Assignment No. 1 Q.1 What Was Mujeeb's Six Point Formula? Elaborate All The Six Points and The Rationale Behind It

Course: Political & Constitutional Development in Pakistan-II (4668)
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Semester: Spring, 2021
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ASSIGNMENT No. 1
Q.1 What was Mujeeb’s Six Point Formula? Elaborate all the six points and the rationale behind it.
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was the founder of Bangladesh. During the rule of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, he
played a bouncy role in Pakistan politics and became prominent especially when he presented a Six-Point formula
in 1966, in collaboration with his party and demanded the Pakistan government to implement his six points in
every way to the fullest extent. The Government of Pakistan disliked his idea that was prone to make the center
significantly weak and the provinces predominantly independent. But his Awami League urged the Government
to encompass all the six points in the new constitution that was to be framed by the new Constituent Assembly.
Sheikh Mujib and his party showed extreme rigidity when asked to amend or modify a few points. Though at
times he agreed to take a reasonable view of his points, especially before the elections of 1970, yet at every
juncture, he backed out and stuck to the Six-Point formula that had made him exceedingly popular among the
people of Bengal. All the members of the Awami League were so emotional that they pledged to make every
sacrifice to implement the Six-Point formula. And it was the very formula that aroused them to civil disobedience
and to defy the authority of the central government. A force of freedom fighters known as Mukti Bahini paralyzed
the civil administration. Exploiting the appalling scenario India intruded, dashed off to their rescue, and paved
the way for the Awami League to declare an independent Bangladesh.
The Six-Point formula comprised the following points:
1: Through a federal parliamentary system based on direct adult franchise representation of provinces would be
based on population in the federal legislature.
2: The federal government will be restricted only to foreign affairs, defense and currency.
And even concerning foreign affairs, the subject of economic issues would rest with the provinces.
3: There would be either two different currencies for the two wings or a single one with a separate Federal Reserve
System for each wing.
4: The power of implementing and collecting taxes would rest with the provinces. The federal government will
be given enough shares to fulfill its tasks of foreign affairs and defense.
5: There would be separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings for each wing.
6: East Pakistan would be entitled to have militia or paramilitary force solely under its jurisdiction.
The mainstream political leaders of the opposition parties in Pakistan were not even willing to discuss the merits
or demerits of the proposed six-point formula for ensuring greater provincial autonomy for the eastern province
of Pakistan. In fact, no West Pakistani political leader (not even Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the President of
the then All-Pakistan Awami League) was willing to lend any support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's clarion call
for maximum provincial autonomy based on the proposed six-point formula.
It is also really appalling to recall that, even after the lapse of forty two years, the non-Awami League delegates
from the then East Pakistan did not endorse the six-point demand in that historic conference in early February
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1966. Like their West-Pakistani counterparts, East Pakistani political stalwarts had also smelled an element of
"secession" or "disintegration" of Pakistan in the six-point formula. In fact, the six-point formula could not be
pried out of the "subject-matter committee" of that so-called all-party conference.
Instead of endorsing or discussing the six-point formula, the self-declared champions of restoration of democracy
in the then Pakistan had deliberately launched a vile propaganda campaign against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
chief sponsor and proponent of the six-point plan. Doubtless, the motivated propaganda was essentially
characterised by blatant falsehoods, conjectures, distortions, and innuendoes. In fact, the six-point proposal
received frontal attack even from the veteran Pakistani political stalwarts of most of the political parties at a time
when they were clamouring for establishing pure democracy in Pakistan!
In her celebrated book, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (The University Press, 1994, pp. 139-140), Dr.
Rounaq Jahan succinctly summarised the hostile reactions of other political parties to the six-point formula: "The
six-point demand not only split the Awami League but also made it difficult for the East Pakistan wing to form
an alliance with any other West Pakistan-based party. The CML (Council Muslim League) decried the six points
as a demand for confederation, not federation; the Jama'at-i-Islami branded it as a separatist design; the Nizam-i-
Islam rejected it as a unilateral, dictatorial move on Mujib's part; and the NAP (National Awami Party) dismissed
it on the grounds that it was parochial and did not include any measures to free East Pakistan from imperialists
agents." Yet, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to be blackmailed or intimidated by the criticism of his six-point
plan.
In an impromptu press conference in Lahore on February 10, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman argued, as noted by
Talukder Maniruzzaman in a seminal essay in 1967: "The question of (provincial) autonomy appears to be more
important after the war (between India and Pakistan in September, 1965). The time has come for making East
Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects. He then enunciated a 'six-point charter of survival' program for East
Pakistan (Talukder Maniruzzaman, National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan, Asian Survey,
Vol. 7, No.12, 1967, pp. 876-885)."
In that press conference, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had clearly said that since the proposed six-point demand was
not at all designed to harm the common people of West Pakistan, the question of demanding a genuine "provincial
autonomy" for East Pakistan based on the six-point formula "should not be misconstrued or dismissed as
provincialism." He pointed out that the 17-day war between Pakistan and India in September 1965 had made it
crystal clear to the "East Pakistanis" that the defense of East Pakistan couldn't be contingent upon the mercy or
courtesy of West Pakistan. He said that instead of relying on West Pakistan for its protection, East Pakistan -- a
land located one thousand miles away -- should be made self-sufficient for defending itself from external
aggression. He also made it abundantly clear that his six-point plan for "maximum" provincial autonomy reflected
the long-standing demands of the people of East Pakistan. He also pointed out the uselessness and irrelevance of
the All-Party Conference.
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On his return to Dhaka on February 11, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman provided further clarification on his six-
point formula in a press conference. He explained why he had disassociated himself from the All-Party conference
in Lahore. He clearly stated that the delegates from East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) had rejected not only
the proposals passed by the All-Party Conference but also severed all ties with the leaders of the so-called
conference of the opposition parties. He said that it was not at all possible for him or his party to 'betray the
genuine interests" of the aggrieved and deprived people of East Pakistan.
He emphasised that the immediate adoption and implementation of his six-point formula "will be conducive to
foster durable relationship between the two provinces of Pakistan." In a press conference on February 14, 1966,
he also repeated what he had uttered in his Lahore press conference: that the "the question of autonomy appears
to be more important for East Pakistan after the 17-day war between Pakistan and India. The time is ripe for
making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects."
Reaction of the then dictatorial regime to the six-point plan
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's demand for "maximum autonomy" based on his six-point formula seems to have
shaken the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The six-point plan had exposed the fact that the real
intention of Pakistan's ruling elite was to "strengthen" the central government, but not Pakistan. He repeatedly
said in several public meetings that the people of Pakistan had always desired to have a "strong Pakistan," not a
"strong central government."
However, the ruling coterie of Pakistan was not at all interested in dealing or negotiating with the Awami League
on the issue of provincial autonomy even though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had publicly stated that he was willing
to negotiate his six-point plan with anyone in good faith, provided a meaningful autonomy was ensured for East
Pakistan. The autocratic rulers of Pakistan started using repressive tactics to suppress the six-point movement. As
noted by Dr. Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, "the Ayub regime's policy towards the six-point demand of the Awami
League was one of total suppression. It showed once again that the regime failed to respond to the political demand
(Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, Emergence of Bangladesh & Role of Awami League, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing,
1982, p. 104)."
Immediately after the provincial autonomy plan based on the six-point formula was unveiled by Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman at the Lahore conference of opposition political parties in early February, 1966, Ayub Khan was quick
to denounce it as a separatist or secessionist move. Aimed at browbeating the dedicated champions of greater
provincial autonomy, Ayub Khan had started discrediting both the message and the messenger of the six-point
program. Appearing in the final session of the Pakistan (Convention) Muslim League in Dacca on March 21,
1966, fully attired in the army general's khaki uniform with full display of all of his regalia and medallions, the
self-declared president of Pakistan had condemned the six-point plan in the harshest possible terms.
Characterising the six-point formula as a demand for "greater sovereign Bengal," he claimed that such a plan
would put the "Bengali Muslims" under the domination of "caste Hindus" of West Bengal. He had compared the
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"prevailing situation" in Pakistan (as of March, 1966) with the volatile situation that had prevailed in the USA
before the outbreak of a prolonged Civil War in the early 1860s. He said that the nation might have to face a "civil
war" if such volatile situations were forced upon him by the "secessionists" and "destructionists."
He had even threatened the alleged "autonomists" and "secessionists" with "dire consequences" if they failed to
shun the idea of provincial autonomy. Ayub Khan had also the audacity to threaten that the "language of weapons"
would be ruthlessly employed for exterminating the "secessionist elements from Pakistan."
Q.2 After the Elections of December 1970, why had the session of National Assembly not called and the
majority party not allowed forming the government? Elaborate.
General elections were held in Pakistan on December 7, 1970 – 50 years ago today – to elect members of the
National Assembly. They were the first general elections since the independence of Pakistan and ultimately
the only ones held prior to the independence of Bangladesh. Voting took place in 300 constituencies, of w hich
162 were in East Pakistan and 138 in West Pakistan.
The elections were a fierce contest between two social democratic parties – the west-based Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP) of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the east-based Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami
League was the only major party in the east wing, while in the west wing, the PPP faced competition from the
conservative factions of the Muslim League – the largest of which was Muslim League (Qayyum), as well as
Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP).
The result was a victory for the Awami League, which won an absolute majority of 160 seats, all of which
were in East Pakistan. The PPP won only 81 seats, all in West Pakistan.
In the provincial elections held ten days later, the Awami League again dominated in East Pakistan, while the
PPP won Punjab and Sindh. The Marxist National Awami Party emerged victorious in the Northwest Frontier
Province and Balochistan.
The National Assembly was initially not inaugurated as the military dictator Yahya Khan and the PPP
chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not want a party from East Pakistan heading the federal government. Instead,
Yahya appointed the veteran Bengali politician Nurul Amin as prime minister, asking him to reach a
compromise between the PPP and Awami League. However, this move failed as the delay in inauguration had
already caused significant unrest in East Pakistan. The situation escalated into a civil war that led to the
breakup of Pakistan and the formation of the independent state of Bangladesh. The assembly was eventually
inaugurated in 1972 after Yahya resigned and handed power to Bhutto. Bhutto became prime minister in 1973
after the post was recreated by a new constitution.
The National Assembly elections and the enthusiasm they generated was a golden chapter in the history of the
struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Until just a few years before, a military dictator used to say that democracy
was not suited to the temperament of Pakistanis.

