SIA Beyond Borders Report FINAL May 6 1

BEYOND BORDERS
TH E GL O BAL SEMI CO NDU CT O R VA L U E CH AI N
How an Interconnected Industry

Promotes Innovation and Growth
SUBMITTED TO SUBMITTED BY
Semiconductor Industry Association Nathan Associates Inc.
www.semiconductors.org www.nathaninc.com
May 2016
BEYOND BORDERS: THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR VALUE CHAIN
CO N TENTS
Abbreviations ii
1 Introduction 1
2 A Deeply Global Industry 3
2.1 A Global Value Chain: Forged by Complexity and Competition 4
2.2 Supporting Activities: Completing the Ecosystem 6
2.3 Differentiation: Driven by Demand 6
2.4 Operating Models: Responding to Change 7
2.5 Here, There, Everywhere: Geographic Dispersion of the Value Chain 9
3 Global Approach: Clear-Cut Benefits 16
3.1 Benefits of Participating in the Global Value Chain 16
3.1.1 Greater Efficiency, Higher Productivity 16
3.1.2 Economic Growth, Lower Consumer Prices 17
3.1.3 Access to Large and Growing Markets Worldwide 18
3.1.4 Innovation, Advancements in Technology 19
3.1.5 Movement up the Value Chain 20
3.2 Risks of a Single-Nation Value Chain 22
3.2.1 Misdirection of Investments, Leading to Higher Costs, Prices 22
3.2.2 Knowledge Transfer and Technological Advancements 24
3.2.3 Lost Export Opportunities 24
3.2.4 Erosion of Downstream Industries that Rely on Global Sourcing 26
3.2.5 Threat of Overcapacity 28
3.2.6 Undiluted Risk 28
4 Conclusion and Recommendations 29
References 32
Appendix: Semiconductors 41
Endnotes 43
ILLUSTRATIONS
ILL U S T R ATI ONS

List of Exhibits
Exhibit 1. Stages of Semiconductor Production 5
Exhibit 2. Factors Promoting a Global Value Chain for Semiconductors 15
Exhibit 3. Galápagos Syndrome in Japan and United States 25
Exhibit 4. Steel: From Overcapacity to Crisis 27
List of Figures
Figure 1 Semiconductor Production Chain, Basis for Value Chain 4
Figure 2 The Semiconductor Ecosystem 6
Figure 3 Operating Models in the Semiconductor Industry 7
Figure 4 Functional Evolution of the Semiconductor Ecosystem (1950s–2010s) 8
Figure 5 Revenue by Semiconductor Sector (2014), US$ Billion 9
Figure 6 Growth (CAGR) in the Semiconductor Ecosystem, (2009–2014) 9
Figure 7 Example of Global Nature of Semiconductor Value Chain 10
Figure 8 Internationalization of the Semiconductor Value Chain (% of total revenue, 2015) 11
Figure 9 Geographic Dispersion of the Semiconductor Value Chain by Six IDMs 15
Figure 10 Share of Global Exports of Electronic Integrated Circuits 14
Figure 11 Shares of Global Imports of Silicon 17
Figure 12 Relationship between China’s Semiconductor Imports and Top Five Exports (in Revenue) 18
Figure 13 Share of Revenue of IC Design, Manufacturing and Packaging and Testing in Taiwan. 20
Figure 14 Growing Number of Semiconductor Enterprises in China 20
Figure 15 Distribution of Value Chain Activities in China as Share of Total Value (2003–2013) 21
List of Tables
Table 1 Key Cost Data for Selected Semiconductor Companies (2013), US$ million 23
i
A B B REVI ATI ONS

ASE Advanced semiconductor engineering
CAD Computer-aided design
DG Director General
EDA Electronic design automation
FGP Factory-less goods producers
GVC Global value chain
HS Harmonized System
IC Integrated circuit
IDM Integrated device manufacturer
IOT Internet of Things
IP Intellectual property
NAICS North American Industrial Classification System
NES Not elsewhere specified
ODM Original design manufacturers
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSAT Outsourced semiconductor assembly and test
PC Personal computer
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers
R&D Research & development
SEMI Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International
SMIC Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp.
SOC System-on-chip
SOP System-on-Package
SPIL Siliconware Precision Industries Co. Ltd
TI Texas Instruments
TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.
UK United Kingdom
UMC United Microelectronics Corp.
ii
INTRODUCTION
1
INT R O DUCTI ON
Semiconductors, also known as integrated
circuits, microchips, or just “chips,” drive
the digital economy.1 Containing thousands
of miniature electronic components all
connected together, semiconductors are
the “brains” of all modern electronics, from
consumer products including televisions,
laptop computers, tablets, and mobile
phones, to more sophisticated equipment
used in aerospace, business operations,
industrial applications, and national defense.
Just like the complex and interconnected
nature of a semiconductor itself, the
semiconductor industry, with US$335.2 billion
in global sales in 2015, is distinguished by
a highly specialized, globally dispersed,
and interconnected value chain. This value
chain and a host of supporting activities
form a complex and global semiconductor
ecosystem.2 Countries that participate in this global value chain or supporting activities reap
countless benefits, including increased employment and export opportunities. The benefits
compound with greater and lasting participation in that global ecosystem.
The ubiquity of semiconductors explains in part why the ecosystem is global. The extreme
complexity of the industry provides a deeper explanation. The nonstop, consumer-driven
demand for more and better capabilities, features, reliability, and speed requires a heavy
investment in research and development (R&D), design, and efficient, low-cost manufacturing,
testing, assembling and packaging, and distribution. These same pressures also affect the
supporting activities, such as the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
development of design software and semiconductor intellectual property cores (“IP cores”
or “IP blocks”), and provision of raw materials.3 These pressures have led semiconductor
companies to develop business models that look beyond national borders to achieve
efficiencies to compete in the marketplace.
Over the years, demands for new technology innovations that rely on chips have become
even greater: Simple scaling and cost reductions based on Moore’s Law will soon no longer be
enough to improve device performance. The industry is rapidly moving into new areas such as
brain-inspired computing, the Internet of Things, energy-efficient sensing, automated devices,
robotics, and artificial intelligence calling for new breakthroughs. A globally interdependent
industry that pools the best each participant has to offer provides the best path to the future.
1
Yet, because the industry is so dynamic and a key driver of economic growth and technological
innovation, a country may be tempted to create and operate a fully domestic industry by
attempting to reproduce the entire value chain within its own borders. This report shows that
trying to do so not only ignores the experience of several economies that have successfully
participated to their benefit in the global value chain, but also risks undermining domestic
industry capabilities and competitiveness.
The first section of this report describes how the semiconductor value chain and ecosystem
evolved globally for economic, technological, and market reasons. Based on economic
principles and case studies, the second section of the report summarizes the benefits of the
current ecosystem and the risks of confining value chain activities to a single country. Because
the evidence does favor a globally dispersed, but hightly interconnected and integrated
ecosystem for the semiconductor industry, the report’s conclusion describes policy choices that
support maintenance of, and participation in, this existing ecosystem. The alternative of going
it alone as a nation does not make sense from an economic or technological veiw point.
Readers desiring a more thorough understanding of semiconductor types and applications can
find that information in the Appendix.
2
A DEEPLY GLOBAL INDUSTRY
2 A DEEPLY GLOBAL INDUSTRY

Semiconductors are complex products critical to the function of everyday consumer electronics,
communications and computing devices, and increasingly sophisticated equipment used in all
economic sectors: aerospace, automotive, financial, medical, and retail, to name a few. End-
users depend on a globally integrated supply chain comprising these activities: R&D, design,
manufacturing, assembly, testing, packaging, and distribution. Carrying out each activity
requires great specialization and offers a chance to add significant value. The supply chain
thus becomes a value chain, with each activity contributing to the overall competitive edge of
the final product.4 The actors in the value chain form part of a semiconductor ecosystem also
populated by materials suppliers, design service providers, developers of “IP cores” or “IP
blocks,” and makers of equipment to manufacture semiconductors.
Few industries, if any, have a value chain and ecosystem so complex, geographically widespread,
and intertwined. For example, one U.S. semiconductor company has over 16,000 suppliers
worldwide. More than 7,300 of its suppliers are based in 46 different American states and more
than 8,500 of its suppliers are located outside of the United States. Many of those suppliers are
small businesses in multiple industries that provide a variety of goods and services including
chemical gases, materials, construction services, foundry services, capital equipment, spares,
control and life systems, computing hardware, market research, technical consulting, and media
services. The industry is uniquely structured to derive maximum benefit from the diverse and
varied skills of human resources and locational advantages of participating countries. Canada,
European countries, and the United States tend to specialize in semiconductor design, along with
high-end manufacturing. Japan, the United States, and some European countries specialize in
supplying equipment and raw materials. China, Taiwan, Malaysia and other Asian countries tend
to specialize in manufacturing, assembling, testing and packaging. Canada, China, Germany,
India, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all major
hubs for semiconductor R&D. Major semiconductor companies have located facilities in countries
as far flung as Costa Rica, Latvia, Mexico, South Africa, and Vietnam.
This international structure evolved over

decades and is still changing. In the 1950s,
individual companies tended to engage in
all stages of production and operated in one
country. The industry is now characterized by
an ever-diversifying range of business models
and relationships crossing national and regional
boundaries. Technological advances and
competition have driven this evolution.
Even companies that remain vertically integrated

produce in multiple countries and not all are
as integrated as in the past. For instance, for a
subset of their products or technologies, they
3
may turn to other companies for some specialized design or production. A significant number
of these specialist companies operate throughout the world.
This global ecosystem benefits all participants and their global economies. Countries
experience increased employment, derivative innovation, export opportunities and overall
economic growth. Benefits accrue at all segments of the value chain, including those segments
involving lesser investments in R&D and plant and equipment. The contribution of a country to
the value of semiconductors increases as the country’s economy and the skills of its workforce
grow and the country moves up the value chain. Newer countries join the value chain and
start to move up. The global value chain thus expands and spreads the benefits that come
with it. Companies, wherever based, benefit from productivity gains, cost efficiencies from
specialization, and gains from improved technology and increased knowledge.
2.1 A Global Value Chain: Forged by Complexity and Competition

To understand how and why this value chain evolved, it is important to understand the
complexities of semiconductor production. This makes it possible to analyze the unique
enhancements in each activity in the value chain and each of the supporting activities.
This analysis also makes it possible to understand the role of competition.
Semiconductor production begins with R&D and ends with distribution (figure 1, exhibit 1).
After research and before distribution come design, manufacturing, and assembly, testing, and
Figure 1
packaging. Although research and distribution are not strictly speaking production activities,
Semiconductor Production Chain, Basis for Value Chain
this report includes them in the production chain because of their critical importance and their
role in the value chain.
Figure 1
Semiconductor Production Chain, Basic Elements of Value Chain
Research and Assembling, Distribu?on

Development Design Manufacturing Tes?ng and
(R&D) Packaging

PRE-COMPETITIVE COMPETITIVE
AND
COMPETITIVE
Research and development (R&D) activities, as figure 1 above shows, can be precompetitive
or competitive. R&D is precompetitive when industry participants, government, and
academia cooperate to promote technological innovation. Competitive R&D on the other
hand comprises activities undertaken by individual companies in an attempt to innovate and
compete in the market through better products. All other activities in the value chain also are
carried out by companies that actively compete with each other by pursuing innovations and
cost efficiencies. Exhibit 1 further describes each stage of production.
4
Exhibit 1
Stages of Semiconductor Production
Research and Development (R&D): This critical stage chain drives the industry’s rapid
technological advancement. Researchers constantly seek to increase the processing
capability and speed of semiconductor devices while reducing their cost, following
Moore’s Law.* Research is increasingly moving toward “more than Moore” with a focus on
innovations in packaging and technologies to surpass the physical limits of semiconducting
materials. The semiconductor industry is one of the most R&D intensive industries in the
world, with industry-wide investment rates ranging between 15-20 percent of sales.
Design: In the design stage, companies conceive new products and specifications to meet
customer needs, then lay their design foundation. Research outcomes are a key input to the
design stage, which relies heavily on highly skilled engineers and human capital.
Manufacturing: This stage involves production of the designed chips. This stage
demands advanced technical and chemical/material proficiency and utmost precision. It is
characterized by high fixed costs and the need for constant facility improvement to keep up
with technological advances. Successful manufacturers require high capacity utilization (90
percent) and large-scale operations.
This is the final stage in the making of a semiconductor device, necessary to connect a chip
or IC. This stage has higher material and higher labor costs than the manufacturing stage. It
appears at the end of the production cycle and prepares the product for shipment to the market.
Distribution: Finished semiconductor devices are shipped to distributors or through direct sales to
equipment manufacturers for use in electronic goods. Efficient logistics are essential in this stage.
*Named after Intel cofounder Gordon E. Moore. Moore’s Law postulates that the number of
transistors embedded in an integrated circuit doubles every 2 years, while the price remains the
same. The number of transistors defines capability (e.g., processing capabilities, speed, and memory).
(Refer to the Appendix for details on transistors and integrated circuits.)
Sources: SIA 2016 Databook, Jeremy Millard, et al, Study on Internationalisation and Fragmentation
of Value Chains and Security of Supply (Brussels: European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry,
February 2012).
Each stage of production is highly specialized and competitive. For participants in the supply chain
to succeed, they must offer better features or cost advantages. These features or advantages
must incorporate continuously evolving consumer preferences and differentiate the participant’s
contribution to the supply chain. Participants in the supply chain thus turn it into a value chain. The
end product containing a semiconductor becomes more competitive in the market.
5
Figure 2
The Semiconductor Ecosystem
Intellectual
Raw Material
Property (IP)
Suppliers
Companies
Raw wafer, Lead frames, packaging material

