Dawe ReflectionsAteHamartia 1968
Dawe ReflectionsAteHamartia 1968
Dawe ReflectionsAteHamartia 1968
Author(s): R. D. Dawe
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology , 1968, Vol. 72 (1968), pp. 89-123
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology
R. D. DAWE
J v E-rTvy Xapa rovarWv Aoro' Ed. vUTL SE 'Lo T0S c v "77Tv E PE-T7tL aobE'pc
FEWthought
passages in Greek
as the passage literature can have
reproduced above. Hereprovoked as finest
we have the much
critical mind of antiquity passing judgement on the process which lies at
the very heart of Greek tragedy, and doing so in a way which in the eyes
of many is gravely inadequate, and in the eyes of some hopelessly wide
of the mark. "The idea of hamartia simply will not fit Sophocles...
still less will it explain Euripides," wrote W. C. Greene, and many other
scholars have expressed themselves in similar terms. Whitman even
prefaced the treatment of Sophocles in his book with a chapter on
" Scholarship and Hamartia," in which he poured ridicule on the useful-
ness of trying to apply the term to actual Sophoclean tragedies; ridicule
which would have been more effective if it had not been accompanied by
the sentence (p. 33) " There can be no real doubt that Aristotle meant by
hamartia a moral fault or failing of some kind."
For hamartia, though a familiar word in the vocabulary of every
student of Greek (and even Shakespearian) tragedy, is still a term sub-
ject to widespread misconceptions. There still flourishes, even in other-
wise civilised parts of the globe, the belief that hamartia may mean a
flaw of character. But closer to the truth is the often quoted definition
of Rostagni: "Errore, proveniente da inconsapevolezza, da ignoranza di
4+H.S.C.P. 72
But is there really any very startling emphasis on hamartia? The word is
mentioned in the context of the right character for a tragic hero. Someone
has to pass from good fortune to bad: traditionally there are two well-
marked routes to misfortune: there is (a) the well-merited punishment
of the transgressor which, says Aristotle, is not a suitable subject for
tragedy and which does not necessarily, even in the fifth century, involve
any a&tapriia; or (b) there is the downfall of a decent chap like you or me,
through some mistake or other. There is no abnormal emphasis:
Aristotle is simply recording his opinion, in ordinary Aristotelian Greek,
that what one ought to do is represent on stage not cases of (a) but cases
of (b).
Adkins attempts to give his theory further support by examining the
meaning of TLELKI'S, which he takes as meaning a man notable for his
"co-operative excellences." But are we obliged to treat the word in this
narrow specialised sense? May it not be the "ordinary language" which
Adkins finds present in his discussion on ttcapdv (p. 96)? Adkins has
done us a valuable service in pinpointing the differences in outlook
between Aristotle and the fifth-century tragedians, but I believe he has
laid too great a stress on them. The difference between us is that, though
both of us agree that Aristotle was not ideally equipped to talk about
Greek tragedy and that his interposition between us and it has very pos-
sibly done more harm than good, Adkins would maintain that the
&capdra "doctrine" is almost wholly irrelevant to classical tragedy,
whereas I would continue to maintain that in this respect at least
Aristotle had fastened onto an essential truth on a topic where many of
his successors have gone astray.
We return then to our original problem, which may be defined in
these terms: we have to work with the meanings of hamartia as they
were established by Hey; and we have to show that this concept is
applicable to Greek tragedy as that art was actually practised. Now the
biggest obstacle in our path, as it seems to me, is this: the Poetics
offer us, at this point, a view of tragedy which appears to exclude the r6le
of the gods: and yet every schoolboy knows (even if his knowledge
is not immune from the charge of oversimplification) that what Greek
tragedy is about is heroic figures being sent to their doom by
divine and irresistible forces. How are we to effect the necessary
reconciliation?
putting a man in such a position that he has little choice but to make a
decision that will later recoil on him with disastrous, and above all
disproportionate, consequences.
19 Hesiod Erga 352, Solon I.74f, Theognis 133, Aesch. Cho. 825, Eum. Ioo007ff,
Soph. O.C. 92f. Hesiod Erga 231 probably implies the same opposition and so
may 413 and 216. Aesch. Suppl. 444 is corrupt, but it seems likely that what is
being spoken of is a restitution "greater than the loss." In Solon I.I3 ate, once
more the instrument of Zeus, is surely financial ruin; but for a different interpre-
tation see Jaeger in Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
1926 pp. 69ff. I mention finally the proverb 'yy'-q" ir&pa ' dri7.
