(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 601 U. S.

____ (2024) 1

Per Curiam

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–719
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.

NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

PER CURIAM.
A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits for-
mer President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential
nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election,
from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme
Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado
secretary of state to exclude the former President from the
Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any
write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him.
Former President Trump challenges that decision on sev-
eral grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress,
rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3
against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse.
I
Last September, about six months before the March 5,
2024, Colorado primary election, four Republican and two
unaffiliated Colorado voters filed a petition against former
President Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena
Griswold in Colorado state court. These voters—whom we
refer to as the respondents—contend that after former
2 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

President Trump’s defeat in the 2020 Presidential election,

he disrupted the peaceful transfer of power by intentionally
organizing and inciting the crowd that breached the Capitol
as Congress met to certify the election results on January
6, 2021. One consequence of those actions, the respondents
maintain, is that former President Trump is constitution-
ally ineligible to serve as President again.
Their theory turns on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Section 3 provides:
“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or
hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State leg-
islature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of
each House, remove such disability.”
According to the respondents, Section 3 applies to the for-
mer President because after taking the Presidential oath in
2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol
on January 6 in order to retain power. They claim that he
is therefore not a qualified candidate, and that as a result,
the Colorado secretary of state may not place him on the
primary ballot. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§1–1–113(1), 1–4–
1101(1), 1–4–1201, 1–4–1203(2)(a), 1–4–1204 (2023).
After a five-day trial, the state District Court found that
former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection”
within the meaning of Section 3, but nonetheless denied the
respondents’ petition. The court held that Section 3 did not
apply because the Presidency, which Section 3 does not
mention by name, is not an “office . . . under the United
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Per Curiam

States” and the President is not an “officer of the United

States” within the meaning of that provision. See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a.
In December, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in
part and affirmed in part by a 4 to 3 vote. Reversing the
District Court’s operative holding, the majority concluded
that for purposes of Section 3, the Presidency is an office
under the United States and the President is an officer of
the United States. The court otherwise affirmed, holding
(1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respond-
ents’ challenge based on Section 3; (2) that Congress need
not pass implementing legislation for disqualifications un-
der Section 3 to attach; (3) that the political question doc-
trine did not preclude judicial review of former President
Trump’s eligibility; (4) that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a con-
gressional Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the
District Court did not err in concluding that those events
constituted an “insurrection” and that former President
Trump “engaged in” that insurrection; and (6) that former
President Trump’s speech to the crowd that breached the
Capitol on January 6 was not protected by the First Amend-
ment. See id., at 1a–114a.
The Colorado Supreme Court accordingly ordered Secre-
tary Griswold not to “list President Trump’s name on the
2024 presidential primary ballot” or “count any write-in
votes cast for him.” Id., at 114a. Chief Justice Boatright
and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each filed dissent-
ing opinions. Id., at 115a–124a, 125a–161a, 162a–183a.
Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme
Court, its ruling was automatically stayed pending this
Court’s review. See id., at 114a. We granted former Presi-
dent Trump’s petition for certiorari, which raised a single
question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering
President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential pri-
mary ballot?” See 601 U. S. ___ (2024). Concluding that it
4 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

did, we now reverse.

II
A
Proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the States
in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal
power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “funda-
mentally altered the balance of state and federal power
struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 345 (1880). Section 1 of the Amendment, for in-
stance, bars the States from “depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law” or
“deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws.” And Section 5 confers on Congress “power to enforce”
those prohibitions, along with the other provisions of the
Amendment, “by appropriate legislation.”
Section 3 of the Amendment likewise restricts state au-
tonomy, but through different means. It was designed to
help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Con-
federates from returning to power in the aftermath of the
Civil War. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2544 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens, warning that with-
out appropriate constitutional reforms “yelling secession-
ists and hissing copperheads” would take seats in the
House); id., at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard, lamenting
prospect of a “State Legislature . . . made up entirely of dis-
loyal elements” absent a disqualification provision). Sec-
tion 3 aimed to prevent such a resurgence by barring from
office “those who, having once taken an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States, afterward went into re-
bellion against the Government of the United States.”
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull).
Section 3 works by imposing on certain individuals a pre-
ventive and severe penalty—disqualification from holding
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Per Curiam