Provide IP cores chemicals
used to build
advanced integrated
circuits
Assembling,
Research Designing Manufacturing Testing and Distributing
Packaging
Provide services Specialized

using specialized equipment
design tools and tools
Electronic Design
Automation (EDA) Equipment
Companies Suppliers
2.2 Supporting Activities: Completing the Ecosystem

Specialized companies whose activities support the value chain—in an industry characterized
by unprecedented technological advancement—complete the semiconductor ecosystem. The
contribution of these companies is essential to producing semiconductors that are competitive
in price, quality, performance, and consumer preference. The main types of supporting
companies in the semiconductor ecosystem are:
• IP companies that develop and license predesigned “blocks” of circuits that semiconductor
companies then integrate into their own broader chip designs as a subset of their own chips.5,6;
• E
lectronic design automation (EDA) companies that provide computer-aided design (CAD)
and other design services7;
• Materials companies that produce wafer-fabrication and packaging materials; and
• Equipment manufacturers that produce specialized equipment and machine tools for
manufacturing, assembly, testing, and packaging.
Figure 2 illustrates the ecosystem, showing where supporting companies interact with the value chain.
2.3 Differentiation: Driven by Demand

Differentiation in human and financial resource requirements across various stages of
production is a distinguishing feature of the semiconductor industry. This differentiation is
based on factors such as pace of innovation, technology requirements, scale of production, and
operational efficiency. For instance, semiconductor design requires teams of skilled engineers,
while the manufacturing stage is capital intensive and requires advanced technological
6
expertise: a capacity utilization rate of as high as 90 percent is considered to be “healthy”

for semiconductor manufacturers.8 Assembly, testing, and packaging is more labor intensive,
requiring less technical skill, although this paradigm is shifting because of advances in
packaging technology. Those advances will require more skilled labor.
Through differentiation, companies perform the tasks they do best and assign the rest to other
companies better equipped for that work, thereby gaining a competitive advantage.9 Demand
for rapid innovations, combined with the efficiencies resulting from specialization, enables
companies to compete successfully.
2.4 Operating Models: Responding to Change

Different levels of specialization and functional delineation in the value chain have led to the
emergence of two key operating models in the semiconductor industry: IDM, for integrated
device manufacturer, and fabless-foundry. Figure 3 diagrams these two models along with the
industry participants, including R&D companies, and identifies some companies representing
different activities in the value chain.
In the IDM model, one company carries out all stages of production—design, manufacturing,
and assembly, testing, and packaging. In the fabless-foundry model, production is split:
Design companies focus on design and contract out manufacturing (fabrication), and are
thus “fabless.” Foundry companies concentrate on contract manufacturing. A third group
of companies, though not part of the fabless-foundry name, perform assembly, testing,
and packaging. This third group is known as outsourced semiconductor assembly and test
companies, or OSATs.
Figure 3
Operating Models in the Semiconductor Industry
Fabless-Foundry Model
Research and Design (Fabless) Manufacturing Outsourced Assembly Distribution (to OEMs
Development (R&D) AMD, Broadcom, (Foundries) and Test (OSAT) / ODMs)*
CEA-Leti, IMEC, ITRI, MediaTek, Global Foundries, HH Amkor, ASE, ChipPAC,
Allied Electronics, Ar-
Spreadtrum, Grace, SMIC, Tower JCET, J-Devices,
SEMATECH, row Electronics, Avnet,
Qualcomm Jazz, TSMC, UMC Power-tech, SPIL
Semiconductor Digi-Key, Mouser
Research Corporation IDM Model Electronics
Integrated Device Manufacturer (IDM)
Infineon, Intel, Micron, Renesas, Samsung, Texas Instruments
* Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)/Original Design Manufacturers (ODMs) buy semiconductors to integrate into consumer end-products
The IDM model derives efficiencies from vertical integration. The fabless-foundry model derives
efficiencies from delineation of tasks and specialization. The fabless companies focus on
design and innovation and avoid heavy investment in setting up, maintaining, and upgrading
foundries. Foundries try to achieve high capacity utilization and efficiency by servicing many
fabless companies in the market. OSATs focus on achieving operational efficiencies by also
serving many companies to ensure a profitable capacity utilization rate, just as foundries must.
Figure 4 highlights the functional evolution in the semiconductor industry over the years toward
a diversity of business models and industry relationships.
7
Figure 4
Figure 4
Functional Evolution of the Semiconductor Ecosystem (1950s–2010s)
Functional Evolution of the Semiconductor Ecosystem (1950s–2010s)
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Software
IP Provider IP Provider IP Provider

Fabless
Fabless Companies Fabless Companies Fabless Companies
Companies
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Manufacturing Tools Manufacturing Tools Manufacturing Tools
Tools Tools Tools
IDM IDM IDM IDM IDM IDM IDM
EDA Tools EDA Tools EDA Tools EDA Tools EDA Tools
Foundries Foundries Foundries Foundries
Packaging Packaging
Note: The individual colored blocks are only a representation of the participants present in the semiconductor value chain at
Note: The individual colored blocks are only a representation of the participants present in the semiconductor value chain at various points in time. They are not indicative of
various points
their relative in stime.
market izes. They are not indicative of their relative market sizes.
Source: Heide, Marcel, et al., Study on the changing role of Intellectual Property in the semiconductor industry—including non-
Source: Heide,
practicing Marcel, et (European
entities, al., Study on tCommission
he changing role DG
of Intellectual
Communication Property in the semiconductor
Networks, Content industry—including
& Technology, non-‐practicing
Reportentities, (European
prepared by TNO Commission
and DG
Communication
CWTS, 2014),Networks,
6. Content & Technology, Report prepared by TNO and CWTS, 2014), 6.
IDMs had the largest revenue share of the semiconductor industry in 2014. However, while
IDMs will continue to play an important role, the fabless-foundry model is gradually becoming
a larger portion of the industry as technology changes and products become even more
complex. Between 2009 and 2014, fabless, foundry, and OSAT companies have shown a higher
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) than IDMs
In the past decade, IDMs have been acquiring more characteristics of the fabless-foundry model.
Several IDMs contract with other companies to manufacture chips while performing all other
remaining tasks internally. This is commonly called fab-lite. Many IDMs become fab-lite due to the
constant and costly need to upgrade manufacturing facilities to keep up with technological advances.
The growth in vertical specialization in semiconductors since 1985 reflects the influence of both market-
related and technological factors. The expansion of markets for semiconductor devices enabled
vertically specialized semiconductor design and production firms to exploit economies of scale and
specialization, consistent with the predictions of [George] Stigler and [Adam] Smith. Scale economies
lowered production costs, expanding the range of potential end-user applications for semiconductors
and creating additional opportunities for entry by vertically specialized firms. The increasing capital
requirements of semiconductor manufacturing provided another impetus to vertical specialization, since
these higher fixed costs make it necessary to produce large volumes of a limited array of semiconductor
components in order to achieve lower unit costs. The design cycle for new semiconductor products also
has become shorter and product lifecycles more uncertain, making it more difficult to determine whether
demand for a single product will fully utilize the capacity of a fabrication facility that is devoted exclusively
to a particular product and increasing the risks of investing in such “dedicated” capacity. Since foundries
tend to produce a wider product mix, they are less exposed to these financial risks.
—Jeffrey T. Macher and David C. Mowery, “Vertical Specialization and Industry Structure in High
Technology Industries,” Business Strategy Over the Industry Lifecycle, Advances in Strategic
Management, Volume 21 (2004), 331–332.
8
Total 449 IDM 6.8%
Fabless 10.6%
OSAT 7.0%
Source: Semiconductor
FoundryIndustry Association; World S emiconductor Trade Statistics; SEMI, "SEMI Reports Global Se
15.0%
billion," http://www.semi.org/en/semi-‐reports-‐2015-‐global-‐semiconductor-‐equipment-‐sales-‐365-‐billion; IC Insight
Continue to Capture Bulk of IDM and Fabless IC Sales," http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/US-‐Companies-‐

Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World Semiconductor Trade Statistics; SEMI, "SEMI Reports Global Semiconductor Equipemnt Sales of $36.5
billion," http://www.semi.org/en/semi-‐reports-‐2015-‐global-‐semiconductor-‐equipment-‐sales-‐365-‐billion; IC Insights, News Bulletin, "U.S. Companies
Continue to Capture Bulk of IDM and Fabless IC Sales," http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/US-‐Companies-‐Continue-‐To-‐Capture-‐Bulk-‐Of-‐IDM-‐And-‐
Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World Semiconductor Trad
Figure 5 Figure 6
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1322324&page_number=2
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1324902&page_number=1
Global and Chinese Regions," http://www.thestreet.com/story/13269917/1/
Revenue by Semiconductor Sector (2015), US$ Billion Growth (CAGR) in the Semiconductor Ecosystem, (2009–2015)
37
16.0% 15.0%
27
37 14.0%
27 IDM 12.0% 10.6%
IDM
50 Fabless 10.0%
50 Fabless
CAGR
8.0% 6.8% 7.0%
Foundry
Foundry 6.0%
232 232 OSAT 4.0%
OSAT
Equipment 2.0%
103
Equipment 0.0%
103 IDM Fabless OSAT Foundry
Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World

Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World Semiconductor Trade Statistics; EE Times, “Fabless Chip
Semiconductor Trade Statistics; SEMI, “SEMI Reports Global Companies Ranked by 2013 Sales,” http://www.eetimes.com/
Semiconductor Equipemnt Sales of $36.5 billion,” http:// document.asp?doc_id=1322324&page_number=2; EE Times,
www.semi.org/en/semi-reports-2015-global-semiconductor- “Foundry Sales Growing Faster Than Chip Market,” http://
equipment-sales-365-billion; IC Insights, Research Bulletin, www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1324902&page_
“U.S. Companies Continue to Capture Bulk of IDM and number=1; PR Newswire, “Advanced Packaging Market and
Fabless IC Sales,” http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/ OSAT Industry 2015 Review Report for Global and Chinese
US-Companies-Continue-To-Capture-Bulk-Of-IDM-And-Fabless- Regions,” http://www.thestreet.com/story/13269917/1/
IC-Sales/; IC Insights, Research Bulletin, “Leading Edge Leads advanced-packaging-market-and-osat-industry-2015-review-
the Way in Pure-Play Foundry Growth,” http://www.icinsights. report-for-global-and-chinese-regions.html
com/news/bulletins/Leading-Edge-Leads-The-Way-In-PurePlay-
Foundry-Growth/; PR Newswire, “Advanced Packaging Market
and OSAT Industry 2015 Review Report for Global and Chinese
Regions,” http://www.thestreet.com/story/13269917/1/
advanced-packaging-market-and-osat-industry-2015-review-
report-for-global-and-chinese-regions.html
Thus, from a time in the early 1960s when individual firms performed all functions in-house and
used a “combination of homemade equipment and scientific lab equipment,”10 the industry
has evolved into an entire semiconductor ecosystem. Firms enhance competitiveness through
increasing specialization in only certain segments of the value chain including the support
activities. This ecosystem is together enhancing the overall competitiveness of semiconductors
in capabilities, consumer preferences, and price.
2.5 Here, There, Everywhere: Geographic Dispersion of the Value Chain

The semiconductor value chain began to cross national boundaries in 1961 when the U.S.
company Fairchild Semiconductor, facing increased market and technological competition,
began assembling chips in Hong Kong. The advantages of this move included lower costs,
availability of qualified engineering and technical personnel, advanced infrastructure, proximity
to consumer markets, and low tax rates and duties, increasing the competitiveness of the U.S.
company.11 This allowed the firm to continue to rapidly increase its investment into R&D that
was essential to creating new technologies. The value chain became increasingly dispersed as
the benefits grew. Today, a majority of the wafer capacity of U.S.-based firms is located in the
Americas, while 30 percent lies in the Asia-Pacific, 9 percent in Europe, and 9 percent in Japan.
12,13
Exhibit 2 at the end of this section summarizes the factors promoting a global value chain.
A variety of data make it possible to gauge the extent to which the value chain transcends
national and regional boundaries. These include information on revenue and trade flows for
various products and raw materials. Figure 8, based on share of revenue, illustrates international
dispersion of the semiconductor value chain for the IDM and the fabless-foundry models.14
9
Figure 7
Example of the Global Nature of the Semiconducor Value Chain
Source: UN Comtrade and Taiwan Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance; Year of 2014
Semiconductor goods defined by HS Codes: 8541 (Diodes, Transistors, and Similar Semiconductors); 8542 (Electronic Integrated Circuits)
Fabrication materials goods defined by HS Codes: 280429 (Rare gases other than Argon); 280430 (Nitrogen); 280461 (Silicon (>99.99% pure)); 280469 (Silicon (<99.99% pure));
28047 (Phosphorus); 851680 (Resist); 903141 (Photomasks)
Assembly, test, packaging goods defined by HS Codes: 3506 (Glues and Adhesives); 854710 (Ceramic Packaging)
10
Figure 8
IDM
Internationalization of the Semiconductor Value Chain (% of total revenue, 2015)
<1% Fabless
2% 1% IDM
Fabless
<1%
2% 1% United States 2% United States
United States 2% 7% United States
7% South Korea 10% Taiwan
7% 7%
South Korea 10% Taiwan
11% Japan China
11% Japan China
Europe Europe
51% Europe 18% Europe
28% 51% Taiwan 18% 62% Japan
28% Taiwan 62% Japan
Others Others
Others Others
Foundry OSAT
Foundry OSAT
2% 6% 2% 5%
2% 6% 2% Taiwan 5% Taiwan
7% Taiwan Taiwan
7% United States United States
United States 12% United States
China 12% China
10% China China
12% Singapore
10% Israel 12% Singapore
Israel 54% Japan
73% South Korea 54% Japan
South Korea 17%
73% 17%
Japan
Japan
Source: IC Insights, Research Bulletin, “U.S. Companies Continue to Capture Bulk of IDM and Fabless IC Sales,” http://www.icinsights.com/
news/bulletins/US-Companies-Continue-To-Capture-Bulk-Of-IDM-And-Fabless-IC-Sales/; Gartner, “Worldwide Semiconductor Foundry
Market Grew 4.4 Percent in 2015, According to Final Results by Gartner,” http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3281630; Company reports.
Note: The IDM and fabless charts describe the share of IC revenue across the entire global market. The charts for foundry and
OSAT describer the share of semiconductor revenue across the top 10 companies in their respective sectors.
IDMs are mainly concentrated in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Europe, in that order.
Several IDMs also have dispersed segments of the value chain geographically, (although still within
the firm) to realize cost advantages (see Figure 9). In the fabless-foundry model, countries’ roles
differ according to the activities performed. For instance, the United States and Taiwan lead in the
design segment of the value chain, while Asian countries, particularly Taiwan, largely concentrate
on manufacturing and assembly, testing, and packaging.15 Besides Taiwan and United States, there
are several other countries involved in the fabrication segment of the semiconductor value chain,
either as pure-play16 foundries (e.g. Israel and China) or as wafer manufacturing plants of IDMs (e.g.,
Ireland and Singapore).17 Assembly, testing, and packaging are also performed in several countries
including Taiwan, United States, China, Singapore, and Japan.18
Delineation and globalization of production are also apparent in activities supporting the
semiconductor value chain. The United States and Japan19 are the two leading suppliers of
semiconductor manufacturing equipment, with 44 percent and 32 percent market shares,
respectively.20 The Netherlands has a strong presence as a maker of high-end equipment to
11

Figure 9
Geographic Dispersion of the SemiconductorValue Chain by Six IDMs
Intel Micron Toshiba Samsung Infineon NXP

12
manufacture integrated circuits.21,22 Japan is the foremost supplier of materials, including wafer
fabrication materials and packaging materials such as lead frames and bonding wires, providing
more than 50 percent of the world supply of semiconductor production materials.23 The United
States and several European countries also engage in materials supply.
2.5.1.1 Integrated Circuits, Silicon: an Expanded World Market

As the next two figures demonstrate, export markets have created growth opportunities for
many exporters. And while it appears that some countries have lost market share—the United
States and Japan, for example—it must be remembered that the size of the market has grown.
Subsequent discussions will show that a diversity of suppliers is a net plus for all, because
numerous suppliers can step in to add more and more specialized value to enhance the
competitiveness of the end product.
Figure 10 illustrates the share of the major countries in the export of integrated circuits
(ICs) from 2000 through 2014. This figure demonstrates that many nations export electronic
integrated circuits, and the global participation has increased since 2000. This clearly shows the
global nature of the industry, with no one country standing alone.
Analysis of data on imports of silicon—the primary raw material for chips—also highlights
how increasingly interconnected the semiconductor ecosystem has become, evidence of
growth amid an expanding value chain. Figure 11 gives the share of different countries in
silicon imports from 1995 to 2014. Silicon imports are a good indicator of semiconductor
manufacturing in a country. Semiconductor manufacturing has become a truly international
enterprise over the past 20 years
The various discussions and data presented in this section highlight the evolution and extent
of geographic dispersion in the semiconductor global value chain. At the same time, the
discussions in this section also point toward the potential for newer countries, for example
in South America and Africa, to enter the semiconductor global value chain by undertaking
activities of semiconductor production in which they
have a competitive advantage, such as affordable human
resources and low cost of production. As the countries
that currently participate in the semiconductor global
value chain experience economic growth and as their skill
and technological capabilities and cost structures change,
they will move up the value chain, making room for new
entrants. Also, as segments of the value chain become
increasingly specialized due to rapid innovations, new sub-
segments or supporting activities will emerge in the value
chain—just as semiconductor design further specialized
into EDA companies and IP block companies—providing
opportunities for new countries and companies to enter
the semiconductor global value chain.
13
FORMER
VARIABLE
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value SINGAPORE 28,836,160,101 23,533,854,089 25,454,812,331 32,541,880,822
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value CHINA, HONG KONG SAR 10,796,500,470 11,047,498,618 13,238,513,271 16,314,875,951
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value OTHER ASIA, NES* 18,655,417,765 13,476,888,998 15,115,876,385 18,091,016,368
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value CHINA 2,937,994,687 2,626,270,642 4,315,530,598 6,587,864,175
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value REP. OF KOREA 20,006,360,655 11,239,297,812 12,265,784,908 15,469,049,996
BEYOND
EXPORT BORDERS: THE GLOBAL
8542 Trade_Value USA SEMICONDUCTOR VALUE CHAIN
54,098,080,412 40,427,553,801 38,229,541,604 41,930,340,025
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value MALAYSIA 15,040,237,130 13,066,393,221 16,006,354,059 18,872,786,027
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value JAPAN 30,265,738,584 22,034,024,648 22,699,824,072 25,920,859,095
EXPORT 8542 Trade_Value OTHERS 70,563,937,777 55,829,134,237 58,303,034,240 62,013,765,380
EXPORT 8542 total_trade_val 251,200,427,581 193,280,916,066 205,629,271,468 237,742,437,839
Figure 10
Share of Global Exports of Electronic Integrated Circuits
Figure 11
100%
Shares of Global Imports of Silicon
90%
80%
Billion U70% SD
Country 60%
1995 2000 2005 2010
China 50% 5,839,710.00 21,921,850.00 221,269,455.00 2,903,143,460.00
Japan 40% 461,051,240.00
495,067,223.00
1,095,628,475.00
2,066,517,574.00

Other Asia,
30% NES* -‐ 57,222,393.00
120,841,940.00 1,072,243,968.00
Germany20% 169,601,000.00
127,492,000.00
250,412,000.00 1,045,169,240.00
Rep. of K10%
orea 64,702,350.00
79,028,188.00
152,655,905.00 727,428,572.00
USA 0% 190,049,516.00
262,954,776.00
379,235,206.00 769,189,776.00
United Kingdom 2000
80,833,530.00
2001
2002 2003 2004
2005
98,100,045.00
2006 2007
131,061,017.00
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012
392,563,109.00 2013 2014
Netherlands SINGAPORE CHINA, 34,616,410.00

HONG KONG SAR OTHER ASIA,
45,930,717.00
NES* CHINA REP. OF KOREA
22,946,431.00 USA MALAYSIA JAPAN 185,224,501.00 OTHERS
Source: UN Comtrade (Code: 8542)
Malaysia 166,818,438.00
49,849,972.00
34,780,380.00 85,136,579.00
*NES: Not elsewhere specified
Singapore 9,160,081.00 3,535,608.00 42,109,383.00 230,334,912.00
Note: Singapore has a high *NES: share Not elsewhere of exports specifiedas a major transshipment hub for semiconductors.
Others Note:
228,247,268.00
Singapore has a high share of exports 334,405,116.00
as a major transshipment hub for semiconductors. 789,689,187.00 1,865,523,164.00
-‐ -‐ -‐ -‐
Total 1,410,919,543
1,575,507,888
3,240,629,379 11,342,474,855
Figure 11
Shares of Global Imports of Silicon
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
China Japan Other Asia, NES* Germany
Rep. of Korea USA United Kingdom Netherlands
Malaysia Singapore Others

*NES: Not elsewhere specified
14
Exhibit 2
Factors promoting a global value chain for semiconductors
Relative advantage of countries in undertaking certain activities: The semiconductor

global value chain enables countries to focus on activities where they have a competitive
advantage and trade for other goods and services. In the semiconductor global value chain,
countries “trade in tasks” within specific segments of the value chain. Generally, countries
with abundant labor perform labor-intensive tasks (e.g., assembly and testing), while
countries with skilled labor (process knowledge) primarily undertake technology-intensive
tasks (e.g., manufacturing), and developed economies focus on knowledge-intensive tasks
(e.g., design). A country’s comparative advantage is not static, but will constantly adjust as
some activities grow and some decline, and as a country’s economic and structural policy
environment changes.
Trade-facilitating conditions: The emergence of global value chains has also been
facilitated in the recent years by advancement in information and communications
technology, improving the quality and reducing the cost of global communications and
business operations through real-time interaction and resource sharing. Technological
advancements have also facilitated development of international standards for technology,
product descriptions, and protocols. Increased trade liberalization and the resultant
increased access to worldwide resources and markets have also contributed to the
emergence of a semiconductor global value chain. Another promoting factor has been the
reduction in costs associated with international trade (port costs, freight and insurance costs,
tariffs and duties, transportation and communication costs, and so on).
Positive business environment: Elimination of tariffs, provision of tax benefits such as

R&D credits, provision of grants, establishment of industrial clusters, protection of IP, and
government investment in skill development are all incentives that prompt firms to move
their operations to countries to improve their competitiveness. At the same time, changing
perceptions of the stability and openness of markets, concerns about intellectual property
protection, rising costs and a range of other factors also prompt firms to “back-shore” or
relocate activities. A positive and stable business and policy environment is a key factor in
firms’ decision to invest and engage in economic activities in a country.
Proximity to end-use markets: Increased demand for electronic products in emerging

markets especially in Asia has pushed semiconductor companies to move production
facilities closer to these markets.
Physical characteristics of semiconductors: Semiconductor manufacturing involves

physically distinct stages of production which allow for geographic dispersion of the
production process. Further, the high value to weight ratio of semiconductors allows easy
and economical transportation during the various stages of production.
15
3 GL O BAL APPROACH: C L E A R - C U T B E NE F I TS
As the preceding section shows, the semiconductor value chain became geographically
dispersed for an array of economic and technological reasons, as a result of business decisions
made over time in response to specific situations. This globally integrated value chain
contributes to a steady stream of innovation—fueled by demand and large-scale spending
on R&D—and to the availability of increasingly sophisticated and affordable products. This
section details the benefits to industries, consumers, and entire economies of participating in
the global value chain, citing economic principles and examples from numerous industries,
including the semiconductor industry. The benefits of participation can also be demonstrated
through a “but-for” analysis: but for a global value chain, what position would industries,
consumers, and national economies be in? Recent history has numerous examples of the risks
to industries of economies that have insulated themselves from the global market. This section
also categorizes costs and risks of a nationalistic approach.
3.1 Benefits of Participating in the Global Value Chain
3.1.1 Greater Efficiency, Higher Productivity

The most obvious benefits from division of tasks across countries are efficiency gains and
higher productivity as companies concentrate efforts on areas where they can excel, with each
region adding maximum value on a competitive basis, in a way that naturally controls the risks
of overcapacity and oversupply.
The first step toward the global semiconductor value chain—the decision by market players to
establish facilities in Asia in response to intense inter-industry competition—was based on this
consideration. As benefits of a global value chain became more apparent, U.S.-based activities
gravitated to R&D, design and high-end manufacturing, while the availability of more-skilled
and less-skilled labor drew other
manufacturing, assembly, and testing
to Asian countries. The higher value-
added activities are still spreading: U.S.
companies have been initiating R&D
development activities—especially
focusing on the design stage of the
value chain—in the United States and
other regions such as India, Israel,
Malaysia, and Singapore as skill levels
there have risen and governments have
introduced policies supporting such
specialized participation in the global
value chain. 24,25,26 Suppliers of electronic
design automation (EDA) services in
China, India, Malaysia, Singapore,
16
GLOBAL APPROACH: CLEAR-CUT BENEFITS
South Korea, and Taiwan have harnessed their competitive advantages in designing through the
use of EDA tools and have experienced high revenue growth in response to global demand.27
In short, the allocation of tasks across countries based on competitive advantages enables
companies to operate more efficiently and compete more effectively in the world market. It is
important to note that “increasing foreign presence does not necessarily involve the closure or
physical offshoring of existing production from advanced economies, but does often imply the
creation and expansion of affiliates abroad.”28 This behavior by companies ultimately benefits
national economies around the world where companies place jobs and often invest in local
universities, science centers, and other contributors to the semiconductor ecosystem.
3.1.2 Economic Growth, Lower Consumer Prices

Another major benefit from participating in the global value chain is the positive impact it
has on overall economic development of every participating nation. The positive impacts are
measurably direct, as in exports and sales, or may be more diffuse, promoting productivity and
lowering consumer prices. The activity does not have to occur within a geography to benefit that
geography. It can occur anywhere in the world, with some of the benefits (e.g., revenues) coming
back to the parent company to fule more innovation.
For instance, by tapping into the global value chain, South Korea has seen its share of worldwide
semiconductor sales increase from about 6 percent in the early 1990s to 17 percent in 2014. Taiwan’s
share has increased from almost zero in the early 1990s to 7 percent in 2014, and China’s share has
increased from almost zero in the early 2000s to 4 percent in 2014. The U.S semiconductor market
share has remained roughly steady at around 50 percent for the past 20 years, yet the industry’s
contribution to the U.S. economy, as measured by growth in real value added, has accelerated
amid globalization, increasing 265 percent from 1987–2011. The pace exceeded that of any other
manufacturing industry. Value added jumped to US$65 billion from US$50.3 billion from 2007–2011,
growing far faster than GDP as a whole. Among manufacturing industries, only petroleum refineries
and pharmaceutical preparation makers contributed more to U.S. GDP in 2007 and 2011.29
The Taiwanese semiconductor industry is also making significant contribution to Taiwan’s GDP
through estimated exports worth US$61.2 billion in 2014—demonstrating a 16.3 percent year-
over-year increase.30
Deeper global value chain integration resulting from participation in trade liberalizing
agreements has also been critical in spurring economic growth, especially for developing
countries. The 1997 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) – a multilateral trade pact
that eliminated tariffs on a wide range of electronic products – is a key example. Several ITA
countries saw their shares of ICT goods exports increase dramatically in the years following ITA
implementation.31 For example, China’s share of global exports of IT products rapidly expanded
from 2.2 percent in 1996 to 27.5 percent in 2012, surpassing both the EU and the US to
become the leader in overall ITA trade in 2005.32
R&D spending, spurred by participation in the global value chain and rewarded by increased
global sales, cannot be discounted as a driver of economic growth.33 In 2015, the worldwide
17
semiconductor industry spent a record US$56.4 billion on R&D.34 R&D expenditures of the U.S.
semiconductor industry grew at an average annual rate of about 33 percent during 1994–2014,
and R&D spending as a share of sales ranged from 15-20 pecent for U.S. semiconductor firms
over the last 10 years—an unprecedented ratio among manufacturing industries in the United
States.35
The technological advances that R&D spending brings about have created significant value
through price and productivity. The benefit to consumers can be estimated as the difference
between the price that consumers were willing to pay for a semiconductor and the lower price
that they actually paid. For instance, economist Kenneth Flamm estimated that “in 1995, the
value of a year’s price decline was worth $12 billion to consumers,” meaning “twenty years of
price declines generated a cumulative benefit worth $340 billion in 1995 or five percent of the
entire value of goods and services produced in the U.S. economy in 1995.”36 If the automobile
industry had had similar improvements in price and performance to semiconductors over three
decades, “a Rolls-Royce would cost only US$40 and could circle the globe eight times on one
gallon of gas—with a top speed of 2.4 million miles per hour.”37
3.1.3 Access To Large And Growing Markets Worldwide

The international diffusion of the semiconductor value chain is not driven by cost and efficiency
considerations alone. Access and proximity to markets and customers is another very important
reason for joining this value chain.
In particular, the market for semiconductors38 in the Asia-Pacific has quadrupled over the
past 15 years—from US$39.8 billion in 2001 to over US$194 billion in 2014.39 China alone
accounts for 29.4 percent of all single-country sales of semiconductors.40 Other statistics from
Chinese sources put Chinese consumption of semiconductors at 56.6 percent of the global
market, making semiconductors China’s leading import.41 It is important to note that a large
percentage of this consumption is re-exported to customers around the world, not domestically
consumed, after the semiconductor is incorporated into an end product.42 In fact, China’s top
five exports (in terms of revenue) are electronic end products that use semiconductors, and
semiconductors themselves are China’s third largest export. Without its large imports of high-
quality semiconductors, China would not be the exporting powerhouse it is today (Figure 12).
Figure 12
Relationship between China’s Semiconductor Imports and Top Five Exports (in Revenue)
300 250
250 200
Semiconductors Telecom Equipment

200
150 Computers
Oil
150 Semiconductors
Iron ores
100
Salvage LCD
100
LCD Parts of electronic products
50
50
0 0
2014 Import (in Billion $) 2014 Export (in Billion $)
Source: UN Comtrade Database. HS Codes Semiconductors (8541+8542), Oil (2709), Iron Ore (2601), Salvage (9999), LCD (9013),
Telecom Equipment (8517), Computers (8471), Parts of electronic products (8473).
18
While China’s semiconductor market is significant, there are several other large and important
markets for semiconductors, including Taiwan and Japan, which imported US$34.2 billion
and US$24.5 billion worth of semiconductors in 2013, respectively.43 The United States is also
a huge semiconductor consumer market, with sales of semiconductors, including imported
semiconductors, to electronic equipment makers in the United States amounting to US$69.3
billion in 2014.44
Through proximity and access to customers overseas, participation in the world value chain helps
companies capture foreign markets and exploit new demand opportunities and growth centers.
3.1.4 Innovation, Advancements In Technology

If there’s any doubt about the advances made in the semiconductor industry, consider these
passages: “The rate of progress since the first silicon transistor in 1947 has been enormous,
with the number of transistors on a single chip growing from a few thousand in the earliest
integrated circuits to more than two billion today.”45 As for price, “in 1954, five years before the
IC [integrated circuit] was invented, the average selling price of a transistor was US$5.52. Fifty
years later, in 2004, this had dropped to 191 nanodollars (a billionth of a dollar).”46
The semiconductor industry is highly complex and characterized by rapid technological

advancements requiring huge costs for upgrading and adopting new technology along the
value chain (including demand by customers). Adaptation to the complexity of the industry
and to changes in process technology and wafer sizes occurs most efficiently when the
semiconductor industry around the world works in concert—and participation in the global
value chain greatly facilitates this.
For instance, the eventual planned transition from 300mm diameter to 450mm diameter silicon
wafers requires new manufacturing equipment and materials to develop the prerequisite
manufacturing technologies. A company participating in the global value chain will purchase
newly developed equipment from the companies specializing in 450 mm manufacturing
technologies, whereever they are located because those companies will be the most
competitive in producing the equipment. Similarly, the countries specializing in production of
semiconductor manufacturing equipment cannot function without relying on the world’s value
chain—they will need enough global demand for the new wafer size to justify developing the
equipment for the new wafer size.
Further, a worldwide value chain also facilitates important collaboration between companies
and countries to help the industry successfully adopt new technologies. This is evident from
the vast number of collaborative R&D consortia that have developed over the years47 that bring
together government, industry, academia, and global companies. One example is the Facilities
450 Consortium (F450C), which is bringing together selected companies from across the world to
enable optimized 450mm high-volume semiconductor facility design, construction and operation.
The F450C cooperative model leverages industry alignment and collaboration as a critical enabler.48
19
Similarly, the Global 450 Consortium (G450C) is a public-private partnership program initially
launched by New York State in partnership with several global companies to “develop cost-
effective test wafer fabrication infrastructure, equipment prototypes and high-volume tools to
enable a coordinated industry transition to 450mm wafers.”49 Likewise, Imec—set up as a not-
for-profit organization by the Belgian government to strengthen the nation’s microelectronics
industry—works in association with universities, private firms, and governments to conduct
R&D in nanoelectronics and semiconductors through initiatives such as setting up laboratories
and training programs for engineers.50
3.1.5 Movement Up The Value Chain

Participation in the semiconductor global value chain provides access to international networks,
global markets for goods and capital, knowledge, and technology that might be unavailable to a
domestic value chain. Such access typically result in accelerated development of human resources
and skills. Increased human resources and skills enable all countries to move up the global value
chain and reap greater economic benefits. As countries’ relative advantage in performing tasks
changes due to changes in skills and cost structures, countries will move up the value chain,
allocating the lower value tasks they previously performed to other countries that might now be
better equipped to undertake them. The value chain acquires new participants as a result. Taiwan
and China illustrate this dynamic, as discussed below.
3.1.5.1 Taiwan: From Assembly to Design

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has moved steadily up the value chain since the 1960s, when the
Figure U.S.
13 firms located assembly plants there.51 Today, Taiwan is very involved in semiconductor device
Share of Revenue of IC Design, Manufacturing and Packaging and Testing in Taiwan. 2014
design as well as manufacturing (figure 13 below). It is the third-largest semiconductor manufacturer in
Designthe world, behind only the United 26%States and South Korea, and leader in the foundry segment of the
global value chain. Driven by strong
Manufacturing 53% demand from China for mobile chips, Taiwan’s integrated circuit
design
Packaging and Tsector
esting is also growing at21% a fast pace. Taiwan is the second-largest participant in semiconductor
Figure 13 Figure 14
Share of Revenue of IC Design, Manufacturing and Packaging Growing Number of Semiconductor Enterprises in China
and Testing in Taiwan. 2014
16 664
IC Design
(1990) (2014)
Packaging and Design

Tes9ng 26% Wafer 56 160
21% Fabrication (2003) (2013)
Test and 77 116

Packaging (2003) (2013)
Manufacturing
53% Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, A Decade of Unprecedented
Growth, China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry 2014
Update, (PWC, 2015)
Source: Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association, Overview on Taiwan S
Source: Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association, Overview
on Taiwan Semiconductor Industry (TSIA, 2015 Edition), 4.
20
device design, just after the United States, accounting for 22.2 percent of the global semiconductor
device market as measured by revenue. There were about 245 fabless companies in Taiwan in 2014.
Taiwanese semiconductor companies are expected to follow the example of many Taiwanese
makers of personal computers. The personal computer makers, because of rising production
costs, are setting up manufacturing facilities in mainland China. As costs in China rise, the next
manufacturing destinations are likely to be Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos. Taiwanese firms are
also allocating R&D to countries such as India and China due to availability of talented human
resources in these countries.
3.1.5.2 China: Expands to Become Integral Part of Value Chain

China’s share of worldwide semiconductor revenue has multiplied as a result of China’s
participation in the global value chain for semiconductors, growing from roughly 2 percent of
global revenue in 2000 to 13.4 percent in 2014.52,53 Production of integrated circuits in China
soared,
Figure 15 increasing from 3.5 billion units in 1984 to 71.4 billion units in 2012. The number of
design enterprises,
Distribution of waferinfabrication
Value Chain Activities facilities,
China as Share of Total Valueand assembly, test, and packaging companies in
(2003–2013)
China has also risen significantly (figure 14). Employment in China has gained as a result: 1.28
million people worked in integrated circuit design enterprises
Value $BN
in China in 2013, up 14 percent
Percentage
Date
from a Design
year earlier, the resultPackaging
Manufacturing of a 12.5TotalpercentDesign
increase in theManufacturing
numberPackaging
of integrated circuit design
2003 0.5395 0.7553
enterprises in China from 2012–2013. 2.9465 4.2413 13% 18% 69%
2004 0.984 2.184 3.408 6.576 15% 33% 52%
2005 1.5295 2.8497 4.2182 8.5974 18% 33% 49%
Foreign investment and4.0579
2006 2.3436
establishment
6.2496
of12.6511
facilities have greatly
19%
contributed
32%
to the 49%
industry’s growth
in China, with
2007 2.9592 Taiwan playing
5.2334 a significant
8.2474 role:
16.44 34 percent of
18%investment
32% by Taiwanese
50% firms in
China is in IT. Within the semiconductor industry, as Taiwan grew stronger in fabless design after
2008 3.3912 5.652 8.8862 17.9294 19% 32% 50%
2009 3.942 4.9932 7.3 16.2352 24% 31% 45%
2000, several Taiwanese6.6294
2010 5.3721
fabless companies
9.2964
invested in China,
21.2979 25%
largely
31%
to gain access
44%
to design
engineering
2011 8.1212skills. The Taiwanese
8.2754 companies
13.4668 29.8634trained design engineers
27% 28% in China—an 45%extensive
2012 9.8525
knowledge 9.3458 according
transfer. In 2004, 15.0321 to 34.2304 29%
a survey by the Shanghai 27% 44%
Municipal Corporation, 22
2013 13.16 9.8042 17.8976 40.8618 32% 24% 44%
Figure 15
Distribution of Value Chain Activities in China as Share of Total Value (2003–2013)
100%
80% 49% 45% 44% 45% 44% 44%

52% 49% 50% 50%
69%
60%
28% 27% 24%

40% 31% 31%
33% 33% 32% 32% 32%
20% 18%
27% 29% 32%
19% 24% 25%
13% 15% 18% 19% 18%
0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Design Manufacturing Packaging
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, A Decade of Unprecedented Growth, China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry 2014 Update
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, A Decade of Unprecedented Growth, China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry 2014 Update
21
percent of 124 design houses in Shanghai were partially backed by Taiwanese investment, 17
percent were wholly owned Taiwanese operations, and 5 percent were Sino-foreign joint ventures.
At least 7 of the 10 largest Taiwanese fabless companies have design centers in China.
China has moved up the value chain to become not just a base for assembly, test and packaging
operations but also for fabrication and design. Also, several countries including the United States,
Europe, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have established industry bases and R&D centers in China.
Figure 15 shows the decrease in low-value activities for China and a corresponding increase in
activities higher up the value chain, specifically IC design.
3.2 Risks of a One-Nation Value Chain

The semiconductor industry has evolved into a global value chain in response to changing
market conditions including advances in information and communications, technology, trade
facilitation; declining transportation costs; differences in skill endowments and cost structures
around the world; and increasing competition and demand for electronics. While one could
look directly at the benefits that such globalization of the value chain has bestowed, as
done in the previous section, another perspective would be to identify and analyze the costs
associated with a “what if” scenario. In other words, what would be the costs if the value chain
remains within national boundaries or if the government today attempts to establish an entire
end to end domestic semiconductor industry within it’s own borders? The results of such an
examination follow.
3.2.1 Misdirection Of Investments, Leading To Higher Costs, Prices

A fully domestic semiconductor value chain would encompass all activities in the value chain
and ecosystem. Given the array of segments and different resource requirements for each
segment, significant investment cost must be incurred to create even a part of this value chain.
These costs ultimately affect prices, and the effort necessarily would result in a technological
lag because of a lack of focus and specialization impairs innovation and reduces the efficient
use of resources (that is, one country cannot be leading edge in all steps in the value chain).
A fabrication facility illustrates the cost considerations. For instance, setting up a new advanced
technology fabrication facility can cost between US$5billion–US$10 billion and take 1–2 years
to complete.54 Additionally, to stay competitive, the fab is likely to need retooling every 2 to 3
years, again involving significant costs. As a result of these constraints, few companies build
their own chip plants.55
Table 1 presents the key cost and time variables for selected companies in each segment of
the semiconductor value chain.56 These variables highlight the significant amount of investment
in financial and human resources for a country to have capabilities similar to those of a global
leader in each segment. For instance, the largest fabless company in the world as measured by
total equity—Qualcomm—spent nearly US$5 billion in research and development in 2013. The
foundry TSMC had property, plant and equipment worth US$26.57 billion in 2013. And SPIL, an
OSAT, employed close to 22,795 people in 2013. It is difficult for any country to make this kind
of investment in each segment of the semiconductor value chain by itself.
22
30 BEYOND BORDERS: THE SEMICONDUCTOR VALUE CHAIN
competitive, the fab is likely to need retooling every 2 to 3 years, again involving significant costs. As a result of
these constraints, few companies are able to build their own chip plants.
Table 2 presents the key cost and time variables for selected companies in each segment of the semiconductor
value chain.56 These variables highlight the significant amount of investment in financial and human resources
Most
for of the companies
a country in the semiconductor
to have capabilities similar to thoseindustry were
of a global set up
leader several
in each decades
segment. Forago. Theythe
instance, spent
largest
significant
fabless time in
company and
theresources developing
world as measured by expertise in their areas of interest,
total equity—Qualcomm—spent which
nearly enabled
US$5 billion them
in research
to reach their positions of global leadership today. The opportunity cost—both in terms of time
and development in 2013. The foundry TSMC had property, plant and equipment worth US$26.57 billion in
and resources—of such investments is enormous. Investment resources most likely are finite: major
2013. And SPIL, an OSAT, employed close to 22,795 people in 2013. It is difficult for any country to make this
investment in one industry can very well mean another industry or segment of the infrastructure
kind of investment in each segment of the semiconductor value chain by itself.
is underfunded. Also, domestic investment in all aspects of the industry can fail to leverage cost
efficiencies that might prevail in other parts of the world, diminishing the competitiveness of locally
Most of the companies in the industry were set up several decades ago. They spent significant time and
produced semiconductors and of products that contain semiconductors.
resources in developing expertise in their areas of operation, which enabled them to reach their positions of
Investing
global in establishing
leadership today. Theevery segment
opportunity of the value
cost—both chain
in terms of domestically misdirects
time and resources—of a country’s
such investments is
scarce resources.
enormous. This
Investment is highlighted
resources by are
most likely thefinite:
fact that each segment
investment of the can
in one industry semiconductor
very well mean another
industryor
industry requires
segmentdifferent resources to achieve
of the infrastructure, operational
for example, does notefficiency, product
benefit from quality,
investment. anddomestic
Also,
advances in technology. For instance, investment in R&D and design is different from the
investment in the industry can fail to leverage cost efficiencies that might prevail in other parts of the world,
financial and human resource investment required to set up and maintain production facilities.
diminishing the competitiveness of locally produced semiconductors and of products that contain
By choosing to domestically develop all activities including R&D, design and production, a
semiconductors.
country would forgo gaining from advances made in other geographies.
Table 1
Table 1 Data for Selected Semiconductor Companies (2013), US$ million
Key Cost
Key Cost Data for Selected Semiconductor Companies (2013), US$ million
Founded in Property,
No. of
Total R&D Plant and
Type of company Company Year Country Equity Expense Equipment Employees
Fabless Broadcom57 199158 USA 8,371 2,486 593 12,40059
GLOBAL APPROACH: CLEAR-CUT BENEFITS 31
Mediatek60 199761 Taiwan 5,933 803 192 7,065
Qualcomm62 198563 USA 36,087 4,967 2,995 31,000

Founded in Property,
No. of
Total R&D Plant and
Marvell Technology 199565 USA 4,676 1,157 356 7,355
Type of company Company
Group 64 Year Country Equity Expense Equipment Employees
AMD66 1969 USA 544 1,201 346 10,671
Foundry TSMC67 198768 Taiwan 27,962 1,608 26,573 40,483
UMC69 198070 Taiwan

56 Cost of capital, R&D, property plant and equipment, and 7,028 419 5,443 17,784
number of employees and years since establishment.
57 Broadcom, News Release, 71“Broadcom Reports Fourth Quarter
Assembly, Test and SPIL 198472 Taiwan and Full year 2013 104
1,897 Results.” 1,676 22,795
58 Broadcom.
Packaging Broadcom Corporation Corporate Overview, Q1 2014. 3.
Amkor73 Corporate Overview,
59 Broadcom, Broadcom Corporation 196874 Q1USA
2014. 3. 965 65 2,007 20,900
60 Mediatek, Mediatek Annual Report 2013. (Taiwan: Mediatek, April 30, 2014), 62, 74, 112. Values converted to Exchange rates as on
IDMs
December Intel
75
30th, 2015 (Conversion rate NT$ 11968
76 USA
= USD 0.03037), 58,256 10,611 31,428 107,600
http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TWD&to=USD&view=1Y
Micron77 197878 USA (accessed
10,006 February
931 25, 2016)
7,626 30,900
61 Mediatek, “Investor FAQ, Corporate History,” http://www.mediatek.com/en/about/investor-relations/investor-faq-
more/(accessed FebruaryInfineon 79
25, 2016). 200080 Germany 4,116 572 1,744 26,725
62 Qualcomm Limited. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended September 29, 2013 (United States of America: Qualcomm Limited), XX-
Toshiba81 193982 Japan 1,047 4.89 62 4,055
XX 16, 54, 56.
63 Qualcomm, “History,” https://www.qualcomm.com/company/about/history (accessed February 25, 2016).
Investing in establishing every segment of the value chain domestically misdirects a country’s scarce resources.
Moreover, developing an isolated domestic value chain in those segments of the value chain in which
This is highlighted by the fact that each segment of the semiconductor industry requires different resources to
the country does not have an advantage diminishes the competitiveness of it’s whole domestic chain.
achieve operational efficiency, product quality, and advances in technology. For instance, investment in R&D
and design is different from the financial investment required to set up and maintain production facilities. By
23
Specifically, cost of engaging in the activities in which the country is less competitive will be relatively
higher and reduce national industrial competitiveness as compared with that of other countries that
participate selectively in the global value chain. As a result, the total cost of operating the domestic
value chain will be higher, not just in monetary terms, but in technology and competitiveness in all
other segments of the value chain. This influences the price of the final product, and a higher-priced,
less-advanced product adversely affects the competitiveness of the whole value chain by returning
less profit than can be reinvested in technology innovation.
Governments and industries can invest wisely by encouraging firms to join the existing global
value chain and invest in activities in which the domestic industry has a competitive advantage.
3.2.2 Knowledge Transfer And Technological Advancements

Being a part of the global value chain and interacting closely with companies of other
countries makes it possible to more easily gain lawful access to sophisticated technology and
highly critical process knowledge.83 Legal knowledge transfer ensures the constant stream of
innovation that benefits industries, consumers, and entire economies. A study of 56 Taiwanese
semiconductor companies found that “knowledge transfer could develop semiconductor firms’
core competence,” which could later be built upon to develop competitive advantage.84
The alternative is to attempt to develop knowledge from the ground up, which is highly
inefficient and very difficult in complex and dynamic industries like semiconductor design and
manufacturers, and thus makes achieving success at the leading edge only a remote possibility.
Even with deep pockets for investment, the country is also highly unlikely to be able to catch
up to the latest technology and expertise in the international market. It may have access to a
good domestically developed technology, but it is unlikely to be the best and latest technology,
developed by another country specializing in that segment of the global value chain.
Technological change in one stage of the value chain has a cascading effect as well as an
upstream effect on the technologies in other stages. Change in a chip design, for example, will
be reflected and incorporated in the manufacturing, assembly, and testing segments of the value
chain. Changes in chip design will also have a dramatic effect on the design and functionality
of downstream products made with semiconductors. Manufacturing technology is constantly
upgraded to keep up with wafer size, which has evolved from 13mm in diameter in the 1960s
to 300mm in the 2000s, and is now moving toward 450mm. In this scenario, raw wafer suppliers
must upgrade their technology to supply larger wafers to manufacturers. A global value chain
with various companies regardless of geographic location focused on specific segments of the
value chain is able to respond to such rapid changes in technology. When the entire value chain
is confined to one geography, however, the country must focus on upgrading all stages of the
value chain at once, a suboptimal and most likely impossible prospect.
3.2.3 Lost Export Opportunities

An uncompetitive domestic value chain reduces export opportunities for the host country,
for both semiconductor products and much more seriously in downstream products. A
semiconductor produced in a self-contained supply chain “bubble,” cut off from leading-edge
24
technology inputs, is likely to be neither price nor performance competitive in the international
market, limiting semiconductor export opportunities.
Further, a country that isolates itself off from the global value chain may very well make
the concurrent mistake of imposing domestic standards rather than adopting international
standards, leading to domestic products that are incompatible with end products made for the
Exhibit 3
Galápagos Syndrome in Japan and United States
Japan provides a classic example of the danger of unique domestic standards and isolation
from global markets. While a very open and liberal trading partner today, for much of the
previous five decades, significant parts of Japan’s market was mostly closed to foreign
competitors, and Japan consistently imposed proprietary national standards, such as
wireless communication standards, mobile data standards, and frequency bands, quite
different from those used in other parts of the world.* To be sure, Japan’s industry made
astounding advancements in technology during this time, but these products were often
incompatible with overseas conditions. This “Galápagos syndrome’’ put the existence of
the Japanese firms at risk after they dominated their domestic market because it rendered
them incapable of competing outside the Japanese market. NEC, a former leader in Japan’s
mobile phone market, left the industry in 2013. The company, among other reasons,
failed to create enough business outside Japan. NEC thereby lacked the scale to compete
globally and was exposed to domestic shocks. At the same time, many foreign companies
adopting global standards (e.g., the Android operating system) are making headway into
the domestic Japanese mobile phone market.
The U.S. wireless phone market also struggles with its own “Galápagos syndrome’’ in which
various U.S. carriers operate with different network standards, often incompatible with
each other. For instance, a Sprint phone does not work on an AT&T or Verizon network
and vice versa, and the iPhone designed for compatibility with AT&T does not work with
T-Mobile’s 3G network. This lack of compatibility means that U.S. carriers must individually
build parallel networks at great capital expense, with the effect of limiting consumer
choice in the United States and leading to quality issues for customers in the form of poor
network coverage. The non-standardization of networks domestically and the failure to
align them with global standards has also kept international brands away from investing in
the U.S. wireless phone market. As a result, U.S. operators have been unable to expand to
international markets successfully, missing out on significant opportunities abroad.
* For instance, Japanese phone makers innovated and adopted unique standards for second –generation (2G) and third-
generation (G) wireless technologies in the 1990s and 2001 respectively, a technology still non-existent overseas.
Source: Eurotechnology Japan, “Galapagos effect: how can Japan capture global value from Japan’s technologies and new
business models?” Eurotechnology Japan (2013), http://www.eurotechnology.com/insights/galapagos/(accessed March 3,
2016); Jon Russell, “End of the galapagos era? Japan’s tech and Internet habits have never been more Western,” Next Web
(November 28, 2013). http://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/11/28/end-of-the-galapagos-era-japans-tech-and-internet-habits-
have-never-been-more-western/ (accessed February 26, 2016); Horace Dediu, “The American Wireless Galapagos Syndrome:
How the industry set itself up for a rout,” Asymco (March 23, 2011). http://www.asymco.com/2011/03/23/the-american-
wireless-galapagos-syndrome-how-the-industry-set-itself-up-for-a-rout/ (accessed April 11, 2016).
25
international market. The cost of imposing domestic standards over international standards is
not only the loss of export opportunities, but also the likelihood of creating lesser-quality and
lower-performing products, creating inferior internationally competitive semiconductors and
infusing downstream industries with inferior and higher cost products.
A unique or discriminatory domestic standard might provide short-term stimulus to a domestic

industry as it reduces sales of foreign products or technology. Long-term growth suffers,
however. The opportunities provided by a domestic market, even one as large as China’s or
India’s with more than 1.2 billion consumers each, cannot compare with the opportunities
afforded by global participation, especially in the information and communications technology
(ICT) or related industries. By one estimate, “90 percent of global ICT markets lie outside
of China.”85 Missing those outside markets will mean loss of business and economic growth
opportunities for the home country and its domestic companies in the long run.
This high risk must be a central concern of any national authority deciding to attempt a
move toward self-sufficiency: creating a “national industry,” as opposed to a strong industry
participating in the global value chain, can only lead to undermining that country’s capability to
develop leading-edge semiconductors in all categories, but perhaps more importantly to the
erosion of downstream industries, as described in exhibit 3 to the left.
Over recent decades, adherence to international standards has gained importance in the
semiconductor industry. Standards apply to semiconductor technology, product quality
and specifications, and testing and packaging, for example. Although standards are not
compulsory, countries should follow them to be able to successfully export semiconductor
products and semiconductor-containing products.
3.2.4 Erosion Of Downstream Industries That Rely On Global Sourcing

Semiconductors are critical components of almost all electronic products today. As a result, the
global value chain based on semiconductors extends throughout much of every economy, into
many industries—automotive, communications, consumer electronics, information technology,
and medical devices, to name a few. An economy that isolates itself from the global value chain
risks damaging these downstream industries—each of which may have outsized contributions to a
national economy through skill and level of employment, as well as levels of trade and investment—
by restricting their access to the highest quality, most cost effective, and most innovative products
in the global marketplace. As an OECD report put it, “Today, success in international markets
depends as much on the capacity to import high-quality inputs as on the capacity to export.”86
Isolation from the global value chain, or limited participation in it, limits global sourcing of
competitive inputs. An isolated country could severely and negatively affect its domestic
downstream producers of finished products using semiconductors, especially in instances
where these industries are the nation’s top exporters. This in turn would have a profoundly
negative effect on the nation’s entire economy, not just in terms of exports but more broadly
in other critical components, including foreign investment, domestic production, GDP growth,
and domestic employment.
26
Simply put, a country that limits imports of a critical input to its top export products in favor
of a lower quality and/or more expensive domestic product would soon find its top export
products losing ground in the world market. That country’s downstream companies would
very likely relocate manufacturing to other countries that did allow the sourcing of critical
semiconductor inputs from around the world. This development would ultimately result in a
reduction of (1) exports of leading electronic products containing semiconductors; (2) domestic
industrial production; (3) foreign investment; and (4) employment.
Some countries have highlighted the gap between domestic consumption and production of
semiconductors as a reason for promoting development of a domestic semiconductor industry.
Again, as shown above, this perspective fails to take into account the downstream exporting
industries that rely on imports of semiconductor inputs. While it is beyond the scope of this paper
to analyze the entire global value chain beyond semiconductors, import substitution87 and self-
sufficiency policies in the semiconductor sector have the potential to severely impede the very
semiconductor-enabled downstream industries that form an important part of a nation’s economy.
Exhibit 4
Steel: From Overcapacity to Crisis
One of the most historic and prominent examples of non-market overcapacity has been
global steel manufacturing. With a current annual production of 1.6 billion tons, estimates of
overcapacity in the steel industry vary from 300–600 million tons. [1,2] This has led to falling
capacity utilization levels in the industry. In November 2015, utilization levels fell to 73.5 percent,
much below the healthy utilization rate of 85 percent. Prices declined significantly. “Overcapacity
had driven down prices by—10 percent at an annual average by July 2013,” thereby harming
profitability in the industry.[3] Almost all major countries at some point have been severely
affected. The steel crisis of 1997–2000 affected the U.S. economy due to surging imports from
countries such as Russia, Korea, Brazil, and Japan where large capacity build-up developed
due to heavy government subsidies and other policy support, pushing capacity far in excess
of consumption demand. [4] Restructuring of the U.S. industry has led to a closure of many
factories with many companies driven into bankruptcy and workers being let go. [5] While North
America has adjusted its capacity levels through industry restructuring and stricter anti-dumping
policies, the European Union is still struggling with an overcapacity of 40 million tons. [6] Global
overcapacity continues to distort even markets such as the United States that have successfully
overcome overcapacity, because any attempts by domestic manufacturers to increase prices is
countered through an increase in imports. Despite the overcapacity and slowdown in demand
because of the financial crisis of 2008, new capacity is planned in many countries, especially
Asian countries, Middle East and Latin America, anticipating higher demand in future years. [7]
Sources: [1] Mark O’Hara, “Massive Overcapacity in the Steel Industry In 2015,” Market Realist (January 7, 2015), http://
marketrealist.com/2015/01/massive-overcapacity-plague-steel-industry-2015/ (accessed February 26, 2016); [2] World Steel
Association, World Steel in Figures 2015, 7; [3] & [6] Yann Lacroix, Major overcapacity in the global steel industry ( Euler
Hermes Economic Research, October 10, 2013), 2-3; [4] & [5] Alan H. Price, Government Intervention and Overcapacity:
Causes and Consequences (Wiley Rein LLP Research, July, 2013), Prepared for American Iron and Steel Institute and Steel
Manufacturers Association, 2-3.; [7] OECD, Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry and the Implications of New
Investment Projects (OECD Publishing, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers No. 18, , 2014), 10 – 11.
27
3.2.5 Threat Of Overcapacity

As stated above, one of the risks of creating and operating a totally domestic semiconductor industry
is the misdirection of investments, distorting the prices of semiconductor products. Another risk of
misdirected investments is the threat of creating overcapacity—excess supply in the domestic as
well as the global market. Such overcapacity leads to declining prices, lost jobs, and a threat to the
financial viability of an industry, a threat that in the long run may also affect the entire global economy.
As an example, exhibit 4 below provides a glimpse of the overcapacity in the steel industry.
The overcapacity story often begins with capacity additions in a particular industry to initially
cater to important domestic demand. In the steel industry, many non-OECD countries added
capacity to support construction and manufacturing industries and to build infrastructure at
home.88 The industry is mostly supported by the government through favorable policies and
incentives such as subsidies and easy access to finance and other approvals. However, usually
unchecked, the capacity additions continue to increase irrespective of growth in demand and
lead to overcapacity in the domestic market and flooding in the international markets.
It is also extremely difficult to roll back this overcapacity due to high closure costs, uncertain
market conditions, and future expectations of pick-up in demand. Government actions also make
this difficult especially when the intention is to ensure “self-sufficiency” in the industry or when
the industry is of strategic importance or to avoid unemployment and other social problems.89
Thus, a country aiming to build an entirely domestic semiconductor value chain with the sole
purpose of attaining “self-sufficiency” in every dependant industry or to support a flourishing
industry (for instance, consumer electronics), may lead to the creation of excess supply in the
semiconductor market domestically as well as globally. Similar to steel, given the strategically
important nature of the semiconductor industry, the country will find it difficult to adjust this
overcapacity later. Further, technologies in the semiconductor industry become outdated at an
extremely fast pace and investing heavily in every segment of the value chain will likely create
overcapacity once the technology is outdated. Thus, it makes more economic sense for countries
to invest in only certain segments of the value chain in which they are competitive and which they
can upgrade and expand based on rational judgement of domestic and global demand.
3.2.6 Undiluted Risk

Investing in a predominantly national value chain in the semiconductor industry is akin to
cutting off the industry from global advances wherever they occur. Given that the industry
experiences rapid technological change, companies unable to keep abreast risk losing
their investments in the value chain. If technological advances or innovation result in the
semiconductor chip being replaced by a new alternative, for example, then a country that has
guided industry investments heavily in a particular direction of chip production will be affected
only to the extent of this particular technology. But a geography that has invested in all the
stages of the value chain will experience greater losses, as this technological shift will affect
not only the chip production stage but also the design, material production, design tools, and
assembly and testing activities also present in that geography, not to mention downstream
28
industries that depend on availability of the latest breakthroughs in semiconductor design

and manufacture. Moreover, in a global value chain, the risk will be shared by investors who
are spread across the world; in a national value chain, a greater share of the risk is likely to be
borne domestically.
If natural disaster or economic shock strikes a country hosting a domestic semiconductor value
chain and ecosystem, the repercussions will extend through the entire value chain and the
industry could come to a standstill. This could harm production and exports of semiconductors as
well as semiconductor-containing finished products. After the 2011 earthquake-tsunami-nuclear
power shutdowns in Japan, the country’s IDMs suffered. Japanese IDMs are part of vertically
integrated conglomerates that make electronic goods. A significant portion of demand for the
IDMs’ semiconductors was harmed by damage to the facilities of electrical goods manufacturers.90
Where there is global sourcing, shared risk mitigates supply shocks, and prevents disruption to
the supply chain when a single factory explodes, as happened in the 1993 Sumitomo accident
that destroyed a substantial portion of the world supply of silicon ingot.
Thus, where there is participation in the global value chain, only a portion of the semiconductor
production may be affected, and the domestic production and overall industry may be quickly
stabilized through sourcing outside national boundaries. The global disruptions of the 2011
Japan earthquake were mitigated mainly due to the global nature of the semiconductor
industry along with efforts of the Japanese government to restore power supply. Several
countries including Taiwan and South Korea were able to fill the void and respond to this
disaster by stepping up their supply of semiconductors to meet the shortage of exports from
Japan.91 Thus, companies that had dispersed their value chains globally were able to deal with
the crisis much more effectively, as their entire value chain was not affected by the earthquake.92
4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The semiconductor industry is extremely complex. Products constantly improve through
technological advances, production now requires numerous distinct and divergent processes,
and there is constant demand for more speed, reliability, capabilities, and features. Given
this complexity and the forces of competition, the semiconductor industry has evolved into
an increasingly specialized and complex value chain, with different firms focusing on more
specialized, activities within the production process. This delineation extends through the
entire ecosystem. Participation in this worldwide ecosystem has been demonstrated to be an
essential part of success for individual firms and the industry as a whole.
The current semiconductor ecosystem and value chain are dispersed geographically, with
companies specializing in specific activities based on their inherent advantages. The result is a
truly global and interdependent semiconductor value chain and ecosystem that have benefited
the industry by spurring innovation and technological advancements. It has also benefited
the participating countries (and firms within them) by providing competitive employment and
opportunities for growth and expansion.
29
Today, the basic technology of semiconductors is changing, and soon growth in the industry
will continue be driven by extraordinary levels of innovation; simple scaling and cost reductions
based on Moore’s Law will no longer be the only basis for improved device performance and
functionalities. The industry is rapidly moving into new areas such as real-time communication,
the Internet of Things (IOT), energy-efficient sensing, and other semiconductor-enabled
applications, calling for further breakthroughs.
As the history of the past 50 years along with economic fundamentals demonstrate, innovation
accelerates and is profitable when the industries within each country specialize in tasks they
can best perform, and in which participants collaborate across the entire value chain, share
knowledge, and exploit each other’s relative advantages. This is different from most other less
complex industries where simply adding productive capacity or implementing protectionist
measures may be enough to enable an emerging industry to be competitive.
Cooperation could be further enhanced. Some potential areas include (1) additional
government funding of precompetitive R&D to overcome the increasing technological
challenges faced by the industry; (2) development of a skilled pool of engineers and scientists
through focused education programs and R&D funding; and (3) joint work on creating
manufacturing improvements—including partnerships among device manufacturers, tool
suppliers, and materials suppliers to develop new manufacturing processes and equipment,
process chemicals, and other innovations.
Development and adoption of global standards would facilitate the efficient functioning
of the global value chain. Applying common global standards instead of varying domestic
standards makes integration of different segments of the value chain in different countries
efficient and attainable. Such standards are critical for emerging applications such as IOT where
interoperability is their core value.
Governments can create policies that facilitate integration into global value chains. These
include policies that support open to international trade (removal of tariff and non-tariff
barriers), establish a transparent and predictable investment environments and ensure sound
legal systems and intellectual property protection.
Such steps would be far more effective than an insular strategy, which risks wasting precious
resources and time, hinders the ability of semiconductor and downstream industries from
moving to the next level of innovation and growth, and ultimately impedes a nation’s economic
growth. The greater opportunities lie with full-fledged participation in the global value chain of
one of the world’s most dynamic and vital industries.
30
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
31
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40
APPENDIX: SEMICONDUCTORS
A PP E NDI X: SEMI CON D U C TOR S

Semiconductors are materials with the electrical properties of both conductors and insulators,
making it possible to control the flow of electric current in each direction. While other
semiconductor materials exist, such as germanium and gallium arsenide, silicon is the most
widely used. Semiconductor materials are used to make devices, which are in turn used in
nearly all electronic applications today. These devices replaced the vacuum tubes of old, given
their lower cost and power requirements, greater reliability and processing speeds.
The key types of semiconductor devices are:
1. Integrated Circuits (ICs): An integrated circuit is an arrangement of electrical circuits and

components including resistors, capacitors, diodes, and transistors,93 which are directly
embedded onto the surface of the semiconductor chip. Used in nearly all electronic devices
today, ICs can be subdivided into three categories:
a) Logic semiconductor devices: These perform certain logical or thinking operations on the
ure A–1
ctor
miconductor
sales by tsype
ales (2014) inputs provided to them,
by type (2014) fromFigure
Figure A–2
which A–2
they then produce an output. Micro components are
the most significant type of Clogic
Integrated ircuit semiconductor
Integrated
Sales by TCype
ircuit
(2014) devices and include microprocessors or
Sales by Type (2014)
Circuits
egrated Circuits central processing units
82% 82% Logic (CPUs)
Chips used
Logic Chips in computers, smartphones,
55% 55% and similar devices.
miconductors
crete Semiconductors 6% 6% Memory Chips Memory Chips 29% 29%
onics
toelectronics
and sensors
and sensors 11% 11% Analog Chips Analog Chips 16% 16%
b) Memory semiconductor devices: Memory semiconductor devices store information.
They can be volatile94 (e.g., dynamic random access memory, or DRAM, used in personal
computers) or nonvolatile95 (e.g., NAND flash memory, used in USB drives and solid-state
hard drives.
c) Analog semiconductor devices: Analog semiconductor devices are used to convert

analog (i.e., continuous) information into digital format (0s and 1s) and vice versa. When
recording a song to an MP3 player, for example, the song (continuous audio information)
is converted to digital Source:
form Wong,
for
Source:
D. and
storage,
Wong,
Chanda,
D. and
A. (October
then
Chanda, 2015).
A. (October
converted
Semiconductor
2015). Semiconductor
Industry Primer
back
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analog
Research.
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Research.
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Securities,
to listen to it.
Fargo Securities,
Source: Wong, D. andSource:
Chanda,Wong,
A. (October
D. and2015).
Chanda,
Semiconductor
A. (October 2015).
Industry
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Primer 2015.Industry
Equity Research.
Primer 2
LLC LLC
LLC LLC
Figure A-1 Figure A-2

Semiconductor sales by type (2014) Integrated Circuit Sales by Type (2014)
11% 11% 16% 16%

6% 6%
Integrated Integrated
Circuits Circuits Logic Chips Logic Chips
Discrete Semiconductors
Discrete Semiconductors Memory Chips Memory Chips
55% 55%
Optoelectronics
Optoelectronics
and sensors
and sensors 29% 29% Analog Chips Analog Chips
83% 83%
Source: Wong, D. and Chanda, A. (October 2015).

Semiconductor Industry Primer 2015. Equity Research.
Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
41
2. Discrete Semiconductors: These are single individual semiconductors used in electronic

devices primarily to control electric current. Types include transistors, rectifiers, and diodes.
3. Optoelectronics and sensors: These semiconductors are mainly used for generating or
sensing light, for example, in traffic lights or cameras.
In 2014, ICs accounted for 83 percent of semiconductor sales, followed by discrete

semiconductors at 11 percent and optoelectronics and sensors at 6 percent. Within
ICs (Figure A–2), the share of logic semiconductor devices was the highest in sales
(55 percent) in 2014, followed by memory and analog semiconductor devices.
Figure A-3 presents semiconductor sales in 2014 based on the type of applications. Computing
applications such as PCs, laptops, and servers had the largest share of revenues in 2014, followed
Figure A–3 by communications-related equipment such as smartphones.
or Semiconductor
sales by application
sales(2014)
by application (2014)
Figure A-3
Semiconductor sales by application (2014)
1% 1%
10% 10% Automotive Automotive

12% 12%
Computing (personalComputing
computers,(personal
servers, etc.)
computers, servers, etc.)
Consumer (television,Consumer
gaming consoles,
(television,
etc.)gaming consoles, etc.)
30% 30%
34% 34% Communication (modem,
Communication
smart phones,
(modem,
etc.) smart phones, etc.)
Industrial Industrial
13% 13% Government Government
Source: Semiconductor Industry Association and World Semiconductor Industry Statistics, Semiconductor Industry End-Use Report 2016.
iconductor
Source: Semiconductor
Industry Association
Industryand
Association
World Semiconductor
and World Semiconductor
Industry Statistics,
Industry Statistics, Semiconductor
Semiconductor
d-Use 42
Industry
ReportEnd-Use
2016. Report 2016.
ENDNOTES
E NDNO TES
1
“Semiconductors” technically refers to semiconducting materials, but this report will frequently use the term as a shorthand for
“semiconductor chips” or will use the term “chips.”
2
“Global Semiconductor Sales Top $335 Billion in 2015,” Semiconductor Industry Association, February 1, 2016, http://www.
semiconductors.org/news/2016/02/01/global_sales_report_2015/global_semiconductor_sales_top_335_billion_in_2015/.
3
This report will often refer to value chain even when discussing the entire ecosystem. This is a convenience but also reflects the
linear connection of each segment of the value chain and its direct relationship with the production chain. What is said about the
value chain should apply to the entire ecosystem.
4
A supply chain consists of nodes through which a product passes on its journey from producer to ultimate customer. Raw material
production, manufacturing, marketing, and sales are common nodes in a supply chain. In a value chain, value is added at each
node to meet consumer preferences and requirements. Value addition is not a requirement in a supply chain; however, in a value
chain, it becomes the key competitive advantage for the company.
5
Ilkka Tuomi, The Future of Semiconductor Intellectual Property Architectural Blocks in Europe, ed. Marc Bogdanowicz (JRC Scientific
and Technical Reports, JRC European Commission, Institute for Perspective Technological Studies, 2009), executive summary and 11.
6
These companies charge a one-time license fee to product developers and receive royalties once the product enters the market.
The use of these blocks reduces design cost and lead time.
7
Reduces design time and cost.
8
David Wong and Amit Chanda, Equity Research: Semiconductor Industry Primer 2015, (Charlotte, NC: Wells Fargo Securities, October 2015), 19.
9
Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low, eds, Global Value Chains in a Changing World, (World Trade Organization, Fung Global Institute,
and Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations, 2013), 26–27. According to Michael Porter’s theory on competitive
advantage, firms waste resources (time and money) on certain stages of production and support activities in which they do not have
a competitive advantage and hence, they should focus only on tasks they perform best and pay others to do the rest.
10
raig Addison, “SEMI Oral History Interview,” Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, http://www.semi.org/en/
C
About/P036368 (accessed April 6, 2016).
11
Addison.
12
Americas refers to Central America, North America, and South America.
13
U.S. Semiconductor Industry: 2015 Factbook, Semiconductor Industry Association, 7.
14
While IDM revenue reflects all activities within the value chain (design, manufacturing, assembly, packaging, and testing) as they
are carried out internally by the IDM companies, design revenue in the fabless-foundry model is captured by fabless.
15
It is important to note that within these countries, individual companies also have their own competitive advantages in scale,
process knowledge, technology ownership and others.
16
Foundries that manufacture only.
17
For instance, three of the top 10 pure-play foundries in the world (by revenue) are located in Israel and China—TowerJazz
(Israel), Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), and Shanghai Huahong Grace Semiconductor
Manufacturing(China). Intel—the world’s largest IDM company—also has substantial manufacturing in Israel and China.
Singapore is home to 14 wafer fabrication plants including those of leading IDMs such as Micron and NXP, as well as those
of leading foundries such as Global Foundries, United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Smaller IDMs such as ON Semiconductor and fab-lite companies such as Infineon have
fabrication facilities in Malaysia.
Source: Gartner, “Worldwide Semiconductor Foundry Market Grew 16.1 Percent in 2014, According to Final Results by
Gartner,” Gartner, (April 13, 2015), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3027717 (accessed February 29, 2016) ; Solid State
Technology, “Top 12 semiconductor foundries of 2012,” Electroiq (August 21, 2012), http://electroiq.com/blog/2012/08/top-
12-semiconductor-foundries-of-2012/ (accessed February 29, 2016); Intel Corporation, Annual Report 2014 (Santa Clara, CA:
Intel Corp.), 10; Cho Jin-Young, “Chips in China: Samsung Electronics, Intel Expanding Semiconductor Manufacturing Facilities
43
in China,” Business Korea (October 22, 2015), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/industry/12589-chips-china-

samsung-electronics-intel-expanding-semiconductor-manufacturing (accessed February 29, 2016); and Singapore Government,
“Electronics: Industry Background,” Future Ready Singapore, Singapore Government https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/
industries/industries/electronics.html (accessed February 29, 2016).
18
For instance, Singapore has 15 semiconductor assembly and test units, including some of the world’s top OSAT companies such
as Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE), and Amkor. Leading IDMs such as Texas Instruments have assembly and test
plants in the Philippines, while Intel has its assembly and test operations based in Malaysia, China, and Vietnam.
Source: Singapore Government, “Electronics: Industry Background,” Future Ready Singapore, Singapore Government,
https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/industries/industries/electronics.html (accessed February 29, 2016); and David
Lammers, “TI’s Evolving Manufacturing Strategy,” Semiconductor Manufacturing & Design Community, http://semimd.com/
lammers/2011/11/04/ti%E2%80%99s-evolving-manufacturing-strategy/ (accessed February 29, 2016).
19
SEMI Association, “Seven Facts about Japan Semiconductor Manufacturing Supply Chain,” SEMI (November 4, 2014), http://
www.semi.org/en/node/52146, (accessed February 29, 2016). Five of the top 10 semiconductor equipment manufacturing
companies in the world are based in Japan.
20
Indrek Grabbi and Dorothea Blouin, Semiconductors and Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: A market assessment tool
for U.S. Exporters (U.S. Department of Commerce—International Trade Administration, July 2015), 9.
21
Semiconductors can be broadly divided into integrated circuit semiconductors, discrete semiconductors, and optoelectronics
and sensors. Integrated circuits are the most popular type of semiconductors, with a revenue share of 83 percent in 2014. (See
Appendix).
22
Grabbi and Blouin, 9. Other supplier countries for integrated circuit manufacturing equipment include South Korea (<3% share),
Germany (<3% share), China (<0.5% share), Taiwan (<3% share), Singapore (<3% share) and some European countries (<0.5%
share each).
23
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International ( SEMI) “Seven Facts about Japan Semiconductor Manufacturing Supply
Chain,” (November 4, 2014), http://www.semi.org/en/node/52146 (accessed February 29, 2016).
24
esearch and development activities related to manufacturing process are also shifting outside of the United States as they are usually
R
likely to be conducted close to the manufacturing locations (i.e., in countries where the new wafer fabrication facilities are moving).
25
E.g., low tax rates or tax holidays, grants and loans for conducting research, developing highly skilled human resources and
research universities.
26
Dewey and LeBoeuf, Maintaining America’s Competitive Edge: Government Policies Affecting the Semiconductor Industry R&D
and Manufacturing Activity, (Semiconductor Industry Association, March, 2009), ii.
27
rost & Sullivan, “Increasing Use of Semiconductor Devices in End-user Segments Driving the Asian EDA Tools Market,” Frost &
F
Sullivan, (April 30, 2008), http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/press-release.pag?docid=128899945 (accessed March 3, 2016); and Dieter
Ernst, Why is Chip Design Moving to Asia?: Drivers and Policy Implications. (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center).
28
OECD, Interconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains, (Paris: OECD, 2013), 10.
29
Matti Parpala, The U.S. Semiconductor Industry: A Key Contributor to U.S. Economic Growth, (Semiconductor Industry Association.
August, 2014), http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Industry%20Statistics/SIA%20White%20Paper%20on%20Value%20
Added%20and%20Economic%20Impact.pdf, 4.
30
Paige Tanner, “Factors driving the semiconductor industry in Taiwan” In “All You Need to Know about the Global Semiconductor
Industry,” Market Realist (September 10, 2015), http://marketrealist.com/2015/09/factors-driving-semiconductor-industry-taiwan/
31
Stephen Ezell, “The Benefits of ITA Expansion for Developing Countries,” (December 2012) http://www2.itif.org/2012-benefits-
ita-developing-countries.pdf (accessed April 19, 2016).
32
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E.
33
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2007), https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=110139, (accessed April 13, 2016); U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, (February 9, 2012), http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/blog/2012/02/09/why-investing-rd-matters.
44
ENDNOTES
(accessed April 13, 2016).

34
“Semiconductor R&D Growth Slows in 2015,” IC Insights, http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/Semiconductor-RD-Growth-
Slows-In-2015/.
35
Semiconductor Industry Association, The U.S. Semiconductor Industry: 2015 Factbook, http://www.semiconductors.org/
semiconductors/2015_sia_factbook/, 17–18.
36
obert J. Damuth, America’s Semiconductor Industry: Turbocharging the U.S. Economy, (Arlington, VA: Nathan Associates Inc.,
R
1998, for the Semiconductor Industry Association), http://www.nathaninc.com/sites/default/files/Turbocharging%20the%20
U.S.%20Economy.pdf, 3.
37
McKinsey & Co., McKinsey on Semiconductors, “Creating Value in the Semiconductor Industry,” (2011)
38
Considering sales of semiconductors to electronic equipment makers only.
39
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), The US Semiconductor Industry: 2015 Factbook, (Semiconductor Industry Association,
2015), 12.
40
World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS) program, December 2015 Semiconductor Industry Bluebook
41
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry – 2015 Update, Part 1: China’s Semiconductor
Consumption Market (http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/publications/china-semiconductor-consumption-market.
html (Accessed April 21, 2016)
42
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), based on data from the WSTS. For an explanation of why China’s data differ from WSTS, see
PwC, “Interpreting Chinese Semiconductor Statistics,” http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/chinas-impact-on-
semiconductor-industry/interpreting-chinese-semiconductor-statistics.html (accessed April 06, 2016).
43
Indrek Grabbi and Dorothea Blouin, Semiconductors and Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: A market assessment tool
for U.S. Exporters, (U.S. Department of Commerce–International Trade Administration, United States of America, July 2015),
19,21, 25.
44
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), 2015 Annual Databook: Review of Global and U.S. Semiconductor Competitive Trends
1994–2014, (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2015), 20.
45
Mark Hopkinson, “With silicon pushed to its limits, what will power the next electronics revolution?”PHYS Org, Aug. 27, 2015,
http://phys.org/news/2015-08-silicon-limits-power-electronics-revolution.html.
46
. Dan Hutcheson, “40 years of Moore’s Law,” The Chip History Center, https://www.chiphistory.org/exhibits/
G
ml_40yearsofmooreslaw.pdf, 14-15;
47
xamples are Sematech, the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, the Industrial Technology Research Institute
E
(ITRI), Imec.
48
F450C, Evolution of the Silicon Wafer (F450C), 1. http://www.f450c.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/F450C_Wafer-History-
Infographic_FNL_ForWeb.pdf (accessed March 2, 2016)
49
G450C, “Vision,” G450C, http://www.g450c.org/about.aspx (accessed March 2, 2016)
50
IMEC, “History,” http://www.imec-in.in/in_en/about-us/history.html (Accessed March 15, 2016)
51
Sources for this section on Taiwan are: References: Paige Tanner, “Factors driving the semiconductor industry in Taiwan,” in
“All You Need to Know about the Global Semiconductor Industry,” Market Realist (September 10, 2015), http://marketrealist.
com/2015/09/factors-driving-semiconductor-industry-taiwan/ (accessed February 26, 2016); Jeremy Millard, et al., Study on
Internationalisation and Fragmentation of Value Chains and Security of Supply (Brussels: European Commission, DG Enterprise
and Industry, February 2012), 18; Donald S. Zagoria and Chris Fugarino, eds, Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse (National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, Greenwood Publishing Group), 122; Aries Poon, “In Taiwan, Export Figures Show Impact
of Offshore Manufacturing,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/12/09/in-taiwan-
export-figures-show-impact-of-offshore-manufacturing/ accessed April 6, 2016.
45
52
In 1999, China accounted for only 2 percent of global production of semiconductors.
53
Sources for the section on China are: PricewaterhouseCoopers, China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry—2015 Update,
www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/publications/china-semiconductor-industry.html, accessed March 10, 2016; Jeremy
Millard, et al., Study on Internationalisation and Fragmentation of Value Chains and Security of Supply (Brussels: European
Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, February 2012), 18; Xin Xin Kong, Miao Zhang, and Santha Chenayah Ramu, China’s
Semiconductor Industry in Global Value Chain (ERIA Discussion Paper Series, February, 2015), 5; PricewaterhouseCoopers, A
Decade of Unprecedented Growth, China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry—2014 Update,18; Douglas B. Fuller, “The
cross-strait economic relationship’s impact on development in Taiwan and China: adversaries and partners across the Taiwan
Strait,” in Technology Transfer between the US, China and Taiwan, (Routledge, 2013), 159–160; Chu, Ming-chin Monique, “The
Migration of the Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry to China,” in East Asian Computer Chip War (Routledge, 2013), 185.
54
David Wong and Amit Chanda, Equity Research: Semiconductor Industry Primer 2015, (Wells Fargo Securities, October, 2015), 14.
55
Vinod Dham, “Does India really need a $5 billion semiconductor unit?” The Economic Times (July 21, 2015), http://articles.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-21/news/64683585_1_fab-chip-plant-samsung (accessed February 26, 2016).
56
Cost of capital, R&D, property plant and equipment, and number of employees and years since establishment.
57
Broadcom, News Release, “Broadcom Reports Fourth Quarter and Full year 2013 Results.”
58
Broadcom. Broadcom Corporation Corporate Overview, Q1 2014. 3.
59
Broadcom, Broadcom Corporation Corporate Overview, Q1 2014. 3.
60
Mediatek, Mediatek Annual Report 2013. (Taiwan: Mediatek, April 30, 2014), 62, 74, 112. Values converted
to Exchange rates as on December 30th, 2015 (Conversion rate NT$ 1 = USD 0.03037), http://www.xe.com/
currencycharts/?from=TWD&to=USD&view=1Y (accessed February 25, 2016)
61
Mediatek, “Investor FAQ, Corporate History,” http://www.mediatek.com/en/about/investor-relations/investor-faq-more/(accessed
February 25, 2016).
62
Qualcomm Limited. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended September 29, 2013 (United States of America: Qualcomm Limited),
XX-XX 16, 54, 56.
63
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64
Marvell Technology Group Ltd. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended February 2, 2014 (United States of America: Marvell
Technology Group Ltd.), 39, 61.
65
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66
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edgar/data/2488/000119312514057240/d674550d10k.htm (Accessed April 21, 2016)
67
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 31st, 2013 (Taiwan:
TSMC). 82, 83, 84.
68
TSMC, “Company Profile,” http://www.tsmc.com/english/aboutTSMC/company_profile.htm (accessed February 25, 2016).
69
United Microelectronics Corporation. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2013 (United States of America:
United Microelectronics Corporation), 61, 100, 101, 102.
70
United Microelectronics Corporation, “UMC Milestones,” http://www.umc.com/English/about/b.asp (accessed February 25, 2016).
71
Siliconware Precision Industries Corporation Limited. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 31st, 2013 (Taiwan:
SPIL) 16, 21, 44. Values converted to Exchange rates as on December 30th, 2015 (Conversion rate NT$ 1 = USD 0.03037). http://
www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TWD&to=USD&view=1Y (accessed February 25, 2016)
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73
Amkor Technology Inc. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 31st, 2013. (United States of America: Amkor
Technology Inc.) 53, 55, 17.
74
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75
Intel Corporation. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 28th, 2013. (United States of America : Intel Corporation) 50, 52, 12.
46
ENDNOTES
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Micron Technology Inc. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended August 29th, 2013. (United States of America : Micron Technology) 8, 53, 55.
78
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Infineon Technologies AG. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended September 30th, 2013. (Germany: Infineon Technologies AG)
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82
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83
Process knowledge refers to expertise in processes for performing an activity including manufacturing or assembly of products.
It encompasses layouts, quality systems, organization of the process and so on. Good process knowledge helps to reduce defect
rate, delivery time, and costs while improving quality.
84
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S
study of the Taiwan semiconductor industry,” Technovation (2007)” 402-411.
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In an electric circuit, resistors are used for regulating the flow of current passing through them, capacitors are used for storage
of energy in the form of electrical charge, a diode exhibits the property of conducting electric current in only one direction,
transistors behave as conductors or insulators of electric current depending upon the voltage applied
94
A volatile memory chip loses its memory when power is disconnected
95
A non-volatile memory chip can keep its memory when power is disconnected
47

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BEYOND BORDERS

TH E GL O BAL SEMI CO NDU CT O R VA L U E CH AI N

How an Interconnected Industry

ILL U S T R ATI ONS

A B B REVI ATI ONS

2 A DEEPLY GLOBAL INDUSTRY

This international structure evolved over

Even companies that remain vertically integrated

2.1 A Global Value Chain: Forged by Complexity and Competition

Research and Assembling, Distribu?on

Raw wafer, Lead frames, packaging material

Provide services Specialized

2.2 Supporting Activities: Completing the Ecosystem

• Materials companies that produce wafer-fabrication and packaging materials; and

2.3 Differentiation: Driven by Demand

expertise: a capacity utilization rate of as high as 90 percent is considered to be “healthy”

2.4 Operating Models: Responding to Change

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

IP Provider IP Provider IP Provider

Foundries Foundries Foundries Foundries

A DEEPLY GLOBAL INDUSTRY

Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World Semiconductor Trad

Source: Semiconductor Industry Association; World

2.5 Here, There, Everywhere: Geographic Dispersion of the Value Chain

Intel Micron Toshiba Samsung Infineon NXP

2.5.1.1 Integrated Circuits, Silicon: an Expanded World Market

Netherlands SINGAPORE CHINA, 34,616,410.00

China Japan Other Asia, NES* Germany

Rep. of Korea USA United Kingdom Netherlands

Malaysia Singapore Others

Source: UN Comtrade (Code: 8542)

Relative advantage of countries in undertaking certain activities: The semiconductor

Positive business environment: Elimination of tariffs, provision of tax benefits such as

Proximity to end-use markets: Increased demand for electronic products in emerging

Physical characteristics of semiconductors: Semiconductor manufacturing involves

3.1 Benefits of Participating in the Global Value Chain

3.1.1 Greater Efficiency, Higher Productivity

3.1.2 Economic Growth, Lower Consumer Prices

3.1.3 Access To Large And Growing Markets Worldwide

Semiconductors Telecom Equipment

3.1.4 Innovation, Advancements In Technology

The semiconductor industry is highly complex and characterized by rapid technological

3.1.5 Movement Up The Value Chain

3.1.5.1 Taiwan: From Assembly to Design

Packaging and Design

Test and 77 116

3.1.5.2 China: Expands to Become Integral Part of Value Chain

80% 49% 45% 44% 45% 44% 44%

28% 27% 24%

Design Manufacturing Packaging

3.2 Risks of a One-Nation Value Chain

3.2.1 Misdirection Of Investments, Leading To Higher Costs, Prices

Mediatek60 199761 Taiwan 5,933 803 192 7,065

Qualcomm62 198563 USA 36,087 4,967 2,995 31,000

AMD66 1969 USA 544 1,201 346 10,671

Foundry TSMC67 198768 Taiwan 27,962 1,608 26,573 40,483

UMC69 198070 Taiwan

3.2.2 Knowledge Transfer And Technological Advancements

3.2.3 Lost Export Opportunities

• Materials companies that produce wafer-fabrication and packaging materials; and

1. Integrated Circuits (ICs): An integrated circuit is an arrangement of electrical circuits and

c) Analog semiconductor devices: Analog semiconductor devices are used to convert