TRS 1030 Annex 3 EV71 Vaccines

Annex 3
Recommendations to assure the quality, safety and

efficacy of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated)
Introduction 161
Purpose and scope 163
Terminology 163
General considerations 165
International reference materials 168
Part A. Manufacturing recommendations 170
A.1 Definitions 170
A.2 General manufacturing recommendations 170
A.3 Control of source materials 170
A.4 Control of vaccine production 175
A.5 Filling and containers 185
A.6 Control tests on the final lot 186
A.7 Records 188
A.8 Retained samples 188
A.9 Labelling 188
A.10 Distribution and transport 189
A.11 Stability testing, storage and expiry date 189
Part B. Nonclinical evaluation of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated) 190
B.1 Product characterization and process development 190
B.2 Nonclinical immunogenicity and protection studies 191
B.3 Nonclinical safety studies 192
Part C. Clinical evaluation of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated) 192
C.1 Introduction 192
C.2 Assays 193
C.3 Immunogenicity 194
C.4 Efficacy 195
C.5 Safety 199
Part D. Recommendations for NRAs 200
D.1 General recommendations 200
D.2 Official release and certification 200
Authors and acknowledgements 201
159
WHO Expert Committee on Biological Standardization Report of the seventy-second and seventy-third meetings
References 202
Appendix 1 Model summary protocol for the manufacturing and control of
enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated) 209
Appendix 2 Model NRA/NCL Lot Release Certificate for enterovirus 71 vaccines
(inactivated) 220
Recommendations published by the World Health Organization

(WHO) are intended to be scientific and advisory in nature. Each
of the following sections constitutes recommendations for national
regulatory authorities (NRAs) and for manufacturers of biological
products. If an NRA so desires, these WHO Recommendations may
be adopted as definitive national requirements, or modifications
may be justified and made by the NRA. It is recommended that
modifications to these WHO Recommendations are made only
on condition that such modifications ensure that the product is at
least as safe and efficacious as that prepared in accordance with the
recommendations set out below.
WHO Technical Report Series, No. 1030, 2021
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Abbreviations
BPL beta-propiolactone
ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
EV71 enterovirus 71
HFMD hand, foot and mouth disease
ICP immune correlate of protection
Ig immunoglobulin
IPV inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine
MCB master cell bank
NAT nucleic acid amplification technique
NCL national control laboratory
NIBSC National Institute for Biological Standards and Control
NIFDC National Institutes for Food and Drug Control
NRA national regulatory authority
PCR polymerase chain reaction
PDL population doubling level
PSGL-1 P-selectin glycoprotein ligand-1
RD rhabdomyosarcoma
SCARB2 scavenger receptor class B member 2
SCARB2 scavenger receptor class B member 2 (gene)
WCB working cell bank
Introduction
Enterovirus 71 (EV71) was first isolated from the faeces of a female suffering
from encephalitis in 1969 in California (1). However, a retrospective study
conducted in the Netherlands indicated that the virus could have emerged
as early as 1963 (2), a finding consistent with reports of possible worldwide
EV71 epidemics in the late twentieth century (3). The virus is associated with
hand, foot and mouth disease (HFMD) throughout the world and has caused
epidemics in Asia, Europe and North America. Manifestations of the disease
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range from asymptomatic infection to mild HFMD to neurological disease

with severe central nervous system complications and cardiopulmonary failure.
In severe cases mortality rates can be high, especially in children aged 5 years
and younger. EV71 is considered to be the most severe neurotoxic enterovirus
and severe EV71 disease has become a major public health problem in China.
In 2011, the WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific issued A guide to
clinical management and public health response for hand, foot and mouth
disease (HFMD) (4) to support the treatment, prevention and control of HFMD.
Several vaccines against EV71 are currently under development and
three inactivated EV71 vaccines have been licensed in China (5–10). The
WHO Expert Committee on Biological Standardization discussed the EV71
situation at its 67th meeting in 2016 and considered it to be of major regional
significance (11). The Committee noted that the joint efforts of the National
Institutes for Food and Drug Control (NIFDC) and the National Institute for
Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) had resulted in the development
of the First WHO International Standard for anti-EV71 serum (human), and
recommended that consideration also be given to the development of a WHO
written standard for EV71 vaccines. In addition, the First WHO International
Standard for EV71 inactivated vaccine was established by the Committee in
October 2019 following a collaborative study led by NIBSC and NIFDC (12,
13). National standards for antigen content and neutralizing antibody responses
for evaluating EV71 vaccines are also available in China (14) where they have
supported the development and clinical assessment of such vaccines. In 2018,
the Committee also endorsed a proposal to develop WHO international
standards for enterovirus RNA for nucleic acid amplification technique (NAT)-
based assays for EV71 (15, 16).
Following requests from regulators and other stakeholders for WHO
to develop recommendations to assure the quality, safety and efficacy of EV71
vaccines, a series of meetings was convened by WHO to review the current

status of their development and licensure (17). These meetings were attended by
experts from around the world involved in the research, manufacture, regulatory
assessment and approval, and control testing and release of EV71 vaccines.
Participants were drawn from academia, national regulatory authorities (NRAs),
national control laboratories (NCLs) and industry. The recommendations
provided in the current document for the production, quality control and
evaluation of inactivated EV71 vaccines have been based upon the experiences
gained during the development and production of the first three licensed EV71
vaccines in China, the candidate EV71 vaccines now under development (5–8,
18–22) and other inactivated viral vaccines, such as inactivated poliomyelitis
vaccines (IPVs) and hepatitis A vaccines (23, 24).
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Purpose and scope

These WHO Recommendations provide guidance to NRAs and manufacturers
on the manufacturing processes, quality control and nonclinical and clinical
evaluations needed to assure the quality, safety and efficacy of inactivated EV71
vaccines.
The guidance applies to EV71 vaccines prepared by the inactivation of
whole EV71 virus for prophylactic use, grown in mammalian cells in culture,
and using formaldehyde or other chemical inactivation procedures.
The document does not cover recombinant and other forms of subunit
vaccines, vectored vaccines, virus-like particle vaccines or bivalent EV71-CA16
vaccines, which are at an early stage of development. However, some aspects
outlined in this document may be relevant and may be taken into consideration
during the development of such vaccines.
These WHO Recommendations should be read in conjunction with
current WHO guidance documents on the nonclinical (25) and clinical (26)
evaluation of vaccines, good manufacturing practices for biological products
(27), characterization of cell banks (28), nonclinical evaluation of vaccine
adjuvants and adjuvanted vaccines (29) and lot release (30).
Manufacturers and regulators should also take note of the decision of
the Committee in 2018 to discontinue the inclusion of the innocuity test (also
referred to as the abnormal toxicity test or general safety test) in routine lot
release testing requirements for all vaccines in WHO Recommendations,
Guidelines and other guidance documents for biological products (31, 32). As
this test is no longer recommended, it is not included in the routine testing
requirements for EV71 vaccines provided in the current document.
Terminology
The definitions given below apply to the terms as used in these WHO
Recommendations. These terms may have different meanings in other contexts.
Adjuvant: a vaccine adjuvant is a substance, or combination of substances,
that is used in conjunction with a vaccine antigen to enhance (for example,
increase, accelerate, prolong and/or possibly target) the specific immune response
to the vaccine antigen and the clinical effectiveness of the vaccine.
Adventitious agents: contaminating microorganisms of the cell culture,
or source materials used in its culture, that may include bacteria, fungi,
mycoplasmas/spiroplasmas, mycobacteria, Rickettsia, protozoa, parasites,
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents and endogenous/exogenous
viruses that have been unintentionally introduced into the manufacturing
process of a biological product.
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Cell bank: a collection of vials of cells of uniform composition (though

not necessarily clonal) derived from a single tissue or cell and used for the
production of a vaccine, either directly or via a cell bank system.
Cell seed: a quantity of well-characterized cells that are frozen and
stored under defined conditions, such as in the vapour or liquid phase of liquid
nitrogen, in aliquots of uniform composition derived from a single tissue or cell,
one or more of which would be used for the production of a master cell bank
(MCB). Cell seed is also referred to as a pre-MCB or seed stock. It may be made
under conditions of good manufacturing practices or under the manufacturer’s
research and development conditions.
EV71 antigen: the virus-specific antigen produced in infected cell
cultures and purified from such cultures. It can be assayed by methods such as
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) using EV71-specific antibodies.
The antigen may consist of empty or full virus particles or both. The full and
empty particles differ in their antigenic reactivity and both may be present in
the final vaccine.
Final bulk: a formulated vaccine preparation from which the final
containers are filled. The final bulk may be prepared from one or more purified
antigen bulks formulated to contain all excipients and homogenous with respect
to composition.
Final lot: a collection of sealed final containers of finished vaccine that
is homogeneous with respect to the risk of contamination during the filling
process. A final lot must therefore have been filled from a formulated bulk in
one continuous working session.
Immunogenicity: the capacity of a vaccine to induce antibody-mediated
and/or cell-mediated immunity and/or immunological memory.
Master cell bank (MCB): a quantity of well-characterized cells of human
or animal origin derived from a cell seed at a specific population doubling level
(PDL) or passage level, dispensed into multiple containers, cryopreserved and
stored frozen under defined conditions (such as the vapour or liquid phase of
liquid nitrogen) in aliquots of uniform composition. The MCB is prepared from
a single homogeneously mixed pool of cells and is used to derive all working
cell banks. The testing performed on a replacement MCB (derived from the
same clone or from an existing master or working cell bank) is the same as for
the initial MCB, unless a justified exception is made.
Master seed lot: a quantity of virus suspension that has been processed
at the same time to ensure a uniform composition, and passaged for a specific
number of times that does not exceed the maximum approved by the NRA. It
is characterized to the extent necessary to support development of the working
seed lot.
Purified inactivated bulk: a purified pool of virus harvests in which the
virus has been inactivated through the use of a validated method either before
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or after purification. It may be prepared from one single harvest or a number of

single harvests and may yield one or more final bulks.
Seed lot: a preparation of live viruses constituting the starting material
for the vaccine antigen. A seed lot is of uniform composition (though not
necessarily clonal), is derived from a single culture process and is aliquoted into
appropriate storage containers, from which all future vaccine production will be
derived either directly or via a seed lot system.
Single harvest: a quantity or suspension derived from a batch of
production cells inoculated with the same seed lot and processed together in a
single production run.
Working cell bank (WCB): a quantity of well-characterized cells of
animal or other origin, derived from the MCB at a specific PDL or passage level,
dispensed into multiple containers, cryopreserved and stored frozen under
defined conditions, such as in the vapour or liquid phase of liquid nitrogen,
in aliquots of uniform composition. The WCB is prepared from a single
homogeneously mixed pool of cells. One or more of the WCB containers is
used for each production culture. All containers are treated identically and once
removed from storage are not returned to stock.
Working seed lot: a quantity of virus of uniform composition derived
from the master seed lot used at a passage level approved by the NRA for the
manufacturing of vaccine.
General considerations
Clinical disease
HFMD was first reported in New Zealand in 1957 (33) and occurs mostly in
young children, with a peak incidence at about 2 years of age. The common mild
disease involves lesions on the mucosal surfaces of the mouth and spots on the
palms of the hands and soles of the feet which resolve in a few days; this is not
life threatening. However, a more severe and potentially fatal form of the disease
was reported in 1969 (1) which is now recognized to encompass meningitis/
encephalitis, autonomic nervous system dysregulation, cardiovascular collapse
and pulmonary oedema. The overall mortality rate of HFMD is of the order of
one per 1000 to 10 000 cases.
The frequency of reported HFMD cases is geographically highly variable
with most cases occurring in East Asian countries, particularly China but
including Viet Nam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea.
Normally, only few cases of severe disease are reported in Europe or the USA
with reports of mild HFMD also being less common – though underreporting of
the latter is very likely. Typically, the total combined number of cases in Europe
and the USA is of the order of several hundred per year, whereas in 2008 there
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were 488 955 cases and 128 deaths in China alone (4, 34, 35). HFMD is now a
reportable disease in China (in contrast to Europe and the USA) and during the
period 2013–2018 between 300 000 and 400 000 cases occurred in May–June
each year, with a small number of deaths (4, 34, 35). The reason for the differences
in disease burden in different geographical areas is not yet clear.
Enteroviruses and their epidemiology

The causative agents of HFMD are picornaviruses, most often of human
enterovirus species A. The picornaviruses belong to the Picornaviridae, a family
of small non-enveloped viruses with a single-stranded positive-sense RNA
genome of about 7500 nucleotides. The enteroviruses are a recognized taxon
by the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses and are sub-classified
into numerous species including the four human enteroviruses A, B, C and D
(36). The archetypal human picornavirus is poliovirus (belonging to species C)
but the most common cause of HFMD is species A enteroviruses, chiefly the
Coxsackie A viruses and EV71. The relative frequency of different enterovirus
species found varies from year to year when clinical isolates or environmental
samples such as sewage are examined.
In recent years, Coxsackie viruses such as A16, A10 and A6 have
caused most of the HFMD cases in Asia. However, other human enteroviruses
of the Picornaviridae family have also being implicated and as the different
serotypes are antigenically distinct, the development of a vaccine based on a
single serotype to protect against all mild HFMD cases is unlikely using existing
technologies. There is therefore interest in the development of combination
vaccines containing several serotypes. However, while mild HFMD is caused by
many strains of enterovirus, the great majority of severe disease in recent years
has been caused by EV71 which accounts for 70% of severe HFMD cases and
90% of HFMD-related deaths in China (35). As a result, EV71 has been the main
focus of vaccine development.

