduced to −.20 as a consequence of
publication bias considerations (Sitko et al., 2020). The overall results of this meta-
analysis suggest that there are small to medium effects favoring CBTp for positive
symptoms, hallucinations, delusions, and negative symptoms, with an increased
effectiveness of CBTp overtime for delusions only (Sitko et al., 2020).
In addition to the more general literature on CBTp for psychosis, there has also
been work done on CBTp and its application to special cases (Burns et al., 2014;
van der Gaag et al., 2014). For example, van der Gaag et al. (2014) conducted a
meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials (RCT’s) of CBTp on first episode
psychosis. Participants were categorized as being at a critically high risk (CHR) for
developing psychosis (van der Gaag et al., 2014). Results showed that CBTp
approaches lowered the risk of individuals moving from the prodromal phase to the
active phase of psychosis (pooled risk ratio of .52) (van der Gaag et al., 2014).
Medication-resistant psychosis is a significant problem in the treatment of
schizophrenia, as roughly 50–70% of persons have residual symptoms despite tak-
ing antipsychotic medications (Burns et al., 2014). Burns et al. (2014) conducted a
meta-analysis of 16 studies of CBT on outpatients with medication-resistant psy-
chosis (Burns et al., 2014). At post-treatment, the mean weighted effect size for
positive symptoms was .47, a medium effect size (Burns et al., 2014). At follow-up,
the mean weighted effect size was maintained at .41 (Burns et al., 2014). These data
seem to suggest that CBT is effective in the treatment of positive symptoms in
medication-resistant psychosis in outpatients (Burns et al., 2014).
Naeem et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of seven studies involving a

briefer version of CBTp, of which usually involves between 6–10 sessions over a
period of 4 months or less. Results showed that, at the end of treatment, brief CBTp
showed a moderate effect size compared to treatment as usual (TAU) (Naeem et al.,
2016). Surprisingly, there were greater improvements in negative symptoms than in
positive symptoms, and greater effect sizes for delusions than for hallucinations
(Naeem et al., 2016). These results were maintained at the three to six-month fol-
low-up (Naeem et al., 2016). Hazell et al. (2016) found similar results when exam-
ining brief forms of CBTp. This area of research looks promising and may lead to
improved treatment compliance.
Limitations
The research on the effectiveness of CBTp has some important limitations to men-
tion. One important limitation is within-trial heterogeneity across studies, in which
different treatments, assessments, and delivery mechanisms are used which makes
it difficult to compare results across studies (Thomas, 2015). One consequence of
this is that the metrics for the outcome measures are quite broad in nature, and thus
reduce sensitivity in the assessment of individualized outcome variables. Another
limitation that has been discussed is the level of specialization that CBTp requires
(Thomas, 2015). This means that only a small number of clinicians and practitioners
are able to effectively administer CBTp, which may limit generalization to real-
world clinicians and settings (Thomas, 2015). It has also been claimed that brief/
low intensity CBTp may not use the core elements of CBTp proper, and that it
instead uses exposure techniques and behavioral activation (Thomas, 2015). Finally,
Morrison and Barratt (2010) posited additional limitations of the research, a central
one being that there is debate as to what degree of characterological similarity is or
is not shared between CBTp, and traditional CBT and or CBT for other disorders.
Relatedly, it has also been claimed that there is neither a definitive consensus as to
which elements of the intervention are most important, nor one as to which elements
rightly constitute it (Morrison & Barratt, 2010). These limitations seem to call for
more rigorous methodology, improvements in standardization and availability,
communal consensus in treatment method and method emphasis, and improvement
in the clarity of outcome metrics.
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Delusions
Delusions are defined as “a false belief based on an incorrect inference about exter-
nal reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the con-
trary” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, pg. 821). Beliefs that have a
clear cultural or religious basis are not considered delusional so an attention to these
factors is important in working with psychosis. Individuals with psychosis and
schizophrenia form delusions based on the irrational interpretation and assignment
of meaning based on “evidence” found in their lives. Although there are more ratio-
nal and more adaptive explanations for events, they use this “evidence” to make
faulty conclusions to support the delusional belief. It is this evidence that is
addressed in CBTp. The goal is to weaken these beliefs using verbal and behavioral
strategies. However, delusions are not found only in psychosis and schizophrenia,
but also in severe depression, bipolar disorder, substance use, and even in normal
community adults (10–15%) (van Os et al., 2000; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). By far,
the most common types of delusion found in schizophrenia are persecutory delu-
sions, in which the person strongly believes that another person or group of persons
has intentions to harm the individual, and this harm is ongoing, or will occur in the
future (Freeman & Garety, 2000). In fact, delusions are often linked to the meaning
and interpretation of hallucinations. Studies estimate that about 50–80% of persons
with schizophrenia hold paranoid delusions at one time or another (Appelbaum
et al., 1999; Brakoulias & Starcevic, 2008). Delusions of reference, grandiosity, and
somatic functioning are also common.
The measurement of delusions is a multidimensional construct, with the most
common dimensions being: (1) conviction, (2) preoccupation, (3) distress, (4) per-
vasiveness, (5) emotionality, and (6) action/inaction (Appelbaum et al., 1999, 2004;
Garety & Hemsley, 1987). CBTp attempts to weaken these dimensions as part of
treatment, which provides good data for outcome tracking and measurement
(Combs, 2010). In essence, persons with delusions are making erroneous, biased
inferences and decisions about internal or external events, and then maintaining
them in a rigid, inflexible, and rejecting manner.
The basic model used to understand delusions comes from the classic A-B-C
paradigm commonly used in all CBT approaches (Beck & Rector, 2000). For per-
sons with delusions, the A (antecedent/activating event) is usually some form of
unusual sensory experience (voices), negative interpersonal interaction (person
looks at you strangely), and/or a strange event (unusual car is parked outside your
home; person over hears a personalized comment from strangers) (Beck & Rector,
2002; Myin-Germeys et al., 2001). These events can consist of a single salient event,
or of a series of events that are all connected in an illusory, correlational-type man-
ner. Ambiguous events in which motive or attribution is unclear are more prone to
delusional thinking (Combs, Penn, et al., 2007). Following some unusual event, the
person attempts to explain this event (B = Belief), but the interpretation is impacted
by various biases and distortions that arise from early interactions, values, and
beliefs (Garety et al., 2001; Maher, 1988; Startup et al., 2003). Persons with delu-
sions develop schematic beliefs about social inadequacy, powerlessness, inferiority,
and or a lack of achievement (Beck & Rector, 2002; Bentall & Swarbrick, 2003;
Rector, 2006), and often blame others for their faults and failures. Finally, the C part
of the model reflects the consequences, such as the emotional, behavioral, and social
issues that result from the belief. Real life examples include paranoia, hostility,
avoidance, and/or the loss of friends or a job. In reality, the social and behavioral
avoidance often serves to prevent the exposure to disconfirming evidence in many

cases (this being an assumption of operant conditioning).
Cognitive Biases and Distortions
CBTp focuses on the thought processes and biases that foster and maintain the delu-
sional belief (see Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2002). It is these very same
processes that CBTs attempts to remediate, which in turn leads to the weakening of
the delusional belief (B). Examples of these biases and cognitive distortions include:
• Increased attention to social threat
• Jumping to conclusions (making rapid decisions with poor or limited data)
• Confirmation bias (looking for evidence to support delusion)
• Personalizing attributional style (blaming others for negative events)
• Cognitive rigidity
• Excessive need for closure
• Poor theory of mind abilities (problems understanding the motives and intentions
of others)
• All-or-nothing thinking (everyone dislikes me)
• Hostility bias for ambiguous situations
• Emotion perception/social cognition deficits
Stages of CBTp
There are 4 stages of CBTp that are often part of treatment, although many of these
are integrated and flow freely from one to the other. The stages are as follows: (1)
Engagement and Assessment, (2) Education and Orientation, (3) Verbal Strategies,
and (4) Behavioral Strategies (see Chadwick et al., 1996; Combs, 2010; Kingdon &
Turkington, 2005).
Stage 1: Engagement and Assessment Phase
Before the verbal disputation of delusions can begin, attention must be given to
developing engagement/rapport, assessing the severity of the delusion, and teaching
the client about how delusions are formed (Chadwick et al., 1996; Kingdon &
Turkington, 2005; Rector, 2006). This is followed by verbal and behavioral disputa-
tion methods, which are the real mechanisms of action for belief change in CBTp
(Chadwick & Lowe, 1994). In the early stage of treatment, the therapist and client
begin the process of becoming acquainted with one another and working on estab-
lishing rapport. The importance of a good therapeutic relationship characterized by
trust, empathy, and respect cannot be underestimated, and is especially important in

the treatment of delusions and paranoia. This phase generally lasts between 3 and 6
sessions and is relatively unstructured and free flowing in terms of activities. At this
point, the client is allowed to tell their story, how they came to be referred, and dis-
cuss any current problems. At some point, clients will express their delusional
belief. It is important that this information be dealt with appropriately. First, if the
material seems delusional, or if the clinician knows ahead of time what the delusion
is (based on the referral information), then ask the client what things, events, and or
experiences led to the formation of that belief. Since the client is preoccupied with
the belief, this information is easily accessible. At this point, simply make notes of
the important events that the client used to form the delusion. This is the same evi-
dence that will be targeted later in the verbal intervention phase. Some evidence will
be historical, and some will be more current, but both types are viewed and reinter-
preted in the light of the delusional belief. When listening to the events surrounding
the belief, you can try to fit the events/evidence into the ABC paradigm (as dis-
cussed in Chadwick et al., 1996). Usually, the client reports some type of ambigu-
ous event, emotional stressor, negative social interaction, or strange physical
sensation, and then uses these as reasons to support their belief (B). Pay attention to
the emotional, social, and behavioral consequences as well (C), as these may pro-
vide a reason to change or modify the belief. Obtain information about what they
do, how they feel, or how they act when the event (more accurately, the belief) occurs.
Potential Problems in The Early Stages
Potential issues to be aware of include confrontation and collusion with the delu-
sional belief. Sadly, many clients have had a history of working with therapists who
were overly confrontational and told them in an outright or blatant manner that they
are wrong. At the beginning of treatment, we often get asked whether we believe
their belief is true or not. This is a critical point in the relationship. Clients with
paranoia do this quite often to see if you are an ally or an enemy. First, it is too early
to begin disputing their belief directly. Clinicians should take the approach that
beliefs are not facts, and that the support of a belief comes from the evidence that
needs to be examined first, which reflects the concept of collaborative empiricism
(Chadwick et al., 1996; Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). By resisting this request, we
model a careful, slow, and deliberate method to examine beliefs that is different
from the usual jumping-to-conclusions style found in delusional persons. In con-
trast to direct confrontation, it is also not a good idea to engage in collusion or buy
into the idea that the belief is true (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). If a client asks
you if you believe them, simply responding that “it depends on the evidence” or
“let’s test it out” will help avoid this potential trap. If you collude and agree with the
client’s belief the consequences can be severe, and this makes it hard to challenge
the belief in later sessions.
The proper assessment of a delusional belief is necessary for a full understanding
of the nature of a delusion, its relevant dimensions, and its emotional/behavioral
consequences. It is also useful to conduct outcome assessments during therapy to

ensure that there is movement and change in the dimensions of delusions following
treatment. Some relevant and useful measures include: (1) Conviction of Delusional
Beliefs Scale (CDBS) (Combs et al., 2006), (2) Brown Assessment of Beliefs Scale
(Eisen et al., 1998), (3) Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (Taylor et al.,
1992), (4) Percentage Conviction Rating Scale (Hole et al., 1979), and (5)
Characteristics of Delusions Rating Scale (Garety & Hemsley, 1987). All of these
measures use Likert scale formats to provide numerical changes in the characteris-
tics of delusional beliefs (see Combs, 2010).
Stage 2: Education and Orientation Phase
Stage 2 involves educating and socializing the client to ABC’s of cognitive-

behavioral therapy (Chadwick et al., 1996; Rector, 2006). Many CBTp resources
have handouts and formal descriptions about CBTp (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005).
Using an example from the client’s life, it is useful to setup an ABC model to show
the connections between events, beliefs, and consequences. It is important to
emphasize that beliefs are not facts and need to be critically examined using the
evidence for and against their belief. Once the client has grasped the ABC model,
the next step is the development of specific and achievable goals. The goals usually
stem from the C’s – the client’s emotional, social, and behavioral consequences.
Finally, before moving on to the verbal disputation phase of treatment, the client
and clinician share and discuss the case conceptualization. This shows the client that
we have tried to understand their situation, and to demonstrate to the client that their
belief is connected to a large number of events. The case conceptualization guides
treatment, and without one, treatment will seem less focused. Consistent with
Freeman and Garety (2006), triggers, unusual events, emotional factors, and cogni-
tive biases that lead to the formation of the belief are presented and discussed. This
is the step where the clinician lays out how the belief was formed, and how it is
maintained.
Stage 3: Verbal Disputation of Delusional Beliefs
The active treatment phase of CBTp involves both verbal and behavioral methods.
Research has shown that using verbal methods before behavioral ones leads to
greater changes in belief conviction (Chadwick et al., 1994). The four verbal tech-
niques used to reduce belief conviction are as follows: (1) Thought Disputation and
Challenging, (2) Accommodation, (3) Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction, and
(4) Direct Challenge.
Thought Disputation and Challenging Using the standard dysfunctional thought
record (DTR), the client first identifies an event (A), the belief (B), and the conse-
quences (C), and rates their current level of conviction, preoccupation, and distress
(scale of 1–100). After this is done, the client then develops an alternative belief or
explanation that is counter to the delusional interpretation. The client then re-rates
their level of conviction, preoccupation, and emotional distress for the delusional
belief after assessing the alternatives. To use this effectively, it is recommended that
the clinician start with the least important event/evidence first, and then gradually
work up to the most important (and usually the most resistant) evidence (Chadwick
& Lowe, 1990, 1994; Watts et al., 1973). This forms a belief hierarchy and is devel-
oped collaboratively with the client. A limitation of the DTR is that it examines only
automatic or surface thoughts elicited by events. However, CBT also provides tech-
niques to go deeper and focus on schemas, which serve as the foundation for the
delusional belief. Schemas can be accessed by using a common technique called
thought chaining or the downward arrow technique. In thought chaining, the thera-
pist moves from automatic thoughts to inferences (if, then statements) to core beliefs
using Socratic questioning.
Accommodation This technique is based on the idea that clients are exposed to a
wide range of information and evidence on a daily basis (Chadwick et al., 1996).
Most often they ignore, do not attend to, or distort the evidence to fit their existing
belief. As treatment progresses, clients may begin to notice contradictory informa-
tion more frequently, and then integrate this information into their beliefs (e.g., the
belief changes to include new information). Accommodation centers on the whether
the client is aware of new information, and what the client does with this informa-
tion. To assess accommodation, the client is simply asked, “Has anything happened
since the last session to alter the belief in any way?” (Chadwick & Lowe, 1990). The
response is then rated using the scale developed by Garety and Helmsley (1987),
which assess change in belief content, preoccupation, and interference.
Accommodation can be used as a homework assignment and is usually discussed at
the beginning of the session.
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) For this technique, the client is

presented with a formal challenge to their belief, which consists of an alternative
explanation that directly contradicts the belief. This is a simple procedure but does
require some planning ahead of time. The key is to provide a strong challenge to
their belief; it might be good to brainstorm about some alternatives, and then select
the best one. The therapist takes a piece of evidence from the client’s hierarchy and
formulates an alternative explanation to present to the client. Client responses can
be rated on a scale of 0–4, with higher scores representing more change in the belief
(Garety & Helmsley, 1987).
Challenging the Belief Itself The final verbally based method to modify delusions
centers on using logic and reason to undermine the foundation of the belief itself.
Chadwick et al. (1996) suggest three ways to challenge the belief and accomplish
this goal. First, focus on the irrationality, inconsistency, and lack of feasibility for
the belief. The question “why would it make sense for things to be as you say they
are?” can be used here.
Stage 4: Behavioral Challenging and Disputation Phase
Behavioral challenging (also known as behavioral experiments, reality testing, or

empirical testing), has always been considered an important part of modifying delu-
sions. Bennett-Levy et al. (2004) defines behavioral experiments as “planned expe-
riential activities, based on experimentation or observation, which are undertaken
by patients in or between sessions” (pg. 8). The goal of these behavioral experi-
ments is to test the evidence for the belief, and subsequently lead to the formation
of a new, more adaptive and realistic belief. Behavioral experiments can be of sev-
eral types. First, observational-type experiments allow the person to record the
behaviors of others, or ask trusted others their opinions about their beliefs, the latter
exercise being similar to giving a survey (as discussed in Bennett-Levy et al., 2004).
The involvement of a third party whom the client trusts can mean the inclusion of
an additional observer. Second, experimental or hypothesis testing methods are uti-
lized, and the person is asked to do something different (put their belief to the test),
and then determine if the evidence supports or does not support their belief. By
actively engaging the test of their belief, the client sees that alternative outcomes are
possible.
Previous works have outlined the steps used to design effective behavioral exper-
iments (Combs, 2010; Combs et al., 2007). These steps are as follows.
1. Establish readiness to engage in experiments – Usually after the verbal chal-
lenge phase of treatment, rapport will be enough to initiate the topic of using
behavioral experiments. Anxiety is to be expected when putting their beliefs to
the test.
2. Involve the client in designing the experiment – Behavioral experiments work
best if the client has a role in designing and planning the test. Experiments are
not done to prove that the belief is true, but to examine the evidence. There must
be a buy in from the client for these to be effective.
3. Test specific predictions – Make specific testable predictions about what may
happen. Usually one is the client’s delusional belief.
4. Discuss and troubleshoot problems – After the plan is derived and predictions
are made, the client and therapist need to discuss any potential problems that
may interfere with the experiment. Oftentimes, the client may come up with a
flawed, incomplete, or irrelevant experiment, and the clinician is encouraged to
help shape or revise the experiment if necessary. Role-playing may be useful
here. The expression of negative emotion, hostility, or anger toward others dur-
ing the experiment may actually lead to increased paranoia (reciprocal interac-
tion). For persons with paranoia, observational experiments are used first to
lessen the threat if they have to interact with others without practice.
5. Refine plan and Commit – The plan is refined or altered, and both the client and
therapist should feel comfortable with the proposed experiment. Setting a date
and time for when the experiment is to be completed is important in ensuring
that the plan is actually carried out.
6. Conduct, observe, and evaluate evidence – The client (and any other person
involved) should be instructed to take carefully written notes about the event,
and to fully attend to the situation. Verbal reports from the client are often incom-
plete, less detailed, and subject to cognitive and memory biases. Compare the
results to the predictions and discuss.
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Hallucinations
Hallucinations can be understood using the ABC model as well. In this case, the
hallucination is considered the A, or activating event, that leads to beliefs about the
voice (B), which is then followed by an emotional or behavioral consequence (C).
In the ABC model, the hallucination represents an odd or unusual experience that
the person must make sense of or assign meaning to in order to understand. Thus,
hallucinations stimulate the search for meaning about the identity, power, and pur-
pose of the voice. Within a larger conceptual framework, hallucinations are con-
nected to the individual’s life experiences and schematic beliefs (Beck & Rector,
2002; Rector, 2006), and may stem from the persons failures, or other traumatic life
events. Voices can be triggered by some event, such as a lack of sleep, drug use,
stress, or highly charged emotional events (Beck & Rector, 2003). Chadwick et al.
(1996) argue that the most important feature of hallucinations is not the form or
content, but the meaning and beliefs assigned to the voices. Meaning is reflected in
terms of their (1) identity, (2) purpose, (3) omnipotence, and (4) consequences for
resisting or obeying the voice (Chadwick et al., 1996).
Overview of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Hallucinations
The goals of CBTs for hallucinations are to (1) weaken the voices’ activity, and (2)
change the persons beliefs about the voices (i.e., omnipotence, etc.). The stages of
treatment are generally the same as with delusions.
Stage 1: Engagement and Assessment Phase
Just like with delusions, the first 3 to 6 sessions are spent developing rapport, trust,
and obtaining information about the voices. Along the way, the clinician begins
constructing an ABC model of the hallucination experience with a focus on the
beliefs about the voices (B), and the emotional and behavioral reactions (C). Useful
assessments of hallucinations include the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS),
Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale (PSYRATS), the Positive and Negative Syndrome
Scale (PANSS), and the Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ) (Chadwick
et al., 2000). These assessments are useful, in that they provide information about
the meaning and importance of the voices to the person.
Stage 2: Education and Orientation
Again, the client is socialized and taught the basics of the cognitive model. For cli-
ents with distressing voices, a desire to terminate, control, or stop the voices is com-
mon. Negative voices may be associated with depression, anxiety, or low
self – esteem. Comforting voices are often more difficult to treat, as they provide a
sense of closure, emotional attachment, and meaning in the individuals life. The
final activity for this phase is the construction, sharing, and refinement of the case
conceptualization.
Stages 3 and 4: Cognitive and Behavioral Disputation Methods
After the education and orientation phase, the therapy becomes more focused on
active interventions. In the research literature, both distraction and focusing meth-
ods may provide immediate relief for distress in hallucinations (Haddock et al.,
1996). These are followed by cognitive and behavioral remediation.
Distraction Strategies Distraction or counter-stimulation methods are designed to
accomplish one or more of the following: (1) interrupt the attention to the voices
themselves, (2) provide competing stimuli, which the client can attend to instead of
the voices, and (3) disrupt the voice itself. For auditory hallucinations, this is some
type of language or listening activity, such as reading aloud, naming objects you
see, listening to music, signing, or placing an earplug in the non-dominant ear (left
ear for right-handed clients which reduces non dominant speech intrusions). All of
these intervention methods likely distract attention away from the voices to more
enjoyable or interesting activities (Haddock et al., 1996).
Focusing Methods In contrast to distraction methods, focusing methods require

the client to pay more/closer attention to different aspects of their voices in order to
weaken them. This is a form of self-monitoring, which can lead to a reduction in
voice activity, more perceived control, and understandability of the voices (Haddock
et al., 1998). These methods are based on the gradual exposure to features of their
voices in order to lessen distress and fear. Haddock et al. (1996) suggest that focus-
ing on the frequency, form, tone, content, emotions, and meaning of voices can be
useful activities. The key is to start small, and gradually increase the amount of
material that is recorded by the client. This can be done by writing out the informa-
tion on paper or recording what the voices say on a phone or tape recorder (Haddock
et al., 1998).
Technique #3: Using Evidence to Challenge Voices Given that the beliefs about
voices are often erroneous, we can examine the evidence for and against these
beliefs to help reduce their influence and power. To begin, when a client hears a
voice, they typically assign meaning to the voice, and the clinician’s job is to extract
from the client the evidence for this interpretation. The power of this technique lies
in the ability to generate alternative evidence for their interpretation (belief is all
knowing and prevents harm). Questions about whether the voice has ever been
wrong, about times when the voice has been inconsistent, and about whether the
client ever acted against the voice are useful here. Additional techniques to use
could involve eliciting the opinions of others, looking for disconfirmatory informa-
tion on a daily basis (Accommodation), or setting up hypothetical contradictory
situations similar to the RTHC for delusions.
Empirical Testing The goal of empirical testing for hallucinations is to get the cli-
ent to act or do something different. Usually, this is acting against the voices, or
doing something the client wants to do despite the voices. Attending therapy is a
good action to start with, given that many voices argue that therapy is not helpful, or
is ineffective. As with most experiments, having testable predictions, engaging in
collaboration, gathering evidence, and employing assessments of the outcomes are
core features to be included. At the end, persons are often surprised when nothing
happens, or the voice does not appear, or comment on the situation.
Summary
CBTp is considered an evidence-based practice for the treatment of schizophrenia

and psychosis. Second wave CBTp approaches are still widely used with great ben-
efit to clients. In addition, CBTp has arguably the most research support of any
psychological intervention for psychosis. CBTp procedures have come a long way
to become more standardized, which no doubt has improved research and clinical
utility. Compared to first and third wave approaches, CBTp provides practical skills
to not only manage their symptoms, but also presents them with an understanding
of how delusions and hallucinations are formed and maintained. More specifically,
first wave approaches such as token economies and social skills training, often tar-
get a specific behavior and ay not lead to overall symptom changes. Third wave
approaches have focus less on psychotic symptoms and more on acceptance, nor-
malizing symptoms and experiences, and coping with a lifelong illness. Future
research needs to examine low intensity versions of CBTp and involve persons with
first episode schizophrenia or those at high risk for developing the disorder. The
ultimate goal of CBTp is move individuals with psychosis towards recovery in
which they use the skills learned in CBTp to have productive and fulfilling lives.
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Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other
Psychotic Disorders: Third Wave Case
Conceptualization
Stacy Ellenberg and Brandon A. Gaudiano
Schizophrenia is listed among the top ten causes of disability worldwide (Charlson
et al., 2018), with total costs of 155.7 billion USD annually (Cloutier et al., 2016).
Psychosis involves a loss of contact with reality. Positive symptoms include hallu-
cinations, delusions, and disorganized thinking/behavior, whereas negative symp-
toms are characterized by blunted affect, poverty of speech and thought, apathy,
anhedonia, and asociality. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th Edition classifies several types of psychotic disorders, including
schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional dis-
order, and brief psychotic disorder (McCutcheon et al., 2020). The various types of
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are present in 3.5% of the general population
(Perälä et al., 2007). Age of onset for psychosis is generally in the late teens or early
adulthood. Men and women have similar rates of psychosis, but women tend to have
a later onset and better prognosis (Ochoa et al., 2012). It also should be noted that
dimensions (versus purely categorical classification) of psychotic experiences, such
as hallucinations and delusions, are increasingly emphasized in the assessment and
treatment of these conditions (Heckers et al., 2013). Studies show that subthreshold
psychotic symptoms are even more common in community samples, with 5–8%
evidencing psychotic-like experiences (Kelleher & Cannon, 2011). In addition, psy-
chosis often co-occurs in other psychiatric disorders, with 10% of individuals with
S. Ellenberg
Alpert Medical School of Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
Butler Hospital, Providence, RI, USA
Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA
B. A. Gaudiano (*)
Alpert Medical School of Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
Butler Hospital, Providence, RI, USA
Providence VA Medical Center, Providence, RI, USA
e-mail: Brandon_Gaudiano@brown.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_22
506 S. Ellenberg and B. A. Gaudiano
major depressive disorder exhibiting psychotic features during a mood episode

(Shen et al., 2020).
Schizophrenia and related psychotic conditions are understood to be some of the
most impairing and costly to treat psychiatric illnesses (Charlson et al., 2018).
Individuals with schizophrenia tend to experience significant functional impairment
and high rates of relapse (Emsley et al., 2013; Fulford et al., 2013). The lifespan of
patients with schizophrenia is shortened by 14.5 years compared with the general
population (Hjorthøj et al., 2017), and 5–10% of these individuals die from suicide
(Popovic et al., 2014).
Most etiological models emphasize the complex interaction between genetic and
biological risk factors, along with environmental triggers, such as early trauma and
life stressors (McCutcheon et al., 2020). Research points to the heritability of psy-
chotic disorders; although recent genome wide association studies have found only
small effects spread over a hundred possible gene candidates (Schizophrenia
Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014). In addition, winter
births and perinatal complications increase the risk of developing psychosis (Ursini
et al., 2018). Environmental factors are also important, with early traumatic experi-
ences, bullying, acute stress, migration, urbanicity, and substance use increasing
risk (Radua et al., 2018). Furthermore, psychosis expression varies as a function of
cultural factors, such that geographical location, social norms, familial style, and
local customs and rituals, can influence illness prevalence, severity, clinical fea-
tures, and impact on functioning, positively or negatively (Larøi et al., 2014).
ACT for Psychosis
Psychotic disorders are most commonly treated with first or second generation anti-
psychotic pharmacotherapy (Davis et al., 2003). However, research indicates that up
to 50% of patients are medication nonadherent (Acosta et al., 2012), and patients
who are medication adherent have an inadequate treatment response in many if not
most cases (Elkis & Buckley, 2016). First and second wave behavior therapies and
family therapies are recognized as an essential part of the evidence-based treatment
of psychosis because they improve clinical and functional outcomes beyond medi-
cations alone (Dixon et al., 2010). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is
one of several types of third wave therapies that also have been adapted and tested
to treat psychosis in recent years.
Theoretical Rationale
ACT is based on the philosophy of functional contextualism, which emphasizes the

function of behavior, rather than its form, as well as the full context in which behav-
ior occurs, including the environment, reinforcement contingencies, and the
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders: Third Wave Case… 507
learning history of the organism. Experiential avoidance (EA) represents maladap-

tive attempts to escape unwanted internal experiences (e.g., thoughts, feelings,
memories) and has been implicated in psychosis and most other forms of psychopa-
thology (Hayes et al., 2006). Consistent with EA, researchers have found that
attempts to suppress hallucinations are an ineffective means of coping with chronic
symptoms (Falloon & Talbot, 1981). In addition, other scholars have noted that vari-
ous forms of “resistant,” “defensive,” or “sealing-over” coping styles defined by
avoidance and denial of psychotic experiences are predictive of increased psycho-
logical distress, poorer outcomes, and less treatment engagement in psychosis
(Escher et al., 2003; Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; Tait et al., 2003). Research has
revealed a link between the process of EA and increased distress, auditory halluci-
nations, paranoia, depression, and anxiety, as well as reduced cognitive functioning
and insight in psychosis (Goldstone et al., 2011; Shawyer et al., 2007; Udachina
et al., 2014; Valiente et al., 2015; Varese et al., 2016; Villatte et al., 2010; White
et al., 2011). Taking these findings into account, Thomas (2015) proposed a model
arguing that preoccupation in psychosis is driven by specific interactions among
various EA-associated processes, including ruminative thinking patterns, tenden-
cies to engage or resist voices, negative reinforcement mechanisms related to anxi-
ety reduction, maladaptive attempts to maintain self-esteem, and efforts to withdraw
from aversive environmental contingencies.
Treatment Processes
Although protocols vary, ACT for psychosis (ACTp) generally follows the same
principles used in ACT for other clinical populations, with some specific adapta-
tions (Oliver et al., 2013). Given that EA is the presumed central mechanism under-
lying psychosis development and maintenance, the treatment is focused on applying
the ACT processes of acceptance, defusion, self-as-context, present moment aware-
ness, values, and committed action in the service of increasing psychological flexi-
bility. Psychotically flexibility is the inverse of EA and represents the person’s
ability to adapt to changing situations as they occur, with choices being guided by
the individual’s personal values instead of merely to avoid discomfort (Ciarrochi
et al., 2010). When applied to psychosis, ACT attempts to help the patient to: (1)
accept distress associated with psychosis, (2) notice psychotic symptoms when they
occur without judgment, and (3) work toward valued goals in the presence of symp-
toms (Gaudiano et al., 2010).
Although various components of ACT can be helpful for addressing positive and
negative symptoms, certain processes may be particularly relevant to psychosis
(Bach et al., 2006). Treatment typically starts with a review of the person’s history,
highlighting the role of EA in interfering with valued pursuits and merely exacer-
bating symptoms in the long-run. As part of the early treatment process, a functional
analysis of psychotic symptoms is conducted to identify what triggers and main-
tains these problems. It should be noted that psychotic symptoms often have
personal meaning to the individual and serve some function through reinforcement
principles (Bach, 2013). For example, voices might stem from the person’s learning
history of criticism from others, which then come to function as a way for that indi-
vidual to motivate and achieve a desired goal through self-punishment, as mani-
fested through the voices. In other words, psychosis is understood in ACT as an
attempt based on the person’s particular learning history and life experiences
(including trauma) to pursue important life values such as safety and meaning, but
often in avoidant or maladaptive ways.
Common Strategies and Techniques
Acceptance-based strategies (e.g., “Tug of War with a Monster “Metaphor, in which

the cost of fighting a losing battle with a personal “monster” is explored and the
option of giving up the struggle are practiced as ways of regaining behavioral con-
trol) are particularly useful for targeting voices (Gaudiano et al., 2010). For exam-
ple, arguing with voices can simply cause them to become louder and more intrusive
over time. Alternatively, increasing the person’s willingness in the moment to sim-
ply notice when the voices are occurring without engaging with them or trying to
block them out is explored as an alternative stance that can be taken to stay on track
in the pursuit of desired goals despite symptoms being present. In addition, cogni-
tive defusion strategies (e.g., word repetition exercises) can be helpful for address-
ing delusions, so as to reduce patients’ general tendencies to overvalue their thoughts
as the ultimate determinants of choices and behaviors (e.g., deciding not to leave the
house because of paranoid ideation). In ACTp, the patient is taught to hold all
thoughts “lightly” (i.e., not necessarily buying into them and thus remaining more
agnostic), and instead to focus on values as a more useful guide for making effective
and worthwhile choices in the moment. This lessens patients’ defensiveness and
circumvents tendencies to become engaged in argumentative exchanges with the
therapist regarding delusional content. Furthermore, values clarification is particu-
larly helpful for addressing impairing delusions through the identification of the
more “workable” ways of responding to delusional beliefs, while still staying con-
sistent with values, regardless of the perceived veracity of the belief in question. For
example, a person might be encouraged to maintain important social contacts with
others despite the presence of paranoid ideation at times and to recognize any delu-
sional beliefs that are triggers as “thoughts” that one can choose to hold lightly.
Consistent with this practice, research suggests that ACTp decreases the level of
believability in psychotic experiences and that this change predicts clinical out-
comes (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006). Values and committed
action work (e.g., values-based goal setting) also serves as a behaviorally activating
process to counteract the low motivation, social disengagement, and depression
generated by negative symptoms. For example, research suggests that ACTp is par-
ticularly helpful for decreasing associated distress and mood problems related to
psychosis (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; White et al., 2011). Finally, self-compassion
is an essential feature of the ACTp treatment process, in that patients are taught how
to be kinder to themselves when experiencing symptoms. Psychotic symptoms are
normalized and emphasized to be an understandable (albeit unhelpful) reaction to
stress, as they fall along a continuum of experiences that anyone can have at one
time or another.
Clinical Considerations
Although various mindfulness practices have been found to be safe and effective
for individuals with psychotic disorders, intensive meditation practices are some-
times contraindicated during periods of acute psychosis (Chadwick et al., 2005).
Certain types of meditation practices may produce iatrogenic effects via the foster-
ing of unhelpful internal preoccupation and disengagement from reality (Sharma
et al., 2019). However, this does not mean that all forms of mediation are prohib-
ited. Exercises focusing on mindfulness applied to activities (e.g., eating, walking,
listening to music) can be substituted during periods of acute psychosis as safer
alternatives. Furthermore, ACTp typically is delivered in combination with phar-
macotherapy, so the role of medications in the treatment of psychosis is also
addressed in treatment. Issues related to nonadherence or other barriers to appro-
priate medication use can be discussed using ACTp strategies focused on work-
ability, values-action consistency, and the therapeutic relationship (Moitra &
Gaudiano, 2016). However, ACTp respects the patient’s autonomy and presumes
that any medication decisions should be carefully negotiated between the pre-
scriber and patient based on their understanding of shared values and goals.
Supporting Research
Among third-wave approaches to psychotherapy for schizophrenia-spectrum disor-

ders, ACTp is one of the most comprehensively studied to date (Gaudiano, 2015),
leading to its designation as having “modest research support” as an empirically
supported treatment by the Society of Clinical Psychology (Division 12) of the
American Psychological Association (“Acceptance and commitment therapy for
psychosis,” 2020). Wakefield et al. (2018) published a systematic review of ACTp
evaluating 13 open trials and randomized controlled trials (RCTs). They found that
ACTp was effective when delivered in brief formats (e.g., 3 sessions), including for
those experiencing severe psychosis and complex comorbidities. In addition, this
approach was effective for reducing rehospitalization rates, enhancing psychologi-
cal flexibility, and improving psychotic symptoms and functioning, and these effects
tended to continue through follow-up periods. In addition, Yıldız (2020) completed
a systematic review of 11 RCTs and reported small to large effect size improve-
ments for ACTp, relative to comparison conditions, on measures of psychotic
symptoms (ds = .60), anxiety (ds = .60), depression (ds = .43–.93), help-seeking
(ds = .21–.43), satisfaction (d = .65), and psychological flexibility (d = 1.87), as well
as an increased time to rehospitalization.
In addition, a meta-analysis of 4 early RCTs of ACTp concluded that the treat-
ment was effective for reducing negative symptom severity (SMD = .65) and rehos-
pitalization rates (RR = .54) relative to comparison conditions, which included
enhanced forms of treatment as usual or “befriending” interventions for psychosis
(Tonarelli et al., 2016). These authors recommended that future studies include
larger samples, longer follow-up periods, improved methodological rigor (e.g.,
larger samples), and use of active treatment comparators. In addition, Wood et al.
(2020) conducted a meta-analysis of RCTs testing second and third wave cognitive-
behavioral therapies for inpatients with psychosis, which included five studies of
ACTp. Third wave interventions such as ACTp had larger effects in terms of symp-
toms improvement compared with second wave CBTp at post-treatment
(SMD = −.276 vs SMD = −.207, respectively). However, this analysis was limited
by comparisons of effect sizes across studies, as no individual RCTs to date have
directly compared ACTp versus second wave behavior therapy for psychosis.
Less work has been conducted to date on the effectiveness and dissemination of
ACTp in typical clinical settings. An open trial (n = 26) of ACTp for inpatients
showed that the treatment was acceptable to patients and staff and was potentially
effective, when delivered by non-doctoral level, routine hospital staff (e.g., nurses,
social workers, occupational therapists) with minimal training in ACT (i.e., an ini-
tial training workshop with periodic supervision and case consultation) (Gaudiano
et al., 2020). Results of this trial indicated that patients’ symptoms, distress, and
mindfulness significantly improved from pre- to post-treatment and through a
4-month follow-up. Another study of 69 outpatients with psychosis showed that
implementation of group ACTp in routine practice as part of community psychosis
teams was rated as acceptable by patients and significantly improved functioning
(primary outcome), mood, and ACT processes (e.g., experiential avoidance) from
baseline to follow-up (Johns et al., 2016). A recent RCT with 55 young adults tested
ACTp enhanced with a mobile digital intervention to improve the reach of the inter-
vention versus an active control. Result showed that ACTp significantly improved
interviewer-rated depressive, but not psychotic symptoms (which improved simi-
larly over time), relative to the comparison condition (van Aubel et al., 2020).
Additional research has begun to test potential mechanisms of action in ACTp.
Gaudiano et al. (2010) showed that changes in the believability of hallucinations, a
measure of cognitive defusion, mediated the effects of ACTp plus treatment as usual
(i.e., pharmacotherapy with standard inpatient therapy) compared with
enhanced treatment as usual alone on hallucination-related distress. A follow-up
study using combined data from two previous RCTs of ACTp for inpatients (Bach
& Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006) showed that changes in psychotic
symptom believability mediated the effect of ACTp relative to treatment as usual on
reducing rehospitalization rates at follow-up (Bach et al., 2013).
Less work has been done to date investigating possible moderators of ACTp’s
treatment effects. Spidel et al. (2019) found that ACTp improved symptom severity
and treatment engagement relative to treatment as usual alone provided at the clinic
(i.e., case manager, psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy), in a RCT of 50 patients
with psychosis and childhood trauma who received an 8-week ACTp group. An
avoidant attachment style and lower number of sessions attended predicted poorer
outcomes, but trauma severity did not moderate the effects of ACTp.
Other Third Wave Interventions for Psychosis
Although the literature base for ACTp is more extensive than that of other third
wave treatment approach for psychosis, emerging research also shows promising
findings for related mindfulness, acceptance, and compassion-based therapies for
this population. Third wave interventions aside from ACTp involve amalgamations
of mindfulness- and acceptance-based treatment protocols and second wave inter-
ventions for psychosis. Much like ACTp, each approach tends to include the key
features involved in third wave treatments: an emphasis on functional, not symp-
tomatic change, acceptance, self-compassion, and mindfulness. Among these other
approaches includes mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn,
1982), mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002), person-
based cognitive therapy for distressing psychosis (PBCT; Chadwick et al., 2005),
and compassion-focused therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2009).
Typically delivered in a group format over several weeks, mindfulness programs
based on MBCT and MBSR aim at reducing distress in individuals with psychosis
(Chadwick et al., 2005). Using meditation techniques adapted for those with psy-
chosis, including briefer breathing and body scan exercises, they attempt to alter the
relationship between the patient’s psychotic experiences and associated distress.
Controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials of mindfulness groups for psychosis have
demonstrated significant effects with respect to remission rates, rehospitalizations,
psychiatric symptoms, functioning, insight into illness, and mindful responding to
internal experiences of psychosis (Chien et al., 2017; Chien & Thompson, 2014;
Langer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016). A meta-analysis of mindfulness-based inter-
ventions for psychosis other than ACTp, comprised primarily of trials involving
variations of MBSR or MBCT, indicated small to moderate effects for overall and
positive symptoms, as well as small effects for negative symptoms (Hodann-
Caudevilla et al., 2020).
Person-based cognitive therapy (PBCT) is typically delivered in 12 individual or
group sessions and combines second wave CBT and mindfulness-based treatment
for psychosis. Unique to PBCT is the integration of an individual’s negative schema
of self and others (Hayward et al., 2015). Currently, one quantitative and two quali-
tative studies exist for PBCT for psychosis, with findings showing early support for
PBCT in improving overall wellbeing, distress, and reactions to internal experi-
ences of psychosis (Dannahy et al., 2011; Goodliffe et al., 2010; May et al., 2014).
Compassion-focused therapy (CFT) uses strategies, such as compassion-oriented
meditation and focused imagery practices, to increase compassion in the interest of
“soothing” the self and increasing social affiliation to regulate perceptions of threat.
CFT’s adaptation for individuals with psychosis emphasizes the importance of fos-
tering compassion in coping with shame, depression, and stigma experienced
directly and indirectly as a result of the illness (Taylor & Abba, 2015). Emerging
research suggests that CFT improves compassion, shame, and negative beliefs about
psychosis (Braehler et al., 2013; Laithwaite et al., 2009; Martins et al., 2017).
Additional mindfulness interventions for psychosis have emerged over the years as
well, including treatments targeting emotion regulation in early psychosis (Khoury
et al., 2013), mindfulness and social cognition training (Mediavilla et al., 2019), and
lovingkindness meditation (Johnson et al., 2011).
Case Illustration
Client Description and History of Illness
Note that details of this case example were altered to protect the identity of the
patient. Claudia is a 33-year-old, single, Black/African-American, cisgender
woman, who presented at the behest of her friend at an outpatient mental health
clinic for worsening anxiety, paranoia, auditory hallucinations, depression, and pas-
sive suicidal ideation over the past three months. Claudia stated her symptoms were
exacerbated after becoming socially isolated in her apartment due to the COVID-19
lockdown.
Prior to the lockdown, Claudia was working part time at a bakery, spending her
free time with family, going to the mall, and helping her church on the weekends. In
addition to being psychiatrically disabled, in recent years Claudia was working part-
time at a bakery which hired individuals with serious mental illness. Prior to the
COVID-19 lockdown, Claudia frequently spent evenings and weekends with her
family, including her father and sister, both of whom lived within 30 minutes of her.
Claudia also described being very religious (Protestant) and attending church ser-
vices regularly until the lockdown began.
Claudia had no formal psychiatric history prior to her mother’s death which
occurred when Claudia was 17. In the weeks following her mother’s death, Claudia
developed severe symptoms of depression, anxiety, and eventually psychosis, and
she experienced her first and only suicide attempt (via overdose). Claudia had four
psychiatric hospitalizations total during her life, which occurred after prolonged
periods of isolation and withdrawal triggered by depression. Claudia was prescribed
various antipsychotic medications (e.g., Haloperidol, Aripiprazole, Olanzapine)
over the years, but the medication Claudia had taken consistently for the past several
years is Clozapine, with generally good effects and minimal side effects.
Claudia stated that her anxiety had significantly worsened during the lockdown,
lasting most of the day nearly every day. Claudia reported distressing, paranoid
thoughts that the CIA had been monitoring her video phone calls. For that reason,
she refused to communicate with any of her social supports or treatment providers
via video conferencing. Because her sister was immunocompromised, Claudia was
unable to make in person visits in recent months. Claudia described being “tor-
tured” by paranoid thoughts that intruders were coming into her apartment at night,
rearranging her furniture, and stealing her personal belongings. Claudia stated that
to protect herself from intruders coming into her apartment, she started blockading
her front door nightly before going to sleep. Claudia stated she began hearing voices
around the time of her mother’s passing, characterized by derogatory, rude voices of
one man and one woman, neither of whom she recognized in real life. Although she
consistently experienced auditory hallucinations since age 17, the voices tended to
stay relatively low in volume and intensity when they did appear, but had worsened
in the past few months.
ssessment of the Client’s Problems, Goals, Strengths,

A
and History
Claudia was administered several assessments by her therapist at the start of treat-
ment capturing diagnostic and clinical variables of interest: the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-5 for diagnosis, the interviewer-rated Brief Psychiatric Rating
Scale (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962) for psychiatric symptom severity, the self-
report Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Bond et al., 2011) to measure
experiential avoidance and psychological flexibility, and the self-report WHO
Disability Assessment Schedule-II (WHODAS; Federici et al., 2009) to measure
overall functional impairment (Andrews et al., 2009).
Claudia met diagnostic criteria for schizoaffective disorder, depressive type as
determined by the SCID-5, due to symptoms including delusions (paranoia), hallu-
cinations (derogatory voices), and negative symptoms (anhedonia), as well as the
presence of multiple major depressive episodes lasting the majority of the time
since her psychotic symptoms began. She also demonstrated high levels of experi-
ential avoidance and deficits in role functioning (e.g., impairments in daily living,
household, and community activities).
Claudia also possessed a number of strengths and protective factors working in
her favor prognostically. Claudia was motivated, interpersonally affiliated, involved
in religious activity, supported by her family, and able to live independently. Claudia
stated that as part of treatment, she wanted to identify ways of coping better with her
symptoms so that she could spend more time with her family again and get back to
her normal activities (i.e., completing tasks outside her house, interacting with
others).
Case Formulation and Treatment Plan
By the time she presented for therapy, Claudia was almost entirely isolated from her
sources of social support. She was limited to seeing her father (who is elderly) and
sister (who is immunocompromised) in person infrequently. Fearful of monitoring
by the CIA, Claudia severely restricted her normal socializing patterns. Her church
was no longer hosting in-person sermons due to COVID-19 restrictions. Claudia
also was not attaining the appropriate level of care by her psychiatrist as she became
unwilling to communicate via telehealth. Isolation and disengagement with treat-
ment were antecedents to her depression, anxiety, hallucinations and paranoia.
Looking to avoid further exacerbation of her symptoms, Claudia spent much of her
time indoors to protect herself from life stressors. She attempted to distract and
distance herself from her disturbing thoughts and berating voices; however, no mat-
ter the number of times she tried, she reported that she could not seem to escape them.
After the therapist obtained informed consent about treatment from Claudia and
discussed treatment with Claudia’s psychiatrist, ACTp was determined to be appro-
priate for her ongoing and chronic symptoms (i.e., hallucinations, paranoia). She
had also received several courses of more traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy
in the past with some benefit but was looking to try something different.
Treatment was aimed at increasing Claudia’s psychological acceptance and flex-
ibility in pursuing committed, valued actions. The therapist assisted Claudia in fos-
tering a more accepting and open stance toward all her experiences, including
symptoms of psychosis, to counteract her avoidance behaviors that caused func-
tional impairment and created a vicious cycle that would ultimately worsen her
symptoms. Claudia learned skills such as contacting the present moment through
mindfulness, interacting with the world based on her values instead of her fears, and
increasing her response flexibility so that she could remain committed and work
through obstacles to pursue valued goals despite her symptoms.
Description of Therapy Course
Sessions 1–3. In these initial sessions, the therapist and Claudia worked on building
a healthy working alliance, reviewing her history, constructing a preliminary shared
ACTp case conceptualization, and discussing the ACTp treatment rationale. Leading
therapy with an initial discussion of her values, and what she prioritized as being
most important to her in life, laid a foundation for the sessions that followed. The
therapist asked Claudia to consider: “If your symptoms were to go away completely
in the next minute, how might you live your life differently?” Next, the therapist and
Claudia worked to identify her core values, first clarifying the difference between
values and goals. The therapist explained the “Compass vs Directions” metaphor,
which defines values as being like points on a compass, or the direction in which she
wishes to travel in life, and goals as being specific destinations along the way.
Claudia endorsed her most important values as being family, community, spiritual-
ity/religion, and physical health. She worked with the therapist to set weekly goals,
broken down into smaller, more manageable steps, to immediately engage Claudia
in committed action towards her values, which included going on daily walks, say-
ing gratitude prayers, and calling her father and sister on the phone for five minutes
to start. There were various goals Claudia stated she would ideally like to be able to
achieve, but which were not possible without the use of video chat (e.g., seeing her
family, participating in group religious activities). Claudia emphasized that incorpo-
rating her family into this process was extremely important to her culturally. The
therapist coordinated with Claudia’s father and sister over a telephone family ther-
apy session after obtaining releases of information for this purpose, where the fam-
ily learned how to support Claudia’s treatment goals and work toward her video
chat goal.
Sessions 4–9. Working toward her valued goals highlighted how Claudia’s symp-
toms functioned to help her avoid distress in the moment, but at the cost of being
disconnected with her values (“Digging a Hole” Metaphor, in which a person keeps
digging a hole because they only have a shovel as a tool, and are invited to put it
down and try something different). In this phase of treatment, the goal was fostering
Claudia’s ability to take committed action towards valued-living in the presence of
symptoms, without trying to get them to go away first, but instead learning to man-
age them in the moment and stay on course. As treatment progressed, the therapist
focused on implementation of the additional core processes of ACTp – mindfulness,
acceptance, perspective taking, and cognitive defusion. In addition, visual aids, car-
toons, and animated videos also were used to reinforce the concepts and to aid in the
learning process.
Slowly Claudia’s therapist began training her in mindfulness practices. Claudia
was first guided through lessons in mindfulness using the exercises of mindful eat-
ing (raisins, Skittles), which she found highly engaging. Claudia then began listen-
ing to a guided lovingkindness meditation at least once weekly in between sessions,
to help address her depressive and self-deprecating thoughts and voices. Brief
(5 minute), eyes open mindfulness to breath meditation exercises also were incor-
porated into the start of sessions over time.
The therapist then introduced acceptance of symptoms and the notion of increas-
ing Claudia’s willingness to sit with internal experiences, such as her derogatory
voices, fear of intruders, or paranoia about the CIA, without reacting to them or
judging them, in the interest of actively choosing actions that moved her toward her
values instead of away from them. The therapist used the “Tug of War with a
Monster” metaphor as a way of helping her to visualize the difference between
struggling with her thoughts and accepting her thoughts as thoughts. The therapist
encouraged Claudia to increase her willingness as a choice to be more loving, kind,
and accepting towards herself and her uncomfortable experiences. Perspective tak-
ing and cognitive defusion were further reinforced for Claudia with the notion of
separating herself from her internal experience of symptoms. Defusion exercises
included the “I Can’t Hold This Pen” exercise, in which the person says one thing
but does another, demonstrating that thoughts do not need to dictate one’s actions.
Claudia proceeded to challenge herself outside of session and was encouraged to

start reducing the time spent engaging in the compulsive behaviors causing her the
most distress (i.e., blockading her door at night).
Next, the therapist normalized experiential avoidance as a temporarily effective,
but ultimately unhelpful method for coping with challenges in life. The therapist
used the “Pink Elephant” Metaphor to emphasize this point; in this metaphor, one is
encouraged to “try not to think of a pink elephant,” which, of course, elicits one to
think of a pink elephant immediately. Claudia reviewed the role that experiential
avoidance played in her life, recently manifesting in her refusing to leave her apart-
ment or use video chat. Because of this avoidance pattern, Claudia was no longer
engaging in the activities most meaningful to her, causing her to feel disconnected
and estranged from her family, culture, church, and community. Using skills to
build psychological flexibility, Claudia began to demonstrate a willingness to briefly
(5 minutes at a time) use video communication again because it meant she would be
able to more easily communicate and connect with her family. At first this was done
in session with the therapist present, with homework to eventually start to do it on
her own, with family support. The therapist helped to prompt her to use acceptance
and defusion skills when dealing with her negative internal experiences that arose
during the video chat. After gradual completion of values consistent actions of
increasing difficulty for her, Claudia found that she was able to communicate via
video chat more independently, and doing so was highly rewarding, despite her
occasional thoughts of being monitored by the CIA. Claudia eventually began other
additional behavioral tasks which were in line with her life values, including partici-
pating in virtual religious services, completing daily walks, and starting to volunteer
for a suicide hotline, something she was able to do from home.
Sessions 10–12. Claudia’s final therapy sessions were intended to be used for
discharge planning, relapse prevention, and follow-up “booster” sessions. Booster
sessions were provided as transitional support for Claudia and included several
follow-up phone sessions after stopping in person work, to reinforce the continued
application of ACTp concepts and skills. Such phone calls entailed 20- to 30-minute
review of basic ACTp principles, followed by discussions of Claudia’s functioning
and application of ACTp to her current situation. The therapist coordinated care
with Claudia’s family to help them assist in Claudia’s continuation of care, and to
support her in implementing the treatment plan she created for herself.
Therapy Monitoring and Use of Feedback Information
The therapist received ongoing case consultation from a psychologist experienced

in ACTp. Assessment measures were re-administered periodically during and at the
end of treatment (e.g., BPRS, AAQ, WHODAS-II) to monitor progress. Potential
disruptions in the therapeutic alliance were also monitored and addressed during
sessions. The therapist would check in with Claudia regularly to support her in
expressing any confusion, disagreement, or uncomfortable feelings she might have
been having in the moment. The therapist offered support and empathy and empha-
sized that they were both “in the same boat” even though they might have different
experiences. The therapist also appropriately self-disclosed her own discomfort or
uncertainty when relevant. It was often helpful to discuss these situations in the
content of Claudia’s values, and how the therapist could better support them.
Concluding Evaluation of the Therapy’s Process and Outcome
Learning to increase her psychological flexibility over the course of therapy allowed
Claudia the freedom to separate her sense of self from her delusional thought con-
tent (e.g., being monitoring by the CIA) which was her avoidance behaviors.
Further, Claudia learned how to more compassionately accept that she does, indeed,
experience symptoms, such as derogatory voices, at times, and will likely continue
to do so. However, over time, Claudia became less reactive to these experiences
because meaning shifted from the psychotic experiences to her personally valued
experiences. As a result of learning to be aware but not entangled with her voices,
Claudia became capable of redirecting to healthy behaviors instead in the moment.
In time, Claudia began increasing her engagement in valued goals, like volunteer-
ing, exercising, and staying in contact with her family.
Claudia’s BPRS scores increased and decreased somewhat during therapy as she
began working on concepts centering around activating toward her values despite
symptoms. As she reflected on her symptoms in a more open and honest way, she
more willingly reported hallucinations and delusions as they were occurring, instead
of minimizing them or telling others what she thought they would want to hear. The
therapist encouraged Claudia’s increasing self-disclosures with empathy and sup-
port. Based on the overall trajectory of change of BPRS scores, Claudia demon-
strated notable improvements in overall symptomatology by end of treatment, with
her symptom score decreasing by nearly half. Claudia’s scores on the AAQ-II and
WHODAS-II also improved over time, signifying increased psychological flexibil-
ity and functioning. Perhaps most importantly, by the end of treatment and at the
follow-up, Claudia reportedly stated she felt “more like [herself] again.”
Comparing ACT vs First and Second Wave Approaches
All waves of behavior therapy emphasize a functional analysis of behavior to under-

stand what is maintaining maladaptive patterns and to determine how to intervene
to modify them. The first wave of behavior therapy for schizophrenia emphasized
principles of reinforcement and the practicing of adaptive skills, as exemplified in
token economies (Dickerson et al., 2005) and social skills training (Kopelowicz
et al., 2006). In these types of interventions, positive reinforcement, behavioral
rehearsal, and social learning principles are used to foster desired behaviors,
including self-care, treatment adherence, social and vocational skills, and indepen-
dent living. ACTp shares aspects of traditional behavioral therapy in that both rely
on principles of reinforcement (instead of punishment) to foster adaptive behavior
change efforts. However, ACTp differs from the first wave through its emphasis on
applying learning principles via Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Barnes-Holmes &
Roche, 2001) to target the negative effects of verbal behavior on the development
and maintenance of psychopathology. In addition, ACTp emphasizes the clarifica-
tion and mobilization of the patient’s personally-defined and freely-chosen life val-
ues in directing goal setting and behavior change efforts.
In addition, ACTp and second wave CBT for psychosis share several important
aspects, including: a focus on the present relative to the past in sessions, the impor-
tance of building a strong therapeutic alliance, the establishment of specific behav-
ioral goals, the use of exposure-based techniques when appropriate, and an
appreciation of how language and cognition influence the distress and impairment
stemming from psychotic symptoms (although they approach changing them in dif-
ferent ways). However, ACTp differs from traditional CBT for psychosis in that the
former does not attempt to directly change dysfunctional cognitions related to psy-
chosis, but instead focuses on building meta-cognitive processes and modifying
contextual factors to reduce stress and impairment (McLeod, 2009). For example,
whereas CBT for psychosis may encourage the patient to test delusions and halluci-
nations to correct information processing biases (e.g., jumping to conclusions),
ACT for psychosis focuses more broadly on helping people to simply “make room”
for psychotic experiences when they occur while reserving judgement, to choose
the more workable approach in the moment, and to do all of this in the service of
pursuing one’s valued goals despite ongoing symptoms. Although both strategies
would ultimately result in new learning that would change pre-existing habits, they
would do this through somewhat different pathways. In addition, ACTp does not
focus on psychotic symptom reduction directly (as some first and second wave
approaches for psychosis do), but instead on building the functional capacity of the
individual. Psychotic symptom reduction is often achieved indirectly by reducing
avoidance and stress. However, currently there are no direct comparisons of ACTp
versus first or second wave behavior therapies in RCTs, so conclusions about the
similarities versus differences among these interventions cannot be drawn at an
empirical level.
Conclusion
Research has demonstrated the safety, feasibility, and acceptability of ACTp. In

addition, ACTp has been found to produce significant improvements in psychotic
symptoms, depression, and functioning, along with reducing rehospitalization rates
compared with treatment as usual. ACTp has been used in inpatient and outpatient
settings, in group and individual formats, in chronic and acute psychosis, and in
emerging mHealth formats. However, clinical effects vary based on the outcome
measure used and the sample characteristics. Symptom reduction may be more vari-
able given ACTp’s lack of specific focus on this goal and encouragement of a more
honest open reporting of experiences by individuals with psychosis. Larger and
more rigorously controlled clinical trials of ACTp are needed to further clarify the
treatment’s clinical effects. At this time, it is unclear whether ACTp is more or less
effective compared with other empirically-supported first or second wave
approaches, or whether it works through similar or different mechanisms to achieve
its outcomes, because direct tests have not been conducted in RCTs. Given its treat-
ment model, ACTp may be most appropriate for those with chronic or acute psycho-
sis, where reducing ineffective struggle with symptoms can help to decrease
functional impairment. Overall, ACTp should be considered as a treatment option
for patients who have failed other first/second wave treatments or whose clinical
problems fit the ACTp model, taking into account patient preference and therapist
competency.
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Substance-Related and Addictive
Disorders: First Wave Case
Conceptualization
Hendrik G. Roozen and Jane Ellen Smith
Introduction
The Skinnerian operant principles have been considered the lynchpin of key behav-
ior modification strategies, such as the Token Economy (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968),
Contingency Management (CM; Higgins et al., 2007), and Community
Reinforcement Approach (CRA; Hunt & Azrin, 1973). In this operant perspective
desired behaviors are considered malleable because of their consequences: When
systematically reinforced, these desired behaviors will most likely re-occur more
frequently. Skinner’s student and colleague, Nathan Azrin, tested and applied this
operant perspective in clinical practice embedded to treat various mental health
problems, including addiction. The treatment used for alcohol problems was coined
CRA (Azrin, 1976; Hunt & Azrin, 1973).
The goal of CRA is to rearrange individuals’ reinforcement schedules such that
they result in a healthier lifestyle that is more rewarding than the use of alcohol or
drugs. CRA is a comprehensive treatment package that contains a wide range of
behavioral and social interventions that focus on the management of substance-
related behaviors as well as behavioral adaptation in other disrupted life-areas, such
as financial, housing, vocational, social, and recreational domains. CRA readily can
be used in conjunction with pharmacological interventions, such as disulfiram,
acamprosate, naltrexone, methadone, buprenorphine, facilitating integrated
medication-assisted treatment (e.g., Abbott et al., 1998; Azrin, 1976; Azrin et al.,
1982; Bickel et al., 1997; Miller et al., 2001; Roozen et al., 2003, 2013).
H. G. Roozen (*)
Center on Alcoholism, Substance Abuse, and Addictions (CASAA), University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
e-mail: hroozen@unm.edu; info@communityreinforcement.com
J. E. Smith
Psychology Department, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
e-mail: janellen@unm.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_23
526 H. G. Roozen and J. E. Smith
Since its inception, CRA has been demonstrated to be among the most strongly
supported treatment methods for substance abuse in multiple reviews and meta-
analyses (Miller et al., 2011; also see “Development and Effectiveness of CRA”
section). This chapter discusses more than a century’s worth of evidence with
respect to the underlying behavioral mechanisms in CRA. We also outline the effec-
tiveness of CRA as a treatment for various substance use disorders, including
comorbid psychiatric conditions, such as those commonly found in homeless indi-
viduals (Smith et al., 1998). Subsequently we present the use of CRA with adoles-
cents in the juvenile justice system (Hunter et al., 2014), followed by the combination
of CRA and CM. Furthermore, we discuss two novel variants of CRA which are
considered viable approaches for treating special populations: adolescent-CRA
(A-CRA; Godley et al., 2016) for adolescents with substance-related problems and
Community Reinforcement and Family Training (CRAFT; Smith & Meyers, 2004)
for assisting family members of treatment-resistant individuals with substance use
disorders (SUDs). To do so, we first present the operant conditioning principles and
its clinical applications, which is cemented in the foundation of CRA.
Operant Conditioning
The three aforementioned treatment systems: Token Economy, CM and CRA are
rooted in operant conditioning. Operant conditioning is based on the assumption
that environmental contingencies are key to encouraging or discouraging substance-
using behavior. Operant conditioning is targeted on the modification of (maladap-
tive) behavior by aiming at the stimulus-response relationship. More than a century
ago, Edward Lee Thorndike (1898) started to explore these stimulus-response asso-
ciations, which ultimately resulted in the ‘Law of Effect’. This law states that
rewards strengthen stimulus-response associations, whereas unpleasant conditions
weaken these relationships (Thorndike, 1898). Based on numerous experiments,
Burrhus Frederic Skinner later refined Thorndike’s theory and introduced the term
‘reinforcer’ (Skinner, 1938). The fundamental principle of reinforcement, whether
positive or negative, is that responses followed by a reinforcer will increase their
frequency of occurrence (Skinner, 1938).
Clinical Applications of Operant Conditioning
As part of the applied behavior modification uprise in the early 1960s, applications
of operant conditioning, which more recently have been referred to as reinforcement-
based therapy (Jones et al., 2005), were systematically studied by behaviorists, such
as Nathan Azrin and colleagues (e.g., Azrin et al., 1982; Hunt & Azrin 1973). In
general, these studies have contributed to the development of empirically validated
treatments, characterized by being relatively brief, present- and problem-focused,
Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders: First Wave Case Conceptualization 527
and employing skill-training and assigning homework. Many of these applications

still have widespread usage (Chambliss & Ollendick, 2001; O’Donohue et al., 2000).
These treatments often encompass behavioral procedures such as: (1) stimulus-
control, (2) shaping, (3) chaining, and (4) time-out. Stimulus-control characterizes
a behavior that is triggered by the presence or absence of a stimulus (Baum, 2005).
In other words, the behavior occurs at a higher frequency when the stimulus is pres-
ent, and the behavior occurs at a lower frequency when the stimulus is absent.
Shaping is a process that entails the differential reinforcement of successive approx-
imations toward the ultimate desired behavior by reinforcing small and gradual
steps (Peterson, 2004). In order to shape even more complex behaviors, a procedure
known as chaining can be utilized (Cooper et al., 2014). In chaining, a behavior set
is linked to another set by use of a discriminative stimulus, i.e., an antecedent stimu-
lus that is associated with the next behavior being reinforced. A time-out from posi-
tive reinforcement occurs when an individual is separated temporarily (see Baron &
Kaufman, 1966) from an enriched and pleasant environment (time-in). For instance,
when an unacceptable or abrasive behavior has occurred, the individual is removed
from that specific environment with the goal of extinguishing the undesired behav-
ior (Smith, 1981).
It must be noted that a time-out is an extinction procedure, not punishment.
Skinner considered punishment generally ineffective for modifying human behav-
ior (Skinner, 1953), because of emotional reactions common to punishment as well
as escape or avoidance behavior. One of the overarching characteristics of SUDs is
the persistent acquisition and consumption of chemical substances, despite a typical
rise in negative consequences in the medical, social, and/or legal domains. These
negative consequences have been viewed in the past as critical for building motiva-
tion to change through the process of the individual experiencing punishment.
Oftentimes this has been referred to as the individual having “hit rock bottom”.
More recently, ‘negative’ approaches such as confrontational counseling and aver-
sive therapies have been found to be ineffective in decreasing the use of alcohol and
other substances (Miller et al., 1998; Miller & Wilbourne, 2002; White &
Miller, 2007).
The four aforementioned complementary behavioral procedures were studied
extensively by Azrin and colleagues in self-care programs for severe mentally dis-
abled individuals, who sometimes had concurrent addiction issues. The procedures
have addressed toilet training (Foxx & Azrin, 1973), nocturnal enuresis (Azrin
et al., 1973, b, 1974), eating skills (Azrin & Armstrong, 1973; O’Brien & Azrin,
1972), aggression (Foxx & Azrin, 1972), and self-injury (Azrin et al., 1975, b;
Favell et al., 1982). Also, behavioral programs have been devised for individuals
who had problems with medication compliance (Azrin & Powell, 1969; Sisson &
Azrin, 1986; Azrin & Teichner, 1998), stuttering (Azrin et al., 1968, 1979; Azrin, &
Nunn, 1973; ), Gilles de la Tourette (Azrin & Peterson, 1988; Peterson & Azrin,
1991), Trichotillomania (Azrin et al., 1980), marital dysfunction (Azrin et al.,
1973), unemployment (Azrin et al., 1975; Azrin & Besalel, 1980), parent-youth
interactions (Besalel & Azrin, 1981), and depression (Azrin & Besalel, 1981).
Neurobiological Findings
To date, the mechanisms of addiction is also studied from a neurobiological per-

spective, and these neurobiological findings are often translated to an operant level
of analysis. From a neurobiological perspective, alcohol and/or drug intake activate
reward regions in the animal and human brain by increases in dopamine release
(e.g., Di Chiara & Imperato, 1988; Wise, 2008). During the progression of addic-
tion, disruptive changes of the brain occur in the reward, emotional and executive
circuits, whereby individuals initially, and for a relatively brief time-span, take
drugs to have a hedonic experience or to “get high”. In operant conditioning terms
this stage can be described as positive reinforcement. This is followed by a dys-
phoric phase characterized by a motivational drive to take drugs in order to obtain
transient relief from stress and negative emotions (Volkow et al., 2016). This dys-
phoric stage resembles aspects of negative reinforcement. The third stage of this
multi-step process is associated with dysfunctions of the prefrontal cortical regions
that are implicated in executive processes, including capacities for self-regulation,
decision making, flexibility and planning (Volkow et al., 2016).
Consequently, positive or negative reinforcement as a central mechanism for
substance abuse implies a high level of goal-directedness. Nevertheless, recent
research on chronic alcohol dependence found evidence of a shift from reward- or
goal-directed behavior towards stimulus-driven habitual behavior while the rein-
forcing effects or associated outcomes become less relevant. More specifically,
while the initiation of drug use is considered goal-directed, drug-taking behavior
develops into a stimulus-driven habit, which characterized by persistent drug use
irrespective of consequences (Lim et al., 2019).
Nevertheless, since addiction begins with the formation of habits through posi-
tive reinforcement (Wise & Koob, 2014), the historical model of operant condition-
ing (Skinner 1938) still fits well in this context. Specifically, such behavior of
substance use is not primarily driven by cognitive and motivational mediators (e.g.,
intrinsic motivation and self-control) but rather turned into an automatic drive
directly guided by stimuli in the environment (Sjoerds et al., 2013, 2014). According
the dual-systems theory, the role of such automatic habitual control conflicts with
deliberative modes of self-control, impairing the forecasts of long-term conse-
quences of a given action (e.g., McClure & Bickel, 2014). In fact, there is a growing
body of evidence showing that individuals with substance abuse choose an immedi-
ate reward and ignore future negative consequences as a result of neural adaptations
in the brain, which are theorized to increase a greater risk for relapse (Volkow
et al., 2016).
In laboratory settings, these poor decision-making processes have been exten-
sively studied by means of neurobiological tasks, such as the Iowa Gambling task
(Bechara et al., 1994). In this task it becomes evident that participants with SUDs
are more prone to choose large rewards at the expense of even larger future losses
(e.g., van Toor et al., 2011). This bias towards rewards has become the subject of
research of key behavioral processes that have been augmented by CRA, along with
other first-wave interventions, such as token economy and CM.
Community Reinforcement Approach: An Applied Extension
The Use of Incentives: Alternative Rewards
Laboratory research has showed that the availability of unbiased (non-drug related)
environmental factors can influence drug use (Higgins & Petry, 1999). For example,
animal studies have shown that under restricted conditions, whereby animals can
choose from drug rewards or alternative non-substance related options (such as food
or sweetened water), they often preferred the non-drug option (e.g., Lenoir et al.,
2007). Such choice-making has been observed between drugs and social interac-
tions as well (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004). Furthermore, Solinas et al. (2009,
2010) demonstrated that enriching the environment of mice in their cages reduced
the reinforcing effects of stimulants and eliminated cocaine-induced behavioral
sensitization.
Early clinical trials of the use of incentives can be traced back to the ‘Token
Economy’ system that was designed for individuals with various mental health
problems at the Anna State Hospital in Illinois (Allyon & Azrin, 1965, 1968). At
that time, ‘tokens’ could be earned contingent on desired behavior and exchanged
for various merchandises and privileges, such as books, clothes, chocolate, watch-
ing a movie, playing table-tennis, having room privacy, walking with staff, and
watching television (Betgem, 1982).
As an outgrowth of this behavioral approach (Petry, 2000), a more formal labora-
tory controlled intervention emerged that was coined “motivational incentives” or
“contingency management (CM)”. In the 1970s when CM was introduced, naturally-
occurring reinforcements primarily were used, such as take-home privileges for
methadone. A series of experiments on CM were successfully implemented by
Maxine Stitzer at the Johns Hopkins University (Stitzer et al., 1984; Stitzer & Petry,
2006a, b). In recent years, CM has been top-listed among treatments in several
meta-analyses (Dutra et al., 2008; Lussier et al., 2006; Prendergast et al., 2006).
Impressively, more than 500 empirical studies have been conducted on CM, with a
large proportion of them showing the clinical efficacy of CM (Davis et al., 2016).
It is important to note that CM is not considered a panacea, as studies have shown
that there were also non-responders. For instance, non-response were said to occur
when the reinforcement schedule was insufficiently salient, or because, for a sub-
group of individuals, the desired target behavior was too complex to attain. Evidence
also shows that a significant challenge remains in terms of its implementation into
routine clinical practice (see Roozen, 2009).
In practice, CM is employed to achieve positive behavior change by the provi-
sion of reinforcing incentives upon reaching a predefined treatment goal (e.g.,
abstinence over a seven-day period) or by withholding those incentives when

patients engage in the undesired behavior (Higgins & Petry, 1999). These reinforc-
ers typically take the form of money, prizes, or vouchers (redeemable for items and
services consistent with a drug or alcohol-free lifestyle). Many programs make
these reinforcers contingent upon the patient’s provision of drug-free urine toxicol-
ogy specimens or a well-specified target behavior.
Development and Effectiveness of CRA
In the past century, by focusing on environment-organism interactions, experiments

were conducted to develop behavioral programs for tobacco-dependent individuals
(Azrin & Powell, 1968) and patients with alcohol use disorders (Azrin, 1976; Azrin
et al., 1982; Hunt & Azrin, 1973). More specifically, with respect to the myriad of
problems associated with alcohol use disorder, Nathan Azrin and George Hunt cre-
ated a comprehensive treatment in the early 1970s designated the “community-
reinforcement approach to alcoholism” (Hunt & Azrin, 1973, p. 92).
Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) focuses on the reinforcement of an
alternative lifestyle that is more rewarding than a substance using one (Meyers &
Smith, 1995). CRA stratifies environmental contingencies to support the pursuit of
a wide range of vibrant non-substance-related behaviors, such as (high impact)
sports, playing music, following educational classes, working, dining in restaurants,
socializing, attending to personal care, engaging in intimacy, and hobbies. As
described above, CRA also enhances individuals’ ability to cope with problems in
several major life areas.
CRA has been shown effective for patients with various alcohol and drug prob-
lems in severity (Roozen et al., 2013). CRA has been studied in inpatient, outpa-
tient, and day treatment settings, as well as in both rural and urban environments. A
typical length of a regular (outpatient) treatment ranges from 3–6 months, but some-
times a trajectory takes longer dependent on patients’ condition, somatic/psychiat-
ric comorbidity, mode of treatment referral (voluntary or coercive), legal
involvement, and treatment modality (e.g., inpatient followed by outpatient treat-
ment). CRA can be delivered in individual as well as group format. In several cases,
multiple professionals are involved for a single clinical case. For instance, in the
capital city of the Netherlands (Amsterdam), inner-city patients with complex
chronic alcohol and drugs problems living at home or in shelters are treated with a
CRA team that consists of approximately 40 health professionals (Nabitz &
Staats, 2018).
Treatment goals of CRA have included a focus on abstinence, stabilization or
controlled use, and harm reduction. Favorable effects have been observed in recent
reviews and meta-analyses that compared outcomes across a wide array of psycho-
social and pharmacological treatments (e.g., Finney & Monahan; 1996; Holder
et al., 1991; Meyers et al., 2011; Miller et al., 1995, 1998, 2003, 2011; Miller &
Wilbourne, 2002; Roozen et al., 2004). In this latter review, meta-analytic pooling
showed that the weighted mean difference regarding the number of drinking days
was decreased −0.94 (95% CI; −1.60 to −0.27) in favor of CRA compared to (12-
step) control conditions in a 6-month treatment window (Roozen et al., 2004).
ontextual Factors That Influence the Promotion of Healthy

