STRATEGIC & DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUIDES ANU COLLEGE OF ASIA &

THE PACIFIC

GRADUATE STUDIES IN STRATEGY & DEFENCE

COURSE GUIDE

STRATEGIC STUDIES

STST8001

2011

Posted to web: February 2011

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Course Convenor
Name: Room: Telephone: Email address: Consultation Times: Stephan Frhling 3.11 6125 1540 stephan.fruehling@anu.edu.au During business hours Dr. Stephan Frhling is Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University. Since 2006, he has been Managing Editor of the journal Security Challenges. His publications include articles and monographs on Australian defence planning, nuclear strategy, counterproliferation, strategic theory and ballistic missile defence. Stephan completed a Master in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 2003. He has studied economics at the Christian-Albrechts-Universitt in Kiel, Germany, and at the Universit Paris I Panthon-Sorbonne, graduating in 2004. He gained his PhD from the ANU in 2007.

Session Outline
The course will be taught on the following days: Days & Time: Room: Wednesday, 5-8pm Hedley Bull Centre Lecture Theatre 2 (Room 1.09)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

23 February 2 March 9 March 23 March 6 April 27 April 11 May 18 May 25 May 1 June

Make Peace, Not War? The International System and the Causes of War How Is Force Useful? The Nature of Strategy How To Make Sense of It All? Operations on Land, at Sea, and in the Air Fighting Politicians and Statesmen Generals? Civil-Miliary Relations Should We Do Harm At All? Law and the Ethics of War Prisoners of History and Geography? Geopolitics, Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy Winning War by Drinking Tea? Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Can Engineers Revolutionize War? Technological Change and Strategy Absolute Weapons? Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Munitions So What Do We Buy Next? Defence Planning

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Tutorials
Five tutorials complement the course lectures and give additional opportunity for discussion of topics covered in the course. Professor Hugh White will lead these tutorials in cooperation with other academics in the Centre. In an additional four academic skills sessions, we will discuss how to do well in course assignments. While attendance at the tutorials and skill sessions is not compulsory, we strongly encourage students to attend. Tutorials and skills sessions are held in the SDSC reading room, which is located on the 3rd floor of the Hedley Bull building. They will run on Monday evenings from 5.30-6.30pm on the following dates: 28 February 7 March 21 March 4 April 9 May 16 May 23 May 30 May 6 June Skills session (academic writing) Skills session (essays) Skills session (literature reviews, op-eds) Tutorial Tutorial Tutorial Tutorial Tutorial Skills session (exam)

Introduction & Objectives

Welcome to the Strategic Studies core course of the SDSC Graduate Program. In this course I look forward to investigating with you the nature of strategy and strategic studies, and the strategic ideas and issues both old and new that make this subject so rich and exciting to study. We will end up building some very strong analytical foundations to help you with your studies in other courses and which will stay with you as you consider strategic issues in your current and future careers. Because this is a core course which aims to build those analytical foundations, you will find that many of the sessions will approach the same questionhow to use force for political endsfrom a number of angles. These can be political, historical, theoretical, geographical, or ethical. We will also maintain a constant interest in the applications of strategy by governments and other actors: strategic studies is always an applied subject, involving the choices which political actors make about the use of force in international society. We will thus be asking how strategy is made in theory and in practice and how it is shaped by culture, geography, law, technology, or the medium in which violence is used. We will be considering whether strategy needs to be rethought in the light of the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on the one hand, or the threat insurgencies on the other hand. We will look at the influence of geography and technology on war and strategy, and examine how civilian leaders and military commanders interact. To do all of this, our course will consist of 10 three-hour teaching sessions on Wednesdays, and 5 tutorials on select Thursdays. Attendance in the teaching sessions is compulsory, while we would strongly encourage you to attend the tutorial if you are able to. You will be required to write a 1300 word short essay, a compilation of four x 600 word reviews on the essential readings of four sessions of your choice, and a 3000 word essay
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(from a selection of topics). You will also sit a final 3 hour exam which will test your understanding of the course as a whole and your ability to write succinctly on strategic issues within a limited time-frame. This course guide includes information on the teaching and tutorial topics, the assignments you will be required to complete, the SDSC requirements for essay writing and the means of assessment, and provides an introduction to each of the ten teaching sessions. You will also have access to the STST8001 page on Wattle, which will host this course guide and other information on the course and which will allow you to post your assignments electronically. Welcome to the course!

Preliminary Reading
In addition to the reading materials for each session, the best preparation for the course will be to read: John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), Strategic Studies: A Reader, London: Routledge, 2008. Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Random House, 1995).

This course has an associated Reading Brick for enrolled students. This brick contains all the essential readings for each of the sessions. The brick will be available free of charge electronically on USB drive (replacement USBs can be purchased for $20 if required) and also on the Wattle Course site. The readings will be available from SDSC Administration in February.

Attendance & Course Etiquette

Please ensure that you arrive at the course venue on time for each teaching session. Please advise your lecturer by email if you are unable to attend any one of the teaching sessions of the course. Please note that a roll may be kept for attendance. Please turn mobile phones off upon arrival in class.

Chatham House Rules

Most of our lectures will be recorded and available on Wattle. Please note that students will be bound by Chatham House Rules. This means that participants are free to use the information received in lectures, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

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Enrolment Variations
Students can modify their course enrolment by using the Interactive Student Information Service (ISIS) http://students.anu.edu.au/ Students can only drop a course via ISIS if it is not their only course for a particular session (Semester 1 or Autumn). If the course is your only one in either of these sessions please contact SDSC Administration (gssd.adminstrator@anu.edu.au). Students must withdraw from individual courses prior to the relevant census date in order to avoid academic and financial penalty. For more information, please refer to the Student Enrolment and Administrative Procedures (SEAP) guide available at http://www.anu.edu.au/sas/SEAP_guide/ .

Enrolment Variations - DROP

Prior to Census Date 31 March

Date

ISIS and Transcripts

Not shown

Penalty
No financial or academic penalty

After Census Date but 13 May before Date to Drop with Failure Drop Course with Failure 8 June

WD (withdrawn without No academic penalty failure) although fees must still be paid WN (withdrawn fail) Academic and financial penalty

Withdrawals are not permitted after the commencement of the official examination period Note: In accordance with SDSC Graduate Program Working Rules, students who receive a letter fail (including WN) will not be permitted to continue in the program.

Course Assessment
Assessment item Short Essay Literature Review Compilation Essay Final Examination Value 15% 20% 25% 40% Length 1300 words 4 x 600 = 2400 words 3000 words Three Hour Writing Period Due date 9 am, Tuesday 15 March 9 am, Monday 11 April 9 am, Monday 23 May TBA

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS
Short Essay
Write a 1300 word essay on What is Strategic Studies? This essay does not require an executive summary.

Literature Review Compilation

Choose any four of the ten sessions in the course, and for each of these write a 600 word, self-contained literature review of the essential readings of that session. Each review must have a short introductory and concluding paragraph. The literature reviews for each session must be separate pieces of work, but should be submitted as one MS word document. Footnoting is not required except for any direct quotes you may use. A list of pieces reviewed should be included, but is not part of the word count.

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The purpose of these reviews is to give a reader with general knowledge but who is not familiar with the readings a thorough impression of the literature for example, from what angles the literature approaches a topic, the intention with which pieces may have been written, strengths and weaknesses, overlaps and gaps, agreements and controversies. The reviews must thus strike a balance between summary of the pieces and broader analysis but be aware that they should be about the literature on a given topic, not on that topic itself.

Essay
Write a 3000 word essay on one of the following questions: 1. Does strategy today differ from strategy during Roman or medieval times, and if so, how? Answer with reference to two case studies. 2. Lawrence Freedman wrote that The view that strategy is bound up with the role of force in international life must be qualified, because if force is but one form of power then strategy must address the relationship between this form [of power] and others. Do you agree and why? If Freedman is correct, what then is the essence of strategy, if it is not the use of force? 3. The Roman general Vegetius wrote that If you want peace, prepare for war. What does this tell us about the relationship between war and peace? 4. Strategy is the use of force for the ends of policy. But how can we establish the contribution of force of arms to a political outcome in practice, among all the other influences at work? Is strategy an illusion? Answer with reference to one case study.

Executive Summary for Essay

Each essay written for a SDSC course (ie those with an STST prefix) is required to have a 200 word Executive Summary in which you communicate the key points of the essay in a manner suitable for a nonacademic/policy focused audience. The Summary must be clearly indicated and appear before the essay itself and will constitute 10% of the overall mark for the essay. The other 90% will come from the essay which will be marked as a separate, self-contained document. Essays lacking a Summary will receive zero marks for the 10% component. (Please also see the chart later in this guide on the SDSC criteria for marking the essay component). In marking the Summary we will be looking in particular for (a) a clear writing style suitable for your audience in this case assume you are communicating the essence of your essay to an interested Government Minister (b) your ability to summarise and communicate the key features of your essay (c) a clear indication of the significance of your findings in the essay and (d) your ability to stay within the 200 word limit (you must stay within the range of 180 to 220 words).

Approaching the Essay Question

Take time to get a good understanding of what the essay question requires. Concentrate on those issues which are directly relevant to the essay question. If your essay ends up covering a general topic but not answering the specific question you may find that your mark is not as good as it could be. This does not mean that you need to provide a decisive all or nothing answer. In weighing the evidence you may find yourself coming down on more than one side. This is perfectly acceptable. But do make sure that your response is supported by the evidence you have provided. It is a good idea at the outset of your essay to explain what you understand the question requires of you and how you propose to answer it. Remember, above all, stick to the question! The essay is about your argument in response to the question.

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Examination
The exam will consist of a series of essay questions from which you will choose to answer a required number of questions. Copies of previous exam papers for STST8001 are available on the ANU Library website. http://anulib.anu.edu.au/online/exams/ It is an ANU requirement for all students to make themselves available for the entire examination period (9 25 June inclusive, including Saturdays) to sit exams. SDSC will only approve students to sit exams at a time different to the published schedule in very specific circumstances, for example personal illness or accident, significant illness in the immediate family, or completely unanticipated travel commitments for work. It is possible to request to sit special exams either on or off campus, if the reason for the request is due to work commitments outside of Canberra. In both instances an application can be made on the form found at: http://www.anu.edu.au/sas/forms/special_exam.pdf . The form must be lodged with SDSC Administration a minimum of three weeks before the scheduled date of the exam. It is preferable that the student chooses a date before the scheduled sitting date to sit the exam. If the request is for an off-campus exam, the onus is on the student to find an appropriate venue to sit the examination. Some examples of appropriate venues are other tertiary or educational institutions, an embassy or a government department. The student must provide the full name of the invigilator, their job title and the institution they are associated with, contact number/s, mailing address and their email address. The Examinations & Graduations Office will approach the invigilating person/institution and vet their appropriateness.

Assignment Guidelines
Submission
All assignments are to be submitted online using Wattle. All assignments are due by 9am on the due date. The time is recorded centrally by Wattle, therefore please allow adequate time for submission and do not leave it to the last minute as the 9 am deadline will be strictly enforced. Instructions for new students on the use of Wattle will be available before the commencement of the Semester. Assignments submitted late will receive a 2-percentage point deduction for each day late, including weekend days. All assignments must include the appropriate assessment cover sheet which is available for you on the Wattle site for this course. Students must ensure that they keep a copy of their submitted work, which can be readily accessed, until results for that course have been released. Students should also ensure that they have an electronic back-up of submitted work as extensions will not be given for technical problems (eg the malfunction of a USB drive, or harddrive crash).

Word length
Please observe the required word length. A word length within +/- 10% is acceptable e.g. for a 3000 word essay, a count of between 2700 and 3300 words including footnotes or endnotes. Any essays that are much longer than the required length may be penalised.

Presentation
Assignments and essays must be in 12-point font, double-spaced, formatted for A4-size paper, and with pages numbered. Adequate margins must be left for comments. You should include your student number in the header of your assignment and ensure that your entire assignment is saved in the one document, including the cover page if possible. All assessment is blind-marked so please do not include your name anywhere on your assignment.

Extensions
Please note the following rules when considering extensions All extension requests must be made via email directly to gssd.extensions@anu.edu.au before the due date. Do not seek an extension from your lecturer.

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Assignments handed in after the agreed extension date will receive a 2-percentage point deduction for each day late, including weekend days. No assignment will be marked after the start of the examination period for the course concerned. These dates are available each year in the SEAP guide, which can be accessed on the following web-page http://students.anu.edu.au/ Students with long extensions on their assignments may be asked to produce an assignment on a different topic if assignments on the original topic have been marked and returned to students. Suitable reasons for seeking an extension include personal illness or accident, significant illness in the immediate family, or completely unanticipated travel commitments for work. Unsuitable reasons include commitments to other courses and work pressures.