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By voting the way they did, the people proclaimed that they had grown weary of the then -prevalent political
and social system in the country and wanted to change it as soon as possible. They stood by every such slogan
and party which stood for social revolution. Ranged against them were those who claimed Islam was in danger,
or that the ideology of Pakistan was in danger. Fatwas of apostasy and heresy were issued upon socialism and
its supporters and the election of the National Assembly was presented as a war between Islam and evil.
Extremely provocative things were said about the left-wing parties in newspapers, mosque sermons but this
storm of propaganda could not influence the people. They were not deceived by the Islamists be cause their
daily experiences had made them aware that the demon of exploitation had worn the clothing of Islamism.
Everyone knew that the sole purpose of the 1970 election was to devise a democratic constitution. There was
a strong possibility that indeed if a compromise developed between the Awami League and the Peoples Party
then the constitution could very easily be framed in the appointed period of four months.
Approximately two dozen political and religious parties participated in the elections. Their manifestoes
emphasised a solution to the political, economic and social problems of the country and made rosy promises
to the people but the results of the election showed that only two parties – the Awami League and the PPP –
were acquainted with the habits and disposition of the nation and were those who had the knowledge of the
pulse of the feelings, emotions and desires of the people. The motto of both these parties was socialism. On
the other hand, the parties which had started off as claimants of the Islamic system to contest the election were
totally unsuccessful in identifying with the mood of the common people.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his comrades had been busy in political activities since the very days of
the Pakistan movement and their political party was old and experienced; but Bhutto and the Peoples Party
were young. The systematic organisation of the Peoples Party was hardly two years at that time. In this short
duration, the popularity which this party attained especially in Sindh and Punjab was astonishing. This party
had participated in the elections in very unfavourable conditions. Most party workers were young and
inexperienced, and the experienced ones were in jail.
Great responsibilities befell the Peoples Party and the Awami League after this success. They were no longer
provincial parties and Mujib and Bhutto were not the leaders of a region but the whole nation. Now they had
to prove with their word and action that they were eligible for this position and the trustees of peo ples’ interest.
The problems and interests of the people were the same everywhere whether they were in Sindh or in Bengal,
Punjab, then-North West Frontier Province and Balochistan.
This victory was a big test for the Peoples Party. Its victory at least illuminated the reality that the dominant
majority of then-West Pakistan was safe from provincial prejudice, religious frenzy, sectarianism and
differences of caste. But the path to political power is very difficult and the PPP and Bhutto failed to do what
was needed of them.

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It is said that Ravana of Lanka had a thousand hands and when one of his hands got injured, he began to fight
with the other hand. Similarly, the affluent classes too have a thousand hands. They do not admit defeat easily
nor do they withdraw happily from their political and economic dominance. It is correct that the people clearly
defeated them in the 1970 elections but wealth is not an intoxication which an election verdict can take off.
The need of the hour was to beware this unlimited power of the enemy.
The stamp of this economic power of the wealthy could also be found on Pakistan’s national laws and
institutions of law and order, especially the military, which were arrayed against popular demands whether it
be the clash of democracy and dictatorship, the conflict of capital and labour, the struggle for citizens’ rights,
the demand for wage increases or linguistic rights.
Sometimes section 144 was imposed to maintain peace, sometimes strikes were declared illegal under cover
of basic industry, sometimes people were arrested without registering a case against them or presenting them
in court for the security of Pakistan; though there was no such law according to which those who raised the
prices of basic necessities received proper punishment. No such law was present according to which a case be
registered upon non-provision of conveniences of medicine and treatment; or to investigate those who kept
the nation ignorant; or according to which the hungry, homeless, unclothed and unemployed could move the
chains of the court.
In short, Pakistan’s economic and social life was at that moment held captive inside a triangle. One angle of
this triangle represented the interest of the ruling classes; the second, law; and the third was the the bure aucracy
and the establishment. All these three angles were related to each other as well as being helpers and supporters
of each other. No problem of the people could be solved without breaking the power of this triangle.
The big question confronting the victors of the 1970 elections in Pakistan was how to break the power of this
triangle. The electorate wanted the Awami League and Peoples Party to act honestly upon the socialist
principles of their manifestos while formulating a new constitution that would guarantee the rights of all.
Alas all of this came to naught as the elected assembly initially did not meet as the dictator Yahya Khan and
Bhutto’s PPP did not want the majority party from East Pakistan to form government, as was its right. This
caused great unrest in East Pakistan, which soon escalated into the call for independence on March 26, 1971
and ultimately led to a war of independence with East Pakistan becoming the independent state of Bangladesh.
The assembly session was eventually held when Khan resigned four days after Pakistan surrendered in
Bangladesh and Bhutto took over. Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1973, after the post was
recreated by the new Constitution.
The lesson from the 1970 election that eventually broke Pakistan a year later and its aftermath was that the
popularity which is attained during some temporary excitement upon the shoulders of the people, is indeed
temporary and comes and goes. These events proved and continue to prove in Naya Pakistan 50 years on tha t