C
Alternative Reinforcers
Neuroscience studies on individuals diagnosed with SUDs have demonstrated that

their prefrontal cortex is much less able to cognitively modulate strong desires and
emotions, such as those that account for poor decision-making (e.g., van Toor et al.,
2011) when compared to individuals without SUD diagnoses. The same is true for
flexible, goal-directed action control (see Noel et al., 2013). Thus, the reduction of
substance use can be promoted by enrichening the environment with non-substance
related rewarding alternatives (Carroll, 1996; Tucker, 2001; Vuchinich &
Tucker, 1996).
From a Behavioral Choice Theory perspective (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1983,
1988), the reinforcing valence of substances is a contextually determined product of
direct reinforcing drug effects, individual factors such as impulsivity (e.g., delay
discounting), sensitivity to rewards, and the availability of alternative reinforcers
(Bickel & Marsch, 2001).
Indeed, at least one study found that an increase in substance-free related behav-
iors was negatively related to substance use in college students (Correia et al., 2005),
implying that instructions to reinforce alternative substance-free related behaviors
by increasing exercise and creative activities was found to be relevant to attenuating
the reinforcing valence of substances.
However, this inverse relation was less obvious in studies that used other student
samples (Murphy et al., 2005; Skidmore & Murphy, 2010). Interestingly, these stud-
ies indicated that substance use is also related to substance-free social rewards. A
recent non-clinical study showed that the severity of alcohol use was positively
related to both substance-related activities and non-substance-related activities
(although to a lesser degree). Therefore, it seems plausible that in student popula-
tions, the time spent in alcohol-related activities is not necessarily at the expense of
alcohol-free activities (Delmee et al., 2018). Importantly, the results indicated that
the inclusion of non-substance-related activities in the context of available
substance- related activities dampened the severity of alcohol use (Delmee
et al., 2018).
Another recent clinical study (Tressova-van Veldhoven et al., 2020) on patients
with AUD investigated the role of reward sensitivity towards individuals’ motiva-
tion to engage in goal-directed behavior focused on activity engagement. The activ-
ity engagement was measured by the Pleasant Activity List (PAL; Roozen et al.,
2008) that include 139 different activities. This study also includes other constructs
critical for reward appraisal that potentially influence activity participation, such as
delay discounting and anhedonia. Delay discounting is often viewed as a deprecia-

tion regarding the value of delayed rewards, whereby higher discount rates are asso-
ciated with impulsive choices that are focused on immediate gratification (e.g.,
substance-using behavior) and impede the ability to work toward long-term goals
(Bickel & Marsch, 2001). Anhedonia is considered the inability to experience plea-
sure from activities that are usually found to be enjoyable (Ribot, 1896). It was
found that reward sensitivity was strongly related to non-substance-related activi-
ties. Interestingly, neither anhedonia nor delay discounting impacted this relation-
ship in patients regarding both substance-related and non-substance-related
activities (Tressova-van Veldhoven et al., 2020).
Earlier work on patients’ pleasant activity preferences, defined by activities on
the PAL (Roozen et al., 2008), demonstrated that highly extraverted patients typi-
cally engage in most activities more frequently and consider them more enjoyable
than patients who score low on the extraversion dimension. Despite these reported
differences on most subscales, both patient groups globally value the same type of
activities (Roozen, Evans, Wiersema, & Meyers, 2009). Many patients with sub-
stance use disorders spend much of their time relatively inactive, which can be
characterized as the absence of goal-oriented and pleasant non-substance related
purposeful activities. Consequently, it seems important to explore patients’ indi-
vidual differences, such as in terms of their reward sensitivity and extraversion, as
related to prosocial activity engagement. These findings could support therapists’
efforts to promote an adequate level of reinforcement derived by alternative behav-
iors (Roozen et al., 2014).
Recently, McKay (2017) has advocated that: (1) treatments primarily should tar-
get patients’ access to experiences that are enjoyable and rewarding, instead of
focusing on reducing or eliminating substance use, and (2) efforts should be made
to increase the level of incentives in the community, thereby supporting the effort
needed to sustain long-term abstinence for substance using individuals. As acknowl-
edged these ideas are not new, whereas fostering practical improvements in the
patients’ physical environment has been advocated within the CRA framework
from the seminal studies. Nonetheless, many addiction treatment centers have been
focused primarily on rather ‘talking’ interactions between patient and therapist,
thereby neglecting the importance of patients ‘doing’ practical pleasant and social
activity engagement within their communities. To bridge the gap from office to the
real-life setting aimed at bringing purpose, meaning and excitement to patients’
lives, more work should be conducted to unravel the treatment mechanisms of mul-
tiple CRA procedures to facilitate this process (McKay, 2017).
Characteristics of Community Reinforcement Approach
Although the CRA procedures are well-specified and described in therapist manu-
als, there is still flexibility in the order in which they are introduced, as well as their
spacing, number, and format of delivery (e.g., online by using video, or face-to-face
individually or in a group format) (Meyers & Smith, 1995; Roozen et al., 2012).
More specifically, CRA’s menu-driven approach to procedures can be tailored to the
level of a patient’s personal need. For example, if the patient wants to work on rela-
tionships, several procedures can be employed. These include communication
skills, social/recreational counseling (e.g., to plan social activities like going to
movies, restaurants, museums or walking). In addition, spouses/partners can make
use of CRA relationship therapy to improve their romantic relationship. The plan-
ning of these CRA procedures would be done in conjunction with the patient.
Importantly, the flexibility in treatment planning and the content of sessions allow
therapists to retain a much-needed sense of autonomy.
CRA should be delivered by therapists who can create solid working-alliances
with their patients. These therapists should be energetic, practical, empathic, engag-
ing, non-confrontational, supportive and yet directive (Meyers & Squires, 2001).
Furthermore, therapists must constantly identify a patient’s reinforcers and use
opportunities to reinforce the patient, even in small ways, during sessions. It is the
combination of compassion and skills that appears to make CRA effective (Meyers
& Squires, 2001). CRA interventions, such as home-visits and social/recreational
clubs (Mallams et al., 1982; Meyers & Smith, 1995), may nicely illustrate the
energy and action associated with these CRA therapists.
CRA Treatment Plan: Happiness Scale and Goals of Counseling
The CRA treatment plan is a procedure that revolves around two other CRA proce-
dures: the CRA-Happiness Scale (CRA-HS) and the Goals of Counseling form. The
CRA-HS is a multi-item questionnaire for patients to rate their perceived happiness
on a 10-point Likert scale (see Meyers et al., 2011, p. 383). Across the world, the
CRA-HS has been adapted to accommodate the clinical needs of diagnostic groups
in their own community. For instance, in the Netherlands, this scale was clinically
expanded by including new items, and the terms “happiness” and “satisfaction”
were considered interchangeable, as an “adaptive translation” (see Bouten et al.,
2017; Roozen et al., 2013). It was decided that the colloquial use of “satisfaction”
in the Netherlands more closely approximated the original meaning of “happiness”
in the U.S. Recent psychometric work, including measurement invariance across
college students in five countries (i.e., U.S., Spain, Argentina, Uruguay, and the
Netherlands), reduced the measure back to 10 ‘core’ items (with eight additional
optional items and one open-ended item) (Roozen et al., 2020). The core measure
assesses 10 life-domains: housing, job/education, money management, social life,
alcohol and/or drug use, personal habits, family, emotion, communication, and
health. Information regarding patients’ happiness in each category helps to set the
stage for developing treatment goals.
There are multiple advantages for using the CRA-HS as an instrument in clinical
practice and routine outcome measurement. First, the response-cost is low. On aver-
age it can be completed in less than 90 seconds. Second, clinical progress on each
life-domain can be easily evaluated by using the CRA-HS throughout the program.
As such, this instrument may serve in a Routine Outcome Measurement (ROM)
framework (Dijkstra & Roozen, 2012). Third, the patient can take the lead in choos-
ing which life areas to work on ad libitum. This approach is compatible with the
‘mental health recovery orientation’1 (Anthony, 1993) and affords the opportunity
to discuss such preferences with the therapist (i.e., shared decision making). The
CRA patient-focus is embodied by the commitment of the therapist to address only
those topics the patient wants to address. The implication is that working directly on
a substance abuse problem could be postponed in favor of another life-area that has
a higher priority for the patient. Fourth, besides choosing the life areas on which to
work, patients can be prompted by the therapist to explain what needs to change in
their life in order to be positioned to rate the category several units higher in the near
future. For instance, the therapist can ask: “What needs to be done in this ‘social
life’ category over the next month so that you can change this four into a six?” Small
steps with a higher likelihood of being accomplished can be built upon to eventually
attain patients’ goals.
Fifth, due to the inclusion of multiple life-domains, the CRA-HS can be used in
complementary frameworks such as moderation-reduction and harm-reduction
focused treatments (e.g., Marlatt et al., 2011; Marlatt & Witkiewitz, 2002), instead
of solely focusing on abstinence. For instance, by working on life domains other
than substance use, successful increases in patients’ perception of happiness or sat-
isfaction can be obtained, as was shown in regular treatement outcomes based on
routine outcome masurement (Roozen et al., 2013). The concept of CRA-HS is
closely related to other quality of life measures (Irsel et al., submitted), whereby
support was obtained for internal consistency and criterion-related validity of the
CRA-HS scores regarding ecologically valid subscales of rumination, personality
traits, and mental health (Roozen et al., 2020). Currently, quality of life is consid-
ered essential in evaluating the accuracy and effectiveness of treatment outcome in
terms of a state of well-being (Bickman & Salzer 1997; Gerharz et al., 2003;
Vederhus et al., 2016). It seems viable that targeting quality of life is especially
important for multi-problem diagnostic groups, such as dually diagnosed individu-
als. Finally, the CRA-HS can be personalized and expanded to include life areas that
are identified as meaningful to the patient (Venner et al., 2016), whereas non-
meaningful items can be omitted.
Sixth, a recent visualized version of CRA-HS comprises printed cards with pic-
tograms related to the life-domains can used to target individuals with intellectual
disabilities, acquired brain injury or developmental problems (Bolsius, 2020). By
means of mapping out each card to three key-emoticons representing patients’ hap-
piness, ranging from unhappy– neutral – happy, the patient is capable in making a
similar selection of life domains to work on during treatment as with the regu-
lar CRA-HS.
1
In which individuals improve their health and wellness, live a self-directed life, and strive to reach
their full potential (American Psychiatric Association, 2022) https://www.psychiatry.org/psychia-
trists/practice/professional-interests/recovery-oriented-care
The same life domains that are stated on the CRA-HS are also listed on both the
Goals of Counseling form and the Perfect-Life form. The Perfect-Life form, which
was modeled after the Perfect Relationship form (Meyers & Smith, 1995, p.
174–176), can be used by the patient in conjunction with the CRA-HS to list out
what ideally would happen on each life domain to attain a ‘perfect life’ on that spe-
cific domain, for instance as a home-work assignment.
Building upon the CRA-HS and supplementary Perfect-Life form, information
can be assessed to make up treatment goals. The clinician works together with the
patient on adhering to basic guidelines when setting goals in these areas. Goals
should be (1) positive (what the patient wants as opposed to what he/she does not
want anymore), (2) specific, measurable, realistic, and (3) under the patient’s con-
trol. Short-term strategies or actions that are needed to accomplish each goal are
identified. These weekly steps toward a goal are essentially the homework assign-
ment. At each session, the clinician checks on homework completion and discusses
any potential barriers that may have thwarted progress.
In sum, working and updating the CRA treatment plan is fundamental to the
CRA approach to improving various areas of the patient’s life. The overall objective
is to introduce patient-specific substance-free reinforcement. Many of these goals,
and the strategies for attaining them, require specific behavioral skills training, such
as communication, problem solving, and drink/drug refusal. Research has shown
that there is a relationship between patients’ exposure to the different CRA proce-
dures and recovery at follow-up (cf. Garner et al., 2009).
CRA Procedures
Functional Analyses
CRA encompasses two types of functional analyses: (1) one that focuses on sub-
stance use or other maladaptive behaviors (such as violence or aggression) in order
to decrease these behaviors (an ‘initial assessment’ version is targeted on a common
episode and a ‘relapse’ version focuses on a single episode), and (2) the other one
that targets healthy, pleasant, pro-social behaviors, in an effort to increase them and
ideally compete with the substance use. Both functional analyses are characterized
by a semi-structured interview that explores the antecedents and consequents of the
specified target behavior. As part of this, it assesses the intra- and inter-psychological
conditions that govern alternative behavior and discourage substance use (see
Meyers & Smith, 1995; Roozen et al., 2012).
Perhaps the most critical information obtained from the functional analysis for
substance using behavior is the list of positive consequences associated with the
patient’s use, because they represent the motives that sustain the alcohol/drug use.
The therapist uses this information to generate acceptable prosocial substitutes for
the patient.
Sobriety Sampling
Sobriety sampling represents a process of ‘shared decision-making’ to “sample” a

time-limited period of sobriety. A relatively short “trial period” of sobriety (e.g.,
2 weeks, a month) is experienced by patients as more attainable than an indefinite
(or even lifelong) period of time. Once the patient has agreed to sample sobriety, the
length must be negotiated, and the patient’s reinforcers must be tied in strategically.
For instance, a patient’s beloved daughter might agree to meet him for coffee, but
only once he has been abstinent for 2 weeks. Importantly, sobriety sampling is used
regardless of whether the final treatment goal is abstinence, moderation, or even
harm-reduction. If the goal is abstinence, a series of brief, manageable periods of
sobriety are linked together over time. If the patient desires moderate drinking, the
clinician can introduce a day-to-day diary to specify the goal amounts during the
sampling period. Even in a harm-reduction perspective, agreements for the duration
of a sampling period can be made, for instance, to drink alcohol at home and not in
public places. Additional benefits of sobriety sampling include the provision of an
opportunity to experiment with new coping strategies, and increased self-efficacy
through goal attainment.
The last part of the Sobriety Sampling procedure involves setting up a specific
plan so that the patient can successfully reach the sobriety goal. Other CRA proce-
dures may be utilized to assist in the process, such as by relying on the functional
analysis for substance use to identify alternative rewarding behaviors, and by teach-
ing CRA problem-solving skills to create plans for handling relapse triggers.
CRA Skill Training
Many patients experience an impaired level of reinforcement derived from the

social domain. In order to target the social domain as an important source of alterna-
tive reinforcement, skills training can be employed to enhance social interaction
patterns. The four main skills are: (a) communication skills (b) problem-solving, (c)
drink/drug refusal training, and (d) job-finding skills. CRA’s action-oriented behav-
ioral approach extensively employs modeling and shaping during role-plays as part
of skills training (Meyers & Smith, 1995).
Communication Skills CRA highlights the value of communication skills training
because social factors may serve as triggers for relapse (Sliedrecht et al., 2019).
Furthermore, effective communication paves the way for the successful implemen-
tation of goal-related tasks, such as job interviewing, making verbal requests, and
talking with loved ones about relationships. Once therapists have discussed this
rationale for focusing on communication training, the communication guidelines
and examples are presented, and a basic communication script is outlined (see
Meyers & Smith, 1995). A series of role-plays (“practices”) follow, with the thera-
pist providing supportive/corrective feedback each time. A homework assignment is
then made that entails the patient going out and engaging in the conversation in the
real-world situation while incorporating the newly-acquired communication skills.
Problem-Solving Skills CRA problem-solving skills training is based on the work

by D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971). The main objective is to break down problems
into manageable steps, to think creatively about possible solutions (“brainstorm”),
and to assess (and overcome) potential obstacles so that the proposed solution will
be successful. The seven steps are: (1) narrowly define the problem, (2) generate
potential solutions (brainstorm), (3) eliminate undesired suggestions, (4) select one
potential solution, (5) generate possible obstacles, (6) address these obstacles, and
(7) assign the specific task (i.e., the homework). Subsequently, the clinician evalu-
ates the outcome of the task at the start of the next therapy session. If the solution
did not resolve the problem, patients are encouraged either to modify the attempted
solution or to select a different potential solution that was generated. Some common
problems that are targeted by this procedure include: inadequate non-using social
networks, sleep difficulties, cravings, and stress.
Drink and Drug Refusal Skills Sometimes patients find themselves in unexpected
situations that require them to actively refuse alcohol or drugs. CRA’s drink/drug
refusal skills training starts with helping patients identify and prepare for high-risk
situations, and proactively making requests to supportive individuals within their
social network who can be available in such situations. Information that was
obtained during the functional analysis can be useful for identifying personally-
relevant high-risk situations.
Assertive communication skills are taught and practiced by means of role-
playing (Monti et al., 1989). Patients are asked to identify verbal responses or
behaviors that have helped them successfully reject offers of substances in the past.
These suggestions are supplemented with additional ideas, such as: (1) saying “no,
thanks” without feeling guilty, (2) using appropriate body language (eye contact, a
firm stance, etc.) while delivering the verbal response, (3) suggesting alternatives
(“No, thanks, but I’ll take an iced tea”), (4) changing the subject (“Did you hear the
news today?”), (5) directly addressing the aggressor about the issue if needed (“Why
is it so important to you that I drink?”), and ultimately (6) leaving the situation.
Patients are requested to identify their own assertive response style and are assisted
in its practice implementation.
Job-Finding Skills
Job-finding skills are discussed and practiced as part of CRA, since having a volun-
tary or paid job is generally a significant source of alternative reinforcement that
commonly is incompatible with substance abuse. In addition to being a source of
money, a job can boost self-esteem, support enjoyable social relationships, and
combat boredom. Based on the work of Azrin and Besalel (1980), CRA offers a
step-by-step approach to obtaining and maintaining a job.
The procedure starts by assessing job preferences and suitability (e.g., avoiding
jobs that present a high risk for relapse). A system is established for tracking con-
tacts with potential employers, and patients are assisted with developing resumes
and completing job applications in a manner that highlights their strengths. Role-
plays are conducted to provide practice in calling potential employers and going on
job interviews. In order to keep a job, the therapists help patients anticipate difficult
work situations based on previous job problems. Other CRA procedures, such as
problem-solving, are introduced when clinically indicated.
Social/Recreational Counseling
Social and recreational counseling helps patients: (1) sample and engage in enjoy-
able (substance-free) social and recreational activities, preferably in their own natu-
ral environment, and (2) discover that some of those activities can compete with
drug and alcohol use without diminished life satisfaction. CRA offers a wealth of
options to develop ideas and create specific plans for increasing the level of proso-
cial healthy activities. Some of these include relying on problem-solving to generate
ideas for new, reasonable activities, or using the Goals of Counseling procedure to
set goals and outline the step-by-step strategies for accomplishing them in the
social/recreational domain. Furthermore, the functional analysis for pro-social,
healthy behaviors (see CRA Functional Analyses) can be conducted. Finally, instru-
ments, such as the PAL (Roozen et al., 2008) or Social Circle (Tracy & Whittaker,
1990), have proven valuable and can be employed as well. Once an activity is iden-
tified, a homework assignment is made to sample the activity, and as usual, potential
obstacles (e.g., transportation, money) are discussed.
Systematic Encouragement
Systematic encouragement is a supplemental procedure for situations in which the

therapist is concerned that the patient may have trouble following through with the
planned activity despite being motivated to do so. This procedure is designed to
increase the likelihood that patients will be successful by helping them take the first
step toward actively engaging in the new activity during the session. This might take
the form of making a phone call or checking a website to locate the schedule for an
activity or to access transportation to it. Potential obstacles are addressed during the
process. The therapist inquires at the next session as to whether the assignment was
completed and whether it had been enjoyable.
Relapse Prevention
The CRA relapse prevention or management (Roozen & van de Wetering, 2007)
procedure teaches patients how to identify high-risk situations so that the threat of
a relapse can be anticipated and managed (e.g., Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). Various
behavioral skills can be practiced to address such situations. For example, the func-
tional analysis can be used to focus specifically on a relapse episode. CRA clini-
cians also utilize a behavioral “chain” by drawing and labeling the series of events
that preceded the last relapse (see Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). Patients are shown how
these seemingly irrelevant and unrelated small decisions throughout the day led
them to a relapse. Clinicians then work with the patients to help them generate dif-
ferent decisions at multiple points along the chain to prevent a future relapse.
Finally, CRA relapse prevention may include the Early Warning System, which
entails having patients set up a plan that enlists the support of a concerned other
(monitor). The therapist helps the monitor and patient generate a list of signals
which indicate that the patient is headed toward a relapse. When a certain number
of these signals are manifested during 1 day, the monitor is free to contact the thera-
pist (with the patient’s consent) to discuss the precarious situation and plan the
next step.
Medication Monitoring
The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) suggests that effective treatments
encompass a combination of behavioral and pharmacological aspects (NIDA,
2018). It is well known that the effect size of studies of pharmacological interven-
tions is rather modest, partly because of problems with treatment compliance
(O’Brien & McLellan, 1996). Increased adherence to treatment is associated with a
reduction in therapy time, thereby reducing costs and increasing benefits (e.g., Azrin
et al., 1982; Miller et al., 2001). CRA offers a pharmacotherapy–compliance proce-
dure (Sisson & Azrin, 1986) that entails having patients agree to take their medica-
tion under the supervision of a supportive loved one. This monitor attends a session
with the patient in order to learn positive communication skills for administering the
medication. In line with the Early Warning System, a plan is developed regarding
the steps to take if the patient refuses to take the medication. This medication moni-
toring procedure has been used to monitor a variety of medications, such as for
individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), bipolar disorder,
and depression.
Relationship Therapy
CRA relationship therapy is focused on improving the overall interaction style

between the patient and the partner, which typically is a valuable source of rein-
forcement (see Meyers & Smith, 1995). A basic part of CRA’s relationship therapy
entails teaching the couple CRA communication and problem-solving skills (which
the patient may have already learned in individual sessions). These elements are
essential as far as the couple communicating effectively with each other in a respect-
ful manner, and setting reasonable goals for each other and their relationship.
In order to identify the couple’s main problem areas, both individuals rate their
happiness with their partner on a 10-point scale across multiple domains using the
CRA Relationship Happiness Scale (CRA-RHS; see Meyers & Smith, 1995). The
domains include: household responsibilities, raising the children, social activities,
money management, communication, sex and affection, job or school, emotional
support, partner’s independence, and general happiness. Partners are asked to focus
on what they would like their partner to change in several of the domains to improve
the relationship satisfaction. The guidelines for specifying goals and strategies (see
CRA Treatment Plan: Happiness Scale and Goals of Counseling section) are fol-
lowed, and the newly learned positive communication skills are used to verbally
convey requests to each other. The negotiated goals/strategies become the home-
work assignments.
Finally, another homework assignment is based on the Daily Reminder to Be
Nice exercise (see Meyers & Smith, 1995), during which each partner commits to
increasing at least one of seven partner-pleasing behaviors (e.g., expressing appre-
ciation, giving a pleasant surprise) on a daily basis in an effort to reinstate positive
behaviors. In subsequent sessions, the partners report their progress, discuss poten-
tial barriers to completing their goals, and identify future goals.
Case Illustration
Below is an exemplar case of “Joe” who underwent a CRA. The format of CRA
presented in this case example is common for the outpatient treatment of an indi-
vidual with a substance use problem who either does not need to participate in a
detox program first, or who has already done so.
Background Information
Joe was a married, 34-year-old non-Hispanic White male who lived in the south-
western part of the United States. He attended a 2-year college and received his
associates degree. It was during his college years that he met and married his wife.
They engaged in a moderate amount of drinking in the early years of their marriage,
but Joe’s wife reduced her drinking considerably when they had their son.
In contrast, Joe’s drinking increased over time, primarily while spending time
with his coworkers. Joe knew that his drinking had gotten out of control, and yet it
was still difficult for him to seek treatment. He finally called an outpatient clinic
when he received his not-so-good annual performance review at work. Joe knew
that his hangovers had been interfering with his job motivation and his ability to
focus on work tasks. Additionally, his wife had been urging him to seek treatment
due to the martial strain resulting from Joe joining his coworkers to drink several
evenings each week, and from Joe rarely spending time with their 7-year-old son.
Joe presented as a subdued individual with some apprehension about treatment. He

met DSM-5 criteria for Alcohol Use Disorder (Severe). Additionally, Joe reported
mild symptoms of depression and anxiety, but these symptoms did not cause suffi-
cient impairment or distress to meet DSM-5 diagnostic criteria. Joe explained that
he felt undervalued at work; a job that he did not find challenging or meaningful
anymore. The main pleasure he obtained from work was through socializing with
his coworkers. He stated that he loved his wife and son very much and that he was
worried about the strain his drinking appeared to be putting on these relationships.
Course of Treatment: Introductory Session
Joe’s first CRA session started with the therapist explaining that the objective of
CRA. The objective of CRA in this particular clinical case was to help Joe find a
healthy and rewarding lifestyle that did not revolve around alcohol. Specifically, the
therapist talked about guiding Joe in determining how to make his current job (or a
new job) and his family life rewarding again so that his main source of positive
reinforcement was no longer obtained from drinking. The therapist also provided an
overview of the treatment components in CRA and offered ideas regarding how they
would be applied to Joe’s case. For example, the therapist noted that communication
skills training might be needed to help him work on his strained relationship with
his wife, and problem-solving might be beneficial for identifying fun non-drinking
social activities for him and his family or friends.
Next, the therapist introduced the CRA Functional Analysis and helped Joe settle
upon a common drinking episode to use for the exercise. Joe selected the Friday
Happy Hour with friends from work because it occurred every week and it was
“costly” in terms of missing family activities Friday evening and Saturday mornings
if he woke up late. The main antecedents for the Friday Happy Hour included: driv-
ing past the bar on the way home and seeing his friends’ cars (external triggers) as
well as feeling exhausted and wanting to celebrate the end of the stressful week
(internal triggers). Typically, Joe drank at the bar with his friends for about 3 h, and
during that time he consumed about 7 beers. He reported that the salient short-term
positive consequences of the Friday Happy Hour drinking were: laughing with his
friends about the hectic work week and the “difficult” boss, and feeling appreciated
for being a “team player” on the job. Joe also identified several long-term negative
consequences of the Friday Happy Hour drinking, which included: an increase in

arguments with his wife and an overall strained relationship with her, feeling disap-
pointed in himself for missing his son’s activities, a drop in his work performance,
and the loss of friends whose social activities did not center around drinking. The
therapist shared with Joe that this information could be used in several ways to
inform treatment. For example, conceivably Joe could establish other (non-drinking)
enjoyable activities for de-stressing after a long week of work; perhaps some of
these activities would involve his wife and son, whereas others might be with his old
non-drinking friends. The treatment plan also could include a strategy for Joe to
become enthusiastic about work again, such as through an interesting job assign-
ment or a new job altogether.
Treatment Planning
Before adopting a treatment plan based on inputs collected during the CRA func-
tional analysis, the therapist had Joe complete the CRA Happiness Scale. In review-
ing the scale completed by Joe, the therapist learned that Joe primarily was unhappy
about his drinking, his job, and his relationship with his wife and son. Joe decided
to start by setting goals (and strategies for achieving them) in both the drinking and
the family categories; the therapist tracked these on the Goals of Counseling form.
In terms of the drinking category, Joe stated that he wanted to become a social
drinker as opposed to being abstinent. Nonetheless, the therapist asked Joe to con-
sider sampling a period of sobriety (Sobriety Sampling) and explained the advan-
tages of doing so. For example, Joe mentioned that he had missed several of his
7-year-old son’s soccer games because he had instead chosen to go drinking after
work with his friends. Joe’s wife recently had asked him not to leave the bar early
to attend games anymore because he had clearly been under the influence the last
time he came. Joe reported that he would love to attend his son’s big soccer tourna-
ment in a month. The therapist tied this goal (attending the soccer tournament) to a
month-long period of sobriety for Joe. The therapist reasoned that both Joe’s wife
and son would be happy to see him attend if he had not been drinking, particularly
if he had proven he could be abstinent for a month prior to the event. Although Joe
was somewhat intrigued by the challenge, realistically he did not know whether he
could be abstinent for a month. As a result, the period of sobriety was negotiated
down to 1 week, at which time it would be assessed and renegotiated. The therapist
then helped Joe identify the biggest threats to sobriety in the upcoming week (after-
work gatherings at the local bar with his coworkers) and develop a plan for address-
ing them (meet his wife for an early dinner, meet his wife and son at the park). The
therapist inquired about barriers to completing this assignment and added these
plans to the Goals of Counseling.
Joe reported successfully skipping the Happy Hours and instead going to the
park with his family and dinner with his wife, but he also reported that he really
missed socializing with his friends, especially on Friday nights. The therapist
recognized that Joe’s new activities with his family were not sufficiently rewarding
to repeatedly compete with the bar full of boisterous friends, and so the discussion
turned to methods for either increasing the reward value of the Friday evenings with
his family or for identifying a new activity with other people. The therapist referred
to the Short-Term Positive Consequences column of Joe’s CRA Functional Analysis
and noted that the Happy Hour socializing was rewarding to Joe because of the
opportunity to laugh and to feel respected as part of a team. In examining the Long-
Term Negative Consequences column, the therapist was reminded that Joe had
reported missing some of his old non-drinking friends. Upon inquiry, Joe explained
that within the last year he had lost contact with several friends who used to play
pickle ball with him every Friday or Saturday night. Importantly, the therapist asked
whether re-joining these non-drinking friends on Friday evenings would be suffi-
ciently rewarding to enable Joe to readily choose that activity over the Happy Hour
each week. Joe said that the team activity was great fun, and occasionally his wife
and son used to attend as spectators. Importantly, several new skills needed to be
taught before finalizing this revised plan for Friday evenings.
Skill Training
Joe was hesitant to contact his old non-drinking friends, given that he had been
avoiding them for some time now and he was worried they might reject him. The
therapist used this opportunity to conduct Communication Skills Training so that
Joe could learn and practice (through role-plays) a positive conversation about re-
joining the pickle ball team and explaining his disappearance from their social cir-
cle. The therapist also described how these communication skills could be applied
to Joe’s conversation with his wife about this change in Friday night plans and his
hope that she would join him. Joe also was concerned about telling his Happy Hour
drinking buddies from work that he was no longer going to be joining them. In addi-
tion to practicing a basic positive conversation about this topic, the therapist taught
Joe Drink Refusal Skills in the event that a co-worker pressured him to drink regard-
less. The session ended with Joe agreeing to extend his Sobriety Sampling contract
for a month.
Over the next few weeks, Joe was able to re-join the pickle ball team and bring
his wife and son along on two occasions. He reported thoroughly enjoying this time
with his old friends and his family, but he was still missing his social contact with
his (drinking) co-workers. Since this placed Joe at risk for a relapse, the therapist
introduced Problem-Solving Skills as a method for finding a fun, alcohol-free social
activity that Joe and his coworkers might enjoy after work.
After settling on several possible activities, Joe rehearsed his Communication
Skills again so that he felt confident about presenting the idea to his coworkers. The
therapist also encouraged Joe to consider introducing a “solo” enjoyable activity
that would compete with drinking after work. Joe stated that he used to enjoy play-
ing the guitar and writing music, but he could not seem to get himself motivated to
engage in that activity lately. The therapist suggested they do a Functional Analysis
of Pro-Social Behavior to ascertain what would set the stage for Joe to choose play-
ing his guitar over drinking. Once these antecedents were identified and methods for
enhancing the enjoyment of the activity itself were selected (e.g., obtaining new
songs to learn) a goal of increasing this behavior and the strategy for accomplishing
it were added to his Goals of Counseling form.
Treatment Plan Updating
The therapist re-administered the CRA Happiness Scale to gauge progress and to
identify the next treatment goals/strategies. Joe indicated that he wanted to work on
two areas yet: his relationship with his wife and his job. As far as his job, Joe had
re-discovered some of his motivation for work once he stopped drinking, but he still
wanted to approach his boss about getting assigned more challenging duties.
Communication Skills were used to practice this conversation with the boss. Joe
then said that he had been thinking about seeking additional job-related skills such
that he would be eligible for more advanced positions. Given that Joe appeared
highly interested but still hesitant to follow up on this idea, the therapist worked
with Joe right in the session (Systematic Encouragement) to research online course
options and settle on one. In discussing how to address Joe’s relationship with his
wife, the therapist reminded Joe that CRA offers the option of several Relationship
Therapy sessions. Although Joe was open to the idea, he first wanted to try re-
introducing pleasant social activities that he used to enjoy with his wife. However,
since he felt overwhelmed at the prospect of deciding on an activity, the therapist
recommended that Joe use his Problem-Solving Skills to identify and plan for a
specific activity. The therapist suggested that some of these activities be placed dur-
ing his high-risk times for drinking (e.g., right after work) since they would serve as
a deterrent to drinking.
During this session, the therapist asked Joe if he would be willing to extend his
Sobriety Sampling contract another month. The many benefits that Joe had experi-
enced during his month of sobriety were reviewed. Some of these included: fewer
arguments and more intimacy with his wife, more quality time with his wife and
son, more energy and a better mood throughout the day, increased satisfaction at
work, renewed relationships with old friends, and involvement in numerous fun
social activities. He also reported that two of his coworkers had recently joined his
pickle ball team. Joe decided that he was willing to extend his sobriety contract
another month.
Treatment Plan Updating and Relapse Prevention
After another month of successfully meeting his abstinence goal, Joe agreed to add
yet another month-long commitment to sobriety. Nonetheless, he remained uncer-
tain as to whether he wanted to adopt an abstinent lifestyle indefinitely. The thera-
pist reassured Joe that they simply would revisit the issue in a month, and in the
meantime, he would teach Joe specific relapse prevention strategies in the event that
he wanted to use them. A Behavioral Chain was used to map out a “close call” that
Joe had experienced the previous week, given that the events had a high chance of
being repeated if not addressed. As far as the reinforcers in Joe’s life, he reported on
his Happiness Scale that he was much happier in all three main categories: drinking
(which overlapped with social life), job, and relationship with family. Specifically,
he had continued to substitute various healthy and fun activities (pickle ball, coffee
breaks/lunches with coworkers, the park with his family, writing music) for his
drinking. Furthermore, he had received a favorable response when he approached
his boss as planned and Joe had registered for additional job-related training. In
terms of his family, Joe and his wife were spending considerably more pleasant time
together (antiquing, dinners out) and Joe was engaged in several ongoing activities
with his son (e.g., teaching him how to play the guitar).
Case Conclusion
Throughout this case, the therapist checked on whether Joe was being positively
reinforced for the lifestyle changes he adopted, since the new behaviors would not
be maintained if they were not sufficiently rewarding to compete with drinking.
“Non-drinking” areas (job, relationship with wife/son) were addressed as well,
because they influenced his decision to drink and were significant components of
Joe’s overall happiness. Importantly, Joe was taught skills that he could apply to
other areas of his life once therapy ended.
ommunity Reinforcement Approach &

C
Contingency Management
Earlier in this chapter, the value of CM was reported (see “Use of Incentives:
Alternative Rewards”). Several studies have also delved into the effectiveness of
CM in concert with CRA (see DeFuentes-Merillas, & Roozen, 2014; De Crescenzo
et al., 2018; Higgins et al., 2003; Roozen et al., 2004). It was Stephen Higgins, a
colleague of Maxine Stitzer, who conducted a seminal trial on a combination of CM
and CRA (Higgins et al., 1991). Several studies showed that for cocaine using
patients treated with CRA, the addition of CM was found to yield improved results
(García-Fernández, et al., 2011, 2013; Higgins et al., 2007; Roozen et al., 2004;
Secades-Villa et al., 2008, 2011, 2013). Over the years a series of studies that have
examined cocaine dependent individuals treated with a combination of CRA and
CM have found highly favorable results (e.g., Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2009; Higgins
et al., 2003). A systematic review concluded strong evidence that CRA with vouch-
ers was more effective than usual (12-step) care in achieving cocaine abstinence
[with a relative risk of 5.09 (95% CI 1.63–15.86)], and more effective than CRA
alone [with a relative risk of 1.73 (95% CI 1.04–2.88)] in a 4–16 week treatment
window (Roozen et al., 2004).
In the study of Higgins and colleagues a comparison between CRA plus CM and
CM only yielded a relative risk of 1.52 (95% CI, 1.12–2.07) during treatment, how-
ever this difference disappeared after treatment period (Higgins et al., 2003).
Recently, comprehensive network meta-analytic techniques were conducted with
50 RCTs that evaluated 12 psychosocial interventions. It confirmed that the combi-
nation of CRA and CM increased the number of abstinent patients at 12 weeks [with
an odds ratio of 7.60 (95% CI 2.03–28.37)] in treating stimulant users when com-
pared to other psychosocial treatments (De Crescenzo et al., 2018). Finally, it was
shown that CRA with CM was more efficacious in head-to-head comparisons with
other psychosocial interventions (De Crescenzo et al., 2018).
In sum, notably, the effects of CM –just like other treatments in general – tend to
dissipate slowly after discontinuation of reward administration. However, almost
30% of studies that evaluated long-term CM effects found that important benefits
retained even after reinforcers were absent (Davis et al., 2016).
dolescent Version of Community Reinforcement

A
Approach (A-CRA)
For youth and emerging adults between the age of 12–24 years, the adolescent ver-
sion of CRA (A-CRA) can be employed (see Godley et al. 2001, 2016). A-CRA
entails both an elaboration and adaption with respect to CRA procedures and forms.
For instance, the forms, such as CRA-HS, are age-modified and additional proce-
dures are incorporated: (1) anger management, and (2) caregiver sessions, both
alone (e.g., parents, grandparents) and with the adolescent client.
The sessions with solely caregiver(s) focus on: (1) aspects of parenting practices
that support adolescents’ sobriety, (2) CRA communication skills, and (3) problem-
solving skills. The sessions that include both caregivers and the adolescent are simi-
lar in structure to the aforementioned CRA relationship therapy sessions, which
emphasize the negotiation of goals and the required strategies for obtaining them.
Multiple randomized clinical trials of A-CRA have been published in the past
two decades. A large trial on A-CRA was conducted as part of the National Cannabis
Youth Treatment Study (Dennis et al., 2004). A-CRA demonstrated statistically sig-
nificant pre-post improvements in days of abstinence and days in recovery (i.e., no
substance use problems and not institutionalized). Furthermore, A-CRA was the
most cost-effective treatment when compared to the other treatments; namely,
12-week Multidimensional Family Therapy, 5- or 12-week Motivational
Enhancement Therapy and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, and 12-week Family
Support Network plus a combination of Motivational Enhancement Therapy and
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (Dennis et al., 2004).
Another study showed that CRA was more effective than usual care (i.e., food,
showers, case management) for homeless adolescents who used illegal drugs
(Slesnick et al., 2007). Specifically, the CRA program (12 sessions) resulted in a
reduction of substance abuse (37% vs. 17% decrease) and depression (40% vs.
23%), and improved social stability/reliance (58% vs. 13%) when compared to
usual care (Slesnick et al., 2007). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that A-CRA
is equally effective across ethnic groups (Godley et al., 2011).
Other randomized clinical trials have demonstrated that A-CRA is effective for
adolescents with juvenile justice involvement (e.g., Henderson et al., 2016). This
study used A-CRA in conjunction with a continuing care approach for adolescents,
which typically has been employed after adolescents completed residential treat-
ment (Godley et al., 2007; Godley, Godley, Dennis, Funk, Passetti & Petry, 2014).
The control group received drug education and individual sessions with a counselor
of the juvenile probation department or community. Adolescents receiving A-CRA
decreased their problems associated with substance use more than the controls, with
an effect size indicating a large treatment effect (Henderson et al., 2016). Several
additional studies indicate that A-CRA proves to be an asset in transdiagnostic treat-
ment for adolescents with co-occurring psychiatric disorders (Godley, Smith,
Passetti, & Subramanian, 2014), forensic problems (Hunter et al., 2014), and opioid
use disorder (Godley et al., 2017).
ommunity Reinforcement Approach and Family

C
Training (CRAFT)
Research has indicated that a considerable group of patients with problematic alco-
hol and drug use refuse to engage in formal treatments (Kohn et al., 2004; Stinson
et al., 2005; Tuithof et al., 2016). In general, it has been suggested that seeking treat-
ment may even take up to 6–10 years after the initiation of drug use (Joe et al.,
1999). The collateral damage inflicted by persons with substance use disorders pro-
foundly plagues the general wellbeing of family members, such as partners, spouses,
parents, and children (Collins et al., 1990; Fals-Stewart et al., 1999; Kahler et al.,
2003; Kirby et al., 2005; Meer-Jansma et al., 2016; Winters et al., 2002).
Robert J. Meyers created Community Reinforcement and Family Training
(CRAFT) in the 1970s (see Roozen et al., 2021); an early version of CRAFT was
tested by Sisson and Azrin (1986). CRAFT targets substance using individuals who
refuse to seek treatment. It uses the same underlying operant-based fundamentals of
CRA (and A-CRA). However, rather than attempting to motivate these resistant
individuals directly, CRAFT instead works through a concerned significant other

(CSO). These CSOs are taught how to improve their own wellbeing, while also
learning new behavioral skills for interacting with their substance-abusing loved
one (identified patient; IP) with the objective of getting that individual to enter treat-
ment. CRAFT therapists work with CSOs to enable them to go home and change
their IPs’ social environment by removing any inadvertent reinforcement for sub-
stance using, and by reinforcing behaviors related to sobriety (Meyers & Smith,
1997). Although CRAFT is not designed for use with CSOs who have been involved
in domestic violence with their IPs, nonetheless it has specific procedures that
address safety issues in the event that violence threatens (Roozen, Blaauw, &
Meyers, 2009), or has been employed in a jail reentry program for substance abus-
ing offenders (Miller et al., 2016). Recently, a permutated CRAFT procedure has
been composed to serve CSOs of individuals associated with repeated incidents of
drinking and driving (Roozen, 2019).
As noted earlier, the seminal CRAFT study was conducted by Sisson and Azrin
(1986). Six of the seven women receiving CRAFT (CSOs; 86%) were able to get
their problem-drinking IPs into treatment compared to none of the CSO who were
in the comparison group. A larger CRAFT study that focused on IPs with alcohol
problems demonstrated that CRAFT-trained CSOs were significantly more effective
in engaging unmotivated problem drinkers in treatment (64%) as compared to
Al-Anon (13%) and the Johnson Intervention (30%; Miller et al., 1999). The suc-
cess of CRAFT was established for treatment-refusing IPs with illicit drug prob-
lems in a non-controlled study, whereby CSOs were able to get 74% of IPs into
treatment (Meyers et al., 1999).
When Kirby and colleagues conducted a controlled CRAFT study in the eastern
United States, they obtained treatment engagement rates of 64% for CRAFT-trained
CSOs and 17% for CSOs in the 12-step condition (Kirby et al., 1999). Another ran-
domized trial found that the average engagement rate for two CRAFT conditions
(67%) was significantly better than that for the Al-Anon/Nar-Anon condition (29%).
A CRAFT aftercare component did not significantly improve the CRAFT outcomes
(Meyers et al., 2002). Several other studies confirmed the success of CRAFT in a
community treatment agency (Dutcher et al., 2009) and with parents of drug-
abusing, treatment-refusing adolescents (Kirby et al., 2015; Waldron et al. 2007). To
date, two meta-analyses have confirmed the effectiveness of CRAFT (Archer et al.,
2020; Roozen et al., 2010). For instance, in this latter review it was shown that
CRAFT produced 3.25 (relative risk) times more patient engagement than Al-Anon/
Nar-Anon (95% CI 2.11–5.02) and 2.15 times the engagement of the Johnson
Institute intervention (95% CI 1.28–3.62). Overall, CRAFT encouraged approxi-
mately two-thirds of treatment-refusing IPs to attend treatment, typically after four
to six CRAFT sessions (Roozen et al., 2010). A unique application of the CRAFT
protocol was a study that delivered CRAFT in a group treatment format (Manuel
et al., 2012). Moreover, the use of CRAFT has been expanded to serve family mem-
bers of IPs with gambling problems (Hodgins et al., 2007) and other mental condi-
tions as well, including autism-spectrum disorder (Yamamoto & Roozen, 2020),
‘hikikomori’ problems (social isolation; Sakai et al., 2015), early psychosis (Wood
et al., 2021) and posttraumatic stress disorders in US veterans (Erbes et al., 2020).
In summary, CRAFT emerges as more effective in engaging treatment-refusing

substance abusing individuals compared with traditional programs. Moreover,
CRAFT has been shown effective across ethnicities, different types of CSO-IP rela-
tionships, and various drugs of choice for the IPs. Importantly, IP engagement
occurs after relatively few CRAFT sessions on average, and CSOs report psycho-
logical improvement regardless of the outcome of their engagement efforts.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the theoretical, preclinical, and clinical accumulation of evi-
dence with respect to the underlying behavioral mechanisms employed in CRA and
its novel variants. This ‘family’ of CRA (i.e. ACRA & CRAFT) targets specific
populations with various substance use disorders, including comorbid psychiatric
conditions and/or patients that reside in the (juvenile) justice system. Also the sur-
plus value in term of therapeutic efficacy of the combination of CRA and CM has
been highlighted in this chapter. The ‘family’ of CRA includes individuals with a
wide range of ethnic populations and different age groups such as adults (CRA) and
adolescents (ACRA), but also targets family members (CRAFT). Since this com-
prehensive and complementary treatment package does not exclusively reduce sub-
stance abuse but also addresses psychiatric and forensic problems, it has certainly
transdiagnostic value. That said, it has shown efficacy in both in- and outpatient
facilities and outreach teams and the dissemination of the ‘family’ of CRA is mov-
ing forward in many places throughout the world.
According to contemporary neurobiological models, addictive behaviors are
considered a dynamic interplay of a sensitized reward system and a prefrontal cor-
tex system predominantly dually-driven by automatic and controlling processes,
respectively. For instance, the Impaired Response Inhibition and Salience Attribution
(IRISA) model has been deduced from accumulating neurobiological evidence
(Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Zilverstand et al., 2018). This model suggests an exag-
geration of reinforcer salience and impaired or even hijacked higher-order cognitive
functions in the human brain. Therefore, this model proposes that the cognitive and
motivational mediators apparently have less impact on addictive behaviors, thereby
suggesting that first generation behavior therapy continues to play a significant role
in the treatment of SUDs. This is consistent with the cumulating body of research
confirming its high efficacy.
As has been discussed earlier, the rate at which individuals with SUDs discount
future rewards (i.e., discounting rate) is associated with substance use (Bickel, et al.,
2020). According to Reinforcer Pathology theory, reinforcers are integrated over a
temporal window that determines the relative value of substances and prosocial
reinforcers (Bickel, & Athamneh, 2020), whereas general poor treatment effects
among individuals with SUDs can be attributed to their limited temporal window of
integration (Kwako et al. 2018; Petry et al. 1998). For example, heroin dependent
individuals have an average temporal window of only 9 days, while healthy controls
report almost 5 years (Petry et al. 1998). It seems viable that such a short temporal
window limits the long-term effectiveness of interventions, since long-term conse-

quences fall beyond that temporal view (Bickel et al., 2006). From this perspective,
the Reinforcer Pathology theory predicts that interventions that expand the temporal
window of integration would increase the valence or importance of reinforcers asso-
ciated with future long-term outcomes (Hollis-Hansen et al., 2019).
A novel intervention, ‘Episodic Future Thinking’ (EFT), comprises a projection
of the self into the future to pre-experience an event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). It
has been the subject of extensive research demonstrating the efficacy to influence
decision making (i.e., reducing discounting rate) and expand the temporal window
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Hollis-Hansen et al., 2019). Therefore, it has been argued
that EFT might be a promising approach for shifting the temporal attention towards
distal outcomes (Koffarnus et al., 2013). In EFT interventions, participants typically
identify multiple positive future events (with different delays assigned: 1-day,
2-days, 1-week, 1-month, 6-months, etc.) that they are looking forward to and plan
to attend (e.g., wedding, party, vacation). This partially resembles the rationale of
the CRA Perfect Life form and Goals of Counseling form; namely, patients are
encouraged to compile a list of ideas regarding upcoming events/behaviors that
could significantly improve their satisfaction with prevailing life domains.
Within EFT a more structured framework is offered. Specifically, participants are
asked to write/describe those events and vividly think about them when faced with
future inter-temporal choices (Bickel et al., 2017). Furthermore, they are asked to
rate them (e.g., 1–5 Likert scale) on variables such as personal relevance, valence,
and arousal (Peters & Büchel, 2010), whereby events with a three or higher is pref-
erable. We believe that the EFT framework may be valuable to include within CRA
when developing and completing assignments. The ratings could be added into the
Goals of Counseling plan.
In addition to focusing on methods for enhancing existing empirically-supported
treatments such as CRA, attention should be paid to ongoing general therapy imple-
mentation problems, such as therapy-drift (Waller, 2009). Given the high variability
of treatment outcomes among therapists, ongoing consultation while using evidence
based treatments, such as CRA, is considered critical (Backer et al., 1986; McCarty
et al., 2004; Simpson, 2002). The same learning principle, reinforcement oriented
feedback, holds promise as far as the foundation of the supervision, since systematic
feedback, when combined and compared with behavioral goals, enhances perfor-
mance (Locke & Latham, 1990).
Importantly, to safeguard treatment fidelity, a certification system has been
developed and internationally disseminated (Smith et al., 2014). This certification
system can be employed in conjunction with electronic web-based tools such as
EBTx (https://www.chestnut.org/ebtx/) and TxIntegrity (https://www.txintegrity.
com/). The ratings of therapist fidelity have been based on a CRA/A-CRA compre-
hensive coding manual (Smith et al., 2007) that uses specific, behaviorally-anchored
items (Smith et al., 2014). This system has also been the template for a CRAFT
coding manual (Smith & Meyers, 2010). Using such rating system, it was deter-
mined that the more competent the therapist was in delivering the treatment, the
better the adolescent’s treatment outcome (Campos-Melady et al., 2017). Finally, a
description is available of the successful dissemination and implementation of

A-CRA in a national study (Godley et al., 2011). This will assist program directors
and health professionals in promoting their general practise more evidence-based
and improve treatment-outcomes.
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Substance Use Disorders: Second Wave
Approaches
Anthony H. Ecker, Julianna B. Hogan, Darius Dawson,

and Michael A. Cucciare
Second wave behavior therapies (e.g., cognitive behavior therapy; CBT) for sub-
stance use disorders (SUD) extended previous paradigms which focused primarily
on conditioning responses and modifying behavior by altering reinforcers. These
remain important components of second wave behavior therapy for SUDs, but like
other disorders, integration of the cognitive model introduced more targets for treat-
ment, particularly addressing maladaptive cognitions. Importantly, CBT for SUDs
also integrated advancements in the understanding of substance use and how to
change such behaviors, including the use of harm reduction, relapse prevention, and
motivational interviewing (Marlatt, 1998; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Miller &
Rollnick, 2013). CBT for SUDs and addictive behaviors is well researched and
overall has strong evidence for its efficacy (for review see McHugh et al., 2010).
Generally, CBT for SUDs is effective in helping individuals make changes to their
substance use including reducing and/or abstaining from using substances. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the history and development of
CBT for SUD, summarize the literature on its effectiveness, and discuss issues
related to its dissemination and implementation.
A. H. Ecker · J. B. Hogan · D. Dawson

VA South Central Mental Illness Research, Education and Clinical Center (A Virtual Center),
Houston, TX, USA
VA HSR & D Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety, Michael
E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, (MEDVAMC 152), Houston, TX, USA
Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine,
Houston, TX, USA
M. A. Cucciare (*)
VA South Central Mental Illness Research, Education and Clinical Center (A Virtual Center),
Houston, TX, USA
Center for Mental Healthcare and Outcomes Research, Central Arkansas Veterans,
North Little Rock, AR, USA
Department of Psychiatry, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences,
Little Rock, AR, USA
e-mail: mcucciare@uams.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_24
564 A. H. Ecker et al.
Social Learning Theory
CBT for SUD was influenced by the rise in prominence of Social Learning Theory,
which shifted focus from purely behavioral theories and influenced initial studies in
the early 1980s (Carroll, 2005). Social Learning Theory emphasized the cognitive
process of learning through social contexts which was a shift from operant and clas-
sical conditioning models of learning. Early research in this area aimed to treat
alcohol use disorder (AUD) by including a brief skills training procedure designed
to teach inpatients with alcohol use disorder alternative behaviors for handling neg-
ative events, such as managing negative affect or social pressure (Jones et al., 1982).
This study compared a skills training group to a discussion group and no treatment
group. All patients attended mutual help group meetings (i.e., Alcoholic Anonymous)
and weekly care meetings for the 28-day treatment period. Skills training involved
patients developing strategies for dealing with anger, negative mood, interpersonal
pressure, and social pressure to drink. Patients participated in discussions surround-
ing the nature of the problem situations that could lead to alcohol use, problem-
solved for general strategies to use when dealing with those problem situations and
practiced effective responses to problem situations with therapists. The discussion
control group involved discussion surrounding problem situations but maintained a
focus on the emotional nature of the problems and emotional factors prohibiting the
patient from responding more appropriately. The no treatment control group did not
receive any additional treatment. Patients in both the skills training and discussion
control groups exhibited increased skill acquisition and reported less alcohol con-
sumption and fewer days intoxicated than the no treatment comparison at 12 month-
follow-up (Jones et al., 1982). It is noteworthy that lapse and relapse often occur
after 12 months (Maisto et al., 2018), but such long term outcomes are often diffi-
cult to obtain in research studies.
Harm Reduction
Harm reduction is another model that has influenced CBT for SUDs, especially with
regards to treatment goals (e.g., Logan & Marlatt, 2010; Marlatt & Witkiewitz,
2002). In contrast to theories and treatments that view abstinence from drugs and
alcohol as the only acceptable goal, harm reduction focuses on reducing the physi-
cal, psychological, and social negative consequences of drug and alcohol use rather
than focusing exclusively on use itself or complete abstinence (Marlatt, 1998).
Harm reduction is employed in a range of individual and public health interventions
(e.g., nicotine replacement therapy, needle exchange programs, housing first pro-
grams). In the context of CBT, harm reduction has influenced the expected out-
comes of interventions and the tools used to achieve those outcomes. For example,
moderation (as opposed to abstinence) as a substance use-related treatment goal can
result in similar or sometimes even better alcohol use outcomes compared to
Substance Use Disorders: Second Wave Approaches 565
abstinence only (Larimer et al., 2012; Sobell & Sobell, 1976). These findings have
influenced CBT’s focus on individual goal setting by using cognitive and behavioral
skills to reduce harms associated with substance use such as SUD symptoms and
functional impairment rather than solely focusing on use quantity and frequency as
an outcome (Logan & Marlatt, 2010; Marlatt & Witkiewitz, 2002).
Relapse Prevention
Relapse Prevention (RP), pioneered by Marlatt and Gordon (1985), is another

important historical component of CBT for SUDs and has become widely influen-
tial in the treatment of alcohol use disorder (AUD) and other SUDs. RP was one of
the first models and treatment approaches to diverge from the prevailing dichoto-
mous view that one is either sober or has relapsed (Larimer et al., 1999). This
approach posits that a relapse is precipitated by high risk situations and cognitive
and behavioral coping skills can be used to avoid or help reduce the likelihood of
future substance use. Also central to RP is the idea of the abstinence violation effect,
in which an initial lapse (i.e., a one-time temporary “slip” in substance use) can
contribute to a return to pre-abstinence levels of substance use (i.e., relapse or full-
blown return to a pattern of behavior) due to guilt and/or shame regarding not meet-
ing one’s goals. However, relapse is not inevitable, and coping skills can be used to
avoid this outcome. Specific intervention strategies have grown from this model,
including identifying and coping with high-risk situations, both anticipated and
unanticipated, that could contribute to substance use relapse. Therapists help
patients identify coping skills (e.g., avoiding places where they are likely to drink/
use drugs, engage in physical activity to manage uncomfortable emotions) that
could apply to high risk situations (e.g., a party where alcohol/drugs might be pres-
ent, or feeling depressed or bored). Coping skills may be more cognitive, such as
using self-talk to cope with a negative emotional state, or be more behavioral, such
as calling a pre-identified person who can provide recovery support. Further key
skills include anticipating future high risk situations and planning when/how to
implement coping skills to avoid lapse (i.e., slip) or relapse. RP can reduce sub-
stance use quantity and frequency, substance-related problems, and result in fewer
relapses (Hendershot et al., 2011). It is important to note that many CBT protocols
are based on this model and employ RP intervention strategies to good effect
(Hendershot et al., 2011; Magill & Ray, 2009).
Motivational Interviewing
CBT for SUD was also heavily influenced by Motivational Interviewing (MI)
(Miller & Rollnick, 2013). Motivational interviewing was initially developed by
Miller and Rollnick in 1991 as an effort to help individuals explore and resolve
ambivalence about changing alcohol use and other health-related behaviors, with
the goal of helping individuals act on making changes. Described as a patient-
centered directive style of counseling, MI involves the use of specific communica-
tion techniques used strategically to help people making a case for behavior change
(i.e., to help elicit and reinforce “change talk”) while minimizing arguing for the
status quo (i.e., “sustain talk”). Foundational skills used in MI include open ended
questions, affirmations, and reflecting and summarizing a person’s statements.
Miller and Rollnick describe MI as primarily a communication style- that is, it is not
an intervention in and of itself, but a set of principles and skills that can be used
intentionally to promote motivation to change behaviors. Several interventions have
been developed that employ MI skills including motivational enhancement therapy
and brief motivational interventions. Motivational enhancement therapy originated
in the Project Match Study (described in more detail in Alcohol section below) as a
structured way to deliver MI and included an assessment of drinking behaviors, the
results of which was presented to patients to discuss with the therapist (Miller et al.,
1999). The focus of this discussion was for the patient and therapist to work col-
laboratively to build a behavior change plan. In contrast to the relatively lengthier
Motivational Enhancement Therapy, Brief Motivational Interventions involve 1-4
sessions and incorporate motivational interviewing and motivational enhancement
therapy elements (e.g., brief assessment followed by personalized feedback) to pro-
mote change in alcohol use (Dunn et al., 2001). Because of their brief nature, brief
motivational interventions are commonly used in outpatient medical settings includ-
ing primary and specialty care clinics and can be delivered effectively by providers
from various disciplines.
Meta-analyses of MI and interventions focused on delivering MI (e.g., motiva-
tional enhancement therapy, brief motivational interventions) show that MI pro-
motes change in substance use and health behaviors with overall effect sizes ranging
from 0.28 to 0.40 (Lundahl & Burke, 2009) and produces superior effects compared
to traditional advice giving in 80% of studies reviewed (Rubak et al., 2005). In light
of these strong effects, MI has become an integral part of CBT for SUD through
MI/CBT combinations and as a framework used within CBT treatment protocols to
enhance motivation for behavior change throughout the treatment process (e.g.,
DeMarce et al., 2014; Steinberg et al., 2005).
Group CBT
Treatment for SUD has long involved group meetings, which are among the most
common modalities of treatment for SUD (Weiss et al., 2004). This may be due in
part to the widespread use of mutual help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous in
treatment settings and the community, which strongly emphasizes the role of group
dynamics (e.g., receiving non substance use-related support) in the recovery process
(Marcovitz et al., 2020). CBT for SUD has been evaluated as a group treatment (as
opposed to individual) and shown to be effective for improving SUD outcomes.
Sobell and Sobell (2011) developed the Guided Self-Change model which incorpo-
rates a cognitive behavioral and motivational approach to group SUD treatment,
highlighting harm reduction and moderation goals. This approach weaves elements
of CBT and RP, with MI such that treatment is focused on eliciting ambivalence
toward change as opposed to being more didactic in nature (Sobell et al., 2009). One
randomized controlled trial that evaluated group Guided Self-Change found that
patients reduced their alcohol and drug use post-treatment effect size and at
12-months follow-up, and that individual and group treatment outcomes did not dif-
fer significantly. This finding suggests that group treatment is an effective and
potentially cost-saving way to deliver CBT for SUD.
CBT for Specific SUDs
In the following sections, we describe the treatment approach and scientific evi-
dence related to CBT for specific SUDs.
Alcohol
CBT for AUD has been shaped greatly by Project MATCH (DiClemente et al.,
2001; DiClemente, 2011; Project MATCH Research Group, 1997). Project MATCH
was a large multisite trial with the overall aim of determining whether patient char-
acteristics contributed to the success of different types of treatments for AUD (i.e.,
to determine if patients can be matched to ideal treatments) including CBT. In addi-
tion to this hypothesis related to treatment matching, Project Match also served as
the largest randomized controlled trial of psychosocial treatment for AUD, and has
been written about extensively, producing over 100 publications (DiClemente,
2011). Although there was limited support for the hypothesis related to treatment
matching, a landmark finding was that all three treatments used in the study
(Cognitive Behavioral Coping Skills, Twelve-Step Facilitation Therapy, and
Motivational Enhancement Therapy) showed evidence for contributing to reduced
drinking behaviors that were largely persistent at 3-year follow up (Project MATCH
Research Group, 1998).
The CBT protocol used in Project Match (i.e., Cognitive Behavioral Coping
Skills) was modified from a manual originally published by Monti et al. (1989)
designed for individual therapy and consisting of 12 weekly 60-min sessions. Seven
of these sessions are dedicated to core modules, and the remaining five are split
between elective modules and a treatment termination session. Most sessions
include home-based skills practice which is considered essential for mastery of cop-
ing skills and maintaining treatment gains. The core modules consist of psychoedu-
cation/functional analysis, learning to cope with craving, cognitive skills to manage
drinking-related thoughts, problem-solving, refusal skills, planning for
emergencies/coping with lapse/relapse, and seemingly irrelevant decisions. For the

four sessions allocated for elective modules, therapist and patient may collabora-
tively choose from a menu of sessions that provide additional work on communica-
tion skills (e.g., assertiveness), cognitive-behavioral skills for managing negative
mood/anxiety, building social support (e.g., involving partners/significant others,
building non-drinking networks).
Participants in the CBT arm of Project Match reduced their alcohol use and
alcohol-related problems post treatment (Project MATCH Research Group, 1997).
At 3 year follow-up nearly 25% of participants who received CBT reported alcohol
abstinence (Project MATCH Research Group, 1998). Taken together, findings from
project Match suggest that CBT for AUD can help individuals reduce alcohol intake
and maintain gains over a relatively long period of time.
Research on CBT for alcohol continued to proliferate following Project Match.
For example, the COMBINE trial’s primary aim was to evaluate the efficacy of
medications that target AUD (i.e., naltrexone and acamprosate), behavioral therapy,
or their combination (Anton et al., 2006). The behavioral treatment in this trial was
a merged version of the three therapies in project Match (i.e., CBT, MET, and
twelve-step facilitation). Importantly, the behavioral intervention included the core
CBT sessions discussed above. Among the several combinations of medication,
behavioral therapy, medication management, and placebo, naltrexone emerged as
the medication with the most evidence for efficacy for reducing drinking behaviors.
Interestingly, outcomes for the behavioral intervention (with placebo medication),
naltrexone, and their combination produced similar outcomes. These findings sug-
gest that interventions that include core CBT components for AUD are efficacious
with or without accompanying medications.
Cannabis Use Disorder
Lack of effective treatments for cannabis use disorder and reluctance of chronic
cannabis users to engage in treatment have contributed to comparably lower rates of
treatment among cannabis users (Sherman & McRae-Clark, 2016). Like CBT for
AUD, CBT for cannabis use disorder helps patients identify potential triggers and
situations related to cannabis use and helps patients develop coping skills to avoid
use in those situations (Babor et al., 2004; Sherman & McRae-Clark, 2016). Similar
to core skills targeted in CBT for alcohol, CBT for cannabis includes functional
analysis and coping skills training (Babor et al., 2004). Treatment for cannabis use
disorder also includes motivational enhancement therapy and contingency manage-
ment approaches (Babor et al., 2004). Research has indicated that motivation to
change may not be sufficient enough for marijuana users, especially for those with
chronic and regular use beginning in the teenage years (Stephens et al., 1993), lead-
ing to more focus on teaching of coping skills (Carroll, 2005). Contingency man-
agement approaches is are suggested to identify and reduce non substance-related
problems that affect treatment success such as housing, social support, and trans-
portation (Babor et al., 2004).
In the first randomized controlled trial exploring CBT for cannabis use disorder,
researchers evaluated the RP model, which emphasizes that relapse is a result of a
failure to effectively use behavioral and cognitive coping skills. The study com-
pared RP to a non-behavioral, group discussion based treatment condition (Stephens
et al., 1994). RP focused on identifying high risk situations for relapse, acquiring
coping skills, and attending to life balance. The comparison treatment focused on
social support experienced during treatment as a method of therapeutic change.
Inconsistent with hypothesized outcomes, no significant differences were found
between the two groups with nearly two-thirds of all participants achieving absti-
nence at post-treatment and only 14% maintaining abstinence at 1-year follow-up.
Results from this initial study prompted authors to examine if the intensity and
dose of CBT and inclusion of motivational enhancement improved treatment out-
comes (Stephens et al., 2000). Thus, in a subsequent study, CBT was extended to 14
sessions over the course of 4 months and there was enhanced focus on social sup-
port and inclusion of significant others in the treatment process. CBT was compared
to a brief, two-session Motivational Enhancement Therapy protocol and wait list
control. Substantial reductions in marijuana use (30% at 4-months post-treatment)
were found in both conditions compared to the wait list control. Consistent with
other studies, findings did not fully support extended CBT or the role of enhancing
motivation interventions to improve treatment outcome in this population (Budney
et al., 2000; Copeland et al., 2001; Stephens et al., 2000). Similar results were con-
firmed in a multisite randomized controlled trial (Babor et al., 2004) which found
that a nine-session combined treatment consisting of CBT, Motivational
Enhancement, and case management treatment reduced marijuana smoking signifi-
cantly more than a 2-session Motivational Enhancement Treatment up to 15 months
posttreatment. These findings emphasize improved treatment outcomes when using
a combined CBT and Motivational Enhancement approach (Babor et al., 2004).
Tobacco Cessation
Development of tobacco dependence is a complex process, determined by an inter-

play of individual factors, which often lead to multiple treatment attempts for users
trying to quit (Shiffman & Waters, 2004) before achieving success. First wave
behavioral tobacco cessation treatments such as taste aversion and rapid smoking
focus on associated learning and cue exposure to increase awareness of associations
of discomfort and smoking triggers through behavioral conditioning (Baker et al.,
2004; Bevins & Palmatier, 2004; Hall et al., 1984). Therapies that focus on external
cues that produce feelings of craving and reinforce reward yield cessation rates
between 20% and 30% (Otto et al., 2005; Shiffman, 1993). In the 1980s, research
findings highlighted the relationship between cessation and mood, prompting a shift
in treatment approaches (Shiffman, 1982). The influence of Social Learning Theory
led to cognitive behavioral treatment approaches to better integrate coping skills

and cognitive processing into treatment for tobacco cessation (Carroll, 2005). A
greater focus on the importance of mood in tobacco cessation treatment resulted in
more emphasis placed on behavioral and cognitive therapy components, knowledge
and use of relapse prevention and coping skills, and awareness of the perceived
costs and benefits of quitting (Carroll, 2005; Hall et al., 1984).
Currently, CBT is the recommended psychological approach for tobacco cessa-
tion (Denison et al., 2017; Fiore et al., 2008). CBT aims to identify and modify
associations between tobacco-related cues and tobacco use (Shiffman, 1993). CBT
focuses on teaching people skills to cope with and reduce internal cues to smoke.
Internal cues that can lead to tobacco use are emotions, thoughts, and physiological
sensations such as cravings and withdrawal (Shiffman & Waters, 2004). CBT typi-
cally focuses on helping people learn to self-monitor their smoking triggers and
smoking behaviors over a period of time (Hernandez-Lopez et al., 2009). Individuals
then become more aware of how their smoking is linked to certain thoughts and
emotions (Hernandez-Lopez et al., 2009). Other CBT treatment components include
nicotine fading or establishment of a quit date early in treatment (Hernandez-Lopez
et al., 2009; Webb et al., 2010). Planning a quit date allows for preparation and pre-
vention of distress experienced when quitting, as well as active coping with physi-
ological and cognitive distress once quitting occurs. Techniques used to increase
coping with distress during a quit attempt include cognitive restructuring, thought
stopping, and mental distraction.
CBT is effective for tobacco cessation. One of the first CBT treatment studies for
tobacco cessation examined coping skills training in comparison to a discussion
group control (Hall et al., 1984). One treatment goal of the coping skills training
was to decrease anxiety and irritability during cessation by introducing deep breath-
ing and cognitive cue of relaxation. In addition, the coping skills training program
included written exercises and physiological feedback to increase perceived costs of
smoking and emphasize benefits of change. Reduction rates in the skills training
group (64.36%) were higher than those of the discussion group control condition
(52.97%) at 12-month follow-up. However, smokers in the skills training group did
not differ in negative mood reduction compared to the control group.
More recent examinations of CBT with tobacco users have yielded similar
results. CBT results in higher rates of cessation compared to supportive therapies
(i.e., general education) (Fiore et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2012). However, the
effect of CBT on cessation is limited. Rates of cessation are no better among those
using CBT when compared to other therapies such as supportive talk therapy and
general education at long-term follow-ups (i.e., 12-month) and cessation rates are
poor for those with histories of increased depression (Brown et al., 2001; Killen
et al., 2008). Additionally, in efforts to sustain treatment effects, increased dosage
and intensity of CBT has shown no greater effect on longer-term abstinence rates
for tobacco use (Arias et al., 2014; Mueller et al., 2012). However, integrating moti-
vational enhancement into treatment improves outcomes. Higher levels of quit
motivation was positively related to smoking cessation rates (Schnoll et al., 2005),
a finding consistent with use of motivational enhancement approaches to increase

successful tobacco cessation (Fiore et al., 2008).
Another approach to treatment for tobacco use has been a focus on preventing
tobacco use relapse by targeting negative mood. The connection between negative
mood states and tobacco use is well documented (Hall et al., 1994; Shiffman, 1993),
with negative mood being one of the most commonly attributed causes of smoking
relapse (Pomerleau et al., 1978; Shiffman et al., 2002). Tobacco users report more
negative affect and stress than those who do not use tobacco (Shiffman, 1982). In a
recent study comparing standard CBT for smoking cessation to behavioral activa-
tion enhanced CBT (greater focus on increasing pleasurable activities and non-
smoking-related activities), smokers in the behavioral activation enhanced CBT
condition reported higher abstinence rates (30%) than those in the standard CBT
(18%) condition at 12-month follow-up (Martinez-Vispo et al., 2019). Findings
from this study are consistent with those of other studies using interventions focused
on improving mood for tobacco use (Brown et al., 2001; Hall et al., 1994; Niaura &
Abrams, 2002).
Limitations of CBT for tobacco cessation are highlighted by the comparison of
its effectiveness to third wave behavioral approaches in treating tobacco depen-
dence, the necessary combination of nicotine replacement therapies into treatment,
and accessibility of treatment options. Research examining third wave approaches
for tobacco cessation has included acceptance and commitment therapy, and
mindfulness-based approaches, with results supporting a combination of CBT and
third wave approaches (Vinci, 2020). Furthermore, a combination of CBT and nico-
tine replacement therapy results in higher rates of cessation than CBT alone
(Denison et al., 2017; Martinez-Vispo et al., 2019; Ramon & Bruguera, 2009),
resulting in the consensus of adding nicotine replacement to CBT when treating
tobacco use disorder (Vinci, 2020).
Stimulant Use Disorders
Stimulant use disorders include repeated problems experienced due to continued

