Winter22 INFMag

PB 7-22-4
BG LARRY BURRIS
Commandant,
U.S. Army Infantry School
RUSSELL A. ENO WINTER 2022-2023 Volume 111, Number 4

Editor
DEPARTMENTS
MICHELLE J. ROWAN 1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE
Deputy Editor 2 MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
2 THE CASE FOR COLD REGIONS AND MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS TRAINING
CPT Edward M. Kwait
Peter D. Smith
FRONT COVER: 7 MAKING IT MOUNTAIN: OPPORTUNITIES IN ARMY MOUNTAIN WARFARE
A Basic Military Mountaineering CAPABILITIES
Course student crosses a rope
bridge over a mountain gorge at MAJ Tom Kumes
the Northern Warfare Training 10 MOUNTAIN ALPINE FORCES FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION
Center’s Black Rapids Training
Site in Alaska on 15 August MAJ Gerard T. Spinney
2020. (Photo by John Pennell) MAJ Evan K. Mair
15 THE ARMY MOUNTAIN WARFARE SCHOOL AND THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF MILITARY MOUNTAINEERING
MAJ Micah Kidney
20 ARMY BUILDS TOOL TO SAVE LIVES AT HIGH ALTITUDE
BACK COVER: Carey Phillips
Cold Weather Orientation 21 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Course 20-002 students
snowshoe into the mountains 21 FIGHTING AS A TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE AT NTC
while pulling loaded ahkio sleds LTC Gordon R. Kinneer
at the Northern Warfare Training
Center’s Black Rapids Training LTC Eric B. Ponzek
Site in Alaska on 11 February 25 IMPROVING INFANTRY DEFENSES AGAINST ENEMY AIR
2020. (Photo by John Pennell)
LTC Darrell E. Fawley III
29 RIFLE COMPANY TEMPORAL OVERMATCH IN LSCO
CPT Zachary J. Matson
36 EYE OF THE TIGER: RAVEN CONSOLIDATION AT NTC
CPT Will Oakley
This medium is approved for official 1LT Sharon Murray
dissemination of material designed to keep 39 INSTRUCTION IS LEADERSHIP
individuals within the Army knowledgeable of
current and emerging developments within
CPT Shameek De Lancey
their areas of expertise for the purpose of CPT Chris Jarrett
enhancing their professional development. 42 WHAT IS LEADERSHIP: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A COMMAND
SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Jesse J. Clark
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 44 MOBILE PROTECTED FIREPOWER: AN OPPORTUNITY
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE LTC Ben Ferguson
General, United States Army CPT Lennard Salcedo
Chief of Staff 50 BOOK REVIEWS
Official:
Infantry (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S.
MARK F. AVERILL Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantry Soldier,
Administrative Assistant the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information
to the Secretary of the Army presented in other official Army publications. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the
2235000 authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
Contact Information
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Commandant’s Note BG LARRY BURRIS
T
he Army is hard at work readying itself for the large- The effective use of small
scale combat operations (LSCO) likely to comprise unmanned aircraft systems
the nation’s future engagements. Producing the (SUAS) to target armor, air
Army of 2030 requires changes to doctrine, organization, defense, and dismounted
training, materiel, and more. LSCO will differ in many respects targets is a lesson with implica-
from this century’s earlier counterinsurgency campaigns. tions far beyond the Caucasus.
Still, the United States Army Infantry will remain the world’s In June 2020, dozens of
premier maneuver fighting force. The Army’s valuable expe- soldiers died in close combat in
rience gained over the past two decades of operating in the the mountains along India’s 3,000 kilometer disputed border
complicated landscape of the mountains, deserts, and cities with China. Two nuclear powers fighting hand-to-hand in
of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq will undoubtedly contribute the mountains is a sobering reminder that no technological
to the organization’s future success in the complex physical progress eliminates the need for strong and capable Infantry
terrain of future warfare. In this issue of Infantry, we look up formations.
to the mountains. The topography of our adversaries likewise proves the
When most people consider the characteristics relative relevance of mountain operations for our Infantry formations.
to mountainous terrain, a cold climate is usually the first The Himalayas along China’s southwest border contain
to come to mind. After all, the Army conducts much of our some of the highest elevations on earth. Iran’s territory is
mountain training in the snow-capped mountains and hills 55 percent mountainous, principally on its borders. Russia’s
of upstate New York, Vermont, Colorado, and Alaska. And Ural Mountains sharply divide the country’s east and west.
our doctrine, like ATP 3-90.97, Mountain Warfare and Cold Mountains make up 70 percent of the Korean Peninsula.
Weather Operations and ATP 3-21.50, Infantry Small-Unit To think about the landscape of the future battlefields is to
Mountain and Cold Weather Operations, jointly address this consider the likelihood of combat in the mountains seriously.
as well. However, the new FM 3-0, Operations, released The Army today is taking necessary steps to prepare for
in October, makes clear that “mountainous terrain can be future mountain operations in several ways. For example, the
found on jungle, Arctic, and desert islands.” Extreme heat Army Mountain Warfare School in Vermont provides numer-
or cold, dryness or humidity, lush jungles, or sparse vegeta- ous courses focused on individual Soldier mountaineering
tion are all possible. Afghanistan, for example, has several skills and training, such as Basic and Advanced Military
different mountainous environments within the same area of Mountaineering, Rough Terrain Evacuation, Mountain
operations. Rifleman, and the Mountain Planner Courses. The 5th
It is impossible to predict where the men and women Ranger Training Battalion in the north Georgia mountains
of the Infantry will fight the next battle. In his aptly named trains students on the collective mountaineering skills and
book Out of the Mountains, Dr. David Kilcullen argues training of units through the execution of the Ranger Course
that future combat will shift toward coastlines and urban program of instruction. These two organizations, along with
areas. Yet almost every country has mountains, and nearly the Northern Warfare Training Center, the Sapper Course,
every war has included some form of mountain operations. the 25th Infantry Division’s Lightning Academy, and other
Mountains comprise 25 percent of the globe’s dry surface, organizations from around the force, make up the Army’s
and 10 percent of the world’s population calls them home. Mountaineering Board. These organizations come together
One-quarter to one-third of those mountain populations live multiple times throughout the year to discuss lessons learned
in cities. Fighting to, in, and through these spaces requires from the operational force and training centers to improve
careful attention to the terrain. the instruction required for the Army to operate within such
Mountains introduce a vertical terrain challenge to an complex terrain.
already crowded battlefield, making medical evacuations But, as with all specialized training, mountains must not
and lines of communication more complex. The need for cause us to lose sight of the Infantry’s fundamentals. Per ATP
technical climbing expertise and specialized equipment 3-21.50, vii, “While the Infantry rifle company is an organiza-
become prerequisites along with the additional physical tion not specifically designed for mountain … operations, it is
training required for Soldiers maneuvering at altitude before well suited for this environment.” So long as we continue to
firing a single shot. provide our Soldiers with appropriate equipment and train-
Recent fighting by other nations should inform our thinking ing, the men and women of the Infantry will implement the
about mountain operations. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces principles of land warfare into any environment to fight and
fighting in the rugged Nagorno-Karabakh area claimed some win.
7,000 lives in 2020 and another 300 this past September. I am the Infantry! Follow me!
Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 1

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The Case for Cold Regions

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M e
Op
and Mountain Operations Training

CPT EDWARD M. KWAIT
PETER D. SMITH
environment for friendly and enemy forces. This includes the

“Losses among the troops because of frost application of the warfighting functions to mountain environ-
ments, with a specialty in mobility operations. These subject
weigh heavier on the commander’s conscience matter experts have been crucial to the success of military
than battle casualties. Because in this case operations in the past, continue to demonstrate their value
there always remains the disturbing feeling in the present, and are necessary to prepare for mountain
that losses due to the cold might possibly have warfare in the future.
been avoided if greater precautions had been A Look at the Past
taken.” The common theme in past mountain conflicts is that
— Marshal of Finland Carl Gustaf Emil disaster awaits those unprepared for the environment. Even
Mannerheim, 1942 a brief look at the history of warfare in mountainous and
cold regions reveals the need to utilize specialized tactics,
M
ilitary operations conducted in a mountainous techniques, and procedures. Harsh lessons from the Austria-
environment are affected by severe weather, Italian front waged more than 100 years ago still apply today.
insufficient infrastructure, restricted mounted During World War I, the Italian Army was given the
and dismounted access, high elevation, and snow and cold mission to re-take the heavily fortified ground occupied by
weather proportionate to the season and elevation.1 The Austria in the Eastern Alps, which included the Dolomites
U.S. Army trains military mountaineers to succeed in terrain and the Carnic Alps.2 To have a chance of success despite
and weather that may otherwise impede or halt operations. their evident disadvantage, the Italians emplaced weapons
When engaging in mountain warfare, military mountaineers and observation posts high in the mountains, blasted miles
advise commanders on the limitations and possibilities of the of trenches out of solid rock, formed tunnels and barriers
Photo by CPT Edward Kwait

A view of the East Alaska Mountain Range as seen by students of the Advanced Military Mountaineering Course in July 2021.
2 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

in the deep snow, and constructed paths
through the rugged terrain.3 The vastly
developed supply network included the
“telerifica” which utilized wires and pulleys
to carry fighting men, wounded, equipment,
and rations to and from inaccessible points.4
Throughout these efforts, the Italians had
to contend with both the enemy and the
environment. Austrian machine guns were
positioned on the high ground and could
decimate exposed troops with plunging fire.
Rock fall and steep, exposed terrain were
ever present hazards that led to loss of men
and equipment. Deep snow restricted vehi-
cle movement and required heavy loads to
be transported on sleds.5 Avalanches took
the lives of 10,000 soldiers in the Dolomites
in December 1916; on both sides, more
than 60,000 would perish from these deadly
National Archives photo
snow slides.6 The remote fronts of both
Soldiers with the 10th Light Division (Alpine) prepare for ski training at Camp Hale, CO.
armies made it difficult to supply clothes,
food, water, and shelter; and both were forced to adapt over tain and winter warfare training which culminated in a three-
the three plus years of mountain warfare. Cold temperatures week exercise called the “D-Series.” This exercise required
and high altitude hindered soldier performance and further personnel and equipment to move over unforgiving terrain,
stressed the supply system. including climbing 2,000 feet over rock and ice in tempera-
The United States began to debate the need for mountain tures as low as 35 degrees below zero, and address a series
troops at the outset of World War II. In 1939-1940, Finnish of field problems along the way. Division-level maneuvers
winter tactics had dealt a severe blow to the Soviets. Despite demonstrated the need for decentralized command and
being seriously outclassed in every measure by the Soviet control as well as unique solutions for mountain mobility,
military, the Finns were able to inflict a 95-percent casualty supply, and medical evacuation. The greatest dividend noted
rate on the invading Russians by using their knowledge of by participants at all levels was the development of resource-
how to exploit the terrain and weather to their advantage. ful, mentally and physically tough Soldiers.
As WWII began, intelligence reports disclosed that the In 1945, the 10th Mountain Division’s victory in the north-
Germans were preparing specialized forces for combat in ern Apennine Mountains of Italy confirmed the value of the
Alaska, Canada, and the Western United States. The U.S. past five years of mountain and winter warfare training in the
Army also took note of the failure of standard Italian divisions U.S. Army. The Germans controlled the high ground in the
in Albania.7 This led to the activation of the 87th Mountain Apennines which prevented the Allies from accessing the
Infantry and Mountain Winter Warfare Board (MWWB) at rest of Europe. Allies had tried and failed at dislodging the
Fort Lewis, WA, and the Mountain Training Center (MTC) at Germans from the Mount Belvedere ridgeline due to well-
Camp Carson, CO. These pioneer organizations developed established and fortified German positions. These German
the first formalized mountain and winter warfare training positions easily controlled the only available routes below, the
and would eventually provide experts to fill the ranks of the valleys within their range, and were believed unassailable. The
10th Light Division (Alpine).8 The MTC developed mountain 10th Mountain Division installed ropes, pitons, and anchors
and winter warfare instructors that trained the Mountain in preparation for a 1,700-2,200 foot climb up vertical rock
Infantry Regiments at Fort Lewis and Camp Hale. They also and ice to attack the adjacent Riva Ridge. Due to the vulner-
taught a variety of units in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, ability of their formation while negotiating steep terrain, the
Wisconsin, Virginia, and West Virginia rock climbing, basic Soldiers moved through darkness and fog on the night of the
mountaineering, snowshoeing, skiing, and winter warfare to attack. Their tactics succeeded in taking the ridge, and they
aid in their preparation to conduct collective mountain and were able to hold off German counterattacks for five days.
winter training.9 In Virginia, the MTC provided low moun- The day after Riva Ridge was taken, six infantry battalions
tain training and instruction for the 36th and 45th Infantry assaulted up Mount Belvedere and fought for six days before
Divisions' deployment to Sicily, which substantiated the taking control of the ridgeline. Following the success at Mount
program’s value. Five additional divisions would later receive Belvedere, the 10th Mountain Division Soldiers continued to
training in the mountains of West Virginia.10 fight north through the Apennine Mountains and were the first
In 1943, the U.S. Army activated the first division-sized to reach and cross the Po River, forcing the German army to
mountain unit, the 10th Light Division (Alpine). During the retreat and ultimately surrender in May of 1945.11
following year, the division would complete collective moun- With the activation and deployment of the 10th Mountain

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Division in 1944, and the need for troops in all Training for brigade combat teams currently takes place
M e theaters, the MTC and Low Mountain Training at one of four training centers (the National Training Center
O p Program were inactivated. Continuity was held by [NTC], Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC], Joint Multi-
the Mountain and Winter Warfare Section, but state- National Readiness Center [JMRC], or the Joint Pacific
side maneuvers came to a halt. The development of Field Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska [JPMRC-AK]) and
Manual (FM) 70-15, Operations in Snow and Extreme Cold, serves to prepare our Army to fight a near-peer force in a
and FM 70-10, Mountain Operations, were intended to be decisive action training environment (DATE). However, the
the continuity for mountain and cold weather operations.12 first three training centers lack an emphasis on training in a
Following WWII, the 10th Mountain Division was deactivated. mountainous and cold weather environment, and only one
Since then, a division-level mountaineering program has JPMRC-AK winter training cycle has been completed thus
ceased to exist for the U.S. Army. far. Additionally, training areas across U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) lack mountainous terrain, and
Current State of Training and Operational
unlike some of our partners and near-peer adversaries,
Requirements there has not been a requirement to train in the mountains
Since WWII, the U.S. Army’s mountaineering training has to protect borders or resources. National security interests in
evolved into what is now provided by the Army Mountain Alaska, partner nation interests in the Arctic and sub-Arctic,
Warfare School (AMWS) and the U.S. Army Northern and impacts from climate change have led to a shift in this
Warfare Training Center (NWTC) today. The mountaineer- mindset. In the Army’s 2021 Arctic Strategy “Regaining
ing-specific courses have the same program of instruction Arctic Dominance,” the Department of the Army defines
(POI) between the two schools, which encompass a 14-day Arctic-capable units as those “enabled by doctrine, trained at
Basic Military Mountaineering Course (BMMC) and 14-day echelon, with the right equipment, and manned by Soldiers
Advanced Military Mountaineering Course (AMMC). NWTC with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to
also provides an 11-day Cold Weather Leaders Course successfully operate in the Arctic. These formations could be
(CWLC) and a five-day Cold Weather Orientation Course employed in other sub-arctic, extreme cold weather (ECW)
(CWOC) with an emphasis on extreme cold weather and cold and mountainous environments anywhere in the world.”13
regions operations. This training provides a percentage of the
The Northern Warfare Training Center uses the Black Rapids Training
formation with mountain and cold weather training with the Site (BRTS) in Alaska to conduct its training courses. BRTS is made
expectation that these Soldiers are leveraged by command up of more then 3,800 acres and is located south of Delta Junction.
and staff should the need arise. Photo by CPT Edward Kwait

importance for “Soldiers to be masters
of their craft in Arctic warfare, not just to
survive but to thrive in extreme cold weather
and mountainous terrain.”16 This was a great
step towards higher echelons developing the
appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate
in sub-arctic, extreme cold weather, and mountainous
environments. As has been true in the past, individual
and small unit proficiency is the foundation of success.
Building Mountaineering and Cold Weather
Proficiency
On 6 June 2022, the 11th Airborne Division was
activated at Fort Wainwright and Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson, AK. Guidance from the division commander
includes plans to conduct another JPARC JPMRC
exercise in the winter of 2023 and a focus on mountain,
extreme cold weather, high-latitude, and high-altitude
training throughout the year. NWTC provides small unit
leader training to support this guidance. Units outside
of Alaska may be tasked to support mountain or cold
regions operations and have an obligation to leverage
existing experience, seize educational opportunities,
and build expertise in cold regions and mountain opera-
tions.
All these obligations were accomplished from 2019
to the present in the 10th Mountain Division. In 2019,
COL Scott W. Horrigan, previous battalion commander
of 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, set the
precedence for unit-level mountain warfare training
when he tasked his staff to develop a training concept
culminating in a tactical field training exercise (FTX) in
the Adirondack Mountains of New York. Fortunately,
Photo by SSG Christopher Dennis
there was mountaineering knowledge available within
A student in the Advanced Military Mountaineering Course conducts a
controlled fall on 12 July 2022 at Black Rapids Training Site in Alaska. the organization that was aligned against the task. SFC
Seth N. Toy, Level III mountain leader and previous
Arctic-capable units could be employed to fight in the NWTC senior instructor from 2012 to 2016, was crucial in
vast tundra and sea ice north of the Arctic Circle across the sculpting and implementing individual and collective train-
globe, the 1,500-mile-long Himalaya mountain range which ing across the battalion. He started with inspecting all the
serves as home to the world’s highest peaks and maintains a battalion’s High Angle Mountaineering Kits (HAMKs) and
history of contention, or the rest of the mountain ranges that cutting each rope and cord to the appropriate length. Next,
make up 38 percent of the world’s landmass. The strategy he integrated all qualified Soldiers within the battalion into the
outlines the resources available — NWTC, AMWS, and the instruction of mountaineering tasks that corresponded with
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), which enable the skills required for the FTX. Under his supervision, these
Arctic formations to meet the end state: fight, win and survive instructors trained the battalion in individual and collective
in extreme cold weather and rugged mountainous condi- tasks progressing from basic knot tying and squad mobility
tions over extended periods.14 Lastly, the strategy alludes to systems to platoon tactics for establishing expedient squad
echelons above brigade participating in annual requirements rappel lanes on Fort Drum. The culminating event for 1-32 IN
for combined arms maneuver in harsh terrain.15 mountaineering training was the tactical company FTX in the
Two recent exercises in the JPARC illustrate the impor- Adirondack Mountains. This exercise included a fixed-rope
tance of brigade-on-brigade training exercises in austere infiltration established by the scout platoon to mass combat
mountain and cold weather environments. The Center for power on the objective, a company raid, and a 40-foot rappel
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) identified significant gaps exfiltration off Cathedral Rock.
in training during the February Arctic Warrior 2021 exercise Since then, the division’s mountaineers have teamed up
in the JPARC. In March of 2022, units were able to narrow as a part of a Mountain Cell to serve as advisors and super-
the gaps identified in the previous exercise during the U.S. visors for mountaineering training. Soldiers have continued
Army’s first JPMRC-AK. During JPMRC-AK, the lessons to conduct individual mountaineering training at smaller
learned for the two participating brigades focused on the echelons, and four Soldiers from Fort Drum attended the

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NWTC’s Advanced Military Mountaineering
M era As higher headquarters continues to
Op 2022. The availability of military mountaineering- refine the arctic-capable formation, we
qualified Soldiers continues to be a worthwhile resource
to build additional expertise within the 10th Mountain must leverage available experience,
Division. However, high operational tempo focused on the seize educational opportunities, and
requirements of the rapidly deployable division inhibits a build expertise in cold regions and
robust mountaineering training program at echelon. Despite
the lack of a company-level tactical mountaineering exercise
mountain operations.
since 2019, the lessons learned prove that realistic mountain
warfare training is possible for any unit. 4
Ibid.
5
Ibid, 31-32.
Mountain and cold regions proficiency is important for the 6
Richard Galli, “La Grande Guerra: The Italian Front, 1915-1918 -
U.S. Army. The drastic changes in the newly re-designated Avalanche!,” Worldwar1.com, 2000, accessed 10 October 2022 from http://
Alaskan 11th Airborne Division demonstrate commitment to www.worldwar1.com/itafront/avalan.htm.
achieving the end state outlined in the Arctic Strategy. As 7
Nathan A. Marzoli, “The Best Substitute: U.S. Army Low-Mountain
Training in the Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains, 1943-1944,” Army
higher headquarters continues to refine the arctic-capable
History 113 (Fall 2019): 7-8.
formation, we must leverage available experience, seize 8
MAJ Justin J. Chabalko, Forging the 10th Mountain Division For War,
educational opportunities, and build expertise in cold regions 1940-1945: How Innovation Created a Highly Adaptive Formation (Fort
and mountain operations. These subject matter experts have Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press,
2019), 61-72.
been crucial to the success of military operations in the past, 9
CPT Thomas P. Govan, “AGF Study No. 23: Training for Mountain and
continue to demonstrate their value in the present, and are Winter Warfare,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1946, accessed 22
necessary to prepare for mountain warfare in the future. September 2022 from https://history.army.mil/books/agf/agf23.htm.
10
Marzoli, “The Best Substitute,” 12.
Notes 11
Randy Wyrick, “The Battle of Riva Ridge and the Triumph of the 10th
1
LtCol Scott W. Pierce, U.S. Marine Corps, “Mountain and Cold Weather Mountain Division, 75 Years Later,” [online] Vaildaily.com, accessed 27
Warfighting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century,” (School of Advanced September 2022 from https://www.vaildaily.com/news/the-battle-of-riva-
Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008): 5-6. ridge-and-the-triumph-of-the-10th-mountain-division-75-years-later.
2
Barry Gregory, Mountain and Arctic Warfare: From Alexandria to
12
Govan, “AGF Study No. 23.”
Afghanistan (London: Stephens, 1989), 18.
13
Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Regaining Arctic Dominance:
3
Ibid, 35. the U.S. Army in the Arctic,” 19 January 2021, 10; available at https://www.
army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/about/2021_army_arctic_
strategy.pdf.
14
Ibid, 11-12.
15
Ibid, 33.
16
MG Brian S. Eifler and Troy J. Bouffard, “Forging
the Arctic Warrior: Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness
Center - Alaska,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (3 October
2022), accessed 11 October 2022 from https://www.
airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3173321/forging-
the-arctic-warrior-joint-pacific-multinational-readiness-
centeralaska/.
CPT Edward M. Kwait currently serves as the

Training Branch OIC for the Northern Warfare Training
Center (NWTC), 11th Airborne Division, Fort Wainwright,
AK. His previous assignments include serving as a scout
platoon leader, heavy weapons platoon leader, and oper-
ations officer with 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment,
1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort
Drum, NY. He is a graduate of the Infantry Basic Officer
Leader Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course,
Ranger Course, Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Leaders Course, Air Assault Course, Basic Airborne
Course, Mountain Warfare Course, Rappel Master
Course, Basic and Advanced Military Mountaineering
Courses, and Cold Weather Leaders Course. CPT Kwait
earned a bachelor’s degree in kinesiology from Temple
University.
Peter D. Smith currently serves as training special-
ist at NWTC. He is a graduate of the Infantry Captains
Career Course, Ranger Course, Basic Airborne Course,
Bradley Leader Course, Basic and Advanced Military
Mountaineering Courses, and Cold Weather Leaders
Photo by CPT Edward Kwait Course. He earned a bachelor’s degree in biology from
the U.S. Air Force Academy and Master of Social Work
Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment rappel down Cathedral Rock during
from the University of Southern California.
training in the Adirondack Mountains of New York in August 2019.