Referencing
You will need to use references (either footnotes at the bottom of the page or endnotes at the end of the essay) in your essays for SDSC, and in the short assignment for this course. You will also need a bibliography which lists in alphabetical order the sources you have used for both assignments for this course. Here are some examples from the major categories: Book and Journal Article 1. Endnote/footnote Book: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 84 (NB: If you are referring to a particular book more than once in an essay, subsequent references to that book should be referenced in the following shortened form): Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p.75. Journal article: Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, Survival, 44:1, Spring 2002, p 25. (NB: If you are referring to a particular article more than once in an essay, subsequent references to that article should be referenced in the following shortened form): Roberts, Counter-terrorism, p.29. 2. Bibliographic Entry Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. Roberts, Adam, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, Survival, 44:1, Spring 2002, pp. 7 32. Essay Cited in Book 1. Endnote/footnote Roderic Alley, The NPT since 1995: relapse or refurbishment?, in Carl Ungerer & Marianne Hanson (eds.), The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001. p 55. (NB: If you are referring to a particular chapter from an edited book more than once in an essay, subsequent references to that chapter should be referenced in the following shortened form): Alley, The NPT since 1995?, p.58. 2. Bibliographic Entry Alley, Roderic, The NPT since 1995: relapse or refurbishment?, in Carl Ungerer & Marianne Hanson (eds.), The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001, pp. 54 71.

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Internet References When referencing from the internet, your entry needs to include the author and the name of the document, the date of the document, the URL and preferably the date you accessed it. For example: Alexander Downer, The spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Tackling the greatest threat to Global Security The sum of All Our Fears, Speech to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 17 February 2003, at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030207_sydinst.html, [accessed 4 March 2003]. (NB: If you are referring to a particular internet source more than once in an essay, subsequent references to that source should be referenced in the following shortened form): Downer, The spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons:, p.75. Students concerned about the inclusion of footnote and endnote texts in the word-count may choose to use an author-date system within the text with a full list of references at the end of the essay. Details on this system, which is often called the Harvard system can be found on-line in the Chicago Manual of Style at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html

Plagiarism
Please be aware that the ANU penalties for plagiarism are severe. Students are referred to the Universitys Code of Practice for student Academic Integrity: http://policies.anu.edu.au/policies/code_of_practice_for_student_academic_integrity/policy It is the responsibility of each individual student to familiarise themselves with this document and to also ensure that:

work submitted for assessment is genuine and original; appropriate acknowledgement and citation is given to the work of others; they declare their understanding of and compliance with the principle of academic integrity on the provided assignment cover sheets; and they do not knowingly assist other student in academically dishonest practice.

Marking and Second Marking of SDSC Ggraduate Assignments

Marks of 80% and over (High Distinctions) are awarded sparingly and represent work of the highest quality, being close to, or at, a publishable standard. All assignments which receive a grade of 80% and above or less than 70% from the original marker are double-marked in the interest of equity across all SDSC Graduate courses. Students have the right to appeal to the Director of Studies in cases where they are dissatisfied with a grade awarded. However, before doing so, students should approach the lecturer who marked their assignment to discuss the reasons for the grade being awarded.

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SDSC Graduate Marking Criteria High Distinction grade (HD) = 80% and above
Analysis Directly answers the question. Strikes an excellent balance between description and analysis. Arguments are backed up by quality evidence. Acknowledges and refutes possible counterarguments to the case advanced. Displays an outstanding awareness of key issues/debates and is superbly positioned relative to those. Originality is a distinguishing characteristic. Generally at or close to publishable standard. Research Draws upon an excellent number and range of sources. Sources selected are of a uniformly high quality. Quantity of sources is highly appropriate to the assignment task. The research is up-to-date and shows an awareness of key texts. Structure/ Expression Superbly organised. Follows a clear and logical structure that supports the answer provided. Written in a precise and accessible style that is always easy for the reader to follow. Tone is at or close to publishable standard. Excellent sentence structure. Contains few if any grammatical or spelling errors. Presentation/ Documentation Strictly adheres to SDSC requirements in this area. Footnoting and bibliographic technique are impeccable, with all sources consistently and fully documented. Formatting is excellent. Word limit is adhered to.

Analysis
Directly answers the question. Strikes a good balance between description and analysis. Arguments are backed up by sound evidence. Analysis may not be entirely original, but displays a solid grasp of key issues/debates and is well positioned relative to those. Advances a clear and consistent line of argument.

Distinction grade (D) = 70% - 79% Research Structure/ Expression

Draws upon a good number and range of sources. Research effort goes beyond material listed in the course guide. Avoids over-reliance upon media sources. Quantity of sources is appropriate to the assignment task. Well organised. Follows a clear structure that supports the answer provided for the most part. Written in an accessible style that is generally easy for the reader to follow. Tone is appropriate for formal academic work. Grammatical or spelling errors are minimal.

Presentation/ Documentation
Largely adheres to SDSC requirements in this area. Footnoting and bibliographic technique are sound containing few if any errors. Formatting lapses are minimal. Word limit is adhered to.

Analysis
Addresses the question but does not answer it directly. Balance between description and analysis favours the former. Evidence provided to support arguments is modest. Analysis is generally sound, but not well positioned relative to key issues/debates. A line of argument is advanced, but not always in a particularly clear and consistent fashion.

Credit grade (C) = 60% - 69% Research Structure/ Expression

Shows evidence of a basic research effort. Little attempt is made to go beyond material listed in the course guide. Often relies too heavily upon media sources. Quantity of sources is modest for the assignment task. Adequately organised. An attempt is made to devise a clear structure, but this is not followed consistently. Writing style is relatively basic. While the reader can follow for the most part, meaning is obscured in places due to poor expression. Tone is too informal in places. Grammar and spelling are fair.

Presentation/ Documentation
Basic adherence to SDSC requirements in this area. Footnoting and bibliographic technique are patchy in places but are basically sound. Formatting is sloppy in places, indicating a lack of attention to detail. Pushes the boundaries of the upper or lower word limits.

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Analysis
Addresses the question but does not answer it directly. Overly descriptive and little relevant analysis is provided. Evidence provided to support arguments is relatively weak. Little awareness and understanding of key issues/debates is demonstrated. A line of argument is attempted, but not executed in a clear and consistent fashion.

Pass grade (P) = 50% - 59% Research Structure/ Expression

Little evidence of any research effort. No attempt is made to go beyond material listed in the course guide. Relies too heavily upon media sources and/or less than optimal internet sources, such as Wikipedia. Quantity of sources is insufficient for the assignment task. Weak organisation. Little evidence of a clear and coherent structure to support the answer provided. Writing style is poor and consistently difficult to follow. Tone is too informal throughout. Grammatical and spelling lapses are relatively frequent.

Presentation/ Documentation
Patchy adherence to SDSC requirements in this area Footnoting and bibliographic technique are inadequate throughout. Formatting is consistently sloppy, indicating a significant lack of attention to detail. Fails to meet or exceeds word limit.

Analysis
Fails to address the question. Overly descriptive and no relevant analysis is provided. No awareness or understanding of key issues/debates. Little attempt to advance any line of argument. Evidence provided to support any arguments advanced is poor to non-existent.

Fail grade (N) = 0-49% Research Structure/ Expression

No evidence of any research effort. Material listed in the course guide does not appear to have been consulted. Relies upon media sources and less than optimal internet sources, such as Wikipedia. Quantity of sources is unacceptable for the assignment task. Very poor organisation. No structure to support the answer provided. Writing style is extremely weak and virtually impossible to follow. Tone is highly inappropriate for formal academic work. Grammatical and/or spelling errors are evident throughout.

Presentation/ Documentation
Fails to adhere to SDSC requirements in this area. Footnoting and bibliographic technique are either unacceptable or absent altogether. Formatting is either sloppy throughout or nonexistent, suggesting a complete absence of attention to detail. Substantially fails to meet or grossly exceeds word limit.

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SEMINAR ONE

Make Peace, Not War?

The International System and the Causes of War
Outline Strategy, in the sense we will focus on in this course, can be defined as the use of threat of use of violence for political ends. The subject is important, because while functioning states carefully limit the use of violence within their borders through legal systems and the police, violence in the international space perpetrated by both states and non-state actorsremains de-facto unchecked by similar institutionalized constraints. Without doubt, war is one of the most important determinants of the course of human history which also means that it can be fiendishly difficult to define what situations may be referred to as its opposite, peace. Hence, even peaceful places like Australia spend a lot of money building the capacity to undertake organised violence against other states. In the first part of this session, we will thus begin our course by discussing the causes of war. In the second half of the session, we will then explore what it is about the international system that makes organised violence so important, and dangerous. Hugh White, Director of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, will join us to discuss the nature of relations between states. The international system is highly complex, as it is constituted not only of the states themselves, but also the states domestic systems, and the relation between states. Yet its functioning is critically important to discussing war as it is both the arena in which conflict takes place, and the source of belligerents. We will see that although the international system is anarchical, it is not without orderand the relationship between these two aspects is a powerful determinant in how states can further their interests by, for example, aligning with like-minded nations. Much of the writing on international politics has thus been fascinated with the questions relating to the causes and prevention of war. Key Questions: Must war always be an inherent part of international politics? Do states and other actors use force for different purposes today than one hundred years ago? What is peace? Is war caused by human nature or human circumstances? Essential Reading: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. 3-15. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 184-199. Stanley Michalak, A Primer in Power Politics, Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 2001, pp. 45-80. Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 7-22. Further Reading: Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999, pp. 13-75. Richard K. Betts (eds.), Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, New York: Macmillan, 1994. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, Melbourne: Sun Books, 1977. Michael E. Brown, & Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, WW Norton: New York, 1997. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books, 1992. Nils Petter Gleditsch, The Liberal moment Fifteen Years On, International Studies Quarterly, 52, 2008, pp. 691-712. Fred Charles Ikl, Every War Must End, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
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Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Jack S. Levy, The causes of war and the conditions of peace, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 1998, pp. 139-65. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends and Means, New York: Basic Books, 1989. H. Suganami, On the Causes of War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, transl. by Richard Crawley: Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Thucydides, New York, Touchstone, 1996 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

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SEMINAR TWO

How Is Force Useful?

The Nature of Strategy
Outline While the term strategy has all sorts of uses (from business strategy to educational strategy to personal strategies), within the academic discipline of strategic studies it has tended to refer to the study of the use of armed force for political purposes. This follows the logic that strategy involves a relationship between ends policy and the means and ways military forces, but also sanctions or economic enticements, among others - used to obtain these ends. This would suggest that strategy is simply a matter of clarifying ones policy interests and making sure that available resources are organised so as to meet them. While this can be an appealing way of thinking, strategy does not consist of single actors seeking their own objectives in some sort of vacuum. A truly strategic situation involves the interaction between two or more self-interested actors. When the ends and means of these interacting parties are mutually exclusive, they can find themselves locked in competition and conflict. The most extreme and violent form of this interaction is war itself. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that when we read Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher of war who is historys most famous strategic thinker, we see an emphasis on war as a political act. Strategy is thus about imposing ones will on the enemy, while trying to prevent the other from doing the same. It follows that strategy is easy in theory and most difficult in practice. In this session, we will dissect the concept of strategy and look at its various dimensions and levels, the difficulty of implementing it, and at a number of general approaches to strategy that have been proposed throughout history. In all respects, strategyand hence this sessionis pivotal for this course, and, indeed, the whole SDSC graduate program. Key Questions: What is the difference between strategy, policy, and war? What do you think is required of a good strategist? What distinguishes strategy from tactics? Can the concept of strategy be separated from competition and conflict? Essential Reading: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (ed & tr Michael Howard and Peter Paret), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, pp. 83-101 (Bk 1, Ch 1); 731-37 (Bk 8, Ch 8). Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 16-47. Hew Strachan, The Lost Meaning of Strategy, Survival, 47:3, Autumn 2005, pp. 33-54. Further Reading: Robert Ayson, Concepts for Strategy and Security in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006, pp. 10-24. Bartholomees, J. Boone, The Issue of Attrition, Parameters no 401 (Spring 2010), pp. 5-19. John Baylis, James Wirtz et al, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, London: Faber & Faber, 1965. Richard K. Betts, Is Strategy an Ilusion?, International Security 25:2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5-50. Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, Basingstoke: Macmillian, 1987. Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: The Free Press, 2002). Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Policy in the Information Age, London: Routledge, 2005. Lawrence Freedman, ed., War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Lawrence Freedman, Strategic studies and the problem of power, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 22-33. Stephan Frhling, Offense and Defense in Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 28:5, 2009. pp. 463-477.
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John Garnett, Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett & Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts, 2d ed, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 329. Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed., Harmondsworth: Meridian, 1991. P.H. Liotta and Richmond M. Lloyd. From Here to There: The Strategy and Force Planning Framework, Naval War College Review, 58:2, Spring 2005, pp. 121-137. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, London: Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987. William C. Martel, Formulating Victory and Implications for Policy, Orbis, Fall 2008, pp. 613-626. Daniel Moran, Strategic Theory and the History of War, in John Baylis et al, (eds) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 17-44. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, Introduction: On Strategy, in Williamson Murray et al (eds.) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 123. Peter Paret (ed), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Hugh Smith, The Strategists, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra ACT, 2001. Craig Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999. Hew Strachan, Strategy and the Limitation of War, Survival, 50:1, February-March 2008, pp. 31-54. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (ed. Samuel B. Griffith), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Terry Terriff et al, Security Studies Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. Waldman, Thomas, Shadows of Uncertainty: Clausewitzs Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies 10:3, September 2010, pp. 336-368. Philip Windsor, Strategic Thinking: An Introduction and Farewell, (ed. Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

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SEMINAR THREE

Prisoners of History and Geography?

Geopolitics, Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy
Outline In this session, we will interpret many of the themes of the first two lectures by looking at a map. States do not exist in a vacuum, but have specific geographic circumstances and neighbors, and their specific situations determine many basic aspects of the strategic challenges that they can be faced with. Hence, both geography and historical experience both play an important role in forming what scholars call the strategic culture of a country. However, when strategists look at a world map, they also see other organizing principles which go beyond a particular countrys borders. For example, some geostrategic thinkers like Mackinder have argued that the world is divided and dominated by the great Eurasian world island, which is home to the large majority of the worlds population and industrial capability. Hence, the conflict between land- and maritime power that has characterized many historical eras now plays out at a global scale in modern times. Other phenomena of strategic relevance at this large scale include, for example, conflict lines where great civilizations meet, or the co-existence of modern states, post-modern integrated blocs like the European Union, and pre-modern areas of failing or not (yet) existing state structures. Dealing with the significant challenges that derive from a world order or disorder, and with trends that transcend individual adversarial relationships, encourages us to analyze the concept of grand strategy. Today, grand strategy is often seen as a concept for times of relative peace where ones assets are coordinated and organized to prevent war from occurring. In the protracted Cold War struggle the economic basis of national power and the health of the economy as a means of competition helped encourage an emphasis on nonmilitary factors in strategy. Increasingly, grand strategy has come to mean the coordination of national resources for overall national interests. After discussing the theoretical and conceptual bases of grand strategy and geostrategy, we are joined by Prof Paul Dibb to discuss their practical importance for national security. Key Questions: How do land powers differ from maritime powers? What are the geographic characteristics of the world as a strategic system? What may be practical consequences of strategic cultures? How does Grand Strategy differ from foreign policy? Essential Reading: Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony, International Security, vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46. Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, 1944, pp. 35-44. Robert Cooper, The Postmodern State and the World Order, London: Demos Foreign Policy Institute, 2nd edition, 2000, pp. 4-21. Further Reading: American Grand Strategy after Major War, special edition, Orbis (Fall 2009). Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Practice and Principles, Annapolis, MD: Naval War College Press, 1973. Christopher J. Fettweis, Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century, Parameters, 30:2, Summer 2000, pp. 58-71. John Lewis Gaddis, A Grand Strategy of Transformation, Foreign Policy, 133, November-December 2002, pp. 50-57. Colin Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, New York: Free Press, 1992. Colin Gray, Strategic Culture as Context, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, chapter 5.
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Robert E. Harkavy, Thinking about Basing, Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 12-42. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars, London: The Ashfield Press, 1972 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. G. John Ikenberry, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror, Survival, 43:4, Winter 2001-02, pp. 19-34. Robert Kagan, Christoph Bertram, Franois Heisbourg, One year after: A grand strategy for the West? Survival, 44:4, Winter 2002-03, pp. 135-56. Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991. Christopher Layne, From preponderance to offshore balancing: Americas future grand strategy, International Security, 22:1, Summer 1997, pp. 86-124. Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 1919, reprinted: Washington DC: NDU Press. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History 1660-1783, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1890. Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London: Pinter, 1998). Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing visions for U.S. grand strategy, International Security, 21:3, Winter 1996-7, pp. 5-53. Richard Rosecrance and Authur A. Stein, ed., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993. Geoffrey Sloan, Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now, in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds), Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 15-38. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.

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SEMINAR FOUR Fighting Politicians and Statesmen Generals? Civil-Military Relations

Outline Civil-military relations between government, citizens and the armed forces are a core influence on the theory and practice of strategy. The essence of a state is that it holds the monopoly over violence, both internally and externally. To deal with external threats, the government creates armed forces that by their nature and size are generally able to exercise far greater physical violence and power than any other group in the state. Throughout history, this has raised the question for governments and populations alike of who guards the guardians? Even in countries where social conventions and traditions make the risk of outright coup very low, the relationship between politicians and the military is seldom without tension. If strategy is the link between military means and political purpose, it should be neither the exclusive domain of politicians nor military officers. But the commonly accepted notion of the primacy of politics in theory is often contrasted in practice with a widespread expectation that politicians should not second-guess or micro-manage their military commanders. Even in peacetime, the boundaries between, and relative importance of, political judgment and professional advice remain ever contested as practical and far-reaching decisions are made that affect the creation, maintenance and use of the defence force. In this session, we are joined by Adm Chris Barrie, former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, and Professors Paul Dibb and Hugh White, to discuss the relationship between politicians, civilians and the military in theory and practice.

Key Questions: How is the primacy of politics maintained in the practice of military operations? When should politicians involve themselves in military operations, and when not? What is the best way of doing so? In Australia today, there is little risk of a military coup. What factors make that so, and how can they be maintained? Should civilians advise the government on military affairs? Essential Reading: Peter D. Feaver, The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control, Armed Forces and Society 23:2 (Winter 1996), pp. 149-178. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 1-14. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations, Naval War College Review, 59:4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 68-80. Further Reading: Eric Andrews, The Department of Defence (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001). E.M. Andrews, Civil-Military Relations in the Twentieth Century, in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds.), Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 366-390. Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1977). Raymond Callahan, Churchill and his Generals (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Eliot A. Cohen, Civil-Military Relations, Orbis 41 (Spring 1997): pp. 177-86. Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999). Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Crows Nest, NSW: Allan & Unwin, 2006). Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

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Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). David Michael Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds.), Civil-military relations in today's China : swimming in a new sea (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957). Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971). H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997). Charles C. Moskos, From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization, Armed Forces and Society 4:1 (November 1977), pp. 41-50. Charles C. Moskos, Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update, Armed Forces and Society 12:3 (Spring 1986), pp. 377-382. Charles C. Moskos et al (eds.), The postmodern military : armed forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds), American Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Suzanne C. Nielsen, Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness, Public Administration and Management 10:2 (2005), pp. 61-84. Amos Perlmutter, The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army, Comparative Politics 1:3 (April 1969), pp. 382-404. Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, American Political Science Review 76:4 (December 1982), 778-789. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (eds), Inside Defense (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). Andrew Scobell, Chinas Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua, Armed Forces and Society 31:2 (Winter 2005), pp. 227-244. Hew Strachan, Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival 52:5 (October-November 2010), pp. 157-182. Sir Arthur Tange (ed. Peter Edwards), Defence Policy-Making: A Close-Up View, 1950-1980, Canberra Paper, no. 169 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2008). Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations 1689-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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SEMINAR FIVE

Should We Do Harm At All?

International Law and the Ethics of War
Outline Killing or threatening to kill people for political ends, however justified these ends might be, raises some immediate moral questions. Throughout history, peoples have addressed these questions in a variety of ways, including arguments which seek to justify political violence for supposedly higher ends, and often with disastrous consequences. For example, war has been understood as a divine command (such as in the case of the Mayan harvests of people for human sacrifice, or certain interpretations of Islamic Jihad), as a socialdarwinist law of nature (such as in National Socialism), or by making groups of humans, rather than individuals, the frame of reference (such as in the revolutionary class struggle in Communism). All of these perspectives justify, in the eyes of their proponents, doing harm in the pursuit of a higher aim. In the Western judaeo-christian tradition, the dominant paradigm for addressing the ethical problems of warfare is Just War Theory. Developed by medieval theological scholars, it enumerates a number of principles and demands for war to be just, such as a just cause, a rightful authority, and proportionality in the use of violence. These principles were taken up by early international legal scholars, and there has been an intensification of the development of international law applying to the use of force especially in the past century. These legal arguments are divided into two main areas when it is legally permissible to go to war (jus ad bellum) and what it is permissible to do within war (jus in bello). Today, the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions are the most important legal documents relating to war. However, their applicability in specific situations remains contested and subject to ethical, legal and political qualificationswhich is not helped by the fact that the UN Security Council, which has an important role in legal as well as, arguably, ethical terms, has limited powers of independent action because of the contests between its state members. Most decisions to use force in the international community continue to generate important ethical dilemmas. This is also a trend which seems set to intensify, not least within liberal democracies such as Australia. Indeed it is possible to detect an ethical component to any strategic decision, and it is arguable that all of the hard issues in public policy are increasingly becoming questions of ethics. To discuss these developments, we will first review the just war concept and its relationship with international law, and then discuss how these concepts were applied during the discussion about the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Key Questions: Can the use of force ever be justified on ethical grounds? Is there really such a thing as a just war? Can it be more hazardous to have force justified through moral argument than through naked selfinterest? Can an argument be made that students of strategy should avoid ethical questions to retain analytical rigour? Can international law be applied without reference to the underlying moral arguments? Essential Reading: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980, pp. 3-20. Eugene V. Rostow, Competent Authority Revisited, in Elliott Abrams (ed), Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and Just War Theory, Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998, pp. 39-63. David B, Rivkin, Jr & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, The National Interest, 73, Fall 2003, pp. 57-69. Frederic L. Borch, Targeting after Kosovo, Naval War College Review, 56: 2, Spring 2003, pp. 64-81. Further Reading: UN Charter at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
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Geneva Conventions at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView Louis Ren Beres, On Assassination, Preemption, and Counterterrorism: The View from International Law, International Journal of Intelligence, 21:4, 2008, pp. 694-725. Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Hedley Bull, Strategic Studies and Its Critics, World Politics, 20:4, July 1968, pp. 593-605. Anthony Burke, Critical approaches to security and strategy, in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006, pp. 152-169. Antonio Cassese, International Law, New York: Oxford University Press,2001. Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994. A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1997. Christian Enemark and Christopher Michaelsen, Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 3 (2005), pp. 545-563. Gareth Evans, When is it Right to Fight? Survival, Vol. 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 59-82. Tom Frame, Living by the Sword? The Ethics of Armed Intervention, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004. Robert Goodin, Whats Wrong With Terrorism? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, London: Oxford University Press, 2004. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Collateral damage: Humanitarian assistance as a cause of conflict, International Security, 28:1, Summer 2003, pp. 79-109. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Self-Defense in International Law, New York: St. Martins Press, 1996. Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the Limitations of Warfare, Brookefield, VT: Ashgate, 1998. Doug McCready, Ending the War Right: Just Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 8, no. 1 (2009), pp. 66-78. Justin Morris and Hilaire McCoubrey, Law, politics, and the use of force, in John Baylis et al (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 45-65. Richard J Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Mary-Ellen OConnell, The UN, NATO and International Law after Kosovo, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1 (2000), pp. 57-89. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Eugene V. Rostow, War, Law, and the United Nations, Orbis, Vol. 40, No.1 (Winter 1996), pp. 145158. Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

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SEMINAR SIX

How To Make Sense Of It All?

Operations on Land, at Sea, and in the Air
Outline Once political goals are formulated, they need to be translated into military objectives. How to approach this difficult step, and how military forces should be developed to be suited to the task, is a question for operational doctrine. In this session, we will discuss the development and current state of operational doctrine for warfare in the three main dimensions, on land, at sea, and in the air. With the appearance of mechanization and massed indirect fires (especially artillery), operations on land have undergone quite fundamental conceptual changes since 1914. By 1918, warfare had changed to something quite different from 1914, but it took the Second World War to demonstrate how the new lessons could be applied. During that conflict, Germanys Blitzkrieg operations provided early and impressive successes, but ultimately proved inferior to the more theoretically-based Soviet Deep Operations Theory. Ultimately, the same ideas underlying that theory were taken up in the post-Vietnam re-discovery of operational art by the United States Army, and became the basis for the AirLand Battle concept that still underlies combined arms operations today. At sea, Alfred Thayer Mahan with his concept of the decisive battle proved the most influential thinker in the area of naval doctrine. His near-contemporary Julian Corbett had much less practical influence at the time, but his more comprehensive view of seapower and of the command of the sea is arguably much more relevant today. In this session, we will discuss both writers ideas, and analyze how their ideas hold up in the twenty first century. Finally, a convenient early focus on doctrine for the air war is the work of Gulio Douhet, who argued in the interwar period that the use of airpower, and specifically bombing from the air, could cause such destruction as to break the will of an enemy population. From it developed the idea of strategic bombing, which underwent a number of transformations throughout the 20th century but remained the core idea most closely associated with air power. However, pursuit and attack, or air superiority and support of the land forces, remain important parts of air power doctrine. After discussing main concepts in the operational art, we will then be joined by Dr Garth Pratten of SDSC, who will discuss historical examples of operational art in practice. Key Questions: How can we translate political goals into military objectives? What drives changes in the operational art? What are the particularities of the land, sea and air domains from an operational point of view? What is the relationship between doctrine and strategy? Essential Reading: John English, The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, in B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessey (eds), The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996, pp. 7-27. Robert C. Rubel, Talking about Sea Control, Naval War College Review, vol. 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 38-47. Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target, New York: Encounter Books, 2006, pp. 103-143. Further Reading: Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes (New York: Free Press, 1990). Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1911, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm> Giulio Douhet, The new form of war, in The Command of the Air, Translated by Dino Ferrari, Coward-McGann: New York (1942), Reprinted by The Office of Air Force History, 1998, [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/command_of_the_air.pdf] Michael Evans, The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power, Study Paper No. 305, Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2004.

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Michael Evans, Contemporary military operations, in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006, pp. 39-54. Richard P. Hallion (ed.), Air Power Confronts an Unstable World, Brasseys, London, 1997. D. M. Horner, The Continental School of Strategic Thought, Defence Force Journal, 82, May/June 1990, pp. 37-46. Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001). Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009). R.A Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, Brasseys, London, 1994. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, London: Frank Cass, 1997. Hew Strachan, Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival 52:5 (October-November 2010), pp. 157-182. Alan Stephens (ed.), The War in the Air 1914-1994, Air University Press, Alabama, January 2001. Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17: 1, March 1994, pp. 176-199. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, 2004. John A. Warden III, The Enemy as a System, Airpower Journal, 9:1, Spring 1995. Harry Richard Yarger, Land Power: Looking Toward the Future Through Green Lens, Strategic Review, 27:2, Winter 1999, pp.22-30.

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SEMINAR SEVEN

Winning War by Drinking Tea?

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Outline Warfare is not the exclusive preserve of nation statesmany civil wars are fought between ethnic groups with a state, for example, which can control territory and are sometimes states in all but name. However, a particular kind of warfare characterizes conflicts that are fought not between states or proto-states, but for the control of power within a state between insurgents and the government. On the one hand, an insurgency plays out as much in the social fabric of the population as it does on the battlefield. On the other hand, insurgent and counterinsurgent forces also use military force directly to weaken the other side, but in campaigns that are often distinctly different in their operational approaches from those of conventional wars, and in reality there are often many more than two main players whose policies and attitudes will determine the ultimate outcome of the war. Even more than traditional strategy, insurgency and counterinsurgency is a field that draws heavily on past practical experience. Several decades after the end of the Vietnam War, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have now seen a renewed theoretical and practical interest in this topic in the Western world. In this session, Dr Garth Pratten will join us to introduce the particular challenges that insurgency and counterinsurgency forces face. Key Questions: How do insurgencies and counterinsurgencies relate to strategy? What are the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency approach? What are the challenges of mounting a successful counterinsurgency campaign? Why have Western nations found it so difficult to deal with insurgencies in other countries? Essential Reading: James D. Kiras, Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, in Strategy in the Contemporary World (eds. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen,and Colin S. Gray), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 208232. Robert R. Tomes, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, Parameters (Spring 2004), pp. 16-28. Frank G. Hoffman, Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?, Parameters (Summer 2007), pp. 71-87. Gian P. Gentile, A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army Parameters (Autumn 2009, pp. 5-17. Lincoln B. Krause, Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes, Parameters (Autumn 2009), pp. 49-64 Further Reading: Ivan Arregun-Toft, How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict, International Security, 26:1, Summer 2001, pp. 93-128. Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001). David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964. Stephen T. Hosmer and S.O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, Santa Monica: RAND, 1962, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R412-1/ Michael Howard, The Long War, Survival, 48:4, Winter 2006-07, pp. 7-14. David Kilcullen, Counter-insurgency Redux, Survival, 48:4, Winter 2006-07, pp. 111-130. David Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:4, August 2005, pp. 597-617. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber & Faber, 1977. Anatol Lieven, Nasty Little Wars, The National Interest, 62, Winter 2000-1, pp. 65-76. Andrew Mack, Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflicts, World Politics, 27:2, January 1975, pp. 175-200. Mark ONeill, Confronting the Hydra (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009). Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, New York: Praeger, 1961.
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Daniel Marston and Carter Malakasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Oxford: Osprey, 2008. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 Adam Roberts, The War on Terror in Historical Perspective, Survival, 47:2, Summer 2005, pp. 101130. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, Revolutionary War, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (ed. Peter Paret), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 815-62. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, London: Chattus and Windus, 1966.

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SEMINAR EIGHT

Can Engineers Revolutionize War?

Technological Change and Strategy
Outline While there is a danger for members of the strategic studies community to become mesmerized by the latest weapon systems, it is also important not to underestimate the importance of changing technology for the conduct of military operations and for strategic thinking generally. After all if an essential part of strategy is an assessment of the relationship between means and ends, and there is significant change in the military means available, this should be of clear interest to the strategist. Measuring the type and extent of change which comes from new military technologies may seem a straightforward business. For example the invention of the crossbow, gunpowder, and telegraph had significant implications for warfare during the times at which these became available. It can be argued that throughout history there have been periods of intense military technological change that were exploited by many armed forces and constituted veritable revolutions in the ways wars were conducted. But this does not mean that technological change was the only factor, nor does it tell us much about how to bring about such a change. A case in point here may be claims over recent decades that a revolution in military affairs is occurring as information technology is exploited for use on, above, and beyond the battlefield. In recent years, the term transformation has also become fashionable, as have related concepts such as network centric warfare or information operations. This session will explore change in military technology and the concept and history of revolutions in military affairs in more detail, and then discuss current concepts in the light of strategic theory and historical experience. Key Questions: What justifies calling something a revolution in military or strategic affairs? Has the information age transformed the way force is used, the reasons for its use, and the relationship between means and ends? How much do civilian leaders need to know about military technological change as they make decisions about the selection of military capabilities and the use of force? Essential Reading: Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 52-77. Williamson Murray, Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, 16, Summer 1997, pp. 69-76. Eliot Cohen, Change and Transformation in Military Affairs, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:3 (2010), pp. 395-407. Gregor Ferguson, Risks and rewards: Defence R&D in Australia, Policy Analysis, no. 71 (Canberra: ASPI 2010). Further Reading: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds), In Athenas Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997. Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, New York: The Free Press, 1989. Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998. Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, London: Frank Cass, 2002. Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999.

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Frederick W Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy, New York: Encounter Books, 2006. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Knopf, 1993. David Kirkpatrick, Revolutions in Military Technology, and their consequences, RUSI Journal, 146:6, August 2001, pp. 67-73. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, ed., The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Andrew Latham, Re-imagining warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs, in Craig Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp. 210-235. Michael OHanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Thomas L. McNaugher, The Real Meaning of Military Transformation: Rethinking the Revolution: Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy, Foreign Affairs 86:1 (Jan/Feb 2007), pp. 140-147. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (ed.), Military innovation in the interwar period, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Reflections on Future War, Naval War College Review, 61;3, Summer 2008, pp. 61-76. William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000. Robert L. Paarlberg, Knowledge as power: Science, military dominance, and U.S. security, International Security, 29:1, Summer 2004, pp. 122-51. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, Innovation and the Modern Military, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991 Peter W. W. Wijninga and Richard Szafranski, Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward Axiological Air Operations, Aerospace Power Journal, 14:4, Winter 2000, pp.45-59.