use of stimulants, such as methamphetamines, cocaine, or other amphetamines
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, 2016). CBT for stimulant use directly focuses on problem-
atic use and factors surrounding use of stimulants (e.g., evaluating thinking patterns,
stimulus control, planning for high-risk use situations), and may also include sec-
ondary targets that underlie the etiology of the substance use itself (e.g., mood dys-
regulation). Today, there is good evidence for the application of CBT to the treatment
for stimulant use disorders. Much of the initial research compared CBT to 12-step
approaches or case management. While these approaches continue to be popular
among providers and patients, naturalistic evaluations have demonstrated compa-
rable outcomes between traditional approaches and CBT-oriented programs
(Ouimette et al., 1997). RP, also based on CBT, for stimulant use targets drug use
relapse by helping the person develop self-control strategies, such as lifestyle modi-
fications, coping plans for high-risk situations, and building skills to manage crav-
ings. RP strategies rely both on internal (e.g., values-driven) and external motivators
(e.g., spousal contingencies) to help shape and change behaviors related to problem-
atic stimulant use (Carroll et al., 1991).
CBT may be especially helpful for persons with stimulant use and comorbid
psychiatric problems. In the case of psychiatric comorbidities, research has found
that for patients diagnosed with cocaine abuse who also have a history of depression
CBT is more effective in terms of abstinence from cocaine compared to a 12-step
approach; in a 12-step approach a history of depression did not predict treatment
efficacy (Maude-Griffin et al., 1998). These results suggest that CBT may be par-
ticularly helpful for persons using stimulants and with a history of depression. CBT
can also be used across a wide variety of treatment settings, from outpatient, com-
munity, inpatient, or even virtual (web-based) clinics (Carroll et al., 2004; Randall
& Finkelstein, 2007), making it easy to fit within different care models to provide
greater access to care for patients in need of treatment.
Opioid Use Disorder
Prescription opioid use has been steadily increasing over the past several decades,
with an estimated 18 million Americans misusing a prescription opioid within the
past year (National Institutes of Drug Abuse, 2020). Heroin use is also on the rise
within the US according to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH,
NIDA), with about 948,000 Americans reporting heroin use in 2016 (Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2018); a number that has been
increasing since 2007.
Medications for Opioid Use Disorder (MOUD) are currently the first-line phar-
macological treatment approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for the treatment of opioid use disorder (Connery, 2015). MOUD may include one
of three medications, including buprenorphine, methadone, or naloxone, which
have been deemed safe and effective by FDA in combination with counseling inter-
ventions or psychosocial support. Much of the psychosocial support offered during
the course of MOUD encourages medication adherence. Approximately 90% of
opioid related deaths are not intentional (Volkow et al., 2014), and MOUD can sig-
nificantly reduce mortality associated with opioid use (Ma et al., 2019), therefore,
the main target of the intervention is medication adherence.
Within pharmacotherapy clinical trials for MOUD, incorporating behavioral
therapies has become commonplace as these types of treatments can reduce vari-
ability in medication trials, encourage medication adherence, reduce attrition to the
protocol, and can address ethical issues related to placebo-controlled trials. Such
interventions may include MI (Sayegh et al., 2017), Contingency Management
(CM) (Petry & Martin, 2002) or CBT (Carroll et al., 2004). While CM and MI
(Carroll et al., 2004) can offer flexibility to the treatment setting (e.g., easily adapted
to specific populations), CBT has been demonstrated effective with a range of psy-
chiatric disorders (DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph, 1998), making it especially useful
for patients with mental health co-morbidities. Further, treatment effects of CBT are
durable typically lasting well beyond the treatment episode, which is a relative ben-
efit of CBT over other available behavioral interventions such as MI or CM.
Since CBT is a relatively short-term, time-limited treatment that supports a
patient’s recovery from opioids by providing coping skills and strategies for plan-
ning for risky situations, it holds many benefits over other behavioral treatments
when combined with pharmacotherapy. Additionally Beck et al. (1993) published a
CBT manual for opioid addiction, with strategies to manage drug-related beliefs,
cravings, and support recovery by preventing relapse. For those who initiated opioid
use due to chronic pain, CBT is often a helpful treatment strategy to manage pain
and decrease opioid use (Mariano et al., 2018).
Within MOUD treatment programs, among those who are being treated for opi-
oid use disorder associated with prescription opioids, CBT leads to better absti-
nence outcomes when compared to physician management alone. However, CBT
appears to be less effective for persons using heroin (Moore et al., 2016). Other
work supports the application of CBT concurrently with MAT, finding that adding
CBT to MOUD leads to improved quality of life (Clarke et al., 2013).
The Drug Abuse Treatment Act of 2000 has allowed physicians to prescribe
buprenorphine to treatment patients with OUD in office-based settings, with a rec-
ommendation to refer patients to “appropriate counseling or ancillary services as
needed” (Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, 2004). While research supporting
the use of office-based buprenorphine treatment without additional counseling is
effective, early treatment drop out remains a significant issue (Thomas et al., 2014).
The role of adding counseling or behavioral therapies to office-based buprenorphine
has been controversial, with mixed findings regarding the utility of additional ther-
apy (Copenhaver et al., 2007; Fiellin et al., 2013). In a recent commentary, authors
posited that a subset of patients with particular characteristics—such as, those who
have had positive experiences participating in support groups—may benefit from
added therapy, and recommended that a stepped-care approach may be the answer
to the question of when additional therapy is appropriate (Carroll & Weiss, 2017).
Indeed, CBT may hold more promise for specific patient groups in MOUD pro-
grams for opioid use disorder. For example, one study found that a novel application
of CBT plus interoceptive exposure for drug craving cues (CBT-IC), when com-
pared with increased therapist contact of an equal amount, yielded more positive
results for women, such that illicit drug use was significantly lower for women
engaged in CBT-IC (Pollack et al., 2002). However, a relative weakness of incorpo-
rating CBT in the treatment of opioid use disorder is that is can be training intensive
for the provider. Additionally, CBT can be demanding on patients when compared
to incentive-based treatments including contingency management. Further, CBT
can be challenging or even contraindicated for persons with cognitive disabilities
due to substance use (Chapman et al., 2002).
Comorbidity with Other Mental Health Disorders
An important consideration in treating CBT for SUD is the presence of comorbidi-

ties. SUD is likely to co-occur with other mental health disorders. Individuals with
SUD, including drug use disorders and AUD, are 2–3 times more likely than those
without these disorders to have co-occurring anxiety disorders or depressive disor-
ders (Lai et al., 2015). Not only do SUDs and mental health disorders co-occur, but
their co-occurrence leads to increased clinical severity (Blanco et al., 2012, 2013)
and poorer CBT treatment outcomes (Buckner & Carroll, 2010). In recent years,
there have been efforts to combine active elements of both CBT for SUD and mental
health disorders into a single protocol. An advantage of this approach is that it can
reduce the overall time spent in therapy by combining treatments, and can directly
address unique elements of co-occurring disorders Co-occurring SUD and anxiety
disorder combined protocols often involve exposure therapy coupled with relapse
prevention skills and cognitive therapy that can apply to both disorders. For exam-
ple, one study examined the effectiveness of a protocol combining CBT for canna-
bis and CBT anxiety disorders delivered weekly for 12 sessions which found that
compared to a control condition of MET-CBT for cannabis only, the combined anxi-
ety/cannabis CBT intervention improved anxiety significantly post treatment
(Buckner et al., 2019). The combined anxiety/cannabis CBT protocol produced
similar outcomes on cannabis use when compared to MET-CBT. In another study,
among individuals with PTSD and AUD, a single protocol combining prolonged
exposure for PTSD and CBT for AUD found that combined CBT resulted in higher
rates of PTSD remission compared to RP for alcohol only (Back et al., 2019). The
combined treatment also resulted in greater reductions in alcohol use quantity
6 months after treatment. Overall, findings from this work is encouraging, and sug-
gests that transdiagnostic CBT interventions can be effective for improving out-
comes in persons with comorbid SUD and mental health disorders (Baker et al.,
2012; Hides et al., 2010).
CBT SUD Technologies
Recent advances in technology have allowed digital delivery of CBT for SUD. These
innovations allow patients to directly access treatment information and facilitate
skill-building outside of a provider-led clinical encounter. There is a range of use for
these programs, such as mobile applications (i.e., apps) and programs, that may be
self-initiated by the patient, or suggested or prescribed by a provider to enhance
ongoing treatment (Babson et al., 2015; Brief et al., 2011; Kuhn et al., 2016). In
some cases, these programs can stand on their own, or can be used with limited
provider support (Mohr et al., 2011).
Technology-delivered interventions have many benefits to patients and provid-
ers, such as, helping to overcome geographic barriers, allowing flexible timing to
access treatment content, and offering care with lower costs (Bennett & Glasgow,
2009). These technologies can help increase access to quality and effective care,
making treatments more accessible (for review see Cucciare et al., 2009). Much of
the research in this domain has focused on technology-delivered interventions as
“add-ons” to standard care. In this capacity, technology-delivered interventions can
be delivered in an efficacious and safe way (Carroll et al., 2009). More recent work
has begun to explore innovations with limited or minimal clinical support/monitor-
ing, where the patient takes a more self-directly role in their treatment (Carroll
et al., 2014; Kiluk et al., 2018). Further, these types of web-based CBT programs
can be adapted to different populations to provide a tailored fit for diverse popula-
tions. For example. CBT4CBT (a computer-delivered CBT program) has success-
fully been adapted for Spanish-speaking substance users (Silva et al., 2020).
CBT SUD Implementation
Given the abundance of evidence for the effectiveness of CBT for SUDs, efforts
have been made to implement CBT for SUD into healthcare systems. In the Veterans
Health Administration (VHA), a large scale, multi-site training in CBT improved
outcomes among patients with SUD in the system (DeMarce et al., 2019).
Specifically, training included a workshop and supervised practice of cases. Among
patients who received CBT for SUD, reductions in substance use and improvements
in quality of life were observed. One study found that among 340 substance use
disorder treatment facilities throughout the United States, 90% report using
CBT. However, of those that reported using CBT, 66% had providers who reported
receiving any training in CBT, and 39% reported receiving training that included
supervised cases (Olmstead et al., 2012). These findings suggest that even though
CBT for SUDs may be commonly used in some treatment clinics, provider training
may vary. Structured training in CBT is important as it may improve patient out-
comes. For example, one study involving the implementation of CBT for stimulant
use disorder in community treatment centers found that providers who received a
didactic workshop plus supervised practice reported higher skill quality compared
to providers who received a treatment manual and brief orientation to the CBT
approach.
Technology-assisted training may serve to increase the availability of CBT train-
ing and supervision. Further, flexible (i.e., allowing the provider control over the
sequence of topics) technology-delivered CBT training programs can increase SUD
treatment providers’ CBT knowledge and self-efficacy, and reduce job-related burn-
out (Weingardt et al., 2009). Aside from training, other factors may influence the
success of CBT for SUD implementation, including treatment centers’ theoretical
orientation, readiness to change, and ability to provide CBT to large caseloads
(Manuel et al., 2011). While there are private companies that offer training as part
of a product purchase (e.g., Pear Therapeutics, Inc.; SilverCloud), there are resources
that do not require a purchase for use. For example, American Telemedicine
Association (ATA) and Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS)

routinely offer webinars that may be useful to providers interested in learning more
about technology-assisted treatment approaches. Many of the tools, and correspond-
ing trainings, may also be available to providers who are integrated into large
healthcare systems, such as the Veterans Health Administration. Additionally, some
health care systems may offer free or reduced cost memberships for their staff to
professional societies and organizations that promote the integration of technology
into clinical care (e.g., https://www.americantelemed.org/; https://www.himss.org/).
Conclusion
In the treatment of SUDs, second wave approaches such as CBT have led to several
important developments that have shaped the scientific and treatment landscape.
These developments include the integration of behavioral, social, and motivational
approaches and a boom in empirical research, including large-scale RCTs on these
treatment approaches. Overall, CBT has been found to be an efficacious approach
for treating SUD. However, more scientific work, especially studies using disman-
tling and implementation science methods, is needed to better understand how, for
whom, and in what context CBT for SUDs works best. Despite these gaps, CBT for
SUD remains an important approach for reducing suffering related to SUDs.
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Third Wave Therapies and Substance
Use Disorders: A Case Example
Angela L. Stotts, Yolanda R. Villarreal, Mackenzie Spellman,

and Thomas F. Northrup
Global substance use is high and increases every year. The United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime reported that almost 270 million people used drugs in 2018 which
is a 30% increase from 2009 (United Nations, 2020a). Drug use is especially preva-
lent in urban, developed, and poverty-stricken areas within countries. The most fre-
quently used substance is cannabis with almost 200 million people who reported
using in each year. Opioids are considered the most harmful of substances and
account for 66% of substance use-related deaths (United Nations, 2020b).
A 2018 survey of the U.S. population indicated that over 60% of Americans
reported using alcohol or other drugs in the past month, where 140 million people
drank alcohol, 58.8 million used tobacco products, and over 30 million reported
illicit drug use (Lipari & Park-Lee, 2019). Substance use disorders (SUD) are char-
acterized by recurrent use of alcohol and/or drugs in a manner that causes signifi-
cant clinical and functional impairment, such as health problems, disability, and
failure to meet major responsibilities at work, school, or home (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). In the U.S., 20.3 million people aged 12 or older have a SUD,
14.8 million have an alcohol use disorder, and 8.1 million with a drug use disorder
(Lipari & Park-Lee, 2019).
There are a number of social and behavioral treatments for SUDs that are based
on evidence, however, of varying levels and quality (Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, 2020). The National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (2012) lists six formal treatments that require specific competencies,
training, and supervision. Most of the identified treatments, such as contingency
management (Prendergast et al., 2006) and cognitive-behavioral relapse prevention
therapy (McHugh et al., 2010), originated several decades ago and therefore have
been well-studied, with the largest volume of support. No third wave behavioral
A. L. Stotts (*) · Y. R. Villarreal · M. Spellman · T. F. Northrup

Department of Family and Community Medicine, McGovern Medical School, University of
Texas Health Science Center, Houston, TX, USA
e-mail: Angela.L.Stotts@uth.tmc.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_25
584 A. L. Stotts et al.
therapy is on the list of formal treatments likely due to a more recent genesis.
Nevertheless, mindfulness and acceptance-based behavioral treatments as a collec-
tive are accruing a solid evidence base. Specifically, acceptance and commitment
therapy (ACT), dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) and mindfulness-based treat-
ments have been developed and tested with substance use disorders as well as other
addictive behaviors (e.g., gambling), with encouraging results (Gloster et al., 2020).
To date, second vs third wave comparison studies have resulted in mixed findings
with no clear superiority of one over the other (e.g., Lee et al., 2015), as discussed
in more detail below.
Third wave cognitive behavioral therapies differ from their predecessors in sev-
eral important ways, which have implications for addiction treatment. The newer
behavioral therapies are based in contextual science (Hayes et al., 2012) which
broadly attempts to identify basic principles linked to processes. Processes, in turn,
form the basis of specific treatment techniques and components, with an emphasis
on mechanisms and moderators (Hayes et al., 2006). Acceptance and mindfulness
therapies comprise an empirical, principle-driven approach to distressing or
unwanted internal psychological and physical experiences, common precipitants to
substance use (Hayes & Levin, 2012). The emphasis is placed on the context and
function of these experiences rather than their content as emphasized in traditional
cognitive and cognitive behavioral therapy treatments. In third wave therapies inter-
nal content (thoughts, feelings, and physical sensations) is not presumed to be
causal, and thus the emphasis is not on changing the content of thoughts or related
feelings. Rather, the context in which these internal experiences occur is altered in
order to change the function of the unpleasant or distressing experiences (Hayes
et al., 1999).
The functional contextual perspective is particularly relevant and applicable to
SUDs and other addictive behaviors. Unpleasant and unwanted internal thoughts
and feelings are ubiquitous, especially among individuals struggling with alcohol or
drug use (Newman, 2001). Common feelings include sadness and anxiety; thoughts
such as, “I’m a loser for getting high again,” or “I need a drink,” or “What is wrong
with me?” and physical sensations associated with alcohol and/or drug withdrawal
symptoms (Beck, 1993). Perhaps more salient in addiction is that these internal
experiences can be both precipitants (i.e., occurring contiguously with drug use)
and consequences, meaning that substances are used to both eliminate/control
unpleasant thoughts and feelings as well as to manage the physical and psychologi-
cal consequences resulting from the excessive use of substances. The use of sub-
stances in this way can lead to a “revolving door” of experiential avoidance (Hayes
& Levin, 2012), or repeated attempts to change the form, frequency, and/or intensity
of these distressing internal experiences, even when ineffective and in the face of
disastrous consequences. A repeated reliance on experiential avoidance via sub-
stance use paradoxically exacerbates the experiences which are attempting to be
avoided (Hayes et al., 1999). Experiential avoidance overlaps with other third wave
processes, such as lack of distress tolerance (Brown et al., 2002).
Based on this conceptualization, third wave treatments for SUDs use varying
processes to target three broad concepts: Openness/Awareness, Acceptance, and
Third Wave Therapies and Substance Use Disorders: A Case Example 585
Engagement (Hayes et al., 2011a). Experiential exercises are commonly used to

engage the various processes rather than only discussing them. Openness involves
slowing down and observing what is happening both internally and within one’s
environment (Hayes, 2011). Persons struggling with the use of substances and stuck
in the experiential avoidance loop are often not observing the precipitants or trig-
gers of drug use, nor are they fully open to and aware of drug use consequences
(Hayes, 2011; Stotts & Northrup, 2015) Mindfulness-based strategies are typically
used by most of the major third wave therapies in this context to increase openness
and awareness (Barner & Barner, 2011). Experiential exercises typically start with
just “noticing” internal thoughts and experiences, both inside and outside of the
therapy room (Hayes et al., 2011b; Villarreal et al., 2020). Mindfulness practice
assists clients’ awareness of natural environmental contingencies in a more flexible
and objective manner, which in turn theoretically should lead to a wider range of
more adaptive behavioral choices (Roemer et al., 2015). In ACT there is also a
related process, defusion, which further promotes distance from difficult thoughts,
feelings and physical sensations (Hayes et al., 2011b). Recognizing and “de-fusing”
from ingrained, repetitive, and seemingly automatic distressing thoughts and feel-
ings are often addressed using experiential exercises designed to loosen the grip of
these internal experiences (especially as they relate to behavioral choices), and to
hold them more lightly or take them less seriously (Assaz et al., 2018).
Most third wave therapies eventually lead to implicit or explicit “acceptance” of
distressing or unwanted internal experiences (Vujanovic et al., 2017). Hayes et al.
define acceptance as, “…adoption of an intentionally open, receptive, and flexible
posture with respect to moment-to-moment experience”(Hayes et al., 2013).
Generally speaking, once clients reach sufficient awareness and openness to their
internal experiences they can start to practice allowing their thoughts and feelings to
occur without having to act to remove or alter them in some way, e.g., using sub-
stances (Hayes, 2011; Villarreal et al., 2020). This is not to suggest the therapy
process is linear, however. Practicing these skills is necessary and their implementa-
tion will wax and wane just as with any newly learned behavior. Ideally, gaining
distance and reducing the struggle with unpleasant private experiences will lessen
their impact and allow for the identification or development of new behaviors in this
challenging context (Assaz et al., 2018; Hayes, 2011; Stotts & Northrup, 2015).
The concept of Engagement involves strategies most similar to traditional behav-
ioral therapy in which the therapist works with the client on identifying concrete
behaviors to change and developing a plan to implement change. This might entail
small goals to reduce the impact of substance use, such as seen in harm reduction
models of SUD treatment (Marlatt et al., 2011), e.g., controlled drinking, or succes-
sive approximations, such as reducing substance use gradually over time until absti-
nence or some other milestone is reached; or the goal might be a much larger change
such as complete and immediate cessation, often referred to as the “cold turkey”
approach (Henssler et al., 2020). While perhaps more implicit in other approaches,
ACT explicitly ties behavior change to valued life directions (Stotts et al., 2009;
Wilson & Murrell, 2004). Rather than focusing exclusively on the reduction of sub-
stance use or abstinence, the therapist focuses more on living a meaningful life and
the values encompassing that life and less directly on the end goal of reduction or
abstinence. Behaviors that serve to avoid or control distressing private experiences
are often in conflict with values. For example, avoiding conflict with a spouse by
drinking alcohol in the evenings moves one in the opposite direction from having a
loving and satisfying marriage. Having a focus on what is important helps to dignify
the inevitable suffering involved in changing the powerful and effective avoidance
behaviors such as drinking alcohol or using drugs (Wilson & Murrell, 2004). One of
the primary goals of therapy is to broaden the client’s response repertoire in the face
of unpleasant internal experiences, such that these experiences do not only and nar-
rowly lead to addictive behaviors, and thus can be associated with other more adap-
tive behaviors (Stotts & Northrup, 2015). Continued, excessive involvement in
substance use tends to push clients far from their values, sometimes making it dif-
ficult to identify what is important or to build motivation to quit (Luoma et al., 2012;
Wilson & Murrell, 2004). In fact, the very definition of SUD involves disruption in
functioning related to relationships, employment, school and/or health.
Third wave therapies have differing models yet with many similar and overlap-
ping processes. For simplicity, we will focus on the Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy model as it is comprehensive with well-delineated processes, and along
with mindfulness-based therapies, has the largest evidence base for SUDs (Ii et al.,
2019; Lee et al., 2015). In ACT, the overarching construct or guiding process is
psychological flexibility, i.e., patterns of behavior regulated by the six, interrelated
ACT processes involved in either expanding or narrowing behavioral repertoires
(Hayes et al., 2013).
The six processes, as broadly discussed above, include (1) acceptance, as
opposed to avoidance, of distressing internal and external events; (2) cognitive defu-
sion, a disconnection from distressing thoughts that often become connected with
self and identity; (3) contact with the present moment, non-judgmental awareness
and connection with internal and external experiences; (4) self-as-context, or per-
spective taking, viewing oneself within a context of experiences (internal and exter-
nal); (5) values, guiding beliefs as to what is important; (6) committed action,
behaviors directed by identified values. In the following sections, we introduce a
recent, substance abuse intervention trial and 3-session protocol; present a study
client, “Norma” (with some details altered to protect confidentiality); and illustrate
ACT processes with actual excerpts from therapy sessions.
Clinical Trial for Mothers of Neonatal ICU (NICU) Infants to Promote
Substance Use Treatment and Contraception Maternal substance abuse is a sig-
nificant public health problem with devastating consequences (Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013). Unfortunately, many pregnant
substance users receive sporadic, late, or no prenatal care, making identification,
referral and treatment unlikely or impossible prior to hospital delivery (Olah et al.,
2013; Wells et al., 2002). With funding from the National Institute on Drug Abuse,
we developed and tested a 3-session, hospital-initiated intervention using both moti-
vational interviewing (MI; (Miller & Rollnick, 2002) and ACT, which we named
MIACT, for mothers who used substances during pregnancy and had an infant
admitted to the NICU, with the goals of reducing substance use, increasing treat-
Table 1 MIACT intervention protocol

Topic Description
Session 1 Introduction and Introduce the client to therapy; discuss current
Openness/ rapport building NICU infant pregnancy & birth
awareness
Awareness raising Increase openness and awareness with defusion
and mindfulness strategies
Substance use & Obtain a substance use history & help the client
reproductive histories identify their reliance on substances to avoid
distressing thoughts and emotions (experiential
avoidance; fusion).
Session 2 Values identification Highlight function of substance use and impact on
Acceptance & Identify actions that are values; highlight impact of not using
engagement aligned or misaligned contraception in the future.
with values
Control is a problem Attempts to ignore, avoid, control unwanted
thoughts and feelings will ultimately fail.
Willingness Present willingness to experience distressing

internal experiences that are most common
triggers to substance use. Fish hook metaphor.
Valued vs. avoidant- Define specific actions/goals to move toward a
directed behaviors chosen value. Telescope and/or magic pill
metaphors.
Readiness for substance Assess for readiness to speak with a professional

Use treatment and about substance use treatment and reproductive
reproductive care care. Make referrals, if ready.
Session 3 Continued practice of Identify/review client-specific ACT processes
Awareness, all skills related to engaging in substance use treatment and
acceptance & obtaining reproductive care.
engagement
Short vs. long-term Identify the effectiveness and consequences of
effectiveness of engaging and getting stuck in avoidance-driven
substance use behavior.
Raising awareness Review mindfulness/defusion around distressing
thought/feelings and related avoidant-directed
behaviors.
Acceptance vs fighting Review of willingness to have difficult thoughts
Internal experiences and feelings. Purple unicorn metaphor.
Commitment to Review client’s commitment to chosen goals
valued-driven behavior encourage value-directed action. Riding the wave
metaphor.
NOTE: This protocol is based on content from multiple books and protocols (Hayes et al., 1999;
Polk et al., 2016; Stotts et al., 2012)
ment initiation, and starting effective contraception (Villarreal et al., 2020)

(NCT03165565). The intervention was primarily ACT-driven given its rich theoreti-
cal basis, with MI strategies woven in. For illustrative purposes aligned with the
goals of this chapter, we will primarily limit our discussion to the ACT components
of the intervention (Table 1).
Case Description
Norma is a 28-year old, Black female with a high school education. She lives in a
house with extended family members in a large Southern U.S. City. Norma has two
biological children with two different men, one of whom is a newborn infant admit-
ted to a NICU and a second child who is 5 years of age and was removed from her
custody by Child Protective Services. Norma previously considered herself married
via common-law but considers herself unmarried currently. Neither of the biologi-
cal fathers are involved in her nor the children’s lives. Norma has a history of poly-
substance use and mental health disorders. She has a high school education and is
currently unemployed.
Intake screening with the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI)
(Sheehan et al., 1998) reveals that Norma has a history of depression, reporting over
10 depressive episodes over her life. She also meets DSM 5 criteria for panic disor-
der (current), and substance use disorder (current: cocaine and cannabis). She
reports using cocaine and marijuana during her most recent pregnancy. She also
reports a history of physical and emotional trauma. She recently fled from a physi-
cally and emotionally abusive relationship and is living in a shelter where she
became pregnant. Her infant’s birth was medically induced at the hospital as she had
hyperemesis gravidarum (i.e., severe nausea, vomiting, weight loss, and dehydra-
tion) throughout her pregnancy as well as pre-eclampsia and her baby was born
early at 34 weeks. Norma’s primary coping seems to be limited to avoidance and
control-oriented strategies, such as distraction (including use of substances) or posi-
tive self-talk—strategies functioning to control or escape negative thoughts, feel-
ings and physical sensations.
Session 1: Awareness and Openness
Introduction and Rapport. Session 1 begins with rapport building and describing
treatment goals and expectations. Treatment is presented as a new program being
developed to help new mothers who used substances during pregnancy to manage
with their current situation and to provide them with resources. The therapist asks
Norma to describe her pregnancy story and begins to introduce and incorporate
ACT processes (e.g., defusion, present moment awareness).
Awareness Raising via Mindfulness and Defusion. To draw attention to Norma’s

fusion with internal distressing experiences (e.g. thoughts, emotions, and bodily
sensations) the therapist introduces the idea of mindfulness/awareness. The thera-
pist promotes defusion from thoughts by asking her to expand on distressing
thoughts mentioned earlier in the study visit.
Therapist: I’m remembering earlier you mentioned having thoughts or feelings of
worthlessness, like our minds kind of tell us these thoughts [ACT: Defusion,
present moment focus]. What would you say are some of those feelings or
thoughts?
Norma: Oh, like: This is all of your fault, it’s because you’re ugly, it’s because
you’re not good enough. Gosh, now I think that is kind of stupid. I had no reason
to think that way about myself. How could I ever let me think that? I had no
reason to think that. I should have never stooped that low.
Therapist: Your mind would bring you these thoughts [ACT: Defusion]. That sen-
tence, “Oh I should have never stooped that low” it’s another way our minds are
being hard on us [ACT: Defusion], beating yourself up for beating yourself up.
Norma: I’m still downing myself when I’m saying that basically. You’re right,
you’re right. I never caught that before. And those little things like that is what
build up and you know depression comes. I never noticed that. I never noticed
that before, it starts with me.
Therapist: Well, we are all kind of hard on ourselves. If we could take a magic wand
and never have to feel that again, we all would, [ACT: Self-as-context, defusion]
but it doesn’t work that way, because it finds a sneaky way of coming back in
[ACT: Acceptance, present moment]. And sometimes you have to get really still
and kind of quiet to be able to notice that you are even operating that way [ACT:
Present moment, self-as-context].
Substance Use and Reproductive Histories. The therapist asks about the first
time Norma used substances. The primary goal during this portion of the session is
to help her identify the function of her substance use, i.e., to avoid distressing
thoughts and emotions. The therapist highlights acceptance/experiential avoidance
and the futility of using substances to manage internal experiences.
Therapist: So you were angry the first time you tried cocaine, what happened?
Norma: After my dad died, I was using it as a crutch to make me feel better.
Therapist: You can really look back and see a time where you were struggling [ACT:
Self-as-context], and you used [cocaine] to escape that pain [ACT: Experiential
avoidance, self-as-context].
Norma: Yeah … let’s say like some fucked up shit really happened, like I’m just
like, I’m not going to say anything, I’m going to be like, you know what, I’m just
gonna go get a bag [of cocaine], I’m not gonna speak on it, let me just go, do a
bump to get my head straight and yeah, that was a problem. That was a prob-
lem I had.
Therapist: What did it take your attention away from? [ACT: Self-as-context; expe-
riential avoidance].
Norma: Ugggh, a lot….from being raped, a lot from my father not being there, a lot
from me having a horrible relationship with my husband, with it going sour.
Feelings of not being good enough.
Therapist: So in some ways you would have this yucky stuff that would come up,
these feelings, these thoughts, these memories and you used cocaine [ACT:
Defusion, self-as-context, experiential avoidance].
Norma: And I would use cocaine…ummmhmmm…yeah.
Therapist: And it would be wonderful if using cocaine worked, right? [ACT:

Creative hopelessness].
Norma: Yeah, you know it took me a long time to realize it was never working for
me, I never, it never made me feel better. It just masked the problem, it just tem-
porarily covered them up. It took me a long time to realize that.
Therapist: So temporary, because thoughts and feelings would just come back
up …like trying to hold a bunch of beach balls under water (Stoddard & Afari,
2014). And I wonder if it turned your attention away from other things that were
also important to you? [ACT: Values]. Yes it turned your attention from the yucky
stuff, but what did it cost you?
Norma: My family. It cost me my family. Ugh my family was looking at me differ-
ently. My family began not to trust me. They didn’t understand what I was going
through and neither did I at that time.
The therapist introduces a mindfulness exercise that invites Norma to notice sounds
in the environment and to focus on her body, (e.g., feet on the floor, tingling in
hands, etc.) and her breathing. After a few moments, the therapist asks Norma to
notice if her mind is wandering, either ahead or to the past, normalizes the mind’s
tendency to wander and prompts her to gently notice it and bring attention back to
her breath. After ending the mindfulness exercise, Norma reports she did notice that
her mind wandered but that when prompted she could bring her attention back. The
therapist reminds her that mindfulness is a skill that can be practiced to increase
awareness of internal activity [ACT: Present moment, self-as-context].
Toward the end of Session 1 the therapist asks Norma how ready she is to speak
to someone about entering a substance use treatment program. When she mentions
she is not ready the therapist uses defusion strategies while summarizing what she
shared regarding substance use, highlighting discrepancies between behaviors and
values/goals.
Session 2: Acceptance and Engagement
Values. The therapist begins the session by inquiring what has happened since the
prior session, probing for whether Norma began substance use treatment or attended
an obstetrician/gynecologist (OB/GYN) visit to obtain birth control in the prior
2 weeks. The therapist then leads her through a mindfulness exercise similar to the
one introduced during Session 1. Upon completion the therapist inquires, “What did
you notice about your mind’s tendency to wander away from the present moment?”
This portion of the session allows Norma the opportunity to continue practicing
noticing when internal thoughts arise and turning her attention away from these
distracting thoughts and back to the present moment.
During the next component of this session, the therapist begins to help Norma
identify her values, as well as values-driven and avoidant-driven behaviors. The
therapist asks, “Who or what is important to you?” Norma shares that, “her
children, and being a good mother is important.” The therapist then asks in exagger-
ated fashion if, “every single second of every single day she is able to be a ‘good
mother.’” When Norma says no, the therapist expresses relief to normalize that it is
challenging, and often impossible, to always act from ones’ values. The therapist
asks her to identify what internal thoughts and emotions come up and get in the way
of being a good mother [ACT: Defusion, mindfulness]. Norma mentions she has
thoughts such as “I really want that [cocaine], why can’t I have it? Just do it, who
cares about what anyone else thinks or says.” She also identifies that certain emo-
tions, such as anger and frustration, turn her attention away from being a good mother.
Identifying Actions Misaligned with Values. The therapist uses the Telescope
metaphor (Stoddard & Afari, 2014) to ask Norma what she could be seen doing
when she was having these internal distressing thoughts and emotions.
Therapist: If I was looking at you from afar through a telescope and you were feel-
ing and thinking these distressing thoughts how would you be moving your body,
what could you be seen doing [ACT: Self-as-context, committed action,
mindfulness]?
Norma: I would be yelling, arguing, maybe even fighting with someone, I would be
snorting cocaine, drinking alcohol.
Therapist: Would you say snorting cocaine, and getting into arguments and fights
with people you care about is moving you toward or away from those things and
people that are important to you?
Norma: Yeah, umm, away.
Therapist: These things you are sharing with me, they are things that you can be
seen doing when this internal yucky stuff comes up. You feel angry, frustrated,
you feel sadness, you have these thoughts of “I’m so mad, this is too much, I’m
so overwhelmed…”, and if I were watching you through a telescope I could
maybe see you arguing and using cocaine. Do you think you do them to try to
make you feel a little better or to avoid feeling that yucky stuff [ACT: Self-as-
context, defusion, mindfulness]?
C: Yeah, Norma nods expressively.
The therapist and Norma confirm that these actions are undertaken to bring “relief”
or to “escape” from distressing internal thoughts and emotions. The therapist reflects
that these behaviors move her away from things that are important to her and that
her mind brings in these thoughts [ACT: Defusion] that seem to turn her attention
away [ACT: Self-as-context, present moment] from what is important [ACT:
Values]. The therapist then elicits the idea that trying to escape these unpleasant
thoughts and feelings can interfere with what she considers most important [ACT:
Defusion, values].
Identifying Actions Aligned with Values. The therapist uses the same telescope
metaphor to ask Norma how she would be moving her body if she was choosing
behaviors based on her values [ACT: Committed Action, self-as-context]. She states
that if she was engaged in values-directed behaviors she would be “spending time
with her babies, exercising, cooking and eating healthy food, and writing, drawing,
and painting.” The therapist elicits that these actions would bring about feelings of
“satisfaction” as they are behaviors that move Norma toward the people and activi-
ties that are important to her [ACT: Values, committed action].
Control Is the Problem and Willingness to Have Distress. To assist in moving

toward acceptance the therapist discusses the futility of attempting to control
internal thoughts, emotions, and physical sensations and offers the alternative of
willingness.
Therapist: There doesn’t seem to be a magic pill that makes all of this (internal dis-
tressing thoughts and emotions) go away. What are we going to do?
Norma: I don’t know.
Therapist: Is it possible that your values are so important, they bring you satisfac-
tion, and are so valuable that you might choose to move your body in a way that
is aligned with them even if distressing thoughts and emotions are present? Can
they just come along for the ride like background noise? [ACT: Acceptance,
values, defusion].
Norma expresses a desire to be able to do this and the therapist reminds her about
the importance of noticing [ACT: Mindfulness, self-as-context]. The therapist also
uses the fish hook metaphor (Polk et al., 2016; Stoddard & Afari, 2014) to describe
how unpleasant thoughts and emotions are like hooks that pull us away from the
things that we value and we are often hooked before we can notice. The therapist
invites Norma to see the hook, notice it, and keep on swimming, with the hooks
dangling in the water and says, “Hooks can be there and we don’t have to bite them.
Like how thoughts and feelings can come up but we don’t have to buy into or act on
them.” Norma expresses, “I like how you put that!” The therapist reminds Norma
that mindfulness exercises can improve our ability to notice internal experiences or
“hooks.”
However, Norma continues to discuss how difficult it is to not use cocaine when
she feels that her life is stressful. She says that having a baby in the NICU adds even
more stress and she is struggling to cope. The therapist listens empathically and uses
the ACT process of Acceptance, as well as others, and discusses “dead people
goals”, to normalize the idea that stress is a part of all of our lives [ACT: Acceptance,
mindfulness] and encourages her to move toward value-directed action [ACT:
Committed action] even in the face of stress.
Norma: I’m just, I know what I want, and I know what I need to do.
Therapist: What do you want?
Norma: I want to live that life we’ve talked about but ... stress-free.
Therapist: Oh you want a stress-free life? You want to not have conflict or anger or
ever have painful thoughts again? Do you know what that means? That means
you have dead people goals. Dead people are the only people who don’t have
stress in their lives, and don’t have bad things happen to them [ACT: Acceptance].
Norma: Laughs to herself, you are too much.
Therapist: We all have stress, it is a human part of life. We are alive and so we have
stress [ACT: Acceptance]. Luckily we have others things that are so important to
live for [ACT: Values].
Norma: Yes, my son.
Therapist: Yes, your son. And what does living for him look like? What does your
body do when you are focused on your son [ACT: Defusion, self-as-context]? If
I was across the room and saw you, how would you be moving your arms and
legs when you were focused on your son [ACT: Committed action]?
Norma: I would be holding him, giving him a bath, getting his bottle.
Therapist: That is important stuff [ACT: Values]. Is it important enough for you to
do even if you have stress, even when you have the urge and craving to go use
cocaine again? Is it important enough to hold him and take care of him and put
those thoughts and feelings in your back pocket so they aren’t taking a lead
[ACT: Acceptance, Values]?
Norma: Yes it is.
The therapist summarizes what was shared during this session, probes for any ques-
tions from Norma and assesses her readiness to seek additional substance use treat-
ment and reproductive care. The therapist identifies additional resistance to engage
in these behaviors and schedules the third and final intervention session.
Session 3: Awareness, Acceptance, and Engagement
Continued Practice. The session begins with the therapist checking in with Norma
to see what has happened in the prior 2 weeks. The therapist asks her if she initiated
substance-use treatment or began reproductive care. Norma had not, so the therapist
once again leads her through a mindfulness exercise providing another opportunity
to practice awareness and turning her attention away from internal thoughts and
sensations and onto the present moment.
Short and Long-Term Effectiveness. The therapist helps Norma review and pro-
cess the material discussed during the prior session. Together they identify and label
Norma’s experiences over the prior 2 weeks, raising awareness of whether she was
engaging in valued-directed as opposed to avoidance-driven behaviors. The thera-
pist again refers to the magic pill metaphor (Stoddard & Afari, 2014) to initiate a
discussion on the short-term verses long-term effectiveness of the previously identi-
fied avoidant-driven behaviors.
Therapist: Like we said earlier, if I could give you a magic pill that would make all
of this [distressing thoughts and emotions] go away, I would, I would take it
myself even. But unfortunately, no one has developed one yet, so we are here
feeling this stuff [anger, frustration], we have these thoughts, ‘I don’t want to feel
this’ so we escape, maybe with cocaine, to try to bring relief. But then they come
back, ‘I don’t want to think this, I don’t want to feel this,’ this brings us relief and
then it wears off, and we go on and on and get stuck in a loop [ACT: Creative
hopelessness, experiential avoidance].
The therapist then asks about the impact of getting stuck in this loop of distress and
avoidant-driven behaviors.
Therapist: Let me ask you, when we are stuck over here in a loop, what is happening
to the other part of our life, to those things and people we value, what gets left
behind? [ACT: Values].
Norma: You’re not really paying attention to what is important, and being a good
mom, your baby, all of that is on the back burner.
During this portion of the treatment it is difficult for Norma to accept the realization
that she has been stuck in avoidant-driven behavior (e.g., cocaine use) to suppress
difficult thoughts and feelings about the neglect of her child’s welfare; cocaine use
then leads to more child neglect, in revolving door fashion. She begins to express
self-blame, the therapist uses her own experience in the session to remind her that
she is not alone in engaging in this behavior.
Therapist: I have my own list of things that I do when I am avoiding this internal
stuff, we all do. And yet, which of these two lives do you really want to live
[avoidant-driven behaviors led by escaping from distressing internal processes or
valued-directed behaviors led by things that are important]?”
Commitment to Valued-Driven Behavior. Norma states that she would like to
live the value-directed life. The therapist uses the “Riding the Wave” metaphor
(Stoddard & Afari, 2014) to explain the concept of engaging in committed action
even in the face of distressing internal experiences.
Therapist: We kind of get into patterns, I know I do. Like hard stuff happens, really
hard stuff, stuff that’s beyond our control, including cocaine cravings [ACT:
Acceptance, mindfulness]. I can just almost imagine a tsunami, a giant wave of
this stuff coming right at us right now. Have you ever seen a picture or a video of
someone surfing one of those giant waves? What do you think would happen if
the surfer was trying to control the direction of that wave? What’s going to hap-
pen to that surfer? What’s the wave going to do?
Norma: It’s going to take him down.
Therapist: Right, it’s going to crush him it’s going to pull him into the undertow. So
trying to control the wave doesn’t work and fighting against the wave is probably
going to get the same result. And yet I’ve seen pictures of people surfing those
gigantic ocean waves. What did they do, how did they do it?
Norma: Moves hand in a wave motion.
Therapist: Right, they found the current of the wave and rode it [ACT: Acceptance].
I am not a surfer but I can imagine that it must be pretty terrifying. Can you
imagine? To see a wave and your idea is to get out on your little tiny surfboard
and paddle out to it and get on a board and ride it? That is scary right? Why
would they do it?
Norma: Because they enjoy it.
Therapist: Yes, I think so too. It is scary, but they love it so much that to them it is
worth it. Maybe is it possible for you to do that in the waves you experience in
your life [ACT: Acceptance, committed action]. When you notice you have drug
cravings or thoughts of wanting to use again, that you notice them and then turn
your attention to doing something aligned with what’s important. Because just
like that surfer who is fighting the wave and trying to control the wave and trying
to run from the wave...you can’t run fast enough, can’t fight hard enough, those
cravings, emotions and thoughts are going to come [ACT: Acceptance, mindful-
ness]. But could you ride through them? What would that look like [ACT:
Self-as-context]?
Norma: I guess it would look like not using?
Therapist: Right, and a dead person could, “not use!” What would it actually look
like? What would you be doing? [ACT: Committed action].
Norma: Yea, I could do that, go on a walk with my kids, or make sure they are ready
for school.
Therapist: And just like the surfer, you would do it because…? [ACT: Values].
Norma: Because they are my kids, and they are the most important things in my life.
Will I miss the drugs? Of course I will, but my kids mean more to me than
the drugs.
Therapist: Your children are so important to you that you’re really willing to do a lot
of things to make sure that you’re a good mom to them [ACT: Values]. And that
might mean dealing with thoughts of using, with cravings and urges [ACT:
Acceptance]. When it happens, it will be uncomfortable, but whoever said we are
supposed to be happy all the time [ACT: Self-as-context]? Earlier you said to me
‘I can’t be happy right now.’ I mean I understand, of course you can’t… but you
can still hold your baby even if you are not all the way happy.
Norma: He makes me happy, holding him makes me happy.
Therapist: What’s a bold move you could take today that would bring you closer to
who or what is important to you [ACT: Committed action]?
Norma: I can go visit my baby in the hospital, I can take my children to the park and
I can fill out a few more job applications [ACT: Committed action].
Because Norma doesn’t mention beginning substance use treatment as a bold move,
the therapist asks how seeking treatment might be linked to values and discusses
internal barriers: “What comes up inside and gets in the way when you think about
seeking treatment [ACT: Mindfulness, defusion]?” Norma shares that she has
thoughts of “I just don’t want to” and that she feels really afraid of what beginning
treatment means. The therapist and Norma work together using defusion strategies
to identify instances when she got hooked by these distressing internal processes
and stuck in avoidant-driven behaviors of the past. Willingness to have these dis-
tressing internal processes and to move toward values is again reviewed.
Acceptance vs Fighting Internal Experiences. When Norma again mentions that
she wishes she could stop having these stressful thoughts entirely the therapist uses
the Purple Unicorn metaphor, highlighting in a different way the futility of trying to
control these internal experiences (Stoddard & Afari, 2014).
Therapist: So, what does it look and feel like when you are hooked [ACT: Defusion,
self-as-context] by these thoughts and feelings?
Norma: My mind gets racing to, “you don’t have time to go to treatment, you need
to do all this other stuff, you need to go to work, you have been off work too
long.” My work takes my mind off of stuff, I need to be doing something.
Therapist: And really when we try to control these thoughts or we buy into them
what comes up?
Norma: the anxiety, the depression... that’s what comes up.
Therapist: I’m going to give you a million dollars, right now, if you don’t think of a
purple unicorn... no matter what don’t think of a purple unicorn [ACT:
Acceptance] … don’t do it, don’t think of it, ready?
Norma: It already popped up because you said it.
Therapist: Could you control your thoughts?
Norma: No.
Therapist: Even if I gave you a million dollars you couldn’t control your thoughts ...
those thoughts just come – and a million dollars is a really big incentive, and
even with that, you can’t control your thoughts.
Norma: Yeah.
Therapist: So what are some things you can control?
Norma: My actions.
Therapist: Yeah that is something you can control, you can leave here and go take
care of your kids, or you can leave here and go use [drugs]. But your thoughts
and your feelings, you really can’t do much there, they just come along [ACT:
Committed action, values, acceptance].
The session ends with Norma requesting to be scheduled for an intake at our part-
nering substance use treatment center and an appointment to receive reproductive
care. At a follow-up assessment we confirmed that Norma showed large reductions
in psychological inflexibility, as measured by the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire II (Bond et al., 2011), from a total score of 24 at baseline to a 7 at the
2-month and a 10 at the 6-month follow-up. Scores on the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire – Substance Use, Values and Defusion Subscales (Luoma et al.,
2011) showed a higher commitment to values from baseline (Total score = 47) to
follow-up (F2: 63; F6: 60) as well as increased defusion between baseline (Total
score = 32) and follow-up visits (F2: 45; F6: 57). Norma also achieved nearly a 50%
reduction in overall depressive symptomatology across time-points, as measured by
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977). Importantly,
after the third session Norma began substance use treatment and met with a health
professional for reproductive care, where she received an intrauterine device (IUD:
long-acting contraception). While she reported using marijuana and cocaine during
her pregnancy she was abstinent via urine drug screen at both follow-up time points.
An exit interview with the participant found her to be highly satisfied with the
treatment. Specifically she stated, “… [the therapist] asked me so many questions
that I had no choice but to really just look at myself. I don’t really know how to
explain it … but I gradually began changing my mind about what’s best for me and
my children.” When queried about the intervention’s utility in linking her with sub-
stance use treatment and reproductive care the participant stated, “I definitely think
it [the therapy] helped me with that. I wouldn’t have done it on my own.”
Empirical Support
The foundational study of ACT for SUD, conducted by Hayes and colleagues, tested
ACT against two conditions: an intensive 12-step facilitation (ITSF) and methadone
maintenance only (MMO) (Hayes et al., 2004). The sample of individuals received
treatment in a methadone clinic for polysubstance abuse and opioid dependence.
Results indicated that participants in the ACT and the time-matched ITSF condi-
tions were more likely to be abstinent from opioids and all other drugs at the end-
of-treatment (EOT), compared to the MMO group. By the 6-month follow-up, the
ACT and ITSF conditions continued to demonstrate favorable abstinence outcomes
relative to MMO. Also, ACT participants were abstinent (from opioids and all other
drugs) at double the proportions relative to ITSF participants (e.g., 42% vs 19%,
respectively, at 6-month follow-up). Follow-on work by other researchers and with
SUD samples and protocols, has predominantly favored ACT over passive control
groups (i.e., treatment as usual) (González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Hayes et al.,
2004; Luoma et al., 2012; Stotts & Northrup, 2015; Villagrá et al., 2014) with mixed
results when comparing ACT over time-matched, active control groups, such as
CBT (González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2015; Stotts
et al., 2012; Stotts & Northrup, 2015; Villagrá et al., 2014). For example, Stotts
et al. (2012) evaluated a 24-week ACT treatment for individuals detoxifying from
methadone in an outpatient setting and reported 36.7% abstinence from opioids at
the end of treatment, compared to 19.2% for participants in a time-matched drug
counseling control condition (Stotts et al., 2012). However, Smout et al. (2010)
found no difference between ACT and CBT but experienced significant study attri-
tion (Smout et al., 2010).
eta-analytic Findings and Reviews of ACT and Other Third

M
Wave Therapies.
ACT was designated as an evidence-based practice in 2011 on the Substance Abuse

and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA), National Registry for Evidence-
based Programs and Practices (NREPP) (Hayes, 2011). The NREPP was later ter-
minated by SAMHSA in 2018 due in part to an effort to increase rigor around
evidence-based practice designations and other limitations of the registry
(Throckmorton, 2018). While ACT is not currently listed on SAMHSA’s Evidence-
Based Practice Resource Center (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, 2020), published reviews and meta-analyses highlight potential

efficacy of ACT and other mindfulness-based therapies’ for treating myriad SUD
and other addictive behaviors. More large-scale, rigorous research is needed,
however.
From 2010 to 2020, at least a dozen meta-analyses or reviews of acceptance and
mindfulness-based approaches have focused exclusively on or included addiction
studies as a part of a broader meta-analysis (Bautista et al., 2019; Byrne et al., 2019;
Garland & Howard, 2018; Gloster et al., 2020; Goldberg et al., 2018; Grant et al.,
2017; Ii et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2015; Öst, 2014; Ruiz, 2012; Sancho et al., 2018;
Stotts & Northrup, 2015). A large meta-analysis of 60 ACT studies conducted by
Öst in 2014 reported a small effect size across all comparisons (Hedge’s g: 0.42),
and included five RCTs of ACT for SUDs. Öst concluded that ACT was, “possibly
efficacious” for drug abuse (Öst, 2014), which was similar to efficacy determina-
tions reached by SUD-focused and contemporaneous reviews (Lee et al., 2015;
Stotts & Northrup, 2015). Lee and colleagues reported small-to-moderate effect
sizes (g = 0.45, 95% CI = 0.15, 0.74,z = 2.95, p = 0.003, k = 5) favoring ACT over
active control conditions (e.g., CBT, drug counseling) at post-treatment for drug-use
outcomes (Lee et al., 2015). Also in 2015, A-Tjak and colleagues published a meta-
analysis that included 8 SUD studies (503 participants) with results favoring ACT
over control conditions that included treatment as usual (TAU), waitlist, and active
therapies such as cognitive therapy (Hedges’ g = 0.40, SE = 0.13, 95% CI: 0.15–0.66,
p = 0.002) (A-tjak et al., 2015). Recent reviews by Byrne and colleagues included
third wave studies addressing alcohol use disorders (AUDs) and indicated promise
for ACT and other mindfulness approaches in treating AUD, noting a need for
research with first-line comparison conditions, such as cognitive behavioral relapse
prevention and contingency management (Byrne et al., 2019). In 2019, Ii and col-
leagues adopted a mechanism-based approach and broadly analyzed studies of
treatments that targeted psychological flexibility. These psychological flexibility-
based third wave treatments were associated with almost a 10% increase in sub-
stance discontinuation compared to first-line interventions (e.g., brief MI, 12-step
groups), i.e., 33.6% vs. 24.8%, respectively (Ii et al., 2019). Reviews of other third
wave therapies (e.g., mindfulness-based approaches) also have reported favorable
findings for these therapies, (Garland & Howard, 2018; Goldberg et al., 2018; Grant
et al., 2017; Sancho et al., 2018) while cautiously noting limitations (e.g., need for
longer follow-ups and research with younger, vulnerable populations) (Sancho
et al., 2018).
In 2015 we completed a review of evidence for treating SUDs with ACT (n = 5
studies) and Dialectical Behavior Therapy (n = 2) across a range of populations and
substances (Stotts & Northrup, 2015). Specifically, we evaluated efficacy (i.e., the
percentage abstinent) at the end-of-treatment (EOT) and during follow-up periods
spanning 3–6 months for ACT conditions relative to passive and active control
groups. Effect sizes (expressed as relative risk ratios [RR]) were generally largest in
RCTs comparing ACT to passive controls and ranged from 1.58 (95% CI: 0.86–2.92);
(Hayes et al., 2004) to a high (at EOT) of 3.61 (95% CI: 0.48–27.4) and a high (at
follow-up) of 4.17 (1.31–13.26); (González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Villagrá et al.,
2014)). Effect sizes were generally smaller (or favored CBT) when ACT was com-
pared to CBT (RR range: 0.64 [95% CI: 0.34–1.19; (Smout et al., 2010)] to 1.76
[95% CI: 0.49–6.31;(González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Villagrá et al., 2014)] and
other active controls (RR range: 1.04 [95% CI: 0.59–1.85; (Hayes et al., 2004)] to
1.91 [95% CI: 0.76–4.77; (Stotts et al., 2012)]).
Additional treatment development studies using ACT for co-occurring psychiat-
ric comorbidities (e.g., PTSD) (Hermann et al., 2016) and related issues (e.g., pre-
venting substance-exposed pregnancies) (Villarreal et al., 2020) are in progress and
will result in subsequent randomized controlled trials (RCTs). While few additional
RCTs of ACT for SUDs have been published since 2015, ACT and other third wave
intervention studies for AUDs (Byrne et al., 2019), smoking cessation (Bricker
et al., 2017; Heffner et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2015) and other addictive behaviors
(e.g., self-perceived problematic pornography use) (Crosby & Twohig, 2016) have
been conducted.
Alcohol Use Disorders
Byrne et al.’s (2019) review of ACT and mindfulness-based interventions for AUDs
identified 6 studies testing ACT protocols (n = 4 RCTs [n = 3 with an active control
group]; (Byrne et al., 2019; George & de Guzman, 2015; Petersen & Zettle, 2009;
Stappenbeck et al., 2015; Vernig & Orsillo, 2009). RCTs of ACT for AUD were
modest in size (N range: 24–78) and were often delivered in a brief format (most
often 1–5 sessions). Only 1 RCT (Stappenbeck et al., 2015) reported a reduction in
alcohol consumption. Stappenbeck et al. (2015) randomized 78 individuals with
comorbid AUD and PTSD to experiential acceptance (EA; n = 29), cognitive
restructuring (CR; n = 31), or an attention-control group (n = 20) (Stappenbeck
et al., 2015). The study therapist randomized participants so that other study team
members remained blinded. Excellent treatment retention (93% of EA group
received treatment) and follow-up rates (i.e., ≥86% for all 3 conditions) were
reported. The CR group had a significant incidence rate ratio (IRR) for predicting
daily alcohol consumption across the follow-up period (IRR = 0.59 [95% CI:
0.47–0.73]); the EA condition was associated with lower daily alcohol consumption
but was not significant (IRR = 0.83 [95% CI: 0.69–1.00]). The other 3 RCTs of ACT
for AUD focused on non-alcohol-related outcomes or did not measure alcohol use
(e.g., due to an inpatient recruitment setting (Petersen & Zettle, 2009). Two of these
3 studies reported reductions in primary outcome variables (i.e., depression
(Petersen & Zettle, 2009), and stress and emotion regulation outcomes (George &
de Guzman, 2015; Vernig & Orsillo, 2009) found no differences on any outcomes.
Future research with ACT on AUDs should measure and compare differences on
abstinence from alcohol relative to control groups.
Third-wave therapies characterized as mindfulness-based interventions reviewed
by Byrne and colleagues (n = 11 [n = 6 RCTs]) were associated with significant
reductions in alcohol use. For example, Kamboj et al. (2017) conducted a study with
68 drinkers at risk for harm from alcohol, who were randomized to 11 minutes of
mindfulness instruction (active treatment) versus a matched-relaxation control
group (Kamboj et al., 2017). Alcohol cravings declined in both groups but the mind-
fulness group had a greater reduction in alcohol use over the previous 7 days at
follow-up (i.e., M = −9.31 units or 74.5 g of alcohol, d = 0.593, p < 0.001) compared
to the relaxation group (M = -3.00 units or 24 g of alcohol, P > .1, d = 0.268).
Stasiewicz et al. (2013) randomized 77 alcohol-dependent outpatients (who reported
drinking during negative affective states) to either CBT with affect regulation train-
ing (ART; active condition) versus CBT and health lifestyle training (HLI; control)
(Stasiewicz et al., 2013). The authors retained ≥64% of participants at all time
points and the CBT+ART reported significantly greater treatment satisfaction than
the CBT+HLI. The CBT+ART group had significantly greater reductions in alcohol
use. Specifically, CBT+ART participants demonstrated greater days abstinent at
EOT compared to CBT+HLI (74% vs 59%), fewer average drinks/day at 3 months
(4.6 [SD = 4.0] vs 6.2 [7.0] drinks), and fewer heavy drinking days from baseline to
EOT (i.e., simple slope; b = −26.9, p < 0.001, Cohen d = 0.89) compared to
CBT+HLI.
Byrne et al. (2019) noted promise of third-wave approaches (ACT and
mindfulness-based interventions in this review) but called attention to the method-
ological limitations (e.g., small sample sizes, limited follow-up, lacking first-line
treatments [e.g., CBT] for comparisons) that need to be addressed in future work
(Byrne et al., 2019). Other mindfulness-based interventions studies with non-
randomized designs have also demonstrated reductions in alcohol abstinence (e.g.,
Zgierska et al., 2008), reduced “binge episodes” (Mermelstein & Garske, 2015) and
reduced risk of relapse (e.g., Crescentini et al., 2015).
Smoking Cessation Research
Research targeting smoking cessation with ACT and other third wave therapies
(e.g., MBAT) (Vidrine et al., 2016) has an impressive and growing literature, par-
ticularly from 2014 and after (Bricker et al., 2014b, 2017; Hooper et al., 2018; Lee
et al., 2015; Spears et al., 2017; Vidrine et al., 2016). Gifford and colleagues (Gifford
et al., 2004) first demonstrated the promise of ACT (compared to nicotine-
replacement therapy [NRT]) in 2004 with a moderate-to-large effect size as deter-
mined by expired carbon monoxide (CO) collection at 12-months (g = 0.61, 95%
CI = 0.11–1.12, 0.71, z = 2.37, p = 0.02) (Lee et al., 2015). Lee and colleagues
(2015) analyzed Gifford’s foundational work, along with 4 other studies examining
ACT for smoking cessation (Bricker et al., 2013, 2014a, b; Gifford et al., 2011).
When smoking-cessation studies were examined alone, small-to-moderate effect
sizes favored ACT over a variety of control conditions (i.e., phone apps, websites,
CBT, NRT, and Bupropion; g = 0.42, 95% CI = 0.19, 0.64, z = 3.64, p < 0.001, k = 5)
(Lee et al., 2015). In 2016, Vidrine and colleagues found no effect of mindfulness-
based addiction treatment (MBAT) on overall abstinence but reported large MBAT
effect sizes for recovery from lapses compared to CBT (MBAT vs. CBT: OR = 4.94,
95% CI: 1.47 to 16.59, p = 0.010, Effect Size =0.88) and usual care (UC; MBAT vs.
UC: OR = 4.18, 95% CI: 1.04 to 16.75, p = 0.043, Effect Size = 0.79) (Vidrine et al.,
2016). Bricker and colleagues have continued to develop smartphone technology
using ACT-based applications (i.e., SmartQuit 2.0) and report encouraging partici-
pant receptivity and usefulness data, along with favorable abstinence data (e.g.,
21% 7-day point prevalence; 23%, at a 2-month follow-up time point)(Bricker et al.,
2017), comparable to other evidence-based treatments for smoking cessation (e.g.,
NRT, Varenicline) (Baker et al., 2016).
Other Addictive Behaviors Research
ACT and mindfulness-based interventions have shown promising results for treat-
ing other addictive behaviors and disorders (e.g., treating internet (Lee et al., 2019)
and sex addictions (Van Gordon et al., 2016)), and we highlight a few recent find-
ings to demonstrate their potential in these additional areas. For example, a
mindfulness- based cognitive-behavioral intervention for smartphone addiction
found significant reductions in smartphone use among university students, com-
pared to participants randomized to a control group (Lan et al., 2018). Twohig and
Crosby first piloted ACT to target problematic internet pornography use in a small
sample of six adult males with no control group and reported dramatic reductions of
85% in self-reported time spent viewing pornography (Twohig & Crosby, 2010).
Crosby and Twohig (2016) next conducted an RCT with 28 adult males and again
reported large reductions in pornography viewing for participants who received 12
sessions of individual ACT compared to participants who were first randomized to
a waitlist control and later completed treatment with ACT (93% vs 21%). After all
participants had received the ACT treatment, 54% of participants at the end-of-
treatment and 35% of participants at a 3-month follow-up assessment self-reported
that they had completely stopped viewing Internet pornography using a daily por-
nography viewing questionnaire reported weekly to therapists (Crosby & Twohig,
2016). Others have also written about the potential benefits of ACT for treating
problematic pornography use (Sniewski et al., 2018), particularly in a one-on-one
format (Fraumeni-McBride, 2019).
Third Wave and Second-Wave Therapy Comparisons
In the area of addiction, few studies have tested ACT against traditional CBT proto-
cols, with these studies yielding mixed results (González-Menéndez et al., 2014;
Smout et al., 2010; Villagrá et al., 2014). For example, at the end-of-treatment ACT
compared favorably to CBT (risk ratio: 1.76 [95% CI: 0.49, 6.31] for abstinence, as
measured by random urinalyses and self-reported use, in a sample of women who
were incarcerated and had a SUD diagnosis. Furthermore, this effect remained sta-
ble across an 18-month follow-up period, but the trial experienced 50% attrition by
the final assessment, limiting confidence in group comparisons and outcomes
(González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Villagrá et al., 2014). Conversely, work by Smout
and colleagues, found that CBT participants were more likely to be abstinent at
EOT and follow-up, relative to ACT participants (e.g., 42.9% vs. 33.3% abstinence
for methamphetamine at EOT) (Smout et al., 2010), with the exception of ACT
demonstrating greater abstinence at a 3-month follow-up assessment (50.0% vs.
36.3%) (Smout et al., 2010). Again, however, attrition was extensive, making con-
clusions based on the study tenuous. Across three studies, Lee and colleagues com-
pared ACT and traditional CBT on substance abstinence and reported no significant
differences between the two at follow-up (g = 0.34, 95% CI = −0.04, 0.71, z = 1.75,
p = 0.08, k = 3) (Lee et al., 2015). This comparison included both SUD studies
(described above) (González-Menéndez et al., 2014; Smout et al., 2010; Villagrá
et al., 2014) and a small pilot RCT targeting smoking cessation by Bricker et al.
(2014a). Noteworthy, Mindfulness-Based Addiction Treatment (MBAT) has been
found more effective than traditional CBT for promoting recovery from smoking
lapses (Vidrine et al., 2016). More work is needed to test third-wave against second-
wave CBT (active) control groups, although this has been questioned as a fruitful
endeavor.
Understanding Mechanisms of Action
Mediational analyses to explore mechanisms of behavior change for ACT and other
third-wave therapies for treating SUDs is a prominent shortcoming of the literature
(Bautista et al., 2019; Byrne et al., 2019; Ii et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2015; Roos &
Witkiewitz, 2017; Shonin & Van Gordon, 2016; Stotts & Northrup, 2015). Across
disorders, Ruiz and colleagues (2012) indicated that ACT tends to work through its
proposed mechanisms, whereas second-wave CBT does not (Ruiz, 2012).
Specifically, in a meta-analysis of studies comparing ACT and CBT, ACT demon-
strated greater impact (g = 0.38) on its putative processes of change (e.g., defusion
and experiential avoidance) but CBT showed little to no impact on its proposed
processes (e.g., automatic thoughts and dysfunctional attitudes; g = 0.05). However,
this early work only included studies (n = 16) which compared ACT to traditional
CBT protocols, spanned diverse areas and populations, and included only a single
study on a SUD (i.e., methamphetamine dependence) and one study on smoking
cessation (Ruiz, 2012). Partially addressing this critique of the literature, the previ-
ously mentioned 2019 review by Ii and colleagues on “psychological flexibility-
based” versus first-line psychosocial interventions for SUD was conducted to
explore interventions based on theoretical mechanisms vs techniques or strategies
only. As noted above, the key finding was that psychologically flexible interventions
were more likely to generate better SUD outcomes (e.g., substance discontinuation;
33.6% vs. 24.8%) (Ii et al., 2019). Notably, this meta-analytic review comparing
psychologically flexible interventions to first line treatments included several ACT
and DBT studies, as well as an ACT study on AUDs, and additional studies with
CBT and other third-wave therapies targeting SUDs which were not included in
other reviews or meta-analyses.
To date, however, studies attempting to explore ACT-related constructs for reduc-
ing addictive behaviors have generally been small-n designs limiting conclusions.
For example, a small smoking-cessation 3-arm design found that participants taught
defusion techniques smoked less than participants in either a control condition or in
an experiential avoidance condition (Hooper et al., 2018). ACT has also been piloted
for cannabis dependence with three participants, and significant drops in levels of
experiential avoidance and other constructs (e.g., depressive symptoms) were
reported but deserves further inquiry with a larger sample (Twohig et al., 2007). An
8-session ACT protocol developed to treat problematic internet pornography view-
ing identified large increases in psychological flexibility and small reductions in
thought-action fusion and thought control as potential mediators of change (Twohig
& Crosby, 2010). Future ACT SUD research with larger sample sizes is needed in
order to conduct credible mediational analyses on behavior change mechanisms.
Conclusions
Support for ACT, mindfulness-based, and other third wave therapies to treat addic-
tion is growing (Bautista et al., 2019; Byrne et al., 2019; Garland & Howard, 2018;
Goldberg et al., 2018; Grant et al., 2017; Ii et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2015; Öst, 2014;
Ruiz, 2012; Sancho et al., 2018; Stotts & Northrup, 2015), with recent support for
treating AUDs (Byrne et al., 2019), and additional data demonstrating efficacy for
smoking cessation (Bricker et al., 2010, 2013, 2014b 2017; Heffner et al., 2020; Lee
et al., 2015; Vidrine et al., 2016). Several third-wave interventions with AUDs or
SUDs have also shown significant promise for treating comorbid psychiatric condi-
tions (e.g., depression)(Petersen & Zettle, 2009), borderline personality disorder
(Linehan et al., 1999, 2002), and PTSD (Hermann et al., 2016)). However, more
large-scale research with acceptance and mindfulness-based therapies is needed on
substance use and relapse prevention outcomes, ideally with limited study attrition
and treatment dropout, increased effect sizes, comparisons with first line treatments
(including traditional CBT), and rigorous study designs (e.g., double blinded).
Additionally, more research is needed on the cultural appropriateness of these thera-
pies with diverse samples from substance use and other addictive behavior popula-
tions. The budding interest in and preliminary efficacy for acceptance and
mindfulness therapies to treat a host of addictive disorders (e.g., internet and phone
addictions) make them highly attractive to therapists, providing broad application
and significant potential for improved outcomes.
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Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder:
First Wave Case Conceptualization
Michele D. Wallace and Justin Han
Recall that first wave behavior therapy uses the principles of operant and respondent
conditioning to address behavioral deficits (e.g., unacquired skills) and behavioral
excesses (e.g., challenging behavior). Moreover, it is based on the notion that behav-
ior is subject to the laws of nature and as such, is a result of both a person’s ontogeny
and phylogeny. When addressing specific challenges (i.e., behaviors missing or dis-
played from a person diagnosed with a disorder) within this first wave approach,
practitioners cannot change the ontogeny or past – phylogeny of the client, but they
can and do address current environmental contingencies to change behavior.
Clinicians working as behavior analysts or clinical behavior therapists, manipulate
environment-behavior relations to change client behaviors.
First Wave Behavior Therapy: An Overview
Historically, a first wave behavior therapy approach was based upon a behavior
deficiency model of deviant behavior, and group homes were developed to establish
and support the behavioral competencies for both kids and parents in social, aca-
demic, and family living skills (Wolf et al., 1976). However, this approach is now
more broad and is an evidence-based method of examining and changing what peo-
ple say and do by altering the environment-behavior relation. It should be pointed
out that within this approach, a client’s diagnosis does not change the clinical
approach taken to create lasting behavior change. Instead, the approach and the
procedures based upon this behavioral model cross diagnosis categories [e.g.,
M. D. Wallace (*)
California State University, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
e-mail: mwallac@calstatela.edu
J. Han
University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_26
610 M. D. Wallace and J. Han
obesity, substance-related and addictive disorders, Autism, Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), to name a few]. Specifically, antecedents and con-
sequences are manipulated to change behavior, both to teach and increase desirable
behavior, as well as, to eliminate or decrease undesirable behavior. With that said,
this chapter will address first wave behavior therapy approaches to specifically
address common behavioral concerns exhibited by individuals with ADHD. More
specifically, this chapter will provide a general overview of how to approach behav-
ioral concerns, as well as, a brief summary of current research pertaining to address-
ing behavioral deficits and behavioral excesses of clients diagnosed with ADHD.
The general assumption in the first wave behavior therapy approach to behavior
is that if a behavior is not occurring, it is either a skills deficit or is not being ade-
quately evoked and reinforced. Given this approach, treatment intervention target-
ing behavioral deficits are two-fold: (a) develop and implement a program to teach
the behavior or (b) arrange sufficient antecedents to evoke the behavior and rein-
forcement to maintain the behavior. Similarly, if a behavior excess is occurring, the
assumption is the behavior is being evoked and reinforced. Thus, in order to treat the
behavior excess, the reason(s) why the person is engaging in the behavior (the rein-
forcing function the behavior serves) must first be identified (i.e., conducting a
Functional Behavior Assessment) and then used to modify the antecedents and con-
sequences to eliminate the behavior.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: An Overview
Individuals are diagnosed with ADHD based upon a persistent pattern of inattention
and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning or development
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Behaviors associated and addressed for
inattention generally include: not paying attention to details or making careless mis-
takes; trouble staying focused on a task, especially non-preferred tasks; non-
compliance or lack of follow through on tasks, especially schoolwork or homework;
disorganization and difficulty prioritizing tasks; and forgetfulness. Behaviors asso-
ciated and addressed for hyperactivity-impulsivity generally include: fidgeting,
elopement, social skills (e.g., unable to play quietly, talking excessively, waiting
their turn, interrupting); and blurting. It is also common for individuals diagnosed
with ADHD to engage in comorbid problem behavior (e.g., aggression, disruption,
self-injury; Biederman, 2005 and adulthood (Biederman, 2004). In fact, children
diagnosed with ADHD are at a higher risk for displaying behavioral difficulties,
including defiance, lying, stealing, and fighting (Barkley, 2006). In addition, chil-
dren diagnosed with ADHD frequently struggle with academics (DuPaul & Stoner,
2003). As these children become teenagers and young adults, they tend to have
lower high school grade point averages and enrollment in college degree programs
(Barkley et al., 2008). Thus, interventions for individuals with ADHD must not only
address the attention, hyperactivity, and behavioral issues, but must address specific
academic skills.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: First Wave Case Conceptualization 611
Intervention Approach for Behavioral Deficits
When an individual presents with a behavioral deficit, we know that the behavior is
either not in the individual’s repertoire (e.g., a skill deficit) or is not being triggered
and supported by their environment. A number of behavioral procedures can be
utilized to teach new behavior or arrange the environment to evoke and support
behavior that is not being exhibited by individuals. Behaviorally based interventions
have a long documented history of producing socially significant behavior change
across a wide range of behaviors, populations, and settings (Mayer et al., 2019).
Generally, some combination of the following procedures are utilized when taking
a first wave behavior therapeutic approach to achieve change: differential reinforce-
ment, shaping, task analysis and chaining, prompting and transferring of stimulus
control, modeling and imitation, discrimination training, contingency contracting,
and self-management (Mayer et al., 2019). It should be noted, these first wave
behavioral procedures are not tied to diagnosis or age of clients, but are designed
and implemented based upon the target behavior in need of change. With that said,
with adults as clients the behavior change agent (the person who implements the
behavior change program) is the client themself, while with children clients the
behavior change agents are usually caregivers or teachers.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed description of these
above-mentioned behavioral procedures. However, a brief summary of the recent
research literature of the use of these procedures with individuals with ADHD for
specific behavioral deficits is warranted.
Reinforcer Identification
Regardless if the reason for the behavioral deficit is a skill deficit or unsupportive
environment, the first step in addressing challenges faced by individuals with ADHD
will be to identify functional reinforcers (i.e., effective reinforcers). If you want
behavior to occur, we know, it must result in effective reinforcement. In fact, rein-
forcement occurs naturally in the course of life and is responsible in most circum-
stances for what we learn, how we learn, and how long we retain the learning. Thus,
it should be no surprise that identifying effective reinforcers is paramount to
addressing behavioral deficits in individuals diagnosed with ADHD.
A number of procedures are commonly used to identify effective reinforcers to
use in behavior analytic and clinical behavior therapy interventions. These include
surveys, preference assessments (e.g., paired stimulus assessments, multiple stimu-
lus assessments, single operant assessments), and reinforcer assessments (Mayer
et al., 2019). Research has shown that utilizing these reinforcer identification prac-
tices has been successful (Ringdahl et al., 1997).
One interesting phenomenon pertaining to the identification and use of reinforc-
ers with individuals diagnosed with ADHD is that a significant percentage of clients
who receive first wave interventions also conjointly receive pharmacological inter-
ventions (Danielson et al., 2018). In practice, it is important to understand the influ-
ence of these pharmacological interventions on the identification and use of
reinforcers. For example, Northup et al. (1997) demonstrated that Methylphenidate
(MPH) can influence the effectiveness of common classroom reinforcers.
Specifically, they evaluated the influence of MPH on the number of math problems
completed during a reinforcement based intervention. They compared the number
of math problems completed when the children were receiving MPH versus a pla-
cebo while utilizing a reinforcement based intervention. Results demonstrated that
while receiving MPH, preference for food or activities and the number of math
problems completed differed than when participants were receiving placebo.
Similarly, Ellsworth (2005) demonstrated that the time since medication admin-
istration and when preference and reinforcer assessments were conducted affected
the efficacy of reinforcers. Specifically, preference assessments conducted during
medication full effect status predicted responding during the reinforcer assessment
conducted during both full effect and partial effect status. However, the preference
assessment conducted during the partial effect status did not predict responding dur-
ing either reinforcer assessment status.
Based upon this literature, it would be advised to conduct preference assess-
ments to identify reinforcers under the same medication status one wishes to use
those reinforcers. If at the start of intervention, the individual is not taking pharm-
alogical interventions, but at some part starts, it is advisable to re-do reinforcer
assessments.
After completing reinforcer assessments, the next step in addressing behavioral
deficits is to determine how those reinforcers will be used and what other proce-
dures will be incorporated into a comprehensive treatment plan. Given that rein-
forcement is the bases of most interventions designed to address behavioral deficits
for individuals with ADHD, next we look at specific interventions based upon the
type of behavioral deficit most commonly encountered. Specifically, individuals
with ADHD commonly exhibit difficulty in maintaining attention as well as not
demonstrating self-control (i.e., engaging in impulsive behavior). Likewise, indi-
viduals with ADHD tend to need interventions related to academic and social skills.
The First Wave of behavior therapy is not focused on ridding clients of their diagno-
sis. Instead, interventions are developed and implemented to address common
behavioral deficits that are impeding the client’s functioning.
Self-Control
One behavioral deficit addressed by first wave behavior therapist is teaching indi-
viduals with ADHD self-control. Impulsivity, or the behavioral deficit in self-
control, is a common behavior pattern displayed by individuals with ADHD
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).Impulsivity is the behavior of choosing
(or engaging in behavior that results in) a smaller-immediate-reward as opposed to
the larger-delayed-reward (Ainslie, 1974). The severity of impulsivity can vary

between individuals, for some individuals it can look like turning in work late for
school or work, while for others it can result in impulsive aggression (Dowson &
Blackwell, 2010). The assessment of impulsivity, a vital part of an ADHD diagno-
sis, is usually conducted by way of verbal narratives, written narrative, question-
naires (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2000). One behavioral approach to
assessing impulsivity in individuals with ADHD is to conduct a choice assessment
(i.e., examine if an individual chooses a smaller immediate reinforcer over a larger
delayed reinforcer; Neef et al., 2001).
Subsequent to the assessment of self-control/impulsivity, behavioral procedures
are then utilized to switch an individual’s propensity of engaging in an impulsive
response (engaging in the behavior that results in the smaller immediate reinforcer)
to a self-controlled response (engaging in the behavior that results in the larger
delayed reinforcer). This has been accomplished by analyzing and understanding
the influence of the dimensions of reinforcement that affect behavior (e.g., rate, tim-
ing, quality, quantity, etc.; see Mayer et al., 2019 for detailed analysis of the effects
of reinforcer dimensions). Neef and colleagues (2001, 2005) demonstrated that the
self-control behavior of individuals with ADHD can be malleable, but that imme-
diacy of reinforcer delivery tended to override the effects of rate, response effort,
and quality of the reinforcer. Thus, it is important to bridge the gap or teach delay to
gratification. Binder et al. (2000) taught children with ADHD self-control by gradu-
ally manipulating the delay to reinforcement for the larger delayed reinforcer.
Initially, both the smaller and larger reinforcer were made immediately available.
Then, delays were progressively increased for the larger reinforcer, until the partici-
pants selected the larger, delayed reinforcers. Recent research has extended this
approach to task completion (Gadaire et al., 2014), developing a computerized
assessment (Hoerger & Mace, 2006) as well as a brief format within an outpatient
clinic (Falcomata et al., 2010).
In summary, the combination of identifying a high-quality reinforcer along with
the systematic introduction of a delay to that reinforcer has been very effective in
shifting impulsive behavior to self-control. Initially, the goal is to teach clients these
skills in contrived situations in hopes that they will engage in self-control when it
matters. These techniques can also be adapted outside of contrived situations by first
identifying a highly preferred reward then slowly increasing the wait time to obtain
that reward. It is important to note that reinforcement is not a singular thing or con-
cept, and the way one presents a specific reinforcement will change the value of the
reinforcer. However, with that said, future research is needed to programming for
generalization rather than just hoping for its occurrence with respect to self-control
and impulsivity.
Academic Performance
Common behaviors displayed by those diagnosed with ADHD (e.g., inattention,

hyperactivity) comorbidly affect their academic performance. For example, an indi-
vidual with ADHD might have a more difficult time attending to teachers in the
classroom when the teacher is presenting a new topic or providing instructions for
homework, thus resulting in that individual not performing well on that assignment
or concept. For an individual who struggles with maintaining focus during pro-
longed instructions, missing a key component of an assignment or a question on an
exam can adversely impact their academic performance. First wave behavior thera-
pists have looked into different training methods to increase both level of respond-
ing and maintenance of correct responding to address academic problems in
individuals with ADHD.
Early research within the field of behavior therapy focused on fluency training.
Fluency- based training are training protocols that are designed to increase rate of
correct responding in a short amount of time. These trainings result in faster, and
more accurate responses to instructions. Researchers found that if a learner attained
fluency on a topic, they performed better academically when faced with distractions
(Binder 1996). Fluency training can be done through different methodologies. One
popular method to develop academic fluency is precision teaching (PT). PT is an
individualized teaching method used to build and support lasting response fluency
and generally involves repeated practice, error-correction, timed drills, and analysis
of data through the usage of a specialized tool for fluency data collection called
standard celeration chart(Lindsley, 1991; Potts et al., 1993). PT or generative
instruction has received much popularity in the recent decade, for a detailed descrip-
tion please see Johnson et al., 2021.
In a recent example, McDowell and Keenan (2001) successfully used PT to
increase both on-task behavior as well as increased phonological awareness (i.e.,
letter sounds) in a 9-year-old boy diagnosed with ADHD. Prior to PT, the partici-
pant was only on-task half of the time and could not correctly state the sound of
letters. The intervention resulted in an immediate increase in correct responses,
decreases in incorrect responses, and on-task behavior for the entire learning ses-
sion. After achieving fluency, these improvements were maintained even when the
intervention was removed.
Besides using PT to teach academics skills, one recommendation has been to
reinforce academic performance itself, as well as, on-task behavior. However,
sometimes the delivery of reinforcement can in and of itself prove to be a distrac-
tion, as it takes time out of a person’s routine to deliver a reinforcer to an individual
(Robinson & St. Peter, 2019). For example, if a teacher needs to reinforcer a stu-
dent’s on-task behavior or correct performance in the middle of teaching or if a
student stops working to consume their earned reinforcer. To combat such an issue,
Robinson and St. Peter (2019) demonstrated increases in academic engagement
(on-task behavior) and reduction in problem behavior for 3 students with ADHD
when the students were allowed to accumulate reinforcement (i.e., save 15 seconds
of play for each correct answer) over the course of the session and play at the end of
the session. This study demonstrates that the utilization of reinforcement for aca-
demic performance or engagement does not have to be disruptive to the flow of the
learning environment.
Inattention or disruption in academic engagement can be a common concern
with students with ADHD. Besides reinforcing active academic engagement, others
have tried to provide white noise (continuous sound from 20 to 20,000 Hz) during
academic work. In a recent study, Cook et al. (2014) allowed three students with
ADHD to wear headphones that played white noise during academics. They com-
pared the effects of headphones that played white noise, with headphones alone, and
no headphones. For all three participants, headphones with white noise were associ-
ated with increases in on-task behavior.
Academic deficits can be effectively targeted with behavioral interventions not
only to improve a specific academic performance, but to increase academic engage-
ment. Future research needs to focus on the broader application, as well as, gener-
alization of these behavioral interventions targeting academic performance and
engagement.
Social Skills
Although deficits in social skills are not part of the criteria, per say, for obtaining a
diagnosis of ADHD. Individuals diagnosed with ADHD tend to have difficulty in
this area. One approach that has been useful to teach a number of adaptive skills is
behavioral skills training (BST; Mayer et al., 2019). BST includes instructions,
modeling, rehearsal, and feedback (Miltenberger, 2019). Generally, the instruction
component describes the response criteria as well as the conditions under which the
behavior should occur; modeling, involves a demonstration of the correct response;
rehearsal, requires the learner to engage in the behavior; and feedback is provided
contingent on the rehearsal (e.g., specific praise for correct response or error-
correction for the inaccurate responses). The process is repeated until a mastery
criterion is achieved. Peters and Thompson (2015) utilized BST to teach conversa-
tional skills. Two of the 10 participants were diagnosed with ADHD along with
Autism. Specially the researchers trained students to identify if a listener was inter-
ested or uninterested, ask a question, or change the topic if the listener was
uninterested.
When addressing social skills deficits, a powerful tool in any therapist bag would
be to develop a specific social skill program by first operationally defining the target
social skill and then utilizing BST to teach it. Future research should look at both
generalization from the training situation to the natural environment and generaliza-
tion across social skills (i.e., does teaching one skill using BST influence use of
other skills).
Take Home Points
First wave behavior therapy is a direct derivative from a behavior analytic approach
to behavior change. As such, treatment focuses on environmental manipulations to
overcome behavioral deficits experienced by someone regardless of diagnosis.
There is rich history of the application of behavioral interventions to address behav-
ioral deficits among a wide variety of clients in a number of settings. In particular,
first wave behavior therapy approaches have been utilized to address behavioral
deficits that are caused by both skill deficits, as well as, unsupportive environments.
In particular, the use of reinforcer assessments and reinforcement based interven-
tions are important tools for helping those with ADHD overcome their behavioral
deficits. It is important to remember that other interventions, namely, pharmalogi-
cal, can alter the efficacy of reinforcement based interventions. Given that impulsiv-
ity is one of the diagnostic criteria used to evaluate an individual to determine if they
have ADHD, it is important to understand how self-control can be evaluated and
targeted. Teaching individuals with ADHD how to engage in self-control is para-
mount to their functioning and should be explicitly targeted during intervention.
Although behavioral interventions have a long history of being utilized to teach
and address both academic and social skills, with respect to their application with
individuals with ADHD more research is needed. More importantly, the generaliza-
tion of effects must be addressed to determine their global effects. It should be noted
that these interventions, which are based upon the principles of behavior analysis
(e.g., differential reinforcement, shaping, task analysis and chaining, prompting and
transfer of stimulus control, modeling and imitation, discrimination training, con-
tingency contracting and self-management), produce gradual rather than immediate
changes in behavior. In fact, there are no quick fixes with respect to the use of first
wave behavior therapy approached to behavioral deficits and these interventions
require extended implementation.
The goal for the use of first wave of behavior therapy in the treatment of clients
with ADHD is to grant our clients autonomy and provide them the opportunity to
live their lives to their full potential. The literature is full of examples of how to do
so when targeting behavioral deficits, now let’s turn to interventions designed to
reduce or eliminate behavioral excesses.
Intervention Approach for Behavioral Excesses
Similar to when an individual presents with a behavioral deficit, when they present
with a behavioral excess (e.g., problem behavior), we know something. We know
that if a behavior is occurring it is being reinforced. Thus, the first step to treating a
behavioral excess from a first wave behavior therapy approach is to conduct a func-
tional behavior assessment (FBA) to determine what is reinforcing the behavior
(Mayer et al., 2019). The FBA methodology has been shown to be an effective tool
in assessing problem behaviors for not only individuals with ADHD, but also other
diagnoses and age groups (Beavers et al., 2013). This is true when working with an
individual with ADHD, just as much as when working with individuals with ______
(insert any diagnosis). Engaging in comorbid problem behavior (e.g., aggression,
disruption, self-injury) is often associated with the diagnosis of ADHD (Barkley,
2003). Although diagnosis of ADHD and displaying problem behavior can co-occur
in an individual, it is important to understand that diagnosis of ADHD is not the
cause of the problem behavior. In fact, all too often therapist erroneously rely on
faulty explanations for problem behavior (i.e., problem behavior is a function of a
diagnosis). Besides being faulty, arguably it does not lead to effective interventions
(e.g., one cannot remove the ADHD) and is not a helpful approach. Utilizing a FBA
and intervention approach to identify and manipulate the environmental determi-
nants of problem behavior with individuals with ADHD has been an effective
approach taken by first wave behavior therapists (e.g., Miller & Lee, 2013).
FBAs consist of interviews and record reviews (indirect assessment), observa-
tions (descriptive assessment), and most importantly, a functional analysis (Iwata
et al., 1994a) to identify why an individual is engaging in problem behavior (see
Mayer et al., 2019 for a detailed description of FBA procedures). The creation of
functional analysis methodology has allowed behavior therapist to develop more
effective interventions for problem behavior while minimizing the usage of
punishment-based procedures (Pelios et al., 1999). Both the effectiveness, as well as
the importance, of an FBA approach can be recognized through its adaptation into
the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) in 1990 and reauthorized within
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) in 2004. Within
the two laws, schools are recommended to conduct an FBA of problem behaviors
for individuals with a disability or in the case of students with ADHD through
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (U.S. Department of Education, 2020).
Effective interventions aimed at reducing problem behavior exhibited by indi-
viduals with ADHD will necessitate an FBA to identify the “why” behind the
behavior. Is the person engaging in the problem behavior to get something or get out
of something? Is the behavior a byproduct of the behavior itself, or does someone
actually reinforce the behavior (be it accidently)? Research has shown that the iden-
tification of the specific function is crucial to effective interventions. Specifically, it
has been demonstrated that a nonfunctional intervention, can result in further harm
to the individual or others (Iwata et al., 1994b).
Once behavioral function has been identified via an FBA, behavior therapists can
use that information to develop behavior interventions to reduce problem behavior
and increase replacement behavior by including antecedent manipulations, extinc-
tion, and differential reinforcement (Mayer et al., 2019). Antecedent manipulations
include the removal of discriminative stimuli for the problem behavior, presentation
and development of effective discriminative stimuli for the replacement behavior,
abolishment of motivating operations for the problem behavior, establishing moti-
vating operations for the replacement behavior, and manipulation of the response
effort for both the problem and replacement behavior. The extinction component of
the intervention eliminates the reinforcer contingency by ensuring the problem
behavior is not reinforced (e.g., attention is not provided, delay to work completion
doesn’t occur, attenuation of stimulation produced by the response itself). Generally,
differential reinforcement is utilized to increase replacement behavior (e.g., a com-
munication response or some other adaptive behavior), as well as, to reinforce the
absence of the problem behavior.
Given that the function of the problem behavior dictates how these interventions
are procedurally executed, the following discussion will be based on the functions
of behavior (social-positive, social-negative, and automatic). Again a detailed
description of all the possible behavioral interventions based upon the function of
the problem behavior is beyond the scope of this chapter.
ehavioral Excesses Maintained by Social

B
Positive Reinforcement
The two most common social positive reinforcers maintaining problem behavior are
attention (e.g., comments of concern, reprimands, etc.) and tangibles (e.g., access to
computers, iPads, iPhones, etc.). With respect to individuals with ADHD, a com-
mon social positive reinforcer maintaining problem behavior is access to peer atten-
tion. Jones et al. (2000) demonstrated that an 8-year-old boy diagnosed with ADHD
engaged in disruptive behavior maintained by peer attention. To address this prob-
lem, researchers implemented noncontingent reinforcement (NCR) to abolish the
motivating operation. Specially, peers were instructed to interact with Sam every
90-s for 30 s. Substantial decreases in Sam’s disruptive behavior were observed dur-
ing this intervention.
Grauvoguel-MacAleese and Wallace (2010) also identified peer attention as the
functional reinforcer maintaining three children, diagnosed with ADHD, problem
behavior. During treatment, the researchers implemented a differential reinforce-
ment program in conjunction with extinction. Specifically, peers provided attention
and praise if the participants engaged in appropriate replacement behavior (on-task)
during homework time in an after school program. Moreover, the peers were trained
to discontinue attention contingent on the problem behavior until the participant
regained focus on the task. Similar results were achieved in a classroom when Flood
et al. (2002) used peer-mediated reinforcement plus prompting to decrease off-task
behavior of 3 students diagnosed with ADHD. Interestingly, these two studies dem-
onstrate the need for functional analysis rather than developing a treatment based
upon the activity in which problem behavior occurs. Although in both these studies
the participants engaged in problem behavior during work (e.g., homework or class-
work), all of them engaged in problem behavior to gain peer attention rather than
escape or avoid their work.
In a more straight-forward demonstration of the use of interventions aimed at
reducing social positive reinforced problem behavior, Kodak et al. (2004) success-
fully treated elopement displayed by a 5-year old girl diagnosed with ADHD during
a summer program. A functional analysis determined that the child engaged in

elopement during program games (e.g., kickball) to gain attention from the staff.
Subsequently, NCR and time-out were utilized during the intervention. Specifically,
staff provided attention to the girl on a time based schedule and contingent on elope-
ment time-out consisted of the girl spending 30 s in a penalty box.
Despite whose attention or what item or activity is determined to maintain some-
one’s problem behavior, developing an intervention that manipulates the discrimi-
native stimuli that set the occasion to respond and the motivating operations;
removing the contingency between the response and the reinforcer; and providing
the functional reinforcer for adaptive responding is essential in eliminating the
behavioral excess and establishing a functional replacement behavior. Again,
although the behavioral literature has many examples of the utilization of this
approach to treat behavioral excess maintained by social positive reinforcement,
there is a great need for more research with respect to generalization across popula-
tions and settings, specifically, with clients diagnosed with ADHD.
ehavioral Excesses Maintained by Social

B
Negative Reinforcement
The functional reinforcer for behavior maintained by social negative reinforcement

tends to be escape or avoidance of task demands (Hanley et al., 2003). It is not to
say that all problem behavior maintained by social negative reinforcement falls into
this category, there are situations like escape or avoidance from loud noises or social
situations; however, arguably the aversive properties of task demands will result in
escape maintained behavior if reinforced and/or the person does not have a more
adaptive way of getting a break. The treatment approach to behavior maintained by
social negative reinforcement is similar to how we treat other functions categori-
cally, although the actual implementation of the procedures are different. The best
interventions will again tackle the antecedents (i.e., discriminative stimuli, motivat-
ing operations, and effort), the reinforcer contingency (e.g., extinction), and differ-
ential reinforcement.
Although most research on escape maintained behavior requires some sort of
extinction (e.g., follow through with the task demand), Wilder et al. (2019) demon-
strated a unique intervention in which they not only addressed the functional rein-
forcer (social negative reinforcement), but added nonfunctional reinforcer (social
positive reinforcer) without the use of extinction to treat problem behavior.
Specifically, they utilized a combined treatment in which the participant could earn
a break and access to an iPad contingent on compliance, all while still providing
escape from the demand contingent on aggression. Not only was the intervention
successful in eliminating the 4-year-old boy’s aggression, but compliance was
maxed out at 100%. This study highlights the notion that other forms of reinforce-
ment can be combined with a function based intervention.
Behavioral Excesses Maintained by Automatic Reinforcements
Generally, a determination that a problem behavior serves an automatic reinforce-

ment function is determined by default, in that the behavior is not maintained by
social reinforcers (Vaughan & Michael, 1982). However, another perspective states
that automatic reinforcement is assumed when a person continues to engage in a
behavior in the absence of any known reinforcer (Hagopian et al., 2015). Regardless
of which perspective one takes when approaching developing treatment for behav-
ioral excesses maintained by automatic reinforcement the approach is the same:
include antecedent manipulations, extinction (if possible), and differential
reinforcement.
In 1998, Rapp, Miltenberger, and Long developed an automated device called
awareness enhancement device (AED) to treat hand-to-head habit behaviors like
thumb sucking. The AED produces a tone every time an individual raises their hand
to their head, and signals to the wearer that they are engaging in the behavior. As a
continuation, Sticker et al. (2001) utilized the device to treat automatically main-
tained thumb-sucking for two participants diagnosed with ADHD. As a result of the
treatment, both participants’ thumb sucking behavior reduced to zero level when the
device was active, extending and validating the effectiveness of the device. There
are two differing hypotheses argued for the mechanisms responsible for the devices
effectiveness: (1) the tone produced by AED increases the wearer’s awareness of
their behavior and (2) the onset of the tone acts as an aversive stimulus for the
thumb-sucking and the termination of the tone acted as negative reinforcement for
moving the hand away from the mouth.
Chronic tic disorders (CTDs) are considered childhood-onset neurobehavior dis-
orders that can potentially cause substantial functional impairment and distress
(Conelea et al., 2011). Woods and Himiele (2004) utilized verbal instruction
enhanced differential reinforcement of other behavior (DRO) to reduce tic behavior
of 4 children with Tourette’s syndrome (2 of which were also diagnosed with
ADHD). Capriotti et al. (2017) were able to achieve the same results for the 2 par-
ticipants who also had a diagnosis of AHDH in their demonstration of utilizing a
DRO for the treatment of CTDs.
The combination of these two approaches (awareness training and differential
reinforcement), known as habit reversal training (HRT), has become a go to
approach for first wave behavior therapist in the treatment of behavioral excesses
maintained by automatic reinforcement. In a recent study, Wiskow and Klatt (2013)
demonstrated the effects of awareness training alone in the treatment of tics in a
9-year old boy who was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, Tourette syndrome and
ADHD. Results demonstrated that the awareness training was sufficient to eliminate
the boy’s tics.
Take Home Point
The conceptualization of FBA has made significance contribution to the first wave
of behavior therapy with respect to treating problem behavior. The behavior excesses
exhibited by individuals with ADHD are not a symptom of their diagnosis, but a
byproduct of the environmental contingencies. Therefore, identifying the function
of the behavior is paramount in effectively treating said behavior.
Another important point to be made is that the diagnoses of behavioral disorders
like ADHD are partly based upon behavioral indicators. And diagnostic tools typi-
cally include stakeholder reports of observable behaviors. For example, descriptions
like “forgetful” and “having trouble focusing” are examples of inattention. And
descriptions of “have trouble staying in the seat during class-time” are used to qual-
ify diagnostic criteria of hyperactivity (Arnett et al., 2013). In 1997, DuPaul and
colleagues concluded within their discussion that “one size does not fit all” when
developing interventions for individuals diagnosed with ADHD, suggesting that
although there are topographical similarities between descriptions of behavior defi-
cits and behavior excess, it is more important to know that these behaviors addressed
from individuals with ADHD must be treated functionally.
Case Application: A Case of Mark
Overview
Mark, a 10-year-old boy, who lives with him mother (Tymerie, 45-year old) and
sister (Karen, 13-year-old) has been referred for home behavior therapy due to his
aggression and impulse control issues. Mark’s mother and father (Jack, 46-year old)
got divorced when Mark was 2. Jack moved out of state when Mark was 5. Mark
only spends 4 weeks in the summer and 1 week over winter break with his father.
Mark was diagnosed with ADHD at the age of 8. Although his pediatrician has sug-
gested multiple times to have Mark placed on ADHD medication, both his mother
and father do not want to put him on medicine at this time. The family has gone to
family counseling and Mark has received school counseling off and on in the past.
Tymerie says that Mark has been aggressive since he was 5, but he is now getting
bigger and she does not know how to handle him. She says Mark will go off for no
reason and that her and Mark argue and yell a lot. One of the issues is that Tymerie
has a really hard time getting Mark to do his homework or help around the house.
She also says that if things don’t go smoothly, Mark will get frustrated and then
things spin out of control. Tymerie says she has tried taking things away and ground-
ing, but nothing works. Tymerie says that all Mark wants to do is sit in his room and
play video games. Karen says that her home sounds like a war zone and that her
mom is always fighting with Mark and then Mark hits their mom.
Step 1: Assessments
Mark has a number of behavioral deficits (he lacks self-control and social skills) as
well as a behavioral excess (aggression). The behavior therapists (BT) has identified
a number of behaviors to work on: (1) self-control, (2) appropriate frustration toler-
ance (Social Skills), (3) compliance with homework and household chores, and (4)
aggression. The first thing that must be done is to conduct a preference assessment
to identify reinforcers that can be used to support the appropriate behaviors targeted.
Similarly, an FBA on the aggression must be completed. The BT recommends
biweekly sessions to work with both Mark and Tymerie, each consisting of 2 h in
duration.
During the first session, the BT met with Tymerie and Mark and discussed the
scope of the services she would provide and built rapport with both Tymerie and
Mark. Then the BT met individually with Tymerie and asked her to describe the
issues she has been having with Mark and conducted an indirect assessment (step 1
of an FBA), where she asked Tymerie a set of questions regarding the possible rea-
sons why Mark engages in aggression. Then the BT met individually with Mark and
asked him to describe how he views things working or not working at home. In
addition, the BT also conducted an indirect assessment on Mark’s aggression with
Mark. The BT also asked Mark what kinds of things he likes to do. The BT then met
with Karen and conducted another indirect assessment regarding Mark’s aggres-
sion. Afterwards, the BT set up a time when she could observe how things typically
work in the home. Results from these initial assessments indicated that Mark
engages in aggression to avoid or escape having to do homework, to get out of doing
any chores, and because all he wants to do is play video games. In addition, Mark
says he likes video games, sour candy, jumping in the trampoline, playing board
games, and building legos.
During the next session, the behavior therapists does a descriptive assessment on
Mark’s aggression, while doing naturalistic observations of how the family interacts
with each other after school until dinner time. The results suggest that Mark’s
aggression usually results in getting out of doing his homework or chores and being
able to continue to play video games. It was observed when Mark went to ride his
bike that when his chain popped off, he threw his bike down, kicked it, and walked
away. Another example of not dealing with frustration well came when Tymerie
finally got Mark to take out the trash and the trash bag broke. Mark started yelling
at Tymerie and saying that he hated his life. Tymerie said he could not play video
games for the remainder of the night and Mark just ignored her and went back to
playing video games while Tymerie and Karen picked up the trash and Karen took
it outside. The BT scheduled a time to come back and conduct a Trial – Based FA.
During the next session, the BT brought a bug-in-the-ear device and had mom
conduct a trial-based FA on Mark’s aggression. It was very clear that Mark engaged
in aggression to get out of doing his homework and chores, and to get to continue to
play video games. After the FA, the BT conducted a multiple-stimulus preference
assessment to identify possible reinforcers to use during the Behavior Intervention
Plan. Marks reinforcers were: access to video games (1st), sour candy (2nd), access
to legos (3rd), jumping on the trampoline (4th), and chips (5th). Based upon the
results of these assessments the BT developed a BIP to address the self-control,
frustration tolerance, compliance and aggression.
tep 2: Development of Behavior Intervention Plan

S
and Parent Training
The BT complied the information from the assessments and informed Tymerie of
the results. Basically, the assessments indicated that Mark engages in aggression to
avoid or escape situations he finds aversive and to gain access to playing video
games (i.e., social-negative and social-positive reinforcement). Moreover, he lacks
the skills to deal with frustrating situations in an appropriate manner and needs to
develop some self-control. The BT summarized the assessment results and provided
an overview of the proposed behavior intervention plan. She also reminded Tymerie
that if her and Mark’s dad decided to put Mark on medication she would need to
inform her right away because it could change the assessment results and the effi-
cacy of the intervention. Namely, the behavior intervention plan consists of running
some self-control sessions (these will be conducted during therapy sessions); using
some visuals and BST to teach Mark how to respond to frustrating situations (the
BT will do this during therapy session); and setting up a homework/chore and video
game schedule and contingency plan (this will be implemented by mom every day).
In the homework/chore and video schedule, Mark earned minutes to play video
games for every minute he engaged in homework/chores without engaging in prob-
lem behavior. For example, if Tyemerie asked Mark to do his math homework and
Mark did his homework without engaging in problem behavior, Tymerie started the
timer and recorded how long he engaged in his homework. The same procedure
occurred for asking him to do chores. Mark could then use his earned time to play
video games. After he depleted his earned video game time, Mark had to engage in
other activities (e.g., going on a bike ride, playing baseketball outstide, etc). Mark
also earned minutes to play video games by doing these other activities on a 1-to-1
ratio. If an any time, Mark engaged in aggression (verbal or physical), he lost 1 min
of video game play. Tymerie was instructed to just deduct the time and not say any-
thing to Mark in the moment. The BT presented the plan to the family and utilized
BST to train everyone on the plan. In addition, the BT met with the family together
and individually to check on what was working and what was not working every
other week. After 3 months, everyone in the family stated that things were much
better and the yelling and aggression had stopped. Moreover, Karen and Mark stated
that they started riding bikes to the park together. Mark is still working with the BT
on learning how to engage in self-control and they are trying to generalize the skill
to when he is faced with these type of choices (e.g., when his friends want to ride
their bikes to go get an icy, but he has a project due in school the next day for which
his mom already told him she would give him v-bucks if he got a good grade on it).
Mark and the BT are still role-playing frustrating situations and how to handle them.
Tymerie gave an example of how the other day when Mark lost a skin in the video
game that he had bought and there was no way to retrieve it, he cried and was upset,
but that they talked and she gave him a hug and he took a break from the video
game. All in all, things are going well.
Summary & Conclusions
An overview of first wave of behavior therapy approach to the treatment of individu-

als with a diagnosis of ADHD draws focus towards the importance of environmental
contingencies of an individual. With antecedent and consequence manipulations,
behavior therapists can address multitude of behavior deficits and excesses for indi-
viduals with ADHD. Behavioral interventions are conceptualized based on the func-
tionality of the behavior to be changed instead of the diagnosis of the individual.
The generality of first wave of behavioral therapy approach to the treatment of
behavior deficit and excess allows for effective behavior change regardless of
diagnosis.
Behavior deficits can be addressed by either teaching a new behavior or re-
arranging unsupportive environments. With that said, prior to developing an inter-
vention, it is important to ensure the reinforcer one uses is a reinforcer. Thus, it is
paramount for the success of first wave behavior therapy to conduct preference
assessments prior to treatment development and implementation. Given the number
of individuals who receive pharmalogical interventions along-side of behavioral
interventions, understanding the mediating effects of these drugs is important. First
wave behavioral interventions have demonstrated to be effective in the treatment of
a number of behavioral deficit concerns including self-control, academic perfor-
mance, and social skills. It would be amiss to overlook the need for extending this
approach to other behavioral deficits faced by individuals diagnosed with ADHD, as
well as, evaluate the generalization and maintenances of these effects.
Similarly, behavioral excesses exhibited by individuals with ADHD can be elim-
inated by tackling the antecedents and consequences relevant to the problem behav-
ior. Like behavioral deficits, it is necessary to first conduct an assessment to
determine what variables are responsible for maintaining the problem behavior.
Thus, prior to developing and implementing a first wave behavioral intervention,
one must first conduct an FBA. More specifically, it is important to determine the
functional relationship between the behavior and its controlling variables (e.g., FA).
After conducting an FA, it is possible to manipulate the discriminative stimuli and
motivating operations, the maintaining reinforcer contingency (i.e., extinction), and
utilize differential reinforcement to reinforcer either alternative behavior or the
absences of the problem behavior. Again, developing and implementing interven-
tions to eliminate problem behavior for individuals diagnosed with ADHD does not,
in and of itself, pose differences in how one approaches treatment. In fact, there are
a number of examples in the literature demonstrating the use of first wave behav-
ioral interventions to treat problem behavior exhibited by individuals with
ADHD. There is a calling, however, to extend this research both in the amount of
research conducted, as well as, with respect to generalization and maintenance.
According to a parent survey conducted in 2016, while 77% of the respondents
said their child under the age of 18 was receiving treatment for the diagnosis of
ADHD, 15% received only behavioral treatments, and 32% received both behav-
ioral and medication treatment (Danielson et al., 2018). These data suggest that
there is more to be done to assist individuals with ADHD through increasing aware-
ness to behavioral therapy and multidisciplinary research to increase treatment effi-
cacy of behavioral therapy in conjunction with medications. The current guideline
for treatment of ADHD recommends that the first line of treatment for children
4–6 years old should include behavioral therapy and parent training in behavior
management, while medications like methylphenidate should be considered if
behavioral intervention is ineffective alone (Wolraich et al., 2019). Future research
should include further examination of the interactions between medications and
behavioral variables like reinforcer preference, sensitivity to consequence proce-
dures, and response criteria for target behaviors. For example, individual consuming
medications that alters their appetite can potentially shift preference to edible rein-
forcers after taking the medication.
One area of dissemination of first wave behavior therapy for individuals diag-
nosed with ADHD more globally, compared to idiosyncratic applications, is in par-
ent education. Parent training or educational approaches have started to teach
parents how to effectively manage contingencies to address specific concerns (e.g.,
sleep issues, homework issues). Parent training, per say, is a more global way to
addresses behavioral concerns for children diagnosed with ADHD. Lequian et al.
(2013) were able to utilize a BST approach to teach parents how to “handle” home-
work time. Results indicated that parent training on how to manage contingencies
resulted in reductions in challenging behavior exhibited by their child during home-
work. Similarly, Hiscock et al. (2019) was able to train parents by way of their
pediatrician or psychologists to implement behavioral interventions to reduce sleep
problems.
First wave behavior therapeutic approaches for treating behavioral deficits and
excesses has had tremendous efficacy; however, the question remains as to why this
approach has not received more attention or been employed more globally.
Interestingly, within the last decade there has been an explosion of utilization of this
approach to treat individuals diagnosed with Autism, in fact, there are practice
guidelines on Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) treatment of Autism Spectrum
Disorder (CASP, 2014, 2020). Moreover, due to insurance mandates, clients with a
diagnosis of Autism are entitled to ABA services via their healthcare insurance.
Although this adoption of first wave behavior therapies to individuals diagnosed
with Autism is phenomenal and timely given the increase in occurrence; this same
type of movement and widespread adoption of first wave behavior therapy needs to
occur for individuals diagnosed with ADHD.
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https://doi.org/10.1901/jaba.2004.37-417
Second Wave Conceptualization
and Intervention
Will H. Canu and Dane C. Hilton
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) emerges in childhood or early

adolescence, with extensive review of worldwide epidemiological studies suggest-
ing a prevalence of approximately 5.9–7.1% in this population. While there are
substantially fewer studies tapping the presence of ADHD in adults, this more lim-
ited knowledge base suggests a prevalence of around 5% in adults (Willcutt, 2012).
ADHD manifests primary traits such as impulsivity, disorganization, and inatten-
tion (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2013), and emotion dysregulation
vies to be a central symptom of the disorder as well (see review in Shaw et al.,
2014). As with many other psychological disorders, patients with ADHD often pres-
ent clinically with comorbidities; this disorder is associated with increased risk for
disruptive behavior, learning, mood, anxiety, and substance use disorders
(Anastopoulos et al., 2018; Kessler et al., 2006; Pliszka, 2000). Given these fea-
tures, it is unsurprising to note that impairment related to ADHD extends across a
wide range of life domains, including but not limited to academic outcomes (e.g.,
Martin, 2014; McConaughy et al., 2011); social, romantic, and family relationships
(e.g., Ben-Naim et al., 2017; Canu et al., 2014; Hoza et al., 2005; Young &
Gudjonsson, 2006); work (e.g., Barkley et al., 2006; Kuriyan et al., 2013); and risky
behavior and physical health (Rooney et al., 2015; Swensen et al., 2004).
The history of ADHD as a condition of medical and/or adaptive concern is long,
and etiological conceptualizations have varied substantially (see reviews by Barkley,
2015a; Lange et al., 2010). Early theories ranged from poor child rearing (e.g.,
Weikard, 1775) to defects in moral control (e.g., Still, 1902) to post-encephalitic
sequelae (e.g., Bender, 1942). The latter drew the field nearer to the modern concep-
tualization of ADHD being a neurodevelopmental disorder with biological
W. H. Canu (*)
Department of Psychology, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA
e-mail: canuwh@appstate.edu
D. C. Hilton
Department of Psychology, Wofford College, Spartanburg, SC, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_27
630 W. H. Canu and D. C. Hilton
underpinnings, but reflected the tendency in that era to label children with ADHD
traits with “minimal brain damage” or “minimal brain dysfunction” (Eisenberg,
2007). It was in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM; APA, 1968) that the ADHD syndrome was first formally
recognized, in the form of “hyperkinetic reaction of childhood,” which was a reflec-
tion of a shift toward a definition of the disorder more based on specific behavioral
observations rather than what, at the time, was a rather speculative etiological
assumption of generic brain abnormalities (Lange et al., 2010).
Even at that early stage, however, the fundamentals for a cognitive-behavioral
conceptualization of this disorder were there, and prominent current-day ADHD
researchers have built upon that foundation. One of the most prominent, cognitive
etiological frameworks regarding ADHD has to do with executive functioning (EF).
EF encompasses a broad range of metacognitive abilities that enable goal-directed
behavior and self-control (Geurts et al., 2004), such as working memory, self-
monitoring, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, set-shifting, organization, plan-
ning, and attention to tasks (Castellanos et al., 2006; Corbett et al., 2009; Stuss &
Alexander, 2000). Review and meta-analytic papers examining the relatively deep
pool of existent research of EF in both children and adults with ADHD have consis-
tently indicated deficits in these populations that are medium-to-large in effect size,
as compared to non-diagnosed peers (e.g., Huang-Pollock et al., 2012; Sonuga-
Barke et al., 2008; Willcutt et al., 2005; Willcutt, 2015), and EF and related adaptive
behaviors are an important factor in current theoretical and psychosocial treatment
models of ADHD (e.g., Barkley, 2015b; Chacko et al., 2014; Hartung et al., 2020;
Knouse & Fleming, 2016; Kofler et al., 2018; Pauli-Pott et al., 2020; Safren et al.,
2005; Sibley et al., 2016; Solanto et al., 2010).
While EF differences may be the most widely recognized in ADHD, there is
clear evidence for other cognitive factors being in play. Delay aversion, which could
be largely characterized as a strong preference for immediate over delayed rewards
and high delay-related frustration and irritation (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2003), is also
observed in both children and adults with ADHD much more than in those without
the disorder (Bitsakou et al., 2009; Wilbertz et al., 2013). A further cognitive aspect
that has clear evidence for differences related to ADHD is a sort of emotional dys-
regulation, described by Barkley (2015c) as a propensity to have a “hair-trigger” for
intense, primarily negative emotions such as frustration, impatience, and anger that
are evoked in environmental interactions and that are slow to de-escalate (Bodalski
et al., 2019; Bunford et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 2014). Working memory deficits are
also well documented in both children and adults with ADHD (Alderson et al.,
2013; Kasper et al., 2012; Kofler et al., 2011).
What is more, there is ample evidence these sorts of cognitive differences that are
associated with ADHD in turn exacerbate problematic behavior or thought patterns
and overall maladjustment. For instance, executive dysfunction in this population
has been linked to academic problems (e.g., disinterest in academics, low grades;
Sibley et al., 2019), reading and writing problems and unemployment (Halleland
et al., 2019), greater dysfunction related to alcohol use (Langberg et al., 2015), and
social problems in childhood (Bunford et al., 2015). Delay aversion in children with
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Second Wave Conceptualization… 631
ADHD has been linked to poor decision making (Sørensen et al., 2017), and emo-
tional dysregulation has been linked to parent-observed deficits in their children’s
daily living skills, more prominent aggression, and other conduct problems
(Anastopoulos et al., 2011), problematic reactions to negative emotion and general
social dysfunction in adolescents (Bunford et al., 2018; Cleminshaw et al., 2020),
and dissatisfaction in adult romantic relationships (Bodalski et al., 2019).
The cumulative experience of a lifetime of dealing with the sequelae of ADHD
and associated cognitive and behavioral dysfunctions engenders a perspective on
the world, life, and oneself that digs an even deeper hole. Adults with ADHD often
report the negative automatic thoughts associated with depression and anxiety dis-
orders (Mitchell et al., 2013). More specifically, poor self-regulatory efficacy—or
lack of belief in one’s own ability to self-regulate—has been described by Ramsay
(2020) as a core cognitive theme in adult ADHD, and self-mistrust is identified as a
key schema. Interestingly, overly positive thinking has also been noted in adults
with ADHD (Knouse et al., 2019), which can lead to trouble, as well. Someone with
ADHD might need to complete an important task but think that they have plenty of
time to work on it or get to it later, and then get off-track and pay the price. Such
thinking may temporarily assuage negative emotions, such as anxiety or discomfort,
leading to negative reinforcement of this pattern of thinking despite its related task
avoidance and subsequent problems (Knouse & Mitchell, 2015).
Cognitive Behavioral Conceptualization of ADHD
Safren et al. (2005), the first to empirically validate a psychosocial intervention for
adults with ADHD, summarize the cognitive-behavioral rationale model as it applies
to the disorder as (a) core ADHD impairments that originate in childhood prevent
effective coping, (b) this lack of coping leads to experiences of failure and under-
achievement, (c) these same experiences further lead to negative thoughts and
beliefs, and (d) negative self-schema drive mood disturbances and distress and also
maladaptive avoidance. In short, there is ample evidence that ADHD involves both
cognitive and behavioral problems which at least theoretically lend themselves to
the sorts of interventions that can be described as “second-wave” behavioral ther-
apy. Furthermore, the high rates of comorbid mood and anxiety symptoms and dis-
orders experienced by adults with ADHD (Kessler et al., 2006) speaks to the
potential appropriateness of such interventions.
The “Waves” of Therapy for ADHD
Before examining second wave interventions for ADHD, it is necessary to frame

these approaches within the context of first and third wave interventions. The fol-
lowing section will briefly operationalize second wave for the purposes of this
chapter, then review interventions that would fall under the first wave and third
wave umbrellas. Interventions for ADHD across the three waves often include simi-
larities and conceptual overlap, so our goal will be to clarify the primary differences
between the other waves and those that will be the focus of our second wave review.
As discussed elsewhere in this volume, the primary difference between the first
and second waves of behavior therapy is the recognition and inclusion of cognitive
processes in the assessment and treatment of pathology. While first wave treatments
rely on basic behavioral principles to engage in functional assessment and change
maladaptive patterns, behavior therapy’s second wave layers onto that conceptual-
ization the metacognitive nature of humanity: behavior is often in response to
thought processes and emotional experiences. The difference between second and
third waves of behavior therapy is slightly more nuanced, in that both approaches
utilize metacognitive strategies to change behavioral and functional outcomes.
While similar in many ways, third wave therapies include a greater focus on themes
of acceptance, mindfulness, and spirituality, and the focus of metacognition is not
necessarily to change the content of thoughts, but rather to change the relationship
to thoughts and emotions (Kahl et al., 2012). For the purposes of this chapter, sec-
ond wave behavior therapy will be defined as those therapies which include an
emphasis on metacognitive strategies to examine and change thoughts, the use of
direct skills training to compensate for metacognitive or skills-related deficits, and
the use of self-directed behavioral principles to change behavior patterns (e.g., the
use of metacognition to engage in contingency management).
The research on interventions for ADHD across the three waves of behavior
therapy varies with developmental period, with first wave interventions well-
established and considered the treatment of choice for children (Evans et al., 2018),
and second and third wave interventions primarily researched in adult populations
with varying degrees of empirical support (Mitchell et al., 2015; Young et al., 2020).
Research on ADHD interventions for the transitional period of adolescence spans
across the three waves, with possibly efficacious first wave evidence (Evans et al.,
2018), well-established second wave support (Evans et al., 2018), and increasing
empirical examinations of third wave interventions (Davis & Mitchell, 2019;
Zylowska et al., 2008). In the sections below, we will outline the interventions we
are conceptualizing as primarily first or third wave and briefly differentiate these
from the second wave treatments on which we will focus our attention for the
remainder of the chapter.
First Wave Therapy for ADHD ADHD is primarily conceptualized as a neurode-
velopmental disorder (APA, 2013), and the empirical intervention literature gener-
ally reflects this conceptualization in terms of number of studies as well as types of
intervention. Much of the early literature focused on implementing the behavioral
processes of consistent and immediate reinforcement, effective punishment strate-
gies, and adaptive structuring of the environment in the school and home settings
(Barkley, 2015a). Indeed, a recent review of the psychosocial intervention literature
for children and adolescents with ADHD shows that four out of the five “well-
established” interventions are largely first wave, including behavioral parent train-
ing, behavioral classroom management, behavioral peer interventions, and combined

behavior management interventions (Evans et al., 2018). We conceptualize these
interventions as first wave, as they rely primarily on changing behavioral contingen-
cies in specific environments (e.g., home, school) to increase desired behaviors and
decrease problematic behaviors while, and they do not engage in the training of any
metacognitive strategies, the direct acknowledgement or evaluation of thoughts and
feelings, or the training of coping skills to make up for deficits foundational to the
disorder.
Third Wave Therapy for ADHD Examination of treatments considered third

wave for ADHD started initially within the broader context of “alternative treat-
ments,” and these interventions were lumped together with things like supplements,
homeopathic remedies, and Chinese medicine (Arnold, 1999). As understanding of
the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying ADHD has improved and “alternative
treatments,” such as meditation, have received more rigorous empirical examina-
tion, the literature on third wave interventions for ADHD has grown considerably.
The rationale behind third wave metacognitive techniques like meditation and
acceptance for ADHD includes evidence that meditation can impact various aspects
of cognition (Bishop et al., 2004; Lazar et al., 2005), reduce reactivity, and improve
emotional regulation (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Teasdale et al., 1995).
Clear third wave interventions for ADHD include those that primarily focus on
meditation, including the Mindfulness Awareness Practices (MAPs) for ADHD
developed by Zylowska et al. (2008) further examined by Mitchell et al. (2017). In
addition, a growing body of evidence has examined the use of dialectical-behavior
therapy (DBT) for ADHD (Hirvikoski et al., 2011; Nasri et al., 2020). Many aspects
of DBT are fairly second wave in nature, including skills training and direct exami-
nation of maladaptive thought patterns; however, DBT also heavily employs the use
of mindfulness and acceptance approaches. For this reason, mindfulness-based
interventions and DBT-informed interventions will not be covered in this chapter.
Review of Second Wave Interventions for ADHD
In the following sections, we will review the second wave behavior therapies for
ADHD with a primary goal of summarizing intervention effectiveness. We will also
examine available evidence of variables that may impact or moderate treatments,
including medication status, demographic characteristics, and comorbidity. As
stated earlier in this chapter, the evidence for second wave treatments varies consid-
erably across developmental stage. With this in mind, the following section will
examine interventions in children and adolescents separately from adults. For chil-
dren and adolescents, we will examine CBT and Training Interventions. For adults,
the focus of our review will be traditional and adapted CBT interventions.
Interventions for Children and Adolescents
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy The empirical treatment literature for childhood

ADHD offers mixed support, at best, for cognitive or cognitive-behavioral interven-
tions. In the broad context, Fabiano et al. (2015) conducted a systematic review of
meta-analyses on psychosocial interventions for ADHD and concluded that psycho-
social treatments for youth with ADHD are efficacious. However, several reviews
have concluded that cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for children with ADHD
does not meet the criteria for well-established1 or probably efficacious treatment
(Evans et al., 2018; Pelham et al., 1998; Pelham & Fabiano, 2008). In the seminal
review of psychosocial treatments for ADHD by Pelham et al. (1998), the authors
found that despite significant research aimed at examining CBT for ADHD, even
well-controlled studies found no clinically significant changes in either behavior or
academics. Pelham and colleagues (1998) did note some evidence for certain cogni-
tive interventions when paired with “intensive, multicomponent, behavioral treat-
ment packages” (p. 193); however, no research had examined the incremental utility
or long-term maintenance of these intensive packages. In their follow-up review,
Pelham and Fabiano (2008) focused primarily on behavioral interventions (e.g.,
BPT, behavioral classroom management) and did not provide any updated examina-
tion of cognitive behavioral interventions for ADHD other than to confirm that there
is no evidence for these therapies.
In contrast, a meta-analysis by Van der Oord et al. (2008) found that psychoso-
cial treatments were effective in reducing ADHD, but with smaller effects compared
to methylphenidate. They noted no significant difference between interventions
coded as “behavioral” versus “cognitive-behavioral”, and suggested that one pos-
sible reason for the range of effect-sizes in CBT may be due to their heterogeneous
nature (Van der Oord et al., 2008). While behavioral treatments consistently apply
techniques like direct contingency management or clinical behavior therapy tech-
niques (Pelham et al., 1998), cognitive-behavioral interventions may use any mix of
second wave techniques like self-instruction, problem-solving, or self-reinforcement
to a greater or lesser degree, in combination with first wave strategies (Whalen &
Henker, 1991). One meta-analysis focused exclusively on school-based interven-
tions for ADHD did find evidence for cognitive-behavioral interventions for ADHD
on both academic and behavioral outcomes, which the authors attributed to a shift
away from cognitive approaches outside the classroom to self-regulation approaches
delivered inside the classroom (DuPaul et al., 2012).
Evans et al. (2014) conducted an updated review of psychosocial treatments
since the Pelham & Fabiano, (2008) review. Their review did not include any studies
that would be considered cognitive behavioral, instead they focused on behavioral
and “training” interventions, the latter of which included cognitive training,
1
See Evans et al., 2018 for evidence-based treatment evaluation criteria and labels (e.g., well-
established, probably efficacious).
neurofeedback, organization training, and combined training studies (Evans et al.,

2014). In the 2017 follow-up review, Evans and colleagues examined several studies
that included “CBT” in their intervention title; however, the researchers argued that
because these studies did not use tradition aspects of cognitive therapy (e.g., cogni-
tive restructuring) and they focused on teaching skills, they should be classified
under the umbrella of “training” interventions.
In short, while the empirical literature on CBT for ADHD has clearly concluded
that this intervention approach is not an evidence-based therapy, the story is slightly
more nuanced. The aforementioned reviews provide strong support for the evidence-
base of behavioral interventions and question the efficacy of CBT for
ADHD. However, while the stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria employed in
these meta-analyses and reviews winnows the existent literature down to what could
be argued as the highest quality studies, a lot of possibly informative data is lost. For
example, of 122 studies identified by Evans et al. (2014), only 21 were selected as
meeting criteria for review. Similarly, Sonuga-Barke et al. (2013) only analyzed 15
studies in reviewing the literature since 1973, a period of almost 40 years. As noted
by Fabiano et al. (2015), there is also a high degree of heterogeneity in the studies
reviewed across the various meta-analyses, and although this has provided a consis-
tent story for behavioral treatments, the evidence for CBT may get muddled.
On top of this, the issue of how exactly CBT is defined might contribute to the
mixed evidence. Some researchers classify CBT as “training interventions” (Evans
et al., 2018) while others classify these same interventions (e.g., social skills train-
ing, self-instructions) as “cognitive-behavioral” (Van der Oord et al., 2008). A brief
review of the literature will reveal several individual studies that have found signifi-
cant benefits of CBT for ADHD (e.g., Coelho et al., 2015; Miranda & Presentación,
2000) and even meta-analytic evidence of significant benefit (Battagliese et al.,
2015; Van der Oord et al., 2008). While the evidence for behavioral interventions is
quite robust and CBT may be unlikely to result in outcomes that rival the large
effects of behavior therapy for children with ADHD, there may still be a place for
further evaluation.
One important fact that is often overlooked in the CBT treatment approaches that
have been tested to date is that ADHD is highly comorbid with other disorders, both
internalizing and externalizing (Chronis-Tuscano et al., 2010; Jarrett & Ollendick,
2008; Jensen et al., 2001). In fact, ADHD comorbidity is the rule rather than the
exception (Jarrett & Ollendick, 2008). The scant available research has shown that
adapted ADHD interventions for children that include family-based CBT compo-
nents can be effective in reducing internalizing symptoms as well as core ADHD
symptoms (Jarrett & Ollendick, 2012; Maric et al., 2018). While perhaps this points
to a subgroup of children with ADHD that might benefit more from CBT-oriented
interventions (i.e., those with comorbid anxiety or mood disorders), more research
is needed to test whether this is consistently the case.
Training Interventions As researchers have looked to expand psychosocial treat-
ment options for children with ADHD, a growing body of evidence has accumulated
for “training” interventions. Training intervention is an umbrella category similar in
breadth to “behavioral intervention,” as it defines a conceptual approach to treat-

ment that can include several more specific techniques. As defined by Evans et al.
(2014), training interventions do not attempt to reinforce a certain behavior within
the context that the skill will be employed as is done in behavior management, but
rather focus on training specific skills that are intended to be generalized to other
settings, (e.g., social skills training in a therapy context, to be used in social interac-
tions with peers). Of the many training interventions, organizational skills training
has the most consistent empirical support. In both the Evans et al. (2014) and (2018)
reviews, organizational training studies were found to be statistically superior to
waitlist or no treatment control with positive effects across several outcome mea-
sures. Compared to other non-behavioral interventions, the consistently beneficial
findings for organizational training across independent research groups make it the
only training intervention to earn the well-established designation for level of sup-
port, both for elementary school children and adolescents.
Another heavily researched training intervention is cognitive training, which
attempts to improve core cognitive deficits found in ADHD (e.g., working memory,
inhibition, attention) through regular practice of these skills in game-like computer-
ized or face-to-face environments. In addition to a review of these interventions by
Evan and colleagues (2014, 2017), Rapport et al. (2013) conducted a large meta-
analysis examining the impact of cognitive training programs on children with
ADHD. With few exceptions, these studies have found very little evidence for any
significant or sustainable improvements in academic, behavioral, or cognitive func-
tioning in children with ADHD following cognitive training (Evans et al., 2018;
Rapport et al., 2013). In addition, a consistent finding across cognitive training stud-
ies is lack of significant improvement reported by blinded raters (e.g., teachers),
whereas unblinded raters more often report improvement (e.g., parents, treating cli-
nicians; Evans et al., 2018; Rapport et al., 2013). One cognitive training program by
Tamm et al. (2013) was notably different from the others, in that clinicians delivered
the treatment directly to children rather than use a computer-delivered format.
While this study still found a “Hawthorne” or bias effect between those aware of the
treatment and teachers who were unaware of the treatment, they did report improve-
ments on various facets of attention on both neuropsychological and computer tasks
(Tamm et al., 2013).
Combined training interventions, which are treatments that include a focus on
training a variety of skills (e.g., social, academic, organizational), have also been
evaluated for adolescents with ADHD and found to have mixed levels of support.
Some combined treatments rely more heavily on practicing skills and providing
feedback (e.g., Challenging Horizons Program [CHP]; Evans et al., 2011; Molina
et al., 2008) and have met the threshold of probably efficacious, while others have
provided skills training with little repetition or feedback and have typically resulted
in less improvement and an “experimental treatment” designation (Sprich et al.,
2016; Vidal et al., 2015). Finally, there have been a few high quality studies that
attempt to use feedback from physiological systems (e.g., biofeedback, EEG) to
improve deficits in children with ADHD. Studies of these interventions, typically
called neurofeedback, have found mixed results. One study of children receiving
neurofeedback compared to an attention training group resulted in positive post-
intervention report by both parents and teacher on ADHD ratings for neurofeed-
back; however, no differences between groups were found for social, home, or
academic functioning (Gevensleben et al., 2009). A study of EEG neurofeedback vs
EMG biofeedback in a small sample of children with ADHD found a positive effect
for both treatments across parent and teacher ratings of behavior; however, this
study did not have a control group, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn
(Maurizio et al., 2014). One combined treatment of methylphenidate and EEG feed-
back compared to a matched attention control group found no significant effects
after 40 sessions on parent- or teacher-rated ADHD symptoms, but significant
effects were found at a 6-month follow-up (Li et al., 2013). As noted by Evans et al.,
2018, there is no previous example of such a “sleeper effect” in the literature, nor
was there a proposed mechanism for this delayed effect, indicating a need for repli-
cation before any conclusions should be drawn from the study.
Interventions for Adults
Up until the 1990s and early 2000s it was not uncommonly believed that ADHD
was a childhood-limited disorder that tended to wane in adolescence (Barkley,
2015a). However, research has conclusively shown such remittance to be more the
exception than the rule, with a majority of children with ADHD continuing to suffer
from the disorder later in life or to at least have clinically meaningful impairment
due to residual symptoms (Biederman et al., 2010; Faraone & Biederman, 2005;
Barkley et al., 2002; Kessler et al., 2005). In turn, the advent of effective psychoso-
cial interventions to address ADHD-related maladjustment in adults was signifi-
cantly delayed, compared to that for affected children, corresponding to relatively
thin literature base for second wave behavioral (i.e., CBT) treatment, with the first
widely available treatment manual published in 2005 (Safren et al.). As with treat-
ment for children, there are a variety of specific interventions for adults that fall
under the CBT umbrella, but commonly these involve techniques to mitigate ADHD
symptoms, poor EF and other cognitive deficits, and the cumulative effects of life
with ADHD. This can specifically include components such as skills training to
improve organization, time management, planning (OTMP), and reduce distractibil-
ity, cognitive restructuring techniques, study and other academic skills training (i.e.,
for college students), and/or psychoeducation about ADHD and related topics.
In a recent review of all published non-pharmacological intervention studies for
adult ADHD, Nimmo-Smith et al. (2020) found just 32 that included randomization
to treatment or control groups. While those fitting the CBT model were the most
common (n = 14), it is a mark of just how limited the research is. Still, the existent
work generally indicates promise for this type of intervention being effective for
ADHD-related problems in adulthood.
Review and meta-analytic papers that specifically focus on CBT for adults with
ADHD generally cast its efficacy of CBT as promising, contrasting those examining
the corresponding child population. Knouse et al. (2017) conducted a meta-analysis
of cognitive and behavioral therapy studies that aimed to reduce ADHD symptoms
or impairment in adults and included pre- and post-treatment measures and a
requirement that any ADHD medication use be held constant over the trial. Notably,
this examination included both controlled and open designs; 32 studies met their
inclusion criteria, and these included skills training, mindfulness, combination, and
DBT-based approaches. The findings supported efficacy of cognitive and behavioral
therapy for adults with ADHD, with large effect sizes for self- and blind assessor-
rated symptom reduction and functioning which were clinically meaningful when
possible publication bias was factored in. Treatment effect was larger for skills
training and mindfulness than DBT. Medication status (i.e., unmedicated or medi-
cated) did not significantly alter ratings of improvement. Comparisons of control
type indicated that larger effects were noted in comparison to no-treatment control
versus active treatment. The researchers conclude that there is “reason for cautious
optimism among clinicians and their adult clients with ADHD regarding cognitive-
behavioral interventions” (p. 747).
More recently still, Young et al. (2020) completed a meta-analytic review of
peer-reviewed, published, randomized controlled trials of CBT for adults with
ADHD. Only nine studies were identified for inclusion with a total of 386 partici-
pants, many of whom had prior pharmacological treatment that was continued dur-
ing their psychosocial trial. Designs included comparison to wait-list (n = 5) and
active control groups (n = 4); separate meta-analyses were used to examine the
effects of these different approaches. Efforts were made to account for publication
bias and other possible design flaws. Results in this more focused review mirrored
those of Knouse et al. (2017); CBT was generally superior to wait-list and to active
comparison groups (e.g., supportive therapy, relaxation training with psychoeduca-
tion) from pre-to-post treatment with regards to symptom reduction, with approxi-
mately large and moderate effect sizes, respectively. Improvements were also noted
in comorbid anxiety and depressive symptoms in some but not all studies in which
these variables were included, and organization, self-esteem, and anger manage-
ment also were shown to improve when measured. Across studies, when treatment
effects are detected for ADHD symptoms, inattention appears the more responsive
of the cardinal ADHD characteristics.
One of the shortcomings of these reviews and, indeed, the RCT designs for adult
ADHD CBT interventions is that data are scant regarding long-term (vs. pre-post)
impacts Lopez-Pinar and colleagues (2018) recent review and meta-analysis offers
a first systematic examination of 3-to-12 month follow-up outcomes in psychoso-
cial interventions for adults with ADHD. Twelve studies met the inclusion criteria;
9 were RCT designs and 3 were open trials, and half, overall, included CBT (alone)
as the experimental condition. Self-reported reductions in ADHD symptoms and
global functioning were sustained in a within-subjects meta-analysis, and medium
treatment effects, compared to control groups, persisted at follow-up in a separate

meta-analysis of the RCT. Compared to DBT and biofeedback, CBT was shown to
have more positive effect on the key outcome variables.
There are understandably few CBT trials for adult ADHD that have emerged
since the publication of these recent reviews. However, one subpopulation of adults
that has garnered significant attention in the literature in the past several years is
college students, and it is notable that a handful of studies documenting newly con-
ceived interventions for this population have been published in that short interval
that generally fit under the CBT umbrella (Anastopoulos et al., 2020, 2021; Hartung
et al., 2020; Meinzer et al., 2020). All focus to a large degree on OTMP skills train-
ing and psychoeducation regarding ADHD with additional focus on study skills
and/or cognitive restructuring or related techniques to address comorbidity, utilize a
combined group and individual approach with tailored coaching, and are short-
term, with active treatment fitting in the span of one college semester. It should be
noted that across the work of these three different research groups only Anastopoulos
et al. (2021) utilized an RCT design, but collectively their findings show ADHD
symptoms to decrease and OTMP skills (or executive functioning) to improve, pre-
to-post. Further, anxious and depressive symptoms were also reduced (Anastopoulos
et al., 2020; Meinzer et al., 2020) or stabilized (Anastopoulos et al., 2021), and self-
concept was improved (Hartung et al., 2020). Five-to-seven month follow up in one
study also suggests that such improvements are maintained over time (Anastopoulos
et al., 2020).
While all of this is quite promising, the body of results should be interpreted with
limitations in mind. Many participants, if not most, in the adult ADHD interventions
that have been documented to date have been using previously prescribed stimulant
or other psychotropic medication(s). Interestingly, Knouse et al. (2017) noted in
mediator analyses that treatment effect sizes were similar when all participants
were medicated or all were not, but when the sample’s medication status was mixed
the results were not as favorable. The authors suggest that perhaps interventions that
are tailored to either medicated or unmedicated clients may be most effective,
although that remains to be established. Ethnic and socioeconomic diversity in these
initial trials have been limited, and participants have tended to be middle-aged or
younger, suggesting that the generalizability of CBT to all groups in the adult popu-
lation is not certain. Finally, many of the studies rely on self-report for key out-
comes, and particularly in studies without an active “placebo” control condition this
may be subject to expectancy bias. However, in sum, while the existent literature
regarding the cognitive-behavioral treatment of adults with ADHD is not nearly as
deep as that for children and adolescents, signs point clearly to CBT interventions
being useful with the former. A few manualized treatment protocols are readily
available (e.g., Safren et al., 2017; Solanto, 2013), and others are forthcoming,
which should provide practitioners with the know-how and materials to implement
CBT with their adult clients who have ADHD.
Conclusion
Psychosocial interventions for ADHD are well-established (Fabiano et al., 2015);

however, the evidence-base varies considerably across the waves of behavior ther-
apy and developmental age of those being treated. For children, the most effective
interventions are first wave interventions such as behavioral parent training and
behavioral classroom management (Evans et al., 2018). Training interventions (e.g.,
organizational skills training) are the only second wave treatment that have earned
the designation of well-established for children and adolescents with ADHD. While
CBT has not shown consistent benefits for children with ADHD, the somewhat
mixed and nuanced nature of the literature suggests further examination may reveal
components of these interventions that are beneficial. In addition, the fact that
ADHD has high comorbidity rates (Jarrett & Ollendick, 2008), CBT-based inter-
ventions that target both core ADHD symptoms as well as comorbid internalizing or
externalizing symptoms may still have a place in the ADHD treatment toolbox.
Although there was initially high expectation for second wave interventions,
especially CBT, in treating childhood ADHD, more modern conceptualizations of
ADHD as having deficits or delays in certain metacognitive skills and self-regulatory
processes help provide some explanation as to why metacognitive interventions like
CBT have fared poorly under empirical examination. This also helps explain why
CBT for adult ADHD has shown more positive results in the literature. While adults
with ADHD may still possess certain executive or functional skills deficits, they are
developmentally more capable of engaging in metacognition and thus, more likely
to benefit from the skills taught in CBT. Further, established trends for ADHD-
related hyperactivity to wane in adolescence and beyond and for inattention to
remain relatively more stable (Biederman et al., 2000) suggest that attentional dif-
ficulties are more central to the adult manifestation of ADHD, which may logically
be more amenable to cognitively-oriented interventions than overactivity and
disinhibition.
While there are several well-established treatments for ADHD, considerable
research is needed to further improve outcomes for those with ADHD across the
lifespan, and there is much that could be discovered that could improve the efficacy
of second wave behavioral interventions. ADHD is now being recognized as a fairly
heterogeneous diagnostic group (Nigg et al., 2020), and improved understanding of
the core mechanisms driving dysfunction, comorbidity, and impairment will inform
ongoing efforts to provide effective intervention. Given the focus on cognitions and
emotions, second wave interventions may become more relevant as emerging
research uncovers the role of mechanisms in “pure” ADHD and those with addi-
tional comorbidities, such as high negative affect (Karalunas et al., 2019), emotional
dysregulation (Bodalski et al., 2019; Bunford et al., 2015), and cognitive-behavioral
avoidance (Knouse et al., 2013).
In addition, even where there has been relative success for second wave behav-
ioral therapy in addressing ADHD-related issues (e.g., in adults), one direction that
has not been adequately explored is dismantling studies. Indeed, authors of
important reviews noted herein are unanimous in calling for further research to
determine the relative effects of components of current interventions (Knouse et al.,
2017; Lopez-Pinar et al., 2018; Nimmo-Smith et al., 2020; Young et al., 2020),
which could lead to both more effective and more portable treatment that would
more easily lend itself to widespread implementation. Further, future research
across both child and adult populations would benefit from larger studies that would
facilitate mediator analyses; in particular, it is critical that we satisfactorily docu-
ment for whom second wave interventions are likely to work and those who we
might expect to not benefit (Knouse et al., 2017). Such work could, for instance,
identify groups of children and adolescents that do benefit, such that they might
selectively be targeted. Finally, relatively few studies employ long-term follow-up
designs of second wave interventions for ADHD, which represents a significant
weakness, both for appreciating the durability of “successful” interventions and
also for detecting possible delayed effects, as have been seen elsewhere with second
wave interventions (Jarrett & Ollendick, 2012; Li et al., 2013).
Conflicts of Interest We have no known conflicts of interest to report.
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Third-Wave Behavior Therapy
Conceptualization
Bridget R. Beachy, David E. Bauman, and Melissa D. Baker
During a 2015 TEDMED talk, Dr. Nadine Burke Harris, a pediatrician and the cur-
rent surgeon general of California, implores listeners to consider the impact of
Adverse Childhood Events (ACEs) on child development. Dr. Burke Harris explains
how she noticed an interesting phenomenon when she went to work with children in
a severely impoverished and underserved area near San Francisco, CA. Essentially,
she was receiving an inordinate number of referrals for Attention Deficit /
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Dr. Burke Harris explains she started to uncover a
“disturbing trend” after doing thorough history and physicals for these referrals.
Specifically, a large proportion of these children, “…had experienced such severe
trauma that it felt like something else was going on…somehow, I was missing
something important” (TEDMED, 2015, 3:24). After researching the ACE’s study,
Dr. Burke Harris started to put the issue into context, and she conjectured that this
childhood trauma had devastating consequences to children’s brain and body
development.
ACEs are just one example of potential contextual factors that may prompt
behavior and symptoms that are congruent with ADHD symptomology. Surprisingly,
and as Brown et al. (2017) pointed out, “despite evidence that suggests that specific
psychosocial risks and accumulation of risk factors exert strong influence on child
development and behavior, the family and social context of ADHD has not been
well studied” (p. 352). Many of the behaviors that are in line with symptoms of
ADHD are the very behaviors one would expect to be present after learning the
patients’ contexts. This assertion is best explained by a third-wave behavioral
B. R. Beachy (*)
Community Health of Central Washington, Yakima, WA, USA
e-mail: bridget.beachy@chcw.org
D. E. Bauman
Core Faculty, Central Washington Family Medicine Residency, Yakima, WA, USA
M. D. Baker
HealthPoint, Bothell, WA, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_28
650 B. R. Beachy et al.
theoretical underpinning called functional contextualism, which suggests that

symptoms are not inherently problematic, dysfunctional, or pathological: rather,
may be the expected result a specific context. In other words, symptomatic behav-
iors “make sense” once clinicians understand patients’ contexts. From a third-wave
behavioral approach (or any therapeutic orientation that considers an individual’s
larger system), the external context as well as the internal context of the individual
presenting with ADHD symptomology is of paramount consideration in assessment
and intervention. Fundamentally, ADHD symptomology cannot (and should not) be
assessed, diagnosed, or treated in a vacuum. Instead, presenting symptoms should
be placed into context, which may include biological (e.g., family heredity factors),
social (e.g., ACEs), and psychological (e.g., negative self-talk) contextual factors.
This chapter is organized into several sections as the authors aim to demonstrate
how clinicians, trained in third-wave behavior therapy, approach ADHD. First, the
authors provide definitions of major third-wave therapies (e.g., Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy [ACT], Dialectical Behavior Therapy [DBT] and Mindfulness
Based Interventions [MBIs]). A description of the reality of where most individuals
receive treatment for ADHD (i.e., primary care) and treatment implications of this
setting is then discussed. Next, the authors briefly review the core aspects of ADHD,
accompanying etiology, research outcomes, and implications this may have for cli-
nicians who practice from a third-wave perspective. Additionally, case conceptual-
ization will be discussed, and case illustrations will be offered within the clinical
context of primary care. We hope readers will have their assumptions challenged
regarding the presentation of ADHD, and this chapter will offer an additional lens
from which to view patients presenting with typical ADHD symptomology.
Additionally, we hope a context is created that propels clinicians to be curious (or
more curious) about the contexts their patients live. We further hope clinicians take
the additional steps with their patients to create a clinical context that inspires love,
compassion, and grace within their patients. Even with ADHD, “Love isn’t every-
thing, it is the only thing” (TEDx Talks, 2016, 19:26).
Setting the Stage: Third-wave Behaviorism and Primary Care
Although third-wave behaviorism encompasses a variety of orientations; most well-

known include ACT, DBT and MBIs. Due to the increased focus of ADHD treat-
ment being in primary care, focused ACT or fACT (Strosahl et al., 2012) which was
developed for use in settings where briefer interventions are needed will also be
defined. ACT is a transdiagnostic therapeutic framework that uses acceptance, pres-
ent moment and values strategies to increase psychological flexibility (Hayes et al.,
2011). With increased psychological flexibility, people can adapt to myriad circum-
stances to help them stay in touch with valued living (Hayes et al.). DBT and those
who use DBT based skills aim to help support patients with the skills of mindful-
ness, distress tolerance, emotion regulation and interpersonal effectiveness (Linehan,
2015). Further, MBIs are designed to help people learn skills to attune to the present
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Third-Wave Behavior Therapy… 651
moment in a nonjudgmental way (Kabat-Zinn, 2013). Focused ACT is a therapeutic

approach that condenses the six core principles of ACT into three pillars to stream-
line case conceptualization while highlighting the interconnectedness of the pro-
cesses (Strosahl et al., 2012). The authors of this chapter have extensive training in
the ACT and fACT philosophy, which will underlie much of this chapter. However,
the processes and research that are discussed are congruent with DBT, MBIs or
other third-wave principles.
Readers of this chapter may be familiar with ACT’s philosophy that incorporates
a radical behavioral philosophy (i.e., first-wave behaviorism) with eastern philoso-
phy (e.g., mindfulness, acceptance, etc.—see chapters “What Is Second Wave
Behavior Therapy?”, “What Is Third Wave Behavior Therapy?”, in this volume). In
a sense, ACT posits individuals do not necessarily struggle or have functional
impairment because of symptomology that accompanies typical human experience,
rather, it comes from the efforts people make to rid themselves of these symptoms
(Hayes et al., 2011). Thus, and contrary to second-wave behavioral approaches that
work to change cognitive schemas, ACT strives to encourage patients to take an
observer approach to what the mind is informing the individual of and to have a
compassionate willingness to bring all of themselves (even unwanted symptoms)
while moving towards their identified values. The ACT hexaflex includes the six
core processes that underlie the treatment goal of psychological flexibility and
include acceptance or willingness, cognitive defusion, present moment focus, the
observer self, values clarification, and committed action. Briefly, these core pro-
cesses are described below and please refer to chapter “What Is Third Wave Behavior
Therapy?” for a more detailed overview.
Psychological Flexibility Psychological flexibility is defined as an individual’s
ability be flexible with their internal process and/or thoughts, emotions, associa-
tions, memories, sensations (TEAMS) while enacting behaviors that move the indi-
vidual closer to their life values (Hayes et al., 2011).
Acceptance or Willingness Acceptance or willingness is described as one’s ability

to create a space for their TEAMS. Further, rather than suppressing or avoiding
these internal processes through behavioral responses (i.e., avoidance), acceptance
encourages individuals to be open and present with these experiences while moving
towards a meaningful life (Hayes et al., 2011).
Cognitive Defusion Cognitive defusion refers to one’s ability to create a space