EV71 isolates can be clustered according to their genomic sequence into
at least eight genogroups (A–H) (36, 37) but belong to one serotype. Genogroups
B and C have been of greatest interest because of their frequency of isolation and
implication in disease in Eastern Asia, and can each be sub-classified into five
subgenogroups (C1–C5 and B1–B5) (36, 37). C4 is by far the major genogroup
circulating in China, while B4, B5 and C5 are found in other Asian countries. In
contrast, strains of genogroups C1 and C2 are predominantly found in Europe
where severe disease is uncommon. It is possible that this has some effect on
the disease burden, with C4 being particularly virulent. However, an outbreak
of HFMD with severe disease caused by a C1 genogroup strain occurred in
Spain in 2016 (38, 39). At the time of development of the current document,
little information was available on the situation in South America, possibly due to
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inadequate surveillance or because EV71 infection is less common in this region

(40–42). A recent study showing that the EV71 genotype C exists in Peru was
the first report of this lineage circulating in South America (42). Previously, low
levels of EV71 genotype B had been identified in the State of Para, Brazil (40).
Animal models
A valid animal model would be useful in vaccine development to measure
protective efficacy and potency, as well as to resolve issues related to virulence. As
yet, the available models are imperfect. Neonatal mice are susceptible to EV71 by
intracerebral inoculation and neonatal (but not adult) rhesus monkeys develop
symptoms of HFMD on infection. Adult or infant mice are not susceptible to
infection. Infant rhesus monkeys have been demonstrated to develop HFMD
symptoms upon inoculation with the virus and could therefore be used as a
model of protection (43, 44). The neurovirulence of EV71 was demonstrated in
cynomolgus monkeys and this model would be useful for challenge-protection
studies for candidate EV71 vaccines (45, 46). Picornaviruses are believed to use
specific receptors to infect human cells. Human P-selectin glycoprotein ligand-1
(PSGL-1) is expressed in leukocytes and involved in their binding to endothelial
cells in the early stages of inflammation, and has been identified as a receptor
for EV71. However, the disease produced by clinical EV71 strains in transgenic
mice carrying PSGL-1 was not enhanced compared to non-transgenic strains.
Human scavenger receptor class B member 2 (SCARB2) has also been identified
as a receptor for EV71. Transgenic mice carrying the SCARB2 gene are more
susceptible to infection and disease than non-transgenic controls but the effect
is not dramatic – two-week old transgenic mice develop mild symptoms and
then recover (47–50).
Vaccines against EV71

Three vaccines against EV71 have been licensed in China, all using C4
genogroup strains. Candidate vaccines containing B4 and B5 genogroups are in
development elsewhere but have not yet reached the licensing stage. In addition,
the development of vaccines against Coxsackie A16, A6 and A10 is being
considered with a view to developing combination/multivalent vaccines. The
efficacy of the three licensed EV71 vaccines after two doses ranges from 90.0% to
97.4% after one year of surveillance (5–7) to 95.1% after two year follow-up (8).
Licensed EV71 vaccines are produced from virus grown on mammalian
cells and inactivated by validated methods – similar to the approach used for
IPVs and hepatitis A vaccines. Tissue culture grown virus harvests comprise two
types of particle forms; one containing the RNA genome (full) and one that does
not (empty). In the case of both polioviruses and EV71 viruses, the two particle
forms have different antigenic and immunogenic properties; poliomyelitis
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vaccines are purified so that they contain little if any empty virus particles but
EV71 vaccines contain both types; potentially complicating potency assays.
The atomic structures of both full and empty particles of EV71 viruses and
polioviruses have been resolved by X-ray crystallography and cryogenic electron
microscopy (51, 52).
Specific issues in the development of inactivated EV71 vaccines include:
■■ The degree to which a vaccine based on one genogroup will protect
against the others is not established. Although there is good cross-
neutralization between genogroups, including by sera induced by
vaccination (53, 54), it has not been established that this translates
into good cross-protection in humans. One recent collaborative
study indicated that assays of antigen content work acceptably on all
genogroups tested. However clinical cross-protection has not been
demonstrated. Thus, the C4 genogroup vaccines may or may not
protect against other genogroups.
■■ There is a lack of a convenient and convincing animal model, with
the model most accurately reflecting human disease at present
being infant rhesus monkeys. This makes the study of protective
efficacy and immunogenic potency difficult other than by clinical
trial. Neonatal mice are susceptible to disease and transgenic mice
carrying the SCARB2 gene which encodes EV71 receptors have
been developed and can prove useful without fully imitating human
pathogenesis.
■■ Virological issues include the existence of full and empty particle
forms in the licensed products. These two particle forms differ in their
antigenic and immunogenic properties, thus complicating potency
assays. It is not clear whether current national and international
vaccine reference standards and antigen potency assays are suitable

for specifically detecting one or other of the particle forms (55).
International reference materials

Subsequent sections of this document refer to WHO reference materials that
may be used in laboratory or clinical evaluations. The following key standards
are currently used in the control of EV71 vaccines.
■■ A WHO international standard for anti-EV71 serum is available
for the standardization of diagnostic tests for use in seroprevalence
studies and for assessing immunity. This standard was established
by the WHO Expert Committee on Biological Standardization in
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2015 as the First WHO International Standard for anti-EV71 serum

(human) (NIBSC code 14/140) with an assigned value of 1000 IU/
ampoule (56, 57). The preparation is held and distributed by NIBSC
and NIFDC.
■■ A WHO international reference reagent for EV71 neutralization
assays (low-titre) is also available for use in the standardization of
virus neutralization assays. This reference reagent was established by
the Committee in 2015 as the First WHO International Reference
Reagent for EV71 neutralization assays (NIBSC code 13/238) with
an assigned value of 300 IU/ampoule (56, 57). The preparation is
held and distributed by NIBSC and NIFDC.
■■ In 2019, the First WHO International Standard for EV71 inactivated
vaccine (NIBSC code 18/116) was established by the Committee with
an assigned unitage of 3625 IU/ampoule (12, 13). In addition, WHO
international reference reagents for EV71 genogroups C4 and B4
inactivated vaccine (NIBSC codes 18/120 and 18/156 respectively)
were established with assigned unitages of 300 and 250 IU/ampoule
respectively (12, 13). These preparations are held and distributed by
NIBSC. The First WHO International Standard for EV71 inactivated
vaccine is intended for use in in vitro assays to measure the antigen
content of vaccine products through the calibration of secondary
reference preparations. However, it is known that full and empty virus
particles (known to be present in EV71 vaccine preparations from all
manufacturers) differ in their antigenicity and immunogenicity. The
proportion of empty/full virus particles in the WHO international
standard is not known. It is also not known whether this matters
for the overall assessment of vaccines or if the current international
standard is suitable for accurately measuring antigen content across
manufacturers. International standards and reference reagents for the
control of in vivo potency assays are under investigation (13).
■■ Product-specific national standards for EV71 neutralizing antibody
and EV71 antigen were established by NIFDC following collaborative
studies conducted by NIFDC and the three main vaccine
manufacturers in China (14). This has helped to ensure the accuracy,
comparability and repeatability of anti-EV71 neutralizing antibody
and EV71 antigen detection assays, and hence improve EV71 vaccine
standardization. In addition, NIFDC has also developed a new
national reference for in vivo vaccine potency. These preparations
are held and distributed by NIFDC.
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Part A. Manufacturing recommendations

A.1 Definitions
A.1.1 International name and proper name
The international name of the vaccine should be “enterovirus 71 vaccine
(inactivated)”. The proper name should be the equivalent of the international
name in the language of the country in which the vaccine is licensed.
The use of the international name should be limited to vaccines that
meet the specifications given below.
A.1.2 Descriptive definition

An EV71 vaccine (inactivated) consists of a sterile suspension of EV71 grown
in cell cultures, concentrated, purified and inactivated. The antigen may be
formulated for delivery with a suitable adjuvant. The preparation should meet all
of the specifications given below.
A.2 General manufacturing recommendations

The general guidance provided in WHO good manufacturing practices for
pharmaceutical products: main principles (58) and WHO good manufacturing
practices for biological products (27) should be applied to the design, establishment,
operation, control and maintenance of manufacturing facilities for EV71 vaccine.
Staff involved in the production and quality control of inactivated EV71
vaccine should be shown to be immune to EV71.
A.3 Control of source materials

A.3.1 Virus strains and seed lot system
A.3.1.1 Virus strains
Strains of EV71 used in the production of EV71 vaccine should be identified

by historical records, which should include information on their origin
and subsequent manipulation or passage (for example, the genogroup and
subgenogroup of EV71). Strain identity should be determined by infectivity tests
and immunological methods, and by full or partial genomic sequencing.
Only virus strains that are approved by the NRA and that yield a vaccine
complying with the recommendations set out in these WHO Recommendations
should be used.
A.3.1.2 Virus seed lot system

Vaccine production should be based on the virus seed lot system. Unless otherwise
justified and authorized, the virus in the final vaccine should not have undergone
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more passages from the virus master seed lot than were used to prepare a vaccine
shown to be satisfactory with respect to safety and efficacy.
Virus master and working seed lots should be stored in a dedicated
temperature-monitored system that ensures stability during storage (for example,
at or below −60 °C).
A.3.1.3 Tests on virus master and working seed lots

Each virus master and working seed lot used for the production of vaccine lots
should be subjected to the tests listed in this section.
Each virus master and working seed lot should have been derived from
materials that comply with the recommendations made in sections A.3.2 and
A.3.3 below and should be approved by the NRA.
A.3.1.3.1 Tests for adventitious agents

The virus master and working seed lots used for the production of vaccine lots
should be free from adventitious agents.
A sample of at least 20 mL of each virus master seed lot should be tested
for the presence of adventitious agents. The sample should be neutralized by a
high-titred antiserum against EV71. If the virus cannot be completely neutralized,
alternative testing methods should be explored. Any alternative method used
should be validated and approved by the NRA.
If polyclonal antisera are used, the immunizing antigen used for the
preparation of the antiserum should not be the same as the production
seed.
The immunizing antigen should be shown to be free from adventitious

agents and should be grown in cell cultures free from adventitious
microbial agents that might elicit antibodies that could inhibit the
growth of any adventitious agents present.
The sample should be tested in susceptible cells such as Vero, human

rhabdomyosarcoma (RD) or human diploid cells. The tissue cultures should be
incubated at 37 °C and observed for 2 weeks. Within this observation period,
at least one subculture of supernatant fluid should be made in the same tissue
culture system. The sample should be inoculated in such a way that the dilution
of the supernatant fluid in the nutrient medium does not exceed 1 in 4. The area
of the cell sheet should be at least 3 cm2 per mL of supernatant fluid. At least one
culture vessel of the cell cultures should remain uninoculated and should serve
as a control. The cells inoculated with the supernatant fluid and the uninoculated
control cultures should be incubated at 37 °C and observed at appropriate
intervals for an additional 2 weeks.
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The virus master seed lot passes the test if there is no evidence of the
presence of adventitious agents. For the test to be valid, not more than 20% of
the culture vessels should have been discarded for any reason by the end of the
observation period.
New molecular methods with broad detection capabilities are being
developed for the detection of adventitious agents. These methods
include: (a) degenerate NAT for whole virus families, with analysis
of the amplicons by hybridization, sequencing or mass spectrometry;
(b) NAT with random primers followed by analysis of the amplicons
on large oligonucleotide micro-arrays of conserved viral sequencing,
or digital subtraction of expressed sequences; and (c) high-throughput
sequencing. These methods might be used in the future to supplement
existing methods or as alternative methods to both in vivo and in vitro
tests after appropriate validation and with the approval of the NRA (28).
The theoretical risk of the presence of potential human, simian, bovine

or porcine adventitious agents in the seed lots, which may be derived
from the use of bovine serum or porcine trypsin, should be assessed. If
necessary, viruses such as bovine polyomavirus, porcine parvovirus or
porcine circovirus may be screened for using specific assays, such as
molecular NAT-based assays (28).
The need for adventitious virus testing on working seed lot should
be based on risk assessment. However, sterility testing for bacteria, fungi and
mycoplasmas should be conducted.
A.3.1.3.2 Identity test

The strain identity of the seed lot should be determined by infectivity tests.
The test for antigen content described in section A.4.4.2.2 below can be used to
identify the seed lot.
A.3.1.3.3 Virus titration

The virus concentration of the seed lot should be determined by titration of
infectious virus using validated tissue culture methods. This titration should be
carried out in not more than 10-fold dilution steps using 10 cultures per dilution,
or by any other arrangement yielding equal precision.
The use of human RD, human diploid or Vero cells in microtitre plates is
suitable for this purpose (28).
A.3.2 Cell lines

The general production precautions, as formulated in WHO good manufacturing
practices for biological products (27), should apply to the manufacture of EV71
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vaccine, with the additional requirement that, during production, only one
type of cell should be introduced or handled in the production area at any one
time. Vaccines may be produced in a human diploid cell line or in a continuous
cell line.
A.3.2.1 Master cell bank (MCB) and working cell bank (WCB)
The use of a cell line for the manufacture of EV71 vaccine should be based on
the cell bank system. The cell seed and cell banks should conform to WHO
Recommendations for the evaluation of animal cell cultures as substrates for the
manufacture of biological medicinal products and for the characterization of cell
banks (28). The MCB should be approved by the NRA. The maximum number
of passages (or population doublings) by which the WCB is derived from the
MCB and the maximum number of passages of the production cultures should
be established and confirmed through process validation and characterization of
end-of-production cell culture by the manufacturer and approved by the NRA.
The WHO Vero reference cell bank 10-87 is considered suitable for use as
a cell seed for generating an MCB (59) and is available to manufacturers
on application to the Group Lead, Norms and Standards for Biologicals,
Technical Specifications and Standards, Department of Health Product
Policy and Standards, Access to Medicines and Health Products Division,
World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
A.3.2.2 Identity test

Identity tests on the MCB and WCB should be performed in accordance with
WHO Recommendations for the evaluation of animal cell cultures as substrates
for the manufacture of biological medicinal products and for the characterization
of cell banks (28) and should be approved by the NRA.
The cell banks should be identified by means of tests such as biochemical
tests (for example, isoenzyme analysis), immunological tests, cytogenetic marker
tests and DNA fingerprinting or sequencing. The tests used should be approved
by the NRA.
A.3.3 Cell culture medium

Where serum is used for the propagation of cells it should be tested to
demonstrate freedom from bacterial, fungal and mycoplasmal contamination
– as specified in Part A, sections 5.2 (60) and 5.3 (61) of the WHO General
requirements for the sterility of biological substances – as well as freedom from
infectious viruses. Suitable tests for detecting viruses in bovine serum are given
in Appendix 1 of the WHO Recommendations for the evaluation of animal cell
cultures as substrates for the manufacture of biological medicinal products and
for the characterization of cell banks (28).
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Validated molecular tests for bovine viruses may replace the cell culture
tests of bovine sera if approved by the NRA. As an additional monitor of quality,
sera may be examined for freedom from bacteriophage and endotoxin. Gamma
irradiation may be used to inactivate potential contaminant viruses, while
recognizing that some viruses are relatively resistant to gamma irradiation.
The source(s) of animal components used in the culture medium should
be approved by the NRA. The components should comply with the current
WHO guidelines on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in relation to
biological and pharmaceutical products (62). The serum protein concentration
should be reduced by rinsing the cell cultures with serum-free medium and/or
by purification of the virus harvests.
In some countries, control tests are carried out to detect the residual
animal serum content in the final vaccine.
Human serum should not be used. If human serum albumin is used at

any stage of product manufacture, the NRA should be consulted regarding the
requirements, as these may differ from country to country. At a minimum, it
should meet the WHO Requirements for the collection, processing and quality
control of blood, blood components and plasma derivatives (63). In addition,
human albumin, as with all materials of animal origin, should comply with
the current WHO guidelines on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in
relation to biological and pharmaceutical products (62).
Manufacturers are encouraged to explore the possibilities of using serum-
free media for the production of EV71 vaccine.
Penicillin and other beta-lactams should not be used at any stage of

manufacture because they are highly sensitizing substances in humans. Other
antibiotics may be used during early stages of production. In this case, the
use of antibiotics should be well justified, and they should be cleared from the
manufacturing process at the stage specified in the marketing authorization.

Clearance should be demonstrated through a residual removal study (or studies)
and acceptable levels should be approved by the NRA.
Bovine or porcine trypsin used for preparing cell cultures should be
tested and found to be free of cultivatable bacteria, fungi, mycoplasmas and
infectious viruses, as appropriate (28). The methods used to ensure this should
be approved by the NRA.
In some countries, irradiation is used to inactivate potential contaminant
viruses. If irradiation is used, it is important to ensure that a reproducible
dose is delivered to all lots and to the component units of each lot. The
irradiation dose must be low enough for the biological properties of the
reagents to be retained but also high enough to reduce virological risk.
Therefore, irradiation cannot be considered a sterilizing process (28).
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Recombinant trypsin is available and should be considered; however,

it should not be assumed to be free from risk of contamination and
should be subject to the usual considerations for any reagent of biological
origin (28).
The source(s) of trypsin of bovine origin, if used, should be approved by

the NRA and should comply with the current WHO guidelines on transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies in relation to biological and pharmaceutical
products (62).
A.4 Control of vaccine production

A.4.1 Control cell cultures
A fraction of the production cell culture equivalent to at least 5% of the total
or 500 mL of cell suspension, or 100 million cells, at the concentration and cell
passage level employed for seeding vaccine production cultures, should be used
to prepare control cultures.
If bioreactor technology is used, the NRA should determine the size and
treatment of the cell sample to be examined.
A.4.1.1 Tests of control cell cultures

The treatment of the cells set aside as control material should be similar to that
of the production cell cultures but they should remain uninoculated for use as
control cultures for the detection of any adventitious agents.
These control cell cultures should be incubated under conditions as
similar as possible to the inoculated cultures for at least 2 weeks, and should
be tested for the presence of adventitious agents as described below. For the
test to be valid, not more than 20% of the control cell cultures should have been
discarded for any reason by the end of the test period.
At the end of the observation period, the control cell cultures should
be examined for evidence of degeneration caused by an adventitious agent. If
this examination or any of the tests specified in this section shows evidence
of the presence of any adventitious agent in the control culture, the EV71
grown in the corresponding inoculated cultures should not be used for vaccine
production.
If not tested immediately, samples should be stored at −60 °C or below.
A.4.1.2 Tests for haemadsorbing viruses

At the end of the observation period, at least 25% of the control cells should
be tested for the presence of haemadsorbing viruses using guinea-pig red
blood cells. If the latter cells have been stored, the duration of storage should
not have exceeded 7 days and the storage temperature should have been in the
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range of 2–8 °C. In tests for haemadsorbing viruses, calcium and magnesium
ions should be absent from the medium.
Some NRAs require, as a test for haemadsorbing viruses, that other types
of red blood cells, including cells from humans, monkeys and chickens
(or other avian species), are also used instead of guinea-pig cells alone.
A reading should be taken after incubation at 2–8 °C for 30 minutes, and

again after a further incubation for 30 minutes at 20–25 °C.
If a test with monkey red blood cells is performed, readings should also
be taken after a final incubation for 30 minutes at 34–37 °C.
In some countries the sensitivity of each new lot of red blood cells is
demonstrated by titration against a haemagglutinin antigen before use in
the test for haemadsorbing viruses.
A.4.1.3 Tests for other adventitious agents in cell supernatant fluid

At the end of the observation period, a sample of the pooled supernatant fluid
from each group of control cultures should be tested for adventitious agents. For
this purpose, 10 mL of each pool should be tested in the same cells, but not the
same lot of cells, as those used for the production of vaccine.
A second indicator cell line should be used to test an additional 10 mL
sample of each pool. When a human diploid cell line is used for production, a
simian kidney cell line should be used as the second indicator cell line. When
a simian kidney cell line is used for production, a human diploid cell line should
be used as the second indicator cell line (28).
The pooled fluid should be inoculated into culture vessels of these cell
cultures in such a way that the dilution of the pooled fluid in the nutrient medium
does not exceed 1 part in 4. The area of the cell sheet should be at least 3 cm2 per
mL of pooled fluid. At least one culture vessel of each kind of cell culture should
remain uninoculated and should serve as a control.
The inoculated cultures should be incubated at the same temperature as
that of the production of virus antigen and observed at appropriate intervals for
a period of at least 14 days.
Some NRAs require that, at the end of this observation period, a
subculture is made in the same culture system and observed for at least
an additional 14 days. Furthermore, some NRAs require that these cells
should be tested for the presence of haemadsorbing viruses.
For the tests to be valid, not more than 20% of the culture vessels should
have been discarded for any reason by the end of the test period.
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If any cytopathic changes due to adventitious agents occur in any of the

cultures, the virus harvests produced from the lot of cells from which the control
cells were taken should be discarded.
Some selected viruses may be screened for using specific validated assays
which are approved by the NRA, such as molecular NAT-based assays (28).
If these tests are not performed immediately, the samples should be kept
at a temperature of −60 °C or below.
A.4.1.4 Identity tests

At the production level, the control cells should be identified using tests approved
by the NRA.
Suitable methods include, but are not limited to, biochemical tests
(for example, isoenzyme analyses), immunological tests, cytogenetic tests (for
example, for chromosomal markers), morphological identification and tests for
genetic markers (for example, DNA fingerprinting or sequencing).
A.4.2 Cell cultures for vaccine production

A.4.2.1 Observation of cultures for adventitious agents
On the day of inoculation with the virus working seed lot, each cell culture or a
sample from each culture vessel should be examined visually for degeneration
caused by infective agents. If this examination shows evidence of the presence
of any adventitious agent in a cell culture then the culture should not be used for
vaccine production.
A.4.3 Control of single harvests

After inoculation of the production cells with virus, the culture conditions of
inoculated and control cell cultures should be standardized and kept within
limits agreed with the NRA.
Samples required for the testing of single harvests should be taken
immediately on harvesting.
Samples may be taken after storage and filtration with the agreement of
the NRA.
A.4.3.1 Identity test

The single harvests or pool of single harvests should be identified as EV71 by
serum neutralization in cell culture infectivity assays using specific antibodies,
or by molecular methods such as NAT-based assays. The test for antigen content
described in section A.4.4.2.2 below can be used to identify the single harvest.
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A.4.3.2 Sterility tests for bacteria, fungi and mycoplasmas