20 Schadewaldt in Wiener Studien 1955, and Gundert in Neue Jahrbiicher fiir
klassische Philologie I940 p. 227.
It will already be apparent that ate and hamartia have at any rate
something in common. But how much in common? It may be for
metrical reasons that the noun hamartia does not occur in Homer. But
it is significant that no other word is used (except ate itself) which might
fill the gap. A schematic representation might look as follows:
Problem: estimate the extent by which the parallel lines opposite ate an
hamartia are separated.
Obviously there is a certain air of unreality about the problem as
posed. The dangers of imposing upon antiquity a system of thought
which exists only within our own minds are only too evident; and I
approach this question not in any spirit of cheery confidence, but with
the hesitancy of an amateur water diviner who thinks, but is not quite
sure, that his stick may be beginning to twitch. If we examine the
occurrence of ate words in the poetry and criticism of antiquity, to see if
by any happy chance ate and hamartia words are ever used in the same
context with reference to the same ideas, instant gratification is our
reward. Let us begin where the coincidences are most striking.
IA. Passages in poetry where ate and hamartia (or &'1TAaKta)24 are linke
24 It may be objected that p7TrAaKov is not the same as qptaprov. But the close-
ness of the two concepts is clear from an examination of the lexicon. &i'TrAaKW4-
aw7a, &alapri-qara writes Hesychius. The confusion at Aesch. Eum. 934 wher
M hasglossing
word &'LrrAaK Llae
the and the
former, otherindeed
unless MSS &,4apvr'Laraa
it is a simplemust derive from
substitution the latte
of a synonym
At Soph. O.T. 472 K'?pEg &va(l)7TAAd17roL are paraphrased by the scholiast as al
ELS qv & Lap-r&vovacu. The same equation reappears in the Euripides scholia at
Hipp. 833 (& rTAaRKtaL" O aTLV, O0 &' V tlv pT-Ptqlr a TLrWpO oat aAAa a 7TpoyowKOdv),
892 (yvdaiqt y&p av'Bt &p~rrAaKCKv: 'XELt y&p yvCOva 7Lt oj7apTEg), and Andr. 948 ( 8''
&LrlTAaKofaa avVVOaEZv aCvr"7 OE'AE: 8' & Lapprooaa &vspds).
Similarity between &L7TrAaKla and dmr- can be shown by comparing Eur. Hipp.
146 with Homer I 537: both refer to the failure (by an oversight) to
sacrifice to the gods.
25 The scansion of 4rq7 is apparently unique, but sense forbids the emendation
ayq; nor do I believe in aA-7, commended by the Stephanus Thesaurus, where the
statements of Herodian and the Et. Magn. in favour of the long a are recorded.
&ATXI, &AA'oVK
a..oS oo7pcav
.LaPt V.
Apollonios Rhodios 4.412:
E7TE' TO 7 rpWrova aOrT7y
&J/z7TAa K 1qL.
It is evident from the language used (cf. also 1097, and i075) that the
BAda% are none other than Ate in a plural form, or perhaps the At-ra
of Iliad I, which has clearly been the archetypal passage.
Pers. 93ff the ' (Diihnhardt p. 42) are referring to 7rdr-q when they
mention r+v tE'AAovaav E7rEAOE-v arW-Jt flAdc3v. In the MSS of Sophocles
which I am collating at present, flAcfl?q appears regularly as the gloss on
Finally let us notice how the word OEo3AS3flEta is used in prose authors
to denote what appears to be the ate process.
Was ist das Charakteristische aller dieser Fille aus der &piap-r-vwo-
Gruppe? Sie beziehen sich auf Handlungen, die ausgefiihrt werden in dem
guten Glauben, das Zweckmtissige zu tun, die aber missraten (zu flA?af
werden) infolge mangelnder Einsicht des Handelnden. Sie haben an sich
keine moralische Seite, k6nnen aber eine solche erhalten, je nach dem
Grade, in dem der Handelnde fUr sein Nicht-Wissen selbst verant-
wortlich zu machen ist [p. 143].