a wide array of offices—rather than by granting rights to

all. It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase con-
cluded and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized,
to “ ‘ascertain[ ] what particular individuals are embraced’ ”
by the provision. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a (quoting Grif-
fin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase,
Circuit Justice)). Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accom-
plish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, pro-
ceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of deci-
sions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id., at 26.
For its part, the Colorado Supreme Court also concluded
that there must be some kind of “determination” that Sec-
tion 3 applies to a particular person “before the disqualifi-
cation holds meaning.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.
The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how
those determinations should be made. The relevant provi-
sion is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course
to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “en-
force” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Or as Senator Howard
put it at the time the Amendment was framed, Section 5
“casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for
the future, that all the sections of the amendment are car-
ried out in good faith.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 2768.
Congress’s Section 5 power is critical when it comes to
Section 3. Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legisla-
tion less than a year after ratification, Sen. Trumbull noted
that “notwithstanding [Section 3] . . . hundreds of men
[were] holding office” in violation of its terms. Cong. Globe,
41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626. The Constitution, Trumbull
noted, “provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifica-
tion, necessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental
law embraced in the Constitution.” Ibid. The enforcement
mechanism Trumbull championed was later enacted as
part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power
6 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

conferred by §5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” General

Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S.
375, 385 (1982); see 16 Stat. 143–144.
B
This case raises the question whether the States, in addi-
tion to Congress, may also enforce Section 3. We conclude
that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting
to hold state office. But States have no power under the
Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal of-
fices, especially the Presidency.
“In our federal system, the National Government pos-
sesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain
the remainder.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 854
(2014). Among those retained powers is the power of a
State to “order the processes of its own governance.” Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 752 (1999). In particular, the
States enjoy sovereign “power to prescribe the qualifica-
tions of their own officers” and “the manner of their election
. . . free from external interference, except so far as plainly
provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Taylor
v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571 (1900). Although the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts state power, nothing in it
plainly withdraws from the States this traditional author-
ity. And after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
States used this authority to disqualify state officers in ac-
cordance with state statutes. See, e.g., Worthy v. Barrett,
63 N. C. 199, 200, 204 (1869) (elected county sheriff ); State
ex rel. Sandlin v. Watkins, 21 La. Ann. 631, 631–633 (1869)
(state judge).
Such power over governance, however, does not extend to
federal officeholders and candidates. Because federal offic-
ers “ ‘owe their existence and functions to the united voice
of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,’ ” powers over
their election and qualifications must be specifically “dele-
gated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U. S. Term
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

Per Curiam

Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (1995)

(quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States §627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)). But nothing
in the Constitution delegates to the States any power to en-
force Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.
As an initial matter, not even the respondents contend
that the Constitution authorizes States to somehow remove
sitting federal officeholders who may be violating Section 3.
Such a power would flout the principle that “the Constitu-
tion guarantees ‘the entire independence of the General
Government from any control by the respective States.’ ”
Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers
and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232
U. S. 516, 521 (1914)). Indeed, consistent with that princi-
ple, States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of
mandamus against federal officials or to grant habeas cor-
pus relief to persons in federal custody. See McClung v.
Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble’s Case, 13
Wall. 397, 405–410 (1872).
The respondents nonetheless maintain that States may
enforce Section 3 against candidates for federal office. But
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not
affirmatively delegate such a power to the States. The
terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Con-
gress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment
through legislation pursuant to Section 5.
This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the sub-
stantive provisions of the Amendment “embody significant
limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U. S. 445, 456 (1976). Under the Amendment, States can-
not abridge privileges or immunities, deprive persons of
life, liberty, or property without due process, deny equal
protection, or deny male inhabitants the right to vote (with-
out thereby suffering reduced representation in the House).
See Amdt. 14, §§1, 2. On the other hand, the Fourteenth
Amendment grants new power to Congress to enforce the
8 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

provisions of the Amendment against the States. It would

be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as
granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqual-
ify a candidate for federal office.
The only other plausible constitutional sources of such a
delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which
authorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and
Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, §4, cl. 1;
Art. II, §1, cl. 2.1 But there is little reason to think that
these Clauses implicitly authorize the States to enforce Sec-
tion 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. Grant-
ing the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth
Amendment’s rebalancing of federal and state power.
The text of Section 3 reinforces these conclusions. Its fi-
nal sentence empowers Congress to “remove” any Section 3
“disability” by a two-thirds vote of each house. The text im-
poses no limits on that power, and Congress may exercise it
any time, as the respondents concede. See Brief for Re-
spondents 50. In fact, historically, Congress sometimes ex-
ercised this amnesty power postelection to ensure that
some of the people’s chosen candidates could take office.2
But if States were free to enforce Section 3 by barring can-
didates from running in the first place, Congress would be

——————
1 The Elections Clause directs, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times,

Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-

tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art.
I, §4, cl. 1. The Electors Clause similarly provides that “[e]ach State
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors,” who in turn elect the President. Art. II, §1, cl. 2.
2 Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, for instance,

Congress enacted a private bill to remove the Section 3 disability of Nel-

son Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected to represent the State
in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427. Tift took his seat in Congress
immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499–
4500 (1868). Congress similarly acted postelection to remove the disa-
bilities of persons elected to state and local offices. See Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess., 29–30, 120–121 (1868); ch. 5, 15 Stat. 435–436.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Per Curiam

forced to exercise its disability removal power before voting

begins if it wished for its decision to have any effect on the
current election cycle. Perhaps a State may burden con-
gressional authority in such a way when it exercises its “ex-
clusive” sovereign power over its own state offices. Taylor,
178 U. S., at 571. But it is implausible to suppose that the
Constitution affirmatively delegated to the States the au-
thority to impose such a burden on congressional power
with respect to candidates for federal office. Cf. McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819) (“States have no
power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con-
trol, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress”).
Nor have the respondents identified any tradition of state
enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders or
candidates in the years following ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment.3 Such a lack of historical precedent is
generally a “ ‘telling indication’ ” of a “ ‘severe constitutional
problem’ ” with the asserted power. United States v. Texas,
599 U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477,
505 (2010)). And it is an especially telling sign here, be-
cause as noted, States did disqualify persons from holding
state offices following ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That pattern of disqualification with respect to state,
but not federal offices provides “persuasive evidence of a
general understanding” that the States lacked enforcement
power with respect to the latter. U. S. Term Limits, 514
——————
3 We are aware of just one example of state enforcement against a

would-be federal officer. In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to

commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional
election, because—in the Governor’s view—Section 3 made Christy inel-
igible to serve. But the Governor’s determination was not final; a com-
mittee of the House reviewed Christy’s qualifications itself and recom-
mended that he not be seated. The full House never acted on the matter,
and Christy was never seated. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House
of Representatives §459, pp. 470–472 (1907).
10 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

U. S., at 826.
Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Sec-
tion 3 with respect to would-be or existing federal office-
holders. Shortly after ratification of the Amendment, Con-
gress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870. That Act
authorized federal district attorneys to bring civil actions in
federal court to remove anyone holding nonlegislative of-
fice—federal or state—in violation of Section 3, and made
holding or attempting to hold office in violation of Section 3
a federal crime. §§14, 15, 16 Stat. 143–144 (repealed, 35
Stat. 1153–1154, 62 Stat. 992–993). In the years following
ratification, the House and Senate exercised their unique
powers under Article I to adjudicate challenges contending
that certain prospective or sitting Members could not take
or retain their seats due to Section 3. See Art. I, §5, cls. 1,
2; 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives
§§459–463, pp. 470–486 (1907). And the Confiscation Act
of 1862, which predated Section 3, effectively provided an
additional procedure for enforcing disqualification. That
law made engaging in insurrection or rebellion, among
other acts, a federal crime punishable by disqualification
from holding office under the United States. See §§2, 3, 12
Stat. 590. A successor to those provisions remains on the
books today. See 18 U. S. C. §2383.
Moreover, permitting state enforcement of Section 3
against federal officeholders and candidates would raise se-
rious questions about the scope of that power. Section 5
limits congressional legislation enforcing Section 3, because
Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at
520. To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tailor
its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the spe-
cific conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999). Section 3, unlike other
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes con-
duct of individuals. It bars persons from holding office after
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

