DB2 - Lec5
DB2 - Lec5
DB2 - Lec5
Introduction
Database security means protecting the database from unauthorized access, modification or
destruction.
Database security pillars
Authentication and Authorization
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
DATABASE SECURITY PILLARS
AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
Confidentiality refers to the need to maintain secrecy over data, (critical to the
organization), whereas Privacy refers to the need to protect data about individuals.
Generally it means that protection of information against unauthorized disclosure
A Security policy is the statement of the security that the system is expected to
enforce. Every organization should have a publication that prescribes the security
policies and procedures that must be followed. It should define:
The specific rules,
Who is responsible for enforcing them, and
What procedures should be followed when requesting exceptions to policy or when reporting and
responding to expected security breaches.
SECURITY CONTROL
There are three types of security controls that need to be implemented for a successful security
policy to be put into action.
Administrative controls consist of policies that determine how the organization will function.
Technical controls use software and hardware resources to control access to information and
computing systems, to help mitigate the potential for errors and blatant security policy violations.
Physical controls monitor and protect the physical environment of the workplace and computing
facilities.
DATABASE SECURITY AND THE DBA
The database administrator (DBA) is the central authority for managing a database
system. The DBA’s responsibilities include granting privileges to users who need to
use the system and classifying users and data in accordance with the policy of the
organization. The DBA has a DBA account in the DBMS, sometimes called a system
or superuser account, which provides powerful capabilities.
Account creation
Privilege granting
Privilege revocation
Security level assignment
ACCESS PROTECTION, USER ACCOUNTS, AND DATABASE AUDITS
Whenever a person or group of persons need to access a database system, the individual or group
must first apply for a user account. The DBA will then create a new account number and password for
the user if there is a legitimate need to access the database.
The database system must also keep track of all operations on the database that are applied by a
certain user throughout each login session. (log file)
A database log that is used mainly for security purposes is sometimes called an audit trail.
DATABASE SECURITY MECHANISMS
ACCESS CONTROL
Access Control is the most important technique or mechanism for implementing the authorization.
The basic principle in all access control models is that a subject is or is not permitted to perform a certain
operation on an object.
The subject can be characterized by its identity, its roles in an organization, its tasks, and so on
The default approach adopted by most access control policies is that any request which is not authorized by the
access control policies is denied.
The most common models are:
Discretionary Access Control—DAC
Mandatory Access Control—MAC
Role-Based Access Control—RBAC
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL BASED ON GRANTING AND
REVOKING PRIVILEGES
The typical method of enforcing discretionary access control in a database system is based on the
granting and revoking privileges.
Types of Discretionary Privileges
The account level: At this level, the DBA specifies the particular privileges that each account holds
independently of the relations in the database.
The relation (or table level): At this level, the DBA can control the privilege to access each individual
relation or view in the database.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
TYPES OF DISCRETIONARY PRIVILEGES
The privileges at the account level apply to the capabilities provided to the account
itself and can include:
the CREATE SCHEMA or CREATE TABLE privilege, to create a schema or base relation;
the CREATE VIEW privilege;
the ALTER privilege, to apply schema changes such adding or removing attributes from relations;
the DROP privilege, to delete relations or views;
the MODIFY privilege, to insert, delete, or update tuples;
and the SELECT privilege, to retrieve information from the database by using a SELECT query.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
TYPES OF DISCRETIONARY PRIVILEGES
The second level of privileges applies to the relation level, whether they are base relations or virtual
(view) relations.
The granting and revoking of privileges generally follow an authorization model for discretionary
privileges known as the access matrix model, where the rows of a matrix M represents subjects
(users, accounts, programs) and the columns represent objects (relations, records, columns, views,
operations). Each position M(i,j) in the matrix represents the types of privileges (read, write, update)
that subject i holds on object j.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
TYPES OF DISCRETIONARY PRIVILEGES
In SQL the following types of privileges can be granted on each individual relation R:
SELECT (retrieval or read) privilege on R: Gives the account retrieval privilege.
In SQL this gives the account the privilege to use the SELECT statement to retrieve tuples from R.
MODIFY privileges on R: This gives the account the capability to modify tuples of R.
In SQL this privilege is further divided into UPDATE, DELETE, and INSERT privileges to apply the corresponding SQL
command to R. In addition, both the INSERT and UPDATE privileges can specify that only certain attributes can be updated
by the account.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
TYPES OF DISCRETIONARY PRIVILEGES
REFERENCES privilege on R: This gives the account the capability to reference relation R when
specifying integrity constraints. The privilege can also be restricted to specific attributes of R.
Notice that to create a view, the account must have SELECT privilege on all relations involved in the
view definition.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
SPECIFYING PRIVILEGES USING VIEWS
The mechanism of views is an important discretionary authorization mechanism in its own right.
For example, if the owner A of a relation R wants another account B to be able to retrieve only some
fields of R, then A can create a view V of R that includes only those attributes and then grant SELECT
on V to B. The same applies to limiting B to retrieving only certain tuples of R; a view V’ can be created
by defining the view by means of a query that selects only those tuples from R that A wants to allow B
to access.
DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
REVOKING PRIVILEGES
Whenever the owner A of a relation R grants a privilege on R to another account B, privilege can be
given to B with or without the GRANT OPTION.
If the GRANT OPTION is given, this means that B can also grant that privilege on R to other accounts.
Suppose that B is given the GRANT OPTION by A and that B then grants the privilege on R to a third
account C, also with GRANT OPTION.
In this way, privileges on R can propagate to other accounts without the knowledge of the owner of R. If the
owner account A now revokes the privilege granted to B, all the privileges that B propagated based on that
privilege should automatically be revoked by the system.
AN EXAMPLE
Suppose that the DBA creates four accounts (A1, A2, A3, and A4) and wants only A1 to be able to
create base relations; then the DBA must issue the following GRANT command in SQL:
GRANT CREATETAB TO A1;
In SQL2 the same effect can be accomplished by having the DBA issue a CREATE SCHEMA command
as follows:
CREATE SCHAMA EXAMPLE AUTHORIZATION A1;
AN EXAMPLE(2)
User account A1 can create tables under the schema called EXAMPLE.
Suppose that A1 creates the two base relations EMPLOYEE and DEPARTMENT; A1 is then owner of
these two relations and hence all the relation privileges on each of them.
Suppose that A1 wants to grant A2 the privilege to insert and delete tuples in both of these relations,
but A1 does not want A2 to be able to propagate these privileges to additional accounts:
GRANT INSERT, DELETE ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A2;
AN EXAMPLE(3)
AN EXAMPLE(4)
Suppose that A1 wants to allow A3 to retrieve information from either of the two
tables and also to be able to propagate the SELECT privilege to other accounts. A1
can issue the command:
GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A3 WITH GRANT OPTION;
(Notice that A4 can not propagate the SELECT privilege because GRANT OPTION
was not given to A4.)
AN EXAMPLE(5)
Suppose that A1 decides to revoke the SELECT privilege on the EMPLOYEE relation
from A3; A1 can issue:
REVOKE SELECT ON EMPLOYEE FROM A3;
(The DBMS must now automatically revoke the SELECT privilege on EMPLOYEE
from A4, too, because A3 granted that privilege to A4 and A3 does not have the
privilege anymore.)
AN EXAMPLE(6)
Suppose that A1 wants to give back to A3 a limited capability to SELECT from the
EMPLOYEE relation and wants to allow A3 to be able to propagate the privilege. The
limitation is to retrieve only the NAME, BDATE, and ADDRESS attributes and only for the
tuples with DNO=5.
A1 then create the view:
CREATE VIEW A3EMPLOYEE AS
SELECT NAME, BDATE, ADDRESS
FROM EMPLOYEE
WHERE DNO = 5;
After the view is created, A1 can grant SELECT on the view A3EMPLOYEE to A3 as follows:
GRANT SELECT ON A3EMPLOYEE TO A3 WITH GRANT OPTION;
AN EXAMPLE(7)
Finally, suppose that A1 wants to allow A4 to update only the SALARY attribute of
EMPLOYEE;
A1 can issue:
GRANT UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE (SALARY) TO A4;
(The UPDATE or INSERT privilege can specify particular attributes that may be
updated or inserted in a relation. Other privileges (SELECT, DELETE) are not
attribute specific.)
MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL
Typical security classes are top secret (TS), secret (S), confidential (C), and
unclassified (U), where TS is the highest level and U the lowest:
TS ≥ S ≥ C ≥ U
The commonly used model for multilevel security, known as the Bell-LaPadula model,
classifies each subject (user, account, program) and object (relation, tuple, column,
view, operation) into one of the security classifications, T, S, C, or U:
clearance (classification) of a subject S as class(S) and to the classification of an object O as
class(O).
MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL
To incorporate multilevel security notions into the relational database model, it is common
to consider attribute values and tuples as data objects.
Hence, each attribute A is associated with a classification attribute C in the schema, and each
attribute value in a tuple is associated with a corresponding security classification.
In addition, in some models, a tuple classification attribute TC is added to the relation
attributes to provide a classification for each tuple as a whole. Hence, a multilevel relation
schema R with n attributes would be represented as
R(A1,C1,A2,C2, …, An,Cn,TC)
where each Ci represents the classification attribute associated with attribute Ai.
MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL
The value of the TC attribute in each tuple t – which is the highest of all attribute
classification values within t – provides a general classification for the tuple itself,
whereas each Ci provides a finer security classification for each attribute value
within the tuple.
The apparent key of a multilevel relation is the set of attributes that would have
formed the primary key in a regular (single-level) relation.
COMPARING DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL
By contrast, mandatory policies ensure a high degree of protection in a way, they prevent any illegal
flow of information.
Mandatory policies have the drawback of being too rigid and they are only applicable in limited
environments.
In many practical situations, discretionary policies are preferred because they offer a better trade-off
between security and applicability.
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Role-based access control (RBAC) emerged rapidly in the 1990s as a proven technology for managing
and enforcing security in large-scale enterprise-wide systems.
Its basic notion is that permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to appropriate
roles.
Roles can be created using the CREATE ROLE and DESTROY ROLE commands.
The GRANT and REVOKE commands discussed under DAC can then be used to assign and revoke
privileges from roles.
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
RBAC appears to be a viable alternative to traditional discretionary and mandatory access controls; it
ensures that only authorized users are given access to certain data or resources.
Many DBMSs have allowed the concept of roles, where privileges can be assigned to roles.
Role hierarchy in RBAC is a natural way of organizing roles to reflect the organization’s lines of
authority and responsibility.
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Another important consideration in RBAC systems is the possible temporal constraints that may exist
on roles, such as time and duration of role activations, and timed triggering of a role by an activation of
another role.
Using an RBAC model is highly desirable goal for addressing the key security requirements of Web-
based applications.
In contrast, discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) models lack
capabilities needed to support the security requirements emerging enterprises and Web-based
applications.