Dass die gut (oder nicht bis-) gemeinte Tat zur fAdcr) ausschligt, ist
Schuld der mangelhaften Einsicht (ayvota...... orrav 1t-7E yv rLrE
/-UVrE dE L tlrTE o; EVEKa v7TrEAaCE 7Tpd4't). Dieser Mangel an Einsicht besteht
entweder um einfachen Nichtwissen der fUr die Wirkung der Handlung
in Frage kommenden Faktoren, oder in der voriibergehenden Verdunk-
lung des Wissens durch ein rdcos [in his Resume on p. 1591].
The place assigned by Aristotle to transient iraOrq7 (and what is Ate if
not a transient ?rdBos?) or the failure to apply latent knowledge to particu-
lar cases is admirably discussed by I. M. Glanville (see note i), and in
the pages of the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics there is a wealth of
comment by Aristotle which could, if space and energy permitted, be
brought into a fruitful relation with the practice of the tragic poets
themselves. But I renounce such grandiose projects. Instead, and by
way of transition, let me close this section by reproducing two quota-
tions from Glanville's article, for the reader to mull over by himself in
tranquillity: the first is on page 54, the second on page 56:
a) But for the poet, the boundary between the voluntary and the in-
voluntary (i's 87 ayvOOvLEvov, -L% oyvoovLEvvov v ,uV /L r' a1?V-t r' ov,
Sf'iat), the limit of purpose and of happiness, is still the shifting margin
between the human and the divine.
b) ... as the human agent passes from ignorance to knowledge and
attributes his fate directly to the deity, so we, in this moment of intense
feeling, accept &/.apria as a function of the divine will that shaped his end.
32 Cf. Aesch. Agam. 1535 with Fraenkel ad loc. and Dodds The Greeks and the
Irrational p. 8.
I say no more about Aeschylus; and when the time comes, I promise
to be just as brief with Euripides. For it is only right that Aristotle's
preoccupation with Sophocles should be ours too. The famous Ate ode
in Antigone (vv. 582ff) is a natural starting place. We have already
noticed that Ate has superstitious connections as well as intellectual
ones - and just as well, for an ode to hamartia would be a strange
thought indeed. And yet from the logical standpoint there is no great
difference. In fact the whole of Antigone is seen in intellectual terms to a
degree found in no other tragedy, with the possible exception of
Oedipus Rex. The kind of language we have been discussing abounds
throughout. As events move towards their crisis, the chorus stress the
need for EtPovAla (Io98); and after the event the messenger sums up in
terms of &a9ovAta (1242) and Creon himself speaks of his own 8vapovAhat
(1269). The closing lines of the play are a homily on qpovEYv. Antigone
herself sees the dispute as one over which side is committing the
hamartia:
TE.oWLTEp,
KP. o"Uw KX.TL.TOV K7/1JXTWV
oMLaL, 7o-tpO-V EVJOVUXY;
7TAEloU,;7 -qc3.
Against this background stands the Ate ode. The first stasimon had
been on the brilliance of human intelligence and the attendant dangers
when it goes wrong, this note of warning being sounded only in the last
antistrophe, where it refers, one can only assume, to Antigone's in-
genuity in burying the body. Our Ate ode is parallel in structure, the
last antistrophe having a special application to the case of Creon, as will
emerge immediately from the following scene with Haemon. The
following chorus is about "Epws: we have already noted the connections
of Aphrodite and "Epws with Ate.3" When we read 787ff we recognise
this as language we have seen before used of Ate:
Kol Or" 0 7 C&O(XV&ZTWV 1LO~o o
o0K ~Ao7pl'v
oOvVK, &AA"' '3n A
and his first words of lamentation are l' WpEv~wv w8vapdovwv at1apxrpLara.