Making it
Mountain:
Opportunities in
Army Mountain
Warfare Capabilities
MAJ TOM KUMES
An Army Mountain Warfare School

student rappels a cliff face on
Smugglers’ Notch in Jeffersonville, VT.
Photo by SSG Nathan Rivard
I
n the coming months, the 10th Mountain Division 252-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for Training and
is set to undergo a change to its modified table of Education 2020-2040. By nature, an active-duty organiza-
organization and equipment (MTOE) that will make tion focusing on relevant applications to the contemporary
it the only active component U.S. Army Forces Command operating environment (COE) will cultivate a much wider
(FORSCOM) entity with a stated focus on mountain and talent pool and facilitate “…seamless transitions… into and
cold weather operations. The division’s MTOE will reflect a out of operational units and institutional opportunities.”1 Five
requirement that additional enlisted positions per brigade are years from now, the Army Mountain Warfare School (AMWS)
coded for the Special Qualification Identifier (SQI)-E (Military and our sister schoolhouses at the Northern Warfare Training
Mountaineer), which will serve as a forcing function to ensure Center (NWTC) and 5th Ranger Training Battalion (RTB)
more Soldiers across the division receive specialized training will provide better education thanks to an influx of instruc-
in military mountaineering. In ushering in this change, 10th tors experienced in mountain operations. During the coming
Mountain Division leaders have made the most significant assignment cycle(s), Soldiers from AMWS, NWTC, and 5th
moves progressing Army mountaineering in the past decade. RTB should receive priority consideration for leadership
It is a tremendous start, but we have a way to go in establish- assignments within 10th Mountain to drive the cultural shift
ing the essential capabilities needed to master the unique and ensure that the right training, people, and leadership is
operating conditions imposed by the mountains. positioned to facilitate the organization’s success.
The 10th Mountain’s addition of designated military moun- Prior to the 10th Mountain MTOE change, the 86th Infantry
taineer positions onto its MTOE will help drive the develop- Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) (Mountain) was the only
ment of their mountain culture and improve the mobility designated mountain brigade in the Army. The 86th IBCT is
and lethality of their formations. Having more qualified a National Guard unit headquartered across the street from
mountaineers concentrated in one organization will make AMWS on the Ethan Allen Firing Range (EAFR) in Jericho,
significant inroads in establishing best practices and tactics, VT. Elements of the 86th are spread between Vermont,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Critically, this will bring Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
the force more in line with the principles dictated in U.S. Colorado. The 86th IBCT has more than twice the density of
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet SQI-E positions than comparable 10th Mountain brigades. In

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the coming years, additional changes to the conundrum to 10th Mountain leaders. Compounding this
M e 10th Mountain MTOE should be considered is the struggle to balance required training metrics versus
O p to standardize capabilities so senior leaders can the (currently) unquantified mountain skillsets. Until mili-
better conceptualize the unique skills these organiza- tary mountaineering is tied to specific mission-essential
tions bring to the COE. tasks (METs) and a mission-essential task list (METL) is
Currently, there is no additional skill identifier (ASI) avail- developed specific to mountain units, balancing mountain
able for officers or warrant officers denoting their status as proficiency against the Regionally Aligned Readiness and
military mountaineers akin to the SQI-E awarded to enlisted Modernization Model (ReARMM)-dictated training gates will
Soldiers. As such, there is no requirement for leaders remain a challenge. Long term, the Army should examine
selected for mountain units and training institutions to have developing existing training areas along similar lines to what
attended “Mountain School.” This is counterintuitive and the Marine Corps has done in developing their Mountain
easily fixable. While many officer positions are coded for Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, CA, where they are
ASI-5S (Ranger Parachutist), Mountain Phase of Ranger able to conduct large-scale force validation in an alpine
School focuses on very different skillsets than the Basic environment.
Military Mountaineer Course (BMMC), as evidenced by A competent mountain organization must be fundamen-
the fact that all Mountain Phase instructors at 5th RTB go tally organized and equipped differently than their light
through BMMC as part of their instructor development and counterparts. Basic soldier loads must be kept to an absolute
risk mitigation plan. In establishing a military mountaineering minimum to retain mobility and situational awareness. While
ASI for the officer community, we will double down on our a step forward, current Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)/
commitment to the mountain mentality at all echelons. It will high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)
aid the Army Interactive Marketplace (AIM) in identifying and substitutes like the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) and Light
selecting those officers who have demonstrated a desire and Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV) will often still prove impracti-
commitment to mountaineering for the right positions. cal. Sustaining forces in a mountainous environment will
There are also considerations of geography in posturing require greater reliance on aerial resupply where available
our mountain forces. Gaining and maintaining proficiency in and utilization of lighter wheeled platforms than what forward
the mountains requires living and training in the mountains. support companies (FSCs) are currently equipped with. The
Neither Vernon Parish, LA, nor Watertown, NY, are renowned organization of a mountain brigade support battalion (BSB)
for their towering peaks and rolling hills. Overcoming a lack may need to be examined to incorporate niche skillsets
of mountain terrain at home station presents a long-term like advanced sling-load operations, animal packing, and
tramway construction/operation, or even
consolidation of Level II assault climbers
into a “mountain guide” element similar
to pathfinder formations (think of it as the
rigger company equivalent for mountain
organizations).
The majority of Army-issued moun-
taineering gear in the High Angle
Mountaineering Kits (HAMKs), Snow and
Ice Mobility Kits (SIMKs), and Assault
Climber Team Kits (ACTKs) were issued in
2014 and have since expired. Replacement
components are often unavailable, or
worse, have been sitting in a warehouse
for nearly a decade and aren’t safe for
use. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
solutions are available to bridge the gap,
but a deliberate effort is needed to achieve
a long-term remedy. There are several
pieces of individual equipment that moun-
tain organizations need to be successful
including a mountain boot, cold weather
boot, and integrated glove system. We
have an opportunity and an imperative to
standardize solutions across the force so
An Army Mountain Warfare School student
scales the mountain at Smugglers’ Notch in
Jeffersonville, VT, on 16 February 2016.
Photo by SSG Nathan Rivard

feet.8 Not known for their robust away game,
likely conflicts involving the PLA will take place
in the mountains, as recently witnessed in the
Doklam standoff on the shared border between India/
China/Bhutan and Ladakh incident along the China/India
Himalayan border.9-10 Were China to become expeditionary,
their most likely target remains Taiwan. Central and eastern
Taiwan is a nightmare of complex, compartmentalized, and
severely restricted terrain with more than 200 peaks above
9,800 feet.11 Outside concerns about our near-peer competi-
tors, we must remember that mountainous terrain remains a
corresponding factor predictive of insurgency and civil war.12
The need for mountain-capable units within our force struc-
ture is real and here to stay.
Notes
1
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2, The
U.S. Army Learning Concept for Training and Education 2020-2040, 13 April
Photo by SSG John Yountz 2017, 16-18.
2
Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Regaining Arctic Dominance:
Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment move up
The U.S. Army in the Arctic,” 19 January 2021, accessed from https://api.
a mountain to establish an observation post during mountain warfare
army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/15/9944046e/regaining-arctic-dominance-
training with the Italian Army’s Alpini Brigade on 2 October 2022.
us-army-in-the-arctic-19-january-2021-unclassified.pdf.
that Soldiers gain equipment proficiency and familiarization
3
Joe Lacdan, “Army Re-activates Historic Airborne Unit, Reaffirms
Commitment to Arctic Strategy,” Army News Service, 8 June 2022, accessed
that follows them from assignment to assignment. from https://www.army.mil/article/257356/army_re_activates_historic_air-
It’s imperative that across the force we understand that borne_unit_reaffirms_commitment_to_arctic_strategy.
4
Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife (NY: Penguin Books, 2013).
arctic is not mountain. After the publishing of the “Regaining 5
Hans Schreier, “Mountains: Source of Water, Sites of Poverty and
Arctic Dominance” document in January 2021 and reflagging War,” Population Reference Bureau, 9 August 2002, accessed from https://
of our Alaska-based units to the 11th Airborne Division “Arctic www.prb.org/resources/mountains-sources-of-water-sites-of-poverty-and-
war/#:~:text=Facts%20About%20Mountains,percent%20of%20the%20
Angels,” it’s been in vogue to equate these two distinct operat-
Earth’s%20surface.
ing environments and relate proficiency in one to the other.2-3 6
Kevin McCauley, “Himalayan Impasse: How China Would Fight an Indian
While there are some similarities, asking a force to special- Border Conflict,” The Jamestown Foundation, 20 September 2017, accessed
ize in both, especially in the infancy of its specialization(s), from https://jamestown.org/program/himalayan-impasse-how-china-would-
fight-an-indian-border-conflict/.
will result in proficiency in neither. Arctic operations primarily 7
Frank O’Donnell and Alex Bollfrass, “The Strategic Postures of China
require skill in operating in extreme cold weather environ- and India: A Visual Guide,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for
ments. Many mountains are not situated in cold weather envi- Science and International Affairs, March 2020, accessed from https://www.
ronments. Much of the arctic is flat. I’m writing this from the belfercenter.org/publication/strategic-postures-china-and-india-visual-guide.
8
Mark Episkopos, “Introducing China’s New Type 15 Tank. Here’s What
Huachuca Mountains; the training, equipment, and mindset I You Need to Know,” The National Interest, 1 January 2019, accessed from
need to operate effectively here is vastly different than what I https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/introducing-chinas-new-type-15-tank-
need to traverse a glacier in the Arctic Circle. heres-what-you-need-know-40297.
9
Ankit Panda, “Geography’s Curse: India’s Vulnerable ‘Chicken’s Neck’”
Achieving a robust mountain capability will require a more The Diplomat, 8 November 2013, accessed from https://thediplomat.
nuanced approach than framing the problem as just another com/2013/11/geographys-curse-indias-vulnerable-chickens-neck/.
stoplight chart. Change is hard, and the successful develop-
10
Soutik Biswas, “India-China Clash: 20 Indian Troops Killed in Ladakh
Fighting,” BBC, 16 June 2020, accessed from https://www.bbc.com/news/
ment of these capabilities will require fundamental changes to world-asia-53061476.
the way some of our organizations look and conduct business. 11
Staff Writer, “Taiwan’s Most Breathtaking Mountain Landscapes,”
As once noted, “You are either a zealot or a martyr.”4 Leaders Smithsonian Magazine, accessed from https://www.smithsonianmag.
in these burgeoning mountain organizations need to embrace com/sponsored/taiwan-mountain-landscapes-hiking-ecotourism-nature-
travel-180972646/.
change and uncertainty as we develop the infrastructure to 12
Paul J. Tompkins Jr. and Nathan Bos, Human Factors Considerations
enable our future success. of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Second Edition (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army
Special Operations Command and the Johns Hopkins University Applied
Mountains make up 24 percent of the Earth’s surface and Physics Laboratory, 25 January 2013).
house 10 percent of the world’s population; a disproportion-
ate amount of armed conflict is fought in the mountains.5 In MAJ Tom Kumes currently serves as the operations officer for the
terms of our greatest competitor, 33 percent of China’s total Army Mountain Warfare School (AMWS) on Ethan Allen Firing Range, VT.
area, much of it on their borders and immediate periphery, His previous assignments include serving as chief of the Training Division,
AMWS; commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd
is mountainous terrain.6 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment (Mountain) in Jericho, VT; and the S2
has multiple light brigade-sized units that live and train at of 1st Squadron, 172nd Cavalry Regiment (Mountain) in St. Albans, VT.
elevations upwards of 13,000 feet. They have a medium MAJ Kumes earned a bachelor’s degree in communication studies from the
brigade equivalent stationed above 4,500 feet.7 They have a University of Montana and a master’s degree in organizational leadership
from Brandman University.
tank specially designed to function at altitudes above 15,000

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Mountain Alpine Forces

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M e
Op
for Strategic Competition

MAJ GERARD T. SPINNEY
MAJ EVAN K. MAIR
E
volving light infantry divisions require direction,
justification, and resources to meet the emerging
threats of strategic competition. The Army must
transition to meet current Russian and potential future
People’s Republic of China aggression. Historically, light
infantry divisions provide the Army and the joint force with
rapidly deployable forces able to operate in all environments,
including in austere conditions, at altitude, and within the
arctic climate. This article proposes that a light infantry divi-
sion transforms into a mountain alpine infantry formation,
capable of rapidly deploying and executing a broad range of
missions across the joint competition continuum.
This article provides the why, the what, and the how
necessary for developing the future mountain alpine infantry
formation for the joint all-domain force. The scope centers
on two primary questions: First, why must the Army man,
train, equip, and organize future division formations to win
in extreme cold weather, mountainous, and high-altitude
environments? Second, what is the utility of light infantry
formations within multidomain operations doctrine during a
period of strategic competition? The simple answer to these
questions is that a future mountain alpine division would offer
the unique advantage of providing high-impact results at a
low cost.
The mountain alpine infantry formation would provide
the joint force with specific land combat power capabilities, Photo by SSG Nathan Rivard
including strategic mobility (depth), a decentralized and A student at the Army Mountain Warfare School rappels a cliff face on
highly flexible organization (agility), low-cost modernization, Smugglers' Notch in Jeffersonville, VT.
and rapid integration to joint task forces (convergence) — all dently in a complex world across a full spectrum of conflict.
of which maintain its advantage of being able to strategically This evolution made the force more flexible during the
deploy faster and with fewer resources than mechanized global war on terrorism, including adopting a standardized
forces (endurance). Alpine infantry formations would be structure for all division headquarters elements. This transi-
uniquely capable of providing combined arms capabilities tion was a timely decision based on threat analysis, recent
across multiple domains. Additionally, aligned with the origi- lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and resource
nal purpose of the light infantry division, the alpine infantry constraints.
formations would use infiltration operations through rough
terrain to create and exploit positions of relative advantage Historically, great power competition required highly
for terrain denial during periods of cooperation, competition trained, rapidly deployable light infantry forces. Examples
below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The transforma- include the British actions in the Falkland Islands (1982),
tion of a light infantry division into a mountain alpine infantry Israeli operations in Lebanon (2006), U.S. initial actions in
formation requires low-cost modernization, worldwide part- Afghanistan (2001), the Second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
nered training opportunities, and the continued development (2018), and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, which
and retention of the Army’s toughest Soldiers and leaders. reveal that decisive forces do not always have to be armored
forces. Historically, a light infantry division has a greater tooth-
The Why: Specialization for Alpine Domination to-tail ratio than other Army divisions and will be deployable
During the last 18 years, the Army has deliberately forged much faster than a heavy division. The light infantry division
a modular force capable of fighting and winning indepen- must also be an expeditionary force prepared to operate in all

environments. They will also be available for contingencies The 2022 National Defense Strategy
elsewhere, including regions that lack a developed support (NDS) states that mutually beneficial alliances
infrastructure. Subsequently, light infantry divisions must still and partnerships are an enduring strength for the
evolve and modernize to maintain strategic relevance and United States.3 A mountain alpine infantry division can
tactical effectiveness. contribute to our nation’s enduring strength with its many
potential partners who share similar training environments.
To remain relevant in strategic competition, a mountain
Training with allies and partners with like formations would
alpine division must see the world as a globe rather than
strengthen our country’s relationships and also provide
a map.1 This approach allows the military to maximize the
opportunities to share lessons learned in mountainous and
opportunities of the arctic “northern routes” to speed force
cold weather training and with special equipment. The alpine
projection from the continental United States to points
infantry formations’ rapid deployability can provide combat
around the globe. The arctic region extends across multiple
forces to critical regions during competition and crisis. A
geographic combatant command areas of responsibilities.
mountain alpine force’s presence could affect the outcome
A mountain alpine division must adapt, posture, train, and
of hostilities by demonstrating U.S. resolve and capability
equip future combat power to support and enable multido-
during an accelerated transition from crisis to conflict.
main operations in extreme conditions and rugged terrain
over extended periods. The What: Alpine Infantry Formations
Additionally, regaining dominance in mountainous and As an integrated deterrence force, alpine infantry forma-
cold weather environments provides new opportunities tions must be combat credible and able to fight anytime,
to engage and train with allies and partners as the divi- anywhere, and against any opponent. This demanding
sion modernizes with Force Design Unit (FDU) 2030 and mission requires the highest degree of tactical excellence
beyond. The Army’s Arctic Strategy explicitly states that if and unit readiness. To meet this challenge, alpine infantry
there is an arctic contingency response, the Army forces formations must be capable of infiltration operations for terrain
responding must have the proper training for operating in denial. The division will need to be able to deny the enemy
the arctic environment, the right equipment that can func- key terrain using initiative, stealth, and surprise, especially
tion in the challenging terrain and extreme conditions, and in enduring regional competition and limited armed conflict.
then they must have the ability to sustain the force over Alpine infantry formations will be “key terrain-focused” forces,
extended distances.2 Strategic competition takes place experts in fieldcraft and masking, skilled in countermobility
in many regions with mountainous or cold weather areas, techniques, and quick to seize advantages provided by their
thus requiring future mountain alpine forces to train with and Paratroopers from 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment
assist new strategic partners. provide covering fire during training in Italy on 3 Ocober 2022.
Photo by SSG John Yountz

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tough Soldiers and NCOs. These formations
M e will be a highly responsive division organized The alpine infantry formations could
O p for a wide range of missions during cooperation, assume supporting missions during
competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict,
mainly where close-fighting terrain exists.
LSCO, freeing Stryker and armored
brigade combat teams for decisive
In addition to cooperation and competition below armed
conflict, mountain alpine infantry forces can also be employed points elsewhere. The alpine infantry
during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). During LSCO, formations will maintain organizational
mountain alpine infantry forces will require reinforcement flexibility so they can be tailored for
with corps enablers to increase combat power and sustain-
ability. The alpine infantry formations could assume support- different missions.
ing missions during LSCO, freeing Stryker and armored
brigade combat teams for decisive points elsewhere. The alpine formation can be used to understand and shape the
alpine infantry formations will maintain organizational flex- operational environment and operate as the premier “inside
ibility so they can be tailored for different missions. Mountain force” across mountainous and sub-arctic conflict zones. If
alpine infantry forces will habitually operate as combined funded and organized, mountain alpine forces will increase
arms teams with organic engineers, artillery, aviation, and the Army’s combat power and, as a result, play a significant
air defense. They will operate independently at brigade, role in future U.S. contingency response.
battalion, and company levels when suitably augmented and
In support of the 2022 NDS’s integrated deterrence
organized for specific missions.
effort, the alpine infantry formations will seek to develop
Superb leaders, fighting Soldiers, and demanding training their warfighting capabilities with allies and partners who
must be the hallmarks of mountain alpine infantry forces. also operate within cold, mountainous, and high-altitude
Soldier Power will make the mountain alpine forces uniquely environments.4 Through collaborations with key allies and
effective through their tough, patient, and self-reliant identity. partners, current light infantry formations such as the 10th
Soldier Power derives from education, rigorous training, Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, and the new 11th
physical and mental toughness, fieldcraft, and innovative Airborne Division must re-address doctrine, training, and
leadership. Mountain alpine forces will leverage innovative equipment. As mentioned in the previous section, a mountain
multi-level training, modernized high technology, and cross- alpine division would actively seek training opportunities with
domain convergence to give Soldiers a crucial edge over their allies and partners with similar formations throughout the
future adversaries by Soldier-focused kill-webs. Mountain other geographic combatant commands.
alpine infantry leaders will establish a resilient command
climate and serve as role models for tactical skill and techni- The How: Building the Mountain Alpine Infantry
cal modernization, physical toughness, and moral behavior. Formation
Additionally, alpine infantry formations must be specially The mountain alpine infantry formations initiative cannot
equipped for the mission. Modernized technology will be “business as usual,” and these forces’ transformation
enhance command and control, firepower, sustainment, and must reach maturity quickly. Their mission is to deploy
ground mobility. Developing modernized mountain alpine tonight and infiltrate to fight tomorrow. Many of the concepts
capable equipment and combat resources will become an of light infantry are already time proven. The evolution of the
integral part of the Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness light infantry concept must remain within the constraints of
and Modernization Model (ReARMM) process. Modernized combat readiness. Division missions, structure, equipment,
mountain alpine equipment requires reduced size and weight and employment concepts must be carefully evaluated and
for strategic mobility and tactical effectiveness. Modernized should apply lessons to the other light divisions as well.
communication sets to enable rapid integration into the Joint Personnel Readiness. Personnel readiness is the source
All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) ecosystem of “Soldier Power,” and it must remain the top priority in alpine
are critical to becoming capable of multidomain operations. infantry formations. Mountain alpine infantry forces require
Having the right properly trained and led Soldiers, with the quality officers and NCOs. Leaders must demonstrate critical
right skills and equipment, alpine infantry formations will skills and behaviors such as innovation, agility, endurance,
make an impact wherever the mission requires. diversity of thought, depth of cold weather, and mountain life
Mountain alpine infantry formations must drive the modern- experience. Leadership positions will require Ranger and
ization and transformation process for other arctic forces. The mountaineer training. Unit commanders will be among the
DoD enterprise must recognize mountain alpine forces’ politi- most experienced officers in the Army, and the most techni-
cal, operational, and tactical utility as an integrated deterrence cally advanced, physically and mentally tough trainers must
“inside force.” The concept is relevant because it involves be available to fill NCO leader positions.
the development of highly mobile, rugged, and hard-hitting Austerity in the mountain alpine infantry design demands
combat units with a higher ratio of combat-to-support capa- that the division have maximum personnel readiness. This
bilities with comparatively small modernization requirements. will allow horizontal and vertical development across the
With modernization and strategic employment, the mountain ReARMM cycle. With a more stable unit environment, alpine

infantry formations will produce tight-knit, self-confident, Individual training must concentrate on
competent units capable of withstanding the most demanding critical fieldcraft skills as well as basic infantry
stresses of war. The ReARMM cycle will be used to provide and support skills. Essential to individual skills in
modernized mountain alpine infantry battalions beyond Army mountain alpine forces is expanding mountaineer-
2030. ing skills through establishing the Special Qualification
Equipment Readiness. Mountain alpine infantry forces Identifier (SQI)-E (Military Mountaineer) and additional
must test and modernize the most effective weapons and advanced training through course attendance at the Army
efficient cold weather equipment. The development of new Mountain Warfare School or Northern Warfare Training
lightweight weapons and equipment must consider the Center. Basic and advanced mountaineer courses teach light
unique operating characteristics of mountain alpine infantry. formations to operate effectively and safely across complex,
The new design will include commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) high-angled terrain and extreme climates. Mountaineering
equipment that is lightweight, highly deployable, man-porta- skills also cultivate independence, initiative, navigation, and
ble, highly reliable, and simple to maintain and support at leadership skills within the officer and NCO Corps.
extended range over rough terrain.
Critical developments for mountain alpine
forces are modernized anti-tank weapons,
shoulder-fired air defense weapons, weaponized
unmanned aerial vehicles, and longer-range
precision artillery. Mountain alpine forces require
modern lightweight, securable, anti-jam, joint
communications equipment necessary for inte-
gration into the JADC2 ecosystem. Divestment of
big and bulky vehicles that are non-conducive to
mountainous terrain must be a priority to begin
fielding vehicles better equipped for the harshest
environments. Modernized equipment will enable
the mountain alpine forces to conduct infiltration
operations in a decentralized and independent
method. Finally, mountain alpine forces will
require additional electronic warfare, space, and
information-dominance capabilities to achieve the
depth and endurance under multidomain opera-
tions doctrine.
Supply Readiness. The unique support struc-
ture of the alpine infantry formations will require
innovative logistics concepts, equipment, and
organizations which take advantage of modern-
ized technology and unit productivity enhance-
ments. Operating in extreme environments will
need innovative ways to manage batteries and
generate water sources. Mountain alpine forces
will require substantial increases in lightweight
fire support systems similar to modernized,
lightweight 105mm howitzers and 120mm
mortars. Corps support enablers will augment
the division when the mission or geography is
required. Future support initiatives, programs,
and funding must improve support to families,
minimizing the impacts of frequent deployments
and fostering the mountain community image of
the Soldiers and families in the future infantry
divisions.
Training Readiness. Training is the most
critical element of the mountain alpine infantry
concept. It must also promote cohesion when Photo by John Pennell
A Basic Military Mountaineering Course student crosses a rope bridge over a
leaders and Soldiers share stress and hard- mountain gorge during training at the Northern Warfare Training Center’s Black
ships. Rapids Training Site in Alaska on 15 August 2020.