Per Curiam

taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection

or rebellion—nothing more. Any congressional legislation
enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870
and §2383, reflect “congruence and proportionality” be-
tween preventing or remedying that conduct “and the
means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at
520. Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other
legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 123.
Any state enforcement of Section 3 against federal office-
holders and candidates, though, would not derive from Sec-
tion 5, which confers power only on “[t]he Congress.” As a
result, such state enforcement might be argued to sweep
more broadly than congressional enforcement could under
our precedents. But the notion that the Constitution grants
the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section 3
should be enforced with respect to federal offices is simply
implausible.
Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the
Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the con-
text of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions
implicate a uniquely important national interest.” Ander-
son v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983) (footnote
omitted). But state-by-state resolution of the question
whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President
from serving would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an-
swer consistent with the basic principle that “the President
. . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.” Id., at 795
(emphasis added).
Conflicting state outcomes concerning the same candi-
date could result not just from differing views of the merits,
but from variations in state law governing the proceedings
that are necessary to make Section 3 disqualification deter-
minations. Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge
to succeed based on a preponderance of the evidence, while
12 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

others might require a heightened showing. Certain evi-

dence (like the congressional Report on which the lower
courts relied here) might be admissible in some States but
inadmissible hearsay in others. Disqualification might be
possible only through criminal prosecution, as opposed to
expedited civil proceedings, in particular States. Indeed, in
some States—unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secre-
tary of state recently issued an order excluding former Pres-
ident Trump from the primary ballot)—procedures for ex-
cluding an ineligible candidate from the ballot may not
exist at all. The result could well be that a single candidate
would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others,
based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same fac-
tual record).
The “patchwork” that would likely result from state en-
forcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers
found so critical between the National Government and the
people of the United States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits,
514 U. S., at 822. But in a Presidential election “the impact
of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast”—
or, in this case, the votes not allowed to be cast—“for the
various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U. S.,
at 795. An evolving electoral map could dramatically
change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the
country, in different ways and at different times. The dis-
ruption would be all the more acute—and could nullify the
votes of millions and change the election result—if Section
3 enforcement were attempted after the Nation has voted.
Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such
chaos—arriving at any time or different times, up to and
perhaps beyond the Inauguration.
* * *
For the reasons given, responsibility for enforcing Section
3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with
Congress and not the States. The judgment of the Colorado
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13

Per Curiam

Supreme Court therefore cannot stand.

All nine Members of the Court agree with that result.
Our colleagues writing separately further agree with many
of the reasons this opinion provides for reaching it. See
post, Part I (joint opinion of SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and
JACKSON, JJ.); see also post, p. 1 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).
So far as we can tell, they object only to our taking into ac-
count the distinctive way Section 3 works and the fact that
Section 5 vests in Congress the power to enforce it. These
are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforce
this particular constitutional provision with respect to fed-
eral offices. But they are important ones, and it is the com-
bination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as
some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular ra-
tionale—that resolves this case. In our view, each of these
reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for
the judgment the Court unanimously reaches.
The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

BARRETT,of
Opinion J.,Bconcurring
ARRETT, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–719
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.

NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.
I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that
States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presiden-
tial candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this
case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was
brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court.
It does not require us to address the complicated question
whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through
which Section 3 can be enforced.
The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the re-
maining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my
judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with
stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue
in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particu-
larly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should
turn the national temperature down, not up. For present
purposes, our differences are far less important than our
unanimity: All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this
case. That is the message Americans should take home.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

SOTOMAYOR
SOTOMAYOR , J., concurring
, KAGAN in part
, and JACKSON , JJ.,and dissenting
concurring in in part
judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–719
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.

NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE

JACKSON, concurring in the judgment.
“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case,
then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022)
(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen-
tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our
Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is”
only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases
. . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis
added).
Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid-
ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the
future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo-
rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the
ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus
disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so
would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork,
at odds with our Nation’s federalism principles. That is
enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further.
Even though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that
this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
2 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR,, K
SOTOMAYOR KAGAN
AGAN,, and
JACKSON , JJ.,, JJ.,
JACKSON concurring in the
concurring in judgment
judgment

five Justices go on. They decide novel constitutional ques-

tions to insulate this Court and petitioner from future con-
troversy. Ante, at 13. Although only an individual State’s
action is at issue here, the majority opines on which federal
actors can enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The
majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection
can occur only when Congress enacts a particular kind of
legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In doing so, the majority shuts the door on other po-
tential means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an
opinion that decides momentous and difficult issues unnec-
essarily, and we therefore concur only in the judgment.
I
Our Constitution leaves some questions to the States
while committing others to the Federal Government. Fed-
eralism principles embedded in that constitutional struc-
ture decide this case. States cannot use their control over
the ballot to “undermine the National Government.” U. S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 810 (1995).
That danger is even greater “in the context of a Presidential
election.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795
(1983). State restrictions in that context “implicate a
uniquely important national interest” extending beyond a
State’s “own borders.” Ibid. No doubt, States have signifi-
cant “authority over presidential electors” and, in turn,
Presidential elections. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S.
578, 588 (2020). That power, however, is limited by “other
constitutional constraint[s],” including federalism princi-
ples. Id., at 589.
The majority rests on such principles when it explains
why Colorado cannot take Petitioner off the ballot. “[S]tate-
by-state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars a
particular candidate for President from serving,” the major-
ity explains, “would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an-
swer consistent with the basic principle that ‘the President
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

S OTOMAYOR,, K
SOTOMAYOR KAGAN
AGAN,, and
JACKSON , JJ.,, JJ.,
JACKSON concurring in the
concurring in judgment
judgment

. . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.’ ” Ante, at 11

(quoting Anderson, 460 U. S., at 795). That is especially so,
the majority adds, because different States can reach “[c]on-
flicting . . . outcomes concerning the same candidate . . . not
just from differing views of the merits, but from variations
in state law governing the proceedings” to enforce Section
3. Ante, at 11.
The contrary conclusion that a handful of officials in a
few States could decide the Nation’s next President would
be especially surprising with respect to Section 3. The Re-
construction Amendments “were specifically designed as an
expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sover-
eignty.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 179
(1980). Section 3 marked the first time the Constitution
placed substantive limits on a State’s authority to choose
its own officials. Given that context, it would defy logic for
Section 3 to give States new powers to determine who may
hold the Presidency. Cf. ante, at 8 (“It would be incongru-
ous to read this particular Amendment as granting the
States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candi-
date for federal office”).
That provides a secure and sufficient basis to resolve this
case. To allow Colorado to take a presidential candidate off
the ballot under Section 3 would imperil the Framers’ vi-
sion of “a Federal Government directly responsible to the
people.” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 821. The Court
should have started and ended its opinion with this conclu-
sion.
II
Yet the Court continues on to resolve questions not before
us. In a case involving no federal action whatsoever, the
Court opines on how federal enforcement of Section 3 must
proceed. Congress, the majority says, must enact legisla-
tion under Section 5 prescribing the procedures to “ ‘ “ascer-
tain[ ] what particular individuals” ’ ” should be disqualified.
4 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR,, K
SOTOMAYOR KAGAN
AGAN,, and
JACKSON , JJ.,, JJ.,
JACKSON concurring in the
concurring in judgment
judgment

Ante, at 5 (quoting Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26

(No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). These
musings are as inadequately supported as they are gratui-
tous.
To start, nothing in Section 3’s text supports the major-
ity’s view of how federal disqualification efforts must oper-
ate. Section 3 states simply that “[n]o person shall” hold
certain positions and offices if they are oathbreaking insur-
rectionists. Amdt. 14. Nothing in that unequivocal bar sug-
gests that implementing legislation enacted under Section
5 is “critical” (or, for that matter, what that word means in
this context). Ante, at 5. In fact, the text cuts the opposite
way. Section 3 provides that when an oathbreaking insur-
rectionist is disqualified, “Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability.” It is hard to
understand why the Constitution would require a congres-
sional supermajority to remove a disqualification if a simple
majority could nullify Section 3’s operation by repealing or
declining to pass implementing legislation. Even peti-
tioner’s lawyer acknowledged the “tension” in Section 3 that
the majority’s view creates. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31.
Similarly, nothing else in the rest of the Fourteenth
Amendment supports the majority’s view. Section 5 gives
Congress the “power to enforce [the Amendment] by appro-
priate legislation.” Remedial legislation of any kind, how-
ever, is not required. All the Reconstruction Amendments
(including the due process and equal protection guarantees
and prohibition of slavery) “are self-executing,” meaning
that they do not depend on legislation. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 524 (1997); see Civil Rights Cases, 109
U. S. 3, 20 (1883). Similarly, other constitutional rules of
disqualification, like the two-term limit on the Presidency,
do not require implementing legislation. See, e.g., Art. II,
§1, cl. 5 (Presidential Qualifications); Amdt. 22 (Presiden-
tial Term Limits). Nor does the majority suggest otherwise.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

S OTOMAYOR,, K
SOTOMAYOR KAGAN
AGAN,, and
JACKSON , JJ.,, JJ.,
JACKSON concurring in the
concurring in judgment
judgment

It simply creates a special rule for the insurrection disabil-

ity in Section 3.
The majority is left with next to no support for its require-
ment that a Section 3 disqualification can occur only pursu-
ant to legislation enacted for that purpose. It cites Griffin’s
Case, but that is a nonprecedential, lower court opinion by
a single Justice in his capacity as a circuit judge. See ante,
at 5 (quoting 11 F. Cas., at 26). Once again, even peti-
tioner’s lawyer distanced himself from fully embracing this
case as probative of Section 3’s meaning. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 35–36. The majority also cites Senator Trumbull’s
statements that Section 3 “ ‘provide[d] no means for enforc-
ing’ ” itself. Ante, at 5 (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st
Sess., 626 (1869)). The majority, however, neglects to men-
tion the Senator’s view that “[i]t is the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment that prevents a person from holding office,”
with the proposed legislation simply “affor[ding] a more ef-
ficient and speedy remedy” for effecting the disqualifica-
tion. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626–627.
Ultimately, under the guise of providing a more “com-
plete explanation for the judgment,” ante, at 13, the major-
ity resolves many unsettled questions about Section 3. It
forecloses judicial enforcement of that provision, such as
might occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrection-
ist and raises a defense on that score. The majority further
holds that any legislation to enforce this provision must
prescribe certain procedures “ ‘tailor[ed]’ ” to Section 3, ante,
at 10, ruling out enforcement under general federal stat-
utes requiring the government to comply with the law. By
resolving these and other questions, the majority attempts
to insulate all alleged insurrectionists from future chal-
lenges to their holding federal office.
* * *
“What it does today, the Court should have left undone.”
6 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR,, K
SOTOMAYOR KAGAN
AGAN,, and
JACKSON , JJ.,, JJ.,
JACKSON concurring in the
concurring in judgment
judgment

Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissent-

ing). The Court today needed to resolve only a single ques-
tion: whether an individual State may keep a Presidential
candidate found to have engaged in insurrection off its bal-
lot. The majority resolves much more than the case before
us. Although federal enforcement of Section 3 is in no way
at issue, the majority announces novel rules for how that
enforcement must operate. It reaches out to decide Section
3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to
disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In
a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons
that course.
Section 3 serves an important, though rarely needed, role
in our democracy. The American people have the power to
vote for and elect candidates for national office, and that is
a great and glorious thing. The men who drafted and rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment, however, had witnessed
an “insurrection [and] rebellion” to defend slavery. §3.
They wanted to ensure that those who had participated in
that insurrection, and in possible future insurrections,
could not return to prominent roles. Today, the majority
goes beyond the necessities of this case to limit how Section
3 can bar an oathbreaking insurrectionist from becoming
President. Although we agree that Colorado cannot enforce
Section 3, we protest the majority’s effort to use this case to
define the limits of federal enforcement of that provision.
Because we would decide only the issue before us, we concur
only in the judgment.