But in the same breath as he says this, Creon recognises that he is the
victim of the gods. His hamartia too has been their will. But the victim
of ~rr or -&zdr? does not know what is happening to him until it is too
late. So here the chorus (1270) comment o'L' tw 'OS 'oLKas 3OE 7rv 8K 7V
8~Ev and Creon responds oOL ~lx 1Oa lo6v Ehacos. ~daOEL 0 00os- applies
to Creon in a more refined sense than it did to Aeschylus' Agamemnon,
whose ,id0os- does not rise above that enshrined in the formula rOacwv 8 1
rE Vrmo~ lyvw. With Antigone we are now much closer to the 'pr~
LavOdvvw of Euripides; and closer too to Aristotelian anagnorisis.40
39 That Creon is in fact making a mistake, although adhering to the letter of
the law, is something that would have been readily comprehensible to Aristotle,
who (Eth. Nic. II37b) distinguishes between rT 14LELKi and rT &'KaGov. Creon
observed only r SL'KaLov. I reproduce the most relevant sentences: aTrrov S' 7TL
" U4EV vdOLO SaO 'ov lVrTSi, rTEP E&4voJv S' ox otov tE OP OS EITELV r KOZlOdaOV, Ev
ots o3v avYK7y,) /EV EV L OITELV U,KOOV, t otdv TE 8 Ep'0(2, rT (L 29 ' r3 b O AOV AcplCVVEL dJ
VOdLOS, OVK czyvov r Tz'CzaPTaCVOLEVOV. Katl EaLYt ot3Sv 'TTOv OpOw-" ro yap C/LCaPT7/La OVK
Ev TWL VOLWL O V Ev 4 TWL vOLOUOET77tL AA" Ev 7L 9VcTEL tTOV Trpa)'ia01oS Eat7LV, EVOeV yap
TOCVT77 77 TOv 1TrpaZKT(v ;A77 E'arLv. rOCv oi3v A4Ey77tL EV J0 VdOtOS KCOOdAOV, CTVfl2SL 8' ?'iT
TOVTOV 7rraparTO KZOO'AOv, TOTE 0p'wS ECXEL, 7ft it CZPaAEITtL 0 VO1OOET7T7S9 Kclt 77?LPTCEV ca6rAC2
(Io95-1097)
The chorus recommend cflovAlo a (io98), viz. IracpEtLKaOiv (1 IO2), and urge the
necessity of speed:
avvrT4LVOvaU y&p
OEWV 7TO8KELS ETOV KaKd0POVCzS PO a flat.
Or
for XPjp"
she is lk' 'JapTEan
fulfilling Xpp-r1g& CtowsEwr.
oracle; but if there isDeianeira's
any moral act must be
evaluation in predestined,
this
piece, it is simply that the heroine "made a mistake." In this respect
Women of Trachis is not different from other plays: it is merely that
other plays tend to be richer in alternative explanations; for even if the
last words are KOV'EV ro7vr0V 0" 7rL 4Z7 Zeiv', it has to be admitted that the
action of the piece is not pervaded by the mysterious interpenetrating
ambiguities which most of us have come to regard as belonging to the
essence of Greek tragedy.
With Ajax we must differentiate between the prehistory of the play
and the events which constitute it: the same division that we shall have
to make with Oedzipus Rex. The messenger speech 748ff relates the
conditional prophecy of Calchas and the two occasions when Ajax had
returned a prideful answer to Athena's offer of help. This information
comes to light in the middle of the play, just before Ajax commits
suicide: it may therefore have been put in by the poet to mitigate the
feeling that Ajax' death is totally unjustified. Earlier in the play (172ff)
the chorus surmise that Ajax' madness is a punishment for a failure to
sacrifice (cf. Homer I 537 where such an omission is called an act
of ate, and Eur. Hipp. 146 where it is &Ao11haK t).41 But even the hybristic
answer to Athena is itself an act of ate; compare the parallel at 8
502-504 (of A .TS: 4 AOKpdO', said posterity, mindful of the conflict with
the suicide story which the 8 poet may not have known):
KM VV KEY EKcAVYE Kj. al EX otzEVos- 7
El tEptb7 6cXA0 oY E7TOS. EK/3AE Kac ,I1y' aOrc-G).
1^ A' P aEK-g7-tL 0E65Y (VYEvELY ,d ya oaTizla GaAaUUiq-.
and Teucer's later panegyric over him, with his night sortie on the
commanders' tents. Can it be the case that his mind was already
deranged before he set out at all? A difficulty here would be that at
387ff Ajax, recovered by now from his frenzy, addresses a prayer to
Zeus which contains a wish that he may kill the Atridae and Odysseus
before he dies. Sophocles seems not to have provided us with the
information necessary for a solution of this problem. But that Ajax is an
ate play, no one can doubt. Its language abounds in references to the
sickness of Ajax' mind: and although in the mouth of an enemy it is
Ajax' character which is said to make him specially liable to derangement
of this kind (1358), most comment, including comment from Athena
herself, treats the ate as a divine visitation. When the word itself occurs,
it is not always certain whether on any particular occasion it means
"ruin " in general, or " derangement"; but the latter meaning seems the
more likely at vv. 195, 643, 848.
It is certainly true that Ajax is to a large extent a play of character.