with their internal processes and notice thoughts as thoughts, feelings as feelings,
etc. Described often as a fish jumping out of water for the first time and noticing the
water surrounding them, individuals demonstrate defusing by noticing the constant
and automatic cognitive process that surrounds individuals (Hayes et al., 2011).
Present Moment Contact Present moment or mindfulness is defined as one’s abil-

ity to bring full awareness to the here-and-now experience, with openness, interest,
and receptiveness; focusing on, and engaging fully in whatever the individual is
currently doing (Hayes et al., 2011).
The Observer Self The observer self or self as context or perspective is described
by one’s ability to notice the transcendent sense of self; a continuity of consciousness
that is unchanging, ever-present, and impervious to harm. This concept teaches indi-
viduals to view their identity as separate from the content of their experience (Hayes
et al., 2011).
Values Clarification Values clarification is described by one’s ability to clarify the

aspects of one’s life that are of utmost importance. The combination of values is
often described as one’s North Star, which can serve as a consistent guiding force in
peoples’ lives (Hayes et al., 2011).
Committed Action Committed action is described as one’s ability to move, behav-

iorally, towards their identified values. In service of striving towards values, this
committed action is unrelenting and intentionally chosen (Hayes et al., 2011).
It should also be noted that in addition to having a basic understanding of ACT’s
hexaflex, there are the important concepts of functional contextualism and Relational
Frame Theory that underlie the ACT approach and are relevant to understanding
how context impacts behavior. Functional contextualism is a pragmatic philosophy
that promotes (1) behavior arises from a context and (2) truth is determined solely
by the behavior’s ability to accomplish an identified goal (Gifford & Hayes, 1999).
While seemingly simple, these two principles have profound impact on how the
clinician approaches and interacts with patients, which will be discussed in pro-
ceeding sections. Second, the growing cognitive science of Relational Frame Theory
(RFT) details how language shapes humans’ interactions with their internal and
external world often through derived relational pairings (Hayes et al., 2001).
According to RFT, individuals can derive relationships between events, join them in
vast relational networks, and transfer functions between related events, which is
known as “relational framing.” RFT allows humans to analyze, talk, plan, imagine,
compare, invent, and problem solve (Hayes et al., 2001). This chapter’s goals do not
include an in depth look at RFT; however, its implications, influence, and presence
underlays much of the proceeding sections.
Before discussing ADHD and other third-wave approaches to treatment, it would
behoove us to discuss the context of where ADHD typically presents and the impli-
cations of such. While mental health providers around the United States provide
humbling and inspiring services to the patients they see, only 7% of the United
States adult population will meet with a mental health provider in an outpatient
mental health setting in a given year (SAMHSA, 2018). Instead, the majority of
patients with any mental health concern will receive no care and those receiving
care will most likely receive care within a primary care medicine or outpatient
ambulatory medical setting (Wang et al., 2005). ADHD is not immune to this reality
and point of care resources, such as UpToDate, encourage primary care providers
(PCPs) to treat ADHD within the primary care setting and only recommend refer-
ring to a specialist when there are comorbidities (Krull, 2020b). Children ages
4–18 years old with non-comorbid ADHD will most likely only receive care by
their PCPs (Krull, 2020b). Additionally, for the close to a third of patients who have
comorbidities associated with their ADHD (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013), it is not guaranteed they will meet with a mental health professional,
even when referred. Research has repeatedly demonstrated simply receiving a refer-
ral to a mental health agency does not ensure the patient will receive treatment
(Friedman et al., 1995). In fact, mental health referrals are the least likely to be
completed by patients amongst medical specialties (Friedman et al.). And, the oft
cited statistic that demonstrates the mode number of psychotherapy visit a patient
will attend is one (Gibbons et al., 2011). Thus, it can be extrapolated that many
patients with ADHD concerns will never even meet with a mental health profes-
sional, and for many who do, it may be a “one and done” situation. Even more
concerning and as Brown and colleagues (2017) pointed out, PCPs, such as pediatri-
cians, are often unfamiliar with or do not have the time nor expertise to identify
contextual factors (e.g., ACEs) that have been associated with higher rates of the
diagnosing of ADHD. With these realities in mind, taking a pragmatic approach to
addressing ADHD symptomology is very important, which, in our opinion, aligns
harmoniously with a third-wave behavioral approach.
Overview of ADHD and Implications for Clinicians
Briefly, the DSM-V identifies ADHD’s essential feature as “a persistent pattern of

inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning and or
development” (APA, 2013, p. 61). ADHD, which manifests in childhood, impacts
cognitive, academic, behavioral, emotional, and social functioning. In order to meet
DSM-V criteria, several of the symptoms must be present prior to age 12, occur in
more than one setting, and as was highlighted previously, not be better explained by
another mental disorder. Often, people with ADHD experience pervasive impair-
ment into adulthood. Symptoms of inattention include problems making careless
mistakes, sustaining attention, listening, following through, staying organized,
managing time, engaging in tasks that require sustained mental effort, losing items,
avoiding distraction, and being forgetful with everyday tasks. Symptoms of hyper-
activity and impulsivity include fidgeting, restlessness, problems being too loud,
appearing to be “driven by motor,” talking excessively, impatience, interrupting and
intruding on others and inappropriately leaving their seat, running or climbing.
Patients with ADHD might also present with low frustration tolerance, irritability,
mood difficulties as well as mild delays in language, motor or social development
(APA, 2013).
It is also important for any clinician to understand the comorbidities that come
with ADHD. Of children with ADHD, up to a third have at least one comorbid con-
dition (Krull, 2020a). These include oppositional defiant disorder, conduct disorder,
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and specific learning disorders. Although in
a minority of patients with ADHD, there is a higher rate than the general population
for anxiety disorders, major depressive disorder and intermittent explosive disorder.
Adults with ADHD are more likely to have antisocial and other personality disor-
ders (Krull, 2020a). Obsessive compulsive disorder, tic disorders, and autism spec-
trum disorders also occur with ADHD. There is increased risk of suicide attempts
for those with ADHD, especially in patients with comorbid mood, conduct or sub-
stance use disorders (Krull, 2020a). The DSM-V outlined several consequences
associated with ADHD, including, reduced academic achievement, social rejection,
poor work performance, unemployment, interpersonal conflict, increased substance
use, incarceration, and higher likelihood of injury and traffic accidents (APA, 2013).
The etiology of ADHD continues to be a challenge for researchers. Like many
mental health disorders, there have been attempts to attribute the cause of ADHD to
purely biological mechanisms (Krull, 2020a; Syme & Hagen, 2020). This viewpoint
is often promoted and accepted in healthcare settings with the accompanying mes-
sage being delivered erroneously to patients; however, research has not demon-
strated that ADHD is able to be quantified through a siloed, biological lens. To this
day, there is no biomarker that can be used to diagnose or differentiate those who
have ADHD versus those who do not have this diagnosis (Krull, 2020a). Further,
while biological processes, such as brain structures and heritability amongst first
degree relatives, may be implicated in ADHD, a causal relationship has yet to be
determined (Krull, 2020a). Also, environmental factors, including the recent recog-
nition of correlational relationships between ADHD and ACEs (Brown et al., 2017),
appear to have a profound effect on ADHD symptomology and accompanying
ADHD diagnoses, as well (Krull, 2020a). It should be noted that in most cultures,
ADHD impacts about 5% of children and 2.5% of adults (APA, 2013). ADHD is
diagnosed more frequently in males than females, at a 2:1 ratio in children, and at
1.6:1 ratio in adults (APA, 2013). In line with burgeoning complexity science
research, ADHD continues to be complex and consist of interconnected, dynamic,
nonlinear processes that cannot be reduced to solely a nature versus nurture debate
(Valeras, 2019). Not only are there not clearly delineated causes of ADHD, the
diagnostic process is not any more straightforward.
Prevalence rates of ADHD vary greatly dependent on interpretation of diagnostic
criteria and populations studied (Krull, 2020a). Specifically, prevalence rates in
studies vary considerably and are estimated to be as low as 2% and upwards to 18%
(Krull, 2020a). The fact that black and Latinx populations tend to have lower iden-
tification rates in the United States compared with Caucasian populations may dem-
onstrate there are cultural factors that impact ADHD diagnostics (APA, 2013).
Further, the prevalence of ADHD appears to have increased over the past two
decades, with one study showing a 4% increase from 1997 (i.e., 6% prevalence rate)
and 2016 (i.e., 10% prevalence rate) in ADHD diagnoses (Krull, 2020a). This
increase could be due to a variety of factors, including greater awareness and iden-
tification, as well as contextual factors including processed food-based diets and
worsening environmental influences (e.g., lack of access to parks or places to exer-
cise), among others (Krull, 2020a). Multiple studies have found inconsistent assess-
ment of ADHD symptoms and the presence of other comorbidities (e.g., depression,
anxiety, etc.) have led to the potential overdiagnosis of ADHD. For example,
Thomas et al. (2015) found clinicians often assigned a diagnosis of ADHD to chil-
dren before ruling out more appropriate diagnoses, such as anxiety and depression.
Handler and DuPaul (2005) and Epstein et al. (2014) found psychologists and pedi-
atricians, respectively, often do not follow recommended diagnostic procedures
when arriving at an accurate diagnosis of ADHD. Epstein et al. (2014) further found
only half of pediatricians assess symptoms of ADHD across two settings, which is
fundamental to the diagnostic criteria. Even with this lack of adherence to appropri-
ate assessment procedures, 93% of pediatricians still prescribed a medication
(Epstein et al., 2014). Syme and Hagen (2020) also discussed recent evidence from
large studies that revealed there was an increase in ADHD diagnoses in children
whose birthdates fall in months that make them younger compared to their class-
mates, which demonstrates at the very least a contextual variable that has been left
unchecked in clinicians. Contextual factors not only impact the presentation of
ADHD symptomology in patients but appear to impact the diagnosing procedures
in clinicians. This happens despite the DSM-V informing clinicians that one cannot
diagnose ADHD if the symptomology is better explained by another mental disor-
der or is normative of the developmental stage a child is in (APA, 2013).
Perhaps, there are other explanations for the difficulty in determining the patho-
genesis of ADHD and the growing rates of ADHD. Functional contextualists, which
include both first wave and third-wave clinicians, ask questions aimed to help them
understand how presenting symptoms may make sense given one’s context.
Additionally, ACT has long embraced evolutionary science and other scientific dis-
ciplines to inform its theory and subsequent assessment and intervention. Along this
vein, the pair of anthropologists, Syme and Hagen (2020), recently offered that
ADHD could potentially be a “mismatch” of biological evolution with societal evo-
lution. They specifically pose the question of whether our ancestors would have
identified ADHD symptoms during their hunter and gather context, whereas the
modern environment of classrooms and work places “sets tighter restrictions on
what is normal or acceptable” (p. 21). There is not clear evidence related to how
problematic ADHD symptomology are in unstructured environments. Could, and as
Syme and Hagen proposed, ADHD be a representation of our biology not fitting our
current societal context, which is resulting in ever increasing diagnoses? At the very
least, Syme and Hagen demonstrate that normal behavior may often be pathologized.
Regardless, the most current research has not been able to identify a clear etiol-
ogy of ADHD. ADHD is a complex issue and its etiology is likely multifactorial and
influenced by interconnected biological, social, environmental, and psychological
contexts. From a functional contextualist standpoint, this reinforces the idea of
remaining curious when individuals are presenting with ADHD symptoms, and to
work to clarify and determine what combination of contextual influences might be
influencing symptoms. And, similarly, it is important for clinicians to strive to deter-
mine what combination of treatment factors might be most useful in helping the
patient to gain a higher level of functioning.
Research Related to Third-Wave Interventions and ADHD
According to the APA’s Division 12, Clinical Psychology (Society of Clinical

Psychology, 2016), which details evidence-based treatments for common mental
health concerns, only second wave-cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has been
identified as having “strong research support” for treating adults with ADHD. Further,
DuPaul et al. (2020) posited, based on available research, psychosocial interven-
tions for children with ADHD should include a combination of behavioral modifica-
tions, cognitive strategies, parenting training, self-management strategies, and
school interventions. In addition to the implementation of such interventions being
based on the environment and context the children is coming from, DuPaul et al.
(2020) encouraged a longitudinal and continuous application of these interventions
throughout the child’s development. It is important to note, however, that this dis-
tinction for second-wave CBT, as well as more traditional first and second wave
interventions (e.g., behavioral modification, cognitive strategies, etc.) does not nec-
essarily mean there is no utility of third-wave approaches. As stated earlier and
promoted by a functional contextualist framework, clinicians are often working
with patients on skill sets that help patients achieve self-identified goals. Meaning,
first and second-wave interventions identified by Division 12 and DuPaul et al.
(2020), including psychoeducation, problem solving skills, time management and
planning training, increasing attention span, etc., may very well be utilized by third-
wave behavior clinicians when the context indicates the use of such interventions.
ACT clinicians are widely known to promote the idea that a clinician should use
what works within the presenting context. Thus, inherently, there is not necessarily
a need for third-wave clinicians to “throw out” other interventions from other phi-
losophies, “waves,” or schools of thought in the pursuit of helping the patient with
ADHD. One could imagine a third-wave clinician educating a patient who is strug-
gling with time management and being easily distracted on stimulus control and
problem solving to set up the patient’s environment to promote better contingency
management. For a child who struggling with homework completion and the parent
uncertain of how to support the child, one might imagine a clinician teaching the
parent about the use of a token economy to reward desired behaviors and increase
the child’s sense of self-efficacy. In a sense, growing evidence for first and second-
wave behavioral interventions are welcomed and appreciated by third-wave clini-
cian. The difference, though, may be the intentionality of applying a specific
intervention. The third-wave clinician may be more inclined to assess the context of
the presenting symptom and initiate an intervention that fits the context, rather than
following a standard first or second-wave behavioral protocol.
Numerous meta-analyses have been completed on the efficacy of ACT on a num-
ber of conditions; and, recently, Fang and Ding (2020) summarized 14 ACT meta-
analyses done with 1189 children on a variety of different presenting concerns.
They found ACT showed significant improvements in reducing specific symptoms
including anxiety (SMD = −.31, p < 0.05), depression (SMD = −.74, p < 0.001),
behavioral problems (SMD = −.76, p < 0.001), and other mental health problems
(SMD = −.89, p < 0.006), as well as showing significant improvements in quality

of life and well-being (SMD = 1.74, p < 0.001). Additionally, Gloster et al. (2020)
reviewed 20 ACT related meta-analyses that included 12,477 total participants.
They found similar results when reviewing meta-analyses related to ACT, finding
small effect sizes for depression (g = 0.33), anxiety (g = 0.24), substance use
(g = .41), chronic pain (g = 0.44), and transdiagnostic combinations of conditions
(g = 0.46). Gloster et al. (2020) also found a small overall effect size (g = 0.46) in
improving quality of life. The importance of the seemingly broad reach of third-
wave behavioral interventions for multiple conditions is vital when discussing its
use with a complex, multi-faceted, and often presenting with comorbidities diagno-
sis like ADHD.
While these summaries of the growing transdiagnostic research for third-wave
approaches, such as ACT, are vital and promising, it is important to acknowledge
the apparent dearth of standardized third-wave behavioral treatment protocols
or subsequent research studies specifically conducted for ADHD. While the authors
believe a more transdiagnostic, process-based, and contextual influenced approach
to ADHD is needed and discussed next, it is important to note this obvious lack of
research and encourage readers to take up the effort on evaluating the efficacy and
effectiveness of ACT and other third-wave behavioral approaches with ADHD.
With the third-wave behavior approaches adopting a philosophy of functional
contextualism, which prompts a more transdiagnostic and pragmatic approach to
many presenting concerns, including ADHD, clinicians are beginning to replace
protocol-based approaches with process-based approaches. Specifically, Hayes and
Hofmann (2017) advocated for the field of psychology to shift “…toward a process-
based field that seeks to integrate the full range of psychosocial and contextual
biological processes” (p. 245). This process-based focus frees up clinicians to home
in on incorporating first, second, and third-wave processes that aligns and moves
patients to their identified goals and desired outcomes, rather than a treatment algo-
rithm dependent on subjective symptoms and often problematic diagnostic criteria.
Additionally, a process-based approach recognizes the humanness of psychological
and behavioral interventions and considers the uniqueness of each patient’s present-
ing context and adapts to it accordingly. Hayes and Hofmann summarize this
call well:
Researchers and practitioners alike seem ready for a turn toward process-based therapy
(PBT), in which processes, procedures and their linkage are evidence-based, and are used
to alleviate the problems and promote the prosperity of people. Similar to the trend toward
personalized and precision medicine, focusing on changeable processes that can make a
difference in the behavioral and mental health of individuals provides a way for evidence-
based care and person-centered care to merge under a single umbrella of process-based
care. Orienting the field in that direction may ultimately be the most important “changed
shore” produced by the third-wave of CBT (pp. 245–246).
Within the limited third-wave studies for ADHD, there are a number of them that
address key symptoms that are implicated in ADHD including inattention, focus,
impulsivity, etc., which are discussed next. The lack of ADHD treatment protocols
in conjunction with the shift in context and philosophy (i.e., moving from a
protocol-based approach to a process-based approach), the question also shifts from

which treatment protocols work to which processes might address ADHD sympto-
mology? Below is an overview of third-wave processes and the impact on ADHD
symptomology related outcomes.
Psychological Flexibility While not a stated unified goal of third-wave behavioral
interventions, third-wave approaches, such as ACT, DBT, MBI, fACT, etc., com-
monly strive to change the relationship an individual has with their internal pro-
cesses, such as their thoughts, emotions, associations, memories and sensations
(TEAMS). Whether by being a mindful observer, or by promoting a willingness and
acceptance of internal processes, it can be said that third-wave behavioral tech-
niques are congruent with ACT’s aspirations to promote psychological flexibility.
While no known studies have looked at the direct impact of psychological flexi-
bility on ADHD outcomes as a whole, multiple studies have looked at psychological
flexibility and the impact on symptoms and topics related to ADHD. Specifically,
studies have shown that individuals who are more psychologically flexible are less
likely to have stigma related to mental health (Masuda et al., 2009) and learned
hopelessness (Trindade et al., 2020), more adherent to medication regimens (Moitra
& Gaudiano, 2016), less impulsive (Marcowski et al., 2017; Sairanen et al., 2017)
and less likely to procrastinate in academic settings (Glick et al., 2014), and able to
delay gratification (Levin et al., 2018). Further, parents that demonstrate greater
psychological flexibility are more accepting of their children’s health conditions
(Benjamin et al., 2020) and have children score higher on well-being measures
(Brassell et al., 2016). Additionally, and affirming an oft theorized concept, indi-
viduals that are less inflexible appear to be more impacted by negative environmen-
tal influences (e.g., ACEs) when compared to individuals demonstrating more
psychological flexibility (Makriyianis et al., 2019). While these studies are promis-
ing and signal the inclusion of the process of psychological flexibility, there are
numerous limitations to these studies, and due to being single studies that were
mostly completed in adults, additional research is needed to replicate the findings
and determine true efficacy and effectiveness.
Mindfulness Another common and more explicitly shared process amongst the
major third-wave behavioral approaches is mindfulness, or the ability to be present
with one’s internal context. Research has shown that the process of mindfulness
may be most impactful for reducing ADHD symptoms. Specifically, Cairncross and
Miller’s (2020) recent meta-analysis evaluated 10 mindfulness-based treatments
(MBTs) for individuals with ADHD aged as young as 8 years old to individuals
50 years of age. Overall, Cairncross and Miller found an overall medium effect size
in MBTs in reducing inattention symptoms (d = −0.66) and reducing hyperactivity/
impulsivity (d = −.053). While promising, a number of limitations were identified
in the 10 included studies, including small number of participants within the studies
and the heterogeneity of the studies included.
Research is also growing regarding the impact of meditation and mindfulness
interventions on ADHD related symptoms. Specifically, mindfulness interventions
show changes in fMRI in areas of the brain related to self-awareness, impulsiveness,

emotional regulation, and interoception (Gotink et al., 2016; Kral et al., 2018;
Marusak et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2016; Young et al., 2018). Krull (2020b) concluded
that medication and behavioral interventions are recommended for the treatment of
ADHD; however, mindfulness skills may have an added benefit if supplemented to
these regimens. Again, while promising, these studies have small numbers of par-
ticipants, have largely been done with adults (only Marusak et al. was done with
children and adolescents), and provide correlational findings, rather than causal.
Thus, additional research is undoubtedly needed to replicate these findings, as well
as show a causal relationship with these brain changes and behavioral improve-
ments (e.g., better self-awareness, impulse control, etc.)
While promising research is emerging for mindfulness as an effective process
intervention for ADHD, Krisanaprakornkit et al. (2010) conveyed meditation thera-
pies for ADHD need to be further researched due to small sample sizes and potential
for bias, similar to research findings regarding the commonly prescribed amphet-
amines for ADHD in children and adolescents (Punja et al., 2016) and social skills
training for children with ADHD (Storebø et al., 2011).
Third-Wave Conceptualization of ADHD
While treatment protocols have dominated second-wave CBT approaches to com-

mon psychopathology, third-wave approaches, largely due to the influence of func-
tional contextualism and RFT, are focusing more on process-based interventions.
Thus, it is integral that third-wave clinicians have strong conceptualizations skills.
If a patient with ADHD is presenting in specialty mental health settings, the patient
most likely has comorbidities. This reality does not create a barrier for the transdi-
agnostic ACT clinician, and in fact, the ACT clinician (and many third-wave behav-
ior therapists) embrace the idea that pain is an inevitable part of living. There is less
focus on psychopathology and more attention towards helping patients to thrive and
live a life that is meaningful despite painful and inevitable internal experiences. As
stated previously, the authors are largely coming from an ACT and fACT perspec-
tive; thus, this will be the main therapeutic orientation used in the following case
illustrations.
In ACT case conceptualization, one must realize it is a non-linear process. The
six core processes work together in an interconnected fashion to produce psycho-
logical flexibility, and is often the case, the lack of psychological flexibility. We can
“dance” as it is often referred to in the ACT literature, around the hexaflex in a
nonlinear fashion. Again, we must remember that this is for illustrative purposes, as
there is not a one size fits all approach.
ADHD Case Illustration and Conceptualization
To demonstrate the impact third-wave clinicians can have when helping patients
with ADHD, two examples of the same patient are explored along with clinical
implications. First, is a clinical example of John, who is a 28-year-old Caucasian
male who is presenting to his PCP with complaints of concentration and attention
difficulties that are impacting his relationship and work. Then another case example
of John is provided; however, 20 years earlier, where John and his mother are pre-
senting to their pediatrician after John’s school psychologist suggested he receive
medication therapy for his ADHD. During both case examples, readers should con-
sider how the contextual information is impacting John’s symptomology. Further,
an ACT conceptualization is incorporated, along with potential treatment directions
that were derived from a functional contextualism perspective. The six core pro-
cesses we are working to upskill and subsequently impact psychological flexibility
will be identified during the conceptualization sections. Although not specifically
identified in the conceptualization sections, we remind readers that the six core
processes are condensed into three pillars (values and committed action to engaged;
present moment and self as context to aware; acceptance and defusion to open) in a
fACT conceptualization. This is important to note as the authors are heavily influ-
enced by the fACT approach.
Case Example One: John at Age 28 John is a 28-year-old Caucasian man who
presents to his PCP with complaints of difficulty with attention and focus and hopes
to start a medication to address his concerns. He explains to his PCP that he was
diagnosed by a school psychologist when he was 8 years old and was subsequently
started on a stimulant medication, which past medical records confirmed. While he
has not been on medications since his mid-teenage years, he currently is having
significant difficulty completing his work responsibilities, as well as effectively
communicating in his relationship, which he explains, “because I cannot pay atten-
tion or complete things my girlfriend wants me to do.”
The same day he comes in for his medical appointment, the PCP has John meet
with one of the integrated behavioral health consultants (BHCs) who was able to see
John immediately after his 15-minute primary care visit. The PCP specifically asks
the BHC to help determine if John has ADHD and relevant comorbidities, as well as
offer and implement any behavioral interventions that may support John. The BHC
can also help determine if a future referral to a higher level of care (specialty mental
health) is appropriate and/or feasible.
As the BHC (Dr. Smith), who comes from a third-wave behavioral approach and
was trained in both ACT and fACT, enters the room, John informs her that he only
has 20 min to meet due to needing to get to work. The BHC conveys that this will
not be a problem and after explaining her role and discussing informed consent,
begins gathering John’s contextual information. The Contextual Interview (Table 1)
was first introduced in Robinson et al.’s (2010) “Love-Work-Play” interview and
was iterated in Bauman et al. (2018). Using the first visit to gather relevant
Table 1 Contextual interview

Contextual interview
Love (identify the patient’s social relationships)
Living situation
Relationship status
Family
Friends
Spiritual life
Work (identify the patient’s work and financial situation)
Work
Source of income
Play (identify meaningful activities to patient)
Hobbies
Fun activities
Health Risk & Behaviors
Caffeine use
Tobacco use
Alcohol use
Marijuana use
Street drugs use
Diet/supplements
Exercise
Sleep
Sexual activity
contextual information is central to a fACT approach, which is often utilized in

medical settings where time is more limited (Strosahl et al., 2012). A Contextual
Interview can be said to be similar to a behavioral functional analysis, as a clinician
is able to get a “snapshot” of a day in life of John and see the antecedents, behaviors,
and outcomes of symptoms of concern.
Dr. Smith intentionally prioritizes her time doing the contextual interview in
order to focus on learning John’s context, rather than symptomology, as she knows
John’s symptom presentation will be embedded within his context as she learns it.
Within the first 12 minutes of the visit, Dr. Smith learns John lives with his “on
again and off again” girlfriend of the past 10 years. Also living with John are two
children, who are 9 and 7 years old. John explains he is the biological father of the
9-year-old; however, the 7-year-old is his girlfriend’s child from a relationship when
they separated. John describes his relationship as “strained” with a lot of yelling
from both sides. John also struggles with his “anger” and “patience” towards the
kids and admits he is not always proud of how he behaves towards them. When
asked who he is close to in his family, John offers that he had a difficult childhood
and when he was 4 years old, his parents divorced due to domestic violence towards
his mother. Since the divorce, John has had minimal to no contact with his biologi-
cal father. John further explains his mom had numerous relationships growing up,
causing John to move frequently with his mother. Currently, John reported he has a
distant relationship with his mother and while he knows his mother went through a
lot and “did the best she could,” it is easier to just keep to himself. John also has an
older sister and three half siblings that he rarely communicates with. John further
explained that he only has one or two close friends who have been friends through-
out his lifetime, explaining, “I know who I can trust, and I keep to them.” John cur-
rently works as a gas station clerk and explained he has been having a difficult time
focusing and completing his responsibilities, commenting his boss recently informed
him he may lose his job if he is unable to complete his basic responsibilities. He
further explains this is nothing new to him, as he struggled regularly through school,
both behaviorally and academically, was placed in special education classes, and
eventually dropped out of high school when he was 17-years old and obtained his
GED. John has a few hobbies, such as video games and working on cars; however,
he has not been engaging in them recently due to the stress of his work, as well as
ongoing relational stress at home. John explains he drinks energy drinks regularly
throughout the day, indicating it is the only thing that can keep him “focused.” John
also smokes one pack of cigarettes perday as it helps him with his stress. He dis-
closes he drinks most nights to help him, “relax and shut my mind off.” His alcohol
use has been a point of contention with his girlfriend due to it causing him to disen-
gage from his family. While John indicated he has tried many substances when he
was a teenager and younger adult, he denies all other substance use currently. John
remarked he is quite proud of himself for not using any substances, other than alco-
hol, for the past 3 years and states he is dedicated to never relapsing. He eats a
convenience diet, consisting of food he picks up from the gas station where he
works. He does not engage in regular physical activity and his sleep has been diffi-
cult for some time. Specifically, John conveyed, “I can’t shut my mind off,” before
he goes to bed and while he is physically exhausted, it takes him usually 1–2 hours
before he is able to fall asleep. Once asleep, John wakes up regularly throughout the
night and has difficulty falling back asleep.
Congruent with what he told the PCP, when Dr. Smith asks specifically about his
diagnosis of ADHD, he stated he was diagnosed by a school psychologist in third
grade. John explained he was regularly getting in trouble at school and doing poorly
academically. At that time, John was prescribed a stimulant medication by his pedi-
atrician and although he thinks it helped him focus, he was inconsistent in taking it
and eventually stopped taking it completely when he was a teenager.
Questions for the Reader After reviewing the information from John’s Contextual
Interview, what symptoms do we anticipate being present? Do we anticipate John to
have inattention, impulsivity, and focusing concerns? How has John’s context
potentially shaped how he sees himself, as well as his world? Would we anticipate
John to meet criteria for ADHD? Would we expect John to meet criteria for other
mental health concerns?
ACT conceptualization After completing the Contextual Interview, Dr. Smith con-
firms, “John, based on what we’ve just discussed, it seems as though your relation-
ship with your girlfriend and family (values) are most important to you…is that
what we want to start addressing today, or is there something else we want to focus
on?” John shrugged and said, “I just want help. I am tired of dealing with all of this,
I just want to be normal. I feel like I am going to lose my girlfriend and my job, and
my kids will end up hating me if I don’t figure out how to focus better and get things
done like a normal person.”
Dr. Smith reflects to John it appears his struggle with concentration and focusing
has been present for some time, and, Dr. Smith suspects, is accompanied by a great
deal of other symptoms, such as worry, anxiety, self-doubt, insecurities, etc. John
responds, “now that you say that, yes, man, I must be really messed up.” Dr. Smith
recognizes John not only is not present (present moment) nor aware of what his
internal process (i.e., thoughts, emotions, associations, memories, and body sensa-
tions [TEAMS]) are, he is fused (defusion) with the assumption that something is
wrong with him. In a sense, John does not see himself as a reflection of his context,
rather John sees himself independent of his context, thus, internalizing his ever-
present and expected symptoms (self as context). While Dr. Smith can trace his
symptoms back through his context, John appears to attribute his symptoms due to
just simply “not being good enough” (defusion, self as context). Dr. Smith can also
conceptualize after the Contextual Interview that many of his behaviors are attempts
to rid himself of his uncomfortable symptoms (e.g., alcohol use, caffeine, cigarettes,
isolation, etc.; acceptance). These avoidance behaviors, which provide John a
momentary glimpse of relief via negative reinforcement, actually takes him further
away from engaging in behaviors (committed action) that would line up with his
stated values (values) and nurture his relationship with his family.
Using a metaphor of trying to put together a puzzle that was missing pieces, Dr.
Smith begins to explain to John that she was asking him those questions to find
those missing pieces. Dr. Smith explains when we gather more puzzle pieces and we
start putting them together the image becomes clearer. And, based on what she has
learned from John, his situation is becoming more and more clear. In fact, Dr. Smith
explains, to her, it would be peculiar if John did not have symptoms congruent with
ADHD, as his current and past contexts appear to be a soil from where such symp-
toms would grow, as well as other mental health diagnoses and symptoms. John
with growing interests, inquires, “so, are you saying I do not have ADHD?” Dr.
Smith replies, “truthfully John, it is probably going to be really difficult to tell, as
there are many potential reasons for your symptoms. Honestly though, what we call
it might not matter much…. What if instead we focus on getting you to where you
want to be and I have some ideas on where we might start.” John, with as a sigh of
relief responds and a chuckle, “so I’m not too messed up after all, doc?”
A byproduct of a functional contextualism approach is there is no one right inter-
vention, treatment option, or skill to work on. Rather, the goal is to find avenues to
accomplish or achieve identified goals or values. For John, this may be improving
his relationship with his girlfriend and children, which may result in Dr. Smith and
John discussing a plan to reduce his alcohol use through stimulus control or daily
routine and structure. Or, it might be via implementation of meditation exercises
that could help John be present (present moment) with his uncomfortable TEAMs
(acceptance) that he usually avoids through consuming alcohol. Interestingly, if the
latter is decided to be implemented, and as indicated earlier, these mindfulness
exercises may have a desired side effect of improving his overall attention and con-
centration. Maybe, John decides what is most important to him is improving his job
performance, which may result in Dr. Smith and John discussing sleep hygiene and
restriction interventions to improve John’s sleep, resulting in him being able to have
more energy and focus throughout the day. Potentially this focus on improving his
work situation could result in Dr. Smith and John making plans around the use of
daily planners, identifying moments of potential distraction and brainstorming
potential solutions, and pharmacological interventions to help promote attention.
Again, meditation and mindfulness exercises may also be indicated with the goal
being to improve work performance. Maybe, John conveys he feels his overall
social interactions are most important, particularly with his children and estranged
family members. However, preventing this from being accomplished are his uncom-
fortable TEAMs that prompts him to be cautious of others, resentful towards his
mom and extended family, and easily frustrated when his children do not engage
with him. Dr. Smith may then introduce experiential exercises that prompt willing-
ness (acceptance) and help John defuse (defusion) from what his mind is telling him
in hopes he will be able to gently and compassionately carry these uncomfortable
TEAMs while engaging in actional behaviors (committed action) that line up with
his value of family (values). Potentially, exercises such as the Program (https://
youtu.be/wrdZQDOo6EQ) and Movie Metaphors (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=M2cUHd1oaLU&t) could be initiated to help create more flexibility and
compassion with John’s internal context, resulting in more engagement in his
defined values.
From an ACT and functional contextualism perspective, the right intervention is
solely dependent on whether a behavior helps to achieve a desired outcome. First,
second, and third-wave behavioral principles, as well as other psychological tech-
niques, may be applied when the context prompts its use. And, the intention of
applying respective interventions, whether it be one of ACT’s six hexaflex princi-
ples or a cognitive distortion exercise, is only implemented when it is in service of
an identified value. These principals will guide Dr. Smith and John’s future work
together.
Summary of John at 28 Years Old Although some may think this is a complex
patient scenario, in our experience, this is a very common scenario in primary care.
Patients come with complex psychosocial histories that are often prompting the
very symptoms we are identifying as the problem and striving to eradicate. While
patients may eventually enter the specialty mental health system (if appropriate,
accessible, feasible, etc.) and receive standardized, evidence informed treatment
protocols, more likely, patients will not move past a primary care office and are
looking for explanations for their experience and pragmatic plans where they can
see noticeable improvement. To us, third-wave behavioral and functional contextual
approaches serves this reality well. Using ACT and fACT conceptualization allows
the clinician to operate from a transdiagnostic standpoint. Instead of the goals being
symptom reduction per se, the goals are to improve the functioning of the patient,
based on what they are identifying as important to them.
The question of, “does John have ADHD?” may still arise from John and the
PCP. From a purely diagnostic and protocol dependent context, we could easily
come up with enough support to say, “yes,” John has ADHD. However, from a func-
tional, process-based context that underlie third-wave behavioral philosophy, the
question may not be of priority as the focus shifts to helping John clarify and move
towards his overall values.
Now, let us consider a third-wave approach to a pediatric case. In fact, let us
imagine what it could have looked like if Dr. Smith had met John (and his mother)
during a pediatric visit 20 years earlier.
Case Example Two: John at Age 8 John is an 8-year-old Caucasian male that
presents to his pediatrician with his mother, Sally. Sally explains to the pediatrician
that John has been struggling regularly in school, as well as at home. His behavior,
which includes acting out, not being able to be redirected, an inability to sit still for
long periods of time, being easily distracted, among others, appears pervasive across
both home and at school. Recently, Sally explains, John’s teacher made a referral to
a school psychologist who felt John likely met criteria for ADHD and should be
considered for pharmacological interventions.
Similar to the clinic described in Case Example One, after the 15-minute medical
visit, John’s pediatrician requests Dr. Smith, the clinic’s integrated BHC, to visit
with John and Sally to help with diagnostic clarifications and potential behavioral
interventions and recommendations. Again, the BHC can also help determine if a
future referral to a higher level of care (specialty mental health) is appropriate and/
or feasible.
Upon entering the room, Dr. Smith is greeted by Sally and John and John imme-
diately begins spinning on the exam room chair, resulting in Sally asserts, “stop
doing that!” Dr. Smith introduces herself, gains informed consent, and proceeds to
gather the Contextual Interview questions geared towards Sally and John. While
John responds to some questions addressed to him, he is easily distracted by all the
interesting exam room instruments, resulting again in Sally, this time more esca-
lated, responding, “stop doing that!” Due to this, Dr. Smith offers John crayons and
specific directions to sit and color on provided paper and coloring books. John can
color on his own for a few minutes before he interrupts Sally and Dr. Smith, exclaim-
ing, “look what I drew!” Sally, responds, “Johnny, be quiet,” and saying to Dr.
Smith, “he just never stops wanting attention.” This pattern of interruption and act-
ing out, as well as Sally responding each time, is seen repeatedly throughout
the visit.
Dr. Smith gathers that Sally, John, and John’s older sister live with Sally’s current
boyfriend of 4 months. Sally goes on to describe they recently moved in with the
boyfriend after having financial difficulty. Also in the home is Sally’s boyfriend’s
brother and sister-in-law, as well as their three children. When asked about John’s
biological father, Sally begins to tear up and states they divorced 4 years ago after
significant domestic violence in the family. Sally stated she finally left after her ex-
husband began to escalate, stating, “I was okay with him doing that to me but not to
my kids.” Sally adds that John’s father is incarcerated and has no contact with John,
nor any parental rights. Sally goes on to comment John and his older sister do not
get along, as John constantly “annoys her.” Further, while John is mostly able to get
along with Sally’s significant other’s children, they often fight over toys. Sally stated
she is currently looking for work and is often not home due to her helping her boy-
friend with his business. When she is not at home, John is watched by Sally’s boy-
friend’s sister-in-law or friends of Sally. John commented he does not like many of
Sally’s friends but does like the sister-in-law because she “is nice to me.” Since
divorcing John’s father, Sally stated they have moved at least three different times
and John has been to two different schools; although, the recent move to boyfriend’s
home did not result in a school change for John. At school, Sally stated John has
always struggled with socializing with others because “he annoys them.” Sally adds
that teachers say he is easily distracted and has a difficult time being redirected.
Sally did convey that John has unfortunately missed numerous days of school due
to moves and John not wanting to go. When asked directly, John stated he enjoys
playing video games and spending time with his mom watching movies, although,
Sally said she rarely gets one on one time with John. Dr. Smith learns John con-
sumes at least one soda a day and most adults in the home use cigarettes and alco-
hol; however, Sally denied any other substance use by members in the home. Sally
said John is always active and he has a good appetite. Due to her busy schedule,
however, she mentioned his diet is mostly “whatever is available.” Lastly, Sally said
it is difficult getting John to bed every night. John shares a bedroom with his older
sister and receives only 6–7 hours of sleep a night due to refusing to go to bed.
Dr. Smith also receives from the PCP the Vanderbilt Assessment Scale screeners
(Wolraich et al., 2003) that score John positive for ADHD symptoms from both
teachers and Sally. Through the visit, Sally regularly describes John as her “problem
child,” and that he “takes after his father.”
Questions for the Reader After reviewing the information from John’s Contextual
Interview, what symptoms do we anticipate being present? Do we hypothesize John
to have inattention, impulsivity, and focusing concerns? How has John’s context
potentially shaped how he sees himself and his world? Would we anticipate John to
meet criteria of ADHD? Would we expect John to meet criteria for other mental
health concerns? How does Sally see herself and her world and how does this
impact John?
ACT Conceptualization Clearly, John is having symptomology that aligns with

ADHD criteria and Dr. Smith is observing behaviors in the visit that reinforce this
notion. However, Dr. Smith is also curious if much of what John is presenting with
is a reflection of his context. While Dr. Smith believes Sally is doing the very best
she can, essentially all reinforcement and attention is given to John’s poor behavior.
Contrarily, when Dr. Smith asks Sally what does John do well, Sally has a difficult
time identifying behaviors that John does well, eventually saying, “I guess he helps
me cook when I let him.” Additionally, Dr. Smith is very keen to the budding rela-
tional frames that are being reinforced and built within John. Specifically, Dr. Smith
sees how perceptive John is to the conversation they are having. Dr. Smith wonders
about the impact that Sally describing John as her “problem child” and stating he
“takes after his father” has on him. Dr. Smith also starts to extrapolate about the
messages he is receiving from his teachers and peers at school. Is he being delivered
the message daily that he is annoying or a “bad kid?” Literally happening before her
eyes, Dr. Smith sees the relational frames building that could potentially define
John’s internal context for years to come.
Interventions for 8-year-old John will most likely reflect what is commonly seen
in first-wave and second wave behavioral approaches to ADHD and pharmacologi-
cal interventions may be indicated. John may also benefit from mindfulness and
meditation exercises to strengthen his ability to self-regulate, focus, and shift atten-
tion from stimuli to stimuli. That being said, for a the third-wave clinician, they will
be equipped with a lens to organize the patient’s context and budding relational
frames. They will be able to gauge progress via the lens of the six core processes
that impact psychological flexibility.
This may spur Dr. Smith giving concerted focus and effort to educating Sally on
contextual influences of John’s behavior and the importance of framing John’s
behavior within the context from where they are coming from (self as context). Dr.
Smith may explain to Sally that John seeks her attention and affection, like all kids
seek from their parent. Providing Sally observed examples from the visit, Dr. Smith
would explain how Sally unintentionally reinforced John’s acting out behavior and
suggest to Sally alternative responses to John. Essentially, Dr. Smith may strive to
help Sally see John’s behaviors in context and to help her adjust her behaviors to get
a different outcome. She might also use psychoeducation to help her handle her
reactions to John’s behavior with compassion and grace (present moment, accep-
tance, defusion). This will be a difficult ask as Sally is coming from her own con-
text, one that Dr. Smith hypothesizes may have been filled with similar psychosocial
strife. Indeed, asking Sally to provide John with stability, unconditional love and
compassion, and constant attention may be hard for Sally to do within her current
context. Thus, interventions aimed at helping Sally with her psychological flexibil-
ity may also be utilized. Clinicians should keep in mind that putting too much pres-
sure on Sally to change her behavior without taking into account her context may
cause Sally to disengage, which could be attributed to an avoidance process where
she might have uncomfortable TEAMS regarding not being a good mother. Thus,
Dr. Smith may need to work with Sally on becoming defused with her own TEAMs
and compassionately move towards her value of being a loving parent towards John.
Further, Dr. Smith may want to work with the medical clinic and potentially the
school to fortify Sally and John’s support network. A referral for more specialized
mental or behavioral health resources and/or treatment may be initiated as well.
Summary of John at 8 Years Old The unfortunate reality of John at 8 years old is
that it will be very difficult to improve his symptom presentation without tangible
changes to his environment and context. Clearly, being in chaos will produce cha-
otic symptoms and while a ADHD diagnosis may be warranted, interventions may
be futile if the context from where the symptoms are derived is left unchanged.
However, this speaks to even more reason for a third-wave approach that utilizes
functional contextualism to be utilized with John, even if the observed interventions

reflect more first-wave behaviorism. Taking this approach may allow Dr. Smith, as
well as the pediatrician and medical staff, to validate John’s symptoms, create rela-
tional frames with John of love and support, as well as support Sally in her endeav-
ors of achieving a more loving and stable environment. While a third-wave clinician
may clearly work on impacting the immediate and present symptoms of ADHD, Dr.
Smith will also be ever mindful of how her approach, interactions, and engagement
shapes both John’s and Sally’s relational frames.
Summary
We end our journey where we began with Dr. Burke Harris detailing the influence
of ACEs and the potential impact these contextual factors have on presenting symp-
tomology, such as ADHD. She ends her talk with a provocative statement, “The
single most important thing that we need today is the courage to look this problem
in the face and say, this is real and this is all of us” (TEDMED, 2015, 15:48).
Whether it is ADHD, whether it is depression, whether is obesity or diabetes, it
would behoove healthcare to take a functional contextualism viewpoint and
approach signs and symptoms with curiosity. Further, while first, second, and third-
wave behavioral interventions may be indicated, mental health providers would
benefit from looking at the realities of ADHD through a macro lens. Meaning,
instead of solely developing interventions for the identified patient and their family,
we need to identify interventions that address macrosystems, such as our communi-
ties, to create contexts where symptom presentations such as ADHD are less disrup-
tive, not because they do not exist, rather, because the context helps to ameliorate
them. Reflecting on John, what would his outcome have been if community
resources, trainings, and support were made available for him and his mother, Sally?
What would have happened if the entire community approached Sally and John
with kindness, curiosity, and compassion? What happens when we create contexts
of support, validation, and love? We hope, at the very least, this chapter inspires the
reader to explore and, maybe, answer these questions.
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Chronic Pain: Perspective on the Second
Wave
Leah M. Adams and Dennis C. Turk
Chronic pain, typically assessed as pain that persists for longer than 6 months,
remains a significant public health issue affecting millions of people worldwide
(Goldberg & McGee, 2011). Based on epidemiologic data from the 2016 National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) estimated that approximately 20% of adults had chronic pain and 8% had
high impact chronic pain (i.e., chronic pain that inhibited daily functioning) Chronic
pain has been linked to anxiety, depression, disability, dependence on opioids, as
well as poor perceived health and health-related quality of life. In the United States
chronic pain is one of the most common reasons adults seek medical carer (Rasu
et al., 2013).
Chronic pain is not a single, cohesive disorder. Instead, it is a generic classifica-
tion that includes a wide range of disorders. Individuals with chronic pain comprise
a disparate group, with varying underlying pathophysiology, and widely diverse
impacts on quality of life, function, and demands on the healthcare provider and
society (Turk & Okifuji, 2002). It is a mistake to characterize all individuals with
chronic pain as chronic pain patients, as for the majority of the time they are simply
people living with chronic pain. It is only when they are in the office of healthcare
providers that they become “patients,” just as a person with diabetes has to self-
manage and cope with the impact of the disease on their lives and do not refer to
themselves as “diabetic patients.” Unfortunately, for many people as pain becomes
more chronic, they often come to develop an identity as a disabled chronic pain
patient (Gatchel et al., 2007). This belief can set the individual with pain up for pas-
sivity, a “sick person” role, withdrawal, helplessness, and the downward spiral
L. M. Adams
Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
D. C. Turk (*)
Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, University of Washington,
Seattle, WA, USA
e-mail: turkdc@uw.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_29
674 L. M. Adams and D. C. Turk
continues. These self-perceptions contribute to greater demoralization, passivity

and ultimately, disability (Flor & Turk, 2011).
The relationship between the subjective experience of pain and pathoanatomic
findings is often poor (Brinjiki et al., 2014). Moreover, for many chronic pain disor-
ders (e.g., low back pain, fibromyalgia, headache) there usually is no objective evi-
dence of underlying pathology that explains the symptoms making the diagnosis
often somewhat challenging.
Despite truly impressive advances in medical and surgical interventions, includ-
ing the development of novel drug treatments, chronic pain persists, as do its psy-
chological, emotional, and social impacts (Turk et al., 2011). This is not to say that
improvement in chronic pain management and reduction of its impact on quality of
life is impossible (Gatchel et al., 2007).
There is a growing consensus that all chronic pain conditions reflect an amalgam
of biologic, psychologic, and social factors that is best assessed with a multidimen-
sional perspective to determine further evaluation and treatment options. The
International Association for the Study of Pain has recently updated the original
1979 definition to reflect advancements in the understanding of pain and to acknowl-
edge that pain may exist even in the absence of objective physical pathology (Raja
et al., 2020). The revised definition states that pain is “an unpleasant sensory and
emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or
potential tissue damage,” and is expanded upon by the addition of six key notes and
the etymology of the word “pain” for further valuable context:
• Pain is always a personal experience that is influenced to varying degrees by
biological, psychological, and social factors.
• Pain and nociception are different phenomena. Pain cannot be inferred solely
from activity in sensory neurons (i.e., nociception).
• Through their life experiences, individuals learn the concept of pain.
• A person’s report of an experience as pain should be respected.
• Although pain usually serves an adaptive role, it may have adverse effects on
function and social and psychological well-being.
International guidelines have proliferated for treating chronic pain using nonphar-
maceutical, noninvasive, biopsychosocial therapies, as well as traditional medical
modalities (e.g., Almeida et al., 2018; Qaseem et al., 2017; Van Wamneke
et al., 2017).
The primary foci of treatments recommended for patients with chronic pain
emphasize physical and functional improvements and gains in health-related quality
of life, rather than an exclusive focus on “cure” or the complete elimination of pain
(Flor & Turk, 2011; McCracken & Marin, 2014). There is support for the effective-
ness of these multidisciplinary and multimodal treatments across several pain con-
ditions (e.g., lower-back pain, fibromyalgia) (Guzmán et al., 2001; Hauser et al.,
2009; Kamper et al., 2014). However, the results of these treatments have not always
been consistent as evidence by meta-analyses (e.g., NICE, 2020; Williams et al.,
2012). The NICE draft guideline does support the beneficial effects of
Chronic Pain: Perspective on the Second Wave 675
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT, i.e., “second-wave”) and Acceptance and

Commitment Therapy (ACT, a “third-wave” approach).
Much like chronic pain, psychological intervention has many manifestations
with specific practices emanating from varied sources (i.e., theoretical orientations).
Even though these conceptualizations and practices can be further categorized by
psychotherapeutic paradigm (e.g., behavior therapy, psychoanalytic therapy), there
are key differences within a paradigm that have emerged over time. In this chapter,
we aim to highlight the contributions of CBT, the second wave of behavior therapy,
namely, to the treatment of individuals experiencing chronic pain. We accomplish
this by identifying primary distinctions between the approaches (i.e., conceptualiza-
tions, goals, practices) of the second wave and the first and third waves of behavior
therapy, applying a CBT conceptualization to a sample case, and ending with an
examination of the evidence base for each of the three waves. We believe that mov-
ing towards an understanding of under which circumstances and for whom each
wave’s perspective and tools provide maximum benefit is a more fruitful endeavor
than simply choosing a “top contender” across all conditions or all patients.
ariations in Chronic Pain Treatment Across Waves

V
of Behavior Therapy
Although we emphasize differences in this chapter, it is evident that the three

“waves” of behavior therapy share some common components, such as building a
working alliance between therapist and patient, engaging patient motivation, and
promoting self-management through patients’ actions (Table 1). In this section, we
provide a brief overview of each wave’s foundational principles and discuss how
they conceptualize the maintenance of chronic pain and pain interference. We also
note the goals of psychological intervention for chronic pain according to each
paradigm.
First Wave
First wave approaches to pain treatment focus on the roles of classical conditioning,
operant conditioning, and social learning (de Jong et al., 2005; Goubert et al., 2011;
Morley, 2011). First wave clinicians conceptualize behaviors like activity-restriction,
avoidance of pain-exacerbating experiences, and visible pain behaviors (e.g., verbal
reports, gestures, medical visits) using these concepts. Classical conditioning prin-
ciples can help explain activity-restriction and avoidance of subsequent pain. For
example, a person who experiences a pain flare-up while engaging in a favorite
activity (e.g.,gardening) may become “conditioned” (learn) to experience a negative
emotional reaction the next time they are tending to their garden. Eventually, they
Table 1 Comparisons of three waves of behavior therapy approaches to chronic pain treatment
First-wave Second-wave Third-wave
Assumptions Reinforcement for Negative beliefs about Futile attempts to control
regarding what pain behaviors pain one’s thoughts, feelings,
maintains pain & Lack of positive Catastrophic thinking and sensations
pain-behaviors? reinforcement for Low perceived control Constant seeking of
“well” behaviors Low self-efficacy symptom relief, rather
Reinforcement of pain than striving for personal
behaviors life goals and values
Lack of positive
reinforcement for “well
behaviors”
Goals for treatment Modify pain-related Promote self- Promote self-
behaviors management of pain management of pain
Reduce pain-related Reduce prominent role of
distress pain
Reduce pain-related Acceptance of pain
interference Increase personal goal-
Modify pain-related and values-directed
behaviors behavior
Correct maladaptive
and unhelpful thoughts
and beliefs related to
pain
Increase self-efficacy
for pain management
Techniques used in Engaging patient Alliance building Alliance building
treatment motivation Engaging patient Engaging patient
Exposure motivation motivation
Changing Guided training and Values identification
environmental practice with Mindfulness practice
contingencies techniques Metaphor
Cognitive restructuring Paradox
Relaxation training
Activity pacing
Assertiveness training
Out-of-session practice
may avoid gardening entirely out of fear that they will experience more pain in the
future. Notably, anticipatory fear acquired through such conditioning is used to
explain why avoidance behavior is maintained.
Although practitioners of the first wave acknowledge that pain is largely a private
experience, they emphasize that pain plays an important communication role and
that publicly observable expressions of pain are reinforced by one’s environment
(hence, operant conditioning), noting that pain interference persists due to rein-
forced pain-related behaviors (e.g., reduced physical activity, medication use, lim-
ited social interactions) and lack of positive reinforcement for “well” behaviors
(Morley, 2011). The maintenance of pain behaviors can be understood through
operant conditioning and social learning principles in which people directly
experience or learn from viewing others that some pain behaviors are reinforced.
For example, a person whose partner provides more caring attention when they
verbalize their pain experience or is able to briefly escape pain by resting will be
reinforced to continue to speak up about their pain and to continue to avoid activity.
Importantly, these behaviors may continue to occur despite potential disruption
caused in the relationship (e.g., caregiver burden) or further physical deconditioning
that contributes to subsequent pain.
Within the first-wave conceptualization of chronic pain treatment, intervention
focuses on modifying pain-related behaviors (Morley, 2011). From a classical con-
ditioning perspective, exposure to the feared and avoided behavior (e.g., physical
activity) is key. Repeatedly engaging in the behavior produces progressively less
pain than anticipated, which leads to reduced anticipatory fear, anxiety, and avoid-
ance associated with the behavior (Boersma et al., 2004; de Jong et al., 2005).
Operant conditioning and social learning principles are used in first wave interven-
tions for chronic pain by changing environmental contingencies and settings where
pain behaviors take place (Flor & Turk, 2011). For example, families can be taught
to ignore pain behaviors in their loved ones, and instead reinforce wellness behav-
iors (e.g., Thieme et al. 2005). Operating in tandem, the combination of exposure to
more activities and revised patterns of reinforcement can help move the attention
away from pain and its associated behaviors to improved functioning and better
quality of life.
Second Wave – Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
First wave approaches emphasize overt behaviors largely to the exclusion of the
interior workings (e.g., thoughts, emotions) of the person (Morley & Williams,
2015). The development of cognitive therapy in the 1960s, with its focus on the
mediational role play by an individual’s interpretation of their events, such as their
beliefs about the situation and expectations about what may come, on their emo-
tional and behavioral responses provided a new perspective to the treatment of
chronic pain. The integration of the behavioral perspective and cognitive perspec-
tive into the cognitive-behavioral (CB) perspective is a hallmark of second wave
approaches to chronic pain treatment. The CB perspective has a set of key assump-
tions (Turk & Meichenbaum, 1984). These include:
• Individuals are active processors of information rather than passive reactors.
• Individuals’ thoughts (e.g., appraisals, attributions, expectancies) can elicit or
modulate their affect and physiological arousal, both of which may serve as
impetuses for behaviors. Conversely affect, physiological processes, and behav-
ior can instigate or influence individuals thinking processes and the content of
their thoughts.
• Behavior is reciprocally determined by the environment, contextual factors, and
individuals.
• Individuals have learned maladaptive ways of thinking, feeling, and responding

based on their experiences.
• In the same way as individuals are instrumental in developing and maintaining
maladaptive thoughts, feelings, and behavior; they can, are, and should be con-
sidered as active agents of change of their own maladaptive modes of responding.
Although the American Psychological Association has deleted the hyphen from the
original formulation (Meichenbaum, 1995), we believe the hyphen is important as
it underscores the interaction of behavioral and cognitive principles. As we discuss
later, it is important to distinguish between the general CB perspective and the par-
ticular techniques used within it; specific practices often reflect a single component
(i.e., cognitive technique, behavioral technique), but are used jointly to reflect the
contributions and interactions of both perspectives.
Applied to the treatment of chronic pain, CBT incorporated elements from the
Gate Control Theory (GCT) of pain, which integrated psychological with physio-
logical factors to understand the experience of pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965).
According to GCT, a trio of systems, sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective,
and cognitive-evaluative, are involved in the subjective experience of pain. Notably,
the theory not only highlighted the presence of psychological processes in the inter-
pretation of pain, but also postulated that both physiological and psychological fac-
tors can each amplify, attenuate, and moderate the perception of pain. This theory
continues to provide a strong foundation for understanding and intervening upon
chronic pain, spurring the development of subsequent frameworks that incorporate
the influence of psychological factors into the pain experience, hence the biopsy-
chosocial model (Gatchel et al., 2007; Jensen & Turk, 2014), under which many
practitioners of second wave approaches to pain treatment operate.
The CBT perspective maintains the importance of pain behaviors, conditioning,
and social learning indicative of the first wave approaches, but supplemented this
conceptualization with the role of cognition and emotion. That is, second wave cli-
nicians recognize that while specific behaviors are critical targets of pain treatment,
how a person thinks about their pain and about their life in the presence of pain can
have a significant impact on their quality of life. While the CBT conceptualization
promotes the importance of psychological factors such as beliefs, expectations, and
emotions [] in chronic pain, it is critical to note that it does not presume that pain is
caused by psychological factors alone. Instead, these features are viewed as neces-
sary to the understanding of how pain is experienced. There is an extensive litera-
ture examining the cognitive factors that contribute to the maintenance and
progression of chronic pain and disability (Burns et al., 2003; Ehde et al., 2014). We
highlight several primary cognitive factors that frequently emerge in this literature,
including beliefs about pain, catastrophic thinking, self-efficacy, and perceived
control.
Beliefs About Pain
Beliefs about pain develop over time, incorporating the individual’s unique learning
history (Adams & Turk, 2015; Flor & Turk, 2011). In this way, the combination of
reinforced behaviors and conditioned responses contribute to the way in which peo-
ple with pain interpret their pain experiences. Beliefs about pain play a key role in
how people appraise their pain, including its perceived severity and impact, and on
how they respond to pain. In an interesting study, Benedetti et al. (2013) induced
pain in a group of pain-free adults. They found that when participants were told that
the pain indicated that there was an “adverse event,” they expressed a lower pain
tolerance than those who were told that pain experienced was “beneficial to the
muscles,” highlighting the role that beliefs play in the subjective experience of pain.
Experience of the same event (e.g., pain) can vary widely, in part, because of indi-
vidual differences in interpretation of the event; these interpretations will lead to
drastically different emotional (e.g., fear, anger) and behavioral (e.g., activity, rest)
responses. This point reifies the significance of the CBT approach relative to the
first wave – because behavior and emotions are influenced by one’s interpretation of
events, and not just the objective, observable characteristics of the event, an approach
that fails to incorporate beliefs may misattribute and or miss-specify the relation-
ships between pain experience and pain behavior.
Catastrophic Thinking
Catastrophic thinking is a cognitive style in which a person expects the worst pos-
sible outcome to occur due to a distorted negative view of their problems. As may
be clear, this thinking style is particularly unhelpful in the context of chronic pain,
with an abundance of evidence suggesting that it is often detrimental (Gatchel et al.,
2007). Research highlights that people who endorse more catastrophizing thoughts
report more intense pain, more pain-related interference, greater psychological dys-
function, and declines in social support relative to those who do not use this think-
ing style (Edwards et al., 2006; Quartana et al., 2009; Sullivan et al., 2001; Turner
and Aaron, 2001).
In the Fear-Avoidance Model of pain, catastrophic and overly negative thoughts
and beliefs about pain promote disabling fear and avoidance of the activity because
people misinterpret their pain as a sign of significant injury or pathology, even
though this is rarely the case for those with chronic pain (Crombez et al. 2012;Turk
& Wilson, 2010). This catastrophic thinking leads to pain-related fear, hypervigi-
lance, and then avoidance, disability, and distress. Importantly, the Fear Avoidance
Model incorporates both cognitive (e.g., catastrophic thinking) and behavioral (e.g.,
activity avoidance) components to explain pain interference. A key benefit of explic-
itly noting the role of catastrophic thinking is that it represents a robust and modifi-
able mediator between the behavioral manifestations of activity restriction and
avoidance described by conditioning processes mentioned above. In hundreds of
studies, catastrophizing has emerged as both a predictor of poor adjustment to pain

and a specific target of intervention [e.g., Edwards et al, 2006).
Reduction of pain catastrophizing may moderate and mediate the outcome of
both physical and psychologically focused rehabilitation for chronic low back pain
(Bunzil et al. 2006; Goodin et al., 2009; Treharme et al., 2005). Therapies for
chronic low back pain that explicitly target pain-related cognitions including, but
not limited to, pain catastrophizing appear to be able to modify these cognitions
(Bunzil et al, 3006; Goodin et al., 2009). There is also some preliminary data that
those who benefit most in terms of pain and disability display the most significant
changes in pain-related cognitions (Trompetter et al., 2015). It is important to note
that other techniques not targeting catastrophizing thoughts per se, such as (but not
limited to) third-wave approaches including mindfulness-based therapies (Day,
2017) and ACT (Feliu-Soler et al., 2018), have also reported decreases in pain cata-
strophizing after treatment (Vowles et al., 2007).
Perceived Control
When individuals believe that they cannot predict when they will experience pain or
that they have no control over its impact, they may lose motivation to engage in self-
management strategies needed to function well in the presence of pain. If one can-
not control any aspects of experience related to pain, then what use would it be to
try anything at all (e.g., medication, psychotherapy, physical therapy) - learned
helplessness? Perceived control, then, is another important cognitive contributor
that second wave behavioral therapists address in their conceptualization of chronic
pain. Data suggest that, in general, people who are low in perceived control over
their pain are more likely to feel helpless and report worse pain-related outcomes
such as poorer satisfaction with life, worse adaptation to pain, and greater pain
intensity (Keefe et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2007). In considering the role of per-
ceived control in pain management, caution is warranted. Within the CBT perspec-
tive, practitioners acknowledge that a degree of perceived control over one’s life and
how it unfolds is relevant to stimulate action, but they also recognize that not all
elements of the pain experience are under an individual’s direct control. Evidence
suggests that when actual control over a situation is low, repeated attempts to con-
trol pain or eliminate it may be iatrogenic (Crombez et al., 2008; Gilliam et al.,
2010). In the case of chronic pain management from the CBT perspective, the
Serenity Prayer provides appropriate guidance: “Grant me the serenity to accept the
things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference.” Indeed, recognizing this difference between that which is under control
and that which is not, supports the CBT approach’s focus on reducing pain interfer-
ence, rather than eliminating pain itself (McCracken & Turk, 2002; Turner &
Romano, 2001).
Self-Efficacy
If perceived control represents a person’s thoughts about the degree to which they
can exert influence over their pain experience, self-efficacy represents the extent to
which they view themselves as having the skills necessary to successfully perform
the tasks needed to effectively do so in a given situation (Bandura, 1978). Within the
CBT perspective, self-efficacy is another key cognitive component to target to max-
imize the benefit of pain treatment. A person’s self-efficacy beliefs dictate in which
activities they choose to engage, how much effort they put forth, and their degree of
persistence in those activities. Self-efficacy can be modified through intervention,
and research demonstrates that for people with chronic pain, improvements in self-
efficacy can lead to reductions in pain interference, better physical functioning, and
improved psychological adjustment (Keefe et al., 2004; Marks, 2001). The principal
strategies proposed to increase self-efficacy are performance accomplishments,
vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and awareness of physiological states
(Bandura, 1978). Attention to each of these sources of information is integrated
into CBT.
Chronic Pain Treatment Within the CBT Approach
The goals of CBT for chronic pain map onto the emphasis on the roles of behav-
ioral, cognitive, and affective factors in the maintenance and progression of chronic
pain interference. Importantly, as mentioned above, CBT does not have an explicit
focus on reducing or eliminating the experience of pain in and of itself. Instead,
emotional distress related to pain and pain-interference are targets (Flor & Turk,
2011; Skinner et al., 2012). Behavioral goals within the CBT paradigm focus on
improving physical function and social role function by helping individuals decrease
maladaptive behaviors that do not serve their life goals. Affective and cognitive
goals focus on identifying and correcting maladaptive thoughts and beliefs, espe-
cially related to fear, avoidance, and catastrophizing. Further, CBT for chronic pain
emphasize building a person’s self-efficacy (a personal judgment of how well one
can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations, Bandura,
1978) for pain management, including encouraging adaptive levels of perceived
control that recognize the potential to exert some influence over one’s experience,
while maintaining an awareness that some things exist beyond our control. Moreover,
the CBT emphasis is not just on suppressing uncontrollable thoughts, which, as
noted previously, can have negative unintentional consequences, but importantly on
attending to maladaptive thoughts and attempting to restructure these by exploring
their validity and considering alternative and more adaptive constructions.
Given the multiple aims of CBT for chronic pain, the techniques within it vary.
Notably, CBT represent a variety of specific techniques, with some having origins
in behavior therapy and others in cognitive therapy and hence the importance of the
hyphen between cognitive and behavioral. There is no single, definitive CBT proto-
col, and most efforts under the generic CBT labelled several components in order to
accomplish the behavioral, cognitive, and affective goals of treatment (Ehde et al.,
2014; Morley & Williams, 2015). What is common across CBT approaches are the
inclusion of a structured and guided training; clinic and home practice of a variety
of pain self-management skills, including relaxation techniques for stress manage-
ment, activity pacing, assertiveness training; and cognitive restructuring as impor-
tance of thoughts as a key process.
Treatment of A Chronic Pain Patient: Ms. M
Ms. M was a 40-year old woman who presented to treatment with a 20-year history
of chronic pain. Over the course of her pain diagnosis, she had tried many different
medications for pain management. Though some medications helped initially, over
time they were less effective. Ms. M acknowledged a negative relationship with her
primary medical provider, noting that “they think I’m just making it all up”. Ms. M
reported that her pain prevented her from maintaining a romantic relationship
(though she endorsed desperately wanting to be in a relationship), strained her
friendships, and disrupted her productivity at work. She described her evenings and
weekends as “mostly spent on the couch, watching show after show on Netflix.” Ms.
M presented to the first session of therapy stating that her life and her potential were
“wasted” and with little hope that her circumstances could be improved.
Many of our thoughts throughout the day arise somewhat spontaneously and
provide a running commentary of environmental events. These “automatic thoughts”
often occur in response to or in anticipation of pain. In cognitive restructuring,
patients are guided to become aware of negative thoughts that work against them
and then examine whether the thought is true, partly true, or partly false, along with
the degree to which the thought, even if partly true, is helpful to them in meeting
their goals. Early on, Ms. M identified that many of her thoughts about pain focused
on her feelings of helplessness, and contributed to her “giving up” and “giving in”
with regard to engaging in efforts to reduce its impact. After identifying how such
thoughts not only made her feel worse, but also guaranteed that she would “waste
my [her] time,” Ms. M was taught how to come up more realistic, helpful, and less
negative thoughts. Notably, Ms. M’s restructured thoughts acknowledged that she
may not eliminate pain, but highlighted the ways in which she could still engage in
meaningful activity and not waste her time, even in the face of pain. Thus, the
emphasis was neither on crafting overly positive, unrealistic thoughts nor on sup-
pressing maladaptive thinking.
By the time Ms. M began attending therapy, she engaged in very few routine
activities throughout the day. Common to many chronic pain patients, she reported
getting stuck in a “boom or bust” cycle in which she would maximize her activity in
a given day, experience a pain flare-up following the activity, attribute that pain
flare-up to new injury and then “rest” for the subsequent days, resulting in almost no
activity, further reinforcing activity restriction, and strengthening her feelings of
helplessness. Using graded exposure to physical movement, Ms. M learned that
appropriately paced physical activity using proper body mechanics does not create
injury or pain exacerbations. She learned to pace her behaviors to avoid getting
stuck in the “boom or bust” cycle, and ultimately changed her judgment that physi-
cal activity causes injury to the body. This is an illustration of using behavioral
strategies to reduce feeling of helplessness. By the end of her time in CBT (approxi-
mately 12 weeks), Ms. M had reinitiated dating, reconnected with two of her closest
friends, and had developed a daily routine, which included regular, mild physical
activity. She reported improved mood, and though she still acknowledged mild to
moderate pain intensity on many days, she noted that it rarely got in the way of her
daily tasks.
Table 2 shows common components of CBT which includes exposure to activity
that may have been avoided or restricted, with an emphasis on attending to and
engaging with one’s thoughts to address cognitive errors or unhelpful thinking pat-
terns that contribute to lowered quality of life. A key component is the provision of
activities to be performed between sessions (i.e., homework); this work provides the
opportunity to practice applying new skills and time to reflect upon their impact.
CBT efforts also vary in the number of sessions and format of treatment, as it can be
successfully delivered in various formats including in individual, group, or
technologically-enhanced formats (Ehde et al., 2014).
Some criticisms raised about CBT are that it requires patients to engage in
abstract reasoning, to have comfort with reading and writing, and written homework
adherence. However, the content of CBT has been shown to be readily adapted and
simplified for those with lower reading and cognitive function (Thorn et al. 2018).
Moreover, CBT has been shown to be successful and readily adaptable for use with
children and adolescents with chronic pain (Eccleston et al., 2014).
Table 2 Common components in second-wave behavior therapy approaches for chronic pain
treatment
Practices
Motivational enhancement, patient
Engagement
Education: Pain, self-management, communication with significant others including health-care
providers, adherence to treatment components, resilience
Cognitive restructuring, self-reinforcement
Problem solving
Activity pacing
Goal-setting
Cognitive and behavioral skills training
Relaxation training
Exposure (e.g., behavioral experiments)
Management of flare-ups
Home practice
Relapse prevention
Third Wave
Third-wave behavior therapy is grounded in relational frame theory and functional

contextualistic philosophy in which suffering is viewed as the result of futile
attempts to control and fight against one’s thoughts and feelings (Feliu Soler et al.,
2018). Third wave approaches are also known as acceptance-based and mindfulness-
based strategies, sometimes employed together with commitment and behavior
change strategies, known cohesively as ACT (Hayes, 2004). Importantly,
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) interventions exist as standalone treat-
ments outside of ACT, and Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) is also a third-wave
behavior therapy. However, much of the literature on the effectiveness of third-wave
approaches for chronic pain focus on ACT (Feliu Soler et al., 2018; McCracken &
Vowles, 2006). As such, much of our discussion will center on ACT.
Psychological flexibility is a central tenet of ACT, and refers to the ability to act
in accordance with one’s own values, even in the midst of interfering or uncomfort-
able thoughts, feelings or bodily sensations (Hayes et al., 2006). This idea is a
development from cognitive therapy (McCracken & Marin, 2014), but rather than
being an important element as in CBT, it is viewed as the key to maximized func-
tioning. Psychological flexibility is conceptualized as having six subcategories: (1)
acceptance, (2) cognitive defusion, (3) flexible present-focused attention, (4) self-
as-context, (5) values, and (6) committed action (Feliu Soler et al., 2018). Acceptance
represents not only acknowledging that unwanted experiences (e.g., painful sensa-
tions, negative thoughts, negative feelings, painful memories) are inevitable parts of
life, but also that these unwanted experiences may be necessary to the extent that
they are connected to one’s goals (e.g., to engage in a pleasurable activity such as
hiking, you may experience pain). Cognitive defusion is the practice of differentiat-
ing between one’s thoughts and experiences related to thoughts. While this is simi-
lar to cognitive restructuring within the CB perspective, the distinction is that in
CBT, thoughts are analyzed for distortions and maladaptive patterns in which their
validity and alternative interpretations are addressed, whereas the focus in cognitive
defusion is solely to label thoughts as entities that may come and go, rather than
actively engage with rational disputation of them. Flexible present-focused atten-
tion encourages a connection with the present and a tracking of moment-to-moment
experience; this may mean recognizing painful sensations, but also noticing other
experiences in the moment too, rather than exclusively focus on pain. This focusing
on pain is contradictory to CBT where focusing on pain directly is seen as maladap-
tive and can exacerbate the experience.
Within ACT, self-as-context highlights a distinction between thoughts, feelings,
and the person who observes them; while this idea also has ties to cognitive restruc-
turing from CBT, the same distinction as above applies. The last two components of
psychological flexibility, values and committed action, are concerned with the iden-
tification of and purposeful action towards one’s idiographic values and goals (Feliu
Soler et al., 2018; McCracken & Vowles, 2006) despite pain, which is viewed as
largely uncontrollable so is simply accepted as a fact. Though the naming
conventions of these two components of psychological flexibility are different, they

appear to share significant amount of overlap with goal-setting, self-efficacy, and
positive activity planning seen in CBT.
With regard to pain, ACT conceptualizes pain interference as the result of peo-
ple’s constant search for immediate symptom relief, rather than learning to live with
discomfort. Attempts to control pain and pain-related difficult experiences are con-
ceptualized as the cause of suffering, rather than an effective remedy. As such, goals
for chronic pain treatment within ACT focus on reducing the dominant role that
pain plays in their life and helping patients act in accordance with their self-defined
goals and values. Notably, ACT does not focus on symptom reduction, including
pain intensity or emotional symptoms associated with pain. In fact, the labeling of
difficult thoughts or behaviors as “symptoms” is viewed as problematic because it
is the label that creates the internal struggle, rather than the experience itself.
Treatment from an ACT perspective is considered successful when a person reports
improved daily functioning, not necessarily a change in pain intensity or other emo-
tions; that is, a person may continue to experience moderate pain and may continue
to experience symptoms of anxiety associated with it, but no longer feel compelled
to fight against them, and can instead recognize these sensations/feelings and still
work toward their goals.
Specific intervention techniques within ACT share overlap with earlier waves of
behavior therapy, though the implementation differs. For example, while exposure
is an important treatment technique within ACT, practices such as measuring one’s
subjective units of distress or other active engagement with their thoughts or feel-
ings are not included. Key concepts are frequently communicated through the use of
metaphor and paradox. Other exercises and techniques within ACT are tied to the
subcomponent of psychological flexibility they are aimed at enhancing. Similar to
CBT, ACT can be delivered in various modalities, including individual, group, and
technologically-aided formats (Feliu Soler et al., 2018; Hughes et al., 2017).
vidence Base for Chronic Pain Treatment Across Waves

E
of Behavior Therapy
In this section, we outline the evidence base for chronic pain treatment across the
three waves of behavior therapy. We argue that at this time, the CBT and third waves
have comparable levels of empirical support for their use in chronic pain treatment.
Rather than seek to find the “best” approach, we highlight continuing limitations in
the literature that are applicable across waves. We conclude with a call for research-
ers and practitioners to move towards building an evidence base for when and how
to tailor each wave’s approach to the unique needs of clients with chronic pain, and
outline some possible circumstances in which second wave approaches may be
preferable to others.
There have been few efforts to compare the efficacy and effectiveness of chronic
pain treatment across the first-wave, behavioral treatments, and CBT. When they
have been compared the results suggest that these two approaches appear to have
different outcomes for patients with different pre-treatment characteristics. For
example, Theime et al. (2007) found that at baseline fibromyalgia patients who
responded to an operant behavioral treatment displayed higher levels of pain behav-
iors, physical impairment, physician visits, solicitous spouse behaviors, and level of
catastrophizing; whereas responders to CBT had higher levels of affective distress,
lower coping, less solicitous spouse behavior, and lower pain numbers of behaviors.
Across much of the research on clinical trials, CBT produces small effect sizes
for pain intensity and disability, and moderate effect sizes for mood and catastrophic
thinking across pain conditions when compared to controls (Williams et al., 2012).
These effects are strongest immediately following treatment, and by 6–12 months
post-treatment, most effects only remain for mood (Ehde et al., 2014; Williams
et al., 2012); whereas conditioning based behavior therapy produced only small
improvements in mood immediately after treatment when compared to control
(Williams et al., 2012). Although the authors commented on CBT’s strongest effects
against treatment as usual/waiting list conditions, rather than active controls, they
highlighted an absence of evidence for behavior therapy on most outcomes (Williams
et al., 2012).
The evidence base developed for CBT is considerably longer than that of third-
wave treatment, with over 30 years of RCTs testing its efficacy, though most trials
focus on back pain, headache, or arthritis-related pain (Ehde et al., 2014). Direct
comparisons between CBT and ACT are more plentiful than those between first
wave behavioral treatments and CBT, but not particularly revelatory. As McCracken
and Vowles (2006) point out, despite some differences in terminology and areas of
emphasis, one of the problems inherent in comparing ACT to CBT is that ACT is
CBT. The authors go on to note that in order to meaningfully demonstrate one
approach’s superiority over the other, given the significant overlap in methods used,
studies would require very large sample sizes that are not currently available
(McCracken & Vowles, 2006).
Both CBT and ACT have the classification of “well-established treatment” for
chronic pain by the American Psychological Association (Feliu Soler et al., 2018).
Recently the draft guideline for the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE)
in the United Kingdom recommends CBT and ACT for the treatment of patients
with chronic pain (NICE, 2020). Although some have challenged the methodologi-
cal shortcomings of the work supporting this classification for third-wave treatment
(Öst, 2014), several systematic reviews and meta-analysis support the efficacy and
effectiveness of both CBT and third-wave approaches (Ehde et al., 2014; Hann &
McCracken, 2014; Hughes et al., 2017; Veehof et al., 2011, 2016; Williams et al.,
2012). At this time, there is no strong, consistent evidence that either CBT or third-
wave approaches are superior over the other, though some individual studies dem-
onstrate better results for CBT relative to ACT (e.g., Hughes et al., 2017). Hughes
et al. (2017) found that CBT produced larger improvements in quality of life,
depression, and pain intensity than did ACT in their review of 11 RCTs; however,
they tempered these conclusions because all effect sizes were small, the sample
sizes of the trials were also small, treatment fidelity was not assessed, and concerns
about researchers’ expressed “allegiance” to particular approaches were not
addressed. A meta-analysis of 28 studies of mindfulness and acceptance-based
interventions found no significant pattern of differences in treatment effect between
ACT and CBT (Veehof et al., 2016). Interestingly, as Veehof and colleagues note,
some of the mindfulness-based studies assessed incorporated elements traditionally
associated with cognitive and behavioral approaches, highlighting the significant
overlap present between waves.
Beyond overlapping in the specific techniques used in the studies comparing
CBT and third-wave treatment for chronic pain, there is also evidence of conceptual
overlap in the proposed mechanisms of action that produce effects on pain-related
interference for both second and third wave approaches. For example, even though
psychological flexibility is not explicitly named as a target of CBT, changes in pain-
related outcomes in a CBT intervention were mediated by changes in pain accep-
tance (Åkerblom et al., 2015). In a follow-up study published this year, these
researchers found that several ACT concepts, including psychological flexibility,
acceptance, committed action, and values-based action mediated pain treatment
outcomes in a traditional multicomponent CBT intervention (Åkerblom et al.,
2020). This is not a unidirectional finding; indeed, Trompetter et al. (2015) demon-
strated that although the hypothesized mechanism of action, changes in psychologi-
cal inflexibility, mediated the relationship between an online ACT program and pain
outcomes, so did catastrophizing, a critical element of second wave approaches not
directly targeted in third-wave treatment; notably, reductions in catastrophic think-
ing remained a significant, independent mediator of pain-related improvement.
Taken together, the current state of the literature suggests that non-specific com-
monalities across modalities may be more important than the specific details that
distinguish between the second and third-waves of behavior therapy.
hallenges in Evaluating Efficacy and Effectiveness of Waves

C
of Behavior Therapy for Chronic Pain
Despite a wealth of literature examining psychological interventions, especially

those emanating from the waves of behavior therapy, on chronic pain, there are
considerable limitations to the extant work. To date, one of the biggest challenges in
evaluating the relative impact of various waves of behavior therapy is that most
RCTs employ inactive, rather than active, controls. Although demonstrating an
improvement against treatment as usual is a critical first step in establishing support
for a novel approach, we believe that we are well beyond that phase, particularly
given the over 30-year history of RCTs for CBT’s impact on pain.
Studies inconsistently specify and assess theoretically-driven mechanisms of
action in much of this literature (Ehde et al., 2014). Hypothesized drivers of change
in CBT, such as pain-related beliefs, catastrophic thinking, and fear avoidance are
frequently assessed at baseline and demonstrate expected relationships with pain at
the start of these interventions (Gatchel et al., 2007; Thieme et al., 2007), but are
inconsistently measured as mediators during the course of treatment. Trials of third-
wave approaches on chronic pain share a similar problem, but also have an added
concern of an almost exclusive focus on psychological flexibility, to the near exclu-
sion of other critical components of ACT. For example, while self-as-context is
conceptualized as an active therapeutic process in ACT, there were no validated
measures of the construct prior to 2016 (Yu et al., 2017). Unfortunately, this failure
to adequately assess proposed mediators or the exclusion of them altogether makes
it difficult to know when specific effects take hold or how mediators are temporally
related to each other. This knowledge could help to not only distinguish between the
waves of behavioral therapy, highlighting common and unique mechanisms of
action, but could also help identify primary versus secondary mediators, or suffi-
cient versus necessary targets of treatment.
We have highlighted how varied the specific techniques used across waves of
behavior therapy are, and have noted the overlap present in their delivery. More
detail about trials that assess the impact of these interventions on pain are needed in
order to improve our knowledge base about how these therapies work. For example,
explicit assessment of and inclusion in publication of treatment fidelity, information
regarding clinicians’ training and competence, assessment of client engagement,
and clear delineation of the intervention techniques used would clarify important
details about the effects of individual trials (Ehde et al., 2014). It is heartening to
know that the quality and reporting of methods for trials focused on CBT have
improved over time given the long history of this work (Williams et al., 2012).
Hopefully, the same trajectory will hold for third-wave approaches given that Veehof
et al. (2016) did not find evidence of improvement in the quality of studies between
their initial meta-analysis (Veehof et al., 2011) and their subsequent one of accep-
tance and mindfulness-based interventions for chronic pain.
or Whom and Under Which Circumstances Are Second Wave

F
Treatments Superior?
Interventions emanating from behavior therapy are efficacious for chronic pain
management, with stronger evidence for second (i.e., CBT) and third (e.g., ACT)
wave modalities than first (e.g. behavior therapy). However, both later waves would
benefit from continued evaluation of the proposed and actual mechanisms of action
(e.g., mediators) for change in pain-related outcomes. Despite head-to-head match-
ups, it appears that CBT and third-wave approaches are generally evenly matched
when it comes to pain-related outcomes (e.g., Cherkin et al., 2016; Turner et al.,
2016). Given this knowledge, we believe that it is a better use of time and resources
for researchers to work to identify moderators of each wave of therapy’s effects to
understand for whom and under which circumstances either approach may be most
beneficial. For example, Wetherell et al. (2016) found that though were no differ-
ences in credibility, attrition, satisfaction, or expectations of positive outcome across
treatment groups, older adults randomly assigned to 8 weeks of group-based treat-
ment responded more favorably to ACT than to CBT. Younger adults were more
likely to respond to CBT. The authors speculated on the cause of this effect, but
work aimed at clarifying these differences could help better target and calibrate
treatment.
Importantly, third-wave approaches emphasize psychological functioning and
de-emphasize psychological symptoms, while CBT focuses on both maximizing
positive function and minimizing negative, especially in the context of chronic pain
treatment. Given the high comorbidity between chronic pain and other mental health
disorders (e.g., sleep disorders, anxiety, depression; Asmundson & Katz, 2009) and
the effectiveness of CBT in treating those conditions too, it may be the case that
second-wave approaches to pain management are preferable to third-wave ones
when a patient has comorbid pain and psychological disorder (Ehde et al., 2014).
This is not to say that third-wave approaches do not have an effect on these prob-
lems, rather it is not in its mission to reduce psychological symptoms, potentially
making it a less attractive option.
An important caveat is that both CBT and ACT rely heavily on motivational
approaches and a strong therapeutic alliance and supportive environment are essen-
tial. Regardless of the waves of behavioral treatments, it is important that patients
are provided with a rationale that is understandable and makes sense, likely instill-
ing positive outcome expectancy.
Future Directions
Subgroups There is growing interest in going beyond the “patient-uniformity

myth” (Kissler, 1995) and general treatment benefits to identifying the subgroups of
individuals with chronic pain who are most likely to benefit from treatments with
different approaches (e.g., Rusu et al., 2012; Thieme et al., 2007; Thorn, 2020; Turk,
1990). Treatments could then be individualized and matched to important patient
subgroup differences identified.
There is wide variability in individual responses to comparable levels of physical
trauma and diseases. Thus, in addition to identifying treatment responders, it is
important for research to identify subgroups based on their responses to such expe-
riences. For example, are there particular predisposition factors that predict
responses to trauma and disease (i.e., the diathesis-stress model, Turk, 2002)? If
these can be identified, then it will be possible to target treatments to those most
likely to need some form of behavioral intervention in order to prevent disability.
Utilization of Advanced Technologies Treating patients in a health care setting is
not convenient for many patients who are employed, reside in rural areas, or who
have difficulty traveling. The availability of the internet and smart phone applica-
tions are providing increasing opportunities to make behavioral treatments, in gen-
eral, more readily accessible. Although there have been some demonstration projects
evaluating the potential value of these modalities (e.g., Macea et al., 2010) and there
are many smart-phone applications that have not be systematically evaluated (e.g.,
Dario et al., 2017) the potential of these modalities for the delivery of behavioral
pain treatments will continue to grow and systematic evaluation is warranted to not
only identify the patients who benefit but also to identify the necessary and suffi-
cient components for various subgroups, and how machine learning will permit
customizing treatments based on information acquired during treatments.
Specificity of Treatment Components Research is needed to identify the specific

versus nonspecific components of successful treatments. Given the overlap in the
behavioral treatments described it is reasonable to raise the question of whether
such nonspecific factors as motivation, therapeutic alliance, patient confidence in
their ability to benefit might account for the greatest amount of the variance in suc-
cessful treatment that any particular techniques used within the treatment (e.g.,
Thorn & Burns, 2011).
Conclusion
There is a substantial body of research published over the past 30 years to support
the benefits of CBT in the treatment of patients with diverse chronic pain condi-
tions. More recently there have been studies supporting the benefits of ACT. Although
both these perspectives are recommended by different guidelines (e.g., APA, NICE),
it is important to acknowledge that overall the results have been relatively modest
(e.g., NICE, 2020; Williams et al., 2012). In this respect they are not that different
from most of the more traditional pharmacological and medical treatments of
chronic patients (Turk et al., 2011). Inspection of the perspectives and approaches
of CBT and third-wave approaches reveal that the similarities among these may be
greater than the differences. The CB perspective that superimposes CBT, similar to
ACT, has always considered acceptance as an important component, that is accept-
ing that a person who has a chronic pain condition may not be able to eliminate the
physiological basis for the pain; however, from the CB perspective individuals with
chronic pain do not have to accept they can do nothing, this leads to feelings of
helplessness or hopelessness, a potential consequence and danger of the third-wave
interventions. They may not be able to do anything to alter the neurophysiological
causes of their pain, but they can self-manage their lives and the impact that pain
has. In contrast to the first-wave focus on activity despite pain and third-wave
emphasis on total acceptance and getting involved with more engaging objectives,
CBT does provide some guidance as to things those with chronic pain can do “when
they hurt.” Moreover, they may have the capacity to reduce the severity of the pain
by pacing their activities to prevent exacerbation of their pain and engaging in
activities that can build up their strength, endurance, and flexibility. When they have
flare ups they can modify activities as necessary and reinitiate activities when pain
subsides. When they do experience pain, they can engage in distracting activities
and practice relaxation and controlled breathing. They do not have to focus on the
presence of pain as this can increase stress and accompanying physical changes that
may contribute to the magnification of pain. To reiterate the key concepts of the
Serenity Prayer, these individuals need to accept the things that cannot change
[physical impairments associated with pain], the courage to change the things than
can [self-manage pain severity itself and the impact on pain on their lives], and the
wisdom to know the difference. Thus like the third-wave, CBT is designed to con-
tribute to resilience in the face of chronic pain (Turk & Winter, 2020).
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jpain.2017.01.005
Chronic Pain: Third Wave Case
Conceptualizations
Kevin E. Vowles
Pain: An Overview
Pain has been referred to as a ubiquitous human experience. With the exception of
those with a rare congenital insensitivity to pain, all humans will have multiple pain
experiences over the course of their lifetime (Lumley et al., 2011; Vowles et al.,
2014a). A recently published international consensus statement defined pain as a
multifactorial experience with sensory and emotional components that can be asso-
ciated with actual or potential tissue damage (Raja et al., 2020). There are several
aspects of the pain experience that are relevant in clinical situations.
First, the duration of pain is important. In their 1999 article providing an over-
view of pain, Loeser and Melzack described three types of pain: Transient, acute,
and chronic. They noted that most pain experiences are transient in nature and are
rarely a significantly disruptive experience or of clinical concern.
Acute pain was defined as a more substantial experience, associated with greater
discomfort, as well as more significant actual or potential tissue damage. Acutely
painful experiences are often associated with seeking medical care, although pain
can be expected to subside with the passage of time, typically on the order of days
or weeks. While the experience of acute pain can be associated with significant
distress or disruptions in activity, these difficulties tend to also resolve over time as
pain subsides (e.g., Grotle et al., 2005; McLean et al., 2007).
Pain that persists for longer than 3 months was defined as chronic pain (Loeser
& Melzack, 1999; Nicholas et al., 2019). Chronic pain is reliably associated with
healthcare appointments and with significant emotional and physical impacts,
K. E. Vowles (*)
School of Psychology, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK
e-mail: K.Vowles@qub.ac.uk

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_30
698 K. E. Vowles
including depression, anxiety, and disability (Gatchel et al., 2007; Turk et al., 2016).
The significant impact of pain on functioning and the body’s apparent inability to
restore the body to homeostatic levels of activity have also been identified as dis-
tinctive characteristics of chronic pain (Loeser & Melzack, 1999; McCracken &
Vowles, 2009). The adverse emotional and physical impacts of chronic pain tend to
persist over the longer term alongside continued pain.
As a second important consideration, the purpose and utility of pain can also be
discussed with regard to pain’s function. While transient or acute pain are typically
regarded as unpleasant experiences, they can serve a useful purpose – that of draw-
ing attention to danger or injury. In the case of chronic pain, however, this utility is
often not present as pain is no longer signaling danger or an injury and has, in a
sense, lost its effectiveness as an alarm. Furthermore, when tissue damage is associ-
ated with the onset of chronic pain, the pain persists even after healing has occurred.
The exact reason why pain persists longer than it should is not known, although
issues of central sensitization (Woolf & Salter, 2000), learning history (Chapman,
1983), and biopsychosocial context (Gracely et al., 2004) all appear relevant to its
chronicity.
This perspective regarding the function of pain has direct implications when it
comes to the goals of treatment, the third and final clinical consideration noted
here. In episodes of acute pain, the goals of treatment are often to reduce pain and
discomfort to alleviate needless suffering while healing occurs. As pain decreases,
the assumption is that its disruptive effect on functioning also reduces. In short,
as pain goes down, normal functioning resumes. For chronic pain, however, the
goals of treatment must be more than pain reduction alone – the impact of pain on
physical and emotional functioning also needs to be addressed (Dworkin et al.,
2005). Thus, responses to pain are a viable treatment target, as these responses
can have a direct and independent impact on functioning. In other words, chronic
pain can be viewed as a problem that is directly relevant to the behavior of the
individual.
In the 50 years since behavioral treatments were first investigated for chronic
pain (Fordyce et al., 1968), the evidence base has grown, the methods have
matured, and these interventions have been disseminated across the globe
(Gatchel et al., 2014). The present chapter will briefly review this history through
a discussion of the three “waves” of behavioral therapy. The focus will be on the
most recent third wave with an emphasis on Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 2012), the most established and well-researched
example from this latter wave with regard to chronic pain assessment and treat-
ment. The discussion of ACT will include assessment considerations, a case con-
ceptualization discussion and example, and a review of treatment effectiveness
and mechanism data. The chapter concludes with a comparison of behavioral
treatments across the three waves with a view towards their shared and distinct
aspects and a consideration of some of the challenges they face in the present
healthcare environment.
Chronic Pain: Third Wave Case Conceptualizations 699
The ‘Waves’ of a Behavioral Approach to Chronic Pain
First Wave
The first wave of behavioral therapies for chronic pain was based on operant prin-
ciples (Fordyce et al., 1973). The maturation of this approach occurred with the
publication of Fordyce’s textbook, Behavioral Methods for Chronic Pain and
Illness, in 1976. This book introduced several key ideas in relation to the behavioral
treatment of chronic pain. First, pain was conceptualized as more than a physical
experience alone, as cognitive and emotional factors were also involved (Melzack
& Wall, 1965). Fordyce discussed pain behaviors (i.e., responses to pain) as a topic
worthy of investigation and intervention by themselves. Second, pain responses
were described as learned behaviors, which could themselves be adaptive or mal-
adaptive, in that they could contribute to increases or decreases in distress and dis-
ability. Overuse of analgesics could, for example, contribute to problems with
sedation, substance use disorders, or impairments in role functioning (Fordyce,
1992; Fordyce et al., 1973). Third and finally, maladaptive pain behavior was con-
trasted with what Fordyce referred to as “well behavior” – for example, engagement
in physical exercise could contribute to improved physical capabilities. Therefore,
treatment focused on decreasing maladaptive pain behaviors and increasing adap-
tive well behaviors. Further, treatment used a graded approach to behavior change,
akin to shaping and fading procedures successfully used in other operant approaches
(Ince, 1976). Overall, these programs worked at reducing disability and distress,
reducing sick leave and unemployment, and improving function (Fordyce, 1976;
Fordyce et al., 1973, 1985; Lindström et al., 1992). More recently, Fordyce’s 1976
seminal text was republished with commentary from several leaders in the field of
behavioral treatments for chronic pain (Main et al., 2014). Many of the commenta-
tors noted the continued relevance of the operant approach in the treatment of
chronic pain.
This operant approach also formed the basis of interdisciplinary interventions for
chronic pain (Gatchel et al., 2014). These interdisciplinary interventions make use
of the expertise of various disciplines involved in the treatment of chronic pain,
often including physicians, psychologists, and physical or occupational therapists
(Chapman et al., 2010; Gatchel et al., 2014; Vowles et al., 2020c). These programs
have persisted throughout the waves of behavior therapy and continue to have a
robust evidence base (Flor et al., 1992; Gatchel et al., 2014; Kamper et al., 2014,
2015; Stanos, 2012; Turk & Burwinkle, 2005).
Second Wave
As was the case in psychology more broadly, cognitive behavioral therapies (CBT)
became increasingly common in the treatment of chronic pain from the 1980s
onwards (Hofmann et al., 2013; Turk et al., 1983). These approaches were based on
700 K. E. Vowles
evidence that thoughts and other forms of private behavior were often correlated
with physical activity (Turk & Rudy, 1986). Thus, CBT focuses on the problem of
maladaptive cognition, and assumes that human thinking has a uniquely causal
influence on human behavior (Beck, 1993; Hofmann et al., 2013). Further, models
of attention were hypothesized that the experience of pain was a drain on available
attentional resources and thereby impeded effective action (Eccleston, 1994).
Treatments from the second wave hypothesized that these maladaptive cogni-
tions were an important lynchpin in the relation between pain experience and pain
impact. They therefore sought to alter cognitive content so that it was less irrational,
maladaptive, and inaccurate and more rationale, adaptive, and accurate. Across the
modern instantiations of CBT, there is often a focus on altering pain catastrophiz-
ing, a set of cognitive responses to pain that view it as uncontrollable, ruinous, and
unending (Sullivan et al., 1995). The focus in modern CBT on pain catastrophizing
stems from evidence indicating it is reliably associated with pain-related distress
and disability (Cook et al., 2006; Leeuw et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2000).
The second wave also continued with a focus on pain behavior, although pain
behavior was generally discussed in terms of coping responses (Turner et al., 2000).
Thus, second wave treatment programs generally sought to reduce pain catastroph-
izing and integrate coping skills training (Jensen et al., 1994a). While the literature
indicated broad support for the role of coping in adaptation to chronic pain, the
strongest evidence was for coping behaviors that were problematic, while the evi-
dence was more equivocal for positive coping (Blumenstiel et al., 2006; Jensen
et al., 1994a; McCracken & Eccleston, 2003; McCracken et al., 2007b; Vowles &
McCracken, 2010) and the measurement of coping was at times confounded with
the measurement of beliefs and knowledge (Jensen et al., 1991).
As was the case with the first wave approaches, psychological and behavioral
models of treatment continued to underpin interdisciplinary work in this area
(Gatchel et al., 2007). Cognitive interventions were integrated into interdisciplinary
interventions, with a focus on challenging problematic cognitions and supplement-
ing them with more rational, logical, and adaptive cognitions (Morley, 2011). The
second wave also focused on methods of pain management, which included skills
such as progressive muscle relaxation, coping skills training, and cognitive change
to minimize pain intensity and thereby reduce pain-related distress and disability
(Ehde et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 1994b; Thorn, 2017; Turner et al., 1995).
Third Wave
As noted, the most well-established third wave approach to chronic pain is ACT,
which will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. While other approaches,
such as mindfulness interventions alone (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; McCracken & Vowles,
2014), can be discussed in relation to the third wave, ACT is a more direct descen-
dent of the first and second waves in the treatment for chronic pain. The evolution
from the first and second waves to the third wave can be summarized as follows.
The third wave integrated important aspects of the preceding waves. One of the
first wave’s most significant contributions pertained to the idea that pain behavior
was learned and could therefore be more completely understood through operant
principles. Further, interventions could make use of these principles to provide a
helpful intervention for those with persistent pain. In a similar vein, perhaps the
second wave’s most significant contribution was its view of cognition as an impor-
tant and influential human experience. An assessment of thoughts could therefore
inform treatment on pertinent issues in relation to individual patients. If significant
pain catastrophizing was indicated, for example, then treatment could address this
issue by providing accurate information regarding these fears alongside exposure-
based interventions to provide opportunities for learning. The third wave is an inte-
gration of both aspects of the first and second waves – specifically, both operant
principles and human cognition are important from an assessment and treatment
perspective.
The third wave approach to chronic pain was also based on three significant
assumptions (see McCracken, 2005 for a further discussion). First, it was assumed
that pain will persist in most people who have chronic pain and that it will, at times,
be unpredictable in its intensity. Thus, effective intervention must address the prob-
lem of continued and changeable pain. Second, it was assumed that improved focus
on the present moment would allow for treatment-related benefits. For example,
present focused exercises such as mindfulness training should allow for more effec-
tive responses to both pain and the wider behavioral and environmental context on
an ongoing and moment-to-moment basis. Third, it was assumed that engagement
in valued activities was a core treatment objective. Thus, all aspects of intervention
could be conceptualized as being directed at increasing clarity, awareness, and
engagement in activities deemed meaningful, salient, and important to the individ-
ual with pain. As was the case with the previous two waves, interdisciplinary inter-
ventions continued to use behavioral models as their theoretical basis. There are
many examples of interdisciplinary ACT interventions for chronic pain (Vowles
et al., 2020c).
ACT Case Conceptualization
Conceptual Issues
From within the ACT framework, effective action can be understood as the primary
goal of treatment. In a clinical sense, effective action is defined as using clinical
methods to occasion behavior change in the individual experiencing pain such that
their actions are more effective at achieving desired outcomes. For example, an
ACT practitioner works to occasion behavior change such that engagement in per-
sonally meaningful activity occurs at a level that is sufficient to the person in pain.
If effective functioning is the ultimate goal, there are three key overarching issues
702 K. E. Vowles
that are relevant at the assessment and case conceptualization phase. These areas
comport with the “open, aware, and active” focus of ACT (Hayes et al., 2011). The
statements made in the next few paragraphs come primarily from clinical experi-
ence, although the section on assessment measures that follows provides supportive
research evidence and the statements made are consistent with the extant evi-
dence base.
First, an individual can present with significant unwillingness to experience pain.
They may make statements such as, “My life cannot go on until this pain goes
away” or “I’d give anything to get rid of this pain.” Such unwillingness may indicate
a significant narrowing of behavioral responses to pain, such that pain avoidance
predominates. Substantial pain avoidance is reliably related to greater pain-related
disruptions in functioning (Lethem et al., 1983; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Further,
it is often associated with failure to achieve pain relief – persistent efforts to avoid
pain in those with chronic pain tends to result only in the continued experience of
pain. Such persistently failing behavior can be a clinically relevant sign of ineffec-
tive avoidance and may indicate the need for exercises to facilitate pain willingness,
enhance flexible responses to it, or decrease its frequency or intensity. Finally, per-
sistent avoidance behavior impedes on learning new behaviors as no new contingen-
cies are contacted.
Second, preoccupation with the past or the future can unhelpfully dominate and
occlude the present. Anecdotally, such preoccupation can take the form of regrets
about the past or anxiety about the future. Both of these experiences can be present
in those with chronic pain. They can regret past accidents that gave rise to chronic
pain or fear the impact that continued pain will have on future quality of life. This
loss of contact with the present moment can also interfere with the individual’s abil-
ity to take effective action in the moment, as opportunities for behavior change or to
engage in valued actions may be missed. Individuals who are experiencing signifi-
cant loss of contact with the present may benefit from structured exercises to assist
them in orienting to it. For example, mindfulness exercises or noticing present sen-
sations in addition to pain can help orient to the moment and highlight experiences
that are occurring more broadly.
Third, problems in relation to valued activity can occur. Individuals may present
with a lack of clarity in what is valued, insufficient engagement in valued activities,
or both. Clinical experience suggests that a lack of values clarity can be indicated by
statements such as, “This pain has been around so long, I don’t even know what
matters to me anymore” or “The important things in my life seem so far away right
now.” These statements can also be accompanied by clinically significant anhedo-
nia, hopelessness, or helplessness. If a lack of values clarity is indicated, the early
parts of treatment can benefit from clarification exercises, such as a values card sort
or a values questionnaire (Hayes et al., 2012; Lundgren et al., 2012; Wilson &
Sandoz, 2010). Clinical discussions regarding what could matter or used to matter
before pain began can also be useful, as individuals may be able to imagine what
was previously of value, which may provide clinical guidance in relation to what is
of value now.
Regarding insufficient engagement in valued activity, these deficits are common,

as individuals are unlikely to be seeking treatment from a behavioral health provider
if valued activity is sufficient. Increasing engagement in valued activity can take
advantage of established operant methods, such as shaping and modeling, imaginal
practice, such as visualizing successful engagement, as well as in vivo skills training
and practice. Further, within ACT-based interdisciplinary treatments, other disci-
plines can utilize their clinical skills to facilitate increases in valued activity. For
example, physical therapists can focus on increasing physical activity for the pur-
pose of achieving greater success in valued activity, while occupational therapists
can incorporate accommodation adjustments in work or home activities in a manner
that promotes engagement in valued activity.
Questionnaire Assessment
There are several standard areas to assess generally in those with chronic pain irre-
spective of the particular “wave” of behavioral treatment that one is utilizing.
Briefly, these include aspects of the pain experience (e.g., intensity and interfer-
ence), emotional and psychosocial functioning (e.g., depression, pain-related anxi-
ety), and physical and role functioning (e.g., disability, independence). Several
well-established and validated measures exist to assess these domains (see Dworkin
et al., 2005; Nicholas et al., 2008; Vowles et al., 2007 for reviews).
With regard to the third wave approaches specifically, it can be important to
evaluate aspects of openness to the pain experience, awareness of the present
moment, and activity in relation to valued domains, as assessment of these domains
may help inform subsequent treatment direction. Questionnaire responses in these
domains may be used to inform intervention selection or guide treatment progres-
sion. If one is significantly closed to the experience of pain, that can take the form
of substantial unwillingness to put oneself in potentially painful situations, persis-
tent pain avoidance behavior, and impaired engagement in activity. The report of
these difficulties may indicate a lack of openness to the pain experience. If one is
significantly pre-occupied with the past or worried about the future, that can indi-
cate that the facilitation of present-focused awareness or other aspects of mindful-
ness, may be useful in grounding the individual in the present so that they may
respond more effectively in the now. Finally, if there is a deficit in awareness of
what is valued or a failure to consistently engaged in valued activity, that may indi-
cate a need for values clarification, behavioral methods to increase engagement in
valued activity, or both.
The most widely used measure of ACT-related processes is the Chronic Pain
Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ). The measure was originally developed as part
of an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Geiser, 1992) and subsequent psychometric
and factor analyses revised it to include a 20 items across two subscales, Activity
Engagement and Pain Willingness (McCracken et al., 2004). The items of the
Activity Engagement subscale evaluate participation in activity with pain present,
704 K. E. Vowles
while the items of the Pain Willingness subscale evaluate openness to the experi-
ence of pain without attempts to control it. Confirmatory factor analysis has sup-
ported the factor structure of the CPAQ (Vowles et al., 2008; Wicksell et al., 2009)
and its two subscales are reliably related to pain-related distress and disability
(Reneman et al., 2010). Further, the CPAQ is sensitive to intervention and has been
shown to mediate chronic pain treatment outcomes (Vowles et al., 2014d, 2020c). In
addition to the 20 item measure, there are two briefer versions of the CPAQ, one
with eight items derived via factor analysis (Fish et al., 2010) and a more recent two
item version derived via item response theory (Vowles et al., 2020b).
The Psychological Inflexibility in Pain Scale (PIPS; Wicksell et al., 2008) has
also been used as a broader measure of ACT processes. The PIPS has 12 items and
was designed to measure psychological flexibility, a broad behavioral process that
entails acting effectively in a manner consistent with one’s values even in the pres-
ence of unwanted thoughts, feelings, and sensations (Hayes et al., 2006). Cross-
sectional studies of the PIPS have indicated acceptable relations with other measures
of pain-related functioning (Rodero et al., 2013; Terhorst et al., 2020; Wicksell
et al., 2008, 2010a). The PIPS has been shown to change over the course of ACT
treatment and one study of whiplash injury related pain found that it mediated out-
comes (Kemani et al., 2016; Wicksell et al., 2013, 2010b).
There are three measures assessing aspects of valued activity in those with
chronic pain. The most widely used is the Chronic Pain Values Inventory (CPVI;
McCracken & Yang, 2006). The CPVI assesses importance and perceived success in
six valued domains, including family, intimate relations, friends, work, health, and
growth/learning. Three scores can be calculated from the CPVI, average impor-
tance, average success, and the average discrepancy between importance and suc-
cess. The importance score is often positively skewed, as the majority of respondents
rate all domains as highly important (e.g., McCracken & Yang, 2006). Previous
studies have shown that the values success score is associated with pain acceptance,
pain-related distress, and disability (McCracken & Vowles, 2008; Scott et al., 2016;
Vowles et al., 2014c, e). Further, both success and discrepancy scores have been
shown to be sensitive to intervention, as they improve over the course of ACT treat-
ment (Vowles et al., 2011, 2014d, 2019; Vowles & McCracken, 2008).
More recently, the Valued Living Scale (VLS; Jensen et al., 2015) was developed
for use in chronic pain. The VLS includes eight broad valued domains and 26 spe-
cific valued goals within these domains. The eight broad domains include keeping
physically healthy, feeling emotionally healthy, productivity, parenting, spirituality,
spousal/partner relationships, friendships, and community citizenship. The specific
valued goals were intended to be used as a guide for improving engagement in val-
ued activity. If a respondent indicated a particular goal as having high importance
but low success, then it could be a plausible target for intervention. Like the CPVI,
the VLS assesses importance and success in values domains; it also assesses respon-
dent’s confidence in each domain as well. The initial factor analysis indicated two
subscales, Health and Productivity activities and Social and Relational activities
and subscale scores were correlated with pain intensity, depression, and pain inter-
ference (Jensen et al., 2015). A follow-up study replicated these findings in a large
sample of individuals with long-term health conditions (Jensen et al., 2019). There
are no published data examining the VLS longitudinally or its sensitivity to ACT or
values-based intervention.
Finally, a brief two item values measure has also been developed, the Values
Tracker (VT; Pielech et al., 2016). The original development paper indicated strong
cross-sectional relations with pain-related distress and disability. More recently,
latent trajectories of change in the VT across a 4 week interdisciplinary program of
ACT for chronic pain have been investigated (Vowles et al., 2019). A single class of
change with increasing slope was indicated. Slope of change was associated with
amount of change in psychosocial functioning at the end of treatment, but not at
3 month follow-up.
With regard to aspects of present focused awareness and mindfulness, there are
a number of self-report measures of mindfulness that have been used in those with
chronic pain. The two most commonly used measures have been the Five Factor
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2008) and the Mindful Attention
and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). These measures of mindful-
ness are generally correlated with important clinical factors, such as pain intensity,
pain interference, physical disability, and psychosocial functioning (McCracken
et al., 2007a; Trompetter et al., 2014), as well as with other measures related to the
ACT model (Scott et al., 2016; Vowles et al., 2014c, e). The Self-Compassion Scale
(SCS; Neff, 2003), which also assesses several aspects of mindfulness, has also be
used in those with chronic pain and has been shown to correlate cross-sectionally
with pain-related distress and disability, change with interdisciplinary ACT treat-
ment, and mediate some aspects of treatment ACT treatment outcomes (Edwards
et al., 2019; Vowles et al., 2014d)
Finally, there are measures of ACT-consistent coping and persistence in valued
action. Specifically, the Brief Pain Coping Inventory-2 (BPCI-2; McCracken &
Vowles, 2007) and Brief Pain Response Inventory (McCracken et al., 2010) assess
pain responses that entail aspects of psychological flexibility. Both measures are
correlated with pain-related functioning and are sensitive to intervention (Vowles
et al., 2014b; Vowles & McCracken, 2010). The Committed Action Questionnaire
(CAQ; McCracken, 2013) evaluates activity patterns in relation to a persistent flex-
ibility in the pursuit of goals. The CAQ also has evidence of significant relations
with important aspects of pain-related emotional and physical functioning (Bailey
et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2016).
Case Conceptualization Example
Gloria was a 59 year old female presenting to treatment with a diagnosis of

Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA). She was originally referred to clinical psychology for
anxiety in relation to choking on her medications, a specific phobia. At assessment,
she noted that her diagnosis of RA was recent and that the size of her prescribed
medications was concerning. She noted a history of concerns related to choking and
706 K. E. Vowles
one incident approximately a decade earlier of having a piece of hard candy stuck
in her throat. She was not taking her medications at all due to these fears.
At assessment, it was clear that an exposure-based treatment could be appropri-
ate, given the evidence supporting exposure in cases of specific phobias (Wolitzky-
Taylor et al., 2008). A systematic desensitization procedure was explained to Gloria
to educate her on the treatment process and its likely progression. It was noted that
such an intervention would involve building a hierarchy of activities related to swal-
lowing and that shaping procedures would successively aid her in behavior change.
The evidence underlying this approach was briefly reviewed and the therapist noted
that the probability of successful treatment was high.
Following the explanation of this procedure, the therapist asked Gloria if her
pain and anxiety-associated limitations were associated with her prescribed medica-
tion taking behavior alone. The therapist noted that it was rare for these limitations
to be circumscribed in such a way and noted concern that other important areas
were being negatively impacted. Immediately following this question, Gloria
became tearful and noted a number of other important areas that were being
adversely affected. Gloria noted that relations with her husband were problematic,
as she felt like a burden and that her ability to spend quality time with him was sig-
nificantly restricted by pain. For example, she noted that she had not been out to
dinner with him for almost a year. Further, Gloria noted a number of concerns in
relation to her ability to be a mother for her two adult daughters. One daughter had
recently moved to a large city, which was about 1.5 hours away, and Gloria felt
guilty that she had not been able to help her daughter move and decorate her new
apartment and that also that she had not yet visited due to pain and anxiety-related
restrictions. Furthermore, Gloria noted that she was too anxious to drive due to the
pain in her hands and that she relied on her husband and her other daughter, who
lived locally, for transportation to and from medical appointments. Gloria also
reported significant limitations in physical activity and felt restricted to her home.
For example, her independence was reduced as she did not feel she could walk alone
in the countryside where she lived and that she was no longer seeing the wildlife
around her home. These limitations were discussed in relation to potential valued
areas for treatment to focus upon. Gloria reported good clarity in what was of val-
ued, but noted clinically relevant failures in valued behaviors in the domains of
martial and family relations, independence, and self-care.
The brief assessment of values performed by the therapist served as an initial
definition of potential treatment goals should Gloria elect to pursue outcomes
beyond her specific phobia alone. Thus, the therapist was able to determine two pos-
sible courses of intervention – an exposure based approach designed to reduce med-
ication taking anxiety and increase medication taking behavior and an ACT-based
approach to pursue improvement in valued activity. At the conclusion of the first
assessment session, these treatment options were discussed with Gloria and it was
noted that both had reasonable evidence to indicate a good probability of success.
The therapist noted that the exposure based approach would likely result in increas-
ing her ability to take her prescribed medications, but that it would not necessarily
help in regard to the other valued domains she identified. Further, it was noted that
an approach focused on improving engagement in valued activities would likely be

longer and would ask her to change in more areas of her life, but that it would also
be more likely to result in improvement in these areas. The therapist then asked
Gloria which approach she would prefer to pursue first – she noted that the values-
based approach was her preference as it focused directly on the important areas of
her life that she missed. She noted that medication consumption was important and
that she would also like to improve her ability in this regard as well.
From an ACT case conceptualization perspective, Gloria was experiencing dif-
ficulties in her ability to effectively pursue her values. Pain and anxiety were impos-
ing unhelpful limitations in this regard. In her case, there was no issue with regard
to values clarity, as she was able to easily report on meaningful areas of her life.
Thus, values clarification exercises were deemed unnecessary at the early stages of
treatment.
At this point in treatment the therapist and patient had a shared initial definition
of treatment success. Treatment would aim to improve Gloria’s engagement in her
marriage and with her daughters, improve her independence in relation to travel and
mobility (e.g., she desired to drive independently again), and increase her ability to
walk in the countryside that surrounded her home so that she could re-engage with
her local landscape and its wildlife. Both the therapist and Gloria would also keep
an eye on her consumption of prescribed medication as the medication would likely
help her symptoms. The initial assessment session concluded with a discussion of
these shared goals of treatment and the therapist asked Gloria to both think about it
herself and discuss with her family before the next session.
Thus, there were several objectives for Gloria’s next session. The first was to
determine the views of her family on the treatment plan that had been outlined. If
her family was supportive of the plan, they could be a source of support, problem
solving, and reinforcement. The second goal was to evaluate willingness to poten-
tially experience pain in the pursuit of her values. If Gloria was significantly unwill-
ing to experience pain, then treatment could incorporate pain acceptance and
willingness exercises. For example, creative hopelessness exercises could be
included to determine if Gloria’s previous pain control efforts had been helpful in
achieving reduced pain intensity and pain interference over the longer term. Further,
if she noted significant difficulty with pain related cognitions, then the therapist
could include cognitive control exercises into treatment sessions to determine if
these activities had a helpful effect on frequency or intensity of difficult cognitions.
These exercises can be useful in illuminating the general failure of pain control
efforts to control pain, as well as illustrate that pain control efforts can actually
impede activity in important areas.
Effectiveness and Mechanism Data
The evidence regarding ACT for chronic pain is reasonably well-established. At

present, there are two recent meta-analyses examining the efficacy of ACT for
chronic pain (Hughes et al., 2017; Veehof et al., 2016) and one comparative
708 K. E. Vowles
meta-analysis examining the relative effectiveness of unidisciplinary (psychology

only) and interdisciplinary ACT for chronic pain (Vowles et al., 2020c). The effi-
cacy meta-analyses concluded that there was supportive evidence of ACT for
chronic pain across key outcome domains including emotional functioning, disabil-
ity, pain interference, and pain acceptance. While the size of effect varied from
small (for disability) to large (for pain interference) across the studies reviewed, this
variability is consistent with other meta-analyses of psychological interventions for
chronic pain (Hoffman et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2012). The comparative meta-
analysis of Vowles and colleagues (2020a, b, c) indicated that interdisciplinary ACT
resulted in larger effect sizes than psychology alone ACT for disability, psychoso-
cial impact, and depression at post-treatment and follow-up, while there was no
difference for pain-related anxiety, pain intensity, or pain acceptance. Composition
of the interdisciplinary ACT treatment teams included clinical psychology, plus at
least one other discipline operating within the ACT model (e.g., physical therapy,
nursing/physicians, occupational therapy). Furthermore, there were significant
associations between treatment duration and outcome for many of these outcome
domains. While the magnitude of the correlations were generally modest, longer
treatments were associated with greater improvement.
Further, the American Psychological Association’s Division of Clinical
Psychology (Division 12) identifies ACT as having “strong” research support for
chronic or persistent pain in general, the highest possible grading (Society of
Clinical Psychology, 2018). This grading provides broader support for the utility of
psychological approaches for chronic pain generally, as CBT is also graded by
APA’s Division 12 as having strong support for low back pain, headache, fibromy-
algia, and rheumatologic pain.
With regard to treatment mechanisms, ACT self-report measures (e.g., CPAQ,
PIPS, CPVI) have generally been related to treatment outcomes following
ACT. There are several correlational studies that have indicated that change in sin-
gle measures of the ACT model are positively correlated with the magnitude of
change in pain-related outcome measures. For example, the first study to examine
change over the course of treatment indicated that increases in the CPAQ over a
3–4 week interdisciplinary intervention were significantly correlated with improve-
ment in pain intensity, depression, pain-related anxiety, physical and psychosocial
disability, daily rest due to pain, and observed physical performance on a sit-to-
stand task (McCracken et al., 2005). This pattern of findings has been replicated
across several studies using single or groups of ACT process measures. For exam-
ple, changes in the CPAQ and PIPS account for significant variance in improve-
ments in pain-related distress and disability through follow-up periods up to 3 years
(Kemani et al., 2016; Luciano et al., 2014; Vowles et al., 2011; Wicksell et al., 2011).
Because of the limitations inherent in correlational studies of process and treat-
ment relations (Aggarwal & Ranganathan, 2016), more comprehensive analyses of
the ACT model have been performed as well. These studies have also indicated
statistically significant relations across pain acceptance, psychological flexibility,
valued activity, present-focused awareness, and aspects of mindfulness (Scott et al.,

2016; Vowles et al., 2014c, e). Furthermore, and as noted above, slope of change in
the Values Tracker (Pielech et al., 2016) over 4 weeks of treatment was associated
with magnitude of change in psychosocial outcomes, including depression, psycho-
social disability, pain anxiety, and the discrepancy between values importance and
success at the conclusion of treatment, but not at 3 month follow-up (Vowles et al.,
2019). Finally, mediation analyses have indicated that ACT measures, including the
CPAQ and PIPS primarily, mediate treatment outcomes (Kemani et al., 2016;
Vowles et al., 2014d; Wicksell et al., 2010b).
The ‘Waves’ – Comparisons and Challenges
While much can be made of the perceived differences between the three waves of
behavior therapy, they are also bound together by their similarities. For example, the
operant principles of the first wave form the foundation of both the second and third
waves – the notion that ongoing responses to pain are influenced by learning history
continues to be highly relevant in both the assessment and treatment of chronic pain.
For example, both the fear-avoidance model of chronic pain and the in vivo
exposure-based interventions that seek to reduce significant pain avoidance behav-
iors are based on operant models (Leeuw et al., 2007; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000;
Vlaeyen et al., 2001; Woods & Asmundson, 2008).
Further, the waves are concordant in their view that the goals of intervention are
not restricted to pain intensity alone. While they may differ in the degree to which
they seek to reduce pain as a goal of treatment, all three waves include an emphasis
on altering responses to pain so that the quality of functioning is maximized.
Finally, each of these waves conceptualizes pain from the biopsychosocial
model, where pain intensity and pain responding are understood as a complex inter-
play biological, psychological, and social factors in relation to both learning history
and current experiences. For an expanded discussion, see Morley (2011) and
Jensen (2011).
Even bearing these similarities in mind, there are differences. Two primary dif-
ferences are key. First, the waves differ in the degree to which they view cognitions
as uniquely causal in the determination of behavior. Second, the waves differ in the
degree to which they prioritize engagement in valued living as the goal of treatment.
Regarding cognitions, the first wave was relatively silent on the role of private
behaviors, such as cognitions and emotions, in pain behavior. The second wave
prioritized the role of private behaviors and substantial clinical attention is paid to
cognitive change as a key goal. In fact, the key development in the second wave was
its focus on cognition and emotion – while CBT retains its foundation in operant
learning, its focus is on altering problematic cognition and emotion. Much like the
cognitive-oriented approach in psychology more broadly (Beck, 1993; Hofmann
710 K. E. Vowles
et al., 2013), CBT for chronic pain views problematic pain-related cognitions as a
crucial causal influence on maladaptive pain behaviors (Ehde et al., 2014; Jensen,
2011). The third wave views cognition as an important aspect of human functioning,
but that thoughts do not have a uniquely causal influence on behavior. Thus, the
focus of ACT is not on changing cognitions as a prerequisite of behavior change, but
on changing responses to cognitions (and other private experiences) as that is behav-
ior change.
With regard to values-based action, all waves focus on this issue to some degree,
but they differ with regard the centrality of this focus. In ACT, the facilitation of
values based action can be understood as the primary indicator of successful treat-
ment. Thus, values are a central and distinctive focus of all aspects of intervention.
This distinctive focus is not present in the other waves. Fordyce’s (1976) well
behaviors could be conceptualized as engagement in values-based action to a
degree, but the personal nature of these behaviors was not discussed, nor focused
upon in intervention. Furthermore, the specification of well behaviors, including
how to assess, establish, and reinforce them was relatively under-developed in the
original 1976 text (McCracken, 2014). In CBT, there is a clear focus historically on
goal setting (Gatchel & Rollings, 2008), although this focus is not necessarily in
relation to valued actions, nor is it as central in CBT as it is in ACT.
Future Objectives for a Behavioral Approach to Chronic Pain
There are key challenges with regard to psychological approaches for chronic pain,
regardless of particular wave. These challenges, and potential methods of address-
ing them, are discussed below.
First, several recent meta-analyses published by the Cochrane Collaboration
indicate that psychological treatments for chronic pain writ large achieve only mod-
est treatment outcomes and that efficacy appears to have gotten weaker over time
(Eccleston et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2012). Therefore, the research support for
these approaches is not as strong as it has been historically (e.g., Flor et al., 1992;
Morley et al., 1999) and may be decreasing over time. Therefore, high quality
examinations of psychological interventions for chronic pain are needed to address
why recent findings differ from the historic evidence base. Furthermore, few studies
of ACT for chronic pain have been included in these meta-analyses and there is a
continuing need for ACT studies that are of sufficient methodological quality to
warrant their inclusion in future meta-analytic work (Öst, 2014).
Second, the required components of treatment and required dose of intervention
remain unclear across all the waves (Morley, 2011). There is a range of intervention
complexity and duration, from online only to intensive interdisciplinary treatment
and there is also a range in how people with pain are living with their pain (Vowles
et al., 2017). There are few studies that have attempted to match treatment intensity
with severity of pain’s impact (Hill et al., 2011), or examine specific treatment com-
ponents or mechanisms (Burns et al., 2020). In addition, there are few guidelines in
place regarding training or experiences necessary for clinicians to adequately pro-
vide ACT for chronic pain.
Third, in some healthcare settings, funding for intensive treatments can be diffi-
cult to secure and reimbursement rates can be prohibitive (Gatchel & Okifuji, 2006;
Schatman, 2007). Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness evaluations are needed
(Sletten et al., 2015).
A final issue is that of comorbidity between chronic pain and substance use.
Exponential increases in opioid prescribing in some countries preceded significant
increases in opioid-related morbidity and mortality (Bailey & Vowles, 2015;
Jamison et al., 2011). In turn, there is a pressing clinical issue regarding co-morbid
chronic pain and opioid misuse (Ballantyne, 2015; Becker et al., 2008; Manchikanti
et al., 2010; M. Sullivan, 2013; Vowles et al., 2015), with only a few behavioral
treatment options available that have at least preliminary evidence of effect (Garland
et al., 2014, 2019; Vowles et al., 2020a). Thus, there is an urgent need for efficacious
integrated interventions that seek to reduce the problematic effects of chronic pain
and address problematic opioid use. On a related note, co-morbid alcohol or seda-
tive use disorders and chronic pain continue to be under-researched areas even with
evidence indicating that they co-occur (Booker et al., 2003; Dhingra et al., 2015;
Egli et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015; Votaw et al., 2019; Vowles et al., 2018;
Witkiewitz & Vowles, 2018).
Conclusion
The three “waves” of behavioral therapy have each considered chronic pain as a
relevant and treatable clinical problem. These treatments have a longstanding and
well-established evidence base. As the prime example of a third wave behavioral
treatment, ACT for chronic pain seeks to enhance willingness to have chronic pain
in the service of engaging in personally meaningful activity. Several studies have
examined willingness to have pain (e.g., pain acceptance) in the service of engage-
ment in meaningful activity (e.g., values-based action) and there is strong support
for their relevance in those who are living with chronic pain. Treatments using the
ACT model have been successful at improving pain acceptance, values-based
action, emotional distress, physical ability, healthcare utilization, and engagement
in role functioning up through follow-ups of as long as 3 years. As with the other
behavioral treatments from preceding waves, ACT for chronic pain seeks to reduce
the deleterious effects of pain on functioning. That being said, ACT is distinctive
from the previous two behavioral waves with regard to its view of cognition as an
important and relevant, but not uniquely causal, aspect of human behavior and in its
specification that increasing engagement in valued activities is the principal goal of
intervention.
712 K. E. Vowles
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Part V
CBT from International Perspectives
The History of Behavior Therapy in Brazil
and Its Relationship with the Three Waves
Jan Luiz Leonardi and Gabriel Vieira Cândido
Proposing a chapter on the three waves of behavior therapy in Brazil raises a first
reflection: how do we compare beach waves bathed by different oceans? As the
wave metaphor describes changes in cultural practices under the label behavior
therapy – which occurred mainly (but not exclusively) in the US – transposing this
metaphor directly to other cultural contexts may be inaccurate. In this sense, we
must outline unique aspects of the development of behavior therapy in Brazil.
The debate about waves in behavior therapy has been widely addressed in Brazil,
and there seems to be a consensus among numerous authors that the wave metaphor
cannot be directly transposed from the English speaking world to Brazil (Guilhardi,
2012; Leonardi, 2015; Malavazzi, 2011; Pavan-Cândido & Neufeld, 2019). This
stems from the fact that the path taken in Brazil to build knowledge regarding
behavior therapy differed in several key aspects. Initially, we should note that the
logic of behavior therapy in Brazil equates to the rest of the world’s: extrapolating
empirically validated principles in basic research to solve human problems (Kazdin,
1978; O’Donohue et al., 2001). However, the history of the so-called three waves of
behavior therapy in Brazil followed a different path.
The expression behavior therapy was first published on a report by Lindsley
et al. (1953). However, behavior therapy was presented by Lazarus and Rachman
(1957) and Eysenck (1959a, b) independently. All of this occurred in the English
speaking world in just two countries. This way, the origin of the name behavior
therapy is related to (1) a different set of techniques to change behavior (2) in dif-
ferent countries, and (3) different ways to explain behavior.
In Brazil, behavior therapy was initiated in the late 1960s by a group of research-
ers with a solid background in experimental behavior analysis gradually developed
J. L. Leonardi (*)
InPBE – Instituto de Psicologia Baseada em Evidências and Paradigma, Centro de Ciências e
Tecnologia do Comportamento, São Paulo, Brazil
G. V. Cândido
UFSCar – Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Paulo, Brazil

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_31
724 J. L. Leonardi and G. V. Cândido
a way to treat verbally competent patients who presented typical psychotherapy

problems through verbal interactions in clinical settings. For decades, approxi-
mately between 1970 and 2000, several terminologies were used to refer to this
Brazilian clinical practice with a radical behaviorist base, such as behavior psycho-
therapy, behavior therapy, and clinical behavior psychology. However, in the 1990s
and 2000s, Brazilian behavior analysts questioned whether these categories sufficed
to represent their practice, with a Skinnerian base, especially because they were
often confused with cognitive-behavior therapists (Costa, 2011; Tourinho &
Cavalcante, 2001; Zamignani et al., 2008).
For this reason, Tourinho and Cavalcante proposed, in 2001, the use of the term
behavior-analytic therapy (TAC, from the original in Portuguese, terapia analítico-
comportamental), which has become widely accepted among therapists from differ-
ent regions in Brazil as the best name to describe their professional practice. This
term was chosen because it specifies, already in its name, its philosophical, concep-
tual and methodological bases of support – behavior analysis. Notably, the term was
not intended to propose a new modality of psychotherapy, but rather to standardize
the name of a Skinnerian-based clinical practice that had been practiced in Brazil
since the early 1970s (Zamignani et al., 2008). In short, TAC refers to a form of
clinical behavior analysis (cf. Kohlenberg et al., 1993) originated and developed in
Brazil, which can be defined as:
a form of service that uses the theoretical framework of behavior analysis and the knowl-
edge of basic and applied research to solve human problems. Interventions by behavior-
analytic therapists are based on philosophy, principles, concepts, and methods of the
behavior science and focus on the client’s relation with their environment, including those
that define their feelings and cognitions, with the participation of public and private events
(stimuli and responses). For this, contingency analysis is a basic and indispensable instru-
ment, whether in the evaluation of the client’s complaint, or in the design, application and
evaluation of the intervention itself. The intervention can propose changes in different com-
ponents of the three-term contingency, that is, antecedents, responses, or consequences
(Meyer et al., 2010, p. 172).
As can be seen so far, TAC is a model of behavior therapy with its own identity,
which differs from the third wave ones. This chapter thus aims to describe the his-
torical development of behavior therapy in Brazil, outline its underlying features,
examine the relationship between TAC and third wave therapies, as well as present
evidence of its efficacy.
Behavior Therapy in Brazil: A Historical Construction
Psychology as field of knowledge and occupation was regulated in Brazil in 1962.

From a practical standpoint, such regulation established the playing field for psy-
chologists and methods available for use. Since then, in Brazil, five-year undergrad
courses allow professionals to work as clinical practitioners, whose services can be
paid for by the client, private health care providers, or the government. Until 1962,
The History of Behavior Therapy in Brazil and Its Relationship with the Three Waves 725
those who identified as “psychologists” in Brazil had graduated overseas or became

interested in psychology through undergrad courses mainly in medicine, pedagogy,
philosophy, and engineering (Antunes, 2014; Baptista, 2010; Massimi, 2016).
Thus, talking about the Brazilian history of behavior therapy necessarily implies
understanding that psychology, in Brazil, was experiencing an expansion. While
behavior therapy developed in and outside of universities, mainly in England and
the United States, few psychologists identified as clinicians in Brazil. Psychotherapy
(or at least the objects and methods that were closer to current psychotherapy) hap-
pened in the medical context, mainly in psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes,
based on psychoanalysis or with an organicist bias. The behaviorist movement, its
main actors, and theoretical propositions were scarcely known in Brazil.
Behavior analysis was introduced in Brazil in 1961 with the arrival of Dr. Fred
Keller, a student as well as a good friend of B. F. Skinner, as a professor of experi-
mental psychology at the University of São Paulo (USP). Founded in 1936, USP is
one of the oldest, most renowned Brazilian universities.
After this, a first group began to form, dedicated to research and intervention
based on behavior principles. The group based their theoretical framework on the
“reinforcement theory”, as presented by Dr. Keller (e.g., Azzi et al., 1963; Keller,
1962a). During his sabbatical year in Brazil, he taught basic concepts of operant
behavior (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner, 1953), which included the use of a
laboratory equipped with Skinner boxes. In addition to a theoretical approach, the
laboratory setting allowed for the study of real behaviors, manipulation of variables,
and direct observation of target behaviors.
Two epistemological aspects presented in Dr. Keller’s publications derived from
his work in Brazil are: (1) the progressive perspective of science and (2) the search
to redefine the problems of psychology in terms of Skinnerian radical behaviorism.
These can be seen in at least two of his publications in Brazil. In Keller (1962b),
when talking about “historical problems” of psychology, he stated that the “rein-
forcement theory” was the “reigning” standpoint in psychology. In Keller (1962a),
he presented the advantages of frequency measures of behavior and the concept of
reinforcement for “redesigning modern psychology” present in early behavior inter-
ventions in Brazil.
The historiography of behavior analysis in Brazil has identified the origin of
early behavioral interventions also in this period (Cândido, 2017; Matos, 1998;
Souza Jr et al., 2018; Todorov, 2006; Todorov & Hanna, 2010). The first behavior
intervention publication found in Brazil was written by Isaias Pessotti – Dr. Keller’s
student in 1961. Due to a military intervention of the Brazil’s 1964 political regime,
Pessotti was forced to move to Italy, where he was granted a scholarship.
Pessotti (1966) proposed to discuss technical problems in the scope of “rein-
forcement therapy”, understood as “an application of principles of the experimental
analysis of leaning for the correction and conditioning of response repertoires in
human subjects” (p. 91). He presented six cases whose patients were so-called
“retarded children”. “Pathological behaviors” presented by the subjects included
the lack of sphincter control, phobias, and motor defects – regarded as “the effects
of inadequate reinforcement”.
Using treatment strategies such as modeling, chaining, and reinforcement sched-

ules (and the “use of a light diuretic” in one case), Pessotti (1966) taught different
types of behavior. In one case, he conditioned a child with a phobia of spherical
foods to request and ingest spherically shaped foods and pills. In another case, for a
child with a phobia of darkness, he had to turn off the lights in the room, lie down,
and fall asleep. For a child with hydrocephalus and atrophied limbs, he conditioned
him to walk on crutches. Thus, the author states that “correcting and replacing the
effects of such contingencies constitute the essence of the reinforcement therapy
processes, whose effects are ensured as long as the subject is not reconditioned by
the healing institution or the family” (Pessotti, 1966, p. 104–105).
As for technical problems, Pessotti (1966) sorted them into three groups. The
first included difficulties with deprivation, as it is “indispensable and preliminary to
any reinforcement” (p. 97). The second regarded difficulties in defining the contin-
gency terms to which the patient was submitted in therapy. The third referred to
contingencies extraneous to therapy, whether “incidental or intentional”. In any
case, the author states that, despite the failure in two of the six cases, results may
have shown the importance of adequate control of reinforcement contingencies.
In parallel, throughout the 1960s, two therapists and professors from Rio de
Janeiro – Geraldo da Costa Lanna and Otávio Soares Leite – applied Wolpe’s sys-
tematic desensitization and Jacobson’s progressive relaxation, among other proce-
dures (Lima, 1997; Pavan-Cândido, 2019). Chronologically, then, the end of the
first wave described by Hayes (2004) thus coincides with the first uses of behavior
therapy in Brazil.
However, little was known in Brazil about behavioral interventions in general.
Guilhardi (2012), a behavior therapist in Brazil since 1969, summarizes this moment
historically: “there was no conceptual knowledge, no clinical or technological
expertise with the behavior model, no models of clinical practice for such.” (p. 2).
Throughout this path, several events supported Brazilian therapists in their training
and practice. The release of the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis in 1968 and
Behavior Therapy in 1970, along with other behavior modification publications, are
some examples.
Possibly, the first publication in Brazil to use the term behavior therapy was
Rosamilha (1969), in an article that proposed to discuss the use of behavior technol-
ogy in pre-schoolers. In the same year, senior students from the first class of psy-
chology at the Catholic University of Campinas (PUC-Campinas) expressed their
interest in applying the principles of experimental behavior analysis in the clinical
setting, which led professor Luiz Otávio de Seixas Queiroz to create a supervised
internship entitled Behavior Modification. At the end of that year, professor Queiroz
and his students founded the first behavior-analysis-based clinic in Brazil (Batista
et al., 2005; Guilhardi, 2003).
A group headed by Dr. Thereza Pontual de Lemos Mettel offered different train-
ing opportunities in behavior therapy. For example, in 1973, a behavior modifica-
tion program took place in a psychiatric hospital, aiming to “increase the rate of
appropriate behaviors and decrease inappropriate ones in the following classes:
hygiene, eating habits, and sociability” (Zucoloto et al., 1973, p. 391).
Dr. Mettel’s group trained mothers to act as therapeutic agents, thus aiding the
modification of their children’s behavior. Their training included discussing daily
records (rate, location, and sequence of the child’s behaviors that occurred at home),
presenting concepts (e.g., modeling), role-playing, defining individualized proce-
dures, and programming the records of subsequent meetings. Several problem
behaviors were eliminated (e.g., pain complaints), others remained (e.g., disobey-
ing), and new ones emerged (e.g., cooperation) (Gorayeb et al., 1974; Otero
et al., 1974).
The studies cited here have not been selected due to their pioneering role as
attributed to the studies by Wolpe (1958), Lazarus (1958), and Eysenck (1959a, b),
for instance. They mostly consist of abstracts published in conference proceedings.
However, they signal a change in zeitgeist from the early 1970s in Brazil, in which
behavioral interventions to establish new and eliminate undesired behaviors arose
both in academic and applied settings.
In the early 1970s, the first landmark of integration between the cognitive and
behavioral models emerged, when Raquel Rodrigues Kerbauy and Luiz Otávio de
Seixas Queiroz began to emphasize in their courses the role of private events and
cognitions as mediators of behavior (Rangé et al., 2007; Rangé & Guilhardi, 1995).
In 1973, Kerbauy and Queiroz brought Dr. Michael Mahoney to the Pontifical
Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), where he taught a year-long course on
cognitive modification. Little is known about the content of such course, but part of
it is known to have served as the basis for his book “Cognition & Behavior
Modification” (Mahoney, 1974), in which the author discusses the inadequacy of
non-mediational models, stating that individual’s responses occur in a perceived or
interpreted environment, rather than in a real one.
That same year, Garry Martin offered a course on behavior modification to
Psychology undergrads at Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP)
(Queiroz et al., 1976). In November 1974, these students’ initiative created the
Behavior Modification Association. Among its contributions, we highlight the
implementation of a scientific journal in Portuguese – Journal of Behavior
Modification –, which helped disseminating research in the area. In its 2 years of
existence, the journal published 11 articles on different topics: teacher and student
behavior, environmental effects on study behavior, placing objects in series, aca-
demic responses, enuresis, isolation, and teacher training. Among the most cited
authors by the group are Montrose Wolf, Vance Hall and Charles Ferster (Torres
et al., 2020).
In 1974, during a brief visit to Brazil, Dr. Donald Baer, another student of
Skinner, spoke about creativity and offered a course on single-subject experimental
design, where each participant provides his or her own experimental control
(Associação de Modificação do Comportamento, 1975; Kerbauy, 1975). Dr. Charles
Ferster, another student of Skinner, also in Brazil, spoke about experimental research
and functional analysis of clinical problems (Associação de Modificação do
Comportamento, 1975). It is important to note that all these lectures from visiting
professors in Brazil were placed in different cities, all held in São Paulo state.
In general, the studies in the 1970s feature the definition of both problem and
target behaviors. Many therapists defined the reinforcers to be presented and
responses to be reinforced. The population ranged from inpatients and patients from
private clinics. Studies reported decreased anxiety due to systematic desensitization
aiming at increasing school performance and socialization; use of reinforcement to
implement new behaviors; extinction to eliminate tantrums; modification of leaving
objects out of place; application of behavior therapy in the treatment of couples; etc.
Also, those dedicated to behavior therapy in Brazil during this period kept close
contact with the experimental behavior analysis lab. Many of them even had exclu-
sive training in basic research with non-human subjects when in the early stages of
their career as therapists.
The proceedings of the Ribeirão Preto Psychology Society annual meetings doc-
ument a part of the development of behavior therapy in the 1970s. From 1971 to
1977, the first seven events featured 33 studies that fall under the behavior therapy
umbrella, based on authors such as Wolpe, Jacobson, Suinn, Cheery-Sayers, Lovaas,
Iñesta, and Bijou (Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia, n.d.). These papers include a
number of case studies, as well as supervision and training sessions on behavior
modification and behavior therapy.
The 1970s also featured the first translations into Portuguese of books originally
written by representatives of the 1st wave, like Krasner and Ullman (1965), Bandura
(1965), Lazarus (1972), Wolpe (1973), Whaley and Malott (1971), among others,
and began circulating more easily among universities, clinics, and hospitals, con-
tributing enormously to the formation of new behavioral therapists.
Brazilian scientific literature, at the turn of the 1980s, ceased to have an almost
exclusively applied research character and began to generate reflections about the
therapeutic process and the evaluation of therapy outcomes (e.g., Kerbauy, 1981a,
b) as well as the role of the therapeutic relationship on the client’s responsiveness
(e.g., Mettel, 1980, 1987). Thus, behavior therapy in Brazil expanded in the number
of practitioners and intervention procedures, featuring a theoretical and technical
dispersion. Kerbauy (1981b), for instance, states that, in addition to widely known
techniques such as systematic desensitization, operant and aversive techniques, oth-
ers were being employed such as assertiveness training, covert awareness, cognitive
restructuring, and self-control. She stated: “Certainly, some basic assumptions are
being changed by the incorporation of new concepts that are more descriptive of the
observed phenomena. Certain principles – rather than techniques – is what charac-
terizes behavior therapy” (Kerbauy, 1981b, p. 181).
The principles outlined by Kerbauy (1981b) relate to general aspects of the ther-
apist’s behavior: (1) using experimental analysis of behavior as a reference; (2)
rejecting the notion of mental illness of the medical model; (3) assessing the effec-
tiveness of the therapy; (4) using functional analysis both in diagnosis and treat-
ment; and (5) training client’s non-existent or deficient behaviors. While behavior
therapy should arguably be based on experimental analysis, Kerbauy (1981a) recog-
nized that the conditions of a therapeutic situation differ from those of a laboratory:
However, this controlled situation, free of extraneous variables, does not exist in the thera-
peutic setting. The therapist does not control the client, but rather exerts an influence on
them, as he or she does not have access to all the necessary variables to talk about control
and probably does not propose to do so; this does not define clinical work, no matter to
which theoretical approach the therapist subscribes. The therapist’s influence stands more
on the way he or she works, on the either voluntary or involuntary model they present dur-
ing their practice (p. 829).
The role of the therapist-client relationship as means of promoting change has been
discussed in Brazil at least since the 1980s. Kerbauy (1981a) states that one of the
determinants of therapeutic success is the personal qualities of the therapist, the cli-
ent, and the interaction between them. In this sense, Mettel (1980) argued that the
therapeutic relationship is one of the most important variables in the process, in
which the therapist functions as a social reinforcer, model, discriminative stimulus,
and participant-observer.
Conte et al. (1987) discussed the difficulties of teaching behavior therapy in
Brazil in undergraduate psychology. Students opposed to behavior therapy due to
their dissatisfaction with the theoretical and philosophical model (e.g., behavior
analysis would have an allegedly “simplistic” view of the human being, disregard
feelings and emotions, adopted a linear position when determining behavior, etc.).
In addition, the intimate relationship between experimental behavior analysis and
behavior therapy was also a source of dissatisfaction due to the scientific criteria
adopted, which, when transposed to the clinical setting, it would supposedly elimi-
nate the human character of the therapy.
In the late 1980s, cognitive therapy began to spread in Brazil, especially in the
city of Rio de Janeiro. Headed by Dr. Harald Lettner – an Austrian therapist – and
Dr. Bernard Rangé – a Brazilian therapist –, a group of therapists composed by
Eliane Falcone, Helene Shinohara, Lucia Novaes, Mônica Duchesne, Paula Ventura,
and Maria Alice Castro dedicated to the study and practice of Aaron Beck’s thera-
peutic approach (whose book “Cognitive Therapy of Depression” was translated
into Portuguese in 1997). The work from this group of therapists would later be
called cognitive-behavior therapy. Lettner and Rangé (1988) published in Portuguese
the “Behavior Therapy Manual”, with 30 chapters that include theory, assessment of
clinical problems, scientific methodology, aspects of practice, special applications,
and training in behavior therapy. At the same time, this book can be considered a
landmark for the entrance of cognitive therapy in Brazil, which started to advance
mainly from the 1990s (Rangé et al., 2007).
An important milestone for behavior therapy in Brazil was the foundation of the
Brazilian Association of Behavior Psychology and Medicine (ABPMC) in 1991,
whose goal was and still it to assemble psychologists and professionals from other
areas interested in the dissemination as well as scientific and technological develop-
ment of behavior analysis. ABPMC gathers researchers, lecturers, and professionals
who work with behavior analysis in various settings – basic, applied, conceptual,
and historical research as well as practice – although most members are clinical
psychologists. Since its foundation, ABPMC has held annual meetings, which con-
figures the largest Brazilian forum – and one of the largest in the world – for
behavior analysis. In addition to promoting the dissemination of behavior analysis

through its annual meetings, ABPMC publishes scientific journals and books, pro-
vides services to the community, as well as manages the accreditation process of
behavior analysts in Brazil, which aims to attest a practitioner’s work as based on
the concepts of behavior analysis and the philosophy of radical behaviorism. In
2020, ABPMC had approximately 2.000 members.
ABPMC’s annual meeting represent, to a certain extent, the growth of behavior
analysis and behavior therapy in Brazil. Attendance grew from 75 participants in
1992 to 1700 in its 24th edition in 2015 (Zamignani et al., 2016a), often welcoming
foreign behavior analysts along the years such, as Drs. Fred Keller, Murray Sidman,
Robert Kohlenberg, Richard Mallott, and Jay Moore in the 1990s, as well as Drs.
Garry Martin, Steven Hayes, John Austin, William McIlvane in the 2000s, among
others. In 2004, the 13th ABPMC Annual Meeting and the 2nd International
Conference of the Association for Behavior Analysis International were held simul-
taneously at the same venue, favoring a closer relationship between Brazilian and
international behavior analysts. All ABPMC’s editions featured posters and talks
involving TAC, including case studies, their relationships with the third wave,
among others.
It is also in the 1990s that some of the main landmarks of cognitive and cognitive-
behavioral therapy are seen in Brazil (the second wave in the international context).
In 1996, the Brazilian Association for Constructivist Cognitive Therapies (ABTCC)
was founded. Shortly after, in 1998, the Brazilian Society of Cognitive Therapies
(SBTC) was founded and merged with ABTCC. From philosophical, theoretical,
and practical points of view, Rangé (1997) can be considered a landmark in the
distinction between the Skinnerian propositions that supported clinical practice in
Brazil and those presented by Aaron Beck. Certainly, his article “Why am I a
Cognitive Behavior Therapist” is a landmark for the emergence, acceptance, and
development of cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies in Brazil.
In 2009, SBTC was renamed “The Brazilian Federation of Cognitive Therapies”
(FBTC) (Shinohara & Figueiredo, 2011). The objective of FBTC is to disseminate
cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies in Brazil and, more recently, third
wave therapies. Thus, among other actions, FBTC organizes a biennial conference,
promotes international workshops, coordinates a certification of cognitive and
cognitive-behavioral therapists in Brazil, and maintains several publications, such
as the Brazilian Journal of Cognitive Therapy. In addition, FBTC is a member of the
Latin American Association of Cognitive Psychotherapies and has maintained close
relationships with representative international organizations, such as the Academy
of Cognitive Therapy, Association for Contextual and Behavioral Sciences, and the
Association of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies (Neufeld & Affonso, 2013;
Neulfeld et al., 2015). In 2020, FBTC was composed of 4000 members.
ehavior-Analytic Therapy (TAC) and the Third Wave

B
of Behavior Therapy
TAC stems from a collective effort of Brazilian researchers and practitioners to

transpose the principles of experimental analysis of behavior and the philosophy of
radical behaviorism into the scope of psychotherapy. At the same time, since the
1990s, the development of TAC has been influenced by third wave behavior thera-
pies, especially Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; Kohlenberg & Tsai,
1991) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999).
For example, Dr. Fátima Conte, a practitioner since 1979, attended a workshop
in 1989 by Steven Hayes entitled “Analysis and Treatment of Experiential
Avoidance”, practicing clinical psychology under the influence of ACT even before
its name – known as “Comprehensive Distancing” at the time. Between 1991 and
1997, Dr. Conte and her colleague, Dr. Maria Zilah da Silva Brandão, coordinated a
postgraduate course at the State University of Londrina (UEL), called “Specialization
in Functional Analytic Psychotherapy”, whose objective was to teach ACT and FAP
and integrate them with the prevailing form of behavior therapy in Brazil (F. Conte,
personal communication, July 12, 2020). ACT initially suffered a strong rejection
from the Brazilian community on the accusation of being a cognitive approach.
However, it gradually gained space and was more carefully analyzed in terms of its
compatibility with radical behaviorism (e.g., Costa, 2012).
In 1995 and 1999, Dr. Robert Kohlenberg taught courses on FAP in Campinas
and São Paulo (both in São Paulo state), leading many Brazilian therapists to adopt
its essential elements (e.g., watch for clinically relevant behaviors, evoke clinically
relevant behaviors, reinforce clinically relevant behaviors that are improvements of
problem behaviors, etc). In fact, when attending Dr. Kohlenberg courses in Brazil in
the 1990s, many avant-garde Brazilian behavior therapists recognized clinical strat-
egies that they were already applying in their clinical practice (M. Delitti, personal
communication, July 10, 2020).
More recently, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), a third wave
therapy, has started to make inroads in Brazil. Since the first Brazilian edition of the
Dialectical Behavior Therapy Intensive Training promoted by Behavioral Tech in
2015, some TAC therapists have adopted many of its intervention procedures. In
fact, at the 2016 ABPMC meeting, seven talks were offered in DBT (Sayago, 2016),
rarely addressed in previous events. Once again, as expected from a community of
therapists strongly rooted in Skinner’s work, publications emerged that analyzed the
compatibility of DBT with radical behaviorism and behavior analysis (e.g., Abreu
& Abreu, 2016; Almeida Neto, 2016; Leonardi, 2016b).
This symbiotic relationship between TAC and third wave therapies makes it dif-
ficult to accurately identify the features that define and distinguish it from the other
numerous behavior therapies. In Brazil, we can commonly witness a combined use
of intervention procedures based on different models of psychotherapy (ACT, FAP,
DBT, behavior activation, etc.).
In this context, one might ask: why tell TAC from the rest of clinical behavior
analysis? This distinction seems important because, although both TAC and clinical
behavior analysis have been defined as psychotherapies based on the philosophy of
radical behaviorism and on the conceptual, methodological and empirical bases of
behavior analysis (cf. Guinther & Dougher, 2013; Meyer et al., 2010), they do not
consist of identical practices. On the one hand, they advocate the transposition of
empirically validated behavioral principles (reinforcement, discrimination, etc.) to
the scope of psychotherapy, but on the other hand, third wave therapies show some
detachment with the principles of experimental analysis of behavior and make use
of terms that sound mentalistic to those who value Skinnerian terminology. This
may not be a point of great relevance for many third wave therapists outside Brazil,
but it is undoubtedly crucial for an important part of the Brazilian behavior therapy
community. In addition, the use of middle-level terms that do not stem from basic
research and appear to have no relation to the original theory and vocabulary of
behavior analysis (McEnteggart et al., 2015), as occurs in ACT and DBT, is often
viewed with discredit by professionals who base their clinical practice on experi-
mental analysis of behavior.
Behavior-Analytic Therapy (TAC): A Brazilian Model
TAC has not yet been systematized in a manual, as were DBT and ACT for instance.
However, several articles and chapters (e.g., Borges & Cassas, 2012; Cassas, 2013;
Meyer et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2018; Zamignani et al., 2016b) describe the main
elements that constitute its therapeutic process. A summary is presented below
based on these publications.
A client’s suffering in their daily lives is conceived as a reflexive conditioned
motivating operation (cf. Michael, 2000), thus increasing the likelihood of seeking
professional help. What makes a clinical psychologist a possible source of rein-
forcement (and, consequently, establishes them as a conditioned reinforcer) is their
professional status as a specialist in human behavior and a specially structured
office setting to deal with painful and embarrassing events.
From the very first sessions, the therapist aims to develop a relationship through
a nonpunishing audience (attentive and cautious listening, completely free of judg-
ment, criticism, or disapproval), empathy (expressions of acceptance, care, respect,
and understanding of what the client does, thinks, and feels) and demonstrations of
what the scientific knowledge can provide them. In the words of Meyer et al. (2010):
The simple fact that the client has sought help, regardless of any exhibited behavioral pat-
tern, should be the target of social reinforcement, via general expressions of support to the
fact that the client is in therapy, given the problems that the client faces… The social rein-
forcement that the therapist must provide at this point seems “non contingent”, as it does
not address any of the client’s specific class of responses. However, it is related to a client’s
broader behavioral class of engaging in a change process. The therapist’s response classes
are those that allow the therapeutic process to occur and are typically constituted by their
actions and verbalizations that suggest care and a general contingent support to seeking
therapy (p. 163).
From the very first sessions, the therapist collects information on the client’s com-
plaint and life history through verbal interactions and direct observations in session.
Generally, the client’s report occurs in lay terminology and, throughout the process,
the therapist organizes the data from the perspective of contingency analysis,1 which
makes it possible to understand which element of the behavioral relation (anteced-
ent, response or consequence) is responsible for the clinical problem, and what
needs changing to lead to improvement. As the determinants of the client’s behav-
ioral repertoire – genetics, life history, cultural context, and current environmental
conditions – are unique to each case, the contingency analysis and resulting inter-
vention are necessarily individualized.
Contingency analysis can reveal that the client’s difficulties are related to conse-
quent variables. In some cases, the problem may be the absence of reinforcing stim-
uli. For example, lack of interest and spending the day lying in bed can be the result
of the absence of positive reinforcers, while frustration and nervous breakdowns can
be attributed to a rupture in a previously established relationship between response
and reinforcement (Skinner, 1974, chapter 4). In these circumstances, the therapist’s
role varies according to behaviors presented at the clinical complaint. If they are
likely to occur in session (e.g., difficulty in interpersonal relationships), the thera-
pist can evoke and reinforce them differentially, as proposed by FAP (Kohlenberg &
Tsai, 1991). If not, it is up to the therapist to identify possible sources of reinforce-
ment and enable new occurrences of the client’s behavior, now likely to be rein-
forced, as proposed by behavioral activation (Martell et al., 2013).
In other cases, the problem may be related to other types of consequences. For
instance, responses such as complaining, and expressing distress may have been
reinforced by the decrease, elimination, and avoidance of aversive tasks or even
attention, care, and compassion. However, due to their aversive effect on others,
such responses can lead to social distancing, thus decreasing the density of positive
reinforcement obtained over time, contributing to the maintenance of the clinical
problem. In such situations, the therapist’s role consists of analyzing the conse-
quences and proposing interventions to change them.
1
In Brazil, the term contingency analysis has been used to identify functional relations (antecedent-
response-consequence) in the therapy setting, which is essentially of an interpretative nature,
whereas the term functional analysis has been reserved for research in which there is direct manip-
ulation of environmental variables and strict experimental control (Costa & Leonardi, 2020).
Naturally, the interpretation made in contingency analyses is not speculative, since it is based on
empirically validated principles through basic experimental science, which makes such an inter-
pretation a fundamental tool for the understanding of complex human behaviors (cf. Donahoe, 1993).
Still regarding consequences, the clinical problem presented by the client may be
related to a history of punishment, which generally brings a wide range of harmful
side effects such as guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, freezing, disturbing emotions, incite-
ment to violence, etc. (Sidman, 1989). In such cases, the therapist aims to reduce the
amount and magnitude of aversive stimulation in the client’s life by developing
repertoires to cope with the problem.
Contingency analysis can reveal that the client’s suffering is related to antecedent
variables, such as when the client is behaviorally capable of producing reinforcers
and the environment provides reinforcing consequences, but there is inappropriate
or no discriminative control. In these cases, the therapist’s role is to assist the client
in identifying discriminative stimuli related to each response and facilitating their
success in such environments.
Another problem related to antecedents concerns rule-governed behavior.
Excessive control by rules is usually correlated with some degree of insensitivity to
changes in contingencies (and, thus, being responsible for a rigidity in the repertoire
that contributes to the clinical problem), while a deficient control by rules can bring
numerous problems (Meyer, 2005). In the first case, the therapist must lead the cli-
ent to pay attention to other aspects of the situation, thereby decreasing the degree
of control exerted by the rule, and, in the second, to develop rule-following.
In addition to revealing whether the clinical problem is related to antecedents or
consequences, contingency analysis can also indicate whether there are behavioral
excesses (e.g., overeating), deficits (e.g., lack of social skills) and interfering behav-
iors (e.g., difficulty in flirting due to a clothing style). When there are behavioral
excesses, the therapist must strengthen alternative and / or incompatible behaviors
that produce reinforcers powerful enough to compete with those obtained by the
problem behavior, which is likely to decrease its frequency. When there are deficits,
the therapist aims to foster the necessary repertoires, making use of shaping, model-
ing and / or rules, in addition to combining these techniques. When there are inter-
fering behaviors, the therapist’s role is to highlight the undesirable effects they
produce and to suggest alternatives. Finally, it should be noted that, in some cases,
repertoire problems are not related to excessive, deficient, or intervening behaviors,
but rather to unsuitable topographies for the context in which the client is inserted.
In such cases, it is due to the therapist to shape the existing topography of that
behavior.
Finally, what we see today in the practice of TAC in Brazil is similar to what
Callaghan and Darrow (2015) called the fourth wave of behavior therapy: employ-
ing contingency analysis as the main tool for formulating the case and using it to
determine which intervention procedures from different behavior therapies, such as
ACT, DBT, and FAP, to use. In their words:
Without denigrating any of the third wave treatments, it is possible to see the emergence of
a fourth wave of behavior therapy. This wave would emphasize the key role of functional
assessment in targeting client problems and choosing which strategies from the existing
behavioral treatments to apply to a particular client. This relegates the current third wave
treatments to a set of interventions for client problems that can be integrated into one coher-
ent, individualized intervention guided by a functional assessment. This is in contrast to
more typically using ACT, FAP, DBT, or Behavioral Activation as standalone interventions
and would require a therapist to consider multiple hypotheses for contextual variables sur-
rounding different types of suffering. (...) Creating an approach to understand and treat
human suffering that is grounded in behavioral principles, driven by functional assessment,
and utilizes available contemporary behavioral treatment technologies, may allow a
clinician to become a beacon of contemporary clinical science and therapy. The next wave
of behavior therapy can integrate existing approaches to begin with the client, not the dis-
order, nor the treatment, but a functional assessment of that unique person. More than that,
this wave will make room for the development of new strategies to alleviate suffering as our
psychological problems evolve with human kind (p. 62–63).
Evidence for Behavior-Analytic Therapy (TAC)
Experimental evidence of the efficacy of TAC is scarce. When reviewing 142

Brazilian publications on behavior therapy from 1949 to June 2001, Nolasco (2002)
identified that 86% of studies in the area are conceptual, which led the author to
conclude that TAC therapists “have communicated little to the scientific community
about the models of its intervention method and their practical results” (p. 64).
More recently, Leonardi (2016a) conducted a systematic literature review in 14
databases to analyze the production of empirical evidence on the efficacy of behav-
ior therapy in Brazil, locating 38 case reports, six single-case experiments, and no
clinical trials. This predominance of case reports allows us to state that TAC lacks
experimental studies, essential for the establishment of causal relationships between
procedures and outcomes. Therefore, it is not currently possible to know if TAC is
effective.
Most intervention procedures analyzed by Leonardi (2016a) failed to enable a
trained reader in behavior therapy to replicate their findings or reproduce them in
their practice. Examples (among numerous others) of illegible descriptions of thera-
pists’ actions are “giving discriminative stimuli for the client to approach the fam-
ily” or “questioning rules”. The lack of accurate in-session descriptions of therapists’
behaviors considerably diminishes the scientific value of the empirical studies.
Leonardi (2016a) highlighted that no studies evaluated the fidelity of procedures,
that is, if the intervention was implemented as planned and described. Thus, the
outcomes may be unrelated to the planned treatment, but rather to miscellaneous
therapeutic actions that differed from those planned and described (i.e. the actual
treatment).
In summary, data on TAC from Leonardi’s (2016a) literature review indicate that
this type of therapy lacks clinical research that adequately verifies its efficacy. More
recent work (e.g., Moraes & Silveira, 2019) reveals that little empirical research has
been carried out since then.
Conclusion
Behavior therapies are characterized by the work of researchers and practitioners in

different places, contexts, needs, and historical periods. As every historical event is
unique, the history of behavior therapy in Brazil followed its own path.
Analyzing the history of behavior therapy based on the wave metaphor com-
prises models of psychotherapy that have spread internationally, such as ACT, DBT,
FAP, among others. Thus, we chose to describe how such waves influenced the his-
tory of behavior therapy in Brazil, contemplating its beginning and develop-
ment paths.
Also, we must highlight that the Brazilian term to descibe behavior therapy
based on radical behaviorism is unfamiliar worldwide. A Google Scholar search in
August 2020 with the terms “behavior-analytic therapy“, “behavioral-analytic ther-
apy” and “analytical-behavioral therapy” (some possible translations of the original
“terapia analítico-comportamental” in Portuguese), almost exclusively returned
articles by Brazilian authors that used such expressions in their abstract or keyword
sections. The term used in Brazil is not known and used internationally, which hin-
ders the dissemination of psychotherapy practice and research by Brazilian behav-
ior analysts in other parts of the world and, consequently, the dialogue with other
forms of already developed behavior therapies.
In Brazil, behavior therapy started in the late 1960s, and spread in the 1970s. At
the time, many Brazilians either sought training abroad or invited overseas research-
ers and practitioners to teach in Brazil; thus, Brazilian therapists kept a close contact
with representatives of the different waves in behavior therapy. It is also worth not-
ing the strong female presence in scientific leadership throughout the history of
behavior therapy in Brazil, including TAC.
The TAC model for understanding psychotherapy can be considered original
given that no similar organization is known to have occurred simultaneously. The
main assets of the theoretical-practical originality of TAC may be the well-known
importance given to the therapeutic relationship as a drive for change and the adop-
tion of contingency analysis as an assessment tool – both already present in various
early 1970s’ studies. Notably, there are similarities between TAC and other models
of psychotherapy, especially third wave ones. However, this similarity is not unique
to TAC. Approximations between FAP, ACT and DBT, for example, are common in
the international literature (Carlson, 2017; Center & Lynch, 2018; Gifford et al.,
2011; Kohenberg & Callaghan, 2010; Martins & Vandenberghe, 2006; Olaz, 2015;
Reyes-Ortega et al., 2020).
In conclusion, the three waves metaphor does not represent the development of
behavior therapy in Brazil. On the other hand, third wave behavior therapies influ-
enced the construction of the Brazilian model of behavior therapy (TAC) which,
from a conceptual point of view, is strongly founded in behavior analysis and radi-
cal behaviorism and, from a practical one, is open for new developments of different
behavior therapies.
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History of Cognitive and Behavior
Therapies in Japan: A Behavior Analytic
Perspective
Takashi Muto and Akihiko Masuda
In Western cultural contexts, the terms behavior therapy and cognitive behavioral
therapy (CBT) are often used interchangeably to refer to a family of behavioral and
cognitive therapies, ranging from applied behavior analysis to cognitive therapy
(CT) and to acceptance- and mindfulness-based cognitive behavioral therapies
(Hayes, 2004; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008, 2009). According
to Goldfried and Davison (1994), when behavior therapy, or CBT, is viewed in this
way, it is characterized as:
… a general orientation to clinical work that aligns itself philosophically with an experi-
mental approach to the study of human behavior. The assumption basic to this particular
orientation is that the problematic behaviors seen within the clinical setting can best be
understood in light of those principles derived from a wide variety of psychological experi-
mentation, and that these principles have implications for behavior change within the clini-
cal setting… There are several important consequences of this basic point of view. Behavior
therapists, like their experimental colleagues, are operational in their use of concepts. High
level abstractions such as anxiety or depression are always operationalized in specific
terms, such as a particular score on a behavioral assessment device, or a concrete descrip-
tion of behavior. Also very much within the spirit of experimental psychology, the behavior
therapist is interested in the search for and manipulation of the strongest controlling vari-
ables… That is, the behavior therapist assumes that behavior is lawful and that it is the
function of specifiable antecedent, organismic, and consequent conditions. In this regard,
every clinical interaction constitutes a kind of experiment (pp. 3–4).
In the field of behavioral health, these are the features of behavior therapy that dif-
ferentiate it from other schools of psychotherapy and behavioral health
interventions.
T. Muto (*)
Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan
e-mail: tamuto@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
A. Masuda
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_32
744 T. Muto and A. Masuda
Behavior therapy was originally introduced to Japan by Kousaku Umezu

(梅津耕作, 1928–1999) in the early 1950s (see our detailed discussion on Umezu
below). During that time in Japan, evidence-based procedures linked to evidence-
based processes of change was explicitly emphasized as the core of behavior ther-
apy. However, today the term behavior therapy (“行動療法; kodo ryoho” in
Japanese) is hardly presented in Japanese peer-reviewed journals. While the term
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT; “認知行動療法; ninchi kodo ryoho” in Japanese)
is well recognized by many, including both the professional and general public, it is
understood merely as a therapeutic tool, rather than as a larger system of knowledge
and treatment development (Hayes et al., 2013; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009).
In this chapter, we will present the evolution of Japanese behavior therapy in
light of unique Japanese cultural contexts, as well as highlight key historical events
that took place since its inception. To do so, we will first orient readers to Japanese
cultural and historical contexts relevant to the dawn and development of Japanese
behavior therapy. Subsequently, we will present our views on the history of Japanese
behavior therapy by following the wave rhetoric, which was used for the first time
by Steven C. Hayes in early 2000s (Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 2003).
ehavior Therapy and Licensing Law for Psychologists

B
in Japan
In the United States (U.S.), the first licensing law for psychologists was passed in
Connecticut in 1945; by 1977, all states had passed similar licensing laws (Rehm &
DeMers, 2006). On the other hand, it was not until 2017 that the Japanese govern-
ment passed legislature for establishing master’s level psychologists as nationally
licensed professionals (i.e., “国家資格” in Japanese) (see Ishikawa et al., 2020).
Subsequently, it was not until 2019 that this law officially sanctioned the first mas-
ter’s level licensed psychologist in Japan. To date, the Japanese government has not
passed a licensing law for doctoral level psychologists.
In many ways, this slow progress is somewhat surprising, as other healthcare
professionals in Japan have been recognized as nationally qualified and licensed for
years since the end of World War II. For example, licensing laws were passed for
medical doctors, including psychiatrists, in 1946, for nurses in 1948, and more
recently for psychiatric social workers in 1997.
Why did it take so long for Japan to pass a licensing law for psychologists?
One major factor was the resistance from other licensed professionals, such as phy-
sicians and nurses, who have served as primary providers of mental health ser-
vices for years. Simply put, in Japan, physicians have traditionally held authority
and privileges in all aspects of behavioral health care. These include diagnostic
decision- making, treatment planning, and billing and reimbursement from the
national healthcare system. Additionally, somewhat similar to the U.S. where peo-
ple initially seek mental healthcare from their primary care physicians (O’Donohue
& Maragakis, 2015), Japanese individuals tend seeks initial mental health
History of Cognitive and Behavior Therapies in Japan: A Behavior Analytic Perspective 745
services from their family doctors or from physicians in “Psychosomatic Medicine

(心療内科)” under their national healthcare system. To date, under this system, the
primary duties of mater’s level psychologists are to assist physicians and provide
services prescribed by physicians. For this reason, although these master’s level
clinicians are called “licensed psychologists,” the extent of their authority and privi-
leges are minimal– a state of affairs which is substantially different from the status
of both doctoral-level licensed psychologists master’s level clinicians in the U.S.
Another factor for the delay in the sanctioning of national licensure of master’s
level psychologists was the lack of consensus among doctoral level psychologists at
meta levels (O’Donohue, 1989; O’Donohue & Ferguson, 2016), including the phi-
losophy of humanity or human nature (“人間観” in Japanese), as well as the way
that psychologists approach human conditions both theoretically and clinically. The
lack of consensus among these doctoral level psychologists has been problematic
because in the current Japanese licensing system, they serve as mentors and super-
visors for future master’s level psychologists in master’s training programs in clini-
cal psychology (see Ishikawa et al., 2020 for their discussion on established training
systems for psychologists as well as graduate students in Japan). Among these dis-
crepancies, the role of science in clinical psychology has yielded a series of heated
debates among psychologists. That is, many Japanese, including Japanese psychol-
ogists, are generally resistant to the idea of applying scientific knowledge and tech-
nologies to humans, especially the idea of doing so to “control” themselves and
others. Furthermore, generally speaking, Japanese people tend not to like the idea
that their thoughts and actions are controlled by other agents; while at the same time
they do not like the idea that they have to take responsibility for their actions as their
own control agent (Masuda, 2017; Weisz et al., 1984). Within the field of clinical
psychology and other related disciplines, behaviorists emphasize science as the
backbone of their clinical research and practice (Herbert & Forman, 2013; Herbert
et al., 2013; O’Donohue & Fisher, 2009), and the public tends to continue to view
behaviorists negatively as cold-hearted control agents of their clients (e.g., Turkat &
Feuerstein, 1978). This is also the case in Japan, which has given Japanese behav-
iorists a rather unfavorable image within Japanese society (see Weisz et al., 1984 for
the first-order control coping vs. second-order control coping). On a related note, as
discussed briefly above, in Japan, family doctors, physicians in psychosomatic med-
icine, and psychiatrists are typically the primary service providers for mental health
concerns. Generally speaking, they tend to follow a non-behavioral orientation,
such as psychopharmacological and contemporary psychodynamic approaches.
ublic Image of Behavior Therapy in Japan:

P
A Cultural Perspective
If the first author (T. M.) is asked whether Japanese people generally like behavior
therapy (or behavioral school of thoughts), his answer would definitively be “no.”
Although there are some Japanese individuals who hold favorable views of behavior
therapy, including the authors of this chapter, these individuals are in the minority.
From a sociocultural perspective, it is possible to identify three cultural practices
(i.e., contextually situated behavioral repertories) of Japanese individuals that may
account for this “cultural dislike of behavior therapy.” These are (a) preference of
assimilation and accommodation over first-order control, (b) characteristics of
Japanese language, and (c) unwillingness to recognize oneself as a control agent.
More specifically, as we will discuss extensively below, these repertoires of Japanese
individuals at a cultural and social level are not compatible with the spirit of behav-
ior therapy (i.e., philosophical, theoretical, and applied positions).
Preference of Assimilation and Accommodation Over Control
Metaphorically speaking, Japanese culture is often considered to be the polar oppo-

site of Western culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Weisz et al., 1984). That is,
Japanese culture is considered the culture of interdependent self, seeing relations
with others and what surrounds the self as vital determinants of self, whereas
Western culture is viewed as that of independent and autonomous self (Hamaguchi,
1985; Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Particularly relevant to the issue of “control”
discussed above, Japanese culture is known to value second-order control strate-
gies, characterized by efforts to coexist and harmonize with the events of interest,
including nature (e.g., natural disasters), social and political conflicts, and mental
health issues (Weisz et al., 1984), while Western culture is often said to encourage
first-order control strategies (e.g., direct attempts to conquer a targeted problem) for
these events. For example, if there is a huge mountain between town A and town B,
Japanese would want to make a path that goes around the mountain, but Westerners
would want to dig a tunnel though the mountain to minimize the distance between
town A and town B. As discussed elsewhere (e.g., Masuda, 2017), historians and
psychologists have noted that the emphasis on second-order control within Japanese
culture reflects the climate and geographic characteristics of Japan to which genera-
tions of Japanese individuals have had to adapt to for the sake of survival and
prosperity.
Geographically speaking, Japan is an island country located along the Pacific
coast of East Asia. Surrounded by oceans, over 70% of Japan is forested and moun-
tainous. Most regions of Japan are temperate and characterized by four distinct
seasons. Because of its wide range of latitude, seasonal winds, and different types
of ocean currents, the climate in Japan varies dramatically from a cool, humid, and
continental climate in the north to warm, tropical, and rainforest climate in the
south. Japan is also known for a range of natural disasters. Typhoons occur annually,
causing floods and landslides. Due to its location in the Pacific Ring of Fire with
over 100 active volcanos, Japan is also prone to earthquakes and tsunami, having the
highest natural disaster risk in the developed world. As a matter of fact, the major
earthquake and tsunami in 2011 are still fresh in the memories of the Japanese
people (Normile, 2011). Once again, relevant to the topic of this chapter, the
Japanese have learned as a cultural practice that a range of these natural disasters
almost always occur in a way that is beyond human control. At the same time, the
people of Japan have learned to appreciate the power and beauty of the nature and
have done so by adapting themselves to nature, not the other way around.
Relatedly, adaptation and assimilation as behavioral choices of Japanese people
were observed regarding the U.S., an enemy nation, during World War II and the
post-World War II period. More specifically, the people of Japan appeared to have
perceived and accepted many attacks from the U.S., including the major bombing of
Tokyo (March 9–10, 1945) as natural disasters more so than as human-inflicted
malice (i.e., first-order control). The major bombing of Tokyo, enacted as a fire-
bombing raid (codenamed “Operation Meetinghouse”) by the U.S. on the capital of
Japan during the final stages of World War II, is often cited as one of the most
destructive acts of war in history, more destructive than atomic bombs dropped on
Hiroshima or Nagasaki. As a result, Japanese people as a whole chose to assimilate
and adapt themselves to the U.S. occupation, rather than continuing to resist further
or expressing hatred toward the U.S. One important point to note here is that during
U.S. occupation, Japanese individuals were still allowed to use Japanese as their
native language. As such, Japan has been said to only have been Americanized in
the materialistic domains, but not in the domain of cultural practice and identity.
Japanese Language
Relative to the English language, Japanese language has several ways of deempha-
sizing the agent and action in a sentence (Masuda, 2017); these features of the lan-
guage might explain why Japanese people tend to have less favorable attitudes
toward a scientific way of thinking and problem-solving embraced by behaviorists.
More specifically, in pointing out this feature of Japanese syntax, Maynard (1997)
terms Japanese a “Be-language” or “Become-language,” while describing English
as a “Do-language” or “Have-language.” Summarizing the features of Japanese lan-
guage, Maynard (1997) states:
… Japanese tends to frame the event as (1) something existing rather than someone possess-
ing something, and (2) something becoming or happening, often beyond the agent’s control,
and not as something that an agent who has full control “initiates and causes to happen.”
The Japanese are more likely to interpret an event as a situation that becomes and comes to
be on its own, while Americans tend to perceive an event resulting from an agent doing
something and causing things to happen… Incorporating the concept of centrality of scene,
we can conclude that one of the ways that Japanese are characteristically encouraged to see
things is as the scene becoming, whereas from the American perspective it is the agent
doing. The world that becomes is also a world where elements are held in balance, located
in mutual interrelation. Here, instead of recognizing an agent acting on an object, multiple
elements constructing the entire scene find themselves in a relational balance (p. 176).
Here is an example of how an event is framed and expressed in Japanese. The sec-
ond author of this chapter (A.M.) was recently promoted to the rank of full profes-
sor at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. In English, the second author would share
this news with his family and colleagues by saying something like, “I am officially
promoted to the rank of full professor.” However, he is very much likely to share this
news with his Japanese family and colleagues by saying something like “konotabi
Hawaii-daigaku kara Furu Professor heno shoushin wo itadakimashita.” The literal
translation of this sentence is something like “It turns out that I have been promoted
to the rank of full professor by the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa.” In his Japanese
expression, the second author himself as an agent of change is deemphasized by
saying “It turns out…” as if it is an unidentifiable external factor that determined his
promotion at the university, not himself earning it or by the action of any specific
agent. From a lay perspective, this subtle difference between English and Japanese
diction may not seem to be so crucial for practicing behavior therapy. However, the
“be-language” and becoming-language” aspects of Japanese make it difficult to
conduct a functional assessment (e.g., analysis of three-term contingency) for a
given target behavior (i.e., B in the A-B-C functional assessment), as it obscures
one’s understanding of what the target behavior is as well as its agent (e.g., who is
engaging in that behavior). In other words, many Japanese have difficulty in passing
the dead man test (Lindsley, 1991) for adequately identifying the target behavior of
interest in practice and research.
In sum, language (or what B. F. Skinner called verbal community) shapes the
way a given culture’s members think and feel (e.g., self-control; Maynard, 1997;
Skinner, 1957, 1974). The Japanese verbal community seems to socially encourage
Japanese people to pay closer attention to the context where their experience unfolds
without emphasizing the agent of change, including themselves. Reinforcing this
form of linguistic practice may facilitate one’s sense of self as being harmonious
with the context and hone their sensitivity to the changes unfolding in that context.
However, on the other hand, this cultural practice also makes explicitly pursuing
and advocating for first-order control strategies, a common problem-solving strat-
egy derived from the practice of Western science, less appealing and intuitive to
many Japanese individuals (Masuda, 2017).
Unwillingness to Recognize Oneself as a Control Agent
Generally speaking, Japanese people have a tendency to avoid identifying them-

selves as agents who regulate and control themselves, others, and encountered situ-
ations. This tendency often accompanies a desire to conceal or obscure the locus of
control or responsibility (Davies & Ikeno, 2002). Together, these proclivities are
argued to be adaptive within Japanese culture, while actions in opposition to these
behavioral predispositions are often punished. For example, when Japanese people
perceive that a given individual achieves something individually by regulating or
controlling something, they tend to applaud that individual and their accomplish-
ment less, or even express dislike toward that individual for being “too individualis-
tic.” Similarly, when an individual attempts to achieve something independently
without explicitly taking collectivistic support into consideration, that person is
likely to be at the center of blame from others especially if that person fails to
achieve desired ends. These social and cultural contingencies operating within
Japanese society seem to reflect the collectivistic characteristics of Japanese culture
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010), where the survival and sustainability of the
group are emphasized over those of each of the individuals that constitute the group.
On a related note, some readers may think that these avoidant tendencies are
incompatible with a well-known virtue of Harakiri of Samurai (武士の切腹; ritual
suicide by disembowelment with a sword), which was formerly practiced in Japan
by samurai as an honorable alternative to disgrace or execution. Harakiri, at least in
a Western cultural context, is viewed as a symbolic act of a samurai who fully honors
and embodies self-control, self-discipline, and personal responsibility as the agent
of their own action (Nitobe, 2012). Nevertheless, we argue that harakiri is a stereo-
typed and exaggerated aesthetic of self-sacrifice and personal responsibility. In real-
ity, we argue further that it was a reflection of the Japanese social system at the time
that covered up the practice of scapegoating (i.e., singling out an individual and
placing the full responsibility or blame on that individual) by calling it the heroism/
aesthetics of Samurai (侍の誇り). Furthermore, Samurai as a social class consisted
of only 7% of the population in Japan at the time, while the vast majority of Japanese
(i.e., over 80%) were farmers. In other words, the embodiment of self as the agent of
own conduct, as seen in the way of Samurai (Nishigori et al., 2014; Nitobe, 2012),
has not been part of mainstream Japanese culture in the past or present.
Once again, one’s unwillingness to take personal responsibility as the cause of
certain outcomes in certain situations has permeated into many aspects of Japanese
culture and is maintained in part throughout the linguistic features of the Japanese
language and vice versa. Said in another way, the avoidance of putting oneself into
a situation as the locus of responsibility or control seems to be a fundamental behav-
ioral tendency among Japanese, which is incompatible with the spirit of behavior
therapy (e.g., self-control; Skinner, 1974; Weisz et al., 1984).
Person-Centered Approach and Japanese Culture
Even to this date, seeking psychotherapy is not necessarily part of mainstream cul-
ture in Japan (Ishikawa et al., 2020; Masuda et al., 2009; Masuda et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, given the aforementioned three points, if Japanese individuals seek
professional psychological services, they seem to prefer to receive Rogerian person-
centered psychotherapy, in which a gentle and harmonious therapeutic relationship
between client and clinician is emphasized. Within this type of therapeutic relation-
ship, Japanese clients prefer to work with therapists who are gentle and validating,
rather than explicitly direct in targeting active and intentional behavioral change. In
fact, although dated, a national survey showed that the most common therapeutic
orientation with which Japanese clinicians self-identify was a person-centered sup-
portive and integrative approach (Japanese Society of Certified Clinical
Psychologists, 2006).
awn of Behavior Therapy in Japan (1950–1980):

D
The First Wave
From a perspective of many European nations, Japan is located in the Far East: In
fact, Japan is officially referred to as Nippon in Japanese, meaning “the land where
the sun raises.” As noted above, Japan is an island country separated from the con-
tinent of Asia and surrounded by ocean. The geographic features of Japan have
shaped the way Japanese obtain and develop new knowledge and skills at a cultural
level. That is, historically Japanese initially tend to learn a new skill or knowledge
from outside (e.g., learning to grow rice from Chinese and Koreans and manufactur-
ing cars from Western cultures), learn them wholeheartedly, and advance that
knowledge and skill further (to adapt them to the Japanese sociocultural context or
otherwise). In other words, rather than inventing something new or innovative them-
selves, Japanese tend to import ideas or products from elsewhere and improve them
further (i.e., Kaizen; 改善 in Japanese) or adapt it to their cultural context. Behavior
therapy was no exception to this heuristic.
Behavior therapy was introduced to Japan in 1950s as one of the innovative sci-
entific technologies of the West, the winners of World War II (Yamagami et al.,
1982). As noted elsewhere, this was because behaviorism happened to be the main-
stream school of thought in psychology at the time (O’Donohue & Kitchener, 1999).
For this reason, if cognitive science were the mainstream approach in psychology in
the 1950s, behavior therapy might not have been introduced to Japan in the way that
it was. Metaphorically speaking, the introduction of behavior therapy to Japan in the
1950s was a smaller tide of the larger wave of Western behavior therapy that arrived
on the shore of the Far East.
tudies of Nocturnal Enuresis by Kousaku Umezu: The Dawn

S
of Behavior Therapy Research in Japan
The first behavior therapy research paper published in Japan was said to be the one
by Kousaku Umezu (梅津耕作, 1928–1999) in 1956 (Umezu, 1956). The title of the
paper was “A treatment of nocturnal enuresis (NE) through conditioning Part I,”
which was informed by O. H. Mowrer and his classical conditioning account of NE
(Mowrer, 1938; Mowrer & Mowrer, 1938). More specifically, in this study, Umezu
presented a treatment device for NE that he developed and its effects on 13 children
with nocturnal enuresis (Umezu, 1956, 1957). Based on these findings, Umezu also
proposed his account of NE and treatment of NE (see Fig. 1). According to Umezu,
a child’s behavior of nocturnal urination was theorized to be a conditioned response
(i.e., denoted as “r”), which was elicited by elevated pressure within the bladder,
which was theorized to serve as a conditioned stimulus (cs). The treatment device
Umezu created was designed to detect urine and signal the child with a sound of bell
within three seconds from the detection of urine. Following principles of classical
conditioning, the sound of the bell was theorized to serve as an unconditioned
Fig. 1 Umezu’s treatment model for enuresis based on classical conditioning
stimulus (US), which elicited the unconditioned response (UR) of waking up from
sleep. Once these “cs-r” and “US-UR” behavioral associations were conditioned to
occur at the same time, perceived pressure within the bladder (cs) was theorized to
come to elicit the response of waking up from sleep, behavior that was topographi-
cally identical to UR in the model), which was incompatible to the behavior of
urinating.
Translation of the Volume Behaviour Therapy

and the Neuroses by Hans Eysenck
Following the seminal paper by Umezu in 1956, behavior therapy was applied to a
number of psychiatric conditions, such as pediatric mutism and psychosomatic tics
during the latter part of the 1950s (Umezu, 1976). At the same time, researchers and
clinicians began to scrutinize the link between learning theories and behavior ther-
apy as an applied extension of these theories. However, during the 1950s, behavior
therapy did not have a huge impact on Japanese society.
According to Umezu (1976), a major shift in regards to the recognition of behav-
ior therapy in Japan occurred when the volume Behaviour therapy and the neuro-
ses: Readings in modern methods of treatment derived from learning theory by
Hans Eysenck (1960) was translated into Japanese and published in 1965. It is worth
noting that this volume was translated into Japanese by the founding members of the
Society of Personality and Behavioral Disorder (SPBD; 異常行動研究会). The SPBD
was founded in 1960 by a group of psychologists who studied clinical applications,
which were informed by animal learning models. In addition to Umezu, other
founding members of the SPBD included Hiroshi Imada (今田寛; 1934-) of Kwansei
University, Takashige Iwamoto (岩本隆茂; 1933–2010) of Hokkaido University,
Yutaka Haruki (春木豊; 1933–2019) of Waseda University, Hisashi Hirai (平井久;
1928–1993) of Sofia University, and Yoshinori Matsuyama (松山義則; 1923–2014)
of Doshisha University. These individuals are now recognized as the founding
researchers of learning principles in Japan. As shown in Fig. 2, since the publication

of Behaviour therapy and the neuroses in Japanese in 1965, there had been a dra-
matic increase in the number of peer-reviewed papers that featured behavior therapy
(Agari, 1980).
stablishment of Japanese Association of Behavior

E
Therapy in 1975
The growing interest in behavior therapy in the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted
in the establishment of the Japanese Association of Behavior Therapy (JABT) in
1976, which was purported to have been carved out from the Society of Personality
and Behavioral Disorders (SPBD). The key figures in the establishment of JABT
were Kikuo Uchiyama (内山喜久雄; 1920–2012) of University of Tsukuba and
Yujiro Ikemi (池見酉次郎; 1915–1999) of Kyushu University. In the same year, the
Japanese Journal of Behavior Therapy, the flagship journal of JABT, also started. A
content review of the papers published in JJBT between 1976 and 1980 revealed
that the interests among JABT members were mainly in clinical practice (e.g., appli-
cation of behavior therapy to diverse behavioral issues), rather than in theories and
basic research in behavior therapy. Exemplars of the major topics covered during
that time included the application of behavior therapy to children with a range of
behavioral issues, such as autism, developmental disabilities, selective mutism,
asthma, and vocal tics. Other rather minor topics covered during that time were the
220
200
180
160
Number of Articles
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1956-1960 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980
Year
Fig. 2 Number of the published articles related with behavior therapy in Japan (1956–1980).
(This figure was based on data in Agari, 1980)
application of biofeedback and behavior therapy to adults with anxiety, eating dis-
orders, and weight concerns (Fig. 3).
urther Development of Behavior Therapy and Division

F
(1980–2001): The Second Wave
In the previous section, we noted that one of the most salient features of Japanese
cultural development is the importation of innovative knowledge and technologies
from elsewhere (in hopes of advancing them further or adapting them to a Japanese
cultural context). While there are notable advantages of this feature in Japanese
culture, there is also one notable pitfall. That is, this way of advancement in cultural
practice does not come from within, but from outside the Japanese cultural context.
Additionally, Japanese people tend to become too consumed with staying abreast of
the ever-increasing number of innovative trends to be able to adequately adapt or
assimilate them in sufficient depth to Japanese culture or advance them further. As
such, new trends in Japan in many fields simply come and go quickly as if these
trends are one-hit wonders, so to speak. This seems to be the case for the field of
behavior therapy in Japan. The trends with Japanese behavior therapy often are not
shaped by concerted paradigm shifts from within, but rather from emanate from
perspective shifts in Europe and North America, such as the cognitive revolution in
the 1950s and 1960s (see Strunk et al., this volume).
1960 1970 1980 1990
Society of Personality and Japanese Association of

Behavioral Disorder Behavioral Science
1993
Japanese Association for

Behavior Analysis
1983
Japanese Association of
Behavioral Therapy
1976
Fig. 3 Historical flow of the establishment of behavior therapy-related societies and associations
in Japan from ’60 to ’90
n Invited Visit of Albert Bandura in 1982: Bridging

A
from Behavioral Theories to Cognitive Theories
One of the major historical events in Japanese behavior therapy was the visit of
Albert Bandura in 1982. For Japanese behavior therapy researchers and clinicians in
1980s, Albert Bandura had been extremely influential since the 1970s. His major
works published in the 1970s (Bandura, 1971, 1977) were translated into Japanese
and published for Japanese audiences almost simultaneously during that time. In
1982, Bandura was invited to deliver a plenary address at the 46th Annual Meeting
of Japanese Psychological Association (JPA), which was followed by a series of
seminars across four major cities (i.e., Hiroshima, Kyoko, Gigu, and Tokyo). At the
time of his visit, Bandura was known internationally for his social learning theory
(Bandura, 1977), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1978), and cognitive and symbolic inhibi-
tion (e.g., Bandura & Barab, 1973). In the area of behavior therapy, Bandura also
stressed the role of cognitive process in behavior change (e.g., Bandura & Adams,
1977). As can be imagined by looking at the cover of his seminar booklet (see
Fig. 4), Japanese behaviorists’ responses to Bandura’s innovative ideas were ini-
tially mixed. While some were thrilled by this newer wave, others were concerned
about his heavy emphasis on cognition in behavior change.
Nevertheless, the major contribution that Albert Bandura made to Japanese
behavior therapy was on its guiding principles (theories). That is, Bandura was so
influential that he made the transition of its guiding principles from the “behavioral”
(i.e., operant and classical conditioning) to the “cognitive” (e.g., cognitive media-
tional models) rather smoothly. Additionally, as his theoretical model places the
emphasis on self as the agent of change (e.g., self with self-efficacy), rather than the
therapist as the control agent, behavioral practice drawn from his model seemed to
be better suited to Japanese cultural practices more so than traditional behavioral
accounts (e.g., behavior therapist serving as the controlling agent for a client’s
behavior change). Finally, once one of his most cited works, Social foundations of
thought and action: A social cognitive theory was published in 1986 in Japanese
(Bandura, 1986), many learning researchers as well as behavioral therapists in
Japan became cognitivists.
stablishment of Japanese Association of Behavior

E
Analysis in 1983
The mainstream school of thought in the Society of Personality and Behavioral

Disorder (SPBD) was the learning theory of Clark L. Hull (1884–1952; see Rashotte
& Amsel, 1999 for Clark Hull’s behaviorism). The Japanese Association for
Behavior Analysis (JABA; not to be confused with the Western behavior analytic-
oriented Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis [JABA]) was founded in 1983 by
Skinnerian scholars and clinicians who were members of SPBD. On a related note,
Fig. 4 The cover of the

Dr. Bandura’s seminar
booklet
B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) was the plenary speaker for the 43rd Annual Meeting of
Japanese Psychological Association (JPA), which was held 3 years prior to the visit
of Albert Bandura. Of these Japanese Skinnerian scholars and clinicians, Masaya
Sato (佐藤方哉; 1932–2010) of Keio University was the central figure, who was
often considered by many as the father of behavior analysis in Japan as well as the
long-term leader of the JABA (Ono, 2011). In 1973 during his sabbatical year, Sato
went to work with Lewis. R. Gollub (Gollub, 1964, 2002; Gollub & Urban, 1958) a
former student of B. F. Skinner, at the University of Maryland. For Westerners, Sato
is known as the first Association of Behavior Analysis International (ABAI) presi-
dent from outside the United States.
Another notable leader who made a significant contribution to the establishment
of JABA was Kaoru Yamaguchi (山口薫;1924–2015) of Tokyo Gakugei University.
From 1967 to 1968, Yamaguchi received Dr. Sydney W. Bijou’s (1908–2009) guid-
ance as a Fulbright scholar and studied as an affiliated faculty at the University of
Illinois. Today, Bijou is known by many as having established the first systematic
program of research in the experimental analysis of human behavior specifically
related to typically and atypically developing children. Relevant to the present
chapter, Bijou is also known for taking an early role in the globalization of behavior
analysis, notably in Mexico and Japan. Yamaguchi served as the first president of
JABA and had worked tirelessly to bring radical behaviorism-informed behavior
analysis to Japan. Yamaguchi’s efforts have served to further cultivate the guiding
principles of behavior analysis in Japanese soil, which is still to this day, the major
mission of JABA. To do so, Yamaguchi established strong working and collegial
relationships with well-known behavior analysts outside of Japan who were mem-
bers of ABAI, and in 1986 JABA was officially recognized as the third regional
ABAI chapter outside the United States. From a historical perspective, the estab-
lishment of JABA in 1980s can be viewed as a resistance among Skinnerian
researchers and clinicians against the cognitive revolution that was promoted fur-
ther by the visit of Albert Bandura.
ublication of “Cognitive Behavior Therapy” by Yuji Sakano:

P
The Establishment of Cognitive Behavior Therapy in Japan
Figure 5 shows the changes in the number of conference presentations on cognitive

therapy (CT) or cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) in Japan from 1981 to 1993
(Takazawa et al., 1994). As can be seen in this graph, cognitive-oriented behavior
therapy began to gain recognition by Japanese scholars and clinicians in the late
1980s. In the context of this growth, one of the notable events in the history of
Japanese behavior therapy was a symposium that was held in the annual meeting of
the Japanese Association of Behavior Therapy (JABT) in 1995. The title of the sym-
posium was “Is cognitive behavior therapy a behavior therapy?” In this symposium,
Yuji Sakano (坂野雄二) of Waseda University and Hiroaki Kumano (熊野宏昭) of
the University of Tokyo expressed their position of CBT as behavior therapy,
whereas Masahiro Sugiyama (杉山雅彦) of the University of Tsukuba and Shinji
Tani (谷晋二) of Seiyu Clinic presented an opposing view (i.e., “CBT is NOT behav-
ior therapy”). However, much of the topics covered by these presenters were on
therapeutic procedures, not on theoretical frameworks or basic science (e.g., rule-
governed behavior, stimulus equivalence), upon which these behavioral procedures
were purported to be based (see Hayes, 1978; Hayes, 1991 for different levels of
analysis in behavioral science). In other words, this symposium revealed the gap
between research and practice within JABT, which is conceptualized as a major
impediment to the advancement and progress of behavior therapy (Hayes et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, in the same year, the first Japanese-originated book on CBT by
Yuji Sakano, entitled “Cognitive behavior therapy (認知行動療法)” was published
(Sakano, 1995). As discussed above in the context of the influence of Albert
Bandura, the cognitive approach seems to be compatible with the Japanese culture
more so than traditional behavioral approaches. From a historical perspective, the
publication of this seminal book set the foundation of CBT as a legitimate paradigm
within JABT.
75
60
Number of Papers
45
30
15
0
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Fig. 5 Number of papers reported on cognitive behavioral therapy from 1981–1995
ehavior Therapy’s Identity Crisis in Japan (2001–2020):

B
The Third Wave
In 1999, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan declared evidence-
based medicine as the guiding framework of healthcare in Japan (Sakurai, 2003).
Because of this new policy, evidence-based treatments also became of a great inter-
est in the field of behavioral health in the following years. Particularly relevant to
the topic of the present chapter, this national level of shift in emphasis of evidence-
based treatment accelerated the popularity of CBT in Japan, although the movement
was far less pronounced than the proliferation of CBT in the United States due to the
rise of managed care in the late 1990s (Cummings et al., 2001; Hofmann et al.,
2013). Nevertheless, since then in Japan, Beck’s CT for depression (Beck et al.,
1979) has achieved the same status as other evidence-based treatments for depres-
sion, such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). More specifically, in
2010, CT/CBT for outpatient clients with mood disorders has been covered by the
national health insurance system (Ono et al., 2011). Finally, in the early 2000s,
applied behavior analysis (ABA) was gradually recognized in Japan as the treat-
ment of choice for children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder
(Hiraiwa, 2016).
While this emphasis on evidence-informed practice is encouraging, it also has
resulted in unintended outcomes for behavior therapy. That is, because of a more
exclusive focus on outcomes (i.e., symptom reduction) in evidence-informed prac-
tice, both behavioral health professionals and the general public seem to view
behavior therapy (including CT and CBT) merely as a set of effective techniques,
which is somewhat disjointed from its purported links to learning theories and
experimental psychology (Goldfried & Davison, 1994; Rosen & Davison, 2003).
Once again, as noted by many experts in the West (e.g., Hayes, 1991; Hayes et al.,
2013; Hofmann, 2013), this gap between inductive, evidence-informed, theory and
practice is extremely problematic for the advancement of knowledge and technolo-
gies in behavior therapy.
Furthermore, in our view, this unintended outcome, along with the lack of clarity
regarding the essential characteristics of behavior therapy embraced by both behav-
iorists and the lay public were exacerbated further in the early 2000s by the intro-
duction of acceptance- and mindfulness-based CBT (Hayes et al., 2004). Relatedly,
this acceptance- and mindfulness-based CBT movement has revitalized the Japanese
interest in Zen Buddhism and other traditional practices (e.g., meditation) for the
pursuit of optimal health and well-being, however (Masuda & O’Donohue, 2017).
World Congress of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies in 2004
One of the most significant historical events for Japanese behavior therapy was the
World Congress of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies (WCBCT) held in Kobe in
July 2004 (Ishikawa et al., 2020; Ono et al., 2011). This was the third largest inter-
national conference of psychology held in Japan with 1400 attendees and a total of
90 invited lectures (e.g., David Barlow), workshops, and symposia by nationally
and internationally recognized scholars, such as David Barlow, Edna Foa, Keith
Dobson, Robert Liberman, Arthur M. Nezu, Lars-Göran Öst, Jacqueline B. Persons,
and Paul Salkovskis. The conference was sponsored by three behavior therapy-
related organizations in Japan: the Japanese Association of Behavior Therapy
(JABT), the Japanese Association for Behavior Analysis (JABA), and the Japanese
Association for Cognitive Therapy (JACT) which was founded in 2001 (Ishikawa
et al., 2020; Ono et al., 2011).
As implied above, during the early 2000s, these three organizations operated
somewhat independently from one another, and they remained to be isolated from
one another until 2004. Therefore, one of the notable merits in co-hosting the
WCBCT was that professional members of these three organizations began to com-
municate with one another more openly and reciprocally in research and practice
that went beyond the boundaries of their affiliated organizations (see Bachnik,
2019; Matsumoto, 1990 for ingroup vs outgroup dynamics in Japan).
rrival of Mindfulness Revolution: A Role of Japanese

A
Cognitive Behavior Therapy
Another set of the historically significant events for Japanese behavior therapy that
happened during the WCBCT was the first symposium on acceptance- and
mindfulness-based CBT in Japan. The symposium was organized by Yoshinori
Sugiyama (杉浦義典) of Shinshu University, Yoshinori Ito (伊藤義徳) of University
of Ryukyus, Takashi Muto (武藤崇) of Ritsumeikan University, and Minoru

Takahashi (高橋稔) of Hiroshima International University, who later became the
leading scholars and clinicians on acceptance- and mindfulness-based CBTs in
Japan. This symposium was followed by the translation and publication of
Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the cognitive-behavioral tradition (Hayes
et al., 2004) in 2005 by these symposium members along with Yutaka Haruki of
Waseda University. Parenthetically, Haruki translated Kabat-Zinn’s Full cata-
strophic living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and
illness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) into Japanese in 1993. However, this translated book or
mindfulness did not gain much attention from Japanese behavioral health profes-
sionals nor the general public. Similarly, Muto (2006) published the first Japanese-
original edited volume on acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al.,
1999; Hayes et al., 2012) in 2006, entitled Acceptance and commitment therapy in
Japanese context. However, this first Japanese ACT book received limited interest,
mostly among academics.
During 2000s, many Japanese CBT clinicians and researchers were skeptical
about acceptance- and mindfulness-based CBTs, such as ACT (Hayes et al., 2012),
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2013), and dialectical
behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), which incorporated mindfulness and medi-
tation into their theory and practice. This was in part because the practices of mind-
fulness and mediation were not necessarily innovative or novel for many Japanese
individuals, including Japanese behaviorists and CBT researchers, and also because
these Eastern-originated practices were also negatively associated with Aum
Shinrikyo (オウム真理教, Oumu Shinrikyō, literally “Supreme Truth”). Aum
Shinrikyo was a Japanese doomsday cult and terrorist organization at the time,
which carried out the deadly Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, randomly killing
14 people and injuring over 5000 people in varying degrees. In a denouement of
events, Chizuo Matsumoto (松本智津夫; 1955–2018), the leader of Aum Shinrikyo
was executed by hanging in 2018. At that time, he had attained celebrity status in
Japan for his unique yoga and mediative practice, which are often associated with
mindfulness- and acceptance-based practices that are incorporated into ACT, DBT,
and MBCT (Fig. 6).
Although mindfulness is often said to have originated in an Eastern cultural con-
text (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), it did not become a cultural trend in
Japan until the 2010s. In fact, until 2010, mindfulness and meditation were often
viewed as “old-fashioned” or “forgotten” practices which offered no practical value
for Japanese people in the present time. Japanese public perception of mindfulness
morphed into a favorable one in the 2010s when mindfulness was featured as an
efficacious practice, which is deliberately incorporated by well-known global IT
companies (e.g., Apple and Google) for promoting their employees’ mental health
and workplace functioning. Once again, consistent with historical Japanese cultural
evolution, mindfulness was an (re)imported as new trend in lay public and aca-
demia. Subsequently, mindfulness became of great interest to many Japanese as
many notable Buddhist abbots and scholars responded to and raised concerns about
the mindfulness movement from the West (e.g., Matsuyama, 2017). As a result, the
1990 2000 2010 2020
Behavioral Science
Japanese Association
for Behavior Analysis
WCBCT in Japan
Japanese
Association of
Cognitive and
Behavioral Therapy
Behavioral
Therapies
2014
Japanese
Association for
Japanese Association for Cognitive Therapy
Cognitive Therapy
and Cognitive
2001 Behavior Therapy
2016
- Mindfulness
2013
Fig. 6 Historical Flow of the Establishment of Behavior Therapy-related Societies and

Associations in Japan from ’90 to ’20
Japanese association of mindfulness (JAM) was founded in 2013, and Yutaka Haruki
became the first president. Unlike other Japanese associations (e.g., Japanese
Association of Behavior Therapy, Japanese Association for Behavior Analysis) pre-
sented in this chapter, JAM focuses on health psychology and positive psychology
more so than on psychopathology and behavioral and cognitive behavioral therapies.
Where Is Behavior Therapy Headed in Japan?
Following the WCBCT in 2004, the Japanese Association of Behavior Therapy

(JABT) and Japanese Association for Cognitive Therapy (JACT) held their annual
meetings together on a few occasions. However, the two organizations have not yet
become integrated. In fact, each association has remained independent from each
other, while changing their names slightly, similar to how the Association for
Advancement of Behavioral Therapies (AABT) changed its name to the Association
for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies (ABCT) in 2003. In 2014, JABT changed
its name to the Japanese Association of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies
(JABCT; 日本認知 .行動療法学会), and to reflect this change, the JABCT changed
the name of its flagship journal from the Japanese Journal of Behavior Therapy to
Japanese Journal of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies in 2017. On the other
hand, JACT changed its name to the Japanese Association of Cognitive Therapy and
Cognitive Behavior Therapy (JACTCBT; 日本認知療法 .認知行動療法学会).
As discussed above, behavior therapy, or CBT, is traditionally characterized by a

system of advancing knowledge and techniques derived from our understanding of
evidence-based procedures linked to evidence-based processes of changes (Herbert
et al., 2013; Rosen & Davison, 2003). Recently, JABA explicitly and intentionally
has focused on this original spirit of behavior therapy through the framework of
clinical behavior analysis (Dougher & Hayes, 2000; Kohlenberg et al., 1993). For
example, notable JABA members, such as Muto and his colleagues (Muto, 2006;
Muto et al., 2011), have studied and practiced ACT (Hayes et al., 2012) and func-
tional analytic psychotherapy (FAP; Tsai et al., 2009) by following the perspective
of B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism (Skinner, 1974). On a related note, more
recently in 2021, the Japanese Journal of Behavior Analysis, the flagship journal of
JABA, put forth a special issue on clinical behavior analysis.
Education and Trainings
As noted above, the Japanese government has not passed a licensing law for
doctoral-level psychologists with an equivalent status to that of a licensed psycholo-
gist in the United State. For this reason, the majority of clinical training in Japan is
at the master’s level where graduate students are exposed to behavior therapy and
CBT as part of their degree requirements in applied clinical training (Ishikawa et al.,
2020). It is important to note that there several doctoral programs in clinical psy-
chology and related fields exist in Japan. However, their primary goals are not to
produce licensed psychologists upon the completion of doctoral training. Rather,
the primary goal of these programs is to train doctoral candidates to attain theoreti-
cal expertise in their field, with licensure, or licensure eligibility often considered as
a byproduct of such academic training. To date, within the field of clinical psychol-
ogy in Japan, behavior therapy and CBT exist as major orientations, or as part of
their “eclectic” orientations, but not as a dominant, or unified, perspective.
Conclusion
When behavior therapy was first introduced to Japan in the 1950s, it was still faith-
ful to its original spirit that was adequately summarized by Goldfried and Davison
(1994). That is, behavior therapy in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s emphasized
the link between basic research and applied research in knowledge and treatment
development. As a post-World War II innovative paradigm that was imported from
the West, Japanese behaviorists at that time consistently followed this system of
scientific endeavor in behavior therapy. However, in our view, unlike other disci-
plines (e.g., natural science, medicine, technologies) that have been flourishing and
thriving in Japan, the impact and contribution that behavior therapy has brought to
Japan seems minimal. That is, unlike other disciplines that have advanced
themselves further from “the originally imported,” the field of behavior therapy in
Japan merely gravitates toward the aftereffects of new trends occurring in the West
without advancing them further.
So, is behavior therapy in Japan dead? We do not think so. Instead, we are hoping
that this chapter redirects the focus of our fellow Japanese behaviorists and cogni-
tive behaviorists to the very original spirit of behavior therapy, which was brought
to Japan by Kousaku Umezu– the great Japanese pioneer of behavior therapy, nearly
70 years ago. We also believe that there is now enough momentum built for Japanese
behaviorists and cognitive behaviorists to begin to tackle the real challenges that are
ahead of us.
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Part VI
Summary and Future Directions
The Future of First Wave Behavior
Therapies
Bruce A. Thyer
The focus of this chapter will be upon the future directions that first-wave behavior
therapies seem to be heading. By the first wave behavior therapies I will be princi-
pally reviewing those forms of assessment and intervention largely derived from the
conceptual framework of operant learning. Other early behavior therapies that relied
more on respondent and observational learning, such as systematic desensitization
and other forms of ‘reconditioning’ (e.g. exposure to fear evoking stimuli in order
to desensitize someone to objects, animals or situations which produced unrealisti-
cally high anxious reactions) will be reviewed elsewhere in this volume, as will the
so-called cognitive behavior therapies.
First wave behavior therapies based on operant learning principles initially
tended to focus on eliminating dysfunctional behavior and on promoting more
adaptive skills, without an empirical assessment of the causes of the problem. For
example, if a child was displaying large amounts of out-of-seat behavior in the
classroom, a program to reinforce in-seat behavior, and perhaps to punish out-of-
seat behavior, might be implemented. If the child responded by remaining atten-
tively seated more often, this was seen as a successful outcome. If the problem was
self-injurious behavior by a young person with a serious intellectual disability, a
similar program of reinforcing keeping one’s hands away from the head, and apply-
ing mild aversive consequences contingent on head-banging might be applied. Early
published examples of this type of behavior modification can be found in Isaacs,
Thomas and Goldiamond (1960) who used the contingent delivery of chewing gum
to reinforce verbal behavior among two chronically psychotic persons with mutism.
Similarly, Ayllon (1963) used mild punishment to reduce food stealing, satiation to
reduce towel hoarding, and mild punishment to reduce the wearing of excessive
amounts of clothing, with a 47 year old woman diagnosed with schizophrenia.
B. A. Thyer (*)
College of Social Work, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Optentia Research Unit, North West University, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa
e-mail: bthyer@fsu.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_33
770 B. A. Thyer
These early efforts at operant-based treatment, which eventually evolved into the
contemporary field known as behavior analysis, rarely attempted to consider the
underlying functions of the problematic behaviors. It was seen as sufficient to “fix
the problem” and to a very great degree this approach was successful (Grossberg,
1964). Over time behavior analysis became recognized as a generally effective
approach to helping clients, albeit more so in the fields of education and develop-
mental disabilities than in mental health.
As the field progressed, attention was drawn to cases when operant-based treat-
ment either did not work, or produced only fleeting gains (e.g., Lazarus, 1971,
Mausner, 1971), and it became obvious that the lack of attention to the causes main-
taining the problematic behavior was responsible for some instances of treatment
failure. In the 1980s the assessment methodology known as functional analysis
entered the armamentarium of behavior analysts, wherein diligent efforts are under-
taken to empirically ascertain the causes potentially maintaining a client’s problem-
atic behavior (e.g., Iwata et al., 1982; Bailey & Pyles, 1989). Rather than immediately
and directly implementing a behavior change technique, in functional analysis
efforts are made to examine the antecedents and consequences surrounding the
occurrence of the problem behavior, and potentially maintaining controlling contin-
gencies that are tested via temporary experimental manipulation.
A given problem behavior could potentially be maintained by external positive
reinforcement (e.g., attention), negative reinforcement (e.g., escape from an unpleas-
ant situation), or perhaps by self-reinforcement (e.g., scratching an itch). A prob-
lem, such as school avoidance, could be caused by severe fears of something at the
school environment, inadvertent reinforcement provided by the parents for staying
home (e.g., more gaming time), so-called separation anxiety, or a child’s not want-
ing to leave mother alone for fear she might be abused by the father if the child is
not present. Each different maintaining factor requires quite different approaches to
treatment.
For treatment to be successful over the long run, determining the existing contin-
gencies maintaining the problem behavior is crucial. The behavior analyst might
take a baseline of the problem behavior under varying conditions, then change only
one consequence, and see its possible effect. By evaluating the frequency of the
problem under these varying conditions, one can gain a more accurate sense of the
maintaining conditions, and then implement a suitable approach, such as withdraw-
ing reinforcement, reinforcing an incompatible behavior, extinguishing escape
behavior, or removing opportunities for self-reinforcement. An example of the latter
might be having a client who scratches himself excessively wear gloves, have their
fingernails well-trimmed, or apply anti-itch cream.
Treatments based on functional assessment have a higher probability of being
successful in the long run than applying a one-size-fits-all approach. Hanley et al.
(2003) conducted a comprehensive review of the use of functional analysis in
behavior analysis and found the approach to be widespread and highly effective in
resolving behavioral difficulties. As we shall see below, behavior analysts are actu-
ally required by their code of ethics to conduct a functional analysis prior to imple-
menting a behavior reduction plan (BACB, 2016, see Section 3.01). The
The Future of First Wave Behavior Therapies 771
implementation of functional analysis, along with other factors, has significantly

elevated the conceptual sophistication of the field.
Behavior analysis has made significant advances in the past few decades. Below
I will outline some of the major developments and discuss both positive and nega-
tive aspects of each.
Signs of Professionalization
The field focused on the sociology of the professions has established a number of
criteria through which a given discipline can be considered a genuine profession.
These include such factor as recognition and endorsement by the larger society,
solid professional associations, being based on a recognized body of specialized
knowledge, a code of ethics, and the requirement of specific training, among others
(see Larson, 1978). Here are some of the advances behavior analysis has made in
this regard.
Organizational Infrastructure
The field of behavior analysis is well-supported by a number of national, regional

and state associations that are academically-based and that practicing behavior ana-
lysts can join. The two major ones at the national level are the Association for
Behavior Analysis - International (ABAI) (https://www.abainternational.org/wel-
come.aspx) and the Association of Professional Behavior Analysts (APBA, https://
apbahome.net/) ABAI was founded in 1974 and has about 7000 members. It spon-
sors a number of national conventions each year; supports a stable of quality behav-
ior analytic journals; accredits doctoral, masters and bachelor’s degree programs;
hosts an employment listing service, and sponsors continuing education (CE) pro-
grams in behavior analysis and several related fields, such as psychology and social
work. APBA was founded in 2007 and has a clear focus on meeting the needs of
practitioners in the field. In many ways APBA mirrors the activities of the
ABAI. APBA hosts an annual conference, sponsors CE programs, undertakes legis-
lative advocacy related to behavior analytic services, promotes a model legislative
act governing the legal regulation of behavior analysts, and has a number of state
chapters. Both ABAI and APBA endorse professional liability insurance programs
its members may purchase. The European Association for Behavior Analysis
(https://www.europeanaba.org/) and within-country associations around the world
further support the development of the field.
A relatively small number of psychologists (about 500) remain active members
within the American Psychological Association and form Division 25 – Behavior
Analysis. It is more academically based than practice-oriented and includes impor-
tant issues, such as basic research in the experimental analysis of human and animal
772 B. A. Thyer
behavior and the philosophy of behaviorism (topics of not much interest to practi-
tioners). It sponsors some awards in the field of behavior analysis and has a small
number of papers and panels presented during the annual convention of the APA.
I am a member of Division 25 and my sense is that its members are older than the
majority of practicing behavior analysts, who gravitate more to the ABAI and
APBA. While not absolute, the budding off of behavior analysis from the field of
psychology is nearly complete (Thyer, 2015a). Many licensed health care providers
claim human behavior and its modification within its legal scope of practice, and to
be science-based (this varies greatly obviously), claims isomorphic with those of
behavior analysis. Fields such as clinical social work, marriage and family therapy,
mental health counseling, speech and language pathology, teachers, business man-
agers, all can potentially make use of the methods of behavior analysis. That they
typically do this less well than qualified BCBAs seems apparent (I am a licensed
clinical social worker and very familiar with that field), but it is unlikely that behav-
ior analysts will ever successfully stake out an exclusive and legally supported claim
to the professional practice of using operant methods to modify human behavior.
Credentialing and Legal Regulation
Unlike the ABAI and APBA, which are membership organizations, the Behavior
Analyst Certification Board (BACB, https://www.bacb.com) was founded in 1998
to nurture the legal regulation and state-level credentialing of the practice of behav-
ior analysts. One does not join the BACB as a member. The BACB develops and
maintains a high quality set of credentialing examinations, created consistent with
the highest psychometric standards, to support several levels of credentialing. These
are the Board Certified Behavior Analyst (BCBA, requiring a master’s degree), the
Board Certified Associate Behavior Analyst (BCaBA, requiring a bachelor’s
degree), and the registered behavior technician (RBT, requiring a high school
diploma). BCBAs holding a doctoral degree may also qualify to use the designation
of BCBA-D but there are no additional requirements for this designation. All these
credentials require formal training in ABA, passing a valid examination, adherence
to the professional code of ethics (formally called the Professional and Ethical
Compliance Code for Behavior Analysts, https://www.bacb.com/ethics-information/
ethics-codes/), and maintaining ones skills through continuing education (CE)
requirements. Recertification is required every two years.
The two major initiatives of the BACB involve the development and administra-
tion of the credentialing examinations, and promoting the state-level licensure of
qualified behavior analysts. Both initiatives are extremely successful. At least 31
states now legally regulate or license the practice of behavior analysis and passing
the appropriate BCBA examination is included in to each state’s legislation as a
requirement to be licensed. Some states (e.g., Florida) do not legally regulate the
practice of behavior analysis via licensure but may provide for a lower level of regu-
lation called certification, but also involving the BACB examinations.
The BACB actively works with the states lacking licensure to help obtain it, and
refine the licensure acts in states which already have licensure. As of the end of
2020, there were over 42,000 BCBAs, over 4500 BCaBS, and about 83,000 RBTs.
The BACB focuses on providing certifications to residents in the USA, Canada, and
the UK, although residents of other countries may be permitted to apply in the
future. The BCAB program is accredited by the National Commission for Certifying
Agencies, a highly respected agency. The demand for persons holding the BACB
credentials is rapidly increasing and salaries are generally good. For example, in
2018 there were over 16,000 job postings for BCBAs, increasing to almost 29,000 in
2019 (BACB, 2020b).
Insurance Reimbursement and Billing Codes
Related to the growth of an extensive and valid credentialing program for profes-
sional behavior analysts, is the practice of permitting BCBAs to obtain health insur-
ance reimbursement for their services. Behavior analysis is a fairly intensive
treatment modality and few families have the financial wherewithal to pay for ABA
out of pocket, so having insurance reimbursement available makes these services
more widely accessible and also makes ABA practice more financially feasible for
BCBAs. When federal and state insurance programs, such as Medicaid and the
widely available military insurance program known as Tricare, decided to reimburse
for BCBA services, this acted as a sort of imprimatur which encourages other state
and private insurance programs to similarly support behavior analysis. As noted by
Trump and Ayres (2020) “Recent insurance reforms in 47 states, the District of
Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands require companies to offer, or cover, behavior-
analytic services to individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.” (p. 282).
This is an incredible impetus to the spread of behavior-analytic treatment.
The ABAI collaborates with a multidisciplinary Billing Codes Commission
which is aimed at developing Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes for
BCBAs and other professionals to use to bill for behavior analysis assessment and
treatment services. This is important because the improper use of a CPT code can
result in non or delayed insurance reimbursement (Staff, 2020).
Practice
The practice of behavior analysis is growing exponentially. As noted by the BACB

(2020a), “Demand for behavior analysts is increasing: Annual demand for individu-
als holding BCBA/BCBA-D certification has increased each year since 2010, with
an 80% increase from 2018 to 2019. In addition, increases in demand occurred in
every state since 2010” (p. 1, bold in original).
774 B. A. Thyer
The practice of behavior analysis is not limited to providing autism services. The
ABAI supports a number of special interest groups focused on many other domains
and social problems in which BCBAs practice. Some of these are Addiction; Health,
Sport and Fitness; Behavioral Gerontology; Behavioral Medicine; Clinical
Medicine; Crime; Delinquency and Forensics; Gambling; Mental Health;
Rehabilitation and Independent Living; and Sexual Behavior, among others. Clearly
it is a mistake to see behavior analysis as being limited to practice with persons with
intellectual disabilities and autistic spectrum disorders, although this latter field
clearly dominates the field.
Some Problems
Competing Credentials
Although the BACB continues to be the dominant credentialing program for behav-
ior analytic providers, a number of less stringent or more narrowly focused compet-
ing credentials have arisen. This creates some confusion within the field itself and
among the public. The Behavioral Intervention Certification Council (BICC, https://
behavioralcertification.org/) offers credentials as a Board Certified Autism
Technician (BCAT) and a Board Certified Autism Professional (BCAP). This group
has its own examination program (not as well developed at those offered by the
BACB) and a Code of Conduct (2 pages long, also not as extensive as that devel-
oped by the BACB). The BICC was created in 2013 and focuses exclusively on
providing credentials related to the treatment of person with autism spectrum disor-
der, a far narrower focus than the field of behavior analysis as a whole. The BCAT
requires only 15 h of clinical experience (a shockingly low number) to earn the
credential, along with other qualifications. The BICC eerily mirrors the structure of
the BACB processes and services such as its own code of conduct, credentialing
examinations, certifications, continuing education programs, disciplinary
actions, etc.
The American Board of Professional Psychology (https://abpp.org/Applicant-
Information/Specialty-Boards/Behvioral-Cognitive.aspx) offers board certification
with an emphasis in applied behavior analysis (under the umbrella of its certifica-
tion in behavioral and cognitive psychology, an odd pairing, given ABA’s eschewal
of so-called cognition as a directly manipulable cause of behavior). This credential,
board certification in clinical psychology, is limited to licensed psychologists (hold-
ing a doctoral degree) with at least two years of practice in behavioral and cognitive
psychology. It does not require earning the BCBA credential. It is not clear how
many licensed psychologists have earned the ABPP with the specialization in
behavioral and cognitive psychology but it is likely very small.
Professional psychology viewed with misgivings the slow but steady rise of
behavior analysis as an independent, science-based practice. Increasing numbers of
ABA practitioners obtain their academic degrees outside of psychology programs
(e.g. academic masters or doctorates solely in the field of behavior analysis, or in

education). One early sticking point was whether BCBAs were practicing ‘psychol-
ogy’ and as such needed to be supervised by licensed psychologists. There is an
uneasy truce now, with the surge of ABA as its own independent discipline and
credentials, and the apparent minimal interest of licensed psychologist in providing
ABA services. ABA services requires a sizeable investment of time and effort and
do not lend themselves to the tradition of the 50-min-h and office-based practice
common in psychotherapy. Licensed psychology lost the fight in terms of restricting
the licensed masters-level practice of psychotherapy by clinical social work, mar-
riage and family therapy, and mental health counseling, and it seems ABA is emerg-
ing as its own similar stand-alone discipline.
In one recent development, the APA has approved accreditation standards for
master’s programs in “health” psychology, e.g., clinical, counseling, and school
psychology (Grus, 2019). Previously APA only accredited doctoral programs in
professional psychology and this new accreditation program in health psychology
will inevitably lead to state-level efforts to permit the licensure of masters-level
health psychologists. These will likely be met with some resistance by doctoral-
level licensed psychologists in some instances, and also very likely from other
masters-level psychotherapy-related professions, such as clinical social workers,
marriage and family therapists, and counselors, fearing, perhaps rightly so, increased
competition in the marketplace. It is also possible that licensed masters-level health
psychologists will compete with the large and growing number of masters-level
BCBAs, and state-level efforts by BCBAs may also push back on providing licen-
sure to masters-level health psychologists. This could potentially give rise to a
resurgence of conflicts between the profession of behavior analysis and that of pro-
fessional psychology.
The International Board of Credentialing and Continuing Standards (IBCCS)
offers a Certified Autism Specialist and an Advanced Certified Autism Specialist
credential (https://ibcces.org/certifications-education/#1600369147586-2ebcce10-
6b51). One can earn both ‘credentials’ with a bachelor’s degree, some years of prac-
tice experience in the field, completing 21 continuing education hours, and the pay-
ment of a $875 fee! The CE training is limited to the following topics: Behavior,
Behavior Contingency, ethics, and Discrete Trial Training. These are certainly
within the scope of ABA practice but extremely limited, coming nowhere near the
competencies needed to effectively serve persons with autism. I suspect that these
certifications are marketed to either the gullible or those unwilling to complete the
more rigorous requirements of the BACB.
The Qualified Behavior Analysis Credentialing Board (https://qababoard.com/
about/) is another independent body which offers certifications to practitioners who
serve persons with autism spectrum disorder. Founded in 2012, it offers three levels
of credentials which largely mirror those of the BACB, the entry-level Applied
Behavior Analysis Technician, the supervisory-qualified Qualified Autism Services
Practitioner, and the masters-level Qualified Behavior Analysts. These required a
high school diploma, continuing education or university-based coursework, passing
a written exam, and supervised experience. Unlike the BCBA, the QABA
776 B. A. Thyer
credentials are exclusively focused in the area of autistic spectrum disorders. Fewer
than 5000 individuals have earned one of these credentials.
Green (2015) authored a comprehensive paper on evaluating various credentials
in behavior analysis, a paper whose recommendations were adopted by the
Association for Professional Behavior Analysis (https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.
a p b a h o m e . n e t / r e s o u r c e / c o l l e c t i o n / 1 F D D B D D 2 -5 C A F -4 B 2 A -A B 3 F -
DAE5E72111BF/APBA_Guidelines_EvaluatingCredentials_180906.pdf). Anyone
contemplating education and credentialing in the field of ABA is advised to consult
Richmond’s recommendations, and to evaluate each credentialing program they are
considering against these standards.
For now the BACB credentials remain the most rigorous and most widely recog-
nized. In many states the title “Behavior Analyst,” or some close variant thereof, is
a legally protected term that may only be used by licensed behavioral analysts
(licensure of behavior analysts is each individual state’s prerogative). No private
organization licenses behavior analysts, no matter what credential is offered by that
organization. The advantages of the BACB credentials is their sound research-base,
rigorous standards of examination, a highly sophisticated and scrupulous code of
ethics, disciplinary procedures, broad scope of practice – beyond the field of autistic
spectrum disorders, third party insurance recognition, and widespread adoption by
the states that regulate ABA services. The development of multiple practice creden-
tials in behavior analysis is confusing to the field, practitioners and public alike. As
the legal regulation of behavior analysis moves ahead (31 states license behavior
analysts), with more and more states requiring the BCBA credential and restricting
the title “Behavior Analyst” and terms such as “behavior analysis services” to the
holders of that and other BACB-provided credentials, it is hoped that alternative,
and in many ways spurious credentials, will wither away (BACB, 2020c).
Corporate Takeover of Behavior Analysis?
In the early years of behavior analysis, services were usually provided in institu-
tional settings, such as state homes for persons with intellectual disabilities, psychi-
atric hospitals, and public schools. Clientele were often persons with very serious
disabilities for whom there seemed little hope, who received little professional
attention and were provided only with custodial care. There seemed little to lose by
letting experimental psychologists try their new methods to help such persons learn
to acquire adaptive living skills and to decrease dysfunctional behaviors.
Over time, the successes of behavior analysis led to these services being adopted
within more mainstream setting. With the rise of the BACB credentials, individual
practitioners became hired as staff members or independent contractors, and com-
panies exclusively devoted to providing behavior analysis services arose. As third
party insurance payments became more widely available, some entrepreneurial
ABA companies expanded and became not only quite large in terms of professional
staff, but also quite profitable. Inevitably, this has attracted the attention of venture
capitalists or larger health care companies, who literally ‘bought’ entire ABA-
service companies. This can be a problem, as noted by Cathey and Ward (https://
bsci21.org/how-to-build-your-business-as-a-behavior-analyst/):
A related issue is the tendency for leaders to sell out their businesses to larger organizations
or conglomerates. This again may make for a short-term windfall for the leader but larger
conglomerates can tend towards profit maximization over quality care and production. This
is of course not the rule, but is quite common.
Graber and O’Brien (2019) also accurately note this issue. The new owners may
tend to see ABA service providers more as profit generators than as purveyors of
humanistically-based care carefully regulated by a strong code of ethics. Caseloads
might be increased to the point that quality of care deteriorates, and supervisory
hours are cut below the minimum required. The careful attention to live data-
collection, ascertaining inter-rater agreement, conducting functional analyses, and
social validity issues, all may be seen as ancillary to the real business of doing
‘therapy’, which produces billable hours, and reduced accordingly.
Sohn (2020) wrote about this problem and quoted one of the country’s leading
experts in ABA, Jon Bailey, Ph.D., making the following point:
…the agencies that hire RBTs often rely on a vast pool of undertrained labor. These busi-
nesses collectively train and employ tens of thousands of RBTs to work with children. “It’s
being treated as a money grab in many places,” Bailey says. He estimates that there are
hundreds, if not thousands, of these companies in the United States. Some are profitable
enough that they have become popular buys for private equity firms.
One firm was alleged to have committed fraud against the federal Tricare insurance
program and paid a penalty of over $600,000 (https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/
pr/tampa-b ay-a utism-s ervice-p rovider-a grees-p ay-6 75000-r esolve-c ivil-
healthcare-fraud). The ABA Ethics Hotline (https://www.abaethicshotline.com/
who-we-are/) is one reliable resource dedicated to providing guidance to companies
and individuals faced with ambiguous billing practices of a lowering of practice
standards. Several Florida ABA firms were convicted of Medicaid fraud. While the
firms involved paid penalties, the state also cut back on ABA services as a whole,
depriving clients of needed care. Such incidents tarnish the reputation of ABA as a
credible and trustworthy field. Some companies specialize in rooting out fraud and
abuse among the providers of behavior analysis services (e.g., http://highlandbehav-
ioral.com/managed-care-organizations-employers/fraud-abuse-analysis/). In sum
careful attention needs to be given to ensure that ABA firms owned and operated by
larger corporations which are non-ABA focused maintain high professional stan-
dards and that these are not sacrificed in the name of enhancing profits.
he Intrusion of Pseudo-scientific
T
and Non-Research-Based Services
In the broad field of human services, there are several ways a given intervention can
be categorized.
778 B. A. Thyer
1. It may have no scientific support at all, which is all too common. A given pro-
gram has simply not been examined, and there is no way to empirically see if it
is or is not supported by research since the requisite research has not been
undertaken.
2. It may have been researched and found not to be helpful. This too is common.
‘Helpful’ means that the intervention yields outcomes that are clearly superior to
the benefits obtained following receipt of credible placebo-type services. Many
accepted therapies have been shown to provide little more than placebo-level
benefits.
3. It may have been researched and found to be harmful. This too is common. Yet
such services continue to be provided.
4. It may have been adequately researched and shown to be generally beneficial.
The BACB Code of Ethics is quite clear that therapies associated with statuses 1–3
above are unacceptable for inclusion in the practice of ABA. For example, Item 2.09
(a) on Treatment/Intervention Efficacy states “Clients have a right to effective treat-
ment (i.e. based on the research literature and adapted to the individual client)…
Effective treatment procedures have been validated as having both long-term and
short-term benefits to clients and society.” Given this clear mandate it is surprising
to find behavior analysts providing non-scientifically validated or pseudoscientific
services to their clients, as documented by Schreck and Mazur (2008) and Schreck,
Karunaratne, Zane and Wilford (2016). Among the non-research-based therapies
provided were facilitated communication/rapid prompting, vitamin therapy, holding
therapy, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, Sensory Integration Therapy, Auditory
Integration, and Gluten-casein-free diets, and Floor-time. As Schreck et al. (2016)
contend, “These results must serve as a wakeup call for our field of ABA. It is
unfathomable that even one behavior analyst would admit to and/or use any of the
unestablished or ineffective/harmful treatments listed” (p. 373). There is an ample
literature out there to educate practitioners on ineffective and harmful therapies and
their characteristic warning signs (Capuano & Kim, 2020; Offit, 2008; Pignotti &
Thyer, 2015; Thyer, 2015b, 2019, 2022; Thyer & Pignotti, 2010, 2015. Schreck,
Karunaratne, Zane & Wilford (2016) provide some helpful suggestions to further
reduce the intrusion of fake therapies into the practice armamentarium of behavior
analysts. If we do not that behavior analyst employ empirically valid practices, our
claims to being a science-based field will ring hollow.
Summary and Conclusions
For many, behavior analysis is considered as a major approach in the first wave of
behavior therapies. Today there are solid indicators forecasting that behavior analy-
sis will thrive in the future. There is a snowballing of the number of appropriately
credentialed Board Certified Behavior Analysts, the professional infrastructure is
sound, private-pay and third-party insurance sources of income needed to support
the practice of ABA are growing, our scientific foundation is sound and expanding.
Our Code of Ethics, supported by the BACB is solid, and in my opinion is one of the
most rigorous and comprehensive available. The number of avenues for becoming
certified as a behavior analyst, via formal university-based degrees or by taking
approved courses, is growing. I find these developments astonishing, considering
the state of affairs when I entered the field in the late 1970s. My peers and I had little
sense of how successful the field would become. We held the view that through
behavior analysis we could help make over the existing practice disciplines (Thyer,
1995). We believed that by showing how effective ABA services were, myriad clini-
cal social workers, professional psychologists, educators, and other groups would
eagerly substitute ABA practices their less effective, traditional practices, and in
effect become much more behavioral in their orientation. This did not happen. ABA
remains a minority practice perspective in most health care fields. It is the privilege
of these fields to ignore the utility of the science of behavior. If they continue to do
so, a Darwinian process will likely winnow out the less effective approaches to care
and behavior analytic practices are well positioned to file the gap.
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The Future of Third Wave Cognitive
Behavior Therapies
Robert D. Zettle and Akihiko Masuda
Prognostication would seem to be a rather thankless and perilous undertaking that

is perhaps best reserved for predictions about the weather by groundhogs and wool-
lybear caterpillars (“7 Animals Besides Groundhogs that Can Predict the Future,”
n.d.). After all, even prophecies that eventually prove to be accurate, especially
those that are unwelcomed, may not be believed, leading to the dismissal of those
who offer them as little more than modern-day Cassandras. Our purpose in this
chapter is to offer our thoughts on where we believe what have come to be known
as third wave cognitive behavior therapies (CBT)1 may be headed. We claim to have
no special psychic powers in doing so and are mindful of considerable trepidation
that our predictions may eventuate in us being placed in the same company as a
large ground squirrel (“Punxsutawney Phil”) or a cursed Greek priestess
(“Cassandra”). We are nonetheless willing to take this risk.
1
It should be noted that the term “cognitive behavior therapy” is being used broadly to encompass
a collection of related approaches whose development has progressed over three distinct waves
(Hayes, 2004). During the first of these phases or generations, the approaches that evolved during
the second wave into what is now known as traditional CBT were commonly recognized as behav-
ior therapies and/or forms of behavior modification and applied behavior analysis.
R. D. Zettle (*)
Wichita State University, Wichita, KS, USA
e-mail: robert.zettle@wichita.edu
A. Masuda
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3_34
782 R. D. Zettle and A. Masuda
Domain of Third Wave Cognitive Behavior Therapies
Our vision of what the future might hold collectively for third wave CBT would
seem to be somewhat dependent on what specific approaches are regarded as being
legitimate and appropriate members of the domain. Resolving this matter, however,
may be a bit more challenging and contentious than might be expected. Hayes
(2004) submitted that a third generation of CBT had emerged by the dawn of this
century that represented alternative approaches for addressing clinically-relevant
private events. More specifically, rather than seeking to directly change problematic
affective states through the application of operant or classical conditioning princi-
ples (first wave) and/or dysfunctional beliefs via cognitive restructuring (second
wave), therapies within this third wave instead pursued a second-order change
agenda that emphasized the incorporation of mindfulness and acceptance strategies
to alter how clients relate to unwanted thoughts and feelings. According to Hayes,
interventions representative of this latest generation of CBT included, but were not
necessarily limited to acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al.,
1999, 2012b), dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), functional ana-
lytic psychotherapy (FAP; R. J. Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), and mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002). Others asserted that metacognitive
therapy (MCT; Wells, 2008) and mindfulness-based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn,
1990) should also be regarded as part of the movement (Herbert & Forman, 2010).
Perhaps not surprisingly, at least some proponents of second wave or more tradi-
tional versions of CBT took rather strong exception to the proposition that this pur-
ported next generation of therapies had anything all that new to offer (Arch &
Craske, 2008; Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008), or even if it did, that its membership
list was all that expansive. Hofmann et al. (2010), in particular, cited personal com-
munications from Linehan and Wells expressing their affiliation with more tradi-
tional CBT in arguing that DBT and MCT, respectively, should not be considered as
third wave approaches. If there was one point, however, that both sides of this debate
seemed to be in agreement on it was that to the extent that a new generation of CBT
had emerged, ACT most clearly exemplified it.
To the degree that ACT may thus be regarded as a “poster child” for the third and
most recent wave of CBT, our discussion of the future of such approaches will of
necessity be closely linked with that of this intervention. Another purported, but less
visible, third wave approach, however, that also warrants inclusion and explicit
mention in this overall consideration is FAP (R. J. Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991).
Practitioners and researchers of ACT commonly regard and value proponents of
FAP as “fellow travelers” insofar as it is the one other third wave approach that is
most closely associated with ACT, to the point that separate as well as conjoint pre-
sentations, symposia, and workshops of each are commonly featured at each annual
conference sponsored by the Association of Contextual Behavioral Science (ACBS).
One reason for the close relationship between FAP and ACT is that both are essen-
tially process-based approaches that share common philosophical and conceptual
roots in functional contextualism and radical behaviorism, even though FAP is more
The Future of Third Wave Cognitive Behavior Therapies 783
relatively concerned with how clients relate to others than with their own private
events (B. S. Kohlenberg & Callaghan, 2010). Despite these somewhat differing
clinical foci, both approaches can and have been rather seamlessly integrated with
each other in both research (Gifford et al., 2004) and practice (Callaghan et al.,
2004), leading Carmen Luciano (1999) to go so far as proclaiming that “if you’re
doing ACT and not doing FAP, you’re not doing ACT!” While FAP has established
an identity and presence independent of ACT, it is, nonetheless, so closely related to
ACT as another approach grounded within contextual behavioral science (CBS) that
their futures in our view are likely to be inexorably linked. And if so, as goes ACT,
so goes FAP in particular, and third wave approaches more generally.
Changes in What Is Delivered and How
We are not sure where ACT is going, but we are reasonably confident that it will not
be standing still as we anticipate changes in at least both its composition and acces-
sibility. In what follows, we will first address anticipated alterations in the make-up
of ACT by elucidating two pathways already in motion that we believe will increas-
ingly impact the future of ACT and other members of CBT’s third generation.
One of these movements involves the ongoing relationship between ACT and
both practical advancements and conceptual refinements related to relational frame
theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001) as a “functional contextual account of human lan-
guage and cognition” (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, p. 130). The other is the
growing emergence of a process-based approach to CBT in particular (Hayes &
Hofmann, 2018) and of psychotherapy more generally (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019)
that has the potential to supersede and subsume the three waves of CBT that have
preceded it. Insofar as these two developments until quite recently have unfolded
largely independent of each other, we will first discuss each of them separately.
However, in light of recent efforts to develop an RFT-driven, process-based therapy
(e.g., D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2020a, b), we will then consider the implications of
the two heretofore parallel movements essentially merging into one for the future of
third wave approaches.
Either singly or collectively, we expect that further developments in RFT and
process-based therapy (PBT) are quite likely to result in the eventual demise of the
branded therapy currently known as ACT within a further blurring of distinctions
between the three generations of CBT (D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2020a). Such an
apparent inevitable outcome, however, in our view is to be heralded rather than
lamented insofar as it would specifically reflect ACT’s ultimate legacy and contribu-
tions, as well as those of the third generation of CBT more broadly, to progressive
therapeutic movements larger than themselves. In short, we believe that the impact
of ACT will continue to be felt through its legacy as a coherent process-based
approach (Ong et al., 2020) even though its specific identity and explicit recognition
of its contributions to future research and practice of CBT may diminish over time.
Apart from changes in what might be regarded as the make-up or branding of

ACT, are others that we more confidently foresee impacting the delivery of ACT as
well as other more contemporary approaches to CBT. A trend that was already in
motion away from offering face-to-face psychotherapy sessions in traditional prac-
tice settings, such as offices, to instead through telehealth has been greatly and
dramatically accelerated as a result of the global COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Perrin
et al., 2020). The proportion of services offered by psychologists in the US via tele-
health prior to this year (i.e., 7%) has increased 12-fold to over 85% during the
pandemic (Pierce et al., 2020). Moreover, these same psychologists expect that over
a third of their work will continue to occur as telehealth following the conclusion of
the outbreak (Pierce et al., 2020). Accordingly, our expectation is that this shift in
service delivery modes, while certainly not specific to ACT and other third-wave
approaches, is unlikely to be reversed, but will continue to proliferate as more cre-
ative uses of modern technologies such as apps (e.g., Bricker et al., 2020), internet-
based platforms (ACBS, n.d.-b), and other computer-assisted options, such as
virtual reality (e.g., Matsangidou et al., 2020) are further developed.
The ACT-RFT Relationship
Consistent with their shared philosophical groundings within functional contextual-

ism, the relationship between ACT and RFT can be most meaningfully understood
by considering the historical and current situational contexts within which their
relationship has been and is presently situated. In short, reflecting on the history
ACT and RFT have shared with each other may help explicate both their current and
future relationships, as well as any resulting implications for the future of ACT in
particular and of third wave CBT more generally. From our perspective and for our
purposes, it seems meaningful to view the relationship between ACT, which is
based on RFT-informed behavioral principles (e.g., rule-governed behavior), and
RFT as having progressed and as continuing to unfold over three discernible stages.
Parallel Play
Although a case can be made that ACT preceded the development of RFT, both have
common roots in an effort to better understand how language and cognition contrib-
ute to human functioning from a behavior analytic perspective (Zettle, 2005; Zettle
& Wilson, in press). In that sense, it seems more useful to regard the simultaneous
development and co-evolution of each, particularly during the 1990s, as being
roughly akin to parallel play. ACT and RFT, like two children occupied with their
own toys within a shared playroom, were certainly aware of each other and their
respective activities, especially given the seminal contributions of Steve Hayes to

the development of each, but advancements in one, in retrospect, received minimal
explicit acknowledgement by the other. The first book-length presentations of both
ACT (Hayes et al., 1999) and RFT (Hayes et al., 2001) were published around the
same time, but made relatively little mention of each other. For example, the index
of the first ACT book (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 303) included three mentions of RFT
within it, and that of the RFT text (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 273) referenced ACT twice.
By contrast, the second edition of the ACT book 13 years later (Hayes et al., 2012b,
p. 400) cited RFT over 20 times. Thus, especially within the first decade of this
century, developments in ACT and RFT became more closely interrelated to where
advancements in one were more likely to stimulate and inform progression in
the other.
Reticulated Model
The inter-relationship that subsequently emerged between ACT and RFT, particu-
larly during the first decade and a half of this century, came to be formally cast and
championed as occurring within a broader “reticulated model” of CBS (Hayes et al.,
2012a) in which ACT and RFT collaboratively pursued increasingly mutual inter-
ests, albeit via a division of labor in which advancements within basic RFT research
in human language and cognition would presumably lead to the more efficacious
practice of ACT.
One such example was the development of a brief ACT protocol targeting the
stimulus function of repetitive negative thinking that was informed by both concep-
tual and empirical progress in RFT (Ruiz et al., 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020). From an
RFT perspective, client values and triggers for repetitive negative thinking, respec-
tively, are conceptualized as nested within hierarchical networks of positive and
negative reinforcers that, in turn, are related to each other in a frame of opposition.
Within this framework, events that have positive reinforcing functions due to their
congruence with values (e.g., spending time with a close friend) also set the occa-
sion for worrying and rumination to be triggered by their nonoccurrence or block-
age, such as when that same friend fails to return a phone call or text message. The
focus of therapy is to disrupt escalating repetitive negative thinking that serves a
negative reinforcing/experiential avoidant function and is triggered by such value-
incongruent events by redirecting client attention to valued actions (e.g., reaching
out to another friend). Although a more detailed account of how the protocol was
administered by Ruiz and his colleagues is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is
important to highlight that what was uniquely RFT-consistent in its development
was the way initially triggered negative thinking was reframed in relationship to
value-consistent alternative/compatible behaviors following the RFT principles of
mutual entailment, combinatory entailment, and transformation of stimulus func-
tion (see Ruiz et al., 2016).
Within the reticulated relationship being advocated between ACT and RFT,
interests of and challenges encountered by clinicians also would help identify criti-
cal phenomena to be further investigated by basic scientists within the RFT lab.
Illustrative applications of this facet of the CBS model advocated by Hayes et al.
(2012a) included efforts by RFT to account for and enhance the use of metaphors
(Foody et al., 2014; Sierra et al., 2016) and exercises promoting a type of perspec-
tive taking, known as self-as-context (Foody et al., 2013, 2015) within the practice
of ACT. Metaphors, in particular, have been included within versions of ACT that
predated both its recognition as a branded approach as well as the development of
RFT (Zettle, 2005; Zettle & Wilson, in press). For example, the results of a labora-
tory analogue experiment by Sierra and associates (2016) suggested that the thera-
peutic impact of metaphors could be optimized by emphasizing shared physical
properties between client experiences and the metaphor (e.g., struggling with anxi-
ety and quicksand) and by the inclusion of appetitive augmenting functions within
its presentation (e.g., highlighting valued actions that could be engaged in if the
struggle were abandoned).
Speaking of metaphors, RFT researchers within the reticulated model came
to be likened by at least some (McLoughlin, 2017; Schoendorff, 2018) to “elves
in the basement” who were tasked with producing new toys for ACT “Santas” to
then gift to their “good little girl and boy” clients. Some understandable resent-
ment and other ill feelings by proponents of RFT about being cast in this role, as
well as a growing recognition of the sheer futility of the task assigned to them,
eventually lead to what might currently be compared to an amicable separation
between RFT and ACT, rather than a marriage in which one partner dominated
over the other (Y. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2016a, b). On this latter point, those in
the RFT labs particularly pointed out the challenges of conducting a satisfactory
scientific analysis of “middle-level terms,” such as defusion and self-as-context,
germane to the model of psychological flexibility on which ACT is based (Foody
et al., 2013). Most importantly, such nontechnical terms and concepts have not,
in contrast to one such as “reinforcement,” been generated directly from labora-
tory data (Y. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2016a, b). Instead, they were posited as less
technically defined clinical processes contributing to behavioral health and well-
being within the model of human functioning on which ACT is based. As a
result, RFT bench scientists attempting an experimental analysis of ACT-related
middle-level terms soon realized they were in effect taking on a “mission
impossible.”
It seems worth pointing out that this relationship between what might be regarded
as the applied and basic domains within CBS, as represented respectively by ACT
and RFT, seems to have been largely the reverse of that which occurred during the
development of the first generation of behavior therapy (Zettle, 2016). Systematic
desensitization, for example, was informed by basic respondent principles first
investigated by Wolpe (1958) in establishing and eliminating conditioned emotional
reactions in cats, while the treatment program developed by Lovaas (1966) for
children with autism was based on behavioral principles originally identified and
investigated in the operant conditioning laboratory (Ferster & Skinner, 1957;
Skinner, 1938). Imagine if Skinner first developed an effective means of modifying
the behavioral deficits and excesses of children with developmental disabilities
before retreating to the lab with his rats and pigeons to identify the basic principles
and processes behind its success. Applied scientific advances often precede basic
science, which results in the latter chasing and lagging behind the former. In retro-
spect, this same relationship appears to have played itself out at least to some degree
between ACT and RFT.
Amicable Separation
More recently over roughly the past 5 years, proponents of RFT have asserted more
autonomy and independence in pursuing their own interests, particularly within the
domain of educational practices (Y. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2016b), and in being less
influenced by the agenda of ACT practitioners and researchers. The resulting sepa-
ration or divorce has been an amicable one, especially insofar as a number of the
theoretical/conceptual advancements within RFT, as well as related basic research
findings, have clear implications for psychotherapeutic practice. A shift that has
occurred over this time period is that RFT’s contributions to clinical work have
become less closely tied to ACT, but are increasingly instead more widely applica-
ble to other therapeutic practices and traditions, particularly the burgeoning PBT
movement occurring within CBT writ large (Hayes & Hofmann, 2018). Two prime
examples of what may be regarded as the development of RFT-informed approaches
to verbal psychotherapy unfolding largely independent of ACT as well as other
specific, branded treatment packages are provided by the recent work of Villatte
et al. (2016) and D. Barnes-Holmes et al. (2020).
The book by Villatte and associates (2016) particularly represents a coherent
effort to apply what has been learned in the RFT lab to more effectively utilize lan-
guage as a medium for human growth and the alleviation of suffering within verbal
psychotherapy. The volume even includes a “Quick Guide to Using RFT in
Psychotherapy” (pp. 361–380) that makes it quite clear at the very outset that it is
not merely another ACT manual:
It is not meant to describe another or better way to do ACT, nor to suggest that you need to
become an ACT therapist in order to apply RFT in your clinical practice. It is not meant to
replace ACT or, indeed, any other treatment. Instead, this book is an attempt to explore and
explicate principles that apply to a common core mechanism of all psychotherapies – lan-
guage. (Villatte et al., 2016, p. 5)
The most recent work by D. Barnes-Holmes et al. (2020) is even more

explicit in developing their version of an “RFT-driven process-based therapy”
informed by recent advancements in their conceptualization of arbitrarily applicable
relational responding.2 They specifically propose a new conceptual unit of analysis

within RFT, referred to as the ROE, based on their argument that psychological
experiences for those of us who are sufficiently verbally competent is a byproduct
of a continuous stream of relating (R) to stimuli and events verbally, orienting (O)
or attending to particular events or stimuli, and their evoking (E) properties, depend-
ing on whether such stimuli or events are appetitive, aversive, or relatively neutral
in nature. Because the three elements of the ROE are thought to interact with each
other in a dynamic rather than linear way, ideographic functional analyses and
assessments of their respective roles in initiating and maintaining clinically-relevant
behavior must be undertaken in order to effectively guide process-oriented therapy
tailored on a client-by-client basis.
While RFT has been busy finding its own way in the world, ACT has not been
exactly standing still. Over 60% of the 400 plus randomized controlled trails of
ACT that have been reported to date have been published within the last 5 years
(ACBS, n.d.-a) as the globalization of the approach and its areas of application have
similarly expanded beyond psychotherapeutic practices over this same period of
time (Zettle & Wilson, in press). ACBS, which is the parent organization for ACT
practitioners and researchers as well as applied and basic scientists within RFT, cur-
rently has over 9000 members, with over 80% of them residing outside the
U.S. (ACBS, n.d.-c).
The Emergence of Process-Based Therapy (PBT)
It exceeds the focus and purpose of this chapter to offer a detailed summary of the
growing PBT movement within CBT and its possible implications for clinical
research and practice beyond it to psychotherapy more broadly. For such coverage,
interested readers are referred to the recent book (Hayes & Hoffmann, 2018) as well
as a series of related papers by Hayes, Hofmann, and colleagues on PBT (Hayes
et al., 2019, 2020a, d; Hofmann & Hayes, 2019). For our purposes, an overview of
PBT and the context in which it has emerged should be sufficient to provide a back-
drop in which to specifically consider its potential impact on the future of CBT
more generally and on that of its third wave in particular.
In large measure, PBT can be viewed as a reaction and alternative to the “proto-
cols for syndromes” approach (Hayes et al., 2019) of the past 25 years within CBT
2
According to RFT, both humans and nonhumans display nonarbitrarily applicable relational
responding by differentially responding to stimuli based on their relative physical properties. For
instance, a pigeon can be trained to peck the larger of two discs even if selecting the smaller one is
the only option that has been previously reinforced. However, to date only verbally capable humans
have reliably shown arbitrarily applicable relational responding in which behavior is controlled not
by the relative physical properties of stimuli, but by others established by verbal-social communi-
ties. The prototypical example is how the value of coins in a number of monetary systems is not
based on their respective sizes (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016).
during which empirically-supported psychological treatments were organized

around psychiatric diagnoses (e.g., Task Force, 1995). While this movement served
its purpose in supporting more randomized clinical trials and firmly establishing
CBT writ large as the dominant evidence-based approach to psychotherapy, it even-
tually collapsed under its own weight. Ultimately, it became virtually impossible for
any practicing clinician to become sufficiently competent in implementing respec-
tive treatment manuals for the ever-expanding number of branded efficacious inter-
ventions linked to diagnoses (see Hayes & Hofmann, 2020 for the detailed accounts
of this claim). Rather than emphasizing research-supported therapeutic packages
and protocols, the PBT movement alternatively focuses on “the underlying change
mechanisms that lead to attainment of a desirable treatment goal” (Hayes et al.,
2019, p. 41). The ultimate objective is to then link processes that can be shown to
mediate therapeutic improvement with evidence-based procedures that reliably
move such processes.
The advocates of PBT have proposed a multidimensional and multilevel meta-
model derived from evolution science in organizing individual models of how spe-
cific evidence-based therapeutic process and procedures are related to each other
(Hayes et al., 2020a, b, c, e). The adequacy of specific process-based models at a
psychological level are to be judged within this larger meta-model to the extent that
they account for the contexts in which clinically-relevant changes or variations in
six dimensions [i.e., affect, cognition, attention, motivation, self, and overt behavior
(Hayes et al., 2019)] are selected and retained (Hayes et al., 2020a). For example,
do increases in emotional acceptance as an affective process mediate reduced psy-
chological suffering and enhanced well-being, and if so, what specific therapeutic
procedures or practices, in turn, have been shown to activate such emotional
acceptance?
It is by no means clear at this point in its development and dissemination what
ultimate impact the PBT movement will have on the third wave of CBT in particu-
lar, CBT more generally, and even psychotherapy as a whole. Additionally, to date
there are no studies examining the incremental effects of PBT above and beyond the
extant syndrome-focused treatment approach. That being said, our educated guess
is that whatever effects there might be are more likely to be felt by CBT, given that
the two chief proponents of PBT, Steve Hayes and Stefan Hofmann, have been
major players within the third and second waves, respectively, of CBT. At present,
the core clinical competencies highlighted in their edited book (Hayes & Hofmann,
2018) as instrumental in activating evidence-processes of therapeutic change
include the implementation of procedures, however, that span all three generations
of CBT. For example, chapters on contingency management (Higgins et al., 2018),
stimulus control (McIlvane, 2018), and shaping (Miltenberger et al., 2018) repre-
sent operant conditioning approaches integral to CBT’s first wave, while its incor-
poration of respondent principles are updated in a chapter covering arousal reduction
(McKay, 2018). The second generation of CBT and its emphasis on cognitive
restructuring is reflected among other chapters by those focused on cognitive reap-
praisal (Wenzel, 2018) and modifying core beliefs (Arntz, 2018). Finally, chapters
on cognitive defusion (Blackledge, 2018), cultivating psychological acceptance
(Forsyth & Ritzert, 2018), values (Lundgren & Larsson, 2018), and mindfulness
(Baer, 2018) highlight procedures and techniques popularized by ACT and related
third wave approaches.
It is our expectation that a successful pivot to PBT is most likely to blur distinc-
tions among the three waves of CBT as well as those among existing branded thera-
pies nested within each. We suspect that this may be even more so for ACT and
other third wave approaches due to both conceptual and philosophical reasons. ACT
is fundamentally itself a process-based approach supported by a model of human
functioning that encompasses key behavioral processes posited to contribute to
greater psychological health. Thinking about CBT more broadly, and even all of
psychotherapy for that matter, in terms of the key processes that mediate the allevia-
tion of suffering and the promotion of psychological well-being is something with
which practitioners and researchers of ACT are already comfortable and accus-
tomed. Moreover, the proposed extended evolutionary meta-model within which
PBT is to be situated in our view embraces the same philosophical viewpoint;
namely, functional contextualism (Hayes et al., 2012a); embraced by ACT and
related third wave approaches, such as FAP. Both basic and applied behavioral sci-
entists are likely to have an affinity for evolutionary theory extended to incorporate
psychological phenomena, although acceptance of the PBT meta-model by those
who explicitly endorse functional contextualism is likely to be less of a stretch com-
pared to those who implicitly favor an alternative worldview, such as elemental
realism/mechanism (Hughes, 2018; Pepper, 1942).
While we are not prepared, unlike our groundhog friend, to predict when winter
will be transformed into spring, we are reasonably confident in concluding that the
unique contributions of ACT and other third wave approaches within CBT will
remain even if eventually subsumed within the PBT movement. Their continued
legacy will have been the identification of additional therapeutic processes, such as
acceptance, and the development of efficacious ways of fostering them. Ironically,
ACT’s success in this respect appears to have led to its undoing. Progressive muscle
relaxation is still being taught to clients (McKay, 2018) even though therapists who
limited their practice to systematic desensitization have by now become extinct.
A Confluence of Influences
The profile and status of ACT as a “poster child” for CBT’s third wave appears to be
in the process of being weakened (if we can mix our metaphors) by a “perfect
storm” of eroding forces. ACT’s primary originator (Hayes) has seemingly given
birth to a new and more favored sibling (PBT) within the CBT family at the same
time that a long-standing partner (RFT) of ACT has opted to go its own way in also
supporting the new addition. The merging of PBT with RFT-informed clinical prac-
tice that may expand beyond ACT seems likely to further diminish ACT as a branded
treatment and blur any useful remaining distinctions that may still exist among the
three waves of CBT. If this occurs, all of CBT may become repackaged as PBT,
particularly if the movement does not expand to psychotherapy more generally.
To the extent that ACT never was meant to be defined as a set of techniques or
procedures, but rather as a process-based approach distinguished by the conceptual
model of human functioning and related philosophical framework on which it was
based, its likely diminished status in our view is not be lamented, but instead
acknowledged as scientific progress, especially if improvements in therapeutic effi-
cacy and/or efficiency can be documented for the PBT initiative. ACT after all was
responsible for introducing increased variation in putative psychotherapeutic
change mechanisms, some of which have been selected based upon their empirical
support and therapeutic value, and are consequently being retained within the PBT
movement.
ACT and the Rest of Third Wave Behavior Therapies
As we get closer to the end of this chapter, we would like to share some further
thoughts on the third wave CBT movement and the role of ACT within it. As we
noted earlier, ACT has been regarded by many as the prime representative for the
latest generation of CBT mainly because of Steven C. Hayes (Dimidjian et al.,
2016). That is, Steven Hayes, the originator of ACT, was the first to use the term
“third wave” in writing, and he was also among the most vocal proponent of it as a
distinct movement within CBT (Hayes, 2004; Hayes & Hofmann, 2017; Hayes
et al., 2003).
As ACT, FAP, DBT, MBCT, and several other approaches are grouped together
as representing a third generation of CBT, it is often naturally assumed that they
must be quite similar to one another in some very significant way. However, as we
implied earlier in this chapter, “third wave” is not a scientific term that describes a
scientific paradigm with a coherent set of principles and worldview. Rather, it is
more like a term used for the purposes of a political campaign in forming a coalition
within the field of CBT. Perhaps for this reason, the first published characterization
of the third wave movement was less specific and more inclusive:
Grounded in an empirical, principle-focused approach, the third wave of behavioral and
cognitive therapy is particularly sensitive to the context and functions of psychological
phenomena, not just their form, and thus tends to emphasize contextual and experiential
change strategies in addition to more direct and didactic ones. These treatments tend to seek
the construction of broad, flexible, and effective repertoires over an eliminative approach to
narrowly defined problems, and to emphasize the relevance of the issues they examine for
clinicians as well as clients. The third wave reformulates and synthesizes previous genera-
tions of behavioral and cognitive therapy and carries them forward into questions, issues,
and domains previously addressed primarily by other traditions, in hope of improving both
understanding and outcomes. (Hayes, 2004, p. 658)
As implied in the statement above, ACT, FAP, DBT, MBCT, and other key
members of third wave CBT are grouped together based primarily on their shared
topographical features in practice (treatment techniques and “middle-level” mod-

els), and not necessarily on coherent and shared psychological principles, such as
RFT, and guiding philosophical assumptions. We emphasize this because coherence
in the latter domain is crucial for a given concept to be considered as a scientific
paradigm. We view that whereas a single third wave approach, such as ACT, may
have this coherence more or less, the third wave CBT movement as a whole, given
its within-group heterogeneity, does not appears to have this quality. Perhaps for
this reason, contrary to what many might assume, a major takeaway from this sec-
tion for us is that regarding the third wave of CBT as a unique scientific paradigm
in a strict sense may not be particularly useful (see Barlow, 2016 for paradigm
crashes in the field of CBT).
Contributions of Third Wave Cognitive Behavioral Therapies
Although the third wave movement within CBT as a whole may not be considered
as a distinct scientific paradigm, it has brought significant changes within the field
as well as to that of behavioral health. At applied levels, many third wave concepts
and methods, such as acceptance and values, have become central parts of the CBT
tradition (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017). In fact, these concepts and methods co-exist
with previously established ones within a unified model of CBT (e.g., Mennin et al.,
2013), and within the larger field of CBT (e.g., O’Donohue & Fisher, 2008).
One of the most notable contributions of the third wave CBT movement is the
revitalization of CBT as an interconnected and empirically informed system of
basic scientific theory, applied theory, and practice, which is guided by an underly-
ing philosophical worldview (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017, 2018). This significant shift
from viewing a CBT as a mere collection of various therapeutic techniques occurred
out of necessity. That is, the domain of behavioral and cognitive therapies lacked a
meta-framework (e.g., underlying philosophical assumptions) to synthesize and
assimilate various and often seemingly contradicting concepts and methods that co-
exist within it. In order to do so, the field of CBT now, more so than before, recog-
nizes the importance of explicating one’s own underlying philosophical assumptions
(Klepac et al., 2012; Masuda & Rizvi, 2019).
As discussed above, scrutiny and clarification of underlying philosophical world-
views have naturally led to a strong focus on developing and refining basic and
applied theories of behavior change and well-being (Hofmann & Hayes, 2019).
Third wave approaches, such as ACT, FAP, DBT, and MBCT, have focused far less
than previous generations of CBT on developing and refining tightly crafted treat-
ment protocols for specific psychological disorders. Instead, this movement has col-
lectively emphasized broadly applicable evidence-based processes of change linked
to evidence-based procedures in treatment development (Hayes & Hofmann, 2017).
This set of major contributions has cemented a stage for the dawn of process-based
CBT or PBT within the last 2–3 years (Hayes & Hofmann, 2018; Hofmann &
Hayes, 2019).
hallenges That the Third Wave Movement Has Brought

C
to the Field
It is also important to acknowledge some notable problems that the third wave
movement may have unintentionally brought to the field or at least perpetuated.
These problems seem to stem mainly from ambiguity in what defines this third
wave. Because of shared topographical features in their practices, the term “third
wave” is often used synonymously with that of “acceptance- and mindfulness-based
CBT” (Hayes et al., 2004), much like the second wave of traditional CBT was
defined by its inclusion of cognitive restructuring. Whereas many proponents of the
third wave movement have made efforts on the reticulated investigation and
advancement of evidence-based processes of change linked to evidence-based pro-
cedures, organizing the third-wave movement on the basis of topographical features
implicitly encourages continuing to view CBT at a technical or “middle-level” as a
mere collection of various therapeutic techniques. That is, from this point of view,
any therapeutic intervention, for example, that mixes behavioral and cognitive tech-
niques with a mindfulness or value exercise could be legitimately called a third
wave CBT, just as those in the previous generation were identified as CBT based on
the utilization of cognitive restructuring. In fact, to date, because of this, there is a
proliferation of purportedly new and unique acceptance- and mindfulness-based
CBTs, such as mindfulness-based exposure therapy (King et al., 2016) and
compassion-focused ACT (Hill et al., 2020). What is unclear is whether these newer
CBTs are qualitatively unique at a process of change level.
Furthermore, this topographical and technical level of grouping and understand-
ing third wave CBTs (e.g., acceptance, value, and mindfulness) make it difficult to
differentiate third wave CBTs from interventions that are not, including those origi-
nating from nonbehavioral traditions. On the bright side, this feature of the third
generation of CBT has made it more relatable and approachable for nonbehavioral
clinicians as well as for a wide range of behavioral health professionals. This inclu-
sive and welcoming nature of the third wave CBT movement allows the erosion of
tribe mentality across and within different schools of thought in the field of behav-
ioral health. However, at the same time, the rapid expansion of third wave CBT in
this way fails to ensure quality control in service delivery and interventionist
training.
After All, What Is the “Third Wave”?
From a broader perspective, one can view this third wave movement as part of
mindfulness revolution occurring more broadly within the field of behavioral health
since the turn of this century (e.g., Li & Ramirez, 2017; Norcross et al., 2013).
Because of this, the third wave movement in CBT is often indistinguishable from
mindfulness-informed psychotherapies, a group of nontraditional approaches that
have been part of this mindfulness revolution (e.g., Bien, 2006; Germer et al., 2013;
Pilla et al., 2020). As discussed elsewhere, many of these mindfulness-informed
psychotherapies are athoretical in the strictest sense (at least for the behavior ther-
apy tradition) and have originated in eclectic schools of thought. In other words,
these other less empirically-oriented traditions are not necessarily committed to
evidence-based treatment delivery linked to the evidence-based process of change.
In being considered part of the mindfulness revolution, the third wave movement in
CBT may have unwittingly contributed to this atheoretical and eclectic approach. In
sum, we believe that the third wave movement, because of its obscurity and ambigu-
ity, has brought both blessing and curse to the field of behavior therapy and CBT.
Personal Reflections by Robert D. Zettle
As the philosopher George Santayana (n.d.) remarked, “To know your future you
must know your past.” In offering an epilogue to our projection of where we believe
the field may be headed, we hope it therefore does not seem too self-indulgent for
one of us (RDZ) to reflect upon his personal experiences in being both a witness to,
and sometime participant in, the three generations of CBT.
My (RDZ’s) first formal indoctrination into the world of behavior therapy
occurred during the first year of my master’s degree program at Bucknell University
in the fall of 1974 when our class attended the first Temple University Conference
in Behavior Therapy and Behavior Modification. The gathering was organized by
Joseph Wolpe and featured a keynote address by Mary Cover Jones, whom he
regarded as “the mother of behavior therapy” (Wolpe, 1969 as cited in Gieser, 1993)
based on her two publications 50 years earlier on the elimination of children’s fears.
If the first wave of behavior therapy had a clear point of origination, it was with
those two landmark papers in which Jones (1924a, 1924b) reported on the efficacy
of strategies and techniques that were not only the forerunners of Wolpe’s desensi-
tization by reciprocal inhibition (“method of direct conditioning”), but also of
modeling-based interventions (“method of social imitation”), and even cognitive
therapy (“method of verbal appeal”), thereby earning her appropriate recognition as
“the first behavior therapist” (Gieser, 1993).
The Temple Conference further solidified my interest in behaviorism itself,
which had began while still an undergraduate at Wilkes College (now University)
with my initial exposure to Skinner (1971), as well as the viability of existing
behavioral interventions, such as systematic desensitization and aversion therapy,
while at the same time making their limited applications, especially in addressing
the most common presenting problems of adult outpatients, all the more obvious.
Behavior therapists of the era were also increasingly noting that none of their inter-
ventions adequately addressed the influence of language and cognition (e.g.,
Mahoney, 1974), or what Kohlenberg et al. (2002) would later frame as “the most
basic question about outpatient adult behavior therapy” (p. 248); namely, “what is
the mechanism that explains how … talking helps the client outside of the office in
his or her daily life?” (p. 248). It would only be later with the clear emergence of
CBT’s second wave that alternative outside approaches, such as rational emotive
therapy (Ellis, 1962) and especially cognitive therapy (Beck, 1970), that had already,
or were in the process of being developed, would be adopted as legitimate members
of the CBT family. Until that time, apart from some meager beginnings of “cognitive-
behavior modification” (e.g., Meichenbaum, 1977), the recognized first wave inter-
ventions to address the role of verbal-cognitive variables in the mid 1970s were
largely limited to thought stopping (Rimm, 1973) and coping self-statements within
self-instructional training (Meichenbaum, 1972).
In the absence of any clear behavior analytic answers to the question of cognitive
control, I turned to the writings of Skinner (1969, 1974) for possible clues. This
quest, however, did not bear fruit until I began my doctoral degree program in the
fall of 1976 at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and had the good
fortune of having Steve Hayes, as a newly-hired assistant professor, assigned as my
advisor. It soon became apparent that both of us shared a commitment to better
understand the impact of verbal behavior and language on human suffering and its
alleviation. Initially this collaboration resulted in a conceptual expansion of
Skinner’s (1969) formulation of rule-governance (Zettle & Hayes, 1982) and an
empirical demonstration of how the impact of coping self-statements could be
accounted for as a form of rule-following known as pliance (Zettle & Hayes, 1979).
A much more formidable challenge, however, emerged following the Rush et al.
(1977) randomized clinical trial comparing cognitive therapy to antidepressant
medication and the subsequent emergence of CBT’s second wave. If there was a
singular event that marked the birth of a new and second generation of CBT, it was
the publication of this paper as the first to report that a psychological approach was
superior to pharmacotherapy in the treatment of a psychiatric disorder. First genera-
tion behavior therapists who longed for a way to effectively respond to what and
how clients think now seemingly had the means to address these concerns in a way
that was not only more sophisticated than both thought stopping and coping self-
statements, but even more importantly, enjoyed more substantive empirical support.
Not surprisingly, clinicians with less strong allegiances to behavior analysis and
radical behaviorism soon added cognitive restructuring components and procedures
to their existing first-generation treatment packages, and the second generation of
CBT quickly expanded beyond Beckian cognitive therapy (Beck et al., 1979). In
short, behavior therapy had become CBT.
While it seemed clear that the means Beck and his colleagues had developed for
apparently altering client thinking in clinically-relevant ways worked, it was by no
means obvious how or why cognitive therapy worked. More closely examining the
approach through the behavior analytic lens of rule-governance suggested that the
components of “distancing” and behavioral homework within cognitive therapy
might be more critically important than the one, cognitive restructuring, that had
been receiving the most attention (Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Distancing was regarded
as the “first critical step” within cognitive therapy (Hollon & Beck, 1979, p. 189) in
which clients were basically taught that thoughts are not facts, while behavioral
homework assignments were regarded as the most powerful way of “testing out”
and restructuring cognitive distortions. The stance that distancing in particular takes
towards dysfunctional thinking seemed sensible from a behavior analytic perspec-
tive and suggested the possibility of expanding and further developing such a strat-
egy into its own therapeutic approach (Zettle & Hayes, 1982), known at the time as
comprehensive distancing (CD; Hayes, 1987). As the forerunner of ACT, CD
included explicit emphases on what are now recognized as processes of acceptance,
defusion, mindfulness, and committed action, but excluded any similar focus on
values clarification and enhancement of self-as-context (Zettle & Wilson, in press).
What is now regarded as the first randomized clinical trial of ACT was my dis-
sertation (1984) in which CD was compared to cognitive therapy of depression.
Perhaps somewhat ironically and in an effort to better understand cognitive therapy
from the inside, the bulk of participant data were collected while I was completing
my predoctoral internship at Beck’s Center for Cognitive Therapy in Philadelphia
during 1982–1983. It seems worth mentioning in light of later criticisms directed
towards ACT by second-wave proponents of CBT (Arch & Craske, 2008; Hofmann
& Asmundson, 2008), that I was rebuffed in my efforts to receive participant refer-
rals through the Center. I was asked if CD included cognitive restructuring and upon
answering “no,” was informed that referrals were only made to those who offered
cognitive therapy. Clearly at least at that time, CD (ACT) was viewed as sufficiently
different than cognitive therapy to not be summarily dismissed as merely “old hat”
(Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008).
ACT assumed a relatively low profile during the 1990s during which time rela-
tively more focus was placed on the development of RFT and explication of func-
tional contextualism as its respective theoretical and philosophical foundations
(Zettle & Wilson, in press) than on accumulating further empirical support for the
approach. In fact, there were only two published studies on the efficacy of ACT by
the time of the first book on it (Hayes et al., 1999), and nine total 5 years later when
Hayes (2004) proclaimed that CBT’s third wave had arrived. What soon followed
for over the next decade was a quite contentious period of predictable pushback,
largely from second wave proponents, in which ACT, in particular, and third wave
approaches more generally were criticized on both empirical and conceptual
grounds. More specifically, both the quality (Öst, 2008, 2014) and quantity
(Corrigan, 2001) of supportive research was seriously questioned and ACT was
accused of being indistinguishable from both traditional CBT as well as Morita
therapy (Hofmann, 2008; Leahy, 2008). Even those not all that familiar with RFT
can derive via combinatorial entailment that traditional CBT must therefore also be
equivalent to Morita therapy (i.e., “If ACT is the same as traditional CBT and is also
indistinguishable from Morita therapy, then CBT must be the same as Morita ther-
apy”). Suffice it to say that even being a relatively minor participant in CBT’s ongo-
ing family squabble at the time often seemed more akin to being a combatant in a
civil war.
Happily, an armistice and eventual rapprochement were finally attained once it
became increasingly clear to even some of ACT’s most strident skeptics and critics
that its mechanisms of action were sufficiently distinct from those of traditional,
second wave CBT (Forman et al., 2012; Niles et al., 2014), even if it was not more
efficacious (e.g., Arch et al., 2012; Craske et al., 2014; Forman et al., 2007). There
is perhaps no more persuasive evidence that the once combative relationship
between the troops of CBT’s second and third wave has been resolved than that the
two former opposing “generals” (i.e., Hofmann and Hayes) are now collaborating in
promulgating PBT. If their campaign is broadly successful, future distinctions
between CBT writ large and other approaches to psychotherapy may no longer
hold. If the impact of the PBT movement is more limited to CBT itself, it may rep-
resent a fourth wave that blurs previous lines of demarcation among the first three
generations of CBT.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to offer our thoughts on where the third wave of CBT
may be headed. Although not having special psychic powers in doing so, we are
reasonably confident in concluding that ACT and other third wave CBTs in the cur-
rent forms are likely to disappear sooner than we may think, but that their unique
contributions within CBT will remain as part of the next wave of CBT (i.e., PBT).
Their continued legacy within PBT will have been the identification of additional
therapeutic processes of change, such as those referred to as acceptance and values,
and the development of evidence-based procedures of fostering them. As we look
forward to seeing if our prognostications will place us in the same company as
Punxsutawney Phil or Cassandra, we are at least somewhat comforted by the sage
observation of the Nobel Laureate in Physics, Niels Bohr (n.d.): “Prediction is very
difficult, especially if it’s about the future.”
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Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behavior: A potential theoretical framework
for cognitive-behavioral therapy. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive- behavioral
research and therapy (pp. 73–118). Academic.
Zettle, R. D., & Wilson, K. G. (in press). Progression of ACT. In M. P. Twohig, M. E. Levin, &
J. M. Petersen (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of acceptance and commitment therapy. Oxford
University Press.
Index
A 277, 317, 340, 341, 343, 352, 357,

Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), 365, 366, 381, 404, 416–420, 423,
4, 8, 13, 14, 26, 69–71, 74–77, 83, 431, 467, 491, 493–495, 498–500,
87, 102, 115, 116, 128, 131, 133, 505, 513, 516, 535, 566, 596, 601,
137–144, 167, 187, 232, 235, 236, 602, 610–613, 616, 617, 622–624,
254–256, 259, 267, 268, 271, 632, 650, 654, 655, 666, 688, 698,
273–276, 278–280, 282, 305, 330, 701–707, 709, 729, 734–736, 743,
332, 334–343, 389, 404, 440, 441, 748, 769, 770, 773, 788
445, 446, 449, 506–511, 514–518, Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
571, 584–603, 650–652, 655–660, (ADHD), 11, 13, 14, 234, 539,
662, 664, 666, 675, 680, 684–690, 610–621, 624, 625, 629–641, 649,
698, 700–705, 707–711, 731, 732, 650, 652–668
734–736, 759, 761, 782–788,
790–793, 796, 797
Acceptance and commitment therapy for B
psychosis (ACTp), 507, 509–511, Beck’s cognitive therapy, 3, 12, 63, 109–115,
518, 519 129, 130, 154, 156, 244–247, 264,
Acceptance-based behavioral treatment 266, 369–372, 376, 378–381, 757
(ABT), 13, 438, 440, 441, 445–449, Behavior activation, 13, 103, 731
452–456, 584 Behavioral interventions, 13, 38, 110, 112,
Addictive disorders, 525–551, 603, 610 114, 117, 174, 419–431, 468, 476,
Alcohol use disorders (AUDs), 530, 531, 541, 568, 573, 615, 616, 618, 624, 625,
564, 565, 567, 568, 574, 583, 634–636, 640, 656–660, 665, 668,
598–600, 603 689, 725–727, 774, 794
Anxiety disorders, 9, 11, 12, 128, 133, 142, Behavior analysis in Japan, 755
144, 159, 163, 204, 207, 225, 226, Behavior-analytic therapy, 724, 731–736
251, 252, 274, 275, 293–320, Behaviorisms, xi, 5, 24, 58, 60, 72, 73, 76,
329–335, 338, 339, 574, 631 85–87, 90–95, 97–100, 103, 111,
Anxiety-related disorders, 12, 294, 295, 302, 310 153–155, 173, 189, 197, 222, 227,
Applied behavior analysis (ABA), v, 14, 53, 234–237, 247, 257, 258, 266, 268,
56–58, 96, 97, 101, 230–234, 237, 271, 294, 308, 314, 463, 650–653,
265, 419, 428, 625, 726, 743, 754, 668, 725, 730–732, 736, 750, 754,
757, 772–779 761, 772, 782, 794, 795
Assessment, 3, 6, 10, 21, 32, 40, 42, 43, 45, Behavior modification, v, 18, 19, 25, 33, 58,
53, 77, 100, 140, 153–168, 97, 100, 112, 153, 230, 265, 428,
173–189, 195–212, 232, 233, 235, 525, 526, 726–728, 769, 794

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11677-3
806 Index
Behavior therapy, v, 3–6, 9, 13, 14, 17–46, 53, 378, 390, 399–401, 410, 490–492,
54, 56, 57, 63, 76, 83–103, 109, 496, 511, 518, 563–576, 597–603,
111–113, 127–131, 133–141, 633–635, 637–640, 656, 657, 659,
143–145, 154, 155, 163, 165, 166, 675, 678–691, 699, 700, 708–710,
182, 185–187, 189, 210–212, 219, 743, 744, 756–761,
236, 258, 265–281, 283, 284, 329, 781–784, 787–797
332, 338, 344, 353, 359, 371, 372, for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
419, 431, 463, 464, 468, 470, 476, (ADHD), 13, 14, 634–635,
478, 479, 517, 549, 611, 612, 614, 637–640, 656
616, 621, 624, 632, 634, 635, 675, for chronic pain, v, 9, 11, 14, 142, 144,
681, 686–688, 723–732, 734–736, 273, 675, 677, 678, 680–683,
743–762, 769, 778, 786, 794, 795 685–691, 699, 708, 710
Behavior therapy for obesity, 417 for substance use disorders (SUD),
Board Certified Behavior Analyst 564–576, 597, 599, 602
(BCBA), 772–776 Cognitive therapy (CT), 3, 11, 12, 56, 63, 68,
69, 77, 109–116, 121, 129, 130,
132, 135, 141, 154–156, 161–164,
C 166, 236, 243–259, 265, 266,
Case conceptualization, 10, 12, 117, 164, 268–270, 278, 281, 310, 332, 358,
173–189, 195–212, 252, 253, 255, 371–374, 378, 380–390, 397, 404,
341, 351–366, 371, 381, 382, 511, 570, 574, 598, 635, 677, 681,
397–411, 437–456, 487–500, 684, 729, 730, 743, 756–758, 760,
505–519, 525–551, 609–625, 650, 791, 794–796
651, 659, 697–711 Cognitive therapy for depression, 381
Case formulation, 153–168, 180–183, 185, Community Reinforcement and Family
188, 189, 219, 234, 514 Training (CRAFT), 526, 547–550
Chronic pain, v, 9, 11, 14, 138, 141, 142, 144, Community reinforcement approach (CRA),
265, 274–276, 313, 438, 573, 657, 13, 525, 526, 529–550
673–691, 697–711
Classical conditioning, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 86,
110, 219–227, 233, 295–296, 298, D
299, 302, 418, 421–428, 564, 675, Depression, v, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 33, 42–44, 96,
677, 750, 754, 782 100, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119,
Cognition, 5, 12, 18, 22, 24, 25, 27, 40, 73, 74, 121, 130–133, 141, 142, 144, 156,
86, 90–93, 101, 102, 109, 112, 114, 157, 160–163, 176, 178, 196,
115, 121, 131, 135, 136, 154–157, 201–204, 225, 229, 230, 235,
159–162, 166, 183–186, 236, 244, 244–246, 248–251, 254, 265,
247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 266, 270, 274–276, 278, 282, 332, 335,
281, 293, 303, 310, 311, 313, 331, 351–362, 366, 371–380, 385–390,
339, 344, 353, 356, 372, 374, 397–411, 415, 438, 488, 492, 499,
378–381, 387, 389, 390, 399, 430, 507, 508, 510, 512, 514, 518, 527,
479, 493, 512, 518, 563, 633, 640, 539, 541, 547, 570, 572, 588, 589,
678, 680, 700, 701, 707, 709–711, 596, 599, 603, 631, 654–657, 668,
724, 727, 754, 774, 783–785, 673, 686, 689, 698, 703, 704, 708,
789, 794 709, 729, 743, 757, 796
Cognitive-behavioral therapy for psychosis Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), 4, 10, 26,
(CBTp), 487–498, 500, 510 69, 116, 128, 131, 133, 137,
Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), v, xi, 3–14, 140–143, 173–189, 195–201,
17–46, 53, 69, 70, 109–118, 208–210, 212, 255–259, 267, 268,
120–122, 131–134, 137, 138, 273, 275, 276, 279, 280, 332–336,
140–145, 157, 159, 163, 165, 219, 338, 441, 445, 584, 598, 603, 633,
235, 236, 265–268, 270, 272, 274, 638, 639, 650, 651, 658, 684, 731,
275, 282, 283, 333–340, 344, 371, 732, 734–736, 759, 782, 791, 792
Index 807
E M
Experimental analysis of behavior, 97, 101, Mindfulness, xi, 4, 36, 69, 70, 75, 116, 128,
230, 231, 237, 419, 728, 731, 732 131, 133, 136–138, 143, 145, 166,
174, 176, 187, 189, 197, 198, 212,
252, 255–257, 259, 267–270, 276,
F 277, 279, 280, 283, 314, 315, 330,
First wave, 5, 9–14, 56, 57, 76, 77, 84, 99, 332–337, 340–342, 353, 398–399,
103, 109, 121, 135, 136, 160, 166, 401, 402, 404–409, 430, 438–442,
212, 220–235, 237, 255, 258, 259, 444–446, 450–453, 456, 509–512,
266, 269, 270, 273, 294, 303, 305, 514, 515, 584, 585, 587–595, 598,
315, 316, 338, 344, 351–366, 371, 600, 603, 632, 633, 638, 650, 651,
399, 421, 422, 424, 429–432, 463, 658, 659, 663, 664, 667, 676, 687,
476, 479, 500, 517, 518, 529, 569, 700–703, 705, 709, 758–760, 782,
609–625, 632–634, 640, 651, 655, 790, 793, 794, 796
667, 668, 675–679, 686, 690, Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT),
699–701, 709, 726, 750, 751, 778, 4, 12, 116, 128, 131, 133, 141, 142,
782, 789, 794, 795 267, 268, 273, 275, 276, 280, 332,
behavior therapy, 10, 57, 58, 83–103, 111, 334–336, 399–410, 442, 444, 511,
112, 129, 130, 219–237, 265, 266, 759, 782, 791, 792
268, 419, 421, 429, 463–480, Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs), 334,
609–625, 769 404, 438–446, 450–452, 456, 511,
conceptualization, 11, 13, 293–320, 677 599–601, 633, 650, 651, 658, 688
treatments, 353, 415–432, 632
Future of cognitive behavior therapy, 14, 788
Future of first wave behavior O
therapies, 769–779 Obesity, 11, 12, 234, 415–432, 437–456,
Future of third wave cognitive behavior 610, 668
therapy, 781–797 Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 12,
133, 141, 144, 196, 204, 205, 226,
258, 259, 298, 329–333, 335–342,
H 344, 654
History, 4–5, 9, 13, 14, 56, 61, 66–68, 73, 84, Obsessive compulsive related
86–91, 93–95, 97, 98, 100, 103, disorders, 329–344
113, 129–131, 144, 156, 173, 180, Operant conditioning, 6, 22, 34, 57, 62, 63,
183, 189, 219, 221, 226, 228, 237, 183, 219, 227, 229, 265, 298, 301,
243, 255, 293, 302, 306, 308, 352–353, 371, 421, 493, 526–528,
353–354, 375, 378, 381, 386, 387, 675–677, 787, 789
405, 407, 410, 422, 428, 440, 463,
464, 468, 471, 494, 507, 508,
512–514, 563, 570, 572, 587–590, P
611, 616, 629, 649, 664, 679, 682, Pavlov, 23, 55, 58, 61, 89–91, 94, 129, 219,
687, 688, 698, 705, 709, 723, 725, 221–225, 227, 295, 307
733, 734, 736, 743–762, 784 Philosophy of science, xi, 61–62, 71, 72, 74,
of behavior therapy, 9, 56, 90 76, 155, 227, 271, 272
of behavior therapy in Brazil, 14, 723–736 Process-based therapy (PBT), 143–145, 657,
of behavior therapy in Japan, 744–762 783, 787–792, 797
of cognitive behavior therapy in Japan, Psychotic disorders, 463–480,
14, 756–760 487–500, 505–519
L R
Lewinsohn’s model of depression, Radically open dialectical behavior therapy
353, 354 (RO DBT), 195–212
808 Index
Rationale emotive behavior therapy (REBT), 113, 116, 130, 132, 135, 136, 143,
63, 68, 69, 110–116, 371, 372, 377, 156, 160, 162–165, 167, 174,
385, 387, 388, 390 195–212, 219, 228, 230, 232,
244–246, 255, 257, 259, 266–276,
294, 295, 298, 299, 301–312, 314,
S 315, 319, 320, 331, 336, 344, 352,
Schizophrenia, 57, 115, 229, 230, 244, 356, 359, 366, 371–377, 390, 416,
463–480, 487–500, 505–519, 769 422, 426, 431, 463, 476, 478, 493,
Schizophrenia spectrum disorders, 505, 509 518, 526, 528, 531, 549, 550, 564,
Second wave, 5, 9–14, 56–58, 63–71, 76, 77, 569, 629, 652, 655, 678, 684, 704,
109, 115, 121, 127, 129–138, 141, 725, 729, 732, 751, 752, 754,
143, 144, 153–168, 185, 186, 259, 757–759, 783, 790, 792
266, 268, 270, 274, 293, 303, 305, Third wave, 5, 9–14, 18, 26, 36, 69–77, 83,
310–313, 330, 338, 339, 344, 353, 102, 116, 127–129, 131, 133, 134,
358, 359, 371, 390, 399, 430, 136–140, 142–145, 162, 166–168,
487–500, 510, 511, 517–519, 187, 212, 219, 235–237, 253, 259,
563–576, 601, 602, 629–641, 651, 266–283, 293–295, 305, 310–316,
656, 659, 667, 673–691, 699–701, 320, 329–344, 356, 397–411, 421,
709, 730, 753, 782, 789, 793, 430, 431, 437–456, 479, 500,
795, 796 505–519, 571, 583, 584, 598–603,
behavior therapy, 109–122, 164, 186, 266, 631–633, 649–653, 655–660, 664,
269, 506, 510, 518, 563, 632, 665, 667, 668, 675, 676, 680,
633, 683 684–691, 697–711, 724, 730–732,
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), 9–14, 736, 757, 782–784, 788–794,
70, 115, 121, 141, 157, 333–335, 796, 797
371, 390, 399, 430, 487, 500, 510, Third-wave behavior therapy, 53, 57, 87,
511, 518, 563–576, 601–603, 127–145, 195, 199, 236, 237,
677–687, 689, 709, 782, 789, 793, 265–284, 649–668, 684, 731, 736,
795, 796 791, 792
treatments, 115, 116, 338, 371–390, 487, Third wave behavior therapy for alcohol use
519, 632, 633, 640, 688, 689, 700 and substance use
Skinner, B.F., 3, 6, 9, 19, 23, 25, 40, 56–63, disorders, 583–603
67, 72, 73, 76, 85–87, 92–97, 102, Third wave cognitive behavior
112, 129, 136, 153–155, 167, 219, therapy, 781–783
220, 226–229, 231, 232, 235, 236, for obesity, 12, 437–456
247, 269, 352, 353, 421, 464, 467, for psychosis, 437–456
525–528, 725, 727, 731, 733, 748, Third wave therapies, 11, 70, 115, 116, 128,
749, 755, 761, 787, 794, 795 134, 137, 140–142, 145, 237, 293,
Substance use disorders (SUDs), 330, 343, 313–316, 329–332, 337, 338, 399,
526–528, 531, 532, 547, 549, 441, 445, 506, 583–586, 597–600,
563–576, 583–586, 588, 597–599, 602, 603, 632, 633, 650,
602, 603, 629, 654, 699 724, 730–732
Substance use problems, 173, 275, 276, Third wave treatment for obesity, 438
540, 547 Third wave treatments, 115, 116, 294, 340,
438, 455, 456, 511, 584, 598, 686,
687, 734–735
T
Theory, 3, 10, 12–14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27,
29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41–43, 55, V
57, 60, 66–68, 70, 71, 73–76, Values, 5, 20, 32, 35, 43–46, 58, 59, 69, 70,
83–86, 91–98, 100–102, 110, 111, 75, 101, 128, 137–139, 142, 143,
Index 809
145, 158, 167, 199, 201, 204, 206, W

220, 227, 253, 258, 270, 276, 279, Waves of behavior therapy, 56, 57, 60, 76, 77,
281–283, 300, 314, 332, 334, 84, 102, 103, 186, 212, 268, 270,
340–343, 355, 357, 399, 418, 431, 517, 632, 640, 675, 676,
420–422, 430, 444, 446–449, 453, 685–688, 699, 709, 723
456, 492, 507–509, 514–518, 532, Waves of cognitive behavior therapy,
536, 543, 545, 549, 586, 587, 3–14, 53–78
590–596, 613, 650–652, 660, Weight loss, 416, 423–426, 428–430,
662–665, 667, 676, 684, 685, 690, 437–439, 441–445, 447–456, 588
702–707, 709, 710, 732, 735, 746, Wolpe, 3, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29, 43, 57, 87, 94,
759, 782, 785, 788, 790–793, 95, 132, 219, 223–225, 296, 297,
796, 797 472, 726–728, 786, 794

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William O’Donohue

Akihiko Masuda Editors

ISBN 978-3-031-11676-6 ISBN 978-3-031-11677-3 (eBook)

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), encompassing behavior therapy, behavior modi-

Reno, NV, USA William O’Donohue

Part II Assessment and Case Conceptualization

Part III Comparative Issues and Controversies

Part IV Treatments for Specific Disorders

Part V CBT from International Perspectives

Part VI Summary and Future Directions

William O’Donohue, PhD, is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University

Akihiko Masuda, PhD, is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of

William O’Donohue and Akihiko Masuda

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 3

with sufficient commonality to be properly subsumed under the general rubric of

History and Revolution of CBT: A Kuhnian Perspective

Wittgensteinian Fibres and CBT

Scientific Epistemology and CBT

But if science is so important to cognitive behavior therapists perhaps a more care-

single subject experimental designs, while second generation behavior therapists

Agnotology and CBT

Perhaps a part of scientific knowledge is also a full and frank acknowledgement of

Overview of Chapters in the Present Volume

understanding the basic behavioral conceptualization of anxiety disorders.

practice as well as empirical evidence of these intervention, including acceptance-­

Beck, A. T. (1979). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. Plume.

Lindsley, O. R. (1956). Operant conditioning methods applied to research in chronic schizophre-

In June 1999 I was privileged to be invited to a two-day conference at the University

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 17

myself for a few months in physiological psychology in J. A. Deutsch’s (Deutsch,

 ognitive Factors in Behavior Therapy – The Development

delusional beliefs centering around spirits communicating through some cysts on

The Person as an Active, Thinking Agent

Relaxation as an Active Cognitive Process

Radical behavioristic theorizing was exemplified by the pioneering research and

And with respect to awareness or cognition, I pointed out that:

Science and Practice: A Two-Way Street

Principles of Change Not Treatment Packages

This principles-focussed conception of CBT (and of any science-based approach to

Abnormal Psychology Textbook

Clinical Complexity and Psychotherapy Integration

Based on our respective clinical supervisory experiences, Marvin Goldfried and I

eclecticism of Arnold Lazarus and the theoretical integrative efforts of Paul

 he Therapist’s Thoughts and Feelings During Interactions

Our cognitive-behavioral perspective and our intensive involvement in both clinical

The Phenomenological Essence of CBT

This is an important point, so allow me to elaborate.

Early Involvement in Basic Cognitive Research

Ethics and Psychotherapy of All Kinds

My doctoral education in behavior therapy, as rigorous and sophisticated as was

Clinical Problems as Clinicians’ Constructions

In writings since my 1976 article, influenced importantly by my teaching and clini-

“Behavior therapy” used to be synonymous with “the conditioning therapies” as

And with respect specifically to clinical psychology programs:

American Psychological Association. (2006). Evidence-based practice in psychology. American

Davison, G. C. (2006a). An invitation to auseindersetzen about the Evidence-Based Practices in

Goldfried, M. R. (1980). Toward the delineation of therapeutic changes principles. American

William O’Donohue and Fredrick T. Chin

Reno, NV, USA William O’Donohue

Part II Assessment and Case Conceptualization

Part III Comparative Issues and Controversies

Part IV Treatments for Specific Disorders

Part V CBT from International Perspectives

Part VI Summary and Future Directions

History and Revolution of CBT: A Kuhnian Perspective

Wittgensteinian Fibres and CBT

Scientific Epistemology and CBT

Agnotology and CBT

Overview of Chapters in the Present Volume

practice as well as empirical evidence of these intervention, including acceptance-

ognitive Factors in Behavior Therapy – The Development

The Person as an Active, Thinking Agent

Relaxation as an Active Cognitive Process

Science and Practice: A Two-Way Street

Principles of Change Not Treatment Packages

Abnormal Psychology Textbook

Clinical Complexity and Psychotherapy Integration

he Therapist’s Thoughts and Feelings During Interactions

The Phenomenological Essence of CBT

Early Involvement in Basic Cognitive Research

Ethics and Psychotherapy of All Kinds

Clinical Problems as Clinicians’ Constructions

Science and Problem Solving

irst Wave: Skinner, Behavior Therapy, and Applied

B. F. Skinner’s Views of Science

Skinner’s Philosophy of Science and Evolutionary Epistemology

Skinner’s Indigenous Evolutionary Epistemology

The Second Wave: The Stoics and Neo-Popperians

Popper and the Neo-Popperians

Bartley’s Pan-Critical Rationalism

Pan-Critical Rationality and Evolution

Pan-Critical Rationality and Rational Emotive Therapy

The Third Wave: Post-Modernism and Contextualism

Basic and Applied Science: A Reticulated Model

Middle-Level Terms and Constructs

d esensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology. Clinical Psychology

A Representative View of Behavior Therapy

Foundations of Behavior Therapy

Long Past: 500 B.C.E.–1900 C.E.

Short History: 1900–1950

Recent Origins: 1950–1960

Institutional Founding (1960–1970)

Yesterday and Today