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permanent and durable leadership is the one which remains steadfast on the righteous path of ideas and action
for the completion of the true interests of the people and the remedy of their basic issues.
Q.3 What were the impacts of nationalization of banks on the financial sector in Pakistan? Explain in
detail.
1. Introduction to Banking Nationalization of banks of Privatization of banks
2. Nationalization of Bank Nationalization means transfer of any property or institution from the private to the
ownership of state. It is defined as: “Nationalization is the process of bringing the assets of a company into the
ownership of the state”
3. Nationalization of banks in Pakistan • In the early years of Pakistan, the banks were going well and they played
an important role in the economic development of country. • But afterwards it was felt that banks did not provide
funds towards the most needy sectors of economy. • Keeping in view this situation the banking business was
nationalized on 1st January 1947, under Bank Nationalization Act, 1974.
4. Categories • On 31st December 1973 there were 13 Pakistani scheduled banks in Pakistan with 2906 branches
in all over the country. • Govt. of Pakistan took control of all 13 commercial banks and state bank of Pakistan
under Bank Nationalization Act, 1974. Govt. merged the weaker banks with the banks which had strong financial
position to make 5 nationalized banks in all.
5. Categories These banks are: I. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) II. Habib Bank Limited (HBL) III. Muslim
Commercial Bank (MCB) IV. United Bank Limited (UBL) V. Allied Bank Ltd. (ABL)
6. Objectives Objectives of nationalization of banks were as follows: I. Credit for agriculture sector. II.
Controlling unproductive expenditure III. Ending control IV. Professional management V. Credit for small
entrepreneurs
7. Advantages of nationalization of banks • Fair distribution of credit • Financing agriculture sector • Banking
facilities for underdeveloped areas • Control over non-development expenditure • Security of deposits •
Development of banks • Service motive • Price stability • Mobilization of resources • Use of profit
8. Disadvantages of nationalization of banks • Low efficiency of bank employees • Poor service standard •
Political interference • Favoritism • Rise in price • Unbalanced distribution of credit • Increase in expenses • Poor
recovery of loan • Decrease in profit • Low competition
9. Privatization of Banks
10. Privatization of Banks Privatization is the process of involving private sector in the ownership state owned
enterprises. It is defined as: “Privatization is the denationalization of an industry, transferring from public to
private ownership”
11. Privatization of Banks in Pakistan • The objectives which were expected by government have not been
achieved. • Government of Pakistan decided to privatize the bank sector. • A privatization Commission was set