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SEMINAR NINE

Absolute Weapons?
Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Munitions
Outline Most weapons employed in war today use chemical explosives or electromagnetic radiation to achieve a physical effect on the battlefield. However, weapons of mass destruction are different as they rely on nuclear, biological and chemical (non-explosive) effects. In this lecture, we will discuss the similarities and differences between these three types, and then look at the impact of nuclear weaponsthe only one of the three categories that are truly suitable for mass destructionon war. Despite the ending of the Cold War a decade and a half ago, we still live in the nuclear age. The arrival of nuclear weapons in the closing phases of the Second World War, and their incorporation into the Cold War struggle, left an indelible impact on strategic thinking. The modern understanding of deterrence and associated ideas such as mutually assured destruction, strategic rationality and stability came in the 1950s and 1960s an era which has often been called the golden age of nuclear strategy. It was often assumed, at least among western thinking, that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union desired a third world war. Moreover, because the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons was so great, making them effectively unusable on the battlefield, a strong emphasis on the coercive elements of strategy (emphasizing threats of using force rather than the use of force itself) came to the fore. This also encouraged an interest in ensuring that any fighting be conducted below the nuclear threshold, a modern reinterpretation of Clausewitzs ideas of limited war for limited ends. However, the end of the Cold War, and the attacks of 9/11 in particular, have created doubts whether deterrence can really be relied upon to enclose nuclear weapons in a cocoon of nonuse forever, and whether now is the time to seek global abolition of nuclear weapons. Key Questions: To what extent did the arrival of nuclear weapons revolutionise strategic thinking? What possible ends can nuclear weapons serve given their immense destructiveness? Is it justified to conceptually lump nuclear weapons together with chemical and biological ones? Can nuclear weapons ever be abolished? Essential Reading: Christian Enemark, Weapons of mass destruction?, in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006, pp. 88-102. Lawrence Freedman, The first two generations of nuclear strategists, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (ed. Peter Paret), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 735-778. International Commission for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, Eliminating Nuclear Threats (Canberra: ICNND, 2009, pp. xvii-xxx. Further Reading: Robert Ayson, Selective non-proliferation or universal regimes, Australian Journal of International Affairs 59:4, December 2005, pp. 431-438. Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? Adelphi Paper 169, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. John Baylis and Robert ONeill (eds.), Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Avis Bohlen, The rise and fall of arms control, Survival, 45:3, Autumn 2003, pp. 7-34. Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, Proliferation rings: New challengers to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, International Security, 29:2, Fall 2004, pp. 5-49. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, New York: Copernicus Books, 2002.

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Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2d ed., London: St Martins/IISS, 1989. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandoras Box, Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War, New York: Basic Books, 1992. Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-1991, in Williamson Murray et al (eds)The Making of Strategy: Rules, States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 579-613. Marianne Hansen, The future of the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, September 2005, pp. 301-316. Pierre Hassner, Violence and Peace From the Atomic Bomb to Ethnic Cleansing, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1997. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. Keith B. Payne, The fallacies of Cold War deterrence and a new direction, Comparative Strategy, 22:5, December 2003, pp. 411-28. T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyos biological weapons program: Why did it fail? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24, July-August 2001, pp. 289-301. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. Michael Wesley, Its Time to Scrap the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, September 2005, pp. 283-299.

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SEMINAR TEN

So What Do We Buy Next?

Defence Planning
Outline Strategy is about the threat or use of violence for political ends, and operates in war and peace. However, wars today for most countries in the world are, happily, the exception rather than the rule, and especially so total wars that command the defence establishments or even the nations full attention and resources. Therefore, many decisions of strategic importance are more about the possibility of having to use or threaten the use of force at some time in the future, rather than a specific conflict and this is especially the case of defence planning, decisions about the allocation of resources between different military capabilities. Not knowing for certain what the military will be asked to do, and when, adds a whole additional layer to the uncertainties that are inherent in doing strategy in practice, because judgments are required about what the armed forces should be prepared to do something that may or may not be the same as what they are most likely to do. Moreover, the timescales over which such judgments have to be made are often measured in decades, and only a small part of any force structure can be adapted at any time. Nevertheless, acquisition decisions are often the most expensive single decisions taken by governments during their tenure, inviting many other pressures and influences on the decision other than purely military or strategic considerations. After discussing defence planning concepts and approaches for different situations, Hugh White will join us to share his experiences of doing defence planning in practice. Key Questions: To what extent is defence planning a technical, analytical task, and to what extent an political, value based one? Does defence planning follow the same logic at all times, or are there different logics for different situations? Is the extent to which military forces are equipped for the tasks they perform always a suitable measure of success of defence planning? What factors other than strategic considerations influence defence planning? Essential Reading: Colin S. Gray, Weapons dont make War (Lexington: University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 65-89. Fitzsimmons, Michael. The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07), pp. 131-146. Hugh White, The new defence white paper: why we need it and what it needs to do (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2008). Further Reading: Barlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes. The Art of Strategy and Force Planning. in Strategy and Force Planning, ed. The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), pp. 18-33. Bartholomees, J. Boone, ed. US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2004. Brake, Jeffrey D. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues. Congressional Research Service Report RL20771. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2001. Collins, John M. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Collins, John M. US Defense Planning: A Critique. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. Davis, Paul K. Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation. Santa Monica: RAND, 2002. Davis, Paul K., ed. New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994. Davis, Paul K.. Uncertainty-sensitive planning. In New Challenges & New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking, eds. Stuart E. Johnson, Martin C. Libicki and Gregory F. Treverton (Santa Monica:

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RAND, 2003), pp. 131-156. Davis, Paul K., David Gompert, and Richard Kugler. Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996. Dewar, James A. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Dewar, James A., Carl H. Builder, William M. Hix, and Morlie H. Levin. Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times. Santa Monica: RAND, 1993. Dibb, Paul. Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996. Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith. How Much is Enough? New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Flournoy, Michle A., and Kenneth F. McKenzie. Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria and Methodology. In QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for Americas Security, ed. Michle A. Flournoy (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2001), pp. 167-191. Gray, Colin S., Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners, Survival 52:3 (June-July 2010), pp. 159-178. Haffa, Robert P. Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. Hillestad, Richard J., and Paul K. Davis. Resource Allocation for the New Defense Strategy: The DynaRank Decision-Support System. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998. Hitch, Charles J. Decision-Making for Defense. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. Johnson, Stuart E., Martin C. Libicki and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. New Challenges & New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003. Kent, Glenn A. A Framework for Defense Planning. Santa Monica: RAND, 1989. Knorr, Klaus, and Oskar Morgenstern. Political Conjecture in Military Planning. Policy Memorandum, no 35. Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1968. McGinn, John G., Gregory F. Treverton, Jeffrey A. Isaacson, David C. Gompert, and M. Elaine Bunn. A Framework for Strategy Development. Santa Monica: RAND, 2002. The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, ed. Strategy and Force Planning. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000.

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