A volume of at least 10 mL of each single harvest should be tested for bacterial,
fungal and mycoplasmal contamination using appropriate tests, as specified in
Part A, sections 5.2 (60) and 5.3 (61) of the WHO General requirements for the
sterility of biological substances, or by methods approved by the NRA.
NAT alone or in combination with cell culture, with an appropriate
detection method, may be used as an alternative to one or both of
the compendial mycoplasma detection methods following suitable
validation and the agreement of the NRA (28).
In some countries this test is performed on the purified virus harvest

instead of on the single harvest.
A.4.3.3 Virus titration

The virus concentration of each single harvest should be determined by titration
of infectious virus using validated tissue culture methods to monitor production
consistency and as a starting point for monitoring the inactivation curve. This
titration should be carried out in not more than 10-fold dilution steps using 10
cultures per dilution, or by any other arrangement yielding equal precision.
The use of human RD, human diploid or Vero cells in microtitre plates
is suitable for this purpose (28). The same cells should be used for virus
titrations throughout the production process.
Information on virus titre will help in selecting single harvests that can
be expected to meet potency requirements after inactivation.
The virus titration may be carried out on the pooled harvest after
demonstration of consistency of production at the stage of the single
harvest.
A.4.4 Control of virus pools

Several single harvests may be mixed to prepare a pool of virus before
inactivation. The order in which the purification, filtration and inactivation of
virus pools is conducted should be carefully established by the manufacturer
to ensure consistent full virus inactivation and absence of residual infectivity.
Based on experience of the production of IPVs, the WHO Recommendations to
assure the quality, safety and efficacy of poliomyelitis vaccines (inactivated) (23)
recommends purification, filtration and inactivation steps in that order.
The requirement for filtration before and during inactivation was
introduced into the IPV production process following the Cutter
incident during which a number of paralytic polio cases occurred in
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children following vaccination with a defective IPV (23). The vaccine

used was later found to contain aggregates which led to incomplete
virus inactivation likely due to formaldehyde not accessing some virus
particles inside the aggregates.
Any deviation from the production sequence shown to be acceptable for

IPV for a vaccine against a virus similar to poliovirus (such as EV71) should be
fully validated and justified in terms of yielding a product of equivalent safety.
Inactivation of virus may be performed before or after purification
according to current approved procedures for the production of licensed
vaccines. The method of purification and inactivation as well as the agent used
for inactivation should be appropriately validated and should be approved by
the NRA.
If inactivation of the virus pool is conducted after purification, please
see section A.4.4.1 below. If inactivation of the virus pool is conducted before
purification please see section A.4.4.2 below.
A.4.4.1 Purification of virus pools

Each pool of virus should be purified. Removal of host cell protein should be
assessed during process validation (28).
An acceptable method is to clarify the virus suspension by filtration, to
concentrate the virus by ultrafiltration and, thereafter, to collect the virus peak
after passing it through a gel-filtration column. Further purification is achieved
by passing the virus through an ion-exchange column. Other purification
procedures resulting in acceptable release criteria may be used.
A.4.4.2 Tests on virus pools (purified or not) before inactivation

A.4.4.2.1 Virus titration
The virus concentration of each virus pool should be determined by titration
of infectious virus using validated tissue culture methods. This titration should
be carried out in not more than 10-fold dilution steps using 10 cultures per
dilution, or by any other arrangement yielding equal precision.
The use of human RD, human diploid or Vero cells in microtitre plates
is suitable for this purpose (28). The same cells should be used for virus
titrations throughout the production process.
Information on virus titre will help in selecting pools that can be expected
to meet potency requirements following inactivation.
A.4.4.2.2 Virus antigen content

The antigen content of each virus pool should be determined using a validated
immunochemical method and should be calculated using a reference vaccine
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calibrated against the First WHO International Standard for EV71 inactivated
vaccine (see International reference materials above) and expressed in IU.
A.4.4.2.3 Specific activity

The ratio of virus concentration or antigen content to the total protein content
(specific activity) of the virus pool before inactivation should be within the
limits of material shown to be safe and effective in clinical trials and approved
by the NRA. This would ensure a consistent ratio of chemical agent to the viral
protein, and thus a consistent inactivation process.
A.4.4.3 Filtration before inactivation (purified or not)

In order to avoid interference with the inactivation process, virus aggregation
should be prevented or aggregates should be removed immediately before and
during the inactivation process. For this reason, each virus pool should be filtered
before inactivation.
Satisfactory results have been reported with several filter types but a final
filtration using a 0.22 µm filter should be used.
Inactivation should be initiated as soon as possible and, in any case, not

later than 72 hours after filtration.
It is preferable to start inactivation within 24 hours of filtration. Since
the purpose of the filtration step is to remove particulate matter and
other interfering substances that may diminish the effectiveness of the
inactivation process and since aggregates tend to increase on standing
after filtration, efforts should be made to keep within this time limit.
A sample of the filtered virus pool should be retained and its virus titre
determined as described in section A.4.4.2.1 above.
The main purpose of determining the titre of filtered virus pools

destined for inactivation is to provide the starting titre to monitor the
kinetics of inactivation.
A.4.5 Control of inactivated bulk

A.4.5.1 Inactivation procedure
The virus in the filtered pools should be inactivated using a validated method
approved by the NRA. Prior to inactivation, the concentration of the filtered pool
(based on viral titre, virus antigen or protein content) should be adjusted to the
acceptable range established during the process validation.
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Most manufacturers currently use formaldehyde as the method for

inactivation but at least one manufacturer is using other inactivating
agents such as beta-propiolactone (BPL).
The method of inactivation should have been shown to consistently

inactivate EV71 virus without destroying the antigenic and immunogenic
activity. Inactivation of the virus pool may take place before or after purification
depending on the approved production process. The progress of inactivation
should be monitored by suitably spaced determinations of virus titres. The
inactivation period should usually exceed the time taken to reduce the titre of
live virus to undetectable amounts by a factor of at least 2 and be agreed to by
the NRA.
A second filtration should be carried out during the process of
inactivation. This step is taken after the virus titre has fallen below detectable
levels but before the first sample for the safety test is taken. Following this
filtration step, the inactivation process should continue.
The kinetics of viral inactivation should be established by each
manufacturer and approved by the NRA. During the validation studies, an
inactivation curve should be established with at least four time points showing
the decrease in live virus concentration with time. The consistency of the
inactivation process should be monitored; the virus titre and antigen content of
each pool before, during and at the end of inactivation should be determined.
A record of consistency in the effectiveness and kinetics of inactivation
should be established by the production of at least five consecutive lots and, if
broken, a root-cause analysis should be performed and a further five consecutive
filtered purified virus pools should be prepared and shown to be satisfactory for
establishing this record.
A.4.5.2 Purification of inactivated virus pool

If inactivation is conducted using a non-purified virus pool, the inactivated pool
should be purified as described in section A.4.4.1 above.
A.4.5.3 Tests on purified inactivated bulk

A.4.5.3.1 Test for effective inactivation
After removal or neutralization (as appropriate) of the inactivating agent, the
absence of residual live EV71 virus should be verified by inoculating a quantity
of the inactivated virus bulk equivalent to 5% of the lot (or not less than 1000
doses of vaccine) into sensitive cell cultures of the same type as those used for
vaccine production.
The virus sample should be incubated for no less than 21 days making
no fewer than two cell passages during that period. The dilution of the sample in
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the nutrient fluid should not exceed 1 in 4 and the area of the cell sheet should
be at least 3 cm2 per mL of sample. One or more culture vessels of each lot of
cultures should be set aside to serve as uninoculated control culture vessels with
the same medium. The sensitivity of the assay should be demonstrated.
If formaldehyde has been used as the inactivating agent, samples of
vaccine for tissue culture tests are generally neutralized at the time of
sampling by the addition of bisulfite. Usually, the samples are subsequently
dialysed or another validated method used.
It is possible to conduct tissue culture tests on non-dialysed material.

However, this is often found to be toxic to cells, even with a dilution
of 1 in 4. If in such tests, nonspecific degeneration of cells occurs, or if
the sensitivity of the tissue culture system is reduced, the test should be
repeated on dialysed material. The virus antigen content after dialysis
should be determined to ascertain whether the viral antigen was lost
during the dialysis process.
If infectious virus is detected, the bulk should not be used for further
processing. The isolation of live virus from an inactivated bulk should be
regarded as a break in the manufacturing consistency record and a production
process review and revalidation should be undertaken.
It is important to demonstrate that each test retains sensitivity to detect
partially inactivated EV71 virus. At the end of the observation period, the cell
culture used for the detection of residual live virus should be challenged with a
validated amount of live EV71 virus of the same strain as that of the inactivated
virus bulk. The details of the challenge procedure should be approved by the
NRA. It is recommended that the ability to detect infectious virus is checked
concurrently for each test by including a positive control at the beginning of
each test. Positive control flasks should be inoculated with a low quantity of
virus close to the detection limit of the method.
The problem of detecting residual active virus in an inactivated vaccine

is not the same as that of measuring infective virus in untreated suspensions.
Other similar viruses that have been exposed to the action of formaldehyde
without becoming inactivated have been shown to require a much longer
period to produce cytopathic changes than untreated virus. For this reason, it
is desirable that tissue cultures in tests for the presence of residual active virus
are observed for as long a time as is technically possible. A satisfactory tissue
culture system for this purpose depends, therefore, not only on the sensitivity of
the cells used for the preparation of the cultures but also on the nutrient fluid.
Serum added to the nutrient fluid should be tested for inhibitors to EV71
at serum concentrations up to 50%. Only serum free from inhibitors
should be used.
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Maintenance of the cultures in good condition may require frequent

changes of culture medium. However, it should be borne in mind that
early changes of fluid may result in unadsorbed virus being removed and
the validity of the test would thus be impaired. Therefore, the fluid should
be changed no earlier than 5–7 days after inoculation.
A.4.5.3.2 Sterility tests for bacteria and fungi

Each purified inactivated bulk should be tested for bacterial and fungal sterility
as specified in Part A, section 5.2 of the WHO General requirements for the
sterility of biological substances (60), or by methods approved by the NRA.
A.4.5.3.3 Antigen content

The EV71 antigen content of each purified inactivated bulk should be
determined by the use of a validated immunochemical method and should
be calculated using a reference vaccine calibrated against the First WHO
International Standard for EV71 inactivated vaccine (see International reference
materials above). The results obtained should be expressed in IU and be within
the required limits established by the NRA.
A.4.5.3.4 Residual inactivating agent

The concentration of free residual formaldehyde or any other chemical used for
inactivating the virus should be determined by a method approved by the NRA.
The maximum acceptable limit should be approved by the NRA.
If BPL is used then its hydrolysation kinetics should be determined
during the validation of the inactivation process to ensure that no residual BPL
is present in the inactivated bulk at the end of the inactivation step.
A.4.5.3.5 Residual cellular DNA

If continuous cell lines are used for production, the purification procedure
should have been shown to consistently reduce the level of residual host cell
DNA (28). The amount and size of residual host cell DNA should not exceed
the maximum levels agreed with the NRA, taking into consideration issues such
as those discussed in the WHO Recommendations for the evaluation of animal
cell cultures as substrates for the manufacture of biological medicinal products
and for the characterization of cell banks (28). Human diploid cell lines have
been used successfully for many years for the production of viral vaccines and
the residual cellular DNA deriving from these cells is not considered to pose any
significant risk (28).
This test can be performed on the purified virus bulk and may be
omitted from routine testing, with the agreement of the NRA, if the
manufacturing process is validated to achieve this specification (28).
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If assessed, the size distribution of the DNA may be considered as a

characterization test, taking into account the amount of DNA detectable
using appropriate methods, as approved by the NRA (28).
A.4.5.3.6 Residual chemicals

If chemical substances are used during the purification process, tests for these
substances should be carried out. Their concentration should not exceed the
limits approved for the particular product.
A.4.5.3.7 Test for residual animal serum protein

If animal serum has been used in the cell culture system, a sample of purified
bulk should be tested. The residual amount of serum albumin should be less than
50 ng per single human dose.
A.4.6 Control of final bulk

Preservatives, excipients or other substances that might be added to form the
final bulk should have been shown, to the satisfaction of the NRA, to have
no deleterious effect on the immunizing potency and safety profile of the
EV71 antigens. Preservative efficacy should be demonstrated during product
development using a method approved by the NRA.
The operations necessary for preparing the final bulk from the purified
inactivated bulk should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid contamination
of the product. In preparing the final vaccine bulk, any substances that are added
to the product (such as diluents, stabilizers or adjuvants) should have been
shown, to the satisfaction of the NRA, not to impair the safety and efficacy of the
vaccine in the concentrations used. Until the final bulk is filled into containers,
the final vaccine bulk suspension should be stored under conditions shown by
the manufacturer to retain the desired biological activity.
A.4.6.1 Sterility tests for bacteria and fungi

The final bulk should be tested for bacterial and fungal sterility as specified
in Part A, section 5.2 of the WHO General requirements for the sterility of
biological substances (60), or by methods approved by the NRA.
A.4.6.2 Potency tests

Each final bulk should be tested using an in vivo assay for immunogenicity
and in vitro antigen content assay approved by the NRA, unless this is to be
performed on final product. Product-specific reference preparations may be
used in these tests.
The EV71 antigen content of each final bulk should be determined using
a validated immunochemical method and calculated using a reference vaccine
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calibrated against the First WHO International Standard for EV71 inactivated
vaccine (see International reference materials above). The in vitro assay found
to be the most suitable for measuring the antigen content is the EV71 antigen
ELISA. The results obtained should be within the required limits established by
the NRA.
Once consistency of production has been established for a suitable
number of consecutive final bulks, the in vivo assay may be omitted for the
purpose of routine lot release, with the agreement of the NRA. This can occur
once it has been demonstrated that the acceptance criteria for the EV71 antigen
determination are such that the in vitro test yields a comparable result to the in
vivo assay in terms of acceptance or rejection of a lot. This demonstration should
include testing of sub-potent lots, produced experimentally if necessary by heat
treatment or other means of diminishing the immunogenic activity.
If an adjuvant is used in the final bulk, a desorption or treatment step
may be necessary before performing the EV71 antigen ELISA.
If the final bulk is formulated with other antigens into a combination
vaccine, the suitability of performing the EV71 antigen ELISA on the final
bulk will have to be determined. If the EV71 antigen ELISA is not suitable for a
particular combination, an in vivo assay should be used.
The potency of the final bulk should be approved by the NRA.
A.4.6.3 Preservative content (if applicable)

If preservative is added, its concentration in the final bulk should be determined
by a method approved by the NRA. The preservative used and concentration
permitted should be approved by the NRA. The preservative should not adversely
affect the quality of the antigens.
A.4.6.4 Adjuvant (if applicable)

Each final vaccine bulk should be assayed for adjuvant content. This test may be
omitted if it is to be performed on the final lot. Where aluminium compounds are
used, the aluminium content should not exceed 1.25 mg per single human dose.
A.5 Filling and containers

The requirements concerning filling and containers given in WHO good
manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical products: main principles (58) and
WHO good manufacturing practices for biological products (27) should apply to
vaccine filled in the final form. Single- and multi-dose containers may be used.
Care should be taken to ensure that the materials of which the container
and (if applicable) the transference devices and closure are made do not adversely
affect the quality of the vaccine.
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Manufacturers should provide the NRA with adequate data to prove the
stability of the product under appropriate conditions of storage and transport.
A.6 Control tests on the final lot

Samples should be taken from each final lot for the tests described in the
following sections. The following tests should be performed on each final
lot of vaccine (that is, in the final containers). Unless otherwise justified and
authorized, the tests should be performed on labelled containers from each
final lot by means of validated methods approved by the NRA. All tests and
specifications, including methods used and permitted concentrations, should be
approved by the NRA.
A.6.1 Inspection of final containers

Every container in each final lot should be inspected visually or mechanically,
and those showing abnormalities should be discarded and recorded for each
relevant abnormality. A limit should be established for the percentage of
rejections permitted before triggering an investigation of the cause, potentially
resulting in lot failure.
A.6.1.1 Appearance
The appearance of the vaccine should be described with respect to its form
and colour.
A.6.2 Identity test

An identity test should be performed on at least one labelled container from
each final lot using an appropriate method. The potency test described in section
A.6.4 below may serve as the identity test.
A.6.3 Sterility tests for bacteria and fungi

Each final lot should be tested for bacterial and fungal sterility as specified
in Part A, section 5.2 of the WHO General requirements for the sterility of
biological substances (60), or by methods approved by the NRA.
A.6.4 Potency test

The potency of each final lot should be determined using an in vivo assay and a
validated in vitro antigen content assay (see section A.4.6.2 above) if such a test
has not been performed on the final bulk. Potency should be calculated using
a reference vaccine calibrated against the First WHO International Standard
for EV71 inactivated vaccine (see International reference materials above) or
other reference preparation.
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If the use of an adjuvant in the final bulk interferes with the assay, a
desorption or treatment step may be necessary. If treatment/desorption is not
possible, the interference of the adjuvant should be documented and an in vivo
assay should be performed (see section A.4.6.2 above).
The potency of the vaccine should be approved by the NRA.
A.6.5 Preservative content

Where appropriate, the preservative content of each final lot should be
determined. The method used and content permitted should be approved by the
NRA. This test may be omitted if conducted on the final bulk.
A.6.6 Endotoxin content

The endotoxin content of each final lot should be determined using a method
approved by the NRA. Endotoxin levels should be consistent with levels found
to be acceptable in vaccine lots used in pre-licensure clinical trials and should
be approved by the NRA.
A.6.7 Residual formaldehyde

The concentration of free residual formaldehyde in each final lot should be
determined using a method approved by the NRA. The acceptable maximum
limit should be approved by the NRA. This test may be omitted if performed on
the final bulk.
A.6.8 pH
The pH of each final lot should be determined and should be within limits
approved by the NRA.
A.6.9 Adjuvant and degree of adsorption (if applicable)

If an adjuvant is used in the formulation, each final lot should be assayed for
adjuvant content. Where aluminium compounds are used, the aluminium
content should not exceed 1.25 mg per single human dose.
The degree of adsorption of the antigen to the aluminium compounds
(aluminium hydroxide or hydrated aluminium phosphate) in each final lot
should be assessed.
Both tests may be omitted for routine lot release upon demonstration of
consistency of production, subject to the agreement of the NRA.
A.6.10 Residual antibiotics (if applicable)

If any antibiotics are added during vaccine production, the residual antibiotic
content should be determined and should be within limits approved by
187
the NRA. This test may be omitted for routine lot release once consistency of
production has been established to the satisfaction of the NRA.
If aluminium adsorption has an impact on the test, then testing for
antibiotic content may be done at the purified inactivated bulk stage.
A.6.11 Extractable volume

For vaccines filled into single-dose containers, the extractable content should be
checked and shown to be not less than the intended dose.
For vaccines filled into multi-dose containers, the extractable content
should be checked and should be shown to be sufficient for the intended number
of doses.
A.7 Records
The requirements given in WHO good manufacturing practices for
practices for biological products (27) should apply.
A.8 Retained samples

practices for biological products (27) should apply.
A.9 Labelling
practices for biological products (27) should apply, and additionally the label
on the container or package, or the leaflet accompanying each container, should

include the following information:
■■ the designation(s) of the strain(s) of EV71 contained in the vaccine
■■ the cell substrate used for the preparation of vaccine
■■ the antigen content
■■ the method and inactivating agent used to inactivate the virus
■■ the nature and amount of any stabilizer and preservative present in
the vaccine
■■ the nature and amount of adjuvant, if applicable.
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It is desirable for the label to carry the names both of the producer and
of the source of the bulk material if the producer of the final vaccine
did not prepare it. The nature and amount of antibiotics present in the
vaccine, if any, may also be included.
A.10 Distribution and transport

practices for biological products (27) should apply. Further guidance is provided
in the WHO Model guidance for the storage and transport of time- and
temperature-sensitive pharmaceutical products (64).
A.11 Stability testing, storage and expiry date

A.11.1 Stability testing
Adequate stability studies form an essential part of vaccine development.
Current guidance on the evaluation of vaccine stability is provided in the WHO
Guidelines on stability evaluation of vaccines (65). Stability testing should
be performed at different stages of production when intermediate product is
stored, namely on single harvests, purified inactivated bulk, final bulk and final
lot. Stability-indicating parameters should be defined or selected appropriately
according to the stage of production. During vaccine production a shelf-life
should be assigned to all in-process materials – particularly intermediates such
as single harvests, purified inactivated bulk and final bulk.
The stability of the vaccine in its final containers, maintained at the
recommended storage temperature up to the expiry date, should be demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the NRA. As a guide, containers from at least three
consecutive final lots derived from different bulks may be tested.
Accelerated stability tests may be undertaken to provide additional
information on the overall characteristics of the vaccine and may also aid in
assessing comparability should the manufacturer decide to change any aspect
of manufacturing.
The formulation of the vaccine should be stable throughout its shelf-
life. Acceptable limits for stability should be agreed with the NRA. Following
licensure, ongoing monitoring of vaccine stability is recommended to support
shelf-life specifications and to refine the stability profile (65). Data should be
provided to the NRA in accordance with local regulatory requirements.
The final stability testing programme should be approved by the NRA
and should include an agreed set of stability-indicating parameters, procedures
for the ongoing collection and sharing of stability data, and criteria for rejecting
vaccine(s).
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A.11.2 Storage conditions

EV71 vaccine (inactivated) should be stored at all times at a temperature of
2–8 °C.
If a vaccine has been shown to be stable at temperature ranges higher
than the approved 2–8 °C range, it may be stored under extended controlled
temperature conditions for a defined period, subject to the agreement of the
NRA (66).
A.11.3 Expiry date

The expiry date should be based on the shelf-life as supported by stability
studies and approved by the NRA. The start of the dating period should be
based on the date of blending of the final bulk, the date of filling or the date of
the first valid potency test on the final lot, and should be agreed with the NRA.
Where an in vivo potency test is used, the date of the potency test is the
date on which the test animals were inoculated with the final bulk.
Part B. Nonclinical evaluation of enterovirus 71

vaccines (inactivated)
Nonclinical evaluation of a new EV71 vaccine should follow the principles
outlined in the WHO guidelines on nonclinical evaluation of vaccines (25) which
provide details on the design, conducting, analysis and evaluation of nonclinical
studies. Further guidance on the general principles for the nonclinical evaluation
of vaccine adjuvants and adjuvanted vaccines can be found in separate WHO
Guidelines (29). The following sections B.1–B.3 provide specific guidance on
addressing important issues related to the nonclinical development of a new
inactivated whole EV71 virus vaccine.
B.1 Product characterization and process development

The vaccine lots used in nonclinical studies should be adequately characterized as
described in Part A of these WHO Recommendations, taking into consideration
the stage of product development. Both the antigen(s) of the vaccine and the
end product need to be clearly defined, and the manufacturing process carefully
monitored for all crucial steps so as to confirm the consistency of production.
It is essential that sufficient data are generated to confirm the full inactivation of
vaccine virus and the absence of virulent virus in the end product. Furthermore,
sufficient vaccine stability data are necessary to support its suitability for use in
the nonclinical studies.
It is crucially important that vaccine manufacturing processes are
appropriately standardized and controlled to ensure consistency of production.
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The extent of product characterization may vary according to the stage of

development. To support their validity, nonclinical studies should be carried
out on vaccine lots that are adequately representative of the concurrent clinical
lots in terms of their physicochemical data, stability, qualitative and quantitative
impurity profiles, and formulation.
B.2 Nonclinical immunogenicity and protection studies

B.2.1 Evaluation of immunogenicity in animal models
Unless otherwise justified, the immunogenicity of any new EV71 vaccine
needs to be characterized in relevant animal models (for example, mice, rats or
rabbits) before proceeding to human trials. These proof-of-concept nonclinical
studies should reflect the clinically proposed use of the vaccine, including the
administration route, and should include an evaluation of serum neutralizing
antibody response against isolated virus strains or pseudoviruses (5–7, 67, 68),
and dose-range testing of the antigen. The immune response to the candidate
vaccine should ideally be assessed after each dose of vaccine, and whenever
possible against a licensed EV71 vaccine used as an active control. Data on cross-
neutralizing antibodies should be obtained from nonclinical immunogenicity
studies using a range of isolated heterologous viruses or pseudoviruses of
different subgenogroups. These data may guide selection of the doses, dosing
regimen and administration route to be evaluated in clinical trials.
When a candidate EV71 vaccine is formulated with a new adjuvant, a
rationale for the selection of the adjuvant should be provided and the benefit
of its inclusion in the vaccine formulation should be demonstrated by the
immunogenicity data.
The immunogenicity studies in animals may additionally be considered,
when appropriate, as part of a comparability exercise to demonstrate the
reproducibility of the manufacturing process whenever major changes are
introduced during the different stages of process development or during the
validation phase of a new candidate EV71 vaccine manufacturing process.
B.2.2 Challenge-protection studies

Current evidence suggests that serological immune responses play an essential
role in mediating protection by formalin-inactivated whole EV71 virus vaccines.
Animal studies conducted in newborn mice, transgenic mice and nonhuman
primates have demonstrated that vaccination with inactivated EV71 vaccines
induces protective immunity against EV71 and that protection in challenged
animals is primarily mediated by neutralizing antibodies (44, 50, 53, 69).
Importantly, human efficacy trials conducted with several formalin-inactivated
EV71 vaccines have shown a strong correlation between vaccine-induced serum
neutralizing antibodies and protection against EV71-associated diseases (5–7).
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Based on these observations, it is considered that, for a similarly manufactured

candidate EV71 vaccine, no further challenge-protection studies in animal
models need to be performed.
However, challenge-protection studies may be useful for any candidate
EV71 vaccine based on a novel production process or intended to have novel
mechanisms of action.
Since evidence from epidemiological studies and clinical trials for
cross-protection against EV71 disease has thus far been limited, any claims of
cross-protection should in general be supported by appropriate animal data.
Specifically, challenge-protection studies should be conducted in appropriate
animal models to evaluate the potential for protection against heterologous
viruses of different genogroups, as this could indicate the breadth of protection.
B.3 Nonclinical safety studies

For a new EV71 vaccine based on inactivated whole EV71 virus, a repeat-
dose toxicity study in a relevant animal species is generally needed to assess
potential local and systemic toxicity and any other undesirable effects. Omission
of standalone local tolerance and single-dose toxicity studies is possible if
assessment of acute toxic effects and local tolerance has been incorporated into
the repeat-dose toxicity study.
If the candidate vaccine contains a novel adjuvant, the principles set out
in the WHO Guidelines on the nonclinical evaluation of vaccine adjuvants and
adjuvanted vaccines (29) should be followed. For example, consideration should
be given to assessing the toxicity of the adjuvant alone.
For candidate EV71 vaccines manufactured using novel cell substrates,
efforts should be made during the nonclinical safety study to explore biomarkers
indicative of potential allergic reactions – for example, by measuring type 2
CD4+ T-helper cell responses.
Part C. Clinical evaluation of enterovirus 71

C.1 Introduction
Clinical trials should adhere to the principles described in the WHO Guidelines
for good clinical practice (GCP) for trials on pharmaceutical products (70) and
the WHO Guidelines on clinical evaluation of vaccines: regulatory expectations
(26). This section focuses only on issues relevant or specific to the clinical
development of inactivated EV71 vaccines.
At present, no efficacy data on cross-protection are available from
completed clinical trials with inactivated EV71 vaccines due to the distinct
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regional circulation of specific subgenogroups. In addition, no internationally

recognized immune correlate of protection (ICP) or surrogate marker of
protection has been established. Although immunogenicity results from clinical
trials suggest that a neutralizing antibody titre of 1:16 to 1:32 might be related
to protection, further analysis based upon the use of a scaled logit model has
indicated that significantly higher levels of neutralizing antibodies might be
needed to achieve protection (5–7, 54, 67).
If cross-protection against heterologous EV71 viruses is to be claimed
then appropriate nonclinical and/or clinical studies should be conducted to
evaluate the potential for such cross-protection (see section B.2.1 above). In
addition, data demonstrating the ability of antibodies obtained from vaccinated
individuals to neutralize various subgenogroups of EV71 viruses in vitro,
including recently circulating isolates, are expected to be provided. Continuous
evaluation of protective vaccine efficacy post licensure is encouraged due to
the evolution of new EV71 strains or a rapid change of subgenogroups in
different countries and regions, which may result in outbreaks. Should new
subgenogroups emerge in a country in which the vaccine is licensed and used,
further clinical investigation of potential cross-protection may be needed.
C.2 Assays
General guidance on the use and validation of assays for the evaluation of
immune responses is provided in section 5.3.3 of the WHO Guidelines on
clinical evaluation of vaccines: regulatory expectations (26).
Sections C.2.1 and C.2.2 provide specific guidance on the following
assays relevant to the investigation of immune responses to inactivated human
EV71 vaccines in clinical trials and to the confirmation of vaccine efficacy in
pivotal studies respectively:
■■ serological assays for establishing the baseline serostatus of trial
subjects and evaluating the humoral immune response to vaccination
(see also section C.3); and
■■ detection assays for laboratory confirmation of HFMD and
herpangina caused by EV71 infection, in vaccine efficacy trials (see
also section C.4).
C.2.1 Serological assays

C.2.1.1 Functional antibody
The direct measurement of anti-EV71 neutralizing antibody is well established.
Neutralizing antibody has been estimated using methods such as plaque reduction
neutralization assays employing either isolated virus strains or pseudoviruses
(5–7, 67, 68). Sponsors are encouraged to develop high-throughput assays for
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anti-EV17 neutralizing antibody. These assays should be standardized using

the First WHO International Standard for anti-EV71 serum (human) and the
First WHO International Reference Reagent for EV71 neutralization assays (see
International reference materials above). In addition, a reference neutralizing
antibody panel for the evaluation of neutralizing antibody responses has been
established in China (14).
C.2.2 Virus detection assays

Since HFMD and herpangina can be caused by different human enteroviruses,
including EV71, Coxsackie and echoviruses, appropriate RNA or virus
detection assays are required to confirm the presence of EV71 in throat and
vesicle swabs and/or stool samples (see section C.4.2 below). International
guidance on enterovirus diagnostics and characterization should be taken into
consideration (4).
For other enterovirus infections, laboratory confirmation of diagnosis
based on cell culture, virus isolation and virus identification remains a standard
approach. The use of established cell lines such as human RD or Vero cells is
recommended for virus isolation.
Various quantitative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays are
commercially available. Although several EV71-specific PCR systems have been
described, the ability of an assay to reliably detect EV71 RNA from specific
subgenogroups should be taken into account when selecting the method to be
used in clinical trials. In general, it is recommended that the subgenogroup
be determined based upon VP1 gene sequences.
Sponsors should provide full details of the methodology applied, and
appropriate controls should be used.
In addition, EV71 infection can be confirmed by the use of anti-EV71
immunoglobulin M (IgM) assays.
C.3 Immunogenicity
C.3.1 Formulation, dose and regimen
C.3.1.1 Primary series
EV71 vaccines will be used mainly or exclusively in regions with relatively
high rates of clinically apparent infections. In naturally primed individuals the
first dose of EV71 vaccine may elicit large increments in antibody due to an
anamnestic response. In contrast, multiple doses of the same vaccine may be
required to achieve similar antibody levels in EV71-naive subjects. Since pre-
vaccination testing for EV71 serostatus will not be practical in routine use, it is
important that the primary series should be selected on the basis of the immune
responses observed in subjects who were seronegative prior to vaccination.
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In the absence of an internationally established ICP for EV71 – that is,

one meeting the WHO definition of an ICP (26) – the selection of the vaccine
dose and regimen may be based on the reaching of a plateau antibody response
unless this is precluded by concerns over reactogenicity. It is desirable that
immunogenicity studies should explore the minimum number of doses and the
shortest dose interval(s) required to achieve a plateau immune response.
C.3.1.2 Cross-protection
The ability of a candidate EV71 vaccine to protect against a range of wild-type
strains covering the main EV71 genogroups may vary according to the vaccine
strain used. For example, lower cross-neutralization against an atypical C2-like
strain was observed in naturally infected EV71 patients (71) and in clinical trials
using B4-based vaccine strains (22).
In clinical trials in which vaccine-elicited antibody is determined against
the antigen in the vaccine, it is recommended that neutralizing activity is also
measured using antigens derived from a range of circulating wild-type EV71
strains from different (sub)genogroups. If marked differences are observed
in measured antibody levels using vaccine versus non-vaccine strains, and/or
by EV71 subgenogroup, it would be of particular interest to assess whether a
similar effect is observed for functional antibody levels in naturally infected
individuals.
C.4 Efficacy
C.4.1 Requirement for a demonstration of vaccine efficacy
It is currently recommended that licensure of a candidate EV71 vaccine should
be based on evidence of its protective efficacy against clinically apparent HFMD
and herpangina. The following considerations apply:
■■ At the time of preparing these WHO Recommendations, three
vaccines against human EV71 had been licensed in one country (see
General considerations above) (4, 9, 17).
■■ These licensed vaccines are not yet widely used internationally. As
a result, the use of a control group that does not receive vaccination
against EV71 is possible.
■■ In jurisdictions in which a licensed vaccine is available, it is possible
that individual NRAs may consider that licensure can be based on
a trial that evaluates the efficacy of the candidate vaccine relative to
that of the licensed vaccine in a population similar to that in which
the efficacy of the licensed vaccine was established.
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■■ The lack of an established ICP against EV71 does not rule out
immunobridging a candidate vaccine to a licensed vaccine that has
been shown to be efficacious. However, this approach is only possible
if both vaccines contain the same antigen(s) so that anti-EV71
neutralizing antibody immune responses can be compared directly.
In addition, the demonstration of efficacy of all three licensed
vaccines was confined to EV71 subgenogroup C4 and it is not
known whether protective efficacy may vary between genogroups
circulating in different regions.
Taking these considerations into account, the focus of the following
sections is on clinical development programmes that include vaccine efficacy
trials in which the control group does not receive vaccination against EV71.
However, most of the recommendations are also applicable to trials in
which the control group receives a licensed vaccine against EV71. Clinical
programmes leading to licensure based on immunobridging are not addressed
in the following guidance. The general principles to be considered are discussed
in sections 5.6.2 and 6.3.3 of the WHO Guidelines on clinical evaluation of
vaccines: regulatory expectations (26).
C.4.2 Considerations for efficacy trial design

C.4.2.1 Primary objective
The primary objective will be to demonstrate that the candidate vaccine protects
against clinically apparent (that is, symptomatic) HFMD and herpangina caused
by EV71 infection regardless of the genogroup (see section C.4.2.4).
■■ It is not required for efficacy to be shown against asymptomatic
EV71 infection as such infections are of no clinical significance.
■■ It is not required for vaccine efficacy trials to be powered to
demonstrate genogroup-specific efficacy (see section C.4.2.2).
C.4.2.2 Trial sites

Efficacy trials will be conducted in endemic areas in which the estimated attack
rate for HFMD and herpangina due to EV71 infection is sufficient to complete
enrolment into an adequately powered vaccine efficacy trial within a reasonable
time frame. Sites may be chosen on the basis of available public health disease-
surveillance data and/or pre-trial evaluations of epidemiology conducted by the
sponsor. In three prior efficacy trials (6–9) the EV71 viruses that caused clinically
apparent HFMD and herpangina were limited to strains of the C4 subgenogroup
circulating at the trial sites in the years in which they were conducted. Sponsors
are encouraged to consider selecting sites in a range of geographical areas in
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which strains of different genogroups are circulating and/or to conduct separate

vaccine efficacy trials in regions with different genogroup distributions.
C.4.2.3 Subject selection criteria

Because of the age-dependent incidence and severity of EV71 infections it is
likely that vaccine efficacy trials will target infants and children. An upper age
limit may be set depending on the age-specific attack rates.
C.4.2.4 Primary end-point

In accordance with the recommended primary objective above, the primary
end‑point should be clinically apparent HFMD or herpangina that is
confirmed to be due to EV71 infection. Sponsors could consider appointing
an independent data-monitoring committee to review the data and determine
which subjects meet the case definition to be counted in the primary analysis.
C.4.2.4.1 Clinical features for the case definition

The clinical features that cause subjects to present to study site staff or to a local
designated health care facility for laboratory investigations for acute HFMD
or herpangina should be identified with the aim of capturing as many cases as
possible while limiting unnecessary investigations. On this basis, it is reasonable
to define a possible case of HFMD or herpangina requiring laboratory
investigation as an illness presenting with febrile illness accompanied by a
papular or vesicular rash in the characteristic distribution on the oral mucosa,
hands, feet or buttocks. A severe case of HFMD should be defined as associated
with neurological, respiratory or circulatory complications as described by
WHO (4).
C.4.2.4.2 Laboratory confirmation of HFMD or herpangina caused by EV71 infection

It is recommended that laboratory confirmation of HFMD and herpangina cases
should be conducted in a designated qualified central laboratory. If more than
one central laboratory is necessary for practical reasons, it is essential that all
of the laboratories use identical methodologies, and consideration should be
given to testing a randomly selected subset of samples at each laboratory to assess
concordance. The laboratory methods used should be validated.
The confirmation of EV71 as causative of the clinical picture should be
based on any of the following:
■■ detection of EV71 RNA in vesicle/throat swabs or in stool;
■■ virus isolation and analysis of VP1 sequence;
■■ detection of IgM against EV71 – which is often detectable at the time
of onset of clinical symptoms but which may peak after 1–2 weeks.
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To avoid cases being missed, protocols should plan for appropriately

timed repeat specimens to be collected from individuals with a first negative test
for EV71 RNA (for example, 3–7 days after the first sample).
Samples obtained at first presentation and repeat specimens should also
be tested to detect infection with other enteroviruses, such as Coxsackie and
echoviruses, that can also cause HFMD and which regularly co-circulate with
EV71 in affected countries.
C.4.2.5 Primary, secondary and other analyses

In a vaccine efficacy trial, it may be permissible for the primary analysis
to include only confirmed cases of HFMD and herpangina caused by EV71
as follows:
■■ in subjects who completed the vaccination series within
predetermined visit windows, if more than one dose is required; and
■■ with symptom onset occurring more than a defined period after the
only or final dose of the series, taking into account what is known
about the timing of the post-dose anti-EV71 IgG peak.
This approach gives the most optimistic estimation of vaccine efficacy.
If the primary analysis is confined to cases counted as described above,
it is essential that predefined secondary analyses are carried out to estimate
vaccine efficacy based on confirmed cases of clinically apparent HFMD and
herpangina caused by EV71 infection, defined and counted as follows:
■■ all cases in subjects who received at least one assigned dose as
randomized, and regardless of adherence to study visit windows;
■■ cases that occurred at any time after the last dose received (that is,
counted from the day of dosing) in those who completed the
assigned number of doses;

■■ cases that occurred after each sequential dose, depending on the
number of doses in the series and counted from the day of dosing.
Vaccine efficacy should be explored according to EV71 genogroup if
this is feasible, depending on the numbers of cases that occur due to individual
genogroups.
It is recommended that an additional analysis should explore any
differences in clinical or laboratory features (including severity) between cases
that occur in the candidate vaccine group and the control group (whether the
control group receives placebo or a licensed vaccine against EV71). The analysis
should take into account whether the severity observed in individual subjects
could reflect coinfection with other enteroviruses.
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C.4.2.6 Case ascertainment

It is recommended that an active case-ascertainment strategy is used throughout
the time frame of a vaccine efficacy trial. This is essential at least up to the time
of the primary analysis, which may be conducted after a specific number of total
cases has been accumulated or after a predefined period in which a sufficient
number of cases are expected to occur to estimate vaccine efficacy.
C.4.2.7 Duration of protection

While the primary analysis may lead to licensure, it is recommended that trials
continue to use active case ascertainment to follow up subjects for several years
to provide data on waning vaccine protection, without un-blinding of treatment
assignment at the level of the individual. These data can then be reported at
some point after licensure of the vaccine and may point to a need for further
doses to be administered at intervals to maintain protection, or a need to change
the vaccine strains used.
C.4.2.8 Vaccine effectiveness

The need for vaccine effectiveness studies should be established at the time
of licensure.
If longer-term follow-up within a pre-licensure trial is not considered
to be feasible, the duration of vaccine protection should be investigated within
a vaccine effectiveness study and/or as part of routine disease surveillance
conducted by public health authorities. Furthermore, the efficacy of the vaccine
against individual subgenogroups should be explored as part of a vaccine
effectiveness study and/or during routine disease surveillance.
C.5 Safety
Evaluation of the safety of candidate EV71 vaccines should be undertaken
in accordance with the recommendations made in section 7 of the WHO
Guidelines on clinical evaluation of vaccines: regulatory expectations (26). If
the primary series consists of several vaccine doses it is important to document
whether reactogenicity increases with sequential doses. Additionally, the safety
of post-primary doses should be evaluated. There may be special considerations
for vaccine safety depending on the vaccine construct and the intended target
population.
If a candidate vaccine is evaluated in a large pre-licensure trial, and if
the safety profile documented during immunogenicity trials did not give rise to
any major concerns, it may be acceptable for a full assessment of safety (that is,
including detailed documentation of local and systemic reactogenicity, as well
as all unsolicited adverse events) to be confined to a randomized subset of the
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total subjects. Any serious adverse event occurring in any subject enrolled at
any of the trial sites should be documented.
Part D. Recommendations for NRAs

D.1 General recommendations
The guidance for NRAs and NCLs given in the WHO Guidelines for national
authorities on quality assurance for biological products (72) and WHO Guidelines
for independent lot release of vaccines by regulatory authorities (30) should be
followed. These guidelines specify that no new biological product should be
released until consistency of lot manufacturing and quality has been established
and demonstrated by the manufacturer.
The detailed production and control procedures, as well as any significant
changes in them that may affect the quality, safety or efficacy of inactivated EV71
vaccines (73), should be discussed with and approved by the NRA. For control
purposes, the relevant international reference preparations currently in force
should be obtained for the purpose of calibrating national, regional and working
standards as appropriate (74). The NRA may obtain from the manufacturer the
product-specific or working reference to be used for lot release.
Consistency of production has been recognized as an essential
component in the quality assurance of inactivated EV71 vaccines. The NRA
should carefully monitor production records and quality control test results for
clinical lots, as well as for a series of consecutive lots of the final product.
D.2 Official release and certification

A vaccine lot should be released only if it fulfils all national requirements and/
or satisfies Part A of these WHO Recommendations (30).
A summary protocol for the manufacturing and control of enterovirus

71 vaccines (inactivated), based on the model summary protocol provided
below in Appendix 1 and signed by the responsible official of the manufacturing
establishment, should be prepared and submitted to the NRA/NCL in support
of a request for the release of a vaccine for use.
A lot release certificate signed by the appropriate NRA/NCL official
should then be provided if requested by the manufacturing establishment,
and should certify that the lot of vaccine meets all national requirements and/
or Part A of these WHO Recommendations. The certificate should provide
sufficient information on the vaccine lot, including the basis of the release
decision (by summary protocol review or independent laboratory testing).
The purpose of this official national lot release certificate is to facilitate the
exchange of vaccines between countries and should be provided to importers
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of the vaccines. A model NRA/NCL Lot Release Certificate for enterovirus 71

vaccines (inactivated) is provided below in Appendix 2.
Authors and acknowledgements

The first draft of these WHO Recommendations was prepared by a WHO
drafting group comprising Dr E. Griffiths, Kingston upon Thames, the United
Kingdom; Dr P. Minor, St Albans, the United Kingdom; Dr Y. Sun, Paul-Ehrlich-
Institut, Germany; Dr H. Meyer, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; Dr J. Wang,
National Institutes for Food and Drug Control, China; Dr J. Martin, National
Institute for Biological Standards and Control, the United Kingdom; and Dr D.
Lei, World Health Organization, Switzerland, taking into consideration the
discussions and consensus reached during a WHO working group meeting
to develop WHO Recommendations to assure the quality, safety and efficacy
of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated), held in Shanghai, China, 11–12
September 2019 and attended by: Dr X. Chen and Dr Z. Wang, Wuhan Institute
of Biological Products Co. Ltd, China; Mr Z. Fu, Dr F. Gao, Dr P. He, Ms Z. Jiang,
Dr Q. Mao, Dr J. Wang, Dr Y. Wang and Dr M. Xu, National Institutes for Food
and Drug Control, China; Dr E. Griffiths, Kingston upon Thames, the United
Kingdom; Dr Y. Hu and Dr W. Meng, Sinovac Biotech Co., Ltd, China; Mrs T.
Jivapaisarnpong, King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi, Thailand;
Dr E. Jung, CJ HealthCare R&D Biomedicine, Republic of Korea; Dr J. Lee, Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Republic of Korea; Dr Q. Li and
Mr L. Yi, Institute of Medical Biology Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences,
China; Dr X. Li Shanghai Institute of Biological Products Co. Ltd, China; Dr Z.
Li and Mr J. Liu, Beijing Minhai Biotechnology Co., Ltd, China; Dr J. Martin,
National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, the United Kingdom;
Dr H. Meyer and Dr Y. Sun, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; Dr P. Minor,
St Albans, the United Kingdom; Dr S. Phumiamorn, Institute of Biological
Products, Thailand; Dr J. Shin, World Health Organization, Regional Office for
the Western Pacific, Philippines; Mr Y. Tang, World Health Organization China
Office, China; Dr H. Wang and Dr H. Yang, Center for Drug Evaluation of the
National Medical Products Administration, China; and Dr D. Lei, World Health
Organization, Switzerland.
The second draft of this document (WHO/BS/2020.2388) was prepared
by Dr J. Martin, National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, the
United Kingdom; Dr H. Meyer, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; Dr E. Griffiths,
Kingston upon Thames, the United Kingdom; Dr Y. Sun, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut,
Germany; Dr J. Wang, National Institutes for Food and Drug Control, China;
and Dr D. Lei, World Health Organization, Switzerland, incorporating as
appropriate comments received from regulators, manufacturers and academia
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following public consultation, and taking into consideration the discussions

and consensus reached during a WHO informal consultation on WHO
Recommendations to assure the quality, safety and efficacy of enterovirus 71
vaccines (inactivated), held via WebEx, 8–10 June 2020 and attended by: Dr X.
Chen, Mr C. Guo, Ms L. Li, Ms Q. Li, Ms W. Lv and Dr J. Shi, Wuhan Institute
of Biological Products Co. Ltd, China; Dr E. Griffiths, Kingston upon Thames,
the United Kingdom; Ms Y. Hu, Sinovac Biotech Co., Ltd, China; Mrs T.
Jivapaisarnpong, King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi, Thailand;
Dr E. Jung, CJ HealthCare R&D Biomedicine, Republic of Korea; Dr H. Langar,
World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean,
Egypt; Dr Q. Li, Mr L. Yi and Ms J. Zou, Institute of Medical Biology Chinese
Academy of Medical Sciences, China; Dr Z. Li and Mr J. Liu, Beijing Minhai
Biotechnology Co., Ltd, China; Dr Z. Liang, Dr Q. Mao, Dr J. Wang, Dr Y. Wang
and Dr M. Xu, National Institutes for Food and Drug Control, China; Dr J.
Martin, National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, the United
Kingdom; Dr S. Phumiamorn, Institute of Biological Products, Thailand; Dr H.
Shimizu, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan; Dr J. Shin, World
Health Organization, Regional Office for the Western Pacific, Philippines; Dr Y.
Sun, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; Mr Y. Tang, World Health Organization
China Office, China; and Dr M. Alali, Dr I Knezevic and Dr D. Lei, World
Health Organization, Switzerland.
Further changes were made to document WHO/BS/2020.2388 by the
WHO Expert Committee on Biological Standardization.
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Annex 3
Appendix 1
Model summary protocol for the manufacturing and
control of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated)
The following protocol is intended for guidance and indicates the minimum
information that should be provided by the manufacturer to the NRA or NCL.
Information and tests may be added or omitted as necessary with the approval of
the NRA or NCL.
It is possible that a protocol for a specific product may differ in detail from
the model provided. The essential point is that all relevant details demonstrating
compliance with the licence and with the relevant WHO recommendations for a
particular product should be provided in the protocol submitted.
The section concerning the final product should be accompanied by a
sample of the label and a copy of the leaflet (package insert) that accompanies
the vaccine container. If the protocol is being submitted in support of a request
to permit importation, it should also be accompanied by a lot release certificate
(see Appendix 2) from the NRA or NCL of the country in which the vaccine
was produced and/or released stating that the product meets all national
requirements as well as Part A of these WHO Recommendations.
1. Summary information on final lot

International name of product:
Commercial/trade name:
Product licence (marketing authorization) number:
Country:
Name and address of manufacturer:
Name and address of licence holder, if different:
Final packaging lot number:
Type of container:
Number of containers in this final lot:
Final container lot number:
Nature of final product (adsorbed):
Preservative and nominal concentration:
Volume of each single human dose:
Number of doses per final container:
Virus strain:
Cell substrate used for production:
209
Summary of composition (summary of the qualitative and quantitative

composition of the vaccine per single human dose, including any adjuvant used
and other excipients):
Shelf-life approved (months):

Date of manufacture:
Expiry date:
Storage conditions:
2. Detailed information on manufacture and control

The following sections are intended for reporting the results of the tests performed
during the production of the vaccine, so that the complete document will provide
evidence of consistency of production. If any test had to be repeated, this must be
indicated. Any abnormal results must be recorded on a separate sheet.
Summary of source materials

Identity of seed lot strain used for vaccine production
Reference number of seed lot:
Date(s) of reconstitution (or opening) of seed lot container(s):
Test for adventitious agents

Methods:
Result:
Date:
Identity of cell bank used for vaccine production

Reference number of cell bank:
Date(s) of reconstitution (or opening) of cell bank container(s):
Identity test
Methods:
Result:
Date:
210
Annex 3
Control of vaccine production

Control cell cultures
Tests on control cell cultures
Ratio of control to production cell cultures:
Incubation conditions:
Period of observation of cultures:
Dates observation started/ended:
Ratio or proportion of cultures discarded:
Results of observation:
Tests for haemadsorbing viruses

Quantity of cell tested:
Method used:
Date of start of test-1:
Date of end of test-1:
Results:
Date of start of test-2:
Date of end of test-2:
Results:
Tests for adventitious agents on supernatant culture fluids

Method used:
Date of start of test:
Date of end of test:
Result:
Identity test
Method used:
Result:
Control of single harvests

Name of the culture medium:
Date of inoculation:
Temperature of incubation:
211
Microscopic observation
Result:
Date:
Date of harvest:
Volume of harvest:
Yield (mg/mL):
Sterility tests for bacteria, fungi and mycoplasmas

Test for bacteria and fungi
Method:
Media:
Volume inoculated:
Result:
Test for mycoplasmas (if applicable)

Method:
Volume inoculated:
Result:
Virus titration
Method:
Reference lot no.
Date:
Result:
Control of virus pool

Lot number of virus pool:
Date of pooling:
Number of harvests:
Volume(s), storage temperature, storage time and approved storage period:
212
Annex 3
Purification of virus pool (may be performed after inactivation)

Purification methods:
Volume before purification:
Volume after purification:
Date:
Tests on virus pool

Virus titration
Method:
Reference lot no.
Date:
Result:
Virus antigen content

Method:
Reference lot no.
Date:
Result:
Specific activity
Virus antigen content:
Total protein content:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Inactivation of harvest pool (may be performed before purification)

Filtration before inactivation
Filtration method:
Date:
Time of start of filtration:
Time of end of filtration:
Inactivation
Agent(s) and concentration of inactivation agent:
Temperature of inactivation:
Date of start of inactivation:
213
Virus antigen units at start of inactivation:

Date of taking first samples:
Date of completion of inactivation:
Virus antigen units at end of inactivation:
Filtration during inactivation

Filtration method:
Date:
Time of start of filtration:
Time of end of filtration:
Control of inactivated bulk

Test for effective inactivation (after removal/neutralization of inactivating agent)
Sample size tested:
Dates of sampling (1–4):
Test method:
Period of observation of cell cultures:
Period of observation of subcultures:
Result:
Sterility tests for bacteria and fungi

Method:
Media:
Volume inoculated:

Result:
Antigen content
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Test for residual inactivating agent

Method:
214
Annex 3
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Test for residual host-cell DNA (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Test for residual chemicals (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Test for residual animal serum protein (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Control of final bulk

Identification (lot number):
Date of manufacture/blending:
Volume(s), storage temperature, storage time and approved storage period:
Blending: Prescription (per dose) Added

Virus antigen (IU or unit):
Adjuvant:
Preservative (specify):
Others (chemicals):
Final volume (mL):

Method:
Media:
215
Volume inoculated:
Result:
Potency test
In vivo assay (may be performed at final bulk stage)
Species, strain, sex and weight specifications:
Number of mice tested:
Dates of vaccination, bleeding:
Date of assay:
Lot number of reference vaccine and assigned potency:
Vaccine doses (dilutions) and number of animals responding at each dose:
ED50 of reference and test vaccine:

Potency of test vaccine (with 95% fiducial limits):
If an in vitro assay is used

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Adjuvant content
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Preservative content (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Control of final lot

Lot number:
Date of filling:
216
Annex 3
Type of container:
Filling volume:
Number of containers after inspection:
Number and percentage of containers rejected:
Appearance
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Identity test
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:

Method:
Media:
Volume inoculated:
Result:
Potency test
In vivo assay (may be performed at final bulk stage)
Species, strain, sex and weight specifications:
Number of mice tested:
Dates of vaccination, bleeding:
Date of assay:
Lot number of reference vaccine and assigned potency:
Vaccine doses (dilutions) and number of animals responding at each dose:
ED50 of reference and test vaccine:

Potency of test vaccine (with 95% fiducial limits):
217
If an in vitro assay is used

Method:
Lot number of reference and assigned potency:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Preservative content (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Endotoxin content
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
pH
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Adjuvant content
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Degree of adsorption
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
218
Annex 3
Residual antibiotics (if applicable)

Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
Extractable volume
Method:
Specification:
Date:
Result:
3. Certification by the manufacturer

Name of head of production and/or quality control (typed)
Certification by the person from the control laboratory of the manufacturing
company taking overall responsibility for the production and quality control of
the vaccine.
I certify that lot no. of enterovirus 71 vaccine
(inactivated), whose number appears on the label of the final containers, meets
all national requirements and satisfies Part A34 of the WHO Recommendations
to assure the quality, safety and efficacy of enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated).35
Signature
Name (typed)
Date
4. Certification by the NRA/NCL

If the vaccine is to be exported, attach the model NRA/NCL Lot Release
Certificate for enterovirus 71 vaccines (inactivated) (as shown in Appendix 2), a
label from a final container and an instruction leaflet for users.
34
With the exception of provisions on distribution and transport, which the NRA may not be in a position
to assess.
35
WHO Technical Report Series, No. 1030, Annex 3.
219
Appendix 2
Model NRA/NCL Lot Release Certificate for enterovirus 71
This certificate is to be provided by the NRA or NCL of the country in which the
vaccine has been manufactured, on request by the manufacturer.
Certificate no.
The following lot(s) of enterovirus 71 vaccine (inactivated) produced by
36
in ,37 whose numbers appear on the labels of the

final containers, meet all national requirements 38 and Part A39 of the WHO
Recommendations to assure the quality, safety and efficacy of enterovirus 71
vaccines (inactivated),40 and comply with WHO good manufacturing practices
for pharmaceutical products: main principles; 41 WHO good manufacturing
practices for biological products; 42 and the WHO Guidelines for independent lot
release of vaccines by regulatory authorities.43
The release decision is based on 44
Final lot number

Number of human doses released in this final lot
Expiry date
The certificate may also include the following information:
■■ name and address of manufacturer;
■■ site(s) of manufacturing;
36
Name of manufacturer.
37
Country of origin.
38
If any national requirements have not been met, specify which one(s) and indicate why the release of the
lot(s) has nevertheless been authorized by the NRA or NCL.
39
With the exception of provisions on distribution and transport, which the NRA or NCL may not be in a
position to assess.
40
41
42
43
44
Evaluation of the product-specific summary protocol, independent laboratory testing and/or specific
procedures laid down in a defined document, and so on as appropriate.
220
Annex 3
■■ trade name and/or common name of product;

■■ marketing authorization number;
■■ lot number(s) (including sub-lot numbers and packaging lot
numbers if necessary);
■■ type of container;
■■ number of doses per container;
■■ number of containers or lot size;
■■ date of start of period of validity (for example, manufacturing date);
■■ storage conditions;
■■ signature and function of the person authorized to issue the
certificate;
■■ date of issue of certificate.
The Director of the NRA/NCL (or other appropriate authority)
Signature
Name (typed)
Date
221

TRS 1030 Annex 3 EV71 Vaccines

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TRS 1030 Annex 3 EV71 Vaccines

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Annex 3

Recommendations to assure the quality, safety and

Recommendations published by the World Health Organization

range from asymptomatic infection to mild HFMD to neurological disease

vaccines, a series of meetings was convened by WHO to review the current

Purpose and scope

Cell bank: a collection of vials of cells of uniform composition (though

or after purification. It may be prepared from one single harvest or a number of

Enteroviruses and their epidemiology

focus of vaccine development.

inadequate surveillance or because EV71 infection is less common in this region

Vaccines against EV71

vaccine reference standards and antigen potency assays are suitable

International reference materials

2015 as the First WHO International Standard for anti-EV71 serum

Part A. Manufacturing recommendations

A.1.2 Descriptive definition

A.2 General manufacturing recommendations

A.3 Control of source materials

Strains of EV71 used in the production of EV71 vaccine should be identified

A.3.1.2 Virus seed lot system

A.3.1.3 Tests on virus master and working seed lots

A.3.1.3.1 Tests for adventitious agents

The immunizing antigen should be shown to be free from adventitious

The sample should be tested in susceptible cells such as Vero, human

The theoretical risk of the presence of potential human, simian, bovine

A.3.1.3.2 Identity test

A.3.1.3.3 Virus titration

A.3.2 Cell lines

A.3.2.2 Identity test

A.3.3 Cell culture medium

Human serum should not be used. If human serum albumin is used at

Penicillin and other beta-lactams should not be used at any stage of

manufacturing process at the stage specified in the marketing authorization.

Recombinant trypsin is available and should be considered; however,

The source(s) of trypsin of bovine origin, if used, should be approved by

A.4 Control of vaccine production

A.4.1.1 Tests of control cell cultures

A.4.1.2 Tests for haemadsorbing viruses

A reading should be taken after incubation at 2–8 °C for 30 minutes, and

A.4.1.3 Tests for other adventitious agents in cell supernatant fluid

If any cytopathic changes due to adventitious agents occur in any of the

A.4.1.4 Identity tests

A.4.2 Cell cultures for vaccine production

A.4.3 Control of single harvests

A.4.3.1 Identity test

A.4.3.2 Sterility tests for bacteria, fungi and mycoplasmas

In some countries this test is performed on the purified virus harvest

A.4.3.3 Virus titration

A.4.4 Control of virus pools

children following vaccination with a defective IPV (23). The vaccine

Any deviation from the production sequence shown to be acceptable for

A.4.4.1 Purification of virus pools

A.4.4.2 Tests on virus pools (purified or not) before inactivation

A.4.4.2.2 Virus antigen content

A.4.4.2.3 Specific activity

A.4.4.3 Filtration before inactivation (purified or not)

Inactivation should be initiated as soon as possible and, in any case, not

The main purpose of determining the titre of filtered virus pools