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up on 22 January 1994. The commission has transferred MCB, ABL, UBL, HBL but NBP was not privatized. It’s
Shares have been sold to general public Through LSE.
12. Rules for establishing a new bank in private sector • Public limited sector • Must be listed on SE of country •
20% shares must be offered to general public • Minimum capital of two billion • Directors of bank will not be
allowed to sanction loans for themselves • Bank will concentrate their branch network in urban areas • Bank will
provide quick & efficient services to customers
13. • Bank will play an effective role in mobilization of savings. • Bank will provide services for rural areas
according to new concessions and incentives. • Bank will have to abide by the instructions of SBP.
14. Objectives • Better standard of service • Improvement in performance • Promote healthy competition • Quick
decisions • Development of capital market • Increase in deposits • Security of loan
15. Advantages of privatization of banks • Improvement in performance • Better standard of living • Decrease in
expenses • Increase in deposits • Secured loans • Decrease in default loans • Productive loans • Quick decisions •
Economic development • Reasonable profit
16. Disadvantages of privatization of banks • Misuse of loans • Unhealthy competition • Neglecting small
industries • Neglecting agriculture sector • Lack of co-operation • Concentration of wealth in few hands •
Protection of black money • Advances to relatives and employees • Favoritism • Profit mitive
Q.4 Z.A Bhutto was a proponent of democracy and always claimed to believe in real democracy but he
was intolerant to dissent and opposition. Discuss this paradox of Z.A. Bhutto by focusing on his
policies with regard to politicians in opposition.
It was the late 60s and this part of the world also witnessed the wave of socialism. It came with the downfall of
Ayub and the rise of a new phenomenon in Pakistan’s politics: Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an icon of resilience
and symbol of democracy who faced dictatorship with utmost valour.
One of the students in those days who later on became a close aide of SZAB and a minister in his government
was my father Abdullah Baloch whose memoirs about his leader are shared below as a tribute on SZAB’s 42nd
death anniversary that falls today.
My father narrates that: “During the late 60s, one named echoed all around: people used to talk about and discuss
Bhutto everywhere – from drawing rooms to tea cafes to public forums. As a youngster, I was fascinated by the
charisma of Bhutto and during one hot summer day in 1967 I made up my mind and went to 70 Clifton where Mr
Khar received me and took me to Bhutto Sahib who was having tea in his drawing room along with Hafeez
Pirzada, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao and Meraj Mohammad Khan.
“I introduced myself and expressed my desire to work for his party; he asked me to visit the party office and start
working. The first party office of the PPP in Karachi was at SMCHS; the office was rented in the name of
Mohammad Khan Ghangro as it was Yahya’s martial law, and nobody was willing to give us space on rent for
the party office.
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“SZAB had impeccable style when it came to his clothes. Even his ministers were given a particular dress code
– white for the day and black for the evening with different collar strips for the president, prime minister, senators,
ministers, MNAs and MPAs, quite similar to the attire in China; this was later on replaced in Zia’s regime by the
sherwani. SZAB was so charismatic that many of the party leaders including me used to follow his dress sense.
“He was a great admirer of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar and as an Auqaf minister he assigned me to install the golden
gate gifted by the Shah of Iran; as a mark of respect, he always used to salute it on entering the dargah.
“The late 60s was the peak of socialism; the red book was a proud possession of every leftist in those days. During
the Hala convention the leftist group of the party led by Meraj Khan were of the view that the party should not
contest elections, but SZAB said “Don’t give me examples from the red book; you have read it, but I have done
dialogue with them. We cannot serve the people unless we contest elections and come in power.”
“In 1970, he formed a parliamentary board for general elections and nominated me as its member. He emerged
as a challenger for Ayub, such that the feudals of those times used to avoid any encounter with Bhutto to avoid
Ayub’s wrath. And believe me those were the tough days – when Ayub’s government was struggling before the
might of the rising leader, Bhutto. In 1972, when I was an MPA my house was burnt in the Karachi riots. SZAB
called me to 70 Clifton, consoled me and tapped my shoulder to which I said this is a very small sacrifice for the
party and the cause. This resulted in a smile on his face and he responded: “I expected the same from you”.
“SZAB was very encouraging. Seeing my passion, he appointed me in charge of the party secretariat. He used to
encourage competition within his party to extract the best amongst all. The classic example of this was to keep
extreme leftist Meraj and Hafeez, both poles apart, together in the Karachi chapter. He inculcated trust and
confidence in the youth by inducting a young person like me in the cabinet as I was just 28 years old at that time;
he also appointed me general secretary Karachi with Kamal Azfar as president, again poles apart.
“In 1976, during the super flood despite being an MPA from Karachi I was appointed minister for flood relief by
SZAB. I tried my best and saved Sehwan and Dadu from being inundated by the floods with his guidance. Later
he appreciated me for my efforts in his historic speech. He called labour conferences yearly where I used to
participate as labour minister of Sindh and saw firsthand that he always wanted to have a grip on the pulse of the
proletariat class.
“Once I went to see off SZAB at the Karachi Airport. He asked me: ‘where will you head from here?’ I replied
home, as I was not feeling well. He immediately took out some tablets from his pocket and told me: ‘even though
I am not well but still travelling; now you should also go back to work.’ He worked tirelessly and inspired all of
us.
“Every passing year, April 4 reminds me what an enormous loss his death has been for the country. Shaheed
Bhutto was a mentor and leader for me. I will always cherish the time spent with him, the lessons learnt from him
and the pearls of wisdom he shared with me. His words still echo in my ears. Such leaders are born in centuries.”
Q.5 What was Federal Security Force (FSF) and why had Z.A. Bhutto felt the need to establish FSF? Was
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it personal force of Bhutto? Elaborate the motives behind its establishment and its actual role.
In 1977 Ali Bhutto had every reason to feel supremely confident. He was prime minister with a strong majority
in the national assembly he was prime minister of. He was perceived as the charismatic leader with a strong
following among the peasants and the poor of the cities. Internationally he was a major leader of international
organizations and could well have become the leader of the Third World. He had carried out substantial
nationalization of the Pakistani economy. He now wanted to change the constitution of Pakistan to allow a
presidential form of government. To do this he needed a two-thirds majority in the legislature.
In January he called for new elections for the national and the provincial governments. The election for the
national assembly was to take place on March 7th and the elections for the provincial assemblies were to take
place three days later on March 10th.
His popularity was such that the political opposition saw no chance of opposing him except in the form of a
coalition party. The name for the coalition party was the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). This included parties
extending from the religious right to secular parties of the political center. The member parties of the PNA agreed
to field only one candidate in each district election.
Bhutto's Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) was expected to win the election. However in order for Bhutto to change
the Constitution and create a presidential form of government he needed a two-thirds majority in the National
Assembly. So while there was little doubt that his party would win the election there had to be extra measures
taken to achieve the two-thirds majority that he desired. Soon after legal steps were being taken to ensure an
overwhelming victory in the election for the National Assembly.
The final day for filing as candidates for the March elections for the National Assembly was January 19, only 12
days after the election was announced. Under Pakistani law if only one candidate had filed for an office by the
deadline date then that candidate would be declared elected unopposed. Bhutto had to be elected to the national
assembly to be prime minister. In his district he was the only one who had filed for candidacy by the deadline.
There were other candidates who wished to file that were detained by the police just before the deadline date.
Therefore police power was being used to ensure an election outcome which would have been achieved by fair
means anyway. This set the precident for later events. There were nine ministers from the PPP who were declared
elected unopposed in the Sindh province as well. In fact, this was achieved because their opposition was
kidnapped by the police just before the filing deadline date. Perhaps the PPP leadership sanctioned this ploy as a
means to demoralize their opposition; to show them that opposition was futile.
In February Bhutto sent a note to the chief minister of the Punjab province telling him that he, Bhutto, was
unhappy with the tempo of the election campaigning. Bhutto ordered him to get the campaign into high gear as
soon as possible. At that time the election in Punjab was considered a tossup.
On March 7th 17 million Pakistanis of the 31 million eligible went to the polls and cast ballots. Bhutto's PPP won
less than 60 percent of the popular votes yet it captured about 75 percent of the seats in the national assembly.
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The opposition PNA won 35 percent of the popular votes and only gained 17 percent of the seats in the national
assembly. There were immediate calls for dismissing the results of the national election. The political opponents
of Bhutto's VP P. called for a boycott of the provincial elections which were to be held on the tenth of March. As
a result less than half of electorate returned to the polls to vote in the provincial elections. Leaders of the PNA
called for strike on the Friday following the provincial elections. Most of his shops in the cities were closed for
that strike. Bhutto had lost the support of the business class with his nationalization of small businesses in the
past few years.
As noted above before the election the electoral chances for the PPP in Punjab were considered about an even 50-
50. On March 7th when the election results were announced they showed Bhutto's PPP having won 105 legislative
seats out of the total of 115. The official results showed 70 percent of the votes in Punjab going to Bhutto's PPP.
Thus while the opposition PNA had won in the big cities of Karachi and Pehawar this was offset by the big win
Punjab.
It was clear to everyone that a considerable amount of election fraud had occurred. Bhutto himself was actually
depressed because it was so clear what had happened. In addition to seeking a two-thirds majority in the national
assembly Bhutto also wanted to make a special effort to oppose the election of those candidates he felt would
obstruct his future plans for Pakistan. Bhutto was also concerned about the need to maintain acceptance of his
administration from the Army. There was concern about a growing prevalence of Islamic fundamentalism in the
Army. This meant that the Army was becoming more sympathetic to his political opposition. Before the election
Army officials reported finding posters in the Army Barracks at Multan calling for an Army revolution. Bhutto
was confident that he had the allegiance of the Army because he felt secure in the leadership of Zia ul-Haq of the
military. Bhutto had appointed Zia to his position. Zia in public and to Bhutto presented the appearance of
subservience; in private he was distributing fundamentalist Islamic literature to the soldiers. So Zia's deferential
demeanor was a sham. He smiled and bowed and seemed humble but he had other plans in mind.
Bhutto recognized that he needed to negotiate with his political opposition. But he was not willing to consider
any alteration of the results of the national election. He said the March 7th election was a settled matter. On that
basis his political opposition refused to enter into any negotiations with him.
Pakistan at that time was suffering several economic crises. The cotton crop, a major economic base of Pakistan,
had failed for the year. As a result of Bhutto's past economic program of nationalization capital was leaving the
country. Due to the shortage of tax revenue Bhutto's government had been printing money which led to severe
inflation. Bhutto had created a 20,000 member Federal Security Force to function as his personal guard. He needed
funds to pay the salaries for this force and the military. To make matters worse he had promised a 50 percent raise
in pay thoughout the military. Bhutto intended to deal with his cash problem by securing a $300 million loan from
Citibank of New York. In order to obtain this loan he needed a guarantee by someone who was solvent. He
thought the Shah of Iran would provide the guarantee. He wrote to the Shah on March 13 just one week after the
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national election to obtain that guarantee. The Shah replied that his government ministry had realized that
borrower would be Bhutto himself rather than the government of Pakistan and that they needed three or four
weeks to consider the matter of the guarantee under those circumstances. This meant in effect that Bhutto would
not get his guarantee and therefore he would not get the Citibank loan.
Meanwhile the DMA opposition was calling for Bhutto's resignation and new national elections to be held
administered by the Army and the judiciary. A major protest march was held in Karachi and was dispersed by the
police using tear gas. Bhutto government responded by having six of the top leaders of the PNA arrested for
creating lawlessness. The next day the protest demonstrations could not be controlled by the police and the Army
was called in to restore law and order. A curfew was imposed. Demonstrations against Bhutto were held in the
major cities of Punjab.
The National Assembly met in Islamabad on March 28th. Only the PPP members showed up. In his address to
the National Assembly Bhutto tried to placate the opposition by promising that there would be no further
nationalizations. He offered to enter into a dialogue with the opposition thinking that it would settle for increased
representation in the national assembly. He also charged that the opposition was being used by the great powers.
Bhutto had declared a national emergency and created a set of administrative measures called Defense of Pakistan
Rules. Under these rules he had all of the opposition leaders arrested. He called for his political opponents to
negotiate a solution and he would release them from prison and rescind the Defense of Pakistan Rules.
The opposition leaders did not trust Bhutto and the demonstrations continued. On April 9 there was a
demonstrations in Lahore and the police opened fire with live ammunition instead of tear gas. The death toll was
variously estimated from 8 to 37. In Karachi five more demonstrators were killed by the police. Elsewhere scores
of prominent opposition leaders were arrested. Further strikes were called for and observed throughout the
country. Local organizations began calling for an investigation of some of the actions of the Bhutto regime.
Bhutto on the other hand announced that he would not hesitate to do call out the Army to restore law and order.
In response to this two former military leaders who were then ambassadors submitted their resignations.
Bhutto felt confident that with the allegiance of the Army under Zia he could control the situation. He however
took steps to placate the Islamic fundamentalists. He announced that within six months his government would
prohibit all alcohol, gambling, bars, and movie theaters. He would bring Pakistan's laws in conformity with the
Koran. Bhutto himself was known to have a drinking problem, to engage in dancing and was sanctioning the
building gambling casinos within Pakistan.
On April 28 Bhutto made a national broadcast calling for public calm and the settlement of issues by negotiation.
Later that day he met with the ambassador from Saudi Arabia and sought Saudi Arabian aid in resolving Pakistan's
difficulties. He charged that the U.S. CIA was guiding the opposition because he had refused to give up his goal
of acquiring nuclear weapons technology.

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Bhutto also had the notion that the Soviet Union was also behind that his problems. Bhutto believed the Soviet
Union was financially supporting the opposition because if the opposition came to power they would dismember
Pakistan. The Soviet Union would then gain influence and an Indian Ocean port in an independent Baluchistan.
Bhutto had no problem in seeing the United States, the Soviet Union, and India as being behind his problems.
In May Bhutto announced that henceforth Friday would be the day of rest instead of Sunday. He intended this as
a further placation of the Islamic fundamentalists. Bhutto also announced that there would be a national
referendum on his continuance in office. He knew that very likely there would be an opposition boycott of this
referendum and he would therefore get overwhelming support. He refused to accept the possibility of a new
election for the national assembly.
ASSIGNMENT No. 2
Q.1 It has been alleged that Z.A. Bhutto manipulated judiciary through different amendments in the
Constitution of 1973. What type of manipulations these were? How had these manipulations set the
stage for abuse of judiciary by military regime of Zia against Bhutto?
After the creation of Pakistan, its military forces were for a few years still commanded by the British officer who
commanded those troops when they were part of the army of British India. The transfer of command to a Pakistani
officer was a matter of a great deal political importance and substantial political danger. It was recognized that
the commander of the army could easily assume political control. The political leaders looked over the top military
officers and saw too much danger of such a usurpation of power. They instead chose a younger, lower level
officer, Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan came from a relative minor Pashtun tribe and thus could not command the
allegiance of a powerful domestic faction the way a Punjabi might. Being a non-Punjabi Ayub Khan might be
distrusted by the Punjabi majority of the armed forces. Having been selected over more senior officers there was
reason to expect those officers to be resentful of Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan also had a reputation for being an
efficient administrator. So the political leaders of Pakistan had good reason in 1951 to believe that they were
turning the army over to an efficient military bureaucrat rather than to a Bonaparte. They thought that without an
ethnic power base he would not dare to seek political power and that if he should even try his military rivals
would hold him in check. They were quite wrong.
From 1951 to 1958 Ayub Khan continually increased the power and political prerogatives of the military. In 1954
Ayub Khan was the minister of defense in the government as well as commander of the army. Finally in 1958 he
carried out a bloodless coup d'etat and ruled Pakistan for the next decade. His justification for his coup was that
the politicians were inefficient and corrupt.
On his own Ayub Khan initiated major policy programs and shaped the direction of Pakistan politics permanently.
The most important of these policy program was the development of alliances with the powerful neighboring
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countries of Pakistan and India; i.e., China and the Soviet Union. He also development a political alliance with
the United States. These alliances were primarily to offset the imbalance between the power of India with respect
to Pakistan.
As an elected leader Ayub Khan was able to strengthen Pakistan's alliance with the United States. This turned out
to be important when war broke out with India in 1965 over Kashmir and border disputes elsewhere. The war
changed little and a cease-fire was arranged through the United Nations. In 1966 Ayub Khan and the prime
minister of India signed a treaty called the Tashkent Declaration. The Pakistan public, not being well informed
about the relative imbalance of Pakistani military power with respect to that of India, treated the Tashkent
Declaration as Ayub Khan's surrender to India.
Political protests to Ayub Khan's rule and by 1968 he was on the defensive. In 1969 it was necessary to declare
martial law again. Ayub Khan resigned in 1969 turning the power in Pakistan to the administrator of the martial
law, Yahya Khan.
The dominant political party in the East Wing was the Awami League headed by Mujibur Rahman. Rahman,
popularly known as Mujib, and his Awami League had been campaigning for some years for a six point program
that consisted of
• that the government of Pakistan be parliamentary and in the nature of a federation

• that members of the national legislature be elected on the basis of universal adult sufferage with
the distribution being strictly on the basis of population
• that the power and responsibility of the national government be limited to foreign affairs and
national defense
• that each wing have its own fiscal budget and circulate its own currency
• that taxes be imposed and collected on a provincial level and the national government rely upon
levies imposed upon the provinces without any powers of direct taxation of the people
• that each province have control of its own foreign exchange earnings
• that each province raise its own military and paramilitary forces.
Immediately after the elections Bhutto more or less declared himself prime minister, suggesting such bizarre ideas
as two constitutions, one for East Pakistan and the other for "West Pakistan," with a prime minister for each wing,
forgetting that the latter was no longer one but four provinces and there was no such thing as "West Pakistan"
except in a geographic sense. He played on the fears of the west Pakistanis that the Awami League would use its
majority to foist a constitution on Pakistan on the basis of its campaign promise to give maximum autonomy to
the provinces, leaving only defense, currency, and foreign affairs with the center. He conjured up fears of
everlasting domination by the Bengalis, forgetting that they too were Pakistanis and the Awami League had won

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the elections perfectly legitimately through democratic means. Bhutto even threatened members elected to
Constituent Assembly from west Pakistan that he would break their legs if they attended its inaugural session in
Dhaka, East Pakistan and that if they insisted on attending they should buy a one-way ticket. The Constituent
Assembly was supposed to make a new constitution for Pakistan in three months, but it never met, not least
because of Bhutto's threat. It was a nexus between Bhutto and a small coterie of military rulers that destroyed
Pakistan. The myopic and rigid attitude of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman didn't help matters, and he played into Bhutto's
an Yahya's hands by remaining rooted in East Pakistan, forgetting that now he was prime minister-elect of the
whole of Pakistan and needed to tour the four provinces of the western wing in order to reassure the people there
and allay their fears. Politics in Pakistan took a new turn in 1958 when the military leader Mohammad Ayub Khan
carried out a coup d'etat. The Bhutto family was of feudalbackground and Zulfiqar Bhutto was well enough
connected that he was appointed to head the Ministry of Commerce. Appointments to other cabinet post followed.
Finally he was made foreign minister in 1963. He then began to develop his own policy program. He felt he
should try to promote ties with China as a counter-balance to the militant relation which had developed between
independent India and Pakistan.
In 1965 a war with India broke out over the issue of Kashmir and Jammu. Pakistan was overwhelmed militarily
by India and had to sue for peace. Bhutto objected to the peace treaty with India that ended the war and in protest
he resigned from his position as foreign minister.
The military regime of Yahya Khan failed miserably and political control was turned over to Ali Bhutto at the
end of 1971. Bhutto was able to rule largely by decree.
Bhutto began immediately to consolidate his power and move toward a socialist economy. He nationalized key
industries and began to tax the land property of the richer families. Bhutto in 1973 used his political power to
install a new constitution which further enhanced his power. He created a Federal Security Force which functioned
as a palace guard outside of the control of the military.
In power the rhetoric of Bhutto's rise to power was ignored. He ruled as an autocrat. His regime reminds one of
the American politician Huey Long of Louisana during the period 1928 to 1936. Long was immensely popular
and claimed to champion the interests of the poor. In practice Long ruled as a dictator, a populist dictator but still
a dictator.
Zulfiqar Bhutto used his popularity to rule as an autocrat if not an outright dictator. After ruling as an autocrat for
about five years, Bhutto decided to hold a new election in 1977. His party apparently won the election but there
was enough suspicion of voting fraud that riots broke out. Bhutto prohibited assemblies for political purpose
hoping to throttle the protest movement. Bhutto had shifted the political focus of his regime from the urban poor
and middle class to the rural poor. He lost the support of the politically active urbanites because of the
ineffectiveness of his regime to achieve the goals he promised. Anwar Hussain Syed in his book The Discourse
and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto quotes a note Bhutto sent to his ministers:
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There are shortages everywhere… The Agricultural Development Bank has not come out with any new scheme
to assist the common man, the poor man … The rural works program and the rural integrated program remain
disintegrated. I have not seen the face of a single Agroville of which we talked a great deal. The low cost housing
schemes are coming up on paper only. The drainage schemes have not seen the light of day. Crime is rising
without fear … In other words, where is our revolution? There is no change. We are supposed to be the harbingers
of a new order, but where is the new order? … The truth hurts and it hurts me the most.
The military under the leadership of General Zia ul-Haq took control of the government and imprisoned Bhutto.
Bhutto was uncooperative with the military regime and Zia ul-Haq, tiring of Bhutto's intransigence, had Bhutto
charged with arranging the assassination of a political opponent in 1974. Bhutto had used force to suppress many
of his political opponents and there was a good deal of gangsterism in the PPP so the charges had a certain
plausibility. Anwar Hussain Syed in his book The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto says:
In his discourse, and in his covenant with the people, Bhutto undertook to maintain civil rights and democratic
freedoms. In his actual practices as a ruler, he did the opposite. His regime insulted, humiliated, harassed,
assaulted, imprisoned and, in some cases, tortured critics and opponents. He had vowed to cultivate respect for
the law, but his agents used lawless force against his adversaries. Even old comrades, who had become critics,
were not spared. Meraj Mohammad Khan languished in jail, and Mukhtar Rana almost died under torture. Men
from the Federal Security Force broke into J.A. Rahim's house and beat him so severely that he had to be
hospitalized.
Q.2 What were the causes of Baloch resistance during Z.A Bhutto era? How Z.A. Bhutto had dealt with
this resistance? Explain in detail.
The ethno-separatist rebellion of Balochistan of the 1970s, the most threatening civil disorder to Pakistan since
Bangladesh's secession, now began. Surveying the political instability, Bhutto's central government sacked two
provincial governments within six months, arrested the two chief ministers, two governors and forty-four MNAs
and MPAs, obtained an order from the Supreme Court banning the NAP and charged everyone with high treason
to be tried by a specially constituted Hyderabad Tribunal of handpicked judges. Following the alleged discovery
of Iraqi arms in Islamabad in February 1973, Bhutto dissolved the Balochistan Provincial Assembly and infuriated
Balochistan's political oligarchs.
In time, the nationalist insurgency, which had been steadily gathering steam, now exploded into action, with
widespread civil disobedience and armed uprisings. Bhutto now sent in the army to maintain order and crush the
insurgency. This essentially pitted the ethno-separatists against the central government, and army. As casualties
rose, the insurgency became a full-fledged armed struggle against the Pakistan Army. The sporadic fighting
between the insurgency and the army started in 1973 with the largest confrontation taking place in September
1974 when around 15,000 ethno-separatists fought the Pakistani Army and the Air Force. Sensing the seriousness
of the conflict, Pakistan Navy dispatched its logistic units under the command of Vice-Admiral Patrick Simpson—
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Commander of the Southern Naval Command—provided its logistic and intelligence support to Army and Air
Force from the Sea. The Navy had applied an effective naval blockade in Balochistan's water and stopped the
illegal arm trade and aid to Baloch rebel groups. In a separate naval operations led by navy, the navy had seized
and destroyed vessels that were trying to aid the Baloch rebel groups. The army suffered more than 3,000
casualties in the fight while the rebels lost 5,000 people as of 1977
The geography of Balochistan and a scattered population helped in building strong tribal identities or barriers that
alienated them within themselves but also helped in ensuring isolation from outside forces. The advent of British
rule certainly changed this. Taj Mohammad Breseeg in his book Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and
Development (2004, 181) argues that Baloch resistance to the British authorities was the result of individual tribal
chiefs due to their own contentions. The failure to form a national struggle was due to “the lack of communication
between the Baloch tribes and contact with the Indian people, having an enemy superior in arms and resources,
and the lack of a proper political organisation to mobilise the masses.”
According to Devasher, the establishment of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan (Organisation for the Unity of
Baloch) in 1929 marked the emergence of a “secular, non-tribal nationalist movement” (2019, 71). Most of the
members and leaders of the group “were from the urban bourgeoisie, large and small, educated youth, and
nationalist-minded members of the clergy and tribal aristocracy” (Breseeg 2004, 216). Finally, as also stated by
Breseeg (2004, 223), it is pertinent to list the demands made by them:
1. Reform in the Khanate.
2. Unification of the traditional Baloch lands which were divided between different administrative units (and
countries).
3. Establishment of a sovereign, independent and united Balochistan.
Accession to Pakistan and Aftermath
Like many other issues that are endemic to South Asia, the predicament of Baloch nationalism and insurgency
deepened with the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. As the withdrawal of the British and the
partition became evident, the state of Kalat decided that it would remain independent and not join either India or
Pakistan. Interestingly, in 1946, it was M.A Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and the then legal advisor of the Khan
of Kalat, who submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission arguing that “Geographically, Kalat does not fall
within the territorial limits of India” and “ethnographically, the people of Kalat and of the territories under its
suzerainty, have no affinities with the people of India” (in Devasher 2019, 5&25).
Subsequently, the government of Kalat was set up with the establishment of a new Parliament as well as the
adoption of a new constitution and flag. Elections were also held in the two houses of Parliament in late August
of 1947. While Pakistan accepted an independent Kalat initially, “Jinnah had second thoughts… and was now
desirous of obtaining its accession in the same form as was accepted by other rulers who joined Pakistan” (Ibid,
87). Consequently, as negotiations between the two broke down, Pakistan invaded Kalat and “the Khan was forced
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to sign the merger document and Kalat was annexed. This led to the first armed insurgency in 1948 led by the
Khan’s brother” (Bansal 2005, 252).
After the first period of insurgency, and before 2004, the Baloch have launched a rebellion against the state three
times in 1958, 1963–69, 1973–77. Devasher rightly notes that every Baloch “rebellion has lasted longer than the
previous one, every rebellion has encompassed a wider geographical area than the previous one and every
rebellion has involved more Baloch than the previous ones” (2019, 90). For instance, while the first two periods
were relatively small, in 1973 “55,000 insurgents faced 80,000 Pakistani troops supported not only by Pakistani
Air Force but also the Iranian Air Force. More than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 soldiers were killed in the
insurgency that lingered on until 1977” (Bansal, 2005, 252).
Over the years, Pakistan’s pervasive and hard-handed response has induced a “psychological alienation from
Islamabad” for the Baloch that has further pushed many towards demanding independence from the state rather
than provincial autonomy (Harrison 1981, 4; Grare 2013). While tension and violence were fomenting for a few
years, the current period of conflict was provoked in 2005 by the rape of a female doctor, Shazia Khalid, in the
small Baloch town of Sui in the Dera Bugti Area committed “allegedly by the captain and three personnel of the
Defence Security Guards. The government’s subsequent handling of the incident and its blatant attempt to cover
up the crime and shield the culprits triggered massive outrage” (Wani 2016, 812).
The 1990s had ushered in a hope of political reconciliation with the rise of Baloch nationalist parties like the
Balochistan National Party (BNP) but Pervez Musharraf’s coup in 1999 and his aggressive stance acted as a
catalyst for the insurgency. While the state blamed the conflict on the tribal chiefs (Sardars), the tensed relations
were “centred on grievances related to provincial sovereignty, the allocation of resources, interprovincial
migrations, and the protection of local language and culture”, prevalent for decades (Grare 2013).
The issue of underrepresentation in politics is further aggravated by the “belief that the Baloch governments were
not allowed to complete their terms by the Punjabi establishment” (Devasher 2019, 106). For instance, till the
1990s, provincial governments led by ethnic Baloch served a total of only three years. The first was dismissed by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto only after ten months in 1972-73[3]. The second was led by Nawab Akbar Bugti (1988-90)
and was dissolved with Benazir Bhutto’s first government. Finally, the third government lasted for only about
fifteen months and was led by Akhtar Mengal in 1997-98 (Ibid, 106). Furthermore, “in the first three decades of
Pakistan’s existence, only 4 of the 179 persons who joined Pakistani cabinet at different points of time were ethnic
Baloch” (Bansal 2008, 186). Before the 1970s, only Akbar Bugti, who also led the fifth wave of insurgency before
getting killed in 2006, was a federal minister. In 2002, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, an ethnic Baloch, was appointed
the Prime Minister by Pervez Musharraf but was subsequently forced to resign after nineteen months, becoming
one of the shortest-serving Prime Ministers (Reddy 2004).
Frederic Grare (2013, 10) also points out that Baloch nationalist parties, either by forming coalitions with
mainstream parties or joining them, were able to win support and form government in the late 1990s. However,
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in the 2002 elections, “the military rigged the elections and reinvigorated its long-standing alliance with the
region’s mullahs, helping the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition of religious Islamic parties to gain
power”. Furthermore, even The Election Commission of Pakistan colluded with the establishment and denied
eligibility to certain qualified candidates (including Akbar Bugti) while accepted madrassa diplomas as valid as
an attempt to Islamize the largely secular Baloch province and movement (Ibid).
Even when Baloch leaders were appointed in the government, they had no control over the decision making. For
instance, Mohammad Jam Yusaf was appointed the Chief Minister in 2002 but his cabinet was dominated by a
conservative Islamist party, the Jamaat-Ulema-u-Islam (Grare 2013, 10-11). Additionally, Musharraf also
launched a devolution plan that sought to establish local governments “entirely dependent on the central
government for their survival” and render provincial assemblies as insignificant. While it was a “form of
decentralization, all provinces except Punjab perceived the scheme to be an imposition of a centralized form of
government and a negation of provincial autonomy — clearly an irritant for Baloch nationalists” (Ibid).
The delimitation of electoral constituencies in Balochistan presents another intriguing problem. The NA-272
Gwadar-cum-Lasbela constituency covers the entire 750-kilometre-long coastline of Balochistan, stretching from
Karachi to Iran. Similarly, the NA-270 comprises of the four central Balochistan district and amounts to a total
of 94,452 square kilometres making it about half the size of Punjab province and bigger than the province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) (Mehdi 2018). Indeed, the average provincial constituency size in Balochistan is ten
times higher while the national constituency size is 12.8 times higher than the other three provinces (Devasher
2019, 106-7).
In an aptly titled article – ‘Obfuscating Balochistan’ – Tahir Mehdi (2018) argues that the “numerical equality of
constituencies does not always result in equal suffrage. If it is taken too literally, it can, in fact, turn into a tool
for marginalisation and exclusion”. Interestingly, Mehdi points out that the state had “legally allowed the
population number in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) constituencies to be half that of the national
average […] to compensate for ‘the representation deficit’ that it suffers for not being a part of a provincial
assembly”. Thus, it is evident that in Balochistan neither can a politician’s campaign nor the people exercise their
ultimate democratic rights. Therefore, they not only risk losing all political value but this also further strengthens
their feeling of alienation with the state.
In addition to the political under-representation, the Baloch occupy a marginal place in the bureaucracy and thus
the wider administration and policymaking. Even though Zia-ul-Haq promised after the fourth period of
insurgency to match the Baloch representation in the bureaucracy to their share of the population (then 3.9 per
cent), it never materialised (Bansal 2008, 186). The problem is further exacerbated by the “fake domicile
certificate racket [which] has been going on systematically and wilfully to deprive the Baloch people of progress
on the economic ladder” (Talpur 2015). The quotas also get occupied by Pashtuns, the second largest ethnic group
in Balochistan, since the reservations are based on provinces rather than ethnicities. The problem, however, also
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goes beyond the bureaucracy. For instance, in 2002, “out of a total of fourteen provincial government secretaries
in Quetta, only four were Baloch; of a total of 3,200 students at Balochistan University, fewer than five hundred
were Baloch; of a total of 180 faculty members, only thirty were Baloch” (Bansal 2008, 186).
The former Chief Minister of Balochistan rightly observed that Islamabad behaves “like the East India Company”
(Devasher 2019, 110). Even in the Army, the recruitment has historically been from the Punjab region while from
Baloch it only grew to 5 per cent in the 1970s from 0.6 per cent since the British rule (Bansal 2008, 185). In 1972,
the Chief Minister of Balochistan declared that “there are only a few hundred Baloch in the entire Pakistan Army.
The famous Baloch Regiment has no Baloch in it” while for the Kalat Scouts and Sibi Scouts “The officers are
from Punjab and soldiers from the Frontier” (Ibid, 185). The problem of under-representation is highlighted by
the fact that “ex-servicemen from Balochistan for the period from 1995-2003 numbered 3,753 men only while
the numbers for the North Punjab and the NWFP for the same period were 1,335,339 and 229,856, respectively”
(Dawn 2005). Similarly, even though the province boasts of a 750 km coast, there is no Baloch in the Navy
(Devasher 2019, 112).
Like the Bureaucracy, the quotas in the Army are also filled with Pashtuns from Balochistan rather than ethnic
Baloch. The Pashtuns now form nearly thirty-five per cent of the population in Balochistan and are mainly
concentrated in the northern districts. The Baloch constantly fear that they are getting “marginalised in their own
province by the rising influx of Pakhtoon and other Pakistanis” (Bansal 2005, 258). This fear has been
compounded by the large influx of Pashtun origin Afghan refugees since the 1979 Soviet intervention and thus
leading to “Pashtun claims of equal or even majority population in Balochistan leading to the Baloch becoming a
minority in their homeland” (Devasher 2019, 119).
Q.3 Discuss in detail the politics of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) by focusing on its election strategies
and campaign during 1977 elections.
Pakistan National Alliance constituted of nine religious and political parties. It was formed in 1977 in which the
alliances agreed to run as a single bloc to overthrow the rule of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the first
elected leader of that country after the Martial law of Yahiya Khan. It was a major and largest alliance formed
against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his government. When it was formed, Card reader and astrologist Akilä Zia
Schüzhgtai told Pakistan Media‘s which later published in the newspapers the next day, that “The 9 stars are
united to end the democratic regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his collaborators”. The Alliance had 9 different
ideological parties and had consisted of all secularist forces, communist forces, socialist forces, conservative
forces, and hardline Islamist forces at a single bloc. However, after General Zia deposed Bhutto and his close
colleagues, the alliance was divided into two sections. Under Zia, the secular forces, communist forces, and
socialist forces were weakened and ruined. Many of the secular, communist, and socialist party members were
either killed, tortured, or missing whom fate is still nobody known. Whereas Religious and ideological leaders
sided with Zia.
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Bhutto’s former political analyst, Dr. Ataul Haque Kasmie, the main objective of this alliance was to teach Bhutto
a lesson for starting a nuclear development and growing socialism in the country.
The Pakistan National Alliance manifesto was to bring back the 1970 prices. Implementation of Islam was its
primary election slogan. They promised to enforce Islamic laws “Nizam-e-Mustafa”, the Sharia laws. The number
of political parties leaders, like Asghar Khan‘s (Independence Movement (People National
Party)Socialism, Nazeer Abbasi‘s (Community Party) Communism, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi‘s (Muslim
League) Conservatism, and Maulana Maududi‘s (Muttahida Mulla Association) hardline Islamism united by a
common dislike of Zulfiqar Bhutto’s autocratic policies on a single platform. At this platform, the modern
European style-influenced forces allied with the opposite of hardline Islamist forces. The alliance decided to
contest the elections under one election symbol “plow” and a green flag with nine stars as its ensign.
Contesting the 1977 elections jointly the PNA launched a campaign against the government after the controversial
and appropriate results showing the Peoples Party as an overwhelming victory in the elections. The agitation
caught the Peoples Party and its political leaders, by surprise and after several months of street fighting and
protests. Under advised by his advisers, Bhutto opened negotiations with the PNA leadership but whether or not
it would have been signed by all PNA parties or by Bhutto remains open to speculation. In the anti-Bhutto bloc,
the alliance seemed to be effective when tapping a wave to remove Bhutto from the government.
Meanwhile, Bhutto’s trusted companion Dr. Mubashir Hassan tried to handle the situation on behalf of Bhutto by
bringing the alliance to a table to reach an agreement of co-existence and a vital political solution. On other hand,
Dr. Hassan advised Bhutto not to rely either on the establishment or use force to control the alliance. However,
Dr. Hassan’s creativities were not successful despite the efforts he made day and night. The PNA later refused to
talk to Dr. Hassan as he was seen as the brain behind Bhutto’s rise. An agreement was finally reached in June
1977 and Bhutto was to sign it on July 5. Though, despite the interest of the negotiating team, other PNA leaders
had questions about the agreement. In reply, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also tried to crush the power of this alliance,
with the help of his agencies such as FSF and Rangers and it was also considered one of the causes of Bhutto’s
hanging on 4 April 1979. In a coup performed by General Zia, Bhutto was removed from office with a number
of his colleagues. Bhutto was thrown in jail with his close companion’s dr. Hassan later witnessed the ill-treatment
of General Zia to both men.
The conservatives and Islamist fronts went to General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, and Admiral Mohammad
Sharif, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and convinced them to remove Bhutto and no other
agreement is reached with Bhutto and his colleagues remained stubborn. The absence of a formal agreement
between the government and the PNA was used as an excuse by Pakistan under its Chairman Admiral Mohammad
Sharif which led to the stage of a Coup d’état. General Zia ul Haque to break the deadlocks of those who were
justifying the coup argued that no agreement had been reached between the two sides.

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The Alliance split after the Army under Zia-ul-Haq overthrew his government, between elements (conservatives
and religious groups) that supported the martial law government and those who opposed it (socialists,
communists, and secularists). The socialist, communist, and secular fronts were suppressed, destabilized,
destroyed, and completely disable by General Zia and his supported Islamic Front. In response, the secular front
decided to form the Movement for Restoration of Democracy to fight the regime of General Zia.
Q.4 Critically analyze the 1985 elections held on non-party basis. What were the motives and implications
of holding non-party basis elections for political system?
General elections were held in Pakistan on 28 February 1985 to elect members of the National Assembly.[1] The
elections were held under the military government of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq after the restoration of the 1973
constitution.
Around 1,300 candidates contested the elections, which were held on a nonpartisan basis.[2] Each candidate was
required to have their nomination paper signed by 50 registered voters from the constituency they wished to stand
in.[3] In an attempt to disqualify a large number of opposition candidates and secure a conservative leadership,
Zia-ul-Haq introduced amendments to the Political Parties Act of 1962. As a result, the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which was calling for an end to the military regime, boycotted the elections.[4]
Voter turnout was 52.93%, considerably lower than the previous two elections.[1] Most of the elected MNAs were
supporters of the Zia regime. A new government was formed under the leadership of Muhammad Khan Junejo, a
lesser known figure in national politics. Prime Minister Junejo and his followers subsequently established the pro-
Zia conservative Pakistan Muslim League.
Party Votes % Seats
Independents 207
Seats reserved for women 21
Seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities 9
Total 237
Total votes 17,250,482 –
Registered voters/turnout 32,589,996 52.93
Source: IPU
Following the elections, Muhammad Khan Junejo was appointed Prime Minister and later formed a new party,
the Pakistan Muslim League. The election boycott was viewed to have been a misstep for the MRD, which had
assumed the public would support its stance.

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There were different claims about the turnout of voters: official figures claimed a voter turnout at 53.71 per cent,
while the political parties said it was not more than15pc. Four days later, elections to the provincial assemblies
were also held. The elections brought hope that a house of politically elected members could also be hoped in
future, and that the House could be tamed democratically.
With a separate electorate system, Gen Zia presumed that perhaps the minorities, especially the Hindus, supported
the PPP and might have helped in bringing a few PPP supporters in the National Assembly. This would create a
serious issue for Gen Zia.
Q.5 What was thirteenth Constitutional amendment and what were the impacts of this amendment on
the parliamentary system in Pakistan.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan (Urdu: ‫ )آئین پاکستان میں تیرہویں ترمیم‬was a short-
time amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, adopted by the elected Parliament of Pakistan in 1997 by the
government of people elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It stripped the President of Pakistan of his reserve
power to dissolve the National Assembly, and thereby triggering new elections and dismissing the Prime Minister.
The Constitutional Amendment was supported by both the government and the opposition, and was thus passed
unanimously. With the enforcing of this amendment, Pakistan's system of government was shifted from Semi-
presidential system to Parliamentary democratic republic system.
The amendment removed Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution, which gave the President the power to
dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion ... a situation has arisen in which
the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.[1]
In Pakistan, once legislators are elected to national or provincial assemblies, the people cannot recall them
before the end of their five-year terms. In the past, this has contributed to a sense of immunity on the part of
members of the ruling party, and to a public perception of rampant corruption among leading politicians – in
1997, Pakistan received the second-worst score in the world on Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index.
A few months later, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, which subjected Members of Parliament to very
strict party discipline by giving party leaders unlimited power to dismiss legislators who failed to vote as
directed. This virtually eliminated any chance of a Prime Minister of being thrown out of office by a motion
of no confidence. The amendments removed nearly all institutional checks and balances on the Prime
Minister's power, by effectively removing the legal remedies by which he could be dismissed.
Nawaz Sharif's government became increasingly unpopular after the passage of these amendments, even
though it was the election of his Pakistan Muslim League by a heavy majority that enabled him to alter the
Constitution in the first place. A few months later, Nawaz Sharif's partisan stormed the Supreme Court of

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Pakistan and forced the resignation of the Chief Justice. This strengthened the perception that the country was
becoming a civilian dictatorship.
In 1999, the Pakistan Army General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in a military-led bloodless coup.
Among the reasons he gave for doing so were the destruction of institutional checks and balances, and the
prevailing corruption in the political leadership. The coup was widely welcomed in Pakistan. Amongst the
Opposition, ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was one of the first leaders to congratulate General Pervez
Musharraf for removing Nawaz Sharif. The Supreme Court later validated the removal on the grounds that
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments resulted in a situation for which there was no constitutional
remedy.
In October 2002, elections were held in Pakistan. In December 2003, Parliament passed the Seventeenth
Amendment, which partially restored the President's reserve power to dissolve Parliament and thus remove
the Prime Minister from office, but made it subject to Supreme Court approval.
The Titles of Nobility Amendment is a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution. The 11th
Congress passed it on May 1, 1810, and submitted to the state legislatures for ratification. It would strip United
States citizenship from any citizen who accepted a title of nobility from an "emperor, king, prince or foreign
power." On two occasions between 1812 and 1816, it was within two states of the number needed to become part
of the Constitution. Congress did not set a time limit for its ratification, so the amendment is still pending before
the states. Ratification by an additional 26 states is now needed for its adoption. This proposed amendment would
amplify both Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, which prohibits the federal government from issuing titles of nobility
or honor, and Section 10, Clause 1, which prohibits the states from issuing them.
One theory for why the Congress proposed the amendment is that it was in response to the 1803 marriage
of Napoleon Bonaparte's younger brother, Jerome, and Betsy Patterson of Baltimore, Maryland, who gave birth
to a boy for whom she wanted aristocratic recognition from France.[2] The child, named Jérôme Napoléon
Bonaparte, was not born in the United States, but in the United Kingdom on July 7, 1805 – nevertheless, he would
have held U.S. citizenship through his mother. Another theory is that his mother actually desired a title of nobility
for herself and, indeed, she is referred to as the "Duchess of Baltimore" in many texts written about the
amendment. The marriage had been annulled in 1805 – well before the amendment's proposal by the 11th
Congress. Nonetheless, Representative Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina is recorded to have said, when voting
on the amendment, that "he considered the vote on this question as deciding whether or not we were to have
members of the Legion of Honor in this country.

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Assignment No. 1 Q.1 What Was Mujeeb's Six Point Formula? Elaborate All The Six Points and The Rationale Behind It

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Course: Political & Constitutional Development in Pakistan-II (4668)

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• that the government of Pakistan be parliamentary and in the nature of a federation

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Seats reserved for women 21

Seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities 9

Total votes 17,250,482 –

Registered voters/turnout 32,589,996 52.93

Skilling.pk Stamflay.com Diya.pk

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