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ou tio Navy forces will be critical to MDO
M era integration.
Op Conclusion
A mountain alpine infantry forma-
tion would provide the Army with a
highly responsive, rapidly deploy-
able force capable of operating in all
environments, including in austere
conditions, at high altitudes, and
within the arctic climate. Mountain
alpine forces will consist of the tough-
est and most resilient Soldiers in
the Army. A mountain alpine infantry
formation would be the unit of choice
for all missions within the harshest of
environments.
Notes
1
Headquarters, Department of the Army,
“Regaining Arctic Dominance: The U.S. Army
in the Arctic,” 19 January 2021, 3.
2
Ibid, 10.
Photo by SGT Gregory Muenchow
3
Department of Defense, “2022 National
Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Defense Strategy Fact Sheet,” 28 March
Mountain Division, and Chilean army soldiers assigned to 3rd Mountain Division, cross-country 2022, 1.
ski at the Chilean Army Mountain School in Portillo, Chile, on 27 August 2021.
4
Ibid, 2.
Training as combined arms teams will continue to be

MAJ Gerard Spinney currently serves as the G5 planner for 10th
standard. Combat leaders will practice infiltration by integrat- Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY. His previous assignments include serv-
ing the initiative, stealth, and surprise inherent in mountain ing with the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
alpine infantry operations with the firepower of artillery, air (Air Assault), and 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division.
defense, aviation, and joint support. Periodically, mountain He has deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Inherent Resolve, and Resolute Support Mission.
alpine infantry must train with joint and NATO partner forces
within the continental United States and abroad to meet a MAJ Evan Mair currently serves as the brigade engineer and lead
planner for 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division. His
broad range of potential employment needs. A mountain previous assignments include serving as the 10th Mountain Division G5
alpine formation would seek foreign military mountain planner; a combat engineer company commander with the 4th Engineer
warfare schools to send their Soldiers and leaders. Battalion, Fort Carson, CO; an Engineer Officer Basic Course instructor at
Fort Leonard Wood, MO; and a Bradley platoon leader and company execu-
Off-post deployments, including overseas training, must tive officer with the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division
become routine so that leaders and units have maximum at Fort Benning, GA. He has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
opportunities to develop and mature. Tailored mountain Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Spartan Shield, and Operation
United Assistance-West Africa. MAJ Mair is a graduate from the U.S. Military
alpine infantry combined arms forces will train to meet Academy at West Point, NY; the Army Mountain Warfare Planners Course
constrained deployment times using emergency deploy- at Jericho, VT; Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort
ment readiness exercises from the company team through Benning; and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort
the division level. Frequent training with Air Force and Leavenworth, KS.
Updated FM 3-0, Operations, Released FM 3-0

OPERATIONS
The manual describes how the Army fights and addresses the challenges the nation faces be-
tween now and 2030. The manual, a product of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort
Leavenworth, KS, provides a framework for Army operations and a baseline for all future Army
doctrine.
The newly updated FM 3-0 establishes multidomain operations (MDO) as the Army’s operational
concept, with a focus on large-scale combat operations against peer adversaries who possess the
capability to contest the joint force in all domains. The new doctrine defines MDO as “the com-
bined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages
that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force com- OCTOBER 2022
manders.”
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-0, dated 6 October 2017.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Available at: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

The Army Mountain
Warfare School
and the Past, Present, and Future
of Military Mountaineering
MAJ MICAH KIDNEY
T
he concept of military mountaineering has continu- of the Basic Military Mountaineer Course (BMMC). Students
ously evolved throughout the history of armed who complete the basic course can return to continue their
conflict, and the Army Mountain Warfare School alpine education in the Advanced Military Mountaineer
(AMWS) in Jericho, VT, will continue to lead the way in the Course (AMMC). The school also offers three specialty
instruction of skills needed for U.S. forces to fight and win in courses — the Rough Terrain Evacuation Course (RTEC),
those environments. Fighting in the mountains has histori- Mountain Rifleman Course (MRC), and the Mountain Planner
cally proven difficult for any military unit due to challenges to Course (MPC). The Soldiers and leaders who receive this
maneuver, sustainment, and communications. In the future, instruction return to their units with the lessons that they’ve
the U.S. Army will continue to require units that can effectively learned and pass those skills on to others in order to improve
conduct operations on vertical terrain and in cold tempera- the mountain competency of their organizations.
tures. Due to these realities, the U.S. Training and Doctrine
Looking to the Past
Command (TRADOC) depends on the AMWS to serve as
the premier provider of the training of our maneuver leaders A quick study of the history of military mountaineering
in alpine fieldcraft. AMWS instructors excel within that role offers clear evidence of its importance to today’s Army.
and will continue to teach our warfighters to overcome the Traditionally, infantry forces have strived to occupy difficult
challenges inherent to mountain operations. alpine terrain in order to take advantage of the protection that
ground provides as well as the tactical benefits it offers to
The AMWS is the executive agent for military moun-
those that control it. One of the first examples of strategic
taineering for its proponent, the U.S. Army Infantry School
mountain operations occurred in 218 B.C. during the Second
(USAIS). The ultimate objective for the school’s instruction is
Punic War when Hannibal crossed the Alps with more than
to teach mobility in mountainous terrain and in cold weather.
60,000 Carthaginian infantry and cavalry troops in an attempt
It is the only school in the U.S. armed forces that teaches
to conquer Rome.1 The fact that an estimated 13,000 of his
basic, advanced, and specialty mountain warfare courses as
men died during the trek over the Pyrenees attests to the
well as additional mission-specific training to U.S. and foreign
challenges that such efforts in the mountains present. The
military forces. Along with the Northern Warfare Training
development of mountain warfare as an art didn’t become
Center (NWTC), they are the only TRADOC schoolhouses
authorized to issue the Skill Qualification Identifier (SQI)-E Soldiers attending the U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School climb
Smugglers' Notch as part of their final phase of the Basic Military
(Military Mountaineer) to service members upon completion
Mountaineer Course in Jeffersonville, VT, on 19 February 2015.
Photo by TSgt Sarah Mattison, U.S. Air National Guard

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n
ou ratio
evident until the Middle Ages when the Swiss (Alpine), which was later renamed the 10th Mountain Division
M e utilized the mountains to successfully defend in December 1943. In 1944 and 1945, the 10th Mountain
O p their homeland. They did this by taking advantage Division, composed of the 85th, 86th, and 87th Mountain
of elevation and observation and fighting in small Infantry Regiments, utilized mountain skills in Northern Italy,
mobile formations from defensive positions on the high most notably during the victories over German defenses on
ground against the European monarchies that threatened Riva Ridge and Mount Belvedere in the Apennine Mountains.
them.2 It was evident to the Swiss that the mountains and The 10th Mountain Division was deactivated after the war but
the harsh conditions that they presented were as much of was eventually reactivated in 1985 at Fort Drum, NY, recon-
a threat to their forces as the enemy. Unforgiving weather, necting the unit to its historical accomplishments. The 10th
jagged terrain, and the virtual impossibility of alpine logistics Mountain Division currently operates as a light infantry divi-
provided challenges that became unsurmountable for forma- sion without a specifically tasked mission to conduct mountain
tions that were not specially trained in those conditions.3 operations and, since its reactivation, has become the most
Force ratios needed to win engagements were cut in half for deployed unit in the Army. The only currently active U.S. Army
units which occupied dominant terrain and operated against unit that is specifically tasked to conduct mountain operations
forces that used predictable valley mobility corridors and then is the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Mountain) out of
had to fight uphill. Italian Alpini units were among the first Jericho, VT, that deployed to Iraq in 2004, Afghanistan in
that could be considered experts in military mountain opera- 2010, and multiple other locations across the Middle East,
tions after their formation in 1872 to defend their northern Africa, and the Balkans in 2021. The 3rd Battalion, 172nd
mountainous borders in the Alps.4 After seeing the Italians’ Infantry from the 86th is one of the only National Guard units
success, other European nations with mountainous terrain to be awarded the Valorous Unit Award for its actions fight-
followed suit and formed specialized units to fight on elevated ing in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan in 2010 while
ground.5 In America, cold weather and mountain operations attached to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Rakkasans) of
have been part of every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the 101st Airborne Division.7
most famously when George Washington and the Continental Although active Army units specifically tasked with moun-
Army reconsolidated on the frigid plateaus of Valley Forge, tain operations were deactivated after World War II, Army
PA. The Civil War also had dozens of engagements involving training schools continued to teach those critical alpine skills
units that utilized vertical terrain to their advantage includ- to individuals and units. The first Army alpine school was the
ing the Battle of Missionary Ridge and the Little Round Top Mountain Training Center at Camp Hale, which was initially
engagement during the Battle of Gettysburg. stood up in 1942 using cadre from the newly formed 87th
The concept of specialized mountain and cold weather Mountain Infantry Battalion. It was tasked with providing cold
units first entered into the minds of American military leaders weather and mountain training to units preparing to head
in 1939 after studying the results of the Winter War where overseas to fight in World War II. Following the inactivation
numerically inferior Finnish forces defended effectively of 10th Mountain Division in 1945, the War Department
against an invasion by the Soviet Union.6 The Finns used understood that maintaining mountain warfare capabilities
superior knowledge of cold weather operations to inflict was critical to our success in future conflicts and kept those
massive losses upon the Soviets and, in doing so,
were able to maintain their sovereignty with the
signing of the Moscow Treaty of 1940. Operating
in extremely harsh winter conditions, Finnish forces
destroyed two Soviet divisions and killed more
than 120,000 enemy soldiers, often conducting
operations on skis. At the time, U.S. Army decision
makers were concerned that we did not possess
the ability to defend against a German invasion that
they anticipated would present itself through the
Appalachian Mountains. Those decision makers
took notice of Finnish success and immediately
made plans to develop their own mountain fighters
versed in cold weather operations.
On 15 November 1941, the 87th Mountain
Infantry Battalion was activated at Fort Lewis, WA,
and became the first American unit of specialized
alpine soldiers. The next year the unit expanded to
a regiment and relocated to Camp Hale in Colorado
before it gained its first operational experience
deploying to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska in the U.S. Army photo
summer of 1943. Upon their return they were Soldiers in 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment prepare to load onto a UH-60
assigned to the newly formed 10th Light Division Black Hawk after a mission in Paktya Province, Afghanistan, on 1 May 2010.

alpine training centers open. The Army later stood up the
Army Mountain and Winter Warfare School in 1946 at Camp With 25 percent of the world’s
Carson in Colorado, using returning 10th Mountain veterans surface and more than 38 percent of
as instructors. The school continued to instruct those skills
between Camp Carson and Camp Hale until 1957. The Army
the world’s landmass being classified
also opened up the Arctic Training Center in 1948 at Big as mountainous, we can be certain that
Delta, AK, which eventually was renamed Fort Greely. After the U.S. Army will continue to need
training ended in Colorado in 1957, the center in Alaska was
units that can operate proficiently on
first renamed the Army Cold Weather and Mountain School
and then became the Northern Warfare Training Center in vertical terrain and in cold weather.10
1963, which is the name that remains today. NWTC, now
in Black Rapids, AK, is the Army’s primary provider of cold attain those goals. The AMWS was mentioned explicitly in the
weather training and instructs individuals and units the skills Arctic Strategy as being a key player in the development and
needed to operate in arctic and mountainous terrain. instruction of the skills needed to operate in that unforgiving
The Army’s Arctic Strategy domain and address the growing opportunity that exists in
the Arctic north.14
Looking to the future, does the Army need a continued
focus on cold weather and mountain operational proficiency? The Army’s current modernization efforts intend to trans-
A quick study of the Earth’s geography and changing climactic form our organization into a multidomain force by 2035.
conditions in the Arctic clearly answers that question. With 25 Traditionally, armed conflict has existed in three domains:
percent of the world’s surface and more than 38 percent of the ground, sea, and air, but in the last few decades it has become
world’s landmass being classified as mountainous, we can be evident that we must be able to operate in two new domains,
certain that the U.S. Army will continue to need units that can space and cyber. Our solution to this needed evolution exists
operate proficiently on vertical terrain and in cold weather.10 within the concept of the multidomain task force (MDTF).
Arctic ice has continued to dissipate at exponentially growing Each of these MDTFs increase our ability to provide strategic
rates, and as a result, access and shipping routes into and deterrence and fight when called upon, in all five domains:
through the Arctic have begun to open. It is also estimated ground, air, sea, space, and cyber. The Army has near-term
that the Arctic contains 15 percent of the world’s oil and 30 plans to increase the current number of MDTFs from two to
percent of the planet’s natural gas.11 Arctic and sub-Arctic five, and one of those is earmarked for Alaska to counter
nations, including our near-peer adversaries, have begun to Russian expansion into the Arctic.15 This will dramatically
expand claims into these environments to increase power increase the number of units and individuals who will need to
projection, access these resources, and decrease shipping be trained in cold weather operations. As stated in the Arctic
costs using these newly opened shipping lanes. One only Strategy, “This rejuvenated Arctic capability will increase the
needs to look at your office globe from directly above to see Army’s ability to operate in cold-weather, mountainous, and
that the Arctic also provides the most direct approach for our high-altitude environments. This strategy poises the Army
peer adversary, Russia, to access U.S. territory in any future to adapt how it generates, postures, trains, and equips our
conflict. forces to execute extended, multi-domain operations in
As a result of these circumstances, both of our near-peer extreme conditions in support of the Joint warfighter.”16
contemporaries, Russia and China, have begun to make Additionally, the June 2022 activation of the 11th Airborne
bold moves to increase their Arctic presence. The Arctic Division in Alaska to become our third airborne division,
is essential to Russia’s military and international presence alongside the 82nd and 101st, provides clear evidence of our
and they have invested billions in the development of infra- expanding Arctic vision. This will only increase the demand
structure and military bases in the expanses north of their for our service schools, including the AMWS, to continue to
territorial borders.12 This is a clear effort to expand power provide cold weather and mountain training to our Soldiers.
and influence into the Arctic region and gain access to the Finally, the 10th Mountain Division recently added more mili-
region’s resources. China’s attention to the Arctic region is tary mountaineer positions to its modified table of organiza-
primarily an effort to create a northern “Polar Silk Road” that tion and equipment (MTOE) in efforts to improve the unit’s
would greatly decrease the oceanic travel distance and the competency in the area that gives it its name. Adding these
cost of bringing its exports to the west when compared to its mountaineer slots will also profoundly increase the instruc-
current shipping path in the south through the Suez Canal.13 tional requirement that lays at the feet of the AMWS.
Both Russia and China’s ambitions in the Arctic make it clear
that they have strategic aims for the area. What does that Army Mountain Warfare School
mean for the U.S. Army and the Mountain Warfare School in In 1983 the Vermont National Guard activated Alpha
Vermont? The answer to that question becomes clear as one Company in Jericho with the mission to serve as the state’s
reads the Army Arctic Strategy published by the Department mountain infantry unit. At the same time, the state also estab-
of Army in January 2021. The document, titled “Regaining lished the Mountain Warfare School to train members of that
Arctic Dominance,” clearly states our expanding national unit. The school initially occupied a small tin shack on Camp
objectives in the cold environs to our north and a path to Ethan Allen, and together, the company and school served as

n
t ai ns
n
ou tio Mountain Concept Plan. The evolution of the
the initial component of the Army Regimental
M era
Op Mountain Infantry in Vermont continued as Alpha
Company expanded to become the 3rd Battalion, 172nd
Infantry and eventually was flagged as the 86th Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (Mountain) in 2006. Throughout that
time the school continued to provide mountaineering training
to Soldiers in that formation. In 1986, TRADOC approved
the Mountain Warfare School’s program of instruction (POI),
which validated its instructional content. In 1987, an actual
schoolhouse was built in the lower valley at Camp Ethan Allen,
and in 1994 it was designated as the proponent of the military
mountaineer skill identifier, called the “Ram’s Head” device.
The school was renamed the U.S. Army Mountain Warfare
School in 2003 and was tasked with teaching mountaineering
to all Soldiers, active and reserve, as well as other branches
of the military, law enforcement, and foreign service members.
The schoolhouse conducts courses 11 months out of the year
and instructs more than 500 students annually in its two-week
Basic Military Mountaineer Course. Initially, a service member
needed to pass both the summer and winter iterations of the
course to earn the coveted “Ram’s Head” device, but since
2008 a Soldier only needs to complete one of the two phases
to earn the “echo” qualification. The school has continued
to provide relevant, sustainable, mission-focused mountain
warfare training, and as a result the school has been desig-
nated a “School of Excellence” with accreditation by the U.S.
Photo by SFC Whitney Hughes
Army Infantry School. It is also the only permanent non- An instructor at the Army Mountain Warfare School demonstrates a
European member of the International Association of Military casualty evacuation technique on 19 January 2022.
Mountain Schools.
ation in alpine terrain. Students learn functional knots and
Training facilities on Camp Ethan Allen have continued to rope systems needed to safely ascend and descend vertical
expand and currently include more than 25 square kilome- terrain. Students utilize rock- and ice-climbing lanes to hone
ters of training areas and live-fire ranges. On-post training their skills that they eventually will share with their peers and
sites include multiple rock-climbing and rappelling routes, an subordinates back in their home units. The course lasts 14
ice-climbing wall, biathlon trails, a ski slope with a renovated days, averaging 14 hours a day, where students conduct
lift line, as well as dozens of maneuver training areas, all practical, realistic, and strenuous hands-on mountaineering
arrayed in challenging mountainous terrain. In addition to training. During the course, students become increasingly
the Mountain School, the training area is utilized by active proficient in the fundamentals, principles, and techniques
and reserve units in multiple service branches from across needed to conduct small unit operations in mountainous
New England. AMWS’ story is punctuated by the May 2022 terrain and in cold weather conditions. The basic course
opening of a new $27 million schoolhouse at Camp Ethan of instruction focuses on Level 1 Basic Mountaineer tasks
Allen that will increase its ability to train Soldiers. All courses described in the TRADOC-approved Army mountain opera-
considered, the school instructs about 1,000 Soldiers a year, tions manual, Training Circular (TC) 3-97.61.
but the demand has increased to over 160 percent of its
current capacity. The new school building features state-of- The Advanced Military Mountaineer Course also lasts 14
the-art facilities including an increased number of beds and days and is designed to instruct specially selected students
classrooms and a massive four-story indoor climbing wall. who excelled in the basic course and continue their alpine
The new 80,000 square foot building will help the school meet instruction with an eye towards becoming assault climbers.
the current demand that will only increase with the addition of Assault climbers are trained and capable of leading and
instructing mountaineering skills on technically difficult,
the new mountaineer slots in the 10th Mountain Division as
hazardous, or exposed mountainous terrain. They are
well as the expanded cold weather initiatives laid out in the
considered experts in small-unit mountain operations and
Army’s new Arctic Strategy.
can be counted on to safely lead and instruct basic military
AMWS Courses mountaineering skills and provide advisement to their unit
The school currently runs both winter and summer courses commanders in decisions pertaining to alpine operations.
in its Basic and Advanced Military Mountaineer Courses. The advanced course of instruction focuses on Level 2
BMMC trains Soldiers in mountain mobility and many other assault climber tasks described in TC 3-97.61.
skills including land navigation, first aid, and casualty evacu- The AMWS also teaches three specialty mountain

courses. The Rough Terrain Evacuation Course focuses on attended one of the courses offered by the
medical and casualty evacuation. In this course students AMWS, what will have stood out is the compe-
learn to safely transport a casualty from the point of injury tency and experience of the instructors. Due to
to a higher level of care over and through vertical terrain the amount of time required to become certified to
in all climactic conditions. Students experience a mixture of safely teach students on vertical terrain, instructors typi-
classroom and field time to develop their medical skills in a cally teach at the school for an extended period of time and
variety of scenarios and practical exercises. The Mountain become highly proficient in mountain skill craft. The school’s
Rifleman Course is designed to train snipers to improve 30 instructors have hundreds of years of cumulative climb-
their shooting skills and lethality in high-angle situations. ing experience and extensive knowledge in the instruction
Students are instructed in mountain-specific marksmanship of military mountaineering. Instructors at the schoolhouse
skills as the round trajectory changes from horizontal to near have climbed hundreds of the world’s most challenging
vertical through the thin mountain air. Soldiers are instructed summits and have provided guest instruction at most of the
in mountain and cold weather mobility, load management, military mountaineering schools of our allied nations. They
and long-range marksmanship, all in challenging moun- have attended European mountaineering schools in Austria,
tainous terrain. They are provided with extensive shooting Germany, Italy, France, and Finland. The schoolhouse has
opportunities on both flat and high-angle ranges and inte- also conducted mobile training teams to provide onsite train-
grate practical exercises that put all of these skills to the test ing for active and reserve units across the country as well
and validate that the shooter can plan and execute missions as to our foreign allies at alpine training centers around the
in alpine terrain. Finally, the AMWS offers the Mountain world. They have been chosen as the Army’s instructor of the
Planner Course, which is designed to train leaders to better year and have been called upon multiple times to save lives
understand the challenges of conducting missions in moun- in critical real-world emergency situations in Vermont and
tainous terrain and in cold weather conditions. Leaders who across New England due to their expertise in alpine and cold
can better understand the challenges and requirements weather operations.9 As a result, instructors at the AMWS are
for alpine operations set their units up for success when commonly referred to as the best in the Army.
conducting those missions. Students learn about the effects
of altitude, vertical terrain, and cold weather on person- Conclusion
nel, equipment, movement, reconnaissance, indirect fires, The history of military mountaineering shows us that we
casualty evacuation, resupply, and water procurement. The will continue to need units that can operate in alpine areas
course provides classroom instruction as well as practical and in extreme cold weather. The changing strategic condi-
exercises that address these challenges that include route tions of our world also make clear our nation’s future require-
planning, offensive and defensive operations, and patrol- ments to fight and win in all climactic conditions, including in
ling.8 the frigid Arctic. As a result, we need schoolhouses that can
If you’ve ever attended or spoken to a Soldier who has teach those critical cold weather and mountain skills that are
Photo by SFC Whitney Hughes

An Army Mountain Warfare School student aims at a target during training on 24 January 2022.

in
n ta ns
ou tio needed for our warfight-
M era
Op
ers to bring the fight to the
enemy from the high ground. Army Builds Tool to Save
The AMWS has accomplished that
mission since 1983 and will continue
to answer the call to do so moving into
Lives at High Altitude
the future.
Notes CAREY PHILLIPS
M
1
“Mountains and Wars,” PeakVisor, 20 May
2019, accessed from https://peakvisor.com/en/ ountain climbing is risky business. When unacclimatized indi-
news/mountains-wars.html. viduals rapidly ascend to altitudes greater than 8,000 feet, they put
2
Ibid. themselves at risk for suffering from high-altitude illnesses. The
3
Ibid.
addition of hard physical exercise, typical of a military mission, increases this
4
“The Alpini Corps,” Italian Heritage, n.d.,
accessed from https://www.italyheritage.com/ level of risk. Detecting these illnesses prior to occurrence has the potential to
magazine/history/alpini.htm. save lives.
5
PeakVisor, “Mountains and Wars.”
6
Michelle Kennedy, “Bootprints in History: U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM)
Mountaineers Take the Ridge,” Army News researchers recently returned from Taos Ski Valley, NM, where they completed
Service, 19 February 2015, accessed from their data collection for a tool that will predict Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS)
https://www.army.mil/article/143088/bootprints_ in individuals prior to occurrence. Thirty-eight warfighters from the 3rd Armored
in_history_mountaineers_take_the_ridge.
7
Sam Hemingway, “Guard Infantry Unit Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, TX, volunteered to
to Receive Award for Afghanistan Service,” participate in this research this past summer.
Burlington Free Press (8 January 2014), accessed
from https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/ “This tool (the AMS_alert algorithm) has the potential to save lives at high
news/2014/01/08/guard-infantry-unit-to-receive- altitude and identify high-risk individuals before a casualty occurs,” said Dr.
award-for-afghanistan-service/4378811/. Beth Beidleman, research physiologist with USARIEM’s Military Performance
8
“The Army Mountain Warfare School Division. “AMS can progress into life-threatening high-altitude pulmonary
(AMWS),” Fort Benning website, n.d., accessed
from https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/ edema [HAPE] or high-altitude cerebral edema [HACE] which both require
amws/Courses.html. evacuation. Both of these illnesses involve fluid either in the lungs or brain and
9
Lynn, Lisa, “A Skier Dies and a Tragic can result in death within 24 hours.”
Rescue,” Vermont Ski and Ride, 2 March 2020,
accessed from https://vtskiandride.com/a-skier- One Soldier in last summer’s study experienced all three high-altitude
dies-and-a-tragic-rescue/. illnesses — AMS, HAPE, and HACE. “Fortunately, we were able to evacuate
10
“The Army Mountain Warfare School,”, this volunteer to the nearest emergency room and there were no untoward or
Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, n.d.,
accessed from https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/
lasting effects, but this option is not always available when warfighters are on
enwiki/10708958. a mission in remote mountainous regions,” said Beidleman. “Having a hypoxia
11
Headquarters, U.S. Army, “Regaining Arctic monitoring system on board can be the difference between life and death.”
Dominance: The U.S. Army in the Arctic,” 19
January 2021, accessed from https://www.army. Roughly 50 to 90 percent of unacclimatized warfighters will experience
mil/e2/downloads/rv7/about/2021_army_arctic_ AMS symptoms when rapidly ascending to high altitudes greater than 8,000
strategy.pdf. feet, depending on the altitude. AMS can impact every aspect of a warfighter’s
12
“Russia Builds Second Military Base to
Support Arctic Ambitions,” Radio Free Europe, 21
physical and mental performance.
October 2015, accessed from https://www.rferl. “If we can alert commanders and non-commissioned officers on the field
org/a/russia-builds-second-military-base-support-
arctic-amibitions/27317698.html.
in real time that someone is in trouble prior to occurrence of AMS, HAPE, or
13
HQDA, “Regaining Arctic Dominance.” HACE, they can begin treatment early, adjust the mission, and plan evacua-
14
Ibid. tions safely.”
15
Wyatt Olson, “Army Considering 13 Bases
as Sites for Multidomain Artillery Units,” Stars Unlike other environments, the dismounted warfighter is the primary
and Stripes (23 June 2022), accessed from weapon platform at altitude, and the impact of hard physical exercise during
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2022-06-22/ ascent is understudied. One aim of this research study was to answer whether
multidomain-task-force-army-comment-6429605.
html.
hard exercise during altitude ascent impacts the timing and severity of high-
altitude illnesses. In addition, most warfighters live below 12,000 feet when
deployed to altitude, and the majority of altitude research occurs at altitudes
MAJ Micah Kidney is the executive officer above 14,000 feet.
(XO) of the Army Mountain Warfare School in
Jericho, VT. He has served in the 86th Infantry Warfighters operate in every terrain, elevation, climate and in any-and-all
Brigade Combat Team (Mountain) for 20 years conditions. The AMS_alert algorithm provides a technological breakthrough
as an infantry platoon leader, scout platoon
leader, company XO, company commander,
in physiologic and genomic monitoring not only for the U.S. Army but also for
battalion S3, and battalion XO. He has deployed civilian health-care providers, mountaineers, recreational athletes, and search
twice: to Afghanistan in 2010 and back to Central and rescue teams. Read more about the study and AMS tool at https://www.
Command in 2021. He is a high-school math- army.mil/article/260429/army_builds_tool_to_save_lives_at_high_altitude.
ematics teacher in the civilian world.

Fighting as a Tactical Combat
Force at NTC
LTC GORDON R. KINNEER
LTC ERIC B. PONZEK
A
s the saying goes, new
things are old things
happening to new people.
This was the case in the summer
of 2022 during the 56th Stryker
Brigade Combat Team’s (SBCT)
recent National Training Center
(NTC) rotation, where the brigade
was tasked to organize a tactical
combat force (TCF). The TCF
concept has fallen out of the Army’s
lexicon in recent years, but with
the flood of lessons learned from
Ukraine, it is relevant again. The
following article outlines Task Force
(TF) Paxton’s execution of the TCF
mission during NTC Rotation 22-08
and provides some lessons learned
from the experience.
What is a tactical combat force?
The TCF has its roots in the
creation of AirLand Battle (ALB)
doctrine. In the days of ALB, the Photo by CPT Cory Johnson
Soldiers from the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division maneuver their Stryker
TCF was designated to defeat a
Infantry Carrier Vehicles during National Training Center Rotation 22-08 at Fort Irwin, CA.
Level III threat, and it still serves
the same purpose today. The three levels of threat refer to tions (LSCO), the need to address the Level III threat has
increasing enemy combat capability, Level III being the most returned. Lessons learned from the current war in Ukraine
potent. Typically, a Level I threat consists of a small enemy have identified the need to address security in the rear
force that can be defeated by units operating in the rear area. Commanders must now ensure their rear area combat
area. A Level II threat generally consists of enemy special forces have the capability to rapidly deploy a lethal combat
operations teams, long-range reconnaissance teams, and element, in a sometimes vast area of operations, to defeat
attrited small combat units. This threat is an enemy force a potential armor or mechanized threat that seeks to disrupt
that is beyond the defense capability of base camps and their logistical operations. Because of the area that must
clusters and any local reserve or response force.1 During the be covered, the TCF needs to be highly mobile and lethal
development of ALB, doctrine writers analyzed the tactics enough to destroy a Level III threat. Having that criteria in
of Warsaw Pact maneuver formations and realized NATO mind, TF Paxton (2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment)
defenses in the rear area lacked the capability to counter a was able to task organize into small mobile teams to rapidly
Level III threat, thus the TCF was born.2 maneuver and counter any Level III threat as it emerged in
As the Army reorients from a focus on counterinsur- the brigade’s rear area.
gency (COIN) operations to large-scale combat opera- While not a typical task for a brigade NTC rotation, adding

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
the TCF mission set enabled a training repetition for an addi- the TCF, and the size of the maneuver element, the battal-
tional battalion. Typically, an undermanned battalion forma- ion staff focused on the rapid decision-making process
tion is consumed by the parent brigade and its manpower (RDSP). Prior to the brigade’s first offensive operation,
redistributed to round out other battalions and the brigade TF Paxton executed the military decision-making process
staff. Assigning opposing force (OPFOR) elements to act as (MDMP), followed by a battalion combined arms rehearsal
a Level III threat fundamentally changed how the brigade, the (CAR) and multiple terrain model and technical rehearsals.
brigade support battalion (BSB), and the brigade engineer During these events, the battalion staff quickly realized that
battalion (BEB) accounted for their security requirements RDSP would be the preferred method for quick planning
in the rear area. TF Paxton deployed to NTC with overall and coordination due to the nature of the mission. Since
reduced manning across the formation. It deployed without the mission didn’t really change and only the terrain and
its scouts and mortar platoon and fielded a reduced battal- locations varied, much of the concepts of sustainment and
ion headquarters, headquarters company, forward support support remained the same, thus enabling RDSP to occur
company (FSC), and a rifle company with its headquarters efficiently across the battalion.
and two platoons. While light in terms of combat power, During execution of the TCF mission, TF Paxton’s
the task force organized into multiple combat and logistical scheme of maneuver remained constant. The initial concept
elements to accomplish its TCF mission. These streamlined of the operation was to fight as dismounted small elements
formations could cover enemy key avenues of approach supported by a Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). Two
as the brigade maneuvered out of Logistics Support Area observation posts (OPs) would be supported by one ICV.
(LSA) Santa Fe, through the Whale Gap, and ultimately The intent was to have a “slinky effect” where OPs would
west toward Razish and Ujen. Like most NTC rotations, TF detect and engage the enemy, pulling the ICV forward to
Paxton quickly discovered what did and did not work and support as needed and then sending it back to a hide site
constantly refined its task organization in order to defeat the that mutually supported both OPs. The element utilized the
Level III threat, named “Desert Rat” by the OPFOR. ICV in a multitude of ways: as a method to sustain the OPs,
The leaders of TF Paxton understood their mission a non-standard casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) platform,
and the importance of operating dismounted Javelin a communication-relay platform, and a mounted weapons
teams to counter an armored formation. Because of the platform. TF Paxton had one Stinger team that protected the
relatively small elements, command and control from the MCP and could be repositioned to one of the OPs based on
main command post (MCP) focused on battle tracking and the enemy air threat.
information sharing up and out of the battalion MCP to the During the initial phase of the operation, the Level III
brigade MCP and laterally to adjacent units. The maneuver threat (Desert Rat) penetrated deep into the brigade rear
was largely left to the commander of Arrow Company and area through the Whale Gap and into No Name Valley.
his platoon leaders, with guidance and direction provided Fortunately, an intrepid Soldier destroyed two BMPs and
by the battalion commander as needed. This also shaped one T90 in less than 10 minutes before the threat could
how the MCP and combat trains command post (CTCP) mount an attack on the BSB. In subsequent phases, Desert
were established. Because of the highly mobile nature of
A team from Task Force Paxton scans the area for enemy targets
during National Training Center Rotation 22-08 at Fort Irwin.
Photo by LTC Gordon R. Kinneer

In the distance, the 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment (Paxton) establishes its main command post prior to an attack on the
notional city of Ujen on 4 July 2022 during National Training Center Rotation 22-08.
Rat was able to use terrain to its advantage, slip by an OP, tial. At the battalion MCP, the COP needed to be friendly
and conduct a spoiling attack against the BSB. This mistake focused rather than enemy focused. Analog graphics should
served as a good lesson for TF Paxton in the importance focus more attention to blue icons than red icons; knowing
of engagement area development (EA DEV) and covering what was coming and going in and out of the rear area was
all avenues of approach appropriately. TF Paxton continued critical to avoiding fratricide and understanding what may
to refine its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and come into contact with the Level III threat along any given
mounted an effective fight against Desert Rat as the opera- ground line of communication (GLOC).
tion progressed. Second, TF Paxton lacked the ability to effectively
The TF sustained multiple OP locations across the combine arms as the TCF without indirect fires. Without its
brigade’s large rear area by using a logistics release point mortar platoon and sections and low priority of fires, TF lead-
(LRP) model. With the field trains command post (FTCP) ers could not shape their engagement areas and engage
co-located with the BSB, the CTCP coordinated replenish- the enemy at a distance. Clearance of fires is complex in
ment of all classes of supply and conducted field maintenance the rear area due to the amount of friendly elements moving
at their location. Located at the FTCP, the Arrow Company within the TCF area of operations (AO). Fire support coor-
supply sergeant shaped the makeup of logistics packages dination measures (FSCMs) must be universally known and
(LOGPACs) based on the logistics status (LOGSTAT) of coordinated across the brigade rear area in order to provide
the OPs. At the OP locations, the supporting ICV moved the TCF accurate and timely fires when the Level III threat is
to the nearest LRP location to receive LOGPAC and then located. Because of the low priority of fires for the TCF and
ferried supplies to its supported OP locations. Because of the location of the position area of artillery (PAA), battalion
the dispersed nature of OPs across the TCF operational and company mortars are the best indirect fires asset for any
environment, a modified system of tailgate resupply, in TCF commander.
conjunction with the use of LRPs, provided the necessary Third, the brigade must clearly delineate who is respon-
logistical support to sustain the battalion. The distribution sible for what in the rear area. In order for the TCF to be
platoon was most likely to inadvertently gain contact with successful, the brigade must clearly articulate who is
the Desert Rat element as it executed its LOGPAC mission. responsible for the various security tasks required in the rear
Because of this, a Javelin team was sometimes added to the area to avoid duplication of effort and squandering combat
platoon as it ran between the CTCP, MCP, LRPs, and FTCP. power. Assigning the TCF sole responsibility for countering
Five primary lessons emerged from execution of the the Level III threat and the BEB responsibility for counter-
TCF mission during NTC Rotation 22-08. The first lesson ing the Level I and II threats allows each element to better
learned was that adjacent unit coordination between the utilize their combat power effectively. The BEB’s attached
TCF, BSB, BEB, and brigade MCP is vital to having a clear MPs are more than capable of defeating Level I and II
friendly common operating picture (COP) during operations. threats; however, they would become quickly overwhelmed
Frequent communication between the TCF, BSB, BEB when attempting to maneuver against a Level III threat.
commanders and their respective staffs proved to be essen- Conversely, if the TCF has to counter all levels of threat, its

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
response to the appearance of armor or mechanized forces
in the rear area will not be effective. The TCF mission may appear simplistic,
Fourth, the TCF MCP must be lean, agile, and rapidly but it still exercises a battalion’s systems
deployable. Use of camouflage netting and vehicle-mounted and processes, requires commanders
command and control (C2) systems in place of tents enabled
TF Paxton to rapidly shift its MCP as needed. The reliance
to maneuver their forces, and gives
on computer systems to create digital products and execute battalion commanders exposure to their
briefings was almost nonexistent due to the time required for peers as they execute combined arms
set up. The TF established a hybrid analog and digital COP maneuver.
using the Joint Battle Command Platform (JBCP) and tradi-
tional map boards and acetate. Leaders completed operation
order (OPORD) briefings and RDSP mostly in person over There are many ways to employ a unit in the TCF role, and
terrain models and over the radio when necessary. Once TF only time will tell how it is incorporated into future operational
Paxton established a battle rhythm and executed set up and designs. Our hope is that the hard lessons learned during
tear down of the MCP a few times, it was able to occupy a TF Paxton’s NTC rotation will spur conversation and provide
new MCP location, establish upper tactical internet (TI), and future CTC rotation participants a good starting point for
transition C2 of the fight from the tactical command post to planning and resourcing their version of the TCF.
the MCP within about an hour of arrival to a new location.
Notes
Lastly, incorporating the use of a TCF into the NTC 1
Field Manual (FM) 3-81, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade,
Operations Group’s scenario enables a fourth maneuver November 2021, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/
battalion the opportunity to participate in the world-class DR_a/ARN34192-FM_3-81-000-WEB-1.pdf.
training that only NTC can offer. As a true crucible in any 2
LTC (Retired) Michael T. Chychota and LTC (Retired) Edwin
service member’s career, there is nothing that can replicate L. Kennedy Jr., “Who You Gonna Call? Deciphering the Difference
this experience. Participation in the TCF role at NTC is best Between Reserve, Quick Reaction, Striking, and Tactical Combat
suited for a battalion with reduced manning or a National Forces,” Infantry (July-September 2014): 16-19, accessed from
https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2014/
Guard battalion that is in its Regionally Aligned Readiness
Jul-Sep/Chychota.html.
and Modernizations Model (ReARMM) training year and
not sourced for a Global Force Management Allocation Other References
Plan (GFMAP) requirement. The TCF mission may appear Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-37.10, Base Camps,
simplistic, but it still exercises a battalion’s systems and January 2017, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/
processes, requires commanders to maneuver their forces, pdf/web/ATP%203-37x10%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.
and gives battalion commanders exposure to their peers as
ATP 3-39.30, Security and Mobility Support, May 2020, https://
they execute combined arms maneuver. armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN22142_
As the Army continues to train in the LSCO training ATP_3-39x30_FINAL_WEB.pdf.
environment against a near-peer threat at Combat Training
Centers (CTCs), more refined TTPs associated with fight-
LTC Gordon R. Kinneer served as a guest observer controller/trainer
ing as a TCF will emerge. Ultimately, the force package a and senior trainer for 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment during
brigade is able to commit as a TCF will shape how it fights. National Training Center Rotation 22-08 at Fort Irwin, CA. He currently
commands the 1st Squadron, 104th Cavalry Regiment,
2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division,
and previously served as the state mobilization and readi-
ness officer for the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. He
has held various staff and command positions within the
56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and recently
completed a tour as the bilateral affairs officer at the Office
of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Vilnius, Lithuania.
LTC Eric B. Ponzek currently commands 2-112th IN
(Paxton), 56th SBCT. His last assignment was as the 28th
Infantry Division battle major, and he executed the last 56th
SBCT NTC rotation in 2018 as the S3 for 1st Battalion,
111th Infantry Regiment (Associator), 56th SBCT. He has
held various command and staff positions throughout 56th
SBCT.
A Stryker reconnaissance vehicle from the 56th

Stryker Brigade Combat Team moves out to occupy an
observation post in the early morning hours of 29 June
during NTC Rotation 22-08.

Improving Infantry Defenses
Against Enemy Air
LTC DARRELL E. FAWLEY III
1
5 April 1953. No U.S. Soldier has died from enemy Otherwise, the infantry platoon leader is left without much
aircraft since that date. For nearly 70 years, the U.S. recourse.
Army has operated in environments in which the Company commanders are left wanting as well. ATP
air arm dominates. However, those days are fleeting. That 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company, offers only that when a
the Army gets this is evident in the design of decisive action column on the march is attacked, all machine guns should
training environment (DATE) rotations at Combat Training engage the aircraft while everyone else seeks cover. While a
Centers (CTCs) like the National Training Center and Joint helicopter likely does not want to fly through a hail of bullets,
Readiness Training Center. Soldiers face “red air” in the form this solution is problematic. First, it is devoid of accuracy.
of attack and reconnaissance via opposing force (OPFOR) Second, it is not a core task requiring training. Third, there
helicopters and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Yet, I is no deterrent nature to this solution. Infantry leaders have
believe the infantry platoon lacks basic doctrine, equipment, no means of countering enemy air that puts them on level
and organization to deal with the threat, and Infantry officers playing ground and forces enemy pilots to consider avoiding
do not receive adequate air defense employment education. their formations.
The Infantry must solve this prior to the next conflict.
Machine guns have been the infantry solution to enemy
The 2022 war in Ukraine has driven home that our great air for decades. CPT Anthony O’Connor and CPT Robert
and emerging power adversaries have robust rotary-wing Kilmer Jr. each discussed training for machine guns in their
assets; it has also driven home the value in possessing air defense role in these pages four decades ago.1 Yet, the
handheld and highly mobile air defenses. The Army’s current concept of air defense at the small unit level does not appear
doctrine for infantry squads and platoons, Army Techniques to have received any attention in this professional bulletin
Publication (ATP) 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, needs since 1989. That year, CPT Michael Parietti argued that the
better solutions to close range air threats. Appendix F offers Army should cross-train the company’s anti-armor gunners
that the machine gun can provide defensive fires for low- as Stinger gunners. In his article, CPT Parietti advocated for
flying, low-performing aircraft within 800 meters and provides what is essentially an arms room concept where command-
a few generic considerations for employment in this role. ers could outfit their anti-armor section with air defense or
anti-armor weapons to fit the mission.2
Parietti’s offering is worthy of rekin-
dling, altering, and expanding. Today,
there is no anti-armor section at the
company level. Light infantry battal-
ions have heavy weapons companies
which move via wheeled vehicle and
carry tube-launched, optically tracked,
wire-guided (TOW) missiles. Company
commanders have six anti-armor
teams armed with Javelins all resident
within their infantry platoons. This
assumes the company is fully manned
or that the command prioritizes fill of
anti-armor roles over other positions
when manning is limited. This does not
always occur. A commander could task
Soldiers defend against an enemy air attack
during Decisive Action Rotation 21-09 at the
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, on
15 September 2021.
Photo by CPT Khari Bridges

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
organize the anti-armor teams under the headquarters for
training and employment purposes, but this is a command
decision.
Regardless, Parietti’s arms room concept is not the best
solution. Making Javelin gunners dual-hat as Stinger gunners
detracts from their training which also includes rifle qualifica-
tion among myriad other tasks and drills. Additionally, a light
infantry organization has little in the way of transport and
storage in the offense to carry unused weapons systems.
Choosing one or the other likely would have down-trace
effects on future operations. Finally, an enemy is likely to
employ armored vehicles and aerial systems in tandem or in
close proximity to each other. Commanders should not have
to choose what threat to protect themselves against.
Infantry organizations are air defense poor at echelon.
There are no organic air defense systems at battalion,
brigade, or division level. The first air defense Soldiers an
infantry commander encounters are on the brigade staff
where a small air defense cell provides coordination and
planning support to the brigade commander. None of these
Soldiers has any systems. In practice and in accordance with
doctrine, units in a DATE scenario receive air defense units
as part of their task organization. However, brigades typically
employ these systems to protect their critical assets such as Paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade practice acquiring
fuel points and command posts. They are not for offensive a target with a FIM-92 Stinger near Medulin, Croatia, on 8 April 2022.
action nor given to forward units.
ing time and become proficient. The disadvantage of this is
Thus, the infantry commander is left to shoot bullets that rifle company commanders and platoon leaders lack
against the grain of gravity at a moving target. The Army organic assets. They would need the battalion commander
needs to do better. Rotary-wing aircraft and medium UAS or operations officer to provide air defenders from the weap-
similar to the car-sized Shadow (in its role as an observer) ons company for training and operations. This increases the
can do vast damage to a brigade combat team (BCT) and chance a battalion commander would prioritize these assets
blunt an offensive. Simply put, the infantry leader needs a away from the platoon and company. Additionally, the solu-
solution. tion is not exportable across BCTs. Stryker and armored BCT
Stingers are the obvious answer. Stingers are cheap formations do not have battalion weapons companies and
compared to many other weapons systems to include the thus cannot employ this solution.
Javelin. They are relatively light coming in at roughly 16 A possible second solution is to create an air defense
pounds lighter than the Javelin. And, they are easy to train section at the company level. This gives commanders
on. The U.S. has issued Stinger missiles to fighters from the maximum flexibility in employment and ensures consistent
contra rebels in Nicaragua to the mujahadeen in Afghanistan training within the company. However, it does place the onus
to the soldiers in Ukraine with great success. Many infantry on company commanders to prepare their forces against
commanders already choose to train their Soldiers on the the backdrop of myriad competing priorities. Light infantry
system prior to CTC rotations so they can equip their Soldiers commanders already possess mortars and a UAS section at
with them during the rotation. However, these are Soldiers the company level, so they have the means to train special-
who have no doctrinal or organizational imperative to train; ized elements. Still, mortars have a centralized hub for
therefore, their skills can vanish quickly following a rotation. training support in the battalion mortar platoon. Similarly, the
Thus, equipping cannot be the sole response to the problem. company and platoon medics and forward observers have
In fact, it is the easy part of the solution. a higher echelon that trains them. A BCT’s air defense cell
The Army must update the modified table of organization couldn’t provide this level of oversight as currently manned.
and equipment (MTOE) to reflect anti-air gunners. There are Due to the need to identify aircraft as hostile, any air defender
four possible options. First, the battalion’s heavy weapons would need to be highly trained.
company could take on an air defense platoon. This platoon The third option would be to create anti-air teams within the
would be the central training hub for the battalion, overseen weapons squad of each platoon. This reduces the company
by a company commander. The advantages of this would commander’s options but provides flexibility to platoons
be standardized training and dedicated training time. When which can find themselves away from the direct fire support
something is a platoon’s core task, the unit will make train- of other elements. These are the elements most likely to have

chance encounters with low performance aircraft. However, a get their slice, the platoon should be organized like a forward
weapons squad leader would be given the burden of training observer section or medical platoon. Each squad would have
two machine-gun teams, two anti-armor teams, and one or habitual responsibilities to a line company, leaving the battal-
two air defense teams. Even though weapons squad leaders ion commander with a squad to employ as needed.
tend to be the most experienced in the platoon, providing However, as the Army considers additional end strength
them with three diverse training missions could induce chal- cuts in the face of modernization, recruiting shortfalls, and
lenges in creating fully trained teams. Even if the air defense tightening budgets, the short-term solution may be to dual-
teams thrived, the other two teams might suffer. hat designated marksmen as air defenders. This would
A fourth option would be to designate one rifleman in every have to come through an update to the MTOE reflecting
rifle squad as a Stinger gunner. ATP 3-21.8 asserts that one the position of an anti-air gunner and Stinger system. While
rifleman in each squad is a designated marksman while the infantry doctrine currently calls for a designated marksman
other is an anti-armor specialist. Employing this option would and anti-armor specialist per squad, the Army’s MTOE does
mean dual-hatting either the anti-armor specialist or the not reflect this. The rifle squad does not have specialized
designated marksman. The anti-armor specialist could not equipment organic to it for either mission. Therefore, it is
carry all the weaponry required to do both jobs and be a rifle- easy to overlook training for designated marksmen and
man, thus requiring the arms room concept. The designated squad anti-armor specialists when a unit is not resourced nor
marksman makes more sense. While not a sniper, a desig- driven through reporting metrics to conduct the training. For
nated marksman should be trained in aspects important to an an anti-air concept to work, the Army would need to update
air defense specialist such as aircraft identification, tracking its MTOE to reflect the position and the equipment.
of a moving target, and accuracy. They would not need to Assigning anti-air specialists to squads would get the
carry the Stinger in operating mode on patrol and thus could concept rolling and enable continuous assessment at
perform both functions. However, the average Soldier could monthly CTC rotations. To enable this, the Infantry needs to
likely only carry one missile. Therefore, the squad would be make doctrinal updates that detail training and employment
left with one shot or would need to cross-load ammo. Also, of Stingers at the platoon and company level. Further, the
in pushing the air defender further down, there is even less Defense Training Management System (DTMS), the Army’s
institutional knowledge to pull from and a greater chance the system of record for training and qualification, would need
training gets short changed. to add Stinger qualification as required training for infantry
The best solution is likely to create a battalion air defense companies. This way, commanders at echelon could enforce
platoon. In light infantry battalions, this would be resident in and oversee training. The Infantry could borrow most of
the weapons company. Stryker and heavy battalions may its training doctrine from existing manuals but would need
need to place this in the headquarters and headquarters to develop employment doctrine unique to its mission. As
company. While training on the use of a Stinger is relatively successive rotations pile up, the Infantry could use data from
simple, there are many aspects that are more complicated these events to shape permanent doctrinal updates as well
such as target identification, battle drills, and integration with as work with the Center for Army Lessons Learned to spread
the rest of the organization. To ensure company commanders best practices.
Soldiers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade fire a FIM-92 Stinger
during an air defense live-fire exercise alongside soldiers with
the Croatian Air Defense Regiment on 8 April 2022.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Naturally, the air defense artillery community would likely and command elements that exist behind their lines.
push back on the concept of arming 11-series Soldiers with It is incumbent on infantry leaders to develop a solution
Stingers. This would be especially true if the solution is creat- to the problem of enemy red air. This must be a branch-
ing an air defense platoon within battalions manned by 11Bs. wide solution. Today, enterprising company commanders
This is not only because Infantry Soldiers would be conduct- are developing solutions. However, these solutions are
ing a core mission of a different branch, but also due to the not universal, nor are they necessarily the best solutions.
high risk of fratricide when employing air defense assets. Air Providing a standardized equipping, doctrinal, and orga-
defenders as a military occupational specialty are certainly nizational solution will help infantry leaders face what may
the best trained in employing air defense assets. However, be a significant threat in the next conflict. It will save lives,
making this a mission of the 14 series is complicated. While preserve combat power, and keep the Infantry doing what it
the Army intends to grow the air defense community, the does best: closing with and destroying the enemy.
focus will naturally be on systems that defend critical assets
and not Stinger gunners. Thus, branch and Army priorities Notes
could leave infantry units habitually undermanned. It is 1
CPT Anthony J. O’Connor, “Air Defense with Small Arms,”
likely the Army will prioritize long-range Patriot systems and Infantry 77/3 (May-June 1987): 36-38; CPT Robert Kilmer Jr., “Air
short-range Avenger systems due to their need to protect Defense Training,” Infantry 72/1 (January-February 1982): 26-27.
critical assets on the battlefield. Placing the organization of
2
CPT Michael I. Parietti, “Organic Air Defense for a Light Infantry
Company,” Infantry 79/5 (September-October 1989): 38-40.
air defenders in the Infantry’s hands ensures that infantry
commanders make decisions on priorities. Editor’s Note: As with all Infantry articles, the views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official
The key is to make air defense an organic mission of policy or position of the U.S. government, Department of Defense,
small infantry units without significantly increasing the burden or any element of it.
on already overworked commanders and companies. This
requires equipment, organization, and doctrinal solutions. LTC Darrell Fawley currently commands 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored
It also requires education. Infantry leaders in the Infantry Cavalry Regiment. He is the author of 4-31 Infantry in Iraq’s Triangle of Death
(McFarland, 2019). He deployed as a light infantry platoon leader, Stryker
Basic Officer Leader Course and Maneuver Captains Career
company commander, and armored brigade combat team executive officer
Course need to learn to employ Stinger missiles in the offense as well a future operations planner. He has also served as an Infantry Basic
and defense and how to train these teams. In general, this is Officer Leader Course instructor and professor of military science. He holds
a small lift compared to many other pressing requirements. degrees from the U.S. Military Academy, Ohio University, the Command and
General Staff College (Art of War Scholars Program), and the School of
Protecting infantry units from the sky not only preserves infan-
Advanced Military Studies.
try combat power but likely protects the fires, sustainment,
New from the Army Center for Lessons Learned

Combining Arms in the Close Fight NO. 23-01 (738)
Operations Group, National Training Center (NTC) created this publication to assist units in
combining arms to win on the battlefield, and it is organized into three sections. Section I offers CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
three foundational concepts and 18 critical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that offer
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
Combining Arms in the Close Fight
“a way” to think about how to combine arms. Section II focuses on brigade combat team (BCT)
sustainment and describes why and how units should design their concept of support and logistics
architecture. And Section III offers a series of hard problems for units to consider as they train for
large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS
Available at: https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2022/11/04/63200cc0/23-01-738-combining-arms- COMBINED

October 2022
CENTER - TRAINING
ARMS CENTER
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People First Task Force

NO. 22-XX
This handbook is a compilation of best practices and tools that can be used by leaders to
(CDN 672)
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LESSONS LEARNED
ue, Building 50
, KS 66027-1350
leaders are empowered to utilize the tools in the handbook to complement their own unit-specific
People First strategies and initiatives. By integrating people into training, leaders can enhance
People First Task Force
the cohesiveness of their teams and foster an environment where all are treated with dignity and
respect.
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Rifle Company Temporal
Overmatch in LSCO
CPT ZACHARY J. MATSON
and back-blast considerations of the Carl Gustav to defend

“A great commander must say to himself several against a counterattack. Company-designed STX lanes
times a day: If the enemy army appeared in front of during our brigade-level home-station training focused on
me, to my right or my left, what would I do?” squads conducting anti-tank (AT) ambushes independently,
— Napoleon Bonaparte and pre-JRTC classroom blocks of instruction refreshed
our understanding of minimum arming distance and round
T
types to ensure all Soldiers took this into consideration. Anvil
he Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and its
Company simply followed the JRTC home-station battle drill
world-class opposing force (OPFOR) “Geronimo” at
handbook as closely as we could during the training cycle.
Fort Polk, LA, challenge Army brigades every month
Empowered by monthly leader professional development
across the spectrum of conflict and along each warfight-
(LPD) sessions hosted by the brigade commander and staff,
ing function and domain. Even if units are particularly well
leaders at echelon understood how the Warrior Brigade
trained and well led, the legendary OPFOR will challenge
intended to fight as a team.
the rotational training unit (RTU) not just in the mechanical
“science” of warfighting, but also in abstract capabilities such The brigade- and division-level home-station annual
as surprise, tempo, and audacity. The 1st Brigade Combat exercises prioritized time for companies, batteries, and
Team (Warriors), 10th Mountain Division deployed to JRTC troops to execute their own training plan, which turned out
in January 2022 for rotation 22-03 with the intent to offer a to pay dividends in developing and refining the initiative
hard fight for the OPFOR throughout its duration in “the box.” of our squad leaders to operate semi-independently in
The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment harnessed the support of a company effort. Mountain Peak, the division
potential of its subordinate units by adhering to the tenets exercise, validated time and again that squad leaders
of mission command and the principles of the offense, and proactively executing counter-reconnaissance patrols will
by striking the historically difficult balance between tempo, interdict enemy small units while they are vulnerable. Anvil
safety, and control. This article details how rifle companies, Company integrated counter-recon patrols as a battle
enabled by their battalion headquarters (HQ), can offer an rhythm at JRTC with platoon leadership automatically
equal challenge for the OPFOR on its home turf across conducting them whenever the company had to halt. Anvil
the spectrum of warfighting. Rather than debilitating
decision-making, the modern battlefield offers infinite
opportunities for tactical units to exploit. Anvil Company,
2-22 IN exploited the chaos of multidomain battle during
JRTC 22-03 by taking calculated risks and relentlessly
maintaining contact with the enemy.
Home-Station Training
Anvil Company’s tailored pre-JRTC preparations
began immediately following 1st BCT’s Expert Soldier
Badge testing. Beginning with fire team live-fire exer-
cises (LFXs) and in accordance with JRTC Center for
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Cell suggestions, Anvil
Company designed training that forced leaders to react
to enemy vehicles and employ attached weapons.
Fire team leaders were forced to engage a mounted
enemy counterattack, and squad situational training
exercises (STXs) challenged squad leaders on react-
ing to a Russian T80 visual modification and employing Photo courtesy of author
an attached Carl Gustav. The squad LFXs assessed Squad situational training exercises (STXs) challenged squad leaders on
squad leaders on employment of an attached M240B reacting to a Russian T80 visual modification.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
turnover, operational tempo, or the
current Army readiness model, it’s
growing harder for RTUs to both
certify on their mission-essential tasks
and grasp the more challenging cogni-
tive competencies required to make
decisions that can outpace an adver-
sary. Factoring in the overwhelming
amount of installation tasks applied
to garrison units and achieving these
competencies becomes nearly impos-
sible. All is not lost, however; units can
achieve at home station the necessary
training required to survive and win in
modern combat, but it does require an
increased level of competence and
commitment at the company, troop,
and battery level to make decisions
faster than the enemy. These echelons
will always have a vital role on the
Photo by SPC Pierre Osias battlefield, but their utility to their
Soldiers in Anvil Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, platoons and squads needs to evolve
10th Mountain Division, conduct a squad live-fire exercise in August 2021. to keep pace with modern combat.
Company’s experience at JRTC during force-on-force Achieving Overmatch in the Temporal Realm
showed that the company echelon is used for command How do maneuver units achieve overmatch in the
and control, sustainment, consolidation and reorganiza- temporal realm? Working literally from the ground up, the
tion, and to mass for fires-supported attacks on key terrain, strength of a light infantry brigade is its ability to operate in
while during movements to contact or hasty attacks and severely restrictive terrain. Additionally, light infantry units
defenses, the squad or section is the preferred unit of action. are expected to move on foot for long distances and arrive
We found that we needed 360-degree security (provided by prepared to fight. The two most effective methods of prepar-
the platoons), while reacting to enemy armor was best done ing a light infantry unit to move further and faster than their
with control from the company commander and executed counterparts are spending the appropriate time at home
quickly by a squad leader employing an attachment with station conducting forced marches and properly employing
engagement and reporting criteria. Combined with the the organic sustainment capabilities of the rifle company. The
emphasis placed on extended dismounted movements, battalion commander manifested the first effort by envision-
the JRTC home-station training glide path, a willingness to ing a 52-mile leader trek in the Adirondacks. The latter effort
take calculated risks nested with the brigade’s concept of was a continued emphasis of the company commander with
“how we fight,” and an aggressive patrolling culture, Anvil particular attention paid to the maintenance of the small but
Company exploited the complexity of the decisive action vital company fleet, notably the company’s mule which is
training environment (DATE) to compete and win in the the medium tactical variant (MTV) on its modified table of
temporal realm at JRTC 22-03.1 organization and equipment (MTOE). The company marched
A year before the Warrior Brigade deployed to Fort Polk, to the training area for more than half of the collective train-
the JRTC Operations Group CALL Cell published its latest ing events and incorporated long movements during all other
collection in the series “Light Fighting at the JRTC: DATE training events. Notably, the battalion training guidance
Is Not a Slow Dance.”2 The title alone offers a clue about included conducting an extended tactical road march of 22.2
the realm in which large-scale combat operations (LSCO) miles with all company-assigned equipment during the train-
is going to challenge units: the temporal one. What Robert ing cycle.4
Leonhard outlines in his prophetic text Fighting by Minutes, Leadership emphasis on fighting light and moving fast
and what the JRTC CALL Cell attempts to assist the RTU became the cultural norm leading into JRTC 22-03. Besides
in understanding, is that the pace of the future fight is building both mental and physical toughness, an extended
measured in minutes and sometimes seconds, and it is or forced road march also provides an example of the time
trending towards a tighter connection between information it takes to move large formations and gives commanders a
inputs and decision-making.3 The tightening loop of deci- running estimate of attrition during movement. More than any
sions is a challenge for RTUs that are still under the similar other event, the extended dismounted movements during
manning and training model that the Army has used for most the training cycle gave all leaders in the battalion a realistic
of the last 20 years. Without a policy change in personnel expectation of unit movement times while also making intui-

tive the enduring consideration of soldier load. During our them of their inherent advantages and expose the inflexibility
rotation, Anvil Company averaged dismounted movement of in any preconceived plan.
1 kilometer an hour. Anvil Company integrated into the 2-22 IN concept by
The persistent concern of Soldier load is directly tied to bounding past a sister company that had seized key terrain
the importance of the company trains, which allowed the to secure the western most flank of the brigade area of
company to pack most of its rucks both inside and outside operations (AO) while maintaining direct contact with enemy
of the Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) or in a trailer forces. To achieve the desired effects at the desired time,
hauled behind one of the company’s high mobility multipur- Anvil Company was tasked with moving near-continuously
pose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Anvil Company incorpo- for 48 hours to reach our objectives. The ability to plan and
rated this method of moving the company during every single execute long movements with minimal rest validates the
training event. The number of rehearsals conducted during Infantry Branch’s emphasis on its officers volunteering for
the training cycle on packing, loading, unloading, and link- and completing the Ranger Course.6 All Anvil officers, includ-
ing up with the company trains paid dividends at JRTC and ing our attached fire support officer (FSO), were graduates of
single-handedly contributed to our ability to sustain ourselves. the course and thus were familiar with planning for long foot
LMTV maintenance is the single most important priority of movements under heavy load. Most Soldiers carried upwards
the company executive officer as this single truck allows the of 85 pounds of gear during the patrol, and the company FSO
company to sustain itself, rather than forcing the battalion to carried more than 100 pounds, including a coax cable and a
provide for it. Distributed operations are only possible after dismantled OE-254 antenna that were essential for construct-
properly synchronizing the sustainment warfighting func- ing a field expedient antenna. With just enough pause during
tion with the maneuver plan. An increased proximity to the the initial movement following joint forcible entry (JFE) to refill
battalion HQ also increases risk to the company as battlefield water sources and synchronize fires, Anvil Company moved
signatures magnify. to secure a hilltop that had been assessed as key terrain in
the brigade AO. As other battalions in the brigade fixed the
The faster and farther a company can move, the faster
enemy in the north, Anvil Company was able to approach
it can close the decision loop and challenge the enemy in
this piece of key terrain from an unanticipated avenue of
the temporal realm. To further understand the importance
approach, marching through the night to launch a dawn
and tactical applicability of the cognitive domain and how it
attack on Hill 95.
relates to the tempo, consider the timeless, although often
oversimplified, observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, as Enabled by the company mortar section located in the
described by U.S. Air Force COL John Boyd (see Figure assembly area, we launched our attack on Hill 95 amidst
1).5 The ground combat manifestation of “getting inside the a shower of high explosive (HE) from the artillery battalion
enemy OODA loop” is showing up where the enemy least as well as our battalion mortar platoon and our own 60mm
expects you. Units achieve success by conducting forced mortar section. The decision and resources to support this
marches, aggressively pursuing the enemy, and mount- attack were approved and resourced at the brigade level as
ing relentless attacks, even when in contact. At JRTC, the commander and S3 were determining when exactly they
the OPFOR conducts a superior military decision-making could shift and provide the invaluable fire support across the
process (MDMP), often much quicker than the recently entire AO. Using the barrage to cover our advance, we seized
formed battalion and brigade staffs of the RTU. The OPFOR the hilltop, defeating a small contingent of OPFOR. Our
still has a battalion-level plan that features branches and ability to hold the terrain against attempts to retake it forced
sequels. Moving faster than the OPFOR soldiers can report the enemy commander to redirect his ongoing assault on
and execute their respective branch plans is going to deprive adjacent battalions. While our company eventually endured
unsustainable losses, the
Figure 1 — OODA Loop
seizure of Hill 95 achieved
the desired surprise. The
OPFOR commander person-
ally commanded the efforts
to retake the hill, an indica-
tor that the OPFOR had
not anticipated such a bold
maneuver from the RTU.
Anvil Company’s failure
to hold Hill 95 following a
successful seizure was a
vital collective learning point.
It became clear that all lead-
ers still subconsciously took
Graphic from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop
for granted that if we had

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
communications with higher that we were going to receive
assets, such as an air weapons team (AWT) or more indi- Leaders at all levels are accustomed
rect fire support, that would help the ground forces. Despite to habits formed during the global war
excellent communication between the company FSO and the
brigade FSO throughout planning, movement, and actions on
on terrorism (GWOT), namely asset
the objective, Anvil Company discovered that the transition to allocation for company- and platoon-
the division as a unit of action requires a paradigm shift for centric operations that are enabled by
subordinate echelons.7 Leaders at all levels are accustomed
battalion and brigade HQ. The growing
to habits formed during the global war on terrorism (GWOT),
namely asset allocation for company- and platoon-centric complexity and pace of the anticipated
operations that are enabled by battalion and brigade HQ. division-centric LSCO fight will make
The growing complexity and pace of the anticipated division- this impossible.
centric LSCO fight will make this impossible. While internal-
izing this hard-earned lesson, Anvil Company’s adherence to
integrating fires and maneuver produced tactical advantages persistent communication with higher, we continued moving
that challenged the enemy in the cognitive domain and with the intent to establish communications as the terrain
forced them to make an emotionally driven decision which permitted. Each minute without communications with higher
threw their operational plan off balance. Fortunately, Anvil is a minute lost to an enemy who can move faster than we
Company had the support of the battalion HQ to execute our can in the competition to seize key terrain. Units will always
assigned mission by providing mission orders, an enemy and struggle to replicate operating in a denied and degraded
friendly intelligence picture, and an umbrella of indirect fires. communications environment at home station, and they
Anvil Company’s adherence to the principles of the offense risk wasting time troubleshooting and reacting to jamming,
and the support from the battalion HQ are far from new ideas, if recognition of jamming is even feasible.9 Not underesti-
but they provided an already proven relationship between mating the OPFOR, we expected to be jammed during all
these two echelons.8 periods of force-on-force and were prepared to react to this
Communication and Coordination form of contact. During one of our longer movements to seize
key terrain, all handheld Global Positioning System (GPS)
Following these actions, Anvil Company enjoyed a brief devices appeared to be much different than our maps and
consolidation period before battalion tasked it as the main pace counts. Without hesitation, the lead platoon leader
effort to retake the key terrain of Hill 95. During this period, assessed that the formation was the victim of GPS jamming,
we were able to refine the common operational picture and the lead fire team’s compass-man maintained azimuth
(COP) with face-to-face adjacent unit coordination with both and pace, negating the impact of the enemy’s actions.
our Charlie Company, which was located within supporting
distance and also anchored on key terrain, and the brigade With my command truck out of the fight, I maintained an
cavalry squadron’s Bravo Troop, which was screening near analog COP, while the 1SG maintained the primary person-
a high-speed avenue of approach. Our communications nel status in the field litter ambulance (FLA), and the execu-
capabilities at this point were vital to maintaining tempo. Anvil tive officer managed the logistics COP in the MTV with the
Company deployed to the box with the Advanced System rest of the company trains. Availing myself of the opportunity
Improvement Program (ASIP) as its primary FM radio and to link up with Bravo Troop and see the brigade digital COP
a PRC-150 as alternate in the high frequency spectrum. using their JBC-P, I was afforded the opportunity to reorient
Additionally, the brigade’s emphasis on home-station training their 120mm mortars on my assessed likely enemy avenues
with our HF platforms maximized our ability to disperse during approach to cover my formation. With our 60mm used effec-
JRTC. Our Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) located tively to respond to enemy probing or counterattacks and
in the command vehicle did not make it to the field during this running low on ammunition for suppression missions, Bravo
rotation, and our end user devices (EUDs) were marked for Troop’s 120s were a welcome addition to the fire support
code out, so they remained at Fort Drum in preparation for plan, if even for a day.
turn in. Adjacent unit coordination after crossing the line of depar-
To mitigate the obvious shortfalls, the company deployed ture needs to be the concern of the company commander as
to the box with a common-sense plan for being out of he or she will most likely have the best understanding of the
communication with higher and adjacent units. The battalion battlefield. My face-to-face interactions with adjacent units
allowed Anvil Company to confidently operate indepen- allowed a brief update that kept all surrounding units informed,
dently as necessary and work through frequent periods of engaged, and mutually supportive. I chose to devote my time
communications blackout and discrete reporting windows. to sharing information and ensuring that assessments were
Anvil Company spent a little over 10 percent of our rotation disseminated to the lowest level to allow mission command.
and one of our four multi-hour company movements without While the minimalist approach to mission command has
communications capability. Instead of potentially losing room for improvement, feedback that I received from
tempo troubleshooting sophisticated platforms to maintain company NCOs affirmed that they knew what the enemy was

capable of doing or planning to do throughout the duration of recalls in his memoir that “in night moves the first aim is to keep
force-on-force. My abbreviated running estimates informed people from getting lost.”13 Our need to synchronize maneu-
by battalion and adjacent unit reporting allowed us a best ver with fires to dislodge a dug-in enemy from key terrain,
assessment of the enemy situation, and these were delivered and our desire to prioritize tempo, meant that we could not
no fewer than six times a day and at least following all enemy afford a single minute lost to a break in contact.14 Additionally,
contact. Commanders will have to take a risk if they intend since this movement took hours and threatened to drain our
to maintain at least some form persistent contact with the invaluable ASIP batteries, we also communicated primarily
enemy or try to achieve the ideal doctrinal level of enemy through touch, and like the 2-12 CAV commander, the only
understanding. JRTC 22-03 validated that if you dictate radio we did not turn off during movement was the artillery
when you make contact with the enemy, you can anticipate radio.15 The platoon leaders expertly maintained control of
his actions and reactions with more fidelity than passive their units, tirelessly trooping their respective formations and
measures allow. A good American historical case study is further validating their Ranger School experiences.
that of General Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign against
While preparing to lead the battalion effort to retake Hill
General Lee. Grant recognized the key terrain of Richmond
95, Anvil Company Soldiers spent brief moments in their
as vital for the Confederate cause, so he threatened the
assembly area (AA) preparing their equipment for another
southern capital but kept Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia his
uphill fight while I spent a minimal amount of time deconflict-
main effort, forcing Lee to fight him.10 Like the Union forces in
ing actions on the objective with fellow company command-
this campaign, 2-22 IN moved Anvil Company as quickly as
ers. Harkening to techniques and tactics reminiscent of the
possible and made direct contact with Geronimo as often as
GWOT’s small kill teams, our company formed an advance
possible by threatening control of key terrain.
element consisting of a four-man recon element so we could
A rifle company consisting of somewhere between 75 and make contact with the enemy using the smallest element
125 Soldiers offers a huge audible and visible signature, and possible.16 The most senior staff sergeant in the company
all leaders are challenged to maintain control of a formation carried the new M110A1 rifle, and he was accompanied by
this size, especially during periods without communication or a platoon radio-telephone operator (RTO) with ASIP, a M249
limited visibility. During nighttime movements, I was particu- gunner, and a rifleman. With the minimal amount of guidance
larly active in patrolling the line and finding subordinate lead- including reporting and disengagement criteria, the recon
ers to stay in touch with.11 Before our dawn attack on Hill 95, element moved out while the rest of the company finished the
we stopped in the middle of a swamp for a couple hours to troop leading procedures. This small element moving even
allow the brigade to develop the situation and shift priority of just an hour ahead of the main body allowed the company
fires to Anvil. Controlling the tempo of this attack was vital to modify our movement technique and formation to get to
to staying synchronized with the battalion and brigade, and our probable line of contact (PLC) as fast as possible with
controlled halts as we crept closer to our objective were our minimal risk to force. This simple temporary task organization
best way of achieving this. All battalion training at Fort Drum allowed us to maintain our edge in tempo during the first few
emphasized the difference between tempo and speed, and days of force-on-force.
we recalled the doctrinal definition
of tempo: “the relative speed and
rhythm of military operations over
time with respect to the enemy.”12
Halting movement in low
terrain during limited visibility
carries outsized risks to tempo.
I assessed it as more important
to maintain control and keep my
formation extremely tight because
the time a company spends
searching for a lost Soldier with
a break in contact could threaten
the battalion’s mission to relieve
pressure on our sister battalion
that was defending a northern
drop zone. Anvil Company’s
movement to seize Hill 95
mirrored almost exactly that of
the 2nd Squadron,12th Cavalry Photo by SGT Kevin Dunnaway
in Vietnam during its movement A Soldier with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division engages opposing forces during
towards Hue. The 2-12 CAV S2 training on 17 January 2022 at the Joint Readiness Training Center on Fort Polk, LA.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Following the battalion seizure of Hill 95 from the enemy, their breaching assets as they attempted to reduce the first
the brigade prepared to transition to the defense. It took the obstacle. The JRTC Operations Group recommends that
company most of the day to secure our assigned sector of RTU “anti-tank units should remain mobile.”20 Maintaining the
Hill 95, and we received notification to move out to meet the principle of flexibility in the defense, the squad leaders fully
horizontal engineers at the anticipated engagement area understood the engagement criteria and destroyed multiple
around midnight. Minutes lost in the defense are doubled enemy vehicles while the enemy engaged us across multiple
since you must walk the terrain twice — once to get there forms of contact over roughly 14 hours.21 Anvil Company
and again during a full-dress rehearsal as the seventh step survived multiple mechanized attacks on our position, but
of engagement area development.17 Knowing each minute unfortunately we lost our company trains to enemy aerial-
the engineers are without guidance is a minute given to delivered family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) munitions.
the enemy, we picked up our rucks and conducted a 1-mile Following a successful defense, the battalion wasted no
forced march in the dark within 15 minutes. I led the column time pondering our losses. The battalion commander imme-
and the pace and immediately planted my command post diately directed our Charlie Company to move out across the
(CP), which consisted of my RTO and the Fires Cell, near a low water crossing and seize as much terrain as possible
tree. I then dropped my ruck, grabbed a rifleman for security, towards the west, knowing that the following phase of brigade
and moved out in the middle of the night to meet up with operations was going to be determined by how much ground
the engineer company commander. After confirming linkup, we took between direct engagements with the enemy and
we ran to the furthest point I assessed we could engage the not forgetting the offensive principle of audacity. Watching
enemy, and I began to request armored vehicle obstacles by Charlie Company move past our position, Anvil Company
providing the engineer company commander with a desired leaders planned to move the next 9 kilometers without reli-
friendly task, purpose, and effect. Working backwards toward able communications because our batteries were depleted
my company’s direct fire weapons range, we confirmed a after the long hours in the defense. Charlie Company passed
likely enemy scheme of maneuver, how I intended to engage our Bravo Company to an objective further west overlook-
them, priority of dig assets, and lastly the obstacles we ing a key low water crossing defended determinedly by the
needed to emplace along the mounted avenue of approach. enemy. Using simple graphic control measures, I defined an
This hyper-abbreviated planning process runs counter to the AA behind Bravo Company, connected timed phase lines on
conventional approach to planning outlined in both the troop linear danger areas for our company trains to leapfrog to,
leading procedures and MDMP, which fortunately gave us and assigned a few linkup points. Anvil Company turned our
another advantage on the clock. Though this can seem risky, radios off for hours until we linked up with the battalion tacti-
the battalion commander provided the companies everything cal command post to receive final coordination for a battalion
they needed to exercise disciplined initiative.18 attack on another piece of key terrain. While not perfect,
After confirming the engineers had tasks that would take this plan allowed us to save the precious batteries we had
them the next eight hours to complete, left for planned actions. This long
Figure 2 — Forms of Contact
I returned to my CP to update battal- daylight movement transitioned
ion HQ. Although I had the horizontal into a full period of darkness two-
engineers at the moment, these company fight to seize and hold
precious assets were to transition a key intersection. The company-
to our sister companies immediately level energy-saving plan paid off
following an allotted time block. Not as we had enough battery power
a single minute in the defense was to sustain us until our company
relinquished to fatigue or the enemy, trains linked up with the forward
and Anvil Company defeated line of own troops (FLOT) the
repeated attempts from all cardinal following morning.
directions to dislodge us from our During the hasty defense of an
position overlooking the single low enemy counterattack, it became
water crossing in the southern area apparent that we had to maintain
of the box. We enjoyed the benefit of 360-degree security around the
training with our habitually attached intersection of two high-speed
sapper squad. The engineer battal- avenues of approach while also
ion commander ensured that sapper quickly employing our anti-tank
squads attached to their respective teams in the hunter-killer role.
maneuver unit for squad STX, squad In the center of the company
LFX, Warrior Peak, and Mountain formation, I was able to dictate to
Peak.19 The rehearsals and assigned platoon-level leadership to destroy
tasks paid off as our first engage- incoming threats, and they in turn
ment with the enemy destroyed Graphic courtesy of author led respective anti-tank teams to

destroy all enemy armored vehicles that
approached our position. The employ-
ment of anti-tank teams led by either
a squad leader, platoon sergeant, or
platoon leader was the result of follow-
ing a deliberate home-station training
path that reflected the recommendations
of the JRTC CALL Cell.22 Every member
of Anvil Company understood the capa-
bilities and limitations of our organic anti-
tank weapon systems, most importantly
the M3 Carl Gustav.
While this is not a comprehensive
review of everything Anvil Company and
2-22 IN accomplished at JRTC 22-03, it
simply serves to offer anecdotal experi-
ence that worked for an aggressive
rifle company enabled by a supportive
and equally aggressive battalion HQ.
The LSCO environment replicated at Photo by SPC Pierre Osias
Soldiers in Anvil Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team,
JRTC is intended to provide the RTU a
10th Mountain Division, conduct a squad live-fire exercise in August 2021.
worst-case scenario, which the OPFOR
achieves with superior results. A LSCO environment will also 8
COL (Retired) Dandridge M. Malone, Small-Unit Leadership: A
provide an environment permeated with risk, but command- Commonsense Approach, (NY: Ballantine Books, 1983), 26.
9
JRTC CALL Cell, “LSCO at JRTC,” January 2021, 55. (ADP 3-90,
ers that understand proactive and consistent risk manage- Offense and Defense, July 19).
ment will enjoy the dividend of increased battlefield initiative. 10
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters
Risk management cannot be treated as a discrete event; 1839-1865 (NY: Library of America, 1990), Overland Campaign.
instead, it is a persistent pursuit.23 Commanders and units
11
MG (Retired) Robert Scales, Scales on War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2015), Chapter 12. Scales mentions what psychologists
that limit their capabilities due to perceived constraints will term “pallination,” which is the amplifying effect that physical touch has on
never exploit the initiative. Communications issues, unclear keeping soldiers’ morale high, especially in low visibility.
enemy situation, or being tethered to a logistics package are 12
Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations, 2-43:
all not excuses to wait for orders. Tactical units exist and “Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time
with respect to the enemy.”
fight in a realm of minutes, and they cannot yield the most 13
Charles A. Krohn, The Lost Battalion of TET: Breakout of the 2/12th
precious thing they have — time — willingly to the enemy. Cavalry at Hue (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 210.
Attack! 14
JRTC CALL Cell, “BCTs in LSCO,” Echelonment of Fires, 16 (ATP
3-09.42, Fire Support for the BCT, March 2016, 2-60, accessed via JRTC
Notes Milsuite group).
1
“How We Fight” is the white paper written by the brigade commander
15
Ibid.
and distributed to battalion and company commanders during the training
16
CPT William C. Baker, “The Anatomy of an Ambush: Small Kill Teams
cycle. It emphasized mission command, communications architecture as an in the Contemporary Operating Environment,” Armor (July-August 2009).
extension of mission command, and integration of all enablers and assets
17
ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, April 2016, 3-172.
in the brigade to fight and win in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
18
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, 2017, 1-26.
2
Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group series, “Light
19
JRTC Operations Group, “The LSCO Fight at the JRTC,” 10. Conduct
Fighting at the Joint Readiness Training Center, DATE Is Not a Slow an Attack: “It becomes clear that BCTs lack a systematic approach to maxi-
Dance,” 15 December 2021. mizing the various tools of each battalion/squadron and said units have
3
Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War rarely worked together.”
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
20
JRTC Commander of Operations Group (COG) Strategic Engagement
– 3Q, FY22, “IBCTs Kill Tanks.”
4
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion, 21
ATP 3-21.20, Forms of Contact, 2-171.
December 2017, 2-46. 22
JRTC CALL Cell, “Home-station Battle Drills to Help Achieve Success
5
Air Force COL (Retired) John Boyd theorized that “conflict is a series of
in Large Scale Combat Operations,” 2020.
time-competitive observation, orientation, decision, action cycles … If one 23
DA Pamphlet 385-30, Risk Management, December 2014, 1-1.
side in a conflict can consistently go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the
other, it gains a tremendous advantage,” according to William S. Lind in his
book The Maneuver Warfare Handbook.
CPT Zachary J. Matson is an Infantry officer serving as a rifle company
6
Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional
commander in the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light
Development and Career Management, 3 December 2014. Notably absent
Infantry) at Fort Drum, NY. His professional military education includes
from the 2019 edition of this pamphlet is specific branch guidance, but
the Air Assault, Airborne, Jumpmaster, Pathfinder, and Ranger Courses;
importantly the line: “The Ranger Course is essential in developing the
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC); Bradley Leader
knowledge, skill, abilities required to serve as a rifle platoon leader” (8-3).
Course; and the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School. He graduated from
7
Dennis S. Burket, ed., Large Scale Combat Operations: The Division
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, in 2016 with a bachelor’s
Fight (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press,
degree in English.
2019).

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Eye of the Tiger:

Raven Consolidation at NTC
CPT WILL OAKLEY
1LT SHARON MURRAY
T
he ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has both of the squadron’s three Ravens were fully mission capable;
reinforced and redefined the role of unmanned in addition, just one of the squadron’s six MTOE-assigned
aircraft systems (UAS) in large-scale combat opera- Raven operators was trained and current on flight hours, and
tions (LSCO). With a lower signature and fewer infrastructure the unit lacked a Raven master trainer to generate additional
requirements than their runway-bound counterparts, small operators.
UAS (SUAS) provide tactical echelons with a critical intel- Recognizing that a critical capability had atrophied, the
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform squadron commander authorized the formation of a Raven
that allows small, dismounted teams to locate targets and section as an attachment to the squadron S3 section.
observe fires. Composed of an Infantry lieutenant section leader, an
The Army SUAS program of record is the RQ-11B Raven, Infantry staff sergeant NCOIC and Raven master trainer,
a hand-thrown, Soldier-portable aircraft. Capable of flying and two teams with three operators each, the section would
missions up to 90 minutes in length within a 10-kilometer be fully expeditionary, with two of its own vehicles and all
range, the Raven has less restrictive ceiling and visibility sustainment functions fulfilled through the S3.
requirements than the RQ-7B Shadow. It pushes electro- Before standing up and manning this element, the squad-
optical/infrared full motion video and accurate targeting data ron needed to restore the readiness of its Raven program.
to any One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) within Having consolidated the squadron’s systems, the section
line of sight. leader worked with Program Manager-UAS at Redstone
The modified table of organization and equipment Arsenal, AL, and the regimental aviation officer (RAO) to fill
(MTOE) and Army doctrine assign Raven operations and all Raven equipment shortages and restore the squadron’s
maintenance to the company/troop level. As leaders of 2nd SUAS capability. Raven section leadership also planned and
Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment observed in a 2018 Armor executed an operator qualification module and subsequent
article, this alignment is a vestige of counterinsurgency training events in coordination with the RAO to maintain
doctrine unsuited to a LSCO environment.1
The solution that 2/2 CAV pioneered at Raven Section Task Organization
the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
(JMRC) in Germany is to consolidate and
operate Ravens at the squadron level as
a dedicated ISR element tasked by the
squadron commander as part of the target-
ing cycle. This article will discuss how 1st
Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Tiger
Squadron) successfully implemented and
refined this squadron-level ISR concept
during garrison training and National
Training Center (NTC) Rotation 22-07.
Raven Section Stand-Up
Tiger Squadron is a Stryker infantry
squadron with three line troops, each
assigned one Raven system and two
operators by MTOE. At the outset of the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 training cycle, Tiger’s
Raven readiness was in a poor state. Of the
myriad tasks and responsibilities assigned
to the line troops, Raven readiness and
employment fell to the lowest priority. None

operator proficiency and flight hours.
By late January 2022, the Tiger
Raven section was fully mission
capable and integrated with squadron
operations and intelligence processes
during troop external evaluations
(EXEVALs), which served as the
regimental certification event prior to
NTC. For the EXEVALs’ culminating
attack, troops were given priority for
Raven support. The Raven section
operated from the squadron tactical
operations center (TOC), where the
squadron assistant S2 (AS2), acting
as collection manager, issued an infor-
mation collection matrix to the Raven
section leader. The Raven section
then traveled as an attachment within
the security perimeter of the execut-
ing troop and reported observations Photos courtesy of 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment
of enemy activity over Joint Battle The Tiger Squadron’s Raven section conducts training in support of troop external evaluations.
Communications Platform (JBC-
P) and FM radio via the squadron fires net. The OSRVT of-sight challenges presented by NTC’s plentiful mountains
allowed the S2 to pull full-motion video feed at the TOC, made FM and JBC-P communications the most reliable
validating multiple tiers of communication. At the end of the reporting mechanisms.
EXEVALs, Tiger Squadron had standardized procedures for To illustrate how Tiger Squadron tactically employed the
Raven section planning, employment, reporting, collection Raven section, the Ravens were attached to a troop at the
management, and restricted operations zone (ROZ) coordi- outset of the first battle period (BP) and flew zone reconnais-
nation with the RAO. sance in support of that element’s screen mission along key
Tiger Ravens at NTC enemy avenues of approach through the Central Corridor.
During this mission, the Raven section successfully identified
During NTC Rotation 22-07, the Raven section operated two enemy scout vehicles and observed squadron mortar
according to the model established at the EXEVALs. The fires on target. During a subsequent BP, the Raven section
section primarily moved with the TOC as an S3 element, detected multiple enemy dismounted observation posts
but it was capable of being detached with other troops or along the Northern Wall before successfully identifying an
employed independently. For each phase of operations, the enemy armored formation counterattacking the squadron’s
AS2 worked with Raven leadership and the operations offi- area defense at the mouth of Alpha and Bravo Passes. In
cer during mission planning to determine the named areas a separate BP, when the regiment pivoted south to seize
of interest and essential elements of information best suited Razish, the Ravens traveled behind a troop and searched for
for the Raven’s airframe and sensor capabilities. The AS2, irregular threat targets in support of Tiger Squadron’s breach
in her capacity as the squadron collection manager, briefed and subsequent clearance operations.
the plan at the squadron operation order, allowing the Raven
section to begin its own mission planning and the often ardu- In sum, the Tiger Raven section flew 13 flight missions
ous ROZ request process. Then, the Raven section leader over the eight-day training period, totaling 17 flight hours
synchronized his portion of the information collection plan — 15 hours more than any other squadron in the regiment.
with the squadron and troop fire support officers (FSOs) at Tiger Ravens identified and observed fires that destroyed
the squadron information collection and fires rehearsal. an enemy reconnaissance section, a tank platoon, and two
separate dismounted observation posts. As a consolidated
NTC also necessitated changes to the Raven commu- unit reporting directly to the squadron commander and TOC,
nications plan. Because the squadron commander often the Raven section provided a dynamic, responsive ISR option
commanded and controlled combat operations from a mobile that successfully answered priority intelligence requirements
tactical command post (TAC) closer to the forward line of (PIRs) and greatly increased lethality.
troops, the Raven section utilized voice reporting over the
squadron command net (FM radio), ensuring maximum Lessons Learned and Recommendations
dissemination of real-time reporting between disparate NTC Rotation 22-07 also uncovered friction points and
command and control nodes. Although OSRVTs at the TOC opportunities for improved Raven employment, including the
and mounted to a TAC Stryker were fully operational, line- ROZ process and Raven system limitations.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
The ROZ request process presented a persistent impedi-
ment to Raven operations. Of the many ROZ requests that One advantage of Raven consolida-
the Raven section leadership submitted, only 20 percent tion, vice operation at the troop level, is
received approval. Some of these denials were substantive;
for example, other higher-priority aviation assets were in
that the section leader and NCOIC were
the area, or the ROZ overlapped with an existing air corri- able to engage with the RAO directly.
dor. Other denials were more procedural or administrative,
stemming from inconsistent guidance from higher echelons
airframe, the Puma offers a 20-kilometer range and five-hour
or discrepancies between data submitted on the request loiter time — two and three times that of the Raven, respec-
versus that called up from the launch and recovery location. tively. Longer term, the Army should expedite and prioritize
One advantage of Raven consolidation, vice operation at the SUAS modernization. The Raven replacement for the troop/
troop level, is that the section leader and NCOIC were able to squadron level should be a quadcopter-style, vertical take-
engage with the RAO directly. This alleviated administrative off/landing SUAS platform that offers a similar range and
friction and optimized the request process to ensure ROZ loiter time to the Puma with greater stability, portability, and
approval. In the future, Tiger Ravens will maintain a close hover features that maximize the tactical echelons’ ability to
dialogue with the RAO during garrison training to streamline find and destroy the enemy.
the ROZ process.
Operating Ravens as a squadron ISR asset was extremely
The other major friction point was the Raven system successful for Tiger Squadron during NTC 22-07 and
itself. Launched like a paper airplane and recovered by further validated the advantages of Raven consolidation at
crash landing, the RQ-11B platform is a fragile airframe the squadron level. By concentrating its Raven assets, the
flown with outmoded ground control station software. As a unit generates a battalion-level ISR capability using exist-
rear-propelled aircraft, it is unduly vulnerable to weather and ing MTOE equipment, filling a previous gap between the
prone to unexpected crashes; because it must continuously brigade Shadow and the unit of action. Troops simply lack
fly forward at low altitude, it can be difficult for even the most the bandwidth to train, certify, and utilize the Raven platform
adept operators to retain a sensor fix on stationary targets. successfully during large-scale combat operations. While
These issues meant that the Raven section spent an exces- there are certainly circumstances where troop-level SUAS
sive amount of time troubleshooting software issues and are beneficial, so long as that SUAS is the Raven, squad-
recovering aircraft. The Raven’s range and loiter limitations rons and battalions will greatly benefit from consolidation to
also prevented the section from maximizing collection before increase lethality in the targeting cycle.
having to recover and relaunch.
Notes
An NTC-specific solution is for units to draw the RQ-20 1
CPT Peter Kerkhof and LTC Steven Gventer, “Lessons in Small
Puma upon arrival at Fort Irwin, CA. A larger and more stable
Unmanned Aerial Systems Employment for High-Intensity Conflict at
Squadron Level,” Armor (Summer 2018), accessed from https://www.
benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2018/Summer/3Kerkhof-
Gventer18.pdf.
Other Resources
Army Futures Command, “U.S. Army Takes Next Step to Procure New
Unmanned Aircraft System.” Army News Service, 7 September 2021,
accessed from https://www.army.mil/article/250020/u_s_army_takes_next_
step_to_procure_new_unmanned_aircraft_system.
“Puma LE,” AeroVironment, https://www.avinc.com/uas/puma-le
“Raven B,” AeroVironment, https://www.avinc.com/uas/raven
PEO Aviation, “Soldier Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS),” Army
News Service, 24 September 2020, accessed from https://www.army.mil/
article/239374/soldier_unmanned_aircraft_system_suas.
CPT Will Oakley currently serves as the squadron intelligence officer

for 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Tiger Squadron) at Fort Hood, TX.
A former Infantryman, his previous Military Intelligence assignments include
serving as task force collection manager in Iraq and analytical control
element officer-in-charge at 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). CPT
Oakley is a 2016 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY.
1LT Sharon Murray currently serves as the information collection
platoon leader in the Regimental Engineer Squadron, 3rd Cavalry
Regiment. She previously served as the assistant squadron intelligence
officer for Tiger Squadron during NTC Rotation 22-07. 1LT Murray is a 2020
A Soldier in the Tiger Squadron launches a Raven during training in graduate of the Redbird ROTC Battalion at Illinois State University.
support of troop external evaluations.

Instruction Is Leadership
CPT SHAMEEK DE LANCEY
CPT CHRIS JARRETT
I
n 2016, I (CPT De Lancey) was a Stryker rifle platoon experience thus far has likely been the responsibility of a
leader conducting a known distance (KD) range with a few key leaders who are in turn responsible for other junior
Thai counterpart platoon as part of Pacific Pathways. leaders or small teams, but leadership as an SGL requires
Everything was going according to plan: The ammunition a fundamentally different approach. MCCC students are
point was set; standards were briefed; preliminary marks- mature and educated rising professionals with prior leader-
manship instruction (PMI) was completed to standard; and ship experience, not younger lieutenants still learning the
remedial and concurrent training plans were established. We basics of organization and doctrine. Your goal is no longer
were well into the firing tables when my battalion commander about directing your organization to a common goal, but to
arrived for a battlefield circulation visit. challenge self-motivated individuals to attain an individual
level of expertise in a collective environment.
After an initial inspection of the training, he pulled me aside
and asked what manuals and doctrine I had read to prepare In practice, this is evinced as the Adult Learning Model, an
for the KD range. I admitted to not reading any training circu- understanding of group formation, and the art of practicing
lar (TC) or doctrine in its entirety but attempted to match what adaptive leadership — guiding the process of work as you
I thought was his expectation by referencing chapters and set conditions for the students to reach the desired outcome
sections on advanced marksmanship and KD firing tables. on their own. Years ago, the term for an MCCC teacher
Visibly dissatisfied with my answer, he replied, “LT, we as changed from small group instructor to small group leader.
professional Infantry officers do not REFERENCE doctrine The change was not accidental. It was made to reflect that
— we thoroughly study, know, and implement doctrine.” the role is not simply delivering content to individuals but
rather guiding the process of student learning, internalization,
This incident was one of those informal leader develop-
and teaching the students’ own future subordinate leaders.
ment snapshots that has been more valuable and impactful
In this way, an SGL’s impact distills through current students
than most deliberate leader professional development (LPD)
to reach the lieutenants and NCOs they will command in the
programs I’ve experienced. It was the first real time in my
upcoming years. Students are actively preparing for their
young career to that point where doctrine and its importance
roles as “educators” in their future commands, and SGLs
were conveyed to me. It also viscerally illustrated that the
are developing that capacity at the career course. This has
best leaders are committed to simple, consistent moments
always been the approach of effective leadership and proves
of instruction to their subordinates. After that discussion, I
“if you’re not teaching, you’re not really leading.” As an SGL,
researched, read, and to the best of my ability applied doctri-
you’ll get an exceptional opportunity to develop in this key
nal concepts to everything my platoon did, which dramatically
competency.
increased our capability and enhanced our contributions to
the battalion. Additionally, not only did that simple conversa- Your leadership competencies are further developed by
tion ignite my appreciation for doctrine, but it also ignited an an understanding that you are serving a collective seminar
appreciation for instruction as leadership and planted the (small group), but the learning is distinctly individual. Though
original seed of my desire to serve as a small group leader you will serve as an instructor for 16-20 students, your funda-
(SGL) for the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at mental goal is to instill an understanding in each individual
Fort Benning, GA. mind in the classroom. As a commander or small unit leader,
you approached your three to five individual junior leaders to
Amongst the myriad of highly attractive post-command
give focused-directed coaching and guidance. As an SGL,
broadening opportunities, serving as an SGL at MCCC
you’ll have a one-on-one relationship with each individual
deserves to be among your top choices. In this position, you’ll
student, not filtered through junior echelons of leaders. The
get a unique and challenging leadership experience; produce
SGL-to-student ratio violates an operational “span of control”
specific, tangible contributions to the profession of arms; and
but challenges you with responsibility for far more learning
be thoroughly developed as a tactical leader, teacher, and
to a far greater number of students. Translating learning
field grade officer.
outcomes to 16-20 people cannot be approached in the same
The Small Group Leader way as disseminating lessons to your unit, and this challenge
The title is neither a misnomer nor falsely aspirational personally develops your ability to lead and develop a large
— as an SGL, you’ll be a leader. However, exercising group unlike any of your previous experiences.
leadership here is markedly different from your experience Serving a greater number of people with a higher level
with U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units. Your of competency and a greater volume of learning forces you

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
to be deliberate. To be successful, you must
maintain a disciplined focus on what you are
there for before determining what you should
do. This means bringing your allegiance
to doctrine and the future success of your
students into alignment, even when your
students resist, and finding the right tools to
pace the learning. This wisdom is infused into
the culture at MCCC from initial to final coun-
seling with the director of tactics. Moreover,
you will receive personal coaching and
feedback on your ability to lead the adaptive
learning process from superiors and peers
alike. The certification process for new SGLs
is grueling and extremely developmental, but
the culture of leadership learning continues
to challenge and develop you throughout
your time at MCCC.
Contributing to the Profession of
Arms
While conquering a new level of leader- Photo courtesy of 3rd Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment
Maneuver Captains Career Course students participate in a practical exercise to
ship as an SGL, you will also be given a understand the individual concepts of each of the five paragraphs of an operation order.
wealth of opportunities to contribute to the
profession of arms. Most obviously, your role in the develop- component of flexibility and adaptive organizational learning.
ment of future company commanders will have an outsized SGLs practice what they preach. Teams of SGLs constantly
impact across the Army. The SGL cohort is soberly mindful review, critique, and propose changes to the MCCC through
of the 1:20 and 20:120 ratio: One SGL will personally impact module working groups to ensure the course remains doctrin-
about 20 students in his or her seminar, who will then go ally correct, tactically sound, and properly accounts for the
on to impact the 120 Soldiers in their future commands. If character of war in the 21st century.
you are reading this as a post-CCC officer, you likely recall MCCC offers other opportunities to contribute to the
your own SGL and the impact they made during your time in profession beyond the classroom. SGLs are commonly
their seminar. Your own experience at the CCC shapes the asked to review and provide input for doctrinal publications.
way you approach command in your planning style, tactical Within the past six months, we have reviewed and provided
competency, and leadership approach. If you care about feedback for revised drafts of Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1,
investing in the next generation of company commanders, Offense and Defense, and Army Tactics, Techniques, and
there is no better assignment than serving as an SGL. The Procedures (ATTP) 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in
opportunity to positively impact hundreds of companies, Urban Operations. SGLs are also provided temporary duty
troops, and batteries is immense. (TDY) opportunities to Combat Training Centers (CTCs)
One of the first lessons of the career course is an exercise and other professional military education (PME) to observe
in how to think critically and creatively. Through doctrine, and provide feedback on how the Army teaches combined
non-Department of Defense (DoD) reading, and exercises, arms tactics more broadly, which then provides better insight
SGLs attempt to illustrate that the point of CCC is not to for students and doctrine review. SGLs have an immense
dictate what to think but to give students the tools for how to amount of autonomy in their classrooms — you will have the
think. These tools appropriately rely heavily on doctrine in the freedom to cater to your style and your students’ learning
application of planning methodologies and tactical decisions needs. However, SGLs also contribute to the actual program
but are rooted in this initial discussion of thinking critically and of instruction (POI) for the course. In the same way, students
creatively. Illustrations like the Dunning-Kruger effect and the are encouraged to challenge and think creatively, SGLs
Marshmallow Test teach students to challenge assumptions constantly evaluate and critique the MCCC POI to determine
and reach fact-based conclusions while simultaneously if we are teaching the right things in the right way. At the time
engaging in creative and collaborative thinking. From day this article was written, we were working through a complete
one, students are encouraged to challenge material even as rewrite of how urban operations are taught to students in the
it is being given to them. This process of challenging every career course.
piece of new information transforms learning from a passive
“receive-mode” process to an active struggle that results Your First Student: You
in true internalization of the material. It results in rejecting This environment of constant analysis, evaluation, and
bad ideas and introducing better solutions, which is a critical creativity is not easy for the SGL — but it is exceptionally

developmental. Serving as an SGL directly makes you a success of our Army, and have the humility and aptitude to
better maneuver officer and develops you in the execution of learn. When these talented people form a group, it creates
unified land operations. As the adage states, “If you want to a great atmosphere where peers challenge each other to be
master something, teach it.” Nothing challenges and develops the best in doctrine, tactics, and the exercise of leadership.
you more as a maneuver officer than attempting to instruct a Furthermore, your leaders offer you the clear guidance and
room of students you just taught to question everything. This latitude to truly develop a better course through each teach-
is a positive experience — knowing you will be instructing ing iteration. We have been fortunate to have received some
doctrinal planning and tactics forces you toward a deeper truly exceptional leaders during our time in the Army, but the
study and appreciation of that doctrine. It is necessary for leaders at MCoE made it the norm.
the sake of your instruction. It also produces a much deeper Lastly, your communication skills will improve. Faced
level of understanding and application in your own mind and with leading a class every day, you’ll become well practiced
models what you expect from your students. at communicating effectively and concisely while tailoring
However, this exceptional growth does not occur in a to your audience. You’ll realize in real time the difference
vacuum. Your SGL peers are top-rated individuals who will between teaching an individual and teaching a group, and
challenge and develop you. Each SGL team is composed of find a lot of fulfillment in watching your verbal messaging
four Infantry officers, four Armor officers, one Field Artillery and example sink into your students’ minds. You’ll also
officer, one Aviation officer, and a team chief senior. The improve your written communication skills. The paper you’ve
result is a highly competent, competitive, and experientially been thinking of writing since you were a platoon leader will
diverse team. Your small, combined arms cohort will greatly receive the challenge and support needed to come to fruition.
deepen your understanding and application of maneuver Not only are SGLs frequently published, but camaraderie
warfare. Everyone has a vested interest in the success of matched with critical and creative thinking make this assign-
our future company commanders; therefore, everyone has a ment the perfect place to experiment with new concepts in a
vested interest in your success. safe environment. There is no shortage of people willing to
It is doubtful SGLs are hired for their doctrinal mastery listen and try out new ideas, perhaps even encouraging you
prior to arriving at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. to adapt and publish them. You will be in an environment of
Instead, the cohort of SGLs is made of people who simply positive peer-to-peer challenges to learn and grow.
care about the success of our students, care about the Conclusion
Serving as an SGL is a rewarding experience and
should rank among your top choices for post-command
broadening. You will experience a unique set of leader-
ship challenges that will directly influence your ability to
manage large teams as a field grade leader, and you’ll
practice and receive feedback on these skills in real time.
Your impact on the lives of your students, their future
Soldiers, and the tactics of our Army is also a clear and
tangible way to contribute to the profession. Finally, you
will grow immensely as a maneuver officer and be well
prepared for your future education and assignment as
a field grade officer. As you approach your upcoming
marketplace, map your career timeline, or begin thinking
about where you might go post-command, consider your
service to the next generation of company commanders
as a small group leader at the MCCC.
CPT Shameek De Lancey served as a small group leader (SGL)

for the Maneuver Captains Career Course for 18 months and is cur-
rently an Art of War Scholar at the Command and General Staff College
(CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous assignments include
serving as a Stryker rifle platoon leader, rifle company commander, and
headquarters company commander in 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Divi-
sion, and later as aide-de-camp to the commander of the 10th Mountain
Division.
CPT Chris Jarrett served as an SGL for 12 months and is currently
an Art of War Scholar at CGSC. His former assignments include serving
as a SBCT rifle platoon leader, battalion scout platoon leader, and as-
sistant S3. He commanded the Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop and
Headquarters Troop of 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and earned
a Masters of Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
What Is Leadership: From the Perspective

of a Command Sergeant Major
CSM JESSE J. CLARK
W
hat is leadership? Everyone has his or her
perspective on what leadership is. These view- If leaders demonstrate that they
points can come from prior leaders, leaders care enough for their Soldiers and
someone has encountered whether positive or negative, or
individuals who had an impact during childhood. Regardless,
continuously put their needs first, it will
all these examples of leaders had qualities and attributes build cohesion and trust in the leader.
that made an impact on someone. Leadership is key to
an organization being successful or not. In the Army, we
Being Present
have Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, Army Profession and
Leadership Policy, that lays out the framework of a leader. For a leader, some duties and responsibilities are required
This is helpful for young leaders to understand what they to be successful. One area that I have experienced that is
are expected to be; however, in my 22-year career, I have not consistent is being present. Some leaders fill a position
developed a leadership philosophy that has helped me lead but do not do anything to lead their organization. Leaders
my organizations. This philosophy includes the following should get out there and engage their Soldiers, get to know
areas: putting people first, being present, sharing hardships, them, and understand what it is that makes them who they
maintaining standards and discipline, and prioritizing physi- are. When you get to know those you lead, it can be reward-
cal fitness. This may not be helpful for everyone, but I am ing for both you and the individual or group that you are
hopeful that young leaders out there, who are trying to figure speaking with. Daily engagement with Soldiers is a priority
out their style of leadership, can take something from my in my organization. Saying “hello” or “good morning” is one
philosophy. way to acknowledge your organization. See how someone’s
day is going, ask about their family, and ask what their plans
People First are for the weekend. I am a college football fan so I like to
This phrase has so many meanings and is different for talk about football and other sports with anyone I can. This
everyone. From my perspective being a leader is not about can be so easy to do and does not take much effort but has
you, it is about those you lead and mentor in your career. a huge impact on those who need you to lead them. Always
Servant leadership is the perfect style of leadership that puts be the leader that you wanted.
people first. Over the years, I have tried my best to put the Sharing Hardships
people I lead first. This includes recognition, awards, time
off, eating last in the field, and ensuring that they are trained It is easy to get caught up in the day-to-day activities and
the best they can be to go to war. An example of this comes forget about what your Soldiers are doing. When we give a
from my current organization. When I arrived, I wanted to do task to our subordinates, whether leaders or Soldiers, we
something to recognize a Soldier each week from the battal- expect them to accomplish that task with minimal involve-
ion that did something awesome. I implemented the “Warrior ment from us. This is not always the case, and we must make
of the Week.” Each company submits a nomination at the it a point to change the way we think about how we lead our
end of the week, and I then pick who out of the battalion will Soldiers. We need to get involved, not because we do not
be recognized. I then present the Soldier a unit t-shirt on trust them but because we want to be out there with them. If
Facebook Live as his or her leader tells everyone why the Soldiers are filling sandbags, help them. We are not above
individual was selected. Additionally, each nominee receives doing these types of tasks at any level. This will continue to
a certificate of achievement. It is awesome to see so many build trust and confidence in your leadership. Leaders who
Soldiers recognized for the great things accomplished for share hardships with their organization build a culture that is
the organization. Think about what people first means to you positive and motivating, and then the organization will follow
and do it. that leader to the end of the earth if asked. Do not forget
where you came from.
If leaders demonstrate that they care enough for their
Soldiers and continuously put their needs first, it will build Standards and Discipline
cohesion and trust in the leader. Gaining trust from those In the Army, there are standard operating procedures
you lead can be a huge task, but once the trust is built, it will (SOPs), regulations, and policies that everyone must follow.
create a cohesive organization. Be the leader who appreci- As leaders, it is our responsibility to enforce these areas
ates those they lead. and explain why they must be followed. Not enforcing the

standards that have been set forth can lead to indiscipline. Conclusion
We must have disciplined formations to fight and win our
As leaders, we need to build a culture of trust and cohe-
nation’s wars. Enforcing standards, in my opinion, is where
sion in our organizations. If an organization’s culture lacks
we start building our disciplined formations. Leaders are
trust and cohesion, accomplishing missions will be harder
where the enforcement starts. Understand your unit’s SOPs
and can lead to indiscipline. Leaders must be subject matter
and policies so you can enforce them within your organiza-
experts in their field and be able to excel at both garrison
tion. Do not get frustrated or upset at new Soldiers coming
and tactical operations. If we cannot do both, we will not
to the organizations who do not know how the Army works.
be able to train, mentor, and lead others to do the same.
It is not just standards you need to teach but also the life
When I address my organization, I talk about when indi-
skills that will make them better prepared for their future. The
viduals become a sergeant or second lieutenant they are
more you teach them, the better they are — and the better
a leader until they get out of the Army, whether that is in
your organization will be. Be an engaged leader who knows,
three years or 20 years. This can be in any capacity they
lives, and enforces standards.
find themselves. Be a good leader, know your organization,
Physical Fitness and do the right things to take care of those you lead. We
Physical fitness is the basis of any military occupational as leaders never arrive, we continue to grow and develop
specialty (MOS) in the Army. We must all be able to shoot, until the day we get out of the Army. Use your leadership to
move, and communicate on the battlefield. If we are to partici- influence your organization in a positive way. This is how our
pate in large-scale combat operations in the future, moving Army will continue to be the best in the world and answer our
under load by foot is going to be required. Prepare your nation’s call when needed.
organization now. Do not wait. Build physical fitness plans
CSM Jesse J. Clark currently serves as the senior enlisted leader of
that will get your Soldiers ready for conditions that will be 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
physically demanding. Leadership at every echelon should at Fort Polk, LA. He began his military career in February 2000 when he
ensure this happens. If someone becomes injured, make enlisted in the Army Reserves as a hospital food specialist with the 256th
sure that individuals get the proper treatment and recovery Combat Support Hospital in Cleveland. After 9/11, he joined active duty as
an Infantryman. He attended Infantry One Station Unit Training and Airborne
so they can come back to your organization ready to fight. School at Fort Benning, GA, and was then assigned to the 82nd Airborne
Leaders are responsible for ensuring their formations are Division at Fort Bragg, NC. He has served as an infantry team leader, squad
physically fit. Ensure you do it but make sure that Soldiers leader, platoon sergeant, first sergeant, observer-coach-trainer, and opera-
are getting something out of what you have planned. This is tions sergeant major. He has deployed twice to Afghanistan in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom, once to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
not a task that should be taken off the calendar; it is one of Freedom, to Poland in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, to Kuwait in
the most important things you do. Be the difference for your support of Operation Spartan Shield and Operation Inherent Resolve, and
organization. to Qatar in support of Operation Allies Refugee. CSM Clark earned an asso-
ciate’s degree in general studies from Troy University as well as bachelor’s
Real-World Scenario and master’s degrees in organizational leadership from Columbia Southern
University.
A real-world example that brings all of these areas
together occurred from August thru October
2021. As the battalion command sergeant
major, my battalion deployed to Kuwait in
support of Operation Inherent Resolve. While
there, we received a no-notice mission to
send part of our element to Qatar in support
of a mission that is now known as Operation
Allies Refugee. Once we arrived, we led a joint
mission to process and move refugees coming
from Afghanistan onward to other locations
throughout the world. The operation required
the ability to put people first by ensuring that
we not only took care of those in uniform
but also took care of the refugees while we
processed them. In order to have a success-
ful mission, it took leaders being present and
sharing hardships with the entire organization.
The mission was stressful, exhausting, and
chaotic; however, because the organization
was physically fit and adhered to standards
Photo courtesy of 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment
and discipline, it was successful. This is just
Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment gather in Kuwait following support
one example of how my leadership philosophy of Operation Allies Refugee in Qatar from August-October 2021. While deployed, the
contributed to success. unit processed more than 30,000 refugees fleeing Afghanistan.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Mobile Protected Firepower:

An Opportunity
LTC BEN FERGUSON
CPT LENNARD SALCEDO
I
n 2016, defense news sources reported that the Army force, IBCTs will see improvement in three different planning
was interested in developing a lightweight ground factors. First, their ability to provide strategic reliability in
combat vehicle to accompany infantry brigade combat facing with motorized or mechanized near-peer threats will
teams (IBCTs) and keep them relevant in large-scale combat be enhanced. Second, they will be better able to respond
operations (LSCO) against a near-peer threat.1 Originally to increased threats with dedicated firepower. Finally, the
referred to as a light tank, Army officials named the new lethality of IBCTs will be improved through their gaining an
concept the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF); this approach organic combined arms maneuver capability comparable
was intended to dissuade service members from viewing it as to a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) and an armored
a tank-like vehicle and then employing it the same way as brigade combat team (ABCT).
the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT). The development The MPF provides a unique capability to enable the IBCT
of the MPF presents an opportunity to bridge a capability to fight as a strategic combined arms team.3 IBCTs use
gap that was created when the M551 Sheridan Armored up-armored, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle (AR/AAV) retired (HMMWVs) for mobility and protection, typically armed with
from service. The M551 had earned admiration for its effec- a .50 caliber machine gun, Mark 19 automatic grenade
tive operational capabilities — and disdain for its technical launcher, or tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
shortcomings. As the MPF meets testing milestones and (TOW) missile. While this system has proven invaluable over
prepares to integrate into IBCTs, commanders at the brigade multiple decades of service, it will be increasingly incapable
level and below must ensure the know-how to employ the of effectively filling the same role in the next major conflict.
platform correctly, or they will face a steep learning curve Even with Common Remotely Operated Weapon Stations
against adversaries, at the cost of Soldiers’ lives.2 The MPF’s (CROWS) and the Improved Target Acquisition System
tactical and strategic potential can better
enable the IBCT to execute its mission set
while augmenting its ability to defeat a larger
spectrum of enemy capabilities. This article will
exam the purpose, relevant history, utility, and
future for the MPF to improve its prospects of
being used appropriately.
Why Do We Need the MPF?
The MPF’s purpose is to defeat targets that
could compromise the effectiveness of the
IBCT. This capability is necessary to defeat
enemy prepared positions, to destroy enemy
armor vehicles, to close with and destroy
enemy forces, and to ensure freedom of
maneuver and action for the infantry. The plan
is for MPFs, by means of organic protection
and firepower, to augment the IBCT’s ability
to conduct combined arms maneuver with
growing technologies. The MPF, with scal-
able armor packages, provides the IBCT a
flexible and tailorable response in contested
U.S. Army photo
and various locations to mitigate the enemy’s The development of the Mobile Protected Firepower presents an opportunity to bridge
ability to exploit previous capability gaps within a capability gap that was created when the M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance/
the IBCT. With the addition of a light armored Airborne Assault Vehicle retired from service.

(ITAS), the HMMWV is outclassed by near-peer formations
that utilize air-droppable fighting vehicles with improved The MPF fills the capability gap
fire control systems to fire on the move. These near-peer by providing a survivable platform
fighting vehicles are armored, maneuverable, and casualty
producing; they can mitigate the IBCT’s strategic maneuver
capable of delivering vehicle- and
significantly. bunker-destroying rounds. At 105mm
Armor company teams had been a frequent request from with a variety of round types, the fully
18th Airborne Corps prior to 2018; this would consist of a stabilized main gun is more than capable
company team of mechanized infantry and tanks accompa- of neutralizing bunkers and defeating
nying an IBCT for a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
rotation. These Individual Ready Companies (IRCs) were light enemy armored forces that an IBCT
even aligned for deployments after the Sheridan’s retirement might encounter in theater.
left the 82nd Airborne with no armored force to accom-
pany it on contingency missions. Combatant command
engaging armored targets or enemy strongpoint defenses.
commanders still have the ability to create these teams
The MPF fills the capability gap by providing a survivable
from forward brigades, such as the deployment of Bradley
platform capable of delivering vehicle- and bunker-destroying
Fighting Vehicles to Syria to support allied operations or the
rounds. At 105mm with a variety of round types, the fully stabi-
deployment of Task Force 1-63 Armor during Operation Iraqi
lized main gun is more than capable of neutralizing bunkers
Freedom.4 This task force deployed to northern Iraq with the
and defeating light enemy armored forces that an IBCT might
173rd Airborne Brigade in 2003 to conduct reconnaissance
encounter in theater. Additionally, the MPF preserves the
in force and to demonstrate coalition resolve. Given that the
infantry’s organic anti-tank assets by directly filling that role.
173rd and the unit (then stationed in Germany) had trained This enables commanders to better reserve their assets for
together, commanders and planners were able to synchro- the appropriate situation and so to maneuver their units more
nize and work effectively to deter enemy forces from seizing effectively.
Kirkuk oil fields. These instances demonstrate the ability
to integrate these formations, but they were not nearly as The MPF enables commanders to appropriately scale
efficient as an organic armored asset aligned with that IBCT their responses to armed conflicts. Within the current brigade
could have been. The IRC concept and effectiveness do combat team (BCT) configurations, the only MPF-like alter-
compare with that of a company of MPFs that is co-located natives are the M1 Abrams MBT or the M1128 Mobile Gun
within the same division and can frequently train with the unit System (MGS). The MGS, while suitable in its initial employ-
to ensure successful integration. ment in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), has lost its utility
within the SBCT.6 The Dragoon variant of the Stryker, with
Limitations of Current Weapon Systems its 30mm gun and the CROWS-J upgrade, will enable future
The MPF will keep the IBCT strategically relevant in SBCTs to have more fighting vehicle-like capabilities and the
LSCO by providing the capability to defeat these threats limited capacity to destroy enemy vehicles when stationary.
and to ensure freedom of action and maneuver. An infantry This upgrade makes the SBCT more formidable, but it still
platoon can employ organic anti-tank weapon systems or rely lacks the firepower and fire control system that the MPF
on the battalion weapons company TOW missile trucks to can bring to the fight. The M1134 Anti-Tank Guided Missile
counter these threats at a significant trade-off.5 First, these Stryker, along with the dual role of anti-tank and anti-air capa-
systems lack a maneuverable fire control system. The ITAS bilities of the Mobile Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD)
and TOW missile, the Command Launch Unit (CLU) and Stryker, partially mitigate the capability gap left by the Army’s
Javelin, and the AT4 are all capable weapon systems that decision to divest the MGS in April 2021.7 The other MPF-like
require a dedicated team to operate; they become increas- alternative is the M1 Abrams. The venerable M1 is a proven
ingly difficult to employ when under direct or indirect fires. platform capable of destroying all types of targets. However,
TOW missiles require the gunner to track the missile onto its increasing weight and logistic requirements make strategic
its target undisturbed for whole seconds that could instead deployments more resource intensive. Until the Army is able
be better spent displacing to the next firing point; Javelins to field the Next Generation Combat Vehicle and mitigate
require an appropriate firing position for a top-down attack; some of these issues with current design and technology, it
and AT4s have no guiding system. will have to expend considerable resources in moving tanks
and armor assets from forward-deployed ABCTs to react to
Second, these weapon systems have minimal protection. conflicts in different areas of interest and areas of operation
Their portability enables the infantry to maneuver through (AORs).
restrictive terrain and set ambushes for enemy forces;
these benefits quickly become burdens if enemy forces Contrasting Improvements Offered by the MPF
can identify and disrupt maneuvering infantry. While these Given these considerations, the Army has limited capability
weapon systems are integral to the infantry platoon, they are for projecting armored combat power to potential theaters of
no replacement for the protection that the MPF will offer in combat. Even if strategic lift assets support the rapid deploy-

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
ment of tanks, the Pacific theater’s dense jungles and various capabilities. Their improved maneuverability will present the
islands or the lack of heavy bridges in Africa could impede enemy with a complex tactical dilemma. While the vehicles
the M1’s effectiveness. The MPF’s lighter weight allows it could still become mired, the MPF’s ability to enable friendly
to be more transportable and more maneuverable in such forces to defeat armor and strongpoint defenses are worth
environments. Thus, commanders and planners can scale the risk. HMMWVs have often filled this role, but they are
their responses in their respective combatant commands to incapable of effectively firing on the move and have signifi-
respond to various types of conflicts more effectively. In multi- cantly less survivability, making them less viable in combined
domain operations (MDO), the MPF is an essential enabler arms maneuver than the MPF. Consequently, maneuver
in ensuring that IBCT units retain their freedom of maneuver battalions will improve their lethality and ability to win enemy
and are able to contribute to the joint forcible entry maneuver engagements.
into contact. Recent Historic Use of Light Armor in Infantry
The MPF will enable IBCT subordinate units to conduct Formations
effective combined arms maneuver. IBCTs, as compared to
First fielded during the Vietnam War, M551 Sheridan tanks
SBCTs and ABCTs, currently have limited ability to conduct
replaced the M113A1 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (an
combined arms maneuver against an LSCO threat. The latter
M113 with three machine guns with turret shields) and M48
formations have dedicated firepower with fire control systems
Patton tanks in cavalry squadrons. With its lower weight
that enable them to maneuver and fight on the move. Based
and 152mm rounds, it was expected to perform better as
on JRTC rotations that previously utilized armor enablers an armored cavalry team.10 The M551’s performance unfor-
from other units, IBCTs typically continued to maneuver tunately failed to inspire total confidence. While maneuver-
without IRC tanks until they met the criteria to pull assets ing was easier, crews dealt with design flaws that caused
forward.8 Reportedly, battalions were already at 70 percent casualties.11 The aluminum armor made it just as vulnerable
combat power after initial engagement with indirect and to mines as the M113A1 had been and more vulnerable than
direct fires from the opposing force (OPFOR) infantry and M48s. Uncased rounds corroborated this, as vehicles hit by
fighting vehicles.9 The accompanying tank force often found mines and sometimes even significant anti-tank fire could
itself unable to occupy templated support-by-fire positions cause propellant to spill inside the vehicle, prompting crews
due to its delayed movement, friendly infantry’s displacement to bail out before the enemy could knock the vehicle out.
in the enemy’s engagement area, and difficulty maneuvering The electronics inside caused further problems in theater, as
in restrictive terrain. crews found systems not to be mission-capable when they
One of the MPF’s major benefits is the ability to maneuver were in environments with high moisture — again, this was
across restrictive terrain with the IBCT. At lower weights, the in Vietnam. The doctrine did not match the employment; the
vehicle is capable of maneuvering with and directly supporting vehicle was arguably not as well-suited for assaulting into
infantry so that commanders will immediately have necessary ambushes as the cavalry team of armored cavalry assault
vehicles and Patton tanks.12
Following Vietnam, the
Sheridan still proved the
utility for light armor during
Operation Just Cause. The
Army retired M551s into
opposing force units while
maintaining a battalion
(4th Battalion, 68th Armor
Regiment, later 3rd Battalion,
73rd Armor Regiment) in
the 82nd Airborne Division.
Paratroopers, together with
M551s, deployed to Panama;
they operated as a combined
arms team against a surprised
enemy force.13 Following a
heavy-drop that resulted in
one inoperable Sheridan,
the platform effortlessly
destroyed barriers to enable
National Archives photo
the infantry to maneuver.
An M551A1 Sheridan tank from the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, moves Snipers, machine-gun teams,
out after being offloaded from a convoy vehicle in Honduras on 1 March 1988. and enemy ambushes failed

U.S. Army photo
The Mobile Protected Firepower brings necessary firepower to the infantry brigade combat team’s fight. The 105mm cannon, the coaxial 7.62mm
machine gun, and the externally mounted .50 caliber machine are the primary armaments for the MPF.
to decisively engage paratroopers, as the Sheridan would Utility of the MPF

quickly dispose of them with its improved fire control systems
Skeptics of the MPF may wonder if IBCTs truly need the
and 152mm high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) or cannister
MPF in their formations. While historic trends show that
rounds. The strategic deployment of a combined arms teams appropriate doctrine and employment of armor are para-
of fires, infantry, and armored assets enabled a swift end to mount to success, senior leaders continually emphasize how
Operation Just Cause. the MPF is not a light tank; consequently, commanders do
3-73 AR demonstrated the utility for mobile protected fire- not immediately employ MPFs in frontline battles with other
power capabilities in Operation Desert Storm and Operation enemy armored forces.15 The MPF will operate optimally
Desert Shield. Following a massive intratheater air insertion when its use is aligned with the Army Armor Branch mission
of the entire battalion with the 82nd Airborne Division, M551s statement, closing in and destroying enemy by fire, maneu-
easily destroyed strongpoint defenses and secured ports for ver, and shock effect.16
the 24th Infantry Division and U.S. Marines. These M551s The MPF’s mobility can enable light infantry to maneu-
had the tank thermal sight (TTS) upgrade and were able to ver more effectively. This platform is more conducive than
fight accurately at night, alleviating enemy pressure on the previous generations to combined arms maneuver, and it
infantry. Machine-gun nests limited friendly maneuver only can allow for the relief of infantry caught in decisive engage-
briefly as 152mm rounds followed by heavy machine gun fire ments in restrictive terrain. The horsepower-to-weight ratio
destroyed multiple positions. These defenses would have allows the vehicle to negotiate various restrictive terrains
otherwise reduced combat power and logistical support for that would otherwise mire an MGS or an M1 Abrams.17 The
friendly forces, if not for MPF-like capabilities. M1A2C Abrams is also approaching higher weights that
While the Army knew it needed to replace the Sheridan to limit both its mobility on Air Force transports and its ability to
keep pace with advancing capability demands, it was none- maneuver through infrastructures such as European bridges
theless intent on maintaining the positive capabilities that the or the current M60 Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge. MPF’s
Sheridan had provided; it would make significant strides in mobility would also allow it to displace rapidly to support
this effort in the 1980s until the Gulf War. It started with the other maneuver battalions, as well as react to threats to
XM8 Armored Gun System (AGS).14 The air-droppable AGS lines of support better than HMMWVs or Mine-Resistant
could deliver capabilities similar to those of the M551, but it Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs). The MPF
could do so more reliably as it was equipped with the proven is likely more maneuverable than HMMWVs and M-ATVs as
105mm cannon. However, the budget could not support its a tracked vehicle, and it is definitely more lethal with its ability
production in 1996, and the program was cancelled. During to fire on the move; the other vehicles in the IBCT are not
GWOT, the Army tested the MGS viability as a replace- designed with such sophisticated fire control systems. While
ment for MPF-like capabilities in IBCTs, which ultimately they could probably engage on the move, their effectiveness
never resulted in the MGS integrating into IBCTs. The Army is limited at best. Situations where tanks cannot maneuver
accepted risk by not replacing the M551 earlier, as GWOT to support infantry assaults will likely become less frequent
remained the strategic priority for the upcoming years. The as MPF crews and leaders learn their vehicles’ limits and are
once acceptable capability gap became one of the focus able to provide commanders with realistic capabilities so that
points of the Army’s modernization efforts as the Army priori- planners can better determine where the MPF needs to be to
tized MDO and LSCO. make operations successful.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Skeptics may state that the logistic requirements for the
MPF could encumber the IBCT’s mobility. In these instances, The MPF will bring better protection
MPF maintenance and resupplies would become a frequent than other vehicles in the IBCT, but it
task for MPF leadership and operational control units to
manage. But the requirement for more logistic support and
is important to note that it cannot bring
planning should not be a factor in why this platform should not the same level of protection that a tank
be integrated into IBCTs. Leaders from ABCTs and SBCTs will might field.
be able to use their experience to help the IBCT better plan for
integration along with the appropriate doctrine, standard oper-
the impression of a main battle tank. These packages, simi-
ating procedures, and mission-specific considerations. Similar
lar to the urban upgrades that the Abrams received during
to the K-series modified table of equipment, the consolidation
GWOT (TUSKs, i.e., Tank Urban Survival Kits), will further
and central management of MPFs is paramount to success.
enable the vehicle to fight alongside IBCT units in cities.18
Like the weapons company in an IBCT or a weapons troop
Contrary to some opinions, tanks and armored vehicles have
within an SBCT, central management will enable MPF crews
fought and will continue to fight in cities. Their commitment to
to learn best practices in tactics, logistics, and leadership prior
the fight must be well regulated, but MPF-like platforms have
to their attachment to an IBCT. The MPF companies will then
enabled more effective and efficient fighting within cities.
be able to deploy with some of their organic logistic support,
Rather than avoid this reality, our Army should embrace the
knowing what they need to request and at what frequency to
concept and continue to refine armor employment within
enable the unit to properly support their operations. This will
cities and megacities.
become drastically more important as IBCTs begin converting
light BCTs that maneuver motorized infantry battalions, which The MPF will likely not be able to push through rocket-
need firepower to keep pace with their units. Thus, the MPF’s propelled grenade volleys or survive tank rounds. Instead, it
logistic footprint should not be treated as a limiting factor, but will be capable of offering enough protection to survive enemy
a planning factor for leaders to consider and develop both the fighting vehicles to augment dismounted troops’ survivability.
proper standard operating procedures and the tactics, tech- The addition of active protection systems, such as the Trophy
niques, and procedures (TTPs) to ensure success. system, will serve to improve its survivability against anti-tank
guided missiles and even against rocket-propelled grenades;
The MPF brings necessary firepower to the IBCT’s fight. together, these can enable the MPF, along with dismounted
The 105mm cannon, the coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, and infantry, to continue the fight both in open and mounted
the externally mounted .50 caliber machine are the primary AORs. While the crew is (relatively) safe from small arms fire
armaments for the MPF. The IBCT can only benefit from and higher caliber rounds, the MPF will have the capability
precision firepower that the fire control system is capable to engage with the combined arms team, enabling them to
of bringing to the fight. The main gun will likely use legacy better mass effects in the right times and spaces to defeat
rounds that the MGS used: HEAT rounds for fighting vehicles, enemy attacks and defenses. The MPF can regulate what
Sabot rounds for tanks, high-explosive plastic for obstacles, was once a haphazard fight with the enemy forces, support-
and cannister for massed infantry. This sort of firepower can ing dismounted commanders by providing more options to
provide commanders with the ability to respond to various react to contact and defeat enemy forces.
threats that would have taken a dismounted anti-tank team
Shock effect is the element that will truly make the MPF
or a TOW HMMWV into the fight. The MPF has a unique abil-
invaluable to commanders at any echelon. The ability to
ity to better react to contact than the other teams. Anti-tank
deliver precision direct fires from terrain previously thought of
teams and HMMWVs function well in the ambush, but they are
as too restrictive for armor to maneuver through will continu-
drastically less likely to destroy the enemy when responding
ally shrink as the MPF integrates and receives upgrades.
to an aggressive armored threat. Under pressure, it can be
Enemy strongpoint defenses that would have otherwise
difficult for these teams to properly acquire a target. The Carl
pinned infantry units down will continue to dwindle; this is
Gustav rockets or AT4s may not guarantee an immediate kill,
exactly the way history’s first tanks broke stalemates in World
meaning the vehicle could potentially engage friendly forces
War I. Next-generation enemy vehicles and upgraded older
and reduce combat power. Javelins and TOWs have a higher
platforms will become less destructive threats to the infantry
probability of kill, but they still require the gunners or crew to
as the MPF — and supported infantry or mounted anti-tank
remain vulnerable to direct and indirect fires. The MPF can
teams — will be able to effectively engage and destroy these
fight better on the move, allowing these teams to function
targets. The multiple tactical dilemmas given by these “spon-
under significantly less duress to destroy armored threats.
taneous” combined arms teams will force them to make hard
The MPF will bring better protection than other vehicles decisions that will allow IBCTs to remain strategically viable
in the IBCT, but it is important to note that it cannot bring the against more enemy formations. As the Army codifies the
same level of protection that a tank might field. Given that primary method for deploying the MPF to theater, its insertion
the MPF will use scalable armor packages to augment its along with IBCTs will become easier to plan and will begin
survivability, commanders must understand that the Mobile to integrate shock effect to break the enemy’s tempo and
Protected Firepower has been deliberately named to not give conduct successful operations.

Conclusion Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by
the Association of the United States Army in its Landpower
Since the end of World War II, the Army has continuously
Essay series.
made an effort to maintain MPF-like capabilities. Even as
these initiatives dwindled during the GWOT, the need for this Notes
capability continues to resonate with IBCT leaders today; it is 1
Sydney Freedberg Jr., “Big Guns for Light Infantry: Mobile Protected
something that they know will augment their operations and Firepower,” Breaking Defense, 11 August 2016.
generate options for them to react to contact. MPF is a capa-
2
John Stone, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military
Tradition (Abingdon, Oxford: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 11.
bility that must be maintained for IBCTs to remain formidable 3
Ibid, 173.
as the Army transitions to MDO and LSCO. After the delay 4
Brian Maddox, “Checkmate on the Northern Front: The Deployment
during GWOT, it seems that the Army is working toward clos- of Task Force 1-63 Armor in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Armor
(September-October 2003): 6-10.
ing the capability gap. It is worth thinking about future MPF 5
Randall Steeb et al., An Exploration of Integrated Ground Weapons
augmentations in light of what was discussed above regard- Concepts for Armor/Anti-Armor Mission (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991),
ing the utility of the MPF. What will the Army do to maintain 115-122.
and upgrade overmatch in fire, mobility, protection, and shock 6
Ryan Morgan, “The Army Is Getting Rid of its Stryker Mobile Gun System
After 15 years,” American Military News, 12 May 2021.
effect? 7
Ibid.
One likely upgrade depends on the ability to integrate more
8
Craig Triscari, “Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain,” Center for
Army Lessons Learned No. 98-10, 40-53.
unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 9
Ibid, 40-53.
artificial intelligence networks into the force.19 Robots that 10
Donald Snedeker, The Blackhorse in Vietnam: The 11th Armored
could automatically seek refueling stations, conduct resupply, Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam and Cambodia, 1966-1972 (Havertown, PA:
and return to crews is just one of hundreds of opportunities Casemate, 2020), 144-150.
11
Ibid.
that could secure integration between people and machines. 12
R.P. Hunnicutt, Sheridan: A History of the American Light Tank, Volume
This would undoubtedly put less risk on Soldiers conduct- 2 (Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point Books & Media, 1995), 78, 189.
ing resupply and present less of a target to enemy forces. 13
Ibid, 280-282.
Unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles
14
“M551 Sheridan Light Tank,” The Army Historical Foundation, accessed
16 June 2021, https://armyhistory.org/m551- sheridan-light-tank/.
could also be used to mitigate the need for scouts with the 15
Sydney Freedberg Jr., “MPF: Light Tank Competitors BAE & GD Head
MPF or combined arms teams. On-board artificial intelligence for Soldier Tests,” Breaking Defense, 19 October 2020.
could help generate synopses for radio transmissions during 16
“Mission Statement,” U.S. Army Fort Benning and the Maneuver Center
of Excellence, last modified 15 November 2021.
engagements or help crews slew the turret to their next most 17
Eric Tegler, “Two Light Tank Prototypes Battle for the Future of Army
dangerous targets. Firepower,” Popular Mechanics (7 March 2021).
18
Kendall Gott, Breaking the Mold, Tanks in Cities (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
The MPF’s doctrine development is just as important as Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 104-111.
its acquisition. It is likely to be used just like an Abrams by 19
P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the
virtue of its aesthetic, which could prove detrimental to its 21st Century (NY: Penguin Books, 2009), 131, 220.
integration into the combined arms team. This is no different
20
John Stone, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military
Tradition (Abingdon, Oxford: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 13.
from commanders in World War II receiving a tank destroyer 21
Bruce Gudmundsson, On Armor (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
company and proceeding to use them as though they were 2004), 178-179.
Sherman tanks. The accompanying doctrine and TTPs must
match the mission set and intent for the MPF, or its misuse At the time this article was written, LTC Ben Ferguson commanded
may deter future investment into making the platform better 3rd Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment at the Maneuver Center of Excellence,
Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include serving as Professor
suited for supporting IBCT operations.20 of Military Science, Boston University; Cobra 02, Fort Irwin, CA; squadron
The IBCT can undoubtedly continue to fight without an operations and executive officer, 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort
Bliss, TX; and commander, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment,
MPF platform to support its maneuvers. However, this comes Fort Hood, TX. He has attended the Command and General Staff College,
with unnecessary risks that the MPF can mitigate. There the Armor Captains Career Course and Basic Course, Airborne School, and
is a reason why the MPF is one of many iterations (Stuart, the Scout and Cavalry Leader Courses. LTC Ferguson earned a bachelor’s
Chaffee, Bulldog, and Sheridan tanks) in the endeavor to degree in history from Kings College and a master’s degree in public policy
management from Georgetown University.
have a light armored platform that can deliver precision fires.21
The ability to field combined arms teams is important in main- CPT Lennard Salcedo is the plans officer for 3-81 AR. His previous
assignments include serving as maintenance control officer, 1st Squadron,
taining overmatch with near-peer threats and in responding to 14th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry
various threats. This platform will enable the IBCT to remain Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA; platoon leader, 1-14 CAV; and
tactically formidable and strategically mobile while reducing squadron adjutant, 1-14 CAV. CPT Salcedo has attended Air Assault School,
the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course, the Scout Leader Course, the Stryker
casualties that would occur if the troops did not have direct fire
Leader Course, and the Maneuver Leader Maintenance Course. He earned
support to counter strongpoint threats and armored threats. a bachelor’s degree in psychology from the U.S. Military Academy at West
The transition from counterinsurgency operations to LSCO is Point, NY.
the perfect opportunity to invest in a capability that will help The authors would like to extend a special thanks to Dr. Robert S.
accomplish the mission, implement a better combined arms Cameron, the U.S. Army’s Armor Branch historian. Dr. Cameron was instru-
team into IBCTs, and mitigate casualties through fire, maneu- mental in ensuring historical accuracy when tracing the development and the
use of light tanks.
ver, and shock effect in the next armed conflict.

The Good Captain: A and the Middle East, The Good Captain offers leadership les-
Personal Memoir of America sons that are applicable from the squad level on the ground
to the national level in Washington. Nor is Hooker reluctant to
at War both praise and critique military leaders he served with, the
By R.D. Hooker Jr. defense bureaucracy, and national security policy.
Havertown, PA: Casemate Most of all, in pulling no punches, The Good Captain is
Publishers, 2022, 298 pages exciting and interesting. I found it hard to put down.
Reviewed by BG (Retired)
Mitchell M. Zais
R ichard Hooker was an Infantry

Soldier. When he retired out of
the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, he had been de-
Exocet Falklands: The
Untold Story of Special
ployed to more conflict zones than any other serving colonel Forces Operations
of his day and was the senior paratrooper on active duty, hav- By Ewen Southby-Tailyour
ing earned his jump wings 35 years earlier. Part memoir, part
military history, and part policy and political studies, The Good South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and
Captain tells an amazing story of courage and personal sacri- Sword Military, 2014, 2016, and
fice in a career that spanned over three decades and saw de- 2021, 314 pages
ployments to Grenada, Somalia, Zaire and Rwanda, Bosnia- Reviewed by SFC (Retired)
Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Sinai, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
John C. Simpson
T
Not only a combat and field Soldier on his journey from
he Falklands War began on 2
private to colonel, Hooker also served at the highest levels
April of 1982 with amphibious landings by Argentinian
of military and defense policymaking. He had three tours on forces on the Falkland Islands which had been under British
the White House National Security Council, served as aide rule since 1883. The military junta then governing Argentina
de camp to the Secretary of the Army, and as speech writer assumed that the British would be unwilling to protect some
for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His story bears islands in the South Atlantic and that with the occupation
witness to the horrors of war from the Soldier’s perspective the British would be driven to the negotiating table for a final
and to the often tragic decision making at the highest levels resolution. They hadn’t counted on Prime Minister Margaret
of national security. Thatcher, however, as she established a War Cabinet on 6
Hooker was born in the Army; his father was also a ca- April for the express purpose of retaking the Falkland Islands
reer Infantryman and paratrooper. Both his sons served as by force. The conflict later ended on 14 June of that same
privates in combat, one with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and year with the British victorious over the invaders.
one with the 82nd Airborne Division, before being commis- Since then, there has been a great deal of analysis in
sioned as Infantry officers. Like so many “Army brats,” the regard to lessons learned from this conflict ranging from how
author grew up with frequent moves and multiple family sep- vulnerable surface ships are from both air-launched guided
arations. His own family made similar sacrifices. missiles or torpedoes from submarines to how in an age of air
Enlisting straight out of high school, Hooker’s first assign- mobility and mechanized warfare British paratroopers still had
ment was to the 82nd Airborne Division. After attending the to march 21 kilometers and the Royal Marine Commandos
West Point prep school and graduating from the academy, (carrying 80-pound loads) had to be able march 90 kilome-
he returned to the 82nd. What ensued was an extraordinary ters just to get to their battlefields. And that’s nowhere near a
30-year career that took him around the world. Having led comprehensive list.
Soldiers in war and in peace as an airborne platoon leader, As anyone who studies military history will tell you though,
company commander, battalion commander, and brigade the full story of a war is seldom known in the immediate after-
commander, his insights and anecdotes serve as a primer on math. There is, however, a “sweet spot” in the research where
leadership. The sacrifices required by the Soldiers and their useful information is finally declassified and surviving partici-
families who bear the burden of our nation’s conflicts are well pants can be interviewed for their firsthand accounts. This all
documented. brings us to the subject of this review, Exocet Falklands, an
Because it covers the military landscape from the halls of outstanding book that definitely benefited from the release of
the Pentagon and White House to the killing fields of Africa previously classified material as well as firsthand interviews

with personnel from both sides of the conflict that were con- One error in the planning of Plum Duff that hit home for
ducted by the author. me was using “you never know” as a substitute for proper
The result is a very readable book with a narrative that contingency planning. Without going into too much detail,
weaves together three parallel story lines: the Argentinian the patrol that was only intended to place surveillance on
effort to do what British intelligence believed impossible the target airfield was ordered to be ready to destroy the
and mount Exocet missiles onto their aircraft without techni- aircraft on the ground if possible. This meant food and cold
cal assistance from French factory technicians; the events weather clothing were replaced with explosive charges and
behind the planning and mistakes over Operation Mikado; detonators. This left each man with four days rations and
and the comedy of errors that was Operation Plum Duff. This inadequate clothing for the autumn weather. This would
is then followed by details of the “hitherto unknown” (accord- impact the mission after the patrol was dropped off by the
ing to the author) — Operation Kettledrum. helicopter across the Chilean border instead of the planned
45 kilometers from the airfield, which led to them trying to
Operation Mikado was supposed to be an airfield assault walk more than 160 kilometers.
using multiple C-130 transports loaded with special air
commandos to destroy the only Argentine aircraft capable The author has included two things of extreme value in
of carrying French Exocet anti-ship missiles. It was actu- this book: a 10-page timeline at the beginning and a 12-page
ally inspired by the successful hostage rescue at Entebbe, epilogue at the end that analyzes the events and decisions
Uganda, by Israeli Defense Forces on 4 July 1976. Plum made by the British military. I’ll leave you with what I person-
Duff was a reconnaissance patrol in support of Mikado ally found to be one of the most useful quotes in the whole
involving an eight-man SAS element that was to approach text that reinforces the constant need to train the whole spec-
the target airfield and provide final eyes on target prior to trum of the skill set and not just the “high-speed, low-drag”
the raid. Kettledrum was a proposed mission for the Special things. It was from an SAS corporal who was in B Squadron
Boat Squadron (SBS) to perform an attack on the mainland at the time it was standing by for Operation Mikado:
at Puerto Deseado in order to destroy any aircraft that they “We trained and worked as infantry sections for the first
might find. time since I joined the Regiment... most of my sergeants
The lessons to be learned from the planning mistakes didn’t have a clue about infantry battle-drills... They couldn’t
documented here are worth the price of the book alone in my give section or platoon orders and would be dangerous to
opinion. Mikado was never executed, but prior to its cancella- have around in a fire-fight. I for one wouldn’t have followed
tion saw the voluntary termination of a senior NCO from the some of my own sergeants... War was bringing out the worst
SAS in protest of being assigned a “suicide mission” and the as well as the best in the SAS. (emphasis added)”
relief of his squadron commander for a perceived failure to Now, I don’t know if you’re a notetaker, highlighter, or
maintain morale. It’s from studying Plum Duff, however, that underliner when reading a book of this type. Myself, I used
we learn the most valuable lessons in the conduct of a long- color-coded adhesive flags to mark the locations of items I
range reconnaissance patrol. This mission was full of errors found with a particularly useful lesson. This is that kind of
practically from the beginning with the team being too large book. I think you’ll enjoy reading it, and you just might learn
for a recon patrol but too small for a combat patrol. something as well. I highly recommend this book.
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PB 7-22-4

RUSSELL A. ENO WINTER 2022-2023 Volume 111, Number 4

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 1

The Case for Cold Regions

and Mountain Operations Training

environment for friendly and enemy forces. This includes the

Photo by CPT Edward Kwait

2 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 3

4 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 5

CPT Edward M. Kwait currently serves as the

6 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

MAJ TOM KUMES

An Army Mountain Warfare School

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 7

8 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 9

Mountain Alpine Forces

for Strategic Competition

10 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 11

12 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 13

Training as combined arms teams will continue to be

Updated FM 3-0, Operations, Released FM 3-0

Available at: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

14 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 15

16 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 17

18 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Photo by SFC Whitney Hughes

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 19

20 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 21

22 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 23

A Stryker reconnaissance vehicle from the 56th

24 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 25

26 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 27

New from the Army Center for Lessons Learned

Available at: https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2022/11/04/63200cc0/23-01-738-combining-arms- COMBINED

in-the-close-fight-nov-22-public-release.pdf Approved for Public Release

People First Task Force

ublic Release Approved for Public Release

28 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

and back-blast considerations of the Carl Gustav to defend

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 29

30 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 31

32 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 33

34 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023

Winter 2022-2023 INFANTRY 35

Eye of the Tiger:

36 INFANTRY Winter 2022-2023