Slaughtering the sheep would not have led to suicide in a man who was
not of Ajax' heroic temper. That amiable victim of ate, Don Quixote,
also slaughtered sheep in the belief that they were soldiers, but long
41 At Iliad Q2 68 Zeus says of Hector that he never forgot to sacrifice:
oi i- fdtAwv 'uLdpr7-avE SMpwv.
E7TOLKTELpco 8 Vw
8&ur-rvov E40MT, KatlTEP oVT-ra 8vcIEV7),
7-1
OUKYvcVplC(pT70L*
y LEYWV K7
[V aLEWtS
V 7LS a EOV
rocra E' AhC~ oVK V TE'OL.
We come now to Oedipus Rex. Aristotle's preoccupation with this
play does not need to be stressed; and indeed he mentions it by name in
the hamartia context. But if we ask wherein the hamartia of Oedipus
lies, more than one answer is possible. In Aristotelian terminology the
unwitting offence of a man killing his father 42 and marrying his mother43
would undoubtedly constitute acts of hamartia. On this supposition we
are talking about a kind of hamartia which does not correspond with ate.
This view of Oedipus Rex is popular today, and there are grounds for
supposing that it was popular in antiquity. It is likely enough that it was
the view of Aristotle himself. Some modern critics prefer to believe that
Oedipus' hamartia consisted in his failure to keep the oracles in the
forefront of his mind night and day, in such a way that he would never
lay a finger on any man nor spend a moment in dalliance with any
woman. It would be possible to quote Aristotle in support of this
interpretation also: &AA' A7TEL &Xws AE'yoEV 7,dE ErTECraircTx (Ka y&p d XOV
utEv o ( XTEVOth. 7L ENc 7TT?71L46. KaA i s XPeconEViS byAE diYETcuasiTntLe),
fPLtTEWV KEl E%'AEE ZV EK T7OC -0V Yt)//(LvOv7v-rcov (7TEP cav ITOCO i- CKO
unequalled
is correct, capacity
we wouldfor doing
very so. Ifhave
nearly therefore at v. own
Sophocles' 442 Bentley's r'Xvythat
confirmation for r-Xi
this
interpretation of his play was on the right lines. " Die Kunst ist's grade, die dich
niederstiirzt" is Weinstock's translation.
He (sc.
committed, usually considered
Aristotle) reserves c
an institution. &I-apria, on th
coming inherent in the general
tion, something that gives him the capacity of making mistakes.
Accordingly, when we now apply these findings to the A&Iaprta of the
tragic hero in Poetics 13, we can state at once that it consists not in any act
committed
in by him-for
some disposition Aristotle
inherent would
in him havefindings
... Our called that c&/cp-pr7/a--but
enable us, therefore,
to assert that Aristotle did not attribute Oedipus' fall into misfortune
to any specific blunder committed by him, as some scholars maintain,
but to something within him that is part of his disposition.
But he does not know the one thing of which, according to Aristotle, a
man is least likely to be ignorant: he does not know who he is himself, he
is ignorant of his own identity as son of Laius and locasta and the slayer
of his father and husband of his mother. It is here that his d&paprtla lies,
and it is in this sense that he acts involuntarily. Only this can be his
&~/aprta in terms of the tragedy, for his slaughter of Laius and the
marriage to his mother would be &/qap7'para, and his ignorance of these
facts would be a b&ap-ra relating to events and actions that are not part of
the tragic action proper.
the false decision in the mind, &p/pr-p to the false act. Clearly in a
philosophic discussion on what constitutes a good tragedy, and in a
chapter devoted to the nature of the ideal tragic hero, &tcapria is much
the more suitable word.
2) Ostwald's definition comes dangerously near to obliterating the
difference between &datap-r1a and 'yvota. But the epithet ILEy r will fit
only the former, for ignorance does not come in a range of sizes from
(917ff)
It was an act of divine a&i7T7r that led Pentheus to his fatal decision to
spy on the maenads. Commentators speculate on the precise nature of
5+H.S.C.P. 72
E6-qra7 1 3a'1tov
cTrEvWo aE 1ztAAov
8 cr' 6 p y JPLEaiv ir
EYV 3Lv rcovW EL
Earlier examples may be su
a) With reference to Hippo
46 A. R. Bellinger in an artic
Yale Classical Studies 6 (1939)
god" and then on the same pa
cruellest penalty of all, the m
perilous state." I do not need
us to Ate.
47 Once more we are reminded of Eteocles in his moment of ate: