Cap 1 - P1
Cap 1 - P1
Cap 1 - P1
particular situation though frequently they are implicit and unquestioned. If they
remain so then the value judgements reached cannot be defended; they merely
become matters of opinion.
Take the rather trivial example illustrated by Figure 1.1. Two people have watched a
particular programme on television; a not-uncommon activity in most households. They
have both seen exactly the same display on the screen and yet they reach totally
different conclusions about whether it was a good or a poor programme. They then
argue about who is right; again not an uncommon activity. There is no point in having
this argument since they are actually both right. The value judgements about the
quality of the programme will be based upon different concepts in the heads of the
two observers as to what constitutes a good television programme. The concept in
the head of observer A emphasises visual impact, which was apparently not observed,
whereas the concept in the head of observer B reflects intellectual stimulation which
appears to have been the nature of the programme.
If these concepts could be made explicit instead of implicit, as models representing a
television programme, they could then be compared against the observed
happenings on the television screen and each observer’s judgement defended. They
may still disagree over the relative merits of the two models but, at least, the
argument can be carried out on a more defensible and rational basis instead of at the
level of unsubstantiated opinion.
In the more significant area of organisation-based activity the situation surrounding
organisa- tional problems and issues is highly complex and the need for defensible
argument is that much more important. Such situations are characterised by complex
operations and management pro- cesses that may have grown over time, unclear
and/or multiple objectives, changing environments and people with different
attitudes, histories and agendas.
The definition of ‘what is right’ in relation to some issue or problem is unlikely to be
achievable and therefore defensibility becomes the criterion to be used in assembling
arguments to support the judgements reached or recommendation made in response
to the issues or problems.
Similarly the concept of ‘optimisation’, prevalent in Operational R esearch studies, is
difficult to defend in such messy situations as it is unlikely that there would be
agreement as to what constitutes an optimum.
Thus, in business analysis generally it is defensible argument to support business
change (not optimisation or the right answer) that is sought. For the argument to be
defensible an explicit ‘audit trail’ is required w hich itself w ill be based upon some
kind of model to represent the situation.
Figure1.2illustratestheprocessofastrategicreview.A reviewer(orreview
team)isinvestigating the overall performance of some organisation unit. The process is
not scale dependent and thus the organisation unit could be a complete company, a
department, a division, a function or even an individual. The questions that the
reviewer is seeking to answer are related to effectiveness (is it doing the right sort of
things?), efficiency (is it doing them with minimum use of resources?) and efficacy
(does it work?). The result of answering those questions will be the production of
recommendations for change as indicated.
An additional question worth asking about this process is: How does the reviewer
reach the recommendations from observing and questioning the organisation unit?
In Figure 1.3 three possible answers are added to the process. Using intuition and/or
experience are very common, but there are two major drawbacks. First, the intuition
or experience cannot be accessed, and second, the value judgements of the reviewer
(based upon the intuition and/or experi- ence) are unlikely to be the same as the
value judgements of the reviewed. These drawbacks may have a significant impact on
the acceptability of the recommendations to the personnel within the organisation
unit. This was the problem of the observers of the television programme depicted in
Figure 1.1.
It is explicit analysis, utilising a specific ‘standard’, that stands the best chance of
leading to recommendations which are acceptable as long as some way of
accommodating the value judge- ments of the personnel within the organisation unit
can be incorporated. Here ‘standard’ is used in its general sense of beng something
against which a comparison is made. It is not an absolute or a mandatory statement
with which something should comply. The ‘standard’ used for comparison, as well as
being coherent, needs also to be relevant to the particular group of organisational
personnel to whom the review is relevant.
The derivation of this ‘standard’ is therefore crucial to the success, or otherwise, of
the review process. It is also the subject of most of this book and will be covered in
detail later. In essence, this ‘standard’ is the organisational equivalent of the model of
the concept of a television programme in the heads of the two observers represented
by Figure 1.1.
It must be apparent that deriving a model to represent an organisation unit (of
whatever scale) will be significantly more complex than this rather trivial example if it
is to accommodate the multiple concepts in the heads of those people concerned
with the strategic review.
Although the problem of multiple concepts has been introduced through the notion of
a strategic review it is a general problem associated with modelling business
processes for whatever purpose. To produce a model as a representative description
of an organisation unit it is necessary to describe its basic purpose, i.e. what it is
trying to achieve and also what it must be doing (in terms of its business processes)
to be successful in realising that purpose. Given the range of concepts referred to
above there will be multiple views about basic purpose and hence about the
necessary business processes.
Suppose that the organisation unit is a police force. It might be argued that its basic
purpose is any one or any combination of the following:
Models (of any kind) are not descriptions of the real world they are descriptions of
ways of thinking about the real world
We are led into confusion surrounding this distinction by the process of model
building when making a ‘hard’ interpretation of a situation. For example, if a simulation
model of a production process is produced on the basis of a mathematically oriented
modelling language, it can be validated by comparing the output of the model
derived from some input demand with the output of the actual process when
responding to the same demand. In this case there is taken to be no disagreement
over the objectives or purpose of the production process and the existence of a
‘validated’ model leads to the belief that it is a model of the real world. It is not. It is
still a model of a way of thinking about the real world whose input and output map
onto reality.
It may seem to be pedantic to insist on this distinction w hen concerned w ith a ‘hard’
situation, but if the example has aided the understanding of the distinction then it has
served its purpose. It is not pedantic to insist on maintaining the distinction between
reality and the intellectual process in relation to soft interpretations. Unless this
distinction is maintained, the subsequent analysis will be flawed and may descend into
debate about opinion.
Figure 1.5 is a useful way of thinking about the distinction emphasised here. At the top
of the figure is a representation of a process of analysis regarding some part of the
real world. The analyst will make sense of what is being observed by using a set of
concepts or intellectual constructs.
Dependent upon the nature of the real-world situation a selection of concepts will be
made. The remainder of Figure 1.5 gives a few examples.
The choice of the concept on the right will lead to a defensible statement about some
concern related to the particular area of real-world activity given on the left. If the
choice of concept is relevant to the kind of analysis being undertaken, then the
conclusions reached will not only be defensible they will also be appropriate.
It is the case that, given a particular situation, one choice of concept will lead to one
set of defensible conclusions, whereas an alternative choice may lead to other (but
equally defensible) conclusions.
Acceptability of one or other set of conclusions will be determined by the
appropriateness of the concepts chosen. ‘Appropriateness’ may well be determined
indirectly by the recipient of the conclusion rather than by the analyst.
It is not sufficient just to derive the appropriate concepts. How they are to be used in
the proposed analysis must also be made explicit. This means deciding on and
describing the intellectual process that makes use of the concepts. Both the concepts
and the intellectual process may change as the analysis proceeds, but if it is not
declared at the outset the changes may occur unconsciously and so remove the audit
trail and subsequent defensibility. What is being described is methodology.